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25th ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 18, 19, 24, 25, 26; MARCH 3, 4, 5, 1970

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25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1970

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:40 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Gallagher. The subcommittee will please come to order.

At the outset, Ambassador Yost, Ambassador Wiggins, and Under Secretary Ball, we wish to apologize for the delay. The House is engaged in feverish activity and we had to go over to the floor and respond to a rollcall.

The subcommittee is meeting this afternoon to begin a series of hearings directed at the United Nations. We propose to review the organization's performance, operations and future goals. We also want to ascertain where the United Nations fits in the overall framework of U.S. foreign policy for the decade of the 1970's.

We believe that the time has come for this undertaking. Two and a half decades have passed since the birth of the U.N. Organization and of the other components of its international system.

During those 25 years, many of our hopes for the United Nations—and for the world community of nations—have been dashed to the ground. At the same time, however, many of man's long-held aspirations have begun to be fulfilled. In the process, the world in which we live has changed, at times dramatically.

It is therefore necessary to ask:

How has the United Nations survived the ordeal of change during its first quarter of a century?

What has the Organization, what have we, learned from that experience?

What role will the U.N. play in the coming decade? What can it accomplish to bring peace and justice and freedom to mankind?

And, finally, what does the United States expect of the United Nations—and what will we be willing to invest in that Organization in order to realize our expectations?

In approaching these questions, we are delighted, indeed, to have been assured of their full cooperation by a number of outstanding experts on the United Nations system and its varied activities.

We will begin with the Honorable Charles W. Yost, the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations. Following his testimony, the committee will hear from Ambassador Yost's two distinguished

predecessors—Ambassador and former Under Secretary of State George Ball, and Ambassador James R. Wiggins.

On behalf of the committee, we welcome you here this afternoon.

At this point we will insert in the record the biographical data on our three witnesses this afternoon.

(The biographical sketches follow:)

Charles W. Yost, Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations, was born in Watertown, New York, and received his A.B. from Princeton. Ambassador Yost entered the foreign service in 1930 and, among other posts, served as assistant to the chairman of the U.S. Delegation to San Francisco Conference (1945), U.S. Ambassador to Syria (1958) and to Morocco (1958–61). He has been adviser to U.S. Delegations to U.N. Assemblies in 1946, 1949, and from 1961 to 1966. He was appointed to his present post in 1969. In 1964, Ambassador Yost, was a recipient of the Rockefeller Public Service award. He is a fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and author of *The Age of Triumph and Frustration: Modern Dialogues*.

George W. Ball served as the United States Representatives to the United Nations from June 1968 through September 1968. He is a native of Iowa and graduated from Northwestern University. He was associated with the General Counsel's Office, Department of the Treasury from 1933 to 1935 and practiced law in Chicago from 1935 to 1942. He served as associate general counsel for Lend-Lease Administration (then Foreign Economic Administration) from 1942 to 1944 and was director of U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, London, from 1944 to 1945. In 1961, he was appointed under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Later the same year, he became Under Secretary of State and remained in that post until 1966. Ambassador Ball is presently a senior partner of the firm of Lehman Brothers International Ltd. in New York City.

James Russell Wiggins was appointed by President Johnson as United States Representative to the United Nations in October 1968. At the time of his appointment he was editor and executive vice president of *The Washington Post*. Mr. Wiggins was born in Luverne, Minnesota. He began his journalistic career as a reporter with the Luverne *Rock County Star* and held positions with the Luverne *Star*, the St. Paul *Dispatch-Pioneer Press*, and *The New York Times*. He became associated with *The Washington Post* as managing editor in 1947 and remained with the *Post* until his appointment to the United Nations in 1968. Mr. Wiggins is a past president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the author of *Freedom or Secrecy*, published in 1956.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES W. YOST, PERMANENT U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador YOST. I apologize for my voice, which has been leaving me progressively the last few days.

I want, first of all, to express my appreciation to you and other members of the subcommittee for setting us these hearings on the occasion of the United Nations' 25th anniversary. Your doing so carries forward the tradition of congressional concern with the United Nations, which began with the membership of Senators Connally and Vandenberg and Representatives Eaton and Bloom on the delegation to the San Francisco Conference, and was later marked by the appointment of two Senators, Warren Austin and Cabot Lodge, as U.S. permanent representatives to the United Nations.

I see that among your own members, moreover, you have several who have served on General Assembly delegations, including two, Dante Fascell and Irving Whalley. I had the great honor and pleasure of having with me on the delegation last fall. I want to take this opportunity to express my especial thanks to them for the most per-

ceptive and comprehensive report on the work of that Assembly which they submitted last week to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

They went beyond a mere account of proceedings, however, and analyzed very penetratingly the central dilemmas which not only the United Nations, but all its members, confront 25 years after San Francisco. In opening my own comments I cannot do better than to take off from two or three of their remarks.

At the head of their report they quote a recent statement of Secretary General U Thant in which he speculated that United Nations members might have only 10 years left to launch global partnership to curb arms race, improve the human environment, defuse the population explosion, and supply the required momentum for world development. If this global partnership were not formed within that time, Thant feared that those problems might become wholly unmanageable.

It is therefore deeply troubling to find your two colleagues reporting that "after nearly 25 years of existence, the organization established to 'save succeeding generations from the scourge of war' is not yet able to exercise any significant part of its cardinal mandate. It has developed neither the power nor the moral authority to cope with its members' proclivity toward violence and their quest of security in even bigger, more dangerous, and more expensive armaments.

Messrs. Whalley and Fascell go on to diagnose the cause of this failure by pointing out, as Dag Hammarskjold and others have before them, that "As of now, the United Nations is neither the conscience of mankind nor its spokesman. Rather, it serves as a mirror of the complex, disjointed, at times unpleasant, reality which exists outside it. The fault here lies not with the institution, but with those who made it what it is, the sovereign nations of the world, each governed by its own ambitions and fears, each jealous of the prerogatives of its independence. The United Nations is uniquely their creature. It is neither more nor less than what they have been willing to make of it."

That, gentlemen, expresses the problem in a nutshell. Certainly the United Nations is very far from having met the hopes of its Founding Fathers or of those who succeeded them. It has not done so quite simply because the soverign nations which compose it have not given it the authority or the resources required to do so.

At any time that they should decide collectively that it was in the national interest of each of them, particularly of the great powers, to carry out the letter and spirit of the charter, the United Nations could and would begin to serve as the principal instrument for controlling international violence and coping effectively with the other accelerating dangers of which U Thant spoke.

Many will tell you that this may be true in theory, but that it is utopian to expect the United Nations in our lifetime to play any such role. My answer would be that it is even more utopian to expect nations to achieve security by unilateral national means under modern circumstances. It may not be as long as we think before peoples and governments at last begin to realize that, in this more and more tightly knit and explosive modern world, the real interests of all are so bound together that those of one nation cannot be served without all being

served, that those of one nation cannot be imperiled without all being imperiled.

To apply this truism to ourselves, I continue to believe, as did those Americans who took part in drafting and ratifying the United Nations Charter, that its effective application would serve the interests of all peoples, but perhaps most of all those of the United States whose interests are so far flung.

Of course, even if peoples and governments do soon begin to reassess their national interests in this sense, reform of the international system and reinvigoration of the United Nations are not going to take place overnight. As in all such enterprises we shall have to begin fairly modestly—but we shall also have to set our sights high.

The 25th anniversary is an appropriate occasion to do both. At the end of the last Assembly our delegation addressed a joint letter to President Nixon in which we recommended "that the United States play a leading and constructive part in the reappraisal and reenforcement of the United Nations which, this Assembly has decided, should mark its 25th anniversary in 1970."

We noted that recommendations would soon be made to the President for both Executive and congressional action regarding the 25th anniversary and future U.S. policies in the United Nations; that many American organizations and citizens would also wish to participate in the observance; and we ended by expressing to the President the hope that he himself would give this enterprise the leadership it requires and deserves.

In reply, President Nixon wrote to me as follows:

> This letter is a welcome reaffirmation of the importance of the United Nations and the need for U.S. leadership in seeking ways to strengthen the organization. The 25th Anniversary of the founding of the world body provides us with an excellent opportunity to rededicate American support for the UN and to attempt to make it more effective. I can assure you of my personal efforts in these tasks.

I might add in the course of the state of the world message that the President has just released, this paragraph occurs:

> This year's 25th Anniversary of the United Nations is an occasion for more than a commemoration. It is time to acknowledge its realistic possibilities and to devise ways to expand them. It is a time to set goals for the coming years, particularly in such areas as international peace-keeping, economic and social programs symbolized by the second development decade and the new environmental challenges posed by man's technological advances.

This, I take it, Mr. Chairman, is also the purpose of the hearings this subcommittee is holding. I see that you have a very distinguished and expert group of witnesses who will deal with each of the principal fields of activity of the United Nations. I shall therefore limit myself at this point to designating briefly the main areas in which, in my judgment, the United Nations most needs to be strengthened.

As your colleagues, Messrs. Fascell and Whalley, noted, the primary purpose for which the United Nations was established was "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." If it cannot do that, it will fail, no matter what else it may achieve.

Now certainly it has during the past 25 years played by no means a negligible role in this respect. It provided the political and organizational structure for resisting aggression in Korea. It helped to bring three wars in the Middle East and two between Indian and Paki-

stan to a rapid close. It prevented the breakup of the Congo and thereby averted a threatened extension of the cold war into central Africa. It checked civil strife in Cyprus and war between Greece and Turkey, which could easily have followed. It has successfully mediated a number of other impending conflicts.

But certainly no one could claim that the scourge of war has been eliminated or even substantially abated, except insofar as the balance of terror holds it, so far, at arm's length. The great powers are still so uncertain of nuclear deterrence that they feel obligated constantly to reenforce it, or as some claim, to weaken it by adding new and immensely costly weapons systems of unpredictable utility and consequences.

The United Nations constantly deplores this escalation. Disarmament is one of its main purposes, but its only means is persuasion. Despite repeated pleas from the United States, the United Nations has been unable to grapple with the conflict in Vietnam. Primarily because the Nigerian government and the Organization of African Unity so preferred, it kept hands off the civil war in Nigeria. It is unable to make effective a series of more and more imperative resolutions about southern Africa, including the application of sanctions against Rhodesia and the withdrawal from South Africa of its mandate over south-West Africa.

Finally, despite the adoption by the Security Council more than 2 years ago of a balanced and reasonable peacemaking resolution about the Middle East, it is unable to apply it or to persuade the parties to compromise or to negotiate.

Why these failures? Simply because the member states have not, in fact, given the United Nations the authority, which was theoretically conveyed to it by the charter, to make and keep the peace, to take and enforce decisions. There is not adequate machinery for peaceful settlement but, more important, there is not adequate willingness by member states to submit disputes to machinery which exists.

For example, when the International Court of Justice completes action on the single case on which it is now engaged, it will have absolutely no business left on its docket.

On the peacekeeping side, the agreements to provide armed forces to the United Nations for enforcement action, envisaged under article 43, were never negotiated and there is, therefore, no effective enforcement. Nor have economic sanctions proved effective, in part, because they have not been unanimously observed.

This is probably the United Nations' central shortcoming and the one which members should most seriously try to correct over the coming decade. The ad hoc arrangements for voluntary peacekeeping which were built up through the years did yeoman service in a number of cases, but they depend entirely on the willingness of countries involved in conflicts to permit United Nations forces on their soil.

We saw in the Middle East 3 years ago what happened when this permission was withdrawn at a critical moment by a host country. Nevertheless, even these ad hoc peacekeeping arrangements are extremely valuable. We are making determined efforts to improve them.

So much for the maintenance of international peace and security which is the main responsibility of the United Nations. I shall mention

very briefly seven other areas of major concern to the United Nations, all of which will be dealt with more fully by subsequent witnesses.

The first is human rights. Here indeed the United Nations, though it can have no power to enforce human rights over domestic jurisdictions, can and does act as the conscience of mankind. The United States and others have proposed the designation of a United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights to hold a watching brief on performance in this area. A significant step the United States could take on its own would be to ratify the several United Nations Human Rights Conventions, such as that on genocide, which have been pending for many years.

A second critical area is economic development. Here it is notable and in my personal view shocking that the United States, which long ranked first among developed countries in assistance to the underdeveloped two-thirds of mankind, now ranks only seventh in terms of official assistance as percent of GNP, and even lower if other forms of assistance are taken into account.

We can hardly expect to play an effective leadership role in the political and social stabilization of the world if we continue more and more to ignore the most pressing needs, the most insistent demands, of two-thirds of our fellow U.N. members. It is my belief that we should reassume that leadership and should do so to a substantial degree, as Lester Pearson has recently recommended in his magnificent report, within the framework of the United Nations system and other multilateral agencies.

Third, the world community, like our own domestic community, is becoming rapidly and keenly aware both of the threats of technology to our environment and of the potential contribution of technology, properly managed and coordinated, to modernization and improvement of the quality of human life. There is a substantial prospect for far-reaching United Nations involvement in the utilization of outer space and the seabeds, in the detection and control of pollution, and in the further application of science to development and education in the developing countries.

Fourth, the United Nations, as it moves into maturity, must not lose touch with youth. Its awareness of that necessity is shown by its convening this summer in New York a World Youth Assembly, by its recommending to members that they include young people on their delegations to the anniversary session and by the inclusion in its agenda of items of primary concern to youth.

Fifth is the question of charter review and improved procedures. Personally I see no need to go through the arduous, unpromising process of amending the charter in the near future. It already contains the powers that are required, if the member governments will agree to their being used. On the other hand, there are a number of ways in which the procedures of the Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and other organs could be vastly improved. One of the most obvious is a reduction in the number of speeches, documents, and meetings. Another is more care and attention to the prescriptions of the charter in selecting members of these organs, particularly the Security Council.

Sixth is the question of membership, which has two aspects. It is not right that one of the world's leading states, Germany, and two im-

portant Far Eastern states, Korea and Vietnam, are represented only by observers, simply because they were, through the fortunes of war, split in two.

It also does not seem reasonable to many members that China, though ably represented by the Republic of China on Taiwan, should have no representation from the regime that governs the mainland. These are complex, delicate problems, but they will have to be solved.

At the other extreme, as the process of decolonization proceeds, is the influx into the United Nations of smaller and smaller states. This is, of course, only a reflection of the balkanization of many parts of the world into too many, too small national sovereignties, but it has an unfortunate effect on the United Nations because it tends to diminish the credibility of General Assembly resolutions.

Finally, I should like to say a word about budget and management. This is so important a subject, and one with which Members of the Congress as keepers of the purse are so rightly concerned, that I am submitting a supplementary statement for the record examining the subject in some detail. I hope you will hear a witness or two on this subject as well.

Let me make only two observations here.

First, it is of course necessary in these days of insistent domestic needs, contending priorities and rising costs that we exercise strict economy in our contributions to international organizations. I can assure you that not only the United States, but all the big powers, are working in the closest possible concert with the Secretary General and are using every available means of supervision and control to insure that funds are used to the best advantage and not used unnecessarily.

Yet I beg of you to keep this aspect of economy in reasonable perspective. In 1969 total contributions by the United States to the United Nations, the specialized agencies and the voluntary programs together amounted to just under $250 million.

Gentlemen, that was a little less than what it is costing the city of New York to maintain this year its fire department, less than half what it costs to maintain the New York City Police Department. I hardly need add that this total sum would not, moreover, cover the cost of the Vietnam war for a single week. It could hardly be claimed, therefore, that we are extravagant in our financing of an organization designed, however crudely, to maintain the peace of the world, to guide and assist economic development and to do all of the other things I have been describing.

As to management and coordination, here indeed there is ample room for improvement. The United Nations has proliferated an inordinate number of agencies just as most governments have. Careful attention is now being given to how they can be better managed and coordinated. Sir Robert Jackson's recent capacity study points the way to better use of the United Nations development program for this purpose. I can assure you, gentlemen, and through you the Congress as a whole, that the U.S. Government and its mission to the United Nations will exercise its utmost care and influence to bring about significant improvement in this area.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, sir, and we will welcome your additional supplemental views on questions of the budget. This is an area that the committee intends to look into.

(Supplementary statement of Ambassador Yost follows:)

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES W. YOST

1. I am, of course, aware of the concern expressed by the Congressional Appropriations Committees at the continued rise in the budget of the United Nations—as well as in the budgets of the specialized agencies. I realize that it is particularly difficult for the Congress to accept such an increase at a time when we in the United States are cutting back governmental expenditures in an effort to assure a balanced budget. I can assure you that we have made, and are continuing to make, every effort to avoid unnecessary and unjustifiable increases in the United Nations budget—and I believe that, on the whole, we have had a reasonable measure of success. This conclusion, of course, requires some further explanation.

2. First of all, when we look at the expenditure budget of the United Nations for calendar year 1970, an amount of $168,420,000, we find that this represents an increase of about 8.7 percent over the corresponding figure for 1969. (It is true that the percentage increase in the amount assessed against Member States is somewhat higher, but this results largely from the fact that, fortuitously, there was available a significant surplus from prior years to credit against the 1969 appropriation and there was a much smaller amount to credit against the 1970 appropriation.) When we examine the 8.7 percent increase in the expenditure budget for 1970, we find that more than 60 percent of that amount results from increases in wages and prices. This means that, of the total increase, only a little more than 3 percent is accounted for by staff increases, by increased costs of conferences to deal with such matters as the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, the Human Environment, the Seabeds, etc., and by increased activities of such bodies as UNCTAD, UNIDO, and UNHCR.

3. It would be possible to take the position that, for the immediate future, there should be no increase in United Nations activities so that the budget would be stabilized except for wage and price increases. However, there is no chance that the developing countries would accept this approach, and indeed I do not believe that such an approach would be in our own interest. I believe that it is important for the United States that the United Nations expand its activities in such areas as the Human Environment, the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Outer Space, the Seabeds, Peacekeeping, and of course Economic Development—and all these activities require the expenditure of money. I believe that the increases in the United Nations budget for such program activities in the last few years have been quite modest in relation to the objectives which the United Nations is seeking to attain.

4. It is sometimes said that it should be possible to stem the increases in the United Nations budget by an application of priorities so that, when new activities are approved, other less important activities are dispensed with. However, in a multilateral organization of 126 members this is more easily said than done. Different nations and different groups of nations have different priorities. We may well think it important to have a major conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy or on Outer Space, whereas the developing countries would consider it much more important to have a conference on Industrialization. Thus, we cannot insist successfully that only our priorities be respected.

5. I do not mean to imply in what I have said that there is not room for improvement in the United Nations budget submissions and appropriations. We have informed the Secretary General of our views in this matter and have urged him to take steps to reduce expenditures, primarily in the fields of personnel and conference and documentation costs. The same position was taken in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly by Congressman Dante Fascell, who represented the United States admirably in that body at its last session.

6. I believe that considerable progress is being made with respect to certain of the areas of the budget which I have mentioned. The Secretary General, at the request of the General Assembly, where the United States took a strong initiative, has now created a new Administrative Management Service, which is engaged in carrying out a careful survey of the utilization and deployment of all Secretariat staff. This Management Service is headed by an American, Robert Ryan, who was formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary for Organization and Management in the State Department and who is now seconded to the United Nations. I have high hopes that this manpower survey will assure that there is no unnecessary growth of United Nations personnel in the foreseeable

future. If this proves to be the case, this will assure a very strong element of stability in the United Nations budget since staff costs make up about 65 per cent of the total budget.

7. I might also mention that at the last session of the General Assembly there was adopted a quite good resolution concerning United Nations documentation, which should have the effect of limiting documentation in a number of areas and reducing the cost thereof.

8. I must admit that we have been less successful in the area of limiting conferences and intend to continue our efforts in this direction.

9. At the last session of the General Assembly we took another initiative designed to deal with concerns expressed by the General Accounting Office with respect to the budgets of United Nations agencies and programs. That office, which has produced reports on United States financial participation in a number of such agencies and programs, has indicated its belief that insufficient control was being exerted over the budgets of these agencies and programs and that insufficient information was available with respect to them. In the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly the United States Delegation proposed that the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (of which a USUN officer is a member) expand its program of work in order to devote a significantly greater amount of time to the examination of the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies. I believe that this same committee should also devote adequate time to the examination of the Administrative budgets of the voluntary programs such as UNDP and UNICEF. If the necessary arrangements can be made, then governments can expect that greater influence will be exerted and a more uniform approach will be taken with respect to the budgets of all these agencies and programs and that governments would have one focal point to which to look for essential information about these budgets.

10. When we discuss the budgets of the United Nations and the specialized agencies and the various voluntary programs, and the increases which have been occurring in these, I believe that we should keep in mind one very important fact. This is the fact that, given the objectives of all these organizations, comparatively little money is being contributed to them by governments today, despite the increases in budgets which have taken place. To illustrate this point, I would like to point out that in 1969 total contributions by the United States to the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and the voluntary programs amounted to about $248,891,000. If we compare this amount to the amount expended by the people of the City of New York during the same year for the cost of the New York City Police Department, we find that this latter figure amounted to $568,382,385. In other words, last year the cost to the United States of contributions to the entire United Nations family of organizations amounted to about 43 percent of the cost of the New York City Police Department to the City of New York. Given the objectives of the United Nations system, it is difficult to believe that the amounts now being contributed represent too large a burden on the American people.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Ambassador, I have a few questions.

One of the severe criticisms we hear of the United Nations on our campuses, among our young people, is that the United Nations has failed to deal meaningfully with Vietnam.

Would you care to comment for the record on the validity of this criticism?

Ambassador YOST. This, of course, is a criticism that has been shared by many U.N. members and obviously it has been a great weakness of the United Nations. It is one which the United States over a considerable period attempted to correct, that is, we endeavored to have the U.N. deal with this matter. We consulted the Secretary General at length frequently.

We consulted all members of the Security Council. We took the initiative to bring it into the Security Council, but of course the principal difficulty was and remains that some of the parties to the conflict are not represented in the U.N. North Vietnam is not represented.

South Vietnam is represented only by an observer. Communist China is not represented. North Vietnam took the position from the beginning that in view of this fact, any decisions of the U.N. or recommendations would be wholly unacceptable to it and it would refuse to observe or act upon them.

Moreover, the Soviet Union declared under these circumstances it would veto any resolution that might be adopted by the Security Council on this subject.

Under these circumstances, I think most of the members and the Secretary General felt that it was useless to attempt to deal formally with the problem and the best they could do was to endeavor to exert their influence privately and quietly on the Communists, which I think they have done to some extent, though to no great avail.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Because of Vietnam and on the basis of the explanation you have just given, there is some question as to the relevancy of the United Nations in the 1970's and the years to follow. Would you comment on that please?

Ambassador YOST. Of course, the failure in Vietnam has been one of the arguments for extending the membership. I think that has been one of the reasons that has led the Secretary General more and more to support universality of membership of all states. However, even had all of the states in the area been members of the U.N., I am not at all sure that that would have enabled the U.N. to deal effectively with the problem.

It would have made it much easier for it to discuss the problem and put it on its agenda, but the basic lack is the one that I outlined in my statement, and that is the lack of the authority of the U.N. to intervene in a conflict other than with the consent and approval of both parties to the conflict.

So, had there been universal representation, the U.N. might have been somewhat better able to mediate the Vietnam dispute, but it would not have been any better able to enforce anything.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, since I came in late, I would appreciate it if I could reserve my time.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Mailliard?

Mr. MAILLIARD. I have no questions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Fascell?

Mr. FASCELL. Ambassador, it is nice to see you again.

Ambassador YOST. It is good to see you.

Mr. FASCELL. I was not here for the early part of your statement, but I caught up with you.

Ambassador YOST. I appreciated your report.

Mr. FASCELL. I was delighted to have the opportunity—and, since Congressman Whalley is not here, I am sure he joins me in expressing appreciation to all of the people at the mission in giving us the opportunity to work with you for 3 months and to learn a great deal not only about the U.N. mission, but the United Nations.

It was a very challenging experience and, believe me, we learned a great deal. It was a very useful exercise and I can only marvel at the wisdom of the arrangement that has lasted so long that it allows Members of Congress to serve on that mission.

Your statement was, as usual, balanced, thoughtful, and candid. One statement struck me particularly forcefully. I hear so much about

the need to amend the charter in order to get anything done. A man with your background and experience coming out flatfootedly and saying we have what we need if we will just put it to work is particularly important. I think that is most candid and useful because it seems to me we could waste an awful lot of time and effort politically and otherwise in trying to amend the charter.

Ambassador YOST. We might end up worse than we are.

Mr. FASCELL. I am not trying to establish priorities here, because all problems with respect to the U.N. are important and they are probably all interrelated at the same level, but I just wonder really whether it would be useful to address ourselves to the financial problem confronting the U.N. as a first step to giving us some sense of well-being and security in order to deal with some of the other problems.

Ambassador YOST. Yes, of course, that is a perennial difficulty. As you know, there have been deficits hanging over the U.N. for years and it needs to be cleared up. We have a constant fight over the current administrative budget and we have a need in my opinion for something in the kitty to deal with peacekeeping emergencies should those arise.

So there are three aspects of the financial problem.

Mr. FASCELL. There has been a great deal expressed about this problem not only in Government, but throughout the country by individuals and perhaps some criticism with respect to U.S. responsibility or leadership in this, and yet in my own feeling based on the many hearings, examinations and personal experiences, I have not found U.S. leadership lacking with respect to the efforts made at the U.N. level about financing. Am I correct that we have really tried every way we know how?

Ambassador YOST. We certainly have.

Mr. FASCELL. We have even gone to almost the point of confrontation?

Ambassador YOST. I would think your experience in the Fifth Committee would probably convince you that our influence in that committee is as important and strong as it could usefully be.

Mr. FASCELL. It taught me one thing, Mr. Ambassador. Legislating around here is fairly easy by comparison when you analyze it. Here everybody speaks the same language and we are generally divided into two major parties—some people say four—but you know where the votes are and you start out with some basis.

I learned immediately in the Fifth Committee at the U.N. that we started out with no votes including our own, because we had not yet received our instructions, so it is a little difficult to wield the kind of influence that commonly seems to be ascribed to the United States that all we have to do is wave a magic wand in the U.N. and we can get anything done we want done. That, obviously, is not true.

I have not found leadership lacking on the part of the United States to get the financial picture straightened out. We took the lead with respect to the delinquencies on the Russians and the French. We have taken the lead with respect to the economic programs. We can be criticized for a lot of things, but I think we really tried to muster our leadership over a period of years and in several administrations in this country to do a good job.

Ambassador YOST. I think we have taken the lead to exercise economies in the operations of the administrative budget.

Mr. FASCELL. So much so I don't know whether what happened this last time was an accumulation of the efforts of some of the gentlemen here who preceded you, but so much so we were almost persona non grata with about two-thirds of the world.

Ambassador YOST. I think we pushed as hard as we can.

Mr. FASCELL. And we have pushed as far as we can in the sense of economy and yet there are a lot of changes that need to be made, of course.

In another area where there has been criticism and here again I don't think it has been justified, but here again I would like to get your opinion with respect to where we are with respect to permanent peacekeeping and what our efforts in general have been.

Ambassador YOST. We have concentrated, in recent years, on trying to improve these ad hoc peacekeeping arrangements that I spoke of in my statement—that is, for the Secretary General, pursuant to a decision of the Security Council, to organize a peacekeeping effort, to ask individual states for voluntary contributions in the form of men or facilities or logistical support or money, and to ask the states concerned for permission to station men in the areas involved in the dispute or conflict.

These may be observers or small military contingents or fairly large ones, but it is all on a voluntary basis on the part of the contributing as well as the receiving states. Therefore, it is all very precarious. Any disagreement by any state involved can upset the process.

Nevertheless, I believe these ad hoc arrangements are the best course to follow at the moment. I don't think we have a strong enough climate of world opinion to move into the more decisive enforcement arrangements that are spelled out in chapter VII of the Charter.

I hope we may get to that at some point, but I think our best hope of bringing the other great powers along, which is essential, is to follow this comparatively modest course for the time being.

The General Assembly's peacekeeping committee has had a working group which has been fairly successful, making progress in this last year. Our representative on it has been Ambassador Finger. I think he is going to be testifying up here later and he will explain in more detail where we stand, but we are planning to pursue this very actively this year.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ambassador, I have many, many questions, but I will restrain myself to one final one so my colleagues can inquire.

I have been wondering about a feeling that I got after serving up there at the U.N. that the U.N. is spending about three-fourths of its resources on economic and social development programs. There is great energy and great interest in every slightest economic move. It has led to not only multiplication of programs and agencies, but a diversification of the U.N. itself in terms of facilities, with new facilities in Vienna, Addis Ababa, Geneva, Santiago.

We ran into that head on in New York. It seems to me, that while all of this is essential, it has had a tendency to detract from what I consider to be the equally if not more important political functions of the United Nations. I would like your comment on that subject as to whether we ought to shift the emphasis or divide out the social

and economic developments—or in some way bring about better focus on the major political problems.

Ambassador YOST. I think both of them are very important. The reason perhaps there has been more progress, more diversification on the economic and social side is that with all of the difficulties, it is still easier and less controversial to move on these than on the tough political problems. Therefore, the U.N. has moved in the direction it could move.

I don't think we ought to stop that as long as we think it is doing useful work, which I think it is doing on the whole, and it should be much better coordinated and managed. We are doing what we can. We will do more to implement the Jackson capacity study. We should equally try to do something about these peacemaking, political problems which, of course, do not involve the expenditure of much money, but there are involved very tough problems of persuading governments to submit what they often consider vital national interests to at least discussion, if not some sort of adjudication by the United Nations.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you see any possibility of that ever happening?

Ambassador YOST. I would think so, yes. My belief is that it will in time, but I don't think it will happen in the immediate future. But I think the whole trend of technology, bringing us closer and closer together and creating a tighter nexus of common interest will gradually make these common interests loom larger and the differences loom smaller and, therefore, produce a greater willingness to permit an international organization to deal with political problems.

We are going to have to go through some very rough times before the human race is convinced of that, but I think it has moved surprisingly in the last 30 or 40 years and I expect it to keep on moving.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ambassador, you have had a long and distinguished career and let me close up by saying Congressman Whalley and I have been very privileged and honored to work with you in the United Nations and watch your capability and intelligence being put to the test on behalf of the U.S. Government.

Ambassador YOST. It was a great privilege to have you and Congressman Whalley with us. I enjoyed it and profited from the experience.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you see any diminution of public support for the United Nations?

Ambassador YOST. I was discussing that with some newspaper people a while ago. Someone advanced the thesis, which I think is quite sound, that there is less opposition to the United Nations than there was some years ago. There are less extreme critics attacking it, but more apathy and this, of course, is an outgrowth of these failures we have just been speaking of. It has not been able to deal with Vietnam and a lot of these other problems.

I would hope that, as I said here, in the course of this 25th anniversary, we might endeavor to make the public a little more aware of the inhibitions which prevented the U.N. from doing some of the things most people hoped it could do. It is not the fault of the institution, but the fact is that most of the governments are not ready to give it the necessary powers.

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Nevertheless, it is performing a number of useful functions. If and when we are ready to ask it to do a little more, it will do a little more and probably quite well.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Secretary Ball says in his statement:

> So long as the fundamental struggle persists between the two halves of this polarized world, I see very little hope of improving the effectiveness of the United Nations in bringing about the resolution of major conflicts.

He seems to be somewhat more pessimistic than you.

Ambassador YOST. He is probably more of a realist than I am. I would certainly not claim that the U.N. is in any near future going to be able to do much to settle the basic conflict between us and the Soviet Union or us and Communist China, and I think most U.N. members would recognize that, and the Secretary General.

Their role can be relatively slight in those great direct country power confrontations. In the past it has dealt successfully and, I hope, will do more in the future to deal with controversies which don't directly involve great power confrontations, but which could, if the disputes worsened, involve great powers.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is it not a fact that the number of controversies more and more involving the great powers is increasing? They seem to have a way of becoming more and more involved in local situations.

Ambassador YOST. They do, but I think they are more and more coming to the realization that I noted. It has not proceeded very far yet, but I think it should be encouraged. The great powers are beginning to realize that unilateral or bilateral involvements are apt to be costly and dangerous and that there are a good many situations in the so-called "third world" in which, if there is a serious dispute, it would be in their own interest to involve the U.N. and to cushion themselves from direct confrontation.

This is something I am very much convinced of and I notice that even the Russians are beginning to become somewhat aware of it now.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think time is running out? Do you think you will ever be able to prove that the United Nations is a viable organization?

Ambassador YOST. I think, as the Secretary General said, we are going to go through a very rough 10 or 20 years, but I think we are going to have an international organization of this kind performing growing functions of all of these sorts if we are not to fall into a very dangerous international anarchy.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. My question should not be interpreted as my opinion. I am merely trying to establish a dialog because I have had these questions presented to me by many people. Do you think we are deluding ourselves in continuing to participate in such an organization when, in fact, it has failed in real crisis situations and has abandoned any effort to become involved in such disputes as Vietnam, the Middle East, Nigeria?

Ambassador YOST. It has been involved in the Middle East, for example, for 20 years. It has both succeeded and failed. It has certainly failed in solving the problem, but I don't think that the U.N. can be expected to solve problems of this kind. The states themselves have to do that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What I am trying to suggest is this: Do you think that the existence of the U.N. deludes us into thinking that we have a

real peacekeeping organization when in reality we do not? Do you believe that we are placing our faith in a body that is not truly effective in resolving conflicts?

Ambassador YOST. I think we should have no illusions about the extent of its competence. We should understand its limitations. Nevertheless, I think experience shows that it can do very useful things.

The situation in the Middle East long ago would have been much worse had it not been for the U.N. It has not done all we would like to have seen it do, but I don't think it is a crutch that should be discarded. I think we would be worse off in many, many ways if it did not exist and, as some have said, if it did not exist we would have to invent it.

If it broke down as the League of Nations did, 5 or 10 years later we would have to create something like it only better, but since we have it, let's try to make it better.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Gross?

Mr. GROSS. Ambassador Yost, it is interesting to have someone come before a committee of Congress and admit the unmitigated failures of the United Nations as you do on page 4 of your statement.

Where has the United Nations been successful in any crisis?

Ambassador YOST. I think perhaps if you are speaking of the political and peacekeeping field, in my opinion, its greatest success has been in the Congo. One can imagine what might have occurred in the Congo if the United Nations had not been viable and had not intervened and had not intervened effectively.

One very easily could have had the United States supporting one faction, the Soviet Union supporting another faction and perhaps some of the radicals in Africa supporting still a third faction, and a very serious and prolonged guerrilla warfare among factions each supported by an outsider.

Mr. GROSS. It is pretty difficult over there now, is it not?

Ambassador YOST. No, it is pretty stable. Mr. Rogers is there today holding meetings with ambassadors from all over Africa while the Congo has a long way to go to attain full development——

Mr. GROSS. He may be safer in a few places other than Africa.

Ambassador YOST. I think it is quite a success story. There is still a long way to go, but when one thinks of what it might have been so easily, I think it was a great achievement.

Mr. GROSS. The United Nations was involved in Korea.

Ambassador YOST. Yes, it was. It played a different kind of role there.

Mr. GROSS. What kind of role did it play in Korea?

Ambassador YOST. Its role there was to mobilize almost all of the world against aggression in Korea.

Mr. GROSS. About as well as it has mobilized world power in Vietnam. You are aware, are you not, that we financed almost 100 percent of the war in Korea.

Ambassador YOST. Yes.

Mr. GROSS. Aside from the South Koreans, we did 95 percent of the fighting and dying in that war. The United Nations supplied only token forces.

Ambassador YOST. Some of the forces supplied by other countries were fairly substantial and we were very grateful for them. We wished there had been more.

Mr. GROSS. We will certainly differ over what you apparently mean by "substantial." I just got through saying we did 95 percent of the fighting and dying in Korea, and I don't think you can dispute those figures. The United Nations has been an unmitigated failure in the matter of resolving crises.

You seem to downgrade the United States and its $250 million contribution to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Do you really mean this?

Ambassador YOST. I did not mean to downgrade it. I was just attempting to put it into perspective, to point out that it was not excessive compared with other expenditures. I cited the Fire and Police Departments of the City of New York. I do not think our contribution to the U.N. was out of proportion.

Mr. GROSS. You don't really mean to cite the city of New York as being a paragon of much of anything, do you?

Ambassador YOST. No; but they are expending the same amount of money for their fire department as we are for the U.N.

Mr. GROSS. According to the last Moody report I saw, the city of New York is about $6 billion in debt. Mr. Rosenthal might give us more information on that, but I have been around here a few years and I have heard much about what the city of New York does, and I have watched that city plunge deeper and deeper into debt.

So when you cite anything pertaining to finances, when you cite New York as an example of expenditure, I don't take very much stock in it. $250 million is a lot of money to me.

Ambassador YOST. It is certainly a lot of money to me.

Mr. GROSS. Are you about to advocate that we embark upon that wonderful expansion of the program of the U.N.; that the United States haul out its checkbook and finance that?

Ambassador YOST. Do you mean its expansion to the southward?

Mr. GROSS. Exactly.

Ambassador YOST. Yes, sir; it does seem to us worthwhile because like all institutions it has grown during the years in its case from 50 to 126 members. This has meant growth in the development program, in the children's fund, in the whole series of its branches. It has had to rent substantial quarters outside of its building and is paying high rents in New York for them.

Mr. GROSS. All I can say, it will take an inordinate amount of gall to come here and ask us for more in view of the fact that we are tossing out $250 million a year to the United Nations and its specialized organizations plus the voluntary contributions made otherwise, plus the money the United Nations owes this country and they are still in hock to us, aren't they?

Ambassador YOST. Somewhat.

Mr. GROSS. Would you say close to $100 million?

Ambassador YOST. No, sir. The total debt is variously——

Mr. GROSS. How much has the United Nations paid on the loan made to it by this country?

Ambassador YOST. The bond issue is still being paid off.

Mr. GROSS. How much has been paid?

Ambassador YOST. I am not sure how much is still outstanding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Without objection, we will get a report on that and put it in the record.

(The information requested follows:)

REPAYMENTS ON UNITED NATIONS BOND PURCHASES

Under the terms of Public Law 87–731 the annual repayment of principal and interest to the United States is accomplished by an offset against the annual United States assessment toward the United Nations budget.

The anniversary date is January 15th of each year starting January 15, 1963. To date (January 15, 1970) eight repayments have been made to the United States in accordance with the approved schedule as follows:

Repayment date	Principal	Interest	Total
Jan. 15, 1963	$1,849,858.04	$199,621.95	$2,049,479.99
Jan. 15, 1964	2,399,983.65	1,324,157.40	3,724,141.05
Jan. 15, 1965	2,439,655.45	1,433,686.23	3,873,341.68
Jan. 15, 1966	2,500,097.67	1,391,475.58	3,891,573.25
Jan. 15, 1967	2,575,591.58	1,341,473.62	3,917,065.20
Jan. 15, 1968	2,592,182.01	1,289,961.79	3,882,143.80
Jan. 15, 1969	2,712,297.07	1,238,118.15	3,950,415.22
Jan. 15, 1970	2,743,939.18	1,183,872.21	3,927,811.39
Total	19,813,604.65	9,402,366.93	29,215,971.58
Remainder due[1]	56,449,671.35		
Total purchased	76,263,276.00		

[1] Last repayment is due Jan. 15, 1989.

Headquarters loan

Under the Headquarters Loan Agreement between the United States and the United Nations (approved by Public Law 903—80th Congress, August 11, 1948) the amount of $65,000,000 advanced by the United States is repayable, without interest, in 30 annual installments (varying from $1,000,000 to $2,500,000) commencing July 1, 1951 and ending July 1, 1982. All installments which have thus far fallen due have been paid promptly by the United Nations and the balance remaining to be paid now amounts to $25,000,000.

Ambassador YOST. What is proposed on the expansion of the building is that the U.N. would pay approximately one-quarter of it, that the city of New York would pay approximately one-quarter——

Mr. GROSS. Good old "Uncle Sucker" will pick up the rest of it.

Ambassador YOST. We would pay approximately one-quarter and private sources would pick up a quarter.

Mr. GROSS. Nice high-rise offices with high-rise plush living quarters.

Ambassador YOST. Just one office building.

Mr. GROSS. Complete with living quarters?

Ambassador YOST. No, sir; no living quarters.

Mr. GROSS. Isn't the program to build some high-rise apartments or at least one apartment building up there? Isn't that part of the plan?

Ambassador YOST. No, sir; there is another private program entirely in the hands of private enterprise which proposes to build some high-rise apartments and hotel across from the U.N. but the U.S. Government is not involved in that financially in any way.

Mr. GROSS. So the delegates to the United Nations can get out of bed and go through whatever formula they do to justify their existence in this country—they wouldn't even have to bother with that abominable subway in New York, would they?

Ambassador YOST. A great many of the members would really like to move out of the United States because of high prices and other reasons. We frankly don't think that would be in the U.S. interest to fragment the organization.

Mr. GROSS. Please don't downgrade the taxpayers of this country by minimizing $250 million. We are in trouble financially in this country. As far as I am concerned, we don't have $25 million or any other amount of money for the further expansion of the United Nations. I call it the flimflam society.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Mailliard?

Mr. MALLIARD. I have no question. I am not a member of the subcommittee. I came here to listen to my old friend, Mr. Yost, and I enjoyed his statement very much, but I won't hold up your work.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ambassador, thank you very much. Perhaps we should finish by saying that we are very fortunate to arrive at the 25th anniversary of the U.N. It has lasted some 6 years longer than the League of Nations. We thank you very much for being here with us.

I would ask Ambassador Ball and Ambassador Wiggins to come up to the table.

The Chair welcomes two very distinguished Americans who give witness to the events and history of the U.N., having participated in some of the great moments and decisions of that organization.

The committee is honored to have with us today the former Under Secretary of State George Ball and the very able and capable Ambassador Wiggins, both of whom were the predecessors of Ambassador Yost.

In the interest of time, we would like both statements presented first. Then we can engage in a dialog with members of the committee.

We would ask Under Secretary of State George Ball to proceed first.

No matter how much its supporters may wish otherwise, the founders of the United Nations did not envisage their creation as a move toward world government, or anything resembling it. They saw it rather as an institutional means through which the great powers could maintain the peace, guided by the principles enunciated in the charter.

United Nations in the Perspective of the Past Quarter Century

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. BALL, FORMER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In examining the present operations of the United Nations and considering possible changes in the charter, or in its procedures and practices, that would make it more effective, one must obviously begin with a well-formulated conception as to what purposes the U.N. presently serves—what is its potential and what are its limitations.

I say this because, in spite of the fact that the U.N. has now been a going concern for a quarter of a century, there is still wide popular misconception as to how the drafters of the charter intended it to function.

Far more clearly than the Covenant of the League of Nations the U.N. Charter placed the prime responsibility for the maintenance of peace squarely on the Security Council, which, in essential concept was to be a club of the great powers—the instrument through which those powers could reach accord and maintain stability throughout the world.

To understand both the League Covenant and the United Nations Charter, one must recognize their common inspiration. Both drew heavily on the experience of the Concert of Europe—or, as it is sometimes referred to—the Council of Europe. This was never a permanent body. The great powers simply came together from time to time when faced with emergencies requiring common action. The arrangement had among its most serious defects the lack of any formal mechanism for convoking meetings, and quite often major powers refused to attend. Nor was there any established set of principles to guide decisions, with the result that the powers normally acted from no higher motive than the maintenance and protection of the existing dynastic system.

Nevertheless, the concert of Europe proved extremely useful. It assured a measure of order and stability throughout the 19th century. It stopped several small wars and prevented them from growing into big ones. So long as there was a reasonably stable balance of power which prevented any one of the great nations from dominating the continent, the concert of Europe was effective to keep the peace. It was only when that balance was destroyed that Europe plunged into the insanity of the First World War.

The United Nations is obviously a far advance over the concert of Europe. The charter provides a body of principles to govern the decision of the U.N. institutions. It establishes the Security Council as a continuing body with permanent members, consisting of the great powers (as they were known at the end of the Second World War) together with nonpermanent members drawn from among the smaller powers and designated to serve on a rotating basis.

Yet, in spite of these obvious improvements the success of the charter was necessarily dependent on the continuance of a balance between the major powers as a fundamental prerequisite for peace. For the effectiveness of both the League of Nations and the United Nations in keeping the peace rested on the assumption of common action by the great powers, which was, of course, impossible if such a balance did not exist.

In the period since the Second World War we have managed to achieve a precarious balance quite different from that contemplated at the time the charter was drafted. It is, in essence, a bilateral balance between the United States and the Soviet Union with the non-Communist powers—particularly the powers of Western Europe—acting, under the leadership of the United States, to oppose the extension of power by the Soviet Union and the Communist nations beyond geographic lines developed in the postwar period.

In terms of classical political theory, these lines have marked the division between the Communist and non-Communist spheres of in-

fluence, and the only important wars that have been fought since 1945 resulted from efforts of the Communist powers to rupture those lines and expand their sphere of influence at the expense of the non-Communist world.

Yet it has been one of the tragedies of the past two decades that, because we have succeeded in maintaining the balance only by a constant political struggle which we have come to call the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union have not been able to achieve that basis for common action which is essential to render the Security Council a fully effective instrument for keeping the peace.

I emphasize this obvious fact because it is so often overlooked by editorial writers—not ex-editorial writers—and, with respect even by some of our political leaders, who write and talk as though we could solve the world's most troublesome problems by "taking them to the United Nations."

We have only to look at the impotence of the United Nations to cope with the principal areas of conflict which now confront us—the war in Vietnam, the struggle in the Middle East—to understand the futility of such a suggestion. Because the most dangerous local quarrels are, by definition, those with cold war implications, they are automatically removed from the area in which it is possible to achieve superpower agreements in order to permit effective United Nations action.

In saying all this, I do not mean to suggest, of course, that the United Nations does not play a useful purpose, or that it is not, in fact, indispensable. Nor do I even suggest that it may not, sometime in the future, finally begin to operate in the manner contemplated by its founders. I devoutly hope it can.

But that will involve not only the continued preservation of the balance, but a slow evolution toward the creation of a new world environment enabling the great powers to live together in greater tranquility. That is the assumption which gives hope to our policy that, as we move together into a changing world, the United States and the Soviet Union will, bit by bit, find an increasing number of relatively small areas where the common interests of our two countries overlap, even though they may not be completely congruent.

Meanwhile, within the limitations imposed by the nature of the cleavage between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Nations has performed any number of useful—indeed, essential—tasks. It has made it possible for a billion people—one-third of the earth's population—to make the perilous passage from colonial dependence to at least some form of juridical independence with a minimum of carnage and disruption.

It has given the leaders of the emerging new nations a place in the sun and an education in parliamentary diplomacy. It has provided peacekeeping forces to create buffer elements between the contesting nations in a number of local disputes. And, finally, it has helped the great powers to avoid direct confrontation by internationalizing specific local conflicts and defusing them within a multilateral setting.

It is in improving the procedures by which the United Nations accomplishes these important tasks that the most useful effort can now be made. So long as the fundamental struggle persists between the two halves of this polarized world, I see very little hope of improving the

effectiveness of the United Nations in bringing about the resolution of major conflicts.

I would hope, therefore, that the work of this subcommittee will be directed primarily toward developing a set of recommendations within the framework of the possible, since there is much to be done in the broad area I have described, and I commend this subcommittee for undertaking this inquiry.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

We would like to proceed with Ambassador Wiggins.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FORMER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. WIGGINS. As the United Nations approaches the 25th anniversary of its founding at San Francisco on October 24, 1945, there is a widespread disposition to say that it has failed to achieve the great objectives proclaimed at its launching. It is a disposition that judges the United Nations by its inability to fulfill the most extravagant hopes that were aroused at its beginning, and one that fails to take account of the degree to which it has fulfilled expectations more consonant with political realities in a far from perfect world.

It has not brought about peace in this century. The devices with which it was equipped to restrain aggression, to impose settlements on warring countries, and to employ collective military force have fallen into disuse and disrepair after some successes. Candor compels the admission that the United Nations today does not have effective peacekeeping machinery. The Security Council has been rendered almost impotent by the great power veto and the alinements of the cold war. The General Assembly after some successes under the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950 has been confronted by almost insoluble problems arising from the refusal of powers to pay for peacekeeping and by unwillingness of the Assembly to enforce article 19 of the charter.

Initial hopes that the Court of International Justice might settle many disputes by judicial means have been disappointing, probably because, as Richard N. Gardner has pointed out, "the major conflicts of our time are typically nonjusticiable, in the sense that at least one party is challenging the legal quo."

In the first stages of euphoria about the U.N. there was hope that the United Nations would put an end to all war. Then there was the much more modest hope that it might end all wars except those between the United States and the Soviet Union. And even that more restricted hope has had to be adjusted to the realization that most disputes involve the two great powers in some way.

In spite of these limitations, the United Nations has been a great influence for peace. A U.N. Commission for Indonesia helped arrange a political settlement that made that country independent, a classical example of the U.N.'s helpfulness in ending colonialism. A U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan brought about a cease-fire there in 1948 and induced another cease-fire in the India-Pakistan war of 1965; A U.N. presence has helped maintain order in Cyprus; the Security Council as a result of the absence of the Soviet Union went to

the defense of South Korea; the United Nations Emergency Force stationed on Arab territory in 1956 made the settlement of the Suez crisis possible and kept the peace in the Middle East until the 1965 war; the United Nations prevented the dismemberment of the Congo in 1960. These are notable accomplishments.

At the same time, the existence of the United Nations has not prevented North Korea from indulging in repeated acts of war undertaken with impunity; it has not diminished the hostility between the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan; it has not punished the Soviet Union and four of its allies for invading and occupying Czechoslovakia; it has not kept North Vietnam from sending troops into South Vietnam; it did not restrain Nigeria from waging a long, bloody, and successful war against Biafra; it has not induced South Africa to relinquish possession of Namibia.

The United Nations failures with the wars of this century have taken place on front stage and in the presence of the world. Its successes, in dealing with circumstances that would otherwise result in the wars of the next century, have not had the same attention. If it has not yet brought about general and complete disarmament, it has achieved many important steps toward disarmament since the establishment of the 18-nation Disarmament Committee. It brought about the suspension of nuclear arms. It has laid the groundwork for the Soviet-American discussions on the limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear arms the first stage of which has just been concluded at Helsinki. These accomplishments, and other efforts such as the Convention on Astronaut Recovery and on the Peaceful Uses of the Ocean Floor, go forward with little fanfare, but all deal with preventing future war.

Dramatic confrontations having to do with the diplomatic crises of our own century capture 90 percent of the attention given the United Nations in the press of the world. But, as it has been frequently pointed out, three-fourths of the staff and three-fourths of the budget of the United Nations are devoted to social and economic problems.

The mere enumeration of some of these activities conveys an idea of the immense scope of the United Nations work in the field of social and economic problems—the United Nations Children's Fund; the United Nations Institute for Training and Research; the United Nations Commission for Refugees; the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization; the United Nations development program; the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; the World Health Organization.

The United Nations development program is one of the most exciting in this field. Funds for this program have risen from $55 million in 1959 to nearly $200 million in 1969 (with $238 million in pledged and anticipated pledges for 1970). These amounts are not great, in terms of worldwide development needs. But the program does not aim at filling the void of capital funds. It has become increasingly apparent that achievements of a satisfactory growth rate in the undeveloped world involves more than infusions of foreign capital. The greatest deficits are in technical assistance, managerial help, developmental ingenuity. It is the object of UNDP to assist low-income countries in making fuller use of their resources; to raise their productive capacity by demonstrating investment feasibility and creat-

ing conditions that will make investment fruitful; to provide expert assistance and equipment.

The UNDP operations rest on the notion that its funds must have a multiplier effect. They are to be used to put a spark to the economic fuel in a country. They are intended to supply the initial stimulus. A list of some 50 UNDP-assisted projects, it has been determined, has brought out $2.3 billion in followup financing to carry on the projects.

A very substantial training program is helping to supply talent deficits. More than 400,000 men and women have been trained at institutes established with UNDP assistance—65,000 engineers, 45,000 managers and supervisors and skilled workers, 50,000 industrial and vocational instructors, 18,000 specialists in public utilities, 10,000 secondary school teachers, and 6,000 administrators and development planners.

Here is a multilateral program that ought to have great appeal for the United States. Our dollars put into UNDP have a double multiplier effect. For every $40 the United States puts into the fund other countries put in $60. Every dollar that UNDP spends is multiplied again, many times over, in the government and private capital attracted by UNDP-approved and surveyed projects.

The U.S. contributions have been substantial. They amounted to $413,946,372 from 1950 to 1965; $63 million in 1966; $70 million in 1967; $75 million in 1968; $70 million in 1969; and $100 million has been proposed for 1970. Large as these sums are, the amount ought to be increased to help bring UNDP the resources it can effectively use—and its technique does not involve a need for billions. This program, by every indication, is the most practical, hopeful, economical, and efficient scheme of aid yet devised.

International conferences organized and sponsored by the United Nations are another means of attacking the problems of our century. At the 23d General Assembly the United States supported a Swedish resolution to hold an international conference on the environment in 1972. Since that resolution was passed interest in environmental problems has greatly increased in this country and in other countries. This heightening interest ought to create a climate favorable for a very useful meeting in 1972. It is to be hoped that this conference will be productive in stimulating new interest in, and demand for, environmental measures within the represented countries, and that it may lead, as well, to international action against worldwide environmental deterioration beyond the reach of any country acting alone.

There is no doubt that the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations is going to stimulate a great deal of reexamination of the charter and of the deficiencies that have appeared in a quarter of a century of operation. And that is proper.

This reexamination surely will be directed first of all to the peacekeeping machinery of the charter. Last October, Secretary General U Thant pointed out that the arrangements of charter VII for the use by the Security Council of military force to maintain or restore international peace have never been used. This, he said, "is the result of two unforeseen events, the change in the nature of war caused by the development of atomic weapons, and the cold war, which have somewhat belied the notion that the Security Council, with the great powers in total agreement, would keep the peace of the world, if

necessary by force." The Secretary General rightly said that the idea of collective security has broken down. An interval of improvisation with the General Assembly's peacekeeping devices now seems also to have about played out.

A distinguished panel of the United Nations Association of the United States of America last April suggested a new attempt to set up standby United Nations forces financed by a voluntary United Nations peace fund, and urged that the United States negotiate with the Soviet Union on the development of methods of proceeding under article 43 of the charter. This proposal, so far as I know, has not been pursued with success. The suggestion does not surmount the real, inherent difficulty that the disagreement between the great powers is not over how to keep the peace but is over what kind of a peace to keep. It is not centrally a dispute over how to recruit and set up and direct a military force.

No doubt, during the 25th year of the United Nations there will be a great deal of renewed discussion of the admission of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nations. It is a subject that raises interesting questions not only about China but about larger questions concerning the rigidity of the charter and its adaptability to circumstances greatly different than those which existed at the time of its adoption. It also raises questions about the powers of the permanent members of the Security Council.

The "China question" has been before the General Assembly at every session except that of 1964. Until 1961 it was in the form of a moratorium proposal on the discussion of the matter. Beginning in 1961, the debate has been on two matters: (*a*) Whether the representation of China is an "important question and (*b*) a resolution proposed by Communist countries to remove the Republic of China of Taiwan and admit the Peoples Republic of Peking.

The General Assembly repeatedly has adopted resolutions affirming that the representation of China is an important question (requiring a two-thirds vote). In 1961 the vote was 61–34–7. In 1965 it was 56–49–11. In 1966 it was 66–48–7. In 1967 it was 69–48–4. The affirmative vote on "important" questions rose to 73–47–5 in 1968. It dropped in 1969 to 71–48–4.

The motion to expel the Republic of China and admit the Peoples Republic of China has failed by the following votes: 1961 (37–48–19); 1962 (42–57–12); 1963 (41–57–12); 1964 (no vote); 1965 (47–47–20); 1966 (46–57–17); 1967 (45–58–17); 1968 (44–58–23); 1969 (48–56–12).

These votes do not suggest that Communist China is likely to gain in the Assembly very soon a majority of the votes on the important question issue of a two-thirds vote on the expulsion of Nationalist China and the seating of the Peoples Republic of China.

There is presently much talk about a rising sentiment for admitting Red China, but such a sentiment has not been reflected in the voting in the General Assembly.

An approach that differs from the so-called Albanian resolution expelling Nationalist China and admitting Communist China has been advocated by many persons under the label "two-China" policy. This proposal would not expel Nationalist China but would admit Communist China as a member of the United Nations. Since the admission of new members is a process that must commence in the Secur-

ity Council and that must gain the favorable vote of all the permanent members, it is difficult to see how a simple membership resolution could get out of the Security Council where China still is seated.

Previous methods to unseat Nationalist China in the Security Council have failed by vote of 3 in favor and 6 against on January 13, 1950, and by a vote of 3 in favor and 8 against on August 1, 1950. These votes were in the 11-member Security Council and the 15-member Security Council might line up differently, but it seems doubtful that a majority, including all permanent members, could be had.

There is nothing in the charter to preclude the delegates of Nationalist China from exercising a veto on a resolution to expel Nationalist China, or to keep him from retaining his seat if expulsion were voted.

If a motion were made to admit Red China as a new member, it would also be subject to a veto. (The Soviet Union frequently has used the veto on membership resolutions.)

The difficulties of implementing the two-China policy result in part from the rigidity of the charter. It is virtually impossible to remove a permanent member by vote or by amendment.

The composition of the Security Council was changed in 1963 from 11 to 15 members. Would it be possible to change the number of permanent members so as to give Communist China a membership in the General Assembly and a permanent delegate in the Security Council?

It is interesting to speculate on what China was in the minds of the delegates to the United Nations Conference in 1945. At that time, the population of mainland China was 455 million, of which 70 million were under Japanese control, 100 million under Communist control, 100 million under doubtful control, and 135 million under Chinese Nationalist control. Territorially, the Nationalists controlled 2,800,000 square miles of China's 3,300,000 square miles. Japan controlled 82,000 square miles. The Communists 200,000 to 225,000 square miles and 170,000 square miles were under no effective control. It is clear that at the time the delegates were surely talking about the China in effective control of most of the territory and most of the population—Nationalist China.

It can be argued that events since then have altered the Government of Taiwan so as to make it a curious anomaly to count it among the great powers and give it one of the five permanent seats in the Security Council. The charter, curiously enough, provides no machinery for correcting such an anomaly. And it contains no machinery for changing other permanent members when and if they no longer can be regarded as "great" powers entitled to permanent membership. The Republic of China has contracted from 4,480,992 square miles on the mainland in all of China, to 13,885 or from 2,800,00 square miles in 1945 to 13,885 square miles now. In population it has shrunk from 457,835,475 (all of China) to 12,993,000. This is a very great change.

Other permanent members have greatly changed too, if size and population are the criteria of eligibility of permanent members of the Security Council. Great Britain has contracted from 5,459,342 square miles and a population of 509,717,413 people at the height of empire to 142,498 square miles and 58,565,070 people. France has contracted from 5,185,029 square miles and 127,604,472 people to 259,105 square miles and 48,136,449 people.

Moreover, if the Security Council were to reflect great power realities, how could permanent seats be refused to Japan and to India?

Such is the rigidity of the charter in this respect, however, that it is difficult to see how the composition of the permanent seats on the Security Council can ever be changed without the consent of every permanent member.

As Hans Kelsen has pointed out: "Amendments to the charter come into force only when ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council" (Kelsen, p. 264); and "* * * a permanent member of the Security Council may use its veto right * * * in its own interest * * * (Kelsen, p. 265).

If the Security Council were to reject the credentials of the individual representing a permanent member, the great power involved could fall back on rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure under which "Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs is entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting his credentials."

The United Nations seems powerless to alter the membership of the Security Council in a manner unacceptable to any of the present permanent members, either by vote in the Security Council, the General Assembly, or by amendment to the charter.

A remaining hope of making the Security Council conform to altering world conditions may exist in the form of amendments to increase the number of permanent members. It is possible to imagine circumstances in which Nationalist China might consent to increasing the permanent members from five to eight by adding India, Japan, and Communist China, as an alternative to some more disagreeable solution.

Many authorities, such as Hans Kelsen, have been very critical of the charter provisions setting up the Security Council with five permanent seats having special powers. Kelsen argues that "the veto right of the five permanent members of the Security Council, which places the privileged power above the law of the United Nations, establishes their legal hegemony over all the other members of the organization, and thus stamps on it the mark of an autocratic or aristocratic regime."

He contends there is a contradiction between the political ideology of the United Nations and its legal constitution. "This contradiction," he believes, "may completely paralyze the great advantage that the charter tried to gain over the covenant (of the league) by conferring upon the Security Council a power almost equal to that of a government."

The China question, in the end, thrusts beyond the issue of China's permanent seat to the issue of the status of all great powers under the charter. No doubt it was unwise of the founders to incorporate nations by name into the power structure of the charter so as to make it virtually impossible to alter this structure by any process under the charter no matter what anomalies arise as the result of shifting power relationships in a changing world.

Of course, it can be argued that, from a small power point of view, the more the permanent members become unrepresentative of great power, the less offensive their privileged positions is and the more democratic the Security Council becomes. Time already has subverted

the intention of the founders to award the permanent seats on the Security Council to the world's greatest powers—if territory, population, and military power are criteria of great power. Only two of the five retain unimpeachable credentials now.

The United Nations, it is clear, is a long way from solving either the China question or the larger question of the permanent seats on the Security Council as a whole.

It is easy to get impatient with the United Nations. The cold war division in the Security Council has rendered it almost powerless to reach decisions and impotent to enforce them after it has reached them. The General Assembly rolls along on a tide of pious protestations that often soar far above the practices of most of its members. Some of its resolutions are monuments to hypocrisy and futility. It is easy to grow impatient with many of the newer states which do not hesitate to recommend the use of force (which they cannot supply) against countries with which they disagree on social or political issues. It is impossible not to be irritated by members who repeatedly attempt to get the General Assembly to impose upon rival governments penalties they know are illegal and violative of the express provisions of the charter and the rules of the Assembly. It is a little trying to hear U.N. officials operate on a double standard that permits them to freely advise non-Communist states on their internal affairs but precludes the same sort of advice for Communist states.

But trying and irritating and annoying as the United Nations may be, from time to time, through weaknesses of its peacekeeping structure, follies of its membership, or idiosyncrasies of some of its spokesmen, these are passing annoyances and trivial irritations that cannot be permitted to becloud the solid achievements of the United Nations, allowed to govern the policies of a great and responsible world power or permitted to color with emotional bias the purposes of a great people.

The United Nations was called into being 25 years ago by the realization of the statesmen of the world that some new system was needed to safeguard mankind against the dangers of recurrent, devastating worldwide war. Events since have multiplied those dangers. While we need to be clearheadedly aware of the imperfections of the United Nations, it is its imperfections we should labor to eliminate and not the United Nations. We began with hopes too high. We moved on to expectations too low. It is time for more mature hopes and expectations consonant with the political realities of our dangerous times.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. You have presented a very enlightening statement, reviewing the activities of the United Nations in the past 25 years.

At this time if there is no objection, I would like to insert Ambassador Goldberg's statement into the record. He was unable to join us here today.

(Mr. Goldberg's statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY HON. ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

When I left the Supreme Court of the United States to enter on my new duties at the United Nations, I made a statement which may have sounded to some like a mere rhetorical flourish; but it was entirely serious. The statement was that I was moving from one area dedicated to the rule of law to another dedi-

cated to the same principle; and that, to my mind, the effort to bring the rule of law to govern the relations between sovereign states—the central effort of the United Nations— is the greatest adventure in history.

These beliefs come naturally to me from a lifetime in the law and in the pursuit of the just resolution of conflicts through the process. The rule of law among nations is obviously more difficult than at home; but it is even more necessary, and we have ample proof that it is possible—indeed in some measure it is an accomplished fact.

I am well aware that there are other views of this subject, even among people who have wide experience of diplomacy and world politics. We hear it said that what nations really respect is not law but political power. Besides, we are told, this is an age of revolutions, of deep splits of values between East and West and between North and South. And since law derives from values, this revolutionary era is said to be going through what one distinguished critic calls "a withdrawal of the legal order," in which sheer power is more decisive than ever in international affairs, and laws, especially that of the United Nations, has become little more than a mockery.

My own reading of the facts leads me to a very different conclusion, as I shall explain in a moment. But before specifically discussing international law, I would first like to make three observations about law in general.

First, we must beware of framing the argument in such a way that law and power become antithetical. In real life, law and power operate together. Power not ruled by law is a menace; but law not served by power is a delusion. Law is thus the higher of the two principles; but it cannot operate by itself.

My second broad point is that law cannot be derived from power alone. Might does not make right. On the contrary, law springs from one of the deepest impulses of human nature. No doubt the contrary impulses to fight and dominate often prevail; but sooner or later law has its turn. In one of the decisive moments in the history of law, King John thought he could impose his arbitrary will by force; but the barons who mustered superior force preferred to substitute an agreed rule—Magna Carta—for any man's arbitrary will. Thus, the King became subject to the law, and new proof was given of the strong human impulse toward law and the peace that law brings. In the history of our country, this impulse has been especially strong from the beginning, and found its highest expression in our written Constitution.

My third point flows from the second. Because law responds to a human impulse, it rests on much more than coercion. Law must have the police power, but it is by no means synonymous or coterminous with police power. It is much larger in its conception and in its reach. It builds new institutions and it produces new remedies. It tames the forces of change and keeps them peaceful. People obey the law not only out of fear of punishment but also because of what law does for them: the durability and reliability it gives to institutions; the reciprocity that comes from keeping one's word; and the expectation, grounded in experience, that the just process of law will right their wrongs and grievances. All the police power in creation could not long uphold a system of law that did not meet these affirmative expectations.

Our hope for world peace depends on our ability to extend to the international sphere a dual concept of law, both creative and coercive.

This extension of law into the international realm is not going to be achieved in one great Utopian stroke of the pen. In the United Nations Charter, and in age-old norms of international law, the community of nations already has a set of fundamental rules which do not need to be rewritten so much as they need to be observed. Our task, therefore, is to make greater use of existing machinery and existing norms—to build on them and to broaden out the areas of international relations that are susceptible to them.

To keep the matter in perspective, let us first recall that the areas of international law and order are already very broad—and they are constantly broadening to fit the emerging common interests of nations. Without law, international mail would not be delivered; ships and aircraft would collide in the night; international business contracts could be violated with even greater impunity than now; infectious diseases and insect pests would cross frontiers all the time; there would be no extradition of criminals; weather information would not be exchanged; radioactivity from nuclear testing would jeopardize our lives and that of our posterity; the Antarctic and the moon would be subject to competing claims of sovereignty and rival armaments; the safety and return of astronauts accidentally landing on foreign earthly soil would not be guaranteed; and even

diplomats—who are supposedly full-time practitioners of power politics—would be unable to carry on their business.

Many functions of the international order are so familiar as almost to be taken for granted. Some of them long antedate the United Nations. But it would be a great mistake to underrate them or to dismiss them as merely "technical" and "non-political." They are bridges of common interest among nations, and the sum of these common interests is one of the great unseen inhibitors of political conflict and international violence.

The United Nations and its agencies, through their economic, technical and social programs, continue to add to this system of bridges. In doing so, they serve not only the technical convenience of nations but also their desperate need to cure the evils from which lawless action springs: poverty, illiteracy, hunger, disease and deprivation of human rights. I believe that this multilateral system must be strengthened further whenever possible.

Now I turn to the most difficult area, where law directly confronts political conflict and violence among nations.

The basic law here is in Article 2, Paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." As the Charter embodies this law, so the United Nations as an organization should be, ideally, the court of last resort in seeing that it is adhered to. I say "last resort" because the Charter itself imposes on member states the prior duty to seek peaceful settlement of disputes through "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice."

The framers of the Charter did not assume that even when these remedies had been exhausted the Security Council would always be able to meet its responsibilities. By providing for a great-power veto, they recognized the divisions of power and the paralysis that these divisions might cause. For situations in which the UN was unable to act, they reaffirmed in Article 51 the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against aggression.

The United Nations system of peace and security, then, depends upon the individual actions of states as well as the collective actions of the Organization. It is a fragile system, to be sure—but the record of its achievements in the past twenty-four years proves it far from impotent. In Korea, it successfully met open, full-scaled aggression. In Kashmir, in Cyprus, it has kept smoldering conflicts under control—and when they leapt out of control it has created new instruments to put out the flames. In the Middle East, the UN kept an uneasy peace for twenty years and after the six day war erupted, is now engaged in the search for a just and lasting peace. In the Congo, it prevented a newborn nation, lacking most of the practical essentials of nationhood, from being torn apart, recolonized, or turned into a great power battleground in the heart of Africa. In the Cuban missile crisis, it played an essential mediatory role.

It is easy for a critic to say, "Well, some of these problems are nearly as old as the UN itself, and they aren't settled yet." This is quite true, and it points up the frustrating difference between the domestic and the international realm. On our Supreme Court, I soon learned that the most satisfying words are four in number, and they appear at the end of a Court decision: "It is so ordered." Many of the greatest conflicts the UN must handle—the "chronic cases" on the international sick list—cannot, we have learned, be cured by issuing orders. Often the greatest success we can hope for is to prevent a relapse into violence until the disputants work the poison out of their systems. That process is normally measured in years and sometimes in generations.

The daily headlines from every quarter of the globe are sufficient reminder of how tenuous the rule of law of the UN is. But, as Adlai Stevenson said, "Let none of us mock its weakness, for when we do we are mocking ourselves."

With all its weaknesses, however, I believe the existence of the UN during the past twenty four years, beset with the dangers of war and the persistent pressures of revolutionary change in every continent, has been a decisive blessing to mankind. It has been a meeting ground between East and West and when hardly any common interests could be perceived save the interest in sheer survival. And today it affords a coherent framework and a place of dignity and influence to more than fifty nations, newly born from the colonial age. It is their international home, their badge of legitimacy, their disinterested helper and adviser, their

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training ground in the arts of diplomacy—the visible sign of their stake in the community of nations.

There are still some who dream of an international Utopia in which a few civilized states could use their power to settle the affairs of the world, much as the major powers of Europe did in the Century after the Congress of Vienna. But we should remember that when the rule of the concert of Europe finally fell apart, world war ensued. This happened in great part because, in large areas of the world, the international order of the nineteenth century did not redress grievances but merely submerged them—until in our own century they erupted in revolution and world war.

The world law we should seek should be different. It should extend impartially to white and black, north and south, old and new. It will still be imperfect; it will still depend for its effectiveness on the willingness of the stronger nations to put their power at its service. But it should embrace in a spirit of equality all the races and cultures of the world—and it should address itself to the real troubles of mankind: Poverty, inequality, and the deprivation of rights. If it does, it will surpass even the hundred years' peace of the Congress of Vienna, which was based on the subjection of impotence of half the world's peoples.

Our country derives its influence in the world not only from great physical power but also from the fact that our basic laws and our national outlooks are premised on the equality and dignity of all men. The way to peace in this turbulent age is to keep to that vision; to work with all our might for the establishment of a structure of law that will be reliable and just to all nations. For though law alone cannot assure world peace, there can be no peace without it. Our national policy and all our energies should operate in the light of that truth.

Mr. GALLAGHER. One question which we would perhaps like to discuss, which you certainly touched on in your statement is the question that is really being posed today by many editorial writers, not ex-editorial writers as the former Under Secretary of State stated: "Would the world be better off without the United Nations?"

On that I would like to ask you to comment.

Mr. BALL. For anybody who has actually felt the responsibility of day-to-day conduct of foreign policy, who has lived through major crises such as the Cuban missile crisis and the problems we had in the Congo, some of the agonizing problems we had in Vietnam, and so on, the idea that we would have to conduct our policy without the availability of the United Nations would be a very startling and dismaying thought.

One does not have to believe that the United Nations is the solution of all problems to recognize that it serves a very useful purpose, and in fact a purpose which is probably quite essential in this present turbulent age.

We have all kinds of difficulties between our part of the world and the Soviet part of the world. There are many times when it is convenient to both sides to be able to avoid the direct, nasty confrontation which could lead to something bigger by resorting to the processes of the United Nations, even though there is a recognition on both sides that this is not going to solve the problem.

It is going to defuze the problem, it is going to wrap it up in a multilateral context making it easier for some kind of a compromise to be worked out which might be impossible if there were only a direct bilateral confrontation.

We see this again and again. There is nothing new about this. Take the problem like the Cyprus problem, which I lived through intimately when I was Under Secretary of State, there were two or three times when we were on the verge of a shooting war between Greece

and Turkey and when the Soviet Union was making rash statements about its own relationship and commitments to the Government of Cyprus, where, if this had been allowed to go forward without direct and assertive action on the part of the United States, then action within the U.N., but also within the U.N. later, we would have been in deep trouble. We could have had an explosion in the eastern end of the Mediterranean that would have threatened one whole flank of NATO and might have led to a direct shooting quarrel between ourselves and the Russians.

In such a case, to have the availability of the United Nations was a very useful thing. If one looks back at all of the speeches that were made in the Security Council, they were propagandistic and wordy speeches. They did not say very much except to overstate each side's position; nevertheless, the very process itself permitted the argument to wear itself out, so it never resulted in a big eruption.

This is something that, from the point of view of the conduct of policy in a world which still unhappily is a polarized world, is an essential fallback that we have to have. In the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union would have had a terrible time taking the missiles out of Cuba if it had not had the opportunity to wrap up all this in the proceedings of the Security Council with a great number of nations getting into the act. Thus the whole thing became an international incident in which a great many people on each side wanted to see a settlement.

All this worked out from the point of the view of the United States and the Western World very successfully. The U.N. did not solve the problem, but the U.N. provided the kind of fallback that enabled the problem to be solved.

I think this is perhaps the most useful role that it plays today and the most useful role that, given the polarization of the world, it can play.

So, to say because it does not solve all the problems we should get rid of it, is total nonsense in my opinion.

Mr. WIGGINS. If it did not exist, Mr. Chairman, I think we would be struggling to contrive its equivalent. I don't know whether in the present climate of the world we would do so very much better. I agree with Ambassador Ball that not only in the dramatic cases that he has cited, but in numberless other cases, the existence of the United Nations and the fact that it brings the representatives of all of the powers together in one place has permitted overtures and the openings toward the solutions of problems which, if they had to wait upon old-fashioned bilateral diplomacy, might have waited a long time for solution.

Although one gets annoyed with the impotence of some of its action and the futility of some of its measures, it may be building up a cumulative power of world opinion, which from this distance we are not capable of satisfactorily analyzing. I suppose that frequently we have to say whereas it has had failures with preventing the wars of this century, it may have had more success in forestalling the wars of the next century. We tend to be impatient and frustrated in solving contemporary problems, but maybe it is even more important to be working on the problems that could confront the next century.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would like to ask just one additional question so my colleagues will have some time. We hear a good deal about mis-

chances on Vietnam, of opportunities we have supposedly failed to take advantage of through the U.N. mechanism and the good offices of Secretary General U Thant, to bring an end to that conflict.

Were there, in fact, opportunities in your days where the U.N. could have provided a more meaningful mechanism toward peace in Vietnam—opportunities that the United States could have taken advantage of?

Mr. BALL. I have never thought so, quite frankly, Mr. Chairman. We were in a position where, as was pointed out by Ambassador Yost earlier, the principal dramatis personae were not available to us. They always gave the back of their hands to the United Nations.

The North Vietnamese were not members and the South Vietnamese have only an observer status. France, which has had a rather special role in the Vietnamese situation and could have played—particularly with the prestige of General de Gaulle—a useful role at one time, was again disdainful of the U.N. mechanism.

So, I have never believed that the U.N. could have done very much. Great efforts were made. Very serious, bonafide efforts were made on the part of the Secretary General and a great many other people, but I have never myself felt that if there had been a slightly different position taken or a slightly different nuance given to a particular policy, that it would have made any difference.

If the United States had been prepared simply to say we are going to get out of Vietnam and we would like the U.N. to help us get out, we could have used the U.N. for that. But that was not the policy of our Government then and it is not the policy of our Government today.

I think we are building up an enormous body of mythology about this which I don't think is very helpful.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ambassador Wiggins?

Mr. WIGGINS. I agree with the Under Secretary. I don't think any great opportunities were overlooked nor neglected. No openings that promised a solution were walked by with indifference.

One that caused the most excitement probably came when Adlai Stevenson was at the U.N. I cannot believe that he would be negligent in prosecuting any inquiry he felt hopeful.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Part of the mythology always seemed to be—and you are closer to it than we here at the Congress—if we did certain things, the Secretary General was quite prepared to carry on beyond the surface.

Mr. BALL. What the whole argument was about was the possibility of starting a dialog. Starting a dialog does not at all assure a complete settlement. All it does is provide some communication back and forth.

I watched this situation from a position of high responsibility in the State Department for a number of years. We never had any problems with starting a dialog if we were prepared to say anything that the other side wanted to hear or if the other side had been prepared to say anything that we were willing to listen to.

The fact is, we had positions which neither side was prepared to move very far from and, consequently, a settlement was impossible.

It was not a question of talking. It was a question of what we said and whether there is a possibility of coming together. In my judgment, there never was. If the United States had been willing to abandon its

position and to take a wholly different one, we would not have needed any apparatus to do that. We had a dozen lines of communications open at all times, through third parties, through disavowable unofficial representatives. The easiest thing in the world was to get messages back and forth.

Mr. ROYBAL. Are you, in fact, saying then that you would not need the United Nations under the circumstances you described?

Mr. BALL. I am saying that in order to have gotten into a discussion, there were any number of instrumentalities available to use. The United Nations could have been one, but we did not have to use it any more than we finally used it when we went to a conference in Paris. It was merely another channel.

The problem was that there was not the raw material for a settlement at that time.

Mr. FASCELL. There was nothing to talk about?

Mr. BALL. That's right.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Would you care to comment, Ambassador Wiggins?

Mr. WIGGINS. I would agree.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Then it would not be fair to chalk up with some doom the failure of the establishment of a dialog. Was it the failure of the U.N.?

Mr. BALL. It was the inability of the U.N. to come to grips with this problem. In order to settle Vietnam, either there had to be a complete capitulation or a substantial concession to the American view on the part of the North Vietnamese, or the great powers on each side had to be prepared to crack heads together and settle it.

None of those situations prevailed. The Soviet Union was not prepared to go very far in trying to influence the situation. On balance, I think the Russians would have preferred to see a solution than no solution. They had their own reasons for wanting to see the struggle ended, but they were not prepared to spend very much of their vested capital within the Communist Party system throughout the world, particularly given the competition from Peking.

They were not prepared to spend this capital to do it. Under the circumstances nothing happened, but that was not the fault of the U.N.

Mr. GALLAGHER. It would also be fair to say there were no missed opportunities on our part through the U.N. or failure to communicate with the good offices of the Secretary General?

Mr. BALL. There was no failure or delinquency on the part of the U.S. Government to utilize the procedures of the U.N., the channels of the U.N. If history makes a criticism, it may hold that our substantive policy in Vietnam was wrong, but that is something else again.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Gross?

Mr. GROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are many questions I would like to ask, but it is not possible and I don't know that it would serve any useful purpose.

With respect to Vietnam, are you two gentlemen saying there was no commitment on the part of the United Nations to do anything about Vietnam?

Mr. BALL. There never was.

Mr. GROSS. There is no obligation upon the United Nations? Let me ask this question: You have been in the State Department a long time, Mr. Ball. Why are we in Vietnam?

Mr. BALL. This requires a rather long answer.

Mr. GALLAGHER. We can bring that up again on the 50th anniversary.

Mr. GROSS. Can't you do it briefly? The question is: Is that a war of aggression or isn't it?

Mr. BALL. All of these words such as "aggression" are words which different people will interpret quite differently.

You asked me why we are in Vietnam and I will tell you. We are in Vietnam because it was the decision of two American administrations—and I think the present administration agrees—that it was essential that we maintain the lines that had been established in the postwar world between the Communists and the non-Communist worlds, and that if we were to permit an expansion of Communist influence and Communist power, this could result in setting in motion a process that could ultimately tip the balance between the two halves of the world.

It was the decision of the U.S. Government that the contest in Vietnam involved precisely that question—an effort by the Communist world to expand its power and influence into an area where it did not have it before.

There is a great deal of argument as to whether this was a proper interpretation of the facts, as to whether this was indeed something that could be regarded as a dangerous extension of Communist power, because there is an ambiguity as to the nature of the war.

You asked me why we are there and I can only say this was the decision of the U.S. Government taken at the time as to the nature of the situation and that a military reaction was deemed necessary.

Mr. GROSS. May I ask a simple question of both of you gentlemen.

Do you consider this to be a war of aggression on the part of the North Vietnamese?

Mr. BALL. There is aggression on the side of North Vietnam. I have had my own private views of the war for a very long time. I held those views when I was in the U.S. Government. I think they are fairly well known. Not only was there aggression on the part of the North Vietnamese, but there were also the elements of an internal revolt. Thus there were a great many factors involved other than Communist expansionism.

So, I never thought this was a clear-cut situation. I thought Vietnam was poor and difficult terrain on which we should make a military stand, but that is neither here nor there. The fact was that the Government did make the decision to do it.

The problem now is how do we get ourselves out of it in a manner that minimizes breakage and maintains the integrity of our position to the greatest extent possible?

Mr. WIGGINS. I have no hesitation in describing it as aggression if aggression contemplates the crossing of a frontier by one armed force engaged in operation against another.

Mr. GROSS. Was there not an obligation on the part of the U.N. to do something about it?

Mr. WIGGINS. In the broad sense that the charter created an organization to create the peace, one has to acknowledge there was a reason for the United Nations to concern itself with this and with other emergencies. As Mr. Ball has explained and as Ambassador Yost explained, there were repeated overtures at New York and consulta-

tions with the Secretary General, the attitude of the Security Council was explored, the position of the Assembly, and it became quite clear it would be an exercise in futility in view of the nonpreparation of the principal countries involved and a certainty in advance that this was a situation in which the great powers would be able to agree on the use of a force of the kind that was employed in Korea. It was perfectly clear that it would not have worked.

Mr. GROSS. And in view of the fact that only two or three nations in the entire wide world had any appetite for that war.

Let me ask you another question: What is your position with respect to seating Communist China in the United Nations?

Mr. BALL. Personally, I think we probably use up more political capital than we should in trying to maintain the present position, the position of this being an important question and making certain that we have the votes to exclude Communist China. I think the time has probably come when we should move toward a two-China solution. The Communists would not accept it, but it would make our position more rational and responsible in the eyes of the world and we would have to use up a lot less political capital trying to support it than we now do.

We ought to move gradually toward the acceptance of the fact that a quarter or a fifth of the whole human race in China can't be ignored so far as concerns an institution which calls itself a universal institution. But this does not mean that we should be willing to see the government in Taiwan thrown out and the government in Peking reinstalled.

This is a situation where we ought to say there is something which is called Mainland China that has a right to a place in the United Nations just as the government in Taiwan has a place. I don't think we would change the result because Peking would not come in under those circumstances, but we would certainly avoid having to spend so much political capital to support what I think is a bankrupt position.

Mr. WIGGINS. I think the Chinese problem has stamped on the bottom of it "Made in China"; that the attitude in the United Nations and in the United States would differ a great deal if Mainland China had exhibited an inclination to pursue ordinary diplomatic means with other countries of the world and dealt as most nations do with the diplomats that have been accredited to it and to face out to the world with a more enlightened attitude.

The form in which this question presented itself to the United Nations General Assembly has always been in the form of the so-called Albanian Resolution, which was a resolution to unseat the Republic of China on Taiwan and to seat the People's Republic of China in its place.

I go into this in somewhat more detail in the statement I gave the chairman. This would be a curious position for the organization to take and the fact that the last two sessions of the General Assembly have very emphatically voted against this solution and the fact that it has voted with very large majorities for a resolution that it is an important question and must be passed by a two-thirds majority.

I see very little immediate prospect of a solution and it is very difficult to see how under the terms of the charter you can unseat Nationalist China as the charter is written. Wisely or unwisely, the

charter was written with a curious inflexibility, reference who are the great powers of the world. It is a curious aspect of the changing decade since not only has the territory and population controlled by Nationalist China diminished enormously, but so has the territory and population controlled by Great Britain and that which is controlled by France and the five great powers in the initial charter.

Only the Soviet Union and the United States retain an unimpeachable title to be called a great power. It is another anomaly of the charter that presently Japan has no seat among the permanent members of the Security Council nor has India, which by territory and population could make a substantial claim.

It is a weakness, I think, in the charter that it provides no ready means for reconciling the constitution of the Security Council with the changing world and the specification of the great power members in the charter itself seems a very, very curious thing to put in a very fundamental document, and in reality means should have been made available in the charter for reconciling it from time to time with the diminishing or accelerating power of different nations who might thus have been given an important place on the Council.

Of course, there is a substantial amount of opinion that the power vested in the five permanent members is undemocratic and that it never should have been constituted in this matter. But whatever criticism there may be of the charter, it is very difficult at this point to see how either the charter itself can be amended since each of the great powers has veto on many amendments, or how any of the sitting members of the permanent members of the Security Council should be unseated, since, if it came to a pinch, the foreign minister of any nation sitting there can present himself and take his seat and not be challenged by the whole Council or subjected to the examination of his credentials.

In spite of all of the language about the two-China policy, I find it very difficult to see how in practical terms it could be effected.

Mr. GROSS. That is one of the great accomplishments of Alger Hiss—the inability to do anything about the United Nations Charter. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question about control of the seabed while these gentlemen are here, but I yield since I have had more than my fair share of time.

Mr. FASCELL. I was struck by a perennial discussion going on in the Congress and our seniority system and how we ought to get rid of our chairmen and it does not make any difference whether they are conservative or liberal, but just because they are old, they should go.

All kinds of ideas have been suggested as to how we should vote and how we should exercise some wisdom and pick "the best man." All of that sounds great, but the only thing that counts in the U.N. is whether you have enough votes and the same is true in Congress.

Mr. BALL. The older I get the more sympathetic I am with the standard of seniority.

Mr. GROSS. Would the gentleman yield very briefly?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, I yield.

Mr. GROSS. When I left the House floor, they were beginning to mop up the blood from this morning's Democratic caucus.

Mr. FASCELL. As one who participated and witnessed the discussion that went on, my colleague will be nauseated and unhappy to realize

there was no blood spilled at all. We had a very, very sensible discussion without a major confrontation. It was actually a love session.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I wouldn't go that far.

Mr. FASCELL. The only confrontation that took place was one of the major participants who got clobbered went out and told the press he won.

Mr. GROSS. Why don't you submit that to the United Nations?

Mr. FASCELL. We have demagogs in the United States as well. I am not so sure we could ever get away from some system that would say the United States is a great power. We don't have much territory and we have 200 million people and the population explosion is going to catch up with us.

I am not ready to make that change yet, although philosophically and ideally and all that might have some bearing. So the U.N. is imperfect. There is no question about that and we are playing for our position as we see it and interpret it and we just have to hope we are doing a sensible and reasonable thing as we go along.

I don't see any major changes in the U.N. Charter that will change the China situation. One is a purely political situation of the United States with respect to policy we hung onto for a long time, which Ambassador Ball says is bankrupt, and the other is the practical problem we are confronted with in a major effort year after year after year to maintain political resources, in terms of political capital which we expend, in terms of all of the negotiations that take place all over the world in order to make that vote and yet I would submit if we just said, "OK, you are in," they would not come in under any circumstances and maybe we ought to gamble for that kind of gambit.

Mr. BALL. I don't think it is much of a gamble. Relations between the United States and the government in Peking are fundamentally a problem of our relations with the government in Taiwan. As long as we maintain the relations which we have with the government of Taiwan, we have little chance of materially changing our relations with the Peking government.

We might as well relax and enjoy it. It is one of the facts of life, which does not mean that we should not put a better face on it since it costs us too much to maintain a position which by and large most of the world thinks is irrational.

Certainly to get the votes in the U.N., we have paid heavily from time to time. We might as well be frank about that. I wholly agree that it is not going to change anything substantive because the mainland Chinese Government is going to come in only on its own terms and not merely we, but most of the leading members of the United Nations are not going to accept those terms.

Mr. FASCELL. Both of you gentlemen have had long distinguished careers prior to the political ones which you enjoy. I have a funny feeling and I will just state a proposition that the Red Chinese could get in any time they wanted to. They don't want in and they want to put the onus on keeping out on the United States.

Mr. BALL. They don't want to come in at all.

Mr. FASCELL. Going one step further, we did manage to get more votes on the China question this time than last time.

Mr. WIGGINS. Two fewer.

Mr. FASCELL. One time we went down to a tie vote.

Mr. WIGGINS. It was quite a way back.

Mr. FASCELL. Whenever it was, we worked our way up, and yet I detect a growing independence on the part of our Latin friends and African friends with respect to the China question and other questions, and I am just wondering what should be the posture——

Mr. WIGGINS. Excuse me. It was 1965.

Mr. FASCELL. What should the posture be if next time we get defeated on that vote? Should we just let that happen or have an alternative plan?

Mr. BALL. I don't think it would ever happen in those terms. We would never be defeated on the Albanian resolution. What would happen is that an intermediate proposal would be put forward which would result in a position, that, in my judgment, would be unacceptable to the mainland Chinese. If we got in a position where it was clear we did not have the votes to carry things exactly the way we want them, I think that is the move anybody who is responsible at that time would make.

The question is whether we ought to move in that direction on our own.

Mr. WIGGINS. There is one question about moving in that direction which I think you have to examine for a moment, and that is if, as Secretary Ball suggests, a mere resolution to admit Red China would be rebuffed by Red China, you would have gone through an empty exercise for a certain political effect. It would not have been an exercise without any price tag on it because it would have involved a certain amount of embarrassment to repudiate our ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan and it would suggest the possibility of an alteration of our policies in other places in the Pacific and the Asian area.

Moreover, over a period of time it has to be acknowledged that the Republic of China on Taiwan considered on its own has not been a difficult, recalcitrant, or disobedient member of the United Nations. It has a pretty good record in the United Nations and it is not without friends in the United Nations.

Mr. BALL. It is a question of how much we are willing to pay to maintain the status quo, which now is more than it should be. I would agree with Ambassador Wiggins that it is not going to result in any substantive change in the situation but it would generally be regarded as a move by the United States toward a somewhat more rational position on behalf of our friends around the world.

Mr. FASCELL. I am not discussing the merits or advocating the admission of Red China. It would seem to me with the efforts of the present administration and its foreign policy position which they don't like to call disengagement worldwide, which is the way I read it, partnership in Latin America and friendship in Africa and Vietnamization of the war in Vietnam and so on, I wonder how long we are going to be able to hold onto those positions.

The negotiations are open to the left. We have this kind of a ball game going on. We are taking a whole new look at all new policies. We are not breaking any commitments, but we are not getting into any new ones, and this kind of thing. So I am not as confident that we are going to maintain a position at the U.N. on what is a major cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy at least up until right now.

Mr. BALL. I think it is a cornerstone that does not support very much.

Mr. GROSS. The U.S. or U.N.?

Mr. BALL. We pay a lot for our rigid position on Red China I think we could move toward a different policy, reduce the political cost and change nothing as far as China is concerned but simply be in a more generally well-regarded position around the world.

Mr. FASCELL. I have one thing and then I am through.

Ambassador Yost here has had a lifetime career in Government service. Ambassador Ball has had a lifetime in law and then capping it with a great career in public service. Ambassador Wiggins was in the newspaper business and a very great man in this field and then capping it with a political career There is a threat from these three different fields of life and I don't know if there is a commonality of ideology in any sense, but I detect on the basis of your judgment, your experience, your analysis of the United Nations and the U.S. role in the United Nations a common thread which is expressed in the answers to your questions and in the statements which you presented.

Do both of you agree with the thrust made by Ambassador Yost that our problems with respect to the United Nations and the U.S. role is not a fruitless search to change the charter?

Mr. BALL. I agree totally. An effort to change the charter now would be either a futility or a disaster.

Mr. WIGGINS. I agree.

Mr. BALL. All one has to do is look at the problem of getting a new Secretary General to find out the agonies of that course.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Frelinghuysen?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I want to apologize for not being present for most of this testimony. I have a competing subcommittee that is beginning hearings and I had to go there.

I have been somewhat astonished by what I have heard. It seems to me we have somewhat gotten off course if we are interested in the U.N. as a useful instrument, or ways of making it useful, and the usefulness of the U.N. to the United States I don't think it would make one iota of difference with respect to the U.N. as an instrument if the United States should do an about-face and say we think Red China should be admitted.

We would certainly destroy our relationship with the Republic of China on Taiwan and I would think a change in our position would have quite an unsettling influence in other areas, too. Yet, I would suppose it would not make any difference with respect to Red China's feeling about us or the United Nations, except to make us seem more naive.

So, if we are talking about the future, it seems to me we might get down to practicalities.

Both of you gentlemen have talked about the importance of eliminating imperfections. I think that was your expression, Ambassador Wiggins, and your emphasis was on improving procedures. What specifically might we do to prevent a further deterioration in the

usefulness of the U.N. as an instrument to help preserve peace or safeguard against aggression, or to protect our own interests?

Isn't that what we are really talking about? Mr. Fascell has mentioned the fact that there are so many countries in the United Nations now that they can gang up on us pretty much any time they want. Well, they can't make us make contributions if we don't want to. We can be delinquent. Perhaps we are delinquent already because Congress has been stingy in making appropriations this year. I do think there is a real question with respect to the admission of additional member nations which are too small to support their responsibilities.

The Ambassador suggested that perhaps something might be done in this area. Is there any way in which you gentlemen think we could slow down the number of states that apply? Or is the record already so bad that there is no way to draw the line, giving some kind of associate membership to countries comparable to the Maldive Islands or others we might mention?

Mr. BALL. The degree of expansion of the General Assembly has passed beyond the point where it probably makes much difference, but I would like to see a line drawn someplace short of total absurdity.

This is a difficult problem to do anything about, as Ambassador Wiggins will tell you, because no nation wants to be against admission of another country since that new member may be another vote on its side. So in my experience, the Soviet Union would never support the idea of qualified membership nor would you find most of the other major powers in favor of a qualified membership that would relieve nations from having to support full-time representatives or that would enable a representative of one country to act for a number of different nations in order to reduce expenses.

The General Assembly is a huge body and the disparity between resources and number is grotesque.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Are you equally pessimistic about a further slowing down of applications or preventing additional mini-nations from becoming full members?

Mr. WIGGINS. I am pretty doubtful that anything could be done, but I think it is unreasonable to project the admission of more and more so-called mini-states. As Secretary Ball has pointed out, the disparity between the realities of political power and the one vote for each sovereign state sometimes is really upsetting in terms of the unreality—the aura of unreality that it gives to the proceedings of the General Assembly.

I would like to say one thing and I am not so sure Mr. Ball would agree to it, but he referred to it in his constructive statement, and that is there is no bad thing to have many of these smaller states have a college education in diplomacy at the U.N. instead of having them excluded from the Assembly. Some good derives from a collision of argument from the initimate relations that arise among the diplomats at the United Nations General Assembly.

It is not without some redeeming aspects. Since the powers of the General Assembly are recommendatory and not compulsory and endorsible upon all the members, I am not sure that on balance the proliferation of memberships has been altogether bad.

Were you to regard it as the equivalent of the House of Representatives, you would have produced an almost unmanageable assembly,

but it has to be remembered that the Assembly is a convocation of sovereign states and not an assembly of freewheeling and independent representatives of states. The problem of the mini-state is an annoyance and a nuisance, but I think it is not one of the problems fatal to the future of the United Nations.

Mr. BALL. I would agree with what Ambassador Wiggins has said. The General Assembly is a finishing school for future foreign ministers; to this extent it serves a useful purpose. It gives the representatives of these small countries an experience in parliamentary diplomacy that is helpful.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The more difficult problem is the Security Council. Mr. Yost said, I believe, that more care could be used in the selection of Security Council members. Ambassador Wiggins, you have been very forthright in saying that the so-called major powers with permanent seats are no longer major while major powers in practice are not even recognized as permanent members. Is there any way of controlling that situation? How can real power be recognized insofar as power is exercised anywhere?

We can argue that the Security Council has been moving in the wrong direction. That is what Ambassador Yost was implying by saying that perhaps we had not looked carefully enough at the credentials of those who serve as members of the Security Council and that more care should be applied in the future in the selection of members.

Are you at all optimistic that anything can be done to correct the trend that is developing in that area?

Mr. WIGGINS. In 1963, the United Nations succeeded in increasing the numbers in the Security Council from 11 to 15. That was an alteration that was brought with the consent of all of the permanent members. I think that any alteration of the constitution of the Security Council contemplated has to be undertaken with the acknowledgement that it has to have the consent of the permanent members.

There is one thing about the selection of the nonpermanent members which I think has been operative in a way not to improve the quality of the Security Council—I don't know whether you agree with me or not—and that is the tendency not to rename a representative of a state. Some very useful members of the Security Council have been precluded from reelection by convention and custom in the U.N. not to reelect the sectional choices of the various powers.

I think that, on the whole, that has operated badly as far as the quality of the Council.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You are not suggesting that anything could be done about reversing that practice?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes; there is nothing in the charter to prevent you from changing that.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Isn't there the pressure of countries that have not served that want their chance at rotation? In other words, perhaps the major powers, so-called, are not really able to call the shots. They still have the power of the purse strings, but even in this area there are very real pressures. As far as the Security Council is concerned, I don't suppose it was pressure from the permanent members that resulted in the increase in the size of the Security Council. In-

deed, you might well argue that it was against the best interests of the permanent members to have such an increase. You certainly might argue against a further increase, but the pressures are very real, I would assume, in both of these cases.

Mr. BALL. I would go a little further than Ambassador Wiggins goes. I think it was a great mistake in 1963 when we enlarged the size of the Security Council. It was a great mistake for a number of reasons.

It made the original purpose of the Security Council more difficult to carry out. The conception, as I tried to point out in my statement of the Security Council, was that there would be a great power agreement to settle local quarrels and to prevent them from growing into big ones.

Once we changed the ratio of the permanent to the nonpermanent members from five to six, which it was originally, to five to 10 which it is today, we diluted the ability of the great powers to do anything effective.

Beyond that, we tended to inject the bloc politics of the General Assembly into the Security Council. This is what Ambassador Wiggins is talking about. The reason you have this selection system is that you have bloc politics that work.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Maybe it is a good thing for world order and preservation of peace that you truss up the big powers so they are incapable of discharging their responsibilities as an individual state. On the other hand, it may not be an improvement to substitute for that kind of power, the bloc politics of a number of small countries ganging up on the big powers.

So perhaps the trend should be registered of numbers influencing the result, because, in the Assembly at least, resolutions are an exercise in futility unless the big powers go along. This may create frictions and unwillingness to work with the United Nations on the part of the big powers, whereas, as a practical matter, it is important that we use the U.N. as a major instrument of international cooperation.

Mr. BALL. I think it would be far better if one had the power to shrink rather than increase the power of the Security Council. There are many situations that develop around the world where there is a local conflict in which two small states get into trouble with one another.

They get so deeply involved for either emotional or racial reasons that they are totally incapable of resolving the problems.

Under the concert of Europe the great powers would have moved in and cracked heads together. That is what the Security Council was intended to be. By diluting of the power of the permanent members, it makes it much more difficult to do that, even in those situations where the two superpowers might be prepared to move along more or less parallel courses.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Secretary Ball, you mentioned in your prepared statement that there should be areas where superpower agreement can be reached in order to permit effective U.N. action. I refer to the statement on page 4. How do you feel about the usefulness and the effectiveness of the U.N. action in the social and economic field? Is this an area that has been productive and should be utilized to a greater degree?

How about the usefulness of the U.N. in the field of environmental pollution and so on?

Mr. BALL. I think it could be useful. One of the problems in talking about the U.N. is that we tend to talk about the whole great conglomeration as though it were a single thing. There are useful economic activities that are carried out on by the U.N. and there are useful social activities—environment is a case in point—where the U.N. can do some helpful things. It does not necessarily require a U.N. to do that.

You could set up ad hoc bodies around the world that could carry on those tasks on a multilateral basis. It has been convenient to bring them under the umbrella of the U.N. but we should be quite clear whether we are talking specifically about the peacekeeping activities of the U.N. which are political and where, if Mr. Gross were still here, I would point out that the U.S. contribution is only about $40 million a year, which is what most people in the world think about as the United Nations.

Then there are all of these ancillary activities which are only somewhat accidentally associated with the U.N. itself.

Mr. FREYLINGHUYSEN. I don't mean to impose on the committee's time.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Roybal.

Mr. ROYBAL. The United States seems to have friends and enemies and nothing in between. Those who are against the United Nations want it abolished completely and the friends look at the United Nations as the only hope for peace in the world. I am glad it was pointed out that their only function is not peacekeeping, that there are many other economic and social functions they also perform.

However, the one thing that people seem to be interested in is the U.N.'s success or failure with regard to keeping the peace. This, I think, is where the real controversy arises. People have not been informed of the other functions of the United Nations. I think to a great extent the United Nations is primarily to blame, not only because of the propaganda it sends, but also because of the different organizations that are going out in the community to sell the United Nations. But I still feel, that the one thing that will keep the United Nations in the limelight and make its functions important is whatever it can do with regard to peacekeeping.

Some argue that in order to have peace, you must have more countries in the United Nations. How, they say, can one get to know one another if we never meet, and they argue that it should become larger and larger. I think your position is that it should not become larger.

Mr. BALL. I don't envisage the United Nations as a lonely hearts society.

Mr. ROYBAL. You anticipated my question. Therefore, I will go ahead and ask another question.

What are the dangers confronting the United Nations if many more mini-nations come into it? What are the specific dangers and why the opposition to it?

Mr. BALL. I will say a word and then Ambassador Wiggins can say a word.

I don't think the dangers are tremendous because they affect only the General Assembly and have no effect on the Security Council.

They do, however, increase the disparity between real and symbolic political power—I don't think that is an enormously serious matter.

The General Assembly does educate people in parliamentary diplomacy. So long as it is not too much of an expensive burden on tiny countries—if they have to keep a fellow here all the time, it costs them an awful lot of money.

Mr. WIGGINS. This is a problem with the mini-states. What you touched on lastly is not the problem in terms of a tiny country that is no larger than a city-state with the burdens of membership and the duty of paying an assessment which is set at a certain minimum for all states of any size, which is presently about $60,000 a year now.

This is not a small burden for them, and it is questionable whether it is a burden, whether their political situation in the world justifies.

In terms of the General Assembly, the psychological matter of the disparity between the political realities in the world and the fact that states representing only a handful of people have shared an equal vote with the greatest nations in the world in the Assembly is a problem of some kind in terms of the world's acceptance of the pronouncements and the philosophical statements by the General Assembly.

Financially, the criticism is frequently made that the United States pays as much as the next 24 members toward the support of the United Nations, a disproportionate share of the total costs of the United Nations. And as the small members increase in number, that disproportionate contribution becomes even more glaring and apparent.

The unwieldiness of the body is another aspect of the matter, but I think what the administration has been worrying about is not so much the present, but the prospect that there is no limit whatever on the proliferation of states that might hereafter occur.

It is conceivable that you could double the General Assembly under the existing situation except for the fact that the Security Council and the General Assembly do have a check on admission of members without any elaboration on the charter or any alteration of the rules.

Mr. ROYBAL. One argument is that it would be so cumbersome, nothing would be accomplished.

Mr. WIGGINS. A check now exists.

Mr. BALL. It is the same problem you have, Mr. Congressman, whether you are going to give the franchise to young people under 21.

Mr. ROYBAL. These are questions people ask of me and I am seeking information that I can use in the district. People in my district contend that if more nations come into the United Nations, that that would mean more money to spend—that is, if these countries are not in arrears and pay their bills. If this were to be the fact, more money would be used for economic and social development, particularly since three-fourths of the budget of the United Nations and staff is used for this purpose.

So it is argued that spending three-fourths of the budget for economic and social development helps develop friendship throughout the world.

Mr. BALL. It is a question of whether the money a state spends is a good use of its resources.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Congressman Mailliard?

Mr. MAILLIARD. Both of you have also raised the question on the same subject—whether it is proper use of intellectual resources. Some

of these countries have so few leaders. I can remember in 1963 sitting next to a brandnew member from a small non-state in Africa where, if I recall, he told me that he was one of four college graduates in his country.

I would think that even more than the money which they could ill afford, they could probably afford even less to have him sitting in New York most of the year.

Mr. BALL. I wholly agree with that. That is a very valid point. I am always concerned about questions of that kind, because last night someone told me the story of Peter the Great in Europe—when he was in London, sitting next to the Lord Chancellor, who was discussing the problems of the bar in England and Peter the Great was asking him questions.

Peter the Great concluded the conversation by saying, "You know, in Russia we only have two lawyers and when I get home, I am going to hang one of them."

Mr. MAILLIARD. Do you see any practical means of turning this back? Having admitted the Maldive Islands and a few others, I don't see how you are going to muster the votes to deny membership to any state that becomes, in fact, sovereign.

Mr. WIGGINS. There is a question of whether the charter permits expulsion.

Mr. BALL. Various schemes have been drawn up to establish different degrees or levels of membership where one would reclassify the members with certain rights and obligations.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Can that be done without a charter change?

Mr. BALL. I don't believe so.

Mr. WIGGINS. There are some representatives without full membership. There is already in existence some kind of quasifull membership.

Mr. BALL. I don't think the charter itself defines requirements for membership and I don't think you could say to a state you are a class C member

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Perhaps the more important question is the question of membership on the Security Council. Isn't it open to question whether Burundi and Syria really should qualify under normal circumstances for membership on the Security Council? As I recall, membership means that a country should be able to make a substantial contribution toward the purposes for which the organization was founded.

Well, could Syria really qualify and how about Burundi? The decision is done on a bloc basis as I understand it, and on no other test. Isn't this really a more serious question than whether or not the Maldive Islands should receive full status?

Mr. BALL. I would agree it was.

Mr. MAILLIARD. As a matter of fact, for the members of the Security Council, we have had some rather remarkable individuals from some small countries who made substantial contributions. I was there in 1963 and I thought increasing the size was a step we should avoid if we possibly could.

Apparently the decision was we couldn't avoid it, so that was that. I would like to ask one final question. The hour is getting late here. This is a question we are going to be wrestling with and I ask it of you particularly, Mr. Ball, because of the position that you occupied

in the past and also you are not inhibited by allegiance to the present administration.

In this whole aid question—and Ambassador Yost was very specific in his presentation that he was disappointed in the direction in which we are going in economic development funds, and we are getting into a period where I suspect some rather hard decisions are going to be made as to the multilateral route, the bilateral route or a combination of both. If multilateral, should it be through regional organizations or should it go through the U.N.?

I have great respect for you and I would really like for my own information to know what your views are. You are in a slightly more detached position than you might have been a few years ago.

Mr. BALL. I was never able to look at the problem, Mr. Mailliard, in a totally objective way because the practical problem was that the House Foreign Affairs Committee had very well-defined views that were diametrically opposed to the views of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Things have not changed. I am beginning to sense now that the House views may be coming a little closer to the Senate's and I just wonder what your views would be. I have always thought multilateralism is great, but since we may go wholly in that direction, I am getting a little nervous.

Mr. BALL. As far as aid through multilateral institutions is concerned, it does have the advantage, in case of a well-run multilateral institution such as the World Bank that the international institution is able to insist upon measures being taken by nation-state to whom aid is made available without incurring all of the political disadvantages and political problem that would result if, say, the United States as a government were to try to insist on it. This is the big advantage of multilateral aid. It works better through the Bretton Woods institutions than through the United Nations. The Bretton Woods institutions assure a more controlled and, therefore, more efficient and less politicized approach toward the problem.

When a program is involved in the framework of the United Nations and 100-some nations are involved, bloc politics and all of the other politics that prevail in the United Nations tend to have a larger role.

At the same time, what has been done—particularly by Paul Hoffman's organization—has been very helpful, but this has been, as Ambassador Yost or Ambassador Wiggins pointed out, not so much through the transfer of capital resources as by the provision of technical assistance particularly the preaid surveys which are made, resource surveys which have been helpful and useful.

I would not put everything in the United Nations. I would not put everything in the World Bank or the Bretton Woods institutions, nor would I do everything through direct bilateral programs. There are advantages in direct bilateral programs, and I think we would be less than candid if we did not admit they have a political as well as an economic function. There are real advantages in the United States being able to say from time to time that we are going to provide aid because of a standard of political conduct that a particular country has exhibited. That would be tacitly understood.

I would certainly agree with Ambassador Yost that the level of aid we are providing is far too low.

Mr. MAILLIARD. May I ask one more question to explore the record and to get your reaction.

A few years ago a former chairman of our subcommittee on inter-American affairs, Mr. Fascell's predecessor in that capacity made a trip to several South American countries, and finally by the end of a couple of weeks we would come across a project and we would say, without even asking anybody, "Aha, this one is financed with the social progress trust funds of the Inter-American Development Bank," because if the management looked extremely bad, you could be sure. So here was a case where, since they were using our funds from a soft-loan window, they did not apply the standards you are talking about as applied by the Bretton Woods Institutions. I think maybe the regional institutions do well with the bank's own funds but when we used it as a funnel, there was sometimes very sloppy administration. That is a great temptation.

Mr. BALL. I would agree this problem does exist.

Mr. GALLAGHER. On behalf of the committee, we want to thank you gentlemen for giving us the benefit of your experience and wisdom. We thank you for being with us today, and for the great contributions you have made both to the United Nations and to the United States in allowing us to get to a 25th anniversary. Thank you very much.

The subcommittee stands adjourned until 2:30 tomorrow afternoon when we will hear from Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Wadsworth.

(The subcommittee recessed at 5:05 p.m., to reconvene at 2:30, Thursday, February 19, 1970.)

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

United Nations in the Perspective of the Past Quarter Century

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1970

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONA
ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3:10 p.m., pursuant to call, in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman) presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

We meet this afternoon in continuance of our hearings marking the observance of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations.

Yesterday, at our opening session, the committee was privileged to hear testimony from three distinguished Americans who have represented our country at the United Nations—Ambassador Charles W. Yost, who is presently serving as the permanent U.S. representative in the United Nations. and Ambassadors George Ball and James Russell Wiggins, who occupied that position in the past.

As we continue in our initial task of viewing the accomplishment and the failures of the United States in the perspective of the past 25 years, we are pleased indeed to welcome here two outstanding public servants who, among their many duties, have represented our country in the United Nations.

On behalf of the committee, I welcome Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who recently returned from Paris, where he headed the U.S. team engaged in the Vietnam peace talks; and

Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, who took the time from his busy schedule as U.S. representative on the Intelsat Conference to be with us today.

Gentlemen, we have your excellent statements before us. You may proceed in any way you wish.

It is a great pleasure to have you with us, today.

(Biographical sketches of the witnesses follow:)

Henry Cabot Lodge, who until recently headed the U.S. Delegation to the Paris peace talks, has had a long and distinguished career of government service and served as United State Representative to the United Nations from 1953 to 1960.

A native of Massachusetts, Ambassador Lodge received degrees from Harvard and the Northeastern University. He was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1936 and reelected in 1942 but resigned to join the U.S. Army; elected again in 1946, he served in the U.S. Senate until 1953. During the next eight years, he represented the United States in the United Nations. In 1960, he was the Republican

nominee for Vice President. Subsequently, he served as U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam (1963–64 and 1965–67) and as the head of the U.S. Delegation to the Paris peace talks from January 5, 1969 to November 20, 1969.

James J. Wadsworth, member of the U.S. Delegation to the INTELSAT Conference, served as Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations from 1960 to 1961.

Ambassador Wadsworth, a native of New York, is a graduate of Yale and Alfred Universities. He served as a member of the New York State Legislature (1931–41) and in several government posts. In 1953, he became deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations and remained in that position until 1960 when he became permanent U.S. Representative. He subsequently served as a member of the Federal Communications Commission (1965–69).

Ambassador Wadsworth has been an officer of Freedom House; the Peace Research Institute; the People to People program; U.S. Commission of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation; U.S. Committee for the United Nations; and other organizations. He is the author of *The Price of Peace* and *The Glass House*.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ambassador Lodge.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE

Ambassador LODGE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me. It is indeed a privilege to appear before a committee of Members of Congress who under our Constitution are the long-range policymakers for the Nation.

I do not know how much I can contribute to your consideration of this important question. I have been out of touch with United Nations affairs since 1960. It is true that I served for almost 8 years before that, and it has been suggested to me that there may be some usefulness in that.

Perhaps it would be fair to say that at the time that I was at the United Nations it was what diplomats call a "power fact." It was something to be reckoned with—something which nations could use positively and innovatively—if one could get a two-thirds vote.

A good example was the action which the United Nations took after the 1956 Suez crisis when it first created the United Nations Force and then obtained a two-thirds vote to station this Force in the Gaza strip and at the entrance of Aqaba where it stayed for about 11 years. I am told today by gentlemen who are now on duty at the United Nations that such a two-thirds vote would be almost impossible to obtain today.

Here are some other actions which were taken during the years that I was there.

The United Nations sent 20,000 United Nations troops from 21 countries to the Congo at the time of the Belgian withdrawal. This had the effect of preventing the Congo from becoming a bone of contention between the great powers and thus prevented a Communist takeover of that enormous country.

In 1958, the United Nations, by rejecting Soviet attempts to condemn us, in effect validated the action which we had taken by intervening in Lebanon in 1958 and which, I do not doubt, had the effect of preventing the subversion of that small country at that time.

When in the spring of 1960, a U–2 plane was shot down over the Soviet Union, one of our planes, we were able to bring about the defeat of the Soviet motion to condemn us. We did so by showing the espionage activities which the Soviet Union had conducted against

us—including even the office of the American Ambassador in Moscow—and asked what kind of logic it was which made it all right for them to spy on us although wrong for us to attempt to obtain information with which to protect ourselves.

That same year, the United Nations played a very active role in mobilizing world opinion to help to bring about the liberation of our Air Force officers—Captain Olmstead and Captain McKone of the RB-47 plane—who had been shot down over the White Sea by Soviet airplanes and were imprisoned in Moscow.

It was during this period that the Trusteeship Council ushered a large number of erstwhile colonies into the world of sovereign nation states—a development of historic significance in which the United States was ably represented by Mason Sears.

A factor of special importance during my service at the United Nations was the subtle yet penetrating intellect of the Secretary General, the late Dag Hammarskjold, who saw chances for the United Nations to use its influences and had the courage to use them.

I do no doubt that the United Nations is still useful today even though circumstances are different. When the attitudes and interests of the great powers coincide on the value of damping down disputes between nations, the Security Council and a cooperative Secreary General, working together, can help stabilize local conflicts and keep the lid on while peaceful processes are given a chance. This has been true in varying ways and degrees in Cyprus and Kashmir.

The Middle East, on the other hand, shows how difficult it is to engage the United Nations profitably in coping with deep-seated conflicts, when the great powers see their interests differently.

In the past decade, the utility of the United Nations as a place for quiet diplomatic exchanges has grown. It continues to function as a great training school for diplomatists who come to it from all over the world. They learn something about us and we, I am sure, learn something about them.

But, of course, water cannot rise about its source and miracles are not to be expected. It is rather like an airport; it is not the fault of the airport and staff if planes don't choose to land.

Looking ahead, I see new usefulness for the United Nations in fields of activity which by their very nature are—and must always be—international, and President Nixon referred to that in his message to Congress yesterday. I mention as examples the seabed and outer space. Pollution of air, land, and sea do not respect international borders, as we read every day in the papers. It should therefore provide opportunities for useful work by the United Nations.

The specialized agencies of the United Nations do much good work in such widely varying fields as, for example, health and aviation. The United Nations development program, which carries on a program of technical assistance and preinvestment surveys, is an excellent undertaking worthy of more credit than it receives. Under this program, we Americans get much more for our money, I believe, than we would on a bilateral basis—for one reason, because the United Nations can hire well-qualified foreign personnel who cost, at the most, half of what corresponding American personnel would cost.

It is also advantageous to us because, obviously, many more countries participate than is the case with aid which we give out alone.

There is also the advantage that the United Nations can prod and push small governments—prodding which it would be very difficult for them to accept from us, but which they do accept when it comes from the United Nations.

Yet, in spite of all these advantages, our interests are completely protected and the United Nations Development Program can never be used against us. I also believe that our participation in this program gets us praise for supporting an altruistic activity.

The leader in this constructive undertaking is a truly great American, Paul Hoffman, who has added this United Nations program to his great achievements as the Administrator of the Marshall Plan just after World War II ended, a plan which undoubtedly saved Western Europe from communism.

Mr. Chairman, a number of uncomplimentary things have been said about the United Nations and, of course, when the United Nations brings pressure to bear on a nation and the pressure is effective, then that particular nation doesn't like it and the United Nations makes enemies. And when the United Nations does nothing, on the other hand, it often appears ridiculous. One very distinguished American said it was a do-it-yourself kit with several pieces missing. But does not that phrase describe the present state of international relations?

Of course, the United Nations is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. Also, it cannot be our sole reliance for building a peaceful world. It is, to be sure, the only place in which the free world meets both the Communist and the so-called nonalined worlds in a regular and institutionalized way.

Frankness compels me to say it is not a factor for unifying the free world. Indeed, the United Nations is a place where our adversaries try constantly to divide us and we must be ever on the alert to ward this off.

I believe, therefore, that a strong case can be made for greater cohesion within the free world. Having said all this, I submit that the world would be less stable than it is without the United Nations.

The underlying truth is that the world is dangerous, disorderly, and complicated. The United Nations reflects that fact and can be an influence for a world which is at least somewhat safer and somewhat more orderly. We should, I believe, stay in it and try to make it stronger.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be glad to try to answer questions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Ambassador Lodge.

If it would be all right with you, we would like Ambassador Wadsworth to proceed and perhaps questions can then be directed to both of you.

Ambassador LODGE. Yes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Please proceed, Ambassador Wadsworth.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES J. WADSWORTH

Ambassador WADSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, appreciate the opportunity of discussing with you a situation that has been unfolding in the United Nations over the years and today and the impact of that situation on the interests of the United States.

I am also delighted to have this reunion with my friend and colleague, Ambassador Lodge—they have been few and far between since we parted company temporarily in 1960, and I am very much honored to sit here with him—who has served his country with so much distinction in so many fields.

It is now just 1 month, tomorrow, over 9 years since I left my post at the United Nations and turned it over to the late Ambassador Stevenson.

Many changes have taken place in the international scene and I have not been in a position to become thoroughly acquainted with all of them. I would like, however, to give you my personal opinion as to what has been happening in the United Nations and what it means to us as the most important member of that body.

This year will mark the 25th anniversary of the Organization. I dare say that there were very few people looking on at its birth in 1945 who felt confident about its survival for as long as 25 years. To me, it is an exceptional example of the success which men of good faith can achieve if they apply themselves diligently and devotedly to building the best possible structure under existing and foreseeable circumstances.

I salute the founding fathers of the United Nations, and in particular the representatives of the United States who participated in the drafting of the Charter, as being men of far greater vision than they were given credit for at that time. They did the best they could with what they had.

This is not to say that the United Nations has been an unqualified success. I have never heard anyone familiar with the Organization claim that. But the fact remains that at the 25-year mark everybody still wants to get in and virtually nobody wants to get out. In my estimation, there could be no clearer evidence of support than that.

People all over the world and particularly in the United States are prone to criticize the United Nations for its lack of success in keeping the peace, much less in constructing a perfect world. This is partly due to an overestimation of its capabilities at the beginning and to continued misunderstanding of what it can do rather than what we would want it to do.

From time to time, I could have been characterized as one of its severest critics, but I have never lost my belief that it is the best instrument so far devised, and that we must not contribute in any way to its downfall.

The United Nations is still struggling with indifferent success over issues that were in the forefront of our concern 25 years ago. This does not mean complete failure, but it does underline the lack of complete success. In spite of the fact, however, that the United Nations has not found the answer to the abrasive questions, my worry is not so much what it has failed to do, but how it will face its difficulties in the future.

As Ambassador Lodge just said, when he and I took office in 1953, there were but 60 members of the United Nations. Today, there are 126. And a great many of the new members, as well as some of the old, unfortunately fall in that classification described as "micro-states." These are the smaller states which have grown up and achieved some measure of independence, but who under any sensible yardstick

of economics are scarcely viable entities, and are not yet fully capable of discharging the duties and obligations of members in the international family of nations.

The Charter of the United Nations asks only that applicants for membership be "peace loving" and "willing and able" to discharge the obligations of membership in the organization. And perhaps article 4, which contains this language (and no more) in setting up qualifications for membership, may turn out to be the Achilles heel of the structure.

Over the years, whether deliberately or not, the members of the United Nations have barred no applicants for the simple reason that they were not peace loving. The matter is almost never raised, and indeed is difficut to define or to determine. The United States has used this argument, among others, in persuading our colleagues not to vote for Communist China, but I know of no case where this provision of the Charter has been invoked alone, as the only reason for denying a seat.

Similarly, I have never heard it charged, nor have I read any opposing views to the effect that a certain applicant is neither "willing" nor "able" to discharge its obligations. Over the years, opposition has been and continues to be purely political—lack of support for certain states because of overriding political considerations.

Thus, the Soviet Union for many years consistently vetoed the application of many states in an effort to force a trade with the West for the admittance of Soviet-dominated states. And the West consistently opposed the admittance of such states to membership because they did not want so many votes to be added to the Soviet side of the hot questions of the day. East and West Germany, North and South Korea, and North and South Vietnam still remain outside the gate for political reasons alone, as does Communist China.

Starting about 12 years ago, however, there appeared on the horizon an increasingly large number of states, some large, some small, some so tiny as to be almost invisible. Most of these states were emerging from one form or another of colonialism, and as such were the objects of a combination of pity, pride, and generosity on the part of older, more established states. So, almost as soon as they knocked on the door, they were admitted. Few questions were asked about their finances or their prospects for gross national product. Many of us realized that, one way or another, some of them would have to be carried, nursed along, if you like. But all that was drowned in the surge of self-determination.

So now we have a situation where a very real majority of the members of the United Nations must be classified as emerging, underdeveloped or nondeveloped, and this could mean trouble. I say "could" because I am convinced that most of these members are in essence so committed to the United Nations that they would look with horror on its dissolution, and would not knowingly provide impetus in the wrong direction.

Yet the possibilities are there, and it behooves all of the more developed states to pay strict attention to the business of keeping the Organization on a level keel, keeping its balance sheet in the black, to the extent they can, and helping the less fortunate to stand on their own feet in economic viability.

It is inevitable that when a state is poor and its people ill-fed and ill-clothed, it will cast about with increasing desperation to improve itself, even at the cost of losing that fabled goose. It may turn to unrealistic ideologies, fall among international thieves, go through the tortures of revolution and bankruptcy. And if you multiply this sad story by the number of microstates that might succumb during hard times, you've got a badly mixed-up United Nations struggling in a badly mixed-up world.

This could only too easily lead to hasty demands in resolutions calling upon the United States to do things we would consider contrary to our best interests, which in turn might lead to an epidemic of defiance of the U.N. by haves and have-nots alike.

That is not the name of the game. That is not what the U.N. is for, and it is not what the United States wants. Precisely because the potential is so frightening, I believe the United States should strengthen its support of the U.N. to almost any lengths to keep it alive and healthy. The alternative is hard to visualize and worse to contemplate.

If we lost the U.N., we would have to pick ourselves up and start all over again, very possibly against much more serious odds than were faced in 1945 in San Francisco. We have here a 25-year-old youngster which in spite of everything has retained a certain level of vigor and courage. We cannot afford to let it dissolve. Leaving out all the disappointments of the peacemaking field, this international family has done itself proud in virtually all the other fields in which it operates, and at a cost ridiculously low compared to more well known bilateral programs. Even in the political field, as Ambassador Lodge has pointed out, it has more hits than errors.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we know that the support of the United States is essential to the U.N. I believe that if the U.S. public will understand the problems involved as well as you do, you will get continued and increased support for a policy of sticking with the United Nations through all its weaknesses, all its troubles, all its agonies. It will reward us as a nation to do so.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Ambassador Wadsworth.

Ambassador Lodge, at the beginning of your statement you expressed the opinion that the United Nations was a "power fact" during the 1950's when we could obtain a two-thirds vote in support of U.N. action and initiatives in critical situations.

You went on to say that a two-thirds vote today would be virtually impossible.

Why is this so? Is it because of the new composition of the United Nations or is it because our attitudes toward some of the world problems have changed since then?

Ambassador LODGE. No; I don't think it is because our attitudes have changed. I believe it is the composition. You have a great many more member states.

As Ambassador Wadsworth said, you have microstates and they are naturally concentrating on their own domestic problems and the problems immediately around them so that when you have a great situation in which the great powers are divided, which is what you have had, it is not realistic to think you can get a two-thirds vote.

On the Vietnam question, for example, the North Vietnamese were opposed to taking it up in the United Nations, and that meant the Soviet Union was opposed to taking it up in the United Nations. When you have that situation you just know you are not going to get a two-thirds vote.

The same way with the Middle East, as I said in my prepared statement. There is a division of view between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is hard to get a two-thirds vote in the U.S. Congress; it is hard to get a two-thirds vote at the U.N.

In fact, I think it is going to get very hard to get what is called a blocking third—to block something we don't want. I think we have to be realistic enough to recognize that that may become difficult.

Now, when Ambassador Wadsworth and I were there, you knew you could always get a "blocking third" to protect the United States against some proposal that would be damaging to us.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Would you care to comment on that, Ambassador Wadsworth?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. No; I would agree completely with that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. On the question of Vietnam, yesterday we discussed the fact that criticism has ofttimes been made that the United Nations failed to make a more meaningful contribution toward a peaceful solution in Vietnam.

Would you care to comment on that?

Ambassador LODGE. Well, the United Nations lacked the will and it lacked the tools to take on the Vietnam question and it lacked the will because one of the parties to that conflict—that is, the North Vietnamese—were opposed to bringing it up in the United Nations, which meant that the Soviet Union was opposed.

As I have just said, you can't bring up something where a two-thirds vote is required if the Soviet Union is opposed any more than you can bring up something where a two-thirds vote is required where the United States is opposed, so it was quite out of the question for the United Nations to take on the Vietnam question.

Mr. GALLAGHER. There is a great deal of talk that the Secretary General had made various suggestions that if they had been followed, perhaps an earlier dialog of events could have ensued.

Do you know of such?

Ambassador LODGE. No; I don't, because the Secretary General can't go beyond the Security Council and water can't rise above its source.

To my knowledge, the Secretary General never received an instruction or a policy guidance from the Security Council that would have justified him in intervening in the Vietnam question.

The U.S. Government wanted to have the United Nations take an interest in the Vietnam question. I think Ambassador Goldberg brought it up, if I am not mistaken. I was in Saigon myself; I cannot answer on the details, but I think he did.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes, sir.

I would, in the interest of time, pass along but I must take this opportunity to ask you as one who has participated in so many aspects of Vietnam, what your prognosis is for Vietnam?

Ambassador LODGE. Well, I think we are unquestionably going to remove our forces from Vietnam. We have removed a good many already and I think the process has been started and it is going to go ahead, without any doubt. I don't think there is any possibility of its being reversed.

I believe that this can be done in an orderly way. I believe it can be done in such a way that, after we have left, the Vietnamese state can go on existing and will not be conquered and overwhelmed by external forces. I think that can be done in such a way as to do that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Ambassador Lodge.

In your closing statement you indicated that the United Nations can be an influence for a world which is at least somewhat safer and more orderly, and that the United States should remain in that organization and try to make it stronger.

Do you have any thoughts or suggestions regarding the ways in which the United Nations could be strengthened?

Ambassador LODGE. I have not got a specific recommendation. I think it is a question of attitude. I think that if all the member states take a world view instead of a local view the capacity of the United Nations to deal with world problems will increase.

I think at the present time with all these microstates to which Ambassador Wadsworth referred—and I agree with him—there aren't as many states to take a world view proportionately as there were at the time that I was there. Of course, that limits the effectiveness of the United Nations in dealing with world problems. So it is a question of the thinking—not so much of the representatives in New York who after all are representing governments—but it is the thinking in the governments of those countries.

I think it is quite natural that a country that has just emerged from colonialism and has just become a member should be overwhelmed with their domestic problems and with problems caused by their neighbors. I believe, to the extent they take a world view, the United Nations can evolve and deal with world problems.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should like to welcome both our distinguished witnesses to the subcommittees.

I regret that the activity on the floor distracts us somewhat from very interesting testimony.

Ambassador Lodge, I notice some young people in the audience. They are probably too young to remember your tenure at the United Nations, where you were certainly a very effective voice of the United States at the United Nations. Those of us who remember that period remember it very vividly and we appreciate this opportunity to hear from you.

Both you gentlemen seem to be unhappy with the effectiveness of the United Nations today, primarily because of the increase in numbers, and you have talked about the power situation as having changed.

I wonder whether we need to be too discouraged. As a major power, we still have a decisive role insofar as putting up money for things we want or by refusing to support something we don't want. This makes a dead letter out of the protests of the many have-not states.

So, is the size of the U.N. something that we really need to worry about? If it is, is there anything that you would suggest that we should do? I don't suppose either of you believe that the number of members could be reduced, or that we could even be slow in adding new members.

Do you think this is something that we do need to worry about, the actual loss of effectiveness? At no time can the United Nations do anything unless there is great-powers agreement, and if there is great-powers agreement the United Nations can still be pretty effective, can't it?

Ambassador LODGE. Well, of course, the United Nations cannot exist without the United States. That is the first thing. If the United States were to withdraw, for instance, that would be the end of the United Nations.

The United States has great influence in the United Nations, and always will have. In addition, we have the right of the veto in the Security Council which we have never used and that would be a protection in case of need. So, I don't worry about the United Nations becoming a threat to us. I don't think that is possible.

I think we are going through a rather bad patch of ground at the present time. I think that we are going to grow out of it. I think as more and more members get the experience in international relations, as their governments get more and more experienced, they are going to interest themselves more and more in world questions and the United Nations will regain some of the effectiveness that it had.

Just at present we are in a stage when countries that have just emerged from colonialism are not really quite ready to cope with some of the complicated world problems. I don't think it is a thing to worry about; I think it is a thing that time will take care of. We must be patient.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Ambassador Wadsworth, you mentioned that there was too much expected of the United Nations at the beginning, and almost expressed surprise that the United Nations even survived for 25 years. You seem to feel it is a reason for congratulation that it is still functioning.

Did we contribute to some of the U.N's problems, in your opinion, by our actions during this 25-year period? Have we helped make it less effective?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. You mean the Congress or the United States, itself?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The United States.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I think to some extent we may have. We expressed an idealism that perhaps was more enthusiastic than the circumstances warranted. In fact, some of the very earliest criticisms of the United Nations was, in fact, that it was going to be a world government which was not what a great many people in the United States want, but instead of turning out to be that, it is not even a federation, not even close to a federation.

So, perhaps in certain cases with people striving for the ideal of the utopian world and things of that kind, some Americans may have added to that impression. I don't think we have since it has actually been in operation.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you think that the United States has been too slow in responding to the material needs of the newer countries, the so-called have-not countries?

I served at the U.N. in 1965 on the Fifth Committee, the Budget Committee. We were always deploring the increases in the budget for the United Nations, saying, "Let's go slow and not be pushed into increased expenditures."

Even though the amounts coming from Washington seemed relatively tiny to me as an individual, I found myself saying, "Let's go slow."

Do you think if we were more generous in responding to these needs, as one of the have countries, that the United Nations might become more effective, or do you think inevitably there has to be this tussle between the haves and the have-nots?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I think that there is going to be some friction no matter how you handle it.

If we had it to do over, I would not have opened the purse strings too broadly at the very outset. I think, of course, you get there into a question of opposing philosophies. The philosophy of the multilateral aid is one, and the philosophy of bilateral aid, expectant of some gratitude on the part of the recipient, is another.

I believe that by and large the United States has followed the second philosophy as far as foreign aid is concerned, and, to a certain extent, I believe that that has been a mistake.

A great many people have for many years criticized our foreign aid for its size and its sometimes comparative lack of success. The same thing can be said about technical assistance in the United Nations but not to the greatest extent, particularly not in ratio to the amount of money spent by the United States in bilateral programs.

I say again, if we had it to do over, I don't think we should have poured wealth into the United Nations to attempt to haul some of these poorer nations up out of poverty.

I think it has been fairly well demonstrated that money alone just does not do that; they have got to do their own "thing." They cannot just sit there and have wealth poured into their laps and automatically become viable because of it. I don't think any country can do that.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't suppose either of you gentlemen has followed the situation closely enough to be able to comment on the current utilization of American personnel in these international organizations.

There is a feeling on the part of some students that American influence and guidance and leadership in these international institutions, such as that provided by Paul Hoffman, is lessening with each year. Ambassador Lodge talked about the comparative lower cost of United Nation's experts. Of course, that is not an advantage for Americans who might be considering employment; the low cost would be a reason for them not to seek employment with the United Nations.

So, this would be a reason for a de-Americanization of these agencies, I would think.

Is this desirable? Is this a trend we should be resisting if we are still going to provide a substantial part of the financial support for these agencies?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I think that the way it has been developing is a healthy thing. We thought at first that the country needing agricultural aid, all we needed to do was send a graduate of the Cornell Agriculture School and it would straighten out, but it might be entirely possible that a native man from Ceylon could do a better job helping out India or Pakistan than the U.S. person because he knows the situation so much better.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you think a multilateral activity, with a program run by non-Americans, is better even where a substantial amount of the funds are put up by this country? In other words, looking at it from the congressional point of view, is it advisable for us to lose control over the utilization of these funds where we don't have key personnel in the agencies?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I think the history of the utilization of the funds would seem to indicate the opposite. It is not a question so much of losing control of it; it is a question of using it to the best advantage. It has been done very well by non-Americans in many cases that I personally know of.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't mean to impose on the committee's time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURKE. If you will yield just a minute, I will give you a comment that we just ran across recently in Taiwan where the Taiwan Government is part of the contributing program under the United Nations with us and they have done an outstanding job in matters pertaining to growing rice and what-not in certain areas of Africa. I think they are far better equipped certainly than we are because they know the agrarian problems and the land is quite similar and the problems are quite similar to what they had at Taiwan in the area they moved into.

I think that is probably what the Ambassador had in mind where some foreign nations can better do it than we can even though we are part contributor to the program.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I question whether there is more expertise in non-American brains. I also question the wisdom, even if there is adequate expertise, of the United States relinquishing leadership responsibilities in these areas even though it might be possible to get things done well without any Americans running these operations.

Is this a wise thing to do, even though we ought to be able to trust the wisdom of others?

Mr. BURKE. I don't know, Mr. Frelinghuysen, because I have some questions myself about the United Nations and its future and certainly its relationship with our security in the long run.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Burke.

Mr. BURKE. Yes; one question to follow that up.

On page 6, Ambassador Wadsworth, you, I think, state what has been a great deal of concern to many of us when you talk about the emerging underdeveloped or nondeveloped nations that could mean trouble by their entrance, let's say, willy-nilly over the years into the United Nations, without any research, let's say, on their ability to survive economically.

Now as to these "have not" nations; what is being said now is that the present world revolution, so-called, is the revolution of the "have nots" against the "haves."

I feel that we have failed certainly in allowing and not reviewing these programs continually because I believe that the United Nations generally consisting of more of the "have not" nations would be more pro-Communist generally in their views than the pro-Capitalist.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. There is that possibility, which is why I put it there. I do feel that at the time that these countries were coming in—I am talking about quite a while ago; I am not talking about just last year. I don't believe that the United States could have afforded to even attempt to slow down the admittance of all these countries that were bursting out of their colonial bonds. Of course, a lot of them were allowed out of their colonial bonds by Great Britain, France, and so forth, but they were coming out and they were considered to be people that we ought to help and we would have probably assumed a very, very poor image worldwide had we attempted to stop it.

Now, we might possibly have looked far enough ahead to have made some provision for a study of their situation so that we would not be shocked or surprised if they did happen to turn up broke some day. Maybe we might have been able to make some plans to help out in that event.

Mr. BURKE. Isn't it true, then, that since we have been the main contributor to the United Nations as one of the leading nations of the world over the years that these poorer nations now will look to us for their survival even though they may not be overly friendly toward our system and let's say our role in world politics.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. A good many of them do look to us, not necessarily as their survival. As I am sure you know, the percentage of the U.S. contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations has been moving downward rather than upward lately because more countries are coming in to take up part of the slack.

Mr. BURKE. Isn't that true of the Soviet Union and some of the other nations that have contributed less?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. Not really; most of their shares have not declined.

Mr. BURKE. Proportionately, we have also contributed more than the others over the years because the others have reduced their payments.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. You can almost say we spoiled them.

Mr. BURKE. That is what I have in mind.

There has been a great deal of conversation, particularly confusion, among many of the American people who feel that the Soviet Union and its satellites have used the United Nations as a sounding board for Communist propaganda throughout the world.

Would you comment on that?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. Yes, sir.

That is true, of course, to the extent that they are able to do it, and do it in an even halfway believable way, but at the same time we have been able to use the United Nations for just as an effective, if not a more effective, sounding board for our brand of governmental philosophy.

I think that the weight of the evidence leans toward our success in that direction more than it does the Communists.

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I would like to ask Ambassador Lodge if I am wrong on that but I really feel that has happened.

Ambassador LODGE. Well, the United Nations can be compared with a microphone and everybody struggling to get a hold of it. The Assembly Building is rather shaped like a loud speaker, and the next time you are in New York, take a look at it and see if you don't think so. People struggle to get the mike and people struggle to say the most effective thing on the mike.

I believe if you look back at it over the years, the type of thing that the Soviet Union and their satellites have put out is awfully stilted and awfully sort of shopworn. I think some of the stuff that we have put out has been fresh; I think it has been sincere. It has been things that we really mean and really think. I don't think we have come off second-best.

Mr. BURKE. Well, I wondered. It seems like the trial in Chicago, Mr. Ambassador. I think this is a little shopworn too and the purpose behind some of these demonstrations is obvious, yet it seemed to impress a lot of the young people in our Nation.

Ambassador LODGE. I don't think what goes on in the United Nations is similar to what happened in Chicago.

Mr. BURKE. No, I'm sure of that but I just wonder about the propaganda value.

I think the conduct of Mr. Khrushchev, for example, was quite similar to the example set by the seven defendants in Chicago in their trial in court.

Ambassador LODGE. We only had him once.

Mr. BURKE. Yes, but unfortunately, we still have the others. That is all. Thank you.

Thank you very much.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Roth.

Mr. ROTH. I am sorry to have come late but, as you know, we are in session this afternoon.

I do have one question.

I hope I am not repeating what went on earlier.

That is, is there anything you think that we should do in the Congress at this time to attempt to strenghten the United Nations or is it merely an evolutionary development until the time again comes where it can be more effective?

Ambassador LODGE. My view is that it is an evolutionary thing. I think beyond doing the regular things, the appropriation and all that, I would not say there was anything else that Congress needs to do.

I think congressional support of the United Nations has been excellent and we have done our part. I think we have been generous and openminded and liberal about it. I would not think we needed to do anything more.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Wadsworth.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I would agree there.

I particularly would like to stress what you said yourself, Congressman, which was about the evolutionary nature of this.

I think the thing of the United Nations is just the latest stop along the road between the caveman and the ideal state. It is not good enough, everybody knows that, but it is the best we have had yet. It has lived, whereas the League of Nations didn't and other leagues that

have started up and faded away, have not survived, but this looks as though it could.

Then the next thing that comes along will be even better—we don't know what that is; we may none of us be alive when it happens, but it is evolutionary.

Mr. ROTH. May I ask the question slightly differently?

If there were not the practical problems of trying to bring about change, what changes would you propose at this stage, if any?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I don't know if we would call it a change. I think I would be more interested in seeing a better system of international education worked out in some way, not only in the interchange of students and teachers and so forth, but also in actual studies which are going on at a much accelerated pace in this country and in many others today.

A great deal of the trouble in the United Nations has been and still is the lack of understanding—lack of understanding of the other person's point of view, and the other person's reaction to certain activities. When one comes to understand a little bit better. I find it is much more easy to tolerate.

Therefore, tolerance and countertolerance all over the world can only be helped by the vast spread of education, young people and adult education alike.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Lodge, would you care to comment?

Ambassador LODGE. Well, I think it is a question of evolution. The thing that makes the world dangerous and complicated and disorderly is, first of all, the poverty and the low living standard, and that would make a lot of trouble in the world even if you didn't have the international Communist movement. The international Communist movement adds to the danger.

If everybody just gave up the idea of trying to impose himself and take over and expand himself, that would help the United Nations. It is the basic conditions in the world that are reflected in the United Nations, and if you try to get at the troubles by changing the charter or amending the rules, it is like a man trying to cure smallpox by putting cold cream on his face; you are just getting at the superficialities and not at the basic cause of the disease.

Mr. ROTH. You don't feel that any change, for example, in the voting power of the various countries on one basis or other would——

Ambassador LODGE. Well, nobody that worked there at the United Nations has failed to think about it—a better way of voting. It seems ridiculous that the United States should have one vote and some little tiny country should have one vote, but that is in the General Assembly. Nothing the General Assembly does is legally binding; everything it does is hortatory, and the strongest verb they ever use is "urge," I believe.

The only thing in the United Nations that can issue a legally binding order is the Security Council, and there we are protected by the veto. You can think about weighted voting, taking into account population, gross national product, area, all that, but, as a realist, I don't think there is any chance at all of that ever being done. I think the revision of the charter is a figment of the imagination.

Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, at one time there was an exciting political movement in the country called "Get the U.S. out of the U.N., Get the U.N. out of the U.S."

When I got up there this time as a representative and worked for 3 months, I found out that this little political movement, which, of course, is no surprise to you gentlemen, was joined by a lot of people in the United Nations and we had very strong efforts to move the United Nations out of New York and diversify many aspects of the facilities and the operations of the United Nations so that now we have them in Geneva, Vienna, Addis Ababa, Santiago, among other places.

Then the question came up about the United Nations expansion. Having had the experience I have had on the Fifth Committee, I want to tell you that it is an extremely difficult thing to get the U.S. point of view across and we came within a cat's whisker of losing the fight in the Fifth Committee in order to obtain the expansion of, and keep, the United Nations in New York.

I just wonder what your feelings are with respect to the necessity in which it will have to be proposed, and is being proposed, by this administration for the expansion of facilities in New York.

Ambassador LODGE. Well, Mr. Congressman, I will be frank with you and say there have been many times when I could have wished it was not in New York. I am going to be frank with you. It creates lots of problems that simply would not exist if it were not there. Now, that is a personal view.

I am not a public official; I am a private citizen. This is not a thing I would say if I were a public official. And I might as well tell you frankly what I feel.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would like to have you back and get your private citizen feelings on many other issues.

Ambassador LODGE. In fact, I have often thought that having it in Berlin, with the 110 miles between Helmstedt and West Berlin as a part of the U.N. enclave, had a good deal to be said for it, even though there is no chance on earth of its happening, I grant you that. What is desirable in this field and what is possible are two very, very different things, but I have often thought that.

Mr. FASCELL. Ambassador Wadsworth.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I have thought of it, too. Of course, the thing that almost always stops the movement of that is the contemplation of the cost that it would take somewhere else to build it from scratch. There is no question about it, that there are some very grave drawbacks to New York as the place for the United Nations.

I had thought not so much about Germany or Berlin, but I have thought it might be a wonderful thing to hold the sessions on board the Queen Mary or some large ocean liner out in the middle of the ocean where nobody could get there.

Mr. FASCELL. That concept was raised, you will be happy to know, in Fifth Committee meetings this fall when somebody was complaining about all of the conferences being held in Geneva by United Nations people out of New York and all the conferences in New York

being held by the people in Geneva. They decided the best way to solve that problem was just to have them on shipboard.

How do you gentlemen feel about the ratification of the treaty on privileges and immunities which seems to have created a problem for us in New York from time to time?

Ambassador LODGE. Is that the old one under the——

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Ambassador LODGE. I have not thought of that for 10 years. I did favor it when I was the U.S. representative but I am really not up to date on it.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I am not up to date but I will stick my neck out a little. I would be inclined, on balance, to go along with it.

Mr. FASCELL. It has been submitted to the Senate, finally, and we hope it will be acted on. I will tell you that we ate that treaty about every hour on the hour up there.

One of the problems that you have discussed, is that the U.N. is more of a propaganda forum than a political forum. I don't know that we can in any way ever change that. I don't know how you take politics out of politics, anyway, and I certainly don't want to. You have to recognize it for what it is and live with it.

A major problem for the United States in the United Nations and the specialized agencies is the diffusion of authority between the State Department and the Mission in New York on one hand—and the U.S. Government departments and agencies on the other, particularly in the U.N. specialized agencies. What do you think of a proposal that would center at the executive level in the United States all of the responsibility in the State Department which has the basic foreign policy responsibility?

Ambassador LODGE. I think a lot can be said about that. I would not put them in the Office of the U.S. Representative in New York.

Mr. FASCELL. No, no; absolutely not. He has too much to do now.

Ambassador LODGE. Yes; even though he is not as potent as he has been said to be in several books that have been written, still he has his hands full with what he has to do and it is not physically possible for him to supervise the participation in Geneva; it just can't be done.

But, certainly the United States ought to speak with one voice, and these things all relate and they should be coordinated. I think your idea of putting it in the State Department is worthy of a great deal of attention.

Mr. FASCELL. Ambassador Wadsworth, what are your feelings?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I would agree thoroughly.

I have had a great deal of experience in working with other agencies, particularly on special committees and special groups, where other departments of the executive had representatives like the Pentagon and so forth.

Generally speaking, it has been not too bad, but I can see that occasionally if there are Agriculture and Commerce and Pentagon and CIA and I don't know how many different other agencies that all need to know and all need to put in this, it makes it very difficult for the head of the delegation, I can promise you that.

Mr. FASCELL. It has been said that the pressure in the United Nations is really not an East-West confrontation but more north-south and more really one of the "have-nots" and the "haves."

This has been translated politically at the United Nations level and also in practical terms into a multiplication of the U.N. economic programs, which in turn create tremendous amount of pressures for more and more money.

This has given rise to several problems which were acknowledged by the Pearson report and the Jackson study.

I am not addressing myself to those management problems but I am addressing myself to the problem that may be because of this natural factor that exists and because with money comes the opportunity for action, that there has been overwhelming attention and focus on the economic aspects of the United Nations and this has tended to detract from the political potential that exists and the capabilities to maybe take steps in the right direction to help solve those political problems. Maybe it would be better to divorce out the economic operations completely. What do you think?

Ambassador LODGE. There is no doubt that on the economic questions broadly speaking the world divides north and south more than it does east and west. I think that is true.

When you have an east and west thing, quite often the countries that are south, the tropical countries, divide. You have seen that happen on the question of Chinese representation. I don't know if there is any way to avoid that. I think that is how the world is. I would not think that you could take all the economic questions out of the United Nations.

Mr. FASCELL. Or that it would be desirable to do so.

Ambassador LODGE. I would not think so. This is how things are.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I agree.

Mr. FASCELL. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Ambassador LODGE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the courtesy of your calling on me. I am not a member of this subcommittee but I am enormously interested and I am very glad that you are holding these hearings.

I would like to join in welcoming these two distinguished gentlemen.

I would like to pursue just a bit the theme that you have touched upon about the possibilities or nonpossibilities of charter review.

Ambassador Wadsworth, you said in your statement that if we lost the United Nations we would have to start all over again and possibly against much more serious odds than we faced in 1945.

Would you care to develop that thought?

I happen to agree with you but I would like to hear you develop it.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. Perhaps you better help me.

No; in 1945, we had just come out of a shattering kind of traumatic experience of the war and everybody was feeling, "We simply have to get together; this is ridiculous; we have to stop all the quarreling and get together."

That was the main thrust back of the 1945 negotiations, as I understand them.

And, not to shorthand that too much, I think it says what it says.

Today, there are a great many people who remember the trauma of World War II and certainly would have found out in more ways

than one about the traumatic experiences in much smaller military events that have transpired.

To some extent, the political divisions between East and West as well as in some cases between North and South seem to have jelled a little bit more than they were in 1945. But now you start out with a mutual suspicion which rather than having been undercut a little bit or softened up a little bit has hardened in a great many minds, not only in the United States but all over the world, and therefore, it would make it harder for the states when representing those countries back of them to put forward ideas that might reach a consensus that would make a good international organization again. I think you would have that much. For instance, you would have the trouble again with voting. You recall in 1945 they tried several different formulas on weighted voting and had to give up and go to the veto instead. So, I think it would be harder if we started tomorrow to build what San Francisco did than it was in 1945.

Mr. BINGHAM. Specifically, would you not agree that there would be a lot of difficulty in getting the Soviet Union to agree to a single Secretary General today in view of their support for the troika idea?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. Yes; they might go back to the three-headed monster; troika we called it in those days. I think they could. They don't like anything that can tell them that they canot say what they want to and do what they want to at any time. We are all the same but they are rougher about it.

Mr. BINGHAM. It has often struck me, particularly in light of some of the criticism of the United Nations that has come from the extreme conservatives in this country, that from the Soviet point of view, the Soviets might have a lot more to criticize about the performance of the United Nations over the years than we have. Would you agree with that?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. Yes.

Mr. BINGHAM. Isn't that fact that they cast all those vetoes an indication that things were happening that they didn't like?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. Entirely possible.

Mr. BINGHAM. In your time at the United Nations, Ambassador Lodge, would you say that there was a policy on the part of the United States not to cast a veto or was it that we didn't have to cast a veto that we never did?

Ambassador LODGE. Well, we didn't have to. It was always possible to get enough votes so that you didn't have to. Naturally, we tried to look good, and when you don't have to, you are foolish to do it. So, that was that.

I think on your first question, it would be much more difficult to get an international organization set up now than it was in 1945. The Russians had been our allies then and that meant a great deal.

I remember very well one afternoon—I was in the Senate at that time. I was in the Senate cloakroom; it was 1947. We all had become accustomed to the idea of the Russians being our allies. I remember Senator Vandenberg saying, "The fact is that Stalin wants to be an adversary."

I remember the shock people felt. Now it is all taken for granted; every one knows that; they think they have known it forever.

But I can remember the sense of shock and the sense of surprise when Senator Vandenberg said that.

Now, if you started over again, you would not start with that basis because in San Francisco it was assumed that the good working relationship between us and the Soviet Union was going to continue and the whole thing was based on that. Then when that changed, there were lots of people who thought that would be the end of the United Nations.

I can remember people here in Washington saying, "The whole thing is down the drain."

Somehow or other, it has kept going. It has kept going because I think there is some kind of demand for it.

Mr. BINGHAM. In connection with the one state-one vote argument, isn't it worth noting that in addition to the Security Council, which you mentioned, there are many United Nations committees plus the Economic and Social Council and the Human Rights Council. On all of these we are represented, the Soviet Union is represented, the major powers are represented, but the small powers get on only some of them and not on others. Does that not amount to a kind of weighted voting?

Ambassador LODGE. Definitely. Definitely. Our interests are protected. Nothing harmful to the United States can come out of the United Nations; I am sure of that.

Mr. BINGHAM. One final question.

In light of Mr. Fascell's question about separating out the economic side, don't you think there is some value in our working together in both areas to get the experience that some day we may be able to apply more effectively in the peacekeeping field?

Ambassador LODGE. Have you got a specific illustration?

Mr. BINGHAM. I am thinking of areas where we have to work on an international basis, say in the communications field or in a similar field where we have to work together.

Ambassador LODGE. Well, Antarctica, for instance. I would say that was a good thing. I don't know how much good it does; I don't know that it really helps any on peacekeeping, but I think it is good as far as it goes.

Mr. BINGHAM. Would you have a comment on that?

Ambassador WADSWORTH. I would think that that and the agreements on outer space, nuclear tests, to the extent that it has been going on. There have been stirrings every once in a while. Now, in this communications business that you speak of, the Soviet Union and the other eastern European states have not as yet joined in the group but they are there as observers and extremely interested. Yugoslavia is just about ready to join.

It is something you cannot stop; there are no boundaries. The satellite is 22,300 miles out and its cone spreads over such a huge territory that there is no such thing as boundaries any more, not in communications.

Ambassador LODGE. The same with the seabed.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. Yes.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I realize the time is running out but we should ask you gentlemen about your view on peacekeeping and peacemaking. Both of you in effect have said that in the old days there was a useful role for the United Nations in the Middle East and elsewhere, but that we cannot expect much of it any more. Isn't it really important to keep in mind the continuing potential for a useful role in the future in the peacekeeping field, should we not attempt to develop a way of financing such efforts, and attempt to develop a continuing role instead of giving it up as a lost cause?

Granted, our experience has not been too happy, but is this not an area where we should still hope that the United Nations can be useful?

Ambassador Lodge. I think we ought not to give up. We ought to hope. But if you remember, in 1956 Mr. Pearson of Canada made the motion to create the United Nations Emergency Force—a motion which carried and the force was created. It was stationed in the Gaza Strip, the Gulf of Aqaba and the entrance there at the Strait of Sharm El Sheik. For 11 years it was a very strong influence for peace and was of great advantage to all concerned.

The same thing could be said about the Congo force that was created in 1960 and certainly at that time prevented that huge country from falling into the hands of outsiders.

Now people tell me that you just could not get anything as elaborate and sophisticated as that done today. I agree with you we should not lose hope, and we should remember we once did things like that and hope we can do them again.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. There is a serious financial problem. Where is the money coming from?

Ambassador LODGE. Money, and men, too.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But there is still a need such as in Cyprus right now and there may even be a need in the Middle East again. It might develop in such a way that the United Nations presence—and this will take money—will be needed. So, I would think that we should not forget this as a way in which the United Nations can be useful.

Ambassador LODGE. Very true.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. Very true.

One thing that has been somewhat unspoken but I know it is in everyone's mind is there will never be a great deal of difficulty in achieving a successful peacekeeping operation unless one or the other of the great powers are violently opposed to it.

Now, the Russian intervention in the Middle East has, without doubt, made that a great deal worse and we are not going to get that kind of vote in the United Nations or anywhere else. If they cannot agree, then there is nothing to it. But if it is a different kind of situation, as in Cyprus which is virtually a volunteer operation, it can be invoked again and can be completely successful.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I recall your talking about the big spy case when you were at the U.N. Back in 1959, I was reading about spy cases and I had some 261 cases documented in the Library of Congress. When you were waging your fight, I called the State Department and told them I had them and they said they would be very interested. In 30 seconds, I think they were asking for part of the compendium on the spy list.

Ambassador LODGE. Very interesting.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I recall your plight.

Ambassador LODGE. When we had that American seal, they put the microphone under the eagle's beak.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I also remember you displaying that eagle.

Ambassador LODGE. That had been given to the Embassy by the Society for Soviet-American Friendship and it was hanging behind the Ambassador's chair and they could hear him dictating his mail on it.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Those were trying days.

Well, Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Wadsworth, we are delighted to have had you with us here today. You have contributed to the air of hopefulness that the United Nations will see another 25 years.

Ambassador LODGE. Thank you.

Ambassador WADSWORTH. Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The meeting stands adjourned until the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Peacekeeping and Arms Control

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1970

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:17 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Mr. Gallagher. The subcommittee will come to order.

I apologize for the delay. Because of the Washington's birthday recess, we have had several members absent. We will proceed now that we do have a semblance of bipartisanship here.

We meet this morning in a continuation of our hearings related to the United Nations. The topic of this morning's discussion is the "United Nations: Peacekeeping and Arms Control."

The subcommittee is delighted to welcome this morning three distinguished gentlemen who will help us in our consideration of today's subject.

They are Ambassador Seymour Finger, Counsellor of the United Nations Mission, Dr. Joseph Johnson of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Prof. Lincoln Bloomfield, of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

(The biographical sketches follow:)

Joseph E. Johnson, president and trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace since 1950, was born in Virginia and received a Ph. D. from Harvard and an LL.D. from Williams College. He served as division chief of International Security Affairs in the Department of State from 1944 through 1947; as an advisor to the U.S. delegation at Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944); to the U.N. conference in San Francisco (1945); to the 1st session of General Assembly of U.N. (1946); and to U.S. delegations to various other international conferences. Ambassador Johnson has been associated for many years with U.S. Government and U.N. activities relating to the Middle East, including service on the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine. He is a director of the Council on Foreign Relations, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Science, and director of U.N. Association of the United States.

Seymour Maxwell Finger, Ambassador and Senior Adviser to the Permanent Representative, United States Mission to the United Nations, was born in New York City and graduated from Ohio University. He also studied at the University of Cincinnati and the Littauer School of Public Affairs, Harvard University. Mr. Finger is a career foreign service officer class one and consul general. He was

a member of the U.S. delegations to the U.N.'s General Assemblies—11th through 21st.

Ambassador Finger served in an executive capacity for Photo Reflex Studios from 1935–1946, and was a special consultant to the Brookings Institution in 1964. His foreign service included assignments to Germany (1946–49), France (1949–51), Hungary (1951–53), Italy (1954–55) and Laos (1955–59).

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a native of Boston and received his S.B., M.P.A. and Ph. D. degrees from Harvard University. Dr. Bloomfield joined the M.I.T. Center for International Studies in 1957. He was the director of the United Nations Project from 1957 to 1960 and subsequently became the director of the Arms Control Project. In addition he served as a consultant to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Dr. Bloomfield also has worked in various capacities in the U.S. Department of State. He is the author of *Evolution or Revolution? The U.N. and the Problem of Peaceful Territorial Change; The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy: A New Look at the National Interest;* as well as co-author and editor of *International Military Forces;* and numerous other books and articles.

Mr. GALLAGHER. We will begin with Ambassador Finger, to be followed by Mr. Johnson, and then Professor Bloomfield. If you will please proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR SEYMOUR FINGER, COUNSELOR OF THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador FINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is indeed a privilege to discuss with this distinguished group of Congressmen who are concerned with international organization the question of United Nations peacekeeping.

This is a subject in which, as U.S. Representative on the United Nations Committee on Peacekeeping, I have taken a strong interest for some years.

I recognize among your ranks many who have become expert in the subject of peacekeeping. Congressman Frelinghuysen, who was on the delegation 2 years ago, Dante Fascell and Irving Whalley, who were on the delegation this past year, and Congressman Fountain.

They have all served with great distinction on delegations to the General Assembly.

I shall try in my statement to sum up the historical background, and the essential nature and purpose of United Nations peacekeeping in today's unstable world, and to describe the state of our current negotiations to enable the United Nations to carry out that purpose more effectively and reliably.

It is apparent, Mr. Chairman, that the framers of the charter, particularly in writing chapter 7, worked in an atmosphere strongly influenced by the 1930's and World War II. It was natural, therefore, that the kind of action most precisely detailed in the charter was enforcement action as set out in article 42.

Article 43 calls for special agreements by which members would place forces at the Council's disposal for the purposes of article 42.

The threat then uppermost in the minds of the five major wartime allies, who are the five permanent members of the Security Council, was obviously the resurgence of German or Japanese militarism. An indication of this frame of mind can be found in the so-called transitional articles, 106 and 107 of the charter:

106. Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

107. Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

But of course the situation has changed very radically since 1945.

First of all, there was an open split in the allied coalition, thus removing a precondition of effective coercion action against outlaw nations, and the Germans and Japanese have directed their great energy and competence to economic growth, rather than militarism.

Second, rapid decolonialization, desirable as it has been, has resulted in a proliferation of small new nations and has brought with it a degree of instability in what is loosely called the Third World.

Third, both of these developments have taken place in the setting of nuclear stalemate, which has deterred big wars, but has not prevented small wars.

Thus, the threat of small wars getting out of hand became a major concern of the international community, particularly as represented at the United Nations.

With a few exceptions, notably Korea and Vietnam on the one hand, and Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the other, the kind of peace-threatening situations which the world encountered and will continue to encounter are local conflicts, not directly involving the forces of major powers.

U.N. peacekeeping action in such situations have been of three types.

First, in quarrels and border disputes between small states, and in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A U.N. mission could supervise a ceasefire and serve as a buffer.

In situations like the Congo and Cyprus, where internal strife threatened to draw in outsiders, the U.N. has helped restore order and stabilize the situation.

In situations such as Greece at the end of the 1940's and Lebanon in 1958, the U.N. helped spotlight subversion and infiltration.

In more than a dozen such situations since World War II, the United Nations has helped to end fighting and maintain a truce.

But except for Korea, it has not undertaken the more ambitious task of stopping aggression or enforcing the peace. It was unable to take such action, for example, in Hungary, in Vietnam, in Laos, or in Czechoslovakia.

In no case has it ordered any such forces into action under article 42, nor have any such forces been put at its disposal under article 43 agreements.

I do not want to imply that U.N. peacekeeping in disputes involving the superpowers is out of the question. On the contrary, during the Cuba missile crisis of 1962, the Secretary General was prepared, if requested by the Soviet Union and the United States, to observe compliance with the agreement on missiles.

This was an important matter to the United States, and Khrushchev indicated a willingness to agree. However, Cuba refused to go along, and other methods of verification were used.

Nor I might add parenthetically, should one rule out the possibility of a U.N. involvement, if there is a truce or armistice agreement in Vietnam—if the other side is willing—for such things as observing the truce, or observing elections.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the record of these U.N. actions over the past two decades shows that United Nations peacekeeping, as distinct from enforcement action, has been primarily an auxiliary to political measures. An extension of political action to contain conflict and to set the stage for peaceful settlement.

The U.N.'s purpose has not been to apply military force in the classic sense of coercing the parties to submit to its will. It has rather been to install a political presence which carries out certain ancillary police duties.

The late Adlai Stevenson put it in a nutshell in an article for McCall's in 1964, entitled "No Mission But Peace; No Enemy But War."

Its essential function is far more political than military. From this fact, a number of consequences follow. First, the mandate of a peacekeeping force must be compatible with the national security interests of the countries concerned, and of the troop-contributing countries.

Second, the consent of the host government or governments, on whose soil this force is to be stationed, is deemed necessary for the entry of the force.

Third, the force should not resort to any violence beyond what may be essential to defend itself, and to carry out its essentially political mission.

Finally, all principal parties to the conflict must be willing to cooperate with the force.

This last point is vividly demonstrated by the recent surge of violence and violations of the UAR-Israel ceasefire. Peacekeeping operations can't stop the parties from fighting, if they are absolutely determined to fight, but where there is a willingness to observe a ceasefire, U.N. forces or observers can give each side reassurance that the other side is also being observed for honest performance.

Among the major powers, the United States has been the most consistent supporter of U.N. peacekeeping. Though our support has usually been crucial, it is equally true that these operations were made possible only through the support of middle powers who were prepared to provide personnel and financing—such countries as Canada, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Yugoslavia, Ireland, and the Scandinavian countries, to name a few.

For more than 20 years the Soviet Union asserted that there was no such thing as voluntary peacekeeping. That is the article 42 type of action.

In practice, they have been more realistic; they have supported or acquiesced in virtually all peacekeeping operations—although they refused to pay the assessments for the Congo and UNEF—thus bringing on the article 19 crisis of 1964–65—and, along with France, have insisted that the Cyprus operation be financed by voluntary contributions.

CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

Of late, there have been some hints that the Soviets might be prepared to bring their position more into line with the realities of today's world. They have shown some signs of being willing to negotiate guidelines for future peacekeeping operations. This has been the basis of negotiations in a working group of eight at the United Nations as well as informal discussions between the Soviets and ourselves.

Some question has been raised by other countries concerning our discussions with the Soviets. These should be seen in their proper context.

Our first efforts after the article 19 crisis in 1964 and 1965 were to work with the smaller and medium-sized countries on behalf of peacekeeping principles supported by a majority of U.N. members but strongly opposed by the Soviets.

However, there was little apparent will among the smaller and medium-sized countries to bring the issue to a head against the strong opposition of the Soviets. More and more they signaled that the United States should attempt to work out some sort of understanding with the Soviet Union, without sacrificing the principles which the majority considered essential.

It was with this background and with the hints of some flexibility in the Soviet attitude that we began a little more than a year ago the discussions which are still in progress.

Both in the Committee on Peacekeeping and in our informal discussions with the Soviets, we have tried to set aside to the greatest extent possible any disputes over charter interpretation whose solution is not essential to progress.

For example, although we continue to believe in the residual authority of the General Assembly to authorize voluntary peacekeeping operations in situations where the Security Council is unable to act, the U.S.S.R. still does not accept this principle; so we agreed to begin discussions on guidelines for operations authorized by the Security Council.

Of course, we have always held to the charter principle (article 24) that the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security.

Moreover, it is obviously a less unwieldy body than the General Assembly of 126 members. Nevertheless, we would not foreclose completely a new resort to the General Assembly— as in the Middle East in 1956—if in a dangerous situation the Security Council were again stalemated by a veto.

Perhaps the most complex part of our discussions has concerned the administration of peacekeeping operations. Here we have determined not to be rigid or doctrinaire about any particular formula or set of proposals. Instead, we have held to the view that the procedures must be both politically realistic and operationally practical.

They must take account of the interest of all parties concerned; they must be impartial in both intent and application; and they must be calculated to induce the cooperation of contending parties, as well as those states on whom the operation must depend for manpower and funds.

This means, first and foremost, an acceptable and workable balance of responsibilities between the Security Council and the Secretary General. The Security Council has ultimate authority over such operations. We believe the Council should have the authority to authorize the operation, determine the key provisions of its mandate, and exercise broad political supervision over it.

The Soviets, however, have advocated extending the authority of the Security Council to encompass operational decisions—for example, the size and composition of the force, designation of the commander—as well as the determination of the method of financing.

The key point of our discussions focuses on where to draw the line of operational responsibility so as to take account of both political and operational necessities.

In our view, the Security Council has a legitimate interest in assuring political responsiveness, but effective management requires that the executive authority of the Secretary General not be impaired.

If the Soviets were to insist on having the Security Council make all operational decisions, we would have a vehicle with a weak motor, powerful brakes, and many hands on the steering wheel. It just would not work effectively.

Quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, we do not know how successful our current efforts will be. We have endeavored to reexamine all elements of our position carefully, to preserve the elements on which an effective U.N. peacekeeping capability depends, but to eliminate any unnecessary obstacles to agreement and to negotiate in a businesslike manner.

The other side has also been businesslike in its approach. The question is whether they can show an equal degree of flexibility so that we may arrive at agreed guidelines.

A second essential is to assure that personnel and facilities for any peacekeeping force are available and ready on short notice. To this end we have advocated that member countries be encouraged to earmark in advance military personnel and facilities for use in the United Nations peacekeeping operations.

We have given assurance that the United States itself will continue to help provide logistical support when requested. We are also prepared to cooperate in joint measures to strengthen the earmarking system.

The third key problem is financing. While the observers in Kashmir and the Middle East are financed on a basis of collective responsibility in the United Nations budget, the larger operation on Cyprus depends on voluntary contributions—a system which is inequitable and undependable.

Although 52 countries, including two nonmembers of the United Nations, have contributed to UNFICYP since its inception, currently such contributions are being made by only 19 countries out of a total membership of 126.

Among the larger members, the most notable omissions are France and the Soviet Union. This is obviously not in accord with the principle of collective responsibility of members. Moreover, it is hardly dignified for the Secretary General to have to go hat in hand to governments in order to carry out an operation to keep the peace.

Finally, there is currently an estimated deficit of some $7,500,000. This is a cumulative deficit since operations began in 1964. As of December 15, 1969, the total cost estimates to be covered by the United Nations were approximately $110 million and total pledges and other income approximately $102,500,000.

The United States has pledged $46 million and other governments $56 million. However, because of our "40-percent principle," we have actually paid in only $40 million. The balance of our pledge will be forthcoming as others make payments on their pledges.

Offhand, it would appear that the United States is paying a disproportionate share of the Cyprus costs. Certainly, it would be better if the financing could be assured on a scale of apportionment where our share might be 40 percent or less.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Excuse me, Ambassador. Does any of that come out of the proceeds of the bond issue?

Ambassador FINGER. No, Mr. Chairman. The bonds financed some of the costs of UNEF and the Congo operation, but from the beginning, the Cyprus operation has been financed by voluntary contributions of governments.

Yet, Mr. Chairman, if there were a question as to whether the operation should have been undertaken at all in the absence of a firm commitment to collective financial responsibility, I think the answer must be a resounding yes in terms of the U.S. national interest.

There is substantial reason to believe that war might have broken out between Turkey and Greece in the fall of 1967 had there not been a U.N. force on the island. Compared to the cost to our national interest and the importance of peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean, the expense involved in UNFICYP is relatively small.

One other point must be mentioned in order to keep this matter of financing in perspective. In addition to the costs of UNFICYP which are met by the United Nations fund I have just discussed, a substantial financial burden has also been borne by nine of the governments which have provided military or police contingents. These governments have themselves assumed a substantial share of the costs of such contingents.

From the inception of UNFICYP through December 1969, these absorbed costs total about $29 million. Taking into account both categories of contributions—that is the direct contributions to the U.N. fund—and costs absorbed by those providing military and police personnel, the United States has pledged or furnished roughly one-third of the total costs of UNFICYP.

In a sense, these "good peacekeepers" who provide personnel for U.N. operations are making a substantial sacrifice on behalf of world peace, which benefits all members of the United Nations.

They are like the volunteer firemen in my home community who bear far more than their share in order to protect the community as a whole. They go on doing it both because of a sense of service and because the community would be much more dangerous if nobody picked up the load. We all owe a great debt to those nations.

This brings me to two conclusions: First, the United States, like the good peacekeepers, should strive for collective financial responsibility, but should not count the pennies too closely in cases where our national interest in world peace are involved.

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Second, we must continue to make every effort to build a system of reliable financing so that the burden may be equitably shared.

But it behooves the United States to gear its policy, not to the actions of those members whose backward thinking has caused them to withhold their full support, but, rather, to the actions of those countries without whose support U.N. peacekeeping would not have been possible and without which the world would be a much more dangerous place.

For it is in the national interest of all countries, and not just the United States and the good peacekeepers, that peace be maintained. It is in the interest of all countries that conflicts and violence be restrained by multilateral action rather than unilateral involvement, wherever possible.

One idea for providing a more solid financial foundation for U.N. peacekeeping has been advanced by a UNA-U.S. national policy panel on multilateral alternatives to unilateral intervention, chaired by Kingman Brewster. In its report entitled "Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's," the panel recommends that a $60 million United Nations Peace Fund be established through voluntary governmental contributions.

Such a fund would be designed as a supplement to financing through normal apportionment procedures, not as a substitute; it is important to maintain the principle among U.N. members that keeping the peace is everybody's business—a principle to be implemented, to the maximum extent feasible, through collective financial responsibility.

I believe that such a plan, with proper safeguards on release of funds, could be a significant factor in strengthening U.N. peacekeeping.

We in the United States are coming more and more to realize the great cost of restraining aggression and violence unilaterally. We must translate that realization into a continued determination to support U.N. peacekeeping, through which many nations share the responsibilities and costs of keeping the peace.

We must never let the laggards determine the pace and call the shots on matters which are vital to the national interest of the United States and, indeed, of every country which believes that peace should be maintained primarily through the multilateral efforts of the United Nations.

My chief, Ambassador Charles W. Yost, who has been most distinquished both as a diplomat and as a scholar in this field, put the matter most cogently when he testified before you last week. He said:

> Many will tell you that this may be true in theory but that it is Utopian to expect the United Nations in our lifetime to play any such role. My answer would be that it is even more Utopian to expect nations to achieve security by unilateral national means under modern circumstances.
>
> It may not be as long as we think before peoples and governments at last begin to realize that, in this more and more tightly knit and explosive modern world, the real interests of all are so bound together that those of one nation cannot be served without all being served, that those of one nation cannot be imperiled without all being imperiled.
>
> To apply this truism to ourselves, I continue to believe, as did those Americans who took part in drafting and ratifying the United Nations Charter, that its effective application would serve the interests of all peoples, but perhaps most of all those of the United States whose interests are so far-flung.

I would like to conclude my oral remarks, Mr. Chairman, by quoting from the two eminent Congressmen who contributed so much to

our delegation's work at the 24th session of the General Assembly, Dante Fascell and Irving Whalley, and who have made a further contribution in their candid and penetrating report entitled "To Save Succeeding Generations." After a frank appraisal of its shortcomings, they say:

> The United Nations, whatever its flaws, remains the embodiment of man's unending quest for peace with justice and opportunity for a better life for all men.
>
> As such, it is the best, and perhaps the only real instrument which the international community of nations has at its disposal today to seek the achievement of those lofty goals.

And they ask:

> What needs to be done to make the United Nations a more effective, dynamic instrument for solving the problems which crowd upon us—and make this decade the beginning of a new and better era?

What can, and should, the U.S. Government do?

I hope that our discussion today may contribute in some way to the search for answers to these two key questions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Ambassador Finger.

What we would like to do is to proceed with the other opening statements. Then we will ask questions at the end of your presentations.

Mr. Johnson.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH E. JOHNSON, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is for me also an honor to be testifying before your subcommittee, and it is also an honor and privilege to be testifying in the company of two old friends and colleagues. I was a colleague of Ambassador Finger's on the delegation to the 24th General Assembly, and Mr. Bloomfield and I have been colleagues for so long, in one way or another, that I have kind of forgotten where it all began.

Sir, I should like, if I may, for the record, to make a statement. As you are aware, foundation officials have certain restrictions put on them recently by an act passed by the Congress, and we are not quite sure what these restrictions are.

I, therefore, wish to have it in the record here that I testified here having been formally invited by you, and that what I am saying are the views of Joseph Johnson, and not of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If you would like to make a few suggestions on that legislation, it could broaden the scope of our hearings.

Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, I shall pass over some of the things that appear in the beginning of my prepared statement, and proceed to express, to state, first of all, that my own interest in the United Nations, which goes back to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations in 1944, has focused from the beginning almost entirely on political and security issues. I am only marginally familiar with social and economic and other questions, which today form such a large part of the work of the United Nations. Within the field of what the U.N. Charter calls the "maintenanec of international peace and security", I have had a good deal to do, both officially and privately as head of a foundation

concerned with peace, with both peacekeeping and arms control, and I should like to address myself specifically to those two subjects.

As the subcommitee is well aware, the phrase "peacekeeping" appears nowhere in the Charter of the United Nations. The concept itself, which has loomed so large in U.N. affairs for nearly 15 years, was not even adumbrated in the charter, largely for the reasons that Ambassador Finger has just suggested.

What is interesting to me is that nowadays, since the peaceful settlement of disputes is the subject matter of chapter 6 of the charter, and enforcement action that of chapter 7, and as peacekeeping appears to fall somewhere in between, we sometimes refer to it as falling under "chapter 6½" of the charter.

I shall say very little about past actions in this field. Ambassador Finger has already said something on the subject, and I believe Professor Bloomfield may want to say some more about this, too; moreover, it seems to me that much useful information is contained in the pamphlet to which Ambassador Finger referred, "Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's," a copy of which I have here, the report of a panel on which both Professor Bloomfield and I served last year.

I should like to proceed by making a few specific points, rather briefly.

First, when we talk of peacekeeping, we must recognize that we are concerned with disputes or conflicts that do not involve directly either of the superpowers.

I wrote that statement before I heard Ambassador Finger. I think my statement is still generally true. It is only marginally, and only very tentatively, I believe, that one can consider the use of peacekeeping machinery in such a situation as that after the end of the Cuban missile crisis to which he referred.

Secondly, we must assume, unhappily, that conflicts to which peacekeeping might apply will continue to be of international concern throughout the next decade.

Given the nature of our modern international system—and this is the third point—including both interdependence and speedy communications, what I like to call "instant interdependence," any time an international conflict heats up, all or a considerable part of the rest of the world will feel a compulsion to do something about it. And in most cases, the question will quickly arise as to whether the matter should be brought before the United Nations, and if so, how.

Moreover, there is reason to believe that a substantial number of what are initially internal conflicts, and what sometimes remain internal conflicts, such as the recent one in Nigeria, will attract world public attention, with, in almost every case, some persons or governments calling for international action at either the regional or the world level.

Fourth, because of a number of changes in positions and attitudes of governments, both of the superpowers and of other countries, the old approaches to peacekeeping will no longer work as well as they have in the past.

Five, there is, therefore, need to reexamine the role and methods of peacekeeping decisions, to see if we can't work out ways to do the job more efficiently.

Six, even at present, with its evident weaknesses, the U.N. is still probably the best instrument for peacekeeping, regional agencies not yet having shown as great a capacity as they may in time be able to develop, and unilateral action being of increasingly dubious value.

Seven, on deciding on any peacekeeping action whether unilateral, regional or under U.N. auspices, it is essential to recognize the relationship between peacekeeping and peaceful settlement of disputes.

The purpose of peacekeeping is not to bring about a settlement of a dispute, but only to prevent or stop the fighting and keep it stopped. Some people believe that peacekeeping does or may even prevent or delay the settlement of disputes. There is much to be said for this position, since often both sides find it to their advantage to allow the dispute to go unsettled, even at the cost of continued tensions and the danger of the outbreak of further hostilities.

Moreover, once the fighting ceases, and the issue vanishes from the front page of the world's newspapers and from the world's television screens, the international community appears content to sink back with relief and not press for settlement.

On the other hand, I doubt whether it could be conclusively demonstrated that a decision not to undertake a peacekeeping operation in a particular situation would lead to an earlier and more generally satisfactory settlement of the dispute.

What is important is that the international community recognize that the establishment of peacekeeping machinery does not remove the obligation to pursue the search for a peaceful settlement.

Eight, on balance, I remain convinced that peacekeeping will continue to be used and that therefore, it is important to try to improve this tool, and that the time is now.

Nine, "Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's" was issued about 10 months ago. Since that time, some small, but not insignificant, progress has been made on the international front, and I wish to record my own hope that more progress will be made between now and the next meeting of the General Assembly.

As Ambassador Finger has pointed out, the General Assembly's Committee of 33, established five years ago, which accomplished very little in its first few years, has now set up a working group of eight countries that meets in private to develop more effective peacekeeping machinery.

As the Ambassador has also pointed out, the United States and the Soviet Union have shown substantial interest in trying to overcome their differences.

What impresses me is that the meetings are now taking place in private, and in these private meetings, delegates do not feel they have to make extensive statements for the record, do not—as so frequently happens in public meetings in the international forum—shout over each other's shoulders in order to make a point without communicating, do not engage in the dialogue of the deaf that was so common in the United Nations when I was there first, 25 years ago, but are willing to sit down and explore quietly the issues that separate them.

If this process which Ambassador Finger has described in some detail can be continued vigorously and with goodwill, I believe that it may be possible to achieve the first solid and durable progress since the Charter was signed in June, 1945, in improving the ability of the

U.N. to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

I turn now, sir, in this introductory statement, to the subject of arms control—a phrase which I much prefer to the word "disarmament."

"Disarmament" has always seemed to me to be a confusing and even misleading word. I don't believe it is a realistic goal, and I even have serious doubts as to whether what is called general and complete disarmament is desirable in a world of sovereign powers.

Incidentally, some of my friends wonder how I got to be the head of a peace organization.

Arms control, arms limitations——

Mr. GALLAGHER. By being realistic about it.

Mr. JOHNSON. I hope so.

Arms control, arms limitation, arms regulation—the word "regulation" is used in the charter—all these seem to be much more useful expressions, because they envisage much more manageable goals; I was therefore interested when I was talking about this subject the other day with a friend of mine who is very active in discussions at the private level with Soviet individuals in this field of arms control limitation, to learn that the phrase "arms limitation" is much more acceptable to the Russians than "arm control." The word "control" evokes in their minds recollections of the Baruch plan, the whole procedure for an enormous international machinery which would invade sovereignty, and things of that kind, and they therefore prefer to use the phrase "arms limitation."

It may be worth noting that the expectation, at least on the part of the United States, at the San Francisco Conference, was that even regulation of armaments would not have priority, but would come about only after provision had been made under article 43 of the charter for armed forces to be available to the Security Council.

In short, arms, and more particularly, the knowledge of fission and fusion that makes it possible to produce nuclear arms, are here to stay, and negotiations in whatever forum should focus not on abolition but on control, and hopefully, on reduction.

With respect to the role of the U.N. in arms control, I believe that it should be limited. Obviously, the Assembly has under article 11 of the charter the authority to consider "the principles covering disarmament and the regulation of armaments," and equally obviously, the Security Council has responsibilities in this field.

Moreover, I believe it important that the U.N. should be kept fully informed of progress, or lack of progress, in the field of arms control, and that hopefully, it should endorse agreements in this field.

It is desirable, too, that the relevant section of the U.N. Secretariat should give as much help as possible.

But the actual negotiations require a very high degree of expertise which is not likely to be sufficiently available to all delegations in the General Assembly, and moreover, there is a danger that arms negotiations may get fouled up in the horse trading that is characteristic of the Assembly, and several of you gentlemen have been on the Assembly delegations, and are aware that there is such horse trading.

As for the Security Council again it seems to me that negotiations are better conducted by a body that includes expert representatives of all those governments that need to be brought into the picture, if negotiations are to be successful, and does not necessarily have to include

representatives of governments that do not have much to contribute to this aspect of the maintenance of international peace and security.

There are now delegations or governments which are represented on the Security Council that I think could not contribute a great deal in this field at the present time.

Actually, most governments have recognized some of the above considerations for years. I take it that considerations of this kind led to the creation of the 10-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1959.

The present Committee, called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, also reflects another fact basic to arms control negotiations, the preponderance of the superpowers—a preponderance that is recognized by the fact that the Soviet and American representatives are cochairmen of the Committee. The U.N. role is limited to the provision of secretarial staff and to the requirement that the General Assembly receive reports from the Committee.

Even the Committee is not the appropriate forum for discussion of some problems, as has been recognized by what I take to be a general, if sometimes grudging, acceptance of the fact that strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) must be the responsibility of the superpowers.

Almost all the emphasis in arms control negotiations in recent years has been on the control of nuclear weapons and strategic systems, with little thought given to so-called conventional armaments, and yet, these are the arms that have been used in all of the conflicts since World War II.

I do not feel in a position to express an opinion on whether there should be active negotiation for the limitation of conventional armaments, but I am convinced that much more serious attention needs to be given by the world than has so far been the case to the problem of the international traffic in arms.

We have recently had several rather notorious instances of the impact of the uncontrolled traffic in arms upon international peace and security.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, again I should like to make a very few very brief points. I don't think it would be safe for me as a man, most of whose future is behind him, to look much further ahead than the next 10 year. Others may try 25 years, or the year 2000, or whatever it may be—not I.

First, I think we must emphasize that the need for international machinery to manage the affairs of this lonely globe of ours is greater today than it was a quarter of a century ago, and it will continue to increase.

Second, the U.N. is far from a perfect instrument for the advancement of international peace and security in the eighth decade of the 20th century, but it is unlikely that in this era of increasing nationalism there will be any significant modifications of the charter.

3. Experience since World War II suggests to me that if the United Nations did not exist, we should be seeking to create something like it and would probably not be able to bring into being as flexible an instrument as the U.N. Charter.

4. The United Nations is probably not going to regain the position it had in the 1940's in the field of arms control—for reasons that are not the fault of the charter or of the United Nations as an organization, but rather stem from the realities of international life.

5. There is, I believe, a real possibility that long before this decade is over there will be more effective machinery for peacekeeping. And I also hope, although with less optimism, that the U.N. will, by 1980, have greater capacity and great utility for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

6. Lastly, the United Nations is not independent of its members with powers apart from those they are prepared to give it. As former Secretary of State Acheson has written, "This idea * * * that the United Nations was and should be something different from its members and could assume responsibility without power has been a curiously persistent one."

The United Nations is based on the sovereignty of states and if it were to be replaced by any organization that, too, would probably have to be similarly founded.

The result is, as Congressmen Fascell and Whalley have said in their report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs released earlier this month, the U.N. is a mirror. Sometimes it is a distorted mirror, but it remains a mirror of the state of international relations and of international society and for that reason we citizens of this globe, from whatever country we may come, should not blame it for its faults and failures, but look to ourselves.

Thank you.

(The complete statement of Mr. Johnson follows:)

STATEMENT BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

My name is Joseph E. Johnson. I am very honored to have been invited to testify before this Sub-Committee about the United Nations as we move into the Organization's 25th year. I have been, since 1950, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with headquarters in New York City, but the views I express here are my own views as an individual. The Endowment as an organization does not take stands on public issues.

I have been involved in matters relating to the United Nations for more than twenty-five years, having attended the Dumbarton Oaks conversations and the San Francisco Conference at which the Charter was written, and having been on the staff of the US Delegations to the sessions of the General Assembly and the Security Council in 1946. Furthermore, a large part of my work at the Endowment is concerned with the problems of international organization in general, with special emphasis on the United Nations. In the autumn of 1969 I had the honor to serve, by Presidential appointment and with the confirmation of the Senate, as an Alternate Delegate to the 24th General Assembly.

My interest in the United Nations has from the beginning focused largely on political and security issues. I am only marginally familiar with economic and social and other questions which form today such a large part of the work of the UN. Within the field of what the UN Charter calls the "maintenance of international peace and security" I have had much to do with questions of arms control and disarmament and problems of peace-keeping (for about 18 months in 1960–63 I was the Special Representative of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, charged with seeking means of making progress on the question of the Palestine Arab refugees. Although, of course, this assignment had wider aspects, it could be considered as primarily relating to peace-keeping.)

I should like to address myself to peace-keeping and to arms control.

As the Committee is well aware, the phrase peace-keeping appears nowhere in the Charter of the United Nations. The concept itself, which has loomed so large in United Nations affairs for nearly 15 years, was not even adumbrated in the Charter, but, as the peaceful settlement of disputes is the subject matter of Chapter 6 of the Charter and enforcement action that of Chapter 7, and as peace-keeping appears to fall somewhere between, it is sometimes referred to as falling under "Chapter 6½".

I shall say very little about past actions by the United Nations, believing that Professor Bloomfield may wish to cover this and hoping that whether he does or

not the Committee will find it possible to study a pamphlet called *Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's*, a report of a National Policy Panel established by the United Nations Association of the USA. Professor Bloomfield and I were both members of that panel, the chairman of which was President Kingman R. Brewster, Jr. of Yale University, and I strongly endorse its conclusions.

I believe I can best proceed by making a few specific points, each relatively briefly.

1. When we talk of peace-keeping, we must recognize that we are concerned with disputes or conflicts that do not involve *directly* either of the superpowers.

2. We must assume, unhappily, that conflicts to which peace-keeping might apply will continue to be of international concern throughout the next decade.

3. Given the nature of our modern international system, including interdependence and speedy communications (what I like to call "instant interdependence"), any time an international conflict heats up, all, or a considerable part of the rest of the world will feel a compulsion to do something about it, and in most cases the question will quickly arise as to whether the matter should be brought before the United Nations and, if so, how. Moreover, there is reason to believe that a substantial number of what are initially internal conflicts, such as the recent one in Nigeria, will attract world public attention, with, in almost every case, some persons or governments calling for international action at either the regional or world level.

4. Because of a number of changes in positions and attitudes of governments, both of the superpowers and of other countries, the old approaches to peace-keeping will no longer work as well as they have in the past.

5. There is, therefore, need to reexamine the role and methods of peace-keeping decisions to see if we can't work out ways to do the job more efficiently.

6. Even at present with its evident weaknesses in this field, the United Nations is still probably the best instrument for peace-keeping, regional agencies not yet having shown as great a capacity as they may in time be able to develop, and unilateral action being of increasingly dubious value.

7. On deciding on any peace-keeping action, whether unilateral, regional or under United Nations auspices, it is essential to recognize the relationship between peace-keeping and peaceful settlement. The purpose of peace-keeping is not to bring about a settlement of a dispute, but only to prevent or stop the fighting and keep it stopped. Some people believe that peace-keeping does or may prevent the settlement of a dispute. There is much to be said for this position since often both sides find it to their advantage to allow the dispute to go unsettled, even at the cost of continued tension and the danger of the outbreak of further hostility. Moreover, once the fighting ceases and the issue vanishes from the front pages of the world's newspapers and from the world's television screens, the international community appears content to sink back with relief and not press for settlement. On the other hand, I doubt whether it could be conclusively demonstrated that a decision *not* to undertake a peace-keeping operation would lead to an earlier and more generally satisfactory settlement of a given dispute. What is important is that the international community recognize that the establishment of peace-keeping machinery does not remove the obligation to pursue the search for a peaceful settlement.

8. On balance, I remain convinced that peace-keeping will continue to be used and that, therefore, it is important to try to improve this tool, and that the time is now.

9. Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's was issued about ten months ago. Since that time some small, but not insignificant, progress has been made on the international front and I wish to record my own hope that more progress will be made between now and the next meeting of the General Assembly. As Ambassador Finger has pointed out, the General Assembly's Committee of 33, established five years ago, which accomplished very little in its first few years, has now set up a working group of eight countries that meets in private to try to develop more effective peace-keeping machinery. Moreover, the United States and the USSR have shown substantial interest in trying to overcome their differences. In the private meetings delegates do not feel they have to make extensive statements for the record, but are willing to sit down and explore quietly the issues that separate them. If this process can be continued vigorously and with good will, I believe that it may be possible to achieve the first solid and durable progress since the Charter was signed in June 1945, in improving the ability of the United Nations to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

I have deliberately employed the phrase "arms control". I have long disliked the word "disarmament". It is confusing and even misleading. I do not believe that disarmament is a realistic goal and I even have serious doubts as to whether what is called "general and complete disarmament" is desirable in a world of sovereign powers. Arms control, arms limitation, arms regulation—the word "regulation" is used in the UN Charter—all these seem to me to be much more useful expressions because they envisage more manageable goals.

It may be worth noting that the expectation, at least of the United States, at the time of the San Francisco Conference was that even regulation of armaments would not have priority, but would come about only after provision had been made under Article 43 of the Charter for armed forces to be made available to the Security Council.

In short, arms, and, more particularly, the knowledge of fission that makes it possible to produce nuclear arms; are here to stay and negotiations in whatever forum should focus not on abolition but on control and, hopefully, on reduction.

With respect to the role of the United Nations in arms control, I believe that it should be a limited one. Obviously the Assembly has under Article 11 of the Charter the authority to consider "the principles covering disarmament and the regulation of armaments" and, equally obviously, the Security Council has responsibilities in this field. Moreover, I believe it important that the United Nations shall be kept fully informed of progress—and lack of progress—in the field of arms control and that, hopefully, it should endorse agreements in the field. It is desirable too that the relevant section of the UN Secretariat should give as much help as possible.

But the actual negotiations require a very high degree of expertise which is not likely to be sufficiently available to all delegations in the General Assembly and, moreover, there is a danger that arms negotiations may get fouled up in the horse trading that is characteristic of the Assembly. As for the Security Council, again it seems to me that negotiations are better conducted by a body that includes expert representatives of those governments that need to be brought into the picture if negotiations are to be successful.

Actually, most governments have recognized some of the above considerations for some time. I take it that considerations of this kind led to the creation of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1959. The present Committee, called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, also reflects another fact basic to the arms control negotiations, the preponderance of the super powers—a preponderance that is recognized by the fact that the Soviet and American representatives are co-chairmen of the Committee. The United Nations' role is limited to the provision of secretarial staff and to the requirement that the General Assembly receive reports from the Committee.

Even the CCD is not the appropriate forum for discussion of some problems, as has been recognized by what I take to be a general, if sometimes grudging, acceptance of the fact that strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) must be the responsibility of the super powers.

Almost all the emphasis in arms control negotiations in recent years has been on the control of nuclear weapons and strategic systems, with little thought given to so-called "conventional" armaments. And yet these are the arms that have been used in all of the conflicts since World War II. I do not now feel in a position to express an opinion on whether there should be active negotiation for the limitation of conventional armaments, but I am convinced that much more serious attention needs to be given by the world than has so far been the case, to the problem of the international traffic in arms. We have very recently had several rather notorious instances of the impact of the uncontrolled traffic in arms upon international peace and security.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, looking ahead to the next decade—it would be presumptuous of anyone, particularly of a man most of whose future is behind him, to try to look farther than that—several things seem to be worth saying today.

1. The first is to emphasize that the need for international machinery to manage the affairs of this lonely globe of ours is greater today than it was a quarter of a century ago and will continue to increase.

2. The United Nations is far from a perfect instrument for the advancement of international peace and security in the eighth decade of the twentieth century,

but it is unlikely that in this era of increasing nationalism there will be any significant modification of the Charter.

3. Experience since World War II suggests to me that if the United Nations did not exist, we should be seeking to create something like it and would probably not be able to bring into being as flexible an instrument as the UN Charter.

4. The United Nations is probably not going to regain the position it had in the 1940's in the field of arms control—for reasons that are not the fault of the Charter or of the United Nations as an organization, but rather stem from the realities of international life.

5. There is, I believe, a real possibility that long before this decade is over there will be more effective machinery for peace-keeping. And I also hope, although with less optimism, that the UN will by 1980 have greater capacity and great utility for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

6. Lastly, the United Nations is not independent of its members with powers apart from those they are prepared to give it. As former Secretary of State Acheson has written, "This idea . . . that the United Nations was and should be something different from its members and could assume responsibility without power has been a curiously persistent one." The United Nations is based on the sovereign equality of states and if it were to be replaced by any organization that too would probably have to be similarly founded. The result is, as Congressmen Fascell and Whalley have said in their report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs released earlier this month, the UN is a mirror. Sometimes it is a distorted mirror, but it remains a mirror of the state of international relations and of international society and for that reason we citizens of this globe, from whatever country we may come, should not blame it for its faults and failures, but look to ourselves.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much for that excellent statement. We will proceed now to Professor Bloomfield.

STATEMENT OF LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am a professor of political science at MIT. I served for about 11 years in the State Department, most recently, as the policy planner for United Nations problems.

About 12 years ago, I went to the Center for International Studies at MIT, where I ran something called the United Nations project, which was an attempt to look rather hardheadedly at this same range of issues. I now direct the Center's arms control project.

Rather than go into details of the past, or the issues which Ambassador Finger and Dr. Johnson have well covered, I thought I might set forth what seems to me the strategic context for talking about peacekeeping, and arms control in the 1970's, and about the opportunities that I think the United States might have to influence the situation.

The subtitle of my remarks might well be "What I Wish Had Appeared in the President's State of the World Message About Foreign Policy." I can do this without any constraints of either an official or a foundation executive.

My gut feeling is that after being very promising a decade ago peacekeeping has declined into the same realm of political theology where we find disarmament and collective security. As peacekeeping has declined in the last 10 years, the superpowers have engaged in their own form of unilateral peacekeeping, the United States in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia. Objectively, it seems to me the results for both have been

poor, and therein lies the best prospect for looking at peacekeeping with fresh interest.

As the 1970's open, it seems to me very unlikely that the United States is soon again going to intervene unilaterally with its own armed forces anywhere, except where its vital security interests are at stake. I think the President's statement confirmed this, and there is other evidence such as many planning exercises which have been undertaken in the last year which seem to me profoundly to confirm this.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the evidence is more ambiguous. I think the Soviets are likely to continue to be torn between the growing desire for stability around them, and the tempting opportunities that local conflicts such as the Middle East will continue to offer them for exploitation, or to compete with Peking.

But regardless of what Moscow and Washington would like to do, my conviction is that the 1970's are going to see a continuation of the kinds of conflicts we have had since 1945. Old local conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli, India-Pakistan, and Cyprus conflicts, and continuing war among the successor states in Indo-China, seem to me predictable. New conflicts will start, possibly at the going rate, which is about 1.5 new conflicts per year according to our research.

The Portuguese African colonies are likely to explode in time, and certainly the fuse will grow shorter on Rhodesia and South Africa. What might be called "tribal" conflict has already infected the developed world, where ethnic and religious outbursts, a la Ulster, are at least possible for such countries as Belgium, Canada, Lebanon, and additional African States.

Latin America seems to me guaranteed to be the scene of revolutionary change, some of it doubtless violent. And over all of us looms the specter of a possible Sino-Soviet nuclear war, the fallout from which could be devastating for millions of people elsewhere. Finally, there may be need for action in the event of nuclear accidents, if additional countries build nuclear weapons.

This kind of agenda of problems, some of which may or may not look like the Congo and UNEF and Cyprus against the background of changed superpower perspectives on the world, seems to me to lead one inexorably to some conclusions.

One is that conflict prevention, which is a particular topic of concern in my own research, becomes vital. The thing most governments and most chancelleries do perhaps worst of all is the anticipation and prevention of conflict. But the "bandaid" function of peacekeeping, with or without settlement of the particular dispute, seems to me still very urgent and necessary.

Second, tacit "spheres of abstention," as opposed to spheres of influence between the Soviets and the Americans, would be desirable to work out. And third, against this background of predictable conflict, likely U.S. partial withdrawal, and tempting opportunities for exploitation—and this is my chief point—multilateral peacekeeping ceases to be a luxury, which I think it has been, and for the first time becomes a real necessity.

To act on this new logic, something more than techniques are needed although I certainly support everything that Dr. Johnson and I and others wrote in the UNA–U.S.A. panel report on peacekeeping. I think the climate is poor for peacekeeping, and that the sense of expecta-

tion that it is a realistic option has to be restored, before people turn to it to deal with the problems that must be dealt with.

I think the United States can help to do this in a number of ways, and that is what we are here to talk about.

I would certainly add that the rigid view of national sovereignty held by the Soviet Union, by France, and by many of what might be called the "peacekeepees"—the people who are peacekept by peacekeeping—is a major obstacle.

But I think the United States itself is not blameless. I would argue that the United States has been very selective in its own attitude toward peacekeeping, and I may get an argument from my friends in Government on this. I think the United States has tended to favor peacekeeping, desperately at times, in the Middle East and in Africa, and has bitterly opposed it at times in Southeast Asia and Latin America. I don't see how one can advance and develop a worldwide capability on that basis.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You may even get an argument on that point from the committee.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. You say I would not?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You may. I don't want to interrupt you, but it is possible we shall raise some questions about that contention.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. All right, that's why I made it.

I think the executive branch should be applauded and encouraged in the conversations which Ambassador Finger mentioned our Government is having with the Soviet Union. That is indispensable to find some kind of working formula to make this thing go in the 1970's, a formula which takes account of the two opposing convictions: the Soviet conviction that you have to have great power control over peacekeeping; and the American conviction that you have to do it efficiently. Those two principles are constantly in collision and of course underlie a lot of the argument.

The specific recommendations of the panel report of the UNA–U.S.A. on peacekeeping—recommendations which have already been supported by 80 Members of the Congress—should, in my opinion, be implemented. Finally, the nations that can probably make the most useful suggestions for improvement are not the United States and the Soviet Union, but the middle and other powers who tend to hang back and rather than take initiatives, wait for us to act. I don't know what your committee can do about that, sir.

Now just a brief word on the U.N. and arms control, because you asked me to say something about it. I have just said that the peacekeeping seems to me to have a new urgency and realism, largely because the superpowers may now be ready to take the multilateral option more seriously than they always have in the past.

On the other hand, the very talks between the superpowers on strategic arms limitation keeps the U.N. role here secondary, and I think necessarily so. But that secondary role has some value. The opinions of other countries have some influence, although not very much, on the strategic policies of Moscow and Washington. Pressures on the "Big Two" to act can be politically important.

It remains very convenient to have a place to talk, which the U.N. supplies. Above all, resounding U.N. votes on the limited nuclear test ban, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Nonproliferation Treaty, repre-

sent the closest thing the world has today to a seal of legitimacy, even a kind of law, which codifies agreements that have been worked out by the great powers.

There are two things the U.N. can do better than anyone else can do in this business. The first is to focus international attention and action on new potential arms races, and it has done so for outer space and tentatively for the seabed. The other thing it can do, it doesn't do at all, which is to publish statistics on the transfer of arms around the world, something which the League of Nations did. And it can usefully discuss the problems of conventional arms, which Dr. Johnson mentioned, because those are the arms that affect the wars that take place, and in my research we count 55 of those since World War II.

The fault here, for a change, is not in what I have heard called, even in these halls, the arrogant unilateralism of the super powers, but the arrogant unilateralism of other countries, who would like to publicize and control everyone else's arms race but their own.

I think the United States is limited in the initiatives it can take for regional arms-control limitation, except for the desperately needed agreement between suppliers of arms to the Middle East. But I think we can and should encourage others to take up this challenge, and provide the needed statesmanship.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY PROF. LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, M.I.T.

THE PEACEKEEPING OPTION

Peacekeeping through the United Nations after its promising start in the mid-50's has increasingly joined the other articles of political theology that live in official rhetoric but inspire real-life pessimism, like disarmament and collective security. As peacekeeping has declined, the superpowers have engaged in their own form of "unilateral peacekeeping"—the U.S. in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia. The results, at least for the U.S., have been traumatic, and as the 70's open it seems unlikely that the U.S. will soon again intervene unilaterally with its own armed forces except when its deepest security interests are at stake. The evidence is more ambiguous concerning the Soviets, who are likely to be torn between their growing desire for stability and the tempting opportunities local conflicts will offer for exploitation, or for policies competitive with Peking.

But regardless of superpower preferences, the 1970's will see little diminution of conflicts in the world. Old local conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli, Indo-Pakistani and Cyprus conflicts, and the war among the successor states in Indochina, will continue to threaten the peace. New conflicts will start, possibly at the present rate of 1.5 a year. The Portuguese African colonies will in time explode, and the fuse will burn shorter on Rhodesia and South Africa. "Tribal" conflict will infect the *developed* world, with ethnic and religious outbursts in Ulster, Belgium, and possibly Canada, Lebanon and some African states. Latin America is guaranteed to be the scene of revolutionary change. Over us all looms the spectre of a possible Sino-Soviet nuclear war. Finally there may be need of impartial reassurances in the event of nuclear accidents in a 5-plus nuclear nation world.

Against this background of predictable conflict, likely U.S. partial withdrawal, and tempting opportunities for exploitation, multilateral peacekeeping ceases to be a luxury and for the first time becomes a necessity. To act upon the new logic, a climate of expectation must be again created that peacekeeping is a realistic option. The U.S. can help do this by ceasing to be selective in its own attitude—pro U.N. peacekeeping in the Middle East and Africa but against it in South East Asia and Latin America. The Executive Branch should be encouraged in the essential explorations with the Soviets to find new and workable formulas that take account of Soviet desires for great power control and U.S. desires for efficiency of operations. The specific recommendations of the UNA-USA Panel,

already supported by 80 members of the Congress, should be implemented. The Middle Powers—the real peacekeepers—should be urged to take initiatives we cannot take to make the admittedly inadequate international system respond more effectively to the iron logic of the changing times.

THE UN AND ARMS CONTROL

In considering the future of the UN, I have said that peacekeeping seems to have a new urgency and realism, largely because the superpowers may now be ready to take that option more seriously. On the other hand, superpower interest in serious stragetic nuclear arms limitations keeps the UN role secondary in this area. That secondary role is not insignificant: the opinions of other countries have some influence—though not much; pressures on the Big Two to act can be politically potent; it remains very convenient to have the UN supply the conference site and services for disarmament talks; and above all, a resounding UN vote is the closest thing the world has to a seal of legitimacy and even law on agreements worked out by the great powers. (I have never understood why the non-nuclear countries, with a few notable exceptions such as Sweden, have not done more homework and come up with imaginative yet serious arms reduction schemes that at times could really command the field.)

The two things the UN can do better than any one else in the arms control field are first, to focus international attention and action on new potential arms race environments—as it has done successfully for outer space and tentatively for the seabed. The other thing it can do it does not do at all, and that is to focus on the non-nuclear arms races and competitions that waste resources and encourage new wars. The UN neither publishes statistics on conventional arms transfers as the League did—nor discusses seriously the problems of conventional arms, which affect the wars that in fact take place. The fault, for a change, is not in the arrogant unilateralism of the superpowers, but in the arrogant unilateralism of the smaller nations who turn out to want to control and publicize everyone's arms races but their own. The U.S. is limited in the initiatives it can take for regional arms control regulation, except for the badly-needed suppliers' agreement for the Middle East. It can and should encourage others to take up this challenge and provide the needed statesmanship.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Professor Bloomfield.

I gather that the prognosis for the 1970's suggests a very busy season for the peacekeepers. Do you feel that the rate of conflicts is going to accelerate? I gather that you do, up from 1.5 per year.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. No, sir, I don't. But the computers tend to let us down on this kind of problem.

Mr. GALLAGHER. They let many people down.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. There is one study which shows that the rate may be declining. However, the risk that each conflict poses for the peace of the world may increase.

I would argue that it may not, if a U.S. policy were adopted of not caring so much about some of these conflicts. If no one on the outside cares about them, except the people who are unfortunately involved in them, then you don't even need international peacekeeping. It is only to insulate these conflicts from escalating into a larger war that it seems to me peacekeeping has a vital function.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You mean like the Soccer War. I am referring to the Soccer War, between El Salvador and Honduras, wasn't it?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I would even refer to the Nigerian War, sir, where unlike the Congo, the super powers, particularly the Soviet Union, did not make a major move that would then require opposition. The Congo had to be dealt with by the U.N. I think the Nigerian War did not.

Whatever one thinks of the human tragedy involved, that to me is a case where other countries left it relatively alone.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Are you saying, then, that perhaps there is a greater role for peacekeeping operations to insulate local conflicts?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Rather than the United States injecting itself into the settlement of those conflicts?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I would. In fact, I feel the ideological aspect of this is crucial, a feeling that is reinforced by my talks with Soviet and Eastern European officials. There is a great suspicion that U.N. peacekeeping has often in the past meant the imposition of a Western solution to an internal conflict somewhere in the world.

I have argued that if the United States is not going to intervene with its own forces, some alternative is needed. But the multilateral alternative will not work unless it is made clear that its purpose is to insulate conflicts, rather than to go in with a view to determine the political outcome. I think this is a very crucial point, sir.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Do we then have a parallel obligation to let them know that they can fight it out to the end, and no one is going to interfere? Is this encouraging a spread of the conflict?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. We have been speaking of wars within States, which tend to be about 50 percent of the wars that take place. The other 50 percent may be even more dangerous. There, I think, every effort has to be made to bring about ceasefires, border patrols, observation, and reporting. In other words the peacekeeping style that we have become used to, which Ambassador Finger has been describing.

Mr. JOHNSON. May I comment on that?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes, if you gentlemen care to comment on this question of insulation, go ahead.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think I agree in general with Mr. Bloomfield, but it does seem to me that with respect to every situation in which the issue of possible peacekeeping arises, we have to be aware that we have to make a conscious decision as to what (A) we and (B) the world as a whole intend to do about it. We can't sort of slip into one. We must say, "This is an issue which calls for peacekeeping forces, or peacekeeping units, or it is not."

And I think I would say, also, to you, sir, that I don't think we ought to make that decision forever. We might have to change it in the course of a conflict, because a conflict that looks initially as if one could isolate it, or insulate it, might change in the course of time, and lead people to think that it ought to be dealt with by the international community. I take it this is what almost happened at one time in the middle of the Nigerian-Biafran struggle. There were strong efforts to have the international community, which had stayed clear, become involved. And I think is likely to happen, because the individual situation does change over time, and people who think initially the side they want to win is going to win, and discover it is not going to win, sometimes have a desire to change the rules in the middle of the contest.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Would you care to comment on that, Ambassador Finger?

Ambassador FINGER. Mr. Chairman, I agree in general with what has been said here. I think that the style of peacekeeping developed by Dag Hammarskjold, which has become the pattern, has been designed principally to prevent conflicts from spreading, and not to push the interest of one side or the other. This is quite distinct from the philosophy of the Korean operation, where it was definitely seen as a way of using the U.N. to meet an aggressive attack from the Communist side.

Now, I think that the Soviet Union and the United States, to take two of the great powers, can look at a conflict in a part of the world where their vital security interests are not directly involved, in two or three different ways. One would be to say, "Well, neither one of us really needs to get involved." There may not be an official communication, but one can tell from the behavior of the other side.

The other, the way in which U.N. peacekeeping would arise, is, for example, the fighting between India and Pakistan, in 1965, where both the Soviet Union and the United States felt it was in their interests as well as the interests of the parties to have the fighting stopped. And as a result, a U.N. mission went out there, and the fighting did stop.

So I think that, as Dr. Johnson has pointed out, not only will we have to look at each situation individually, and not assume that every time a shot is fired, there will automatically be a U.N. peacekeeping operation, but we will have to look at the way operations evolve.

It may be that, a conflict that looked as if it could not spread into a worldwide conflict will assume more ominous proportions over time. It may be that we will misunderstand some signals at the beginning, and have to change our minds.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Ambassador Finger.

Professor Bloomfield, I am uncertain, as I am sure everyone else is, as to what lessons we have really learned from Vietnam. Is that one of them? Or how would your policy of insulation apply there? Or does a policy of intervention apply there?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Well, I was afraid you would ask me that, Mr. Chairman. I think the answer has to be, yes, there is a lesson.

I happen to have been a member of a very small group within the State Department who argued in the early 1950's that the United States should not pick up the marbles dropped by the French in Indochina, but should find some other way. There are not very many other ways. As Cyprus showed, after looking at the alternatives, the only other way, really, is a multilateral peacekeeping operation.

Looking at one of the next problems in Southeast Asia, we should see if the balance of costs and benefits from the essentially unilateral U.S. action in Vietnam can be applied. I refer to Thailand, and without getting into too many details I have the impression that once again we are moving into a situation where the issue is reported infiltration—which I believe is true—across the river from North Vietnam of people trained on the outside. But the issue is also lack of governmental control in the northeast provinces in Thailand, as well as other internal issues of governance within Thailand.

Now, it seems to me we still have a choice. Do we try to move in unilaterally and help with the whole package, both the internal weakness and the reported infiltration? Do we abandon the whole package, and then have to come back later—the Dean Rusk argument? Can we move the McNamara line, so to speak, that cost about a billion dollars, with its reported capacity for monitoring infiltration, to the Mekong River?

I don't want to have to explain that in detail, because my point is the desirability of having an international capability to at least do what was never done in Vietnam—report as unequivocally as possible to the doubters and the skeptics that there is, or is not, significant ex-

ternal infiltration. For once that is dealt with, it no longer can become an argument for going to war, if it isn't happening, or for the international community for not acting if it is happening. That was one of the great ambiguities about Vietnam.

This was the lesson of Korea we failed to learn. I refer to the measure of neutral U.N. observers on the 38th Parallel, on the night of June 24, 1950, when it really wasn't clear who was going to march north or south, given the situation in Korea at the time. The Indian chairman cabled back that he and his neutral U.N. observers saw the march from the north to the south.

That argument could still be going on, as the argument about infiltration often has in Vietnam, if it hadn't been for the capability of impartial observation, not about a civil war, but about external involvement in it.

This to me is an essential lesson from Vietnam that ought to be studied very carefully.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes, but then, assuming that we have that information, is not the issue the same as it is when the information is sketchy? We know it, those who make the decision. I mean, is not the decision there?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Well, it acts also as a deterrent.

If you ever visited, as I did and others here have, the UNEF that was stationed along the Arab-Israeli border for a 10-year period, there was only one U.N. soldier every half kilometer, armed with an unloaded rifle. There was nothing he could have done if either the Israelis or the Arabs had crossed the line. But the U.N. force included about six or seven nations that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis cared to run over, and they privately said it suited them to be deterred this way. It was a political deterrent.

So I think that I am speaking of many other values than just pure observation.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I must really get back to the question. Once we have made a decision that there is movement, one way or another, within a situation, such as Vietnam, or perhaps the Middle East, do we opt for a policy of insulation, or do we opt for a policy of intervention? This is really going to be the question in the 1970's, on the basis of the lessons that we have learned in the past.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Yes, it is, sir. I don't want to monopolize this, but let me say it is the wrong argument. I think intervention is going to continue to take place.

It seems to me the issue is not intervention or not intervention. It is unilateralism versus some other option. And I am arguing that if we are writing off the unilateral option, which in a sense we are politically in this country, I think it is time, however difficult the other options look, to look at them again in that light, and still think of intervention when necessary, of course.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I gathered from Mr. Johnson's statement that in this period of rising nationalism, the United Nations seems to be writing off mutilateralism in the approach to intervention?

Mr. JOHNSON. I wouldn't say necessarily, sir. I think one point that I particularly stress with respect to the information that came in this Korean situation, from an independent source, is that we might very

well, had there not been such information, have been forced to go the unilateral way in Korea, as we did the unilateral way in Vietnam.

The fact that there was an outside, independent judgment, which said the North Koreans were moving south, was the thing that made it possible to get the United Nations behind that, and to create the United Nations' force that is still there in Korea—I visited it last summer—and I think you change the whole picture, once the information is information that is not suspect as coming from one national source, and particularly from a great power source, which is suspect in ways that other information is not.

Now your decision, whether it is intervention or nonintervention, or insulation after that fact, it seems to me this is a decision you make in the context of the particular time. I couldn't answer, offhand, beforehand, how much we or other countries thought it was important for our national interests to stop fighting in that particular area. The immediate situation would partly determine the answer. We might, for instance say, "Well, let's steer clear."

Let me give you an example, from another region of the world, something that concerns me a good deal, and, I suspect, all of us.

Mr. Bloomfield said just now that we seemed to have reached a decision that we didn't want to intervene unilaterally, and I think this is generally the attitude of Americans. I think both Vietnam and the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965 made us all have some hesitations.

And yet, we may very well feel that there is a need for speedy action. This is where the issues get confused.

The U.N. doesn't move as fast as the United States can, and regional organizations seldom move at all. And one of the real problems that I hope that your committee might give consideration to is the problem of what we might do to prevent ourselves being put in a situation again in relation to this hemisphere, such as we were put in in 1965.

Are there any moves that we can take beforehand that would give us wider operations? And this seems to me that——

Mr. GALLAGHER. That is why the committee is questioning you men of experience, trying to learn.

The problem of Vietnam seems fairly clearcut, when you have information about the entry of external forces. But what if you had internal, indigenous conflicts that were not easily detectable by McNamara lines.

Mr. FASCELL. Perhaps I read the report of the International Control Commission incorrectly, but I didn't think there was any ambiguity or doubt in that report.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes, sir; Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador FINGER. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make one comment here, and that is that it isn't always up to us, whether multilateral intervention will be possible. I know that Professor Bloomfield is aware of this, but I would like to state for the record, I am not sure that, in Vietnam, at the time of the French moving out, this was a feasible option, given the unwillingness of the other parties and notably North Vietnam, to cooperate.

This is still an open question. We did, as Professor Bloomfield knows, move in the case of Laos, in 1959, as I recall, to send a subcommittee of the Council out there.

Now in this hypothetical——

Mr. GALLAGHER. What are we going to do in 1970?

Ambassador FINGER (continuing). Well, this is just what——

Mr. FASCELL. We might not have to do anything about it after next week.

Ambassador FINGER (continuing). I happen to have served in Laos, just before coming to the U.N., so it is a problem that concerns me quite a bit, personally. But if we take the hypothetical case of Thailand or of Laos, you will not be able to mount a U.N. peacekeeping operation in Laos, if the North Vietnamese and the Communist Chinese don't want it there.

The Soviets would veto it, and the General Assembly route would not be at all promising in those circumstances. So I don't think we should delude ourselves that the multilateral operation will always be there.

I think we are all agreed that what we should be working toward is to make it as available as possible, as often as possible.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would just like to ask one further question, before I move on to my colleagues.

We have a very pressing problem now with the conflict in the Middle East straying into the international air traffic field. Does the U.N. have a role to play in resolving this problem?

Is this type of thing going to be increasing in the future? What suggestions do we have?

Ambassador FINGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, we did have at the last General Assembly, as Congressman Fascell knows, a resolution at least designed to bring attention to that problem. It did not have the teeth that would be required, the assumption being that your first step is to get governments to be concerned about it.

I think that with all all due respect to our efforts at the United Nations, the terrible tragedy of last week has done more to get governments concerned than that particular resolution.

The International Civil Aviation Organization, which is a specialized agency of the United Nations, has again been concerned about this problem, principally from the standpoint of hijacking. I don't know exactly what steps the U.S. Government will be taking in the forum of the International Civil Aviation Organization, or with governments in other ways. This is not part of my responsibility.

But the ICAO could help there, but I think that the intergovernmental consultation in the immediate future is more likely to be helpful.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, one of the problems I see here, I am as baffled as you are on this, but one of the problems I see is that this is not solely a matter of governments. These terrorists are not really, in many cases, citizens of any country of the world, and there is a real problem; how one can manage to deal on an international basis with terrorists who are outside of the law in every sense and out of the reach of the law, and I think you have put your finger on something where the U.N. is probably going to be ineffective for some time.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. May I add one thing, sir?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Certainly, Professor.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I know you are interested in the United States but when I speak of the multilateral option, I think of almost any means

where the United States won't feel as lonely as it tends to feel when it acts alone.

In case of the airline situation, my guess is that the International Association of Airline Pilots may be a crucial international organization that brings about reform and action here. That is an international nongovernmental organization. It is something U.S. pilots can't do themselves.

So far as peacekeeping is concerned, I might suggest that one look again at a suggestion that Lester Pearson of Canada made when he began to get discouraged about U.N. peacekeeping. He suggested that if you had to have multilateral peacekeeping, and if the U.N. couldn't do it, you ought to consider setting up an ad hoc coalition of people who would peacekeep.

"Multilateral" does not have to mean only the 126 nations who sit in New York.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Do we have an option, in the Middle East, where all this stems from? How does it apply to the Middle East today?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. On peacekeeping? Oh, no; I think there, sir, is one place where there is a lot of sunk capital in U.N. operations, and even the Soviets keep saying that they would be glad to see a new U.N. peacekeeping force there. I think it would be wrong to change the venue there, but I am thinking of other situations.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Ambassador FINGER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes. I am sorry.

Ambassador FINGER. Before we leave the subject of the aircraft, this is one point where I disagree with Dr. Johnson—with whom I generally agree, and whom I admire—and that is that I would not absolve governments completely from the actions of some of the terrorists who have been granted travel documents and against whom no punitive action is taken, and in fact, who have sometimes been assisted in avoiding punitive action, through some governments, and I think that some action by those governments is required. Some means of getting them to take action is required.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't mean to absolve the governments at all. What I was suggesting is it becomes a much harder problem when it is individuals who are not necessarily or clearly citizens of governments, and when the governments themselves are the governments of very unstable states.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On the question of terrorism, it would seem to me that terrorism underlines the fact that there is a serious unresolved problem. Terrorism is one of the manifestations of the fact that there has not been a resolution of that problem.

I don't condone terrorism on the part of any of the parties involved, or by any individuals. But terrorism is one of the reasons why there is urgency in getting a settlement. Perhaps either the U.N. or the United States can be helpful in getting a settlement. This lends an-

other note of urgency, because there could be a rapid deterioration of what is already a serious situation.

If Israel, as an example, should decide to interdict the use of the airports of her neighbors, as a way of responding to the situation in which she now finds herself, we would have an altogether different kind of problem in the Middle East.

This gets us back to the basic problem. Perhaps it is too academic a problem, looking for reasons for optimism, and in defining the role of the U.N.

All three of you gentlemen have provided us with stimulating testimony. All of you have said that we haven't machinery which is very effective today, and that in fact, it is less effective than seemed likely to be 20 years ago. Nonetheless you feel we have some reason for optimism that machinery can be developed.

I think Mr. Johnson said that there was a real possibility that we could develop more effective machinery.

As a practical matter, what reason is there for optimism? The only reason, you seem to say, for optimism is that there may be more flexibility by one of the major powers, who has thus far made it difficult to develop machinery. The Soviet Union, you say, in quiet, behind-the-scenes discussions may become more reasonable. However you don't show us any real indication that there will be the kind of realization on the Soviets' part that will lead to a transformation of the U.N. as a way in which we can either insulate or solve problems.

You point with some concern to the financing problem, and I can see no solution to this problem. I was at the U.N. in 1965, and we had reasonably high hopes that France and the Soviet Union, if they were not coerced, would come up with voluntary contributions, which would at least ease the financial problem at the U.N.

Did either country do it? They certainly did not. Will they do it in the future? I doubt it, unless they set their own terms.

If you have that approach, how are you going to get anything meaningful out of peacekeeping at the U.N.?

Perhaps I am overly sensitive. But isn't it ridiculous to argue that the United States is at fault because we have been selective as to whether the United Nations should be utilized or not? If we could have dumped the Vietnam problem on the U.N., we would have done so years ago. It wasn't that we wanted to act unilaterally. It wasn't that we didn't want the assistance of the U.N. At least as far back as 1966, when we had well-publicized peace ambassadors going all over the world to say that we want peace, and we want others' help in securing it.

At that time an effort was made in the United Nations, but nothing came of it.

It is because these situations are hot potatoes. The U.N. doesn't want such problems. Thus a situation has developed where there may well be increasing reluctance on the part of the United States to act on a unilateral basis. At the same time there really isn't much reason for optimism or even confidence that others will offer much help. With all our good intentions, are we going to be able to develop machinery adequate for the job?

In other words, as an example, what practical possibility is there of getting the suggestions of a standby force approved at the United Nations?

I don't mean to sound pessimistic, but I wonder whether anything in your experience really justifies the hope of developing effective machinery to cope with the very real problems that are sure to develop in this next decade?

I would like to be optimistic, but I must say, I see little reason for optimism about anything that you gentlemen have said today.

Cyprus is a case in point: Relatively small amounts of money involved, and yet as Mr. Finger says, this U.N. activity is an inequitable and undependable arrangement.

This is putting it mildly. Won't the U.N. be very reluctant hereafter to assume responsibility even for as small an operation as that, with no earth-shaking implications? As a practical matter, to suggest that the U.N. presence was helpful in Korea, is no value for the future. What chance is there of having in the future a U.N. presence in an area where it might evaluate a situation and thus affect world opinion?

I haven't asked really any questions, but regret to say that nothing that any of you has said has really satisfied me. It has provoked me a little, but it doesn't satisfy me that we are in a position to influence the result. I am not reassured that somehow sense is going to prevail, either among the big powers who count, or in the whole family that constitutes the United Nations.

Maybe all three of you would like to comment, since I haven't asked a question.

Ambassador FINGER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment. I certainly agree with a great deal of what Congressman Frelinghuysen has said. First, having lived through the 1965 session and the question of contributions, I do want to state the position of the French and the Soviets, as I understand it, though I don't agree with it. It is that they will contribute, if we will also—we, the United States will also contribute, simultaneously. We, of course, have——

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am not sure what you are saying, Ambassador Finger. We have already contributed to operations to which they have not contributed.

Are they now saying if we will make additional contributions, they will come up with something that roughly relates to what they should have contributed as a matter of course?

Ambassador FINGER. Well, sir, what they are saying is not even that good, unfortunately.

In fact, they have not given any sign of the amount they would contribute, but since 1967, the French have developed this beautiful word "harmonisation," which means that they will pay if we pay, even though we have already paid for our share of those two operations.

Their argument is that the assessments for these operations were not legal assessments under the charter. The World Court gave an advisory opinion that they were legitimate expenses under article 17. The membership majority accepted that, but they, as soverign powers, have not accepted it. Therefore, any contribution they make will be a matter of grace on their part, and they feel that we should show equal grace in overcoming the deficit.

That is their position as of the moment. That has been their position for almost 3 years, and there has been no movement, because of our position that we shouldn't pay twice. We have already paid our share, and more, and it is time for them to come in with some money.

Now, on the broader point, of whether there is any reason for optimism, or confidence, or hope, I think that—I said in my statement that we frankly don't know how these discussions will come out. We don't know how much flexibility the Soviets have. Therefore, what ground is there for any hope at all?

First, I would say that ever since the 1964–65 crisis on financing, the U.N. has either stopped or prevented a war three times. In 1965, in September, the India-Pakistan shooting, the Middle East fighting in 1967, and is now working toward a settlement over there.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You said the U.N. stopped a war in 1967 in the Middle East?

Ambassador FINGER. In 1967, yes. The ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Oh yes.

Ambassador FINGER. And in the case of Cyprus, the presence of the force there, in 1967, was a very vital factor in keeping the peace and promoting discussions between the contending factions.

I would also like to point out that the period in 1953 and 1954 was the real nadir of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Never was there so little going on as there was at that time, in part because we were then building up NATO and SEATO, and the alliance strategy for keeping peace. Suddenly, in 1956, the first major operation developed.

My point there is that it is difficult to predict what the organization may do, what heights, as well as what depths, it may reach, as a result of a challenge. So I would not write off the possibility that a new challenge will bring such an operation into focus.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But are you not suggesting, Mr. Finger, that the experience of the past, and the lack of ability to find money, has been a handicap? And also that in the future the U.N. response may be less rapid than would be the case if the finances were readily available and the forces needed?

I am saying all this as a friend of the United Nations. I would like to see in what way it could become a more reliable instrument, however, past experience has been such that there may be less likelihood of experimenting. Because the U.N. must see where the money comes from, and cope with the graceful attitude of France and some other countries, this is why I can't get up any great degree of optimism.

Ambassador FINGER. Well, sir, in my statement I indicated two or three ways that we are trying to improve the situation.

I think first of all, by trying to reach agreement on guidelines, we can give not only an organizational but a psychological uplift, because it is true, the membership is generally discouraged by peacekeeping in the present circumstances.

We believe that this may also help because part of our discussion is to secure equitable financing.

We see these as the way to move, and when I mention the stimulus of emergency, I think that in such an emergency, nations are impelled to move, and I would say that such an emergency would be met, even thought the financial problems haven't been solved.

My point in suggesting that we ought to try to work on building reliable guidelines for future peacekeeping, and a better financial foundation, is that I think we ought to have this multilateral option in the best possible shape.

As for the guess about what the Soviets are or are not prepared to do, this is an open season on guessing, there does seem to be on their side some realization that brushfire wars can involve them. They may in some instances, as in Kashmir and perhaps even the Middle East, where they are paying their share of U.N. observer missions, and various other places, have a common interest with us in confining those local conflicts. They will try to assure that such operations are not used against Soviet interests, just as we want to be sure that they are not used against our interests.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You sound like an incurable optimist to me, Mr. Finger, if you contend that the Soviets are taking a constructive attitude in the Middle East. If only they would do so, and join us in suggesting guidelines for settlement, I would feel happier. But is that basically what the record shows so far?

I don't mean to impose on the committee's time, Mr. Chairman. I think the others ought to be able to ask questions.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a word, if I may, to Congressman Frelinghuysen's point.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. I was the one who used the word "optimist," I guess. I was the one you singled out.

I must say that I agree with many of his criticisms. I have spent a good many sleepless hours recently wondering what one could do within the U.N., outside the U.N., and any other way, in relation to the Middle Eastern crisis, which is, I think, quite beyond the power of control of the U.N. at the present time, and maybe beyond the power of the control of any government.

I would say, though, and this is perhaps too much optimism—and I may rue these words, but I have rued some words before, and I guess I can do it again—I would say that if we can move in the direction that we are now trying to move, that the United States is now trying to move in the working group of eight with the Soviet Union, it may be possible to prevent other situations developing into the totally impossible kind we have in the Middle East.

I wouldn't say this would apply to the Middle East, at all. It may apply to something, and should apply to something more incipient.

But I do come back to a point I made, which is that nobody seems to be interested in the peaceful settlement of disputes. There has been very little effort to bring about the peaceful settlement of disputes.

I worked for a while for something called the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, which is still on the books, and has been since 1948, which is supposed to be concerned with the peaceful settlement of all the disputes in the Middle East.

It has now been superseded by Mr. Jarring, and Mr. Jarring is back in Moscow, because there is nothing to do in the Middle East, and nobody seems to be really trying to find ways. I mean people have been, certainly, but at the moment I am as gloomy as you are, right now. I think the four-power talks seem to have bogged down, and the two-

power talks, and I must admit I see no signs of optimism in the present position.

But I would submit only this last point: I think it would have been worse, and might even be worse, if it were not for the U.N. Now, that is small comfort.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I wouldn't argue with that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Professor Bloomfield.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I think maybe the reason people at this table sound more optimistic than you think they should is that we are so used to being pessimistic that we magnify small pieces of evidence. I think that is true of anyone who has worked around the U.N.

One thing that has not been mentioned is the composition of the U.N. I would submit that one reason the U.N. was really not an appropriate forum for the Vietnam situation is that at least three parties to that conflict or to the Geneva Convention were not members of the organization.

Now, I think that is a price you have to pay, if you want to bring cases such as that into the U.N., as we did, 12 years later. Congressman Frelinghuysen, I was speaking of a time when I think there was a real option, and it was discarded, because there was a general preference in the U.S. Government not to go that route, because we lose control over the situation.

I would not argue for a minute that the United States is responsible for the mess that the U.N. is in, or that peacekeeping is in. I think we are the good guys. But I don't think we are going to get anywhere if we don't recognize that there is an impulse observable at the highest levels of American decisionmaking that when a conflict comes along in which we have a real interest the last thing you want to do is take it to the U.N.

Now, there are some exceptions to this. But Cyprus is a very good case in point. The United States first wanted to deal with it with bilateral diplomacy, which was good if it worked. The Russians then seemed to try a quick and dirty little arms deal with Cyprus, which happily didn't come off. Then the United States looked to NATO as the place to go. Finally, in the usual state of bankruptcy we get into when we have exhausted all the other alternatives, and the problem has of course become almost insoluble, someone says, "Well, let's go to the U.N."

This is the story of much of the history of the great powers in this period, not just the United States.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't mean to interrupt, but maybe the United States is in the position of an overprotective parent, who realizes what a frail child she has in the U.N. We don't want to overburden it, and ask unrealistic things of it.

It is for that reason that we haven't been aggressive in turning over to the U.N. problems which we know need attention because we well know, on the basis of the record, that nothing productive can be accomplished.

I really don't mean to impose on the committee, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I am very happy to welcome all of you here, and you bring a tremendous wealth of dedication, service, and knowledge for our benefit, and the kind of discussions we are having, I think, are most useful to help us crystallize the thinking, at least for me.

I am interested in this possibility of control of conflicts, and independent observations as might apply to, say, new areas, but in order to nail down what I am after, I want to ask some questions, like: Is there any ambiguity with respect to the present struggle in Laos?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ambassador Finger.

Ambassador FINGER. Mr. Chairman, certainly from the standpoint of the U.S. Government, and my personal standpoint, there is no ambiguity. There would be no war in Laos at all if it were not for North Vietnam's intervention.

This might not apply to the way some other governments see it. There might be some value, if it could be done, in having various members of the U.N. constitute a group to go out there and take a look, so that others could share our own clear-cut feeling that this is an outside intervention.

Mr. FASCELL. Is this what you referred to, Professor Bloomfield?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Yes, sir. We live in a world of people who are increasingly skeptical of what we think are the honest facts, and I think this one step toward improving the general situation is this always available, impartial observation capability.

We haven't really discussed that, and I don't want to break into Max Finger's statement, but at some point I would appreciate a chance to say something about what can be done by a multilateral agency long before what we think of as the peacekeeping stage, which may in fact be too late to do anything about it.

I would like a chance to make a suggestion.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, we would like to hear about it.

Dr. Johnson?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think I agree there is, from my point of view, no ambiguity. What interests me is that there is a control commission operating in Laos as well as one in Vietnam and this has not worked. We don't get unambiguous signals from this Commission, because one of the parties takes odds, in effect. The Polish delegation has not made it possible for unanimous decisions to come through.

There is something really weak in the setting up of those two control commissions that prevent the kind of thing that was possible, almost luckily, to do in Korea, as I recall, in 1950.

And I suspect, though I don't know—maybe I had better let you ask your next question, rather than try to answer your question.

Mr. FASCELL. That is all right. You can anticipate.

Do you agree, gentlemen, that it seems to be a present Soviet policy, as a political gambit, for so-called wars of national liberation, in which they use the nationals as pawns, with a primary purpose, of course, of forcing U.S. unilateral intervention, since the rest of the world doesn't seem to fully share our concern?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, my estimate, sir—I will start out and let the others and you crack me—is that that is still a part of Soviet policy, but it is one that they are employing less openly, less vigorously, than they have in the past.

I suspect in Asia they are playing this very carefully indeed, because of their relations with the Chinese. I suspect, or I have a sense, and this is not something that I speak with any great knowledge on, I would sense that they are less willing than they were in Africa to play this game in relation to wars of national liberation, and it might—and this is pure hypothesis—it might even be that the outcome of the Nigerian struggle may have caused them to raise some questions, because that country has retained its unity in the face of a real effort at breaking away. I don't know.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, as I understand, what you are saying is that you think that the Russians are not finding it a useful tool in Asia, nor in Latin America, nor Africa——

Mr. JOHNSON. Not even sure about Asia.

Mr. FASCELL. It seems to be working quite well in Asia.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. One of the central disputes between the Soviet Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party is, of course, on this issue of supporting "bourgeois" governments, with the Soviets critical of the Chinese for their adventurous policy in supporting minority and often suppressd extreme doctrinaire Communist groups, whereas the Soviet policy in the same area may be to support the legitimate government.

They do of course privately compete with the Chinese, in terms of the local Communist parties, but they have had the same doctrinal argument with the Cubans, despite the million dollars a day they pay to Cuba, and they have criticized the Cubans for too adventurous a policy.

Mr. FASCELL. But they give them the million dollars a day. That's the whole point.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Sure.

Mr. FASCELL. Does the United States really have any options in Laos and Thailand?

Mr. JOHNSON. I just don't know enough. I haven't looked at this.

Mr. FASCELL. How do we leapfrog that situation, if you are talking about using an ad hoc, multilateral arrangement, or trying to do something else through an organization, or institutionalizing it in the U.N.? Who wants the problem in the U.N.?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Congressman, it may not be helpful to offer philosophy, when you ask, "What should we do," and yet, until we have a philosophy about this, it seems to me we are going back into situations against our will and better judgment.

Mr. FASCELL. No, but don't we have to leapfrog these problems? That's the only point I am making.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I don't know. I don't know what you mean, sir, except that there is a presumption that the United States has an interest in maintaining the regime of, let us say, Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane, or the royal regime in Bangkok.

The first thing the United States must do, if it faces these difficult alternatives, is to see where they are on a scale of priorities that involve the commitment of U.S. resources. I don't think that question has been answered.

Mr. FASCELL. We have decided priorities; we have done it several times. We probably do it every day, but, you know, that at some point in the evolution of events you have to change your priorities.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. If China could be persuaded not to care, and if Moscow could be persuaded not to care about what happened in Thailand, would you, sir, think the United States had an interest in helping the Thai Government in putting down an insurgency aided from North Vietnam?

I know I am not supposed to ask you questions.

Mr. FASCELL. Why not? Certainly you give me a clean hypothetical, and I will give you a clean-cut decision.

The answer to that is very simple, you know, but politics don't occur in a vacuum, so we have a hypothetical. We might desire the hypothetical you pose, but the point is—that it doesn't exist.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I think there are some places now, for instance in Africa, where the Russians have been burned badly. In fact, their history is a little bit like ours in that you can find familiar statements in the Soviet Union along the lines of, "We threw 80 million rubles into that rathole; let's not go there again."

Mr. FASCELL. Maybe the whole world has gone conservative.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. This is a cause for optimism, not about the U.N., but simply the evidence that Moscow has its own calculations to make again about the payoffs of investing resources, agents, prestige, and the rest in areas where they have been thrown out.

Mr. FASCELL. So what you are saying is what most of us say, practically, politically, is closely scrutinize the Russian signals, if any, and hopefully we can resolve the problems in a given area at a given time unless it doesn't suit their political philosophy at a later moment, whenever that is, because we have no way of knowing with any certainty until they act.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. I am not being argumentative with you. I am just trying to be more precise to fully extend the thesis.

I am for all options for the United States, obviously. However, the realism of it doesn't escape any of us, so I admire what you are trying to do.

One further thing. I have been concerned about the functions of the U.N. because of the trend of the times, and because money is so concentrated on social and economic development that this will adversely affect the political responsibilities, and that the U.N. will, on the political side, atrophy if it hasn't already.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that it won't, essentially for the reason that I do think, as Mr. Bloomfield says, we are going to have one and a half new struggles per year, on the average, in the next decade, and people are going to turn to the U.N.

Now, it may be that it will prove less and less able to deal with the things, in which case they will turn to other operations, but this is where I agree with Mr. Bloomfield, that we have simply got to find ways to use some imagination, developing the multilateral operations at all levels, because I just don't think we are going to be willing to intervene unilaterally any more.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't think there is any question about that. Present U.S. policy, whether you call it low silhouette, disengagement, or "Let's get out," makes that quite clear.

Ambassador. FINGER. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment on this remark.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes, sir.

Ambassador FINGER. I think the figures usually cited about the U.N. involvement in economic and social matters as compared to political take into account all the specialized agencies, and over the years, it is true that is where the bulk of the money goes, that is where the bulk of people are involved.

On the other hand, ifyou take into account what preoccupies the top man in each mission, the permanent representative, it is still political and security matters.

And that is one of the things I feel frustrated about. I think, by the same token, when I look at the peacekeeping operation, and what it costs, when I take into account that we spend roughly $250 million a year on the whole complex of international organizations of the U.N. family, when I think of what a small amount, in comparison, is spent on the peacekeeping side of it, this is when I return to my remark that we shouldn't count the pennies too closely on peacekeeping operations, if it is really going to help do the job multilaterally.

Mr. FASCELL. I sure would agree with that.

I don't know how we are going to do in Congress this year with respect to the economic side of it, but I don't think it is gong to be too good, unfortunately.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I believe before we go to Mr. Derwinski, that Professor Bloomfield asked for an opportunity to clarify a statement on preventive multilateral action.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Well, perhaps one thing would dramatize and make graphic the point I have in mind.

In our most recent research, a study we did for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on these 55 small wars since World War II, their anatomy, and so on, one thing that intrigued me enormously was the confirmation of something I had always sensed, as I am sure you have sensed, but I had never seen numbers put to it before.

It took the form of a pair of inverse curves. The first curve represented options for conflict limitations available to governments through the U.N. through bilateral diplomacy, through courts, through regional organizations, through business organizations, through intermediaries. We counted available options to be very high, case by case, in the early stages of conflicts that later became wars.

This curve of available options, of course, declined as things got bloodier, guns came in and shooting began, until by the time someone called for a U.N. peacekeeping operation, the options were very shrunken and few indeed. The other curve I would call the curve of "noticing" that something is happening—noticing in places where people are very busy, like the White House basement, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and perhaps the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. FASCELL. They are much too busy.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. By the time governments begin to take action the options that can be used in this multilateral area have shrunk to the point where they are few indeed. This, to me, graphically dramatized my own sense of frustration with the whole process, both in government and in the U.N. If you would like to see any further evidence of this, I can only refer you to my latest book, Mr. Chairman, which, of course, I hate to do.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Go right ahead, please.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I just did.

Mr. FASCELL. You might as well put the title in the record.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. "Controlling Small Wars," by myself and Amelia C. Leiss.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Right. Thank you very much.

If you would like to elaborate on that in the record, please feel free to do so.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I think my publisher would be satisfied with what I just did.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you.

That is an interesting illustration of the problem, which is really why we are all here this morning discussing it.

Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have been intrigued, gentlemen, as I peruse your prepared statements, and I don't think you are being either optimistic or pessimistic, but you seem to drift along in what I think is the U.N. dream world, which doesn't necessarily reflect the reality of time.

But what intrigued me was in response to questions that various members have directed, there was finally reference to the fact, that the reason for the failure of U.N. to develop peacekeeping machinery, and the frustration with other U.N. failures, that one of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union, chooses to permit or disrupt U.N. proceedings when it suits their purpose, and they have chosen not to let the U.N. be effective.

Now, this is obviously the case in the Middle East. This is the case in Vietnam. This may well be the situation in Nigeria, although everybody seems to think that it is just a little civil war that finally ran its course.

We didn't participate, except for humanitarian actions. They did, in the military sense, and I am not even asking a question, I am just commenting on obvious frustrations. Mr. Johnson, in your prepared statement, page 2, when you listed a few specific points.

Mr. JOHNSON. I haven't got a text of the version you have.

Mr. DERWINSKI. "When we talk of peacekeeping, you must recognize that we are concerned with disputes or conflicts that do not involve directly either of the superpowers."

Now, could you just tell me your definition directly, as you use it there?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, yes.

The charter never envisaged that the U.N. would be used to deal with a struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States, when it was a struggle, when it was a military struggle, and at least, by extension, it was expected there would not be much use of the U.N. in such a struggle at the level of peaceful settlement.

And this falls in between, and I would assume that if there is the use of military force directly by the United States against the Soviet Union, or vice versa, the U.N. could not be used, and that peacekeeping would not——

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, what you are saying is anything else is indirect. Direct would be United States versus Soviet military involvement.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Anything else, then, would be indirect?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Now, Mr. Finger, in his prepared statement, did point out that at the end of the Cuban missile crisis there was the possibility of having the U.N. doing some policing, which the Cubans rejected, although, as I understand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not averse to this.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now, Professor Bloomfield, you made reference to the complications such as the Indo-Pakistani, the Cypress conflicts. In the case of the Cyprus dispute, which the U.N. takes substantial credit for having calmed down from time to time, isn't it also a fact that if there was a commonsense reason for calming it down, it was the fact that both the Greek and Turkish Governments, being NATO allies, felt a responsibility, and that both Governments at the time felt strong enough to survive public opinion at home, and make some concessions to the other?

In other words, there was a rational basis in which the U.N. could participate.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I think so. In fact, I would expand what you are saying this way: I have said the U.N. doesn't get these problems until they are virtually insoluble, and I think what you are saying, correctly, is that at the same time, they have got to be easy enough to deal with so that the parties will allow the U.N. in, and not insist on continuing to fight.

This reduces the number to a very small number.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Then later on in your statement, you make reference to ethnic and religious outbursts as sources of possible world problems, and you mention Belgium, Ulster, et cetera.

It also occurs to me that that might be an interesting concept to apply to the Soviet seizure of Czechoslovakia, which had at least if nothing else ethnic complexity, or a political complexity. The same problem might apply if Hungary or Bulgaria or Poland, any of these so-called satellites attempted to achieve independence.

When they would be motivated by nationalism or ethnic forces. And then finally, Soviet Union, because of its Russian nationalistic forces, have to take action.

Would I be properly relating, your use of that, your reference of that nationalism?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Congressman, I feel about that a little bit the way my former boss, Secretary Dulles, felt, who after publicizing the need to do something about Soviet suppression of Eastern European States, when the Soviets did invade Budapest in 1956, immediately made a speech announcing that the United States had no intention of interfering.

I think this is the great dilemma for us, of Eastern Europe. I was in Yugoslavia last year, where people at the highest level predicted a decade of collisions in Eastern Europe as a result of the breakup of the of the Soviet empire. I think, myself, there are some things that the international community, such as it is, can do, and I always regretted that a committee of consuls wasn't formed in Budapest at the time of the invasion. But of course to get the United States to launch SAC was

a different proposition, which was vetoed by the President. Our policy was inaction.

Somewhere between those two, there were the things I would argue that could be done. On this point, I mentioned the possibility of a Sino-Soviet nuclear war, which I think is at least a statistical probability, and I don't know today how low I would rate it. This is one where the Soviets themselves might conceivably be interested, even though we and they always say the U.N. has nothing to do with these quarrels. I have in mind some kind of U.N. interposition, particularly if there continue to be border tensions with the Chinese trying to take over territories that are in dispute.

I wouldn't rule out for a minute a role for anyone, including the U.N. because the consequences of a nuclear war would be so horrendous for all of us that the niceties could be overlooked.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Well, at that point, Professor, I refer back to your prepared testimony. When you mentioned Sino-Soviet disputes and the possibility therein, you are actually, without saying so, referring to an age-old ethnic or nationalistic animosity and conflict.

Now to what degree, could any of you gentlemen see the U.N. eventually in a legitimate and rational fashion helping minimize these age-old and obvious emotional conflicts, which are at the root of the Middle East dispute as well as they are the Sino-Soviet?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Indo-Pakistan, Cyprus, everyone of them is that.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes, and other areas.

Ambassador FINGER. I would like to, if I may, answer that question in a little broader context, to get back to your earlier point, Congressman Derwinski, and that is that peacekeeping operations, first of all, have not necessarily been consistently stopped by the Soviets.

In fact, more of them have helped our side, if one takes a narrow cold war look, than theirs, and I think all of them have helped world peace. If one goes back to the beginning, U.N. observers in Greece in 1946 who called attention to outside infiltration—the sort of things Professor Bloomfield was talking about—this was very helpful from the standpoint of stopping Communist aggression at that time.

The Lebanon action in 1958—the U.N. observers were helpful there. Korea, in 1950—the Soviets helped there by boycotting the Security Council, but the fact is the action took place. The Congo, certainly—one of their reasons for being so violently against U.N. peacekeeping was that they feel that it wound up with a western-oriented regime. And so there has been a whole series of useful operations despite the Soviet attitude.

The thing that makes us think that maybe they would have a greater interest in peacekeeping is that they are getting to be a much bigger and more mature country, with a better standard of living, and a greater interest in stability. They start off by being completely suspicious of any outside force, whether national or international, so essentially, they started looking at the U.N. as a propaganda forum, a debating place, and nothing more.

Now anything that moved it beyond that was initially opposed by the Soviets, and what is interesting in the new context is that they are beginning to show some interest in U.N. peacekeeping.

Naturally, they are not going to support something which is going to be against Soviet interest, any more than we would support some-

thing which would be against our interest. But they see that some of these conflicts that start as local could spread, and involve them.

Now as for the question of can the U.N. get involved in avoiding some disputes which are ethnic in origin, or historical, it would seem to me that it could in some cases, and not in others. I mean, it is clear that the invasion of Hungary, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, were not things that the U.N. was equipped to deal with, because to deal with them effectively could have meant World War III.

Also, in the conflicts within a country, such as the Northern Ireland conflict, we run into the difficulty of not getting involved in problems which are considered internal. Apartheid in South Africa is another example. Nigeria is still another example.

Probably the U.N. will continue to be very gingerly in its approach to that kind of ethnic problem, and I think it is prudent for it to do so, because there are so many of them around the world.

On the other hand, where there are age-old quarrels, where there are historical differences, some times through a combination of patience and—let's not call it optimism, but a willingness to keep going—the insoluble will find a solution, the Austrian State Treaty, to give one of the prime examples. Some of the treaties on arms control surprised people.

So, we have got to realize that we are going to fail a lot of times, and many historical conflicts are going to go on. Many ethnic conflicts are going to go on, but if we work at it, we will succeed some of the time.

Mr. JOHNSON. May I say just a word on this, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. It seems to me, Congressman Derwinski, that you have raised an issue that is going to be one of the most troublesome for all of us in this decade ahead, because it is the issue of at what stage does the international community have the right or feel the need to intervene in what may be initially a domestic situation.

I am reminded here that essentially it was because the French said Indochina was a part of the French Government, and under French control that the French opposed bringing Indochina into the United Nations in 1953–54. "This is our own domestic business. You keep out."

And the result of following that French insistence seems to me to have been nothing but total tragedy for everybody, including the French.

I think we are going to have this kind of question raised, and I suspect in each case it is going to be dealt with on a somewhat ad hoc basis, with some awareness of what local groups can do.

Now, one of the things that I suspect led to the question of Biafra not being brought into the U.N. was the willingness of the Organization of African Unity at least to say they were going to try to do something about it, and you may remember that four heads of African States did hold some meetings. It may have had some effect, but I think this is going to be a very troublesome problem for anybody in foreign offices and foreign affairs committees, and foreign relations committees, for a long time to come.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Derwinski.

I was rather intrigued by your matter of factness, or perhaps the matter of factness of some Yugoslavs who foresee that the next decade will see a series of collisions in Eastern Europe, as a result of the breakup of the Soviet empire.

Do they view this as imminent?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Well, this was at a time, sir, when they were digging up revetments around Surcin Airport, expecting possible landings, and I think their mood was a rather tense one. They had looked at what happened at Czechoslovakia two weeks before, and they were afraid that someone would walk through Rumania, and not stop.

However, this is a longer term prediction.

Mr. GALLAGHER. This is Rumania?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. No, this is Yugoslavia. I think in part, it may be a sense that the Yugoslav model is one that is going to be emulated. But I happened to be in East Berlin 2 weeks ago, and I wouldn't put a bet down on any breach in Communist security there, short of a lot of people marching in to help them. It is under control.

So, I don't know how to evaluate the Yugoslav prediction, except it seems to me as good as any other prediction, including those that we have made here this morning.

Mr. FASCELL. Maybe we ought to make a few more to confuse them.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Do they make theirs with a computer, like you do, or without it?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I use computers to validate my predictions, not make them, Congressman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Are there any further questions?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. I do think we ought to thank these gentlemen for a very stimulating morning.

Mr. FASCELL. Excellent.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The problems are very real, and we certainly share your interest in them. I hope these continuing sessions are going to be useful. I am not quite sure what is going to come out of them, but the discussion of topics such as these is helpful to us, at least.

Mr. FASCELL. I think it helps to keep talking and maybe crystallize, perhaps antagonize, and hopefully stimulate, and who knows? You can't ever tell. A new idea may materialize.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. One thing that disturbs me is that a case against the United Nations can be built, if one wants to do it, by people who are strongly interested in protecting the interests of the United States. And yet it does seem to me far more important that we in the United States recognize that a case can be made for the United Nations, as a way in which our own interests can be protected.

What is needed is to provide the balance, to show the usefulness of the U.N., and ways in which it can be of continuing usefulness.

Mr. JOHNSON. Coming back to your point, Mr. Frelinghuysen, your earlier point, I think it is very important that the case be made for the United Nations as not the only answer, and I think none of us here would want to have it appear that we think the United Nations is the only answer.

We are not talking about NATO, but if we were talking about NATO, you would get very different emphasis.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We have another committee talking about NATO. Maybe you would like to come again, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You feel, then, it is perfectly logical not to expect too much of the U.N., that perhaps there has been too much wishful thinking.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. By observers, students, by let us say, the philosophical or ivory tower concept of the U.N.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think very much. It is the worst enemy of a potentially useful means of diplomacy, I think.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I do have one question to ask Mr. Finger, Mr. Chairman.

On page 8 of your statement, you had some reference to the importance of the United Nations as a peacekeeping force. This rang a bell with me, because our report to the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1965 talked about the importance of the U.S. not letting these functions drift.

You say, "We must never let the laggards determine the pace and call the shots on matters which are vital to the national interest of the United States."

The sad part is, as a practical matter, how can we prevent the laggards from setting the pace, even though we don't want to see the U.N. used this way? This is a basic problem we are faced with. We could, in theory, put up 90 percent of financing for operations which we thought was consequential to us, but wouldn't we in the process destroy the United Nations?

So do we not as a practical matter, have the practical problem of pushing the laggards, since we cannot take over the United Nations and run it as an instrument of U.S. policy?

In other words, it sounds nice to say, "We must never let the laggards determine the pace," but as a practical matter, aren't we obliged to let others determine the pace?

Ambassador FINGER. Well, not quite, Congressman Frelinghuysen. Just since 1965, for example, or 1964, we have a Cyprus operation, because we were not willing to let the laggards—in this case, it would have been the Soviet Union and France—determine the pace. They were willing to stand aside, not to obstruct, but it was our determination that the operation should go forward, that and our allies and other governments in those countries I mentioned who are putting the forces in there.

Simultaneously, in things like the Middle East and Kashmir, it required effort, but we do have collective financing.

This is the kind of thing I mean, that the easy way would be to just settle back to say:

> Well, if everybody doesn't pay, and if everybody is not interested, why should the United States take the lead, or why should the United States join with half a dozen other good peacekeepers, to do something about it?

That would be easy, but I don't think we ought ever to relax that way. I think that we ought to try to move toward our own goals. Sometimes they will hang onto our legs so strongly we won't be able to move, but whenever we can, we want to go forward. This is the import of what I said.

What I meant when I said we shouldn't let the laggards call the shots was that if we insisted every time that there must be financing in the U.N. budget, just as one example, and that otherwise, nothing should go forward, they could easily stop the whole thing by saying, "All right, we won't pay."

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. For the purpose of the record, back in 1961, President Kennedy suggested that destroying arms was not enough, that we should do more, and suggested that nations earmark units for special peacekeeping functions, and that these units be made available to the United Nations.

I would ask how many nations have in fact earmarked troops for U.N. services, if any?

Ambassador FINGER. Well, sir, some have done so. The Canadians, of course. The Nordic countries have not only earmarked personnel, but they have joint training, for example, most notably in Sweden, but including Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. All four of those have done some earmarking.

The Dutch have also. The Irish have not done specific earmarking, but virtually their whole force is available.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Probably heading into Ulster.

Ambassador FINGER. Well, that might require them coming back, but for now, at least. Nine or 10 countries have earmarked units, most of whom have peacekeeping experience. Then there are countries like India, whose military establishments are so huge in terms of infantry that they don't have to earmark, and the United States, on its side, has taken a roughly similar position with respect to logistics. "We don't have to earmark this plane, or that one; when the time comes, we will find a way to get it off the shelf."

So, the earmarking system is not as good and as regular as it ought to be. We have stimulated it somewhat by this study on peacekeeping operations, which was a U.S. initiative in the fall of 1967, and which forms the basis of this working group exercise we are now in. If we agree on guidelines, we think a lot more countries will be interested in earmarking and preparedness.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Has there been any agreement on standardization or guidelines?

Ambassador FINGER. We have, sir, in the working group, agreed on five of eight chapters on observer operations. We include some provision for standardizing guidelines for units in the field, and that was the easy part. The technical part, it is not hard to get agreement on. Our big problem has been on the question of who appoints the commander, who decides on the force composition at the time an operation begins.

In short, who gives the day-to-day, week-to-week orders? That is what we are negotiating on, but the other part of it, of developing manuals, developing SOP's and that sort of thing, this has been going on.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would like to ask one final question. We have had 54 wars in the 25 years of the U.N.'s existence. What is the prognosis for the next 25 years? Is it hopeful?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Thirty-seven and a half new ones. I think it is moot, whether it is hopeful or not, sir, but you know, you didn't ask any questions about arms control. I would like to say that I think regardless of arms control and disarmament agreements, most of the conflicts we are talking about are just not even relevant to strategic arms, or even massive conventional arms, and so therefore, the handles we have over them are almost nonexistent.

May I end with a statement that I think belongs in your record. It was said by a very sensible Englishman, a few years ago, talking about the United Nations. It may capture the spirit of at least my view.

He said, "The great tragedy of the United Nations is that it has become indispensable before it has become effective."

And I think that sums up the problem we have.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I think that is a very good summation.

I might ask of you three gentlemen, what additional arms control steps have the best prospects for adoption in the 1970's?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I hope that the things that SALT is working on have some prospects. I hate to see us mess around with MIRV's and ABM's going ahead. This frightens me. Whether there are prospects or not, I simply can't say.

I don't know whether there is any real interest outside of a few people in the United States, and those people, a good many of them, working around and with Lincoln Bloomfield, in a really serious effort to control the traffic in arms. Nobody but Mr. Bloomfield has talked about having the U.N. do what the League did, what he mentioned here this morning—keeping a record of who is supplying whom. This is one of the ignored areas, and even if we couldn't do too much in massive controls, if we could keep a few of these people from getting some of the weapons that permit them to start little struggles, we would be helping things a great deal.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I guess I would have to ask Ambassador Finger why we don't.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't mean to put him on the spot.

Mr. FASCELL. How about an International Citizens Committee to do what Professor Bloomfield is talking about?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. I propose that Dr. Johnson's organization do it, if the U.N. won't because he is right across the street from there.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Well, then, after you say the U.N. won't, and will you, Dr. Johnson?

Ambassador FINGER. Mr. Chairman, all I can say about the U.N. is that efforts to get that done so far have run into opposition, as Professor Bloomfield has pointed out, from the smaller countries, and it is still a one-country, one-vote organization. We just have to produce a market.

Now, I wouldn't predict that for the indefinite future, that will always be so.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we should add, Mr. Chairman, for the record, that both under President Johnson and under President Nixon, there have been serious efforts to try to get the Russians to sit down and talk seriously about the traffic in arms to the Middle East, and the number of "Nyet's" that have been received, I can't count them; per-

haps Ambassador Finger knows how many there are, but there has been no willingness yet even to talk about how one might talk about sitting down.

The U.S. Government has in that particular area made really serious efforts, so far to no avail, and this should go on the record.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would like to ask Professor Bloomfield, what are the prospects for a treaty to prohibit the implantation of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Well, Ambassador Finger has been closer to this diplomatically than I. I think in general, sir, the prospects are good, in that the two countries most likely to be able to do it seem to wish to keep that environment free of nuclear weapons.

The opposition, curiously enough, came not from the Russians, but from other countries that have other fish to fry, I guess would be an apt expression.

Mr. GALLAGHER. That is the only way to do it.

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Who claim 200 miles of territorial waters, such as Peru or Ecuador, or who are suspicious of the lack of inspection provisions. Nevertheless I think whatever the United States and the Russians want to do with respect to strategic nuclear weapons will probably be done, and I would rate that one as quite likely. I would rate as somewhat less likely an agreement on limitation or freezing of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, such as will be discussed in Vienna and Helsinki. Again, I don't see the U.N. as playing much of a role there. I think Dr. Johnson's point is extremely important concerning this issue of conventional arms, which most people ignore except either to buy or to sell, in great quantity.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I have one final question; perhaps you will all take a crack at it.

Do arms control measures offer the best method of reducing the risk of conflicts between great powers, and U.N. peacekeeping machinery the best method of promoting the resolution of conflicts between small nations?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, that is a whole speech, sir.

Mr. GALLAGHER. That is a whole speech, yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I will start off. Arms control measures are essential but not sufficient, I suppose, is what I would say on this score; also, that I do think that in the present status of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the problem of maintaining the deterrent on both sides, and if possible, avoiding escalation, is of crucial importance, absolutely crucial importance.

I can't personally predict or imagine what the world would be like if we start in an ABM and MIRV race in the near future. So that this is important.

On the other hand, I think you are going always to have questions, political questions that have to be dealt with concurrently. They may change from time to time. It may be that although not openly dealt with in the form of a treaty, some political issues will be settled between ourselves and the Soviet Union, and I can imagine some understanding about relations with China, in years ahead.

This is the kind of thing I am talking about.

As for peacekeeping, I think it is important, but again, I come back to the fact that we haven't really begun to approach the hurdle of how you move from putting a lid on the conflict to dealing with the fundamental issues that lead to the conflict, to bringing about some kind of a settlement, and I would hope, frankly, that your committee in its report, whatever report it may submit on these hearings, will refer to the fact that there is something called the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the record is pretty poor.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Finger?

Ambassador FINGER. Well, sir, on these two points, I think that on arms control, Dr. Johnson has expressed what I feel. If there are underlying conflicts, even with a level of arms half of what we each have, of course, we could fight a disastrous war, so it is not the complete answer.

It would, of course, release resources for so many important things that it is worth while pursuing for that reason alone, if it can be done without injuring our security.

Now in peacekeeping, I think one of the things our discussion has brought out this morning is that we should not concentrate on just putting people there, when shooting actually breaks out. I think that Professor Bloomfield's notion that we try to look at it in the early stages, before conflicts break out, and then with Dr. Johnson's point, that you have to couple with it peacemaking, to get at the solution, is the other essential element in looking at this question.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. Professor Bloomfield, would you like to add anything?

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. No, sir; I think you have covered the ground.

Mr. GALLAGHER. On behalf of the subcommittee, I want to thank you gentlemen for an extremely valuable morning. We appreciate it very, very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.)

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Bridging the Development Gap

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1970

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Gallagher. The subcommittee will come to order.

It seems that with the President of France being here, and a state luncheon at the White House, we are experiencing some competition for the attendance of our Members.

According to a report issued recently by a group of distinguished experts headed by Lester Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada, "The widening gap between the developed and the developing countries has become a central issue of our times."

This afternoon, the subcommittee proposes to address itself to this "central issue."

Specifically, in continuing our hearings on the United Nations, the subcommittee will try to ascertain what the U.N. is doing, and what it can do in the future, to help bridge the development gap.

The subcommittee has invited three experts in the field of multilateral development assistance to help us with that task.

They are: Ambassador Glenn Olds, U.S. Representative in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations;

Mr. David Bell, executive vice president of the Ford Foundation, whose distinguished career of public service included assignments as Director of the Bureau of the Budget and as Administrator of the Agency for International Development, which is no small task, I might say, and which he carried out with distinction.

I know of no one held in greater respect by the Foreign Affairs Committee and other Members of the Congress than Mr. Bell; and

Mr. Edward Hamilton, vice president and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, who recently completed a special assignment as the Executive Secretary of the Pearson Commission.

Gentlemen, we are delighted to welcome you here this afternoon.

We have your written statements before us. At this point, we would like to ask you to summarize your statements orally, confining those

opening remarks to not more than 15 minutes each. After that, we will proceed with questions from the subcommittee.

Before proceeding, the biographical sketches of each of the witnesses will be placed into the record.

(The document is as follows:)

Glenn A. Olds is the U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations.

Ambassador Olds was born in Sherwood, Oregon, and attended Willamette University, Garrett Theological Seminary, Northwestern University, and Yale University. He began his educational career as an assistant instructor in philosophy at Yale and has held positions at DePauw University, Garrett Theological Seminary, Northwestern Univ., Denver Univ., and Cornell Univ. He was president of Springfield (Mass.) College from 1958 to 1965, and became Executive Dean, International Studies and World Affairs, at the State University of New York in 1965 where he remained until his appointment to the United Nations.

Ambassador Olds has served as a consultant to the Peace Corps and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He is a trustee of the Albert Schweitzer Foundation, director of the Lisle Fellowship, and author of numerous articles, and *The Christian Corrective to the Campus Confusion*, published in 1953.

David E. Bell, Executive Vice President of the Ford Foundation, was born in North Dakota and educated at Pomona (Calif.) College and at Harvard University. Except for 3 years of wartime service in the U.S. Marine Corps, he was associated with the Bureau of the Budget from 1942 until he became Administrative Assistant to President Truman (1951–53). He became Advisor in general economics to the Government of Pakistan's Planning Board and Project Field Supervisor for the Harvard Advisory Group (1954–57). He continued his association with Harvard as a lecturer in economics (1957–61) and as secretary of the Graduate School of Public Administration (1959–61). Mr. Bell was appointed Director of the Bureau of the Budget in 1961 and Administrator of the Agency for International Development in 1962. He remained with AID until 1967 when he became Executive Vice President of Ford Foundation.

Edward K. Hamilton is Vice President and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution.

Mr. Hamilton is a native of Minnesota, but grew up in Louisiana and Iowa. He has degrees from the University of Minnesota and Harvard University. He served with the International Division, Bureau of the Budget; as Assistant to Director of the Bureau of the Budget in 1963 and 1964; and as Senior Member of the National Security Council Staff at the White House from 1965 to 1968. Most recently, Mr. Hamilton was the Executive Secretary and Staff Director of the Commission on International Development (the Pearson Commission) which issued the report *Partners in Development* (Oct. 1969).

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ambassador Olds, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR GLENN OLDS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador OLDS. With your permission, I will try to speak more extemporaneously than my text would provide.

I am mindful, having listened to the President of France, of a comment made by Benjamin Franklin, our first Ambassador to the Court of France on the eve of the French Revolution, writing home to America and speaking of the King of France. He said:

> Under normal circumstances, he would have been a great king, but he has inherited a revolution.

That might be a backdrop as a kind of a text for what I shall want to say today. Under normal circumstances, what we have done in the

United States to try to close the development gap has been enormous and great.

But we, too, like the France of that day, have inherited a revolution, and the magnitude and sweep of that revolution which widens the gap creates the context within which I think we have to measure our own circumstance.

I, unlike the others in this distinguished series of hearings, and my colleagues today, am not a professional in this field, Mr. Chairman. I am a garden variety American who really backed into this assignment out of a series of unplanned events, and with a deepened sense of civic responsibility. Since I have never testified before, it does seem to me appropriate, and I hope not impertinent, for you to know just a word about that garden variety context because what I have to say will be heavily shaped by who I am and where I have been.

I have come to the United Nations in an unpredictable route. I was born and reared in one of those parochial pockets of homogeneous culture in Oregon on a farm and a logging camp. My world was about a county wide and even until I was ready to graduate from Willamette University about 30 miles from home. It was in that year, on December 7, 1941, that I discovered that there was another world.

That afternoon at 2 o'clock, our football team was to have played the University of Hawaii in Honolulu. We never played that game, but the events of that experience were suddenly to erupt in my life and outlook and remind me that what happened on the other side of the globe reached down in my block.

My two college roommates were killed and my life, in a sense, has been set in the context and conviction that whatever I continue to do as a layman it ought to have some bearing on trying to insure that that kind of tragedy should not happen again.

From a chaplain to a university teacher to a college president, I have really pursued this with the kind of nonpartisan political perspective; I have come, therefore, to this assignment as an innocent consequence of writing a little article entitled "The New Approach to Foreign Policy" which Mr. Nixon read and asked me to serve as his special assistant for policy development during the campaign and subsequently in this role for the last 11 months as the Ambassador to the Economic and Social Council.

I wouldn't offend the intelligence of you distinguished men by commenting at length on what that assignment entails. I have put before you a chart which gives you the scope of the 36 agencies for which this responsibility is discharged. But I want to suggest that with the sweep of this responsibility, all of the specialized agencies and the other factors of the U.N., I think you can imagine my shock when I arrived, bright-eyed and bushy-tailed, for this assignment at the U.S. Mission at the U.N. to ask what kind of support we were receiving for this enterprise and discovered that the collective contribution of the world to this last best hope for peace, the U.N., was roughly 28 cents per person, per year, or to translate it now in the language of the U.S. contribution, it is just under $1 per person, per year, about half the price of a show, a little less than what it costs for a pound of meat, and about the price of a small box of bandaids.

I asked the man that I met where my staff was and he said, "You are talking to him." I thought he had to be kidding. I discovered, however, that there were three other men that had just left the office but when they returned and with the two loaned from AID, with six pro-

fessionals, were to man the U.S. representation in respect to the coordination of our multilateral interests in the U.N.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I sympathize with your predicament. That is why I keep telling everyone we shouldn't cut foreign aid money and have adequate, efficient staff to administer it.

Ambassador OLDS. I am glad you read my footnotes on the run. I obviously come today with a deep sense of shock and the reverberations of that shock, in my conviction that American families are contributing more than $850 per year, per family, for military expenditures, could do better than $1 a person a year for this.

Mr. BINGHAM. Could I interrupt just a moment?

Ambassador OLDS. Yes.

Mr. BINGHAM. I do have to leave, and I wanted to say as one of your predecessors that I was very happy that you could be here. I also wish that our colleague, Mr. Gross, were here so that he could hear in this case, the Office of the Ambassador to the Economic and Social Council, Parkinson's Law has not been in effect. There has been no increase. In fact, I think there has been a slight decrease since my day.

Ambassador OLDS. Thank you. I hope there will be some way of transmitting that to Mr. Gross in some appropriate form.

Mr. GALLAGHER. We will bring your speech to his attention.

Ambassador OLDS. Finally, and I hope it is not impertinent, Mr. Chairman, what I have to say is schooled in a sense obviously of both impatience and a sense of urgency and a handful of homemade convictions which you might expect from a misplaced philosopher, to condition what I now want to say.

There are six propositions in the school of hard knocks that seem to me to be pretty close to the perspective with which we deal with other people and with ourselves.

I just toss them out because they do provide the context for my evaluation of this gap.

The first is we reap what we sow. We don't defy the law of gravity when we leap from a cliff; we illustrate it.

Second, there are no shortcuts to truth. The oversimplified notion that there is some simple answer to a complex problem seems to me to be pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp.

Third, there is no legislating law without representation. Healthy societies, like healthy bodies, require the exercise of responsibility. My pushups don't help your waist and my declarations don't help your fulfillment of participation.

Fourth, the test of what a man believes is what he does. We either put our money where our mouth is or we shut up, or we will be shut up.

Fifth, that the best discipline of power is in its diffusion. The pyramiding of one kind of power to contain another is an invitation to violence.

Finally, privilege imposes obligation. It is in that context that I have seven swift points I want to make about the U.N.'s role in a comprehensive sense in closing this development gap.

The first point is to remind us, I think, that development is peacemaking. It was once said that man's perfectability makes government possible. Man's pervertibility makes it necessary.

This committee has been listening to those who have been speaking to the effort to contain man's pervertibility, his passion for power, which is the security side of the U.N.

The other side of the U.N., which is much less well known, has to do with the release of man's potentiality, the concern to enlighten his economic and social welfare and outlook as a critical ingredient of development.

As the Pope recently said, development is in our time now, another name for peace.

The second point is that the widening gap between the rich and poor nations is an invitation to disaster. This is not a poetic phrase; this is a description of hard fact. In spite of our best efforts, Mr. Chairman, a scattering of statistics make the point vividly.

Here I want to be precise. Though the United States represents only 6 percent of the world's population, we consume over 50 percent of the world's nonrecurring resources, and our gross national product, which reaches this year a trillion dollars is 30 times greater than the collective capacity of one-third of the population of the world.

We define poverty at $3,000 a year, yet two-thirds of the world struggle to get their per capita income up to $200 a year.

Our life expectancy is now over 70 years of age, while 50 percent of the world's population may expect to die by the age of 40.

Over 50 percent of our school age population now enjoy higher education, while 50 percent of the school age children of over 50 percent of the world will attend no school.

Thirty-four percent of the world's population living in the more developed countries live on 97.5 percent of the world's product, while 66 percent of the people living in less developed countries live on 12½ percent of the product.

At the present time, this is a difference of some $3,500 per capita which divide the have and have not nations.

But on the basis of current population trends, by the year 2000 this difference will reach nearly $9,000, with $10,000 a year in the United States, $500 a year in Brazil, and $200 in India.

In the year 1975, the dependent children in lesser developed countries alone will equal the total population of the more developed world.

Moreover, 20 percent of the male population in these countries are unemployed, and most of these children under 15 are obviously also unemployed. The magnitude of this simply staggers the imagination.

The drift toward disaster was gathered up in the further observation of former Secretary of Defense McNamara recently when he observed the relation between the incidence of violence and the economic status of the countries afflicted.

Among the security crises since World War II, only two countries with a per capita income in excess of $750 a year have undergone a major and violent internal upheaval.

On the other hand, roughly 90 percent of these countries with per capita incomes of $100 or less have suffered an average of two outbreaks of violence in the same period.

Clearly, the line of tension has shifted from east to west, from north to south, and a world spending over $750 billion for military security, which is 25 times what it spends for economic and social development, is one flirting with disaster.

The third point is that gaps are man made. They are not ordained of God. They root in a distortion of the deeper human condition of interdependence.

The notion that these gaps are God given or ordained of nature or reflect real capacities or rewards of the real world—nothing could be further from the truth. All that we know about nature at the root of our scientific and technical revolution and all that we know about human nature at the root of the educational explosion in the modern world gives a lie to this concept of the permanence of the gap.

We know our world is one world, that it is interdependent, that it is organic and whole.

Our recent attention to the problem of the environment underscores this belated recognition, and human nature is remarkably resilient and comparable wherever it is found.

It strikes me, Mr. Chairman, that much of the rude awakening and restless revolution of our time is the growing recognition on the part of the world that this is so. Indeed, and that is my fourth point, the American revolution set the pace for this recognition, and it rejected the political, economic and social sanction for this gap psychology. Rooted as it was in the concept of the natural law of the 18th century and its conviction about the unity of the world and the promise of every man, the American Revolution in its Declaration of Independence denied categorically a divinely or politically ordained view of the world as divided into the rich and poor, strong and weak, deserving and undeserving.

And the reverberations of this revolution which have taken a great deal of forms are now at work in the world. Indeed, and that is the point I want to make, it is the inspiration of that revolution which we are now called upon to help to harvest.

It is no surprise, except to some of us, that the Asian leader who opened the Conference on Southeast Asia Interdependence and Dependence opened that conference which we boycotted by the reference and the quotation of Longfellow's Paul Revere.

Whatever we may have forgotten about our heritage, the rest of the world is now quickening in their restless effort to catch up. This hope, which is rooted in both our motivation and our example, is the key to the clue both of the nature of the gap and the hunger to close it.

It roots in what is right, not in some veiled do-good sentimentality, some secondhand reinforcement to fight communism or some disguised version of enlightened self-interest.

It is rooted in the grasp of the right relationship between man and nature and between man and man, and the interdependence of our real world.

It is not pious poetry to say so long as any man is in chains I am not free. Development is not aid, charity or paternalism of the rich for the poor, of the strong for the weak.

It is the requirement of nature and human nature, grasped intuitively, to be sure, by an earlier moral and philosophical insight.

But now the scientific sophistication brings home the real fact about life, which is interdependence and its fullest realization or perish.

The sixth point has to do with the U.N.'s response in giving global

form to this interdependent character of our real world. It would take a book, really, to rehearse its successes in this swift 25 years, but in this area, most recently in the last 10.

During the sixties, the economic target of the second development decade of 5 percent was largely achieved. School enrollments were doubled.

The green revolution is just now beginning to dawn on the world. The United Nations development program, which acts as a resource and coordinator of this system of agencies, has been even more dramatically at work.

Just a sketch of the broad profile of that accomplishment: Its mounted projects and preinvestment and technical assistance exceeding $2½ billion in voluntary contributions, counterpart and local costs. These expenditures have in turn generated more than $3 billion in followup investment.

Led by our distinguished American colleague, Paul Hoffman, its record from 1959 to 1969 is a near miracle, from 110 countries served to 140, from 2,400 experts to 9,000, from 2,150 fellowships to 7,000, from $37 million to $230 million of pledges, an increase of sixfold in a 10-year period. This stream of 60,000 experts and 400,000 trained nationals have helped to build 200 applied research institutes and sustained over 300 large-scale projects.

It has been the chief instrument for insuring that 70 percent of all development resources have come from the developing countries themselves, quickened by this human and material multiplier factor.

Moreover, it is shorn of the political partisan hangups. With remarkable global participation and in collaboration with the World Bank family there has been created an interlocking social system of interdependence which nature and human nature demand.

Finally, what we have begun, Mr. Chairman, in the inspiration of our conviction about this kind of open, interrelated world we must help to consummate in a series of concrete actions.

Our leadership in this respect is something of which to make us all proud. At the peak of our development program it represented 3 percent of our gross national product, and 11 percent of our budget.

It inspired other Nations to carry their fair share, and we are now surpassed in per capita giving in relation to the percent of GNP by 13 Nations.

Precisely at a time when the momentum is building, our own U.S. leadership has been slipping in the stretch. Our development assistance has fallen substantially lower than 1 percent of our gross national product, and less than 1 percent of our budget, and this while our gross national product steadily rises and will increase by another $500 billion by 1975.

The eyes of the world are upon us. They wonder if this reflects a retrenchment, a new isolationism, a war-weary American withdrawal from international leadership.

The President's latest report on foreign policy makes it clear this is not so. He indicates that we are committed to a larger multilateral assistance and strengthening economic and social development. But to give substance to that policy, Mr. Chairman, and in conclusion, what may the Congress of the United States do to close this gap?

Without seeming presumptuous, I hope, may I make 10 swift and simple suggestions with respect to what could be done to close that gap in the reinforcement of the U.N. system.

First, reaffirm the 1 percent of the gross national product target in which we participated in the General Assembly of 1960, in 1964, and 1968, or the Pearson report recommendation of 0.7 percent of official aid by 1975.

Two, to insure the manpower supply for this development by endorsing and helping finance the International Volunteer Service Corps and the U.N. University currently under feasibility study at the United Nations.

Three, endorse the political leadership of the United States through strengthening the State Department and the U.S. mission to the United Nations to properly man and coordinate the U.S. participation in its economic and social development, which, if it will not seem impertinent unduly, would suggest one or two more legs under that manpower effort in New York, among other things.

Mr. GALLAGHER. You have a believer here.

Ambassador OLDS. I don't know to whom I am speaking, but you know, I hope in the end through you, sir, it will be our Congress and our people.

To endorse through appropriations a greatly expanded multilateral aid program built on a greatly strengthened U.N. capacity along the broad lines of the Jackson capacity study and the Pearson reports to which I am sure both my colleagues, Messrs. Bell and Hamilton, will speak.

Five, to call for new forms of private-public partnership in overseas investment, technical assistance, and development which commissions the best features of both.

Six, support new forms of trade policy aimed at accommodating an accelerated development for the less-developed countries, internal structural changes at home and international preference policies looking toward an increasingly open and just international economic order.

Seven, encourage the exploration of new sources of financing for development under the U.N. system, considering internationl taxation, monetary reforms, and sources of income.

Eight, strengthen regional mechanisms of development as envisaged with Latin American design in this year's legislation.

Nine, to encourage the exploration of ways to harness and transfer spinoff consequences for development of publicly financed research and programs in science and technology with special attention to space, to seasonal resources, agriculture, education, and healtth.

Ten, to provide legislation to encourage and support more and better trained U.S. leadership in the U.N. system, especially on the economic and social side, enabling more comparable professional conditions than those inside U.S. Government and private concessions.

The gap between the salaries paid by the U.N. system, Mr. Chairman, and the current U.S. and private salaries makes it difficult to recruit.

Finally, were any of these 10 steps to be undertaken seriously by the Congress, they would greatly strengthen the executive leadership in

helping bridge this development gap. They can be done. They should be done.

I believe the American people want and expect this kind of leadership. I know the world at the U.N. does. But deeper than these human expectations, Mr. Chairman, is the deeper logic of our real world. It demands that we change in this direction or perish; that we reap what we sow; that the truth is that we are being driven by economic and human necessity to an acknowledged interdependence, to an ordering of shared power, to a testing of the pretensions of practice, and to the obligation of privilege.

I don't agree with the Quaker poet who said God wouldn't have given us matches if He hadn't thought the world was fireproof.

I think we live in a highly flammable world, and I think it is possible that our power may have outrun our intelligence and our character.

But if it has, and if we should be this foolish, we certainly shall not be able to say we have not been forewarned. The groaning of the gaps that divide our world are shrill and ominous and urgent. They may foretell the end of an age or a new beginning.

It seems to me that the price is so small and the stakes so high I simply can't believe that the American people will permit us to fail in nerve at this late hour.

As they used to say when I was a boy in the old Grange hall on Saturday night after they discussed problems of concern to the community half the night, I can still hear my old dad say, "Well, gentlemen, the hour is late, and it is now time to put our money where our mouth is."

In an eloquent way and a simple way, they did. This, I think Mr. Chairman, is the genius of our American society, and I feel confident that this is the stuff with which both they and we are made, and I trust we will be a part of the character of the response in both your committee and our Congress.

Thank you.

(The complete statement of Ambassador Olds follows:)

UNITED NATIONS: BRIDGING THE DEVELOPMENT GAP

THE THESIS

Gaps between men and nations, economic, political or cultural, are not God-given. They reflect an uneven history of accident, initiative, and plain luck. Taken or reinforced as given, they perpetuate a mentality of conflict—strong versus the weak, rich versus the poor; East versus the West; North versus the South; old versus the young. Accelerated by shrinking space, quickened time, and instantaneous communications, such gaps invite dangerous drifts toward violence. Seen as man made, however, such gaps can be amenable to human invention and intelligent change. The United Nations represents the most comprehensive human invention for realizing man's interdependence, orchestrating deep differences into a less violent, more productive human community. Its preoccupation with development is its principal peace-making function, complementing its security interests in peace-keeping. Its success turns on radically accelerated understanding and support of this mission, commensurate with the magnitude and urgency of the world's problems in this area. The United States leadership will be a decisive factor in the outcome.

THE ARGUMENT

(1) Development is peace-making, a clue to the U.N. system.

(2) The widening gap between rich and poor is an invitation to disaster.

(3) Gaps are man-made and root in a distortion of the deeper human condition of interdependence.

(4) The American revolution rejected the political, economic and social sanction for the "gap psychology".

(5) It set loose a new mentality in the world of interdependence of independents.

(6) The U.N. system gives global form to this interdependent character of our real world.

(7) What the U.S. convincingly began, it must help to consummate in a series of concrete actions.

THE TEXT

Mr. Chairman: Reading from a manuscript is like courting through a hedge. One can hear all right, but the contact is poor! For that reason, on such an important subject, following so many distinguished speakers, in such a short time frame allotted me, I shall file my manuscript with the Committee, where I have stated a thesis, and sought to make the case in seven swift points, and communicate personally and directly the gravity and promise of the topic assigned to me. "The United Nations: Bridging the Development Gap."

Unlike the others in this distinguished series of hearings, I am not a professional in this field. I am a garden variety American who backed into this responsibility through a series of unplanned events, mingled with a deepened sense of civic responsibility. Since this is the first time I have ever testified and since what I have to say, like every man, I suppose, reflects something of what I am and where I have been, you have a right, if not an obligation, to know a bit at least, of the bias of this testimony.

I have come to the United Nations through an unpredictable route. I was born and reared in one of those parochial pockets of homogeneous culture on a farm and in the logging camps of Oregon. In a world little more than a county wide, attending Willamette University 30 miles away as the first of my clan ever to have a chance to go on to school, it was not until my senior year that I discovered the real world outside that peaceful valley. It was on December 7, 1941, that our football team was to play the University of Hawaii in Honolulu, that afternoon at 2:00 p.m. You know that game was never played. Two of my closest friends were killed, and I vowed that I would not rest so long as I was given life to ensure that their life and others like them would not be lost in vain; that what we knew then and now, that wars at best only buy time to create the opportunity to construct the deeper conditions of peace, should be put to action.

From a chaplain, to a university teacher of philosophy, and college president, I have pursued this course, without regard for political partisanship. I helped get the Peace Corps going, and took time out to put VISTA together in our "War on Poverty". When Mr. Nixon, responding to a paper I had done on "New Strategy for Foreign Policy" asked me to leave the university to serve through his inauguration as Special Assistant for Policy and Manpower Development, I did. And, when I was asked to help implement these policies through serving as the United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council at the United Nations a year ago, I accepted.

I knew, as you do, that the Economic and Social Council was charged with coordinating about 80% of the work of the United Nations. It includes the 13 specialized agencies—the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labor Organization (ILO), the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). International Development Association (IDA), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Universal Postal Union (UPU), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). In addition, the Council is responsible for the Commissions on Human Rights, Population, Narcotic Drugs, Social Development, Status of Women, Statistics and the four regional economic commissions for

Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. It bears further responsibility for coordinating the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development, the Committee for Development Planning, the Committee on Housing Building and Planning, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the U.N. Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), and a few other assorted and special assignments on the Human Environment, the Second Development Decade, and the like.

With this remarkable sweep of responsibility and array of tools for dealing with human development, you can imagine my shock when I arrived at the United States Mission at the U.N. to find the measure of U.S. support for this remarkable undertaking. I thought someone must be kidding when I was told the budget was less than 7¢ per person per year for the year 1968 for the U.N. itself, the specialized agencies about 10¢ per person, and the others including the UNDP, another 11¢ making a grand total of 28¢ per person per year for man's "last best hope on earth." Translated even into the higher percentage of U.S. contribution to these collective budgets it amounted to about $1.00 per person per year for every American; less than a pound of steak, half an adult fare to the movie, about equivalent to a small box of bandaids! This total budget was less than the budget for the State University of New York for which I bore responsibility as an executive Dean, one university system among 50 State systems, and over 2,000 universities and colleges in the United States.

When I asked about my staff, I was told I was talking to him! Three more had just been transferred out, but adding them, plus the two loaned from AID, and our total mission complement to assault the Economic and Social activities at the United Nations was six professionals, hardly enough to represent a quorum for any decent task force for anybody's study! Perhaps you will understand and put in perspective what I say and how. If I seem a bit frustrated, I am! If I seem a bit emotional at how much we must do with how little, I am. If I appear to believe that the average American now contributing better than $850 per family for military expenditures can and wants to do better than a dollar apiece a year for our last best hope of peace, I do.

Finally, if I bring a few homemade convictions, nurtured by an America I love, and in which I deeply believe, which is better than any press makes out, or to which our legislation has yet risen, for which so many of my classmates died, and for which we now seem paralyzed in making the smallest sacrifice to live, I hope you will not think me irreverent, impertinent, or irrelevant. These convictions round out my biases with which I offer my testimony. They seem to me central, simple, and close to the heart of what our experience as a people has to share with the world, and a clue to any strategy for development.

1. *We reap what we sow.*—This is a fairly orderly universe. We do not harvest figs from thistles. We do not defy the law of gravity by leaping from a cliff. We illustrate it!

2. *There are no short cuts to the truth.*—However tempting simple solutions to complex problems may be, there are none. Violence is frequently the evidence of impatience with the slower pace of democratic process in the pursuit and implementation of the truth about man, his needs, appetites, and relationships.

3. *There is no legislating law without representation.*—Healthy societies, like healthy bodies, require the exercise of responsibility. My push-ups do not help your waist, and my declarations do not give you pride in participation.

4. *The test of what a man believes is in what he does.*—We either put our money where our mouth is, or we should shut up, or what may be worse, we will be shut up.

5. *The best discipline of power is its responsible diffusion.*—The pyramiding of one kind of power to contain another is the invitation to violence.

6. *Privilege imposes obligations.*—No man is "self-made"; contrivances of fortune are not so narrowly controlled. The benefaction of nature, society, and inherent gifts must be rendered accountable in any view of justice.

And now, the case for the United Nations' role in development:

1. *Development is peace-making.*—Reinhold Niebuhr once said, "Man's perfectibility makes government possible; man's pervertibility makes it necessary". You have heard the U.N.'s peace-keeping role described. It is the most visible feature of its work, concerned with the Security Council and threats to peace, the control

of man's pervertibility. But what of the other side, the conditions that make for peace? Surely these lie with the threefold hunger of man for (1) economic secuity, (2) personal meaning, dignity and fulfillment, and (3) completion in responsible social order insuring their fulfillment. Development is therefore, and at once, economic and human. It is, as the Pope rightly remarked recently, the new word for PEACE. It is the business of 80% of the work of the United Nations, little understood, fitfully supported, and desperately needed.

2. *The widening gap between the rich and poor, nations and people, is an invitation to disaster.*—Despite our recent best efforts in development, the gap grows steadily worse. A scattering of statistics make the point vividly. Though the United States represents only 6% of the world's population, we consume over 50% of the world's non-recurrable resources, and our Gross National Product this year will reach one trillion dollars, 30 times greater than the collective capability of one-third of the population of the world. We define poverty at $3,000 a year; yet two-thirds of the world struggle to get their per capita income up to $200 per year. Our life expectancy is now over 70 years of age, while 50% of the world's population may expect to die by the age of 40. Over 50% of our school-age population now enjoy higher education, while over 50% of the school-age children of over 50% of the world will attend no school or not finish the third grade.

Thirty-four percent of the world's population living in more developed countries live on 87½% of the world's product, while 66% of the people living in less developed countries live on 12½% of the product. At present, a difference of some $3500 per capita divides the "haves" and "have-nots". On the basis of current population trends, however increasing as it is at a rate of over 2 to 1 in the less favored nations, by the year 2000 this difference will reach nearly $9000—with $10,000 a year in the United States, $500 in Brazil, and $200 in India. In the year 1975, the dependent children alone in the lesser developed world will equal the total population in the more developed world. Moreover, with 20% of the male population in these countries unemployed, and most of these children under 15 and unemployed, the sheer magnitude of the problem staggers the imagination.

The situation is not merely tragic—it drifts toward disaster. As former Secretary of Defense McNamara recently observed, there seems to be a direct relationship between the incidence of violence and the economic status of the countries afflicted in recent history. Among the security crises since World War II, only two countries with a per capita income in excess of $750,000 a year have undergone a major and violent internal upheaval. On the other hand, roughly 90% of those countries with per capita income of $100 or less have suffered an average of two outbreaks of violence in the same period. If the dangerous drift toward a widening gap continues unabated, we might fairly predict major disaster in the years ahead. Clearly the line of tension has shifted from east-west to north-south, and a world spending over 175 billion for military security, 25 times what it spends for economic and social development, is one flirting with disaster.

3. *Gaps are man-made, and root in a distortion of the deeper human condition of interdependence.*—A peril of much of our current thinking on these problems of development lies in the presumption that these gaps are God-given, ordained of nature, and reflect real capacities or rewards of the real world. Nothing could be further from the truth. All that we know about nature, at the root of our incredible scientific and technical revolution in the modern world; and all that we know about human nature, at the root of the educational explosion in the modern world, gives the lie to the permanence of the gap. We know our world is one world, interdependent, organic, and whole; and that human nature, whatever the surface and cultural differences, is remarkably comparable and resilient wherever found. The restlessness and violence of our stirring world is the sudden discovery that this is so; and the refusal to accept these gaps as reflecting anything other than human invention, industry, and change, and therefore open to human transformation.

4. *The American Revolution rejected the political, economic, and social sanction for the gap psychology.*—Rooted as it was in the national law of the 18th century, and its conviction about the unity of the world and the promise of every man, the American revolution, in its Declaration of Independence, constitution and representative government, denied categorically a divinely or politically ordained view of the world as divided into rich and poor, strong and weak, deserving and undeserving. It put "kinging", whether political or economic, out of style. The reverberations of this revolution, taking many forms,

including those set against its own nature, are only now sweeping into consummation around the world.

5. *Our revolution set loose a new mentality in the world of interdependent independents.*—It should be no surprise that the Asian leader opened the Bandung Conference on Southeast Asian independence in the 50's by quoting Longfellow's "Paul Revere". The inspiration, and in large measure, the model for most of the new nations in the modern world roots in our own history and leadership. Their restless hope is rooted in our promise and example. Motivation toward development is not, therefore, some thinly veiled "do-good" sentimentality, some secondhand reinforcement to fight communism, some disguised version of enlightened self-interest. It roots in what is *right*—that is, a grasp of the right relationships, the real relationships, grounded in nature and human nature—the inescapable interlocking of man and nature, and man and man—the interdependence of our real world. It is not pious poetry to say, "So long as any man is in chains, I am not free," or that, "There but for the grace of God, go I!" It is literally, profoundly, true. Development, therefore, is not *aid*, charity or paternalism of the rich for the poor, the strong for the weak; it is rather the requirement of nature and human nature, grasped intuitively by an earlier, less scientific, moral and religious insight, but known now by scientific sophistication to be the real fact about life; to be understood and implemented, or perish.

6. *The U.N. gives global form to the interdependent character of our real world.*—We are only now awakening to the quantum leap in human ingenuity represented in the founding of the U.N. system. It would take a book to tell how the specialized agencies, and all others in the economic and social field have been quietly but steadily giving substance to our interdependent world—in communications, health, education, science and technology, labor, and all the rest. During the 60's the economic target of 5% of GNP was achieved. School enrollments were doubled. The Green revolution in food production recently erupted.

The United Nations Development Program, acting as resource and coordinator of this diverse system of agencies, over this same period has been even more dramatically at work. It has mounted projects in pre-investment and technical assistance exceeding 2½ billion dollars, which has in turn generated more than 3 billion. Led by our distinguished American colleague, Paul Hoffman, its record in this 10-year period from 1959 to 1969 is a near miracle: from 110 countries served to 140, from 2,400 experts to 9,000, from 2,150 fellowships to 7,000, from 37 million to 230 million dollars of pledges, an increase of sixfold. This stream of some 60,000 experts and 400,000 trained nationals have helped build 200 applied research institutes, and sustain over 300 large-scale projects. It has been a principal resource for insuring that over 75% of all development resources expended have come from the developing countries themselves, quickened by these human and material multiplier factors. Shorn of political partisanship, and with remarkable global participation, the UNDP, in growing collaboration with the World Bank family, has literally been creating the interlocking world economic and social system of interdependence which nature and human nature demand.

7. *What the U.S. convincingly began, it must help to consummate in a series of concrete actions.*—U.S. leadership in development from the days of the Marshall Plan has been enough to make every American proud. At its peak it represented 3% of our GNP, and 11% of the budget. It resulted in inspiring other nations to begin to carry their fair share, and we are now surpassed in per capita giving in relation to percent of the GNP by 13 nations. Precisely at a time, when real momentum has been building, the U.S. leadership has been slipping in the stretch. Our development assistance has fallen to one-third of one percent of our GNP, and less than 1% of our budget, and this while our GNP steadily rises and will increase by another 500 billion by 1975. The eyes of the world are upon us. They wonder if this reflects a radical retrenchment, a new isolationism, a war-weary American withdrawal from international leadership.

The President's latest report on U.S. Foreign policy makes it clear this is not so. He is committed to larger multilateral assistance, and strengthening economic and social development. To give substance to such a policy, what may the Congress of the United States do? Without seeming presumptuous, may I close by suggesting at least ten steps well within our powers and critically needed to close the development gap:

1. Reaffirm the 1% of GNP target in which we participated in the General Assembly of 1960, UNCTAD in 1964, DAK in 1965, and UNCTAD 1968; or the Pearson Report recommendation of .7% of official aid by 1975.

2. Insure the manpower supply for development by endorsing and helping to finance the International Volunteer Service Corps., and the U.N. University currently under feasibility study at the United Nations.

3. Endorse the U.S. political leadership through strengthening the State Department and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to properly coordinate the total U.S. participation in the U.N.'s economic and social development.

4. Endorse through appropriations a greatly expanded multilateral aid program built on a greatly strengthened U.N. capacity along broad lines of the Jackson Capacity Study, and Pearson Reports.

5. Call for new forms of private-public partnership in overseas investment, technical assistance, and development which commissions the best features of both.

6. Support new forms of trade policy aimed at accommodating accelerated development for less developed countries, internal structural changes at home, and international preference policies looking toward an increasingly open and just international economic order.

7. Encourage exploration of new sources of financing of development under the U.N. system, considering possible forms of international taxation, monetary reforms, and sources of income.

8. Strengthen regional mechanisms of development, as envisaged with Latin America in this year's legislation, to underpin and round out global responsibility.

9. Encourage exploration of ways to harness and transfer spin-off consequences for development of publicly financed research and programs in science and technology, with special attention to space, the seas, natural resources, agriculture, education and health.

10. Provide legislation to encourage and support more and better trained U.S. leadership within the U.N. system, and especially in the economic and social side, enabling more comparable professional conditions to those inside U.S. Government and private professions.

Were any of these to be seriously undertaken by Congress, they would greatly strengthen executive leadership in helping "bridge the development gap." They can be done. They should be done. They create the conditions that make for peace I believe the American people want and expect this kind of leadership. I know the world at the United Nations does. But deeper than these human expectations is the deeper logic of our real world. It demands that we change or perish; that we reap what we sow; that the truth is we are being driven by economic and human necessity to an acknowledged interdependence; to an ordering of shared power; to a testing of pretensions by practice; to the obligation of privilege. I do not agree with the Quaker poet who said, "God would not have given us matches if he had not known the universe is fire proof." I think our world is highly flammable; and it may be that we are destined to repeat Prometheus, whose power outran his wisdom and character. If we should be so foolish, we will not be able to say we were not forewarned. The groaning of the gaps that divide our world are shrill and ominous. They may foretell the end of an age, or a new beginning.

The price is so small, and the stakes so high, I cannot believe the American people will permit a failure of nerve at this late hour. And, as they used to say when I was a boy in Oregon at the end of long debates at the old community hall: "Well, gentlemen, the hour is late. It is now time to put our money where our mouth is." And with eloquent simplicity, they did. This *is* the stuff of which our nation is made—and I know you are, too!

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Ambassador Olds, for an excellent presentation. I am sure it will be widely read.

STATEMENT OF DAVID E. BELL, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, THE FORD FOUNDATION

Mr. GALLAGHER. You may proceed, Mr. Bell.

Mr. BELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Unlike Ambassador Olds, I have only very limited knowledge of the United Nations. I have never worked directly as a part of the United Nations system, as he has. I have been a member over the past year of the Panel of Consultants to Sir Robert Jackson in preparing his study of the Capacity of United Nations Development System, and I have had some chance while working with the Ford Foundation, AID, and some years ago when I worked in Pakistan, to observe the United Nations activities in the field.

It is this background of limited knowledge that I bring to this discussion today.

I would like to offer three comments to the committee, and then I would be glad to respond to any questions which I am capable of answering.

First, I have a high opinion of the Jackson Report, and I commend it very strongly to the attention of the committee. I think it is an accurate and admirably frank analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations Development System as it is today.

The present system, as Ambassador Olds correctly pointed out, provides a great deal of assistance to less-developed countries. The total amount has risen very sharply over the past 10 years. It has gone up four, five or six times over what it was 10 years ago.

But the procedures and arrangements at present are clearly unnecessarily cumbersome, slow-moving, and diffuse, and need much improvement if the United Nations is to provide larger amounts of development assistance in the future in steadily more efficient ways.

I think, myself, that the Jackson Committee points correctly to the key changes that are needed and should be made.

I identify these without trying to summarize the Jackson Report. I mention just four of the key changes as I see them.

First, Jackson recommends that the system for planning United Nations development assistance should be centered much more clearly in the developing countries themselves and related to what the developing countries themselves want to undertake by way of developmental activities.

There is a tendency at the present time for some of the activities of the United Nations development assistance agencies to be directed from Rome or Geneva, or New York, and not sufficiently related to the actual problems in the developing countries.

Second, it would be helpful if the United Nations development assistance were planned and carried out more in terms of multiyear programs of related projects, rather than as a series of individual and separate projects.

Third, it would be helpful if the management responsibility were centered more sharply on the administrator of the United Nations Development Program.

At the present time, there is some uncertainty as to exactly who is in charge of a given project, with the UNDP financing it but the administrative responsibility normally lying with one of the specialized agencies.

Lastly, the administrator clearly needs more authority to go outside the United Nations system to obtain the skills and services that may be needed to help the developing countries.

Today, if the U.N. Development Program wishes to undertake an agricultural assistance project, the pattern has been—it is just changing now—that Mr. Hoffman invariably turns to the FAO whether or not the FAO has the top quality people in the particular field in question to do the job.

It is important to recognize that the United Nations Development System has been evolving over the past decade and it has been evolving in exactly the directions that I have just stressed.

Paul Hoffman has been leading that evolution. So the way to understand the Jackson Report, it seems to me, is as a report which suggests a further and more rapid evolution in directions in which it has already been moving.

I, personally, as one U.S. citizen, hope very much that the governing council of the United Nations Development Program at its meeting next month will approve the key recommendations of Jackson and his associates, and direct the various parties at interest to put those recommendations into effect.

My second comment, Mr. Chairman, is that the Jackson Report deals essentially with the management of the United Nations Development Assistance. It does not deal and was not intended to deal with the substance of the assistance that is offered by the United Nations to the developing countries.

I would like to make one or two comments on that subject.

First, as this committee knows very well, the United Nations has been slow to recognize the importance of the field of population and family planning. This slowness no doubt reflected the views of some of the governments making up the United Nations.

Within the last 2 or 3 years, however, the United Nations has moved formally and officially into the field of population. This is a very considerable advance and a very important one, in my view.

I think this opens up very significant opportunities, because the United Nations is peculiarly well-suited to advise governments on population issues, to evaluate family planning programs, and to encourage the evolution of sensible national population policies.

The U.N. can do this with much less chance of arousing the concerns and tensions that inevitably arise when representatives of the more-advanced countries, like the United States, pronounce on these subjects.

At the same time, it is important to note that the United Nations is just getting started in the population field, and so far has no record of successful performance.

We should all hope, therefore, that the new United Nations Population Fund will move quickly and effectively.

A second area in which I would hope to see the United Nations play a stronger role is that of research and development related to problems facing the developing countries.

The U.N. Development Program does not have a distinguished record in this area, nor, I should add, do the various national development assistance programs, including AID.

For example, the enormously important research and development work on high-yielding varieties of food grains which has led to the so-called green revolution was pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation beginning 30 years ago, and joined a dozen years ago by the Ford Foundation.

Moreover, the vital research and development work on better and cheaper contraceptives was also supported initially mainly by private sources.

I think we would all be well advised to hope that the U.N. Development Program will pay a good deal more attention to research and development in the future than it has done in the past.

Incidentally, I have made the same point repeatedly to my own ex-colleagues in AID. I think the problem of conducting effective research and development on these crucial barriers to development is extraordinarily significant, and one to which we are not devoting nearly enough resources.

The third comment I would like to make on the general subject before the committee is that assuming that the management and the substance of the United Nations Development Program are markedly improved, I would think the United States ought to continue its strong support for the UNDP for two principal reasons:

First, there are real and well-known advantages to a multilateral approach to development assistance. Not only is assistance from multilateral sources often more acceptable to the developing countries; it is also possible for multilateral agencies often to require more stringent self-help conditions as part of the aid relationship.

Consequently, well-managed multilateral agencies are efficient means through which the United States can achieve its purpose of helping international development. This is not to say that all U.S. development assistance ought to be channeled through multilateral agencies. Especially in the field of technical cooperation—that is, research, training and advice in agriculture, education, transportation, and so on—I think the United States has a great deal to offer and very important interests to serve which call for continuing strong bilateral programs of development assistance.

The second reason, however, why we should continue strongly to support the UNDP, assuming it is increasingly an efficient body, is one that is not normally presented, I think, to this committee, and not normally considered by the Congress in looking at the development assistance problem.

I think there are increasingly in view potentially significant benefits to the United States from the international development assistance process.

It has become painfully clear that within our own country we are not handling our internal problems of development in satisfactory fashion.

We need better ideas and better techniques than we have. As the U.N. development program moves ahead over the years, it will neces-

sarily deal increasingly with the kinds of problems we face here at home, problems of the quality of the environment, urban growth and decay, of family planning, education, and housing for disadvantaged groups, and many other problems.

As the U.N. experts seek to help solve these problems in India, Brazil, or Indonesia, there will be a lot for us to learn in the United States from their results.

Therefore, it seems to me we should not think of the U.N. development assistance activities as simply a way of sharing our advanced technology with the poorer countries, but increasingly we should think of them as a means of cooperatively attacking problems in whose solution we, ourselves, have a considerable stake.

This point holds, of course, for our bilateral technical cooperation programs as well as for multilateral programs.

Mr. Chairman, these are the thoughts I bring to this group, and I will be glad at a later point to respond to any questions you may have.

(The prepared remarks of Mr. Bell follows:)

STATEMENT OF DAVID E. BELL, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, THE FORD FOUNDATION

These hearings are aimed at exploring the role of the United Nations in "bridging the development gap." My knowledge of this subject is limited, as I have never worked in any United Nations agency. But I have been a member, over the past year, of the Panel of Consultants to Sir Robert Jackson in his study of the capacity of the United Nations development system, and I have had some chance while working in the Ford Foundation, in A.I.D., and some years ago in Pakistan, to observe United Nations development assistance activities.

Based on this limited knowledge, I would like to offer three comments today.

(1) In my opinion, the Jackson Report is an accurate—and admirably frank—analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations development system as it is today. The present system provides a great deal of valuable help to less developed countries, but the procedures and arrangements are unnecessarily cumbersome, slow-moving, and diffuse, and need much improvement if the United Nations is to provide larger amounts of development assistance in the future in steadily more efficient ways.

The Jackson Report points correctly, I believe, to the key changes that are needed:

A planning and programming system centered more clearly in the developing countries, and related to their own development planning processes;

U.N. assistance planned and carried out more in terms of multi-year programs of related projects, rather than lists of separate projects;

Management responsibility centered more sharply on the Administrator of the UNDP;

More authority in the Administrator to go outside the U.N. specialized agencies to obtain the skills and services needed to help the developing countries.

It is important to recognize that the United Nations development system has been evolving in these directions, under Paul Hoffman's leadership, over the past ten years. What the Jackson Report suggests is a further and more rapid evolution. I hope the Governing Council of the UNDP at its meeting in March will approve the key recommendations of the Report and direct that they be put into effect.

(2) The Jackson Report deals essentially with the management of United Nations development assistance. It does not deal with the very important matter of the substance of the assistance offered by the United Nations to the developing countries. I should like to make a comment or two on this subject.

First, the United Nations has been slow to recognize the importance of the field of population and family planning. This slowness no doubt reflects the views of some of the governments making up the U.N. Within the last two or three years, however, the United Nations has moved formally and officially in this field. I think this opens up very important opportunities, because the United Nations is peculiarly well suited to advise governments on population issues, to

evaluate family planning programs, and to encourage the evolution of sensible national population policies, all with less chance of arousing the concerns and tensions that inevitably arise when representatives of the more advanced countries pronounce on these subjects.

At the same time, it is important to note that the United Nations is just getting started in this field and so far has no record of successful performance. We must all hope that the U.N. Population Fund will move quickly and effectively.

A second area in which I would hope to see the United Nations play a stronger role is that of research and development related to problems facing the developing countries. The U.N. development program does not have a distinguished record in this area, nor, I should add, do the various national development assistance programs. For example, the enormously important research and development work of high-yielding varieties of food grains, which has led to the so-called "green revolution", was pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation beginning thirty years ago, and joined a dozen years ago by the Ford Foundation. Moreover the vital research and development work on better and cheaper contraceptives was also supported initially mainly by private sources. I hope the United Nations development program will pay far more attention to this kind of work in the future.

(3) Assuming that the management and the substance of the United Nations development program are markedly improved, I would think the United States ought to continue its strong support for the UNDP, for two primary reasons.

First, there are real and well-known advantages to a multilateral approach to development assistance. Not only is assistance from multilateral sources often more acceptable to developing countries, it is also possible for multilateral agencies often to require more stringent self-help conditions as part of the aid relationship. Consequently, well-managed multilateral agencies are efficient means through which the United States can achieve its purpose of helping international development.

This is not to say that all U.S. development assistance ought to be channeled through multilateral agencies. Especially in the field of technical cooperation-research, training, and advice in such fields as agriculture, transportation, education, etc—I believe the United States has much to offer and important interests to serve which call for continuing strong bilateral programs.

Second, I believe there are potentially significant benefits to the United States from U.N. development assistance activities. We are not, after all, handling our own internal problems of development in fully satisfactory fashion. We need better ideas and techniques than we have. As the U.N. development program moves ahead over the years, it will necessarily deal increasingly with the kinds of problems we face in our own country—problems of the quality of the environment, of urban growth and decay, of family planning, education, and housing for disadvantaged groups. As United Nations experts seek to help solve these problems in India, or Brazil, or Indonesia, there will be much for us to learn from their results.

So we should not think of United Nations development activities as simply a way of sharing our advanced technology with developing countries, but increasingly as a means of cooperatively attacking problems in whose solution we ourselves have a considerable stake. The same point holds for our bilateral technical cooperation programs.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Bell, for your thoughts and remarks.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD K. HAMILTON, VICE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR FELLOW AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Mr. GALLAGHER. You may proceed, Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I always have to begin anything I say, at least in this period after the Pearson report has come out, by observing that the Pearson Commission is close to unique among bureaucratic organizations in that having done its job it has dissolved and no longer exists. So what I say does not necessarily reflect the views of the commissioners or of

the chairman, though I think in most cases we think along very parallel lines.

I am very grateful for this opportunity to suggest some summary thoughts as you consider this topic. I will try to be brief. Therefore, I will speak in shorthand. I know that you know the subject very well. Therefore, you will understand when I have cut corners. The one thing I am most worried about is lapsing into the jargon which I think we use in this field with so much abandon as to make communications difficult if not impossible. If I start to do that, I hope someone will interrupt me.

I think that looking at development activities alone, one can sometimes compare the United Nations with an umbrella—more interesting for what it covers than what it is. I don't mean by that to disparage the direct U.N. programs. That is, the U.N. Development Program operating through the 10 specialized agencies. They have been and they are among the world's larger sources of technical assistance and preinvestment studies.

But I think we have to face the fact that the relation of the United Nations as such to the bulk of what is traditionally referred to as multilateral development support is that of a distant and—despite the efforts of Paul Hoffman and others which in themselves are superb—sometimes a rather muddled patriarch of an extended family in which the offspring have long since acquired a size and independence which tend to obscure and attenuate links with their forebears. It is not correct to say that there is no connection between the members of the extended U.N. family, but it is clear that the financial agencies regard and conduct themselves as independent peers, with the United Nations and with each other.

Of course, the oldest of the development finance agencies—the World Bank—is as old as the United Nations itself, and sprang from many of the same concepts and progenitors. However, it is only in the past 15 years that the Bank has concentrated largely on development projects in poor countries, and that it has acquired the affiliates, particularly the International Development Association (IDA), necessary to make loans of the types and on the terms the problem principally requires. The three regional development banks for Latin America, Asia, and Africa are even more recent in the evolutionary scale, though the Inter-American Development Bank has now completed more than a decade of growth.

In view of its recent vintage, it is perhaps remarkable that the multilateral aid community, including the direct U.N. programs, is now the vehicle for on the order of $1 billion in net loan and grant assistance to the developing countries each year, of which about $700 million is on terms which qualify it to be called "aid." Put another way, a little more than 10 percent of the flow of official development assistance from non-Communist industrialized countries is now provided through multilateral organizations.

However, there has been much more to the growth of multilateralism than the expansion of international agencies. A simultaneous trend has taken hold, on a very large scale, which makes the decisions which shape and direct the flow of aid more susceptible to multilateral negotiation and influence. This, too, has taken several forms.

The first was the aid consortium composed of the official donors, bilateral and multilateral (except for the direct U.N. programs), which supply aid to a particular country, meeting under the chairmanship of an international organization.

There are now three of these in operation—in India, Pakistan, and Turkey. A less demanding form of the same concept is expressed in the consultative group, in which potential donors need not signify a commitment to provide aid as a ticket of admission. These now number about a dozen, though they differ greatly among themselves in seriousness and significance. Even less formal ad hoc groupings have emerged in recent years in such countries as Ghana and Indonesia where the initial impulse stems largely from the concern of foreign creditors who see that their prospects of receiving payments on huge outstanding debts rest on the overall long-term advance of the debtor economy. In practice these groups have become nearly indistinguishable from consortia.

Finally, still another hybrid has appeared in Latin America which has yet to be duplicated elsewhere. This is the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress, known by its Spanish acronym CIAP. It joins six representative aid recipients and the predominant donor to the region (the United States) in a formally-chartered organization which undertakes periodic reviews of the development performance of Latin American countries and attempts to advise donors on financial and other external requirements in the light of these assessments. It would be misleading to suggest that CIAP has greatly affected the nature and direction of U.S. aid decisions during its first years of operation, but to my mind it represents a significant innovation in that it (1) addresses more than a single country, (2) is supported by a permanent staff (the economic staff of the OAS), and (3) gives recipients a welcome role—and it could be a leading role—in monitoring their own progress and that of other recipient countries. Moreover, President Nixon's policy statements with respect to Latin America suggest that the United States may now be willing to accord to CIAP all of the influence and responsibility of which it shows itself technically capable.

In my judgment, these separable but closely related trends—toward larger multilateral aid agencies, and toward more ways of "multilateralizing" bilateral aid—reflect a series of lessons, largely political in nature, which the world has slowly learned during the 15 years in which rapid progress in poor countries has become at least a semi-serious policy objective in most of the world.

The first is that development in most countries is a very long-term proposition and that development aid must be conceived and provided with reasonable continuity over a similarly extended period if it is to be effective. The corollary of this is that economic aid to serve short-term political ends (1) doesn't often work and, (2) quickly poisons the political relationship necessary to sustain development cooperation.

The second lesson is that the politics of a successful aid relationship, in both donor and recipient countries, are more and more inconsistent with the more rigid traditional notions of international politics which requires all important enterprises to be carried out largely in the

framework of classic bilateral relations between States. Indeed, where the classic pattern is adhered to, development aid inevitably becomes identified with the natural efforts of each country to further its own immediate political advantage, usually with the damaging consequences suggested above. This problem has long been obvious to students of developing countries, but it is often a relatively recent discovery for citizens of such wealthy countries as our own, who have only lately come to fear bilateral and profoundly political involvement with particular regimes in the volatile politics of the developing world.

I would suggest that a third lesson is that despite the problems of partnership between rich and poor the arm's length concept of development aid is neither efficient nor politically sustainable for any length of time in either rich countries or poor. If the choice reduces to no aid on the one hand and aid without information and involvement on the other, most major donors will resolve the issue by providing no aid.

And, finally, it is very clear that, whatever the organizational expression of the development partnership, there are very real and necessary limits upon the role of outsiders in the affairs of a developing country. A stable aid relationship demands that those willing to provide external assistance be informed and that they be given a fair hearing when major development decisions are at hand. But there cannot be the slightest shred of doubt about who must finally make those decisions; they must be made by the developing countries themselves. This is not only an obvious consequence of political organization in nation-states, it is also reasonable in light of the fact that developing countries do on the average provide at least 85 percent of the resources required for their growth. And, perhaps less obviously, it is required because the central factor in development is the positive will to progress which cannot be supplied from outside.

It seems clear that for all these reasons, and in a somewhat fitful and disjointed way, the world has slowly begun to build a system of multilateral machinery capable of taking the lead in a renewed and much larger attack upon the cancer of poverty which, rivaled only by the control of nuclear weapons, has a reasonable claim as the most serious problem now facing humanity. Much has been accomplished but even more remains for the 1970's.

The basic difficulty is that the impressive array of multilateral instruments which comprises the extended U.N. family does not yet resemble an integrated system in which coverage is reasonably complete, labor is consciously divided, programs are coordinated, monitoring processes are combined, standards are made consistent, development resources other than aid are incorporated, and the decision processes for bilateral aid are filtered through multilateral mechanisms which assure their technical probity and political legitimacy. The challenge for the 1970's is posed in the question whether the community of nations can build on the substantial progress of the past and create the multilateral framework which is, in my view, the best—and perhaps the only—hope for an effective program of development cooperation on a scale consistent with the problem.

What I am suggesting is a mammoth task. But there are four steps which seem to me most important.

First, we must enlarge the concept of multilateral aid to include those resources which are clearly and honestly allocated through processes which accord a strong presumption to the recommendations of legitimate multilateral groups. As I will point out in a minute, this will require mechanisms with more permanence and capacity than present consortia, consultant groups or ad hoc groupings. However, if we are successful in developing multilateral entities with sufficient technical capacity to program and allocate bilateral aid, the resulting flow should be recognized to be just as "multilateral" as though delivered by an international agency. In short, the test should be in the decision process, not in the delivery mechanism. This is the only practical means by which multilateral aid can become predominant in the next decade in a context of expanding total flows.

Second, the multilateral agencies must command a significantly greater share of this growing flow of official aid. It has been clear in the 1960's that the ability of an international agency to take the lead in multilateral groups at the country level has been dependent on the stake the agency itself has invested in the relevant development program. For example, the World Bank group has been a genuine and effective leader in the consortia for India and Pakistan, in large part because it has been the second largest lender in those countries and has maintained a relatively large and substantive resident staff. In many other countries where it has done much less lending it has exerted much less leadership. It seems clear that as long as all the multilateral agencies together command only a little more than about 10 percent of the official aid flow, they will be in a poor position to carry out the responsibilities of leadership which the times demand.

Of course, these agencies vary widely in their capacity for rapid growth, and most of them still exhibit crotchets—such as the aversion to nonproject lending—which impair their usefulness. The direct U.N. programs need substantial reorganizing at both headquarters and field levels along the lines suggested in Sir Robert Jackson's recent "Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System." Here I agree very strongly with Mr. Bell's comments. The three regional banks present very different situations, with corresponding differences in their capacity to grow. Reviewing the entire array, the agency with the most clearly demonstrated ability to expand rapidly without loss of effectiveness is the World Bank's development-lending affiliate, the International Development Association. Thus, the acid test of the world's willingness to capitalize on the progress made in the 1960's is the replenishment of IDA which is currently under negotiation and must be presented to legislatures in 1971. Nevertheless, it is clear that all expansion of these agencies must be accompanied by internal improvements and reforms which equip them to lead the aid community through the same strength and flexibility which have characterized the more enlightened bilateral programs.

Third, we must work toward a worldwide network of resident field missions under multilateral control which conduct systematic and comprehensive reviews of economic performance in aid-receiving countries, engage in a constant dialog with local officials as they—and I emphasize they—determine development plans and programs, and attempt to incorporate capital, technical, and food aid as integrated

parts of a single external assistance program. These missions should support a consortium, a consultative group, or a CIAP-type organization in every developing country which elects to participate in major programs of development cooperation. They may look very different in different regions; what works in Africa or Latin America may not work in East Asia. And the configuration should not be composed according to some global pattern but should reflect the realities and preferences of the parties involved, particularly, obviously the developing country involved.

Today, the United States operates the only network of field missions designed for this integrated programing task. Given the political tribulations of recent years, we have, I think, been remarkably successful in many countries. However, the politics of large resident bilateral field missions are rapidly becoming untenable virtually everywhere. The challenge to us is to see this not as a signal to end U.S. development aid, but as an urgent call to effect an orderly transition from bilateralism to an effective multilateralism for which the world and the international machinery are increasingly well prepared.

Fourth, I would argue that this immense undertaking is only likely—and perhaps only possible—if the major actors on the development stage set about to unite themselves into a more viable source of initiative and a more fitting object of public confidence.

Therefore, my final proposal is that responsible ministers and heads of agencies representing the bilateral donors, the multilateral donors and resource managers, and a strong and representative group of aid recipients be organized into an International Development Council which could begin the long process of creating the country-level mechanisms just described. At the same time such a Council could begin working to develop the necessary criteria for judging economic performance, encouraging the multilateral agencies to take the necessary steps to prepare themselves for a leadership role, and aggregating country-level estimates into an authoritative world aid budget—or a set of alternative budgets—which gives political decisionmakers a reasonably coherent idea of what can be done in which developing country over what period of time and at what cost.

The structure and membership of this Council is crucial to its success. It is important to note that it could be no more than advisory, but its membership would assure a certain weight of influence if each member took the enterprise seriously. I have some very personal notions of how the group might be organized, but the important general principles are: (1) That the group be relatively small and manageable; (2) that it be so structured as to make it possible both to reassure the donors that they enjoy a strong presumption of a voting majority and to reassure the recipients that they have a reasonable chance of persuading the majority to their point of view (this is, in essence, a middle ground between the present U.N. system, which seems to me too dispersed, and the present Bank and Fund representational system, which many developing countries consider too heavily weighted in the direction of the money providers); (3) that every member actually finance or operate development programs or be directly concerned with a relevant flow of nonaid resources; (4) that each international member include both donor and recipient constitu-

ents; (5) that the direct programs of the United Nations be represented by a single representative; (6) that explicit provision be made for the membership of the Soviet Union and mainland China when and if they wish to join; and (7) that the Council be backed by a small but highly competent staff headed by a strong director who stands well with both donors and recipients.

It is only through a group with this breadth and competence that I can imagine the world community making a serious attack on the problem stated in the title of these hearings—"Bridging the Development Gap." For it is only this kind of group which could unite the strengths and compensate for the weaknesses of each actor without arousing the political and jurisdictional fears which would result if any of the major players attempted to assume the lead alone.

It would be a risky enterprise, and there would be no more than an even chance that it would not degenerate into another ineffectual international debating society. Still, in the world in which we must operate, it seems to me that it offers the best chance we have of pulling this formidable but still sadly incomplete aid community into an organization with a capacity to address what is probably the most ambitious objective man has ever set himself. One thing I think is certain; nothing less than innovation on this scale will bring to this global problem the global resolve which alone can lead to solution.

Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Hamilton.

The Pearson report argues in support of more substantial multilateral aid—a recommendation which you three gentlemen generally support.

Specifically, it suggests that the share of multilateral aid be raised from the present level of 10 percent of total development assistance to a minimum of 20 percent by 1975.

I would like, as part of this discussion, to ask whether in your conversations with other U.N. delegates you have noticed any willingness on the part of industrialized countries to channel more aid through multilateral organizations?

Ambassador OLDS. There are seven nations now that have responded positively by way of intention to the prospect of realizing the 1-percent goal which compared to our 0.34 is a sizable increase.

Those are principally Nordic countries—Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and West Germany.

Mr. McNamara reported in his speech Friday night that he had spoken with the Japanese, and they had not made a firm pledge of percentage, but that they were committed to moving in this direction.

So it is clear that with the exception of the United States, which has not yet declared itself on this matter, most of the donor countries whom we have been pressing in that direction have indicated both the desire to increase their total aid and; second, to increase the percentage of that aid into multilateral channels. They have expressed the concern which Mr. Bell put, I think, rather pointedly here, in which we share, that the multilateral mechanism and its capacity, in this case the UNDP and other agencies of the U.N., be strengthened along the lines recommended by the Jackson report and the central features which Mr. Bell underscored.

We intend, in the governing council of the UNDP to press precisely in that direction in the March meeting. The March meeting, which is shortly upon us, gives the opportunity immediately to come to terms with that strengthening.

Mr. HAMILTON. Perhaps I could supplement the quantitative discussion a little, Mr. Chairman. The 1 percent, as you know, is a target for the total flow of resources, public and private. It corresponds to the target that was agreed upon in the second conference of UNCTAD in 1968, and it refers to all flows with terms above 1 year, between rich countries and poor. What the Pearson and Tinberger reports have added is a specific date by which the target should be met: 1975 in the case of the Pearson Commission and 1972 in the case of Professor Tinberger's committee.

The subtarget of the Pearson Commission is that the flow of official aid, which is now running at about half of the total aid flow, should reach 0.7 of 1 percent of the GNP of the wealthy countries by 1975.

The total resource flow runs at about $13 billion a year, 12.8 in 1968. The official aid flow runs at about $6.5 billion a year.

I think what Mr. Olds is referring to is the following: Since the Pearson report appeared, the Government of Germany, in the first declaration made upon taking office, announced that the Federal Republic would try to meet the official aid targets. Those are extremely difficult for Germany, almost as difficult in percentage terms as they would be for us. The Government of the United Kingdom has indicated that it will reach the 1 percent target sometime between 1975 and 1980, and they are not yet clear on precisely when they will hit the official targets, but it is clear, I think, that the intention is there. The Government of France is already meeting both targets, although that story isn't perhaps as good as it looks on first reading because both the total resource flow and the flow of official aid from France has been declining in recent years. It was closer to 2 percent relatively recently. The Government of Japan has suggested that it will continue to raise its aid expenditures at the level it has been raising them in recent years, which I might say is about one-third per year. If they do that, they will achieve the Pearson targets.

There you have four of the five countries that provide more than 80 percent of all the official aid that is provided by non-Communist countries, and all four of them seem to be moving in the direction of meeting the Pearson targets.

As Mr. Olds said, the one that is not, or has not yet expressed itself, is the United States.

To get to your question that is what share of this should be multilateral, I think that is still unclear. No government has yet been willing to put a particular number or percentage, or even a statement of general intent in the record with respect to the increasing share that multilateral aid ought to take, though I think it is fair to say that there is a general feeling among the professionals in this field that governments are tending in that direction. Still, these indications are as yet only general impressions, they are not expressed in statements we can quote to you.

Mr. BELL. I have nothing to add.

Mr. GALLAGHER. In line with that, one of the problems that certainly recurs each year here in the Congress is how are national governments

really going to be persuaded to make more resources available to the United Nations when in so doing they lose control over their own funds.

This is one of the things that we get involved in each year, in discussing multilateral aspects of aid and participation.

I would like to hear any comments you might have on that.

Maybe Mr. Bell who is now a private citizen after being through so many of these wars will have some views on that subject.

Mr. BELL. I am not sure, Mr. Chairman, that it is fair to say that the United States loses control of those resources in any meaningful way.

We provide those resources to the United Nations on the one hand and to the World Bank and the regional banks on the other, which are the principal multilateral channels at the present time.

We provide those resources to organizations in which the United States is itself part of the governing body. We speak with a loud voice in the United Nations and in the World Bank and in the regional banks of which we are members—that is, the Latin American Bank and the Asian Bank.

Consequently, the United States is represented, and strongly represented, in my observation, in governing these multilateral agencies.

Furthermore, we provide these resources to organizations whose standards and practices are completely open book.

The information on how the U.N. development program resources are used is public information. It is available to us. We can judge. You in the Congress and those in the executive branch can judge how well the funds are spent. The World Bank books are open. The regional bank books are open.

My own observation continues to be that among the agencies which dispose of development resources in the world today, the World Bank probably stands at the top of the list in terms of efficiency.

I felt when I was in AID, and I must say I still feel today, that AID's efficiency of use of development resources is probably second only to the World Bank, and ahead of most of the other agencies. But the efficiency of use of resources of the Inter-American Bank and the Asian Bank, which is, after all, a very new organization, and of the UNDP is high, in my observation.

Consequently, the allocation of U.S. resources to these multilateral agencies for development assistance is a strongly warranted use of allocation of our resources in terms of efficiency.

As I indicated earlier in the remarks I made as part of the beginning of this hearing, I think that all of these agencies, bar none, can improve their efficiency, and should be expected to do so.

The Jackson report suggests how the United Nations development assistance program, the technical assistance program, can be improved. I am sure my colleague, Mr. Hamilton, and I would agree that there are ways in which the World Bank's efficiency can and should be improved.

AID's efficiency can and should be improved, and so on. But they are good, strong organizations as the world exists, and they do in fact have a considerable impact on the growth of income and the growth of welfare around the world.

The record, by and large is, I think, quite good. Those would be my responses, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ambassador Olds?

Ambassador OLDS. I would not have too much to add to what Mr. Bell has already said. Perhaps there are two principal points. The one that I tried to make in my opening remarks had to do with the interdependent character of our world. I think it is not yet vividly clear to us how our own interest is interlocked with the interests of others.

We are now facing this acutely on the domestic front in the realization, for instance, of how the perpetuation of pockets of poverty, for instance, impoverish us all. These come to be more costly, not less, as they remain unresolved.

So in the areas, particularly, where, for political reasons, we are on a bilateral basis, unable to be helpful in generating movement toward self-sufficiency on the part of the lesser developed and poorer countries, the multilateral framework provides both a more ready political access to the resolution of that problem, and the extent to which their economy is accelerated relates to our own accelerated economy.

The Economic Commission for Europe, for instance, one of the four regional commissions of the U.N., has just fiinished a study illustrating how the advanced economies are vitally related in their growth curve for the gross national product to the capacity of the less-developed countries in the generation not simply of raw materials but in the consumer capability, the produced goods on the part of the more developed countries.

This interlocking relationship, which, in an earlier period, did, to be sure, define a colonial relationship, is nonetheless a clue to a deeper economic interdependence which, in effect, does reinforce our own economy and its growth in terms of our participation.

A second point: I don't have the figures on the percentage with respect, for instance, of the UNDP's program in terms of equipment and goods where our own markets are really reinforced by the claim of the developing countries for the equipment and for a wide variety of goods essential to the facilitation of their own development program.

These are essentially what I would call self-interested features of our economy.

The final point I think Mr. Bell made but I would like to sort of reinforce and underscore it. That is I am always appalled at colleagues in America who keep talking about the Government in Washington, as though in our kind of society there was a government unrelated to the people and unresponsive to the people.

You can see I am a democrat with a small "d," in the conviction that this is a democracy and that, in effect, we operate by representation and persuasion. This is the art of our kind of Government, and the extent to which people think of the Government as something other than the responsibility of the people it tends to become unresponsive.

In the same way, the United Nations is not the thing up in New York, the operation somewhere else. It is the investment of our commitment and 126 other countries to the conviction that this arena can, in effect, in the same sense that our own federal system works, be responsive to and reflect the judgment of the people.

I have the privilege, as you know, of representing the United States in that arena on the economic and social side. Though I am not a diplomat, and I am a misplaced farm boy in a real sense, nonetheless, I can say in the year that I have been there I have represented us in 10 international conferences, at all levels of complexity, and I believe that the United States' voice, though it might be heard more eloquently than mine, nonetheless, is persuasive and influential, and, in a general sense, the kind of resolution of action to which these bodies come seem to me to reflect our own interest and the main line of our efforts and influence.

As they say, you can't win them all, but they paid Ted Williams $100,000 for only batting .333. It seems to me our expectation of delivery with respect to their function has been more than warranted by the facts. An American leads the program. The principal source of supplier for the impact of the multilateral program in the U.N. is the United States.

The stewardship of the dollar, even though we all would recognize it can be improved and should, is nonetheless of a high order of performance for the dollar committed, and our effort now is to strengthen that system so that, as we say, a larger part of that dollar is multiplied out at the point of need and not eaten up by redtape and bureaucracy.

So in all these senses it strikes me the reason, the initial reason—and now I return to my fundamental point—the initial reason is not because we feel ashamed of our affluence or because we feel moved by humanitarian concerns, though those may all figure, but because the simple fact of life in 1970 is that this is an interdependent world, and what happens in these other countries sooner or later, as they say, come home to roost.

Our own conviction about the importance of helping them to become independent and self-sufficient is, in effect, to enrich the life of us all.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. I think you have really put your finger on one of the nerve ends. I think it would be more helpful if people would refer to "our" Government instead of "this" Government.

We seem to be in an adversary proceeding once in a while. It is our Government. I think that may be part of the alienation of some young people.

Mr. GROSS. Would you yield?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes.

Mr. GROSS. You two Democrats seem to disagree with another Democrat by the name of William O. Douglas. He talks about the Government and the "establishment" in his new book, if you can call it a book.

Ambassador OLDS. Mr. Gross, I should say, not that it makes a great deal of difference here, when I said I am a Democrat with a

small "d," I am a Republican, but I am trying to practice democracy. It is a paradox. The Democrat and Republican—well, I must not get into the history of those terms.

But we have a Republican form of government that practices democracy.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Hamilton?

Mr. HAMILTON. The only thing I would add, Mr. Chairman, is that the question of control is very sensitive to one's objectives, that is, what he wants control for. I think we have evolved a great deal in the development business in the last 15 years in our understanding of both the objectives we have in mind and the conditions in which we must operate.

I think we know now that if we want control in order to achieve short-term political advantages, it probably isn't worth a great deal because foreign aid doesn't produce short-term political advantages in any very predictable way. If we are talking about control in order simply to demonstrate the good will of the Government or the people of the United States in order, in some narrow sense, to win friends through foreign aid, we know that control is not very useful for those purposes either, because foreign aid on the whole doesn't win friends in any predictable way.

What development aid does is to contribute to a long-term process of advancement on the part of people who want to advance—not any process imposed from abroad. This in turn affects all the factors which determine the hopes, aspirations, and behavior of the peoples involved, but it does not necessarily serve the short-term political interest of any particular donor. What we know about development is that it is very hard to imagine the kind of evolution we want to see in the world without a strong element of economic and social advance in the two-thirds of the world where living standards are so much lower than ours.

Given this understanding of our objectives, direct bilateral control is not really very useful. For long-term development ends, the structure Mr. Bell was talking about—the leading role the United States plays in all international organizations—is quite sufficient, in my view, to assure the efficiency of the use of resources to those ends. He is quite right in pointing out that all the international instruments need improvement. But the degree of influence the United States has in these organizations seems to me quite adequate. In short, I don't think we should measure control in quite the terms we would have measured it in this field 15 years ago.

Mr. GALLAGHER. One of the reservations that I have, before we get into the yearly debate on multi or bilateral aid, is that I sometimes feel that there will be a decrease in the amount of overall assistance to the developing countries as we participate on a larger scale in multilateral aid.

I wonder if you gentlemen share that feeling. What will be the net effect of an increase in multilateral aid?

Mr. HAMILTON. That is a very serious worry, sir, but I would emphasize one of the things I was trying to bring out in my remarks, that it is not necessary for true multilateralism to funnel aid only through the formal multilateral agencies. These agencies carry just

over 10 percent of the total flow of development aid now. At best, it probably won't be more than 20 to 25 percent of the total by 1975, if the total is allowed to grow in the next few years.

What one can do, I think, is to try to bring under multilateral influence and negotiation the process by which the aid is allocated. That is, the process by which the performance of the developing country is assessed, the decisions are made as to what priority sectors and investments are to be supported, and the labor is divided among the various donors. If we can manage this, the aid that that results will be multilateral, even if it is delivered by the U.S. aid program, the British, the French, or the Germans. Indeed, it is just as multilateral as if it came out of the World Bank, if, in fact, it is programed by a technical and professional staff capable of doing the extremely difficult and complicated technical job involved in this kind of programing, in the developing country under multilateral auspices.

If this occurs, if you have a consortium, a consultative group, a CIAP-type organization, or something of this kind which works with the developing country in deciding what a development program ought to look like, and what all the external inputs into it ought to add up to, then it seems to me you have a mulilateral system just as certainly as if you decided tomorrow—which I would say is impossible—to turn over all U.S. aid to the regional banks and the World Bank.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Do you see a more meaningful role for this kind of development assistance or greater usefulness within the United Nations infrastructure?

Ambassador OLDS. I think there are a number of areas where this is multiplied substantially in the multilateral arena.

Mr. Bell touched on two that are terribly important. There is the population problem which is very difficult to deal with on a multilateral basis. In Latin America, it runs into the religious dimension. In Africa, it is viewed frequently as a kind of white man's effort as holding the black man down.

The multilateral framework of the United Nations makes it, I think, dramatically more effective in terms of the impact of the end result, which is to control the population explosion and to bring it into some kind of rational order.

In the field of natural resources we are only beginning to touch on the fringe of what I take to be one of the critical frontiers of the future in both space and the seas. We have achieved in terms of space and recently in terms of the seas, an international legal definition of jurisdiction which is the first but important step.

But the exploitation of the seas, which has only begun, cannot, it seems to me, really proceed on a bilateral basis. It must proceed within the framework of an international framework.

On our influence along the lines of developing the multilateral aid, the Ambassador from Yalta has proposed that some of the resources of the seas be utilized for development. There is a great hope that there will be an international machinery that in a more equitable way can help facilitate the development of the seas.

The whole field of the discovery and exploitation of natural resources on land is important. As you know, the U.N.'s Natural Resources Division has been enormously useful in countries where a

bilateral effort would not be permitted, where the anxiety over what some of the developing countries would think of as almost predatory efforts of certain corporations or certain countries where they would not even permit them in the country, they would welcome and have the United Nations' resource teams.

As you know, the uranium finds in Somalia, which has been one of the poorest countries in the world, has just transformed it.

The copper find in Panama—these are illustrations. We took about 40 ambassadors to Houston a couple of weeks ago from the developing countries to look at the earth resource satellite system that is a spinoff of our space program.

These are these sensitive camera systems and sensor systems which can identify at 60 miles up whether the tree in the San Joaquin Valley is alive or dead or going to be dead, the identification of water resources in the arid arena, and so on.

The capacity for these new scientific developments to be useful to the developing countries, it seems to me, relates to their being under the auspices of an international arena and organization.

Then they are both acceptable and they are effective. The whole question of land reform, which has been a critical problem in relation to our bilateral programs in a great many countries, and even in Vietnam, the possibility of land reform coming out of one of the regional commissions on Africa under the U.N. auspices has a vastly different character than if it seems to be the political pressure of one particular government or one particular country.

Finally, in terms of the human environment, the U.N. conference to be called in 1972 illustrates that we really cannot deal with the problem of the human environment, its pollution and/or its conservation on a bilateral basis. The fish don't stop swimming at the 17th parallel or 54.40.

The problems of water pollution—I am an Oregon boy and the Columbia doesn't rise in the United States. It rises in Canada.

The Meking swings through four of the riparian nations of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Virtually all of these key elements in the environment: the water, the resources, the air we breathe, are international. They link us.

In the paper this morning, the sky, the airline, the transport problem, which is now acute with the problem of sabotage, cannot be dealt with on a bilateral basis. It has to be dealt with in the framework, as even the skies, that link us together.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, all of these suggest not that bilateral programs of appropriateness ought not to be pursued, but that increasingly the character of our world links us in a way that we are driven to devise and enhance those mechanisms.

To be sure, they are frail wreaths. This is a very short time, in 25 years, to try to put together how you orchestrate a world. But that is what we are doing.

I think the whole bent of our preoccupation in economics and in the environment and the quality of human life moves us in this direction.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Whalley?

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Gallagher was kind enough to ask me to sit for a few minutes until someone on our side came in. I want to compliment him and his subcommittee for having these hearings.

I am very much impressed with the caliber of the witnesses. I had the tremendous experience of serving in the United Nations with Congressman Fascell at the 1969 session, so I did meet Ambassador Olds and his friend.

David Bell, I remember you when you were with AID, and also Mr. Hamilton with the Brookings Institution.

At the United Nations they never gave me anything as serious as developmental problems for developing countries, but the more simple things such as Red China and both sides of the Korean situation.

I am glad to hear so many nice things said about the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation. I did get to know Mr. Henry Ford, Sr., and I did have 13 automobile agencies and 13 service stations.

So we did contribute to the Ford Foundation, Mr. Bell, and also to the Rockefeller Foundation.

I had the pleasure of receiving a dime way back in 1931 from Rockefeller, Senior, I think at Ormond Beach, Fla. That was the start of the giveaway programs.

Mr. GROSS. What is that dime worth now?

Mr. WHALLEY. I think they are giving a half dollar now. Governor Rockefeller gave me the half a dollar and said it would have the same value.

I think a lot of good can come out of these hearings. I know that we have to be very, very careful on how this money is spent, because even though we say we are the wealthiest nation in the world and the most powerful, there are limits to what we can do.

Thanks to you fellows, it has been a very interesting hour and a half for me.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Fraser?

Mr. FRASER. Ambassador Olds, what will the U.S. position be on the recommendation of the Jackson report?

Ambassador OLDS. Mr. Fraser, we have had a staff committee representing the various branches of government studying that and we have just developed a central position.

I think I can put it as briefly as possible, and perhaps adequately, to say first of all, our position is that the findings of the Jackson study; that is, the limitations of the present system which Mr. Bell has spelled out, is essentially sound.

We called for this study committee in 1966 and have been pressing, partly in response to congressional concern about the management of our contribution for that.

We do not view it as either a shock or alarm, but as the necessary consequence of a program that moved swiftly and without too much of experience and design in the international arena.

Second, we believe, and I think all of us have emphasized in our testimony, and the U.S. Government position, I am sure, will be, to affirm the development cycle oriented principally in terms of country planning, and that this means a development of a timeframe more adequate than a year-to-year basis, a stronger role for the resident representative in coordinating all of the specialized agencies as they are at work in the given country settings.

Third, it will emphasize a larger authority and accountability of the administrator.

At the present time, our governing council spends a great deal of time in the review of project after project, and we believe that the governing council should spend more time on policy, and the administrator should be given more authority and be held accountable in the full sense of the administration of that policy with respect to the details of the projects.

Mr. FRASER. Are you talking about the Administrator of the UNDP?

Ambassador OLDS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. One of the recommendations, as I understand it, and I don't understand it very well, is to try to bring in the operations of all the specialized agencies, with structural changes.

Ambassador OLDS. That is right. When I use the expression "make the administrator more responsible and accountable," I meant that this would endow the administrator with a larger degree of authority with respect to the participation of the specialized agencies as executing agencies.

This would be, in effect, a means of integrating and coordinating the system.

Mr. FRASER. Let me come at it a different way. In what respects do you expect the U.S. position to differ from the recommendation of Sir Robert Jackson?

Ambassador OLDS. There are certain elements in his recommendations that I think our Government will not look on favorably.

One of them is the recommendation of the liquidation or abandonment of the council made up of the specialized agencies, plus the administrator, in the delivery system.

We think to abandon that at this stage would not be a good thing. We think it ought to be tightened up and coordinated, but it ought not to be abandoned. We don't think it is a good thing to move the headquarters to Geneva.

I think we believe that the relationship of the development side of the United Nations should be closely linked with the headquarters and with the political will that is expressed there at headquarters, and that it ought not to be essentially diffused.

There are other elements of the report in its detail with which we would not agree.

But our strategy, and I think that is the best way of describing my response—my hesitance turns on the fact that our strategy is not to get ourselves into a position of discussing the detail at this stage, but, rather, to concentrate on the hard care of the report in order to push for those elements.

If we are distracted by debate, it is like biblical controversy. You could just about find a verse for anybody's preference if you look for it in that text. It is only 700 pages and if you get 126 countries scrambling over that text looking for reasons not to come to terms with change, we couldn't live long enough to get it effective.

So our strategy has been to fasten on those central features, the planning cycle, concentrating on country planning, strengthening the resident representative, reorganizing the administrative structure so that we have something on the order of a central planning and a technical component that feeds into the policymaking along with the advisory council, and not to concentrate at this stage on the essential details.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Hamilton, how would your Council of Ministers differ from the DAC operation, except that it would be larger?

Mr. HAMILTON. DAC, as you know, is made up entirely of representatives of developed countries. It also does not include as members any international organizations, though it is true that many are often there as observers. For most of the year, DAC also consists of people at the level of Deputy Development Minister or below, though there are high-level meetings twice a year where the principals are brought together. In general, I would hope that the participation of principals would be more frequent in the structure I am talking about.

Mr. FRASER. The participation in this case would be the foreign ministers?

Mr. HAMILTON. Not necessarily. It would be up to each government to decide. I would hope they would be at the level of development administrator or minister or above.

I think the central point in distinguishing my proposal is that it would involve very strong representatives of the developing world, the "Third World," and that it would involve the international organizations at the most senior level.

I should hasten to say it would not imply that DAC should be disestablished. The donors, I think, need their own organization. It may well be that recipients will also need more organization than they now have. But the object of the council is to bring the two sides together in something in which they can deal in a manageable framework on equal terms.

Ambassador OLDS. Mr. Fraser, could I add two other footnotes on the elements of the Jackson report we reject?

The recommendation of merging UNICEF, for instance, we think the appeal it has, enlisting voluntary support, children and other governments, and so on, would be jeopardized if it were drawn in.

We also reject the notion of multiplying the capital development fund which we have been opposed to from its conception. We think this more properly belongs in the bank family and not in the new fund.

Mr. FRASER. I want to ask Mr. Bell what he thinks of Mr. Hamilton's ideas.

Mr. BELL. I am very much impressed with it. I have not seen it spelled out. Perhaps it is in the Pearson report and I hadn't noticed it. I hadn't seen this spelled out as thoroughly as he has done in his statement here today, which I have only heard as the committee has, for the first time this afternoon.

It seems to me Ambassador Olds is entirely correct, that we are increasingly involved, necessarily, in multilateral organizations because that is the way the world is.

Mr. Hamilton's suggestion for an International Development Council strikes me as reflecting something like what the world is today in the development field. It has the international agencies about which we have been speaking, nations as donor agencies, and nations as recipients.

To have them all represented, so to speak, in an organization with a strong staff and with as clear a concept of what they would be about as is suggested here, namely, that they would be concerned with the

policy aspects of the relationships among nations and international agencies concerned with development—all this strikes me as a set of strong ideas.

I have no idea what the response might be from the developing countries. I think that is where you might face your most doubtful reaction, because the devolping countries, as this committee knows very well, some years ago were instrumental in getting established the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development.

My own observation as a private citizen is that UNCTAD has been not a strong starter. It has no authority.

It doesn't really deal with a body of substance which yields to international communication in an effective way, whereas the Hamilton proposal, it seems to me, quite possibly does.

Mr. FRASER. Isn't the Hamilton proposal in a way what the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations was supposed to be, the bringing together of that element of interest of the nations in economic and social development in the world?

Mr. HAMILTON. It could be so argued, Mr. Fraser. I think, again, one is dealing with a balance between the entirely understandable desire of the donor nations to have the mechanisms which convey money be subject to control in some weighted way according to the contributions and the desire of the developing countries to have it on a one-country-one-vote basis. I think that in the U.N. structure, in the shadow of the General Assembly, we haven't yet achieved a workable combination of those two desires and as a result we have been relatively ineffective in providing a forum for the more serious policy coordination or negotiation issues that accompany cooperation.

So I think it is perfectly sensible to point out that this is one of the objectives of ECOSOC, but I would wonder how well this balance has been recognized in that particular mechanism. I would think perhaps that the reasons that there has been some falling short of the original objectives of the organization in this area may continue to be effective in keeping it from being what I am describing.

Mr. FRASER. I believe they have largely divorced themselves from the questions which may have been involved in the operations of the specialized agencies. It has not attempted to wrestle with these larger issues. Am I wrong about that?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think that is a little strong, sir.

Ambassador OLDS. Here I speak with some feeling, personally. It was my assumption when I took this assignment that the Economic and Social Council was the agency to do this, and I still believe by charter it is. But I think it has abdicated its function. I think it has really not been performing in this respect.

My comment on this matter would be that the exploration of what Mr. Hamilton has proposed in relation to the charter and machinery of the U.N. it seems to me would be a very important exercise because certainly the political character and the intention of the U.N. is to provide that kind of an arena.

One of our problems now has been, as Mr. Hamilton points out in his testimony, the tenuous relations in some respects of these agencies that were developed at the same time and/or subsequently. I would be hesitant to see yet another agency, as it were generated out-

side the framework without having inquired whether it could be effectively energized within it as some kind of extension.

Mr. BELL Could I add just one comment? I have been impressed by the strengths but also the disadvantages of the U.N. bodies, that is, the Economic and Social Council and the other bodies which are politically representative of the members of the U.N.

It seems to me that one of the strengths of Ed Hamilton's idea is that it would essentially reflect technical questions, how does the development process work and how can we get on with it.

It would not pretend to be a political body. It obviously would have no authority over anybody. It wouldn't vote or pass resolutions or anything like that. Its constitution could not be of that nature.

So it would be quite different from the Economic and Social Council in that sense.

Mr. FRASER. Primarily a clearinghouse?

Ambassador OLDS. Primarily liaison, a clearinghouse, an association, so to speak, of interested parties, rather than a politically represented international body.

Mr. HAMILTON. One amendment to that. I think that if one could find in the framework of development authorities in the world—which for most laymen is now incoherent; the alphabet soup is just too thick—a central place where there was an attempt to bring together the arguments with respect to what performance has been, what requirements are, what objectives are, and if that were connected to a process by which aid is actually programed, then he would have a very potent new counter in the game. That is to say, he would have from a fairly central and authoritative source a picture of what the present objectives, accomplishments, and costs are which would turn out to have considerable political significance, not because the members of the Council were voting on resolutions, but because they were in position to bring together the strengths of the present multilateral and bilateral aid establishment, and bring them to a focus where it would be possible to present real choices to political decisionmakers.

I think that is the political strength. It would have to be a very nonpolitical organization in the narrow sense in order to achieve that.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Olds, how long have you been with the United Nations?

Ambassador OLDS. Eleven months.

Mr. GROSS. If it doesn't "orchestrate" better in the next 25 years, to use your expression, than it has in the past 25 years, it won't orchestrate very well, will it? Or will it be around to orchestrate at the end of another 25 years if it doesn't do better than it has in the first 25 years?

Ambassador OLDS. You have put hard questions, Mr. Gross. First, to your point or assumption, I think in these first 25 years, in spite of the failures particularly acute and visible on some of the security side, it has done a remarkable job on the economic and social front.

Let me specify this in a handful of respects. With regard to the problem of economic planning and the facilitation of economic assistance through a multilateral agency, this is really only 11 years old.

We were, ourselves, so seized with reconstruction of Europe and the Marshall plan that it was really only late in the 1950's that the United Nations began to direct its attention beyond technical assistance to this larger problem of health.

The preinvestment program of the United Nations, which Mr. Hoffman, in a sense, brought into its planning, was to point out the possibility of private investment overseas and even bilateral loans and loans by the bank, required guarantees or the illustration that these risks were viable, that investments could be made without loss.

These preinvestment studies have helped to develop what I think they call in the language the infrastructure.

Mr. GROSS. I have always been intrigued with that. Go ahead and tell us about it.

Ambassador OLDS. I am not very sophisticated in these matters, Mr. Gross. But it does mean that the problems of education, transport, and the elements that really underpin economic development shall have been identified and, in part, developed.

I tried to mention in my remarks briefly the doubling of the educational programing, the acceleration of preinvestment. I think all of these in the arena of history have been really remarkable. We have taken 200 years to develop our country. The Soviets have taken 50. The United Nations has had roughly 25.

In the time frame with which this has been done, the need to accelerate that, of course, is what is so visible. We recognize that we solve some of these problems or there won't be another 25 years.

Mr. GROSS. To simplify this for the benefit of a country boy from Iowa, are we going to go on financing and policing the world, bearing the brunt of it with a futile organization such as the United Nations consuming a substantial amount of our substance, for another 25 years and accomplishing as little as we have accomplished through the United Nations?

Ambassador OLDS. No, sir.

Mr. GROSS. What is the future of this organization based upon its utter and unmitigated failures of the past?

Ambassador OLDS. Well, I think its future, and I am not a prophet but as one farm boy to another—I think that the hard fact is that the sharing of that responsibility has already begun to take place.

Other nations that we have helped to get on their feet—Japan is an illustration——

Mr. GROSS. You don't take credit for that through the United Nations, do you? For God's sake, don't you remember? We "loaned" the Japanese $1.8 billion and we washed that out for something like $400 million. No nation was in a better position to pay than was Japan. But U.S. taxpayers are paying right through the nose now.

Ambassador OLDS. My point, Mr. Gross, was that Japan now is carrying a larger load of support.

Mr. GROSS. But the United Nations didn't do it, Mr. Olds. The United Nations didn't put Japan back on its feet. It was the United States, the taxpayers of this country, that did this.

Ambassador OLDS. I understand. But I am saying that the United Nations as a system has permitted a political system within which Japan's own economic power now can help relieve us in part in the

Asian arena in helping those countries that need help, and can do it better through the Asian Development Bank and the other instrumentalities of the United Nations.

Mr. GROSS. They are relieving us all right, Mr. Olds. You better believe they are. Every day they are increasing their imports into this country, putting more pressure on unemployment in this country and on our economy.

As I understand it, the Japanese are supplying $100 million worth of pipe for the Alaskan pipeline. That is only one of many items. I don't know how long the Japanese are going to be in our camp or we in their camp. I do know that we can't go on giving away the labor market in this country to the Japanese or any other country, for that matter.

Ambassador OLDS. My point, Mr. Gross, was only to say that, as I see it, in this short time, the possibility within the United Nations of relating all of these capabilites, of all of the countries to the wider needs of the world can be more adequately shared and multiplied in that arena, and the price we are paying for it, sir, relatively——

Mr. GROSS. Do you want to pump the money out through the United Nations instead of through Mr. Bell's old organization, the giveaway outfit?

Ambassador OLDS. I would say there are some things that can be done much better, and the dollar can be multiplied far more effectively in the United Nations than in the bilateral programs, but not all of them.

Mr. GROSS. I would have to say that it couldn't be much worse in many instances.

To change the subject for just a minute, you spoke of the seabeds. Do you gentlemen think that this ought to be turned over, the development of the seabeds, to the United Nations? How do you feel about this?

I would like to hear briefly from each one of you.

Mr. HAMILTON. My own view, Mr. Gross, is that at least the rights to the resources on the bottom of the sea have to be administered internationally. The only thing that is clear in international law is that these resources don't belong to any single nation and that they certainly don't belong to any nation simply because it happens to have the technology to develop them. In short, if there is going to be a workable way in which these resources are allocated in the world, it is going to be international.

On the question of whether the revenues from this ought to go to the United Nations, that is something which, it seems to me, needs a great deal of study and is in fact getting that study through a number of private organizations that are now looking at the question. I have no settled view on that, but I do think it is futile to think in terms of national bilateral development of the resources at the bottom of the sea in the way that resources have traditionally been developed in new found territory. That will not happen.

Mr. BELL. I would concur with that.

Ambassador OLDS. Yes, I think the critical question has to do with how much of the sea adjacent to land becomes the definition of the national sovereignty and the boundary.

I think there is no question that wherever that is drawn, what lies beyond it has to be administered in some kind of international organization.

Mr. GROSS. You gentlemen wouldn't suggest that we ought to spend our billions of substance finding out what is there and how to develop it and so on and so forth, and actually developing it and then turn it over to the United Nations or some other international organization?

Mr. HAMILTON. I don't think anything we said precludes the notion that it would be useful for the United States to play a role in the international process by which that is determined. But the questions of allocation of the fruits or the allocation of the costs, it seems to me, are still open.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Hamilton, according to this sheet you were the executive secretary of the Pearson Commission.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right, sir.

Mr. GROSS. And you were employed by the Brookings Institution, or are you still?

Mr. HAMILTON. I am now.

Mr. GROSS. On loan to the Pearson Commission?

Mr. HAMILTON. No. I went to the Pearson Commission from the National Security Council staff in the White House where I had been for the previous 3 years. I joined Brookings when the Pearson Commission exercise was over. The Pearson Commission was financed by the World Bank. During the period I was executive secretary of the Commission I was paid by the World Bank.

Mr. GROSS. This is the Canadian Pearson?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GROSS. Did he suggest that the United States in the matter of 5 years ought to be putting up $10 billion a year for foreign aid to be spent through the United Nations, or some such recommendation?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think the recommendation you are referring to is that 0.7 of 1 percent of the gross national product of the United States be provided as official aid by 1975. If projections on what the gross national product will be in 1975 are correct, that would be a number on the order of $8 billion to $9 billion, as compared to the present disbursements of about $3.3 billion.

Mr. GROSS. Do you agree with that?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. BELL. It is important to note, Mr. Gross, that that is the total outlay. Some fraction of that, a quarter, a third, might go through multilateral channels. In other words, this would be the total bilateral and multilateral aid transfers.

Mr. HAMILTON. Including food aid, incidentally.

Mr. GROSS. I have looked at the Pearson report, admittedly very hurriedly. I don't know whether he suggested that the United Kingdom, including Canada—I don't know what amount he suggested that they put up.

Mr. HAMILTON. He suggested that they provide precisely the share that the United States would in terms of percent of national income, 0.7 of 1 percent.

Mr. GROSS. You mean gross national product, which is a far different thing.

Mr. HAMILTON. Gross national income equals gross national product. Either is acceptable.

Mr. GROSS. I am talking about net national income.

Mr. HAMILTON. The Commission didn't make a recommendation in terms of net national income.

Mr. GROSS. I don't suppose you did. Nobody else does. That is a lost art. We are fed with this phony gross national product as a measure of economic well being.

You were not with Brookings Institution when you were on the Pearson Commission?

Mr. HAMILTON. No, sir.

Mr. GROSS. You were paid by the Pearson Commission?

Mr HAMILTON. Paid by the Pearson Commission from the World Bank. The World Bank financed the Commission and, therefore, financed my salary.

Mr. GROSS. And the World Bank conducts all kinds of studies of this kind and recommendations for which the taxpayers of this country cough up more and more money.

Mr. HAMILTON. I think it would be hard to find in the history of the World Bank another enterprise quite like the Pearson Commission, but it is true that the World Bank conducts studies in the field.

Mr. GROSS. That is part of the International Monetary Fund, isn't it?

Mr. HAMILTON No, they are separate organizations.

Mr. GROSS. Well, I won't go into the building of golf courses and country clubs by these international organizations and using our money to do it. There is not time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I should like to join in welcoming the witnesses before the committee and apologize to them. There has been some competition for attention today, and I missed a good part of the testimony. What I have heard, I enjoyed.

I should like to discuss what Congress might do to be useful. Perhaps Ambassador Olds is the man to begin with.

I don't recall just what was requested by the administration for international programs, but it seems to me that Congress was somewhat begrudging in actual appropriations for multilateral development and aid programs.

I am thinking primarily of the UNDP. Could you refresh our recollection as to what was requested? Why was there a substantial increase—substantial in percent, at least, if not in dollars—and what will be the effect of the reduced amount that Congress is making available?

Ambassador OLDS. The total amount, Mr. Congressman, which includes 12 items, but the largest is the UNDP, was roughly $122 million. The appropriation was $105 million. But since most of those items were fixed items, such as UNICEF, that is, fixed and not able to be cut, the President had requested $100 million for the U.N. development program. Roughly, that reduction of $17 million had to be sustained by the U.N. development program. So its total would be roughly $83 million, though I think the Agency for International Development is putting together a couple of $3 million.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How much had been made available previously for the UNDP? In other words, how much of a jump was the request for the UNDP?

Ambassador OLDS. $71 million was the appropriation the year before, and even this reduced item is still an increase. But what had been requested was a reflection of the desire of the President to begin to move more strongly to the support of the multilateral agencies, and it was the conviction of the Jackson Capacity Study and the Pearson Reports which had identified both weaknesses which were to be remedied and opportunities that were to be realized, and it was in the light of both of those possibilities that additional sums were requested.

It was also felt, I believe, that the nature of the need and the character of the request coming from the developing countries, and the character of continuing commitments were such that in order to get some fresh leverage on some of these critical problem areas it was important to request this additional increase of funds.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Was there anything specific in mind? In other words, a request for funds, even by a President might be something that should be resisted.

What specifically was being planned? What needs were to be met by the increase? As a conferee on the Foreign Aid Authorization bill I recall that hundreds of millions were cut out of bilateral assistance and I personally felt that we might have taken a reasonably charitable look at multilateral aid.

Yet, the result was a cutback of the relatively small amount of dollars requested for multilateral programs.

Ambassador OLDS. There were certain critical areas that we were anxious to substantially underpin. One was in the field of population, family planning and control.

Second, the governing council had approved in June a 3-percent item of the gross budget, that is all of the donors, for research in the conviction, as Mr. Bell pointed out, that many of these programs had been weak at the point of providing the infrastructure, the supportive elements, to find out what is wrong and to do something about it.

A study has been made. It wasn't sophisticated or scientific, but it had been a careful assessment on the part of Mr. Hoffman, with respect to the critical need in the field on a wide variety of funds in relation to the projects that were before the council.

It was felt that the percentage of increase in the funds which had been steady but not significant, did not give the U.N. development program the critical leverage on a wide variety of fronts in terms of the projects.

In my briefcase I could go through some of those projects by way of illustration. Let me mention two or three.

As Mr. Bell pointed out, the Ford Foundation had joined the Rockefeller Foundation in the development of these new strains of grains, rice out of the Philippines and wheat out of Mexico. These have to do with the protein content, particularly of the need of children. It is estimated that 300 million children will grow up limited in their capacities, both physical and mental, because of a serious protein deficiency in terms of their diet.

The advisory council on science and technology for the U.N. just finished their major study. Mr. Hoffman was terribly anxious to under-

pin the effect of those findings so that in a much more comprehensive fashion the impact of that new knowledge about these new strains and the possibility of getting them going, as it were, in terms of all of the appropriate countries of the world, was one of the major concerns that he had for this coming year, and one of the hopes in terms of the underpinning of this.

The problem of water as a critical resource—I am not now talking about the pollution of the waters—in the southern part of the hemisphere where the critical part of the food production and development is related to the water resources—many of these projects were related to the capacity to find and release those kinds of water resources.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. With the reduced resources that will be made available will there be less chance of coping with some of the problems? Is that the gist of it? Will it be necessary to lower the sights in an area where real progress could be made?

Ambassador OLDS. Yes. You understand that Mr. Hoffman, being an American, has been using the American percentage of contribution to the U.N. development program as a leverage on other countries.

We have developed a kind of matching basis in order that our contribution would be a leverage to the others.

On the basis of the President's advocacy of $100 million, the other countries pledged $150 million. I have no way of knowing whether they will reduce their amount because we have not in fact matched it, but this will be the first time that we have not, if indeed, they keep faithful to their pledge.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Bell, it is a particular pleasure to welcome you back to the committee. It reminds me of the old days when your life was perhaps more complicated, or perhaps it was somewhat simpler.

You are now a representative of one of the great private foundations. How do you feel about the criticisms that have been expressed about multilateral aid agencies, both by the Pearson commission and the Jackson commission?

Your formal statement, and I have not really had time to digest it, indicates some misgivings.

Do you feel there really is substance to their cautions, their reservations?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you feel that there should be machinery set up to evaluate the present system and to improve it? What would your concrete suggestions be for improving the multilateral machinery?

If we are suddenly to start relying on international machinery, and I have my doubts whether the United States is going to be aggressively interested in this—if we are going to rely on it, or if reliance should be placed on it by nations generally, we should surely do what we can to improve the machinery.

What are your views?

Mr. BELL. As I said earlier, I think before you joined——

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't want you to repeat yourself.

Mr. BELL. I was a member of a panel of consultants to the Jackson report, and I think it is a good, strong, clear report. I agree with it. I think he has accurately focused on the difficulties of the United

Nations development system at the present time, and how to improve that system.

If you look beyond that to other multilateral agencies, the World Bank as far as I have been able to see is, and I think I said this earlier, the most efficient international organization there is now, but it, too, can stand a good deal of improvement.

I would say the proper posture for the United States is to keep steady pressure on these organizations. We have both financial and management means for doing so. As they improve their capacity, their ability, to use our funds wisely, it would seem to me very appropriate for us to provide increasing amounts of money.

I don't think the proposition before the United States is that we should suddenly double or treble the amount of money we are putting through multilateral agencies. It seems to me it is a matter of a steady rise over the time if the agencies can demonstrate that they are able to use those funds effectively.

There is no question about the size of the need. The committee has had ample demonstration of that. But if Paul Hoffman has $200 million at his disposal, roughly, today, he could not handle $400 million, next year.

If the Jackson report recommendations are put into effect, he could probably handle a growth rate of 10 or 15 percent per year, or some figure of that order.

If the Jackson report recommendations are accepted, I would say that it would be wise for the various donor agencies, including the United States, to plan on a steady rise in the funds made available to the U.N. development system for another 5 years or so and then have another Jackson evaluation and see how they are doing at that time.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The Pearson report, as I recall, Mr. Hamilton, does recommend a very sharp increase over a relatively short time in contributions to the International Development Association, from a level of $400 million to $1.5 billion in 4 years.

Is this a realistic figure? Is there a capacity in the IDA to absorb that amount of money if it should be made available?

Why are they singled out as an agency that can absorb much more substantial increases than Mr. Bell suggests would be logical?

I would think a better case could be made for smaller amounts, because of the digestion problem.

Why is the IDA singled out as an agency that can absorb such considerable increases?

Mr. HAMILTON. Primarily, sir, because of its record. It has in fact grown very rapidly. The World Bank group as a whole has grown rapidly. The Bank is now in the process of a very progressive campaign, that Mr. McNamara has well underway, to double its level of ordinary lending in a period of about 5 years.

As you know, the International Development Association is the same administrative organization as the World Bank, the same people merely wearing different hats. There is no separate organization. I think that the rate at which the Bank has expanded its capacity to lend without, as far as any objective person outside has been able to tell, reducing in any way the efficiency with which it lends, suggests

that its growth prospects are reasonably well proven, which has not been the case with all international organizations. That is why the Bank group is singled out. This is not to say the others can't grow as fast, but it is that IDA has proven that it can.

The other thing I would point out is that there are very great differences in what might be called institutional absorptive capacity if one is planning to do capital lending as distinguished from technical assistance and preinvestment. The first might be called capital intensive and the second labor intensive. You can lend greater amounts of money sensibly with no corresponding increase in size of staff, and the process by which you do so is much more sensitive to what is going on in the developing country than is the process of trying to hire as many technical assistance people, as many preinvestment people as are necessary to run the kind of program the UNDP runs. Put briefly, it is easier to grow in the capital lending business. It is easier to absorb large amounts of new money that it is with UNDP.

So my own judgment, for whatever it is worth, is that IDA could in fact grow at the rate we suggest, that UNDP might grow at a somewhat lower rate, but that both organizations are capable of a great deal more than they are now handling.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How do you gentlemen feel about recruitment and staffing?

Is that too broad a question? I would suppose this is an area that needs considerable attention if there is to be a greater dependence on international organizations generally. More specifically, is the United States doing enough to maintain its interests in providing key leadership in personnel?

I get the impression that what may be attractive to non-Americans in this area may not be attractive to our people, and that we are not worrying much about the kind of leadership being provided.

In other words, how many Paul Hoffmans are coming up within the ranks, and are there sufficient inducements? I know we have recognized that there are pay differences. We tried to develop some way of compensating for those pay differences in legislation enacted only recently.

Maybe Ambassador Olds would like to begin.

Ambassador OLDS. I will comment quickly. Two of the 10 points that I concluded my testimony on relate to this item. I think it is clear that the differential between the international civil servant pay scale and the conventional American scale is so great that the problem of recruiting top talent, unless they are financially independent, is very difficult indeed.

My tenure in this office will be sharply defined, I am sure, by the fact that I don't have any other resource and this is a limiting factor.

In the Jackson study, a good deal is made of the necessity for developing a cadre of competent persons who are drawn from all of the nations, but particularly from our management and technical reservoir in the United States.

We have to do something on that score, and immediately. I suggested that the International Volunteer Service Corps which the President has endorsed and on which the feasibility study is underway, and the U.N. feasibility study, both relate to the question of the three full

components of education, research, training and service, and how these can become resources for the development of the competence that is essential.

My own final comment is that in terms of the importance of the United Nations or the international community as a key ingredient in the conviction of countries, to that extent they will be more effective.

The Scandinavian countries and other countries, of course, view the United Nations as the pinnacle of their professional competence.

With the exception, I suppose, of Mr. McNamara, one would say this has not been the case within the U.S. general position with respect to leadership. But we have a number of key positions—Ralph Bunche and Paul Hoffman, to name but two who are in the highest order.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. They are in the elder statesman category now.

I am worrying about the future. Are we neglecting our responsibility for developing qualified personnel in key areas?

Ambassador OLDS. The answer is yes.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This seems to be something that we need to worry about if we are to utilize these multilateral agencies, especially to a greater extent than we have in the past.

Mr. HAMILTON. There is another aspect of this that is terribly important, I think. As you know, there is one great difference in personnel systems between the U.N. direct programs and the World Bank, for example. The U.N.'s hiring is conditioned by a country quota concept. The World Bank's is not. The World Bank hires on the basis of merit while trying to get as much geographic distribution as it possibly can. I think every group who has tried to judge this in the last 5 years has said that the national quota system on personnel selection will not do if one is seriously interested in upgrading quality. My own view is if you want to talk about personnel problems, that is as critical as any other single one.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Bell, did you want to comment?

Mr. BELL. I would agree with what my colleagues have said. As a personal judgment, I would like to add one point which my colleagues may not agree with. I was persuaded in the U.S. Government that there is a major deficiency in the U.S. civil service system.

In AID, so far as persons in AID who were hired as Foreign Service Reserve officers were concerned, we had the authority of the Foreign Service Act for what is called selection out.

We were able, that is to say, to identify and terminate the employment of the bottom percentage of quality of employees each year. It took a good deal of strength of character to stand up against the claims that were made on behalf of many of those employees. Many of those claims came with great force from Members of Congress, of the Senate. There were often personal circumstances which were difficult.

But it seemed to me that this was an extraordinarily valuable authority if it was used carefully, and we tried to use it with great care in the period in AID that I know about personally.

It seemed to me it was not simply a matter that we were thus able to move on from that agency employees who had not demonstrated good quality performance—they had not committed any misfeasance, there were no charges, but they simply were not well suited to that kind of work and, therefore, belonged somewhere else, and the law

permitted us to terminate their employment, give them severance pay and so on, which seemed a fair system—but we were able to move on a small percentage, never more than 2 or 3 percent in any one year, and the tone that that gave to the entire atmosphere in employment in that agency seemed to me extraordinarily valuable.

People knew that their jobs were not lifetime jobs. They could be terminated.

The Civil Service of the United States does not have any such system, nor does the Civil Service of the United Nations. I personally feel that is a serious deficiency in both cases. I don't know quite how to overcome it. To change the law is obviously extremely difficult.

The Civil Service Committees of the Congress have considered this matter time and time again. I know Mr. Gross has looked at it often. They have come to different judgments than I have just expressed.

It is their power and privilege to reach those judgments. They control the law; I don't. But it seems to me, from my personal point of view, this creates a significant problem for those who want to manage governmental affairs or international U.N. affairs with maximum efficiency.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Bell, it always intrigued me, the speed with which you could get rid of employees in the State Department and in the AID outfit who had turned up some wrong-doing some place in the AID organization or in the State Department.

There didn't seem to be much difficulty in sending them into exile, some contrived Siberia, getting rid of them in one way or another.

I have always been intrigued by this, and I believe you were heading the AID agency at one time—perhaps it was someone else—to seek the power to hire and fire.

Mr. BELL. Yes; we asked for that authority for the civil service employees of AID as well as those hired under the Foreign Service Act.

Mr. GROSS. This will always give me pause in the matter of opening up the civil service regulations, laws and procedures with respect to the elimination of employees.

It seemed that you could move in—I don't mean you, but those in command—could move in on the man who turned up some wrong-doing. They could get him, but fast.

Mr. BELL. I quite agree, sir, that that is a serious and important problem, and it would have to be satisfactorily met by anybody who advocated the kind of power I have just described.

I thought we had a system which met that, which did safeguard individuals through a double review process before any termination was permitted.

But it would be a matter of judgment as to whether those reviews would meet satisfactorily the point you are correctly describing. So far as the United Nations is concerned, there is this point, or something like it, which takes on special significance, because there is so much international courtesy involved, and properly so, in the United Nations system.

You get a fellow on the payroll from Sweden or Britain, and an American is his superior, or vice versa, and any suggestion that the fellow is not doing his job very well and needs to be given some kind of talking to or disciplined becomes even more difficult in the United

Nations pattern than it is within the regular civil service system of the U.S. Government.

That is why it seemed to me this is a serious problem. I don't know anything about the United Nations, I have never been in it, and I don't know how they consider these questions. I don't mean to suggest that these are the only things that are important. I simply add this as my own personal view.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The seniority system is getting some scrutiny here on the Hill, and I would imagine there would be more complications in international organizations than in the legislative branch, if adjustments were attempted in the way things had been done for a length of time.

However, we do need to worry about the quality of personnel, and the role of the United States in producing the kinds of people that are needed for these jobs.

Ambassador OLDS. It is just a footnote, but the only time as a university president I was ever hung in effigy was over this tenuous problem of tenure and I refused to give tenure to a basketball coach.

So it is with some feeling that I commiserate with Mr. Bell and Mr. Gross in the realization that there is, at the point of appraisal of the qualities of a man, enormous pressures.

As has been said in the international arena, I can imagine a circumstance where a Soviet civil servant is being crowded by a very able, younger American in a particular post and having him moved out to be replaced, even if the best of objectivity were to obtain, it would be very difficult indeed. But I do feel that the U.N. itself has addressed itself to this in the Jackson capacity study. We shall be pressing in terms of the U.S. position to greatly strengthen and clarify that.

I intimated in my testimony these two points, ways in which I think congressional help can be very useful.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Have you any views about how the U.N. is reacting to the recommendations of the Jackson study? Is it falling on deaf ears, unreceptive ears, or is there likely to be anything resulting from these recommendations?

Ambassador OLDS. I think that both the Pearson report and the Jackson report, and the Peterson report when it comes out, will have a decisive effect, has had a decisive effect on the mood and outlook of the various countries.

The donor countries, and many of the lesser developed countries, have responded very positively, it seems to me, in recognizing and acknowledging the weaknesses of the system and the desire to wish for change.

The greatest resistance, I think it can be said, comes from the persons entrenched in the operations of the U.N. here, to be sure, criticisms can be taken personally, and often can generate resistance.

But even there I think we are fortunate to have an American in Paul Hoffman, a tremendously resilient and responsive person at the head of it. Though I think some of the critical elements of the Jackson study he felt very deeply and personally, nonetheless the governing council, I am convinced, is intent on moving substantially to strengthen, to correct the weaknesses, and greatly strengthen the system.

I think that mood is characteristic, essentially, of the governments that make up the U.N.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am pleased to hear you say it. I would think that the status quo, no matter whose status quo, is always likely to resent or at least ignore major recommendations for change.

Mr. BELL. The governing council of the UNDP scheduled a special week-long meeting in March to consider this. There are plenty of people in the system who are reacting the way you suggest, who wish it would go away, who don't agree with it at all, who are very happy with the way things are now, who are trying to find ways to argue that the Jackson report should not be accepted.

But the governments, who make up the governing council, I think, by and large, have a more receptive view than the different organizations that actually constitute the U.N. Development System.

Mr. GROSS. Do you suppose it would ever be possible to get some "financial angel," perhaps the Ford Foundation or some other foundation, or the World Bank, to finance a study of the United Nations, of the whole foreign aid, foreign handout, foreign giveaway deal; a commission that was looking for the flaws and shortcomings, without in the same volume apologizing for what is happening, and without saying at the same time, "You have to kick in with $10 billion in the not too distant future"?

Do you suppose you could ever get that kind of commission to operate and to tell the people of the world that instead of being stingy the people of the United States have really reached down and dug up out of their substance an awful lot of money to finance these programs?

I wonder if we could have a commission that would make that kind of a study in the hands of an American and not an Australian or Canadian. I have nothing against the Canadians or Australians; but an American commission to do this, chaired by an American. Wouldn't that be a good enterprise for the Ford Foundation?

Mr. BELL. I suppose the committee President Nixon appointed, headed by the Chairman of the Bank of America, which is now in session, and which will report in a month or so, I suppose that is a commission that is doing more or less what you are asking for.

Mr. GROSS. I think that report would be a bestseller all over this country. You wouldn't have to give it away; you could sell it.

Mr. BELL. I do commend to your attention the Jackson report as a refreshing example of an extremely frank and open criticism—what he found to be wrong as well as very hard-hitting and clear-cut recommendations as to what he thought ought to be changed and how to meet the difficulties.

It is an example of nonbureaucratic prose, which is very refreshing.

Mr. GROSS. The more we pour out, the more trouble we seem to get in around the world. We are in deep trouble in the Philippines now, and the Lord knows, we have pumped a lot of money into the Philippines. I think you will agree that in one way or another since the end of World War II, we have really pumped the money into the Philippines.

Mr. BELL. Since 1906. The Philippine Government and educational system and so on, are very heavily American products; that is right.

I would say, Mr. Gross, it is not just we who are in trouble, meaning the position of the United States in the Philippines, but the Filipinos are in trouble. They are trying to respond to rapid population growth, rapid social change, rapid industrialization, the new situation in Asia.

They are expressing some of those difficulties, the young people particularly, in the Philippines, saying, "Yankee, go home"; but that is a habit pattern of youngsters all over the world.

What they are really wrestling with is how they can do something about their own country and their own future. They are very difficult problems.

Mr. GROSS. I have certainly been highly critical of the United Nations, but hoping at the same time that was wrong, that it could do something.

Mr. BELL. I think it is doing quite a lot, sir.

Mr. GROSS. You would have to prove it to me, Mr. Bell.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Gentlemen, thank you very much. We appreciate your taking time out to give us the benefit of your views.

The committee will be in recess until 2 o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Thursday, February 26, 1970.)

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Social Dimension

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1970

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:15 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Gallagher. The subcommittee will come to order.

We have now reached the second part of our scheduled hearings on the United Nations. Having reviewed the United Nations activities relating to international peace and security, and to economic development, we are now ready to appraise the United Nations posture in the field of social programs and of human rights.

Our witnesses today are: Mrs. Shirley Temple Black, who served as U.S. delegate to the 24th General Assembly of the United Nations and who worked there on social, educational and cultural activities and problems; and Mr. Arthur Stillman, adviser on economic and social affairs at the U.S. mission to the United Nations.

Mrs. Black, we welcome you here today. I have long been a fan of yours, and have been an even greater fan of the work that you are doing now on behalf of the United Nations and in the causes of humanity. I might say, too, that after a long procession of male witnesses who have testified before us in the last 2 weeks, it is indeed a pleasure to welcome you here. I have four at home, so I am more at home listening to women.

It is indeed a pleasure to welcome you here today.

We have your statement before us, and we would like you to proceed.

And, Mr. Stillman, at the completion of Mrs. Black's statement, or at any point that you wish to interject, please feel free to do so.

Mrs. Black?

(The biographical sketches referred to follow:)

Shirley Temple Black served as United States Delegate to the 24th General Assembly of the United Nations.

Mrs. Black was born in Santa Monica, California, and began her career in motion pictures at the age of three. She played leading roles in many films.

Mrs. Black is a member of the National Multiple Sclerosis Society and of the Executive Committee of the International Federation of Multiple Sclerosis Societies. She is known internationally for her work with those societies and

has set up branch organizations for them in Europe. She is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the California Advisory Hospital Council and of the Health Facilities Planning Association of the San Francisco Bay Area. She has been a candidate for the Republican nomination as United States Congresswoman from California.

Arthur M. Stillman, Adviser on Economic and Social Affairs to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, is a native of Illinois and holds degrees from Brown University and Harvard University.

Mr. Stillman began his government career as a legal analyst with the Library of Congress. He joined the Foreign Service in 1954. As a foreign service officer, he has served as economic officer at the U.S. Embassies in New Delhi, Belgrade and Addis Ababa.

STATEMENT OF HON. SHIRLEY TEMPLE BLACK, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 24TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, and committee members, I am honored to have this opportunity.

I offer my remarks with a humility which befits one who has served as a U.S. Representative to the U.N. only one session, yet with a conviction which has deepened during these months of full-time and intensive work.

In deference to your busy schedules I shall be as succinct as possible, and leave as much time as appropriate for your questions.

At the outset let me note three general observations which underscore all to follow:

First: It is clear that the world is locked in an awesome equation of time, power, and passion. The arms race, population explosions, environmental degradation are not less ominous threats to mankind than the more obvious witches broth of anger and cold steel. Taken together, these complex dilemmas of man can find solution only in the framework of rational and peaceful international cooperation. In this quest the world has at its disposal very few instruments, and chief among these is the United Nations.

I understand many of its shortcomings and inadequacies have been suggested in the hearings earlier. However, whatever its weaknesses or inefficiencies, it still remains the rallying point for all mankind who seek peace, justice, and national development.

I strongly believe, reinforced by my first-hand experience, that we must recognize the intrinsic values of the U.N., not only from the broad humanitarian perspective, but from the purely patriotic view.

We must not stand limply aside, wringing our hands at its shortcomings. We must recognize the potential, and roll up our sleeves and make the United Nations what we and our cofounders intended it to be.

The U.N. faults we perceive lie squarely at our door. If we are willing to take a strong initiative, I am confident we shall obtain first-rate results.

My second observation: It seems to me there is a profound and far-reaching misunderstanding concerning the nature of U.N. activities. We cannot overstress the fact that 80 percent of the manpower and budgets are devoted to social and humanitarian work, and has nothing to do with the emotional debates at moments of international crises, for example.

This massive effort does not connote a redistribution of wealth. Its objective is the creation of economic capacity in developing nations, which in turn means profound social, cultural, and environmental changes.

These, of course, are the areas which consumed my principal attention and energies during the 24th General Assembly, and to which I shall address my remarks.

Thirdly, may I state my respect for the manner in which Ambassador Charles Yost and his professional colleagues at the U.S. mission to the United Nations are discharging their responsibilities. In many obvious respects the United Nations is a demanding environment. Like the world, it has grown, and not always in a coherent and effective form. In consequence, working in its chambers, filled with 126 independent nations, requires both technical skill and hard work, but also agility and patience.

Speaking of growth of the U.N., Mr. Chairman, I wish to give strong support to the proposal for the expansion of U.N. facilities which was approved by resolution of the 24th General Assembly. I was impressed with the broad range of U.N. activities and the functions which that organization is performing. It is clear to me that facilities which were adequate to serve the needs of 59 member states in 1952 are no longer adequate for an organization which has grown to 126 members.

The Secretariat currently works under a great disadvantage of space limitation and several key functions of the U.N., such as UNDP and UNICEF are presently located outside of the present Secretariat building. It seems reasonable to me that these operations be kept as close together as possible and that administrative costs be rationalized. I also feel strongly that we should avoid dispersion of the U.N. since this would hamper the efficient operations of the Secretariat and could well lead to reduction in support by the U.S. public for the U.N. I feel that the investment we are asked to make is a small price in terms of the benefits which will accrue to the U.N.

In all these qualities the U.S. mission, with its solid back-up in the Department of State here in Washington, has performed in superlative fashion.

I was inspired by the energy and ability of my colleagues, and commend them to your most favorable attention, particularly you, Congressman Fascell, and Congressman Whalley.

The overall effectiveness of the Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly can be further enhanced, in my view, by two changes in the current practice of appointment and service by the so-called public members, of which I am one, among others. I believe the appointments should be made sufficiently in advance of the General Assembly convocation to permit a period of intensive briefings and study on the proposed United Nations agenda, and so forth. Conversely, the responsible officials will have adequate opportunity to assess the delegates' abilities, and to use them effectively from the outset.

Secondly, and in light of the significant investment the U.S. public makes in each delegate serving during the General Assembly, and recognizing the increased effectiveness which occurs during the session, it makes little sense to me that the Government loses the services of such delegates at the end of each session. To capitalize on the invest-

ment, and to retain the capabilities and personal relationships developed with all their practical potential, I suggest that it is both reasonable and easy to make the terms of service 2 to 3 years, on an overlapping basis, and to select for these positions only those candidates who are willing to make the extended commitment.

Let me leave these introductory comments, and turn directly and briefly to the subjects of concern today, education, youth, refugees, and the human environment.

Rather than review a series of United Nations resolutions, all of which are available and self-evident, I have chosen to quickly review the United States positions on these subjects, hoping thereby to suggest the nature of the debate, and the character of the obstacles which presented themselves.

The International Education Year will be a continuing occasion for reflection and action by governments for the improvement and expansion of their educational systems as suggested by Resolution 1436 of the 47th session of the Economic and Social Council, which my delegation wholeheartedly endorsed, but which need not be recited here.

The urgency of this task is dramatized in two relentless tides of human development.

First, the steep upward trend in world population; and, second, the tendency to orient educational systems more towards national requirements than international understanding.

Already 50 percent of the population in the developing world is under 21 years old. This year 50 percent of the entire world will be under 25. Legions of young people clamber at the gates of education.

Second, in the trend to emphasize nationalism in educational systems, we fashion a problem with our own hand. The U.S. Agency for International Development is spending $205 million in technical assistance projects to develop national educational systems in 40 nations. Education is a steppingstone to national progress, and we are not surprised at pressures to orient such activity to strictly national objectives.

I have been prompt to support the principles of nationalism. I also have been prompt to sound an alarm when the cause of world understanding becomes shaded by any of our 126 flags.

Is it not feasible to turn this floodtide of nationalism towards a better world understanding? Can we afford to be deflected by parochialism?

In its very essence is not education international? Is science parochial? Is art provincial?

I am sure we all think not. And I spoke very strongly on this point during the debates.

As you may suspect, the subject of student protests received considerable attention.

Two years ago in Prague students carrying lighted candles streamed through the streets in a symbolic procession chanting, "Let there be light." It was a gesture in the long tradition of protest against injustice, oppression, and hypocrisy.

In Paris, in California, in New York, the laundry-list of student complaints embraces just about everything that appears hypocritical or unjust, in almost every facet of public, private, or national life.

The university, they say, is run in an autocratic and inflexible har-

ness. It is unresponsive to the times. Its ears are plugged to legitimate student requests for a more audible voice in university affairs.

I do not deny the confusion caused by some student militants.

These are the negative ones. They worship disruption and regard all authority as sinful. They would disassemble society, but are inarticulate about what happens then.

Their philosophy is defined not by the values to which they subscribe, but by those they repudiate. Theirs is a philosophy of self-destruction.

All young people are not noble, any more than all adults. Power, young or old, always thinks it has a great soul.

But I stressed that in our country or elsewhere we must be very careful to distinguish between the main sweep of the youthful current, and these eddies of evil which spin at its margins.

Let's keep our eye on the trees, and not the brambles on the forest floor. Most young people have their heads screwed on tight. Their arguments may be questionable. Their experience may be short. But they have high ideals and noble purposes. They have courage, determination, and vigor.

Their concern is with the power and dignity of the individual. They properly challenge many hallowed and worm-eaten concepts. Their interest lies in the quality of human life, not its material abundance.

I do not regard youth here, or in other nations, as a drop-out generation of gadflies. They do not dodge life's responsibilities; they put their hand to the hard task. I see it here; I saw it in Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968.

To me the critical issue is not the fact of student revolt, but our response to it.

Instead of rejecting our young, we should be listening more. Instead of suppressing them, we should be nourishing them.

That is why I proposed at the 24th U.N. General Assembly, that young people serve as regular members of each delegation, and why I have long urged that the legal age of majority be lowered from its fictitious current level of 21 years.

I expressed my conviction that our task is to endow them with educational resources to study and to learn and to accumulate wisdom of relevance to their own lives.

For example, I indicated that we in the United States are applying pressure on the university educational system so that both faculty and courses relate more to the real and critical issues of our times, both national and international.

Throughout the world, young people are asking for a voice in determining the type of education they receive. They realize the importance of formal education in shaping the values and attitudes of society. That these values should include a "respect for human dignity and equal rights of man without discrimination as to race, color, language, sex or faith" has been fully recognized by the General Assembly in last year's session.

As stated in Resolution 20 of the Human Rights Commission at its 25th session, "Youth is particularly sensitive to any infringement of human rights" and has a "legitimate desire to be useful to society and to have its full share in the accomplishment of the major humanitarian demands of our century." We have supported the organization by the

Secretary-General of human rights seminars on the education of youth in human rights.

Over one-third of the members of the United Nations have some type of national youth service corps. The Secretary-General's Preliminary Report on Long-Term Policies and Programs for Youth in National Development points out that these groups represent the only effective method harnessing the often frustrated and undirected energies of young people.

We urged that the U.N. specialized agencies continue the work begun in Denmark at the Interregional Seminar on National Youth Programs in developing information and advisory activities for youth service corps.

Their involvement in rural development, their participation in self-help housing projects and their contributions to literacy campaigns are only a few ways in which youth corps can serve.

Of special interest is the work which the International Labor Organization has been doing with technical training and education. Too many countries in this world have suffered the burden of having educational systems which were designed for completely different societies at other stages of development.

We support the effort of ILO to aid in both in-school and out-of-school training programs relevant to national development needs. The very real and serious unemployment problems in the large urban areas of the world which are in fact largely youth unemployment problems, can only be met with large-scale training geared to the employment needs of their own locale.

The efforts of the World Health Organization to organize health education programs, with emphasis on nutrition, family planning and the problems of drug dependence, were encouraged.

FAO's widely successful Young World Food and Development Conference has set the basis for its continued work in involving youth in rural development. We urged that youth be given a major role in its proposed 1970 World Food Congress.

I think the interdependency of many of the United Nations activities dealing with youth requires a much greater degree of coordination among the deliberations of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Social Development and Human Rights Commissions, and the Preparatory Committee for the Second Development Decade and the 25th Anniversary. All of these bodies in the last half year have had major discussions on youth items.

The response to our proposals is embodied in three actions of the General Assembly, one calling for a Youth Assembly at United Nations headquarters in New York this coming July; another calling for "greater involvement of youth in activities relating to the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the U.N. in 1970"; another calling for a volunteer service, one of the programs suggested by President Nixon in his speech before the General Assembly last September; others related to young staff members of the United Nations; the 1971 Conference on Youth and the Second Development Decade; and a U.N. Information Center on Youth programs.

In the matter of refugees, the picture is grim, just as the efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees deserves our special respect.

In the last 5 years the total number of persons classified as refugees has more than doubled.

In the Western Hemisphere and Asia they are up 10 to 20 percent; in the Middle East they have increased 50 percent.

In Western Europe they are up eightfold, and in Africa a whopping tenfold increase.

All this despite a truly imaginative and Herculean combined effort of governmental, nongovernmental, and U.N. agencies.

Against this numerical avalanche, a bare 200,000 refugees were removed from the classification last year. Viewing this cold arithmetic, our total world effort to make refugees into something else is producing at a rate slightly better than 1 percent.

The basic problem largely arises, as we all well know, in fighting, politics, and religion. As such, it is solidly rooted in spiritual and intellectual weaknesses of mankind.

Time, and trends seem against us.

First is the worldwide trend towards collection of population in urban environments. This is noted correctly in the High Commissioner's 1969 Report as a trend of major concern.

In the United States, for example, it is predicted that within 30 years three-quarters of our people will be compressed in about one-tenth of our land. This is almost an exact reverse of population distribution 100 years ago. Versions of this urban problem are finding their way into the lap of the High Commissioner, and we must be prepared to support his new initiatives to meet this new challenge.

Secondly, our available total resources are failing to keep pace with our total refugee problem. Obviously our recourse lies in better utilization of our existing resources. In the High Commissioner's Report one finds reassuring recognition of this fact of life.

The key phrases for this next year will be combination, and coordination. Not only within the programs of UNHCR, but in subcontracting, and the activities of several hundred cooperating organizations. Duplication and overlap of effort must be identified, and corrected. We can no longer afford the luxury of inefficiency.

In this area, as many others, we run in the shadow of our own fate.

One figure looms ominously over all others. Some estimates show that 18 million people are classified as refugees, adrift in the sea of nations. To be sure, less than half are included in the technical mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, but the remaining 10 million are no less real. They are no less an abuse to our sense of humanity. They are no less a threat to the social stability of the world. They are indeed one critical element in the fabric of world peace.

And finally, but hardly least, the question of the degradation of the human environment, from an international perspective.

The United Nations has set a tone of urgency to which the world can respond, and has scheduled a U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, preparation for which is already well underway.

The jetstream of winds blow from New York toward Europe. How long before our smog adds to Europe's problem?

Russia's Lake Baikal, one of the finest bodies of water anywhere, is threatened by industry.

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The middle of the Atlantic was visibly polluted last summer, says the explorer Thor Heyerdahl.

The Volga, once a 2,300-mile splendid river, is now menaced by discharges from chemical, oil, and industrial plants. So is Lake Erie.

The Sea of Japan shows unmistakable signs of pollution. How long before Japan's problem becomes somebody else's problem, too?

In our own country we estimate that each year, each person throws away 1 ton of solid waste—paper, plastic, and metal.

In essence, whenever man abuses nature, some day in some way he will pay a price.

The problems of the human environment touch us all. It is not just a matter of sympathy for the Potomac River, or for the sky over industrialized areas seldom blue. Our problems are global.

We have three clear choices:

First, we can do as we have done. Tomorrow awaits us, brooding, and we can just slam the door on his gloomy face.

Second, we can propose impossible remedies. Very neat and easy. Air pollution comes from the exhausts of autos, and the belching smokestacks of industry. So do we encourage developing nations to stay pastoral, avoid exhausts and smokestacks? Complex problems have no simple solutions.

A third alternative is ably proposed by our United Nations colleagues from Sweden. We must recognize the shadow that looms over us is global, and our response will be dissipated unless we confront the threat carefully, and together.

The problems of the human environment, to some of us, are an old story. We are letting "progress" kill the things we value. Just as science and technology have been a boon to mankind, so this side effect has done great damage. Obviously, we cannot turn off the faucet of human progress. Our common challenge is to improve the management of our human environment. The proper use of science is not to conquer nature, but to live with it.

The solutions may hurt. They should not be anticipated lightly. The proposed U.N. Conference on Problems of the Human Environment is an absolutely vital step. Our Government has complimented Sweden for having exercised this initiative, and enthusiastically supports the Conference.

As stated at the outset of my comments, the international dilemmas of the world are of awesome proportions, and the United Nations, for all its corporate growing pains, is the most visible token of international cooperation and progress.

An examination of the charter is in progress, and I sense a subtle but widespread feeling among delegates from other nations that now indeed is a time for stocktaking.

Clearly, we must ask ourselves a basic question: What can be done to greaten its effectiveness?

Instantly one basic step commends itself.

As one of the earth's largest and most enlightened and powerful Nations, the United States should make better use of the United Nations in its myriad activities. Perhaps we can call upon its specialized agencies more frequently, perhaps take a bolder posture of leadership in its affairs, and perhaps defer to its counsel more often.

Ways must be found to bring this vital world body back into a front-line position in the solution of earth's sorest problems, and most obvious challenges.

This was the original intention of its founders and we, as a nation, must take a renewed position of leadership to impel the United Nations to greater activity and effectiveness.

Let it not be said of this Congress, or this Nation that we planned for our hopes, but performed according to our fears.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mrs. Black, for an extremely well thought-out presentation.

We have in the past talked about the political problems of the United Nations. I think you have contributed a very meaningful service in touching on the social, economic, and cultural activities of the United Nations. Unfortunately, the successes in this area are not as dramatic as the failures that the U.N. may be said to have experienced in the larger arena of political problems. And, as we review the 25 years of the United Nations at work, I think your outline demonstrates that there is going to be enough work for the next 25 years, within the United Nations.

So we are very happy to have your presentation.

I might ask, how advanced are the United Nations plans for the Stockholm Conference in 1972?

Mrs. BLACK. We began preparations for this at the last General Assembly, the 24th General Assembly. The meetings will resume on the preparatory committee work for this conference in about a week, in New York.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What do we hope to achieve at that conference? What are some of our immediate goals?

Mrs. BLACK. This conference, hopefully, will build, as it goes along, up to 1972 in Stockholm, we have plenty of time to prepare carefully for the conference. I think the most important aspect of it is that not too many agenda items be included. I think probably it would do best to be in three general areas, or perhaps four. This will be up to the 27 countries that participate on the preparatory committee.

The problems in my home county in California, the problems in the United States, and the problems around the world are not really unrelated, as far as problems of the human environment. Most every country I talked to at the United Nations has the problem of water pollution, one way or another, either through their rivers, streams, lakes, or the open oceans. So I think we hope to come up with definite answers on what can be done to save our old world, and to make the air and the water pure again.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Well, I think those are noble goals. I might ask, perhaps you are not down the road this far, but who will be invited to participate in the conference? Will it be only the members of the United Nations, or will we invite the nonparticipating countries such as Communist China, West and East Germany, and so forth? Is it the intent of the United Nations to go beyond the United Nations family?

Mrs. BLACK. I believe this is the kind of item that will be taken up by the preparatory committee in New York.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I might ask, what is the U.S. position on international cooperation in environmental matters? Have we been doing very much of this up at the United Nations?

Mrs. BLACK. I would say that the testimony, Mr. Chairman, that I heard from the different delegations at the United Nations showed an international interest in cooperating in this problem, and, as I said in my statement, Sweden did initiate the world conference, but all of the nations enthusiastically reacted to it.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mrs. Black.

Mr. Frelinghuysen?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should like to join in welcoming you to this subcommittee, Mrs. Black.

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is a pleasure to see you here. I note we have a very large, and I would say predominantly youthful audience, so it is quite obvious that you have a fan club. I am sure it is not the nature of our hearings that brings out this crowd. It is encouraging, as one of the older members here, to realize that fame has a continuing effect, at least in your case.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I hope it doesn't get back to Ambassador Yost that you outdrew him. [Laughter]

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I imagine he would expect that would be the case.

I enjoyed your very comprehensive statement, and I would like to ask you a couple of questions about the role of youth. I am sure you are very much interested, as a delegate to the United Nations, in ways in which we can channel the idealism and the energy of youth toward strengthening the United Nations and its associated agencies. What do you think might be done to try to direct their attention? I assume this conference in July is one way of trying to attract the attention of youth to the United Nations. Could you tell us a little more about this coming conference, or what you think might be done to encourage youth?

Mrs. BLACK. Mr. Congressman, if I can go back to your very nice comments, and thank you very much for them, I feel that the young people here today are as concerned as we over forties about youth and the problems of youth, and I hope that the young people of our country know by now tht I am one of their biggest and strongest supporters, and have been doing what I can to get the age of majority lowered in California. It is taking a bit of time, but I think we will get there.

The Youth Congress that will be held in New York in July, perhaps Mr. Stillman can talk a bit more about. Mrs. Jean Picker, I believe, is working with the young people for this Congress. I know that it has attracted international interest, and the youth organizations themselves are selecting the delegates, and there will be five delegates for each country.

Is there more we can tell?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How are our delegates selected, Mr. Stillman? Is it a governmental responsibility, or how are the choices going to be made? I should think it might be quite a competitive situation.

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR STILLMAN, ADVISER ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AT THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. STILLMAN. According to the mandate which was given by the Preparatory Committee for the 25th anniversary, five youth delegates from members of the United Nations, and certain dependent territories, would be invited, not as representatives of their countries, but, rather, to reflect the broad spectrum of youth in their countries. They would not be government representatives, they would not speak on behalf of their governments. It would be within the discretion of the member states as to how the delegates would be selected.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You mean at the discretion of the member nations? In other words, the United States makes the decision as to which five——

Mr. STILLMAN. As to the method of selection of the delegates.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How is that selection made?

Mr. STILLMAN. We have decided as a matter of policy that we would follow the recommendation made by the Preparatory Committee, that the delegates should not be government representatives, that they should not be instructed. There is a private committee which has been formed in New York, composed of approximately 20 youth groups, which is now in the process of formulating criteria for delegate selection. It is their hope that by the deadline set by the United Nations, the first of May, that they will——

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Could I interrupt?

What is a youth group? Are Young Republicans a youth group? As I remember, Secretary Dulles, when he was Secretary of State, was still a member of the Young Republicans. I am not sure but I may still be a Young Republican. Is that one of the groups?

Mr. STILLMAN. Yes, sir.

The Young Republicans would certainly qualify. Some of the groups that have been participating are the Committee on International Relations of the United Nations Association, the New York City Youth Service, National Board of the YMCA, the Boy Scouts, and the Black Panthers.

Now, we should emphasize this is a private committee. It has no government support or backing.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How does that group, if it is private, determine who should or should not be included?

Mr. STILLMAN. This group is setting its own criteria, and will be sending out applications for delegate selection. If there is agreement within the committee on five names, these names would then be proposed to the Government.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Suppose if there is not agreement on five names? Then how would they ever reach agreement?

Mr. STILLMAN. In this eventuality, the Government, would have the responsibility, ultimately, of determining which five delegates will attend. This does not necessarily mean that the Government will make the choice. It is our hope that through these private groups, through the youth groups themselves, that there will be five delegates recommended which do have broad support, and that they will represent a wide cross section of the youth of this country.

But it will, of course, in the last analysis, be for the Government to formally propose these five delegates to the United Nations.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But the Government actually exercises its judgment as to whether there is a fair cross section of American youth represented in the five selected? They presumably will be presented as a slate by these private organizations?

Mr. STILLMAN. I think, Mr. Congressman, it would be somewhat premature to speak to that point, as to whether it would be necessary. We would hope it would not be necessary for the Government to make any judgment as to the determination of these delegates.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. If I can get back to a basic point, Mrs. Black, in your prepared statement. You say that the United States should make better use of the U.N. and its myriad activities, call upon its specialized agencies more frequently, and take a bolder posture of leadership in its affairs.

You also say that there is a need for a much greater degree of coordination.

I would suppose if we are going to make greater use of them, we need to worry about the adequacy of these organizations. You referred to the necessity of coordination between the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and various specialized agencies, specifically. How good is the coordination in the educational, social, and the fields in which you are interested? Youth fields?

Isn't there a real need for improvement in the basic way in which these agencies operate?

Mrs. BLACK. Mr. Congressman, this is what I tried to explain in my statement, because I felt that since almost every committee of the U.N. discussed youth, for instance, that they should get together and coordinate, and not duplicate efforts, and that this should be done, very definitely. This does not happen in every subject. It did happen to occur in the youth items, because everyone is interested in the subject. And, to some extent, it happened in the environment area.

Otherwise, I would say that things are going very, very well, and very smoothly.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I have no further questions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Kazen?

Mr. KAZEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Black, first of all, let me congratulate you upon the statement. Thank you.

Mr. KAZEN. It is very well thought out, and we appreciate having, I believe, in your words, before we started this meeting, a layman's point of view, and not one that has had long association in the mechanics of the United Nations.

You say in your statement that we must recognize the potential and not wring our hands at the shortcomings. Why is it that we can't publicize, or we have not publicized, the actual accomplishments in these fields that have taken place?

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you very much for your nice comments, Mr. Congressman.

The main problem is that the United Nations only receives world attention through the news media, when there is a crisis situation, when the Security Council is called into session. The 80 percent of the work done is in the social and humanitarian field and is very good work, and very necessary work, and is a bridge to peace-building. It is not peace-keeping, but it is peace-building. And I wish there was a way to make this good news big news. But it just isn't of great news import, as far as headline making.

Mr. KAZEN. Well, this is exactly what I am talking about, the United Nations has limped along, because of all of the criticism that it has received, but most of the criticism comes from those issues that have been highlighted, yet the environment, the art, the culture, these things that, as you have aptly put it, lead to peace, and are peace-building, should certainly receive the attention of all the peoples of the world.

Mrs. BLACK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAZEN. In order to fortify this organization that we call the United Nations we must publicize its accomplishments. It may be that it will take a person like you to start the ball rolling on actually advertising the pluses of the United Nations, instead of the big minuses that are given the headlines.

Coming to another statement that you made, "By example, the 1959 world refugee year members of the United Nations raised 80 millions in special funds to resettle 15 million refugees."

Where were these refugees resettled?

Mr. STILLMAN. Could I just comment, sir?

Mr. KAZEN. Yes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Perhaps you could supply it for the record.

Mr. STILLMAN. We could supply more information for the record on that, but of course, this refers to the post-World War II refugees, to refugees coming from Communist China, for example, and these refugees have been settled in third countries, either in Europe, in Asia, many of them here.

Mr. KAZEN. This is what I was after.

Mr. FASCELL. The U.S. admitted about 80,000 Hungarian refugees and there are about 250,000 Cuban refugees, most of them in my district. How many do you have?

Mr. KAZEN. I don't know. Maybe my question was not phrased properly. I want to know what fields, or what the resettlements were, and over what period of time. This work began right after World War II, as I understand it, and is still continuing.

Mrs. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. KAZEN. You say that in the Western Hemisphere, in Asia, these percentages are up 10 to 20 percent, and in the Middle East, of course, they have increased 50 percent. Where in the Western Hemisphere have these numbers increased that much, outside of Cuba?

Mrs. BLACK. Well——

Mr. KAZEN. Where is our major refugee problem in the Western Hemisphere?

Mrs. BLACK. I was referring, Mr. Congressman, to the problems, for instance, that I encountered when I was almost a refugee myself, when I was caught in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The people have left Eastern Europe, many people, and have been trying to be relocated elsewhere, like in Austria, here, Switzerland, and so forth.

Mr. KAZEN. I was talking about the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. FASCELL. It is Cuba. Cuba is the biggest.

Mr. KAZEN. Outside of Cuba, I was wondering where problem areas lay.

Mr. FASCELL. That is it.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Stillman, perhaps you could forward us some figures on that.

Mr. FASCELL. Can we get a breakdown on that? Somewhere there

has to be a table on breakdown by countries, all countries. That might be useful, and also third country settlements. That might help us get a better picture.

Mr. KAZEN. Yes, if you could supply this for the record.

Mr. STILLMAN. Yes, we will, sir.

(The information requested follows:)

Department of State—Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Estimated Number of Refugees[1]

[As of June 30, 1969]

World total	
Alien Refugees (A. below)	4,989,292
Nonalien refugees (B. below)	2,757,143
Grand total	7,746,435
A. Refugees who have crossed international frontiers and are aliens or treated as such in their present countries of asylum	
1. Refugees in Europe and the Middle East from Communist countries in Europe	60,000
2. European refugees in Communist China seeking to enter Hong Kong	1,000
3. Chinese refugees from Communist China	2,074,000
In Hong Kong	2,000,000
In Macau	74,000
4. Tibetan refugees	64,000
In India	50,000
In Bhutan and Sikkim	6,000
In Nepal	8,000
5. Refugees from North Viet-Nam in Thailand	40,000
6. Cuban refugees	178,142
In the United States	[2] 129,642
In other countries	48,500
7. Palestinian Arab refugees in the Middle East (including some 240,000 displaced persons resulting from June 1967 hostilities, not registered with UNRWA)	1,616,000
8. Refugees from Rwanda	160,500
In Burundi	52,000
In the Congo (K)	24,000
In Tanzania	14,000
In Uganda	70,500
9. Refugees from Sudan	177,000
In Central African Republic	19,500
In Ethiopia	20,000
In Uganda	71,500
In Congo (K)	66,000
10. Refugees from Angola	381,450
In Botswana	3,450
In the Congo (K)	370,000
In Zambia	8,000
11. Refugees from Zambia	19,500
In Angola	4,500
In the Congo (K)	15,000

(See footnotes at end of table, p. 181.)

Department of State—Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Estimated Number of Refugees—Continued

[As of June 30, 1969]

A. Refugees who have crossed international frontiers, etc.—Continued

12. Refugees from Mozambique	48,800
In Malawi	15,000
In Tanzania	31,000
In Zambia	2,800
13. Refugees from Portuguese Guinea in Senegal	65,000
14. Refugees from South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia: in Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia (including some 300 students)	2,500
15. Refugees from the Congo (K)	70,400
In Angola	3,000
In Burundi	20,000
In Central African Republic	5,000
In Sudan	7,500
In Tanzania	600
In Uganda	34,000
In Zambia	300
16. Refugees (Eritrean) from Ethiopia in Sudan	31,000

B. Refugees displaced within their own countries and other refugees who have the right of nationality in their present countries of asylum

1. Vietnamese refugees displaced within South Vietnam	1,197,143
In camps	435,714
Out of camp	590,074
In process of resettlement [3]	171,355
2. Laotian refugees in Laos (Displaced in the face of continuing Communist aggression)	260,000
3. Hindus in India who fled or were evicted from Pakistan since 1963	1,000,000
4. Muslims in Pakistan who fled or were evicted from India or Kashmir since 1963	260,000
5. Indonesian Chinese displaced within Indonesia	40,000

[1] Undetermined numbers of refugees in some of the listed groups have been partially or fully assimilated within asylum countries.

[2] This is the total number of Cubans in the United States who, as of January 1, 1969, had not acquired citizenship or status as permanent resident aliens.

[3] These are persons who have begun to receive resettlement assistance but have not been fully reestablished. They are in process of resettlement at a place other than their hamlets of origin.

NOTES

A. Refugees from North Korea in South Korea. The five million North Korean refugees who fled to South Korea between 1945 and 1953 are now integrated within the economy of South Korea. Escape from North Korea today is virtually precluded by stringent North Korean controls.

B. East German refugees in West Germany. Between 1945 and 1961, 3.7 million German refugees fled from the East Zone into West Germany, across the zonal border or via West Berlin. Between the erection of the Berlin wall and June 30, 1969 this flow totaled only some 28,100. All of these refugees have been integrated into the West German economy without international assistance.

C. Nigerians displaced within or from Nigeria. Nigerians who have been displaced within Nigeria in the last several years are not included in the above tabulation as no reasonably accurate estimate is available as to their numbers. Those Nigerians who have left Nigeria in the wake of the civil strife in that country and are presently in neighboring West African countries are likewise omitted from the tabulation, pending the development of accurate information as to their numbers and status as refugees.

WORLDWIDE FIGURES FOR 3D COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT NOT AVAILABLE. ATTACHMENT II IS AN ICEM REPORT ON 3D COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES FROM EUROPE TO COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD WHICH IS ILLUSTRATIVE OF RESETTLEMENT PATTERNS FROM 1952 THROUGH 1969. SUMMARY: JAN. 1 TO DEC. 31, 1969, AND FEB. 1, 1952, TO DEC. 31, 1969

	Grand total	Immigration countries (excluding Latin America)								
		Total	Australia	Canada	Israel	New Zealand	South Africa	United States	Other overseas	Europe
Refugee migration, Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1969	59,528	59,164	16,718	2,743	14,946	39	2,323	19,190	3	3,202
Refugee migration, Feb. 1, 1952, to Dec. 31, 1969	816,309	786,924	165,431	99,891	199,372	2,613	8,839	249,143	836	60,799

	Immigration countries (Latin America)											
	Total	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela	Central America
Refugee migration, Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1969	364	49	5	116	57	6	18	.....	14	3	93	3
Refugee migration, Feb. 1, 1952, to Dec. 31, 1969	29,385	3,866	372	17,238	2,777	887	78	426	158	458	2,912	213

Mrs. BLACK. Mr. Chairman, it is in the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees Annual Report. My assignment did not concern past refugees, but the 18 million refugees of today, and I am sorry that I don't have all of the back statistics from 1959. We will furnish you with the High Commissioner's report.

Mr. KAZEN. The only reason that I made the statement was because apparently this will serve as a pattern, and is probably serving as a pattern for the work to be done by United Nations. We may be able to improve on what we have done in the past.

Still on this refugee problem, what is the United Nations doing, actually, to help refugees, at this particular time?

Mr. STILLMAN. The United Nations has two major programs, in the field of refugees. One is the program of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the other is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which is concerned only with Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. The United States has supported both of these programs, actively. Financially, the program of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees is more limited in scope. Although the High Commissioner has under his mandate several million refugees, these do not include Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, which are excluded from his mandate.

He is concerned primarily with the protection of the refugees, of their right to asylum, immigration, and resettlement in asylum or other countries. The High Commissioner is also concerned with local resettlement projects in asylum countries, especially in Africa where he has large on-going programs. He also cooperates with other U.N. agencies, in these types of programs.

Actually, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is operating with a very small budget, less than $6 million a year, in an effort to facilitate refugee resettlement, to assure their protection and their asylum.

Now, the United Nations program for the Middle East is a much more substantial program. It is devoted solely to the one and a half million refugees displaced when Israel was created, and the subsequent unrest in the Middle East.

This program is much more ambitious in its financial scope. Last year, the UNRWA program, amounted to almost $41 million, of which the United States contribution was $22 million, slightly over half. This program involves the provision of health services, of education, and training programs, which will enable the refugees to survive until such time as they can be relocated. These two programs are the essence of United Nations' involvement with refugees.

Mr. KAZEN. One more question, Mr. Chairman: What percentage of the money that goes to these various refugee programs, all of them, is contributed by the United States?

Mr. STILLMAN. As I just mentioned, Mr. Congressman, concerning the program for the Middle East, the budget——

Mr. KAZEN. I am talking about the overall refugee program, all of them. I know that you have the High Commissioner, the Middle East, and all of these others, all of the refugee work that is done through the United Nations. What percentage of the money that is spent on this refugee problem is contributed by the United States?

Mr. STILLMAN (continuing). You are speaking now, sir, solely of the United Nations programs, not programs that the United States would have outside of the United Nations?

Mr. KAZEN. No, no, just within the United Nations.

Mr. STILLMAN. Well, I have it broken down according to the two major programs. We could combine the figures, but as I pointed out earlier, in the Middle East program, we contributed slightly over half of the contribution; that is, last year, $22 million, out of $41 million. Now, our contribution to the program of the High Commissioner for Refugees is a much smaller effort, although it has fluctuated over the years. Of the $5.68 million total for 1969, the United States contributed $800,000, which amounted to roughly 14 percent.

This figure of U.S. participation has fluctuated. In 1962, it was as high as 30 percent, which is approximately our contribution to regular United Nations programs. Fluctuating down in 1967 to 13 percent, rising slightly in 1969.

Now you could combine these two figures, but actually, the operations are somewhat different.

Mr. KAZEN. Thank you.

Just one last suggestion: Don't forget organizations like 4–H clubs, FFA, and some of these other rural youth organizations in your selection for this conference in July. It would be appreciated in the rural area.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I might say that as Mr. Frelinghuysen brought up the Young Republicans, I will mention the Young Democrats.

Mr. STILLMAN. Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Burke?

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mrs. Black, I want to welcome you here, and personally I feel that you are the type of person that just never does grow old, you grow more beautiful, and while this sounds flattering, I think most of us here have seen you grow to be a very beautiful woman. For instance, I think my younger daughter, still believes you are a very beautiful little girl; and while this might embarrass you, I would like to say that I have probably seen "The Littlest Colonel" so many times that I expected to see you walk in, with the military uniform of the old South [Laughter.]

Mrs. BLACK. Mr. Congressman, I did grow a bit more than that.

Mr. BURKE. Yes, you did, I said, into a very beautiful woman, but I think you have grown in beauty in many ways. First of all, your humanitarian efforts, in the fight on multiple scelerosis and with your hospital work.

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you.

Mr. BURKE. And now your work in international programs for the benefit of mankind.

But there are one or two things I would like to ask. On page 3 of your statement, you talk about nationalism. You say, "Is it not feasible to turn this floodtide of nationalism towards a better world understanding?" And where I agree with you at times, it is fine to support the principles of nationalism, I do call your attention to the fact that it is very difficult to rein in nationalism, when it gets started, and I am sure you remember the nationalism that swept Europe, prior to World War II, and the nationalism that resulted in fascism, and the military nationalism of Japan, and so on, yet it still exists in the world, so I wonder if we are perhaps making a mistake in supporting it, when you say that it is not feasible to turn this nationalism towards

a better world understanding? How, with world conditions the way they are now; with the "have-nots" challenging the "haves," and so many of those "have not" nations turning to nationalism for their own purposes, it being the smaller "have not" nations that will turn on us.

Mrs. BLACK. Mr. Congressman, when I spoke of nationalism, I was speaking of nationalism not regarding our country, but of the developing nations.

Mr. BURKE. Yes, I know, but that is what bothers me. The trouble is every nation—and I just took a trip around the world, with Mr. Wolff, who was here earlier, and we found every nation getting more strongly nationalistic and yet we in our country find people from various organizations telling us that we are imperialistic and discouraging us from having national pride and spirit or love for our own country.

How then do you reconcile the two approaches?

Mrs. BLACK. Mr. Congressman, I hoped through my remarks at the United Nations to put over the point that I felt it was more important for countries to think on an international basis, and to have global understanding. It is something that is going to take time, but I think it will be accomplished.

Mr. BURKE. I hope you are right. I think, however, that at this stage of the game, with the world in such a turmoil, it might be just another dream, that I wish we could see. I only mention it, because to me, it is a difficult problem for our own Nation as well as the United Nations to face, in talking about one nation or another, or at least in talking about assisting another.

Could I ask a question, then, with regard to the refugee problem, and in view of the statement I made about the strength of the move towards nationalism, and many of the smaller countries looking to the more wealthy countries to do the job for them, what would you think would be our contribution to this, in comparison with that of the Soviet Union, and the other nations, who are contributing little to the problems.

Mrs. BLACK. Mr. Congressman, in my opinion, the nations of the world are maturing very rapidly. I don't think the nations want to be told by any individual country, how they are to live, how much money they are to be given. I think those days are past. The United States now is making a very good effort to form partnerships with other countries. In the long run, this is very much to our country's advantage, to form these partnerships, and the contribution that we can make that is not money will be through helping in education, in training, in extending our hand in friendship, and of not turning our back on anybody, but to realize that it is a pretty small globe and that we are all on it together.

In the refugee camps, and with the refugees generally, I feel it is most important that we help in education and training, because 18 million people need our help, need our assistance, and if I may interject something, I would like to mention that I think that we must do a lot more about our own American Indians.

Mr. BURKE. Well, you join two very distinguished gentlemen who have given similar testimony with regard to reexamining our monetary approach on these things, and that is Mr. Lodge and Mr. Wadsworth, both former Ambassadors to the U.N. who feel that there

are more things than our giving money, and that there must be joint cooperation from the other nations, too.

Let me just ask one more question and that is one concerning world pollution. Now, during the trip we took we did go into Japan, and strange as it may seem, we found a great deal of smog in Japan, and we saw their rivers polluted, and so on, and yet they have very little concern—or at least the people of Japan and elsewhere indicate that they haven't even made studies yet they recognize it is a problem, and yet we are indicating from a world point of view that we are polluting the world, because of what has been said here in our country. Why should we take the blame for what they have polluted themselves over there and elsewhere?

Now, it seems to me that the only way we are going to really be able to talk about how to solve these problems is by a fair approach by all nations, each accepting their own responsibility, rather than going to international meetings with the hang dog look like we are the sole Nation responsible for the world's problems. I believe we must take the initiative from the start.

I think many of the nations like Japan, are intelligent enough to realize the dangers but they would hate, to upset the apple-cart, at this stage of the game, and set back their present economy, which is going into heavy type of industry, also.

Other than Japan, what other nations are you talking about that are interested, from a world health program. We are having problems, of course, with those who question our missile programs, and make charges of what might become polluted or not, and we also have nations, too, that have the capabilities of the atomic bomb, and which have atomic weapons, and have the use for industrial purposes of atomic energy, and yet in India, just recently an atomic reactor plant was placed right next to a huge river, while we have argued here this is a bad place to put an atomic plant, and as I said, India just completed one, with the help of the United States AID, so what I am driving at is if we are going to solve the problems we are talking about, we must solve them with the help of the other nations, and have them participate, rather than to stand up and tell us what we should do.

I think we have done a great deal to try and inform and tell the world of some of these problems; and I think we have done it, some of it through the United Nations, but I think now, that some of the nations must show that they are willing to participate.

That is all. Thank you very much.

Mrs. BLACK. Mr. Congressman, if I could say a bit on this, as I stated earlier, at the 24th General Assembly, Sweden initiated the idea for the World Conference on the Human Environment, which will be held in 1972, and all of the 126 nations at the United Nations participated fully in the debate, and with great interest in the subject. Through this international conference, information will be made available to all people in the world, and to governments to implement the recommendations from the conference.

Regarding the problem in Japan, Japan participated fully at the United Nations, so I would assume that if Japan is one of the countries attending the conference, that they will continue to participate.

I was in Iran 1-week ago, and I have very high regard for the delegation from Iran to the United Nations. They are very active in all

subjects. They think very broadly of all international problems. In Iran, Teheran is the largest city in the world without a sewage system. They have an excellent water purification method, and you can drink the water from the tap.

Would it be possible for Mr. Stillman to comment on a question you asked, back one, I believe? I don't know which one it is. Did you have a comment?

Mr. STILLMAN. May I comment, sir?

Mr. BURKE. Please.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Surely.

Mr. STILLMAN. Concerning your remarks, Mr. Congressman, relating to the dependence of some countries, the developing countries, on the major countries, and the burden which this country has assumed over the years, with respect to economic assistance, I would think that one of the things that is most impressive in the U.N. setting is the burning desire, of all countries, particularly the new countries, to assert their independence, and to avoid a dependent relationship on any country. They no longer take United States or Soviet leadership for granted. They are interested in a sharing arrangement, in a cooperative endeavor.

For this reason, the former emphasis on bilateral forms of assistance is no longer as readily acceptable to the developing countries, and there is increased emphasis now on mutilateral approaches. This administration is very cognizant of this desire and the President in his recent Message on Foreign Aid stressed again the need for our Government to consider more and better ways of participating in a multilateral framework of assistance. This would not—not necessarily lessen the burden of the United States, but would put it in different context.

I don't think that we can talk in terms of reducing U.S. assistance, but I do think we can talk in terms of improving the quality of multilateral assistance, and I think that with proper direction, with proper input of human and material resources, that we can improve the quality of assistance. And it would seem to me that the United States must continue to play a leading role. We can't leave this to others. We are taking a very active interest now in the measures before the U.N. Development Program, for reorganization and restructuring of that program, to make this effort more effective, through the United Nations.

We would be well advised to pay particular attention to the moves which are being made for more effective utilization of multilateral aid. We should not think in terms merely of reducing the burden to the United States, but rather, of utilizing the assistance which we give, and which should certainly be no lower and preferably higher, in this general multilateral framework.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you.

Mr. Fascell?

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, Mrs. Black, I am delighted to see you again. It is a real pleasure, and let me say for the other two public members of the delegation who had the privilege of serving with you at the United Nations that Congressman Whalley and I not only enjoyed our service with you, but we felt very honored to be part of a three-man team, if you will

pardon the expression, to work together effectively at the United Nations, and I want to say something now to your face that I have been saying behind your back, so the record will be clear, that it was not only just a pleasure to work with you, but you certainly carried your share of the burden, and made our work immeasurably better and easier, as an entire delegation, so and since the measure of the work is the thing that counts, why I want to be able to say to you personally and openly what I have been saying behind your back.

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you, Congressman Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. You presented a very forthright statement, as you always do. It is on one hand ideological, and on the other hand, very practical, which I learned in 3 months is the kind of person you really are, and I commend you for that.

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. And I would like to touch upon some of the things that you have raised in your statement. We all recognize, having worked at the United Nations, the growing feeling of independence, and the growing feeling of nationalism that exists in all the areas of the world, whether it is in Latin America, Africa, Asia, or Europe. All countries are very much aware of their sovereignty, and as Mr. Stillman has said, and we all learned, they don't take too kindly to being led around by the nose by anybody. Don't you feel that one of the effective instrumentalities to channel that nationalism is the United Nations, and without it, we would have more difficult times in the world?

Mrs. BLACK. Yes, indeed. It couldn't be more evident or more important.

Mr. FASCELL. Let's take the conference on environment, that is going to be held in Sweden. Congressman Burke has raised a very valid question. A lot of these countries, first, don't fully realize the environment problem, and secondly, if they do, they don't want to say anything or do anything about it. But the only way to ever bring them into the fold is to have a conference at the international level. We could approach the world effort on the bilateral level, but it would be extremely difficult if not impossible. For example, the Japanese, who depend very largely on fish, suddenly find out from their own scientists that the ocean is polluted, and that their fishing is going to fall off.

I think they would be most anxious to join some kind of a world movement to do something about polluting the oceans. So I am very much for international effort. I don't see any other practical way, do you?

Mrs. BLACK. No; I do not.

Mr. FASCELL. You have raised a very good point, which I think, Congressman Frelinghuysen mentioned in his report, and that was the question of the advance appointment of public members to the U.S. delegation at the U.N.—the three public members.

I don't know about Members of Congress but I think for the other person, it would be an extremely useful thing. I would certainly agree with you that any administration appointing the third public member would do that well in advance of the session, give them time to get fully oriented and acclimated. And I know that you felt that it was difficult at the start, but I must say that you did a fine job. Also let me

assure you, Congressman Whalley and I had a difficult time, too, with all our background and experience.

What kind of impression did you get of our U.S. Mission people, generally?

Mrs. BLACK. Well, they are the best of all 126 countries. I observed the staff was overworked, and I thought the conditions were pretty crowded, both across the street at the United Nations itself, and in the U.S. Mission. I was fortunate that I had a nice office, and a nice desk, as did all of the representatives and alternates, but I think we could use more staff at the U.S. Mission, and Mr. Stillman works awfully hard, and around the clock, as do most of the U.S. Mission staff. They do a fantastic job, wearing several hats themselves, and having to cover so many different agenda items.

Mr. FASCELL. I agree with you, and those of us who have been up there, I think, in all of the reports, without exception, have mentioned in fact. We have been trying to get the message to our respective administrations——

Mrs. BLACK. I see.

Mr. FASCELL. And also to our colleagues in the Congress. Some way, we are going to have to find a means, all of us, to impress our colleagues and the administration on the tremendous effort that is undertaken by the people who are in the U.S. Mission under very, very difficult circumstances.

Mr. FREYLINGHUYSEN. Would the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. FASCELL. Certainly.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. As one who served in 1965, I feel very strongly that we should know more about the U.S. Mission, and the people who are working there. They did a tremendous job for us. Those of us who went up there to serve for that 3-month period. I would like to suggest to our chairman that perhaps the International Organizations Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee ought to go up there at some point this spring, and have a day or two to discuss with the mission and perhaps with some of the U.N. people, just what are the nature of the responsibilities, what are the kind of problems that they are dealing with. It would be helpful for us, and it might even have some value for those up in New York.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I think it is an excellent suggestion. We will try and work that out.

Mrs. BLACK. Excellent.

Mr. FASCELL. We had one other dividend, Mr. Chairman, that I think ought to be recited, in light of the line of questioning by our colleague, Mr. Kazen of Texas, and it is a very valid point.

It is one which has been discussed by many people at top level in Government, in executive branch and in the congressional branch, and that is the seeming lack of attention that the United Nations gets today. Mrs. Black put her finger on it, of course; if the Security Council is called in, and there is a big crisis, it makes the media; everybody knows about it. Yet, three-fourths of the resources of the United Nations are not in the Security Council, they are in the Third Committee, or in Economic Council, or other places where you work.

And it is harder to get that story across. But, Mr. Kazen, you will be happy to know that one of the real benefits that despite some critics and some skeptics, who thought that it was useless to appoint Mrs.

Black to a position of that importance, that she not only served ably, and made preparations of substance in behalf of the U.S. position, but the fact is she was able to get the coverage, when the rest of us couldn't find our way out of the dark. [Laughter.]

Mr. FASCELL. You know, the men with the cameras didn't even know where I was, unless I happened to be standing next to Mrs. Black.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is enough to tempt you to run for public office, isn't it, Mrs. Black? [Laughter.]

Mrs. BLACK. Mr. Chairman, if I could respectfully suggest that Congressman Fascell might, if he goes back there, wear a red suit. [Laughter.]

Mr. GALLAGHER. That would do it.

Mrs. BLACK. A bright red suit.

Mr. KAZEN. You might also invite him to come to California and make that same talk there. [Laughter.]

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Roybal?

Mr. ROYBAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Black, I am sorry that I wasn't here to hear your presentation, but I have read your remarks, have also heard your fielding of the various questions that were asked you, and as a fellow Californian, I would like to commend you, not only for your statement, but for the service that you have rendered to the United Nations over the last few months.

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you.

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Fascell made the statement he made this afternoon to me personally and other members of the committee before, so it wasn't just a matter of just simply making a statement because you were present; I am sure that this is his true feeling, and I know for a fact it is also the true feeling of the other member that served with you.

I do not have any questions but I again want to reiterate my great joy in hearing all these complimentary remarks, particularly when they are made about a fellow Californian.

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. One brief question, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

I notice, Mrs. Black, that you did propose at the 24th Assembly last fall that young people serve as regular members of the U.S. delegation. What is the prospect for such a suggestion being accepted? Is consideration being given to this proposal, and what do you think the outcome is likely to be?

Mrs. BLACK. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. I will have to defer the results, since December, since I have been away from the U.N. to Mr. Stillman, but many of the countries already have young delegates. For instance, Iran had young delegates. Not, I would say, less than 25 years of age, but around the age of 25.

Many of the developing countries have young delegates. I think it would be most important for at least one delegate from each country to be under the age of 25, or under the age of 21, perhaps.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You really are emphasizing youth today, aren't you?

Mrs. BLACK. Yes. As I get older. [Laughter.]

Mrs. BLACK. Young people become more important, because some day they are going to have to take care of me.

Mr. Stillman, do you have any comment?

Mr. STILLMAN. Mr. Congressman, this was one of the recommendations made by the preparatory committee for the 25th anniversary, that member governments consider including in their delegations a young delegate, under the age of 25. This was specifically in line with preparations for the 25th anniversary celebration, would follow from the World Youth Assembly. Our Government has this under very careful consideration. No decisions have been made at this point, but we are giving this serious thought.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I know we have a rollcall vote underway which is going to force us, probably, to suspend the discussion. I wish we had more chance to talk about what you anticipate will come out of this youth assembly. It sounds to me as if chaos might result, if you are going to have this many young people chosen, more or less at random. Is there going to be an agenda, and is there any indication of knowing what will come out of something like this? Is there any way in which we, or the member nations generally, can guide the discussions, or the conclusions that a group such as this might come to? What is going to be accomplished?

Perhaps it is a way of letting off steam, and developing a sense of participation, but I wouldn't think that would be quite enough, unless some conclusions and recommendations were made. However, if those recommendations were not acted upon by the seniors in the U.N., something might have developed that would not necessarily be constructive, if that is the way to put it.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, we could send them up on First Avenue between 50th and 60th, and let them watch the beautiful young people of New York.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. They will do that, whether we suggest it or not.

Mr. FASCELL. Then there won't be any meetings, so you won't have anything to worry about.

Mrs. BLACK. In my opinion, Mr. Congressman, and I haven't been close to the preparations for the youth congress in July, and maybe I am too optimistic, but I think if you give young people the responsibility, and give them the prestige that they will have by being in New York together representing all 126 countries in our world, that they will perform and probably give some very concrete and very important messages to us.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You mean, "Make love, not war"?

Mr. FASCELL. Well, that is a pretty good message. [Laughter.]

Mr. GALLAGHER. With that, the subcommittee——

Mr. FASCELL. Let's not knock it.

Mrs. BLACK. I am not that old. [Laughter.]

Mr. GALLAGHER (continuing). Mrs. Black and Mr. Stillman, thank you very much.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the chair.)

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

United Nations Role in the Field of Human Rights

TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 1970

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:35 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Chair apologizes for the delay. We have no way of programing the rollcalls of the House. I must extend an apology to our witnesses.

We meet this afternoon to continue our review of the United Nations system—and of the role which the United States should play in that "family" of international organizations.

Witnesses who appeared before us earlier discussed several major dimensions of the United Nations—political, security, economic, and social.

Today, we begin our consideration of the role which the United Nations plays in the very sensitive, and very vital, area of human rights.

To help us with this task, we are happy to welcome:

Mrs. Rita Hauser, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and our delegate to the 24th General Assembly of the United Nations; and

Dr. Morris Abram, until recently, president of Brandeis University, whose long and distinguished service to our country in the field of human rights—at the United Nations and in other forums—makes him an expert witness on this subject.

Mrs. Hauser, Dr. Abram, we have your statements before us.

With your consent, we will begin with Mrs. Hauser. After both of you finish your opening statements, we will move on to questions from the subcommittee.

The biographical sketches will be placed into the record at this point.

(The documents referred to follow:)

Mrs. Rita E. Hauser is U.S. Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission and serves as Alternate U.S. Delegate to the 24th General Assembly of the United Nations.

Mrs. Hauser is a native New Yorker and holds degrees in law and political economy from Harvard, New York University and the Universities of Strasbourg

and Paris. She is an international lawyer, member of the law firm of Moldover, Hauser and Strauss of New York and Paris. Mrs. Hauser was chairman of New Yorkers for Nixon by whom she was appointed to the two U.N. posts in 1969. She is chairman of the American Bar Association Committee on the International Aspects of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, and has written numerous articles and contributed to professional journals.

Dr. Morris B. Abram, former president of Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts, was born in Georgia and studied as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University. Among his governmental assignments, he served on the prosecuting staff of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany, (1946) and was the first general counsel of the Peace Corps (1961).

He was a member of the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities from 1962 to 1965; the U.S. Representative on the U.N. Commission for Human Rights from 1965 to 1968; and, from 1965 to 1968, was senior adviser to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. He is currently a member of the President's National Committee for Community Relations.

He is the co-author of the monograph, "How to Stop Violence in Your Community."

STATEMENT OF MRS. RITA E. HAUSER, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, AND ALTERNATE U.S. DELEGATE TO THE 24TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Mrs. HAUSER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think perhaps it might be helpful in looking at human rights in the context of the United Nations to review a little bit of the history of the drafting of the United Nations Charter and even before that, if I may, to go back to the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations to see the degree to which the world in a fairly short period of time took a decided and determined interest in problems of human rights.

I was quite astonished in reading the official history of the drafting of the League of Nations Covenant to find that on a proposal made by Japan at that time to include some fairly harmless language in the preamble to the effect that all peoples of all nations were equal, our delegate, Colonel House and Lloyd George of England were the two who most strenuously opposed any reference at all in that document to what we today call human rights or equality of peoples and nations.

As a consequence of that, the Covenant of the League of Nations is absolutely silent in the area of human rights.

One can only surmise, but perhaps it was the terrible events that occurred in the 25 years between Paris and San Francisco that made for a very different document, which is the United Nations Charter.

By that, of course, I am referring to the Nazi birth, the terrible World War II, the brutalities and atrocities that gave rise to the word "genocide" which had not been in our vocabulary before, and all the other events which I am sure you are familiar with.

When the drafters came to San Francisco, one of the key things that they did have on their mind this time was a statement both in the preamble and as one of the very purposes of the organization itself, to assure fundamental freedoms and human rights for all.

The Charter is eloquent in its commitment to that principle. I think it important to note two things here: First, that it was, of course, Americans who played a very large role in the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations, and particularly in this area.

It was through the great work of a predecessor of both Dr. Abram and myself, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, that a great deal of the work in human rights unfolded.

The Charter, itself, as I said earlier, states as one of the principal purposes of the organization the guaranteeing of fundamental freedoms and human rights for all.

If you read through the Charter, you will discover very easily that the drafters were convinced that the keeping of peace in the world depended very much on the accomplishment of that guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedom.

I think quite clearly that all of the events since 1945 have borne out their point of view, because the wars and threat of war that face us today are essentially problems of human rights.

We find, I think, as someone has stated, perhaps it was Dr. Abram who stated somewhere, there are very few fights nowadays over whether one king or another succeeds by this line or that, which used to mark the wars of the last centuries, and not too many countries fight over boundaries anymore.

But the great disputes that wrack the world are those for independence, freedom, guarantee of equality for all peoples.

We can obviously look to some of the places that are on the current scene to demonstrate that. I am thinking particularly of the war just finished in Nigeria-Biafra.

One can look, of course, to the Middle East which is a problem in depth in human rights.

One can look to Czechoslovakia for yet another demonstration of human rights.

In the period from 1946 to about 5 years ago, most of the work in the United Nations in the field of human rights which unfolds in the Commission on which I sit, was of a scholarly nature. Its representatives are very distinguished jurists and professors of law, and most of the work consisted of drafting documents which spelled out what are the basic human rights.

The most important of these documents is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted unanimously in 1948.

We, of course, were a strong supporter of that declaration. The declaration under current thinking of most international lawyers is not binding law, but it does lay down the particular categories of rights to which the world has agreed all people are entitled, whatever their political system or whatever form of government they may have.

This document, it is interesting to point out, Mr. Chairman, has been cited in the United Nations more frequently than any other document with the exception of the charter itself.

It was a guiding spirit for the drafting of constitution after constitution of the new nations that were born in the last 10 to 15 years, and we, ourselves, of course, have invoked it very frequently in all of the speeches and statements we make.

The document, itself, is interesting to look at for a moment. It really breaks up into two types of rights. The first set we are very familiar with, political rights, free speech, free association, free press, and so forth, and is something that we lean on heavily in our criticism, for example, of many practices in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

But the second category of rights is one that is now coming much more into the limelight and could be best described as economic and social rights. These include the right to a decent education, the right to good housing, protection in old age, the right to decent health, and so forth, which I believe even in our own country have only very recently come to the fore and been considered, indeed, as rights.

This is important because in the last 10 years, with the admission into the United Nations of country after country of people who were formerly colonies of other countries and very poor on the whole and underdeveloped, it is the economic and social rights that have moved to the forefront.

While we, of course, continually press the political rights as well as being of fundamental importance, one is always met with the argument that it is very hard in a country where people are illiterate and have no food to eat, to be concerned about the niceties of a free press or the exercise of free speech.

We have taken it upon ourselves to try to urge that both these categories of rights must move together, lest one destroy the other as has happened in some places in Africa, particularly, and in other places of the world.

But this emphasis on the economic and social rights is a very significant one in the field of human rights.

In the same way as these other new countries have come into the United Nations, there has been a shift away from the more technical emphasis on drafting of documents and conventions and treaties to a more practical approach to the problems of human rights.

In the last 5 years for sure, perhaps 10 years, the Commission has found itself more and more involved in what can fairly be described as political issues, which are grounded on human rights.

I, myself, find nothing wrong with this, and I am astonished when people express some shock at it.

What, after all, has happened in our own country but that human rights or civil rights which used to be fairly theoretical have now, of course, become the focal point of all of our domestic politics.

This, in the same way, has happened in the world context. So, for example, our Commission this session—it is now in current session—will be seized of a report of a special committee which attempted to look into the charges of abuses of the human rights of the Arabs in the occupied territories.

Obviously, that is a subject which is pregnant of political consequences, and we have to look at it both in political and human rights terms.

This has sometimes made the task of the United States difficult in the area of human rights, but I for one see no other development but this because the countries of the world are clamoring for the effective realization of human rights, and they are not particularly interested in a continued development of theoretical or legalistic drafting of documents that lay out these rights.

This, of course, takes us into very serious problems of implementation, and I think that Dr. Abram is going to speak somewhat on that so I will leave that subject to him.

We are as a leader in the field of human rights in the U.N. trying hard to see how we can take the mechanism of the United Nations to

effectively do something where there are specific abuses and violations of human rights. Of course, we run up always against the fundamental problem of the fact that the United Nations is a body of sovereign nations.

For example, as in the last General Assembly when I tried to discuss the plight of the Jews in the Soviet Union, the Soviets objected vociferously and argued this is a domestic issue and this is nobody else's business.

We have persistently taken the view that this is not correct, that substantial, serious, persistent violations concern the entire world.

Obviously, many countries which have violations of human rights do not wish to see them discussed in the world forum or wish in any way to let in factfinding bodies or any other judicial mechanism to change them.

This is the constant problem that we deal with in the area of human rights.

We put forth a proposal through the offices of other countries that looks as if it may pass at this session of the General Assembly, to create the office of a high commission for human rights who would, while his powers obviously are limited so he will be acceptable to all, at least have the catalyst role of being able to come into an area where there is a violation of human rights and try to deal with the government concerned on a confidential basis with the hope that the problem can be worked out.

Our Government originally was somewhat lukewarm about this but as the years have gone by we have become a fairly strenuous advocate of this office, which I am obviously pleased about, and we are hopeful that we will be able to carry it this year.

The office is opposed strenuously by the Soviet Union and its group of friends and, consequently, will be opposed by the Arab nations as well.

We will have to fight hard to get enough votes to get it through. But, as I said, I think it may be that it will come to pass this year.

We are also looking always at other forms of machinery that will permit us to deal effectively in the area of human rights violations.

I would be dishonest if I didn't say in this regard that we have to be prepared to face in the United Nations the criticisms of other nations as to our own human rights practices, and this, of course, always sets off some dismay in many quarters, including the quarters of the U.S. Senate at times in which various Senators have now and then expressed dismay that other countries would use the forms of the United Nations to challenge our own practices.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Not only in the Senate.

Mrs. HAUSER. I point out the Senate because of the particular problem of the human rights treaties, of which there are many now. One in particular which is in the limelight is the Genocide Convention.

We have been a leader in the drafting of these treaties. We have signed virtually all of them. We have yet to ratify any one that is significant.

The Genocide Convention which has been laying dead for 20 years was recently revived by the President's message to the Senate of about 2 weeks ago, and I am hopeful that the Senate will see fit this time to give its advice and consent to ratification.

But this has always put us in a very peculiar position in the United Nations where, as I said earlier, we certainly use the forum to criticize the practices of other countries vis-a-vis their own people, and we have not shown a corresponding willingness to join up in building of international law in this area and in permitting other countries to criticize us freely and openly in our own practices.

I am hoping that that is going to see a changeover the next few years.

That, basically, is what I wanted to say in my opening statement, Mr. Chairman, to give you a bird's-eye view of from where we have come and where we are at the moment.

(The text of Mrs. Hauser's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY MRS. RITA E. HAUSER, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

When the subject of human rights is considered in the context of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, one must at the outset recall the setting in which the Charter was drafted in San Francisco. The world was still at war, although the defeat of the Fascist forces was in sight. The war had witnessed the depths of human brutality and atrocities were commonplace. The Allied forces liberating Europe uncovered unbelievable horrors in the German concentration camps. Significantly, the Nazi excesses were not solely a wartime phenomenon. They commenced years before the war, and should have been a warning to the neighbors of Nazi Germany as to what was in store for them. Yet, most of the Western world looked the other way, immobilized by the dogma of sovereign domestic jurisdiction which dictated that the way a government treated persons within its own boundaries was not a matter of international concern.

Those who gathered in San Francisco in 1945 to write the Charter for the new world organization established to maintain the peace had in mind the terrible sufferings endured by unfortunate millions in Europe and Asia. The evidence was overwhelming that peace and human rights were closely linked. There was a determination that the legal rules of the past must advance to such a point that the individual would be afforded protection on a plane higher than national sovereignty, that the world community henceforth should have a legitimate interest in the situation of all human beings, that world stability and the prospects for continued peace depended significantly upon the observance of basic human rights everywhere. No longer should it be possible for a government to violate basic human rights immune from the attention, concern and cooperative action of the world outside.

Those who framed the Charter included within its Preamble a reaffirmation of faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. Among the Purposes of the United Nations as laid down in the Charter is the achievement of international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. The General Assembly was assigned a specific role to assist in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Under Article 56 all members of the United Nations obligated themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of universal respect for the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. And finally the Economic and Social Council was directed to set up a Commission for the promotion of human rights. Thus the competence of the United Nations in the field of human rights was clearly and without equivocation established by the very terms of the Charter. The provisions as to human rights constituted an innovation over past practice in that what were once domestic matters were transformed into matters of international concern.

By virtue of these novel provisions the United Nations began its life twenty-five years ago faced with the task of developing a meaningful, effective role for the Organization in promoting human rights in the world. It is certainly fitting that we should at this time, twenty-five years later, look back at what has been accomplished and look ahead at what we should hope for the United Nations in the future.

From the outset, the focus of United Nations human rights effort lay in the Human Rights Commission which began its labors in 1947. There gathered together in the Commission a remarkable group of people led by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and Nobel Peace Prize Winner Rene Casin, who at once began the monumental task of defining for the world community the set of principles and goals to be elaborated by the United Nations as a target for achievement in the promotion of the human rights of all. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. It stands today as one of the most remarkable achievements of the United Nations. The Declaration was a guide for many new states which modeled provisions of their constitutions upon its articles. The Declaration has served and continues to serve as the standard of conduct by which the actions of governments all over the world can be measured.

Once the Declaration was completed, the appropriate United Nations organs turned to the drafting of international legal norms in the form of human rights treaties. This work progressed not only in the United Nations but in some of the United Nations specialized agencies as well. Today, there are more than twenty human rights treaties covering a wide range of basic rights. Most of the treaties are gradually securing acceptance by the majority of members of the world community. These treaties established legal rights for many people who before were without basic political or economic rights. Yet, this is not to say that treaties constitute the whole answer to assure international protection of basic rights. Some governments which have become parties to them have failed to live up to their terms. Other governments, few in number, refuse to become parties to them at all. And in almost all cases the treaties do not include effective measures of implementation whereby the individual can be assured of procedural guarantees to secure the benefits of the rights accorded to him in these treaties.

The record of formal acceptance of human rights treaties on the part of the United States compares poorly with that of most other leading countries. Our record has been one which needs improvement. We should be willing to be bound by these treaties not because our citizens need the protections which they would afford, but because our holding back from these treaties has given rise to doubts all over the world as to our intentions to cooperate internationally in promoting the principles which we espouse. The United States stands pre-eminent in the world in its concern for the human rights of its own citizens. Our Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights, and our fully independent judiciary have served continuously to demonstrate to the world our national commitment that the rights of all our citizens must be fully observed. Our natural role is one of leadership and, in fact, there is no doubt that the people of the world look to the United States to point the way in improving human rights observance through the United Nations. Our failure to ratify most of the human rights treaties is not understood by many countries. We seem unwilling to participate fully in cooperative actions for promoting human rights, which actions are called for by the Charter.

When the work of the United Nations in the field of human rights for the first twenty years is reviewed, it is readily apparent that the emphasis during this initial period was on the drafting of numerous international instruments, such as declarations, treaties and recommendations. The problems of human rights were much discussed in the abstract and the texts which were drawn up were designed to fit into a theoretical setting without specific concern for concrete cases. The approach was theoretical from the point of view of the ideals to be achieved. In addition to the drafting process, those bodies of the United Nations concentrating on human rights matters devised other procedures for carrying out the United Nations mandate in the human rights field. The United States Government, particularly during the 1950's took a prominent part in developing some of these new procedures, such as the submission of periodic reports by governments and the conduct of special studies of particular rights through the services of specially designated independent experts.

The archives of the United Nations relating to human rights were well stocked over the years with numerous studies which have been carried out, as noted above, through the assistance of experts. The studies covered a wide range of specific rights, as for example discrimination in religious rights, discrimination in political rights, freedom from arbitrary arrest, slavery. They have been based on surveys made by the expert rapporteurs covering conditions within countries and in this way enabled some amount of attention indirectly to be focused on actual conditions and cases of specific violations. These studies have in many cases been the basis for follow-up recommendations or for draft conventions.

They have given the governments which have been directly concerned a better ability for devising measures to meet these problems.

And finally since 1955 there has been a U.N. program of advisory services in the field of human rights. The rationale for this last category has been that governments can benefit from learning about the experiences of others through such devices as seminars, fellowships, and the technical assistance supplied by experts.

The foregoing description of the principal emphasis of the United Nations during the first twenty years must also take account of the fact that the United Nations did on occasion directly concern itself with concrete human rights problems. For example, the United Nations took up in its early years the violations of human rights provisions of the peace treaties with certain Eastern European countries. The United Nations concerned itself with forced labor in the Soviet Union. Human rights violations which occurred in Hungary in 1956 received the close attention and condemnation of the United Nations bodies. The United Nations also from its early days has been concerned with conditions in South Africa. At first the question of the plight of Indians in South Africa was considered, and since 1952 the United Nations has been annually seized of the problem of *apartheid*. The records of the United Nations are replete with resolutions condemning the failure to assure the rights of all peoples in South Africa.

In assessing the United Nations experience in the field of human rights, the first twenty-five years should probably be separated at the twenty-year line. As has been shown in the foregoing summary, the emphasis in the first twenty years has been more on the abstract, upon a consideration of principles and upon the drafting of treaties and generalized recommendations and resolutions. A distinct shift occurred with the advent of a much enlarged United Nations in the mid-1960's after the admission of numerous new African states. Particularly dating from 1967 when the Human Rights Commission was enlarged to its present size of 32 (the original size was 15) the focus for human rights activities has shifted in the direction of specific human rights violations throughout the world. Needless to say, the impetus for this shift has come largely from the new members who have insisted that the human rights provisions of the Charter must be given more practical scope, at least as they pertain to conditions in southern Africa. The debates of the Human Rights Commission of today bear little resemblance to those fifteen years ago. Now the Commission devotes a major part of its attention to discussion of particular situations involving human rights violations. To meet the new emphasis the Commission has attempted to use modified or new devices. For example, in dealing with South African questions the Commission has adopted the technique of a special rapporteur to draw up detailed reports drawn from a wide variety of sources as to conditions in that area. In addition, the Commission has established special investigatory bodies of experts which have been given the mandate to travel to the actual scene of alleged violations, to hear witnesses and to gather information on the spot to the extent that they can gain access to the areas under scrutiny. This device has been used not only in southern Africa, but also last year with regard to alleged human rights violations in the Israeli occupied territories of the Middle East. In addition, the General Assembly has established certain special committees to deal on a continuing basis with particular problems relating to southern Africa or with problems of colonial countries and peoples.

The United Nations is moving in a new direction in the field of human rights. The movement has been led by the new majority of non-Western states who have expressed their extreme impatience with the former emphasis upon consideration of human rights in the abstract, on the basis of studies, and in the drafting of instruments. This has not been a development which has met with enthusiastic approval from the Western governments, including the United States. Nevertheless, this is a challenge which faces the entire membership and a challenge to which the United States must be prepared to contribute its own ideas in finding the best way to travel in a new direction. There must be persistent efforts devoted to securing a common ground between the more conservative views of the Western countries and the more radical views of the newer members of the United Nations. It must be recognized and accepted on the part of all United Nations members that the human rights provisions of the Charter do properly lead to the involvement of the United Nations with concrete violations. There must be developed better procedures for dealing with these

cases so as to diminish the political considerations which often operate to frustrate meaningful measures to be taken through the United Nations. One proposal which has received enthusiastic and persistent support of the United States Government has been the idea for the creation of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. According to the draft resolution, the High Commissioner would be a new top-level post in the Secretariat of the United Nations. His functions would be essentially advisory and his operations with respect to individual governments would only be with the consent of those governments. He would have as a basic function the focusing of attention upon serious human rights problems; he would be a center for bringing helpful influences to bear through the United Nations for their solution. It is hoped that his office could be built to a level of respect and prestige which would enable human rights matters to be treated in the United Nations on an objective basis, free from propaganda and political influence. This High Commissioner idea has been thoroughly considered by the Human Rights Commission and has been endorsed by that body. It was recently considered by the General Assembly at its last session and the Assembly agreed to give it the highest priority at the 25th anniversary session. It would be a fitting token for celebration for the 25th anniversary if the overwhelming majority of the United Nations members could find a common ground for agreeing upon the creation of this new, imaginative and potentially highly creative post.

There is no denying that for people throughout the world, the United Nations stands as a hope for improving the human rights of people everywhere. Inescapable evidence of the position occupied by the United Nations in this regard is the thousands of petitions which annually are addressed to the United Nations from private persons and groups. These petitions report specific intances of human rights violations and appeal for help from the United Nations to bring about improvements. Certainly a great many of these petitions are frivolous or present relatively minor problems. But a great many others attest to the existence of very serious problems in the world, which for one reason or another governments decline or refuse to bring before the United Nations. These petitions are an untapped source of information. There is much more that should and can be done in dealing with them in the United Nations than is now the case. Under existing rules the United Nations simply notes these petitions in summary fashion. By express decision taken by the Economic and Social Council in 1959, the United Nations has denied for itself the role of taking any action with respect to them. This totally negative attitude needs changing. In this area too the United States has been active in the search for some better procedure. Our search has tended to focus upon the establishment of a means for screening these petitions so that those which reveal patterns of gross violations of human rights in the world would at least come to the formal attention of the Human Rights Commission. The petitions would as well be made available to the High Commissioner in the conduct of his functions as outlined above.

CONCLUSIONS

Twenty-five years of United Nations activities have produced many words embodied in studies, resolutions, declarations and treaties relating to human rights. The question can be put whether all of this effort has been to much avail. While one frequently hears allegations that the high purposes of the framers of the Charter in the field of human rights have fallen far short of fulfillment, one must judge the progress made in the field fairly and in full realization of the utter novelty of the endeavors which the United Nations undertook twenty-five years ago. A significant beginning has been made in breaking new ground, in firmly establishing the competence of the United Nations in this field. The world is today very much farther advanced in its acceptance of the basic premise that the rights of human beings are rights which concern the international community of nations. The United Nations has erected a framework of goals and laws which undeniably have had their effect upon the conduct of governments. Even in those areas of the world where respect for human rights is acknowledged the least and where the competence of the United Nations is most regularly questioned, international concern symbolized by UN involvement in matters affecting those countries has had a real influence. The evidence is clear that conditions are better than they might have been without a United Nations. We know that governments are restrained in their actions by the need to justify their conduct before the bar of world opinion at the United Nations.

The first twenty-five years have emphatically not been a demonstration of ineffectiveness. They have been a demonstration of trial and error, of efforts to find the best way to influence events through United Nations actions. The ideals have not yet been fully achieved; much remains to be done. The United States must be in the forefront of the constant search for better, more effective means of involvement, for the best ways to enable the United Nations to promote human rights, as the Charter requires it to do, whereby the legitimate interests of the member governments are taken into account as well as the legitimate rights of every human being. We can in the United States do a great deal by the example we set at home. We can do a great deal, too, by giving all reasonable, honest support in the United Nations to making the human rights provisions of the Charter work in a way which will find a true common ground between our own views and those held by the other members devoted to the same cause as ourselves.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Dr. Abram.

STATEMENT OF DR. MORRIS B. ABRAM, FORMER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Mr. ABRAM. I recently resigned as president of Brandeis University, Mr. Chairman, to correct the record.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you.

Mr. ABRAM. I certainly want to agree with, I think, everything Mrs. Hauser has said, and particularly the important component which human rights plays in the questions of ultimate peace or war.

To the list of hot wars or cold wars or threatened wars which she referred to I would, of course, be able, and you, to add more, but I could add the instance of India and Pakistan which is a religious division in some respects; the recent problems in Cyprus, which resulted from ethnic and perhaps religious differences or suspicions; the threatening cloud over South Africa and Rhodesia; and there, of course, other instances in which human rights play a major role in some of the disputes that are productive or potentially productive of armed conflict.

This only underlines what President Kennedy said a few months before his death rather perceptibly: "Is not peace in the final analysis a matter of human rights?"

I am fully convinced that the production of human rights principles and, indeed, of international law, has been a mighty achievement of the United Nations, focused to a large extent initially in the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and then working through its parent body, the Human Rights Commission, the Social and Economic Council and then to the U.N. General Assembly.

But as great as the U.N. has been on production in this field, to use an American term, it has been very poor on distribution.

The international law process and the obligation we owe to the United Nations for its production I think is truly quite great.

I would add a word to what Ambassador Hauser said a moment ago about civil and political rights stated in the universal declaration as compared to the economic and social rights, for I think it is here that you begin to see some of the potentials for conflict on questions of human rights in the United Nations.

I know when I first went to the U.N. Human Rights Organization, I was very proud of what my country had achieved in the area of civil and political rights.

I think the right of free speech, press and assembly, and the associated Bill of Rights in America are as well guaranteed here as anywhere else in the world.

When I would refer with pride to this record, though still uncompleted, I recall the feeling of many around the table that as good as our record was in that area we had a terrible record in the protection of economic and social rights in this country, particularly as you measure potential in a great and rich country against the record of the distribution of rights.

I was at first, I suppose, as any American lawyer might be, somewhat astonished that so much of the world could regard the right to a decent house, the right to decent medical care, the right to decent education as a right.

My instantaneous reaction was yes, these are worthwhile goals but in what sense rights?

We have been accustomed in this country to think of rights as something protected in the Constitution. But I think this argument really fails when we consider that Eleanor Roosevelt cast a vote for the universal declaration of human rights and this particular document is becoming more and more a basis of the recognition of legal rights as well as opportunities and moral obligations of states.

I suspect the U.N. human rights organs and perhaps the General Assembly as a whole have served an extremely important educating function in this country and are causing a great many of us to see and understand that at least for a large part of the world, and certainly for an increasing number of Americans, the rights to these economic and social goals are indeed rights and must be protected if we are to have a viable society that hangs together.

I agree with Ambassador Hauser that the problem is one of implementation, and I want to speak to that in a minute.

But there is another associated problem, and that is the problem of getting the United Nations itself to deal with problems of human rights in an evenhanded way. It simply does not and has not.

I think the politicalization of the United Nations' human rights organs has been most unfortunate because if you look at the record in the last few years, especially since many of the smaller states have come into nationhood, and as there has been a proliferation of states each with one vote in the General Assembly, it is a fact that sometimes essentially moral questions are decided by majority votes in which each state has one, and sometimes with results that simply cannot be defended in terms of right and wrong.

All of this arises, the failure to deal evenhandedly with human rights in the U.N., I think, out of the politics of nations.

So far as I can tell, you are able almost automatically to get a majority of the United Nations for a point of view with respect to apartheid and associated South African questions, and also you are able to obtain an almost litmus paper instantaneous majority against Israel.

Let me give you an illustration that happened when I was serving in the Human Rights Commission. A delegate from a non-aligned state came to see me one day and said, "Mr. Abram, we would like to condemn the Soviet Union for its mistreatment of intellectuals, but we are not going to do that. We don't dare. We would like to condemn

you, the United States, for its conduct of the war in Vietnam. But, again, we don't dare."

So I said, "What are you going to do?"

He said, "We are going to condemn Israel for its treatment of Arab refugees."

This delegate personally, and I suspect maybe his government, felt more strongly on the first two questions than on the latter, but they exercised the morality against a power which was relatively weak in terms of the United Nations' votes.

But we are not guiltless either, Mr. Chairman. I can recall in 1968 when, because of certain actions taken in the subcommission, the Human Rights Commission had before it a question dealing with some further studies on the repression of the Greek junta and certain repressive actions in Haiti.

I can recall that the United States didn't stand up too well, either. We were pressured tremendously by Greece, because Greece contended, and, of course, this contention was true, that it was part of NATO, and the United States had no business using polemics or taking any action against a NATO ally, even though I think we felt very keenly that the arguments against the Greek junta were perfectly valid, and as against Haiti equally so.

I would like to first of all suggest that the United States can take the lead in human rights. The United States is very powerful.

Moreover, the United States has very little to fear in terms of turning the coin on the other side and opening up its own domestic practices to the outside world.

Our practices are known to the outside world. We are an open showcase. There is nothing we can conceal. The press ferrets out almost every aspect of our society, all of the warts and blemishes. We are one state powerful enough and open enough, it seems to me, that would permit our self-interest, if self-interest is the test, to act in an even-handed, fair, and objective way on the question of human rights.

Already in our country we have given, and the Supreme Court recognizes this fact, preference to the Bill of Rights, a high constitutional preference. It has a preferred position.

I would like to suggest to you that the time has come and that we could derive much benefit and great standing, and great moral leadership in the United Nations on all questions, if we would simply announce to the world that our foreign policy, so far as human rights are concerned, is going to be pursued even-handedly, calling the shots against friend and foe alike, and willing to have those shots called against us without any loss of friendship or without any recrimination by states so doing.

It could be contended that this would hurt us with certain of our allies upon whom our national security and vital state interests depend.

But may I suggest that if we announce this as a firm policy, the fact that we condemned a junta in Greece for its tyrannical and abusive practices, this was just an eccentricity of the United States because of the preferred position to which we give human rights.

We would not lose those who depend upon us and upon whom we depend for some support, if this were an announced policy and was pursued uniformly against everybody.

I think the time has come for us to do that. If we did, I would suggest to you that we would have more credibility and more standing in the United Nations than from any other single act that we might take.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Besides Greece, what specifics would you suggest?

Mr. ABRAM. Haiti is another excellent one. I could think of a great many. We might even have no difficulty at all in saying what at least the President has said with respect to what has gone on in Vietnam, Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. GALLAGHER. How about Cuba?

Mr. ABRAM. Well, I think we would have no reluctance to condemn what is going on in Cuba.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How would you feel about condemning the treatment of the Arabs in the occupied territory?

Mr. ABRAM. If that be our opinion, we should state our view.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What would it prove?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Perhaps we should let Doctor Abram continue.

Mr. ABRAM. As to the other question I mentioned, which is still a very large question, it is how do we proceed to implement the human rights thrust through its organs in the United Nations.

First of all, I think we should ratify the treaties, or at least those of them that are appropriate for ratification. I certainly would put among those the treaty on genocide which is a key, a capstone and a corner, it seems to me, of human rights policy.

Another treaty which I think certainly deserves ratification very, very quickly is the discrimination treaty dealing with race, the treaty outlawing all forms of racial discrimination.

I would hope that eventually the treaty on religious intolerance would be in a form that we can ratify. I think the treaty with respect to forced labor is long overdue for ratification, and the treaty on the political rights for women, as, indeed, some others.

To the contention that human rights do not constitute a proper area for the exercise of the treatymaking power of the United States, I think the argument comes a little late, because, after all, the Senate did advise and consent to the U.N. Charter which clearly foreshadows the promotion of international human rights and it was well known when the charter was ratified that treaties and covenants are one of the principal means for the implementation of these rights.

The next thing I would suggest is simply an agreement, and an underlining of what Ambassador Hauser has said with respect to the High Commissioner.

I was in the Human Rights Commission when the issue of the High Commissioner was first raised, I heard the Soviet arguments, and I have even heard some of the debates that went on within our administration at the time, within the Government of the United States, within the State Department, as to the pros and cons of the High Commissioner.

But I think this is a minimal first step. For who would the High Commissioner be? What would he represent? He would be the eyes and the ears and international conscience institutionalized as far as that can be.

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I would suggest that some of the troubled hearts and consciences that arose over the struggle in Biafra would have in some respects been satisfied had there been a Commissioner who stood above the nations, who represented an international authority, who had the power to investigate and the power to state his views.

I would also suggest that what went on in Indonesia in an earlier part of the 1960's, when at least we are told 400,000 people were slain, that that could not have been a stain upon mankind without any voice being raised at an international level.

Insofar as I know, no voice was raised in the United Nations with the exception of a very faint reference made by the United States on a minor occasion with respect to what might be going on in Indonesia.

The idea that 400,000 people could have been slain in that civil war, or whatever it was without international voice being raised in the United Nations, I think was a shame.

I do not doubt that the High Commissioner will be relatively powerless in terms of ability to move with force, and perhaps completely powerless.

But I would suggest to you that there is a force now small in the world but constantly growing called the force of public opinion.

I would like to give you a few illustrations of the power of this force.

For a long time, the Soviet Union, as did other states, had a United Nations office within its national territory. These offices were manned by foreign persons, that is, foreign to the state in which the office was located. Because of a practice of Soviet citizens sending petitions to the U.N. through this office then manned by foreigners, the Soviet Union got, insofar as I can recall, and obtained permission to man this office solely with Soviet citizens, which gives you some idea how a very powerful state fears even the trickle of petitions from within its national bounds.

In 1966, when I was on the Human Rights Commission, I saw a state, Burundi, the Kingdom of Burundi, change its opinion in about 10 minutes. The International Labor Organization had filed a charge with respect to the rights of certain workers and what was happening to them in the Kingdom of Burundi, and the Kingdom of Burundi had taken a very contemptuous and obstinate attitude until on the agenda of the Human Rights Commission at the instance of the ILO there appeared this item for consideration, consideration on the question of whether or not it would be further considered.

As the television cameras focused in upon the hearing, and as the press began to scribble, and as the lights were turned on, the representative of the Kingdom of Burundi submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Labor Organization.

I also recall the time when the Soviet Union, through a Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, published a book, an infamous book entitled "Judaism Without Embellishment," a hysterical anti-Jewish statement, rather reminiscent of the cartoons and texts during the Nazi days.

We were able to raise the issue in the Human Rights Commission and shortly thereafter the book was withdrawn from circulation, and a capital arrest was given to its author.

Finally, in 1968, Ambassador Goldberg, as he then was, came into the Human Rights Commission and took the place of the U.S. Representative and spoke of the repression by the Soviet Union of intellectuals in that country.

The matter was aired in the press, fully aired. The NewYork Times must have circulated it to a million and a half people, with maybe six million readers, and the wire services carried the Ambassador's text extensively, and also the reply of the Soviet Representative. But, upon the termination of the hearings that year, when the record was being bound up and the report being made, the Soviet Union made a superhuman and successful effort to get Ambassador Goldberg's remarks expunged from the record, or the reference to them in the summary reports.

To expend this kind of effort to prevent something like that going into a United Nations document that would be circulated throughout the world, to the world capitals, illustrates that the Soviet Union puts a very high price on world public opinion.

So even if the U.N. organs and human rights have not been terribly good on distribution, or terribly good in implementation, I would say they have been eminently worthwhile in building a body of international law, and also developing some sensitivities with respect to the consciences of individuals and ultimately the consciences of states.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would be the last to doubt that the United Nations has some tremendous problems where vital state interests are concerned and where the issue is survival itself.

But the human rights field is a field with issues that have a great deal to do ultimately with war and peace, but which also appeal to conscience and very seldom at a given time appeal or have to do with the vital state interests immediately.

This is an area in which the United Nations has a contribution and can make a greater contribution. Because without confronting completely the great power conflicts, the human rights organs have the ability, if they were strengthened somewhat, to be extremely useful.

I used to believe that S O S was "Save Our Ship." I think the signals have been changed by the course of recent events. I think it really amounts to "Save Our Species."

I would suggest that sovereignty is going to have to be diminished in the conventional sense in which we have understood it if we are to save our species.

In the human rights field, I have frequently said, and I believe, that there is no sovereign right for a power to wrong its own citizens, and I do not believe there is any sovereign power either of a state to pollute the atmosphere which we share with all the world.

In these two areas, the United Nations, without involving the great power conflicts in the Security Council, can perhaps make a gaining toward the great definition of the kind of sovereign power with which the world can live. Perhaps it will have to go on from those humble beginnings, but we have to begin somewhere.

May I suggest in closing that in the ILO, the World Health Organization, the specialized agencies and, indeed, in the human rights apparatus, we are beginning to erode away some of these far out concep-

tions of sovereignty which have plagued mankind and have been productive of holocaust.

Thank you.

(The statement as submitted follows:)

STATEMENT OF DR. MORRIS B. ABRAM

Mr. Chairman: From every corner of this shrinking planet distress signals are going up, the uncontrolled population explosion; a massive pollution of the environment; the widening and dangerous gap in production and living standards between developed and developing countries; burgeoning racial, ethnic and religious tensions tearing at the fabric of civil society; and, of course, the unchecked escalation of both national conflicts and overkill weaponry. The signals are unmistakable in their clarity; SOS—"Save Our Species".

It is precisely because our species is in mortal danger that we must look for solutions to the international community. For none of these death-laden problems are fully or even adequately responsive to measures taken within a restricted national framework. That is why the effective functioning of that sole instrument representing the international community—the United Nations—is so essential.

It goes without saying that this relatively delicate instrument must not be burdened with problems which are beyond the scope of its limited capacities. While multi-lateralism is generally a more efficacious means toward peacekeeping, nonetheless, in areas of power conflicts involving the vital interests of the state, the UN or its major powers can only provide, at best, the most general guidelines or a setting for private and direct discussions between the contesting parties. To require it to do more, especially where the issue goes to the heart of security and state service, is merely an exercise in futility. Even more damaging would be the reinforcement of the terrifying but increasingly widespread notion of the UN's irrelevance. The Arab-Israel conflict offers an immediate illustration of this point: negotiations between the parties directly involved are the only meaningful method to end the present dangerous impasse.

But in the social and economic domains the UN can and must play a crucial, if not vital role. Especially is this true in the area I am most familiar with—human rights. And it may indeed by the area which, in the long run, is the most indispensable for the fulfillment of the UN's peacekeeping function. For, at the core of the many of the threatening political conflicts of our age are oppressions based upon racial, ethnic, and religious grounds. Restrictions upon individual freedoms also have their logical interconnections with foreign aggression, as the brutal Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia so clearly demonstrates. Our late President, John F. Kennedy, brilliantly illuminated this axiom when he rhetorically asked: "Is not peace, in the last analysis, a matter of human rights?"

If, however, the UN is to perform the function which its Charter prescribes in both the Preamble and Articles 55 to 56—universal respect for human rights—structural changes are required. Twenty-five years after the Charter's adoption there is still no general machinery for giving effect to the human rights provisions of the Charter and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We are witness today to an enormous, if regrettably, misplaced trust in the UN by the peoples of the world. Every year some 15,000 complaints reach the UN from individuals in all parts of the globe claiming violations of their rights. Since the emergence of the UN, a quarter of a million such communications have arrived—all properly processed and promptly pigeon-holed. For there is no mechanism for effectively considering the petitions, for redress of grievances.

The tragedy is heightened by the great risks run by individuals in repressive regimes to get their petitions to UN Headquarters. Everyone knows of the courage of the dozens of Soviet intellectuals who have aroused the wrath of the Party authorities by appealing to UN organs. And I mention here my deep respect for those 75 Soviet Jews who have put their futures on the line, by calling upon the UN this past year to assist them in emigrating to Israel in order to live the kind of full Jewish life of which they are deprived in the USSR.

Without machinery to deal with these petitions, the UN is helpless to implement basic human rights. One key structural change proposed is the establishment of an international Ombudsman or High Commissioner for Human Rights. The High Commissioner would have the authority to place human-rights matters on the agenda, so to speak, of the international conscience. He would function as observer and fact-gatherer, as an intermediary away from the public spotlights

and, in extreme cases, as the UN agent who would expose abuses to the glare of world opinion.

We must vigorously support this proposal. And we must help endow the UN Commission on Human Rights with a mechanism whereby, at a minimum, "consistent patterns of gross violations" of human rights can be examined and acted upon. The proposed mechanism has not moved beyond an embryonic stage and determined efforts are required to move it to a level where it can take on a definitive form.

Finally, we must not be hesitant about utilizing the forums of UN bodies to raise the pressing human rights issues of the day. But to do so, we must depoliticize the complex of human rights problems. Only in this way can we encourage others to quit using human rights as a political device. The fundamental difficulty with the UN human rights program today is its politicization as well as the politicization of the organs seized with the program.

These UN organs must be insulated from buffeting political winds. We should welcome a searching light of world opinion beamed into every hidden corner, whether among our allies or even ourselves. Just as we give a preferred position to the Bill of Rights in our own nation, so too are we obligated to give a preferred position to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in the international community. Only then can we help create the climate which no nation is free from the glare of public exposure.

The role which Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt charted for us as champion of human rights in the world arena can only be abdicated at our peril. We must be involved in the expansion of the rule of law covering human rights to every region. That is the purpose of international conventions and we have been derelict in our responsibility in failing to ratify more than a mere two of them in the human rights field. It is a scandal of the highest order that we have not as yet ratified the Genocide Convention, a treaty which cuts to the very foundation of human rights—the right to life.

Almost sixty percent—75 countries—of the UN membership have ratified this Convention. Still we hesistate, and I can only express shame that my colleagues in the American Bar Association advance hoary arguments to defeat the proposal to ratify. The Senate is obligated to give this vote less credence than the moral conscience of the American people and mankind itself.

Another treaty which deserves our highest priority is the Convention on Racial Discrimination. The international ban on all forms of racial and ethnic discrimination, though retaining through a reservation the right of speech and association, would be consonant with our country's highest purposes. I hope that the President will transmit this Convention to the Senate as quickly as possible and that the latter's consent will be expeditiously forthcoming.

Above everything, we should be insistant upon the moral principles deriving from individual conscience. Such principles are not products of majorities. Automatic majorities in the General Assembly condemning one or another state is hardly a measure of the world conscience, especially when such majorities are manipulated by Arab powers and their allies.

George Santayana once observed that he who chooses not to recall the past is doomed to re-live it. The tragic experiences of yesterday teach us to demand the establishment of effective implementation machinery, isolated from political pressures, to advance human rights to a new level. We shall not re-live the past when we lead the world's community in extending everywhere the rule of law based upon moral principles.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much. That was a very interesting statement.

In addition to the conventions on genocide and racial discrimination, are there any other conventions presently pending before the U.S. Senate?

Mrs. HAUSER. Yes; a whole host of them. Dr. Abram mentioned a few that President Kennedy had sent up to the Senate and which were not given consent to.

The political rights of women is one; forced labor is another. There is one on freedom of information which has been pending for a very long time.

There is one on nondiscrimination in education.

Genocide remains, of course, the major old one that is still outstanding.

There are always attempts to draft new conventions, and one which we will get to work on again is the one to eliminate religious intolerance. This one will be somewhat difficult in the drafting.

However, I think the drafting stage is about over. Most of these conventions that are now already finished cover the wide area of human rights concern. Our own country has, apart from the very new countries and some small countries, the poorest record in the world in terms of ratification.

We stand, if I remember the litany, with Togoland, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and South Africa, the nations that have not seen fit to ratify any of these conventions.

In fairness, we have certain constitutional problems based upon the federal system and the problem of States rights and our own distribution of powers in these areas between the Federal Government and the States. But most of us who have studied the problem in depth feel that these are not real arguments but are, rather, surface arguments, and that there is nothing constitutionally to prohibit us from ratifying them.

I think you will get a good chance, Mr. Chairman, to see some of these arguments aired again when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee calls hearings on genocide which Senator Fulbright indicated to me he intends to do shortly.

You still get a feeling of the hesitancy of numerous of the Senators to go forward internationally in the area of human rights. It gets very difficult to build international law, to lay down rules of behavior of States vis-a-vis their own citizens, when the leading country in the world, to wit, our own, does not participate in the effort. In fact, one can argue whether or not you can have international law based on consensus as to what is right and what is wrong when our own country has not subscribed to a particular rule of law.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What do you think we should do now?

Mrs. HAUSER. I think we should ratify, and ratify rapidly, at least the major conventions which would show that we do intend to participate in the building of international law. I would like to see some effort on this side of the House in that area, though you obviously have no constitutional function in ratification. It is important to express a point of view.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Are you at odds with the Department of State on this question of whether or not there are constitutional prohibitions?

Mrs. HAUSER. No; the State Department is of a single mind on that, and on the genocide convention, for example, the Attorney General issued an opinion in which he stated there are no constitutional impediments.

If I may say in the boldest language or the bluntest langauge, these constitutional arguments are fake arguments. They are not real legal arguments. They have a certain surface appeal, if you argue in terms of States rights, but if you look at the fabric of the Constitution on the one hand, and on the other hand the 4,000 treaties in which this country has already entered, which deal with many areas traditionally left to the States—not human rights but other ones—we have long ago passed those arguments.

But it is human rights that set off a certain emotional action because it is human rights.

Mr. GALLAGHER. On the question of the High Commissioner of Human Rights—and I happen to believe that would be a good extension of the program—there are others who believe that that may well undermine the U.S. support of the United Nations efforts.

It is argued that the Human Rights Commissioner could very well interfere in U.S. affairs to a point where the U.S. support, which is very necessary for the funding of the United Nations, may disappear.

We see this in the arguments on aid each year. Why should we give aid to India when they don't vote with us in the United Nations, and so forth?

You and I know what the sophisticated arguments are. But if you had a General Assembly voting every week to investigate areas of discontent within the United States—and there is no way that we can affect it at all—you can see how the funding of the United Nations could drop very rapidly.

What is your feeling on that?

Mrs. HAUSER. I see your point.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I am giving a political point.

Mrs. HAUSER. On the High Commissioner itself, the proposal to establish him obviously gives him, as Dr. Abram said, very limited powers, because to give him any broad powers would mean that the wide range of countries in the U.N. would not accept him.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Also, as was pointed out, it is a tremendous forum for publicity, if he should choose to condemn the United States every week or so.

Mrs. HAUSER. He has only the right to work with them. We all agreed that the element of consent was essential. The High Commissioner cannot just come in and look at any situation.

Let us take a concrete case like Greece. There have been thousands and thousands of petitions received at the Human Rights Commission about the situation in Greece, not simply from Greeks but from Americans, from people all over the world who are concerned about this.

The High Commissioner would then approach the Greek Government quietly and indicate that this is a serious matter of concern and determine if they wish to work with him in a cooperative way to see how the situation can be ameliorated.

If they turn him down, he has no further power.

Mr. GALLAGHER. He certainly has the power of a large and powerful voice in the press.

Mrs. HAUSER. Yes; but if you know the United Nations he couldn't possibly do that and continue to enjoy his job.

Mr. GALLAGHER. He what?

Mrs. HAUSER. He couldn't do that and continue to enjoy his job.

Mr. FASCELL. He might not enjoy it but he would hold it.

Mrs. HAUSER. It is the same problem that U Thant faces.

Mr. GALLAGHER. That is exactly the point. Many people may be unhappy with the Secretary General, but the question of replacing him presents an even greater problem.

Mrs. HAUSER. I will grant you it is hard to find a character for anything that the whole world agrees on.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Precisely.

Mrs. Hauser. If you are going to keep the respect and cooperation all of the governments, any one of these high commissioners has to tread very carefully. If he doesn't, he would rapidly lose the support of many of the countries. But in fairness to your question, I do think that there is an attitude in this country which is harmful to our whole posture. That is what Dr. Abram and I have been trying to point out.

There are many Americans who feel a perfect freedom to criticize that which is going on in other countries, and they think that it is right to criticize, that they are justified. Then they are completely offended when some other country in the world would like to chastise us for our wrongful practices.

Mr. Gallagher. Everybody can criticize.

Mr. Fascell. Is this something new?

Mr. Gallagher. I would like to ask you another question, also receiving the opinion of Dr. Abram.

At what point does the extension of the human rights inquiry in the United Nations clash with the internal development of nationalistic governments?

Mr. Abram. I think the criticisms have to be limited, first of all to the international standards and principles which have been formulated and accepted by the General Assembly. Of course, you look first to the declaration of human rights and perhaps even more in greater detail, actually in greater detail, at any treaties that have become fairly well established international law.

So there is an objective law to which reference would have to be made. I could take a given situation and argue that almost everything we do in the United States is consistent in the field of civil and political rights with international standards, at least what we profess to do and what we hold ourselves out as doing.

Sometimes our national practice doesn't accord, but this is something the Supreme Court of the United States finds very frequently true, anyway.

But I don't, Mr. Chairman, feel that we open ourselves to much more criticism than we are already getting. Ambassador Hauser and I have been referred to, and others in our office, as the embarrassed Americans, and rightly so, because we sit in the U.N., we draft these treaties, we participate, we even force treaties to more nearly fit our own constitutional practice.

Take, for example, the treaty on discrimination on account of race. I recall how long the United States worked to whittle the provisions of that treaty to the point that it accorded with our free speech standards in America.

We didn't quite succeed, and a reservation I think would protect us to the point we didn't. But we worked.

Now everyone can say, "Why in the world do we listen to your influence, your input in human rights? You are not going to ratify them anyway. You haven't even ratified the genocide convention."

Mr. Gallagher. They read our papers but we can't read theirs.

Mr. Abram. I don't really think it will affect our sovereignty in any sense that is meaningful, that I think will cause us to be criticized, for we are criticized anyway.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Along that line, I was rather intrigued, as were my colleagues, in seeing the Vietnam business develop and how it developed, and how quickly the origins of development are forgotten. Really, with regard to the Greeks, we have a role to extend human rights there.

But looking back on the question of human rights, and Vietnam in the early days some developments there troubled our consciences so greatly that the United States was moved to interfere in an even more meaningful way than we did earlier. Now looking at the question of human rights, I wonder whether the Commission on Human Rights and the ADA would give an endorsement to Diem and Nhu if they could go back in time and get our troops out of Vietnam or bring stability to that country.

Sometimes I wonder where the points clash: Where does the extension of international concern end and where does greater responsibility for the United States begin as we tamper with the balance of developing countries?

Perhaps if there is one lesson that we learned from Vietnam it is that we can get overextended tampering with internal governmental matters instead of allowing a natural development.

When I listen to the arguments on Greece right now I see the same people signing the same petitions that were signed with respect to Vietnam urging our Government to do more.

I am just wondering whether as we press for the extension of human rights, do we also put the United States in terribly embarrassing positions where aid, military assistance, military troops, and involvement in war follows in a seemingly natural sequence?

As one who believes as you do, and I think human rights are paramount in any issue, I wonder what your reaction to all of this is.

Mr. ABRAM. I just don't recall an instance, Mr. Chairman, in which our interventions that some of us, including myself, would object to, have followed on a moral condemnation. I think it has followed on a misconception of our state interest in term of power relationships, not morality.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The question of morality and state interest became one at the point where public opinion insisted Diem could no longer remain in South Vietnam's Government, that rectifying this was a primary responsibility of the United States, to the point where the United States obviously changed policy.

In doing that, we tampered with the natural balance. In tampering with the natural balance of the developing countries, right or left——

Mr. ABRAM. In that argument, you come to the stage where I think we have already done the damage.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Exactly. I am with you. We should never have been there. But now we are talking about getting into other areas.

Mr. ABRAM. Let us take Greece, for example. I don't see any harm that could have been done the United States, had we adopted this policy of evenhanded treatment and stated it as just a policy that derives from history, the dreams, and the moral conviction of the United States, just like our Bill of Rights.

Had we adopted that policy and said that the Greek junta in our judgment, in one of the U.N. organs, is engaged in oppression, tyrannical and oppressive conduct and we condemn it, I don't see how that

would have in any way caused us to progress to the point of interfering in the government with troops in an attempt to overthrow it.

I have tried to indicate—maybe I didn't, but I will now—there is a certain contradiction, of course, between the use of force in protecting human rights in the international sphere and the goal, if you like, because force is, after all, the negation of one of the fundamental human rights.

I am certainly not arguing, and I would assume that Ambassador Hauser would not argue either, that for every moral delinquency in the world we should apply American force. That is why I have emphasized the moral conscience not only of the United States and its effectiveness, but also its effectiveness in mobilizing the international conscience of the world.

If the conscience doesn't work it is one of the facts of life that sometimes the things we dream about cannot be accomplished.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, it does seem to me essentially naive to indicate that anything much would be accomplished for the United States to condemn practices in countries which we can't influence in any event.

As an example, I assume you are advocating that we should condemn Israel because we do not think that adequate attention has been given to the human rights of Arab refugees?

Mr. ABRAM. That is your statement. That is not my statement.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am asking. I said that I assume your position. I am certainly not advocating it. Furthermore I think it would be a great mistake for us to sound off about the character of the Greek regime. That would not hasten the end of that regime by one day.

It does seem to me that a big power, even if little powers can afford to be irresponsible, needs to watch its tongue.

I don't think this business of the moral role of the United States should be overemphasized. In our attempt to be evenhanded we should not necessarily go around insulting countries that don't have the kind of government that we think they should have.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How would you answer that with respect to southern Africa? Should we say anything there or not?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We have a position there. I am not saying that we must keep quiet about everything. I am saying it is naive to say that sounding off is automatically a good response.

Mr. ABRAM. I don't say that, Mr. Congressman. Let me refine it a little closer.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I didn't mean to interrupt the chairman. He has not relinquished his time.

Mr. ABRAM. First of all, I think there are priorities in everything. There are a lot of law violations but we don't prosecute them all. There isn't time enough. There isn't resource enough.

But I think one finds the great issues and focuses on them.

Number two, I don't think it is naive because the European Court of Human Rights, or the European Court, has dealt with the Greek situation.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You don't think what is naive? How about the Israeli situation?

Mr. ABRAM. On the Israeli situation, I don't happen to believe that the Israelis are violating the human rights of its inhabitants, Arab or otherwise. That is my view.

If the United States had a different view, then if it were a matter of real consequence, of front burner urgency, I would have no objection to the United States dealing on an evenhanded basis with any state. I don't care what state it is.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Could I get back to the conventions? Both of you have made a strong pitch here today and the testimony has been stimulating, for the necessity of ratifying conventions.

I gather from Mrs. Hauser she would ratify any convention that was approved.

Mrs. HAUSER. No.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You haven't made any limitations that I have heard. Dr. Abram did say the ones that were appropriate should be ratified by the United States.

I haven't heard you say that there are some conventions that really do have constitutional problems which we probably should not ratify. I got the impression that we ought to take the leadership in accepting them, because we were far and away ahead of most countries in the implementation of these programs anyway.

Did I misread what you are saying?

Mrs. HAUSER. No. Let me clarify that point. Don't think there are any constitutional problems with any of the ones that have been drafted thus far and if there were any we could deal with them appropriately in reservations or understandings, which many countries do when they ratify.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Do you think we need to make any reservations, or clarification of our position, with respect to the genocide convention?

Mrs. HAUSER. No, the genocide convention none at all. That is the official position of the Department now, and the President. But the race treaty does have very serious free speech problems and free expression problems which I think Dr. Abram tried to point out.

Our delegate was Secretary Rogers at the time, and Ambassador Arthur Goldberg was involved in it as well. We tried to get the drafting to come closer to our constitutional concepts which may not be the same as other countries hold.

For example, the rest of the world—not all, but many of the countries—take the approach to racism that goes like this: The only way to get rid of racism is to eliminate, to make illegal, any organization that is advocating, teaching, promoting or distributing literature about racism, or Nazism, whatever the "ism" that is not good. Obviously, our approach is different. We believe all organizations, up to the point of seditious statements, are free to flourish in this country.

We believe the clash of ideas of an educated public is what gives us our democracy. The vast majority of countries of the world don't share our point of view.

I must tell you as I have studied the race treaty myself I am troubled as a lawyer. I am not sure that this approach, what we call group libel, is not the final answer to dealing with racism. Perhaps it is a luxury of our Constitution that has given us as many unfortunate

years of experience as it has given us freedom to permit racist organizations to continue to function and flourish and give forth their venom.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Let us get back to the genocide convention. Is there one iota of evidence that our failure to ratify the genocide convention has had an effect anywhere on anybody?

What has it done to weaken our stand with respect to others, or the effect of the convention?

Does the convention have any effect on human rights?

Does any convention have any effect except as a way of showing a country's interest in the subject?

Mrs. HAUSER. You have asked me two questions there. Our failure to ratify is taken by many countries of the world, particularly since the Vietnam War, as evidence of the fact that we practice, or we engage in practices, that are genocidal or come close to it.

You and I may think that is simplistic, but I can assure you that that is felt by very many countries of the world. Why else do we persist in failing to ratify this convention?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Let me ask you, before you go on from there, if there is any substance to the argument that our ratification would affect others' feeling about us.

Mrs. HAUSER. Why not?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Aren't they coming to the conclusions about us because of what we have been doing, not because of our failure to ratify a convention? That has nothing to do with whether we believe in genocide or not.

Mrs. HAUSER. But we can quite properly say that countries which are intending to engage in practices that are wrongful, whether genocidal or not, would normally not ratify any convention that binds them to do otherwise, and the classic illustration is South Africa, which flatly refuses to engage in any of these conventions because its practices are probably violative of many of the conventions.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Now you are talking about the practices of other countries, but we know it isn't because of our practices that we have been slow ratifying.

The only possible thing is that we are going to intend to do something we are not doing presently, which strikes me as a foolish argument and one that we needn't worry about in any event unless there is something to be gained by it.

Mrs. HAUSER. You missed the point, I think, perhaps, that I made earlier, which is the way in which international law is made, the way in which a rule of law is defined for the world community.

It is essentially by treaty. This genocide treaty says that it is an international crime, genocide. Seventy-five countries are now bound by that rule of law.

Technically speaking, we are not. We have not ratified. We do not yet subscribe, then, to that portion of international law which condemns genocide as an international crime.

You ask me, because it leads to it, what are the practical consequences of this and what are the moral forces. Not going back too far in history, in the Nazi period there were very few voices heard in the international scene to condemn the practices of the Nazis vis-a-vis

their own population in the 1930's, and there was no defined international law to condem that which the Nazis were doing.

One could make a very strenuous argument that had the world community reacted to that which the Nazis had done, history might have been otherwise.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am not arguing against ratification of the convention. I assume that it should have been ratified long ago.

But the fact that it hasn't been ratified and has been a dead letter for all this time doesn't seem to have affected the result very much.

It seems to me that implementation of the treaties is really what we should be talking about. How can we get progress? I am not sure whether the conventions themselves represent progress. In a sense they remind us in a formal way that——

Mr. ABRAM. May I shoot at this one moment?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think the answer would be that that is the only way you can build a world body of law. If you believe in the rule of law, you have to build a body of law in the first place.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am not arguing against it. I am trying to find out what they are talking about, whether they are talking about a blind ratification of any convention.

Mr. ABRAM. No.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Until Mrs. Hauser explained her feeling about reservations, I did not detect that she felt some that would run athwart basic principles. Other countries have different ideas about how these problems should be handled. She didn't happen to say that until I asked the question.

Mrs. HAUSER. The genocide convention is particularly important because by making genocide an international crime no country which has ratified can raise the defense that genocide is a domestic matter, not the concern of the rest of the world.

It is very important as a legal matter if you look at the framework of the Charter. The inherent dilemma in this field, and I did not want to get technical in my opening statement, is that while all countries pledge themselves to promote human rights, Article 2(7) says the U.N. shall not interfere in the essentially domestic matters of the states.

You, therefore, have a clash always between what is an essentially domestic matter and what is a matter of international concern.

Mr. FASCELL. The treaty would change that.

Mrs. HAUSER. It would make it an international crime.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Would the treaty on racial discrimination make racial discrimination not a domestic matter, and perhaps subject to pressure from the outside?

Mrs. HAUSER. That I can answer.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. If that is the case, I can see why there would be hesitations and doubts about the wisdom of going along with this process. It may well lead, and perhaps this is what the Soviet Union is saying, it may well lead to an interference in what they consider to be domestic processes.

Mr. ABRAM. Let us get a little focus on the framework of what the ratification means. I recall once we were drafting a treaty in the Commission and the Finnish representative spoke up. He said, "I am going to be extremely careful in drafting this treaty because we take treaties very seriously, and we are not going to ratify a treaty until our domes-

tic law and the practice we are willing to have is on all fours with that treaty."

That is the proper way for a state to do. One question to be decided before the United States ratifies any treaty, and I include that in the word "appropriate" which you referred to, is whether or not our domestic law and practice really justifies us in ratifying the treaty.

On genocide, there isn't a doggone thing in American law that is contrary to the genocide treaty.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I wouldn't suppose there would be, but in other cases there may be major questions.

Mr. ABRAM. As long as a state is enforcing its domestic law which it should be doing, there is no possibility of international intervention. Even if there were intervention, sir, there are no international armies that would move against you, none whatever. None of the implementation features provides for the hauling off of a citizen in the United States by some writ of habeas corpus to be tried in some foreign court.

Ambassador Hauser is absolutely correct. The object here, as far as we are concerned, because our practices would be on all fours with any treaty we ratify as an honorable state, what we are doing is building a body.

Now, why is that important? You might just as well ask what difference does it make that the United States stayed out of the League of Nations Charter? We weren't going to wage aggressive war.

But you and I know that it was a tremendous defect in the international peacekeeping machinery of the world, from 1920 to 1945, that the United States stood aside from the all-embracing system of mutual security at international level.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. I want to get back to something in terms of philosophy and in terms of the practical aspects of implementation. You can't have a convert if you shoot him. But obviously if you go to war, in order to implement that which you say is right, you kill to impose your will, and international armies may or may not move against you. But if an act is determined by the U.N. as an act of genocide and is determined to be endangering the world's security by sufficient votes in the General Assembly, you could theoretically put together an international force to cope with what could be claimed to be a purely internal matter and classed as security or defensive measure.

It is, of course, a question of definition by the world community and the decision to act as was done in Korea and the Congo.

Therefore, the question is raised——

Mrs. HAUSER. Looking at genocide, I think you have to start out with the fundamental that this country will never be in the defendant position. What we are exercising here is a direct leadership. It may sound arrogant but I suppose it is there, a leadership to try to bring other countries up to a standard which we have attained, and which we think is proper in the world and which, obviously, other countries share with us.

I take off on this with something that Mr. Frelinghuysen said. I firmly believe that there is a reason to speak out on human rights violations, not simply to spout morality. Human rights violations when continued and unchecked, the history of the world has shown, usually lead to war, a small war or a big war.

Mr. FASCELL (continuing). How does Biafra and Nigeria fit into the question of genocide? Why didn't somebody do something?

Mrs. HAUSER. I think you know the reason why the matter was never raised in the U.N. forums.

Mr. FASCELL. Because you can't depoliticize a human rights issue.

Mrs. HAUSER. Yes. The President, in speaking to the victorious Nigerians, our President, did express the firm hope that the Nigerian armies, the victorious armies, would not commit any practices akin to genocide, and that the world would find this abhorrent. This was significant. I have no doubt in my mind——

Mr. FASCELL. Mrs. Hauser, that is a fine statement. How was the "action" in Nigeria classified?

Was it civil war or was it genocide?

We can each choose but the question is really the motives which led to the war, and I would very easily say it was genocide.

Mrs. HAUSER (continuing). Do you mean the practices that went on that led to the war?

Mr. FASCELL. They killed a lot of people purposely in order to exterminate a whole class of people, didn't they? Is that the definition? Men, women and children. Isn't an act of starvation an act of genocide? Was it purposely motivated?

Mrs. HAUSER. You are asking questions that would go to prove whether or not there was or was not genocide under the definitions of the treaty.

I am not sure that it has been proven that there was or was not genocide in Nigeria.

Mr. FASCELL. Here, again, I have to state that I am not against the treaty. I am aware of the difficulties of the implementation of treaties, no matter how carefully drafted.

I also think we must have rule of law. Even when you can't enforce it, you have to state what you think the law ought to be as a model for the international community to live by. Eventually, hopefully, some day we will have rule of law.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I have to leave but I do have one question.

Doctor, you suggested that at some point or another we have to relinquish sovereignty. That goes to the whole big question.

In reality, what is your prognosis of the possibility of this Nation relinquishing sovereignty of these issues?

Mr. ABRAM. I do not think, Congressman Rosenthal, that we are living in a day in which we are about to see the millenium. I would not myself argue for the relinquishment of sovereignty to the United Nations, for example. It is so balanced and so composed that I would think it would be manifestly foolish. Nor am I one who feels that the national state has entirely failed, or that nationalism does not serve a purpose.

For example, I think there are many acts of spirit and generosity that rise out of the national state. But I do say this, that we are going to have to give up our rights to do certain things if we are going to survive.

For example, our rights to test atmospheric weapons, which is an act of sovereignty, nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

We have dealt with that because it was necessary for survival. I would hope that France and China would adhere to this or were required to adhere to this.

I think the right to pollute the seas is something we will have to deal with, which will be a diminishment of sovereignty. Every treaty that a state adheres to, whether it deals with migratory birds or whether it deals with piracy, slavery or any of the conventional aspects of treaty-making represents a diminution of sovereignty.

I think we will inch closer and closer to further limits upon unchecked sovereignty because I think otherwise we cannot survive.

I hope we will see the day that disarmament, which is a national right—armament is a national-right—will again be prohibited. Maybe that is the way we will have to move toward it.

I cannot see myself or anyone else voting for the relinquishment of sovereignty until other nations are disarmed. I cannot see our disarmament until other nations are disarmed. I think we have to be coldly practical about it. But I think we better keep the goal in mind. If we don't, we won't have anything to be sovereign over.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Both of you are outstanding advocates in a worthy and important cause. I must say I don't see any substitute for persistent advocacy in order to be successful. Someone has to prod world conscience. Someone has to make international law.

It may be tedious and a step at a time, but that is what we have to keep doing.

It seems to me that the issues, therefore, admitting all of these things, are what can we do now to speed the process up.

We keep talking in terms of re-structuring for example. I am not sure that does much, really. I am for treaties and I am not sure they do anything. A treaty doesn't change human nature. You can make somebody abide by the law, and it doesn't change anything with respect to that person's internal motives. We have seen that.

We manage to live in this country under that kind of a system, and I suppose around the world we have, too. Law and its enforcement really is what we are talking about.

I am not sure that the concept of a peaceful world has anything to do with enforcement within the framework as we now visualize it at all. I don't see where present structure and philosophy of enforcement has anything to do with peace and stability. Punishment for law enforcement may be a descendant from the original concepts that were found worthy, but I think it is all under critical examination today.

Would you agree?

Mr. ABRAM. Fundamentally. I think especially the idea that many people will have to try the frontier, because, otherwise, I would doubt that the most gross and persistent violations would ever be something that were objects of shame and embarrassment.

It is just exactly as in this country when Roger Baldwin started 50 years ago trying to get America to wake up to the responsibility of the enforcement of civil rights in this country, civil liberties, I think he was regarded as very far out and he spent some time in jail for it.

Today, we have made some progress. It is not all we have hoped for but in 50 years we are a better country in terms of civil and political rights.

But I don't think any of this is going to be built in a day.

I am rather inclined to agree with you, that structural changes will be minimal in their effect. But we have to start taking these faltering

steps. I conclude by saying that the High Commissioner for Human Rights is no panacea. It is not going to change the world decisively. But it is a first step, perhaps a faltering one, but it is one of those that doesn't have any risks in it and I think we should take it.

The other steps that Ambassador Hauser and I have argued for is the ratification of those treaties which are appropriate and even in the case of a treaty that is generally appropriate it was necessary to have a reservation in order to protect some of the more fundamental principles by which we live and then the reservations have to be put in.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there any inconsistency in the U.S. position with respect to the Nuremberg trials and the failure to ratify the genocide treaty?

Mrs. HAUSER. The genocide treaty was a response to Nuremberg because Nuremberg laid down its own jurisdiction and it only covered acts of war, acts relating to war and acts that were the direct consequence of the war itself, and by definition it excluded genocide as it applied before the war, during the Nazi period of the 1930's. It was in response to that that the world community drafted the Genocide Convention.

Nuremberg excluded that from its ambit in that it was set up essentially as a tribunal to deal with the war crimes that had been committed.

Mr. FASCELL. The philosophy inherent in war crimes prosecution is the same philosophy which leads to a genocide convention; is it not?

If you support one, it hardly seems rational that you wouldn't support the other.

Mrs. HAUSER. Indeed, and that was argued in the original arguments 20 years ago, that our position was very inconsistent.

Mr. FASCELL. You were a very able spokesman and I was delighted to have the opportunity at the United Nations to watch you in action in your committee. You also were most helpful to some of my constituents. I am talking now about the matter of the Cuban political prisoners.

How can you update me on that situation?

Mrs. HAUSER. Apart from the endless telephone calls I have from your constituents——

Mr. FASCELL. I can't do anything about that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. We get them, too.

Mrs. HAUSER. (continuing.) We expect to raise that in the current session of the Human Rights Commission. This is something that Dr. Abram pointed out which is vital for the record.

It is embarrassing, and I would argue wrongful, for our country to raise with great moral indignation the violations of human rights in countries that are not friendly to us and be totally silent on these violations in countries that are friendly to us.

There is an inherent inconsistency that other countries pick up which makes them say that everything you do is really political and you are dressing it up in that fashion. For example, I can't argue that the practices in Brazil are as bad as they are in Castro's Cuba but there certainly have been some very substantial violations in human rights in Brazil under the present government.

We have been seized of petitions. The matter has been raised publicly in this country. We never raised that in the U.N. because Brazil is a friend. Greece was, of course, another illustration.

I get constant urgings to go forward and discuss the Soviet Union or Iraq.

Mr. FASCELL. Mrs. Hauser, let me ask a question at this point. Why doesn't someone else raise the issue?

Mrs. HAUSER. Occasionally they do, but I am saying even when they do we are often instructed not even to participate in the debate when someone else raises it.

Mr. FASCELL. The only point I am making is quite obvious. We are not the sole keeper of the world's conscience.

Mrs. HAUSER. For example, the Soviet petition from the intellectual dissenters, the United Kingdom raised it this year, forcibly and powerfully, and took the floor on it. Other countries have done it in Latin America about Cuba where there are areas of great interest.

Mr. FASCELL. This is a definite advantage. This persistent advocacy does give other people the opportunity to speak out.

If we are caught off base, so to speak, they like that even better. It gives them more of a reason to speak out.

I want to thank you for pursuing the question of the political prisoners, the Cuban political prisoners. I am glad to know that it will be brought up at the Human Rights Commission meeting.

I wish you continued success in your efforts.

I have no further questions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Since this is a 25th anniversary review, how would you assess the status of human rights today as compared with 25 years ago? Or to what degree have they changed?

Mrs. HAUSER. I think I tried to bring that out in my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, that in the 25 years the world as a whole has become painfully aware of the problems of human rights, the threat to the peace that they pose, and the constant vigilance that is exerted in the world forum to see that these practices are changed wherever they are changeable.

There is no longer prevalent the situation of the 1930's, of indifference to what is going on in other countries on the part of the whole world, and I regard that as a major step forward in international law and diplomacy.

The charter itself has given us that mandate. We are committed to move in this area. I think every country knows what a volatile situation results from a gnawing civil rights or human rights problem.

Perhaps I can best focus it with a good illustration: The riots all last year in Northern Ireland, in a very democratic and representative form of government, a friendly country, where certainly the immediate——

Mr. GALLAGHER. How does the U.N. stand on the rights of the Irish in Belfast?

Mrs. HAUSER. When the matter was first being mooted around in the Security Council, the Representative of Great Britain said directly he didn't think this was a threat to the peace and, therefore, shouldn't be in the Security Council, but he had no difficulty at all to have this question aired as a human rights problem.

The British then appointed a High Commission which found that the very focus of the problem was one of human rights, made more difficult by 1,000 years of religious animosity. There was an illustration in which the world community held back for a little bit waiting to see what would be done.

But I assure you that the British knew very well that, if nothing was done domestically, it would certainly be within the United Nations. This was in itself a spur.

I think we have made enormous progress in the 25 years. Perhaps it is fatuous to expect that somehow this international organization is going overnight to cause the countries of the world to behave the way they all should behave.

None of us are urging that or expecting that. But without the United Nations I wonder how much more badly they would have behaved in the 25 years.

Mr. GALLAGHER. How much of the progress that we have made has been due to the United Nations? Or were there other forces in motion?

How much of the credit would you give to the United Nations?

Mr. ABRAM. I would say the independence of states, particularly the black states, has created the possibility for voices to be heard on the question of race which up to now had been silent, and I think just the independence and the demise of colonialism has had a substantial effect on the attitudes of those raised.

I would say those attitudes have percolated into multiracial societies, including our own. I would say, probably in terms of civil and political rights, outside of a few states in the West, including our own, they are no better off.

The attempt of the Czechs to break loose which was aborted—I think the flowers that began to bloom in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin have now withered.

If I may say so, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Frelinghuysen, the fact that the U.N. is not an all-inclusive body I think has impaired the development of human rights to the extent of about 700 million to 800 million people because the Chinese are not in the position where they have to hear these issues debated.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You don't have to point the finger at us. Our country doesn't want Red China in the U.N., but even if we wanted them in, she wouldn't come. I don't think we have to feel defensive about that.

Mr. ABRAM. I am not being defensive.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thought you meant that we should feel defensive.

Mr. ABRAM. No. I am simply saying that an international body, or an international legal framework, needs to be as multinational as possible and as all-inclusive as possible. I think it would be extremely interesting to have a Chinese delegate to have to take the same kind of criticism that all representatives in the United Nations have to take from time to time.

I think the failure to include China, whether it is their reason or their cause or ours, or someone else's, or the Soviet Union's, even——

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You both gave a strong pitch for a High Commissioner.

What is he supposed to do? I don't get the same picture from you two as to what his powers would be. Mrs. Hauser says that the job would be essentially advisory, that its operations would only be with the consent of those governments.

As I understood Dr. Abram, he would have the power to investigate and state views. He mentioned both Greece and Indonesia. I don't suppose Indonesia would have been enthusiastic about welcoming a commissioner if he was going to condemn the slaughter there.

I don't imagine the Greeks would be enthusiastic about welcoming in such a spokesman for what is right, with a capital "R."

Mr. ABRAM. The original documentation of this gave him much more power than he now would have under the proposal which will be submitted to the General Assembly.

It is an attempt to get it through which has caused the whittling away of his powers. I would like to see him with a great deal more power, the kind I have mentioned. But I would certainly agree that, practically, you are not going to get the proposal adopted except on the lines of the present proposal which Ambassador Hauser was referring to.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You both have talked about the importance of depoliticizing situations. I guess that refers to a commissioner who might attempt to produce an evenhanded result, whereas in the organization, itself, you do get this political attitude.

As a practical matter, do you think you could get an individual who could speak for the conscience of mankind if the parties concerned were not anxious to have such a voice speak?

If it is simply a question of a voice, can't the Secretary General perform that function as well as a High Commissioner?

Mr. ABRAM. He has many other duties to perform and he is not at the present time the embodiment of any human rights, specifically. But I would certainly agree with you that most of his work would have to be done behind the scenes in quiet negotiations. In that sense——

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am not sure what this means—behind the scenes and quiet negotiations. I thought his major function would be to call public attention to the inadequacies of a country with respect to human rights in that country.

Mr. ABRAM. That was the original formulation. But at the present time, under the present construction of the High Commissioner, his function would be conciliatory, to negotiate, advise, to try to rectify the problem by a consent within the country itself which was charged with the violations.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Let me see if I understand. This would mean that the High Commissioner could come to the mayor of Detroit, Washington, or New York and say, "You have a bad situation here and I would like to help you, and the international community would like to help you."

Is that what you have in mind?

Mr. ABRAM. I would say that would be about the last place he would go because there are so many other issues which are more important in terms of world opinion in which the wrongs are so much more grievous that I think he would be quite busy elsewhere.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Such as South Africa? Would he be the man to sum up and bring the pressure of world opinion on South Africa to do something about the abhorrent policy of apartheid?

Mr. ABRAM. Yes. But already you have political bodies. You have the special committee. You have a number of investigative bodies that continuously are representing the General Assembly in one form or another and which do deal with South Africa.

But it has been so far an impracticable subject.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Is there any other area where you think he might be useful?

Mr. ABRAM. He might be useful in Greece.

Mr. FASCELL. May I ask a perfectly serious question?

Is the Australian aborigine included in this whole concept of human rights?

Mrs. HAUSER. Certainly. In fact, you know, to give you an analogy there, here is an illustration of how public opinion does do something. Quite a number of years ago, the Anti-Slavery Society, an old body in the world, brought to the attention of the United Nations alleged practices of eliminating the aborigine Indians up the Amazon, Brazilian practices which were alleged to occur so they could clear out the Amazon for settlement.

They first denied it and so on. Now after much debate and documentation, the Brazilian Government has in effect acknowledged that the practices were taking place and they have taken steps to see that they shall not continue.

There is an official commission in Brazil which is now charged with the matter. Had it never been raised in the world forum, I don't know whether anybody else would be particularly concerned with those Indians.

Mr. FASCELL. Mrs. Black was here a few days ago pleading the cause of the American Indians.

Mrs. HAUSER. I don't know that the American Indians have been discussed in the United Nations, not to my knowledge. But this one I know was a situation which was a serious one, to protect a substantial number of people.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am sorry you are embarrassed to speak at the United Nations. It does seem to me quite an abnormal process publicly to condemn or criticize one's friends. We would end up with relatively few friends.

It isn't that we don't need to exercise influence, but is the practice of publicly standing up and condemning necessarily the best way to achieve something? Perhaps you could accomplish this by getting a spokesman for the United Nations to do it and perhaps it might be more effective if the United Nations did it.

The situation in Greece is a classic case. We have a close relationship, obviously, with Greece, and we are obviously unhappy at the nature of the Government.

But does it do much good to agitate publicly about this situation? Yet it may do harm not to agitate.

I do not know the answer, but I don't think we can dismiss the problem by suggesting that if only we had a little more publicity we could make progress.

I don't know that that necessarily holds at all.

Mr. ABRAM. Maybe my view is distorted. I grew up in the South, as you may have detected, and I never saw much change from the time I was old enough to know what was going on until the matter became one of front-burner urgency, concern, and recrimination in the rest of the country.

I know that perhaps my fellow Southerners didn't like it, but nevertheless, I think it has had a good effect rather than a baleful effect. Arguments were always made that you will never change the South by criticism.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am not arguing against change at all, Doctor. What I am saying is that the United Nations doesn't seem to have developed—you have been saying this, too—instruments that are useful because there is no way of implementing them. The treaties, basically, are window dressing because there isn't any implementation. They provide some psychological push, a very slight push, but without implementation we are not going to do much.

Where a convention interferes with sovereignty you have a serious problem.

Mrs. HAUSER. The last treaty of significance, the race treaty, does have an implementing procedure. It is the first one that does.

There is a committee of 18 under that treaty made up only, of course, of states' parties, and within that committee any state party can levy a complaint against any other state party, and, if a state party wishes to, it may adhere to a procedure whereby private citizens of that country can levy charges to be heard and investigated against the state party.

This is the first effective implementing machinery. Of course, the world body itself came to realize that the treaties while they laid down law, were short on implementation. This is going to make a very marked change in the whole treaty arrangement. We are not a member of that treaty so we cannot participate at all in this process.

I should say to give you an illustration of the range of countries, the United Kingdom, which has plenty of racial problems at the moment, ratified that treaty and is taking a leading role in this committee of 18.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. In your opinion, are we mistaken not to have signed it?

Mrs. HAUSER. We signed it.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But we have not ratified it?

Mrs. HAUSER. Right.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If we join in a censure, say, of Greece or Brazil, would we be morally bound then to cut off our arms shipments? Or in the case of Brazil, would we be morally bound after the U.N. censure to cut off aid?

What would be the effect of the contradictory position?

Mr. ABRAM. As I stated it, Mr. Gallagher, I was trying to be very careful to say that we would adopt this policy, I even called it an eccentric policy, against friend and foe alike.

It did not mean dispensing with alliances, and I would assume not necessarily dispensing with trade or aid. But it would be an expression of our viewpoint which we have a right to express, and we also

have a right to adhere to certain procedures which are in our vital state interests, certainly, in the kind of world we live in.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Wouldn't it be sort of a moral contradiction if we were to join in a censure of Greece, for instance? We obviously ship them arms. We have arrangements for aid with them. Would not we be morally bound to cut off such shipments?

By continuing aid, we would be, in effect, perpetuating a government which we have condemned.

Mr. ABRAM. No more so than if we adopted what one of you suggested a moment ago, that we carry on our private protests, which is, after all, an expression of our moral point of view, but continue to otherwise, have relations with them of a friendly nature.

Mr. GALLAGHER. We might be in a position of saying things one way not really meaning it.

Mr. ABRAMS. I don't think that is as bad as not speaking out.

Mr. GALLAGHER. How about you, Mrs. Hauser, would you like to speak on that?

Mrs. HAUSER. The only illustration there is is our South African policy. We have spoken out on it year after year after year.

Mr. GALLAGHER. That is rather clear cut.

Mrs. HAUSER. But we haven't changed our practical policies to South Africa.

Mr. GALLAGHER. That is a little different than Greece. Anybody can get mad and take a free cut at South Africa. There is no question that many do.

But I am now talking about Greece or Brazil, or Israel.

Mrs. HAUSER. You have to make a judgment as to what your military interests and your strategic interests are and you judge each accordingly.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Let us judge Greece.

Mrs. HAUSER. I have to presume that Greece would be responsive in her current state of need to our strong pressure on her to change some of her practices. That is a personal belief, and I may be wrong.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I don't think that the regime will relinquish control merely because we censure them. I am asking you what would you recommend as our position if we were to publicly join in a censure of Greece, a condemnation of Greece.

Don't you think it would morally follow that we would have to cut off our assistance since the criticism is that by sending these shipments of aid and arms, following our NATO commitments, we are, in effect, perpetuating the regime there?

Mr. FASCELL. Whether it followed or not, Mr. Chairman, if you will pardon an interruption, it would certainly be used politically against you. They would beat you over the head and body with it in the Congress and in the international forum. There is no question about it.

One follows the other as natural as day follows night. But that doesn't go to answering the question of morality of international government. You could phrase that another way: Is any government totally moral or is any people totally moral? Should they be totally moral? Should they act in a totally moral way? Is it possible?

These are fundamental human questions. I think that is where your question goes to, Mr. Chairman; I think it goes right to the heart of

the matter. The pressure is going to be there. I don't think there is any question about it.

Don't you agree?

Mr. ABRAM. I agree. But I thnk you have to build law and you have to build practice on a case-by-case basis. I have never heard a defense that you haven't gotten everybody who ran through a stoplight; therefore, you can't prosecute me.

Mr. FASCELL. I use the defense but I lose every time.

Mr. ABRAM. You sure will.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mrs. Hauser, I think we interrupted you.

Mrs. HAUSER. No, I hope I answered your question.

Mr. FASCELL. I have been concerned about the overemphasis as I saw it in the 3 short months in the United Nations with respect to the problem of money, particularly in the confrontation between the underdeveloped countries and the developed countries.

The scramble for the buck must be worldwide and it is no different in the United Nations. It may be translated in niceties because we are talking about economic development, but what has happened in my view is that there has been so much emphasis on the scramble for the dollar and the translation of that dollar into economic development in the underdeveloped countries that the whole United Nations has lost sight of a very real purpose.

I am just wondering if the political purposes will atrophy. Wouldn't we be better off if we took the whole economic side and moved it some place else?

Let them have it in Geneva or Addis Adaba, or some other place.

Mrs. HAUSER. Do you want an answer or is that a statement?

Mr. FASCELL. That is one long question.

All right, I will restate that. Do you think there is undue emphasis on the economic aspects of the United Nations?

Mrs. HAUSER. I would answer to the contrary, that the more that was spent on that the better product we would have out of the United Nations.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't agree to that philosophy at all but that is interesting. I don't think economic development changes basic human nature. But that is a personal view. Also I don't think economic development has to much to do with the preservation of human rights.

How about you, Dr. Abram?

Mr. ABRAM. I don't have an opinion on that, Mr. Fascell, except to say that I think to the extent that we can deal with aid as a more and more multilateral act——

Mr. FASCELL. What is more multilateral than the U.N.?

Mr. ABRAM. I agree. To the extent that we deal with our aid policies in that way, to the extent possible, I would prefer it, because I think it would get us into less difficulties and I think it might make the recipient of aid feel it is more given——

Mr. FASCELL. U.S. policy since World War II has been predicated on the fact that to achieve independent and political stability it is necessary to achieve economic viability. We went around creating all kinds of economic viability. We may have raised "the standard of living"; we may have created some jobs and built some infrastructure.

I am for all of those things and whatever contribution they make.

But how does that relate to the political issue, the stability, the in-

dependence, or the human right? A retort, with which I do not agree, is that full stomachs make for stability.

Mr. ABRAM. I think Totewell made the statement a long time ago about the French Revolution, that it occurred at the time of rising expectations. I think this is clearly the case. I don't think aid is the way one is able to guarantee political stability. It may go forward to the day when less people will starve. It may give us an opportunity to satisfy our own moral cravings, but I think aid will not be the vehicle, at least the kind that the world can afford, to create political stability and the absence of war that we all desire.

Mr. FASCELL. But isn't the critical point of human relations human rights?

Mr. ABRAM. Yes, I think so.

Mr. FASCELL. If that is true, shouldn't we concentrate on that? Shouldn't we try to put our best efforts into it?

Mr. ABRAM. I would agree we should.

Mr. FASCELL. This is what I am getting at. In the U.N. resolutions are adopted in the political sessions and there are many discourses, all of which are useful, but only to the extent of the interfacing are we directly affecting human relations.

Mr. ABRAM. But don't forget, human rights does include economic and social benefits, as the charter uses it.

Mr. FASCELL. I must say I have found it, as my colleagues have, a very stimulating afternoon. I thank both of you for being here to answer our questions and enlightening us. It may have crystallized some of our own opinions in a helpful way.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mrs. Hauser and Dr. Abram, for an enlightening afternoon.

The subcommittee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Wednesday, March 4, 1970.)

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

United Nations in the 1970's: New Tasks and Opportunities

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 1970

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International
Organization and Movements,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:24 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Gallagher. The subcommittee will come to order.

For the past 2 weeks, this subcommittee, with the help of a long list of distinguished witnesses, has been reviewing the operations of the United Nations.

We have tried to look at the organization in the perspective of the past 25 years, to evaluate what it has accomplished and to see where it stands at the present time.

This afternoon, we propose to change our approach and, instead of looking at the past, we will concentrate on a bit of crystal ball gazing. We will try to discover what new and challenging tasks lie before the United Nations in the decade that lies ahead.

The subcommittee is indeed pleased to welcome to this forum four outstanding experts: Dean Francis Wilcox of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, who during his long service with the Government, first with the staff of our sister committee in the Senate, then in the State Department as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, has acquired considerable reputation in the field of international organization affairs;

Ambassador Christopher H. Phillips, the Deputy U.S. Representative in the United Nations Security Council, whose experience as a State legislator, Government official, businessman and diplomat has exposed him to many problems with which the U.S. Government has been wrestling in the field of foreign policy;

Professor Richard Gardner of Columbia University Law School, who will be with us a bit later, is the author of, among other publications, the provocative book "In Pursuit of World Order." He served in Washington and New York as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, and as a member of the U.S. Delegations to several United Nations General Assemblies; and

Mr. Arthur Barber, President of the Institute of Politics and Planning, whose former experience in the Department of Defense may help to provide an added dimension to our discussion today.

Gentlemen, we have your statements before us, and we would ask if we could begin with Dean Wilcox.

(Biographical information follows:)

Francis O. Wilcox, Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, was born in Columbia Junction, Iowa and holds AB, MA and PhD degrees from the University of Iowa. He was a fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1933 and 1934. Among his many government assignments were the following: chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1947 to 1955; Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from 1955 through 1961; a Member of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Conference in San Francisco in 1945; and member of U.S. Delegations to the 1st, 3rd and to subsequent annual meetings of the U.N. General Assembly. Dean Wilcox also served as U.S. delegate to a number of world conferences. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and author of many articles and books on international affairs, including (with H. Field Haviland) *The United States and the United Nations*.

Richard Newton Gardner is a professor of Law and International Relations at Columbia University.

A native of New York, Professor Gardner is a graduate of Harvard University and holds advance degrees from Yale and Oxford Universities. He was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford. He served as Alternate U.S. delegate to the 19th U.N. General Assembly and as senior adviser to the U.S. Delegations to the 20th and 21st U.N. General Assemblies. In 1966, he was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. From 1967 through 1968 he was also deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

Professor Gardner is the recipient of numerous awards including the Decatur Prize for distinguished scholarship, and is the author of *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy* (1956), *New Directions in U.S. Foreign Economic Policy* (1959), *In Pursuit of World Order* (1964), and *Blueprint for Peace* (1966).

Christopher H. Phillips is the Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations. Ambassador Phillips was born of American parents in The Hague, Holland, and graduated from Harvard University. He was elected to the Mass. State Senate in 1948 and served as Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee on Labor and Industries; Chairman of the Mass. Public Commission on Educational Television; and a member on the Senate Rules Committee. Ambassador Phillips joined the Department of State in 1953 and became Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intl Organization Affairs; U.S. Representative to U.N. Economic and Social Council; and Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N. He also served as vice chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission and Chase Manhattan Bank representative to U.N.

Arthur W. Barber, President of the Institute of Politics and Planning, Washington, D.C., is a native of Connecticut and a graduate of Harvard University. His service with the U.S. Government included work as a physicist at the Air Force Cambridge (Mass.) Research Center and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during President Kennedy's administration.

STATEMENT OF FRANCIS O. WILCOX, DEAN, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Dean WILCOX. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I appreciate very much your kind invitation to appear here today. As the United Nations enters its 25th anniversary, it seems to me to be a very good time to evaluate its work, and to

attempt to understand better than we do, perhaps, its limitations and potentials for the future.

It has been suggested that I might survey the broad spectrum of options that face us in connection with our role in the United Nations, and our quest for a viable world order. This is a rather difficult thing to do in a short period of time, but if I can stir up a few questions, perhaps my presentation——

Mr. FASCELL. I don't think you will have any trouble doing that.

Dean WILCOX. Perhaps then my presentation will serve a useful purpose.

Obviously, I do not have to repeat in detail the assumptions on which this paper is based; namely that the United Nations has changed greatly in the last 25 years, that the world in which it operates has changed very greatly, and that the United Nations has been subject to a good many criticisms, either because it is too strong, if you look at it from the point of view of some people, or because it is too weak, if you look at it from the point of view of other people. Clearly one of the greatest criticisms has been directed at its growing membership, and the resultant unwieldy nature of the General Assembly, and the fear on the part of some people that we can't rely upon the Assembly now to take dependable action with respect to world peace, that we ought not to trust the great problems of world peace to the whims and the caprices of an unwieldy organ like the General Assembly.

What I propose to do, therefore, in a very short time—and I have put my thoughts in longer compass for the record—I propose to go over very briefly some of the options that we might think of, at least, in looking at this whole problem—options that have to do with our relationship to the United Nations, and its role in world affairs.

One option obviously is that of weighted voting. It is an obvious approach to the problem. It does seem a bit ridiculous that a state like the Maldive Islands should have the same voting power as the Soviet Union, and it is equally ridiculous that states possessing only about a tenth of the world's population, and contributing only about a 20th of the UN budget, could command the two-thirds vote necessary for important decisions.

Now weighted voting has been used in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Wheat Council, and other economic organizations, but it has not been used successfully in any general international organization like the United Nations. For a number of reasons, which I have outlined in my written statement, including particularly the very strong opposition of the small states, I do not think this is a feasible option which we can reply upon in the near future.

We might possibly get some cooperation from the small states, if the great powers were ready to come forward with a package proposal involving some very important disarmament agreement, which would carry with it a really important gesture in the direction of world peace, coupled with a large-scale multilateral aid program. If the United States and the Soviet Union were to come forth with a proposal like that, which would be really meaningful, in terms of the small states and their interest in peace and progress, they might be willing to get on a weighted voting bandwagon.

Otherwise, I think there isn't much hope in this direction—at least in the near future.

A second option is what I call a "return" to the Security Council. And by that, I mean, the reinvigoration of the Security Council, so that it might once again assume the main responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. As the 24th Session of the Assembly came to an end in December, 1969, an AP report on the work of the Assembly in the Washington Post read as follows:

Small Nations Outvote U.S. and Russia at UN.

The session produced a small nation revolt against the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but little else.

Reads the report.

The small nations sponsored resolutions on disarmament and exploration of the ocean floor, which they rammed through the Assembly, despite objections from the super powers.

Experiences like this have tended to convince the Soviet Union and the United States that they probably ought to lean more on the Security Council in the future than they have in the past. And there are some hopeful signs of slow progress in this direction. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have indicated a willingness to reopen negotiations under article 43 of the charter, providing for the creation of an effective U.N. peacekeeping arrangement. I also think the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, following which the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom agreed to special Security Council action on behalf of nonnuclear signatories of the treaty, threatened with nuclear attack, indicates some tendency to return to the Security Council.

I have suggested that certain steps might be taken in the event that this option is pursued. I would think, for example, that if the great powers would be willing to renounce their use of the veto with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes, this would certainly go a long way toward strengthening the Security Council and giving it some additional vitality.

We might also want to explore the membership of the Council, as to whether we might want to add to the membership. There is Japan, for example, the third industrial power in the world, but once we begin adding to the permanent membership, we could certainly open a can of worms that might be very difficult indeed.

A third option, which some people have suggested, is that of a concert of the free nations. Senator Fulbright put this type of proposal forward some years ago. He said it ought to be pursued as far as possible within the framework of United Nations, but in large measure, it must be pressed outside of the U.N., through instrumentalities that reflect a limited but real community of common interest.

Now I think that in view of the attachment of the small states for the U.N., that organization must remain far more than just the "symbol of our aspirations," as Senator Fulbright suggests. I would also doubt the wisdom of using NATO as a nucleous for the building of an organization of this type. Certainly I don't think very many nations are about to join NATO. Malta might and possibly Spain, if it were given the opportunity. But it doesn't seem to me that this is a very fruitful avenue to explore at this stage in world history. It is basically

a cold war concept. It might have had some validity a decade or so ago, but in these days, I think it would not serve as either a satisfactory substitute for or a complement to the United Nations.

A fourth area that offers greater hope lies in the development of regional agencies, like the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity, so that they might assume a greater burden in the important tasks of peacemaking and peacekeeping.

The OAS, I think, is the one great exception to the general conclusion that the regional agencies have not done as well as the framers of the charter had hoped they would do in 1945. It has been able to settle most of the disputes that have arisen in the new world, largely because of the strong leadership and the power of the United States. But the fact is that most of these regional agencies lack the three great attributes that I believe all regional agencies ought to have to be successful.

The first one is the strong leadership of at least one relatively powerful nation; secondly, the membership of the states in the area; and thirdly, a real unity of purpose among the member states.

When you look at the Organization of African Unity, for example, you quickly see that it lacks at least two of these qualifications, and the same problem applies to the Arab League. None of the Arab States are equipped, either militarily or economically, to give the organization the strong leadership it needs.

NATO, too, can be cited as an example. It has been quite successful as a deterrent, but when you look at the geographic boundaries of NATO, you begin to recognize some of the limitations upon it. The United Kingdom is a member, but Ireland is not. France and Portugal belong, but Spain does not belong. Norway and Denmark are members, but Sweden and Finland are outside. Italy and West Germany are in, but Austria and Switzerland remain aloof. Greece and Turkey belong, but not Yugoslavia.

For this and for other reasons there are obvious limitation on both the economic and the political expansion of NATO.

Dr. Henry Kissinger has commented on the regional activities of these agencies, in this manner. "Regional grouping," he says, "supported by the United States, will have to take over major responsibility for their immediate areas, with the United States being concerned more with the overall framework of order than with the management of every regional enterprise."

Now there is some logic in this argument, and one can site a good many examples in the economic field, especially where considerable progress has been made. But the fact is that more and more of our really difficult problems are global in character, and require global answers.

World security problems, disarmament, human rights, outer space, the development of the new countries, East-West relations, colonialism, the ocean floor, the control of nuclear weapons, the pollution of the environment, world trade, monetary problems, are all rather obvious cases in point.

These problems all transcend regional boundary lines, and in the final analysis, must be dealt with primarily by international organizations geared to handle global problems.

A fifth option that has been suggested is the functional approach to peace. Some people believe that the best approach to world order lies in developing cooperation among the nations in the social, economic, humanitarian and technical fields. The father of functionalism, David Mitrany, once said that "a world society is more likely to grow through doing things together in workshop and marketplace rather than by signing pacts in chancelleries." There is a great deal to be said for this point of view. One can ask, however, whether it will do much good to make arrangements for the delivery of mail in Afghanistan, or to eliminate malaria in Central America, if we can't prevent a nuclear war.

Yet most people agree that there is a direct relationship between social and economic progress, and the great issues of war and peace, between hunger, poverty, disease and illiteracy on the one hand and world tensions on the other. I think the United Nations has moved ahead with rather modest progress in these fields, but the sad fact remains that the organization has not been given an opportunity by the members to test this functional approach. The framers of the charter had hoped that the specialized agencies would be able to work in a relatively isolated atmosphere, without the political pressures of the General Assembly or the member states interfering with the technical progress which they had envisaged in these agencies.

What has happened you all know. We have had a great deal of animosity generated by the cold war, in the WHO, ILO, UNESCO, and FAO, and we have had this animosity accompanied by the friction and the quarrels growing out of the dissolution of the western colonial system. This latter development is now, I think, exceeding in intensity the heat of the cold war. As a result it has been very difficult for those who wanted to rid the world of malaria, or to improve the agriculture of the new countries, to work out these problems peacefully. Instead they have been subjected to heated debates over the seating of Communist China, the apartheid policy in South Africa, the wickedness of the capital system, and political matters.

While it is clearly in our interest to cooperate in all these areas, where we can, and certainly to work out the answers to these problems with the Soviet Union and other states, the functionalist approach is certainly not the answer to all our prayers.

Now the next option would be world order through world law. Time will not permit me to go into this option, except to say that in the last 10 or 15 years, the supporters in the United States who have generally argued in favor of world order through world law, now seem to be declining in number.

The fact is that there are so many complexities involved in attempting to build anything like a world federation, that it discourages most people who have had any practical experience in this field from thinking along these lines.

The final option, Mr. Chairman, that I have outlined in my paper would lie in the direction of strengthening the United Nations. I see more prospect and more hope in this direction than I do in any of these other areas, although I hasten to add that the options are not mutually exclusive.

The United Nations, as we have pointed out, has failed to live up to our high hopes and expectations. We also know that we can't rely on

the old alliance system. We know that world government is not within our grasp, and we know that regional agencies can't take over all the big problems that the United Nations was supposed to handle.

But I do find some hope in the next 10 years in what the United Nations might do if we take steps to strengthen it, and I suggest in my final section some 10 or 12 points that I won't take time to discuss now because the minutes are slipping by, but I just want to briefly mention them. You will see that these are modest steps but I think they would indicate some interest on our part in the United Nations and tend to strengthen the organization, and possibly restore confidence in its work.

They are not world shaking in their importance individually, but they would be helpful in showing our interest in the work of the organization.

First of all, we should take some steps to increase the amount of economic and technical aid going to developing countries through U.N. channels, as that organization demonstrates its capacity to do the job. In other words I would put more emphasis on multilateral aid, and I imagine this is an objective that most members of this committee would support.

I would even go so far as to suggest that the United States take the lead in proposing the establishment of a fairly large multilateral development program, perhaps $4 or $5 million in size, as soon as the Vietnam situation would permit.

The second thing I would like to do is to take certain steps to strengthen United Nations aid machinery. We ought to do what we can to help in this second development decade—to which we should give our strong support—to help strengthen U.N. machinery for the coordination of the work of the specialized agencies and the other U.N. organs in the aid field.

As Sir Robert Jackson's recent study suggests, although the U.N. development program has done a good job, the system needs to be drastically overhauled, and we should join other U.N. members in pursuing this task with real zeal.

The third thing I would suggest is continued support for a modest standby U.N. peace force, which would be available to help put out brush fires and resolve crises that might arise. The force ought to be a small one, perhaps 5,000 in number at the outset, made up of volunteers from the smaller and medium-sized members of the U.N. On our part, we should be generous in our offers of financial and logistic support, including food, equipment, medical supplies, and transport facilities.

Fourthly, we ought to do what we can to encourage the streamlining of the General Assembly. It has gotten to be a large, unwieldy organ, with 126 members, and it would certainly be in our national interest and in the interest of world peace, to improve the committee structure, perhaps establishing committees to meet between sessions of the Assembly, and to impose some limits on debate. It would also be helpful to set up a more effective system of establishing priorities, and allocating the Assembly's time in dealing with matters on the agenda.

Fifth, I would like to see the United States take the lead in renouncing the right of veto with respect to the peaceful settlement of

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disputes, and in encouraging the other permanent members of the Security Council to do likewise.

Sixth, we ought to repeal the Connally amendment. If we want to give some real substance to the concept of world order through world law, or at least the rule of law concept, we should now withdraw the limitation that we imposed upon our acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. This would give a real impetus to the work of the Court, which it has, I think dampened up to this point.

Seventh, I would like to see our country take the lead in helping to liquidate the rather large United Nations debt that now hangs over the head of that Organization and putting it on a sounder financial basis. This could be done by absorbing our share of the debt, working out more effective measures for obtaining annual contributions, and by exploring the possibility of providing new sources of revenue, perhaps from the exploitation of the resources of the sea, or a small U.N. tax on mail. In this connection, I would like to make arrangements also for the U.N. to accept volunteer contributions from individuals, donations and corporations.

Eighth, I would hope the United States would give all the encouragement we can to the U.N. in its dealings with new problems that might emerge. I refer to such problems as outer space, the seabed, and the ocean floor, overpopulation, and the pollution of the environment. We can be helpful in terms of equipment, financial support, and organizational structure. The more we can lend our support to the U.N. in such matters the more we can help bring vitality to the Organization, as it comes to grips with these really relevant problems of the modern world.

Ninth, it seems to me the United States should help move the Organization toward universality. That means, to me at least, a two-China policy and at an appropriate stage, taking the steps necessary to bring the divided countries of Korea, Vietnam, and Germany into the Organization.

In doing this, of course, we ought not to allow the Republic of China to be ousted from the United Nations. We have obligations there which we should fulfill. Moreover we should take apropriate steps to keep the ministates in their place. We certainly should not encourage these very small states that are not viable coming into the Organization.

Ten, with respect to human rights, I am pleased that President Nixon has once again asked for Senate approval of the Genocide Convention. This seems to me to be the least we can do to indicate at this stage our interest in the human rights program of the United Nations. There are also certain other conventions in the human rights field that we should ratify.

Eleven, with respect to the expansion of United Nations headquarters, it is clear that the Organization has outgrown its headquarters building in New York. It is my hope that our Government would be willing to make a contribution of some $20 million to the expansion of the U.N. headquarters. If we don't, the project may very well collapse, and certain important U.N. programs would be compelled to leave New York. Such a development would be most unfortunate for the work of that Organization.

The final point deals with regionalism. I think we ought to do what we can to encourage the development of regional agencies, both in the

economic and the political fields. In this connection I agree with the UNA-USA Panel on "Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's" that it may be possible to enhance the capability of some of the regional agencies, like the OAS and the OAU, for the conciliation of disputes among their members, and I suggest in my paper how the United States might help in this regard.

Finally, I would say that deeds speak louder than words in world politics. A few concrete acts like the ones I have outlined will do far more than a dozen flowery speeches to indicate our interest in the Organization and our support for its work.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Dean Wilcox's complete statement follows:)

THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOME ALTERNATIVES TO WORLD ORDER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: My name is Francis O. Wilcox. I am presently Dean of The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies here in Washington. Prior to that I served for more than five years as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Earlier in my career it was my privilege to serve for a decade as Chief of Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In these capacities I have attended a good many meetings of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies—including the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

I appreciate very much your kind invitation to appear before your committee today on this important subject. As the United Nations enters its 25th anniversary year, it is highly desirable that we make every effort to understand its limitations and its potentials, learn from past experience, and try to determine just what these lessons mean for the future.

It has been suggested that I survey the broad spectrum of options that face us in connection with our role in the UN and our quest for a viable world order. It is obviously a rather difficult thing to do in a short period of time but if my presentation stirs up some questions in your minds, at least it will have served a useful purpose.

We start, of course, with the assumption that both the United Nations and the World community have changed radically since 1945. The UN itself has changed from an Organization of fifty-one members to an almost universal Organization of one hundred and twenty-six members; from an Organization that had as its principal objective the maintenance of world peace against the possible resurgence of fascist aggression to an Organization far more concerned with the liquidation of western colonialism, economic development and the betterment of mankind. In its brief twenty-five years it has scored a good many successes but it has also been criticized for its failure to develop the peaceful settlement procedures outlined in the Charter, and the machinery for enforcement action contemplated by the founding fathers.

More recently it has been criticized for its inability to come to grips with such important political questions as Vietnam, Berlin and the problems in the Middle East. In the western world much of the criticism centers around the great influx of new members and the changing nature of the General Assembly. There is a growing fear in some quarters at least that we cannot rely upon a huge, unwieldly body like the Assembly for a dependable response to a crisis situation; that we should not entrust the cause of peace to the whims and caprices of an unmanageable, deliberative body of this kind.

Whether these criticisms and fears are justified, may be open to question. In any event, given the situation in which we find ourselves it is only natural to ask what the alternatives are. What other choices do we have? It may be helpful to pass in quick review some of the alternatives suggested by various groups and individuals.

I. WEIGHTED VOTING

One rather obvious approach to the problem would be to inaugurate a system of weighted voting by which the voting strength of a country in the General

Assembly would more nearly conform to its position of power and influence in the world. It does seem a bit ridiculous that a state like the Maldive Islands, with a population of less than 100,000, should have the same voting power as India or the Soviet Union. It seems even more ridiculous when one realized that states possessing only about one-tenth of the world's population and contributing only one-twentieth of the UN budget could command the two-thirds vote necessary for Assembly action on important questions.

Weighted voting has of course been used successfully in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund where voting strength is roughly in proportion to the financial contribution of the member states. The European Community and the International Wheat Council—among others—have also used the principle of weighted voting. But it is much more difficult to devise an effective voting system for a *general* world organization like the UN that would combine the twin principles of workability and acceptability.

For example, what criteria should be used in determining the voting power of a state? Population? Gross national product? Geographic area? Foreign trade? Literacy? Contribution to the United Nations? Military strength? Dedication to humanitarian principles? The mere complication of such a list is indicative of the complexity of the problem.

Moreover, any formula that is at all reasonable would have to put a good deal of emphasis on population. Here one is immediately reminded of India and Mainland China and the fantastic growth rate that characterizes their already huge populations. Clearly a move in this direction would be very detrimental to the voting position of the United States and the western countries generally.

This would not be the case, of course, if votes were allocated according to the financial contributions of member states. In recent years the Atlantic Community countries have contributed about 75 percent of the UN's expenses with more than 40 percent normally coming from the United States. If voting power were based on contributions alone, the Atlantic states would be placed in a very favorable position.

Such a move would be open to serious objection, however, because it would draw an invidious distinction between rich and poor nations. Given the tremendous differences that exist among nations with respect to their capacity to pay, the contributions scale would seem to be an even less reliable criterion than population for determining voting power.

In any event, any voting formula of this sort would run into the buzz-saw opposition of the small states. They consider their vote in the General Assembly as their badge of membership in the world community. Moreover, for very understandable reasons they strongly support the principle of state equality and bitterly resent the idea of second-class citizenship. They would fight to the last ditch to avoid giving up their privileged position in the General Assembly.

Having said this, I must admit there is one *quid pro quo* that might possibly get results. If the Soviet Union and the United States were to present the United Nations with a comprehensive disarmament agreement carrying with it real prospects for a lasting peace, the smaller states would certainly be greatly impressed. And if, on top of this, the two superpowers would make available a substantial portion of their disarmament savings to launch a large-scale UN Development Program of four or five billion dollars, even the smaller nations might get on the weighted voting band wagon. If the cold war atmosphere could be replaced by meaningful cooperation among the great powers on behalf of peace and progress, who can say what the smaller states might be willing to do?

II. A RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

If a system of weighted voting is not feasible, and the General Assembly becomes more unwieldy and unreliable as an instrumentality for political action, another option would be to reinvigorate the Security Council and restore to it the main responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. This would, of course, require at least the tacit consent of the permanent members. It would also reverse a trend which has been going on since 1950 and which has been encouraged by the smaller nations.

As the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly came to an end late in December, 1969, an Associated Press report on the work of the Assembly was headlined in the *Washington Post* as follows: "Small Nations Outvote U.S. and Russia at UN." The session "produced a small-nation revolt against the United States and the Soviet Union but little else," reads the report. "The small nations sponsored resolutions on disarmament and explorations of the ocean

floor which they rammed through the Assembly despite objections from the two superpowers."

Incidents like these, I believe, have already convinced the United States and the Soviet Union that a greater reliance on the Security Council would probably be in the national interests of both countries. The Middle East crisis of 1967 also demonstrated that, on cold war issues at least, the General Assembly might find it increasingly difficult to arrive at a consensus. On that occasion, when the United States and the Soviet Union held conflicting views, very little was done. The Soviet proposal to withdraw Israeli troops from lands occupied during the seven-day war was rejected by the Assembly. But so was our proposal which would have tied the withdrawal of Israeli forces to an over-all peace settlement. Both failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote. The two great powers being at odds, the Assembly, in effect, did nothing and the matter later went to the Security Council for action. This striking example may tend to discourage both sides from using the Assembly for cold-war purposes.

There are some hopeful signs of slow progress. In recent years both the United States and the Soviet Union have expressed a willingness to reopen discussions under Article 43 in order to determine whether it would be possible to work out more effective peace-keeping arrangements. In 1964, the Soviet Union suggested that UN forces be made up of units from the middle and smaller powers rather than from the permanent members of the Security Council. The Soviets have also suggested that the Military Staff Committee—originally set up to advise the Security Council on enforcement action—might be enlarged to include non-permanent members of the Council as well as the five great powers. Finally, it will be recalled that after the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom agreed to special Security Council action on behalf of non-nuclear signatories of the Treaty threatened with nuclear attack.

Traditionally, of course, the Soviet Union has emphatically denied the jurisdiction of the Assembly over peace-keeping activities especially, and has insisted that all such operations be conducted within the framework of the Security Council where the veto applies. Their formal position remains "return to the Charter." The United States, on the other hand, sponsored the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950—largely because of the excessive use of the veto in the Security Council—and thus took the lead in shifting the focus of power from the Council to the General Assembly. Now we appear ready to emphasize the primary role of the Council once more, although retaining the present right in an emergency to have access to the General Assembly if action by the Council is blocked by the veto.

In the event there should be a real "return" to the Security Council, consideration should be given to two courses of action. In the first place, steps should be taken to soften the impact of the veto. This could be done by a liberal interpretation of the Charter which does not clearly define the kinds of decisions that require the concurring votes of the permanent members. In April, 1949, the Assembly recommended to the Council that some thirty-one decisions should be made by an affirmative vote of any seven members, and that the Council should conduct its business accordingly. Included in the list were a number of decisions—such as those relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the admission of new members—to which the veto had previously applied. If the permanent members were really serious in their desire to make the Council a more effective organ of the UN, they could proceed to reconsider this important recommendation of the General Assembly.

In the second place, although this would undoubtedly stir up many difficulties, steps might be taken to revise the composition of the Security Council, especially with respect to permanent membership. Certainly Japan, the third ranking industrial power in the world, should have a permanent seat. So should India and the Federal Republic of Germany when the time comes for its admission to the UN. Permanent or semi-permanent seats might also go to Brazil, Italy, Nigeria, Pakistan and Indonesia. In recent years the Council has been handicapped by the fact that too many small, weak states have been voted to membership without any regard to their possible contribution to the maintenance of peace and security. In line with the principle that power and responsibility go hand-in-hand, it is clear that the stature of the Security Council and its capacity to take effective action would be enhanced if more of the important members of the world community were to occupy Council seats on a regular basis.

III. A CONCERT OF THE FREE NATIONS

There is another approach to the problem which revolves around the proposal made some years ago for a concert of the free nations. This objective, as it was outlined by Senator J. William Fulbright, should be pursued "as far as possible within the United Nations. In large measure, however, it must be pressed outside of the UN, through instrumentalities that reflect a limited but real community of common interests."

There are two points in this proposal which disturb me. In the first place, unless one ignores the deep attachment of the new countries to the UN, that organization must remain far more than a mere "symbol of our aspirations,"—as Senator Fulbright put it. In fact, the UN has many important functions that it alone can perform. It would be penny-wise and pound-foolish if, in seeking to build a community of the free nations, we should allow our solid support for the UN to languish.

Moreover, I would doubt the wisdom of attempting to use the NATO alliance as a "nucleus of machinery" for anything like a concert of the free nations. Theoretically, of course, this could be done either by expanding the geographic scope of NATO or by creating a new security system designed to bring together all those free nations willing to assume joint defense commitments.

But what other governments would join NATO at this juncture in world history? Malta might and possibly Spain if she were given the opportunity. Certainly most states in the neutralist camp would be unwilling to join any such concert because of its military nature and because of their apprehension that it might become a purely anti-communist alliance.

Nor do the prospects for any significant expansion of NATO's work in the economic field appear particularly bright. NATO is too closely associated with nuclear weapons and military power in the minds of many people to enable it to tackle economic problems except on a restricted basis.

I would agree that it might be helpful for the United States and Canada to move towards more effective participation in the economic work of the OECD, the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. This kind of cooperation can be very helpful if it is kept in proper perspective. The central question here is the degree of cooperation between the United States and the Atlantic Community that is consistent with our broader interests in the UN. If it is based on the simple proposition that free world states must federate or unite in order to defeat the communist menace, then it could lead to harmful results, since most states would certainly resent the idea that they must choose sides in the struggle between East and West.

In any event, Mr. Chairman, it appears to me that the concert of the free nations is essentially a cold-war concept. It may have had some relevance a decade or more ago, but the world has changed since that time, and I do not believe any useful purpose could be served in considering it either as a supplement to or a substitute for the United Nations.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL AGENCIES

Still another possibility lies in the development of the regional agencies like the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity so that they might assume a greater burden in the important tasks of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Before the end of World War II, the dream of Winston Churchill was to create a series of regional organizations that would serve as the great pillars on which the world order would rest. Admittedly, the regional agencies have been something less than perfect in this respect. Some of them have been helpful, but they have not supported and complemented the UN as the framers of the UN Charter hoped they would.

The Organization of American States is perhaps the one great exception. By and large it has helped resolve most of the disputes that have arisen in the new world largely because of the power and the strong leadership of the United States. The most recent example is the action of the OAS in bringing to an end the mini-war between Honduras and El Salvador in the summer of 1969. On the other hand, the Organization's efforts to create an OAS peace force have collapsed, largely because of the fear some states have that it would be dominated by the United States.

Unfortunately most of the regional agencies lack the three great attributes they should have in order to be successful: 1) the strong leadership of at least

one relatively powerful state; 2) the membership of the states in the area; and 3) a real unity of purpose among the members. The Organization of African Unity is a case in point. With Nigeria torn by revolution, what state could be expected to assume a position of leadership for the African continent? And how much unity of purpose can the OAU generate? Its members are certainly agreed on the desirability of ridding the continent of the last vestiges of western colonialism. But beyond that when one surveys the deep differences between the states of northern Africa and Africa south of the Sahara, between French- and English-speaking Africa, and between states under white rule and states under black rule, one must conclude that it will be extremely difficult to evolve any real unity of purpose in Africa for some time to come.

The Arab League suffers from some of the same weaknesses. None of the Arab states are equipped—either militarily or economically—to give the organization the strong leadership it needs. Moreover, even though hostility towards Israel gives the League a certain focus or unity of purpose, its members seem to be constantly working at cross purposes, torn by mistrust, jealousies and bitter personal rivalries.

In most of the regional agencies the membership problem remains a serious obstacle. Take SEATO for example. SEATO may have served a useful purpose at the time of its origin in deterring the aggressive designs of international communism. But how can SEATO possibly be helpful in settling disputes in South and Southeast Asia so long as important states like India, Indonesia, Burma and Malaysia are not members?

NATO, too, has been eminently successful in its principal mission—that of providing a shield against possible Russian thrusts into Western Europe. A partial roll call of European states however, demonstrates some of the economic and political limitations inherent in the NATO system. Thus, the United Kingdom is a member of NATO, but Ireland is not. France and Portugal belong, but Spain does not; Norway and Denmark are members, while Sweden and Finland are outside; Italy and West Germany are in, but Austria and Switzerland remain aloof; Greece and Turkey belong, but not Yugoslavia.

The obvious fact is that few, if any, of the big issues that have their focus in other regions of the world can be resolved within the NATO framework. Dutch differences with Indonesia, Portugal's troubles in Angola and Mozambique, Belgium's role in the Congo, and the whole complex of problems in the Middle East, all found their way into the broader forum of the UN. Even problems like Cyprus and Algeria, which had their focus within the geographic area of NATO, ultimately had to be dealt with by the UN.

Nevertheless, there can be no question that these regional agencies have injected an element of stability into the troubled world. The very existence of NATO, the OAS and the Warsaw Pact, for example, has discouraged great power interference in areas outside their own spheres of influence. Moreover, the OAS, and more recently the OAU, on a number of occasions have successfully acted as courts of first resort and have settled disputes among their members. The OAU, in an encouraging burst of vitality, helped resolve differences between Algeria and Morocco, Somalia and Ethiopia, and Ghana and Upper Volta. Yet it failed to bring an end to the costly and bloody civil war in Nigeria.

What of the future? Dr. Lincoln Bloomfield has suggested that the sheer complexity of the modern world may argue for a structure of more manageable proportions. "Security, we were told in 1945, was indivisible," he wrote several years ago. "(Today) our best bet may be to divide security up into smaller pieces in order to keep the larger structure from being overloaded." Dr. Henry Kissinger has commented along much the same lines. "Regional groupings supported by the US will have to take over major responsibility for their immediate areas," he has said, "with the US being concerned more with the over-all framework of order than with the management of every regional enterprise."

There is of course some logic to this argument. In the economic field especially some modest developments have taken place that are rather encouraging. One can cite particularly the common market organization in Europe and Ceneral America, and certain economic cooperation on a regional basis even in Africa and Southeast Asia. But the fact is that more and more of our really difficult problems are global in nature and require a global solution. World security problems, disarmament, human rights, outer space, the development of the new countries, East-West relations, colonialism, the ocean floor, the control of nuclear weapons, the pollution of the environment, world trade, and monetary problems are all cases

in point. These problems all transcend regional boundary lines and, in the final analysis, can be dealt with only by an international organization geared to handle global problems.

V. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

Some people believe that the best approach to world order lies in developing cooperation among the nations in the social, economic, humanitarian and technical fields. By bringing states together to resolve their differences on non-political issues, the argument runs, habits of cooperation will be developed which will enable them to tackle their political problems with a greater degree of success. As David Mitrany, the father of functionalism, puts it, a world society is "more likely to grow through doing things together in workshop and market place rather than by signing pacts in chancelleries."

One may well ask just what good it will do to make arrangements for the delivery of mail to Afghanistan, or eliminate malaria from Central America, if we cannot prevent a nuclear war. Yet most people would agree there is a direct relationship between social and economic progress and the great issues of war and peace, between hunger, poverty, disease and illiteracy on the one hand and world tensions on the other. Certainly the framers of the UN Charter recognized the importance of economic and social cooperation in laying the basis for peaceful and friendly relations among the nations.

By and large the United Nations has moved ahead with a modest degree of success in this field. The fourteen UN Specialized Agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiation, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunications Union came into being to meet very real needs. It is perhaps too early to say that they have made a major contribution to world peace. Obviously they have not been spectacular or world-shaking in their impact. But they have, with limited resources, prevented serious safety problems in international air traffic, helped prevent the spread of communicable diseases, and done a host of other things to coordinate the needs and interests of states in a world shrunk to infinitesimal size by amazing developments in science and technology.

The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Authority have also gotten off to a reasonably good start. To be sure, the economic gap between the developed countries and the new nations is steadily widening. Moreover, the developing states are faced with constantly increasing population pressures so they are compelled to run faster and faster merely to avoid losing ground. Yet it must be admitted that these specialized agencies have done much to develop the techniques, the institutions, the infrastructure, and the patterns of cooperation necessary for man's first systematic attempt to cope with the social and economic problems we face on a global basis.

It remains a sad fact, however, that in this post-war period the members of the UN have not given the functional approach a fair test. Many supporters of the specialized agencies had hoped they would be able to pursue their objective of promoting "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" relatively isolated from political pressures and influences. Quite the contrary, the political animosity generated by the cold war has found its way into the technical meetings of WHO, UNESCO, FAO and most of the other specialized agencies just as it has into the meetings of the General Assembly. This has been accompanied by the friction and the quarrels growing out of the dissolution of the old colonial empire—quarrels between some of the Western European countries and the militant opponents of the old colonial system. Those who have gathered together to rid the world of malaria, or to improve the agriculture of the new countries, have been subjected to heated debates over the seating of Communist China, the apartheid policy of the Republic of South Africa, the wickedness of the capitalist system, and other political questions.

As Professor Inis L. Claude has commented: "In terms of functional theory, the knitting of economic and social bonds between the United States and the Soviet Union is the critical peace-building task of our time; yet, this is precisely the job that functionalism cannot even begin to perform until after some sort of political peace has been established between the two great powers. The politics of the cold war shows no susceptibility to being transformed by functional programs; rather, it shows every indication of being able to transform functional workshops into political arenas."

Even so, it would appear to be in our interest and the long-range interests of world peace to cooperate with the Soviet Union wherever we have common problems that lend themselves to cooperative efforts—either bilaterally or inside the UN. In this connection, in addition to the problem of outer-space, three important problem areas have come to the attention of the United Nations in recent years which may give considerable impetus to the theory of functionalism. Some, like the problems of overpopulation and the pollution of the human environment, are crucial to man's survival. Others, like the seabed and the ocean floor and the problem of outer-space, offer unique challenges because they open up exciting new frontiers for cooperative action. If we can approach these problems with a minimum of political rancor, we may be able to make considerable progress towards a rational world order.

VI. WORLD ORDER THROUGH WORLD LAW

One cannot survey the options before us without some reference to world government and world law. There are still a good many people, in the western world especially, who remain quite convinced that anything short of world government will be quite inadequate to the task of saving the world from disaster. In general, world federation plans are based on the proposition that peace cannot be maintained so long as the world is organized as a group of sovereign, independent states. As one policy statement notes: "World peace can be created and maintained only under world law, universal and strong enough to prevent armed conflict between nations."

Most world government proposals suggest that a start be made towards their goal by amending the UN Charter. Depending on the plan, the amount of authority to be delegated to the world government would vary considerably. The minimum delegation would give the federal government authority only in relation to the control, reduction, or elimination of armed force in relations between states. The maximum delegation of power would be that which in effect would create a unitary type of world state. Most proponents of world government insist, however, that nothing should be done that would destroy or impair the effectiveness of the United Nations at least until something better can be established to take its place.

Space does not permit any analysis of the many proposals that have been made in this direction. Suffice it to say, the idea of world federation does not appear to have the degree of support in the United States that it had in the early post war years. Such proposals had their strongest support in the years immediately after the war when the UN was found to be incapable of resolving fundamental disagreements among the great powers and while the hope was still alive that many of the issues among those powers were capable of solution if only the proper instrumentality could be devised.

Supporters of world government and world law are often dismissed by their critics as idealists or even visionaries who fail to grasp the realities of power politics. Nevertheless, a good many people are in sympathy with their general objectives, but argue that the time has not yet come for their realization. Even so it should be clear to all of us that unless the states of the world are willing to give up a certain amount of their sovereignty, neither the UN nor any other form of international organization that might be devised will be strong enough to keep the peace.

In this connection, I should remind the Committee of an interesting development in the post-war era. Some of the states of Western Europe, discovering the strength that can come from unity, have been willing to give up a portion of their sovereignty to the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market and other organs of the European Community. At the same time there has been a resurgence of sovereignty in much of the rest of the world. The countries of Asia and Africa, proud of their newly-won independence, tend to emphasize the spirit of nationalism and the trappings of sovereignty. This may well inhibit progress in international organization when it is badly needed. It certainly should discourage any move toward world government.

VII. STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS

Still another option, as we move into the 1970's, is to do what we can to strengthen the United Nations in order to make it a more effective instrumentality for keeping the peace and for improving the social and economic well-being of mankind. (Such steps might, of course, include some of the options

referred to above.) We know that thus far the UN has failed to live up to our hopes and expectations. We know, too, that the principal reason for this state of affairs lies in the failure of UN members to develop a strong enough allegiance to the Organization. We also know that we cannot rely on the old alliance system to keep the peace. World government is not within our grasp. Nor can we depend on regional agencies to take over the task of building a viable world order.

There is one great lesson we have learned during the last twenty-five years. The United Nations cannot deal successfully with any of the major political issues we face without at least the tacit cooperation of the great powers. The United Nations was built upon this principle. It was stated again and again at San Francisco that the unity and cooperation of the great powers would be essential if the UN were to fulfill its great destiny.

In the early days, when the UN was a western-oriented organization, we had our way and the UN did pretty much what the western countries—especially the United States—wanted it to do. But that period of western domination has ended and we must recognize it. During the Suez crisis—which many people believe was one of the UN's great periods—the Organization was able to move effectively partly because the USSR acquiesced in what it was doing. In the Congo crisis action was possible in the final analysis because the Soviet Union did not oppose what the states of Africa and Asia wanted to do.

If the cold war should abate, we might very well enter into a new period in world affairs in which the United Nations could play a very important role. In any event, I would like to see our government take the following steps, among others, to help strengthen the United Nations in the decade ahead and to improve our posture in it.

1. *Multilateral Aid.*—We should take steps to increase the amount of economic aid and technical assistance going to the developing countries through UN channels as that organization demonstrates its capacity to do the job. This would not only strengthen the UN by giving it something constructive to do; it would win a good deal of support for the United States in UN circles.

In addition, as soon as the Vietnam situation permits, I would like to see our government take the lead in proposing the establishment, under UN auspices, of a multilateral development of substantial size, perhaps four or five billion dollars. This should be done on a matching basis with the United States contributing at least fifty percent of the total. It is quite possible that the Soviet Union would not be willing to participate, and the UN might not be able to secure matching funds from other countries, but at least we would get credit for trying.

2. *UN Aid Machinery.*—In giving our strong support to the Second Development Decade, we should also do what we can to help strengthen UN machinery for the coordination of the work of the specialized agencies and the other UN organs in the aid field. This is essential in any case, but is especially necessary if the UN is to take on broader assignments in the aid field. As Sir Robert Jackson's recent study suggests, the UN development system needs to be drastically overhauled, and we should join other UN members in pursuing this task with real zeal.

3. *UN Peace Force.*—The United States should continue its efforts to encourage the creation of a modest stand-by UN peace force which would be available to help put out brush fires and resolve crises that may arise. The force should be a small one, perhaps 5,000 in number at the outset, made up of volunteers from the smaller and medium-sized members of the UN. On our part we should be generous in our offers of financial and logistic support, including food, equipment, medical supplies and transport facilities.

At the same time, the United States should reiterate its offer to resume discussions with the Soviet Union and other permanent members of the Security Council looking to the possible creation of larger UN forces under Article 43 of the Charter.

4. *Streamlining the General Assembly.*—Our government should also support any move to overhaul the machinery of the General Assembly and streamline its operations. With one hundred and twenty-six members—most of whose representatives want to make speeches for home consumption—the General Assembly is becoming big and unwieldy. It would certainly be in our interests to improve the committee structure, perhaps establishing committees to meet between sessions of the Assembly, and to impose proper limitations on debate. It would also be helpful to set up a more effective system of establishing priorities and allocating time for the various items on the Assembly's agenda.

5. *Renunciation of the Veto.*—The United States, at a time considered auspicious, should offer once again to give up its right of veto with respect to the peaceful settlement of international disputes and encourage the other permanent members of the Security Council to do likewise. Council decisions should then be taken by a majority of the five permanent members and a majority of the ten non-permanent members. This voluntary renunciation of the right to veto a substantive decision, if it could be obtained, would inject new vitality into the operations of the Security Council.

6. *Repeal of the Connally Amendment.*—The Connally Amendment, you will recall, was a part of the resolution by which the U.S. Senate agreed to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over legal disputes in which we might be involved. In effect, it reserved to the United States—instead of the Court—the right to determine whether a matter fell within the jurisdiction of the Court or within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. This was, of course, a substantial departure from the normal practice.

The amendment has prompted other states to follow our lead. It has thus had a general dampening effect on the work of the Court. I believe the time has come for us to repeal the Connally amendment. Such action on our part could certainly have no harmful effect on our national interest. On the other hand, it would inject new vitality into the rule-of-law concept and would generally enhance the work of the Court.

7. *Resolving Financial Problems.*—Partly as a result of the peacekeeping expenses involved in the Suez and Congo crises, the United Nations remains heavily in debt. The United States should take the lead in liquidating the present debt—by making a special contribution if necessary—and putting the Organization on a sound financial basis. This could be done by working out more effective measures for obtaining annual contributions from member states and by exploring the possibility of providing new sources of revenue, perhaps from the exploitation of the resources of the sea or from a small UN tax on mail going across state boundary lines. Arrangements could also be made to encourage voluntary contributions from non-governmental sources for special UN programs.

8. *New Issues Before the UN.*—The UN will prove its worth, in large measure, to the extent that it can deal effectively with new problems that emerge which are of real interest to the international community. To this end the United States should lend every assistance to the UN—in terms of equipment, financial support, and organizational structure—in its handling of such problems as outer-space, the seabed and the ocean floor, overpopulation, and pollution of the environment. Successful handling of these problems will bring new vitality to the Organization and new confidence in its work.

9. *Towards Universality.*—It seems to me that the time has arrived for the United States to encourage the principle of universality of membership for the UN. We should do this by supporting a two-China policy and, at an appropriate stage, by taking the steps necessary to bring both parts of the divided countries of Germany, Korea and Vietnam into the Organization. In supporting the seating of Mainland China, we should of course make sure that the Republic of China is not deprived of its membership. These steps will require a good deal of negotiating, but I believe the advantages of having a truly universal organization now outweigh the disadvantages of bringing these entities into the UN.

Meanwhile, some forty or fifty mini-states or non-self-governing territories remain outside the fold. For the most part these are not large enough to become full-fledged members, but arrangements should be made for special relationships between some of them and the UN. In a few cases associate membership might be accorded without the right to vote.

10. *Human Rights.*—As a nation that believes strongly in human rights, we should do what we can to strengthen the efforts of the UN to bring about universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the world community. Most states are understandably reluctant to undertake serious commitments in this field, but at the very least we could proceed to ratify the Genocide Convention. This was first submitted to the Senate more than twenty years ago, and I am pleased that President Nixon has once again asked for Senate approval. Other conventions in this field which we might well ratify are the Convention on Forced Labor and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women.

11. *Expansion of UN Headquarters.*—In view of the tremendous development of the UN during the past twenty-five years, it is not surprising that the Organization has completely outgrown its headquarter buildings in New York. Plans

for enlarging the headquarters will depend largely on the willingness of the United States to make a contribution of some $20,000,000 to the project. I would hope this money would be promptly authorized and appropriated. Otherwise, the project may very well collapse and certain UN programs would be compelled to leave the New York area, seriously impairing the work of the Organization.

12. *On Strengthening Regionalism.*—Permit me one final point, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the need to develop regional agencies. We have done much to encourage regional activities in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America. We certainly should continue to do this on the assumption that wherever states can be persuaded to work together to solve their common problems, progress towards peace and world order should be correspondingly greater.

I agree also with the UNA–USA Panel on "Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's" that it may be possible to enhance the capability of some of the regional agencies—especially the OAS and the OAU—for the conciliation of pressing disputes among their members. This might be done by improving the fact-finding, peace observation and communication facilities of the Organizations. To this end, communication equipment from the United States might prove to be a most helpful contribution to both the OAS and the OAU.

CONCLUDING COMMENT

In world politics, Mr. Chairman, actions usually speak louder than words. Graceful and convincing rhetoric is fine so far as it goes, but a few concrete acts on our part would do more to help strengthen the United Nations and restore confidence in it than a dozen speeches. It is my hope that during the twenty-fifth anniversary year our government may be able to take some of the steps I have outlined above. (There are, of course, many other things that could be done.) For the most part the steps suggested are very modest and most of them are not new. But they would indicate in a very tangible way our interest in the United Nations and its work.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Dean Wilcox.

Ambassador Phillips?

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER H. PHILLIPS, DEPUTY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. PHILLIPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee in this important series of hearings on the United Nations, and I am particularly pleased to be able to participate in this panel today, which is looking to the decade ahead and considering new tasks and opportunities which may face the United Nations during that period.

My topic, Mr. Chairman, is the "United Nations and the Ocean Environment." And it is a topic of growing interest to scientists, to industrialists, and to environmental experts the world over. If it is agreeable with you, Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a few preliminary remarks, to highlight some of the key issues, and then ask your permission to place in the record a somewhat more comprehensive statement which I believe is before you now.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. PHILLIPS. It shouldn't be surprising, Mr. Chairman, that a subject as universal as the seas would eventually come to the attention of the United Nations. After all, 70 percent of the earth's surface lies beneath the oceans, and within the 350 million cubic miles of ocean, there exists a vast storehouse of untapped minerals.

With the world becoming increasingly concerned by the dangers of over-population and possible exhaustion of land-based mineral resources, this huge submerged part of our planet takes on added im-

portance. We are daily reminded by the headlines in our newspapers that the ocean, whose role in the ecology of the planet is fundamental, is a threatened environment, and the threat is steadily increasing in severity.

By the very physical nature of the ocean, if this threat is to be met, it must be met by cooperative international action.

In his report to the Congress, entitled "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's," President Nixon, referring to man's growing uses of the oceans, said, and I quote him, "These are issues that transcend national differences and ideology, and should respond to effective multilateral action."

I think it is fair, Mr. Chairman, to say that there is no area of human concern for which the United Nations is a more appropriate instrumentality of action. Indeed, there is no area in which it is more clearly essential that the United Nations be used as the mechanism through which mankind undertakes to organize itself to cope with important common problems.

Outside the United Nations system, there simply is no standing machinery for global lawmaking, and I think this is an illustration of what Dean Wilcox just mentioned concerning the approach to global problems. This is certainly one. In fact, I think the record will show that every general multilateral treaty which has been concluded since World War II, from the Test Ban Treaty to the Conventions on the Law of the Sea, to the recent treaty on the law of treaties itself, has been brought into being through the rather cumbersome, admittedly, but often effective processes of lawmaking within the United Nations system.

There are several important challenges which the world ocean presents to the international community, and I should like to comment briefly on the main ways the United Nations is moving to meet those challenges.

Now let me mention first, international cooperation in ocean research. In 1968, the General Assembly of the United Nations on the proposal of the United States, decided to organize an International Decade of Ocean Exploration to be undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations.

This decade will be the first step in the long-term program of ocean research. The primary responsibility for planning and coordinating the various intergovernmental activities which it will comprise falls on the Inter-Governmental Oceanography Commission, the IOC, which is a standing body of UNESCO.

Now during the past year, the IOC prepared an outline of the activities which should be undertaken in the major fields of ocean exploration and research, together with various suggestions as to practical implementation. The member states have also been asked to prepare proposals for projects to be undertaken during the decade, and to transmit these proposals to the Inter-Governmental Oceanography Commission in time for the beginning of the decade this year.

Perhaps the most dramatic single move in ocean matters undertaken by the United Nations has been its vigorous effort within the last 2 years to deal with the emerging problems of human activity on the ocean floor, beyond national jurisdiction.

As recently as 1958, the first U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea discussed the international implications of important human activity on the deep ocean floor. During the 1960's, it became apparent that technology was developing capacities which in the fairly near future would thrust a whole new complex of problems on the international community.

And it became clear that within much less than a lifetime, man might well be able to extract from the ocean floor hydrocarbons and other mineral wealth in quantities of very great and in some cases breathtaking magnitude.

The need for international action was seen by a number of private organizations and a number of governments, including our own, and in 1967, the delegation of Malta brought to the U.N. General Assembly a proposal to create a special committee to deal with problems of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. As a result, the United Nations now has a standing 42-member body, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, on which I serve as the U.S. member. And I should say parenthetically that in their excellent report on the 24th General Assembly, to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Congressman Fascell and Congressman Whalley made some very useful, and I thought very pertinent comments on the work of the Seabed Committee, and on some aspects of the committee's work, which came up during the last General Assembly session.

Now, the big question facing this committee is how to frame rules by which nations can cooperate and share equitably in the exploitation of potentially very great mineral wealth, most of which belongs to no nation, because it lies beyond the present limits of national jurisdiction.

The committee has taken a two-pronged approach to this job. On the one hand, it has set about immediately drafting a set of general principles governing the conduct of states on the seabed. At the same time, the committee has done work on a more definitive, a more detailed international legal regime for the area, to be established in due course by treaty.

As in the case of outer space, the legal principles declared by the General Assembly would serve to govern in the interim before the establishment of a definitive legal regime, and to a considerable extent, we would hope these would be incorporated into such a regime.

This, of course, amounts to a task of very large proportions, one which will not be accomplished overnight, which is in some respects still in the very early stages, and which has already produced some fairly sharp differences of view within the international community.

But, already certain points of basic agreement have emerged. For example, all countries appear to accept the fundamental point that there is an area of the seabed which lies beyond national jurisdiction. This in effect, rejects the notion that nations may grab and hold the seabed by claims of national sovereignty, all the way out to the middle of the ocean.

There are a number of other points on which there is a wide measure of agreement. These include acceptance that the resources of the seabed should be used for the benefit of mankind; that the area should be used for exclusively peaceful uses; that an international regime for the area should be established in a timely fashion; that as a practical matter, this regime must include some form of institutional arrangement or

machinery which would have a role in regulating the exploitation of seabed resources, and finally, that a portion of the revenue generated by this exploitation should be turned over for international community purposes in recognition of the interest of all mankind in the area.

In respect to all these points, the United States is in agreement. I think this reflects our conviction that U.S. interests will best be served by action which will avoid an escalation of claims and counterclaims, both as to the boundary of national jurisdiction over exploitation and rights to exploit the area beyond.

The mere expectation of great wealth in the seabeds could be the very thing to stimulate just such an escalation of claims, and result in very serious disputes between states, which in all likelihood would involve the United States, either directly or indirectly. We therefore believe that it is in the long-range interests of the United States to assure that the boundary and regime issues are resolved by widespread international agreement.

As to the form which international machinery should take, there have been a number of divergent views. And these range from an international agency with comprehensive authority to regulate and control the exploitation of the seabed all the way across the spectrum to a mere registry of national claims.

And closely related to the problem of international machinery is the problem of defining the extent of the area which lies beyond national jurisdiction. Where does national jurisdiction lie? Where does an international regime begin?

Obviously, if an international regime is to be established, the area to which that regime applies must be precisely defined. The lack of such a precise definition is one of the major unresolved problems which was carried over from the U.N. Law of the Sea Conferences in 1958 and 1960. No agreement was then reached on the precise outer limit of the continental shelf.

Now this is a question which is very much in the minds of all governments participating in the U.N. seabed efforts. Some appear to favor fixing a relatively narrow limit of national jurisdiction over the continental shelves. For example, a limit defined by a single depth criterion, of perhaps 200 or as much as 550 meters.

The advocates of a narrow shelf obviously favor the establishment of an international regime which would embrace the largest possible seabed area.

At the other extreme is the possibility of a wide boundary which would extend not only to the edge of the shelf, but would also include the continental slope which lies immediately beyond the shelf, and would embrace, as well, the sedimentary residues or deposits which extend beyond the slope, and which are known as the continental rise.

There have also been suggestions for a so-called intermediate zone, including a part of the shelf, slope, or rise, in which coastal states would have certain prerogatives regarding exploitation of resources, but which would also be subject to certain internationally agreed arrangements.

Within the Government, we are giving this whole range of possibilities the most intensive examination. It is clear that the United States can't best represent its own interests in the continuing discus-

sions of the seabed until it has arrived at a position on the precise outer limit of national jurisdiction.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I should like to say just a few words about the problem of protecting the marine environment. The world is only just beginning to be aware of the pressing need to act to protect the ocean environment from progressively serious and perhaps irreparable injury within the fairly near future. The problem cuts across the whole range of United Nations ocean activities.

There is, for example, widespread agreement that the legal principles for the seabed which are now under preparation, as well as the regime which will eventually be established, must contain adequate provisions to protect the ocean from the ravages of pollution, which could well result from unregulated exploitation of its resources.

In this connection, the U.N. Seabed Committee will have before it during the coming year a report by the Secretary General of the U.N. on various aspects of the question of marine pollution and its control.

Four of the U.N.'s specialized agencies, the FAO, UNESCO, WMO and IMCO have established a joint group of experts to provide continuing advice to these agencies on the scientific aspects of marine pollution. And several of these agencies as well are carrying on independent programs dealing with the problem of marine pollution.

And lastly, the United Nations is laying plans for a major conference on the human environment in 1972, in which problems of the ocean environment will unquestionably play an important role. The U.S. Secretary General is now working with agencies of the U.N. system which are concerned with other important aspects of the marine pollution problem, in order to place before that conference a full description of the problem and recommendations for action necessary to deal with the growing danger of pollution of the high seas.

That, in brief, Mr. Chairman, is where the U.N. now stands in its efforts to mobilize the world community into effective action to preserve and protect the ocean environment.

A beginning has been made, and governments are now starting to think and plan in terms of their national needs and interests, and hopefully, in terms of the broader interests of mankind as a whole.

Many hard problems remain to be resolved, and they will not be resolved overnight, but I can't believe that man will permit this last great largely untapped area of our planet to become a scene of conflicting national rivalries and the destructive and wasteful use of its enormous resources.

If ever there was a time and a place where the extension of the rule of law is in order, this surely is the time and place.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The complete statement of Ambassador Phillips follows:)

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER H. PHILLIPS

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee in this important series of hearings on the United Nations. I am especially pleased to be able to participate in this panel which is looking to the decade ahead and considering new tasks and opportunities which may face the UN during that period.

My topic is—The UN and the Ocean Environment. It is a topic of growing interest to scientists, industrialists and environmental experts the world over.

It should not be surprising that a subject as universal as the seas would eventually come to the attention of the UN. After all, 70 per cent of the earth's

surface lies beneath the oceans. Within the three hundred and fifty million cubic miles of ocean there exists a vast storehouse of untapped minerals.

With the world becoming increasingly concerned by the dangers of overpopulation and possible exhaustion of land-based mineral resources, this huge submerged part of our planet takes on added importance.

In his Report to the Congress, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's", President Nixon, referring to man's growing uses of the oceans, said: "These are issues that transcend national differences and ideology and should respond to effective multilateral action."

I think it is fair to say that there is no area of human concern for which the United Nations is a more appropriate instrumentality of action. Indeed, there is no area in which it is more clearly essential that the United Nations be used as the mechanism through which mankind undertakes to organize itself to cope with important common problems.

There are a number of reasons why this is so. First is the obvious fact that no one owns the ocean. Except for narrow bands off the shores of coastal states, the ocean is no one's territory and the object of no one's sovereign rights. Consequently no national state has the authority to regulate human conduct there other than as to its own citizens.

In this respect the ocean is similar to outer space. But, unlike outer space, the ocean has long been an arena for a wide variety of exceedingly important human activities, only the most traditional of which are fishing and navigation. The thrust of technology is spawning new modes of activity in the marine environment at a very rapid rate, some of which—such as the mining of ocean mineral resources—promise great and perhaps even radical effects upon the global economy.

At the same time in two important respects—namely, scientific investigation and political organization—the world ocean is an area in which mankind's efforts have achieved only a rudimentary stage of development. While of course our scientific understanding of the ocean, its history, its life systems, far exceeds that of our seafaring predecessors of 100 or 50 or even 10 years ago, in many important respects the ocean remains a strange and unexplored realm of inner space.

No country, including our own, possesses such extensive resources in ocean science as not to stand greatly in need of the cooperative pooling of scientific resources. Moreover, many coastal states have virtually no scientific capacity in this area, nor the economic means to develop one independently. Yet they feel strongly—and in my view legitimately—that they are entitled to an opportunity to participate in scientific research in the marine environment and to share in their fruits. The United Nations system appears to offer the best and perhaps the only means for such an international cooperative effort.

As to legal regimes and political institutions to regulate human conduct in the ocean environment, they are in many respects a patchwork of *ad hoc* arrangements devised to meet highly particular needs. Even the more nearly all-embracing and "constitutional" regimes of the law-of-the-sea, devised through the UN in the late 1960's, have gaping lacunae (for example, they fail to define the limits to which national territory extends in the ocean) and in some ways have already been rendered inadequate by the mushrooming of ocean technology.

Outside the United Nations system, there simply is no standing machinery for global lawmaking, and in fact, every general multilateral treaty which has been concluded since World War II—from the Test Ban Treaty to the Conventions on the Law of the Sea to the recent Treaty on the Law of Treaties itself—has been brought into being through the rather cumbersome but often effective processes of lawmaking within the United Nations system.

Finally, the ocean, whose role in the ecology of the planet is fundamental, is a threatened environment—and the threat is steadily increasing in severity. By the very physical nature of the ocean, if this threat is to be met it must be met by cooperative international action. It is exceedingly difficult to envisage any international framework other than the United Nations capable of serving this purpose.

These are the main challenges which the world ocean presents to the international community—challenges which are tailor-made for action through the United Nations system. In the time remaining I should like to review the main ways in which the United Nations is now moving to meet these challenges. This of itself will provide a certain index to what we may expect in the United Nations in this area during the decade of the 1970's.

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SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION OF THE OCEAN

I mention first international cooperation in ocean research. In 1968 the UN General Assembly, on the proposal of the United States, decided to organize an International Decade of Ocean Exploration to be undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations. This Decade will be the first step in a long-term program of ocean research. The primary operational responsibility for planning and coordinating the various scientific activities which it will comprise falls on the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), a standing body within the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), one of the UN's specialized agencies.

During the past year the IOC prepared a comprehensive outline of the activities which should be undertaken in the major fields of ocean exploration and research, together with various suggestions as to practical implementation. In addition, UN Member States have been asked to prepare proposals for projects to be undertaken during the decade, and to transmit them to the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission in time for the decade to begin in 1970.

REGULATING ACTIVITIES ON THE SEABED

Perhaps the most dramatic single move in ocean matters which the UN has taken has been its vigorous effort within the last two years to organize itself to deal with the emerging problems of human activity on the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. As recently as 1958, the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea discussed the possibility of human activity on the deep ocean floor which would be of sufficient consequence and extent to require detailed international regulation in the immediate future.

During the 1960's it became apparent that technology was developing capacities which in the fairly near future would thrust a complex of new problems on the international community, willy-nilly. It became clear that within much less than a lifetime man might well be able to extract from the ocean floor hydro-carbons and other mineral wealth in quantities of very great and in some cases breath-taking magnitude.

It is true that expectations both as to the extent of the known mineral resources of the ocean floor and the economic viability of their extraction have often tended to outrun the hard facts available to the scientific and industrial community. Nevertheless, there can now be no doubt that the mineral resources of the ocean floor must loom large in any calculation of the recoverable mineral resources of the planet in the decades to come.

The need for international action was seen by a number of private organizations and a number of governments—including our own—and in 1967 the Delegation of Malta brought to the United Nations General Assembly a proposal to create a special committee to deal with problems of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

As a result, the United Nations now has a standing 42-member body, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, on which I serve as the United States Member. Its main responsibility at present is to devise a new legal regime for the seabed—a regime which will go beyond the general and rudimentary rules of international law now applicable to the conduct of states in that area, and one which will be adequate to accommodate the several and sometimes conflicting national and international interests which will be affected.

The Committee has taken a two-pronged approach to this job. On the one hand, it has set about immediately drafting a set of general legal principles governing the conduct of states on the seabed. These would be enacted in the form of a declaration by the General Assembly of the United Nations. (This, you may recall, was the procedure followed when the United Nations first took up the problem of making international law for outer space.) At the same time, the Committee has begun work on a more definitive and detailed international legal regime for the area, to be established in due course by treaty.

As in the case of outer space, the general principles declared by the General Assembly would serve to govern in the interim before the establishment of a definitive legal regime, and to a considerable extent would be incorporated into such a regime. In order to put itself in a position to make informed judgments about the nature of a future regime, the Committee has also undertaken studies of the developing scientific and technological bases of seabed activities as well

as the economic and other requirements which a seabed regime should meet in order to promote the most beneficial use of its resources.

All of this amounts to a task of very large proportions—one which will not be accomplished overnight, which is in some respects still in the very early stages, and which has already produced some fairly sharp differences of view within the international community. Already, however, there are some points of basic agreement emerging. For example, all countries appear to accept the fundamental point that there is an area of the seabed which lies beyond national jurisdiction—thus rejecting the notion that nations may grab and hold the seabed by claims of national sovereignty out to the middle of the ocean.

Other points on which there is a wide measure of agreement include:

1. That the resources of the seabed should be used for the benefit of mankind;
2. That the area should be used for exclusively peaceful purposes;
3. That an international regime for the area should be established in a timely fashion;
4. That as a practical matter this regime must include some form of international institutional arrangement or machinery which would have a role in regulating the exploitation of seabed resources;
5. That a portion of the revenues generated by this exploitation should be turned over for international community purposes in recognition of the interest of all mankind in the area.

In respect to all these points the United States is in agreement. Underlying our policy on the seabed issues is the conviction that U.S. interests will best be served by action which will avoid an escalation of claims and counter-claims both as to the boundary of national jurisdiction over exploitation and rights to exploit the area beyond.

The expectation of great wealth in the seabeds could stimulate such an escalation of claims and result in very serious disputes between states, which could involve the United States either directly or indirectly. We therefore believe that it is in the long-range interests of the United States to assure that the boundary and regime issues are resolved by widespread international agreement.

As to the form which international machinery should take there have been a number of divergent views. They range from an international agency with comprehensive authority to regulate and control the exploitation of the seabed all the way across the spectrum to a mere registry of national claims.

Finally, I should comment on the so-called "moratorium" resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly last fall. In their excellent Report to the Foreign Affairs Committee on the work of the 24th General Assembly, Congressman Dante Fascell and Irving Whalley correctly described this resolution as a "rash decision."

Since the UN took up the seabeds question, there has been a certain amount of sentiment which favors trying to place a moratorium on exploitation of seabed resources until a definitive legal regime for the area can be established. There have been great differences of view as to the wisdom or indeed the possibility of such a moratorium; the United States for its part has thought the idea both unwise and impracticable.

Nevertheless, during the last General Assembly a group of developing countries, led by the Delegation of Mexico, put forward a resolution which "declares" that, pending the establishment of an international regime, states are bound to refrain from claiming or exercising rights in the seabed as well as exploiting seabed resources, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

The sponsors of the resolution, properly, did not regard it as having any binding legal effect, but thought that it might place a certain moral restraint on activities in the area. We opposed this resolution, mainly on two grounds.

First, we felt that it was based on the indefensible premise that retarding the development of seabed technology would be useful. We pointed out that unless this development proceeds, no one—whether a developed or developing country—will stand to benefit from seabed resources.

Secondly, we felt that the resolution, though ostensibly intended to prevent national actions which might prejudice the seabed issues under negotiation, in fact might have precisely the opposite effect. This is because the resolution purported to apply only "beyond the limits of national jurisdiction", but did not specify where those limits were. Consequently, we feared that states which felt it desirable to encourage deep water exploration or exploitation on the seabed off

their coasts might feel compelled to make unjustifiably expansive claims of national sovereignty in order to legitimize their activities.

A substantial number of UN members shared this view, as is indicated by the fact that the resolution was adopted by a vote of 62 to 28 with 28 abstentions—barely enough to constitute the two-thirds majority which the UN Charter requires for "important questions". Because of this fact, and the great deal of controversy which preceded the action, we feel that the moratorium resolution is unlikely to have any marked effect, either on activities on the seabed or in future UN deliberations on seabed issues.

PRECISE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION ON THE SEABED

While all agree that there is an area of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, there is considerable uncertainty as to the geographic extent of that area. Obviously if an international regime is to be established, the area to which that regime applies must be precisely defined. The lack of such a definition is one of the major unresolved problems carried over from the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences in 1958 and 1960, which did not fix the precise outer limit of the continental shelf.

This question is very much in the minds of all governments participating in the United Nations seabeds effort. Some appear to favor fixing a relatively narrow limit to the continental shelf—for example, a limit defined by a single depth-criterion of 200 meters, or perhaps as much as 550 meters (which would be deep enough to embrace the geophysical edge of all continental shelves). The advocates of a narrow shelf obviously favor the establishment of an international regime embracing the largest possible seabed area.

At the other extreme is the possibility of a wide boundary which would extend not only to the edge of the shelf but would also encompass the continental slope which lies immediately beyond the shelf, and the sedimentary residues extending beyond the slope, which are known as the continental rise.

There have also been suggestions for an "intermediate zone" embracing a part of the shelf, slope or rise, in which coastal states would have certain prerogatives regarding exploitation of resources but which would also be subject to certain internationally agreed arrangements.

Within the Government, we are giving the whole range of possibilities the most intense examination, because it is clear that the United States cannot best represent its own interests in the continuing discussion of the seabed until it has arrived at a position on the precise outer limit of national jurisdiction.

LAW OF THE SEA

Simultaneously with its continuing discussion of seabeds problems, the United Nations is turning its attention to the possibility of addressing outstanding issues in the law of the sea (in addition to the question of the outer limits of the continental shelf). At the direction of the General Assembly, the Secretary General is now canvassing the views of member states regarding the possibility of a new law-of-the-sea conference.

We will be watching the results of this canvass with great interest because for the last two years the United States has engaged in widespread consultations regarding the desirability of a new agreement on the limits of the territorial sea, provided that agreement is reached on free passage through and over international straits. The question of certain preferential fishing rights for coastal states on the high seas should also be treated.

We believe that this package of issues is ready to be dealt with through an international treaty, and consequently welcome the interest within the United Nations in the possibility of further work in the law of the sea.

But in this connection it is pertinent to note that the Secretary General, in conducting the canvass to which I referred, is seeking the views of UN members on the possibility of a conference which would review *all* of the law-of-the-sea regimes—high seas, continental shelf, territorial sea and contiguous zone, and fishing and conservation of living resources—with particular attention to the problem of precisely defining the limits of national jurisdiction over the seabed.

This is what he was directed to do by the General Assembly's resolution. At the time we had urged that the inquiry be more narrowly framed—that it envisage a conference dealing with the question of the outer limits of the continental shelf and the establishment of an international regime for the area beyond.

We took this position because we felt that law-of-the-sea questions must be

addressed in manageable packages, and that merging the question of the limits of national seabed jurisdiction with all other law-of-the-sea questions in a single conference would have the probable effect of delaying agreement on all seabeds issues for an indefinite period of time.

I should hasten to add, however, that the resolution even in the form in which it was adopted does not amount to a decision by the UN to call a conference of any particular scope, or indeed to call a conference at all. It was merely a decision to make certain inquiries about a possible law-of-the-sea conference, and left all members full latitude to express their views as to the timing and content of any conference or conferences on the law of the sea. The United States will of course take full advantage of this latitude in preparing its own reply to the inquiry.

PROTECTION OF THE OCEAN ENVIRONMENT

Finally, I should like to speak of the problem of protection of the marine environment. The international community is in most respects only beginning to be aware of the pressing necessity to act to protect the ocean environment from progressively serious and perhaps irreparable injury within the fairly near future. The problem cuts across the whole range of United Nations ocean activities.

There is, for example, widespread agreement that the legal principles for the seabed which are under preparation, and the eventual regime which will be established, must contain provisions designed effectively to protect the ocean from the ravages of pollution which might result from unregulated exploitation of its resources. In this connection, the Seabed Committee will have before it in the course of the coming year a report by the United Nations Secretary General on various aspects of the question of marine pollution and its control.

We can expect that the research programs to be undertaken in the international decade of ocean exploration will yield a rich store of understanding of the life system of the ocean, so as to put man in a better position to manage the ocean's living resources with greater intelligence and foresight. The outline of the research programs for the decade of ocean exploration envisages a series of scientific studies aimed at assessing the present state of affairs in the ocean as regards pollution, and providing forecasts of long-term pollution trends on the basis of which remedial measures could be planned.

Four of the UN's specialized agencies—the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), UNESCO, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)—have established a joint group of experts to provide continuing advice to these agencies on the scientific aspects of marine pollution.

The FAO is itself making arrangements for a technical conference on marine pollution and its effect on living resources and fishing to be held later this year. The IMCO has called for an international conference in 1973 to draft a further international agreement regarding restraints on the contamination of sea, land and air by ships and other vessels or equipment operating in the marine environment. (The existing convention on control of oil pollution at sea was prepared through IMCO in the early 1950's).

Finally, the United Nations is laying plans for a major conference on the human environment in 1972, in which problems of the ocean environment will play an important role. The UN Secretary General is now working with agencies of the United Nations system which are concerned with other important aspects of the marine pollution problem, in order to place before that conference a full description of the problem and recommendations for action necessary to deal with the growing danger of pollution of the high seas.

That in brief, Mr. Chairman, is where the UN now stands in its efforts to mobilize the world community into effective action to preserve and protect the ocean environment.

A beginning has been made. Governments are now starting to think and plan in terms of their national needs and interests and, hopefully, in terms of the broader interests of mankind as a whole.

Many hard problems remain to be resolved and they will not be resolved overnight. But I cannot believe that man will permit this last, great, largely untapped area of our planet to become a scene of conflicting national rivalries and the destructive and wasteful use of its enormous resources.

If ever there was a time and place where the extension of the rule of law is in order, this is surely the time and place.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Ambassador Phillips.

Professor Gardner, we welcome you here this afternoon. Will you please proceed?

STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. GARDNER, HENRY L. MOSES PROFESSOR OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by making an apology for my late arrival. I was a speaker at a conference dealing with the Genocide Convention, and I got here just as soon as I could.

I was asked to talk today about the environment, population, and space and the seabed, and I feel rather like the poor schoolboy who was given a 200-word essay to write on a subject of his choice, and he said, "As the topic, I will choose the universe and other topics."

And you have given me 15 minutes to deal with the universe. So perhaps the best thing I can do is to summarize the main points of my statement, calling your attention to the pages on which more detailed suggestions for implementing these ideas appear.

Before I start, however, permit me to sound a note of caution. In our preoccupation with these glamorous tasks for the United Nations, let us not forget the U.N.'s old tasks: those absolutely fundamental responsibilities which the U.N. was given in its charter for the promotion of peace, economic development, and human rights.

It is on these questions that the U.N.'s performance will be judged by the people of the world, and rightly so.

Involving the U.N. in new tasks, I fear, is for some people a euphemism or an excuse for downgrading its role as a peacekeeping agency.

Having started with that cautionary note, I proceed to the four subjects which I was invited to discuss today.

First, the environment. A U.N. response to the environmental challenge is obviously long overdue. While some measures to defend the environment can be taken by individual nations alone, there are resources that don't belong entirely to any nation—the sea, certain lakes and rivers, migratory animals—whose effective management requires international cooperation.

Even management of resources within the geographic confines of one nation can benefit from the sharing of national experience.

I think we are beginning to recognize that how a nation deals with its environment is no longer its own and nobody else's business. We are beginning to comprehend the unity of the world's ecological system, which means that all nations may be affected by how any one of them treats its air and water and land.

For these reasons, I think the U.N. and the international community will be increasingly involved in environmental questions—even those that have been hitherto regarded as domestic. Indeed, the most powerful impetus to world order may no longer be the threat of nuclear war, but rather the urgent necessity of new transnational measures to protect the global environment.

Now on the top of page 4 of my statement I have suggested a number of things that the U.N. can do about environmental problems. Of course, it is already doing some things, but what I am calling for here is a substantially upgraded effort.

First, a massive program to educate people, particularly political leaders, about the environmental crisis, together with research efforts and studies, and the training of specialists to handle these problems.

Second, a worldwide observation network, using observation satellites and other new technology, to monitor the world's environment on a continuing basis, with the U.N. evaluating and disseminating this information to all the world's people.

Third, the negotiation of new international agreements which provide for firm antipollution and other environmental commitments, so that nations and industries accepting their environmental responsibilities suffer no competitive disadvantage in international trade.

Mr. Chairman, I think the businessmen of this country and other countries will soon be telling their governments that they can't accept the heavy cost of antipollution measures unless their competitors in other countries are subject to the same responsibilities. And for this, we need international agreements.

And fourth, we should have more U.N. action to assure that multilateral aid programs are carried forward with due regard for their environmental implications, and to encourage the application of environmental safeguards in bilateral aid. You know, I am sure, that downstream erosion from the Aswan Dam may wash away as much productive farm land as is opened by the new irrigation systems around Lake Nasser. The United States has made similar mistakes in its own foreign aid efforts.

And last, and perhaps most ambitious, we could establish a U.N. program for the world's heritage, including scenic, historic and natural resources now in danger of destruction, whose survival is a matter of concern to all mankind.

Take Venice, for example, which may be under water in 50 years. The dangers threatening this precious heritage of all mankind call for urgent international action, led by UNESCO and other U.N. agencies.

I turn next to the population problem. So much has already been said about this before congressional committees, that I won't go through the numbers again, and we all know the dimensions of the problem.

Mr. FASCELL. You are not advocating a zero rate, are you?

Mr. GARDNER. I won't get into that, but I do say this, that the present rate of population growth, and I think this is common ground in this room, I hope it is, the present rate of population growth is simply not consistent with the rate of economic progress and the kind of decent world environment we are all seeking.

Now in an area like family planning, the case for a multilateral approach is particularly compelling. As the richest Nation in the world, and as a white Nation, we can't be in the position of running around the world telling dark, poor people that there should be less of them. And this is a case where working through a global organization, in which responsibilities are widely shared, can very much assist in the implementation of the objectives we seek.

In May of last year, a citizens panel of the United Nations Association, chaired by John D. Rockefeller 3d, on which I had the privilege of serving, issued a report entitled "World Population—a Challenge to the United Nations and Its System of Agencies."

I believe that report is available to your committee. Its recommendations deserve to be implemented and implemented as a matter of urgency. They are summarized on page 5 of my statement. I won't go through them, except to say that the main idea is that the U.N. should be spending at least $100 million a year for research, training and implementation of family planning programs, and that there should be a Commissioner for Population, to speak with one voice for the U.N. in this area.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Here in the United States, it might be a good idea, too.

Mr. GARDNER. Family planning begins at home, I believe, is the appropriate thing to say. [Laughter.]

Now outer space, again a large and complex issue, and I probably have all of 3 minutes to cope with it. On page 11, I suggest that we create a United Nations Space Institute, which would be a center for the cooperative planning of space exploration in which all U.N. members could be invited to take part.

Scientists from the United States and the Soviet Union and other countries could work together on such subjects as the medical problems of manned space flight. And they could recommend a set of common priorities for mankind in space, and a specific timetable of space missions.

There is no point in the two countries going on duplicating activities and spending billions of dollars which would much better be spent on pressing domestic problems, and I see a U.N. effort as a way to get us out of this race, and this competitive effort. And if we want to be really ambitious, we could even envisage a United Nations space station. Joint ventures in space between ourselves and the Russians have hitherto been regarded as impractical. It has been said that the presence of Soviet astronauts and Soviet scientists at our launching sites would give them access to our rocket technology, and vice versa, but new technology offers a way around this problem.

Both we and the Russians have developed the art of rendezvous and docking in outer space, and we could separately launch modules for a United Nations space station, and our astronauts could work together in projects of this kind. I have discussed this with men who have the technical competence that I lack, and they tell me that there is no technical impediment to doing this if we are really serious about it.

The U.N. space station could be an orbiting astronomical laboratory, gathering information about our solar system and the universe beyond, and it could be used for practical earth applications—for weather forecasting, observing ice and snow accumulations, mapping ocean currents, monitoring the environment, and locating mineral deposits.

Now, I say a word in this space section about a related matter, space communications, and all I have time to say now is to remind this committee of the hearings held by your sister subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee last year on broadcast satellites, and the fact that 13 Senators and 44 Members of the House, from both parties, have written the Secretary of State supporting the recommendation of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee that "the United States should support reasonable requests by the Secretary General of the U.N. for free use of INTELSAT facilities."

I am sorry to say that elements within the U.S. Government are still resisting this proposal, even though it would do a great deal to strengthening U.N. and involve only 1 percent of the channels and resources of the INTELSAT system. How can we talk of new tasks for the U.N., when we don't match this talk with our actions?

Now, finally, the seabed, again an enormously complex matter. We heard a masterly exposition from Ambassador Phillips. There are two key questions, as you know, first the width of the Continental Shelf in which coastal states should have exclusive mineral rights, and second the kind of regime that should apply to areas beyond the jurisdiction of coastal states.

I submit to this committee that the failure of the U.S. Government to develop clear answers to these two questions, and we have had 5 years in which to do so, has contributed to an unfortunate polarization of views.

I think the clarification of the American view is a matter of very great urgency. I set forth the reasons, starting on pages 20 and 21 of this paper.

I believe our national interest would be served by coming out in favor of a relatively narrow Continental Shelf boundary, that is to say, 200 meters depth or 50 miles breadth, whichever is greater, with the remainder of the ocean floor under an international regime.

Now, many in the oil industry are against this. They are afraid of an international regime. They want to project the boundary of the United States way out to the continental rise, failing to recognize that we only have 10 percent of the Continental Shelf of the world, and the rest of the world has 90 percent, and if we project ourselves out, everyone else will do the same, and this for a country which is the major consumer of minerals seems to me a very shortsighted position.

Of course, they argue, some of these mineral or oil spokesmen, that they would rather negotiate with countries individually than with an international agency. I think this is also shortsighted. Senator Pell and others have pointed out that if you look at what is happening in the world you see that negotiation with individual countries is going to be increasingly difficult, and there is no reason to think we couldn't get an effective international mechanism with special voting and other arrangements to give us the safeguards we seek. This would be essentially a United Nations authority which would license national governments or private companies to exploit the deep seabed under effective international regulation.

Now, am I allowed 2 more minutes to conclude? Mr. Chairman, I hope I haven't trespassed too far upon your patience.

On page 24, I suggest a few implications of all this for American policy. If we are frank with ourselves, we have to admit that the U.N. presently suffers from serious weaknesses that restrict its capacity to undertake these tasks effectively. The Secretariat doesn't have a sufficient number of qualified experts, the U.N. is not effectively organized in these new technological areas. We need a more unified effort by the headquarters organization, the UNDP, the semiautonomous bodies and the specialized agencies, along the lines of the recommendations of Sir Robert Jackson in his recent capacity study.

But beyond all this, we have to face the problem of American

leadership. In recent years, the United States has fought hard against increases in the U.N. budget, and has gone so far as to join in joint recommendations on this subject with the Soviet Union. Due to this attitude on the budget, our delegates are in the anomalous position of saying that we favor U.N. initiatives in environment, in population, in outer space, and other areas, provided they don't cost any money.

Now as long as this financial attitude persists, the U.N. simply will not be able to attract the top flight talent it needs, upgrade its central secretariat, and respond as it should to the new challenges confronting it.

Candor compels me to note that the Congress bears some responsibility for the difficult position in which our delegation presently finds itself. Congress has cut the U.S. contributions to the U.N. development program to the point where the U.S. can no longer put up its traditional 40 percent of the total, and last year Congress required that $2.5 million of our assessed share of the regular budgets of U.N. agencies must be paid in nonconvertible foreign currencies, a requirement inconsistent with the U.N. financial regulations.

No one questions, of course, that in the face of rising costs and pressing domestic needs we must make every effort to reduce unnecessary expenditures in the U.N. as well as elsewhere. But, Mr. Chairman, I cannot accept the assumption which seems to be prevalent in the appropriations committees and in certain parts of the administration, that increases in our contributions to international organizations must be limited in proportion to limitations placed on other parts of our Federal budget.

In conclusion, I would note that the Nixon doctrine in foreign policy states a commendable objective, that we should do less by ourselves and more in partnership with others. I hope we will give concrete manifestation to both of these propositions, and not only to the first of them.

I hope we will use the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations to increase our intellectual, political and financial support for the U.N.'s exciting new tasks, and for its vitally important old tasks as well.

Thank you.

(The complete statement of Mr. Gardner follows:)

STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. GARDNER, HENRY L. MOSES PROFESSOR OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

NEW TASKS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS—THE ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION, SPACE AND SEABEDS

Your invitation to testify on "New Tasks for the United Nations" is gratifying and challenging. I believe that in its second quarter century the U.N. should devote increasing attention to a cluster of interrelated problems and opportunities that it hardly noticed for most of its first twenty-five years. These are areas which the accelerating advances of science and technology have made vitally important and where cooperative action through the U.N. can serve the interests of all men regardless of national, ideological, or racial differences. I have selected four of these areas today—the environment, population, outer space, and natural resources (with particular attention to the seabed). There are others that could be mentioned, of course, but these are four of the "new tasks" which were a particular preoccupation of mine during my service as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from 1961 to 1965 and which continue to engage my attention now that I have returned to private life.

Before I get to this subject, however, permit me to sound one note of caution. In our preoccupation with these glamorous "new tasks," let us not forget the U.N.'s "old tasks"—those absolutely fundamental responsibilities given the U.N. in its Charter—the promotion of peace, economic development, and human rights. It is on these questions that the U.N.'s performance will be judged by the people of the world—and rightly so. "Involving the U.N. in new tasks," I fear, is for some people a euphemism or an excuse for downgrading its role as a peacekeeping agency.

Since you have asked me to cover a variety of subjects, I shall reduce exposition and historical background to the minimum, focussing in each case on what concerns this committee—what, exactly, should the U.N. do about it?

The Environment

Our new concern with the environment has focused so far on domestic problems. We have largely neglected the international dimension. But now we are finally beginning a systematic look at our global environment in a new U.N. committee preparing for a world conference in Stockholm in 1972.

A U.N. response to the environmental challenge is long overdue. While some measures to deal with the environment can be taken by individual nations alone, there are resources that do not belong entirely to any nation—the sea, certain lakes and rivers, migratory animals—whose effective management requires international cooperation. Even management of the environment within the confines of a single nation may benefit from the sharing of national experience.

Moreover, we are finally beginning to recognize that how a nation deals with its national environment is no longer its own and nobody else's business. We are beginning to comprehend the unity of the world's ecological system, which means that all nations may be affected by how any one of them treats its air, water and land.

We are gradually awakening to the realization that all mankind depends on the same scarce and relatively shrinking resource pool, and therefore has an interest in the wise husbanding of resources wherever they may be located. And business firms around the world are beginning to argue that they cannot accept the additional costs of anti-pollution measures unless their overseas competitors do the same.

For all these reasons, the international community will be increasingly involved in environmental issues—even those that have hitherto been regarded as "domestic." Indeed, the most powerful impetus to world order may no longer be the threat of nuclear war, but rather the urgent necessity of new transnational measures to protect the global environment.

President Kennedy asked the General Assembly in 1963 for a U.N. effort to deal with environmental problems—but nobody was listening. Although President Nixon mentioned the environment in his address to the Assembly last fall, his only proposals for international action have been made in NATO. As an organization of limited membership whose principal function is military defense, NATO is not well suited to be the centerpiece of our effort in this field.

The global environment concerns all nations, regardless of national, ideological, or racial differences. Some work on the environment can be usefully undertaken in regional agencies like OECD, but a universal problem needs a universal system of organizations to deal with it. The U.N. system, including its regional commissions and Specialized Agencies, is the nearest thing to a universal system we have. The Stockholm Conference provides an additional reason to make it more universal by admitting mainland China and divided states. At the very least, the U.N. should invite the Peking regime, the two Germanies, the two Viet Nams, and two Koreas to participate in the Stockholm meeting.

The U.N. system, of course, is already involved in environmental problems. Important work has been done in the International Maritime Consultative Organization, for example, on oil pollution in the seas. UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, to give only a few examples, have all had a piece of the environmental "action."

What more can the U.N. system do about environmental problems?

To begin with, it could undertake a massive program to educate the world's people, particularly political leaders, on the problems of the environment; could sponsor joint research efforts and studies; and could finance the training of specialists to handle different environmental problems.

It could organize a world-wide observation network, using observation satellites and other new technology, to monitor the world's environment on a con-

tinuing basis, and it could operate a service for the evaluation and dissemination of this information for all nations.

It could encourage the negotiation of international agreements providing for firm anti-pollution and other environmental commitments so that nations and industries accepting their environmental responsibilities suffer no competitive disadvantage in international trade.

It could insure that multilateral aid programs are carried forward with due regard for their environmental implications, and could encourage the application of environmental safeguards in bilateral aid. (Down-stream erosion from the Aswan Dam, we now discover, may wash away as much productive farm land as is opened by the new irrigation systems around Lake Nasser.)

Finally, it could establish a U.N. Program for the World Heritage, including scenic, historic and natural resources now in danger of destruction whose survival is a matter of concern to all mankind.

Obviously, each nation should be free to decide whether or not to nominate a property within its territory for inclusion in the Program. At the same time, the community of nations should be free to decide whether or not to accept it.

Countries whose resources were included in the Program would gain the advantage of international advice and financial aid in their development with consequent benefits to their economies as a whole. And the world community would be in a position to safeguard unique and irreplaceable resources—Venice, Angkor Vat, some of the great wildlife reserves of Africa—in which all mankind has a common interest.

If the U.N. is to act effectively on environmental problems, a central group of distinguished scientists should be established under the Economic and Social Council to evaluate and help coordinate the work of the different U.N. agencies active in this area. The historic pattern of functional specialization contains the danger that ecological interrelationships may not be adequately considered. For example, FAO may vote, as it recently did, to continue use of DDT; but this question needs to be looked at by a group whose thinking is not mainly centered on agricultural productivity. An "overview" committee of experts could take a broader view in evaluating the implications for the environment of new as well as existing scientific discoveries.

Population

We have all heard a great deal during the last few years about the world population problem. Instead of repeating it, let me just state in one paragraph what I take to be the essential point:

Present rates of population growth in most developing countries of the world—and some developed countries as well—will, if continued, destroy all our hopes for meaningful increases in individual living standards. Worse still, world population trends are dangerously overloading the natural environment, threatening political stability, and breeding tensions that increasingly erupt into violence. The rate of world population growth is now so great—its consequences are now so grave—that this may be the last generation that has the opportunity to limit population growth on the basis of free choice. If we do not make voluntary family planning possible in this generation, we will make compulsory family planning inevitable in future generations.

For the first 17 years of its existence the U.N. did nothing about the population problem except for statistical and demographic activity. It was only in December 1962 that the General Assembly, at the initiative of the Swedish government, passed its first resolution on the subject. In a speech approved by President Kennedy, I told the Assembly on that occasion that the United States favored U.N. action to deal with the population problem and that we were prepared to "help other countries, upon request, to find potential sources of information and assistance on ways and means of dealing with population problems." It is a measure of how backward we were on population in those days that this statement was regarded as revolutionary.

Since 1962, both the United States and the United Nations have come a long way. We have begun a major effort to make family planning services available at home and we have made increasing funds for family planning available in our foreign aid program. The General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Health Organization and UNESCO have all established legislative mandates for action by their executive leadership. The World Bank under Robert McNamara has also moved swiftly into the population field.

The Secretary-General has established a Trust Fund for Population under the U.N. Development Program which is available to support the population activities of the U.N. and the Specialized Agencies. The Administrator of that Program has appointed a senior official to be in charge of the Fund. The U.N.'s own Population Division has been strengthened. The U.N. has sent missions to India, Pakistan, Colombia and various parts of Africa, and has recruited Population Program officers who are now in the field in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

All this represents progress, and our country played a leading role in it. Yet the ratio of talk to action on population remains distressingly high. The world still lacks a wholly satisfactory, economical contraceptive well adapted to the needs of the developing countries. Few developing countries yet have effective nation-wide family planning programs. Only a small fraction of the U.N.'s funds are yet earmarked for population programs.

In a sensitive area like family planning the case for a multilateral approach is particularly compelling. International agencies can help promote a broad consensus on the nature of the population problem and on what ought to be done about it. They can help countries share responsibility for taking controversial steps that may be opposed by particular domestic interests. They can help prevent family planning from becoming a cold war issue involving political ideologies—or a subject of disagreement between national or racial groups. The United Nations and its family of agencies are thus a logical place for increased efforts to deal with the population problem.

In May 1969 a citizens' panel of the United Nations Association chaired by John D. Rockefeller 3rd on which I had the privilege of serving issued a report entitled "World Population—A Challenge to the United Nations and Its System of Agencies." Its most important recommendations were as follows:

1. The present Trust Fund for Population should be increased to at least $100 million in voluntary contributions per year (an increase of more than ten-fold over present levels).
2. A Commissioner for Population should be established to administer the Fund, implement population projects financed from the Fund, and represent the U.N. in dealings with governments and in intergovernmental forums concerned with population.
3. The Commissioner for Population should be prepared to sponsor or support projects extending across the whole spectrum of population and family planning programs such as the training of medical and paramedical personnel; family planning components of health facilities; the use of mass-communication techniques; the manufacture of contraceptive materials; the establishment of special population study centers as well as ongoing statistical census and demographic work.
4. The Commissioner for Population should devote substantial resources from the Population Trust Fund to the support of research into better methods of fertility control, into the operation of family planning programs and into the relationship between population policy and development policy. I believe the World Bank should also be encouraged to devote substantial sums to this purpose.

I have estimated elsewhere (*The Global Partnership*, p. 337) that the cost of providing family planning services to all the women in the world who want to have them would be something like $2 billion a year. This offers some notion of the magnitude of the task before us. Obviously the U.N. cannot be a substitute for national efforts. But it can encourage them and provide essential advice, technology, and resources where these are wanted and needed.

Outer Space

The case for using the United Nations system as a framework for space cooperation is a powerful one.

It is in the interest of all countries, whatever their ideology, that space and celestial bodies should not be subjected to competing national claims, that cooperative experiments be undertaken and information exchanged, that worldwide weather services be developed and that communications among nations be improved. U.N. meetings have served to emphasize this common interest to Soviet scientists and technical experts and, through them, to the Soviet Government. While the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies are not the only institutions to promote cooperation, they do help to put cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union into a broader framework that recognizes the interests of other countries. And, since the success of the U.N. pro-

grams is enhanced by U.S.-Soviet cooperation, the interest of other countries in such cooperation that is manifested in U.N. meetings has helped to stimulate affirmative Soviet actions.

For the United States, cooperative efforts are an absolute necessity if certain space activities are to be successful. In weather and communications, for example, the technology of the United States can yield maximum dividends to its own people and to others only if many nations join in allocating radio frequencies, in tracking and communicating with space vehicles, and in placing necessary ground installations on their territories. For certain activities, bilateral arrangements are most suitable; for others, cooperative projects may be easier to achieve if they are multilateral and bear United Nations endorsement.

It is not too much to hope that, beyond these benefits, cooperative space ventures will strengthen the sense of world community. The new responsibilities of the United Nations for promoting scientific cooperation and information exchange and for assisting in the development of world-wide weather and communication services cannot fail to strengthen the organization as a force for peace by binding its members to it through ties of common interest.

These are some of the considerations that led the United States to propose a comprehensive program of space cooperation under the U.N. auspices in 1961. The result of this initiative was the Space Treaty, the Treaty on Rescue and Return of Astronauts, the World Weather Watch, and certain modest U.N. activities of technical assistance and information exchange in the space field.

Frankly, I wish our cooperative efforts through the U.N. could have been more ambitious. In his address to the General Assembly of September 20, 1963, President Kennedy said:

> In a field where the United States and the Soviet Union have a special capacity—the field of space—there is room for new cooperation, for further joint efforts in the regulation and exploration of space. I include among these possibilities a joint expedition to the moon. . . . Why . . . should the United States and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become involved in immense duplications of research, construction and expenditure? Surely we should explore whether the scientists and astronauts of our two countries—indeed, of all the world—cannot work together in the conquest of space, sending some day in this decade to the moon not the reperesentatives of a single nation but the representatives of all of our countries.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not respond to this invitation, and the Johnson Administration made no serious effort to revive it.

Thus, for the better part of a decade, we engaged with the Russians in a race to the moon. This race involved a massive duplication of effort and a substantial waste of expenditure on both sides. Moreover, important opportunities for the enhancement of international cooperation were lost.

With the brilliantly successful landing of our astronauts on the moon in July of last year, the race to the moon ended. It is too late to convert this race into a cooperative venture in space exploration on behalf of all mankind. But it is not too late to try a new approach in the next phase of space exploration.

A first step in this direction could be the creation of a United Nations Space Institute. The Institute, which might be located in Geneva or Vienna, would be a center for the cooperative planning of space exploration in which all U.N. members could be invited to take part.

Scientists from the United States and the Soviet Union and other countries could work together on such subjects as the medical problems of manned space flight. They could recommend a set of common priorities for mankind in space and a specific timetable of space missions.

Instead of both the United States and the Soviet Union undertaking landings on Mars and Venus, for example, each could divide responsibility for instrumented landings on different planets. Such activities would be considered part of a total U.N. program and every opportunity would be found to let other countries participate in their preparation and in the sharing of the information.

We could also establish a United Nations Space Station, a true joint venture of mankind in what most authorities now agree is the most important space task of the next decade.

Joint ventures in space between ourselves and the Russians have hitherto been regarded as impractical. It has been said that the presence of Soviet astronauts and Soviet scientists at American launching sites would give them access to our rocket technology and thus prejudice our national security—and vice versa.

But technology now offers a way around this problem. Both we and the Soviets have developed the art of rendezvous and docking in space. We and they could launch elements of a space station that could be assembled in outer space. The equipment could be agreed on in advance to assure compatibility. The astronauts—drawn not only from the United States and the Soviet Union but from other U.N. members—could be trained together at the U.N. Space Institute.

When other U.N. members—for example, Japan and European countries—develop sufficient space capabilities, they could be invited to launch additional modules for the space station. In the meantime, their scientific abilities could be used to the full in designing and producing the equipment to be launched by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

A U.N. Space Station could be an orbiting astronomical laboratory, gathering information about our solar system and the universe beyond. It could also be used for practical earth applications—for weather forecasting, observing ice and snow accumulations, mapping ocean currents, monitoring the environment, and locating mineral deposits. One day it might help patrol troubled borders and verify arms control agreements.

Such a cooperative space program could serve the enlightened self-interest of all. The sharing of the costs of space exploration and the adopting of a space timetable geared to scientific cooperation rather than political competition could save billions of dollars the U.S. and the Soviet Union could devote to pressing domestic needs.

The non-space powers, including the less developed countries, could participate more fully in space exploration. Every country would have access to information gained from space activities—for example, the discovery of mineral deposits made possible by observation from a space station. Finally—and by no means least important—significant political benefits could be realized in close U.S.-Soviet cooperation and a stronger United Nations.

The other aspects of space cooperation that should be mentioned here is cooperation in the use of new technology in space communications. In the 1970s, the International Telecommunication Satellite Consortium (Intelsat) will be further developing its global network of space communications, making use of huge Intelsat satellites with 5,000 voice channels, enough for 12 TV broadcasts.

As this committee knows, the present technology makes use of *point-to-point satellites*, in which messages are sent from one ground station through the satellite to another station on the ground. But the 1970s will usher in the use of *broadcast satellites*, which can transmit radio or TV to thousands of community or village receivers simultaneously, and eventually into home radio or TV sets over an area of a million square miles.

The difference between broadcast satellites and point-to-point satellites is both economic and political. Because they bypass the need for expensive ground relay systems, broadcast satellites may be cheaper and more effective than alternative means of communication for reaching large areas, particularly in less developed countries like India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Brazil.

Broadcast satellites also raise the possiblity of broadcasting to the citizens of a country without the consent and perhaps even over the opposition of its government. The prospect of bypassing national broadcasting networks has alarmed some people. In the corridors of the United Nations, one delegate from a less developed country has remarked: "The heads of foreign states will soon be able to address my people, but our own president will not be able to do so. What is the U.N. going to do to help us?"

Of course, it can be argued that space broadcasting is merely an extension of the broadcasting on shortwave now carried on by such agencies as the Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and Radio Moscow. It is, however, a significant extension. Unlike shortwave broadcasting, radio programs broadcast from space will be indistinguishable, so far as quality of reception is concerned, from radio programs broadcast locally. And television programs sent from space will have a substantially greater psychological impact than shortwave radio broadcasts.

The heart of the political problem can be summed up thus: Countries with no immediate prospect of carrying on space broadcasting fear that the United States, the Soviet Union or possibly a joint European satellite authority may use this technology to send their people political or commercial messages that the governments do not like. Unless it is possible to allay the fears of such countries about uncontrolled communication with their populations and give them an interest in the use of this technology for their own benefit, the enormous potential of broadcast satellites may never be realized.

Extensive hearings were held on satellite broadcasting last May before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. Without wishing to repeat here my testimony before that Subcommittee, let me simply repeat two of the main points:

The first point is that we should greatly accelerate our efforts to make satellite broadcasting available to the less developed countries to help speed their efforts at national integration and economic development. A network of community TV receivers in India, for example, could be an enormous aid in the eradication of illiteracy, the introduction of new agriculture techniques, and the encouragement of family planning. In adapting the new technology to the needs of the developing countries maximum use should be made of the research, technical assistance, and financial resources of the U.N. system. This will mean new roles and responsibilities for agencies like UNESCO, the UNDP, the International Telecommunication Union, and the World Bank.

The second point is that Intelsat should grant the U.N.'s modest request submitted to the Intelsat Conference last year for free use of its facilities to handle the U.N.'s internal communication needs and to carry radio and TV programs produced at the U.N. The U.N.'s needs could be met with one percent of the channel capacity available on the Intelsat IV satellites that will soon be available. This would be a good "public relations" investment for Intelsat and would have no adverse effect on the profitability of the system.

The U.N.'s request to meet its internal communication needs is extremely modest—two telephone links from New York to Geneva, one telephone link each with its five major regional centers, and one link each with its peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, the Middle East and Kashmir.

Free use of satellites would help meet the U.N.'s urgent need for better communications to manage its world-wide operations. During the Middle East crisis of June 1967 the U.N. was seriously handicapped by its inadequate communications arrangements—the Secretary-General and his staff did not know what was going on in the area until many hours later. The U.N. will never be an adequate peacekeeping agency until it has better communications facilities at its disposal.

As the U.N. document submitted last year to the Intelsat Conference put it: "Under present circumstances the U.N. is taking risks which for long have been regarded as unacceptable by governments for their own national communications needs." Surely it would be in our own and the general interest to give the U.N. a secure, reliable and cost-free method of communication for its operations in the service of humanity.

Free use of Intelsat facilities for TV and radio programs produced at U.N. headquarters would also be in the general interest, since it would encourage the dissemination of such programs now greatly inhibited by the high cost. It is a paradox that the only area of the world that, as a practical matter, can get simultaneous TV transmission from the United Nations today is North America. By the accident of the U.N.'s location in this hemisphere, our people can get the U.N. immediately on TV when here is a crisis or a Security Council debate, but the rest of the world cannot. This seems to me an element of discrimination or inequality which is really unfortunate.

We want to keep the U.N. here, but surely we want to make it possible for other nations and other peoples to know what is going on at the U.N.

It serves our enlightened self-interest to encourage the distribution of programs that may give people around the world a different point of view than they normally hear on their own national TV or radio networks.

Thirteen Senators and 44 members of the House from both parties have written the Secretary of State supporting last May's recommendation of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee that "the United States should support reasonable requests by the Secretary-General of the United Nations for free use of Intelsat facilities." Yet elements within the United States Government are still resisting this proposal. Here, I am afraid, is a practical example of how our talk of "new tasks" for the U.N. has not yet been matched by our actions.

Looking beyond the specific questions of free use of Intelsat facilities, there are many things that could be done to use satellite communication as an instrument for the building of a better world order. The U.N.'s Radio and Visual Services Department, now budgeted at the totally inadequate figure of $2 million, could greatly expand its work. The General Assembly could adopt a resolution:

1. Providing for an annual "State of the World" TV and radio address by the Secretary-General which U.N. members would be asked to carry on their TV and radio networks, and

2. Urging U.N. members to devote at least one hour a week of prime TV time (or radio time where TV does not exist) to programs produced at U.N. headquarters.

The Radio and Visual Services Department of the U.N. Office of Public Information has already demonstrated its capacity to produce such programs—some showing the executive activities of the U.N. at headquarters and in the field, others giving representative and balanced highlights of U.N. debates.

Many U.N. members provide no radio or TV reporting to their populations on U.N. activities. Many allow their people to hear only those parts of U.N. debates that represent their national point of view. One hour a week of U.N.-produced programs, including highlights of debates, could be a useful corrective. It would surely be a great step toward peace if the people of Egypt and Israel, for example, could have even a few minutes exposure per week to another view of the Middle East problem.

We should have no illusions that those U.N. members with tightly closed national societies would immediately implement such a resolution. But a resolution of this kind might well mobilize international and domestic opinion upon them to implement it after a number of years. At the very least, it would reveal very clearly which countries are really prepared to take practical steps toward international understanding and a more effective United Nations—and which are not prepared to do so.

The United States should take the lead in demonstrating the possibilities of promoting international understanding through communication satellites. We should give the Soviet leaders the opportunity to talk directly to the American people at regular intervals on TV in return for the same privilege for our leaders in the Soviet Union.

The possibilities opened up by communication satellites for world development and understanding are truly exciting. They provide an opportunity to create more open national societies, which are not merely desirable for their own sake, but are essential ingredients of a peaceful international community. To make use of this opportunity, however, we will need to display the same ingenuity in political and social arrangements that we have already demonstrated in the technical sphere.

NATURAL RESOURCES—THE SEABED

The discovery and wise development of natural resources is a key element in efforts to raise living standards in the less developed areas of the world. The United Nations system has already done much valuable work in this field. Recently, for example, U.N. experts executing a project for the UNDP found uranium in Somalia, and the government of Somalia is already making arrangements with foreign industry for the extraction of this rich resource on a mutually beneficial basis.

Yet the potentiality of the U.N. in the field of natural resources is even greater than has been realized so far. Much more could be done through the U.N. system to help the developing countries discover new resources, train resource technicians and managers, and integrate national resource planning with manpower development programs, capital requirements, and national and regional planning generally.

It is tragic that U.N. budgetary restrictions, for which the United States is partly responsible, are now bearing with particular severity on the work of the resources section of the U.N. Secretariat and are generally limiting the U.N.'s work in the resource field. This is a classic example of penny-wise pound-foolishness, because a few million dollars in U.N. activity here can yield to resource discoveries worth tens of millions in revenues to the governments of the less developed countries as well as our own government.

Indeed, the potentiality for self-financing of the U.N.'s work in the resource field has not been sufficiently recognized. Why should not the U.N. receive a "finder's fee" when it discovers resources in a developing country? The funds paid by the developing country out of the new revenues resulting from the resource find could finance U.N. resource surveys in other developing countries.

Let me focus, however, on the major resource issue before the U.N. today—the resources of the seabed. I shall be very brief on this subject, since you are receiving a full exposition from Ambassador Christopher Phillips.

There are two key questions for the seabed, as we all recognize: First, what should be the width of the continental shelf in which a coastal state has exclusive mineral rights? Second, what kind of regime should apply to areas beyond the jurisdiction of coastal states? The failure of the United States Government

to develop clear answers to these two questions has, I fear, contributed to an unfortunate polarization of views.

At one extreme, there are some U.N. members who want national jurisdiction in the seabed narrowly limited and who want the U.N. itself to carry on exploitation in the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, with most of the profits from this activity going to the less developed countries.

At the other extreme, there are some segments of our petroleum industry who want to extend national jurisdiction out to the seaward edge of the continental rise, and who oppose any kind of international regime over a part of the seabed which contains valuable resources.

The first view is clearly unrealistic. There is little in the experience of the U.N. that suggests that it could effectively discharge this kind of operating responsibility. The know how and the technology for exploitation of the seabed is in the hands of private companies and governments, mainly our own. If the riches of the seabed are ever to get above water, adequate incentives and security of investment will have to be given those who have the ability to do the job.

The second view is no less shortsighted. The United States has only 10% of the world's geological continental shelf. As the world's principal resource consumer, we should not be seeking a solution that puts 90% of the continental shelf of the world (and a similar portion of the seabed up to the continental rise) under the exclusive jurisdiction of other countries. It is by no means clear, as some spokesman for the petroleum industry assume, that individual coastal states will be easier to deal with than an international authority.

The United States, as the country furthest advanced in seabed technology, is in a strong position to negotiate an international regime acceptable to it as well as to other nations. A U.N. agency could be established to license operations by private companies, public corporations or governments, in return for an appropriate royalty. The royalties could be channeled for world development through the World Bank and its soft-loan affiliate, the International Development Association.

The U.N. agency could be established with voting and other arrangements assuring an appropriate voice for all the different interests involved—the United States and other leaders in seabed technology, developed countries, less developed countries, coastal and non-coastal states and so on. The amount of the royalty could be fixed at a level that would provide adequate incentives for seabed production and a generous amount of new financial resources for the developing countries.

Such an international regime would be far superior in terms of our enlightened self-interest to the scramble for resources inherent in the extension of national jurisdiction to the seaward edge of the continental rise. An international regime, for one thing, would provide safeguards against wildcatting and a system for the orderly registering of claims and settling disputes. Most important of all, it would provide for international anti-pollution and conservation measures in a vast area of the seas that might otherwise be subject to unregulated or inadequately regulated national and private activity.

If an international regime can be worked out along these lines—and with U.S. leadership I believe it can—we could then accept a relatively narrow boundary for the continental shelf under national jurisdiction. To be specific, the limits of national jurisdiction could be set at 200 meters or a lateral distance of 50 miles from the shoreline, whichever is greater.

It is obvious that the width of the boundary is inseparably bound up with the nature of the international regime. What is less obvious, but also true as a matter of practical politics, is that these questions are linked to the questions of the breadth of territorial waters and fishery rights. For example, certain Latin American countries are less well endowed with seabed resources off their coasts but are concerned with rich off-coast fishery resources and are not likely to make agreements in the one area without satisfaction in the other. To put it more broadly, these and other states will want to trade off acceptance of the relatively narrow territorial sea boundary we are seeking in return for some special recognition of their fishery interests beyond and some reasonable sharing in the benefits of seabed resource development.

For these reasons, I come to the reluctant conclusion that there will have to be one international conference to deal with all these complex law of the sea questions, rather than the separate conference on the territorial sea and fisheries that our government has been seeking. The trade-offs are now too well and widely recognized to compartmentalize these questions. Of course, if an interna-

tional conference is held, the different law of the sea questions could be discussed in separate commissions, but the final compromises would be made in inter-related negotiations at the senior political level.

President Nixon put the matter clearly in his Report to the Congress on Foreign Policy:

> In addition, as man's uses of the oceans grow, international law must keep pace. The most pressing issue regarding the law of the sea is the need to achieve agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, to head off the threat of escalating national claims over the ocean. We also believe it important to make parallel progress toward establishing an internationally agreed boundary between the continental shelf and the deep seabeds and on a regime for exploitation of deep seabead resources.

I very much hope that this statement will soon be translated into official U.S. willingness to participate in a single conference and, equally important, into a U.S. negotiating position on the questions of continental shelf boundary and international regime along the general lines suggested above.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

I have tried to sketch some of the "new tasks" that could make the United Nations a much more significant force in world affairs than it has been in the past. Yet, to be completely honest, I must add that the U.N. presently suffers from serious weaknesses that restrict its capacity to undertake these tasks effectively.

One problem is that the U.N. Secretariat does not have a sufficient number of highly qualified experts to support expanded cooperation in areas like the environment, population, space, and natural resources. Another is that the U.N. is not yet organized effectively to deal with these subjects.

To cope with the organizational problem, we need to press for reforms along the lines of the "capacity study" of Sir Robert Jackson in order to achieve a more unified effort by the UNDP, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the semi-autonomous bodies and the Specialized Agencies. We also need to draw together the interrelated technological areas presently parcelled out among different sections of the Secretariat.

At the present time, for example, outer space and seabeds are handled by the Department of Political and Security Affairs (headed by a Soviet Under Secretary) simply because these items happen to be discussed in the First (Political) Committee of the General Assembly for which that Department is responsible. Environment and population are handled in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, because those subjects are dealt with in the Second (Economic) Committee.

I would recommend abolishing the Special Political Committee of the Assembly, transferring its few annual items to the First Committee, and creating in its place a new Committee to handle the annual debate on the subjects I have discussed today, together with other related issues of science and technology. If this were done, it would be logical to establish a new Secretariat unit handling these same issues which could service the new Committee. Hopefully governments would send as representatives to this new Committee highly qualified scientists and experts, not political figures or foreign service career officers who usually do little more than read speeches written for them in capitals.

These points have a number of implications for U.S. policy. In recent years the United States has fought hard against increases in the U.N. budget, and has gone so far as to join in joint representations on this subject with the Soviet Union. Due to this attitude on the budget, our delegates are in the anomalous position of saying that we favor U.N. initiatives in environment, population, outer space and other areas—provided they don't cost money. Obviously, as long as this financial attitude persists, the U.N. will not be able to attract the top-flight talent it needs, upgrade its central Secretariat, and respond as it should to the new challenges confronting it. Moreover, and this is a point frequently overlooked in Washington, the United States will be in a poor position to press for needed reforms in the U.N.—for strengthening the central U.N. machinery in relation to the agencies and for more reasonable methods of taking decisions—if it is disengaging itself from its financial responsibilities and narrowly circumscribing the conditions of its participation.

Candour compels me to note that the Congress bears some responsibility for the difficult position in which our U.N. delegation presently finds itself. Congress has cut the U.S. contributions to the U.N. Development Program to the point where the U.S. can no longer put up its traditional 40% of the total. Congress has required that $2.5 million of our assessed share of the regular budgets of U.N. agencies must be paid in non-convertible foreign currencies—a requirement inconsistent with the U.N. financial regulations. The United States, which has rightly complained in the past of the failure of other U.N. members to meet their fiscal responsibilities under the Charter, is now slipping into default itself.

No one questions, of course, that in the face of rising costs and pressing domestic needs we must make every effort to reduce unnecessary expenditures in the United Nations as well as elsewhere. But I cannot accept the assumption which seems to be prevalent in the Appropriations Committees and in certain parts of the administration that increases in our contributions to international organizations must be limited in proportion to limitations placed on other parts of our federal budget.

Our total contributions to the U.N. system in 1969, including the Specialized Agencies and voluntary programs, amount to about $250 million—less than the cost of New York City Fire Department, less than one week's cost of the Viet Nam war. How can we talk of having the U.N. perform bold "new tasks" if we are determined to limit our effort to this amount?

There is a related point that needs to be made. This has to do with the size of our foreign aid effort. The Congress recently voted the smallest foreign aid appropriation in the program's history. President Nixon's aid request this year is the lowest since 1956. At the very moment that other countries are moving toward the internationally-agreed aid target of 1% of Gross National Product, we are moving away from it.

Unless we take measures to increase the quantity and quality of our international aid effort, I fear the political and financial basis for the "new tasks" I have outlined today will not exist. This is particularly true with respect to the environment and population. Not only does action on environmental and population problems cost money that the developing countries do not have, but political resistance to efforts in these fields is likely to grow if U.S. foreign aid is static or declining. Already at the U.N. some less developed countries are charging that the new emphasis by the United States on population and the environment is a gigantic "cop out" to justify a declining aid effort.

The "Nixon doctrine" in foreign policy states a commendable objective—that we should do less by ourselves and more in partnership with others.

I hope we will give concrete manifestation to both of these propositions, not only to the first of them.

I hope we will use the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the U.N. to increase our intellectual, political and financial support for the U.N.'s exciting "new tasks"—and its vitally important "old tasks" as well!

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Professor Gardner.

Mr. Barber?

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR W. BARBER, PRESIDENT, THE INSTITUTE FOR POLITICS AND PLANNING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the future agenda of the United Nations. Shortly before World War II, a diplomat remarked to the Kaiser that no one could see even a few years into the future. The Kaiser replied, "It sometimes occurs. Among sovereigns, frequently; among generals, seldom; among diplomats, almost never."

In the United States, the people are sovereign, and I sincerely believe that they now have a vision of the future which diplomats have yet to see. This vision is our hope as well as our frustration—a world at peace, in which men and women give their attention to the care of children, the elderly, and the environment. If the United Nations is to gain political legitimacy in the future, it should be based

on services not to the governments of the world, but to the people of the world.

This gap between diplomacy and the modern world is revealed by a recent ad hoc personal survey conducted by a senior administration official. At recent Washington cocktail parties he asked the ambassadors from foreign governments what they thought of the evening television news. He found that very few ambassadors regularly watched.

However, all of the ambassadors and the political officers who drafted their reporting cables regularly read The Washington Post and the New York Times. The gap between the world of the New York Times and diplomacy, on the one hand, and the television world viewed by the citizens of the Western World, is becoming ever greater, a very real one, and a gap that is growing greater.

Mr. FASCELL (presiding). There are no secrets anywhere any more.

Mr. BARBER. We can reconcile these worlds if we first recognize that there is a gap, and then take effective measures to see that the views and interests of the citizens are represented in our political and diplomatic processees.

I would suggest that world affairs might be improved if diplomatic reports were filed by television. Indeed, as I sit here, I have thought that testifying before this committee might be improved by a television report.

If our ambassador to Saigon had sent President Johnson video reports of what was happening in Vietnam, I think our policies might have been more realistic and effective. Vietnam may be the first war in history that was terminated because of bad television reviews.

Today, I would like to make three specific suggestions by which the United Nations can more effectively serve the interests of the people of the world. Each is a legitimate concern of the House of Representatives, the representatives of the people.

First, I believe that the single most significant step that could be taken to strengthen the United Nations would be for the Congress of the United States to pass appropriate legislation to permit the people of the United States to elect their representatives to the U.N. General Assembly.

In passing, I think we must recognize that the U.N. is not a primary concern or an active political issue with most of the citizens of this country. If representatives were on television debating and going to the people for votes, then I think the questions of U.N. policy would become a more active concern for the average citizens of this country, and I frankly think they would welcome it.

The second step concerns the drafting of a "Sense of the Congress" resolution which would recognize the necessity for U.N. chartering of worldwide utilities for communications, weather forecasting, and certain nuclear services to insure peaceful benefits of atomic energy to all people.

The third suggestion is to permit the Secretary General to issue charters to existing world corporations.

I think that this year, 1970, the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, would be an appropriate time to review the past and set a new course for the future, a future in which the United Nations can more effectively serve the needs of the people of the world rather than the illusions of governments. Let me quickly illustrate the measures with which to implement these objectives.

First, the election of representatives to the General Assembly. This step is clearly within the scope of the U.N. Charter. Other nations, as well as the United States, could similarly elect their representatives if they chose to do so, but they would not be compelled to do so.

I feel confident, and I am hopeful that you gentlemen would concur, that a U.S. representative to the United Nations who is publicly elected will feel more free—indeed, feel a responsibility—to articulate the policies and views which he believes will best serve the needs and interests of the people of the United States.

This would in no way limit the power, responsibility, or authority of the President of the United States or the Secretary of State if, through our elected ambassador to the U.N., we made clear the views of the Government of the United States. Such a step would permit something which is now impossible—the presentation of views of the people of the United States. If we are free men, do we really fear the opinions of publicly elected officials?

Second, the United Nations should charter selected world utilities. The United Nations should be empowered to charter world utilities which provide services that are worldwide in scope, such as a world communications corporation, a world weather system, or one or two corporations to provide atomic energy material and processing for peaceful purposes under International Atomic Energy authority. A closer look at our own Communications Satellite Corporation illustrates the need for such a U.N. role.

Historians may read the congressional debate on the Communications Satellite Act as an excellent illustration of the cultural lag that is omnipresent in the last half of the 20th century. The record leaves the impression that the political issues were seen primarily as a battle between those advocates of a government operation and those who were ultimately successful in creating a private profit-making business.

As far as I have been able to determine, no one raised the question as to the authority of the Congress of the United States to pass a law establishing a world communications corporation, having effectively a monopoly. That historical oversight, which rational men could have foreseen, has seriously hindered the application of communications satellite technology to the problems of the world, both in permitting companies to build systems for other nations and regions and in delaying international television programs.

The result is that the construction of defense satellites, both classified and unclassified, proceed, while peaceful satellite benefits are delayed because of the lack of a sound worldwide basis for cooperation that is equitable for all.

One of the largest customers of the Communications Satellite Corporation has been, from its inception, the Defense Department. I can clearly recall that when Prime Minister Sato of Japan visited the United Nations and the Japanese wished to have the ceremonies relayed to Japan, their request was denied by officers in the Defense Department.

To be specific, I suggest that we recognize that intercontinental communications is the responsibility not uniquely of the U.S. Government, but of the United Nations, and that in all good faith we ask the

United Nations to arrange negotiations with the assumption that no nation will control a world communications satellite company.

Few people are aware of the fact that we have been using export control policy to compel countries to join a U.S. controlled corporation, organized by Congress, at the expense of U.S. companies that could sell satellite systems in Japan, Latin America, and elsewhere in the world.

We promptly need, under the auspices of the United Nations, a worldwide communications satellite policy that is acceptable to the people of the world on a fair and equitable basis, and in which both markets and revenues are shared, depending upon the contributions of each country, a system that is open to all.

I believe that such a step, the chartering of world corporations by the United Nations, would lead to prompt agreement. Just as I would bitterly contest control by a foreign government or power over any international communication satellite monopoly, so can I recognize the legitimate complaint of citizens of other lands whom we put in the same situation.

The world satellite system is not the only U.N. utility needed. There are similar needs now for a comparable corporation to operate a world weather system and to provide for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

I would suggest that a world satellite communications company provide free TV transmission to the United Nations for use by the Secretary General, the idea that Mr. Gardner has already mentioned. I would like to suggest, also, that this is used by the Secretary General to report to the people of the world, without the approval of the Security Council.

Specifically, such a concept would operate under these rules. First, the Secretary General would have under his control a limited staff, including television crews, to send promptly and quickly to any trouble spot in the world, without the approval of anyone.

Second, the Secretary General would have the power to request permission to have the team investigate the situation, only from the parties concerned, that is, the Government of Czechoslovakia, the Government of Vietnam, the Government of Nigeria, and so forth. If these governments refused, then clearly, there would be no reports. But the decision to refuse a request of the Secretary General would be a difficult one, particularly if the U.N. made a very careful effort to report things accurately and fully. The Secretary General, if permitted, would then report both to the Security Council and the people of the world in making public his conclusions concerning threats to the peace.

Think what this would have done if the Secretary General had had this power and capability when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, or when Israel swept to the Suez Canal, or when the United States was building up its forces in Vietnam "to protect air bases."

Third and finally, I think the Secretary General should be authorized to issue charters to existing world corporations who would agree to operate within the U.N. framework.

Today, General Motors manages an economy larger than 70 nations in the U.N. We must begin to tie the world corporation to the world community through the U.N.

What I am suggesting, in essence, is that the U.N. play a major role in establishing a new framework for cooperation between both the developed and developing countries and the powerful corporations and banking organizations of the developed world. It should be quite clear by now that government-to-government and U.N. economic development programs cannot meet the needs of the developing nations for foreign investment or technical assistance. Whatever the merit or lack of merit to these government programs, they are clearly inadequate to the needs of the developing world.

The only hope, and I believe that it is a realistic hope, is for the developing nations to develop a politically responsive framework in which they can exercise command of their national economy, while at the same time providing a legal framework of rules and adjudications for disputes, publicly announced, which will attract foreign investment and which will develop and strengthen local management and entrepreneurship.

I believe that U.S. Government officials who seek to control the operations of U.S. corporations abroad serve neither the interests of the American people nor the interests of the corporation.

On the other hand, I believe that every government has not only the right but the responsibility to completely understand the operation of any company operating within its borders, and to establish rules and regulations on a fair and equitable basis to insure that the company operates to serve the interests of the people of that country.

At the present time, there are many companies, not only abroad but in this country, whose operations are unknown in many areas which are of vital concern to the public, such as financial exchange, labor and working conditions, and pollution. At the same time, such laws should be applied equally and equitably for American, French or Japanese corporations.

Bluntly, I believe many governments of the developing world have underestimated their power in influencing and orienting the policies of private companies, national or foreign, through the use of monetary controls and fiscal and foreign exchange policies.

The use of foreign companies as a whipping boy could explain the failure of local economic growth. Any government which permits a foreign corporation or power to damage the local economy, and create conditions of unsatisfactory economic growth, is admitting incompetence and ineffectiveness as a government. Seizure has all too often failed to solve this problem.

At the same time, however, because of the past, I think this mistrust cannot be overcome through threats of terminating foreign programs or military aid programs on the part of the United States or by offering the sale of military aircraft or similar "sweeteners" to persuade a government to accept the wishes of a U.S. corporation. This mode of behavior is not only obsolete, it is positively damaging to the interest not only of the American people, but the American business community.

To summarize, I recommend a three-step program to reinvigorate the United Nations. The first would be laws to permit the people of the United States to elect their representatives to the General Assembly and a policy encouraging other nations to permit their peoples to directly elect their representatives.

Second is a policy to encourage the creation of world utility corporations, chartered by the United Nations, to provide services which are uniquely worldwide in scope.

Third, I would urge that the Secretary General be authorized to issue charters to existing world corporations who would operate within the framework of the United Nations.

In closing, I would like to close with the words of President Eisenhower: "The people, in the long run, are going to do more to promote peace than our governments. I think the people want peace so much that one of these days, governments had better get out of the way, and let them have it."

(The complete statement of Mr. Barber follows:)

NEW TASKS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

(The following remarks were delivered before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, House Foreign Affairs Committee, on March 4, 1970, by Arthur W. Barber, President, The Institute for Politics and Planning, Washington, D.C.)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to meet with you to discuss the future agenda of the United Nations.

Shortly before World War I, a diplomat remarked to the Kaiser that "no one could see even a few years into the future."

"It sometimes occurs," the Kaiser replied, "among sovereigns frequently, among generals seldom, among diplomats almost never."

In the United States, the people are sovereign, and I sincerely believe that they now have a vision of the future which diplomats have yet to see. This vision is our hope as well as our frustration—a world at peace, in which men and women give their attention to the care of children, the elderly, and the environment. If the United Nations is to gain political legitimacy it should be based on service not to the governments of the world, but to the people of the world.

The gap between diplomacy and the modern world is revealed by a recent ad hoc personal survey conducted by a senior administration official. At recent Washington cocktail parties he asked the ambassadors from foreign governments what they thought of the evening television news. He found that very few ambassadors regularly watched.

However, all of the ambassadors and the political officers who drafted their reporting cables regularly read *The Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. The gap between the world of the *New York Times* and diplomacy, on the one hand, and the television world viewed by the citizens of the western world, is becoming ever greater.

We can only reconcile these worlds if we first recognize the gap and then take effective measures to see that the views and interests of our citizens are represented on our political and diplomatic processes.

I would suggest that world affairs might be improved if diplomatic reports were filed by television. If our Ambassador to Saigon had sent President Johnson video reports, I think our policies would have been more realistic and effective. Vietnam may well become the first war in history that is terminated because of bad television reviews.

Today I would like to make three specific suggestions by which the United Nations can more effectively serve the interests of the people of the world. Each is a legitimate concern of the House of Representatives, the representatives of the people.

First, I believe that the single most significant step that could be taken to strengthen the United Nations would be for the Congress of the United States to pass appropriate legislation to permit the people of the United States to elect their representatives to the United Nations General Assembly.

The second step concerns the drafting of a "Sense of the Congress" resolution which would recognize the necessity for United Nations chartered worldwide utilities for communications, weather forecasting and certain nuclear services to insure peaceful benefits of atomic energy to all people.

The third suggestion is to permit the Secretary General to issue charters to existing world corporations.

I think that this year, 1970, the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, would be an appropriate time to review the past and set a new course for the future, a future in which the United Nations can more effectively serve the needs of the people of the world rather than the illusions of governments. Let me quickly illustrate the measures with which to implement these objectives.

First, the election of representatives to the General Assembly. This step is clearly within the scope of the United Nations Charter. Other nations, as well as the United States, could similarly elect their representatives if they chose to do so, but they would not be compelled to do so. I feed confident, and I am hopeful that you gentlemen would concur, that a U.S. representative to the United Nations who is publicly elected will feel more free—indeed, feel a responsibility—to articulate the policies and views which he believes will best serve the needs and interests of the people of the United States. This would in no way limit the power, responsibility, or authority of the President of the United States or the Secretary of State if, through our elected ambassador to the UN, we made clear the views of the government of the United States. Such a step would permit something which is now impossible—the presentation of views of the people of the United States. If we are free men, do we really fear the opinions of publicly elected officials?

Second, the United Nations should charter selected world utilities. The United Nations should be empowered to charter world utilities which provide services that are worldwide in scope, such as a world communications corporation, a world weather system, or one or two corporations to provide atomic energy material and processing for peaceful purposes under International Atomic Energy authority. A close look at our own Communications Satellite Corporation illustrates the need for such a UN role.

Historians may read the Congressional debate on the Communications Satellite Act as an excellent illustration of the cultural lag that is omni-present in the last half of the twentieth century. The record leaves the impression that the political issues were seen primarily as a battle between those advocates of government control of the program against those advocates who were ultimately successful in creating a private profit-making business. As far as I have been able to determine, no one raised the question as to the authority of the Congress of the United States to pass a law establishing a world communications corporation. That historical oversight, which rational men could have foreseen, has seriously hindered the application of communications satellite technology to the problems of the world, both in permitting companies to build systems for other nations and regions and in delaying international television programs. The result is that the construction of defense satellites, both classified and unclassified, proceed, while peaceful satellite benefits are delayed because of the lack of a sound worldwide basis for cooperation that is equitable for all.

One of the largest customers of the Communications Satellite Corporation has been from its inception the Defense Department. I can clearly recall that when Prime Minister Sato of Japan visited the United Nations and the Japanese wished to have the ceremonies relayed to Japan, their request was denied by officers in the Defense Department.

To be specific, I suggest that we recognize that intercontinental communications is the responsibility not uniquely of the United States government, but of the United Nations, and that in all good faith we ask the United Nations to arrange negotiations with the assumption that no nation will control a world communications satellite company. Few people are aware of the fact that we have been using export control policy to compel countries to join a U.S. controlled corporation, organized by Congress, at the expense of United States companies that could sell satellite systems in Japan, Latin America, and elsewhere in the world.

We promptly need, under the auspices of the United Nations, a worldwide communications satellite policy that is acceptable to the people of the world on a fair and equitable basis, and in which both markets and revenues are shared, depending upon the contributions of each country, a system that is open to all. I believe that such a step, the chartering of world corporations by the United Nations, would lead to prompt agreement. Just as I would bitterly contest control by a foreign government or power over any international communication satellite monopoly, so can I recognize the legitimate complaint of citizens of other lands whom we put in the same situation.

The world satellite system is not the only UN utility needed. There are similar needs now for a comparable corporation to operate a world weather system and to provide for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

I would suggest that a world satellite communications company provide free TV transmission to the United Nations for use by the Secretary General. Consistent with this, I would recommend that this government, together with other governments, seriously press for increased authority on the part of the Secretary General, without the approval of the Security Council or other parties, to form a group of fact finders to report on any threats to world peace. Such a concept could operate under these rules:

1. The Secretary General would have the limited staff facilities, including television camera and film cameramen, to send a team promptly and quickly to any trouble spot in the world.

2. The Secretary General would have the power to request permission to have a team investigate the situation only from the parties concerned, e.g., the government of Czechoslovakia, the government of Vietnam, the government of Nigeria, etc. If these governments refuse, then clearly there would be no report; but the decision to refuse would have to be a difficult one, particularly, if the UN made a very careful effort to report things accurately and fully.

3. The Secretary General would report, in effect, both to the Security Council and the people of the world in making the reports public regarding his conclusions concerning the threat to the peace.

Think what this could have done if the Secretary General had had such powers when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, when Israel swept to the Suez Canal, or when the United States was building up its forces in Vietnam "to protect air bases."

Third, authorizing the Secretary General to issue charters to existing world corporations who would agree to operate within the framework of the United Nations. A set of rules and regulations should be carefully debated and considered by the UN or regional groups and then made applicable to all.

What I am suggesting, in essence, is that the UN play a major role in establishing a new framework for cooperation between both the developed and developing countries and the powerful corporations and banking organizations of the developed world. It should be quite clear by now that government-to-government and U.N. economic development programs cannot meet the needs of the developing nations for foreign investment or technical assistance. Whatever the merit or lack of merit to these government programs, they are clearly inadequate to the needs of the developing world.

The only hope, and I believe that it is a realistic hope, is for the developing nations to develop a politically responsive framework in which they can exercise command of their national economy, while at the same time providing a legal framework of rules and adjudications for disputes, publicly announced, which will attract foreign investment and which will develop and strengthen local management and entrepreneurship.

I believe that U.S. government officials who seek to control the operations of U.S. corporations abroad serve neither the interests of the American people nor the interests of the corporation. On the other hand, I believe that every government has not only the right but the responsibility to completely understand the operation of any company operating within its borders, and to establish rules and regulations on a fair and equitable basis to insure that the company operates to serve the interests of the people of that country. At the present time, there are many companies, not only abroad but in this country, whose operations are unknown in many areas which are of vital concern to the public, such as financial exchange, labor and working conditions, and pollution. At the same time, such laws should be applied equally and equitably for American, French, or Japanese corporations.

Bluntly, I believe many governments of the developing world have underestimated their power in influencing and orienting the policies of private companies, national or foreign, through the use of monetary controls and fiscal and foreign exchange policies.

The use of foreign companies as a whipping boy could explain the failure of local economic growth. I would assert that any government which permits a foreign corporation the powers to damage the local economy and create conditions of unsatisfactory economic growth is admitting incompetence and ineffectiveness as a government. Seizure has all too often failed to solve the problem.

At the same time, because of the past historic irresponsibility of both some large national corporations and some governments, we have a legacy of mistrust,

ill will and bad feelings. I think this mistrust cannot be overcome through threats of terminating foreign programs or military aid programs on the part of the United States or by offering the sale of military aircraft or similar "sweeteners" to persuade a government to accept the wishes of a U.S. corporation. This mode of behavior is not only obsolete, it is positively damaging to the interest not only of the American people, but the American business community.

To summarize, I recommend a three step program to reinvigorate the United Nations. The first would be laws to permit the people of the United States to elect their representatives to the General Assembly and a policy encouraging other nations to permit their peoples to directly elect their representatives. Second is a policy to encourage the creation of world utility corporations, chartered by the United Nations, to provide services which are uniquely worldwide in scope. Third, I would urge that the Secretary General be authorized to issue charters to existing world corporations who would operate within the framework of the United Nations. These concepts may appear impossible, undesirable, and possibly even childish, to which I can only reply, in closing, by quoting from *The Emperor's New Clothes:*

> A little child piped up, "but he has no clothes on." People started to whisper to one another that what the child said was so. "The Emperor does not have any clothes on and what the little child is saying is true." The Emperor squirmed. All at once he knew that what the people said was right. "All the same," he said to himself, "I must go on as long as the procession lasts." So the Emperor kept on walking, his head held higher than ever, and the faithful minister kept on carrying the train that wasn't there.

Like the crowd watching the Emperor, we have been trained to believe:

> That governments serve the interest of their people
> that world corporations serve the public interest
> and that corporations serve the interests of the governments.

The time has come to drop these myths in order that we may work together with the people of this planet toward more realistic goals.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Barber. Mr. Barber, I find your proposal very interesting: the proposal that the people of the United States be given the opportunity to elect members of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. FASCELL. Are you running?

Mr. GALLAGHER. It could be a little more attractive than what I am doing now.

Mr. FASCELL. There would be more people chasing you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Well, that is one of my questions.

Mr. Barber's proposal seems to envision the U.S. speaking, really, with two voices; on one hand, popularly elected delegates, who would represent the country at the General Assembly; and on the other hand, a Presidential appointee would continue to represent the United States in the Security Council. Wouldn't this situation in reality lead to conflicts and confusion about where the U.S. stands on any one particular issue? Unlike now, where we know where we stand on a few?

Mr. BARBER. I think it is possible to formulate some way in which elections are possible, and yet which there is a balance of power, if you will, between not only the U.S. Government, but the American representative at the U.N. on the one hand, and the politically elected officials. I specifically didn't say all 10 representatives would have to be elected.

One obvious point might be to have six representatives appointed by the Government, and four elected. That would clearly give control to the Government. I am not advocating that formula, but I think some formula could be arranged that would permit the clear distinction between the Government of the United States and people who were popularly elected.

At the very least, it ought to provide pressures for change that I think an elected representative "feels" more clearly than someone who doesn't feel himself responsible to an electorate.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Well, would you advocate this for other countries? For instance, how would we compete with a Soviet election? It would be like competing with a Soviet Olympic team.

Mr. BARBER. I, for one, don't see the U.N. General Assembly as such as a sort of competition. I think there is a clear problem of formulating and advocating policies that are in the U.S. Government interest, but to take one obvious example that we have just discussed, on the ocean bottom issue, I personally feel that the ocean bottom issue is not an issue in which the American electorate as such has any overwhelming desires one way or another.

The power forces are the oil companies, the U.S. Navy, and many others, and it isn't at all obvious to me that the summation of those who scream the loudest in Washington is the public interest, and I think that a representative elected to the U.N. General Assembly would provide, in the jargon of our time, a countervailing force, in terms of the public interest.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Would any of you gentlemen like to comment?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, if I may, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the constructive spirit in which the proposal was made, and I think anything which brings people to a better understanding and appreciation of what is going on in the world is in principle good. But I must say, I do see some problems in a kind of split delegation consisting of four or six or however many members elected at large, and then the remainder representing the President.

I think the important thing to realize is that the United Nations is an organization of sovereign nations, and as long as it is, it seems to me that governments must speak for nations, rather than individual citizens. It seems to me that we do have a fairly good compromise now. It has been the practice for a great many years—in fact, I think, since the outset—to have two Members of the Congress as full working members of our delegation. I must say, from my own experience, that the congressional Members I have seen on the delegation are not afraid about speaking up, and frequently, taking issue with positions which have been received by the delegation. On occasion they have succeeded in modifying or otherwise improving official positions.

So I do think there is already, as a practical fact, an opportunity to take into account the consideration of nongovernmental people, through Members of Congress, and through so-called public members, who are in fact private citizens.

Now, I agree that the private citizens, as indeed, the Members of Congress, are all subject to the instructions of the President. But as a practical matter, they do bring into the picture new dimensions, and I think constructive and helpful views, in most cases.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would suppose as a practical matter, also, you would have a very serious job running a nationwide campaign, unless you were part of a Presidential nominees' ticket, and of course, that would only be once every 4 years. You would have a colossal job getting known across the country, if literally 200 million people could vote for a delegate. I doubt very much whether there would be sufficient interest to justify the effort involved. If you had a delegation

that spoke with different voices, it seems to me you would weaken whatever strength that voice would otherwise have, so I don't know how practical a way of attracting attention to the U.N. this would be.

Mr. BARBER. Well, I appreciate the problem, sir. It seems to me, however, that in the long run, if we wish to strengthen a political framework for world order, sooner or later, someone is going to ask the question, how tenuous is the political legitimacy? What are the political roots of this power, if it is to have increased power, which is needed in matters such as Mr. Gardner raises, pollution, and worldwide standards for pollution, for example, which I agree are increasingly going to become necessary? What is the framework in which private citizens can in any way shape or influence that policy?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I think that the faith of people in the U.N. is still very high in this country. This is great. One way in which this can be strengthened is through organizations, such as the UNA, rather than a nationwide election every year to nominate and choose between people, who presumably can't establish themselves very forcefully in the public eye, unless perhaps Shirley Temple Black could, because she has an automatic following.

I don't think your suggestion is a very practical way of solidifying what the U.N. stands for in the minds of the people, and I surely take issue with your suggestion that it is fear of elected officials that has kept us from using this approach.

That assertion was on page 4 of your statement, Mr. Barber.

Mr. BARBER. I understand.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't think it is a question of fear. The issue is what would be the value of their views. I would question whether an elected delegate would be more valuable than someone who is chosen as, say, Ambassador Phillips was chosen, to serve his country. Indeed you are probably getting a better job done by choosing someone than by having him run for elections. Mr. Gardner wouldn't be known all over the country, or Mr. Phillips, or Dean Wilcox, but if they were chosen, they would be able to do a good job.

Mr. FASCELL. If my colleague will allow me to interrupt him, I would like to dissociate myself with those last remarks, particularly as they apply to my district.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What remarks apply to your district?

Mr. FASCELL. If you don't mind, I would just as soon run as get appointed.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Somewhere, you used the expression "fear of elected officials."

I apologize, Mr. Chairman, but General Lemnitzer is appearing before another one of my subcommittees, so I haven't time to question the witnesses, who I think all have made very interesting statements. I would like to ask some questions, but I find myself compelled to leave.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Certainly. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. Fascell?

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, your wide and varied experience has enabled each of you to make a tremendous contribution to these hearings. You have presented enough ideas to keep a whole host of people in the executive branch busy trying to review and implement your suggestions.

Frankly, however, I don't know where we are going to come off in the Congress with respect to the funding problem. That may be fundamental to this whole issue. I don't think that the prognosis is good, so we might as well start from there.

As we all know, the Congress last year cut the appropriations for the U.N. and other international undertakings. There are a whole host of reasons for that which need to be examined and which reach beyond the attitudes of various personalities. I think we ought to start there, examining those reasons and trying to arrive at some conclusions regarding what the Congress is going to do in the next 25 years for the U.N.

I think that is critical. Because regardless of what the administration may do, or what new ideas we may have, it is the Congress reflecting the views of the people of this country, that is going to have the fiscal say-so about our future role in the U.N. I think that is a fundamental, and we had better address ourselves to that some way.

I may add that without U.S. leadership, and the support of the U.S. Congress I see a dim future for the United Nations.

Now to some specific issues: I was curious, Dean Wilcox, about your approach in setting up seven strawmen, knocking them down, and then giving us a whole host of recommendations. You spent a great deal of time in disposing of options, and I know that was done purposefully.

Dean WILCOX. Well, these options are not courses of action that should be accepted or rejected out of hand, individually. Obviously a number of them are complementary to the seventh option.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, let me see if I can give you some impressions.

Dean WILCOX. Sure.

Mr. FASCELL. Option No. 1, according to you, is not feasible. Option No. 2, softening the impacts of the veto, is like trying to do away with the veto.

Dean WILCOX. Which I am in favor of, insofar as it applies to the peaceful element of international disputes.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand that, but for now I am just talking about feasibility, not substance.

The concert of free nations is a great concept, except that it entails some cold war ramifications so we might as well forget about it.

Regional structures are not too useful, really. And the functional approach, while useful is very limited. World law is a great concept, but the interest in it is waning, so it does not present a very encouraging alternative.

Then we go on to the specifics. Now I am not trying to be negative, you understand, but simply conveying the impressions which I derived from what I heard. Increase the amount of economic and technical assistance. Well, I disposed of that in my opening remarks, at least temporarily. We have 25 years to work on that problem and I would put strengthening the aid machinery in the same bracket.

Now these are useful recommendations, of course.

Dean WILCOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. And we are happy to have them. That is the reason for these hearings, of course—we want suggestions, and we need to review them thoroughly at the Executive and at the congressional level. But basically, as I see what all of us are saying, we need a plan of

attack, a plan of operation, which may come out of the examination of all these alternatives. Is that right?

Dean WILCOX. Yes; these options have been suggested by various people, either as alternatives or as supplements to what we are now doing. Faced with the dilemma that we are faced with, and with the United Nations evolving in a way that we did not anticipate in 1945, what do we do in these circumstances?

Mr. FASCELL. What do you do next?

Dean WILCOX. In talking with Mr. Czarnecki, we thought it might be of some use, at least for the record, to briefly pass in review these various options not necessarily with the idea of eliminating them.

For example there is certainly some utility—in connection with our quest to strengthen the United Nations—in looking at this proposition that we should put more emphasis on the role of the Security Council. I don't eliminate that as a helpful possibility, even though such action alone might not be a sufficient answer to our problem.

Mr. FASCELL. Right.

Dean WILCOX. Nor would I eliminate, for example, the idea that we should help develop our regional agencies, but we certainly should be aware of some of their limitations.

Mr. FASCELL. I am glad you are setting me straight.

Dean WILCOX. I would suggest that if we can help strengthen the work of the regional agencies, especially in connection with the peaceful settlement of disputes, this will help strengthen the overall world order. The same is true of course of the functional approach to world order. It is not the only answer to our problem. But it is certainly one possible answer, that can be helpful in moving us generally toward our objective.

Now that was my purpose in putting up these strawmen, and then in part knocking them down. But I don't want them all to stay down. It might be well to use several of them.

Mr. FASCELL. Very good. I am glad I asked the question. I was apprehensive about asking it, frankly, but wanted to see what your answer would be.

Dean WILCOX. Now so far as your comments on the final points are concerned—the specific steps that might be taken to strengthen the U.N.—some of these can be done very simply. Some would cost money, but the ratification of the Genocide Convention, for example, wouldn't cost a dime, so far as I am aware.

Mr. FASCELL. How about the Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, while we are on that subject?

Dean WILCOX. I would like to see the Convention on Privileges and Immunities ratified. I was on Capitol Hill with the Senate when that convention came before us, and I didn't think at that time there was any real justification for our failure to ratify. The main argument, which had to do with the right of our Government to tax American citizens employed by the U.N., has long since been resolved.

Mr. FASCELL. How about the rest of you gentlemen, while we are on that subject, if I may interrupt for a second?

Mr. GARDNER. May I make a comment on one of the points you opened with, about the weighted voting?

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I interrupted Dean Wilcox. Let him finish and then we will go down the line. I am sorry.

Dean WILCOX. Not at all. I had almost finished my point. It is true that the expansion of the U.N. headquarters buildings would cost some money. It could cost us $20 million or thereabouts. On the other hand, we are confronted with all kinds of choices these days, and I think this is a choice we ought to make on the side of the United Nations—very clearly. But most of the points I have listed in the last part of my paper wouldn't cost very much.

The multilateral development program, obviously, would cost several billion dollars, probably, depending upon the magnitude of the program at the outset. But the ratification of the human rights convention, the renunciation of the veto, the repeal of the Connally amendment, and a number of other things could be done without very substantial change on our budget.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Professor Gardner?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, there are so many points raised in Dean Wilcox's very interesting paper, but since you asked about this question that concerns us all, of voting arrangements in the General Assembly and all of that, I wonder if I could just offer a few suggestions?

I agree with Dean Wilcox that weighted voting is just not in the cards. We are not going to get it. It would require a charter amendment. It would mean a two-thirds of the General Assembly voting themselves out of their position of equality. And then getting the Big Five to assign each other Brownie points. One can imagine the Big Five agreeing as to how many votes each one of them should have, and who has more than whom. That doesn't seem to me a practical possibility, but what does seem to me a practical possibility, and something I would like to see explored much more by the Department of State and our mission, as a matter of urgency, is working increasingly through small committees of selective representation.

In other words, every great parliament, such as the Congress of the United States, does its business through small committees. And the committees do much of the work, and they report to the body as a whole, and the body as a whole either approves or disapproves the work of the committee.

Now I think we ought to be aiming for a legislative system in the General Assembly under which the work is done increasingly in small committees of limited size.

Now, this wouldn't mean that the very small countries would not be represented. Of course, they should be represented, but the balance in the committees should reflect more reasonably the balance of forces in the world. In other words, you might have the Big Five; 10 countries that might be described as middle powers (countries like India, Brazil, Japan, Italy, and the United Arab Republic) and then maybe six places for the very small ones. It was this kind of distribution we were thinking about in the Department of State when I was there, for a peacekeeping committee of 21 countries. And if you could establish committees of limited representation for special tasks, you could then perhaps hope to get it agreed by the General Assembly that it would not adopt resolutions in these selected areas except upon the recommendation of the small committees.

You would thus have a kind of bicameral system, in which you would need the approval of both the small committee and the plenary to pass

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something. This would provide safeguards for both the majority of small nations and for the large and middle powers.

This is just one idea. It is complex, and there isn't time to explore it in detail, but I am just suggesting that we shouldn't be hopeless about it, and feel that there are only two possibilities, the General Assembly as it now operates, and the Security Council, where there is a veto.

Going back to the Security Council is an admirable objective. In fact, we have been implementing it over the last decade. We were doing that when I was in the Department, but we wouldn't want, I don't think, to accept the view of some states that the General Assembly has no reserve powers at all in the peacekeeping field. I say that not because I expect that we will be able to have peacekeeping operations against the opposition of the Soviet Union. We won't. But I do have in mind that some day the Peking regime will be occupying a seat in the Security Council. I don't know when that day will come, but it may come sooner than most people think.

In any case, whenever it comes, we should not be in the position, we and the Russians, of being paralyzed in an effort to mount a peacekeeping operation we both want because of the intransigency of Mainland China, and for that reason, and it is primarily for that reason, I would like to keep an escape hatch open to the General Assembly.

Dean WILCOX. I agree with both of those comments. The Assembly should be able to function in the event the Security Council is hamstrung by the veto. Also the idea of the subcommittee system—which Dr. Gardner has referred to—was precisely the kind of thing I had in mind when I referred to the desirability of streamlining the General Assembly and restructuring the committee system.

Mr. FASCELL. The United States has been exploring some intermediate remedial steps. Ambassador Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. If I may just add to this, Mr. Chairman, I think the point is well taken. We have had some very concrete examples of the problems which exist, when you try to deal with highly complex, sometimes rather technical problems, in one of the committees of the whole of the General Assembly, and I refer specifically to the past General Assembly session. Mr. Fascell is well aware of what happened in connection with the first committee's consideration of the report of the Seabed Committee.

Now here is a committee of 42 members, which is beginning to develop a certain expertise in this highly complex and very important subject. Its report is then referred to the political committee of the General Assembly, where it flounders and becomes subjected to irrelevant political considerations.

Now if one could get agreement, that action by a General Assembly, committee of the whole would be deferred until a full report had been submitted by a smaller group of experts, this could be very helpful.

Whether it is a practical matter or not, I don't know, because there is nothing to prevent representatives from simply ignoring the product of the smaller committees' work. It is difficult to see how this could be enforced. But I think it is an excellent idea to consider, and possibly to try.

Mr. FASCELL. How does this discussion relate to the suggestion that Professor Gardner made that there should be a single conference on

all of the related seabed problems—and here we are, as a matter of national policy, proposing a two-level conference—or a series of conferences?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, this gets us into deep water, as they say. I am glad——

Mr. FASCELL. Well, let's just slide along the top for a couple of feet.

Mr. GARDNER. Well, all right, we will slide along the top.

I feel, with great respect, that we are on the wrong track on this. I think, as a matter of practical politics, the attempt of the United States to limit a conference to territorial waters and fisheries is politically unrealistic, and is seen to be politically unrealistic by the majority of members of the U.N.

I didn't have time to give the reason in my verbal testimony, but I will just state it here, since you give me the opportunity, and that is, that certain Latin American countries, less well endowed with seabed resources off their coasts, but concerned with rich off-coast fishery resources, are not likely to make agreements in one area without satisfaction in the other.

These and other States will want to trade off acceptance of the relatively narrow territorial sea boundary we are seeking, in return for some special recognition of their fishery interests beyond and some reasonable sharing in the benefits of seabed resource development.

And that being so, I think we have to have a single conference which deals with all these Law of the Sea questions. Of course, we could, Congressman Fascell, have commissions of the one conference, separate commissions dealing with different aspects of the question. My point is only that there would be one conference, and at some point, all of the different elements of the package would have to be assembled at the senior political level, so that the trade-offs would be made in a way that is acceptable to all the countries concerned.

Mr. FASCELL. Now having flushed a flying fish, what would you say about it, Chris?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, if I may refer to the more comprehensive statement I have submitted for the record, I did deal with this particular point on pages 8 and 9, and I know Congressman Fascell is aware of this problem.

Quite frankly, I appreciate the political facts of life that Professor Gardner mentioned with respect to Latin American concerns and the concerns of other States, but it seems to me that we do share a common desire with most of the countries, developed and developing, to make progress in working for an international regime for the exploration and exploitation of the seabed. The best way not to get progress is to try to lump together in one international conference all of these highly complex Law of the Seas issues.

We know that we have gone already some distance in clearing the way for agreement on those aspects of the Law of the Sea which deal with such things as territorial waters, international straits and fisheries; these are relatively well-known problems. The ground has been gone over, and it probably would be reasonably easy to get agreement on these issues.

If these issues are lumped together with the very difficult and untested issues relating to seabed regimes, the issue of boundary, and so on, it could become a long and drawn-out negotiation. So to respond,

I would say that this is not the way to make progress in the negotiations for a regime of the seabed.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you want rebuttal time?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I just would say this. Ambassador Phillips is seeking an admirable clarity and orderliness, but I think it really does ignore the political facts of life. He says that the territorial water question is a relatively simple one.

The fact is, we have near chaos in this area today. We say it is 3 miles; the Russians say it is 12 miles; there are Latin American countries seizing our fishing boats at up to 200 miles, and making claims of that kind, and the Latin American countries have made it perfectly clear—many of them—they feel strongly, they are not going to accept the kind of narrow territorial sea boundary we want, unless they are satisfied on the fishery rights beyond, and on the mineral questions in the deep seabed.

So I don't see how we are going to unlock this question, unless we change our policy. I will even make a prediction before this committee, I think we will have to change our policy, and within the next year or two.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Barber?

Mr. BARBER. I would like to agree with Mr. Gardner, and add one more complementing factor, and that is some noted authorities on the pollution of the ocean have predicted that the Atlantic Ocean may be the condition of Lake Erie, that is, basically the low oxygen content killing all fish, within 10 or 12 years. And I note that in these discussions about the ocean, we haven't gone, as far as I am aware, to seriously formulate the kind of rules that are going to be necessary to protect the life in the Atlantic Ocean, which, if this prophecy is correct, will take place not only within our lifetime, but in the relatively near future.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ambassador Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. I appreciate that this is a very pressing problem, but I do think that more attention is being given to it than Mr. Barber indicated. In my verbal statement, I referred to some programs which are already underway in a number of the specialized agencies, and I referred to the preparations, which are underway in anticipation of the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment.

I believe that public opinion, not only here, but in the world at large, has in a sense exploded, and there are programs both in the planning stage and in operation, which are coming to grips with these problems. So I don't think it can be said that nothing is being done. More can be done, and more, I am sure, will be done, and indeed, the regime anticipated for the seabeds has always been based on the assumption that there would be rules and regulations with respect to activities on the seabed, that might pollute the waters.

I don't think this has been left out of the picture.

Mr. BARBER. Just a one-minute rebuttal. My point was not that——

Mr. GALLAGHER. I don't mean to break the time rule, but go ahead.

Mr. BARBER. I recognize that a lot is happening. My point was rather, I am unaware that we have got to the point where codification, broadened codification of the kind of rules that will be necessary to protect the Atlantic from pollution at this time, you haven't got to that point, and if we have 10 or 12 years before the Atlantic is pol-

luted, it seems to me traditionally, on the record, it takes 3 to 5 years to negotiate anything in the U.N., from the time you have seen a first draft of a proposed treaty.

That is just a practical rule, that says that if we have a treaty on the pollution of the oceans that is abided to by the principal countries of the world, within 6 years, I will be very surprised.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I think it might take even longer if we have an elected U.N. delegation. [Laughter.]

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could run some other questions by this distinguished panel, and take advantage of their talent?

We didn't finish with the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. Just so we could get it in the record, I assume everybody is for that?

Mr. PHILLIPS. I fully support it.

Dean WILCOX. Yes, sir; it should have been ratified a long time ago.

Mr. FASCELL. OK; now as to the proposed expansion of the U.N. headquarters in New York, we have one witness' expression of views on that. How about the other gentlemen?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes; Professor Gardner, perhaps you could respond. Perhaps I could amend the question, to include what would be some of the practical disadvantages to the United Nations in its role if we do not approve of the expansion program?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I think the practical disadvantages would be very serious. There has been an attempt for many years on the part of the Soviet Union, and countries that often vote the way the Soviet Union votes, to take the United Nations or parts of the United Nations out of New York.

Mr. FASCELL. If not all of it.

Mr. GARDNER. And then there are some other governments that, for a number of reasons having to do with the Middle East question, have raised this issue. To the extent that this happens, to the extent that we start dismembering the headquarters structure and putting pieces of it in Geneva or Vienna, or Stockholm, or wherever it may be, we are weakening both the United Nations as an institution and the role of the United States in it.

I say "weaken the United Nations as an institution," because to start scattering its offices all over the globe will reduce efficiency. This is a perfectly obvious point. Without essential unity, we will lose efficiency.

I would even argue that it would be unwise to separate, as some people have urged, the economic work from the political work. Some people say that the vision of the future should be to locate in Europe all the economic work of the U.N. and keep in New York all the political work. Because it would be most unfortunate——

Mr. FASCELL. You anticipated my next question. I am glad you are discussing both.

Mr. GARDNER. Because I think the American people will then see at their doorstep all the quarreling and all the divisions, and they will not see here tangible manifestations of the constructive peace-building work of the U.N. And there is another aspect of this, and that is that the economic work of the U.N. can best be undertaken if it is in New York, because in New York it has access to the scientific talent,

the technology, and the business experience that the United States has available.

The decision, for example, to locate UNIDO, the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, in Vienna, was a scandal. I know that is a harsh phrase. I say it with all respect to my friends in the Austrian Government who wanted it, but you know, if you looked for a more inappropriate place to locate an organization which depends on advanced science and technology and industry, you could hardly find a worse place than Vienna.

Mr. FASCELL. But the Government did——

Mr. GARDNER. They have got a lovely opera house.

Mr. FASCELL. But the Austrian Government did provide $50 million in facilities to UNIDO.

Mr. GARDNER. I don't think that is a good enough reason.

Mr. FASCELL. No, but they did, and nobody else did. That is the point.

Mr. GARDNER. Exactly, and unless we make a generous proposal to site these facilities in New York, there will be increasing pressure to put them elsewhere.

Now, the last point—I am sorry to give a long answer, but it is such a fundamental question—I think that the United States also has a great advantage in having the United Nations located here. It enables us, for example, to recruit Americans for secretariat activities. It is much harder to recruit Americans to serve overseas.

A practical implication of moving things overseas would be a further diminution of the quantity and quality of Americans serving in the international secretariat. And that problem is already severe, finding good Americans, as the matter stands today, so I think that it is really imperative for strengthening the U.N. as an organization and strengthening the American role in it, that we enlarge the New York facilities and continue to be able to serve as a generous and good host for the organization.

Dean WILCOX. There is just one other point that may be added and that is that the United Nations is often criticized for lack of coordination in the economic and social field. If we were to further disperse the various segments of the United Nations that are engaged in this work, possibly to different parts of the world, it certainly would not help the United Nations to achieve greater coordination. Quite the contrary. To be most effective, the central direction of the programs in this field should remain in New York at the headquarters.

Mr. GARDNER. That is a very important point.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What other disadvantages do you see to fragmentation of the U.N., if we do not approve the proposed expansion?

Dean WILCOX. I think that Mr. Gardner has hit most of the points that I would consider important.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ambassador Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. I would just make a comment about a possible relationship between U.S. ratification of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities, and efforts to defeat measures which would have the effect of dismembering the United Nations. If we could this year, obtain action on the Convention on Privileges and Immunities, it would go a long way to removing one of the criticism about our actions as the host country. This in turn, I think, would help diminish the oppo-

sition which admittedly exists among some delegations to expansion moves which would indicate a determination to keep the center of U.N. activities in New York.

It is also worth noting that the U.N. is now spending close to $2 million a year on rental costs in New York City for outside office space. This is a very uneconomic way of conducting its business. And I would point out another consideration, which though not a major one, has some dollars and cents importance. Secretariat members living in New York, there are some 3,000 of them, receive salaries amounting to something like $12 million a year; these are funds which are being spent in the United States, and this of course is economically a plus factor in our balance of payments. And I would say amen to what Professor Gardner said about the economic and political considerations which dictate in favor of retaining the centerpiece of the U.N. here. Once you begin to break it up, then I think you have done damage which it might be impossible to repair.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Barber.

Mr. BARBER. I have played the role of the heretic regarding the UNDP. It seems to me that we are now emerging into an area where people are reevaluating all types of government-to-government aid programs. And I hear more and more, and in thinking ourselves, about the possibilities that it may be possible to develop more effective aid, foreign aid institutions, through different frameworks, and it is quite possible that the goals of the UNDP might be more effectively carried out in different formulas in different institutions and organizations.

If you took a poll, for example, in Africa and Latin America today, and asked whether they would prefer to have the UNDP assistance as distinct from having the same amount of assistance in the World Bank or the OAS, I don't think you would find very much argument, per se. They obviously need the aid, but I don't think that it necessarily ought to come from the U.N. And more particularly, as a political question, if we look at the U.N. budget, I think we might argue that the U.S. support of the U.N. might be stronger, if in the long term, we planned about the foreign aid aspects of the U.N. being carried out through other institutions, so that a budget that appears before the Congress of the United States as the U.N. budget, is focused on peacekeeping and the formulation of international law.

Mr. FASCELL. I frankly haven't arrived at a decision in my own mind about this, but I can see, on the basis of my limited experience at the United Nations, the tremendous emphasis which is accorded there to economic and social development tasks which account for 80 percent of the resources and the effort, expended by the U.N. In some ways, this emphasis seems to detract from the principal functions of the U.N. in dealing with peacekeeping and other political questions.

I don't mean that you can depoliticize economic decisions—I don't think you can do that at all—but there might be merit in getting some of the economic tasks distributed among the regional commissions, or someplace else. I don't know. I would have to think about that a little bit.

I think there is a growing tendency to believe that we are going to solve all of the problems in the world if we continue to emphasize 80 percent of the U.N.'s effort while the General Assembly keeps on passing resolutions on various topics—resolutions to which less and

less attention is paid. I think that is an unfortunate tendency which can degrade the General Assembly and then the U.N. in the eyes of the public.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Professor Gardner?

Mr. GARDNER. I think the problem which has been just described by Congressman Fascell is a very serious one, and it bears with particular importance on all these new areas of science and technology. The General Assembly is really very poorly equipped, because of its size, work methods, and the type of people who go to it, to deal with some of these highly technical scientific and technological issues, like the environment, population, space, and so on. And I would hope that we can take some leadership in the next few years to encourage the formation of expert scientific panels, of limited membership, to look at some of these questions.

For example, maybe we should have a small panel of distinguished scientists who could look in an orderly and continuing way at the whole environmental question. So that we may want to, if not substitute for the General Assembly, at least supplement the General Assembly, with some small expert groups to look at these new areas, but I wouldn't want to see them parceled out into the regional commissions, or off to the specialized agencies.

It seems to me in an area like the environment, you really need an overall view. One of the dangers is that FAO makes a decision about DDT. They say, "Well, we need DDT, because we want to increase agricultural productivity," but they don't think of the ecological consequences, and the functional approach is not well suited, either in environment or population or anything else, to the necessary coherent program that we are seeking, one that recognizes the linkages between all these functions.

Mr. FASCELL. That lays a predicate for my next question. We have been wondering about the desirability and the necessity of putting into the State Department the final responsibility for coordinating U.S. participation in the specialized agencies, both in terms of budget and policy, so as to have a more unified approach towards the U.N. and the international organization community which we certainly don't have now.

What is the panel's reaction to that?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Dean Wilcox?

Dean WILCOX. In foreign policy unity of action is very important. When the United States speaks abroad, we must not speak with a medley of discordant voices. For this reason I favor the State Department taking the lead on foreign policy questions. We must have close teamwork, of course, between the department of government that is responsible for technical matters such as agriculture or labor or health and the State Department. But there must be a single nerve center somewhere in the Government which is charged with the responsibility for looking at all the facets and all the factors involved in policy, and coming up with a decision. How this leadership is exercised is very important. Clearly the technical agencies of our Government should have the major role to play in decisions relating to the control of communicable diseases, improvements in rice production, and similar matters. Yet even here the political issues may be of some consequence; in any case the decisions should be made in the context of our total for-

eign policy. Moreover, we must keep in mind that important political questions are constantly being raised at technical conferences—questions relating to the seating of mainland China, the status of East Germany, or the apartheid policy of South Africa. These are matters which cannot be dealt with by experts on malaria, or fertilizer, or child care. All this means that we must have a good deal of interdepartmental coordinating machinery. We must also have "joint" delegations to conferences with technical experts and experts in the political field working together.

The State Department must take the lead in the coordination of policy but it must be very careful not to dominate the technical agencies. During a period in the 1950's the relations between State and the other departments of our Government were not very cordial precisely because the State Department did attempt to exercise too much control. Labor questions must be handled primarily by the Labor Department; that's where the experts are.

The only way you can deal with problems like these is on a cooperative basis. However, somebody has to take the leadership in evolving policy and I can't think of any other agency or organ in the Government that can do it more effectively than the State Department. After all, it is the President, the Secretary of State, and the Department of State that are responsible for our foreign policy. On the other hand, I would not think it advisable to move into the Department of State groups of technical experts in health, labor, agriculture, and related fields. This could result in domination rather than cooperation.

Mr. FASCELL. In discussing this, gentlemen, please throw in the budget question.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Professor Gardner?

Mr. GARDNER. I think there is a very serious problem here, of developing a unified and coherent American input into this system. I think if we are honest, we have to admit that much of the fragmentation that we have seen at the international level, among the U.N. agencies, reflects the fragmentation in our own country, in our own Government.

We are the greatest proliferator in the U.N. system.

I think the idea of putting all the responsibility for all these specialized agencies in the State Department is one that just can't work. For example, the Agriculture Department would never agree, and I think they would be right, to let the State Department be the sole judge of whether DDT should or should not be eliminated or whether the codex alimentarius should be amended, or whether there should be a renewal of certain arangements with respect to cocoa. These are technical questions, in which the Agriculture Department has a mandate, under our system.

We will never get the Treasury Department to let the State Department decide whether interest rates should be raised, or whether there should be a devaluation of the lira under the terms of the Monetary Fund agreement. Nor will we ever get HEW to let the State Department decide what kind of health reporting arrangements should be made in WHO.

So we have to, it seems to me, give the specialized departments of our Government a role.

On the other side, one thing is clear. When it comes to political issues, the State Department has the primacy. Whether China should be seated in the WHO is clearly something the State Department decides.

The hard problem, it seems to me, is where you get into issues which transcend the narrow technical responsibility of an executive department, and begin to get into larger developmental questions. For example, should the WHO move into the population field?

Or should FAO have its own technical assistance program in agriculture or should it be only an executing agency for the UNDP?

Now I would like to see those issues primarily the responsibility of the Department of State, but that is going to be very hard to do. We tried to do that over the last 10 years, but we have not succeeded.

As you know very well, initiatives have been taken by U.S. delegates in a number of specialized agencies which were quite inconsistent with things that other delegates, State Department delegates were trying to do in New York. To prevent that, a stronger role will have to be given to the Secretary of State for coordination or perhaps—and this is an alternative, Mr. Chairman—there will have to be established in the White House some central mechanism for coordination that does not now exist.

It is an unfortunate fact that in the White House staff of Dr. Kissinger there is no U.N. expert, and this makes the job of coordination much more difficult and also makes more difficult the bringing of these U.N. issues to the level of presidential attention.

Mr. FASCELL. And the only budget coordination you have is at the Bureau of the Budget level. Isn't that correct?

Mr. GARDNER. That is correct.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ambassador Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. If I may just respond, because I agree with much of what Professor Gardner says, having in a prior incarnation served as U.S. Representative on the Economic and Social Council, I am also keenly aware of the problems of getting unified American positions on matters involving the specialized agencies, and other UN programs. There is a real problem here on one point which I believe you, Congressman Fascell, mentioned: the budgetary question. I haven't perhaps thought it through as carefully as one might, but it seems to me that it would be more useful to strengthen the budgetary coordination process, in the State Department, because it is there where you get an overall view of the relative importance of programs in terms of total U.S. interests.

It is true that the Department of Agriculture has to make a judgment about the use of DDT, something the State Department obviously can't do, but you can't divorce our participation in this whole range of international activities from our total foreign policy interests. They are related.

And it seems to me the real control does come right down to the budget process.

Now at the present time, I think we sometimes take an unduly inflexible position. We try to make a budget assessment based on arbitrary percentage standards, which doesn't always make a great deal of sense. In some cases, an arbitrary percentage figure may be too much; in others, it may not be enough. And we use this standard because we don't seem to have any better, any more logical yardstick.

Mr. FASCELL. And because some people think that it sounds good in the Congress.

Mr. PHILLIPS. You take the words out of my mouth. It is true, it is an easy way to make a decision, but it is not necessarily the best way, and I do think that serious consideration should be given to making it possible to strengthen this kind of budgetary coordination, and my inclination is that it should be in the State Department.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Barber?

Mr. BARBER. I would agree with both Mr. Gardner and Mr. Phillips, and would like to take it, as I see the logic, one step further.

In my experience, it is terribly important for State Department representatives not only in this Government but other governments to have program approval of international projects of any significance. And I think that a clear distinction should be made between what I would call determining data, both at the UN staff level and in the State Department, and making policy, and operating a program.

Let me give you an example. In the weather area, and international geophysics, there is obviously an international club of men who know each other, they share data, and they have joint interests in carrying out certain programs, and this is all to the good. If there is a policy-maker who thoroughly understands the programs from the State Department point of view, and is involved before all the arrangements are made, who has reviewed this both from a budgetary and a policy point of view, and said, "Yes, this is a program that is sound,"—that would be good. But usually this does not happen.

In my experience, time after time, you will find private meetings and a few drinks, and the programs are in fact, de facto, all agreed, and each representative is selling it to his government, so that by the time it reached the foreign office level, every foreign office finds itself with a de facto agreement between the scientific community in that area, and they really are in an impossible position. I think there has to be a club of foreign offices to get control of the situation.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I have another question.

Mr. Barber has offered a series of very interesting suggestions, but one that struck me in particular is his proposal for U.N. chartering of international utilities.

Is that under discussion? It seems to me there is a possibility there not only for useful cooperation and service, but also for providing the U.N. with some financial benefits.

What do you other experts feel about this?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Dr. Gardner?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, it is hard to answer that in the abstract until we have some very specific and concrete examples of the areas in which these corporations are to work. I confess that this is one aspect of the testimony of my friend Art Barber with which I find myself in some disagreement. I hate to be any more conservative than any other member of the panel, but I guess on this I am a little more conservative than he is.

Let me explain why. He had some very harsh things to say about INTELSAT. He talks in his paper about compelling countries to join a U.S.-controlled corporation, organized by Congress. With respect, I think that rests on a misapprehension. I had something to do with the negotiation of the INTELSAT agreement. INTELSAT is, as I am

sure Art knows, an international telecommunications satellite consortium, in which more than 60 countries participate, and we are part of it.

Our membership in it is through COMSAT. It is COMSAT that is the congressionally chartered company, and that is our means of participating in this international thing.

Now I don't really think the U.N. could operate a global television system. If we had—I had far better——

Mr. FASCELL. I didn't understand that that was what Mr. Barber was advocating.

Mr. GARDNER. He wanted to charter companies to perform services, like global TV and radio.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, it could be a private organization, though, couldn't it?

Mr. BARBER. The State of Delaware doesn't run the Standard Oil of New Jersey.

Mr. FASCELL. He is talking about chartering and authorizing, and not control.

Mr. GARDNER. Well, you see, in the case of the global satellite thing, we already have INTELSAT, and I think we ought to work with, and broaden it, and liberalize it along the lines I have suggested to get it to recognize its responsibility to the U.N. and the international community by making some channels available. I don't know what else Mr. Barber has in mind.

You know, when you talk about licensing, then you get into the hard question of who makes the decision. And do we have the confidence that the licensing will be done under a political authority in which our interests are adequately protected?

Mr. FASCELL. I read that in the context of Mr. Barber's other proposals, in which he is trying to force steps upward, within the international community, in order to get away from the question of the dilution of sovereignty.

Mr. GARDNER. Right. Well, I agree with that as an objective, and I would say that the first place we ought to try the Barber approach is the deep seabed. Let's get an international regime for the exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep seabed, with a U.N. authority to license national governments and private corporations, getting a fee in return for the licenses, and laying down strict regulations about use and antipollution measures and so on.

If we could make it go there, maybe we can go on to some other things. I think that would be the top priority.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Ambassador Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Could I just try to clarify this question. I understand Mr. Barber's suggestion was in two parts, one is concerned with international communications or other utilities, and the other, related to the possibility of a U.N. or other international charter, for any private company operating in a number of countries.

During my last 3 years in private life, I was President of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce. We devoted a good deal of time and attention to what has come to be called the multinational corporation. A very extensive study was undertaken by the International Chamber of Commerce on the economic, political, social and financial implications of such world-wide companies. There

was considerable interest on the part of some of these companies, in the suggestion that there be an international charter for multinational companies because it was felt that this might be one way of deemphasizing of the multinational company, which must operate in many countries with different legal and political systems.

These worldwide operations can entail problems of a local or national character. I think some companies were searching for ways of providing an international umbrella to their operations. Now is this essentially what you had in mind?

Mr. BARBER. You correctly articulated two distinct points. One is the utility, which Dick Gardner was addressing, and the other was the question of the large world private corporation, of which you spoke.

Yes, to go first to your point, I find increasingly businessmen are honestly concerned about where their loyalties lie, when they operate in many countries. It isn't a question of being good or evil. It is simply there are companies for example that are directed abroad to do something pursuant to U.S. law, which is in conflict with local law, and when they get in their kind of position, there is nothing they can do right, and they want to try to avoid that kind of situation, and I think it is fair to say that most businessmen prefer the politicians to come up with some formula, whether through the U.N. or somewhere else, where they are not caught in divided loyalties, and I don't think this can be quickly resolved, but I do believe the U.N. or at least the good offices of the U.N., in someway, to formulate general rules of procedure and particularly adjudication procedures, so if there is a dispute in good faith, Brazil tells some company to do X, and it is an American company, and the American Government says do Y, how can they in good faith get an adjudication as to what they should do?

I think we need to develop that kind of institution. But the earlier point, which I think Congressman Fascell was raising, in response to Dick, I think I agree with most everything Dick said, except that I don't think we have to wait and do these one by one. I can see what I would call three agenda items, first private consortia could come up with a proposal de novo, if there were anyone willing to listen, and say in effect, "We can build a world weather corporation, that will give you the kind of performance that NASA and other technology has made possible. We will build it and construct it and manage it, for fees less than governments are now paying, with private capital."

Mr. FASCELL. And make a profit?

Mr. BARBER. And make a profit, but the sense of it is obviously no single legislature, if I may, has the power or authority to authorize that worldwide operation. And therefore, if there were a legitimate open forum in which such things could be legitimatized, that it would be in the interests of everyone, and similarly, now that on March 5, we are going to implement the Nonproliferation Treaty. As I remember, there is a clause in the treaty saying that the signatory governments will do everything within their reasonable power to provide nuclear materials for peaceful purposes to the signatory States consistent with the IAEA.

Well, I think it is operatively true that despite all the good faith of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Government can't, and in my opinion, should not, take a lot of taxpayers' money to run all over

the world to sell atomic materials. That is something that should privately be done by private institutions, but again, not solely U.S. Government institutions or U.S. corporations.

So we need a framework of rules of laws that are generally accepted for everyone, in which companies could offer services on a worldwide basis, in an aboveboard manner.

Mr. GARDNER. Well, this is certainly very helpful in clarifying it. Let's take the weather example. You see, I think it doesn't, I was going to say, quite hold water, but that would be unfortunate.

Mr. FASCELL. Air?

Mr. GARDNER. Can you imagine the Soviet Government turning over its weather services and weather forecasting capabilities and weather research capabilities to a global corporation which would necessarily be controlled primarily by other countries? Weather services are traditionally, and I think will for a while continue to be, functions of national governments. And what we have done under the U.N. umbrella, is something intermediate between where we were and where we want to go. We started in 1961, as a result of President Kennedy's initiative, something called the World Weather Watch, in which the Soviet Central Weather Forecasting Office and our Weather Bureau, and other weather bureaus, make available through the WMO, the World Meteorological Organization in Geneva, the weather material that they gather, and it is disseminated and analyzed for the benefit of mankind.

I am not sure that we are quite ready to go to stage three. I hope he is right, but I don't quite see it in the cards in the next couple of years.

Mr. BARBER. You chose the example. I like it.

Mr. GARDNER. OK.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would like to ask one other question. When I was called outside, one of the students back there found the afternoon very interesting, and she asked, however, what are we learning about things like Vietnam: and what the opinions of you gentlemen might be on whether or not the United Nations could have played a larger role, or looking down the path, what kind of a role can we anticipate it to play in some of the broader questions of immediate concern? As she pointed out, we were talking about some very interesting subjects, but a cloud that hangs over all of it is Vietnam, and more Vietnams.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And when we have disposed of that question in the 4 minutes, Mr. Chairman, maybe there are some other smaller questions we might take up.

Mr. GARDNER. Well, I hope the student can be reassured that it wasn't that the members of the panel were trying to avoid the hard-core questions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. No; that wasn't the problem at all.

Mr. GARDNER. Because we were invited—at least I was—to talk about these new technological areas, and you had another session on peacekeeping.

My short answer to the student would be something like this: That a major effort should be made by us, our Government, in the next decade, to work out with the Soviet Union, as well as others, a strengthened peacekeeping system in the U.N., first for settling

disputes through third-party efforts, factfinding, mediation, conciliation, and second, for mounting international police actions, with men in blue helmets, in trouble spots like the Middle East, and potential Vietnams.

In other words, if we could work it, we could get it agreed with the Russians, that we both have a common interest in containing violence in third areas, which if uncontained, might draw us into direct confrontations, and that the U.N. is the best vehicle for the containment of violence and for the resolution of trouble in these third and peripheral areas.

I think the Russians are coming to understand this. It takes them a long time sometimes to translate their new understanding into concrete political proposals, but I do believe in the next couple of years we have some opportunities to move ahead in this field.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Dean Wilcox.

Dean WILCOX. I think there were very good reasons why the United Nations was not particularly helpful in connection with the Vietnam problem. Our Government did make several attempts, as you know, to seek the assistance of the United Nations. Moreover, the cooperation and the good offices of the members of the U.N. were invited by the President on more than one occasion.

Whether there can be any U.N. assistance in connection with the ending of the hostilities, the cease-fire, and the peace settlement remains to be seen. With North Vietnam, mainland China, and the Viet Cong involved, it is very difficult to see how the U.N. can play a very constructive role, unless these governments change their attitude toward the United Nations and indicate a greater willingness to cooperate than they have in the past.

I suppose in the long run, the Vietnam situation argues for the principle of universality on the assumption that if you had all the countries in the world in the United Nations, situations like this in the future might not arise. And if they did, at least we would be able to deal with the representatives of these countries, in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

Mr. FASCELL. At least you remove the excuse.

Dean WILCOX. Yes, you remove the excuse for them not being willing to cooperate within the U.N. framework to resolve their differences. I can see some international involvement here, perhaps in connection with a cease-fire—the interposition of some international force between the conflicting elements for example—but just how it can be worked out with United Nations assistance, I am not at all sure, unless both sides agree to United Nations help.

That is the first fundamental principle anyway, in connection with United Nations assistance or intervention: Do the countries involved agree to a U.N. presence?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Phillips?

Mr. PHILLIPS. I think there is another element in the picture as one looks ahead. Dean Wilcox has outlined the reasons why in the past the U.N. has been unable to be very effective, but I think as one looks to the time when peace returns to that unhappy area, the U.N. may very well be able to play a useful role in planning for reconstruction for development, and in doing so, perhaps to heal some of the suffering and political bitterness, which obviously is going to carry over after any settlement.

Already, there is some tentative thinking being given, within the U.N. and I think within our own Government, on ways to undertake cooperative action under the umbrella of the U.N., or through some of the existing U.N. activities. There is, after all, the economic commission for Asia, there is the Mekong River development program, and there are various possibilities one could imagine in which the facilities of the U.N. could be brought to bear at that moment. Perhaps very constructively.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Barber?

Mr. BARBER. I do not have any particular words of wisdom on this, other than to say that I feel that the solution to Vietnam, I do not think, will be found in the U.N. in the future, as they have not in the past. And this doesn't, in my view, make a pessimist; it is merely that we are in the midst of changing attitudes, changing values, and I feel very definitely if the same situation had occurred, and there had been no Vietnam this 1965 buildup, and the same situation in 1965 had occurred in 1970, I do not believe the President of the United States, whoever he might be, would have pursued the course that we pursued in 1965.

I think we have all learned whether from Vietnam or Czechoslovakia or other mistakes, that this is not the way to promote the well-being of the people of the world.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Frelinghuysen?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate all of you gentlemen for your testimony today. One of the benefits, from our point of view, is the fact that you provide perspective for one another. The informality of the discussion, I think, has been useful. I wish I had heard every syllable, and hadn't been obliged to leave the room briefly. In comparing the statements, I notice that Dean Wilcox says our problems are really difficult problems, are global in nature, and require global solutions. He says that the United States should take a lead in the financial problems of the U.N., in liquidating its present debt, and putting the organization on a sound financial basis.

Professor Gardner very eloquently says that the U.N. Secretariat does not have a sufficient number of highly qualified experts to support expanded cooperation in areas like environment, population, space and natural resources. He points the finger at Congress, amongst others, for not providing the money for what is presently being attempted by the United Nations.

So I would like to ask how adequate is the U.N. for its job? And how important is the financial problem? Both of you gentlemen, in fact, I think maybe three of you, mentioned outside resources of the United Nations: that perhaps the seabeds might be a source, and license agreements, and so on. Do you think that these independent sources of income are ever going to be significant? And would such revenue ever get us away from the problem of how to get adequate contributions on a regular basis from all the members? Are you talking about developing sources that are reliable, because the U.N. can't rely on members' revenues?

Who would care to address himself to the basic financial problems? It doesn't seem to me that the United States is off to a good start in providing the kind of financial leadership that Dean Wilcox en-

visages. If we are already shortchanging the U.N., I would surely agree that we should be moving in a generous direction on a multilateral basis, especially if we are cutting back bilateral aid, however, the Appropriations Committee refused to see the validity of that argument, and the authorization bill for foreign aid cut back severely a very modest increase requested for international organizations.

Obviously there is a problem, in providing reliable sources of funds from the member nations. How much value do you think these additional sources of revenue would have? How important do you think they would be?

Mr. GARDNER. Well, the problem, of course, is not the amount of money, it is the lack of political will. As many have pointed out, our total contribution to the specialized agencies and voluntary programs and U.N. headquarters budget comes to about $250 million a year, less than the cost of the New York City Fire Department, less than the cost of 1 week of the Vietnam war. So it is not that we can't afford it. But there is political opposition to doing it.

Now I don't quite see how, if there is a political opposition to doing it, I don't quite see how the same people who provide that political opposition would be willing to give way and do it through independent sources of revenue, because they would see that very quickly as a way of providing the funds in a different way.

Moreover, and again, I am going to look like a conservative on this panel, I don't think for the coming decade, the great powers and middle powers will or should seek to finance the regular activities of the U.N., or its peacekeeping activities, through independent sources of revenue.

The fact is that in an organization of 126 countries—and it will be 140 or 150 before too long—in which we have one vote, the possibility to grant or withhold contributions is the principal instrument of control that we possess, and if you set up a great fund for peacekeeping, let us say, funded from the seabed, and you don't fix up the control arrangements, in the General Assembly, in the Security Council, and so on, you will be in real trouble. So I think that factor should be kept in mind.

One final point. That is a modest proposal that I would like to invite reflections on in this committee and in the State Department. I think we got ourselves in a terrible box when we made the decision many years ago to stick the U.S. assessed share of the U.N. budget in the State Department budget. For reasons which we are all aware of, we get the U.S. percentage of the U.N. budgets from the State Department budget.

Now that has meant that as pressure has mounted from the Congress and the Budget Bureau, and other parts of the Federal bureaucracy, to keep the State Department budget down, there has been increasing pressure on the U.N. component of that, which has been growing.

This U.N. component of the State Department budget was about 18 percent, in the middle fifties. It is now up to about 32 percent, and at the present rate of growth it will soon be 40 and then 50 percent, and if we are trying to stabilize Executive department expenditures, the budget fellows and Congress will say, "Yes, but somebody isn't playing square. These U.N. fellows keep going up, and they are violating our mandate."

I think this really has set in motion some forces that are very difficult. Now, could we take the U.S. share of those U.N. budgets out of the State Department budget, so that the U.N. budgets are not subject to this quite artificial measure of appropriateness? Perhaps I am not expressing myself very well.

Mr. GALLAGHER. No; you are, very well. I think it a very valid point.

Mr. GARDNER. This seems to me really something that ought to be explored by the Congress in consultation with the executive branch, because the way we are going at present, I think we are headed for a very difficult situation.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes, I agree. Yes, sir?

Mr. PHILLIPS. I was just going to comment on one point that Professor Gardner made. I agree with him wholeheartedly that when we consider possible independent sources of financing for the U.N., and I think there are such possibilities, we ought to think of them for uses other than the assessed expenses of the U.N.

Now, the most immediate possible source, if ever we are able to negotiate an international regime for the seabed, could be from revenues derived from exploitation of mineral resources on the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. A fairly substantial revenue flowing to the international community could in the long run be available for international community purposes. That is commonly translated to mean for the development needs of developing countries.

Now precisely how you do that, what the mechanisms are, these have got to be worked out, of course, but I do think, assuming that that regime would collect some royalties on the exploitation of resources and seabed, and potentially, the resources are very great, this could be a significant source of independent revenue.

But I would agree, Dick, that they should be reserved for purposes of this kind.

Mr. GARDNER. Development purposes.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Exactly.

Dean WILCOX. I would agree to that, and the comment I made in my paper ought to be interpreted in that sense. This is basically a political question; it is not primarily a financial problem. The members of the U.N. do have ample resources to take care of all these U.N. programs, if they chose to do so, in other words if they put their priorities on U.N. activities rather than someplace else.

So far as new sources of revenue are concerned, I must say I have mixed feelings. You can talk about the sale of Christmas cards, and the income from the trick-or-treat program, but these activities return only a few million dollars a year. Certainly it is a travesty to have the Secretary General of the United Nations going around with his hat in his hand, trying to collect a few million dollars to take care of the great peacekeeping responsibilities which we have imposed upon the United Nations. If we set up peacekeeping operations, we ought to be willing to finance them. I recognize, of course, that the reason the Soviet Union and France didn't contribute to the expenses of the U.N. forces in the Congo, was largely because they didn't approve of the idea of the United Nations becoming involved in operations of this kind. In particular, they objected to the Congo operation.

In this regard the U.N. may be somewhat comparable to the Congress.

I don't think the Congress would be willing to let the President have control of a very large source of revenue that he could dispose of as he wanted to without some control from the Congress. I certainly agree with Mr. Gardner and Mr. Phillips: if there is any independent source of revenue, it ought to be controlled by the sovereign states, the members of the United Nations, who should have a good deal to say about the way the money is spent.

I wouldn't want to turn over a large sum of money to the Secretary General, and permit him to spend it the way he wanted to spend it without appropriate controls by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and other organs and agencies of the U.N.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. As a practical matter, it does seem to me this outside source of revenue which are not contributions from the member states at all, would be controlled, essentially, by the have-not states, whereas contributions are controlled by the have states. As one of the rich states, we need to be concerned about the extent of the freedom on the part of the U.N. to dispose of revenues that are collected.

This is where we need to be wary. I think it is appalling that we don't contribute our fair share of assessments, and so on. We surely should do that, and we should encourage—to the degree that these agencies are fit instruments for multilateral assistance—we should encourage additional aid. But we also need to be wary about providing major sources of additional revenue which would be relatively without strings.

It is all very well to say, "We mustn't let the Secretary General have control over it," but as a practical matter the Assembly would have control, I suppose, and they would dispose of it as they saw fit. This, I think, is what basically is behind the reluctance of our country as one of the major maritime countries, toward the disposition of resources on the seabeds, because these are resources which we figure we might exploit appropriately.

Mr. PHILLIPS. May I comment just on that one point, Mr. Frelinghuysen? A number of possibilities are under consideration on how such resources could be effectively controlled. And one possibility, for example, would be to use some existing organization of the U.N., such as the United Nations development program.

Now, of course, the expenditure, the appropriation of funds, takes place in accordance with the approval of representatives of member states on the governing body of the UNDP, so that kind of an organizational framework is a possibility. You could have some funds which result from international uses of the deep ocean floor, in effect, appropriated through that organization. This would not mean that it would be available to be used by developing countries without any international control.

I don't think this would be particularly desirable, either.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It does seem that the revenues from member states do provide a kind of cement. It makes every member who contributes aware of the fact that his money is being used. Surely it is advantageous to have this kind of discipline on the international organization.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Gentlemen, it is 5 o'clock. Perhaps we should end on this note, but I think Mr. Barber and Mr. Gardner may want to answer.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you. I would like to go back just one point on Mr. Gardner's weather points, and that is that I have personally talked with the head of the Soviet Weather Bureau, and I am quite convinced that a world weather corporation of the type described could be created in the very near future, by cooperation between the Europeans, Soviets, and ourselves. I am not proposing that the Soviet weather system within their borders be in this at all, any more than the Weather Bureau within our country.

The question involves basically weather gathering in outer space, and the oceans, which are the legitimate concern of the United Nations.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Before we close, if you don't mind, Congressman Bingham has asked me if I could ask two questions for him. Then we will end the session.

The questions are addressed to Dean Wilcox.

The first one reads as follows: The use of the term "matching basis" on page 25 is not quite clear. Would the United States offer to make contributions up to 50 percent of total contributions, or what?

Dean WILCOX. Is that on page 29?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Page 25.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Page 25, I believe, of your statement, sir.

Dean WILCOX. Yes, it would be comparable to the matching basis that we have now, with respect to the U.S. contributions to the U.N. Children's Fund, the U.N. development program, and other related programs. We would offer to contribute a certain sum of money if the other countries would contribute a certain amount, let us say, 60 percent, to our 40 percent. This has been the pattern in the past.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Bingham also would like to make this comment: Like you, on page 31 of your statement, he favors trying to increase voluntary nongovernmental contributions to the United Nations and related agencies.

Would you agree with him that such contributions from American individuals and organizations would be encouraged if they were made tax deductible, by change in our present tax structure?

Dean WILCOX. Yes, I think so, Mr. Chairman. At present I believe contributions are made, for instance, through the United States Committee for the Children's Fund, rather than directly to the United Nations Children's Fund program. The U.S. committee then turns the money over to the United Nations. I am not sure what the tax situation is precisely, but I would think it would be helpful to the United Nations if a tax deduction for contributions would be possible, comparable to the tax deduction which an individual now receives in contributing to his church, or to humanitarian ventures in this country.

Mr. FASCELL. Can't we do that now without changing the tax law?

Mr. PHILLIPS. Through the U.S. committee to UNICEF; yes. It is tax deductible.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Well, gentlemen, on behalf of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you very much for the great contribution that you have made. It was an extremely interesting afternoon, and a very valuable record.

Thank you very much.

Dean WILCOX. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene 10 a.m. Thursday, March 5, 1970.)

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Structure, Management, and Financial Policy

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 1970

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell presiding.

Mr. Fascell. The subcommittee will please come to order. We meet this morning in continuation of our hearings on the United Nations.

This first set of hearings would not be complete if the subcommittee ignored the important issue of the U.N. system's management and budgetary procedures.

Good management is essential to proper functioning of the United Nations. It is also necessary to assure that U.S. tax moneys contributed to that system are utilized effectively and efficiently.

Fortunately for all of us, we have the General Accounting Office to keep us all on our toes, and wake us up now and then and give us some clues on what is going on. This morning, we are pleased to welcome the Honorable Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, who is going to help us appraise the efficiency of the U.N.'s management and budgetary system. He is accompanied by members of his staff, Mr. Stovall, Director of the International Division; Mr. Milgate, Assistant Director of the Division; and Mr. Conahan, who is an Assistant Director in that division.

(The biographical sketch referred to follows:)

Elmer B. Staats became Comptroller General of the United States March 8, 1966, after 26 years service in the Federal Government. Before his appointment as Comptroller General, Mr. Staats had served as Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget under Presidents Johnson, Kennedy, Eisenhower and Truman.

Mr. Staats joined the Budget Bureau in 1939 serving in various capacities prior to his appointment by President Truman as Deputy Director in 1950.

In 1953 Mr. Staats left Government service to accept a position as Research Director for Marshall Field & Company in Chicago. A year later he was appointed by President Eisenhower as Executive Officer of the newly established Operations Coordinating Board of the National Security Council. He held this post until he rejoined the Budget Bureau in September 1958 as Assistant Director, and was again appointed as Deputy Director in March 1959. He was reappointed by President Kennedy in 1961 and was continued in this position by President Johnson until he became Comptroller General.

Mr. Staats' interest in public service is reflected in his associations as well as in his career. He is a charter member of the American Society for Public Administration and was its national president in 1961–62. He is a member of several boards and committees interested in the public service, including the

Board of Directors of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the Board of Trustees of Public Administration Service, and the Board of Trustees of the National Institute of Public Affairs.

Mr. Staats is a native of Kansas and a graduate of McPherson College, McPherson, Kansas. He has an M.A. degree from the University of Kansas and a Ph. D. degree from the University of Minnesota. He was a fellow of the Brookings Institution from 1938 to 1939, is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and received the Rockefeller Public Service Award in 1961. He is currently serving on the Board of Trustees of American University in Washington and McPherson College in Kansas.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Staats, we are delighted to have you here.

You have a prepared statement. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELMER B. STAATS, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. STAATS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like, first of all, to congratulate the subcommittee on the excellent hearings that they have had. I have had an opportunity to look at the list of witnesses, and to read a number of the statements which have been presented. I think these hearings are most timely, particularly in view of the recent reports dealing with the effectiveness of our multilateral organizations—the Jackson study, the Pearson study, and now the Peterson Task Force, which has not yet reported, but which has gone into the whole problem of bilateral and multilateral assistance on the part of the U.S. Government. So I believe these hearings are most timely, and we want to help the Congress in any way we can in this very difficult area.

I have a prepared statement, but I hope that you will feel free to interrupt at any point along the way that you feel would be useful.

United States contributions to United Nations organizations for other than peacekeeping activities increased from $141.6 million in fiscal year 1961 to an estimated $263.7 million in fiscal year 1970, an increase of over 85 percent. That is about 8½-percent increase a year.

The funds were used, in the main, for economic cooperation and development and the promotion of social progress. In contrast, funds made available in the annual Foreign Assistance Appropriations Acts for U.S. bilateral economic assistance ranged from $1.9 billion for fiscal year 1961, to $1.4 billion for fiscal year 1970, a decrease of almost 30 percent. These trends are illustrated in the following graphs.

In the two graphs which are on the next page, which shows that in 1961, we were at the level of $141 million, on our contributions to U.N. organizations, and that goes up to $263.7 in fiscal year 1970, whereas the chart just below shows the trend a bit jagged, but still, nevertheless, down in the way that I have indicated.

U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS*
FISCAL YEARS 1961 - 1970



*EXCLUDES CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES

FUNDS APPROPRIATED IN ANNUAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATION ACTS
FOR U.S. BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
FISCAL YEARS 1961 - 1970



Mr. STAATS. I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that the total contributions of the U.S. Government to all multilateral organizations—these are just the U.N. organizations—to all multilateral organizations, where many of the same problems are presented, in fiscal year 1970 about $350 million, so that we are dealing with a very large amount of money, total.

In all, from fiscal year 1946 through fiscal year 1970, the United States will have contributed $4.7 billion to international organizations; of this $3.9 billion will have been contributed to the U.N. organizations. In addition, the United States has paid about $8 billion as capital contributions into the World Bank and other international financial institutions. A brief discussion of U.S. participation in these financial institutions is contained in appendix 1.

DESCRIPTION OF U.N. SYSTEM

The U.N. system is a complex institutional framework of autonomous and semiautonomous organizations and programs, which have evolved over the years, more or less on an ad hoc basis.

In its essential elements, the system consists of the United Nations and 12 other autonomous intergovernmental organizations closely linked to it by longstanding agreements. These include the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and the International Labor Organization. The United Nations itself further includes a number of semiautonomous units created by and reporting to the U.N. General Assembly. These include the U.N. Development Program and the U.N. Children's Fund.

STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS

The charters or constitutions of the organizations generally provide that the work of the organization will be carried out by a legislative body consisting of representatives of member governments and a secretariat comprising the chief executive of the organization and his staff. These two main organs are variously supplemented by executive boards, program and finance committees, and other subsidiary bodies.

The secretariat is responsible for proposing programs and budgets for review and approval by the legislative body and for implementing such programs as are approved by the legislative body. Officers and employees of the secretariats are internationally recruited and have no ties to their national governments in the performance of their duties. At December 31, 1968, the U.N. system employed 41,078 persons.

Legislative bodies establish the policies and principles governing the work of the organizations and review and approve the programs and budgets proposed by the secretariats. Legislative bodies perform no managerial functions. The U.S. Government is represented in the legislative bodies of all the U.N. organizations.

U.S. REPRESENTATION

U.S. representatives in the legislative bodies and their advisers are drawn from U.S. Government agencies, the Congress, State and

municipal governments, and private organizations. For example, the chief delegate of the United States in the World Health Organization legislative body has been the U.S. Surgeon General.

Procedurally, these delegates are guided in their deliberations and voting by position papers prepared within the executive branch and approved by the Secretary of State who has overall responsibility for directing and coordinating the activities of all U.S. departments and agencies involved in international organization affairs and for appointing and instructing U.S. representatives to the organizations.

Although funds for U.S. contributions to international organizations are obtained in a number of appropriation bills—principally those for the Department of State and the foreign assistance program—all contributions are required to be made by or with the consent of the Secretary of State.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REVIEW

I would like to emphasize that it is not the objective of the General Accounting Office to review the internal operations of the international organizations. Indeed, we, like other member governments, do not have authority to audit their activities. However, a 1967 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, instructed the Department of State to make arrangements for an audit by the General Accounting Office of programs being administered by international organizations which are financed solely by the United States. Pursuant to such an arrangement, we are currently making an audit of the Adlai E. Stevenson Memorial Fellowship program as administered by the U.N. Institute for Training and Research.

Our reviews of U.S. participation in international organizations are confined to the developmental assistance activities as opposed to the peacekeeping activities of the United States. Our efforts are further directed to determining how the Department of State and other executive agencies prepare U.S. representatives to the organizations to discharge their responsibilities relative to the level, content, and formulation of programs and budgets supported by U.S. contributions, and the economical and efficient management of these activities. We are also interested in the kind of information made available as to the results or effectiveness of programs administered through these organizations. We view executive branch responsibilities in the context of the U.S. membership in the multinational governing bodies of the organizations.

We have made reviews to date of U.S. financial participiption in the following U.N. organizations:

1. World Health Organization.
2. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
3. International Labor Organization.
4. United Nations Children's Fund.
5. United Nations Development Program.

Almost two-thirds of the U.S. fiscal year 1970 contribution to the U.N. system of organizations, about $172 million, will be contributed to these five organizations. We selected these organizations because each had unique features while at the same time collectively providing a majority of the economic, technical, and social assistance made avail-

able by the U.N. system. Digests of the individual reports we have thus far issued to the Congress are contained in appendix 2.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS BASED ON GAO REVIEWS

Year after year the Department of State has requested the Congress to appropriate increasing levels of funds to be contributed to the U.N. family of organizations although it is not, and has not been, in a position to give the Congress basic assurance that funds contributed by the United States have been used in an effective and efficient manner and to accomplish intended objectives.

We believe that vigorous efforts are required by the executive branch to develop a cohesive U.S. approach and an effective working mechanism to improve its administration of U.S. financial participation in United Nations agencies. In large measure, improvements in U.S. administration involve the initiation and/or support of needed improvements in the United Nations system itself. The full support of other member governments will be required to attain the improvements needed. We believe that improvements are needed in the following specific areas:

I will discuss each of these separately.

First, the executive branch organization, on the U.S. side.—Within the Department of State, primary responsibility for planning, formulating, and implementing U.S. policies and coordinating technical positions throughout the Government relative to international organizations, rests with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. This Bureau is assisted by U.S. missions in New York, N.Y., Geneva, Switzerland, and several other locations.

Other U.S. departments and agencies such as the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Agency for International Development, are expected to have substantial substantive input into matters affecting U.S. participation in international organizations. Over the years, the Department of State has come to rely heavily on these other departments and agencies to answer questions and to assist in formulating positions relative to the programmatic aspects of international organization affairs. This reliance, however, has not been accompanied by clear and firm direction by the Department of State.

In most cases, there is no effective working mechanism for directing and coordinating the activities of the departments and agencies. Thus, there are varying degrees of coordination and cooperation as a result of which the Department of State often receives only minimal and ineffectual support.

For example, there is a U.S. Government Interagency Committee for Food and Agriculture Organization Affairs. Through working groups, it prepares U.S. Government position papers for use by U.S. representatives to the organization. At the same time, neither this Committee nor the Departments of State and Agriculture, in any forum, have been able to develop U.S. policy objectives for its participation in the organization.

On the other hand, there is no formal interagency working group for International Labor Organization affairs, and position papers prepared by the Department of State relative to budget matters, for

example, receive only perfunctory review by the Departments of Labor and Commerce. In fact, the role of the Department of Commerce in International Labor Organization affairs has been minimal.

In our opinion, these conditions contribute to some of the problems and issues discussed below.

A second issue is policy objectives and priorities.—The executive branch has not established definitive policy objectives relative to U.S. participation in the organization, and the priorities to be pursued to reach these objectives. In their absence, it has been difficult if not impossible for U.S. officials to appraise proposals made by the organizations' secretariats, to measure their performance, or to arrive at optimum levels of U.S. support.

Moreover, the organizations, for the most part, have not had an effective system for establishing priorities in terms of the greatest need. Evidence of this has been reported by U.S. overseas posts and some representatives of the United Nations. Their views are supported by a November 1969 study entitled "Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System," made by a team of experts headed by Sir Robert Jackson of Australia, which concluded that 20 percent of all U.N. development program projects are not essential to the recipient countries' development.

In our review, we found that from 1965 through 1969, $100 million of U.N. development program assistance has been granted to countries which, according to representatives of the Department of State or the United Nations, were either relatively developed or seemingly in a position to pay for such assistance. A schedule of the countries and the assistance received by them is contained in appendix 3.

Third, Capacity of the U.N. Development System.—The United Nations development program, which is the largest single source of financing developmental assistance in the United Nations, does not execute projects itself. Rather, it allocates funds to other U.N. agencies to carry out projects in their respective fields of specialization. These agencies also carry out technical assistance projects, in varying degrees, with funds provided by their own legislative bodies.

In recent years, with the increasing size of programs, there were indications that some of the U.N. agencies no longer had the capacity to effectively administer the ever-increasing number of United Nations development program projects being assigned to them for execution.

In recognition of this situation, the United States called upon the U.N. development program in June 1966 to undertake a study to determine the capabilities of the U.N. system to program and implement an increased volume of projects. Such a study was undertaken in July 1968.

The report of the study, dated November 1969, concluded that the present operation is already overextended in certain critical areas and that if governments continue the ad hoc "tinkering" methods of the past, the capacity of the U.N. development system would limit the operation financed by UNDP to about $200 million to $250 million annually.[1] The report said that even this amount of money is somewhat more than the system can handle effectively under the present procedures and administrative structures.

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[1] A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System, vol. 1, p. 18.

Whether the recommendations contained in the study for restructuring the U.N. system are the precise ones that the United States will want to support requires study by the Department of State and other interested agencies. It seems evident, however, that to assure that U.S. contributions are efficiently and effectively administered, the Department of State will have to support many of the study's recommended changes that are aimed at correcting longstanding deficiencies in the U.N.'s present system.

Fourth, management systems.—Information made available to us shows that the United Nations development system, as presently structured, lacks central coordinated direction with respect to programing and budgeting resources, and retrieving and disseminating the results of past and present efforts as a basis for improving future operations.

Many of the U.N. organizations engaged in developmental assistance activities, including the U.N. development program, maintain their own staffs of representatives at the country level—each dealing independently with the country ministries. Attempts, over the years, to achieve effective coordination of their activities by trying to strengthen the position of the U.N. development program's country representatives, have not been very successful. As a consequence, there has been a fragmentation of efforts.

In fact, at the June 1966 session of the U.N. development program's governing council, some of the less developed countries complained that the U.N. specialized agencies had not only lobbied and acted as pressure groups for projects but also shaped projects to their own wishes rather than those of the requesting governments.

Moreover, the Commission on International Development, chaired by Lester B. Pearson, in a 1969 report to the President of the World Bank,[2] noted that:

> The proliferation of U.N. agencies has often resulted in dispersed and unrelated efforts at the level of the recipient countries where there is an urgent need for coordination. The main responsibility for this must rest with recipient governments, but their task is impossible if donors cannot ensure greater coordination among their own agencies. This applies to bilateral aid-givers as well as the United Nations, but the latter seems in particular need of better coordination, continuity, and concentration in priority areas. Above all, U.N. agencies should resist the temptation to "sell" lower priority programs in particular sectors.

We have noted in our reviews that there is a need for more effective coordination between U.S. bilateral assistance programs and the programs of multilateral assistance donors.

Budgetary systems.—Information made available by the individual U.N. organizations in connection with their budget review processes has not been in sufficient depth or scope to permit the legislative bodies of these organizations to assess the justifications for proposed programs, their priorities or the economic feasibility of their implementation. Although a legislative body approves the budget proposed by its secretariat, its individual members are unable to determine with any degree of specificity how the proposed programs are to be carried out, how they compare with the programs of other organizations, or how they relate to the total U.N. effort. Moreover, under the present struc-

[2] Partners in Development, Report of the Commission on International Development, p. 216.

ture of the U.N. development system, there is no means of effectively assessing the overall development program.

In this connection, a member of the U.N. Joint Inspection Unit concluded in September 1969 [3] that it is impossible to either prepare a consolidated general document summarizing the budgets and programs of all U.N. organizations or to easily ascertain objectives. This conclusion coincides with the conclusion drawn by a consultant in his November 1969 report to the United Nations.[4] The consultant found that other than using the same financial year not one aspect of budget presentation was uniform throughout the budgets of all U.N. agencies.

Operational information.—Closely associated with the lack of sufficient information on proposed projects, is the lack of information on their actual operation and results. Effective machinery has not been developed for retrieving, analyzing, and disseminating information on the organizations' past and present activities which might properly be used as a basis for making decisions aimed at improving future operations. Consequently, members of the legislative bodies are not in a position to make informed judgments on actual implementation of programs.

5. Evaluation of U.N. activities.—Both the United States and the U.N. have recognized the need for external evaluations of the activities of U.N. organizations, and both have taken some specific steps to meet this need. Although some progress is being made in this area, we believe that the evaluations currently being performed are not sufficient in scope and coverage to be of much assistance to U.S. officials in making independent judgments relative to the efficiency and effectiveness with which projects and programs are being carried out.

Evaluations being made within the U.N. system include the annual external audit of the accounts of the organizations, reviews by the U.N. joint inspection unit, studies by the U.N. Economic and Social Council and a variety of other U.N.-wide reviews and studies usually undertaken on an ad hoc basis.

In this connection, the question has recently been raised within the U.N. system as to whether the number of review and investigative bodies has not resulted in an uncoordinated proliferation of the review and investigative function. In November 1969, the 24th session of the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution seeking to answer this question. The resolution, after taking into account the need to strengthen and improve the whole machinery of the U.N. system for control and investigation of administrative and financial activities in the interests of economy and greater efficiency, requested the Secretary General to prepare for the 25th session a report showing, among other things, the terms of reference and the costs, from 1965 through 1969, for operating each of the bodies and organs established for the purpose of administration and budgetary control, investigation and coordination.

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[3] Programing and Budgets in the United Nations Family of Organizations, M. Bertrand, member, Joint Inspection Unit.

[4] Budget Presentation in the United Nations System, W. F. McCandless for the U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

In addition to the evaluative processes of the U.N. system there have also been recent attempts by the United States to independently evaluate activities of the United Nations. In 1967, 1968, and 1969. U.S. embassies responded to requests by the Department of State for an evaluation of assistance rendered by the U.N. agencies in their respective countries. The nature of the responses did not present a convincing case that U.S. officials in the field were much aware of U.N. programs in their respective countries or whether the projects were efficiently and effectively administered. Moreover, some of the posts' replies were unresponsive and some posts did not respond at all.

6. Employment of U.S. nationals by United Nations agencies.—At December 31, 1968, U.S. nationals accounted for 2,757, or 6.71 percent of the 41,078 persons employed by the United Nations system of organizations. The percentage, as it relates to professional staff, is somewhat higher—U.S. nationals accounted for 10.5 percent.

It is the policy of the U.S. Government to actively assist international organizations to secure highly qualified American candidates for employment.

Several years ago, the President, in a memorandum to the heads of departments and agencies, stated:

> The capacity and efficiency of these organizations depend, in the end, upon the quality and the motivations of the international civil servants who administer them. These organizations—and our national interest in their fortunes—deserve the services of some of the ablest citizens of the United States. In past years we have not done enough to help these agencies secure the services of highly qualified men and women from private life and from government agencies.

We have not made a comprehensive study of this matter, and therefore are not in a position to comment generally on it. However, we did look into the reasons for the low employment rate of Americans in one of the organizations, i.e., the International Labor Organization.

Although there are a number of factors inhibiting employment of Americans by this organization, some cognizant U.S. officials believe that the present procedures for selection of candidates for employment do not offer equal opportunity for Americans and, in some cases, lead to preferential considerations for employment of nationals of other countries. Factors bearing on employment are:

1. Salaries offered by the organization are often cited as not being commensurate with salaries that can be earned domestically.

2. In the opinion of Department of Labor officials, good candidates are often lost because the organization's Geneva personnel office has not acted on applications until after the candidate has had to accept employment elsewhere.

3. The inability of U.S. applicants to speak a foreign language is said by the organization to seriously limit the number of countries to which Americans may be assigned. It is alleged by the organization that this is a serious problem with regard to the French language and it also exists with regard to Spanish though to a lesser extent.

4. The organization claims that recipient countries are more reluctant to accept assistance of U.S. nationals serving on multilateral programs than they are in connection with bilateral programs.

5. Interviews of prospective U.S. applicants are considered as another problem. European candidates receive expense paid trips to

Geneva for personal interviews. However, because of the expense involved, American candidates are not normally given an expense paid interview in Geneva. Since personal interviews bear heavily on the selection of candidates, American candidates may not be afforded the same initial consideration as is given European candidates.

Beginning last year for the first time, the organization sent a recruitment officer to the United States to interview U.S. applicants. None of the individuals interviewed had been appointed as of a few weeks ago.

6. Another problem is the fact that the organization, when rejecting a candidate, avoids furnishing comments about the reasons for not employing the candidate. This lack of information leaves U.S. officials in a quandary as to why the applicant was not accepted for employment.

In order to assure that U.S. expertise and managerial talent is made available to assist in the economic and social development of less developed countries, we believe that the executive branch should intensify its efforts to secure a continuing and increased number of high-caliber U.S. nationals as candidates for key positions in the United Nations agencies—both in headquarters and in field operations.

7. Voting arrangement in the U.N. system:

The "one nation-one vote" concept has a considerable bearing on the ability of the United States as well as other major contributing countries to bring about changes in the United Nations. The increasing ability of the less developed countries to overrule the desires of the major contributors is being brought more sharply into focus as new and smaller states gain United Nations membership.

During considerations relative to the establishment of the United Nations in 1944, the United States proposed that in making decisions with respect to the budgets of the United Nations or any future U.N. agency, each member state should have voting power in proportion to its financial contribution. This proposal did not find its way into the U.N. Charter or the charter of the other U.N. agencies.

On the other hand, most U.N. agencies have adopted the U.N. scale of assessments for their operating budgets or some modification of it. In 1968, 57 members of the U.N. each were assessed the minimum on the U.N. assessment scale, or 0.04 percent of the total budget. Yet, each of these countries is accorded the same voting strength as the United States which was assessed 31.57 percent.

The less developed countries through their membership on the legislative bodies of various U.N. organizations have in the past been able to override the desires of the United States and other major contributors both as to the nature and level of programs to be carried out.

For example, the voting strength of the less developed countries led to the establishment of the U.N. Capital Development Fund in December 1966, over the opposition of the United States and other major contributors. Also, the United States opposed establishment of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization in 1967. However, when it became evident that the less developed countries would override any objection to the establishment of the organization, the United States did not vote against it.

At the 1968 World Health Organization legislative body meeting, the United States together with 28 other governments, proposed three constitutional amendments aimed at improving the budgetary and

fiscal practices of the organization. The proposed amendments called for (1) biennial sessions of the World Health Assembly rather than the current annual sessions, (2) biennial budgets which would permit a more critical review of proposed budgets, and (3) conversion of the organization's Executive Board into a board of instructed government representatives instead of individuals acting in a personal capacity. When objection to the amendments developed to the point where their passage by a two-thirds vote appeared unlikely to the State Department, the amendments were withdrawn.

SUMMARY

We recognize that U.S. efforts toward improved management of activities of international organizations, of which the United States is a member, must be undertaken and assessed within the framework of the international character of the organization and that membership presumes a willingness on the part of member nations to rely on the management of the organization. We also recognize that constraints on actions that can be taken unilaterally are an inherent part of such membership no matter how constructive the proposed actions might be. Notwithstanding these constraints, we believe that there are opportunities for improvement in the management of U.S. financial participation in the family of U.N. organizations so as to improve the effectiveness of these organizations in contributing to the objectives of the United Nations. We have made a number of recommendations in our reports to achieve this end. In brief, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in concert with other U.S. departments and agencies, take the following specific actions:

Develop and promulgate policy objectives and priorities relative to U.S. support of United Nations organizations;

Emphasize to the organizations that future U.S. contributions will have to be justified by a demonstration that assistance projects are responsive to the priority needs of the less developed countries and can be carried out in an efficient, effective, and timely manner;

Instruct U.S. diplomatic missions to enlist the support of other governments in expediting the needed management improvements in the United Nations development system;

Improve the effectiveness of U.S. appraisals of proposed and continuing projects;

Encourage the establishment of a single United Nations-wide review body of appropriate size and competence to meet the need for effective independent evaluation of United Nations programs and activities. Until an effective internationally constituted means of evaluation is developed, the Secretary of State should arrange to improve the quality of U.S. evaluations by its overseas posts;

Intensify efforts to increase employment of U.S. nationals by the organizations.

In some cases, the needed improvements envisioned by our recommendations will require action by the legislative bodies of the organizations where the matter of voting becomes an issue. The voting arrangements of the U.N. have been discussed in depth by previous witnesses before this subcommittee and I do not believe I can add anything further to their comments.

In all cases, implementation of our recommendations will require an effective, coordinated working mechanism—which does not now exist—within the executive branch. In January of this year, the White House called on the Secretary of State to take the necessary measures to make U.S. participation in international organizations as effective as possible. The President asked other departments and agencies to help the Secretary of State in this effort. Four years ago, the White House made the same appeal.

The conditions discussed above have existed for the last 4 years, and longer. Unless vigorous remedial actions are taken, it is likely that these conditions will continue with the result that the United Nations will be less effective than it otherwise should or could be in the years to come.

This completes the formal statement, Mr. Chairman.

We have referred to the three appendixes attached to our report, but I need to do nothing more than to call attention to those, unless you have some questions about them.

(The appendixes referred to follow:)

APPENDIX 1

U.S. Participation in International Financial Institutions

The United States provides developmental assistance through a number of international financial institutions. This assistance takes the form of contributions to the capital of the institutions. U.S. capital subscriptions and the amounts paid in as of December 31, 1968, were as follows:

[In millions of dollars]

	Capital subscriptions		Subscriptions paid in	
	Total	United States	Total	United States
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	$22,992	$6,350	$2,299	$635
International Development Association	1,921	632	1,853	632
International Finance Corporation	102	35	102	35
International Monetary Fund	21,198	5,160	20,433	5,160
Inter-American Development Bank [1]	4,179	2,468	2,303	1,650
Asian Development Bank	970	200	290	62
Total	51,362	14,845	27,280	8,172

[1] In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank administers the $525,000,000 Social Progress Trust Fund which was contributed by the United States.

Except for the International Monetary Fund, these institutions make loans for economic assistance purposes. To supplement resources made available through capital contributions, the institutions have authority to borrow funds. For example, as of December 30, 1968, the outstanding funded debt of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was $3.3 billion. Unpaid capital subscriptions are available as a guarantee for the Bank's borrowings.

The aggregate principal amounts of loans made by these institutions as of December 31, 1969, were:

	Millions
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	$13,115
International Development Association	2,292
International Finance Corporation	355
Inter-American Development Bank	3,372
Asian Development Bank [1]	140
Total	19,274

[1] As of Sept. 30, 1969.

APPENDIX 2

Comptroller General's Report to the Congress: Management Improvements Needed in U.S. Financial Participation in the United Nations Development Program

DIGEST (DEPARTMENT OF STATE B-168767)

Why the review was made

The United Nations Development Program was established to assist technical, economic, and social development in less developed countries with funds contributed voluntarily by member governments, one of which is the United States. The Program currently provides financing for projects in 140 countries and territories.

This is one of a series of reviews by the General Accounting Office (GAO) examining into responsibilities of the Department of State in connection with U.S. Government financial participation in international organizations.

These responsibilities, as they relate to the United Nations Development Program, are to be viewed in the context of the U.S. membership in the multinational body governing that Program.

The United States has been a continuing member of this body which reviews and approves the financing of projects requested by governments upon recommendation by the Program's administrative officials, or secretariat.

Findings and conclusions

The United States has contributed more than $550 million to the United Nations Development Program and its predecessors during the past 10 years. The President requested an appropriation of $100 million for the 1970 contribution. The State Department has attempted to establish U.S. contributions at increasing levels—within a statutory limitation of 40 percent of the total contributed by member governments—with the view of encouraging other United Nations members to do likewise.

Year after year the State Department has requested the Congress to appropriate increasing funds to be contributed to the Program despite the fact that it is not, and has not been, in a position to give the Congress basic assurance that such funds have been used satisfactorily to accomplish intended objectives. Vigorous efforts must be made by the State Department to improve its administration of U.S. financial participation in the Program. (See p. 17.)

Action is needed in the following areas:

1. The State Department has not developed and promulgated U.S. policy objectives and priorities relative to U.S. support of the Program. Moreover, the Department has not prevailed successfully upon the Program's secretariat to provide assistance to *only* the less developed countries and to the priority needs of countries.

Consequently, from 1965 through 1969, $100 million of assistance was granted to countries which were either relatively developed or seemingly in a position to pay for such assistance. Also, projects were often reported to be of low priority and widely scattered, which dissipated the impact that could be gained from an intensification of efforts in more concentrated areas. (See pp. 20 and 23.)

2. For some time, there has been considerable evidence that some of the United Nations agencies no longer have the capacity to administer effectively the ever-increasing number of United Nations Development Program projects assigned to them. A study, undertaken by the Program's secretariat at the initiative of the United States and completed in November 1969, reported two broad conclusions:

First, the capacity of the United Nations system to handle development projects is overextended and

Second, unless substantial reforms (recommended in the study) are undertaken, the capacity of the system to effectively absorb projects will be limited to a level of about $200 million to $250 million annually.

Even this amount, according to the study, is more than the system can handle effectively at present. The Program has received firm pledges and estimates for members' contributions for 1970 totaling $238 million. (See pp. 26 to 29.)

3. The State Department has not obtained sufficiently descriptive information nor established machinery to make useful appraisals of proposed projects or to provide adequate assurance that approved projects are effectively carried out. (See pp. 30 to 38.)

4. Both the United States and the United Nations have recognized the need for detached evaluations of the activities of United Nations-affiliated organiza-

tions. Both have taken some specific steps to meet this need. Although some progress is being made, GAO believes that the current evaluations are not sufficient to be of much assistance in ascertaining what the actual accomplishments of the United Nations Development Program have been or in making independent judgments relative to the efficiency and effectiveness with which its projects are being carried out. (See pp. 39 to 51.)

Recommendations or suggestions

The Secretary of State should—

Develop and promulgate policy objectives and priorities relative to U.S. support of the United Nations Development Program on a basis consistent with the Program's purpose of providing assistance to the priority needs of less developed countries (see p. 25);

Emphasize that future U.S. contributions will have to be justified by a demonstration that projects are responsive to the priority needs of the less developed countries and can be carried out efficiently, effectively, and timely (see p. 25);

Instruct U.S. diplomatic missions to enlist the support of other governments in expediting the needed improvements in the United Nations development system (see p. 29);

Improve the effectiveness of U.S. appraisals of proposed and continuing projects (see pp. 37 and 38); and

Encourage the establishment of a single United Nations-wide review body of appropriate size and competence to meet the need for effective, independent evaluations of United Nations activities. Until an effective internationally constituted means of evaluation is developed, the Secretary of State should arrange to improve the quality of U.S. evaluations by its overseas posts (see pp. 50 and 51).

Agency actions and unresolved issues

The State Department said that implementation of many of GAO's recommendations exceeded the Department's capacity in terms of available staffing. It said that, within these limitations, it had reviewed the accomplishments of the United Nations Development Program as best it could and had attempted to monitor Program operations to gain the necessary assurances that funds contributed were used effectively. (See pp. 55, 56 and 65.)

The Department agreed that the United States should have policy objectives and priorities underlying its support of the United Nations Development Program and stated that it had been striving since 1961 for the establishment of a centralized voluntary fund in the United Nations to provide technical assistance. (See p. 57). The Department stated also that it intended to give careful attention to the capacity study so that those portions of it which would serve to further U.S. long-term goals might be quickly implemented. (See p. 60.)

The Department said that the success of the United Nations Development Program may be measured by the continuing increase of requests for assistance from the recipient countries and that these countries are not likely to use their own resources to support projects if the projects are not successful. The Department also said that developed countries are not likely to increase their contributions unless they are satisfied with the Program's operations. (See p. 56.) In GAO's opinion, the State Department is not in a position to make firm assessments relative to the Program's performance.

Matters for consideration by the Congress

The House Committee on Appropriations, in reporting the Foreign Assistance and related programs bill for fiscal year 1970, expressed the view that the proposed contribution to the United Nations Development Program of $100 million was excessive in view of the Report by the Commission on International Development which said that the Program's operating capacity seemed strained to the limit. The fiscal year 1970 appropriation for voluntary contributions to international organizations was less than the Department requested, and the Department applied $14 million of the reduction against contributions to the United Nations Development Program. Thus the 1970 contribution to the Program is now estimated at $86 million.

GAO's observations provide additional information for use by the Congress in its deliberations on future requests for contributions to the Program.

U.S. Financial Participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

DIGEST DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND AGRICULTURE B-167598

Why the review was made

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) fosters international cooperation in the fields of nutrition, food, and agriculture. Its programs are financed with funds contributed directly by its member nations and with funds allocated to it by the United Nations (U.N.). FAO also, jointly with the U.N., administers the World Food Program (WFP).

U.S. contributions amount to about 40 percent of all contributions to the programs. U.S. contributions pledged to programs solely or jointly administered by FAO for the 3 years 1966 through 1968 amounted to $219 million, including $92 million in commodities for the WFP.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook this review as part of its continuing efforts to examine into the Department of State's responsibilities for directing and coordinating U.S. Government financial participation in international organizations. These responsibilities are to be viewed in the context of the U.S. membership in the 117-member FAO governing body.

Findings and conclusions

The Departments of State and Agriculture have not obtained the information nor developed the procedures needed to make adequate analyses of FAO activities.

The U.S. Government has no firm basis for making informed judgments, except in very broad terms, as to just what FAO is doing or plans to do with the contributions it has received. (See pp. 17 to 38.)

Although some attempts have been made recently to evaluate FAO's performance, the evaluations have not provided a basis for assessing the manner in which FAO's programs are carried out. At the same time, there is a great deal of evidence that FAO's organization, structure, and operating methods are not geared to the scope and character of the programs being carried out by FAO and that this has hampered effective and efficient administration of the programs. The State Department hopes that a recent reorganization of FAO will help to alleviate this problem. (See pp. 40 to 49.)

Superimposed and perhaps overshadowing these more immediate problems is the fact that the State and Agriculture Departments, after several unsuccessful attempts, have not developed U.S. long-range policy objectives and program priorities to guide present and future participation in FAO, although this is their responsibility. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to determine the extent to which FAO activities are consistent with U.S. interests. (See pp. 12 to 16.)

Recommendations or suggestions

The Department of State with the assistance of the Department of Agriculture should: (1) Obtain the information and develop the procedures necessary for making adequate analyses of FAO and WFP activities. (See pp. 38 and 56.) (2) Evaluate FAO program performance until the means for internationally constituted evaluations are developed. (See p. 49.) Establish long-range policy objectives and program priorities relative to U.S. support of FAO. (See p. 14.)

Agency actions and unresolved issues

The State Department agreed that GAO's recommendations should be implemented. Both State and Agriculture stated, however, that the recommendation for the establishment of long-range policy objectives for FAO should not be implemented at this time.

They advised that it would be a mistake to undertake such a study in the absence of a U.S. policy on the question of whether or not the United States plans to expand multilateral vs. bilateral aid and because of the lack of knowledge as to the planned future level of support of FAO by other major donors. (See pp. 14 to 16.)

Matters for consideration by the Congress

The Departments of State and Agriculture must take the initiative in formulating long-range policy objectives and postulating an appropriate level of U.S. support for FAO.

For these Departments to defer on this matter is to raise a question as to whether they are discharging their responsibility for ensuring that the interests of the United States are met in connection with U.S. participation in FAO.

The Congress may therefore wish to question these Departments with the view of exploring what the future role of the United States should be in FAO.

U.S. Financial Participation in the United Nations Children's Fund

DIGEST (DEPARTMENT OF STATE B-166780)

Why the review was made

The General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook this review to determine how well the Department of State has carried out its responsibilities concerning (1) the makeup of the projects and programs of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and (2) the manner in which the projects were carried out. These responsibilities are to be viewed in the context of the U.S. membership in the multinational UNICEF Executive Board which inherently places some constraints on actions that can be taken unilaterally no matter how constructive the proposed actions might be.

Currently, UNICEF is providing assistance to 119 countries. United States cumulative cash contributions to UNICEF amount to $260 million, or about 40 percent of the total contributed by all governments. The United States also has donated about $100 million in agricultural commodities for distribution by UNICEF.

Findings and conclusions

UNICEF's primary function is to assist governments in underdeveloped areas of the world in establishing long-range health, education, and welfare programs for children and mothers. UNICEF projects are formulated by the UNICEF Secretariat and approved by the UNICEF Executive Board, of which the United States is a member.

GAO found that procedures employed by U.S. officials for analyzing proposed UNICEF projects had to be abandoned in 1968 because UNICEF, over the objections of the Department of State, discontinued the previous arrangements for providing the United States with the information on which the analyses were made. Proposed alternative arrangements which would allow U.S. officials to make future analyses are uncertain. (See pp. 9 to 12.)

Although a body of knowledge regarding the general content and direction of UNICEF programs could be acquired from an analysis of documentation made available by UNICEF, it was not sufficient to permit reliable assessments of actual projects. (See pp. 13 to 14.)

The United States and the United Nations recognized the need for, and have recently initiated, some independent evaluations of UNICEF projects. GAO believes, however, that the current evaluations are insufficient in scope and coverage for officials to make informed independent judgments relative to the efficiency and effectiveness of UNICEF operations or to provide a basis for encouraging action by UNICEF to resolve indicated problems. (See pp. 15 to 20.)

Recommendations or suggestions

The Department of State by appropriate means should:

Obtain necessary information on and make analyses of proposed UNICEF projects so that it can make more informed judgments relative to continued support of UNICEF activities. (See p. 11.)

Elicit from UNICEF more complete and meaningful operation data. (See p. 14.)

Work out an arrangement whereby U.S. overseas posts will make selective periodic evaluations of UNICEF projects until means for internationally constituted evaluations are developed. (See p. 20.)

Agency actions and unresolved issues

The Department of State advised GAO that it is arranging with the UNICEF Secretariat to provide more complete operational data. (See p. 14.) The intentions are still in an obscure stage, leaving the decisions as to the nature, scope, and form of information to be furnished up to UNICEF. GAO believes that the Department should be assured that the information to be furnished is adequate for it to make assessments on the implementation of UNICEF projects.

The Department also advised that it had performed evaluations in connection with its annual reviews of proposed projects. (See p. 19.) Since UNICEF in 1968 discontinued furnishing the information from which these reviews were being made, opportunity for evaluation is now dependent on the U.S. making future arrangements with UNICEF. GAO found little indication of actual observation of continuing UNICEF projects by U.S. personnel; such observation being an essential element of evaluation. (See p. 19.)

Matters for consideration by the Congress

The Congress may wish to review with the Department of State the problems and issues dealt with in this report since they are essentially the same as those noted in GAO's reviews of United States financial participation in the World Health Organization (B-164031(2), January 9, 1969) and in the Organization of American States (B-165850, April 9, 1969—classified Confidential).

U.S. Participation in the World Health Organization

DIGEST (DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE B-164031(2))

Why the review was made

U.S. grants to international organizations, which currently amount to over $300 million annually, are increasing. Grants to one such organization—the World Health Organization (WHO)—have doubled in the last 5 years. During that period, U.S. grants for WHO programs amounted to over $100 million. The grants are made on the basis of assessments associated with membership in the organization and on a voluntary basis.

Currently, WHO has 126 member nations which make up the World Health Assembly—the governing body. Even though U.S. grants amount to 36 percent of all members' grants, the United States, like each member, has but one vote in the Assembly which is charged with the responsibility to review and approve the annual budgets and programs which are formulated by the WHO Secretariat.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook this review in order to determine how well the United States was able to exert a beneficial influence over (1) the makeup of the programs and budgets of WHO, and (2) the manner in which the programs were carried out. GAO did not make an evaluation of the relative success or failure of WHO programs or projects.

Findings and conclusions

GAO found that executive agencies have not obtained the specific analytical information relative to proposed and continuing WHO projects and programs needed to identify programs whose justification may be questionable or which could be accomplished with greater economy and efficiency. (See pp. 13 to 17.) Budget and operational data furnished to members by the WHO Secretariat has been too sketchy and incomplete to make firm assessments regarding implementation of WHO projects and programs. (See pp. 26 to 33.)

The United States has no systematic procedure for evaluating WHO projects and programs. Those attempts which have been made by the United States and by United Nations agencies have fallen far short of what is required by United States officials to make independent judgments relative to the efficiency and effectiveness of WHO operations. (See pp. 34 to 41.)

In 3 of the last 4 years, the United States voted against adoption of the proposed budgets on the basis that they were higher than the United States considered appropriate. The proposed budgets were adopted, however, on the votes of other members, and the United States thus contributed to budgets greater than it wished to support. (See pp. 14 to 15.)

Although U.S. interests appear to have been reflected in certain WHO programs—notably malaria and smallpox eradication—GAO has found it difficult to determine to what extent U.S. objectives have been met over the years because the executive branch has not decided on the relative order of magnitude which it believes appropriate for the various WHO programs. (See pp. 18 to 25.)

Recommendations or suggestions

GAO recommends that the Departments of State and of Health, Education, and Welfare take actions directed towards obtaining the pertinent factual data necessary to make sufficient analyses of WHO programs and budgets in order to exert meaningful influence on the programs and budgets. (See p. 17.)

Agency actions

The Departments of State and of Health, Education, and Welfare agreed in principle with most of the recommendations. The Department of State pointed to actions being taken on a United Nations-wide basis to seek improvements in fiscal and administrative practices of international organizations. The agencies, however, did not indicate any intention to actually implement the recommendations. (See pp. 16, 23, 32, and 40.)

Issues for further consideration

Although the agencies have indicated a willingness to work for improvements in the fiscal and administrative practices of international organizations, GAO continues in its belief that more aggressive action is needed by the agencies in order to solve the specific and basic problems discussed in this report.

Legislative proposals

None.

APPENDIX 3

UNDP ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES CONSIDERED ABLE BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AID, OR UNITED NATIONS OFFICIALS TO PAY FOR ASSISTANCE

ANNUAL TOTALS

[In millions]

Country	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	5-year total
Eastern Europe:						
Bulgaria		$1.56	$0.13	$1.77	$1.89	$5.35
Czechoslovakia			1.24			1.24
Hungary			1.56	.09	.43	2.08
Poland	$1.50	1.09	1.36	1.09	.20	5.24
Romania	1.25	.10	2.02	2.46	.20	6.03
Yugoslavia	1.88	1.47	1.49	.93	1.31	7.08
Subtotal	4.63	4.22	7.80	6.34	4.03	27.02
Other more developed countries:						
Japan				.67		.67
Israel	.74	.98	.25	.19	.49	2.65
Kuwait	.97	.06	.07	.63	.05	1.78
Saudi Arabia	.84	2.33	1.28	.19	2.75	7.39
Spain	.73	1.32			1.46	3.50
Greece	.97	1.19	1.24	1.51	2.16	7.07
Iran	3.97	6.70	3.35	3.76	2.71	20.49
China	3.17	1.81	1.37	.74	1.10	8.19
Subtotals	11.39	14.38	7.56	7.69	10.72	51.74
Assistance to relatively developed nations on behalf of their territorial possessions (includes United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, and Netherlands)	1.19	7.65	2.71	2.83	6.83	21.21
Grand total	17.21	26.25	18.07	16.86	21.58	99.97

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Staats. I appreciate the thoroughness and the scope of this testimony and the recommendations which you made. I would dare say there is enough work there for everybody. I want to add to the conclusion of your statement that not only those things occur which you recite but we would also get less for our money, from the U.S. point of view, and I guess that is where you started. So we have come full circle.

Mr. STAATS. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. I detect a little conflict here in your testimony, because you are saying that State now has the overall responsibility for directing and coordinating the activities of all U.S. departments and agencies involved in international organization affairs and for appointing and instructing the U.S. representatives, and then you

say on pages 7 and 19 that there isn't any effective working mechanism to do that.

What do we have to do? I think that is where we are talking about clear and firm direction. How is that going to be established? What do you suggest?

Mr. STAATS. We don't think there is any doubt that the Secretary of State has this responsibility. What we are saying here, Mr. Chairman, is that we do not believe that there has been effective machinery, and effective mechanisms set up by which the State Department can, on the one side, exercise the necessary policy direction over the various agencies who have part in these programs, nor do we have adequate machinery by which to assure that we are going to actually reach a position before the U.S. Delegate goes into negotiations.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, what you are saying, is that what has happened during the years is that State has let Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce, and others who may be involved in international organizations, go ahead.

Mr. STAATS. There has been a proliferation of centers—I don't like to use the word "centers" of power, but I think that is what it comes down to.

Mr. FASCELL. Diffused their authority without delegating it?

Mr. STAATS. That is correct. And there has not also been an effective way of relating what we do through the multilateral organizations to what we do through our bilateral efforts. While the AID is a part of the State Department, the actual machinery by which we formulate programs in the AID is quite separate and apart from the staff and the machinery by which we formulate our programs with respect to the U.N. bodies, and I think there is another specific point. These are not——

Mr. FASCELL. Yes; two different areas of coordination.

Mr. STAATS. Right.

Mr. FASCELL. You said that it is quite clear to you that the Secretary of State has the authority in the charter. You mean under the statute, under the existing statute, or what?

Mr. STAATS. Well, I don't think we have to go back to the statute. I think if you look at the directives that the State Department has had over the years in this field from the President——

Mr. FASCELL. Will you identify some of them so that we will know exactly where and on what you are relying?

Mr. STAATS. I could go back, actually, to President Eisenhower, directives that President Eisenhower issued, and President Kennedy issued. I think we would need to call attention perhaps only to two recent ones: March 15, 1966, President Johnson sent a memorandum to the heads of the departments and agencies; the subject was U.S. participation in international organizations and programs. I would just like to read one paragraph from that, in which he says:

> If we are to be a constructive influence in helping to strengthen international agencies so they can meet essential new needs, we must apply to them the same rigorous standards of program performance and budget review that we do to our own Federal programs. Our purpose in this undertaking must be to see that the future expansion of the activities of international organizations is governed by the test of feasibility and reasonableness.

And he goes ahead and sets out several other tests.

Now, in January of this year, in a memorandum signed by Henry Kissinger to the Secretary of State, he makes almost the identical kind of point. He says:

In particular, he [Director of the Bureau of the Budget] should work with you in seeing that the budgets and programs of international organizations in which we participate receive the same searching scrutiny that is applied to our own federal programs.

It is virtually an identical language to that in the President Johnson memo.

Mr. FASCELL. Could we have the text of both those presidential directives for the record, please, or copies of them?

Mr. STAATS. Yes, we will.

(The material referred to follows:)

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 15, 1966.

Memorandum for the heads of departments and agencies.
Subject: United States participation in international organizations and programs.

I have today sent the attached memorandum directing the Secretary of State to take certain actions which I believe are essential to effective participation by the United States in international organizations.

I expect the heads of all departments and agencies that contribute to the Government's activities in this field to give their full cooperation to the Secretary of State in carrying out my instructions.

This work must receive high priority and the personal attention of the responsible officials in all agencies concerned if this Nation's interest in improving international organizations as instruments for peace and progress is to be fulfilled.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 15, 1966.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State.
Subject: United States participation in international organizations and programs.

The Federal Budget for 1967 contains this statement—". . . we intend to play an increasingly active role in reviewing the program and budgetary proposals of the various international organizations."

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth what I believe that increasingly active role should be.

No nation has been a greater supporter of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other international organizations than the United States. We are today a member of some 65 such agencies.

Our continued strong support is necessary and desirable—

if the world community is to live in peace;

if we are to cooperate internationally in extending the benefits of modern agriculture, health, and education to the less fortunate, and

if international problems in such fields as meteorology, telecommunications, and aviation are to be given the joint attention required for their resolution.

The United States has by far been the largest financial contributor to the international organizations.

Since 1946, we have provided a total of $3.6 billion in direct contributions.

Since 1956, our annual contributions have grown from $100 million to an estimated $237 million for the next fiscal year, an overall increase of 137%.

Moreover, we can expect the programs and budgets of these international agencies to expand in future years to meet the growing needs of the world community. The United States shall continue to meet its fair share of the financial requirements of these organizations.

If we are to be a constructive influence in helping to strengthen the international agencies so they can meet essential new needs, we must apply to them the same rigorous standards of program performance and budget review that

we do to our own Federal programs. Our purpose in this undertaking must be to see that—

future expansion of the activities of the international organizations is governed by the tests of feasibility and reasonableness;

the programs of the organizations are vigorously scrutinized so that funds are allocated only to high priority projects which we are convinced are in the interests of the international community and of our own country; and

each international agency operates with a maximum of effectiveness and economy.

To achieve this purpose, we must—

decide what we can best accomplish through multilateral action, as compared to action through our own direct programs;

clarify the objectives of our membership in each international agency;

organize ourselves for more effective participation in each organization; and

insist that the money we spend through international agencies is in our national interest and in the best interest of the world community.

I expect you to continue to direct and coordinate the activities of the U.S. departments and agencies involved in international organization affairs and to instruct our representatives to those organizations. I shall look to you to direct this Government's work in—

reviewing and establishing our long-term policy objectives in each major international organization;

analyzing and determining the U.S. position on programs and budgetary needs of each organization on a timely and continuing basis; and

recommending steps to improve the effectiveness of each organization in contributing to the objectives of the world community and the United States.

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recommending steps to improve the effectiveness of each organization in contributing to the objectives of the world community and the United States.

Ambassador Goldberg has unique responsibilities in a wide range of matters relating to the United Nations system. I shall continue to rely heavily on his advice and counsel.

The heads of other Federal departments and agencies have significant interest in activities of the various international organizations. I expect them to provide you with expert assistance in their specialized fields. In this work, the close cooperation of all agencies is needed to provide the essential unity of our effort.

I expect the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to work with you and other agency heads to help assure that the positions we take on the budgets of international organization reflect a searching scrutiny of requirements and priorities for the expenditure of funds.

I am sending copies of this memorandum to all department and agency heads.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, January 8, 1970.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State.

Subject: United States Participation in International Organizations and Programs.

The President believes it should be a special aim of this Administration to make our participation in international organization affairs as effective as possible. He has therefore asked me to convey to you his wish that, consistent with U.S. legislation and in coordination with the President where appropriate, you (a) direct, coordinate, and supervise all activities of the executive agencies relating to our participation in international organizations, programs, and conferences; (b) determine the composition of U.S. delegations, and (c) issue instructions to our delegates and representatives.

In this connection, he anticipates that you will keep under constant review how our worldwide responsibilities can best be served through such participation, identifying priority areas for the investment of our resources and efforts

in international programs, formulating the United States position on programs and budgets, conducting a continuing evaluation of each major organization's program performance, and recommending measures designed to improve their effectiveness.

He also asks that you call on appropriate executive agencies and departments to help you in these efforts with technical support and expert assistance in their specialized fields.

I am sending a separate memorandum to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget conveying the President's wish that he give you all the assistance possible in your efforts. In particular, he should work with you in seeing that the budgets and programs of international organizations in which we participate receive the same searching scrutiny that is applied to our own Federal programs.

Copies of this memorandum are being sent to all department and agency heads.

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Mr. STAATS. And this is in part what you suggested to us, going back 2 years ago, to make reviews of these international organizations, and our reviews were misunderstood to some degree, I might say, at the time, by the Department of State, and I think even today by the Department of Treasury, as to whether we aren't trying to get ourselves involved in the internal operations of the U.N. and international bodies themselves. We think we have enough to do to look at the question of how the United States itself develops its programs, its position, its policy, the priorities, with respect to what we say and do in these various bodies, and that is what we are trying to focus on.

Mr. FASCELL. Not only that, but I think we have an absolute right to know whether we have accomplished what we set out to do in those international organizations, regardless whether it is U.S. money. But in the pursuit of U.S. money, we certainly have the right to examine the results.

Mr. STAATS. Otherwise, you are simply going along for the sake of participating in an international body, and you have to accede to what the votes are, without really knowing whether the money you spent has achieved the objectives that even the body itself wanted it to achieve.

Mr. FASCELL. I am sure in many cases, we are just doing that because it is politically necessary, but if we have to identify it as a political necessity, we ought to write it off as a political necessity.

Mr. STAATS. We recognize that there are limits to what you can do in the framework of multilateral organizations, but we don't think we are doing nearly as well as we could do.

Mr. FASCELL. Tell me this. Since the responsibility of the Secretary of State is so clearly defined, and he has the authority, what is wrong? Why can't it get done? Is there a lack of will?

Mr. STAATS. I would like to, if I may, suggest——

Mr. FASCELL. And this is without regard to who happened to be Secretary of State, because I am sure this has continued for some time now.

Mr. STAATS. It has continued for some time and I have observed this very much when I was in the Budget Bureau, the budget making process, where we attempted many times to get the Department of State to take a more active role in formulating positions on some of the specialized agencies. They are handicapped in part, I think, because of shortage of staff, but I am not sure that that is the main reason. I think it is the fact that it does not have the same level of priority for the Secretary of State as other matters do. Moreover,

I think, to be very honest about it, there is some feeling that some of the other agencies have more power.

Mr. FASCELL. You mean more political power?

Mr. STAATS. More political power than the State Department has.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes; both in the Congress and in the executive branch.

Mr. STAATS. Exactly.

Now, beyond that there are some other considerations. I would like for Mr. Conahan here, or Mr. Milgate, or Mr. Stovall to comment, based on the studies that we have done. Perhaps on the ILO side.

Mr. FASCELL. We would like to hear from those gentlemen. I might add that I am delighted to see you all again.

Mr. STAATS. The FAO might be a good one.

Mr. FASCELL. You have been most cooperative.

STATEMENT OF FRANK C. CONAHAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. CONAHAN. Following through on President Johnson's March 1966 memorandum to the Secretary of State, a working group was set up under the chairmanship of the Department of Agriculture to prepare a policy statement for U.S. participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization affairs. It never got very far, and it went back and forth between the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture a number of times, and no one seemed to want to make a decision on either accepting or rejecting the various drafts of the paper that were prepared; as a result of which, even as of today, there just simply isn't any formal, coordinated U.S. position, relative to that organization.

Mr. FASCELL. Did you gentlemen want to comment?

Mr. Stovall?

STATEMENT OF OYE V. STOVALL, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. STOVALL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one observation on another facet; that, from our look at several of the participations, and they do vary according to organization, of course, in the relationship between the Department of State and its mission, we think there are some real practical problems there of not having a sufficiently defined relationship as to the role of the departmental people, the Assistant Secretary in Washington, as opposed to the role of the people in the mission. We recognize that is a very difficult problem.

Mr. FASCELL. I certainly agree with you, after having been there for 3 months with the U.S. mission. I know that the communications problem alone is gigantic. How they ever get anything coordinated is beyond me. They must just——

Mr. STOVALL. We felt that this condition, also, has contributed to the ad hoc or momentary contrivances, temporary emergencies.

Mr. FASCELL. I concur with that without any question.

Mr. STAATS. We believe it is an opportune time to consider this, because of the issues raised in the Jackson study and in the Pearson study, both very similar in that they do not feel that the U.N. sys-

tem can effectively increase its aid efforts simply because of the management problems.

Take this budget issue alone. They don't even know what it is they are spending through the specialized agencies for the same types of programs. How can you really have a budget, if you can't identify the elements in each of these specialized agencies' programs that relate to the same objective?

Mr. FASCELL. I think that is quite obvious. I agree with you. And yet it seems to me in order for the United States to arrive at a posture so that it can start to take positions in the U.N. to bring about the needed reforms, we are going to have to first reform our own house.

Mr. STAATS. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. I think that is essential.

I would like to ask one final question. Is there any weakness in the Kissenger directive to the State Department? Does the Secretary of State under that have ample guidance and authority to do this job of coordinating and at the State Department level?

Mr. STAATS. I would say that the weakness, as I would see it, is that he simply repeated something that President Eisehower said, President Kennedy said, President Johnson said. He hasn't set up any machinery to implement it. The directive here, signed by Mr. Kissinger, says:

> The President believes it should be a special aim of this administration to make our participation in international organizational affairs as effective as possible. He has, therefore, asked me to convey to you his wish that, consistent with U.S. legislation and in coordination with the President, where appropriate, you (a) direct, coordinate, and supervise all activities of the executive agencies relating to our participation in international organizations, programs and conferences; (b) determine the composition of U.S. delegations, and (c) issue instructions to our delegates and representatives.

Well, you couldn't write it much more clearly than that, but unless there is some machinery set up by which you can better coordinate our positions, this doesn't mean very much, because this has been said before.

Mr. FASCELL. You would probably have to have a preliminary step, though, wouldn't you, in order to get to that? This point I am trying to get specific, now, to see if I understand exactly what you are talking about. Maybe Mr. Kissinger ought to insist on a Cabinet meeting at which time this would be threshed out and presented clearly and personally to each of the secretaries, that is that the primary responsibility is State's; that they are going to take the necessary steps, to bring about effective coordination.

Is that an effective mechanism, or isn't it?

Mr. STAATS. Well, it would help. I think you are going to have to have something of a more continuing nature, though.

Mr. FASCELL. I agree. I said this might be a preliminary necessity.

Mr. STAATS. One would undoubtedly be very helpful, preliminary to the studies.

Mr. FASCELL. What do you have in mind as a permanent mechanism?

Mr. STAATS. I think we need an interagency group staffed and led by the State Department. But I think we are perhaps going to have more than that. I think that group is going to have to take up the

budget for the item directly related to the programs of AID and the State Department, with respect to any of the multilateral bodies.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. STAATS. My own experience in the Budget Bureau is the State Department frequently did not even know what was coming through from the agencies.

Mr. FASCELL. You have anticipated my next question. Is the budget responsibility going to be in State or in the Bureau of the Budget?

Mr. STAATS. We tried to get the State Department to take the responsibility for it.

Mr. FASCELL. The only coordinating mechanism that exists now with respect to all these budgets is in BOB.

Mr. STAATS. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. But that is really not coordinated, is it, as I understand it?

Mr. STAATS. It isn't where it ought to be.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, all they do is fit in within the various categories, and the totals, without relating it to the overall policy.

Mr. STAATS. And without relating it back to the part which the specialized agencies or the U.N. proper would play in it.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, their review is basically mathematical.

Mr. STAATS. Well, it would be more in terms of what priority does our assistance program in total have, say, in relation to Defense or Agriculture, or some other.

Mr. FASCELL. Did you want to add something?

Mr. STOVALL. If I might add one more observation, the translation, I think, of the General Directive, into a base for action in the Department probably can't be done until there has been some action outside the Department to create a visible increased stature of, shall we say, the international organization group, or whatever group in the Department of State is responsible for carrying this out. We have seen in our reviews in comparing relative stature as well as relative priorities, that this organization just tends to get sort of forgotten in many ways. And it seems to me that on your question of what other is needed, outside the Department, there may have to be some continuing force for tangible or physical evidence of increasing the stature of this element of State's organization.

I am not sure that that can come from within State.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Milgate, did you have something you wanted to add?

STATEMENT OF JOHN E. MILGATE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. MILGATE. The only comment I have is that theoretically the Department of State has the responsibility for seizing the initiative, which is a real important aspect of carrying out the mandates that they have already.

Mr. FASCELL. What you are suggesting by way of mechanism to implement this guideline or directive—can't that be done by Executive order, or even by—well, I guess it doesn't even take that. But it might have to.

Mr. STAATS. It would be more effective if it were done by Presidential action.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, rather than the State Department trying to exert its authority under the Kissinger directive.

In other words, what you say is that the Kissinger memorandum would be helpful if it went further and set up the mechanism by which it is to be implemented.

Mr. STAATS. That is correct.

Mr. CONAHAN. I think in the practical application of this mechanism, with respect to the reviews of the budgets of the specialized agencies and the U.N., what happens is that the Department of State will ask other agencies, a number of other agencies, to comment on specific portions of a proposed budget, and the Department of State may or may not receive a response from these other agencies, and, therefore, they don't have the full input into the U.S. position. Some means has to be developed to require the other agencies to respond.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, it has to be a mandatory thing, it seems to me. If you are going to have some input, and some direction over all of the budgets of the specialized agencies, at the State level, you are going to have to have some mandatory requirement for policy review.

Of course, the technical aspects of the various specialized institutions would be up to the agencies involved. But I think with respect to budget and policy that it would have to be different.

Mr. MILGATE. To carry this on through, once you do arrive at the U.S. position, you would have to be assured that our representation at the various bodies are also instructed on budget level.

Mr. FASCELL. You undoubtedly have a specific in mind. You want to put it on the record?

Mr. Burke?

Mr. BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You have kind of asked some of the questions I had hoped to have the opportunity of asking, but I will try and enlarge on them. I know that you are far more an expert on the United Nations than I am, so I am kind of a——

Mr. FASCELL. You don't have to take a back seat to logic, Mr. Burke.

Mr. BURKE. Mr. Staats, first of all I would like to welcome you, and state that although I haven't had the opportunity of fully digesting your very fine statement because I did not arrive at the beginning, I do think from what I heard it is a very good one. However, it does appear to me that your statement is only mildly critical, and yet I have the feeling that you would like to have made it more critical except, perhaps, for political reasons you refrained from doing so.

Mr. FASCELL. He is just a courteous and distinguished gentleman, that is all.

Mr. BURKE. Well in any event I think perhaps it should have been more critical, because I think it is about time that we get more on the factual basis of responsibility in some of these fields.

First of all, I am interested, myself, in knowing why the State Department, over the years, with the authority that it has, has not exercised its own initiative and authority in some of the fields you mentioned. I feel also, that there have been, and of course may be for political reasons, times when HEW, Labor, and Agriculture have usurped, in my opinion, the prerogatives, of both the Foreign Affairs

Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee on the Senate side, and I believe this has been partly because the State Department has not stepped into the picture and used its own initative when it should. It certainly has the ability and I think the authority, not only with regard to the United Nations, but in other fields, as well.

But you do say on page 18 as one of your suggestions we should encourage the establishment of a single United Nations-wide review body of appropriate size and competence to meet the need for effective independent evaluation of U.S. programs and activities.

Now, such an effective group as you talk about, or review body, of appropriate size and competence, are words in generalities, but how then do you get such a group of an effective size and competence out of such as the United Nations, who might appoint one very well geared for the type of report that the appointer wants it to make, or perhaps that certain individual groups or countries want it to make, rather than making a report for the good of, let us say, our participation in the United Nations?

Mr. STAATS. Well, we are not under any illusions about an early change in the voting system. Many people would argue, I think, that the voting system should be different with respect to political matters, in the United Nations, from that on matters of economic aid and assistance. In other words, there should be some better correlation between the level of assistance provided by the country and its voting strength, just as we have in the World Bank.

Mr. BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STAATS. But what we are referring to here, and it is in general terms—we could be much more explicit, in outlining our own views—but I think the details are less important as we see it than the fact that the United States should press hard by virtue of the fact that it is by far the largest contributor. We think the United States has not used that credit enough in insisting that there be set up under the Secretary General a kind of budget machinery and the kind of audit machinery that is needs.

It has only been within the last 2 or 3 years that we have even had something called a joint inspection unit. This unit is made up of eight men, provided by eight countries; they have no authority, but they do go in and make reviews of the effectiveness of the programs in the various countries sponsored by the United Nations. But the money is provided for that service by the individual participating specialized agencies; they can cut it off any time they want to. If they become too critical, there is always the danger that the money will be cut off.

It has only a 4-year charter, so that it is not really in a very good position to be critical of the operations of the specialized agencies.

What we think you need is a group that is responsible only to the Secretary General, and would have both budget and audit responsibilities.

Mr. BURKE. Yes.

Mr. STAATS. Do you want to add anything, Mr. Conahan?

Mr. CONAHAN. I think that in addition, that this group should be responsible to the legislative body of the United Nations, that being the General Assembly.

Mr. STAATS. Yes, the Secretary General, of course, is responsible to the Assembly, and I think he, as the principal executive of the U.N.

ought to have this responsibility, and I think we ought to be pushing in that direction. That makes it a little bit more specific, I hope.

Mr. BURKE. Yes, it does, and that is what I had hoped you had in mind, because I think that has to be brought into a smaller component. I think it should.

Mr. STAATS. Right. And, as a matter of fact, the Secretary General in a speech, I believe it was 2 years ago, seemed to be inviting this kind of move. We had thought that he was going to spell it out in somewhat more detail, but he did at least go so far as to say that the role of the Secretary General with respect to budget and program should be strengthened, and it was our understanding that what he was really doing there was opening up the door for this kind of a move on the part of the member countries.

Mr. BURKE. I would like to ask one other question and perhaps you may not want to answer this. There has been a great deal of criticism from time to time from certain sources about the International Labor Organization of the United Nations, not only because they have been reluctant to employ Americans generally, but on the basis that it is far more pro-Communist oriented, perhaps than it should be.

Do you have any basic knowledge of that, or would you perhaps not like to comment about that phase?

Mr. STAATS. Well, we have heard the same criticism, and that is one of the reasons we included the ILO in our review. Our report on ILO is not as far along as these others. We, therefore, do not have the summary here, but perhaps one of my colleagues would like to comment on your question in terms of where we stand on that.

Mr. BURKE. Yes, if you would, please.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Conahan?

Mr. CONAHAN. Yes, sir. We have looked into the matter of what the U.S. objectives in the International Labor Organization are. I don't think we can talk about them here today in very specific terms. This could go to the point of attempting to use the organization as a forum for showing the rest of the world the economic and social systems of this country, as opposed to perhaps other systems around the world. We have not progressed to the point of making any sort of an assessment or appraisal as to the attainment of that particular objective.

Now, the International Labor Organization also has the objective of assisting in the economic and social development of the less-developed countries, and we feel that in that regard the organization is progressing about the same as some of the other organizations that we have reviewed. That is to say, that the U.S. Government is not in a position to come to a judgment on that particular matter, because of the absence of information and these other problems we are talking about.

Mr. STAATS. If it comes right down to it, I think if you talk with many people off the record and informally, and I won't have to name names here, but with the present voting arrangements, the executive director of these organizations, if he is of a mind to do so can pretty much have his own way, simply by getting enough votes among the smaller countries to support his position and, therefore, the State Department and the U.S. representative to the governing body is in a very weak position.

Mr. BURKE. Now, one more question. I said the last one would be the final one, but I have thought of another one.

In the programs that you mentioned, particularly the World Health contribution, the UNICEF children's group, the International Labor Organization, all of these are somewhat bread-and-butter type of things, humanitarian approaches on our assistance, wouldn't these be awfully hard to get into the point of budgetary criticisms, really, unless somebody down in the field knew where the money was going, how much is being used administratively, and how little, perhaps, might be getting to the need?

Mr. STAATS. We think our missions in the field, our own embassies and our AID missions, ought to have more responsibility here. One of the points we made is——

Mr. BURKE. Do you think they will accept it?

Mr. STAATS. We think they ought to be told to take it. I think they would take it, yes.

Mr. BURKE. I have some question because of some of my experiences in visiting various countries, as whether it is the AID people or actually those connected with the State Department, that make the decisions on these matters and I might add that some of our AID people live awfully well in foreign countries.

Mr. STAATS. Well, we are interested in, when we make our reviews of our own bilateral assistance at the country level as to the extent to which the people in that country are aware of activities of the multilateral organizations, that is, the World Bank, the IDA, and all the other inputs, and we find very frequently that they do not know this, so that the Ambassador is responsible for that, and he should assume that responsibility. However, I would like to say this——

Mr. BURKE. Well, could I just interrupt there?

Recently—I am not going to mention particular names—but I had several long discussions with two of our Ambassadors, and it seemed to me that their problem was that they felt they wanted full responsibility, but, unfortunately, because of the problem with some of those in the field they just couldn't get cooperation. In fact I was told they were to a great extent activities ignored when requesting reports.

Mr. STATTS. It has been very difficult because many of them are not interested in economic assistance, they are interested in the political relations, government to government, and economic aid tends to be delegated to somebody down the line.

The additional point I wanted to make is that we think that the Jackson report recommendations move in the right direction. Now, whether or not it goes far enough, I don't know. I would be inclined to doubt it, but the Jackson report's main thrust is that the UNDP, as the largest financier of the specialized agencies in the economic and social field, ought to have its own representatives in each of these countries.

It ought to have a lot more to say about what gets financed and what doesn't get financed than it now has. This moves in the right direction.

Now, the State Department is, I think, generally favorable to the Jackson report, but there is to be a meeting, I believe, of the Governing Council of the UNDP later this month, in which they are to take up the Jackson report and attempts come to some decision as to what they will recommend to the Assembly.

Do you want to add?

Mr. CONAHAN. No, I think that covers it.

Mr. BURKE. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. It seems to me that one of the problems is that there is no coordination between the specialized agencies and very little cooperation between them and the UNDP representative.

Mr. STAATS. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. He's in the field but he has very little authority.

Mr. STAATS. He has very little authority.

Mr. FASCELL. Once having delegated the execution of a program to a specialized agency, and maybe three or four specialized agencies operating within a country—the UNDP—which is the parent organization—representative has little or nothing in the way of authority, or at least is not listened to, and has no coordinative capability. Is this an actual fact?

Mr. STAATS. That is correct, yes.

Mr. FASCELL. That relates back, then, to the question of a centralized authority in the U.N. I assume that what you have reference to at the budget level is the specialized agency's budgets coming within the U.N. overall budget, and not being autonomous budgets.

Mr. STAATS. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. That probably should be done through the Secretary General who is responsive to the General Assembly.

How big a job from a technical and professional standpoint would it be to have similar budgets or identical budgets for the specialized agencies in the U.N.?

Mr. STAATS. It couldn't be done overnight, but we should have a road map. One of the first steps that ought to be taken would be to at least get a common budget system, so that all the budgets are developed on the same basis. Now, they do get instructions on the budget submissions, but there is no prescription of a common budget system, budget categories, definition of programs—any of the things which we have to have in our Federal Government in order to be able to have any kind of an overall budget at all. So that——

Mr. FASCELL. So it would be difficult, but it can be done, and it will take a little time?

Mr. STAATS. Oh, yes.

Mr. STOVALL. But we recognize, also, the degree of difference among the specialized agencies.

Perhaps WHO has gone further, or at least it has gone a distance in the direction of establishing reasonably well defined and controlled budgets. Some of the others that we have worked with we find have very, very little, and, of course, it immediately becomes a question of degree of autonomy, in beginning to consider this.

Mr. FASCELL. To illustrate the necessity for the implementation of the present directive for centralized direction, I recall that this committee, subcommittee, some years ago detailed a case, regarding ILO. We found there a situation which seems to be a problem that exists with respect to all of these organizations. The primary purpose is technical but obviously, the meetings of the organization also became political forums, and all of these issues are tied in somewhere to the foreign policy objectives of the United States.

We examined the working mechanism that existed between the political arm and the technical arm, meaning Labor Department and State, with respect to the direction and the training of our delegation that went to the ILO. The whole thrust was primarily on the technical aspects carried by the Department of Labor, but when they got into a political confrontation, it was kind of a hit and run, ad hoc, and we didn't come off too well, although there was coordination with State which was represented.

So we pointed out, in this report, some years ago, that it was absolutely essential, in our judgment, for the United States to have a centralized voice with respect to its participation in the international agencies. We also concluded that such responsibility ought to be in State. Then U.S. participation could be related to the foreign policy objectives of the United States.

Is it true, as I have been advised, that our recent U.S. representatives were not familiar with the details of the ILO budget, didn't know what was in it, and couldn't relate cost to result?

Mr. CONAHAN. The ILO budget is reviewed primarily in the Department of State. The notes prepared as a result of that review are submitted to the Department of Labor, and to the Department of Commerce, but our review disclosed that there is only perfunctory review of the position paper by those people with respect to budgets.

Mr. FASCELL. I thoroughly agree with the recommendations that have been made about placing U.S. nationals in international organizations. Also I would like to discuss the relationship between the U.S. mission and the international office here in Washington.

What ideas do you gentlemen have, based on your observations and investigations, with respect to that relationship?

Mr. STAATS. Mr. Stovall, do you want to start this one off?

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Stovall?

Mr. STOVALL. Well, this, of course, is a very, very difficult question. If I might circle back in on the question, we have been working with the Department for some years, in trying to encourage means of getting more Americans into the organizations, and of course we had a small step in that direction in the last amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act, where there was a provision for certain preservation of rights and financial compensation for people coming back into the Government, but getting back more directly to your question, I don't think there is any simple answer to this question.

I think that the impetus for this has to come downward from State. This was the point I was getting at earlier, in relation to the increased stature in State Department. I think the impetus has to come that way.

Mr. FASCELL. I agree with you.

Mr. STOVALL. I don't really have any answer on your main question.

Mr. STAATS. If I may add here.

Mr. FASCELL. Certainly.

Mr. STAATS. The danger is that when one gets into a discussion on the percentage of U.S. people employed, it sounds like we are simply trying to get more handhold on the organization, which may be true, to a certain extent, but the thing we are more interested in is, how do we get the kind of American know-how that we have developed——

Mr. FASCELL. Sure.

Mr. STAATS (continuing). As well as the know-how which the other major contributing countries have developed, into these bodies.

Mr. FASCELL. Getting more Americans in is a legitimate aspiration. It is recognized by the U.N. itself.

This is a major concern of all member countries.

Mr. STAATS. I think we have to face up to the fact that the salary differential is an important consideration here. We have to find some way where we can provide arrangements where a person at least wouldn't lose anything by joining one of these organizations.

Mr. FASCELL. We passed a law last year, it seems to me, that covers part of that problem.

Mr. STAATS. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. When an American is detailed over, he doesn't lose his retirement rights, under our U.S. system.

Mr. STAATS. I think Mr. Stovall is being modest here. That provision was largely drafted in his Division in the General Accounting Office.

Mr. FASCELL. Congratulations.

What else do we need to do, because the pay differential, also, is a very important thing?

Having lived in New York for 3 months, I will tell you that pay differential is a big thing.

Mr. STAATS. The head of the World Health Organization told me last year that he hadn't been able to hire an American for more than 8 years, except to have them over there for a day or two at a time, where they pay their travel, and a consultant fee, and his feeling was that was entirely due to the salary differential. And I don't think he was resisting the idea of employing Americans.

I think he would have given a lot if he could have been able to have done it, but I think the salary differential is the primary consideration.

Mr. FASCELL. I think it is, too.

Yes, Mr. Milgate.

Mr. MILGATE. I want to add that maybe something should be done to encourage people from the private sector to get into this organization. This law, of course, would apply to those who were in Government, but you have got the problem relative to getting people from the private sector in.

Mr. FASCELL. We are going to have to provide some incentive, some inducement, or some subsidy.

Mr. STAATS. If we are looking down the road in terms of a greater proportion of our assistance efforts for the underdeveloped areas being in multilateral form, then this is going to be, I think, an increasingly serious problem.

Mr. FASCELL. I agree with you, because here we have the Pearson Report and the Jackson Study, we have the President's own position, and I am sure the Peterson Commission Report will emphasize the trend toward multilateralization and the decreasing efforts in bilateral aid.

I don't think there is any question of where we are going, so now it is a question of trying to properly channel it, and make it effective. I think in order to do that, we are going to have to make a real serious effort to get Americans into the system.

Mr. STAATS. We would be happy to come up with some alternatives here.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, if you can get some specific ones.

Mr. STAATS. Do you want some?

Mr. FASCELL. I think that would be helpful, if you can get some specific ideas.

Mr. STOVALL. As we were working with the State Department on Federal employees, we had considerable discussion about the possibility of some sort of a supplementation for non-Government employees, but we always ran right up on the rock of continuing then to have that person labeled as a national servant, rather than an international servant.

It seems to me, though, that this is probably the most promising avenue, if we could arrange for some sort of reward, perhaps, after that person comes back, and ceases to be an international servant.

Mr. STAATS. Well, it might be in the form of deferred compensation, just as is done in private industry, today, in many cases.

Mr. FASCELL. If we move or disperse U.N. activities, as has been suggested in some of these reports, to Geneva or some other place, it is just going to make it that much more difficult to get good Americans, isn't it?

Mr. STAATS. I think so.

Mr. STOVALL. Another gap that has to be overcome, I think, is that there has not been enough publicizing and general information to the public on these jobs. I am thinking of the university people, for example, in addition to the industrial people, or State employees.

And it seems to me that if a formula, then, is found, there has to be a means of publicizing and advertising these things much more extensively than has been in the past.

Mr. FASCELL. I think fundamental to this discussion, however, is another important point, which we are facing more and more, and that is, this trend to decentralize the operations of the United Nations. What is your opinion from the standpoint of overall management, efficiency, economy, as to whether that is a good move, from a U.S. point of view?

Mr. STAATS. I think it is very bad. I think that is the reason we welcome the direction that the Jackson Report seems to be moving as far as UNDP is concerned.

We believe that the United States ought to have a firm position as to the kind of structure that the U.N. ought to have in the several fields that we referred to, budgeting, priorities, evaluation, and reporting, reporting back as to the accomplishments, which is a part of evaluation.

We think this has to be centralized, or otherwise we are going to be increasingly fragmented. You have a whole series of separate bodies, rather than a U.N.

Mr. FASCELL. We had some testimony yesterday on this very point. It seems to me that not long ago the Austrian Government put up some $50 million in facilities to have a U.N. agency located in Vienna. When we got to the question of needed facilities in New York, we immediately ran into a move by the Russians and the French and a few other people who, in effect, said, "No, we are not going to support the expansion of the present headquarters facilities in New York; we would prefer to move everything to Geneva, or Addis Ababa, or some other place outside the United States."

We fought very, very hard, and we came out on top on that; but don't you think that it would have been a mistake, had we given up on the question of the expansion of U.N. facilities in New York?

This could have laid the groundwork, it seems to me, for total dismemberment of the U.N. organization.

Mr. STAATS. Yes.

Mr. MILGATE. I would like to add that the Jackson capacity study recommends the creation of a body of international servants.

And, also, I would like to add in regard to recruiting and getting U.S. nationals into these bodies, it is not only the recruiting problem, it has to be carried through here again, not only to the recruitment aspects, but to get them into the proper bodies of the specialized agencies, and the U.N. system.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I know it is a real problem. One of the questions I raised with respect to this was getting proper identification staff-wise, at a high enough level in the U.S. mission, to take the responsibility for American staffing of international organizations.

At the present time, there is a very fine person doing that kind of work at the U.S. mission but she is not at a high enough level to meet all of the problems involved in placing Americans in those organizations.

That is one problem. The other, it seems to me, is the way we handle the budgetary approach at the U.S. mission. And we have a very fine gentleman there, you know, and he has some fine staff help, but they are simply unable to do justice to all of the budgetary activities there.

What is your own observation on that?

Mr. STAATS. I think what you say is quite true. We have had this experience, as you know, with respect to the Selden amendment, which related principally to the Social Progress Trust Fund, but the Mailliard amendment of the same year, applied the same principle, was incorporated in the foreign assistance bill, namely that any U.S. wholly supported organization would be audited by the GAO.

We developed, as you know, suggested guidelines for the Secretary of the Treasury, who in turn passed them along to the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank. They are still in the process of making their first country review, and that has been what, 3 years ago?

It has been 3 years now. They have a three-man audit board, one American and two Latin Americans. They have only two or three members on their staff.

Mr. STOVALL. Three, I think, the last we heard.

Mr. STAATS. It is an incredible situation. We do not believe that was what the Congress had in mind. The intent has not been carried out fully. We have not been able to comment on draft audit reports as the Congress contemplated that we would, because there have been no reports.

Mr. FASCELL. Sure. Well, this problem exists all across the board in international agencies in which the United States is represented. The issue that arises is: Can't the U.S. representative, without interferring with the internal operations of that organ, get all of the information necessary from a U.S. point of view to make its own evaluation?

Apparently he cannot—or hasn't been able to do so in the past. Why, I don't know. I don't see why there is any reluctance or any sensitivity about it. It seems to me that if I were a representative in an institution to which the U.S. is making a substantial contribution, I should have the right, as a country representative, to ask any kind of question and get any kind of information that I consider necessary to enable me to evaluate the operations of that organization.

Are we talking the same language?

Mr. STAATS. Yes; we are. We do not think the Treasury is getting the information from Inter-American Bank that they should be getting.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't think they are either.

Mr. STAATS. We have had all kinds of problems, Mr. Chairman, with the Treasury Department in enlisting their cooperation and getting the materials on the U.S. side of this. We have written, and we have been in touch with, the Treasury Department over the last year. We would like to make a similar review to that which we made at these U.N. bodies of the Inter-American Bank, but they will not give us the information.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I really can't understand that attitude; it is inconceivable to me.

Now, you certainly had the cooperation of the State Department in doing your studies, didn't you, even though you may have had some hard times here and there?

Mr. MILGATE. Very fine.

Mr. CONAHAN. Full cooperation.

Mr. STAATS. Full cooperation, yes.

Mr. FASCELL. You have done all this work, and you have had full cooperation, right?

Mr. STAATS. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. I just don't know about those other agencies and people. What is so sensitive about having the opportunity to examine facts and figures, policies and programs, which relate to the way in which U.S. contributions are spent?

Mr. STAATS. They act almost as if it was improper that we would even ask them a question.

Mr. FASCELL. The thing that really gets me is that the United States is funding a large part of these operations particularly the IDB operation. They do go out into the open market and issue bonds, but they couldn't do it without the U.S. credit to back it up. They can't do it on local currencies alone. Am I correct on that?

Also, am I not correct in my understanding that we put in nearly half-a-billion dollars into the Social Progress Trust Fund without any matching requirement?

Mr. STAATS. $500 million.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes. And $900 million into the Fund for Special Operations. That is too much money for me.

To get back now to the U.S. mission to the United Nations: I am interested in us being able to get more information about U.N., its budget, and its developmental operations. Getting this information is more than any one man can handle. Do you agree with me?

Mr. STAATS. Yes.

Mr. CONAHAN. May I comment?

Yes, sir, I quite agree with your question. Futhermore, his staff is really sitting here in Washington, D.C.

Mr. FASCELL. That's another thing. They are doing the bulk of the work here—but the communications between Washington and New York are not the easiest—or the most adequate.

Mr. CONAHAN. Futhermore, I think that the direction is here in Washington, D.C. You see, we have a zigzag line; you have direction from Washington going out to the man who is operating at the mission, and yet his staff is also back in Washington.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. CONAHAN. Directly responsible to the first man who is giving the direction. This is true, I think, in most of the missions that we have. This is true in Geneva.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, it is certainly true there and it presents a very real problem.

I am not sure that I am ready to advocate moving the Washington staff to New York or the New York staff to Washington to solve that problem. I think however, that there is a happy medium someplace and I am willing to give the New York man some help.

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Chairman, I have one question that I want to ask of you with regard to the statement that you made.

Mr. FASCELL. Surely.

Mr. ROYBAL. My question is, Why not recommend or advocate that there be a change, that the Washington staff go to New York, or vice versa?

Mr. FASCELL. Well, Ed, I haven't analyzed it all the way through. I think it would be almost impossible from the standpoint of the traffic that has to be reviewed at the Washington level, and the input that is necessary in order to relate moment-to-moment decisions with overall policy. That has to be done right here in the State Department. My immediate reaction is that we would be compounding the problem, rather than resolving it.

Mr. ROYBAL. Well, then, this discussion is not in the form of criticism of the system, then, is it?

Mr. FASCELL. No, no. Just in terms of coordinating the effort and providing essential help for the U.S. mission, where I think in this one particular area they could use some help.

By the way, as you know, the administration has proposed that the United States come up with its share of the U.N. expansion project.

Can you take an affirmative view in support of that administration position? Are you prepared to?

Mr. STAATS. We have not been asked by anyone for our views on that. We are quite familiar with the development you referred to.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, without binding you to a position that would be contrary to the administration's portion, what is your opinion as of now? [Laughter.]

Mr. STAATS. We would be happy to give you something, I think, more thoughtful than we can give you right here today, for the record.

Mr. FASCELL. All right. I would appreciate it if you would. If it has to be cleared, I think that should be done.

Mr. STAATS. I don't know that it would be necessary.

Mr. FASCELL. If it were necessary, we could do it formally by having the committee make a request of you. But I think this is sufficient. Don't you think so?

Mr. STAATS. You are the chairman.

(The information requested follows:)

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED EXPANSION OF U.N. FACILITIES IN NEW YORK, N.Y.

In a resolution adopted in December 1969, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary General to proceed with the expansion of the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York at an estimated cost of $80 million of which not more than $25 million would be financed from the regular budget of the United Nations.

Proposed financing of the new construction is as follows:

	Millions
U.N. regular budget	$25
U.S. Government grant [1]	20
City government of New York grant [2]	20
United Nations development program and United Nations Children's Fund contribution	15
Total	80

[1] Congressional action pending. Included in 1971 budget.
[2] The city of New York has agreed to match a U.S. Government grant not to exceed $20 million.

In addition, the City of New York has offered to make the construction site available without charge in proximity to the existing structures. The United States delegation to the General Assembly supported the expansion of the facilities to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations which was unfavorably affected by space shortages and increased operating costs due to the need for renting space.

The Department of State in requesting a joint resolution to authorize a grant of not more than $20 million to defray a portion of the expansion costs cited that the following benefits would accrue both to the United States and the United Nations:

1. The U.N. would benefit by being able to keep related activities together and thereby provide unified and efficient direction to them.
2. The United States would be better able to supply the constructive leadership required for an effective United Nations.
3. American citizens who are needed for many tasks of the United Nations and for contributing to that Organization's efficiency can be more readily recruited for service in this country than for duty abroad.
4. The gain in the U.S. balance of payments which would result from U.N. personnel working in the new Headquarters building in New York instead of overseas is conservatively estimated at $12 million annually and in all probability would be much more.

Our reviews to date have not disclosed anything which would lead us to challenge the arguments, although as you know, Mr. Chairman, we have not studied all the considerations.

Mr. FASCELL. Any other questions?

Mr. ROYBAL. No.

Mr. FASCELL. Gentlemen, do you want to add anything to what we have discussed? Have we left anything out?

Mr. STAATS. I would like to ask my colleagues here if they would like to say anything further.

Mr. FASCELL. Certainly.

Mr. STAATS. One of the questions that we will have to answer, and perhaps the committee would be very helpful to us, is the direction of our effort as an agency of the Congress in this area, from this point forward. We had had in mind originally, that after we completed these series of studies that I referred to, to prepare an overall report,

but our testimony appears to replace the need for that, as we see it. But we do think that the subject is important far beyond the dollars involved, even if we do no more than keep the Congress better informed on the management of our multilateral assistance efforts.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't think there is any question about it.

Mr. STAATS. The question, really, that we have to answer, which we have not yet addressed ourselves to fully, is how best we can make a contribution to the Congress; that is, whether we should add additional agencies to our studies.

The problems tend to be very similar from agency to agency. We think that by having done five or six of these reviews, we have pretty well made our point, but——

Mr. FASCELL. I would say that there seems to be no necessity to buttress your conclusions with any more studies of the same nature. I think you have laid enough groundwork.

Mr. STAATS. Perhaps the next stage might well be to try to detail more specifically the kind of machinery or alternatives of machinery that could be developed at the Washington level, to carry out, put into effect, the concepts that we feel we have established through these reviews.

Mr. FASCELL. I agree with you. Speaking for this subcommittee, we would ask you to do that; and as far as I am concerned, make it available to the subcommittee in any fashion that seems appropriate. I think that with the tremendous amount of effort that you have already put into this task, it would be a waste not to pursue the matter and detail the specifics. I think that is exactly what you should do.

Mr. STOVALL. One item to more or less clarify the record, Mr. Chairman: We listed our United Nations development program report in here. We preempted just a wee bit. It will be issued in the next few days, although the digest is attached to this statement.

Mr. FASCELL. Right.

Mr. STOVALL. However, in that report there is more detail. There are more specifics, generally, back of the types of broad statements that have been made here today. So that will be forthcoming within the next few days.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, so I can clear up one other thing that is worrying me a little bit: Has the distribution of your reports so far followed the normal pattern?

Mr. STAATS. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. You have furnished copies to the Congress, meaning the Government Operations Committees, the Foreign Affairs Committees, the Appropriations Committees; right?

Mr. STAATS. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. So all of those committees, and all the other people in the Congress, who ought to know, have had these reports available to them. Is that correct?

Mr. STAATS. Right; both the House and the Senate.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, the one thing they have not had are these summaries, is that correct?

Mr. STAATS. Yes; they have not seen the testimony until—it will be distributed, though, but——

Mr. FASCELL. But it will be distributed to them. This testimony will be distributed to the same people?

Mr. STAATS. Right. Yes, sir.

Mr. STOVALL. And we will give it to the Department, of course; they have not seen it, either.

Mr. FASCELL. Right. The Department has not seen this yet, and they will get copies.

Mr. STOVALL. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Are there any other questions?

Mr. Roybal?

Mr. ROYBAL. No questions.

Mr. FASCELL. Gentlemen, thank you very much. You were most helpful, and covered an area which will be of great concern to the United States in the next 25 years. It is certainly in the interest of the United Nations to be as effective and efficient as possible in responding to the needs of the world. I think that you have made very significant contributions to the attainment of that goal.

(Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

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