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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

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HEARINGS
 BEFORE A
 SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
 UNITED STATES SENATE
 NINETIETH CONGRESS
 SECOND SESSION
 ON
S. Con. Res. 47
 RELATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED
 NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE

MAY 1 AND 2, 1968

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1968

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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 1968

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Clark, Pell, Carlson, and Case.

Senator CHURCH. The hearing will please come to order.

The International Organization Affairs Subcommittee is meeting today to hold hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, which has been introduced by a distinguished member of this committee, Mr. Clark, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania. The resolution is, of course, relative to the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force.

This resolution is now cosponsored by 21 Senators, and I want to ask that the resolution showing all of the sponsors be printed in the record at this point.

(The resolution referred to as well as information about similar House resolutions follow:)

[S. Con. Res. 47, 90th Cong., second sess.]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 10, 1967

Mr. CLARK (for himself, Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. HARRIS, Mr. HART, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. IONCUE, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. LONG of Missouri, Mr. MCGEE, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. MONDALE, Mr. MORSE, Mr. NELSON, Mr. PELL, Mr. PERCY, Mr. PROXMIER, Mr. RIBICOFF, Mr. TYDINGS, Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey, and Mr. YOUNG of Ohio) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas Congress has urged that there should be developed permanent organization and procedures to "enable the United Nations promptly to employ suitable United Nations forces for such purposes as observation and patrol in situations that may threaten international peace and security" (S. Con. Res. 109, Eighty-fifth Congress, second session); and

Whereas the need for such forces has been demonstrated by past experience and will be even greater in the future; and

Whereas United Nations impartial peacekeeping forces will continue to be a major instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress reaffirms its support for United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking and urges:

- (a) That, as an immediate objective, the United States Government—
- (1) encourage and support the earmarking and specialized training of units by United Nations member states for employment in United Nations peacekeeping operations;

(2) be prepared to make available to the United Nations transport, communications, and logistical personnel and facilities; and,

(3) be prepared to advocate or support on all appropriate occasions proposals for guidelines to govern the financing, training, equipping, and duration of peacekeeping force for effective use, as well as guidelines to govern concomitant machinery for peacemaking where peacekeeping forces are in use.

(b) That, as part of the long-range development of the United Nations as a more effective instrument for building and keeping peace, the United States Government encourage and support the creation of a permanent, individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties.

House cosponsors of resolutions similar to Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, reaffirming the support of the Congress for United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, and for other purposes:

- H. Con. Res. 130, by Mr. Moorhead.
- H. Con. Res. 131, by Mr. Schweiker.
- H. Con. Res. 132, by Mr. Multer.
- H. Con. Res. 133, by Mr. Barrett.
- H. Con. Res. 134, by Mr. Rhodes of Pennsylvania.
- H. Con. Res. 135, by Mr. Rodino.
- H. Con. Res. 136, by Mr. Moss.
- H. Con. Res. 137, by Mr. Ashley.
- H. Con. Res. 138, by Mrs. Green of Oregon.
- H. Con. Res. 139, by Mr. Dingell.
- H. Con. Res. 140, by Mr. Dent.
- H. Con. Res. 141, by Mr. Quie.
- H. Con. Res. 142, by Mr. Brademas.
- H. Con. Res. 143, by Mr. Cahill.
- H. Con. Res. 144, by Mr. Cohelan.
- H. Con. Res. 145, by Mr. Conte.
- H. Con. Res. 146, by Mr. Daddario.
- H. Con. Res. 147, by Mr. Halpern.
- H. Con. Res. 148, by Mr. Hechler of West Virginia.
- H. Con. Res. 149, by Mr. Gilbert.
- H. Con. Res. 150, by Mrs. Hansen of Washington.
- H. Con. Res. 151, by Mr. Corman.
- H. Con. Res. 152, by Mr. Harvey.
- H. Con. Res. 153, by Mr. Mathias of Maryland.
- H. Con. Res. 154, by Mr. Morse.
- H. Con. Res. 155, by Mr. Ryan.
- H. Con. Res. 156, by Mr. Rosenthal.
- H. Con. Res. 157, by Mr. Burton of Utah.
- H. Con. Res. 158, by Mr. Edwards of California.
- H. Con. Res. 159, by Mr. Fraser.
- H. Con. Res. 160, by Mr. Horton.
- H. Con. Res. 161, by Mr. Leggett.
- H. Con. Res. 162, by Mr. Matsunaga.
- H. Con. Res. 163, by Mr. Pepper.
- H. Con. Res. 164, by Mr. Reid of New York.
- H. Con. Res. 165, by Mr. Roybal.
- H. Con. Res. 166, by Mr. St. Onge.
- H. Con. Res. 167, by Mr. Rooney of Pennsylvania.
- H. Con. Res. 168, by Mr. Adams.
- H. Con. Res. 169, by Mr. Bingham.
- H. Con. Res. 170, by Mr. Helstoski.
- H. Con. Res. 171, by Mrs. Mink.
- H. Con. Res. 172, by Mr. Scheuer.
- H. Con. Res. 173, by Mr. Smith of New York.
- H. Con. Res. 174, by Mr. Tenzer.
- H. Con. Res. 175, by Mr. Wolff.
- H. Con. Res. 176, by Mr. Kupferman.

H. Con. Res. 177, by Mr. Button.
 H. Con. Res. 178, by Mr. Eilberg.
 H. Con. Res. 179, by Mr. Gude.
 H. Con. Res. 180, by Mr. Olsen.
 H. Con. Res. 181, by Mr. Giaimo.
 H. Con. Res. 201, by Mr. Conyers.
 H. Con. Res. 225, by Mr. Brown of California.
 H. Con. Res. 238, by Mr. Boland.
 H. Con. Res. 250, by Mr. Reuss.
 H. Con. Res. 258, by Mr. Minish.
 H. Con. Res. 266, by Mr. Ottinger.
 H. Con. Res. 270, by Mr. Rees.
 H. Con. Res. 274, by Mr. Teague of California.
 H. Con. Res. 277, by Mr. Karth.
 H. Con. Res. 284, by Mr. Nix.
 H. Con. Res. 304, by Mr. Dulski.
 H. Con. Res. 358, by Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania.
 H. Con. Res. 366, by Mr. Pepper.
 H. Con. Res. 587, by Mr. Fulton of Pennsylvania.
 H. Con. Res. 694, by Mr. Dow.

STAFF MEMORANDUM ON HOUSE RESOLUTIONS SIMILAR TO SENATE CONCURRENT
 RESOLUTION 47

Comparison of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 with House Concurrent Resolutions 130, 9 and 192, relating to United Nations Peacekeeping Activities.

H. Con. Res. 130 and similar resolutions, submitted by Mr. Moorhead and 66 other Members of the House of Representatives is identical to S. Con Res. 47 except for the omissions and additions in the following paragraphs:

(a)(3) on line 15 of S. Con. Res. 47, H. Con. Res. 130 omits "duration";

(a) (3) on lines 16-18 of S. Con. Res. 47, H. Con. Res. 130 omits "as well as guidelines to govern concomitant machinery for peacemaking where peacekeeping forces are in use"; and

(b) on line 22 of S. Con. Res. 47 after "creation" H. Con. Res. 130 adds "at such times as conditions warrant".

H. Con. Res. 9 and similar resolutions, submitted by Mr. Conte and 8 other Members (Messrs. Cunningham, Friedel, Multer, Wolff, Rodino, Farbstein, Green of Pennsylvania, and Quie) differs in substance from S. Con. Res. 47, and calls for the United States to submit a plan to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the establishment of a permanent United Nations peacekeeping force.

H. Con. Res. 192 sponsored by Mr. Horton differs in substance from S. Con. Res. 47, and calls for the United States to propose to the General Assembly a plan of the procedures and structure for rapid use of the earmarked, standby units for peacekeeping as a first step toward creation of a permanent U.N. peacekeeping force, and also provides the "unqualified offer of one thousand technical and non-combatant personnel of the United States Armed Forces to serve as a unit subject to call by the United Nations for peacekeeping purposes" and "the one-thousand-man American unit shall be known as the FIRST Brigade—Forces for International Relief on Standby—".

Senator CHURCH. Before calling on our witnesses, I would also like to place in the record correspondence between myself and former President Eisenhower, whom I asked to meet with us to elaborate on his provocative ideas of endowing the United Nations with nuclear power to preserve the peace, as well as the article referred to.

I hope that it would be possible for the subcommittee to meet in private with him as he suggests at some future date.

Another statement that I offer for the record is from Congressman Joshua Eilberg, who had hoped to be here, but has submitted a written statement instead.

(The material referred to follows:)

[From VISTA, January-February 1968, published by the U.N. Association of the U.S.A.]

WAR AND PEACE AND THE UNITED NATIONS, AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH
GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

(By Mary Kersey Harvey)

I went to him in Gettysburg—during the midst of yet another crisis which had come near to reducing the UN to what its friends had feared and its critics predicted—an arena for shouting matches between sovereign states.

I went to Gettysburg to seek the President's views on what can and needs to be done to transform the UN into the limited federated world government he had said—in 1948—was a central requirement of peace with justice.

What he had to say during the course of our extended talk that winter morning surpassed anything I expected. Indeed, if Grenville Clark was the prime theoretician of world order, Dwight Eisenhower is its greatest strategist. For to back up a world organization with revised and more equitably apportioned legislative and executive branches, President Eisenhower would give the UN tactical nuclear weapons, while denying them to anyone else. But let's begin at the beginning.

Prior to my arrival in Gettysburg I had prepared for our interview by recalling many of the pointed comments that had been made concerning the UN and world peace during the last twenty years. Particularly I had refreshed my memory concerning General Eisenhower's many pertinent speeches on the subject during his long years in public life.

"What hope can there be for the future of the world unless there is some form of world government which can make its effort to prevent a renewal of the awful struggle through which we have just passed?" Churchill asked in 1950.

In 1961, John F. Kennedy told the UN: "The risks in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race." He called for "a peace race in which the Russians would advance with us, step by step, toward general and complete disarmament."

In 1961 the Soviet Union proposed:

"In order to make it easier to reach agreement with the Western powers and to prevent the control question from becoming an obstacle * * * the Soviet Government has stated that if the Western powers will accept the proposal on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union will unconditionally accept those Powers' proposals on control."

Long before these bold words were spoken the then General Eisenhower had already grasped the nature of the requirements of world order. In 1948 he wrote: "During the war it was demonstrated that international unity of purpose and execution could be attained, without jeopardy to any nation's independence, if all were willing to pool a portion of their authority in a new single headquarters with power to enforce their decisions. In the formation of the new United Nations * * * this lesson had not yet been accepted. Its application would have meant some form of *limited federated world government*."

Because the nations had not accepted this lesson, a defective child was born at San Francisco in June, 1945.

Twenty years later in St. Louis, President Eisenhower joined with President Truman for a celebration of the UN's twentieth birthday. At a press conference following the ceremony, President Eisenhower's praise of the work of the UN's special agencies was published widely. But when the President stressed the imperative need for strengthening the world organization without delay, it went unnoticed by all but a few.

Between Dwight D. Eisenhower's statements of 1948 and 1965 lay two peaceful terms as President of the United States. What had he thought, said and done, as leader of the world's most powerful nation, and as the single most respected and admired public figure in the world, to "wage peace"?

Plenty.

From the very beginning of his Administration, he unremittingly sought creative proposals that might lead to progress toward genuine peace. He initiated the cultural-exchange program with the Soviet Union. He took the initiative in calling a halt to the Anglo-Israeli aggression against Suez, but warned the Soviets against any attempt of theirs to intrude by force. He vetoed military intervention in Laos. And made proposal after proposal aimed at disarmament and a world security system based on law.

During the weeks of torturous preparation of one of his major peace speeches ("Chance for Peace," 1953) he was determined that what he said would be more—far more—than just a jumble of platitudes. The world was sick of hearing its leaders' smarmy-mouthed rhetoric. They demanded more than a forced trip on the nuclear collision course.

In "Chance for Peace" President Eisenhower declared war—total war—not upon any human enemy, but upon the brute forces of poverty and need in the world.

"The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than thirty cities * * * We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could house more than eight thousand people.

"This is not a way of life * * * Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

"This government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction."

At the height of the second presidential campaign, a few days after Anglo-Israel forces moved on the Suez, the President, well aware of the possible domestic political consequences, went grim-faced on national television and explained why compliance with the United Nations' call for a cease-fire was imperative. He then re-stated his belief in the need for giving the UN more muscle;

"The United Nations represents the best and soundest hope for peace in the world. . . . For this very reason I believe that the processes of the UN need further to be developed and strengthened."

Dwight Eisenhower knew then, as he knew in 1948, and knows today, that the world could not and cannot afford the danger of relying on voluntary compliance with UN resolutions and injunctions.

A few months later, facing masses assembled at the Capitol for his second Inauguration, President Eisenhower again sounded a grave, but hopeful note:

"The building of * * * the peace is a bold and solemn purpose. To proclaim it is easy . . . To serve it will be hard . . . We must be ready to pay its full price * * * One truth must rule all we think and all we do."

And at the convening of the fifteenth session of the UN General Assembly the President affirmed with utter clarity his mounting concern about the need for giving the world body power to enact and enforce law binding on all nations:

"Thus, we see as our goal, not a superstate above nations, but a world community, embracing them all, rooted in law and justice."

Dwight Eisenhower's horror of war and restless hope for peace over so extended a period of time is unmatched by any other U.S. President of our time.

It felt like snow as I walked the path to the President's offices at Gettysburg College on the morning of November 7th. The President—who had been up before dawn—had already hiked to the polls, cast his vote and dictated several letters by the time I arrived for the 9 o'clock meeting.

The President was somewhat thinner than when we last met in 1963 at dinner at the Eisenhower farm, but he was every bit as earnest, enthusiastic and ebullient. It was going to be difficult to keep track of everything he said. Thoughts, stories, quotations, references to history, dates, crises, names, technical terms, numbers—all cascaded forth with a briskness, accuracy and intensity characteristic of few men of any age.

I was clutching my worn copy of "Waging Peace" along with other papers and memory-refreshers. That book had been a devil to write, the President said. The research part of it had been tremendous and tedious. He thought he would never get through it. His eyes twinkled a bit as he settled into his chair and talked about his new book, "At Ease". Now that one had been fun to write. It was just like telling stories to friends.

It was fun to read, too, I told the President. But more than that, it helped us to understand the roots of his intense hatred of violence and war. This hatred was intrinsic. A story that had etched itself deeply in my mind had to do with the six-year old Dwight's reaction to the sight of his brother's whipping. He had broken into tears and cried out "Stop! Please stop! Even a dog shouldn't be treated like that!"

The President knew why I was there. Paul G. Hoffman, director of the United Nations Development Programme, had explained to him that readers of VISTA and United Nations Associations publications in 65 other countries were well aware of the great services performed by the UN's ancillary agencies, but were

becoming increasingly concerned by its weakness with respect to its central function: prevention of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of member nations. What the President had to say would be read by the many members of these United Nations Associations throughout the world.

I handed the President excerpts from a recent New York *Times* editorial which said in essence that many of the more responsible powers were now doubting—more than ever before in its history—whether continued membership in the UN was in their best interests. It further said that they feared that unless procedures were changed to conform with the UN's changed character the organization would not survive.

I then expressed my own somewhat stronger concern that the organization might be torn apart because of the inability of its sovereign members to make objective judgments, dispense justice, and enforce decisions on a world scale, thus leaving our interdependent world without the machinery to prevent drift and anarchy.

The President read the editorial carefully, took off his glasses, and turned to me, leaning forward in his chair. He spoke with great earnestness. There were, it seemed to him, many valid reasons for concern, although some voices are predictably gloomy. We had to keep in mind the civilizing and healing effect of the UN special agencies.

But, he added, history shows invariably that associations of sovereign nations (and he emphasized the word "sovereign") never achieve the results that idealists and indeed practical people expect them to. The President gave NATO as a recent and stunning example of this. It had worked only so long as all of its members were willing to go along. But there had been no way to prevent its members from unilateral action, from pulling out when it appeared to be in their national interest.

The point the President was making was that the UN, in reality, was a world treaty group. Its members were no more bound to abide by it than members of regional treaty groupings. National sovereignty, one got the feeling, was to the President the main villain of the piece. (Peace, too, for that matter.)

The President, in "Waging Peace" had said that "of the various Presidential tasks to which I early determined to devote my energies, none transcended in importance that of trying to devise practical and acceptable measures toward universal disarmament."

What he meant by "universal", of course, was disarmament by all nations of the world. Would this still be his number one goal, I enquired? Universal disarmament, the President answered, would not fully assure peaceful settlement of all international issues, but it would certainly (1) lessen the diversion from useful purposes of resources, money and manpower, and it might save sufficient resources to meet many of the basic requirements of the world's impoverished, and (2) eliminate the chances of a world cataclysm and the extinction of civilization. Disarmament, to the President, was a step—certainly a major one—toward the greatest of all goals: a just peace.

The next question had to do with the prodigious efforts made by the Eisenhower Administration to come up with disarmament proposals which would be effective and acceptable, not only to our Congress and to our allies, but to the Soviets. These efforts had been continuous and unremitting, strenuous and consistent.

Now, some seven years had elapsed since his Administration's final and comprehensive plan for disarmament had been placed before the world in 1960. No meaningful progress toward universal disarmament had been made during those seven years. In fact regression had characterized the period. The arms race had escalated. There was one full-fledged war in the field, others threatening. How did the President account for this deplorable record?

With hesitation he snapped out his answer. The failure could be laid directly to the war in Vietnam. You cannot be fighting a war and negotiate effectively about disarmament at the same time.

Now there were those, of course, who might have answered the question in another way, he went on to say. They would lay the failure to the Soviet's various and varying stances on inspection. Back in the days of Stalin, the President explained, the Russians' justifiable fears of war and of opening their country to foreigners were about proportionate.

Stalin had once told him, the President went on, that no major projects, i.e., massive hydro-electric plants, dams, and the likes would be constructed until the chances of their destruction in another war had diminished to a reassuring

degree. Thus, the President told me, when the Russians—after Stalin's death—began construction of many massive and costly projects—he came to the conclusion that they no longer feared attack and would be amenable to a disarmament plan which contained some, but not excessive inspection. He still felt justified in having reached that conclusion. Of course, he added, the Sino-Soviet relationship now makes it difficult for the Russians to talk disarmament with us, just as our involvement in the Vietnam war makes it difficult for us.

I wondered if the President was disturbed about the very real possibility that a number of smaller nations would soon acquire nuclear material and the means for its delivery. Would this not represent a horrendous threat to world stability? As an example, I wondered what would have happened if either or both the Israelis and Arabs had possessed even a few nuclear weapons during the June clashes.

The President pointed out that he had proposed, early in his Administration, that the small and middle-sized countries be provided with nuclear know-how. With this would have come a sense of maturity and responsibility, he said. Too, if all nations now possessed nuclear capability they might be more willing to talk seriously about universal disarmament.

Next question. As a five-star General, and as a President elected by Republicans who, to a large extent, dominate the nation's industry, the President had astounded that country with his warning against what he bluntly termed "the military-industrial complex."

In his Farewell Address, the President had sternly emphasized that "The conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. Its total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government.

"We must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. We must guard against the unwarranted influence * * * by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist."

Was there, in the President's opinion, any connection, however minuscule, between the "persisting power" of the military-industrial complex and the failure of disarmament efforts? The President slumped back in his chair, let his arms hang limply at his sides. His answer came slowly.

He reminded me that as far back as 1930 he had been assigned to work on a Commission to take the profits out of war. Bernard Baruch had been his "mentor". But it was vastly different in those days. Whether wars were of long or short duration, a long period of peace was confidently anticipated. When they were over, industry promptly began to re-tool for civilian needs. This was costly. And, moreover, not all industry became involved in war production. Those that did suffered by losing their consumer-oriented production capability as well as their customers. There was, except in special cases, no appreciable profit in war then. Nothing comparable at all to the profits today.

Moreover, the President said, we have a situation now where whole segments of the economy and the society are partially or totally dependent on the billions of dollars flowing to them from Washington. Possibly \$35 billion for hardware alone! he exclaimed.

These fellows couldn't get out of it if they wanted to, the President was afraid. Would he, I asked, go into some detail about the component parts of the military-industrial complex? Who were they? Where were they?

Well, to begin with, there were the politicians. Every Congressman, the President explained, wants air bases, aerospace contracts, R & D establishments, military camps, and the like, for his state. And what's more, once he's got these things for his state, he'll fight to the death to see they aren't dismantled, even when they no longer serve their original or any real purpose. You hear the rumblings on the Hill every time McNamara wants to close a shipyard or an airbase. Another group in the complex, the defense contractors, not only work through their Congressmen, but court the Pentagon directly.

It has even gotten into the universities, the President said ruefully. Not long ago Dr. Wriston, former president of Brown University, had told him that if Federal grants for research relating to military and para-military matters were to end, almost every university would have to close shop.

This was a deplorable state of affairs, the President continued, but prevailed on many campuses throughout the country. Only those private institutions with enormous endowments (The Johns Hopkins University, of which his brother Milton was president, was one) can take that Federal research money or leave it.

Another part of the complex: the very institution from whence Eisenhower had sprung. Every branch of the Armed Forces demands and sometimes gets more than it needs. Then, the President went on gloomily, there are the unions.

Contrary to what most people think, the nation's largest industrial employer is not the automotive industry. It's the aerospace industry. It employs 1,384,000 workers. Four-fifths of its sales are to the Federal government. Its workers and particularly its scientists are certainly an important component in the complex. Then you've got the electronics, ordnance and petroleum fellows, all with very real interests in the continuance of the war machines.

They are justifiably afraid of arms cutbacks, we agreed.

What then, I asked, was the alternative?

The President cheered up a bit. In a spiritual fashion he began to develop an analogy between the condition of American military-oriented industry when arms spending ended and that of the European nations whose production facilities lay in ruins after World War II.

The President spoke of the ingenious way in which Paul Hoffman, as administrator of the Marshall Plan, had operated. To Hoffman's way of thinking, our government's various bureaus and agencies would be the last to know the requirements of the various devastated European industrial complexes. And so Hoffman went to them and said in essence: draw up your *own* plans for reconstruction and recovery. You know better than we do what is required. Then get up a budget. How much can you lay out and how much help will you need from us?

That, the President said, accounted for the speed and efficiency of the recovery of the European industrial community. He would think that comparable measures could be effective with respect to the American military industrial community when arms spending halted or diminished sharply.

At the risk of dwelling too long on the issue of armaments and disarmaments, I posed one final question in this area, because it could best be answered by a man whose vast knowledge of military affairs and arms is equally matched by his passion for peace. There is probably no man with comparable qualifications in the world.

We were now spending \$87 billion of our total Federal budget of \$135 billion on arms or defense, call it what you will. These figures made the military budget during his Administration look like carfare. The President had written, again in "Waging Peace," that "so long as such proportion of the world's assets are wasted on excessive arms, our ability to help poorer people will be sorely and uselessly impaired."

Question: Would the \$5 billion antimissile missile system recently announced by Secretary McNamara fall into the President's category of "excessive arms?"

I wasn't prepared for his vivid response. Five billion! That was only the beginning, the President said impatiently. It would buy a pilot establishment, nothing else. And then we would have to go on and on until we had "the works." He drew a spiral in the air with his forefinger as he talked. You'd get up into the \$20 billions, then the \$30 billions, and the \$40 billions—just for the United States. Every little town and locality would insist on having a shield. Even Gettysburg. And, soon, too, all your allies will insist on having it. The President had continued to trace the spiral until it had gone as high as his arm could reach. Right *now* our arm expenditures create economic difficulties, he said in a hard tone, as his spiraling arm dropped to his side. But, as of now, it is possible that we will have to take on this great additional cost.

He paused, swiveled to gaze out the window at the wind-stripped trees, and finally turned back to finish up on the anti-missile missile. He thought the value of the project was still questionable. Now, mind you, the President said, I wouldn't call it a form of excessive arms, *if* I thought it would be effective. But I tend to agree with McNamara when he minimized the need for the thing. If it's a "thin" defense, as they now describe it, it won't appreciably improve our defensive posture. And, anyway, it's still axiomatic that the best defense is a perfect offense. We've got *that*.

We then moved from the unthinkable, the madness, the insanity—to the sane.

It was time to discuss what the President had meant when he said in 1956 "there can be no peace without law." Two preliminary questions about basic assumptions: (1) Did his use of the word "law" in the context of world peace imply the law of a world authority, capable of enforcement, as distinguished from a mere set of exhortations or injunctions, and (2) did the proposition "no peace without law" embody the concept that peace cannot be assured by a continued

arms race or an indefinite balance of terror, but only by universal disarmament, together with establishment of institutions in the world corresponding to those which maintain law and order in our country and others?

Obviously, the President replied rather impatiently, that was the kind of law he had spoken of when he said it was essential to world peace. I said I had suspected my two questions about assumptions would be unnecessary, especially in view of the President's uncompromising stance during the Suez crisis of 1956 when he emphasized that there could be no double standard of law in the world, i.e., one law for those opposing us, another for our allies. There could be only one law, the President had insisted then, or no peace. Many in the world believed his stand had prevented World War III.

To get that "one law for all in the world" Grenville Clark, a prominent American lawyer, champion of civil liberties and of peace through world federalism, had drafted a set of changes that could be made in the UN Charter and which would provide the UN sufficient authority to prevent war. That authority, Clark had made clear, would be *strictly limited* to war prevention. I hoped we might now go over some of the main provisions of the Clark proposals.

The President anchored on his glasses the better to study the Clark formula for the UN legislative body. It would eliminate the one vote-per nation provision in the General Assembly, for one thing. Secondly, nations would be given voting power according to a formula which took into account population and geographic factors. Assuming an eventual membership in the UN of about 130 nations (all nations now members, plus those expected to join) Clark had calculated a voting arrangement that goes like this:

Nations	Representatives each	Total votes
4 largest.....	30	120
10 next largest.....	12	120
15 next largest.....	8	120
20 next largest.....	6	120
30 next largest.....	4	120
40 next largest.....	3	120
10 smallest.....	1	10

The President scrutinized the formula most carefully, then whipped off his glasses. There was no doubt, none at all, he said, that we have gone overboard in bringing into the UN certain sovereign groupings which have no valid claim to nationhood. Groups which were not economically and/or politically ready for nationhood and a vote in the UN. But it was not entirely or even largely the fault of these new nations. It was partly the fault of the larger powers. They had expected too much, too much in too short a time.

The President was reminded of a story. Back in 1959 DeGaulle had brought together the prime ministers of ten or eleven African countries of the "French Community." He had asked the President to address them privately. He decided to begin with a question. In view of the fact, the President had asked the African leaders, that the world was becoming increasingly economically interdependent, why did they want to go it alone? And had they considered what they stood to gain if they would unite in some kind of economically-oriented regional federation?

Well, the President said, they just wouldn't buy it. They each wanted their independence. And the reason they gave: it would get each of them that one vote in the UN. The idea of forming a powerful, regional African grouping had no appeal. Now, it might have had appeal if the voting powers of UN members were apportioned on a more realistic basis.

The make-up of the UN, he went on, is discrediting the organization. How can the General Assembly function with one vote for each nation? The United States has the same voting strength as the Maldives Islands with—what was their population?—less than 100,000? It was like giving Rhode Island the same number of Representatives in the Congress as Texas or California or New York. It had been and continues to be a mistake to admit nations to the UN unqualifiedly.

Now that led to the Security Council, the President continued. It wasn't doing its job, either. Couldn't do the job, with the veto. Why couldn't some majority voting formula be worked out?

He replaced his glasses as I handed him the Clark formula for changing the composition of the Security Council.

It would be as follows:

The executive body be enlarged to seventeen members, each elected to a four-year term by the General Assembly. The U.S., U.S.S.R., China and India would have a representative at all times. Four of the eight next largest nations would, in rotation, be entitled to membership, with the proviso that two of these four members should always be from European nations, the other two from nations outside Europe. The remaining nine members would be chosen by the General Assembly from the other member nations.

A simple majority would be ruled out. A majority of 12 out of the 17 votes would be required for all but the "most important" decisions. In these cases, Clark proposes that the majority of 12 must include a majority of each of the two main groups of nations, i.e. the large nations and the much more numerous groups of smaller nations. The President thought it all made a great deal of sense.

After going over the Clark proposals for compulsory jurisdiction by the International Court and the establishment of a World Equity Tribunal to arbitrate cases where legal principles were not applicable, we moved on to the actual disarmament phase. The Clark plan, if adopted and ratified, calls for an immediate and precisely calibrated move toward universal disarmament.

The re-configured Security Council would appoint an Inspection Commission to consist of five persons, none of whom would be a national of any of the twelve largest nations, and no two of whom would be nationals of the same nation.

They would conduct a worldwide Arms Census, supervise an arms production truce, and eventually supervise and verify by inspection, phased, proportionate disarmament which would leave all nations as equally strong or weak during the disarmament period as they were prior to it. The gradual and proportionate giving up of military forces and weapons would take place over a period of ten years at the rate of ten per cent per year.

Rather startling, the President's response to this part of the Clark plan was, in essence, why wait? Of course the main goal is complete disarmament. But why not run some experiments now? Let's open up all our bases, nuclear launching facilities, arms factories, the works—all of it located on or west of the Mississippi and invite the Russians to come in and look around. On condition, of course, that they would open up everything they had located on or west of the Vistula River to inspectors from the United States.

Now these inspectors would soon begin to understand the size and dimension of the problems of inspection and verification. They could learn a lot and then work together to develop a formula which would be workable and acceptable to both sides, and to the other nations, too.

The President didn't see why we had to wait for full UN Charter revision. He knew, as only a military man knows, that such an experiment as he had just put forth could pose no real threat to the security of either side. We must try! The President urged. Try and keep trying!

The disarmament phase of the plan for a world security system was but a relatively short-term proposition. The concurrent build-up of weapons, men and material for a UN Peace Force would lead to a permanent establishment—a military one—within the UN. The President's thoughts on this would be most enlightening. In essence the plan was this:

The United Nations Peace Force would be a heavily-armed and well-disciplined world police force. To prevent domination of this Force by any nation or group of nations, the number of nationals of any nation in its standing component would not exceed three per cent of the total strength of the Peace Force except in extreme emergencies. Units would be dispersed to avoid power concentrations, would be highly mobile, and would be located in defensible positions. *None* of them would be stationed in the larger countries. The UN military staff would be under civilian control.

The President studied the above plan quickly and, as I had expected, caught the ball and ran with it. You'd have, he began to plan out loud, world Marshals, comparable to our U.S. Marshals. Backed by armed forces similar to our National Guard. When the U.S. Marshals go into a troubled area, if they can't handle it, if they can't get compliance with Federal law, the Guard can be called in. You'd have the same thing on a world scale. Non-compliance with UN law and you send in the UN forces. He orchestrated this point at some length.

And too, he hammered away, the UN needs *nuclear* power. He bore down hard on the word "nuclear." The UN can't keep the peace with conventional weapons alone. The President, out of his enormous storehouse of military experience and knowhow, put forth some brilliant innovations on Clark's Peace Force plan. You know, he said, way back in 1953 I proposed that the nations turn over all nuclear weapons to the UN, keeping only that nuclear material necessary for peaceful purposes. The ultimate aim of my proposal at that time was to get those blasted bombs out the hands of the nations and into the hands of an impartial world body.

The President went on to outline, specifically and vividly, how the UN would use its nuclear power, without anyone getting hurt. Take this example, he hurried on. You have two countries in a border argument. The UN orders the matter to be taken to the International Court. One or both of the disputants refuses to submit to compulsory arbitration. They build up their troops along the border.

Then your UN aerial surveillance teams report that armed outbreak is imminent. The UN, which by now has in its possession a fleet of submarines armed with nuclear missiles deployed around the world, orders one of the submarines to proceed to the area. The world is then told that if firing breaks out for any reason whatsoever, a tactical nuclear weapon will be delivered onto the disputed territory. If this threat fails to prevent armed conflict, you back it up with action.

But, the President quickly added, no nuclear bomb would ever need to be delivered, he felt sure. The threat would be sufficient to roll back the opponents from the border—indeed all the way back to the International Court at The Hague.

There can be no effective supernational organization *without power*, the President emphasized. He had said that in 1953 at the United Nations and he insists on it today.

We fell silent for a moment. Was the President thinking about the possible shock effect his ideas might have in some quarters? Grenville Clark had often said that what the world probably needed to get moving on disarmament and world law was a series of severe shocks. As to my own thoughts during those brief silent seconds, it seemed to me that what the President was really saying to the UN and about the UN was: Get tough! Diplomacy, kid gloves, cadenced speeches, behind-the-scenes deals have not worked and won't ever work! Demand the men and the weaponry you require to do the job. Get tough! Get tough!

It came then, down to this: How do you get from here to there?

The President had long been guided by the early period in our national life and the men who shaped it. Would it be stretching the point too much, I asked to equate the Articles of Confederation and the problems of the thirteen original states, with the present UN Charter and the problems of the 123 nation-states today? And, if an equation could be made, could the President then agree that a UN Charter revision conference, similar to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 might result in the carving out of a Constitution for the World, as strong, equitable and sound as the U.S. Constitution?

The famous grin broke out. Here was, he said, an analogy which many Americans would understand and accept. The President then spoke, as though he had struggled right along with Jay, Madison, Washington, Hamilton, Franklin and the others, at Philadelphia during that long hot spring and summer of 1787 in Philadelphia where the Convention was underway.

He delineated the various stresses and strains within and without the thirteen states and why their centers of gravity varied, some having closer ties to foreign governments than to the Confederation. The attempt to save the Confederation by strengthening it faltered again and again. The Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan were so far apart that compromise appeared unattainable.

We both then recalled the words of Chairman of the Convention, George Washington:

"It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair; the event is in the hand of God."

The same situation, the President said, could very well prevail at a United Nations Charter Revision conference. But the lesson of 1787 was that intelligence, the ability to give a little, and the over-riding requirements for survival *can* prevail over sovereign or narrow-minded interests. It was the ability and willingness to compromise for the sake of the larger interest which had created the Constitution and the strongest democracy in the world. This could work on a world level.

And the President added forcefully, the ability and willingness to compromise might, in the end, serve to create a world constitution, the provisions of which would enable the world's people to live without the fear of war ever happening again.

He had a proposal to make before I left. Why, the President asked, why can't we say that the entire program for one year (of the United Nations Association) will be to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for peace?

I knew what he had in mind. It wasn't necessary to ask him to spell out the details. For if Dwight D. Eisenhower thinks the United Nations Association and all its members can and should mount such a one-year program, there are plenty of brains around to work out the details.

I stood to leave. My time had been up a long while ago. The President got up from his desk and walked into the middle of the room to say a last word. He was, he maintained, essentially an optimist. He had always been one and would remain so. He was still hopeful that man's intelligence would outwit his inventiveness.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN FORMER PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND SENATOR CHURCH

APRIL 3, 1968.

Hon. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Gettysburg, Pa.

DEAR GENERAL EISENHOWER: I have read with great interest your interview in the recent issue of VISTA on various questions relating to the preservation of peace. As reported, your comments on giving the United Nations power to enforce World Court decisions, in particular, are most valuable to a discussion of peace-keeping by the United Nations.

This brings me to the point of this letter. On May 1 and 2 the Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations has scheduled hearings on S. Con. Res. 47, relative to the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force, a copy of which is enclosed. While this resolution is the immediate subject before us, I hope that the Subcommittee will address itself to the broader issue of maintaining the peace, particularly through the United Nations. Your views, elaborating on the comments made in the VISTA interview, would be a great contribution to this exploration. On behalf of the Subcommittee, I respectfully offer a very sincere invitation to you to appear before us.

I might add that a similar subcommittee benefited greatly in 1955 by the advice of our former Presidents Hoover and Truman on matters relating to revision of the United Nations Charter.

I hope you will give this invitation your most serious consideration.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK CHURCH.

INDIO, CALIF., April 9, 1968.

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: My interview as reported in VISTA expresses my convictions fairly accurately. Even so, if I were to be in the Washington area at the time of your Hearings I would be glad to meet quietly with your Subcommittee to discuss the possibilities of a stronger United Nations. However, since I am still in California, and my doctors discourage any transcontinental journeys except in emergency, I must regretfully inform you that I cannot be there.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSHUA EILBERG, U.S. CONGRESSMAN FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Senator Church, none of us would dream of waiting for a fire before organizing a fire department and yet we procrastinate as conflagrations threaten to envelop the world in a conflict which could spell the end to civilization as we know it.

Therefore, Sir, I appear before you today to urge action as rapidly and favorable as possible on Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, which supports and encourages United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts with both short-range and long-range aims.

As a short-range objective, the resolution calls upon the United States Government to encourage and support the ear-marking and specialized training of units by United Nations member states for employment in United Nations Peacekeeping operations.

This ear-marking has already been undertaken by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iran, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and New Zealand.

The principal United States contribution to this short-range effort would be to make available to the United Nations transport, communications and logistical personnel and facilities.

The long-range aspect of the resolution is to encourage and support the creation of a permanent, individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties.

We would be less than honest with ourselves, we would be less than realists, if we tried to contend that the United Nations has proven to be a truly effective instrument of peacekeeping and peacemaking.

Indeed, the United Nations' role in these efforts has been more exemplified by its failures than by its successes and there have been both.

But as pragmatists we must realize as well that there exists in the world today but one potential force for the peaceful settlement of international disputes—and this force is the United Nations.

Therefore, as men of peace and men of good will, we should dedicate ourselves to the revitalization and the strengthening of the United Nations so that it might approach the potential seen by its founders.

An effective and ever-ready peacekeeping force is one such approach, and considering world affairs today, perhaps the most important one. It would not be a panacea, but it would be an approach toward world peace.

None of us can prognosticate, but we can reflect upon the past. A ready force can do much to still hostilities and preserve life and property. This situation in Cyprus is a case in point.

When this troubled island erupted into open conflict between its two principal ethnic groups, the United Nations authorized the employment of such peacekeeping force—to separate the combatants, to protect the non-combatants, to restore civil calm while the peacemakers could perform their duties.

Despite the United Nations resolution, it was some five weeks before such a force could be constituted, assembled and transported to the site of hostilities.

None of us can say how many lives could have been saved if the peacekeeping force had been on the ready. None of us can predict how many new wounds were opened and how many roadblocks were created in the path toward a permanent peace during this interim.

However, we who view world affairs realistically must admit reluctantly that in the future there will be new Cypruses and new brush-fires that threaten to ignite the forest.

Let us have a fire brigade ready and able to extinguish the flames before they become uncontrollable.

Thank you.

Senator CLARK. If the Senator would briefly yield, I just talked to Congressman Eilberg on the telephone and he asked me to express to you his regrets at not being present. He has an important subcommittee meeting of the House and strongly recommended that the resolution be favorably adopted and asked to have his statement placed in the record.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Senator, very much.

PANEL OF EXPERTS

This morning we are going to hear distinguished experts on peacekeeping who have at the invitation of Senator Clark volunteered to share their knowledge with us. Their ranks have diminished slightly in recent days for reasons beyond our control.

Mr. George Ball, for example, who was to have testified on peacekeeping in Cyprus, has sent his regrets for reasons not stated, but well imagined.

Mr. Andrew Cordier has found that certain events at Columbia University has prevented him from coming down today.

On behalf of the subcommittee I welcome our panel on overall crisis management: Mr. Arthur Cox, formerly with Brookings Institution and author of "Prospects for Peacekeeping"; Prof. Stanley Michalak, political science professor at the Franklin and Marshall College, at Lancaster, Pa.; Arthur Barber, formerly Department of Defense, and now president of the Institute of Politics and Planning in Arlington, Va.; and our expert on Congo peacekeeping Mrs. Edward W. McVitty, United Nations observer, and representative of the World Association of World Federalists.

By way of procedure, I would like to suggest that our witnesses this morning all come up to the table and be seated here together, to present their prepared statements in turn, after which we will ask questions and ask them to comment on each other's statements.

Before we hear any of the testimony, however, I would like to defer to the other member of the committee. I understand that Senator Pell from Rhode Island would like to make a statement at this time.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONCEPT OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE SOUGHT

Mr. Chairman, 23 years ago, as Assistant Secretary at the United Nations Conference on International Organizations in San Francisco, I worked several months on articles 43, 44, and 45 of the U.N. Charter. Those articles concerned the United Nations peacekeeping force.

Afterward, I worked in the Department of State in the Bureau for International Security Affairs to try to develop the framework for our participation. Actually, even before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, I sought to develop the concept of an international sea guard and had written a memorandum on this subject to the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

This is a concept I have followed and have been pressing on the intervening years, and it is in connection with this concept chapter 7, articles 30-32 of my proposed Ocean Space Treaty, that I suggested that an international sea guard be set up.

To my mind, one of the greatest tragedies is to see how effectively the Military Staff Committee could be and how absolutely vain have so far been the results in the development of articles 43, 44, and 45. The Military Staff Committee sits in New York as a last resting grounds for officers about to retire from the five nations of the permanent members of the Security Council, and because of the frictions in the cold war that exist today, it has never had an opportunity to prove itself effectively.

Peacekeeping forces that have existed have been sent forward usually or always as a result of a General Assembly resolution.

I remember so well and so vividly how full of brave hope all of us at San Francisco were for the future as we worked on these very articles. Every word, every comma, every parsing of a sentence was worked out, thought over, and discussed in French and in English, and we felt these articles, 43, 44, and 45, would do exactly what we are seeking to do today many years later.

My enthusiasm remains as strong as ever. In fact, if we do not develop some sort of peacekeeping force, we are condemned either to a continuation of our present balance of terror or to the demolition of our world by a single nation. Obviously, neither of these alternatives is desirable. For these reasons, I wholeheartedly support you, Mr. Chairman, in your effort to create an international peacekeeping force. I would ask your permission at this time to insert in the body of the record, if I could, a copy of Senate Resolution 263, which incorporates the text of an ocean space treaty and provides, as I said earlier, in a wholly separate part, part 7, for an International Sea Guard that would not only be responsible for the military aspects of enforcement arrangements, but for all the civilian aspects that exist, such as International Iceberg Control, the Whaling Convention, the North East Fisheries Convention, the various resolutions of the intergovernmental maritime consultative organizations, and similar problems.

(The resolution, S. Res. 263, referred to follows:)

[S. Res. 263, 90th Cong., second sess.]

RESOLUTION

Whereas the threat of anarchy is imminent in the field of scientific exploration and commercial exploitation of the deep sea and its resources; and

Whereas international agreement on a rule of law governing the activities of nations in the exploration and exploitation of the deep sea and its resources is in the common interest of all mankind: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should take all necessary steps, through the Secretary of State, the United States delegation to the United Nations, or any other appropriate agency or officer of the United States, to enter into negotiations with representatives of the governments of the major coastal and maritime nations and all other interested nations of the world to the end that there shall be concluded, with as widespread acceptance as is possible, a treaty on the peaceful exploration and exploitation of ocean space as follows:

"TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF OCEAN SPACE

"PREAMBLE

"The States Parties to this Treaty,

"*Inspired* by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's ever-deepening probe of ocean space—the waters of the high seas, including the superjacent waters above the continental shelf and outside the territorial sea of each nation, and the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas of the high seas outside the area of the territorial sea and continental shelf of each nation.

"*Recognizing* the common heritage of mankind in ocean space and the common interest of all mankind in the exploration of ocean space and the exploitation of its resources for peaceful purposes,

"*Believing* that the threat of anarchy exists in the exploration and exploitation of ocean space and its resources,

"Desiring to contribute to broad international cooperation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and exploitation of ocean space and its resources for peaceful purposes,

"Recalling the four conventions on the Law of the Sea and an optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes, which agreements were formulated at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva from 24 February to 27 April 1958, and were adopted by the Conference at Geneva on 29 April 1958.

"Recalling the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which was unanimously endorsed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) of 19 December 1966 and signed by sixty nations at Washington, London, and Moscow on 27 January 1967, and considering that progress towards international cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of ocean space and its resources and the development of the rule of law in this area of human endeavor is of comparable importance to that achieved in the field of outer space.

"Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolution 2340 (XXII) of 18 December 1967, which provided for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to study the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the uses of their resources in the interests of mankind.

"Recognizing that the problems resulting from the commercial exploitation of ocean space are imminent,

"Believing that the living and mineral resources in suspension in the high seas, and in the seabed and subsoil of ocean space, are free for the use of all nations, subject to international treaty obligations and the conservation provisions of the four conventions on the Law of the Sea,

"Convinced that a Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Exploitation of Ocean Space will further the welfare and prosperity of mankind and benefit their national States,

"Have agreed as follows :

"PART I

"GENERAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO OCEAN SPACE

"ARTICLE 1

"Ocean space and the resources in ocean space shall be free for exploration and exploitation by all nations without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality of opportunity, and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of ocean space.

"ARTICLE 2

"Ocean space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use of occupation, or by any other means.

"ARTICLE 3

"There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in ocean space and States Parties to the Treaty shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigation.

"ARTICLE 4

"States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and exploitation of ocean space and its resources in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and the provisions contained in these articles, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding.

"ARTICLE 5

"States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in ocean space, whether carried on by governmental agencies or non-governmental entities or nationals of such States, and for assuring that national activities are carried on in conformity with the provisions set forth

in this Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities and nationals of States in ocean space shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in ocean space by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne by the international organization itself.

"ARTICLE 6

"In the exploration of ocean space and the exploitation of its resources, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in ocean space with due regard for the corresponding interests of all other States Parties.

"ARTICLE 7

"States Parties to the Treaty shall render all possible assistance to any person, vessel, vehicle, or facility found in ocean space in danger of being lost or otherwise in distress.

"ARTICLE 8

"States Parties to the Treaty engaged in activities of exploration or exploitation in ocean space shall immediately inform the other States Parties or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in ocean space which could constitute a danger to the life or health of persons exploring or working in ocean space.

"PART II

"USE OF OCEAN SPACE EXCEPT SEA-BED AND SUBSOIL

"ARTICLE 9

"All States Parties to the Treaty shall have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing, aquaculture, in-solution mining, transportation, and telecommunication in the waters of ocean space beyond the territorial seas of any State.

"ARTICLE 10

"The right declared in Article 9 shall be subject to the treaty obligations of each State Party to the Treaty and to the interests and rights of coastal States and shall be conditioned upon fulfillment of the conservation measures required in the agreement entitled 'Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas', adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva on 29 April 1958.

"ARTICLE 11

"Any disputes which may arise between States Parties to the Treaty with respect to fishing, aquaculture, in-solution mining, conservation, and transportation activities in the high seas shall be settled in accordance with all the provisions of the convention referred to in Article 10 setting forth a compulsory method for the settlement of such questions. The provisions of Article 27 and Annex 4 of the International Telecommunication Convention, signed at Geneva on December 21, 1959, shall be applicable to any disputes which may arise between States Parties with respect to telecommunication activities in the high seas.

"PART III

"USE OF SEA BED AND SUBSOIL OF OCEAN SPACE

"ARTICLE 12

"In order to promote and maintain international cooperation in the peaceful and orderly exploration, and exploitation of the natural resources, of the seabed and subsoil of submarine areas of ocean space, each State Party to the Treaty undertakes to engage in such exploration or exploitation only under licenses issued by a licensing authority to be designated by the United Nations, with approval by the Security Council in the manner provided by paragraph 3 of Article 27 the Charter of the United Nations.

"ARTICLE 13

"The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.

"ARTICLE 14

"The activities of nationals and non-governmental entities in the exploration of submarine areas of ocean space and the exploitation of the natural resources of such areas shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty, and shall be conducted under licenses issued to States Parties to the Treaty making application on behalf of their nationals and non-governmental entities. When such activities are to be carried on by an international organization, a license may be issued to such organization as if it were a State.

"ARTICLE 15

"It shall be the duty of the licensing authority referred to in Article 12 to act as promptly as possible on each application for a license made to it. In issuing licenses and prescribing regulations, the licensing authority shall apply all relevant provisions set forth in this Treaty and shall apply the following criteria :

"(a) The license issued by the licensing authority shall (i) cover an area of such size and dimensions as the licensing authority may determine, with due regard given to providing for a satisfactory return of investment, (ii) be for a period of not more than fifty years, with the option of renewal, provided that operations are conducted with the approval of the licensing authority, (iii) require the payment to the licensing authority of such fee or royalty as may be specified in the lease, (iv) require that such lease will terminate within a period of not more than ten years in the absence of operations thereunder unless the licensing authority approves an extension of the period of such license, and (v) contain such other reasonable requirements as the licensing authority may deem necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty and to provide for the most efficient exploitation of resources possible, consistent with the conservation of and prevention of the waste of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of ocean space.

"(b) If two or more States Parties to the Treaty apply for licenses to engage in the exploration of the seabed and subsoil of ocean space or the exploitation of its natural resources in the same area or areas of ocean space, the licensing authority shall, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, encourage cooperative or joint working relations between such States and be guided by the principle that ocean space shall be free for use by all States, without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality of opportunity. But, if it proves impractical for the license to be shared, the licensing authority shall determine which State Party to the Treaty shall receive the license with due regard given to the encouragement of the development of the technologically developing States.

"(c) A coastal State has a special interest in the conservation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of ocean space adjacent to its territorial sea and continental shelf and this interest shall be taken into account by the licensing authority.

"(d) A coastal State is entitled to take part of an equal footing in any system of research and regulation for purposes of conservation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of ocean space in that area, even though its agencies or nationals do not engage in exploration there or exploitation of its natural resources.

"(e) The exploration of the seabed and subsoil of ocean space and the exploitation of its natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing, or the conservation of the living resources of the sea, nor result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication.

"(f) A State or international organization holding a license is obliged to undertake, in the area covered by such license, all appropriate measures for

the protection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents and shall pursue its activities so as to avoid the harmful contamination of the environment of such area.

"ARTICLE 16

"1. Subject to appropriate regulations prescribed by the licensing authority referred to in Article 12 and to the following provisions, a State or international organization holding a license shall be entitled to construct and maintain or operate on the seabed and subsoil of ocean space installations and other devices necessary for its exploration and the exploitation of its natural resources, and to establish safety zones around such installations and devices and to take in those zones measures necessary for their protection.

"2. The safety zones referred to in this Article may extend to a distance of 500 meters radius around the installations and other devices which have been erected, measured from each point of their outer edge. Ships of all nationalities must respect these safety zones.

"3. Such installations and devices do not possess the status of islands and have no territorial sea of their own.

"4. Due notice must be given of the construction of any such installations and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be maintained. Any installations which are abandoned or disused must be entirely removed by the State or international organization responsible for its construction.

"5. Neither the installations or devices, nor the safety zones around them, may be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international commerce and navigation.

"ARTICLE 17

"To the greatest extent feasible and practicable, the licensing authority referred to in Article 12 shall disseminate immediately and effectively information and data received by it from license owners regarding their activities in ocean space."

"ARTICLE 18

"If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals or non-governmental entities under a license issued pursuant to this Part would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and exploitation of ocean space, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations and obtain the consent of the licensing authority referred to in Article 12 before proceeding with such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and exploitation of submarine areas of ocean space may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment and submit a request for consideration of its complaint to the licensing authority, which may order that the activity or experiment shall be suspended, modified, or prohibited. Review of any such order shall be allowed in accordance with the provisions of Article 23.

"ARTICLE 19

"All stations, installations, equipment, and sea vehicles, machines, and capsules used on the seabed or in the subsoil of ocean space, whether manned or unmanned, shall be open to representatives of the licensing authority referred to in Article 12, except that if there is objection to this procedure by the licensee, such facilities shall be open only to the Sea Guard of the United Nations as set forth in Article 26 of this Treaty.

"ARTICLE 20

"Whenever a State Party to the Treaty or an international organization fails to comply with any of the provisions of a license issued to it under this Part, such license may be canceled by the licensing authority referred to in Article 12, upon thirty days notice to the State or international organization concerned, but subject to the right of the license owner to request review of the decision of the licensing authority as set forth in Article 23.

"ARTICLE 21

"Any dispute which may arise under this Part between States or international organizations holding licenses, or between license owners and the licensing authority referred to in Article 12, shall first be submitted for settlement by the licensing authority, which shall determine its own procedure, assuring each party a full opportunity to be heard and to present its case.

"ARTICLE 22

"In all cases of disputes under this Part, whether among license owners or between license owners and the licensing authority referred to in Article 12, the licensing authority shall be empowered to make awards.

"ARTICLE 23

"1. In the case of any dispute under this Part, if the licensing authority shall not have rendered its decision within a reasonable period of time or if any party to a dispute under this Part desires review of the decision of the licensing authority, such dispute shall, at the request of any of the parties, be submitted to a standing review panel which shall consist of not more than three members to be appointed by the International Court of Justice. The decision of the licensing authority shall be final and binding upon all parties to a proceeding before it unless a request for a review of such decision is made under this Article within a period of thirty days from receipt by such parties of notice of such decision.

"2. No two members of the panel may be nationals of the same State. No member may participate in the decision of any case if he has previously taken part in such case in any capacity or if he is a national of any party involved in the case.

"3. Members of the panel shall serve at the pleasure of the International Court of Justice. The Court shall fix the salaries, allowances, and compensation of members of the panel. The expenses of the panel shall be borne by each party to proceedings before the panel in such a manner as shall be decided by the Court.

"4. The panel shall determine its own procedure, assuring each party to the proceeding a full opportunity to be heard and to present its case.

"5. It shall be the duty of the panel to hear and determine each case as promptly as possible. The decision of the panel shall be by majority vote and shall be final and binding upon the parties to the proceeding; except that if any party to the proceeding desires review of the decision, the case shall be within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as contemplated by paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by such party.

"PART IV

"USE OF SEABED AND SUBSOIL OF OCEAN SPACE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES ONLY

"ARTICLE 24

"1. The seabed and subsoil of submarine areas of ocean space shall be used for peaceful purposes only.

"2. The prohibitions of this Part shall not be construed to prevent—

"(A) the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose;

"(B) the temporary use or stationing of any military submarines on the seabed or subsoil of ocean space if such submarines are not primarily designed or intended for use or stationing on the seabed or subsoil of ocean space; or

"(C) the use or stationing of any device on or in the seabed or subsoil of ocean space which is designed and intended for purposes of submarine or weapons detection, identification, or tracking.

"ARTICLE 25

"1. Each of the States Parties to this Treaty undertakes to refrain from the emplacement or installation on or in the seabed or subsoil of ocean space of any objects containing nuclear weapons or any kinds of weapons of mass destruction,

or the stationing of such weapons on or in the seabed or subsoil of ocean space in any other manner.

"2. Each of the States Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the conduct of the activities described in paragraph 1 of this Article.

"ARTICLE 26

"All stations, installations, equipment, and sea vehicles, machines, and capsules, whether manned or unmanned, on the seabed or in the subsoil of ocean space shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity, but only with the consent of the State concerned. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited. All such facilities shall be open at any time to the Sea Guard of the United Nations referred to in Part VII of this Treaty, subject to the control of the Security Council as set forth in such Part.

"PART V

"REGULATIONS ON THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MATERIAL IN OCEAN SPACE

"ARTICLE 27

"The disposal of radioactive waste material in ocean space shall be subject to safety regulations to be prescribed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, in consultation with the licensing authority referred to in Article 12 of this Treaty.

"ARTICLE 28

"In the event of the conclusion of any other international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, including the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the States Parties to the Treaty are parties, the rules established under such agreements shall apply in ocean space.

"PART VI

"LIMITS OF CONTINENTAL SHELF

"ARTICLE 29

"In order to assure freedom of the exploration and exploitation of ocean space and its resources as provided in this Treaty, there is a clear necessity that fixed limits must be set for defining the outer boundaries of the continental shelf of coastal States. For the purpose of the provisions of this Treaty, the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea to a depth of 600 metres, and (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. Recognizing the desirability of achieving agreement on unsettled questions relating to defining the boundaries of the continental shelf, States Parties to the Treaty undertake to accept any agreements which may be reached in the event a conference is convened to consider such questions as provided for in Article 13 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, adopted at Geneva on 29 April 1958; and any agreement so reached shall become effective for purposes of this Treaty when approved by the conference.

"PART VII

"SEA GUARD

"ARTICLE 30

"In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions set forth in this Treaty, States Parties to the Treaty agree that there shall be established as a permanent force a Sea Guard of the United Nations which may take such action as may be necessary to maintain and enforce international compliance with these principles.

"ARTICLE 31

"The Sea Guard shall be under the control of the Security Council of the United Nations, in consultation with the licensing authority referred to in Article 12 of this Treaty. Paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be applicable to decisions of the Security Council made with respect to the Sea Guard. The licensing authority shall be responsible under the Security Council for the supervision of the Sea Guard in connection with the performance by the Sea Guard of such duties as the licensing authority may deem appropriate to assign or delegate to the Sea Guard for purposes of the implementation of Part III of this Treaty.

"ARTICLE 32

"States Parties to the Treaty are encouraged to provide to the Sea Guard such personnel and suitable scientific and sea patrol vessels as are necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the Sea Guard.

"PART VIII

"NATIONAL LAWS TO APPLY TO CRIMES IN OCEAN SPACE PENDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON CODE OF CRIMINAL LAW

"ARTICLE 33

"Pending agreement upon an international code of law governing criminal activities in ocean space and the institution of an appropriate tribunal with jurisdiction over violations of such code of law, personnel of States Parties to the Treaty and non-governmental entities of State Parties and international organizations engaged in activities of exploration or exploitation in ocean space shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the State of which they are nationals or the State which bears responsibility for their activities in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in ocean space, unless otherwise provided for by international law or in this Treaty.

"PART IX

"FINAL ARTICLES

"ARTICLE 34

"1. The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the Treaty in the exploration and exploitation of ocean space, whether such activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried on within the framework of international intergovernmental organizations.

"2. Any practical questions arising in connection with activities carried on by international inter-governmental organizations in the exploration and exploitation of ocean space, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate international organization or with one or more States members of that international organization, which are Parties to this Treaty.

"ARTICLE 35

"1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

"2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

"3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by ten Governments including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this Treaty.

"4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

"5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices.

"6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

"ARTICLE 36

"Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.

"ARTICLE 37

"Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.

"ARTICLE 38

"This Treaty, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish, Chinese, and Arabic texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

"DONE in triplicate, at the capital cities of the Depositary Governments at Washington, Moscow, and London, this day of one thousand nine hundred and

"For the United States of America:

"For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

"For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:"

Senator CHURCH. I want to thank the Senator very much and I appreciate his attendance here this morning, because of his service for many years in the cause of strengthening the international machinery for peacekeeping. He has been, along with Senator Clark, one of the leaders in the Senate in this effort.

Senator PELL. May I just comment here, too? I used to be on the International Secretariat for the Committee of Experts for the Security Council in the 1940's. I remember then how we were working together as international civil servants to try to bring into being this concept that 20, 25 years later you, Mr. Chairman, have taken a great lead in doing. And I wish you good luck in it.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Senator.

We have two distinguished members of the Republican membership of this committee with us this morning, and I would like to defer to them at this time.

Senator Carlson, have you any comment?

HOPE FOR EFFECTIVE U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE VOICED

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I don't know as I have any comment. As one who served as a delegate to the United Nations, I regretted what seems to be the ineffectiveness of this U.N. in this area of peacekeeping. I think the hearing we are going to hold here today will, I hope, bring out some thoughts that will be helpful in getting either some legislation or at least some resolutions through that would help strengthen the organization in this field.

Senator CHURCH. I thank the Senator very much.

Senator CASE?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The chairman and I were together as delegates a year ago at the United Nations. That experience increased my great admiration for our chairman, as well as my personal regard for him.

PROBE INTO PEACEKEEPING POSSIBILITIES URGED

My own particular interest in that session was this topic of peacekeeping, and I found it extremely interesting and somewhat sobering to get into the matter deeply.

Still, things are what they are and there is no use making believe they are otherwise. I think we understand that to get the most out of any situation it has to be by looking the facts squarely in the face, and that is why I am happy, Mr. Chairman, you have raised the subject again in these hearings. I hope that we may probe more deeply than some superficial examinations of the subject which reflect perhaps the current view of what peacekeeping possibilities are. In doing this, I think we shall probably gain insights which will make us more effective as a committee.

Thank you very much.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK. May I say a word, Mr. Chairman?

Senator CHURCH. Yes, indeed.

A TURN TOWARD PEACE

Senator CLARK. In my opinion, the country, and indeed the world, is at one of those critical watersheds today, where we either turn toward peace or we turn toward a further proliferation into small wars with the ultimate potential of a big war. I would hope that these hearings could make at least a perceptible contribution towards a turn toward peace. To my way of thinking, this is essential if our civilization is to survive.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 is a very modest step toward a turn toward peace. The larger picture, of course, requires a return to the principles of the two treaties of general and complete disarmament under strict international control, as the Russians phrase it, or under enforceable world law, as President Kennedy phrased it, and as our draft treaty tabled at Geneva contemplates.

I would hope that the current situation in Vietnam will turn toward peace promptly, and we can then look forward to that detente with the Soviet Union which, to my way of thinking, in a broader sense, is the sine qua non of any real turn toward peace.

I make these general comments to put in perspective this relatively modest proposal.

I agree fully with Senator Carlson that hopefully we will delve pretty deeply into this relatively minor but nonetheless very important matter in the hearings we are to have. And the witnesses we will hear today are eminently competent to give us that study in depth.

Needless to say, it is my view that if the United Nations is to perform adequately the mission which Senator Pell spoke so well of, which was contemplated in 1945 at San Francisco, we will have in the long run to

make substantial changes in its present charter. But that is not before us today.

I would like to commend Senator Pell for his keen interest in the international regulation of the problems of the sea. I assure him of my strong support for his resolution which he has offered.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

RESOLVING CLAUSE OF RESOLUTION

Senator CLARK. Before the witnesses begin, I would like to call their attention and that of our visitors to the resolving part of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, which appears on the second page is divided into two parts; first the immediate objectives and, second, the long range developments. I have no doubt the witnesses will comment on the part of the resolution which deals with the immediate objectives and in three subheadings calls for: first, the encouragement of and support of the earmarking and specialized training of units by United Nations member states for employment in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Second, that the United States should be prepared to make available to the U.N. transport, communications, and logistical personnel and facilities.

And, third, that the United States should be prepared to advocate or support proposals for guidelines to govern the financing, training and equipping, and duration of a peacekeeping force for effective use as well as guidelines to govern concomitant machinery for peacekeeping where peacekeeping forces are in use.

Then, to me, the long-range objective of this relatively modest proposal which is set forth in subparagraph (b) of the resolution is to develop the United Nations as a more effective instrument for building and keeping the peace and that the U.S. Government should encourage, and here I stress this, the creation of a permanent individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties.

This part (b), is, of course, to many conventional thinkers pretty far out, and yet to my way of thinking the very, very limited yielding of national sovereignty contemplated in creating an individually recruited peacekeeping force instead of mere national contingents is one quite sure way to assure that no one nation will dominate, that the financial problems of peacekeeping forces might well be solved, and I hope you gentlemen will address yourselves to that financial problem, too. And, of course, it is inherent in part (b) of the resolution that the individually recruited force should have quotas to prevent any one country from having a sufficiently large membership in the individually recruited force to dominate the effort.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

INTEREST OF SENATORS IN SUBJECT

Senator CHURCH. I want to say at this time we are all indebted to Senator Clark for the continuing and persistent interest that he has had in all aspects of the U.N., and for doing much of the spadework that was necessary to make this hearing possible. He is entitled to the greatest credit.

Senator CLARK. I want to thank Senator Church for being willing, as chairman of the committee and as a cosponsor of the resolution, to preside at these hearings. And in view of the kind words he has just said about me, I would like to indicate what a great force for the cause of peace the Senator has been during 12 years of service in the Senate. I think perhaps in the light of the presence of my two distinguished colleagues from the minority party on the right, this following comment should be made off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator CHURCH. I really believe, Senator, we should at this point break off to hear the witnesses. So far, we have done all the testifying.

Senator CLARK. I believe that is a good idea. I would like to have printed in the record, however, prior to the testimony of the first witness, the text of chapters 6 and 7 of the United Nations Charter, dealing in chapter 6 with pacific settlements of disputes, and in chapter 7 with action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

(The material follows:)

TEXT OF CHAPTERS VI AND VII OF THE U.N. CHARTER

CHAPTER VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be

referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security

Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Cox, may we start with you, please?

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR M. COX, FORMERLY WITH BROOKINGS INSTITUTION AND AUTHOR OF "PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING"

Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman, and members, I don't have a prepared statement, but I do have a few remarks to make.

I might say at the outset that I endorse fully this resolution. I think it is an important step in the right direction.

I have written a book on this subject called "Prospects for Peacekeeping" which some of you have seen, and which goes into some detail on my thinking of some of the recommendations contained in this resolution and some of the thoughts for future development and strengthening of U.N. international peacekeeping.

BRIEF REVIEW OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

To make a few specific remarks about my thoughts for the immediate future, I would like to say that I think that peacekeeping has come a long way since the concept was organized, first called peacekeeping by Prime Minister then Foreign Minister Pearson, of Canada, at the time of the creation of UNEF in the Middle East after the crisis there in 1956.

Actually, the use of U.N. observers and officers and men goes back to the days of the Greek civil war when UNSCO observers were put on the Greek border to examine whether there was an infiltration from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. But the use of organized forces and the term U.N. peacekeeping really is only about 12 years old, and in that time there have been 12 peacekeeping operations as we know them under that term.

DEFINITION OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES

I consider peacekeeping to be a fragile but very important instrument of control and check of international disputes. I think there is a very important distinction that I would like to make at the outset, which is, that peacekeeping is not the technique that emerged in the Korean war of the use of forces to enforce a decision as the U.N. Charter provides in chapter 7. Peacekeeping is the use of forces to check a dispute, to implement a cease-fire, to carry out, keep the lid on a crisis before it develops into a war. It is not the technique of enforcing a decision against an operation, an aggressive act by one or more governments.

I think this distinction is an important one as we go on to a discussion of what may be done in the future.

Speaking of the immediate problems relating to the development of the art of peacekeeping in the U.N., I think the principal barrier existing today, as Senator Clark indicated, is the war in Vietnam, and I think until we have a solution of that war we are not likely to see a major consensus within the U.N. development strengthening peacekeeping very much further.

EFFECT OF WAR IN VIETNAM

I think there still may be peacekeeping operations, ad hoc responses, where a consensus of the U.N. supports an action such as they did between India and Pakistan, where the Soviets and the United States joined together in strengthening a U.N. involvement.

However, I think that the development and expansion of training, setting forth standard operating procedures and developing the new technology will probably have to await a solution in Vietnam.

But I might say at this point that I believe that when a settlement is negotiated in Vietnam there will be almost certainly a need for an international presence to determine the observation, inspection, carrying out, and implementation of that agreement. I believe the agreement will have to be negotiated first among the disputants, among the Soviets, the United States, the North and South Vietnamese and the NLF, but after the agreement has been reached I am almost certain there will be need for international supervisory machinery. At Brookings during this past year we have been examining this question in some depth and we feel the U.N. is very likely to be the best source of such authority and such organizational machinery at that time. We do not believe it is wise to get this question into the U.N. in terms of action and implementation, however, until there is a negotiated solution. But when there is, it is likely that the U.N. will be the best organization, and with its experience, with its able staff and impartial Secretary General, it is likely to be the best source of authority and of formation of a military international mechanism for peacekeeping.

PARTICIPATION OF CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. May I just inquire at that point, but wouldn't the U.N. be seriously handicapped, and its opportunity to function as the enforcer of any agreement that might be reached in Vietnam jeopardized, by virtue of the fact that North Vietnam and China are not members of the United Nations, and neither country has ever recognized the competency of the U.N. to deal with the dispute by virtue of the fact that they do not share in the membership of that organization?

Mr. Cox. Yes. I think this is a very important consideration.

However, I think that when you look at the various drawbacks, the various problems, involved in going back to the Geneva machinery, for example, or creating an entirely new international consortium of powers interested in this question, in forming a new organization, and new management, and new impartial supervision, that the problems are considerable in any way, in any direction you look. On the question of membership, I believe that it is quite clear, at least at this stage, that the Chinese are going to oppose any form of negotiated settlement.

They are not likely to participate in any talks with the possible exception of participating to obfuscate and to make it more difficult to reach a solution. But at least on the record, and the position that their leaders from the top down in the party have taken up to now, it looks as though the Chinese will not be involved in any negotiated solution.

Now, I believe that if the Soviets and the United States are able to reach a *modus vivendi* and to decide to work with their partners, the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese in a compromise solution, that with the machinery already existing for observer participation, even by nonmembers, that North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese and NLF representatives can be present in Security Council sessions, can be present as consultants with the machinery set up by the Secretary General, so that there is not any organizational reason why they can't participate if they want a solution, and if they believe that U Thant and the leadership of the Secretariat are going to be more impartial than some other mechanism that might be set up.

DIFFICULTIES OF GENEVA MACHINERY

For instance, one of the difficulties about the Geneva machinery as it stands today is that you have a very ad hoc supervisory authority of the cochairmen. This is something that Molotov and Anthony Eden put together at the last minute at Geneva, and they have been cochairmen ever since.

But now certainly the British do not represent the kind of power that they had at the time of the Geneva session, and the Soviets at that time were considered an impartial government because they didn't have a direct stake in Vietnam.

Now, they do. If the Geneva machinery were to be used today I would urge strongly that the United States and the Soviets be the cochairmen. I think this would be a true representation of the power involved.

But when you start going below the cochairmen, down into the day-to-day administration of a peacekeeping force under the Geneva mechanism, for instance, the International Control Commission, and expand it to more nations, this becomes a very, very difficult thing to imagine, how that control would be carried out, and how you could have two super powers at the top administering this jointly.

I think this is going to have to be a much more complex, a much more carefully worked out mechanism than anything that was conceived in Geneva in 1954 and even the modifications that were made later in the Laos talks in 1962.

ANALOGY OF VIETNAM SETTLEMENT

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman—just one question, if I may, before you get into development of the procedures and so forth in some more detail.

Am I correct in understanding that your feeling about a settlement in Vietnam is somewhat analogous to your feeling about the whole question of the possibilities of the UN peacekeeping, namely that—the analogy is not precise—but, rather, the usefulness of this machinery at Geneva or something else would be largely for the maintenance of the agreement that is arrived at by the real parties and that the South

Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese are perhaps the only ones who can make a deal and that we should, all of us, stay as much out of it as we possibly can, is that correct?

Mr. Cox. Yes. I think that is definitely correct.

I think that any settlement in Vietnam has to be a Vietnamese settlement and one that the Vietnamese people and the political forces of Vietnam work out. But I do think that in the deescalation, the withdrawal of the great power that is present there now, of the United States and allied forces and Soviets that there is going to be a definite requirement for an impartial mechanism participated in by both sides so that a degree of trust and confidence can be built up in the extremely complex business of reducing the power.

EMPLOYING THE UNITED NATIONS TO ITS GREATEST EXTENT

Senator CASE. I understand, but I just wanted to make this point again because it does seem to me we cannot trust to Geneva or anybody else, the making of peace in Vietnam, any more than we can trust to the United Nations the making and keeping of peace in the sense that so many people think the United Nations is doing—as a policeman slapping nations down after they have been bad—because this is just not within the realm of possibility. Mr. Chairman, if you will forgive me I am trying to emphasize this point because I think it goes to this question of supporting what can be done, of stripping away the illusions and the rhetoric and all the rest of it that have surrounded this whole matter to the point of making it impossible for us to employ these great institutions to the extent they are useful in actual life.

Thank you.

Mr. Cox. Yes, if I could just comment further on that, Senator. I think that the problem should be stressed that an international mechanism cannot go in with machineguns firing to force a solution. A solution has to be one that the parties in negotiation have decided that they want to fulfill; both sides have to be completely serious about their intent. Otherwise, you are just talking about a continuation of the war.

Until you talk about a solution that is going to be observed and inspected and probably followed by some kind of ballot in time, then you are really not talking about a solution.

You are just talking about a temporary cease-fire, perhaps.

Senator CASE. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

CONTROL OF FUTURE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Mr. Cox. Well, I think, perhaps, I have used more than my share of time on this, but I would like to just make a few other remarks about the future of peacekeeping.

I believe that after the Vietnam war is brought to an end there can be a great advancement, a great development in this field, and based on the talks that I have had with member delegations from most of the governments who have been interested in peacekeeping, I think there is a great willingness to move ahead, a very great interest particularly among, what we call the third world, the developing nations.

I think, also, that in the future if we are going to have a reasonably well organized approach where we do have satisfactory financing, we

are going to have to recognize that the Communists not only want to but will insist upon participating in the command and control and financing of future peacekeeping operations.

I don't think we can keep them out and, furthermore, I don't think it is desirable to keep them out.

I think that it is desirable for the super powers, the United States and the Soviets, to avoid thinking in terms of putting in their own combat forces in peacekeeping operations. But I do think it is perfectly possible for Rumanians, Poles, Czechoslovakians to participate in future peacekeeping operations. They already have participated in Cyprus on the civilian side, the political side, and in such complex matters as refugee movement. They are definitely interested.

I have talked to representatives of these Governments, and they are certainly interested in the future developments of international peacekeeping.

I suspect they will be just as responsible and disciplined as the Yugoslavs have been.

As you know, the Yugoslavs have participated in many peacekeeping operations and have been exceptionally good and effective and well disciplined.

So that I do think in the command and control of future peacekeeping operations, we should anticipate that Communists as well as NATO members like the Norwegians, the Danes, and so on, and neutralists, will be participating.

FINANCING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Now, as to finances, I believe that international peacekeeping is so much in the national interest of the United States that we should have a very flexible and in fact a generous attitude about the relatively small budgets that most of these peacekeeping operations cost.

For instance, in Cyprus, the security that is being kept there in the heart of the Mediterranean in this very explosive area for a relatively small amount of money with a handful of international forces is such a good investment that I think the United States should be prepared at all times to pick up a large share of the budget.

We have had some restrictions in the past on peacekeeping operations as to what we felt our share should be.

Actually, today, the United States has about 47 percent of the world's gross product, and I think we should be prepared to put in at least 47 percent of the cost of operations of this sort, which are so clearly in our national security interests.

NEW TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Now, I also think that we are likely to see in the future the use of new technology in international peacekeeping. I think we are likely to see the use of electronic devices, the use of satellites, the use of early warning information, where the governments of the world participating in the United Nations will be able to act swiftly and to get sufficient advance intelligence so that crises can be looked at in time to act, and also I think we will see new techniques of crisis management, new techniques of riot control. I suspect that international peacekeepers in the future will be using such things as Mace and other chemicals,

nonlethal chemicals, which are deterrents where mobs can be controlled very swiftly, where border incidents can be checked very swiftly, where the knowledge of people on the spot that such deterrents exists will in itself be a deterrent.

These are things that people are just beginning to think about, I don't think yet in sufficient depth.

I think that is a very important element for the future.

INDIVIDUALLY RECRUITED FORCE ADVOCATED

Now, looking to paragraph (b) of Senator Clark's resolution, I think that this is a goal that the drafters of the United Nations strongly had in mind. I think it is a desirable one to look for.

I do think it is important to think of it as something for the future. I find very appealing, the idea of individual recruitment. I think that this is a political act which has great dynamics. Just out of my curiosity in traveling around the world, I have talked to a number of young men, university and military men, about this subject, and I suspect that once this kind of a political act is taken that the impact will be dynamic, that you will have a very, very affirmative response, something akin to the response to our own Peace Corps program when it started. This is the kind of interest I have run into.

I do think this is something for the future. I think it should be approached gradually, but I think it is in the right direction.

Thank you.

Senator CLARK (presiding). Thank you very much. Mr. Cox.

We will now hear from Dr. Stanley Michalak, Jr., Assistant Professor of Government at Franklin and Marshall College.

I am very happy to have a representative of such a distinguished arts college from my own Commonwealth with us today.

I know, Doctor, that your prepared statement is 13 rather closely written pages long, and I will ask consent that it may be printed in full in the record at the end of your testimony, and that you would attempt to condense it into not more than 15 or 20 minutes so that we may proceed with the other two witnesses and then get to what I hope will be a valuable seminar through a question period.

STATEMENT OF DR. STANLEY J. MICHALAK, JR., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE

Mr. MICHALAK. I have a very short summary of the statement.

May I say, Mr. Senator and members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to be here. I hope what I have to say will be helpful here.

First of all, I think that Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 reflects a realistic response to the experience with peacekeeping since the Senate has acted in this area in 1958.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

Senator CLARK. Could I ask you if you would define in your own mind the difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking? The phrases are used in the resolution. I do not think that they mean quite the same thing.

Mr. MICHALAK. Well, peacemaking, as I assume, is concerned with the settlement of disputes and the healing of disputes. Peacekeeping in the sense we are dealing with it, as distinguished from the force in Korea under the charter—peacekeeping in the sense as it has been used over the last 12 years—concerns patrolling, policing, allowing hostile forces to disengage, helping states maintain order as in the Congo and allowing for facesaving withdrawals as again in the case of the Congo as when the Belgians did when they pulled out in the Congo. So what we are involved with in peacekeeping is separating belligerents and controlling and supervising and other functions of this kind.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

HOPES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Mr. MICHALAK. I think the immediate objectives of the resolution reflect one lesson and that is any hope for peacekeeping operations in the immediate future will have to depend largely upon those steps that nations are now taking alone and in concert both to earmark and to train units for such contingencies.

Also by moving the creation of a permanent United Nations peace force from an immediate to a long-range objective.

I think this resolution also takes note of the lack of consensus in the international system at present for the creation of any such force. And with regard to Senator Clark's specific question in his opening remarks about an individually recruited permanent peace force, let me say we have had serious problems with national units in these forces. In the case of the Congo, as soon as the consensus broke down, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia made it clear with the Secretary General if policies did not change they would consider pulling out their forces.

I think Nkrumah threatened to turn his forces over to Lumumba and Lumumba used them to end Katanga's secession.

In the case last year of the Middle East, even if Secretary U Thant wanted to keep the contingent there, some of the contingents said they were going to pull out regardless of what the feeling of the Secretary General or the Assembly might be, so we have a problem with international force.

PROBLEMS IN AN INDIVIDUALLY RECRUITED FORCE

However, when you talk about creating an individually recruited force, you have many more problems. The questions are: how many are you going to have in the force, where are they going to be recruited from, can they be recruited from major as well as minor powers? Must there be a geographic representation, who will appoint the commanders, how will one rise up in the ranks? In his book, "The U.N. Peace Force," the author in 1956 estimated that a force of 7,000 men would cost about \$26 million a year to keep ready. And then the other questions: where are you going to keep these people? So there is no question there are problems with national units. But there is also the problem with recruiting of an international permanent peace force. This you have to negotiate of course.

Senator CASE. Just a question, if I may. It is correct, is it not, that the Secretary General is opposed to the immediate creation of a substantial force in being for this purpose?

Mr. MICHALAK. Yes.

Senator CASE. I take it generally for the reasons that you have summarized here.

Mr. MICHALAK. Yes, and also the important thing is that the consensus does not exist.

Senator CASE. That is the basic problem of course.

Mr. MICHALAK. That is right.

Senator CASE. You have to have a political instrument before you dare create a military force.

Mr. MICHALAK. That is right.

I think then that this resolution would really provide some encouragement to those nations that are earmarking for training, and I would hope it would begin to prod the executive branch more than it has been doing to foster and to strengthen peacekeeping operations within the U.N.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF PEACEKEEPING

The bulk of my remarks in my statement, however, are concerned not so much with the technical problems of peacekeeping but the serious political problems in peacekeeping because these are the essential problems.

I think that the operations in the Congo and more recently in the Middle East have raised considerable concern about the impartiality of peacekeeping. In fact there are those in this Nation and abroad who are beginning to think that the U.N. peacekeeping operations may not serve the national interests. In the Congo, of course, any action had political overtones, and if we looked at the scenarios for the future, possible guerrilla war in the Union of South Africa, possible guerrilla war in Rhodesia, the breakdown of nation states, two questions arise: Is there a role for U.N. peacekeeping at all in such situations like this, and, second, if there is, how can a force hope to be impartial?

Now, one of the questions that we have is the fear that there may be the initiation of a peace force against the interests of the United States, a peace force that might endanger us or our allies.

I think from a structural point of view, this is a fear that is absolutely unfounded. There is no question that the West has lost its positive majority in the General Assembly, but it is highly unlikely that we could not muster a minority of one-third plus one to block any kind of authorization that we oppose.

Secondly, we do possess a veto in the Security Council, and to override this veto and vote a Uniting for Peace resolution would require nine votes and again we only need six. So again I think that is unlikely.

Finally from the statement of Mr. Goldberg on August 16, 1965, I think this Nation has now made it clear we will opt out financially from any peacekeeping obligation we do not believe in. So I believe in terms of this fear that the General Assembly might start authorizing peacekeeping forces to go into, say, Rhodesia, or the Union of South Africa, some people have called these peacebreaking forces, this is very, very minimal if it has the will.

SECRETARY GENERAL AND CONTROL OF AN OPERATION

The more difficult problem of control is the problem of once the operation starts, how do you keep the Secretary General responsive to the organ issuing orders, namely the Security Council and the General Assembly.

We had a problem in the Congo and in the Middle East when there was a lack of consensus between the Secretary General and his actions and leading members of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and we have two results: One is his disaffection with peacekeeping by the member states, and, second, the loss of effectiveness of the Secretary General himself.

The bulk of my statement is that advisory committees have generally been less than satisfactory. However, when you look at the alternatives, they are all just as bad. One, of course, is the troika system, which is absolutely impossible. It assures that the Secretary General will not be out of line with the organs but then it means he will not do anything at all.

Another proposal that has been made is to replace the Secretary General as the administrator of these forces with an individual, one state, or a group of states. In Korea we had an individual state running the operation, and there is no question but that was an American operation and not a United Nations operation in terms of responsibility.

I think the witnesses would agree. I think there are problems with that approach.

Another solution is more precise resolutions. That is almost completely infeasible. If you look at the Congo, there was no consensus from September 1960 to February 1961 and yet things were happening.

Another solution is that there be time limits to operations. This is what is being done in the Cyprus operation and again I do not think that would work in the Congo situation. Again it would be peacekeeping operations and mass chaos would be carried out.

And finally there are proposals for reforms in the advisory committees which again I do not think are very helpful. I think all of these alternatives themselves are not feasible. I think we have a problem that admits of no solution.

ERRORS OF JUDGMENT INEVITABLE

I do not think there is any way of any political institution—I underscore that—of any political institution to assure an executive will be free from errors of judgment or oversight.

So I think that if we are going to have these peacekeeping operations in the future, we will just have to face the fact they are going to be actions that we may consider unwise or inappropriate, but I think the best we can expect is good faith on the part of the Secretary General, a full accounting of his actions and rationale.

I realize that to continue with the status quo may mean that we are going to have to lose a Secretary General every now and then, but I think this is the price that the international community is going

to have to pay both for peace and peacekeeping. I think it is a high price, but I think it is a price that any incumbent of the office of Secretary General is well aware of and is willing to pay.

Senator CLARK. Are you referring to the Secretary General being killed, as Hammarskjold was, or becoming a political casualty?

Mr. MICHALAK. No, I feel that if Secretary General Hammarskjold had not died, I think he would have had to resign. There is no question in my mind that his effectiveness was just reduced, he would not have been able to operate.

Senator CLARK. Because of the Congo operation?

Mr. MICHALAK. Because of the Congo operation.

Senator CASE. But he made his point at the same time, he had made his point that he had served the purpose he has to serve in this imperfect operation.

Mr. MICHALAK. That is right. I think he realized this is the risk he had to take. This is the same thing that happened to Secretary General Lie. We were very lucky with the repercussions of the Mideast crisis that it did not cost us a Secretary General. Before acceding to Russian demands, he said, "I quit," and in that way he did not have to accede to the Russian demand, but he was voted in by acclamation.

Senator CASE. There is no analogy in recent months or recent weeks, is there? [Laughter.]

Senator CLARK. I think that is a serious question. I think it is a very serious question. What do you think?

Senator CASE. Maybe we should not sacrifice him yet. [Laughter.]

Mr. MICHALAK. You mean about the President's move?

Senator CLARK. No, where we are by way of being very close to sacrificing a Secretary General because U Thant, to my way of thinking, has been extremely aggressive, and rightly so, and I commend him for everything he has done. But he certainly has made a lot of enemies in the process.

Do you have a view on that?

Senator CASE. I think it is a good way to get over this little roughness, you are right.

Mr. MICHALAK. I would like to think a minute before I say something.

Senator CLARK. Well, think about it.

Mr. MICHALAK. That is all I have to say.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

(Mr. Michalak's full statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY DR. STANLEY J. MICHALAK, JR.

Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to be here today to present my views on S. Con. Res. 47, a resolution which reaffirms the support of Congress for United Nations peacekeeping activities and calls upon the United States Government to do two things: (1) to assist, support, and encourage all those steps now being taken to prepare for future situations in which peacekeeping forces will be called for and (2) to encourage and support the creation of a permanent United Nations peace force.

PAST CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

What I would like to do today, Mr. Chairman, is to discuss some of the problems and difficulties which have arisen in the employment of United Nations peacekeeping forces since the Congress last made any pronouncements in this area. As the members of the Committee are well aware, when the Senate first became involved in the area of United Nations peacekeeping operations, the

general mood was one of optimism. The success of UNEF in allowing and maintaining a peaceful disengagement of hostile forces in the Middle East portended a new technique through which the United Nations could serve the peace. In the debate over the Eisenhower Doctrine, the small emergency force in the Middle East received considerable praise. In fact, the Doctrine itself was amended to include a specific pledge of continued American support and assistance to the Force.

Several months later, on August 8, 1957, the Senate agreed without objection to S. Res. 15, a resolution which called for the establishment of a permanent United Nations force modeled along the lines of UNEF. To be sure, a number of important problems concerning the nature of the utilization of such a force were recognized, problems of financing, control, and logistics. But quite clearly the feeling was widespread that new life and new hope for the United Nations had appeared in the UNEF idea.

One year later this general optimism was still in evidence when the Senate and the House adopted S. Res. 15 in the form of a concurrent resolution, S. Con. Res. 109. In fact, to many members of both houses the Lebanon crisis then in progress presented exactly the kind of situation in which a permanent United Nations force could be effectively employed. The creation of such a force, it was argued, would have spared the United States the awkwardness and considerable loss of prestige it was to suffer through its unilateral intervention. Although there was some opposition to the resolution at this time, it was adopted in the Senate by an overwhelming majority of 66 to 14 and in the House by a similar vote of 299 to 20.

EXPERIENCE WITH U.N. PEACEKEEPING SINCE S. CON. RES. 109

In the ten years that have intervened since the adoption of S. Con. Res. 104, however, the optimistic hopes for the creation of a permanent peace-keeping arm of the United Nations have been dashed both at home and abroad. Even more, arguments and disagreements about the utilities of peacekeeping operations *per se* have developed both among and within nation states.

In the international system, the experience with peace-keeping operations (and especially those in the Congo) has led to serious differences among the major powers on the crucial issues of authorization, control, and financing. The depths of these disagreements have been great and their effects have been ominous for the cause of peace. They have cost the United Nations a Secretary-General. They have nearly bankrupted the world organization. They have placed, for a time the whole future of the United Nations in doubt. And they have prevented the adoption of any authoritative United Nations policies or guidelines for future peacekeeping operations. In short, these fundamental disagreements have made the prospects for the creation of any permanent United Nations peace force exceedingly remote.

Nonetheless, when crises arise philosophical differences among the powers recede, peace-keeping forces ultimately appear, and some mode of financing is usually found. And the appearance of these forces stems not from miracles but from two factors. First, they stem from the foresight and dedication of those nations who have trained and earmarked forces to perform the vast array of functions which U.N. peace-keeping forces are required to perform. And secondly, they are due to hardworking and dedicated international civil servants and diplomats.

REALISM OF S. CON. RES. 47

In my opinion, S. Con. Res. 47 reflects a realistic response to this experience. All of those immediate objectives of this resolution—those sentences calling for supporting and encouraging the earmarking and training of national units, the preparing of transport, communication, and logistical facilities and personnel, and the creation of guidelines—all of these reflect the lesson that any hope for future peace-keeping operations depends upon the steps which nations must now take on their own or in concert, but largely outside the framework of the United Nations. By moving the creation of a permanent U.N. peace-force from an immediate to a long-range objective this resolution also reflects the lack of any consensus in the international community for the creation of such a force and the remoteness of its prospects.

However, as realistic as this resolution may be, it will not resolve the doubts and questions which have arisen in the minds of many Americans in the last ten years about the extent to which United Nations peace-keeping operations

actually serve the national interest. For the experience with peace-keeping operations, and especially those in the Congo and more recently the Middle East, has raised considerable concern about the financing, authorization, and control of U.N. forces and operations. Thus, the international debate is mirrored within our own national community. Because the members of this subcommittee have already given considerable thought and attention to the financial problems of peace-keeping and because I am sure that this topic will be considered in great detail in these hearings, I would like to devote the bulk of my attention to problems of control over peace-keeping operations.

Involved in this issue of control are two problems: (1) the authorization or initiation of peace-keeping programs and (2) the actual control of and responsibility for the day-to-day operations of a program.

FEAR OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HOSTILE TO U.S. AND ALLIED INTERESTS

In regard to the first of these problems, there are those who fear that the United Nations may initiate peace-keeping programs which are inimical to the national interests of the United States and which might endanger the nation's security and sovereignty. While such views received little consideration in the late nineteen-fifties, they have been given increasingly serious consideration because of three factors: (1) the vast influx of newly independent, neutralist nations, (2) the loss of Western majority control in the General Assembly, and (3) the actual experience of the peace-keeping operations in the Congo. In fact, to some the Congo operations seemed to be a culmination of the first two factors and signified the capture of the United Nations by forces hostile to the United States and its closest allies. As Senator Dodd remarked during the first round of fighting between Katangan and United Nations forces in September of 1961:

It is not the business of the United Nations army, financed largely by U.S. money, to go about overthrowing anti-communist governments and installing pro-Communist coalition governments. There is absolutely nothing in the Charter of the United Nations or in the resolutions of the Security Council which authorizes the actions taken by the U.N.

Thus, while the UNEF operation appeared to almost everyone to be in both the national and international interest, the ONUC operations indicated to many that all peace-keeping operations might not follow the impartial UNEF model. As a result, a fear arose that the United Nations, especially given the present composition of the General Assembly, might initiate an operation inimical to American national interests. Even more, when the Kennedy Administration insisted in the early nineteen-sixties that assessments for the costs of peace-keeping operations were binding on all nations, these same people feared that the day was not far off when the United States would be required to pay for such operations as well.

What is the validity of these arguments? Well, if the mandatory requirement for financing had held, then this *might* have been a possibility. And I underscore the *might*. I do this because we must not overlook the fact that even before mandatory financing became a dead letter, the initiation of any peace-keeping operation which the United States strongly opposed would not be an easy matter. While the United States can no longer command a ready majority in the General Assembly, it would have been unlikely that it could not obtain a minority of one-third plus one to block any peace-keeping operation it opposed. In the Security Council the United States possesses a veto; and if this veto were employed, opponents of the United States would have to find nine votes to invoke the Uniting for Peace Resolution and take the matter to the Assembly. Beyond this, we must not forget that no peace-keeping operation has ever been instituted that did not have at least the acquiescence of the major powers. While the Soviets refused to pay for UNEF from the very beginning, they did not oppose its creation or emplacement with any great vigor. Had they done so, it cannot be said with any certainty whether the Force would have ever materialized.

With the refusal of the Soviets and others to pay their back assessments and the reluctance of other nations to enforce a mandatory requirement, it appears that the American position has changed in regard to financing. As Ambassador Goldberg stated in his speech of August 16, 1965, before the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations:

At the same time, we must make it crystal clear that if any nation can insist on making an exception to the principle of collective financial responsibility with respect to certain activities of the organization, the United States reserves the same option to make exceptions if, in our view, strong and com-

elling reasons exist for doing so. There can be no double standard among the members of the organization.

When one adds this power of the purse to the other pre-existing levers of power I mentioned a moment ago, the possibility of the initiation of a peace-keeping program to which this nation were vigorously opposed is almost nil.

However, let it be clear that I am talking about power and neither policy nor will. Whether an incumbent administration will ever resort to using these levers of power, is another question. And this is a fear shared by some. The point is, however, that, structurally speaking, the United States is quite far from a position of impotence in determining what peace-keeping operations the United Nations will or will not undertake.

PROBLEM OF SECRETARIAT RESPONSIBILITY

The real problem of control lies not with the authorization or initiation of programs but with the second and more general problem of assuring the responsible exercise of power by the person administering peace-keeping operations—responsibility to the organs which make the policies governing peace-keeping ventures.

While the rise of the Secretary-General as the administrator of peace-keeping operations may have breathed new life into the United Nations, it has also created an unanticipated problem of balancing power and responsibility within the Organization. Had the Charter operated as its framers intended, of course, this situation would never have come about. For in that case, international peace-keeping ventures would have been authorized and carried out by only one of the major organs, the Security Council.

With the demise of major power unity, however, the Security Council became incapable of action. Thus after the unique experience of Korea, the responsibility for carrying out peace-keeping operations has fallen on the Secretary-General, while the General Assembly and the Security Council have acted mainly as authorizing organs. This, of course, results in a separation between the organ which authorizes and makes policy for peace-keeping operations and the one which is responsible for carrying it out. Consequently, the question arises of how to insure that the administrator's actions conform to the intentions and mandates of the policy-issuing organs. This problem is perhaps the most serious one in regard to peace-keeping; perhaps even more serious than the financing problem. In fact, it is probably *the* problem that underlies much of the debate over financing.

It was not until the Congo crisis that the significance of this problem was felt in a direct way. Throughout that crisis the impartiality and responsibility of the Secretary-General and his staff were seriously and sharply questioned. The closing of the Leopoldville airport and communications facilities by Andrew Cordier, an American member of the Secretariat staff, led to the fall of Lumumba and brought on vitriolic attacks and demands for a troika from the Soviet Union. Later, actions by the Secretary-General and his staff which were aimed at eroding the independence of Katanga led to sharp criticism here as well as in Western Europe. More recently, the decision of Secretary-General Thant to withdraw UNEF without the approval or even a meeting of the General Assembly, has also led to criticism.

The basis for actions and problems such as these is easy to identify. A busy General Assembly of 122 nations which is not in session several months of the year just cannot supervise on the continuing basis the actions of the Secretary-General. Nor can a Security Council which meets on a sporadic basis and usually only in response to crises. Beyond this, due to the realities of United Nations politics (and this is especially true of the General Assembly), it is almost impossible to get resolutions adopted which provide clear and precise guidelines upon which a Secretary-General can act with certainty. Thus, the lot of the Secretary-General as well as the authorizing organs is not an easy one.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE AS RESPONSIBILITY-MAINTAINING DEVICES

This problem was not unanticipated by the members of the United Nations, however, in its very first resolution creating UNEF an advisory committee was formed by the General Assembly to do four things: (1) to act as a purely advisory body to the Secretary-General in matters relating to the actual operation of the Force, (2) to act as a planning and policy proposing body, (3) to share

administrative tasks with the Secretary-General, and (4) to serve as a "watch-dog" committee. Thus, the Secretary-General was to issue all regulations and instructions to the Force in consultation with the committee. And it was explicitly stated that the advisory committee was to request the reconvening of the General Assembly whenever matters arose which "in its opinion" were of such urgency and importance as to require the consideration of the Assembly. The members of this committee were representatives appointed by the governments of Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Iran, Norway and Pakistan.

The Congo operation began without an advisory committee, even though the ONUC force was to be modeled on the experience of UNEF which called for such committees in future peace-keeping operations. One was created by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, however, when the Soviet Union and Prime Minister Lumumba called for the creation of a "group of observers" which would go to the Congo and ensure "on the spot and without delay" the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga. Hammarskjöld's advisory committee, though, met in New York and its membership consisted of representatives from those nations contributing contingents to the Congo operation.

What has been the experience with these committees? Well, first of all, they seem to have been very helpful to the Secretary-General in a number of important ways. In both crises they provided him with a small, confidential body wherein he could clear his thoughts, share his concerns, and seek counsel and advice. In both crises they served as a means by which the Secretary-General could legitimate decisions or actions he had taken by saying or implying that they had been approved by his advisory committee. And finally, in the Congo operations, the advisory committee served as a repository for the Secretary-General to lay such highly charged issues as reconciling political factions in the Congo and dealing with the murder of Premier Lumumba. When these issues arose, Mr. Hammarskjöld turned them over to his advisory committee and pledged that he would abide by whatever decisions they made.

PROBLEMS OF ADVISORY COMMITTEES

But so much for service to the Secretary-General. To what extent did these committees actually perform their functions of oversight? To what extent did they actually serve as responsibility-maintaining mechanisms?

The answer to both of these questions seems to be, very little, if at all. While these were secret committees, the evidence indicates that in all discussions final decisions were made by the Secretary-General. Also, despite all the crises that arose in both the Congo and more recently, the middle East, never did an advisory committee (1) raise any questions publicly about controversial actions taken, (2) report about such actions to either authorizing body, or, (3) call for the convening of the Assembly or Council to consider any issue of controversy or to clarify any mandate or provide a new one to meet new conditions.

Even more, the existence of these committees has actually added to the influence resources of the Secretary-General and allowed him to insulate himself from criticism. Let me cite one example. Two days after the Security Council had adopted its resolution allowing United Nations troops to use force if necessary to prevent civil war in the Congo, the Soviet delegate demanded to know why the Secretary-General had not yet taken any action. Mr. Hammarskjöld's answer was that he had already had three meetings with the advisory committee since the resolution, that one was also scheduled for the next day, and that plans were progressing as fast as they could. Further complaints from Zorin would have been leveled not only at the Secretary-General but at all his colleagues who were on the advisory committee, colleagues representing states the Soviets preferred not to offend.

Again and again, Hammarskjöld used the advisory committee during the Congo crisis as a means of preventing and forestalling attacks by the major powers on his conduct of the peace-keeping operations. As long as he could maintain a consensus among the bulk of troop contributors, who were largely Afro-Asian, he could remain largely immune from such criticism; for none of the major powers were willing to take a stand which would explicitly or implicitly criticize actions supported by the Afro-Asians when Hammarskjöld lost this consensus and the Afro-Asians split, the Soviets then joined the leftist African nations in attacking Hammarskjöld.

UNEF ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND RECENT CRISIS IN MIDDLE EAST

All of these weaknesses of the advisory committee device are well illustrated in the Middle East crisis of last June. When Secretary-General U Thant first came under fire for having quickly withdrawn UNEF from the Middle East, he stated that he did so after consultations with the advisory committee, thereby implying its agreement with and legitimation of his actions. Later, when more information became available, including U Thant's own report to the General Assembly, a quite different picture emerged.

While U Thant had consulted with the advisory committee as he had earlier claimed, the meeting had not been one of agreement but one of disagreement. Yet, because there was such disagreement with Thant's decision to comply immediately with the United Arab Republic's request, one would think that the Secretary-General would have sought for time in order to obtain a consensus or else the members of the committee, particularly those in disagreement, would have called for a meeting of the General Assembly. But such was not the case, the Secretary-General handed his decision to comply with the UAR's request to the Egyptian ambassador shortly after the advisory committee meeting and no call for a session of the General Assembly was issued by the committee. Why this was the case is unclear. But two points bear notice.

First, on the most crucial decision ever made about the disposition of UNEF, the advisory committee failed to serve in an advisory capacity; for U Thant merely informed the committee members of his decision to withdraw the force. Secondly, despite the sharp disagreement among the members of the committee about the wisdom of the Secretary-General's decision, no effort was made to call into session the General Assembly which authorized the Force and charged the advisory committee to request the convening of the General Assembly "whenever matters arise which, in its opinion, are of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by the General Assembly itself." If a request to withdraw the Force was not "of such urgency and importance as to require consideration of the General Assembly itself," what would be?

In short, there is a problem of balancing power and responsibility in United Nations peace-keeping operations. On the one hand, actions by the Secretary-General have had serious political consequences—consequences perceived by several member states as being inimical to their interests. On the other hand, this problem had cost the United Nations one Secretary-General and led to a great deal of criticism of another. And in the view of many, actual experience in ONUC and UNEF point to the inadequacy if not impotence of advisory committees to maintain this balance.

ALTERNATIVE PEACEKEEPING MODELS

But if present mechanisms are inadequate, what reforms or changes might be made to solve this problem. The possibilities are several and I should like to examine them briefly.

THE TROIKA PROPOSAL

The most radical change that has been proposed so far has been the Soviet troika proposal. This proposal which of course was rejected by the United Nations would replace the present Secretary-General by three persons of co-equal power, each having a veto over the actions of the other two. The advantage of this proposal is obvious. It would prevent any actions by a Secretary-General that were not acceptable to either the United States, the Soviet Union, and at least one other nation.

The disadvantages of this proposal, however, are equally obvious. First, while it would rule out capricious acts, it would probably rule out any action at all and result in near permanent immobilism while the authorizing organs preoccupied themselves with trivia. At the same time, it would probably result in more and more irresponsible actions by people in the field who must act and cannot often wait out prolonged debate. Secondly, it would insure responsiveness not to the Assembly or Council but to only three members of these institutions. Finally, and most importantly, by replacing the Secretariat entirely, it would mean the loss of all those important roles played by past and present Secretaries-General which depend upon individual initiative, tact, flexibility, and the status of impartiality inherent in that office. Thus, by solving one problem, and an im-

portant one admittedly, the international system would be denied one of its major mechanisms for facilitating peaceful change, disengagement, and settlement.

STATES OR INDIVIDUALS AS EXECUTORS

Another prospect would be to replace the Secretary-General as the executor of peace-keeping operations and give this function on a case-by-case basis to selected states, individuals, or groups of individuals. This method would have the advantage of reducing the exposure and vulnerability of the Secretary-General while leaving his facilitative role in international politics largely intact. Also, it would be easier and much less disruptive to the United Nations to fire a state, individual, or group of individuals than to fire a Secretary-General.

Yet, the disadvantages of this solution also seem to outweigh its advantages. Consider the model of a state as executor. This form was utilized in Korea where the United States was in charge. There, however, were serious problems. The war was largely American fought and American won. And the lines of command and response flowed much more between Korea and Washington than between Korea and New York. While it is true that Britain has been charged with the main responsibility with regard to Rhodesia, it is highly unlikely that a great power would be acceptable as an executor of a peace-keeping operation typical of those conducted in the past.

What about a small power performing this function then? Here the question is which small state? And this is so not only for reasons of trust and confidence, but of prestige as well. Also, the communications, logistics, and intelligence requirements for conducting peace-keeping operations would be extremely taxing on many smaller states, especially the newer ones. Such states might be subject to considerable pressures from the Great Powers. And finally, relieving a state of its responsibility may not necessarily be a light or easy matter.

The use of individuals is more complex. Individuals have been used effectively as mediators as in the Middle East. They have also served well on observation and other commissions as in the Conciliation Commission in the Congo. In the League period, a commission of individuals administered the Saar, although not without serious difficulties. The use of individuals in such important and facilitative roles should be continued and expanded as much as possible.

But should individuals be selected for the administration of whole peace-keeping operations? This is another matter. First, getting agreement on a person to perform this function might be extremely difficult and getting him to take on this responsibility even more difficult. More importantly, for an individual to run this operation would require (1) either the use of incumbent Secretariat staff from top to bottom, (2) the creation of a totally distinct staff, or (3) some mix of the two. If the communications, logistics, and intelligence requirements of simple peace-keeping operations could tax the facilities of many smaller nations, think what burdens they would place on an individual. If the selected individual were to rely largely on Secretariat staff and facilities this would require that the staff divide its time between work for the Secretary-General and the administrator. This, I think would create serious conflicts of loyalties. Also, the individual would be faced with the dual problems of learning how to set up and run a peace-keeping operation and running one at the same time. This may, however, be a possibility for largely nonpolitical operations.

MORE PRECISE RESOLUTIONS AND/OR TIME LIMITS TO OPERATIONS

Because one of the reasons for discretionary actions on the part of the Secretary-General has been the imprecision of Assembly and Council resolutions, a tightening of the language of authorizing resolutions might provide more direction and less room for leeway. This solution underscores the cause instead of the cure for the problem. Precisely because the members of the Assembly and Council could not explicitly and specifically agree on what they wanted done, and because the need for action was pressing, the role of the Secretary-General has been enhanced in crisis situations since the middle of the nineteen-fifties. The prospects for greater precision in resolutions, especially in the Assembly, is remote, although it could be sought.

In lieu of this, another expedient would consist of authorizing operations only for short periods of time with a requirement for review before renewal. This is what is being done in Cyprus. The authorization period is for periods of six months.

While this situation has fared well in Cyprus, this case is exceptional in a number of ways. The conflict, though internal in nature, largely involves

two allies who are both susceptible to influence by its major power ally. That is, there are in Cyprus no Soviet, European, or neutralist-nationalist factions as there were in the Congo. In such cases, short term authorizations would probably not solve the responsibility problem. Instead, they might merely lead to an early cessation of operations.

REFORMING THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE SYSTEM

Finally, structural and representational reforms of the present advisory committee system have been advocated as a means of insuring greater responsibility.

In the first regard, there are those who argue that past advisory committees have been incapable of exercising their functions solely because of structural arrangements. The Secretary-General presides over these committees. It is he who largely determines the frequency and agenda of these meetings. These committees have always met in New York and not on the scene, and confidential reports from field officers to the Secretariat remained privileged and were not available to committee members.

Thus, it is argued that given these structural characteristics the advisory committees have been incapable of interceding on their own initiative to attempt to influence or determine policy. After having served on the ONUC advisory committee and then later having gained access to confidential Secretariat telegrams, Conor Cruise O'Brien¹ had this to say:

As for the Congo Advisory Committee "advising" the Secretary-General on the basis of the information with which the Secretary-General saw fit to supply it, it seemed in light of the telegrams (seen only by the Secretary-General and his closest chosen advisors), much less like an advisory committee than a group of innocent outsiders being taken for a guided tour.

The heart of any proposal for structural reform really resides in this issue of confidentiality of information. For even if the chairmanship were placed in the hands of a member of the committee instead of the Secretary-General, this inaccessibility of vital information would probably mean that the committees would function largely as they have in the past.

If such information were made available to the committee, however, there might be several ill effects. First, there might arise a fear of and lack of candor on the part of those in the field whose frankness and accuracy is essential to the success of such operations. Secondly, if such reports become the subject of political controversy and if retribution were taken against individual officials responsible to the Secretary-General, morale in the Secretariat would probably decline. I see in this type of reform a possibility that committee members might evaluate staff reports and staff members on the basis of whether or not the content in these reports and the views of their authors coincided with particular national viewpoints. It might even jeopardize the whole concept of a non-political career oriented international civil service. Finally, the committees might be transformed from bodies where the Secretary-General can enter into frank and intimate discussions with some of his most important partners in peace-keeping to a forum for political controversy and combat.

In short, I feel that the disadvantages from such a reform would offset any advantages obtained. Also, if the members of these committees do feel that meetings are not frequent enough, or that they are not dealing with important issues of policy, or that they are not getting necessary and essential information, they have recourse to three important, albeit largely negative, sources of influence: (1) they can threaten to request a meeting of the authorizing bodies, (2) they can threaten to withdraw their contingents, and (3) they can threaten to resign from the committee.

A final proposal for reform would broaden these committees to include representatives from the permanent members of the Security Council. This proposal, I think, is both unnecessary and unwise. I say it is unnecessary because of its purpose is to keep the Secretary-General aware of the reactions of the major powers to the unfolding events during a peace-keeping operation, the traditional means of constant interaction in New York are adequate.

I say this proposal is unwise because I fear it would have an inhibitory effect on the frankness of discussion in committee meetings. I think it is important to remember that the office of the Secretary-General is the most exposed

¹ (Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), p. 50.

political office in the world. He has almost none of the levers of power available to political executives; in fact, his tenure of office is not even assured.

Yet, if these advisory committees have done nothing else, they have given him a means whereby he can frankly discuss and seek advice on the difficult problems he faces. Also, they provide him with a vehicle for solidifying support among some of his important constituents. To add representatives from the major powers to these committees would, in my opinion, mean the end of this.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, then, I would say this. First, while there have been some problems with the Secretary-General serving as administrator of peace-keeping operations, the alternatives to having him in charge of such programs seem to have more disadvantages than advantages.

Secondly, in operations with political implications inherent in them, it seems that only someone with the legitimacy and prestige of the office of the Secretary-General could begin to carry them out. To be sure, this might cost the Organization a Secretary-General at times, as incidents in ONUC would have meant the resignation of Dag Hammarskjöld had he not met his tragic untimely death. But this is a price the international community may have to pay for both peace and United Nations peace-keeping operations for some time to come. However, I think that every Secretary-General is aware of this and is willing to pay this price. Also, let it be clear that the whole, most peace-keeping operations have been free of the serious political problems that arose in ONUC and more recently in UNEF. I don't think that we need fear any rapid fire turnover of Secretaries-General.

Third, I think that the advisory committee device should be employed in future operations largely in the form they took in the past. While these committees may not have been as vigorous in oversight and criticism as they might have been, I feel that there is nothing inherent in their structure that would prevent them from so acting. In fact, they could probably aid and protect the Secretary-General at times by calling authorizing organs into session at times and forcing them to face up to their political responsibilities.

More importantly, I think that these committees serve two very important functions. First, they do provide a sense of purposeful involvement for some of the Secretary-General's most important constituents, those who contribute forces for these peace-keeping operations. Secondly, they provide a cushion of insulation between the actions and decisions of the Secretary-General and the mandate issuing organs. They legitimate his actions and provide a set of supporters in the Assembly and Council. They can, as Herbert Nicholas has put it, "relieve him of his loneliness" and provide "the most exposed man in the world" with another political resource in his precarious voyage through the web of international politics.

Senator CLARK. We will now hear from Arthur Barber formerly of the Department of Defense and now president of the Institute for Politics and Planning, Arlington, Va.

Mr. Barber, your statement is relatively brief. Would you prefer to read it or put it in the record?

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR BARBER, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR POLITICS AND PLANNING

Mr. BARBER. If you have no objection, sir, I will try to go through it quickly; it is about three pages.

Senator CLARK. Yes, please proceed.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss these issues with you, particularly to attempt, if I may paraphrase Senator Case, to strip away allusions and rhetoric and try to make these institutions work.

I think that it is a sad commentary on our times that we are forced to talk about building up the United Nations military force in the present world, and I do not believe that this will be a successful step toward peace.

My comments are in two parts. First some comments on the changing role of peacekeeping in the world today, and, second, some specific suggestions that might be reflected in modifications to the resolution or new legislation.

CHANGING ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING

While I support the resolution without reservation, we must recognize that the demand for U.N. peacekeeping units may not expand; indeed it may decline dramatically. I think there is an excellent chance that in the decade ahead crises and conflicts between nations will decline dramatically. At the same time, the likelihood of conflict within national boundaries will increase. While U.N. forces have been used in the Congo to limit civil conflict, I think this precedent may not soon be repeated. No one intervened in Indonesia or Nigeria at the outbreak of civil conflict, and although a representative recently suggested that the Dominican Republic send troops to Washington recently to protect Dominican citizens, I think the nations of the world are learning it is unwise to send foreign troops into a situation of domestic civil disorder whether the forces are under the U.N. sanction or not.

On the other hand, I think there is an ever-increasing need to U.N. factfinding and observation teams. In an ever-smaller and complex world, it is increasingly important for the members of the U.N. to have an objective assessment of a crisis. For example, suppose there were a sudden nuclear explosion at this moment. I think it would be extremely important that all of the peoples of the world and all of the leaders of government understand as promptly and as quickly as possible what had happened. It is in this field that I think this resolution or other legislation might go further.

OPERATIONS CENTER

First, the Secretary General and his staff should be provided with an operations center with a small full-time staff and round-the-clock communications to U.N. representatives and government leaders around the world. Furthermore, the current procedures which I understand require Security Council approval of factfinding missions should be changed to permit the Secretary General to send a factfinding group to gather information and to report to the Security Council, if the countries in the area to be observed do not object and the Security Council does not object, within a few hours after being notified.

Senator CLARK. Do you think that can be done administratively without the need for an amendment to the charter?

Mr. BARRER. I have discussed it with a few people and they believe it would not require an amendment to the charter. It would require some authorization by the General Assembly or the Security Council. I am not sure of the details.

SECRETARY GENERAL REPORT TO THE PEOPLE

Second, the Secretary General, with the approval of the General Assembly, should be encouraged to report to the people of the world regularly by television. Tentatively I would suggest a monthly report on progress toward peace and human dignity.

Senator CLARK. Do you think he would have to pay prime rates for it on the networks?

Mr. BARBER. I think it would be in our interest, Senator, and the interests of the Soviet people and the European people to provide this time for him free. I do not think he should provide for it. I think this is a case for public service to which our institutions are allegedly devoted.

Senator CLARK. Let the broadcast stations take notice: Comsat should do it.

Mr. BARBER. They should

He should, of course, have an immediate opportunity to speak when he wishes to do so in a crisis. In the last analysis, progress is reflected in changes in human attitudes, which in turn bring about changes in political and social institutions.

The Congress of the United States can, only at its peril, take positions too far ahead or behind the views of its constituents. Periodic television reports by the Secretary General would have a significant beneficial impact on worldwide attitudes on peace and human rights.

I believe it would be unwise for the U.S. Government to pay for such measures, but we could take a positive step by making private contributions for such purposes from private sources tax deductible. Let me say I think that many governments would be opposed to authorizing the Secretary General to accept private contributions for U.N. purposes such as this because it would diminish the influence of the primary financial contributors. For my part, I think the expansion of the base of financial support of the U.N. from a reliance solely on governments to private citizens and institutions, is necessary in one form or another.

The power of the U.N. is not and cannot be military power. U.N. peacekeeping forces can never become a significant military power. They can make a major contribution if used freely and effectively by the Secretary General to report to the world community on crises and threats to the peace. Such reports would contribute not only to the avoidance of war but to an expansion of man's vision beyond the framework of the nation state to creation of the human community that must be the foundation of any lasting peace.

Thank you.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Barber.

We will now hear from Mrs. Edward W. McVitty, United Nations observer for the World Association of World Federalists.

Mrs. McVitty you, also, have a prepared statement, and I wonder if we could put it in the record in full at the end of your testimony and ask you to summarize it now in, perhaps, 10 or 15 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF MARION H. McVITTY, UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER,
WORLD ASSOCIATION OF WORLD FEDERALISTS**

Mrs. McVITTY. Yes, I would be glad to do that.

I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify today. The bulk of my remarks and my testimony goes to paragraph 3 of part (a) where you call for guidelines.

In the Secretary General's introduction to his report of last year, he went very thoroughly into the peacekeeping issue, and he dealt with the financing of the military, the advising and the training, and so on,

but rather pushed all that aside and said, "The issue is a political issue, and what we need are ground rules."

It seems to me this is what has been missing, and where a lot of the political opposition has developed.

The type of peacekeeping we are discussing today was not in the charter in any detailed form. I think it is authorized, but it is not detailed.

The mandates, except for the first one for UNEF, have been very, very sketchy. They virtually told the Secretary General to take steps.

PEACEKEEPING REPORT OF SECRETARY GENERAL

Senator CLARK. Mrs. McVitty, it appears to me that it might be useful if we could put into the record that part of the Secretary General's report which deals with these peacekeeping matters. I wonder if you could furnish the staff with the excerpts.

Mrs. McVITTY. I could when I get back to New York, sir. I do not have it with me.

Senator CLARK. There is no hurry. If you would send it in to the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee I will see that it is placed in the record. It is not all that long, is it?

Mrs. McVITTY. I think it could be excerpted.

Senator CLARK. Would you undertake to make those excerpts?

Mrs. McVITTY. I would be very glad to.

(The document referred to follows:)

EXCERPTS FROM THE INTRODUCTION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT¹ OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION, JUNE 16, 1966—JUNE 15, 1967

I. GENERAL

* * * * *
 * * * The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, in spite of its best efforts, has been unable to evolve and formulate certain well established ground rules and guidelines which are essential for the successful conduct of peace-keeping operations in the future. * * * This is a matter of deep regret to me, especially as recent events have shown very clearly the need to agree on basic guidelines for the conduct of peace-keeping operations, and I wish to express my hope that this problem will receive the urgent attention that it deserves. * * *
 * * * * *

IV. PEACEKEEPING

The lack of progress in the establishment of a more durable framework for peace-keeping operations, with agreed and authorized guidelines, and ground rules for setting them up, conducting and financing them, undoubtedly diminishes the confidence with which the United Nations can face the probable conflict situations of the future. It is not to the credit of the United Nations that after nineteen years of peace-keeping efforts each operation has still to be improvised for lack of measures of a general preparatory nature by the appropriate organs. While it seems to be agreed that the United Nations must have some capacity to act effectively in time of danger, it has not so far been possible to agree on methods by which that capacity would be increased and made more reliable, especially in the periods between crises. This deficiency stems from the fundamental differences among the Members of the interpretation of the Charter with regard to United Nations activity in behalf of peace.

In this uncertain situation, the decision of a number of Member States to earmark elements of their armed forces for standby service in United Nations peace-

¹ Published by United Nations Office of Public Information. Reprinted from U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Volume IV, Number 9, October 1967, OPI/281—22214—October 1967—10,000M.

keeping operations is a welcome step. It would be helpful in connexion with such forward-looking actions if it could at least be agreed among the Members that the General Assembly would undertake to study such questions as the standardization of training and equipment for standby forces, the relationship of the United Nations to governments providing such forces, and the constitutional and financial aspects of employing them. This could be done either by a committee specially appointed for the purpose or by authorizing the Secretary-General himself to carry out the necessary studies. Such a study would give some impetus to the development of the peace-keeping concept and technique as well as provide useful practical ideas. The Secretary-General has now gone as far as he can properly go in these matters without specific authorization.

These are the basic elements of the United Nations peace-keeping problem—its voluntary nature, its inability to operate if any party is determined on violence, and the lack of agreement in the United Nations on the legitimate basis for peace-keeping, present and future. There are other less fundamental difficulties which sometimes are cited—perhaps because the real basic obstacles seem so intractable—as principal causes of the lack of progress or improvement in United Nations peace-keeping. It is often said, for example, that lack of military staff and lack of planning in the Secretariat are an important source of weakness. The proponents of this position, based on a misleading equation of United Nations peace-keeping operations—which are only semi-military in their functioning—with normal national military operations, never make clear what they would expect even a limited military staff at United Nations Headquarters to do. It is all too obvious that contingency military planning by the Secretariat for specified future operations would be, to put it mildly, politically unacceptable. Apart from anything else, such planning would depend upon the gathering of political intelligence which it would be out of the question for the United Nations to attempt.

It has been said also that the preparation of all sorts of standing operational procedures would greatly improve the quality of United Nations peace-keeping performance. The fact is that such procedures do exist and have been compiled routinely for each peace-keeping operation. These are used as a basis when a new operation is mounted, but experience has shown that instructions and procedures have to be adapted specifically to each operation since, so far at any rate, the various peace-keeping operations have differed widely in scope, nature, composition and function.

The Secretariat at the present time has neither the authorization nor the budget to engage in widespread planning, staff work, recruitment or training activities such as are common to national military establishments; nor, indeed, in present circumstances would such activity have much practical utility. A plan for the training of officers for United Nations peace-keeping duties was elaborated in detail some years ago, but has never been implemented for lack of authorization and finance. In the prevailing political circumstances at the United Nations it is hard to see how a United Nations military staff, even if authorized by the competent organs, could justify its existence and actually improve very much the quality either of existing operations or of hypothetical future ones.

The hard and frustrating fact remains that the principal obstacles in the way of an improvement in United Nations peace-keeping are primarily political and constitutional, and only secondarily military and financial. The crossroads which we seem to have reached in peace-keeping is marked by a political and constitutional impasse. Member States today have the choice of two main directions. They could, despite all the difficulties, frustrations and disappointments, pursue and develop the possibilities of United Nations peace-keeping as a rational and civilized method of seeking to mitigate conflict while basic solutions are sought. They could, on the other hand, decide that the conditions of the contemporary world are too complex and too violent to allow of reasonable and peaceful regulation and that the United Nations has no useful active role at present in helping to keep the peace or in developing a potential for future action of that nature. The latter course seems to me to be unthinkable, for the dangers of the present and the risks of the future will surely not be slow in developing to a critical and disastrous stage should it be adopted. Whatever may be the shortcomings of the United Nations and its failures to find durable solutions or to maintain peace, its achievements both at the conference table and in the field have already demonstrated the essential worth of the peace-keeping concept.

The United Nations cannot begin to justify the hopes placed in it unless it is enabled by its Members to meet the challenge of the increasingly dangerous situa-

tions in many parts of the world by improved methods and new initiatives. It is worth repeating that the pioneering efforts in peace-keeping have not been matched by new and imaginative initiatives in the process of peace-making involving the peaceful settlement of disputes. The capacity of the United Nations to settle disputes or promote constructive and peaceful solutions to disputes is as much—perhaps even more—in need of study as the problems of peace-keeping. The tendency for peace-keeping operations, originally set up as temporary expedients, to assume a semi-permanent character because no progress is made in settling the basic causes of conflict is a serious reflection on the capacity of the United Nations to settle disputes even when these disputes have been brought to the United Nations by the parties directly concerned.

The role of peace-keeper is never likely to be continuously popular with any of the parties to a conflict. By the very nature of its status and its moderating functions, a peace-keeping operation can never espouse the cause of any of the parties. There thus tends to be an underlying element of dissatisfaction and frustration in the relations of the United Nations with the parties to a conflict. This condition may even at times border on a breakdown in those relations. This, however, does not signify that the peace-keeping work of the United Nations has served no purpose, nor that it would be in the interest of the parties to a conflict to do without the assistance which the Organization alone can give them. Quite apart from its more positive functions, the United Nations provides an invaluable repository and a safe target for blame and criticism which might otherwise be directed elsewhere. The Organization has, during all its years and in many situations, performed a vital function as an international lightning rod, as in fact, it is now doing in the Middle East. These are facts of international life which should not be lost sight of when the effectiveness and the future of the peace-keeping function are being considered. The basic problem, now as always, lies in the acceptance by governments of international decisions and machinery and the degree of their realization that the wider interests of international peace may in the long run also coincide with their own best interests. We are today, I need hardly add, very far, in general, from such a realization.

AGREEMENT ON PEACEKEEPING COMMITMENT

Mrs. McVITY. The recent experience in the Middle East of the withdrawal of the force because the consent was removed, and the experience in the Congo—as some other witness has mentioned—of the threat of withdrawal of forces, contingents, which actually occurred at the most crucial moment—they did withdraw contingents, and they were replaced with great difficulty—seem to me to show that the experience of the U.N. on this has been to say, “Well, consent is consent to deployment, and to stop it whenever you want to, if you volunteered contingents or you have invited the U.N. in.”

In the Cyprus situation temporary periods of 3 to 6 months have been used, and it has been rather tacitly understood, I think, that during that period probably the Security Council or the U.N. would decide a contingent would be withdrawn or the force would be withdrawn.

It seems to me that you could make a similar commitment in the future where you have a peacekeeping operation where those who would be a host country or those contributing would agree that for a period of from 3 to 6 months or whatever the period was they would not withdraw the force, but consented to go that long.

Senator CASE. Is there something to the point that up to now, by guess or whatever it is, things have worked about as well as they could, that maybe in the Congo situation it would have been very dangerous to have a fixed force subject to political control or the control of the U.N., and that we are dealing with something that we had better not institutionalize?

Mrs. McVITTY. I think that, if I could continue with my testimony—

Senator CASE. Please do. I just interjected the point.

Mrs. McVITTY (continuing). It would answer that question, because my whole point is that you have to have some ground rules for peacekeeping.

Senator CASE. Yes. But do they have to be institutional?

Mrs. McVITTY. I think, perhaps, they have to be at least agreed upon in advance.

We talk very blithely about peacekeeping being voluntary and being supposedly impartial and noncombatant. It has to be so to a large extent, but mainly because the Secretaries General have seen to it that it was.

The members have at times wanted it to be a military force, at other times they have wanted it to withdraw, and so on.

It seems to me that you have to decide what a force of this sort may or may not do, at least in broad terms, and I think this is part of the ground rules that the Secretary General is seeking. He would like to be sure that it is going to be impartial, that it is not going to be put in on the side of Lumumba against Kasavubu, but as many of the members wished at the time, and despite all the difficulties in the Congo, I think in the end the criticisms balanced up so well from both sides that you feel that, perhaps, it was impartial, although it had its bad moments.

I think the other thing that is extremely important, and it is in the resolution, is this question of peacemaking to go along with peacekeeping.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

Senator CLARK. Mrs. McVitty, would you define those two terms in the same way that Dr. Michalak did?

Mrs. McVITTY. Yes. For our purposes here I think peacekeeping is the use of forces under the U.N. that are not combatant forces, that are voluntarily contributed, and that are to serve an impartial purpose. But they are forces, they are not merely observers. Observers can only report back, they cannot stop anybody from doing anything.

Peacemaking is the effort to settle the issues in dispute not by the use of force but by other means, peaceful means. In this connection, it seems to me extremely important that the U.N. gear itself to put peacemaking together with peacekeeping, so that when you have to deploy a force it is not going to be there indefinitely, either seeming to the populace as an occupation force or, perhaps, outliving its usefulness or not having the finances to continue. My suggestion would be that there be some effort made to get the parties to a dispute to go a little further than they did in Cyprus, where they accepted a mediator, but to say after certain limited periods or after certain efforts they would try a more decisive method of peaceful settlement.

I think the international community has some right to ask this if it provides the forces and settles their disputes. The difficulty has been in the past that the U.N. gave a sense of security that seemed to be just enough to inhibit even further the will to settle the dispute. This

has been true up to a point in Cyprus, and certainly in the Middle East for a while.

I think that the U.N. could very well suggest that they move through negotiation, mediation, including, perhaps, through arbitration, and if the parties knew in advance that this kind of procedure was going to move along they might wish to settle before they got to more onerous methods. At least I think the community has the right to ask this of them.

TYPES OF DISPUTES

Senator CASE. May I just pose a question here, to ask you, Mrs. McVitty, are you talking about just any kind of disputes? Are you talking about disputes in which the United States and Russia may be on opposite sides, for example, between them or between countries with whom they have such close relationships that they are involved?

Mrs. McVITTY. Of course, there is almost no dispute that comes to the United Nations in which the major powers do not feel themselves involved in one way or another.

Senator CASE. Well, you know what I mean.

Mrs. McVITTY. But it seems to me you have two or three different kinds.

I do not think the Congo is a good case where you could have used peacemaking because you had a chaotic situation of a new nation that really did not have its Government organized.

But certainly in the Middle East you have now the Jarring mission with a fairly well laid out set of conditions that both sides ought to try to accept.

If this had been done 10 years ago, when UNEF came along, perhaps in the 10 years that UNEF was there they might have arrived at something.

I do not think it would apply, I do not think any rules that are ground rules will apply, to every case invariably. I think you would have to be flexible. Some would apply to one situation, some would apply to another.

But I do think that there is an attitude of let the U.N. pacify the dispute, and then we will not have to think about it, which has not only existed among the parties but among the other members of the U.N. as well. They do not want to get into stirring up sleeping dogs; if they think the lid is on then they just go about something else.

AD HOC OR INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

Senator CASE. How do you—again, we are joint seekers after guidance and truth here—how do you say, what better way is there, than an ad hoc approach to this thing with great flexibility? I think the suggestions of our three previous witnesses probably have this common thread, that the informal authority of the Secretary General ought to be increased, and we should avoid the kind of thing that I think you are leaning toward, institutionalizing a process which would be started by the United Nations' getting into a particular dispute.

Mrs. McVITTY. Well, sir, I think there is room for a difference of opinion.

Senator CASE. Am I correct in my rough appraisal of the thrust of your testimony?

Mrs. McVITTY. I think there is the possibility to have a great deal of the ad hoc and a great deal of flexibility with some rather general but basic understandings in advance.

Once you get into a crisis situation anything you suggest seems prejudicial to one side or the other, and they resist it, and I think that is why the resolutions that authorize these forces have been very very sketchy. They make it extremely difficult then for the Secretary General to do anything.

Senator CLARK. I would like to interject, as I listen to this colloquy, that it occurs to me that the difference between Senator Case and Mrs. McVITTY is largely one of semantics. The Senator speaks of institutionalizing the situation, and Mrs. McVitty speaks of guidelines.

Certain guidelines might be established which would not necessarily institutionalize anything. I think if you are going to have an amendment to the charter then you would have an institutionalization. As I understand it, we are thinking in terms of procedures and not of an institutionalization. Am I right or wrong?

Mrs. McVITTY. I am thinking of a minimum of guidelines which, I think, would help to reduce the political heat of some of these crises, and make it easier to get the force in action, and to overcome some of the opposition to U.N. peacekeeping which, I think, was described by one of the other witnesses, the fear that it will go into South Africa and be on the side of the guerrillas or go into some other point beyond someone else's side. I think you need a little delimiting of this kind of thing.

Senator CASE. May I just throw out a suggestion here?

Mrs. McVITTY. Yes.

Senator CASE. I think it is worth our considering a possible analogy with our efforts to deal with labor disputes. One view which I generally favor is that we should not have a series of well-defined steps, during which the parties may appeal to this group or that group, and certain things are set in motion which are all known ahead of time. Rather the President or the Governor or the mayor of a city should be given a fairly wide range of powers from which he may choose, and with which he may operate flexibly. That is most likely to result in the maintenance of labor peace, because it puts a premium on the parties themselves making the best deal they can with each other.

If we are in agreement, great. If we are not, it is better that we understand each other.

SETTING GUIDELINES

Mrs. McVITTY. I would like to continue my testimony just a little bit—

Senator CASE. Please do.

Mrs. McVITTY (continuing). Because I did not really get an opportunity to explain quite how I see guidelines.

Senator CASE. You must forgive us. We are really interested not only in the subject but in what you have to say.

Mr. McVITTY. But I do not want to confuse you by thinking that I am suggesting something more grandiose than I am.

Senator CASE. Well, I did naturally expect that you, being a representative of the World Federalists, would be for certain institutionalized operations.

Mrs. McVITTY. I am here as Marion McVitty, although with quite a long period of time at the U.N., although still a strong World Federalist, and I realize that one has to be very practical, particularly at the U.N. level today.

It has been my observation that regarding the dispute which has arisen, the hard deadlock between the Soviets and the United States—and I do not think they are as far apart as they look—I think the United States has a great many reservations about peacekeeping today, as do the Soviets. I think it is due to the fact that nobody knows what these troops are going to do next time, what they are going to be allowed to do, and I think it might clear things up if we have it defined a little bit, that they cannot take sides, that they cannot use more than a certain measure of force, they are not combatant, and so on.

I think, at the same time, you have a possibility of saying, "We will draw up some sort of, maybe it is a model agreement, with the host country." You could do it any number of ways; you could set out in advance so that people can see, at least, they cannot go beyond this, and they may not go beyond that; all rules or any procedures would not be binding on every occasion. I think you would have to be extremely flexible in their application.

For instance, the peacemaking in Cyprus was to me tragic. You had a mediator go in there and he failed to get a solution. They have been groping around ever since.

It seems to me they have started something and, perhaps, they could have gone another step and tried another method rather than simply saying, "Well, that did not work, and how we just rely on political reports from the Secretary General."

RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

On the other hand, when it comes to the use of troops themselves, there has been great dispute over what is meant by the right of self-defense. I think if you will refer to the report of Dag Hammarskjöld of 1958 on the experience of peacekeeping to date, he there set out some guidelines. It was his suggestion that the Assembly formalize them. I think he meant in a resolution or at least to take recognition of them. He tried to spell out a little bit what they tried to do, and what, perhaps, would be the limits to which you could go the next time.

I think you had difficulties in the Congo with things like mercenaries, when the U.N. was allowed to throw out the mercenaries, and they came back. They were not allowed to hold them even for a month. I think there are certain things like this that could be put together as a set of guidelines which would then be generally agreed to, without any commitment, to implement any one of them at any time. But when you got to a situation you would have something to which you could refer that did not make the parties to the dispute feel that you had just made this decision up in order to give advantage to one side or the other.

FLEXIBILITY IN APPLYING GUIDELINES

Now, I think you can be flexible in how you apply them. I think they would not all apply in any case, but I do think that without them you do increase the opposition to U.N. peacekeeping almost with each operation, because they get into troubles that are not foreseen, and they are political troubles. They are the use of the military.

I had an occasion in the summer to talk to a great many of the Scandinavian officers. They say, "Another time do not expect us to go in without heavy weapons and without a lot of men. The Blue Beret does not protect us from hostile attack."

I think you have got to deal with this. I do not think you can expect to have a peace force heavily armed and with a great many men. They would never stand for it. It would be politically not feasible and probably not financially feasible.

But I think there are certain things tried in the U.N. in other operations where you reduce local forces to some extent. The Greek contingent on Cyprus has been confined to barracks. The British have been incorporated into the U.N. force.

There have been efforts to disarm irregulars in the Congo, and so on.

I think there are certain things that could be agreed to of this kind that would make it easier for the planning of forces, that would take a good deal of the fear of what forces might do in the future out of peacekeeping.

I do not think that you will ever convince anybody that anybody is ever completely impartial, but I think you can do a great deal by advance planning to show how you are going to try to be impartial in the application of guidelines.

If you have none, and you make them up as you go along, then to me it always seems to give advantage to one side rather than the other.

POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Senator CASE. But surely, this is inevitable unless you accept that all you are doing is just stopping things, and even that may be taking sides.

Suppose you have an aggressive movement within a country that is building up but has not gotten its strength which, in the ordinary course, it will get soon, whether it be a political movement or whether it be an activist militant movement. Are you going to stop it now or are you going to wait until it gets stronger? You cannot avoid political involvements.

Mrs. McVIRRY. No, I do not think you can avoid political involvement.

Senator CASE. This is just impossible, and this is one trouble I have never worked out philosophically in my own mind. There is no philosophical absolute, in any event, as to whether the U.N., a world organization, is supposed to maintain a status quo, and to what extent, and prevent change.

How are you going to allow for changes? Change is a dynamic thing, and we have seen this in our efforts in Vietnam, for instance. The best intentions in the world, and yet taking no account of the dynamics of that situation, it seems to me, at least, not an adequate account.

Senator CLARK. Before the witness replies, let me suggest to my good friend from New Jersey that the line of thinking which he is developing is completely logical. I think it would lead him in the end, if he follows it all the way through, to the creation of some sort of limited world government, which has been advocated by the organization which the witness represents, so that we would in the end resolve political disputes the way they are resolved within the nation states, our own particular form of an executive, a legislature and a judiciary, with balancing powers, which is certainly not a perfect system, but it has worked pretty well. Why not something somewhat similar at the international level?

Senator CASE. You know, I think Grenville Clark is one of the great saints of the modern world, and Louis Sohn and all the rest of them, and I have deep friendships with the people in this organization and the other one which has split away from it.

But if I may just finish this up here, I think the effort is the thing, that we should, by all the strength and insights that we may possess or we may be persuaded by, proceed to work in this same direction. So anything I say in no way derogates any institution or organization or possibility of movement or anything else. It is just that I wanted in every case to try to get down to brass tacks and understand precisely what we are talking about.

Mrs. McVITTY. I am not talking about world federation.

Senator CASE. And we will find less disagreement when we don't talk about eschewing sovereignty or giving up a little bit of sovereignty for the common good which gets us absolutely nowhere.

Mrs. McVITTY. Sir, I do not have—

Senator CASE. I do not mean you have, but the Chairman has commented in some instances. His own thinking is more sophisticated.

Mrs. McVITTY. Sir, I am not dealing with the second part of the resolution where you have an individually recruited force. I am talking about national contingent contributors, and I am talking about what I think is possible within the next 2 years, provided we get a breakthrough, as the other witnesses have said, after Vietnam.

I believe then that you can go just a little way into giving some kind of rules.

If a peace force is more of a police force than a military force, most of them are enforcing some kind of rules.

I do not think you can get very far with rules in the international community at this stage, but I think you can have rules as to how they may proceed, and when you raised the political question in this, I was very carefully trying to say that I thought the peacemaking, the settlement, had to go along with the rules for the peacekeeping, and this would, I hope, answer your question as to whether we are going to maintain the status quo.

I would certainly not want a U.N. force to go in and maintain the status quo. I think that is what they did in the Middle East, because they could not do anything else. But I think the purpose of this exercise is, first of all, to make your peace force an impartial policeman, and have some idea of what he may do and what he may not do, and how he can be protected from being overwhelmed or discredited.

Then I think you have to have right along with this, and as part of any mandate, some kind of procedure for dealing with the particular political issue that has caused the deployment of the force.

GUIDELINES SHOULD BE GENERAL

Now, I think that you would have to be very general in these guidelines. But I think no guidelines at all are an extreme impediment to any forward movement.

Senator CASE. This is what I wish you would develop, the reasons for that thought.

Mrs. McVITTY. Yes.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, the statement was just made by Mrs. McVitty that she thinks the absence of guidelines is a real impediment to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping role that the United Nations can have, and I have just asked her if she would be rather specific.

As I understand it, you did assert or suggest a country might be more willing to accept a United Nations military force or peacekeeping mission or intervention if it knew the limits of the activity which it might expect either on its own soil or affecting its own interests here.

I wonder if this is a good idea or not. I think that is the question.

Mrs. McVITTY. I think it is not only a matter of the parties who will accept the force or not accept the force; I think it is a matter of a government like the Soviet Union or France, who I do not think really believe it is better to invoke chapter 7 and call out the troops and decide the issue by combat every time when they say, "We would rather do it under chapter 7."

I think what they are afraid of is a precedent being set that has no limits and no definition and no specific at all. They are afraid that if they condone one peacekeeping operation there will be another, and then that other might do something they very much dislike, and they have taken the line that this is all illegal, it is illegal because they are afraid of what it may do.

It seems to me that you can avoid some of the difficulty; you never can avoid all of the political difficulties, but I think you might avoid some, if you had advance agreement on definitions and some rules or guidelines, whatever you want to say.

I think you could improve the effectiveness of the force by such guidelines. I think you could reduce the political opposition, and I think you could put peacemaking and settlement of the political issue together with the deployment of the force, and have the two things going along simultaneously.

Unless you have a little architecture for this thing nobody knows where they are going.

SPECIFICS OF A MILITARY FORCE

Senator CASE. The question really is not if you are going to have nothing; the question is what are you going to have, and it seems to me we ought to now get, perhaps, to the point of considering it in specific terms.

I notice several of the other witnesses are interested in the discussion, and I wonder if they have any comment and whether it would be appropriate for them to make it.

Senator CLARK. I think we ought to move now, if you are through questioning Mrs. McVitty.

Senator CASE. I do not want to cut Mrs. McVitty short.

Mrs. McVITTY. I have one paragraph I would like to read because you asked for a specific.

Senator CASE. Sure.

Mrs. McVITTY. I have two specifics. One was the one I have already mentioned, the moving through a more decisive process of peaceful settlement as you go through an operation.

The other is how you could keep the United Nations from becoming overmilitarized in these peacekeeping operations, lest they be taken with hostile local forces, and I have four specifics.

I think the United Nations should be permitted to disarm irregulars. I mean, that is, ununiformed, unidentified people running around with guns. They had them in the Congo and in Cyprus.

Senator CLARK. They have the same problem in the United States.

Mrs. McVITTY. The United Nations should have the right to neutralize regular armed forces in the area by confining them to barracks or incorporating them, if appropriate, under the U.N. command.

In an area of emergency operation the United Nations should have competence over individuals who impede or oppose mandates. I am thinking of the mercenaries in the Congo.

Paragraph 4. The United Nations should be authorized to halt at the borders of an emergency area military materials or personnel being sent in from outside for the use of any of the parties.

These would not all apply in every case. It would be something that was the limit of what they could do.

Senator CASE. I am very glad that we did get to the matter of specifics, because I had some slight misunderstanding before I realized that your suggestions for guidelines were in the nature of limitations rather than a statement of the powers that a peacekeeping force might exercise. Now I think we do understand each other much better.

Mrs. McVITTY. Yes.

Senator CASE. And I have no dispute whatever with the specifics that you suggest to us.

(The prepared statement of Mrs. McVitty follows:)

TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 47

My name is Mrs. Marion H. McVitty and I testify as Editor of *The Independent Observer*, a publication of commentary on major issues in the United Nations. I have been at the United Nations since 1951 as the accredited representative of the World Association of World Federalists. From 1960-1964 I acted also as confidential correspondent at the UN for the Economist Intelligence Unit of London, covering the UN Congo Operation.

My experience and concern with problems of United Nations peace-keeping prompt me to endorse Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 as a most enlightened guide for United States policy in this regard. It is both practical and forward-looking, and it embodies some creative proposals which merit detailed consideration.

In the desire to contribute to that consideration, I address myself particularly to paragraph (3) of the Resolution. The guidelines as proposed in this paragraph suggest solutions to several of the most serious difficulties encountered thus far in United Nations peace-keeping operations.

Much of the political opposition which has arisen around UN peace-keeping seems to be due to uncertainties as to how UN Peace Forces might be used, or misused, on future occasions. The UN Charter does not specify terms for carrying out UN emergency actions of this kind. UN resolutions authorizing UN peace-keeping operations have been extremely vague. Guidelines as pro-

posed in S. Con. Res. 47 could define and delimit this method of collective security, and thus improve both its acceptability and UN performance in the field. United Nations experience gained in Congo and elsewhere has provided valuable lessons to this end.

UN Peace Forces have all been used on a voluntary basis, with impartiality as to the rights and claims of the parties, and in a non-combatant capacity. All these characteristics were wittingly or unwittingly misunderstood in Congo, and in some other areas.

With respect to the voluntary aspect of UN peacekeeping operations, the hasty withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Middle East has demonstrated the danger of equating host country consent to the *deployment* of UN Peace Forces with *unilateral host country control over termination* of the operation. While that was a dramatic instance of peremptory withdrawal of consent to a UN operation, it was not the only instance.

In the early days of the Congo Operation, Lumumba demanded the withdrawal of the UN Force in Congo. On that occasion the demand was not taken too seriously by the United Nations, because it was already a question as to whether Lumumba or Kasavubu was in authority, and the two Congolese leaders did not agree on UN withdrawal.

In the case of Congo, the untimely withdrawal of national contingents was a more immediate threat to the success of the UN Congo Operation. Key national contingents were withdrawn from the UN Force at a crucial moment as an expression of political disaffection with the operation. They were replaced only with the utmost difficulty. Thus it was shown that the United Nations also should have greater control over contingents once they have been voluntarily contributed.

Guidelines to cover contingent withdrawals and the duration of UN emergency actions might be derived in part from UN experience in Cyprus. The mandates for the UN Cyprus Operation have authorized the deployment of UNFICYP for three- or six-month periods. During those periods it has been tacitly assumed by all concerned that only the UN, itself, could terminate the operation or approve contingent withdrawals. In future, this practice could be formalized to provide that host country consent and the voluntary contribution of contingents, once offered, would be binding for a limited period, specified in advance, and renewable, if necessary, with the further consent of the parties and participants.

Paragraph (3) of S. Con. Res. 47 also provides for "guidelines to govern concomitant machinery for peace-making where peace-keeping forces are in use". This is a most essential requirement, since United Nations experience has shown that UN peace-keeping operations have ultimately failed or been indefinitely prolonged at great cost, because of the unwillingness of the contending parties to settle the issues between them by peaceful means.

For lack of funds, the Congo Operation was terminated after four years while that new country was still in a chaotic state. However, in the Middle East and in Cyprus, time and conditions have existed for settlement if the will of the parties and the insistence of the international community had been strong enough. However, in the absence of adequate settlement procedures, the presence of UN Peace Forces has seemed to provide just enough immediate security to diminish the impetus toward settlement.

It would seem necessary to provide in future that parties to a dispute requiring the deployment of UN Peace Forces should assume *at the outset* an obligation to settle their differences within a reasonable length of time. To this end, guidelines might stipulate that with each extension of a UN peace-keeping mandate, the Parties would resort to progressively more decisive methods for settlement. The UN body authorizing the operation would determine how the settlement process would move through negotiation, mediation, and inquiry toward binding arbitration or judicial decision in any given case. If such a process were prescribed the Parties might find it preferable to settle before the more onerous methods became applicable.

Guidelines proposed in the Resolution for "training and equipping" UN Peace Forces, raise certain questions which may require further consideration. UN commanders with experience in the field are likely to recommend that future UN Peace Forces should be more numerous and more heavily armed. They contend that UN Peace Forces may be overwhelmed or discredited unless they have preponderance over local forces in emergency areas. This problem has been particularly emphasized with respect to the Congo, but has also threatened the

effectiveness of the UN Force in Cyprus. UN officers point out that the mere symbol of the UN blue beret has not protected their men from hostile attack; that at times UN forces could not be interposed between more heavily armed local contenders, lest the UN troops be decimated; and that UN forces have been drawn into unnecessary combat, as in Katanga, because they were unable to inspire respect and restraint by an obvious show of superior UN competence.

The need for UN preponderance over local forces in some emergency situations seems to be borne out by the facts. At the same time, there are likely to be financial and political objections to increasing the military capability of UN forces of this type. UN preponderance might be achieved, however, by *decreasing* local force, rather than by *increasing* UN forces.

In the past the United Nations has been able to take some measures to alleviate the effects of inimical local forces, which suggest guidelines that might achieve UN preponderance in this less dangerous manner.

Efforts were made in the early days of the Congo operation to disarm irregulars. An attempt was even made to disarm the Congolese army. One regular unit of the Congolese army was incorporated into ONUC under UN command toward the end of that action. The Greek garrison on Cyprus has been confined to barracks. British forces from the British base on Cyprus have been incorporated in UNFICYP. The UN took a decision that no assistance of a military nature should be sent into the Congo save under UN auspices. The UN was authorized to expel individual foreign mercenaries from Katanga.

The UN decision to ban the importation of military materials and personnel into Congo was not accompanied by guidance as to how the importation was to be prevented. The Secretary General could actually do little more than plead for compliance with governments thought to be responsible. Although the UN was authorized to expel mercenaries from Congo, it had no right to detain them. As a result the mercenaries which were expelled were able to re-enter the country with very little difficulty.

U Thant has repeatedly called attention to the dangerous build-up of men and weapons from outside for both factions in Cyprus, but has not been in a position to halt that traffic.

The measures cited to reduce local forces in emergency areas were all either so tentatively negotiated, or were so imprecisely authorized (always after the fact), that they could not be implemented effectively. However, these methods already tried out might be sharpened and formalized in guidelines to the following effect:

- 1.) The UN should be permitted to disarm irregulars;
- 2.) The UN should have the right to neutralize regular armed forces in the area by confining them to barracks or by incorporating them, if appropriate, under the UN command;
- 3.) In the area of an emergency operation, the UN should have competence over individuals who oppose, or impede, a UN mandate;
- 4.) The UN should be authorized to halt at the borders of an emergency area, military materials or personnel being sent in from outside for the use of any of the contending parties.

Flexibility would, of necessity, have to attend the application of such guidelines to each specific emergency action. Not all of these conditions would be applicable in every case, and in some instances, none of them would be required. Where these guidelines were applied, great care would have to be taken to insure equitable application to the parties involved.

In this testimony I have tried to spell out a little what kind of guidelines might improve UN peace-keeping. These have pertained to UN control over withdrawals, to peace-making procedures to accompany peace-keeping, and to ways in which UN Peace Forces might gain preponderance in emergency areas without greatly increasing the UN military capability.

It may be felt that the guidelines which I have put forward might make parties involved in a crisis situation unwilling to sanction a UN Peace Force when the interposition of such a force seemed imperative to the preservation of peace. Application of the conditions suggested might seem to the parties too big a price to pay for pacification and settlement of a conflict out of which each side still hoped to gain some advantage.

Experience to date, however, shows that consent to the deployment of a UN Peace Force has been obtainable only when the governments concerned cannot gain their ends or control the situation by any other means. Should such obligations as have been suggested here actually inhibit recourse to UN peace-keeping,

it may be pertinent to question whether, without those commitments, the UN should in future be thrust into precarious efforts to save well-nigh hopeless situations.

It is difficult to see how UN peace-keeping *effectiveness* can be assured on any easier terms than here set out. It is hoped that by agreement in advance to better defined and clearer peace-keeping mandates, political opposition will be reduced with the reduction of uncertainties surrounding a relatively new, and still evolving, UN method for achieving the central purpose of the Organization.

S. Con. Res. 47 seems to me to recognize that adequate UN peace-keeping cannot be obtained without delegating a measure of real authority to the United Nations.

April 1968.

Senator Clark. Thank you, Senator.

Before we proceed to the questioning of the witnesses, I would like to, if the Senator would agree, go back for a couple of procedural matters.

HOUSE RESOLUTIONS

At the beginning of the hearing there were 67 Members of the House of Representatives who introduced into the House resolutions largely similar to Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, and I would like to ask the staff to prepare a list of those 67 Members of the House and have that list inserted at the point of the hearings immediately after Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 was put in the record. (See p. 1.)

There are, I understand, about a dozen additional similar House resolutions and I would like the staff to prepare a list of the sponsors of those 12, and a very brief statement to be put into the record which would summarize the differences between those resolutions and this one. (See pp. 2 and 3.)

We have a letter from the Department of State dated November 1, 1967, and signed by Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs, Mr. Macomber, which endorses Senate Concurrent Resolution 47. I would like to have that entered in the record immediately after the House data.

I would like at this point to read the key paragraph from that letter of approval, and I am quoting:

Keeping in mind the above considerations, the Department would consider the adoption of the concurrent resolution a welcome expression by the Senate of confidence in United States policies and a constructive demonstration of American support for a cardinal purpose of our participation in the U.N., namely to share equitably with other nations responsibilities for keeping the peace.

(The letter referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 1, 1967.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of October 13, 1967, requesting comments on S. Con. Res. 47, relative to United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking.

The Department in the past has commented on similar resolutions relative to the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force.

The Department continues to support the basic objectives of such resolutions. They accord with the consistent United States position, which has been supported on a nonpartisan basis since the establishment of the United Nations in

1945, that UN peacekeeping and peacemaking machinery and procedures should be strengthened so that the burdens of world security may be effectively and equitably shared by Member States.

During recent years, particularly in 1965 and 1966, the United States delegation to the United Nations has actively participated in efforts to formulate principles and guidelines for the conduct of peacekeeping operations and has supported proposals to make UN peacekeeping more effective. The United States delegation has consistently supported, as immediate objectives, the specific provisions set forth in part (a) of S. Con. Res. 47.

With respect to peacekeeping forces, the United States Government has maintained in the United Nations that the most practical way of assuring the availability of trained forces for UN peacekeeping is to encourage and support UN members to earmark and train units to be available on a stand-by basis to respond in appropriate circumstances to a UN call. The concurrent resolution reflects this idea in a constructive way. At the Twentieth General Assembly in November 1965 Ambassador Goldberg proposed a program to train officers and specialized personnel—for example, communications specialists—whose scarcity has hampered previous peacekeeping operations. The Executive Branch is examining the most suitable way for the United States to participate in an aid program to earmarking countries.

The concurrent resolution also proposes that the United States be prepared to make available to the United Nations transport, communications and logistical personnel and facilities. The Department endorses this proposal in the general form in which it is stated and believes that more attention should be given to the best means for carrying out its purpose.

The United States has in the past made available to the United Nations crucial logistical support and specialized services, particularly airlift. Because each UN operation is unique and calls for a specially tailored mix of men and equipment, the question whether the United States should pledge particular transport or other logistical facilities, or whether it should designate a particular group of specialists, is difficult to answer. Our military establishment has a wide range of facilities and specialists and can respond to a UN call on short notice when we consider it appropriate to do so. We are continuing to examine, however, the various actions we might take to assist in sustaining UN peacekeepers in order to assure that an operation will not be hampered for lack of ready logistical support.

With regard to part (b) of the resolution, we agree with the principle that as part of the long-range development of the United Nations as a more effective instrument for building and keeping peace, the United States Government should encourage and support the creation, at such time as conditions warrant, of a permanent UN force. The United States Government is not in a position to determine now whether such a force would be best organized through individual recruitment or through the contributions of national units.

As the Department has noted with respect to similar resolutions which proposed the establishment of a permanent UN force, the proposal contained in part (b) raises certain questions not only about the composition, financing, stationing and command of such a force, but also about political preconditions for sending it into the field. Unfortunately, in the present political climate, it is virtually certain that these questions could not be satisfactorily resolved.

Keeping in mind the above considerations, the Department would consider the adoption of the concurrent resolution a welcome expression by the Senate of confidence in United States policies and a constructive demonstration of American support for a cardinal purpose of our participation in the UN, namely to share equitably with other nations responsibilities for keeping the peace.

The Department has been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM M. MACOMBER, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Generally speaking, there are a number of subjects which I would like the witnesses to develop, and I suspect that Senator Case will have some others, but I think that the Senator made a useful suggestion in that the three witnesses who have been listening

to the colloquy between Senator Case and Mrs. McVitty might have some comments they would like to make on that.

Suppose we call on them in order, the same order in which they testified, which gives you the ball, Mr. Cox.

Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have some comments.

NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT PEACEMAKING

I agree with Mrs. McVitty on the desirability of having peacemaking machinery linked with peacekeeping at the outset, and to the extent possible I think this is a desirable thing, and one that should be given more attention.

But I do not think we should have any illusions about the importance of peacemaking being something that should make peacekeeping any less important. In fact, I think one of the difficulties that I have detected in examining the whole history of the peacekeeping and the debates that have gone on among member nations up to now, has been a desire for the impossible, a reaching out for an ambassador to talk about settling the Middle East dispute between the Arabs and the Israelis by a first rate negotiator out there, in terms of reference out there, and I think this is totally impractical.

It is useful to have a third party out to discuss and looking for ways of mediation, for ways of compromise, but I think it is important to have an international presence, a plate glass window on this dispute, and particularly to have the plate glass window on both sides of the dispute. I think one of the mistakes of the original UNEF agreement is that the Israelis did not allow the United Nations to be on their side of the border so that when we had the crisis last June, some of the member states agreed with Mr. Nasser and decided they would have to move their troops out because this was his prerogative. You had an impotency that I believe should not have existed.

I think we have advanced the situation now of having the U.N. on both sides of the border out there.

But I think that it is very important, although it may be desirable to try to move for guidelines, particularly ones that can be accepted by the two superpowers, that even if we do not get agreement on those guidelines, we should not feel that this is an area of international crisis management, that this should not be strongly supported, because I think there is a lot of merit in ad hocery.

I believe there is a lot of merit in the capacity for improvisation, and an element of flexibility, and I certainly agree with Mrs. McVitty that the Soviets have taken a very firm, rigid public position. I believe their private position is a good deal more flexible, but their public position is a very rigid one, and they are asking for iron clad guidelines, and some of them, I think, can be properly worked out, such as the fact that they should be able to participate in the command and control of the future operations.

This, I believe, can be worked out. On the other hand, I would not be despairing if some of these guidelines could not be nailed down as specifically as some people would like because, as I say, in my past experience there has been considerable merit in the improvisation of these operations as they have gone along, and I think all three Secretaries General have shown great ingenuity, as have mem-

bers of their staffs, in working through this extremely complex political business of managing international operations with many, many nations concerned with how they go.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, sir.

Professor Michalak.

PROBLEM OF SHORT MANDATES

Mr. MICHALAK. I would like to say just a few things. First, on this idea of short mandates, 3 to 6 months, I think that to consider the success in Cyprus is to misunderstand the difference, I think, the unique structural situation there.

If we look at Cyprus, which is a rather internal war situation, there are a number of outstanding differences. One is the whole issue is largely within the NATO frame of reference; second, the conflicts are nationalistic, not ideological. In other words, there is no Western group, neutralist group, or what we consider pro-Soviet group.

Since it is a national conflict, or largely a nationalistic conflict, for the big powers to fish, you cannot win. For the Soviets to get involved if they pick sides, they are going to have to alienate either the Greeks or the Turks, and neither of them would be very helpful.

We have the same problem with respect to the United States. The Army is the problem for Britain, so that all of them have an interest in staying out, letting the thing sit there.

If we were to try 6-month mandates in the Congo, suppose that in August, when they first met, they said that this is going to last for 6 months. When you look there you have the Soviet side, the Lumumbaists, you have the NATO, Western European side, which was the Katangans; you have the American side, after the fall of Lumumba, which was kind of the Kasavubu moderates, and then, of course, the Soviets moved to help the Gizengaists.

Then the Afro-Asians supported the Lumumbaists.

In 1960 we believed the big conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was which model would they vie for development, the American model or the Russian model, and they were going to pick out sides in the next 3 or 4 years, and then in the cold war would be on either one side or the other. In that situation the Congo seemed extremely important.

Let us assume we had the 6-month mandate. First you have Lumumba, then Kasavubu fires Lumumba. Mobutu walks in, and in the meantime, Andrew Cordier had closed the airport. What would that 6-month mandate have done? Nkrumah said, "I promised to be there until February and I ought to stay"—so we ought to be very leery of setting a 6-month mandate in Cyprus as being something that could easily be transportable.

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Second, let me underscore what Mr. Cox has said about peaceful settlement. Suppose we said to the Cypriots, the force stays in for 3 months. Three months and there is no settlement. Then you have two things to do. One is to move to the Acheson proposal, which is let them fight it out.

Now, that certainly works very well in your parlor, in your living room.

When you say, well, the Indians and Pakistanis, maybe the best thing is to let them go at it, or the Israelis and the Arabs. But if you are in a position of power, that is not a very easy choice to make, so that is one solution.

The second is to say, well now, look, we are going to keep it for 3 more months, and you are going to have to submit to arbitration.

This was one of the League's answers in the Geneva protocol that the states would arbitrate, and then the arbitration award was made. The side not accepting the arbitration award would then be considered an aggressor. That is how you put the aggression under the Geneva protocol.

Suppose we moved into a situation like that, the arbitration award was made, and suppose the Greek Cypriots decided not to accept it. Then what do you do? You can go to the Acheson proposal, which is probably what you will have, or you can move into international sanctions.

If you do that who are you going to put the sanctions against, the Greek Cypriots? Are you going to prevent goods from moving from the Turkish areas to the Greek areas of Cyprus. Are you going to take sanctions against Greece as well as the Greek Cypriots?

There are all these other questions then of whether or not the initiation of sanctions would only solidify the Greeks and make the situation worse.

I think I understand what Mr. Cox says there is that this is extremely difficult.

Where hatreds are that deep, that deep we have never had conflicts like that until recently in America, where these racial conflicts are that strong in this country, and you just amplify that when you see those conflicts abroad, you may like to see a settlement, but if the best we can get is peacekeeping, it seems to me, the cost is rather minimal.

POLITICAL SITUATIONS

Finally, we have to remember, I think that you cannot get rid of politics. You may like to get guidelines that are going to make the U.N. peacekeeping operations impartial. But, after all, these are political situations. The organs that are supposed to make decisions, the Security Council and the General Assembly, you just cannot get rid of it by getting guidelines or by getting earmarking or anything else. You cannot even get rid of this with world government.

Senator CLARK. Thank, you sir.

Mr. Barber.

USE OF WORD "PEACEKEEPING"

Mr. BARBER. I have been troubled in this discussion about the vague use of the word "peacekeeping" for many different purposes.

It seems clear to me that in the context of the discussions of the founding of the United Nations peacekeeping, it was largely thought

of as a basis of maintaining the peace between nations, and that both historically and in the dialog here today, we have begun to discuss and, in fact, used, in the case of the Congo, the U.N. as an instrument to participate in domestic or civil disorder within the borders of a nation state.

Now, it seems to me there is a vast difference between using the U.N. to defend South Korea from overt aggression from the north, and using the U.N. if there is civil disorder in Southern Rhodesia.

If we take the dialog that I think I have heard here, the objective is the maintenance of the peace. I put it humbly there are greater values than the maintenance of peace, and if we were trying to serve something called justice, we might want to use the U.N. force right now to go in and remove the Government of Rhodesia.

So I am not advocating this, but my point is, if the sole objective is the maintenance of peace, and the instrumentality is to be the U.N., then I think we may have made a major flaw of logic, polity, and justice, and I think we should examine very carefully whether the U.N. has any role whatsoever in a civil disorder in which there is no outside intervention.

I really question quite deeply whether this is wise, and it seems to me to underline many of the comments.

PARTICIPATION BY AREA COUNTRIES

I would say further that even if it is wise to have some outside participants in the case of civil disorder, I think in many cases it might be wise to have nations from the immediate area participate because, whether we like it or not, when the U.N. participates, the Security Council is involved to some degree or other. I find it paradoxical that we would, therefore, engage the prestige and power of the Soviet Union and the United States and other members of the Security Council in issues that I think, quite honestly, they might in many cases wish to avoid taking a position on.

Let me be quite specific, for example, in Vietnam. I would have a somewhat alternative solution to Mr. Cox's. I think that if we can, hopefully, find a solution in Vietnam, to have a triumvirate that might be Hanoi, Djakarta, and Manila who are responsible for the peace-keeping in that area and, by and large, have broad authority to maintain the peace within all the sort of rules Mrs. McVitty raises, decide among themselves as to the way this should be worked out. Whatever the Government of South Vietnam may be, whatever force there is under a broad U.N. charter, these are the people who will decide the issue.

I think it is often wise to consider how can we disengage the power and prestige of both of the great powers of the world and the U.N. Security Council as well.

Senator CLARK. At this point I would like to have admitted in the record chapter 8 of the U.N. charter entitled "Regional Arrangements" which, I think, is pertinent.

(The material referred to follows:)

TEXT OF CHAPTER VIII OF THE U.N. CHARTER

CHAPTER VIII

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Senator CLARK. Mrs. McVitty.

INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

Mrs. McVITTY. I wanted to reply to Mr. Barber on this intervention in domestic affairs. The U.N. is specifically enjoined against doing that. It is not allowed to intervene in domestic affairs, and the peacekeeping operations, even the Cyprus one, which is certainly a civil war, and in the Congo where you had several civil wars involved—

Senator CLARK. How about the Dominican Republic?

Mrs. McVITTY. The Dominican Republic was a different situation. I would like to finish the other thought first.

The Congo and Cyprus, the U.N. got into it because it was an outside factor of considerable importance. The force was to make it possible for Belgium to withdraw and let the U.N. protect their nationals, and certainly in the Cyprus situation you had a threat from Turkey to intervene, and it seems to me that if you are going to work out your solutions to the Cyprus situation, Turkey will intervene if the Greek Cypriots will not play ball.

I do not believe that we have had any U.N. operation anywhere where the U.N. went in unless everybody concerned felt there was just no other way to get what they wanted or to solve the problem. They never get in until it is practically hopeless. I do not think we have to worry about that one.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Barber.

ROLE NATO MIGHT HAVE PLAYED

Mr. BARBER. Just to reinterpret history a little bit, I think if the U.N. option did not exist there might have been a greater desire on the part of the NATO community to play a role.

After all, these were Greeks and Turks who were a part of NATO, and while it is clear that all the members would have preferred to avoid the issue if they could, there was clearly, in my view at the time a sense that, well, we will kick it up to the U.N. because they will take care of it and we do not want to face it.

Mr. Cox. No. I have to take strong issue with my friend, Arthur, on this.

NATO was tried as an alternative, was pressed very far by the United States and the British, and the main reason why NATO was not acceptable was not because the Northern European members of NATO were opposed, but because Archbishop Makarios was categorically opposed to any NATO involvement in his country, and the only alternative that was acceptable to him was the United Nations.

CLARIFYING BORDER DISPUTE AND CRISIS

The other thing that I feel we really have to be clear about on this point that Mrs. McVitty was stressing, the U.N. involvement in these disputes, is that—whether it is a border dispute or a crisis where there is a clear threat to the peace from external intervention, that the member nations agree upon, the majority of them, or a majority of the Security Council, the permanent members—the U.N. gets involved only as a last resort, and the U.N. is useful in these disputes because it is an area of last resort.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

I think somebody raised the question of the Dominican Republic. It is possible, and I have talked to some of our NATO member ambassadors who feel that it might have been wise at the time that the United States found itself having to intervene with marines and airborne troops, and wanting move up, it might have been better to have had a United Nations peacekeeping presence there.

As you know, there was an U.N. observer force. It might have been better to have a U.N. peacekeeping force rather than the OAS.

The strain on the OAS caused at that time was tremendous. The repercussions of that are still with us.

So this, I think indicates that we should not make any hard and fast decisions about where the U.N. can be involved.

It comes down to the consensus of the member nations and the power of the United Nations, particularly the super powers. If it is possible

to, as a last resort to, get in an impartial peacekeeping mechanism in a dispute of this sort, it may be a very valuable alternative.

Senator CLARK. Do you have any comment to make, Dr. Michalak, before we go back to Mr. Barber for surrebuttal?

U.N. INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

Mr. MICHALAK. I only will say that I think the United Nations does intervene in domestic affairs, whether we like it or not. Ostensibly that may not be what is involved. But if it is not true then I must share and I do share Professor Barber's, call it what you want, realism or pessimism, that over the next 30 or 40 years, the most important conflicts the United States is going to face in terms of foreign policy are internal disorders, internal disruption; the attempt on the part of leftists to gain power over national governments, and if the U.N. is going to intervene in these it is going to be a mess, and if they do not, there are going to be a lot of problems for us. I think this is a very important point that Professor Barber brought out.

Senator CLARK. Yes. Professor Barber.

Mr. BARBER. I am not a professor, by the way.

The court of last resort was mentioned; well, I think this is accurate. But I think we have to distinguish between whether in some cases violence is not better than the suppression of violence, given our choice of instrumentalities.

On the other hand, I think a terribly important question is whether or not this is outside intervention, whether it be by the United States, the Soviet Union, or the U.N.

I cite Nigeria at the moment. I would not like to be put in the role of an advocate of the present chaos in Nigeria. Nevertheless, I can imagine a far worse situation in Nigeria if outside troops were to intervene or even, I could imagine, a U.N. peacekeeping force that might become entangled in the great power conflicts in Nigeria.

So I would say that while I would not want to foreclose or decide, which is impossible, what should be done in the future, I merely am suggesting that there may be many situations in which there is civil disorder, conflict, fighting, people being killed, in which the greater path of wisdom, as long as there are no outside powers intervening, is not to intervene on the part of any outside force, including the U.N.

REFERENCE TO REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Senator CLARK. I would, I think, take exception to that. But in order to develop what I have in mind, I would like to direct the attention of all four of you to the fact that the resolution on which we are conducting hearings makes no reference to regional peacekeeping nor, indeed, chapter 8 of the Charter.

I would appreciate it if you gentlemen and lady would discuss, in turn, whether you think, perhaps, the resolution should be amended to make some reference to regional peacekeeping and peacemaking potentials or whether we had better let it stay the way it is.

In discussing it, I would like you to bear in mind the experience we have had in the Dominican Republic, in Vietnam, in the Congo, in Cyprus, and in the Middle East, and also the point that Mr. Barber made about intervening in civil war or domestic controversy situations.

There has been a good deal of national efforts at peacekeeping as opposed to international. It occurs to me there may be many situations in Latin America, in Africa, in the Far East where regional peacekeeping or peacemaking efforts would be more successful than U.N. efforts, although I see no reason why the regional effort should not call on the U.N. establishment for support.

We have never really activated the military staff committee, and I wonder what you think, to what extent this would be advisable.

Reference was made earlier—I think it was by Mr. Cox—to the desirability of having the U.N. move into Vietnam. I am as skeptical about that, as I think, Senator Case is.

We know efforts were made to create a peacekeeping force out of the Organization of American States, and this did not work.

Within the limits of what I have said I wonder if each of you would be prepared to turn your minds toward that subject, unless Senator Case would like first to ask some questions of a general nature.

Senator CASE. No. Indeed I think the way the discussion has taken place, and your guidance of it, Mr. Chairman, will be very helpful.

Up to now I think everybody is pretty well satisfied he has had a chance to speak his mind. Is that correct?

Senator CLARK. Let us go in reverse order at this time since Mrs. McVitty has her hand up and start with her, and end with Mr. Cox.

TYPES OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Mrs. McVITTY. With respect to the regional arrangements which, of course, are permitted under the Charter, you have to look at what kind of regional arrangements you have around the world. You have the OAS, and you have NATO. One is almost entirely a military—

Senator CLARK. How about the Organization for African Unity?

Mrs. McVITTY. You have the Organization for African Unity, and you have the Arab organization.

Senator CLARK. Yes. But actually the Middle East is one place where we do not have any even embryonic regional group that could be counted on. Whether we could create one in Southeast Asia, as Mr. Barber suggests, is another problem.

I personally would think if you would put Hanoi, Malaysia, and Indonesia into the box you have, I suppose, one neutral and one belligerent and one sort of tending to turn away, and I am not sure it is an ideal setup.

It has always seemed to me that the best hope for regional peace in the Far East would be through the creation of a group consisting of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. But, you know, it is just a suggestion.

Mrs. McVITTY. It seems to me that you have one disadvantage with the average regional group. It may not be true of all of them, but certainly in the Dominican case, with the United States dominant in the OAS, the OAS was hardly an impartial force. In other words, they were there to stop the Castroites, if any, and they were different from a U.N. force in that they were not exactly impartial.

If you have an organization for African Unity you may have a good deal of disunity in it. I do not know how it would operate.

It has had some success in peacemaking in using the heads of state to go around and reason with the Nigerians, and so on. But I think that you get into great difficulties unless you know exactly what you have in the way of a regional grouping.

At the time of the Dominican Republic situation, the Secretary General was most alarmed by the precedent set because he felt that the Arab League would consider itself a regional unity, and he thought that that would be disastrous in the Middle East.

Senator CASE. May I just make a comment there?

Mrs. McVITTY. Yes.

Senator CASE. I think you and I are tending more and more to an agreement of fact, that it is not desirable to institutionalize these things too much.

We should keep ourselves loose, in other words, as to whether we use it.

Mrs. McVITTY. Yes.

AMENDMENT OF RESOLUTIONS

The Senator asked if I thought the resolution ought to be amended. I would not really like to see it amended because I think it confuses the issue.

If you were to amend it, I would say that regional peacekeeping operations should conform to the definition as closely as possible of the U.N., and conform to the Charter, and I think it is very difficult to make that stick.

I think your resolution will become more confusing if you introduce the regional element, so I would oppose that.

Senator CASE. We could put something in the report, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. I am not advocating this. I want the benefit of the brains of these four witnesses.

It has also occurred to me that maybe the OAS could be more effective in future problems in Latin America if the United States immediately got out when the time comes for the exercise of some unusual control.

If we got out I would be reasonably certain the Russians would not get in and then we would let the Latin Americans handle their problems themselves.

Mr. Barber, you are next.

Mr. BARBER. As you might imagine, Senator, I agree with the suggestion of making a slight amendment that would say that these forces would also be encouraged in the support of regional agreements.

I think that one of our problems is that admittedly the regional peacekeeping organizations are not strong. But there is a self-fulfilling prophecy, if we say they are not strong, therefore, let us not count on them. I think intellectually one of our problems is that we make peacekeeping a profession, and everyone who has studied it has studied the U.N., and there is relatively little thinking or planning or documentation on how we could strengthen regional peacekeeping.

I think that particularly the OAU and the OAS have a significant growth potential for significant peacekeeping that would be in our interest to strengthen in a modest way.

I would particularly suggest, while it would not be appropriate in this resolution, that one consider putting a line item in the military aid budget for strengthening the OAU and/or the OAS.

At the present time, we provide funds and encourage each nation to maintain its own independent military strength, except that they are exercised once in a while together. But, as anyone knows, once you set up an organization with a budget, then it tends to focus and strengthen that organization and that budget. So far as I know neither of them at this time have any organized executive or any organized budget. Just the catalyst of having three men with a budget every year would tend to make it a more viable organization than it is now.

Senator CLARK. I think that is a very valuable suggestion.

You know, a great many of us, including the chairman of this committee, have been stressing for some years the desirability of converting the foreign aid program into a multilateral as opposed to a bilateral program. I think we ought to explore the possibility of doing the same thing for military aid, and there is no better place to have a row about it than when we consider the military aid aspect of the foreign aid authorization budget.

Mr. BARBER. One last point. I would like to say, on Vietnam, I meant to suggest the Philippines, who are our allies, the Indonesians, as neutrals, and Hanoi, who is a nominal enemy, as a triumvirate in Asia as a base of operations.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Barber.

Professor Michalak.

INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. MICHALAK. I am afraid I will agree with Mrs. McVitty on this point of regional efforts, at least on my part, until I do more thinking and study. But, just offhand, it depends, as you said, on what you mean by a region. Certainly the Arabs are not the ones to handle a police UNEF type of a force.

Senator CLARK. I should think you could deal with it ad hoc.

For example, I would suggest that Africa south of the Sahara and north of the Union of South Africa would be a good place to start, but then you have to think about Rhodesia. But if black Africa, let us say—I think that phrase is not acceptable to everybody—and also Latin America, without the intervention of the United States, could handle those problems themselves, then we could certainly, from a national point of view, benefit.

Mr. MICHALAK. I think this is another situation I mentioned earlier where you might be trying to escape politics and hire the choices for the United States.

If you have the implicit fear that the United States is going to be involved everywhere, I think our experience in Nigeria is encouraging in this regard, and I think maybe we are trying to get an institutional device to solve a problem that may be decreasing.

The concern of America to be involved in all of these minor disputes, that may be decreasing.

Also, as Mr. Cox pointed out—

Senator CLARK. No more Vietnams.

Mr. MICHALAK. I don't know about no more Vietnams, but I think no more intervention in situations such as Nigeria.

The other thing, you assume, first of all, if you take the OAS, if they run into any politics, if there is peacekeeping, it probably would be peacekeeping in support of a status quo, which would run into the ideologies or the political feelings of many people. Do you want intervention by OAS forces without the United States in support of a status quo?

The other alternative would be—

Senator CLARK. Just a minute. Don't you think when the United States intervenes in Latin America it is always in support of a status quo?

Mr. MICHALAK. That is true. But what I am saying is—

Senator CLARK. So we wouldn't have to be any worse off if we let the Latins handle it themselves.

Mr. MICHALAK. What I am saying is what we ought to do is just let them handle it themselves. Do not set up organizational devices. If you are implying setting up an organizational device, a regional peacekeeping device, it would be for two reasons: one, to keep the United States out of those areas, and, second, to let the Latin Americans handle their own problems, and the Africans handle their own African problems. I do not think either will happen.

I think even in that case if the United States desires to intervene it is going to intervene, and we cannot solve that kind of political problem with an institutional device.

Senator CLARK. I was just suggesting that there already is an institutional device, which is in chapter 8 of the U.N. Charter.

Mr. MICHALAK. Well, you know one of the criticisms that is made of American foreign policy by scholars on the cold war is particularly that article because allowing the United States to cease to operate through the United Nations and to create a whole series of regional substructures through which it could wage the cold war, NATO, SEATO, ANZUS, and all the rest.

Senator CLARK. And CENTO.

Mr. MICHALAK. So I just think at this point that a lot more study or thought ought to be given to it before we accept the device, and it may solve a problem that is decreasing and may not even solve the problem even though it is not decreasing.

STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator CLARK. I wonder if those of us who are such advocates of strengthening the U.N., at least Mrs. McVitty and I, and who would like to see it develop into a much stronger international agency with some kind of sovereignty, do not tend to get too purist about everything that has to be done by the U.N.? There is no other purist way to handle it and, perhaps, we tend to ignore the possibilities for peace-making and peacekeeping by other agencies where we do not have to worry about the veto and the one vote per nation in the General Assembly.

Mr. Cox.

Mr. Cox. I would support Mrs. McVitty and Professor Michalak in urging that you not get into a chapter 8 in this resolution.

I agree with you that regional arrangements are a useful political mechanism, and I think that particularly in regional economic development and in some use of arbitration and diplomatic techniques, even a relatively new organization like the Organization of African Unity have had some very constructive experiences.

However, I have had the opportunity to examine all of these organizations fairly carefully, in talking with their members and chiefs of a state, ambassadors representing the governments, an Arab League, and the Organization for African Unity, and the OAS, as well as the cold war military outfits like SEATO and NATO, ANZUS, CENTO. I conclude strongly that military arrangements of a regional nature are not likely to be developed even if the money were forthcoming, as it was and has been, from the United States for the OAS.

MAKEUP OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES

Our Government has, and our Congress has, for some time indicated that it would finance the creation of a permanent peacekeeping force for the OAS.

I have found only one representative, one government, that would support the creation of such a force in the OAS, one Latin American government, and I think, as Mr. Michalak says, we have very practical political problems.

One thing I have found in looking into this question of using international forces, international policemen, civilian police, as we have in Cyprus now, as we had to a degree in the Congo, the sensitivity to this kind of a presence is such that there is not only what I would call a principle of impartiality, but to a degree what you might call a principle of distance. The extent to which the policemen, the observers, are from a long distance is the extent to which they are acceptable and considered more likely to be impartial.

I was interested today in a poll that was taken down in Miami among the Cuban refugees who were asked if, given an uprising in Cuba, perhaps the overthrow of Castro, in a situation of chaos, requiring some kind of presence to put a balance in the country, would they prefer an intervention by the United States, an intervention by the OAS, or an intervention by the United Nations? The overwhelming majority preferred intervention by the United Nations.

In other words, people usually just do not want neighboring governments present, possibly involved, in their affairs. This is one of the things that Hammarskjold learned in the Congo.

Originally, he had what he called the principle of neighbors, and he felt it very wise to have neighborly Africans going into the Congo and being the presence there.

Well, you know the great political problems that emerged when the Lumumba demise came about and the neighborly Africans were all maneuvering politically to almost the destruction of that U.N. presence.

PRINCIPLE OF IMPARTIALITY

So I think this principle of distance, the principle of impartiality, is important particularly now that we have a group of earmarking states. I would put the Canadians at the head as the real pros in this

business, and respected universally, I would say. Everywhere you go you hear about Canadian peacekeepers, people do respect their knowledge and their impartiality.

Senator CLARK. Is that not also true of the Scandinavians?

Mr. COX. Yes, perhaps not quite as extensively, but I think generally so.

It is true of some of the others, too. The Yugoslavs have a very good record, although they did act rather precipitously in this June development in the Middle East.

Senator CLARK. I would think it would be highly desirable, if you could, to attempt to develop the peacekeeping and peacemaking contingents diplomatically, as well as militarily, from the Communist bloc, also from the Latin American bloc, and from the African bloc, so that we could get to the point where people would say, "Well, this particular country plays it on the level, experience shows it, and we would have taken a substantial step ahead." Would you agree?

Mr. BARBER. I agree, and I also agree with the remarks both you and Mr. COX made about the use of multilateralism. Thinking about both arms control and development of police mechanisms. The extent to which this is done multilaterally, the better. I think Ambassador Goldberg indicated last year in a speech that he made that the United States was now getting around to the point where it would consider making contributions to the budget of the U.N. to facilitate the training and to build up individual earmarking units by governments that had a responsible interest in peacekeeping. I think this would be a healthy development.

Senator CLARK. This brings me to two more subjects I would like to solicit your joint help on before we recess, which we will have to do in about 20 minutes.

The first has to do with the desirability of activating the Military Staff Committee, and for its budgetary support.

The second is to address your attention as to how these peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts can be financed within the U.N. I will alter the format a little bit to give everybody a chance to be the leadoff man, and ask Professor Michalak, if you will start off with a response to those two questions, the Military Staff Committee and how do we finance these efforts.

REACTIVATING THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Mr. MICHALAK. Well, since I believe that the enforcement action, as intended in the charter, in which the big powers would be in concert, is almost totally infeasible or not feasible on any major military scale, I think the reactivating of the Military Staff Committee for that purpose would really be academic. And even if they tried to create a force, I think we would get into the same type of a thing we had in 1945, 1946, 1947, on the nature of the force.

Senator CLARK. I would suggest, if you will pardon me for interrupting a moment, my question is predicated, perhaps, too optimistically, on a vastly different international climate.

Mr. MICHALAK. That is what I was going to say, you see.

What I was going to get to was for the present, I think Mr. COX in his book makes some very good points that the reactivation of the Mili-

tary Staff Committee could allow us to sit down with the Soviet Union and then start talking with them about more limited types of other things, get them engaged in a real dialog which would maybe spill over into what we call the peacekeeping aspect.

I mean, at the present time, it is highly unlikely that the Secretary will have a staff to be engaged in this type of discussion about guidelines, training, equipment, and so forth, and I think this is the way we could do this.

I think this is the way we could build up confidence and, hopefully, we could begin to get somewhere and get them started in this community.

On the issue of financing, I think again there are three methods. Let the people who are involved pay. I think this ought to be resorted to when we can, this is what the United Arab Republic and Yemen did.

The other is voluntary contributions, and I think it has been in our interest, in the interest of peacekeeping, that we ought to keep it going and foster it.

At the same time, we ought to create a norm where as many people pay as possible, especially those who vote for the resolutions authorizing it.

Senator CLARK. Do you think article 19 is dead?

Mr. MICHALAK. I do not think there is a chance of supporting that, and I think people like Senator Aiken mentioned this, that before 1965 we were attempting to force on France and the Soviet Union something that we would not accept being enforced upon ourselves. I see no hope at all for article 19 ever operating, at least in the near future.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Barber.

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED

Mr. BARBER. I would encourage the meeting of the Military Staff Committee.

I think concurrently within the move to do so there should be at least within the U.S Government some concept of what the role of the Staff Committee ought to be, both in terms of short-term goals and long. I think I am in general agreement with the professor.

I would set up as the immediate short-term goal, which I think could be implemented fairly quickly, the building up of a modest staff capability for the Secretary General that is more effective than it is today, and this is no comment upon the quality of the people. They are very good. I think they are very limited in number, and we should provide them adequate communications.

There are eventually a number of things that could be done as a permanent staff which simply cannot be done on an ad hoc basis such as exists today.

I think that the measure probably could be done fairly promptly without any commitments beyond that.

Then, ultimately, I think such a staff ought to go on to try to build up some prompt factfinding capability. The Security Council has some degree of a veto over the operations of such things, which I think would be politically essential.

Finally, I would hope, although I do not see it in the short term, that the Military Staff Committee and the members of the Security Council would find it in their joint wisdom to encourage and set up some military staff inspections and standards for the standby national peacekeeping units. But I really believe that is probably off quite a few years.

Senator CLARK. I call attention to the fact that section 2 of article 47 of the charter provides that the Military Staff Committee shall consist of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, or their representatives. That would mean Russia, Great Britain, France, Taiwan, and ourselves.

If there were to be the beginnings of a détente post-Vietnam between the United States and the Soviet Union, that might very substantially ease the difficulties in establishing that committee, don't you think?

In other words, you are not dealing with 140 countries, or even with the nonpermanent members of the Security Council.

I have always been of the view that one of the great difficulties with the U.N. was that when it comes to peacekeeping or arms control and disarmament, that there are just too many people who do not have an interest in it from the military point of view.

We would be far better off if we started with the 18-nation disarmament conference in Geneva and persuaded France to come back in, and brought China in. That, of course, is rather remote from this present resolution, but I am interested in your comments about the Military Staff Committee.

Mrs. McVitty.

ENFORCEMENT ACTION OF MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Mrs. McVITTY. Well, I think in the present context of the discussion within the U.N. of the peacekeeping that has been under the Secretary General and the chapter VII version under the Military Staff Committee is that you would tend, if you pushed this at all, to simply rule out peacekeeping. In other words, you rather capitulate to the Russian-French side and say, well, under the charter this is the way we ought to do it.

You have a little additional difficulty in this in that a number of the Afro-Asian group of nations are tending toward articles 42 and 43 because they would like to see the U.N. take enforcement action in Southern Africa, and I think they might, too, begin to talk almost entirely in terms of enforcement action of a military kind.

I do not think you would have difficulties with the Military Staff Committee as such if you could get by the Cold War problems that have arisen. The Soviet Union has made several proposals that there might be some minor additions to this from nonaligned or regional military staff committees. I think you could do that.

But I think in the present context that you have to be careful that beginning to talk about the Military Staff Committee and chapter 7 you are not just saying, well, I guess we were wrong about the peacekeeping. It was kind of a side issue. I do not think this rules it out, but I think it is a question.

FINANCING OF OPERATIONS

On the financing, Senator Clark, it has always seemed to me that your main financing problem was political, and largely made up of people who just did not like peacekeeping or who did not want this precedent to be set. You have a good number of smaller countries who find it a burden, and who do not feel any particular interest in the peacekeeping operation that is going on. But there have been a number of proposals that would make their share so small that it could be done.

I think if you could once make peacekeeping an accepted thing by consensus of the U.N., then your financial problem would disappear. You could, at least, up to a sizable amount, have it assessed, perhaps, without too much difficulty. But you have to get by the political question before you get anywhere with the financing.

STATUS OF ARTICLE 19

Senator CLARK. Are you suggesting, Mrs. McVitty, that we might disinter article 19?

Mrs. McVITTY. I think article 19 could be disinterred, but it would be better to disinter it on some issue other than peacekeeping, because the agreement, as I understood it, on the part of the United States, was that they would not invoke it in respect of the UNEF or the Congo operations.

I felt at the time that they were not going to win that battle, and they should have traded something a lot better than they did for giving in. If they traded future peacekeeping instead of past debts they might have gotten somewhere. But I do not think that you can consider it anything but dead for the time being, at least on peacekeeping.

Now, it could come up in another context. I understand there are several delinquent nations right now who cannot vote. An African State who could not vote in a discussion on Rhodesia would be pretty upset, and others might try to revive article 19 around that, and where the African nation could very well lose, whereas not the Soviet.

Senator CLARK. So, in other words, you think article 19 is not dead but in a state of suspended animation.

Mrs. McVITTY. Very suspended animation, and certainly on peacekeeping.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX. I would agree with Mrs. McVitty's remarks. I think that we ought to let article 19 lie indefinitely.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING

I also think that we should make a strong distinction between enforcement operations and peacekeeping. If we do agree to move on some exploratory talks on the Military Staff, we should think of this in terms of strengthening machinery for enforcement procedures, but that we should continue to maintain the special committee on

peacekeeping as a separate device and separate organization, because I think these are separable, and it is very important that we should keep them separate.

The Soviets have tried in their public position to link them together, to lock them in, and I think it would be a very serious mistake if we allowed this to happen. We would lose a lot of the ad hoc possibilities, particularly the possibility for the Secretary General to act as he has in many operations in the past.

Another thing that I would be very careful about is the Soviet view that the Military Staff Committee should be the center of command and control of all future use of international forces.

I cannot imagine any arrangement where military forces are commanded and controlled by four or five or more member nation states and their commanding officers. This is just an impossibility, as we have seen even in an organization of the friendly members, such as NATO.

You have to have a single commander in chief of these operations, and you also have to have a single source of responsible authority behind them, as you have had in the office of the Secretary General.

Senator CLARK. Well, my thought, as I read article 47, is that we are dealing with a staff and not a command function. In fact, the name of the committee is the Military Staff Committee, and I assume, perhaps too quickly, that it would act merely as an adviser to (a) the Secretary General and (b) the Security Council.

Mr. Cox. Well, I think the position you are assuming is the position I would hope the U.S. Government would follow. But that is not the Soviet position, and I think it is important to make that distinction.

FINANCING IS A POLITICAL MATTER

Now, on the question of financing, I agree with Mrs. McVitty that again this is essentially a political matter.

Senator CLARK. Of course, that does not solve it, just to call it a political matter. You still have the question of where is the money coming from.

Mr. Cox. I think one of the important things that can advance this political problem to the point where the Soviets put up money as well as authority—

Senator CLARK. And France.

Mr. Cox (continuing). And France, but particularly the Soviets, is to agree that Communists will have responsibility in, and participation in, the command and control of the future operations.

I think once this is done, once we decide to move in this direction as a matter of policy, I think we will find a good deal more motion on this question of finances.

Senator CLARK. You said motion, not emotion.

Mr. Cox. Motion, yes.

One device that I think might be usefully tried on peacekeeping operations would be the pledging conference technique on individual operations. This has worked very effectively in the development program where last year close to \$200 million was pledged by member nations.

I think because peacekeeping is so much more politically sensitive, you could not get this kind of support, but I think you might get more

support, and it would be a more orderly way of going about it than the present passing of the hat, as the Secretary General has to do in an operation like Cyprus.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

AMENDMENT TO RESOLUTION

I take it that all four of you feel that it is not desirable to attempt to make any amendment to the resolution we are considering; is that correct?

Mrs. McVITTY. Yes.

Mr. MICHALAK. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Silence gives consent, for the record.

Mrs. McVITTY. For the record, I would like to say I support it in all its parts. I never got a chance to say that in my testimony.

Senator CLARK. Senator Case was not giving you unlimited opportunity. I take it you all support it?

Mr. MICHALAK. Yes.

Senator CLARK. The record will indicate an affirmative response.

Gentlemen and lady, I want to thank you for the magnificent contribution you have made to this hearing. I think we are a great deal ahead of where we were when we convened this morning.

I would like to ask Mr. Cox whether he thinks he could take this magnificent book of his, "Prospects for Peacekeeping," which I have not only read but studied and underlined, and prepare for the record a summary of it which would incorporate those parts which are relevant to a consideration of this resolution? It may be you do not think you have time to do that.

Your comments this morning, while most helpful, were not actually in the depth which your book is.

If you feel you cannot do it, I will get the staff to do it, but I think you could do it better than they could.

Mr. Cox. Well, I really think I could not do it, at least not for the next couple of months. I might be able to do it sometime during the summer.

Senator CLARK. We will have it done by the staff then.

(The material referred to follow:)

EXCERPTS FROM PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING

(By Arthur M. Cox, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., published October 1967)

CHAPTER 4. THE PEACEKEEPERS

A Permanent United Nations Force

Twenty-two years have elapsed since the drafters of the Charter set forth those goals and there is still no permanent UN force, nor has the Military Staff Committee ever been responsible for the strategic direction of a security operation. The Military Staff Committee, to this day, goes through the motions of convening and adjourning, and the Soviet Union still insists that peacekeeping should be managed through the machinery of the Staff Committee, but that is as far as it goes.

* * * * *
Despite the political reality of the Cold War, the concept of a permanent UN peace force does not die. The Soviets, exploiting the worldwide longing for peace, made propaganda advances during the fifties by calling for a UN force to police a program of universal disarmament. In 1962 the United States re-

sponded by proposing a treaty for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. Article 4, setting forth the objectives of the proposed treaty, includes among them: "To ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, states also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms."

* * * The UN has not yet moved to establish even a token standby force on a permanent basis. With its present financial crisis, even so small an additional cost as \$10,000,000 seems significant. Furthermore, issues such as obtaining an acceptable locus for a base, the selection of a force commander and deputy commanders, and the question of participation by Communist units all are politically sensitive. Even more fundamental is the Soviet and French opposition to additional authority for the Secretary-General. Certainly there is no prospect for an end to this impasse so long as the Vietnam War continues at its present level of conflict. Even before the escalation of the Vietnam War, both Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant, recognizing the major political obstacles, advised against attempting the establishment of a permanent peace force.

President Eisenhower had endorsed the idea of a permanent UN force in his speech to the special session of the General Assembly in the summer of 1958. Again in 1960, in an address to the General Assembly, he said: "I assure countries which now receive assistance from the United States that we favor the use of that assistance to help them maintain earmarked national contingents in the state of readiness suggested by the Secretary-General." The next year, in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Congress approved the following language, which has remained in the law ever since: "Military assistance to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security * * *." [Italics supplied.]

The fact that so many countries are active supporters and participants in UN peacekeeping and yet have not responded to the Secretary-General's appeal for earmarked units does not reflect any adverse trend or lack of commitment. On the contrary, there has been a steady growth of backing for UN peacekeeping operations despite the Article 29 controversy, the impasse between the superpowers, and the financial difficulties.

The Lessons of Experience

* * * The key to successful peacekeeping is genuine impartiality of the peacekeepers. Factors such as color of skin, familiarity with the environment, and geographical proximity are often mentioned as considerations, but are minor when compared with the importance of impartiality. In fact, experience has demonstrated that it is usually better for peacekeepers to be states located at some distance from the host country. Near neighbors often have too much direct interest in the outcome of a dispute.

Next to the broad issue of political support and the maintenance of a consensus backing the decisions of the Secretary-General, the most difficult aspect of peacekeeping is the demand and control of the force.

Communications and intelligence are other sensitive and difficult aspects of operating with international forces * * *. In the Congo mission. * * * The U.N. force lacked money to buy information from agents and relied primarily on radio intercepts, air reconnaissance, helicopter and ground patrol, and reports from field liaison officers. An important aspect of effective information and communications in the field is the requirement that at least the officers speak English or French, preferably both, and that some skilled interpreters are available who

can communicate in the native language of the country where the peacekeeping operation is located.

* * * Representatives from several governments believe that field manuals and standard operating procedures could be prepared now that would be invaluable for the peacekeepers of the next decade. They think that the best place to assign this work would be the Office of the Military Adviser of the Secretary-General.

* * * * *
 Any planning for the future of U.N. peacekeeping should consider the recent technological advances that might be employed. An important aspect of international control of disputes is an effective early warning system. * * *

* * * * *
 Among the most important considerations for advancing and perfecting UN peacekeeping are the practical and political implications of participation by Communist states. Some of the Eastern European states have indicated an interest in participating in UN security operations. The time has come to explore this interest, through informal channels, in specific detail. There is need to assess the various political and security problems most likely to emerge; the possible extent of participation in headquarters decisions and in the command and control of field operations; and the capability of available units for specialized duties such as communications, engineering, and medical assistance. The future of peacekeeping will be greatly influenced by the extent to which the Communist states are willing to commit themselves to responsible participation in operations managed by the United Nations.

CHAPTER 5. AUTHORIZATION, FINANCING, AND DIRECTION

* * * * *
 There is, first of all, no evidence that during the past twenty years the United Nations was prevented from initiating any needed peacekeeping action because of disagreement about constitutional or legal principles. Yet, in one or another form, divergent views have been held since the very beginning. * * *

* * * * *
 Ambassador Astrom's suggestion that the authorization issue be put aside for the time being probably rests too on the recent record of increased Security Council involvement in the peace and security field—a situation preferred by the United States as well as the Soviet Union. The main reason for continuing U.S. insistence on the option of Assembly authority is not so much a conviction that the Assembly ought to be an alternate decisionmaker on peacekeeping matters, but rather a belief—probably well founded—that the Assembly option has been a deterrent to the use of capricious, obstructive vetoes in the Security Council. With the West Irian exception, every peacekeeping operation in recent years has been initiated by the Council: Yemen in 1962, Cyprus in 1964, Kashmir and the Indian-Pakistan border observers in 1965. This is likely to be the pattern for most future operations, and it is supported by a growing number of member states * * *.

* * * * *
 Two factors contribute to the persistent apprehension at the United Nations about the financial aspects of peacekeeping. First, the assessments for the UNEF and Congo operations have never been fully paid; second, the methods available for future financing are less reliable than the system of compulsory assessments the United States had hoped to enforce with the Article 19 threat. The central political lesson of the Article 19 crisis is that no state, surely no great power, can be compelled to pay for operations that it disapproves of politically.

* * * * *
 In attempting to devise reliable financing methods for future operation, it must be recognized that assessed contributions are no longer a viable source of peacekeeping funds. No alternative will be as neat and, ostensibly at least, as fool-proof as the assessment system; but a variety of nonmandatory financing techniques are available. Skillful and imaginative use of them can produce flexible patterns of financing that will give needed credibility to the principle of collective financial responsibility and, most important of all, take into account the essentially political nature of peacekeeping financing.

Four financing methods have survived and are currently being used. Others have been suggested during recent years. The first, and simplest, is financing on what might be called a "benefits-received" principle; that is, the states that benefit directly from the presence of peacekeeping forces pay for their maintenance.

A second basic financing method was used for the first time in the Cyprus operation. Created in March, 1964, the Cyprus force, under the terms of the Security Council's enabling resolution, is financed entirely by voluntary contributions from member states.

The third financing technique, in common use before the financial crisis provoked by UNEF and the Congo operation, is the funding of operations out of the regular budget—if necessary by shifting available resources from one budget category to another. It too is likely to be an acceptable method for modest financing in the future. Recent operations on the borders of Israel, on the India-Pakistan border, and in Kashmir have been financed in this way; the latter two provide a good illustration of how operations are financed out of the regular budget.

The fourth financing method used represents an attempt to find a middle ground between mandatory and wholly voluntary payments for major operations—in this case, UNEF. This so-called "apportionment" system is essentially a cost-sharing device that anticipates nonpayment by those states that object to the force on political grounds.

Nonetheless, peacekeeping still is a part-time art at the United Nations; it is still in embryonic stages: it is still a patchwork of *ad hoc* procedures. Perhaps the single most important lesson in this examination of the issues is that the interests of all states will be served—and most of them know it—if every effort is made to exploit the *ad hoc* approach to the limits of available political consensus. Demonstrably, such exploitation is possible, and the limits have not yet been reached.

Lincoln Bloomfield wisely said in his April, 1966, *Foreign Affairs* article: "on the assumption that UN peacekeeping will be invoked in the future, yet will continue to rest on a fragmented political foundation, common sense favors arrangements that do not put the existence of the organization at stake each time such a task must be undertaken."

CHAPTER 6. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The point is, rather, that action through the United Nations is one of the foreign policy options available to the President. The UN can and should be a substitute for US military involvement in certain circumstances. When that happens the Secretary-General does indeed carry some of the burdens that might otherwise be carried by the President and the Secretary of State.

The UN is a forum where the superpowers can collaborate with minimum loss of face and therefore less danger of adverse domestic political repercussions.

It is also true that, so long as the war continues, there is little prospect for agreed action to improve peacekeeping machinery. Nevertheless a number of things might usefully be pursued within the US Government.

One of the most important first steps would be a decision by the President to give higher priority to UN peacekeeping, and to consider it under appropriate circumstances as a substitute for US action. Implicit in such a decision would be the recognition that Soviet acquiescence will be required, though it is possible that the General Assembly might act over Soviet objection on a minor issue. Since the Soviets have sometimes acquiesced very reluctantly to peacekeeping forces, their support in the future can perhaps be relied upon with more assurance if they are allowed to assume a greater responsibility for the success of UN peacekeeping and if they are given reason to develop greater trust in the impartiality of the Secretary-General and the peacekeeping process.

One step that might contribute to a better understanding of the different approaches to peacekeeping would be for the United States to agree to an examination of proposals set forth for the first time in the Soviet memorandum of July, 1964, and reiterated in the policy statement of March, 1967. The Soviet position is that a great number of states should be added to the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council to participate in the strategic direction and the operational command of a UN force. * * * An exploration of this position by a subcommittee of the Security Council might provide the basis for a compromise.

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The United States also would probably have to accept the inclusion of Communist units in some future peacekeeping forces in some area of the world.

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* * * US interests would be better served if UN operations are considered impartial, with both the United States and the Soviet Union using the organization to control and block disputes, rather than to advance Communism or anti-Communism * * * Keeping the UN peacekeeping function out of major U.S.-Soviet disputes is not so impractical as it may seem, particularly when viewed in the context of the strategic interests shared by both superpowers in the face of the growing threat from China. In fact, the problem of China gives special urgency to the need for an accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to UN peacekeeping.

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UN peacekeeping should become an explicit subject for US contingency planning. For example, though the United States prefers the OAS for future peacekeeping in Latin America, it will nevertheless be desirable to consider the employment of the UN for western hemisphere peacekeeping.

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* * * The United States should consider affirmative action on the proposal made by leaders of the Republican party that the US formally commit itself to providing airlift for UN operations through the facilities of the Military Air Transport Service, and that it earmark a unit of noncombat officers and men with specialized skills, such as medical corpsmen, engineers, seabees, etc.

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There has been inadequate effort by the US Government to use the authority in the Foreign Assistance Act that permits granting military assistance to enable recipient countries to "participate in collective measures requested by the UN for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security."

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* * * According to senior officials in the Department of Defense, there has not yet been a decision within the government to relate defense assistance programs to the need to strengthen the peacekeeping capability of the United Nations. This situation is consistent with the preoccupation in the government, at least since 1964, with the direct use of U.S. power and bilateral arrangements.

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* * * When Ambassador Arthur Goldberg said in November, 1965, that aid to earmarking nations could be made available through the UN, he did not specify what he meant. One possibility would be to create a "special earmarkers' fund" for the Secretary-General that he could use at his discretion to assist poorer countries who desire to earmark units for UN service.

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For the foreseeable future UN peacekeeping will probably be financed by voluntary contributions rather than assessments. The United States should encourage maximum participation by the members in sharing the costs. One financing technique that would probably further this goal and that has not yet been tried for peacekeeping is an annual pledging conference of the entire membership of the General Assembly. Pledges could be made to cover the costs of each on-going peacekeeping operation. * * *. In 1966 all but seven of the 122 UN members pledged contributions to the budget of the Development Program for a total amount of \$170 million. US pledges are limited by Congress to a maximum of 40 percent of the total given. Since peacekeeping operations are more controversial than development programs, pledging support for them probably will not be so widespread. Forty-four nations have financed the costs of the Cyprus operation. That number might be significantly increased if the pledging technique were used. But whatever the technique, the important thing to remember is that

if there is broad political backing for a particular UN operation the money will be found. Money follows political consent, not vice versa.

* * * Some day, if and when the impasse is broken, there are several improvements that should be made. Presently, the Secretary-General is supported by an absurdly small Military Adviser's Office of one man. The Military Adviser's Office should be given a broader mandate and should be expanded by several officers so that it can prepare manuals on such subjects as earmarking, command and control, logistical support, etc. These manuals should provide the basis for establishing standard operating procedures for the military aspects of all future peacekeeping.

There is also a need for expanding the staff of senior Secretariat personnel responsible for the political direction and management of peacekeeping operations * * *.

* * * * *
 In time the United Nations Institute for Training and Research should assume responsibilities in the peacekeeping field. UNITAR, which has the advantage of being independently financed and directed, should be able to engage in those aspects of strengthening the institution of peacekeeping that temporarily may be too controversial for the Secretariat * * *.

* * * * *
 All of the foregoing are measures that should considerably strengthen the machinery for peacekeeping. The US government can act at once to perfect its own machinery, but some of the other institutional improvements will have to await changes in the Soviet and possibly the French positions * * *.

Senator CLARK. The committee will stand in recess until 2:30 this afternoon, when we will hear from former Ambassador to the U.N., Charles Yost.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator CLARK (presiding). The subcommittee will resume its hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.

We are fortunate indeed to have as our witness this afternoon Charles W. Yost, former Deputy Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and the right-hand man to Adlai Stevenson for a large part of the time he was there, and also a most experienced Foreign Service Officer, now retired, of ambassadorial rank, and who served as U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Syria, and Morocco.

Mr. Yost, it is a privilege to me personally, and I am sure it will be to the other members of the subcommittee, to have you with us this afternoon.

You are speaking to us, I understand, on the subject of overall crisis management in general and, of course, more specifically on this concurrent resolution which, as you may know, has not only been sponsored by 21 Senators, but also by 67 Members of the House of Representatives.

So we would be very happy to hear from you in your own way.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES W. YOST, FORMER DEPUTY PERMANENT U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Yost. Thank you very much, Senator. I am very happy indeed to be here, and particularly to talk about the resolution which covers matters very close to my heart, and I will concentrate mainly on the general subject of the resolution.

Ever since my participation in the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences, I have been convinced that the United Nations is

by far the most desirable instrument for keeping the peace. The question since 1945 has always been whether or not it could be an effective instrument.

Unfortunately, because of the onset of the cold war so soon after 1945 and the consequent unwillingness of the Soviet Union and the Western powers to cooperate in and out of the U.N., the machinery for peacekeeping provided in the charter was never activated. Agreements under article 43 for supplying forces and facilities to enforce Security Council decisions were never concluded and the Military Staff Committee, while it still exists and meets regularly, has remained largely a dead letter.

Instead, there were evolved over the years ad hoc peacekeeping procedures which, at least in cases where great powers were not directly confronting each other, proved surprisingly effective. These ranged from factfinding or mediation by the Secretary General, through the stationing of observers on disputed frontiers and truce lines, to the present substantial U.N. forces, in the case of the Congo reaching 20,000, in areas where serious threats to the peace existed.

ELEMENTS OF AD HOC PEACEKEEPING PROCEDURES

Generally, these ad hoc peacekeeping procedures involved five elements: (1) authorization by the Security Council, for falling short of mandatory "enforcement action" under chapter VII of the charter or, when the Council action was blocked by veto, authorization by the General Assembly; (2) vigorous executive action by the Secretary General and his staff; (3) the provision of armed forces and observers by states other than permanent members of the Security Council and of logistic support by many nations, most of all the United States; (4) financing, when the operation was small, from the regular budget of the U.N., and, when it was more substantial, from special appropriations or voluntary contributions; and (5) since the procedures were not mandatory and the Security Council or General Assembly resolutions were for the most part only recommendations, the consent of the state or states on whose territory the U.N. forces or observers were to be stationed.

REASONS FOR BREAKDOWN OF PROCEDURES

For about 15 years, these ad hoc peacekeeping procedures worked reasonably well. After 1964 they began to break down. There were several reasons for this development. The first was financial and legal, the fact that the United States insisted that all States contribute to substantial peacekeeping operations and that the Soviet Union and France refused to contribute to operations they did not approve. The second was the changed composition of the Assembly, the admission of many new members which for the most part wished to remain "nonaligned" between great powers and, hence, were unwilling to authorize proposed operations which had been blocked in the Security Council by dissension among the great powers. The third reason was the inhibiting effect on the initiative and executive discretion of the Secretary General which these deadlocks and dissensions over peacekeeping necessarily had. And the fourth reason was the dramatic demonstration in May 1967, of the dependence of U.N. peacekeeping operations on the consent of the host state afforded by the United Arab

Republic's withdrawal of consent for the stationing of the U.N. emergency force in its territory. As a result of all these developments U.N. peacekeeping has while still continuing in some places lost a good deal of its earlier momentum effectiveness and public confidence.

In my opinion it is neither wise nor tolerable that U.N. peacekeeping capabilities should be allowed to falter and diminish at the time when the peace of the world remains precarious as it still is. Whatever one thinks of the war in Vietnam, it certainly reveals very starkly the hazards and limitations of peacekeeping operations, no matter how justified which are conducted unilaterally or by self-constituted groups of states. Multilateral instruments and internationally accepted constitutional processes are more than ever necessary and their absence more and more keenly felt.

ALTERNATIVES FOR REVIVING PEACEKEEPING

I, therefore, heartily welcome Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 which proposes to endorse and strengthen certain of these instruments and processes. There are two alternatives ways in which U.N. peacekeeping might be revived and invigorated. I personally favor either one or both, whichever proves most feasible and effective.

The first course would be the strengthening of the ad hoc peacekeeping procedures which have been worked out and have won wide support during the past 20 years. That is the course Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 proposes and it deals with some of the most important elements of these procedures, earmarking and training of peacekeeping units, which a number of nations have already offered, and more should, the provision of logistical support, where the United States can be particularly helpful, and the working out of guidelines for financing, without which of course there can be no peacekeeping. Frankly, I believe that for U.N. peacekeeping operations which the United States conceives to be in its interest, the United States should be prepared, if necessary, to bear the lion's share of the cost, regardless of what other states may or may not do, and that it will still find such operations much cheaper than conflicts like Vietnam which it has to carry on outside the United Nations. Finally, of course, Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 proposes for the longer range the creation of a permanent individually recruited U.N. peacekeeping force not dependent on ad hoc assignment of contingents by individual governments. This, too, I heartily support.

The alternative course for the revival of U.N. peacekeeping would be to make another effort, now that the cold war has somewhat abated, to negotiate the agreements envisaged under article 43, and to return to the procedures laid down in the Charter. This of course would have the advantage, among others, that it would permit more frequent resort, when necessary, to the enforcement procedures of chapter VII of the Charter. The U.N. would no longer be dependent upon the consent of parties to disputes nor obliged to withdraw its forces, as it was a year ago when the Middle East, just when they are most badly needed. On the other hand, this means of reviving U.N. peacekeeping requires agreement among the permanent members of the Security

Council, most of all, agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Senator CLARK. As part of that, Ambassador Yost, would you activate the Military Staff Committee?

Mr. Yost. Yes; I would.

PEACEKEEPING REINVIGORATED THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I would argue, however, that under present circumstances and by that I mean the unlikelihood that the General Assembly will in the future be willing or able to mount peacekeeping operations—any reinvigoration of U.N. peacekeeping will have to come through the Security Council and hence must involve agreement, or at least acquiescence, among the permanent members.

Senator CLARK. This actually means the U.S.S.R. and the United States; does it not?

Of course, there are peripheral problems with Nationalist China, France, and Great Britain.

But I wonder if you share my view that if we once get the shooting stopped in Vietnam with some kind of a peace underway there, that the most important problem confronting our foreign policy is to make some détente with the Soviet Union which, hopefully, would be in the best interests of both countries.

Mr. Yost. I share that very, very heartily, Senator, for a number of reasons, and I will mention that here.

Even the measures proposed in Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, sensible and necessary as they are, cannot be carried very far unless all the permanent members support or acquiesce in them.

What I would, therefore, strongly recommend to both the executive and legislative branches of our Government is that we explore both courses: The courses I have just referred to in our effort to reinvigorate U.N. peacekeeping, the negotiation of agreements under article 43, and the strengthening in the meantime of such ad hoc procedures as those proposed in Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.

STRENGTHENING AD HOC PROCEDURES

Senator CLARK. I am very much taken by your second suggestion, and I am wondering, since you have had a lot of experience in legislating in a forum which is even more difficult, perhaps, than the U.S. Senate, whether you think it would be wise to try to amend the resolution to take into contemplation the second point which you have just referred to. Maybe we are biting off as much as we can chew this way.

On the other hand, I so thoroughly agree with you, I am somewhat tempted by the other course.

Mr. Yost. Well, you are a much better judge than I of what is feasible in the Congress. But certainly if it were feasible I think it would be desirable to indicate that as a possible supplementary course.

Senator CLARK. Spell out just a little bit more specifically, will you, Mr. Ambassador, what you and I mean by that but have not

exactly said. Would you phrase it in terms of a detente with the Soviet Union, or how would you phrase it?

Mr. YOST. Well, that, of course, is an indispensable element to it, and I have just got a word or two to say here, and then I will expand a little, if you would like.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES

Mr. YOST. By "explore" I mean, in the first instance, discuss these courses and measures seriously and patiently with the other permanent members of the Security Council; including, of course, the Soviet Union and France, with other states such as Canada and the Scandinavian countries which have played a major role in U.N. peacekeeping, and with the Secretary General. Regretfully, I would not expect these explorations to make much progress while the Vietnam war continues. But when that war is concluded, I think there may be a real possibility that many U.N. members, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, may conclude that U.N. peacekeeping is in many cases safer and more effective than national means of dealing with disorder in the modern world; and that it is in the national interest of all states, great and small, to shift an ever-growing part of these costly and dangerous burdens from themselves to the international community.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 47 SUPPORTED

For all these reasons, I welcome and support Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 as evidence of the concern of its sponsors, and I hope of the Senate as a whole, with a continuing U.S. commitment to the United Nations, and as a valuable indication of concrete ways and means by which U.N. peacekeeping could be made more effective. The United States is all too obviously confronted both at home and abroad by critical and costly problems. We have a great and continuing responsibility for those abroad but we cannot and should not try to solve them alone or by confrontation. The U.N., if properly organized and used, still offers the best potential means of solving them in cooperation with others.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, sir.

It would not be too difficult, if you have the resolution before you—do you have it?

Mr. YOST. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. On the second page to add a paragraph (c) which would express the view of the Congress that the U.S. Government should explore with other permanent members of the Security Council ways and means of operating under chapter 7 of the charter to achieve the results which are hoped for in the resolution; something like that.

Mr. YOST. Yes; should make renewed efforts to work out, to negotiate, agreements under article 43, something along that line.

Senator CLARK. Yes. I have a number of questions in mind, but I want you to complete what you have to say first. Do you have anything you want to add?

DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. YOST. Well, I might just comment upon the point you raised, that I agree with you very strongly that once the Vietnam war can be concluded, the first item of our international business should be an attempt to improve our relations with the Soviet Union and, particularly, to deal with certain problems which, between us, can become much more serious if we are not able to move forward together.

One, of course, is the control and reduction of the armament race. Another is the situation in the Middle East where both of us can get so easily drawn in further than either of us wants to. A third major field would be, I believe, cooperation inside the U.N. to make it able to carry more of the peacekeeping load.

Senator CLARK. You have had a lot of experience in negotiating with the Soviet Union, and I assume you share my view that they are rough and tough and, indeed, often unpredictable opponents. But in the larger sense, would you not think that because they are intelligent and able and shrewd, that once we got the Vietnam war over, they might feel, as we do, that the best interests of their own people and their standard of living would lie in the area of peaceful agreements as opposed to cold war competition?

Mr. YOST. I would think so.

As you say, any negotiations with them would be tough and difficult and, at the present time, they probably could not be carried on beyond rather restricted limits. But within those limits, where there is a real common interest, such as in curtailing and controlling the arms race, I think there are real possibilities.

Senator CLARK. I am going to ask a couple of questions which you may feel it wiser not to answer; and, if so, please say so.

CHANGE IN RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD COOPERATION

In your experience as a diplomat, did you notice any change in the Russian attitude toward cooperation with the United States from the time of Stalin to Khrushchev, and now Kosygin and Brezhnev? Are they any more amenable to fair and free negotiations on matters of mutual interest than they used to be; and, in particular, are they any less suspicious?

Mr. YOST. They still are very suspicious, but they certainly are much more willing and able to negotiate in recent times than they were in the Stalin days.

During the Khrushchev period there were ups and downs, as you know. They blew hot and cold at different times. There was a period in 1959-1960 when quite a bit more would have been possible if we had taken advantage of the opportunities. At other times we could not do much.

But I have the feeling, and have had it for the last 2 years, that were it not for Vietnam there would be real opportunities, and this is more than a feeling; I have had it repeated to me countless times by Russians and Eastern Europeans.

Senator CLARK. I have had the same experience.

I was in Moscow in November of 1967. They were much more aggressive on Vietnam than I think they are now. I get the impression

now, and I wonder if you would agree, they would be rather happy to see the conflict ended in Vietnam.

Mr. YOST. I think they would be.

Senator CLARK. They tell me at the Kremlin there was not any hope of accommodation with the United States as long as the Vietnam war was going on and while their noble socialistic ally, North Vietnam, was under attack by the wicked colonialists and capitalists.

Of course, they did not stick to that because they negotiated a non-proliferation treaty, and they negotiated the airlines agreement, and they pressed us to ratify the consular agreement.

I do think, nevertheless though, and I wonder if you would agree, that our contrary positions in Vietnam have been a very real deterrent to better relations with the U.S.S.R.

Mr. YOST. A very real deterrent. But, as you say, it is very significant that even with that very heavy deterrent they were willing to negotiate some important agreements, and it is a sign of what might happen if that deterrent passed away.

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN RUSSIA?

Senator CLARK. We hear a lot of talk in this country, a good deal of it chiefly initiated by former President Eisenhower, about the undue power of the military-industrial complex in the United States.

Is there something similar in the Red army and the military strategists in Russia? Do they have the same influence, in your judgment, over the Central Committee, the Politburo, the rulers in the Kremlin, as the Pentagon appears to have, at least to some of us, in both the White House and the Congress?

Mr. YOST. Well, I am sure they have considerable influence. That, too probably varies from time to time. In a way it may be a little stronger now with a less dictatorial man at the top than in some previous times.

But even so, the political element in the Soviet Government is very clearly the predominant one, and if the political people decide they want to make agreements, in the last analysis that will be done.

Senator CLARK. I have some other questions, but I yield now to Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a great delight to welcome you here because when you see an old friend and one who has been your boss at least twice, it is very nice indeed to be here to welcome you officially.

MILITARY ENFORCEMENT ARRANGEMENT MEASURES NEVER USED

As you will recall, our own friendship goes back some years to when the U.N. started. I am wondering what your view was as to why the Military Staff Committee, why Articles 43, 44, and 45, which were the military enforcement arrangement measures, had never been able to be used?

I can imagine no more authoritative voice than yours, Mr. Ambassador, and your view as to why this whole great project was never carried out is welcome.

Mr. YOST. It is a great pleasure for me, Senator, to be able to confer with you here on this subject and to meet again.

I was assigned abroad at the time after San Francisco, when over a period of about 2 years efforts were made to negotiate the Article 43 agreement, so I am not aware of the details, but it is perfectly clear that for those agreements to have been concluded there would have had to be a full cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union and, as we all know, in 1946 and 1947 those relations got progressively worse, and it was simply impossible for them and us to agree to work together to keep the peace of the world, work out procedures which were envisaged by both of us when we drafted the Charter.

I do not think there are any, I am sure there are no insuperable technical difficulties. This subject was gone into pretty carefully at Dumbarton Oaks where I was present, and ideas were pretty well exposed, and while we realized there were all sorts of problems, the solution of the problems was fairly clear.

It was simply the political context which changed completely and made agreement impossible, and if the political context changed again and, as Senator Clark has just been suggesting, there should be an opportunity for really substantive talks, negotiations with the Russians after Vietnam, I would feel reasonably confident that we could make some progress along this line.

Senator PELL. Actually had not the climate changed between Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco? It is reflected by the differing attitudes we each had with regard to the veto, at least the Soviet Union and the United States, which just reversed positions in that period of time?

Mr. YOST. It had begun to change, yes.

Senator PELL. Has the Military Staff Committee ever had a substantive assignment, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. YOST. Not since that time.

Senator PELL. Which is never.

Mr. YOST. In those early days I think we were given the job of trying to work out some of these drafts. But since about 1947, 1948, I do not think they have had any substantive job.

Senator PELL. Do the other four permanent members of the Security Council have military officers assigned to the Military Staff Committee?

Mr. YOST. Oh, yes, yes. The Staff Committee continues to have, I believe, a monthly meeting, which is a pure formality, but it serves to keep it in being, and shows that all the members do hope that eventually it might be used. They do not want it to disappear.

INDIVIDUALLY RECRUITED SMALL FORCE RECOMMENDED

Senator PELL. I was wondering if you had any ideas yourself, from your own reading and knowledge of history, and relating that to the future, as to the best kind of international force. Do you visualize individuals, people individually recruited, as set forth in the second article of this resolution, or do you visualize a national component under an international command? I wonder if you have given any thought to it.

Mr. YOST. What I would like to see worked out eventually would be a small permanent force individually recruited, which could be rushed immediately, in a matter of hours, in an emergency situation to a trou-

ble spot without having to wait to consult governments and get their agreement to supply contingents that would have been earmarked.

Senator PELL. These would be individuals.

Mr. Yost. These would be individually recruited, and it would be a permanent police force, but relatively small. And then to supplement that when you ran into situations where larger forces would be required, then I think you should fall back on this business of calling on national contingents. There is no point in keeping a very large force on hand all the time.

Senator CLARK. Would you yield for a moment?

Senator PELL. Certainly.

SECRETARY GENERAL'S MILITARY STAFF

Senator CLARK. The individually recruited small force would have a command staff structure, would it not?

Mr. Yost. Yes, indeed.

Senator CLARK. So that in the event that it was necessary to call on national contingents there would be an individually recruited top level, which would presumably be operating under the direction of the Secretary General.

Mr. Yost. The Secretary General does have, and has had for some time, a military adviser with a small staff.

Senator CLARK. Is that separate from the Military Staff Committee?

Mr. Yost. That is quite separate from the Military Staff Committee.

Senator CLARK. I wonder why?

Mr. Yost. Well, because the Military Staff Committee would, of course, operate on the basis of unanimity, in other words, subject to the veto. With respect to these peacekeeping operations that have been carried out in recent years, the Secretary General has wanted to be able to operate without that inhibition, and this staff has been kept to a very modest size because of the suspicions of the Russians and the French primarily. But there are a handful of military officers there, and this could be expanded if this small police force were set up.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Senator PELL. What is a typical example of the present or recent military advisers?

Mr. Yost. Well, the present one is an Indian general named General Ryke, who was the head of the U.N. Emergency Force in Sinai until that ended last year.

Senator PELL. Spelling this idea out a little bit, would you agree with the present general thought with regard to the present U.N. peacekeeping forces that the components or members from the five permanent members of the Security Council should be ruled out? Do you think that should apply to a security force?

Mr. Yost. I think so, until we are able to develop a world in which the great powers have more confidence in each other, and some of the small powers and the great powers, it is probably better.

There are, as we learned, a number of the middle powers, like the Canadians and the Scandinavians, who are willing to earmark and supply fairly substantial forces very promptly, from whom most of the military units can be drawn, as long as we and other great powers are ready to supply the air and sea transport that is required.

Of course, the key to much of it is the financing, and there, as I said in my statement, I think it is essential that the United States be prepared to pay a very substantial proportion of the financing of the peacekeeping operations regardless of what others do, and it will not amount to anything like what we pay for operations we engage in unilaterally.

INTERNATIONAL SEA FORCE

Senator PELL. An interesting thought here is that 70 percent of the earth's surface, the oceans, have no geographic bureau representing them, and yet this will become more and more an area where strife can take place, an area where farming can take place, aquaculture, the exploitation of the sea can take place, and the usufruct will have to be thought of.

Along this line of thought, I have been trying to develop the idea of a ocean-space treaty. I would like to see the Department of State, for instance, have a geographic bureau, perhaps, for ocean space which, after all, is 70 percent of the earth's surface, and in working that out we obviously need some kind of enforcement arrangements. I proposed the idea of an international seaguard which would be built along the line we are talking about. It would not be an enforcement arrangement with regard to keeping law between nations, as much as just keeping laws between individuals on the oceans.

My thought has been that a seaguard might be a back way, a way of backing into an international forest, because if you could have a seaguard that actually was enforcing the present regulations in effect with regard to whaling, sealing, fishing, weather patrol, iceberg patrol, the various rules that will come out of these international conferences and law, it could move into being the nucleus of the peacekeeping force envisaged in Senator Clark's resolution.

I was wondering if you had any thoughts along this line, if you had had a chance—I realize you have perhaps not had—to study my treaty.

Mr. Yost. I have not had a chance to look at your treaty, Senator, but I think the idea of a sea force under the U.N. would fit in very neatly with the idea of a small permanent police force which could be even the beginning or a part of the original development along that line. It would, in fact, be easier to station a sea force than a land force.

Senator PELL. It might make it easier, more acceptable, I think, to the other nations of the world to back into it in this way, too.

As long as we have the opportunity of being in a public forum in this way, there are two other little points I would like to ask about.

Mr. Chairman, you finish your questions and then I will come to mine.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Senator.

UTILIZATION OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

We had a good deal of discussion this morning with a panel of well qualified individuals about the desirability or lack of desirability of utilizing regional organizations such as the OAS or the Organization for African Unity or possibly some newly to be created Southeast Asian group. I do not think you could use SEATO as a vehicle for

peacekeeping efforts on a regional basis, unless you could, perhaps, be able to prevent the two major powers from jealous confrontation with each other.

The consensus, I think, was that this was not feasible, that we should rely solely on the U.N.

I made a suggestion that, perhaps, we ought to amend the resolution to take cognizance of the possibility of regional peacekeeping, thinking about the Dominican Republic, where we made an earnest but unsuccessful effort to get the OAS to take over, and in connection with Vietnam, there have been suggestions about the Southeast Asian powers taking a more effective interest.

What would be your views on that general subject?

Mr. Yost. Senator, in these days when international peacekeeping capabilities are still as weak as they are, I would like to see all instruments used to the full extent of their possibilities, and in cases where it is possible and appropriate to use the OAS, for example, for peacekeeping, where the great majority of the OAS members want the OAS used rather than the United Nations, I certainly would not raise any objection to using it.

But there are very few regional organizations that have much of a peacekeeping capacity.

Senator CLARK. This could be done legally under chapter 8 of the charter.

Mr. Yost. Oh, yes, and it has been. There is usually a little debate about this at the U.N. Some of the other U.N. members argue that the OAS is going too far. But, on the whole, this has worked out fairly well.

CHARTER REVISION CONFERENCE

Senator CLARK. I have felt for a long time, and I find that hardly anybody agrees with me, that we ought to press for that revision of the charter which is contemplated in the charter itself. No charter revision conference has ever been held. Would you share the skepticism of most as to whether that would be a constructive move?

Mr. Yost. I would at the moment, yes, because there simply is not enough agreement about revisions of the charter.

I think, to make such a conference productive, I am afraid it would just engage in a lot of fruitless and rather acrimonious debate.

Senator CLARK. It certainly would unless the United States took the initiative in terms of what kind of charter revision we would like to see, and negotiate privately with the Soviet Union and a number of the other powers to determine before we went into a charter revision conference whether we could agree on any particular type of consensus.

I have been very critical of the Department. I think they rented a computer not too long ago, and it came out with the view that the U.S. position was better off with the present situation. I am thinking in the General Assembly we could use a limitation of the one-nation, one-vote rule. I do not imagine that right now our country would be prepared to give up the veto. It would seem to me until that is done, until some kind of automatic financing for the U.N. is agreed to, possibly in terms of a small tax on international trade,

that the United Nations is not in much shape to take the lead in any of the major peacekeeping efforts.

I wonder if you would comment on that.

Mr. Yost. Well, I would agree that before charter revision there must be some behind-the-scene negotiation which would get agreement on some of these major points, and you have put your finger on two or three of the most important ones. This means of independent financing, I think, is one of the most significant.

No one is yet prepared to give the U.N. that much power in the sense of removing the control of the purse from the individual governments. But this may ultimately turn out to be the heart of the matter.

EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Senator CLARK. I have often wondered whether we might not take the initiative in the 18-nation disarmament conference which does have a rather fuzzy connection with the U.N. As you know it reports back to it. Most, if not all, of the major military nations are represented but, of course, France has not come in, China has not either. Perhaps something in the nature of an international disarmament organization with a charter rather different than that of the U.N. might be a feasible approach to a world organization which could be more effective in terms of peacekeeping than the present U.N. is.

I realize this is kind of bypassing the charter, but nevertheless here is a formal organization given its blessing by the U.N. You do not have the problem there of the smaller states.

Does this thought, which I suppose is pretty far out, have any validity at all?

Mr. Yost. Well, of course, that disarmament conference has been exclusively a negotiating affair. They have not had any operating responsibilities.

Senator CLARK. On the other hand, let me point out that there are treaties of general and complete disarmament, with international controls included, tabled by both the Soviet Union and the United States, so it is there for discussion if you want to start it.

Mr. Yost. Yes.

I would myself be more inclined to make a further effort to develop the United Nations in the right way. I do not think the presence of the smaller states, while I deplore the extent to which it has been carried, is a bar.

As I said in my statement, I do not think the Assembly, because of its composition, is going to be able to play much, if any, part in peacekeeping except as a moral force. But I think we can, and I hope we will, go back to using the Security Council as it was originally intended.

Senator CLARK. In other words, your thought is that the most pragmatic way to proceed is to make a sensible arrangement with the Security Council, leaving the General Assembly not much more than a debating society.

Mr. Yost. I would think so. That was the original intention of the authors of the charter. The machinery is there, the charter is there, it

has all been accepted. We were far along the road, and I would think it would be easier to proceed rather than trying to start anew.

THE VETO PROBLEM

Senator CLARK. The trouble, of course, is the veto.

Mr. YOST. Yes.

But even, of course, if you have a broad area of agreement among the permanent members, why, you can go a long way with it without worrying about the veto.

Senator CLARK. You might be able to work up some sort of a procedure outside the Security Council by which we would bilaterally agree with the Soviet Union, possibly with one or two others, that we would not use the veto except under certain broad or clearly defined circumstances of a major nature.

Mr. YOST. Yes; that is one way of going at it, or if you reach agreement on a general area of situations in which U.N. peacekeeping would be used, it would be in the interest of both states, and then the veto problem would not arise.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

SOVIET ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM

One final question: Have you any idea why the Soviet Union has deployed this entire antiballistic missile system to allegedly protect Moscow? Why could they possibly be developing another antiballistic missile system, I think, called the Tallinn missile system, ostensibly to protect other cities, when they must know, as we know, that the system is no good—why do they do it?

Mr. YOST. Well, I am not sure if they do know that it is no good, and I suspect this is part of the unhappy process of action and reaction and disproportionate reaction on both sides that has been going on, in my opinion, for a good many years. There is a long leadtime on these things, and each side decides the year x that it is going to be confronted by a serious threat 5 years ahead if it does not take precautionary measures, and it begins them and feeds them into the machine.

By the time it comes out 5 years later the situation has changed, the device may be ineffective or it may look much more offensive than it did originally, and then the other side reacts to that on the assumption it has just been decided last week, and this just goes on and on.

This is the most important thing I think we have to talk about between us and to try to stop.

Senator CLARK. I think this is true. And yet the overwhelming consensus of American scientific opinion, even in the Pentagon, as expressed by former Secretary McNamara, and by some scientific testimony which we have heard in executive session in the Foreign Relations Committee, is that any antiballistic missile system we have today in the light of our present knowledge of the art, would be ineffective against the Soviet Union.

However, it is thought that the Chinese threat might be turned back, and so we are going ahead and doing it even though all of our experts tell us that we could penetrate the Moscow system and destroy Moscow overnight if we wanted to.

I sometimes think we have lost all of our sanity.

Mr. Yost. I quite agree. This is really *reductio ad absurdum*.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, sir.

Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you.

ENLARGING THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In connection with the veto, has the United States ever used it?

Mr. Yost. No; it never has. But, of course, as the Russians point out, it has never had to because we have always had enough friendly votes on the Council to prevent resolutions from being adopted that we strongly objected to.

Senator PELL. This brings me to my next point. I heard it raised in connection with the ICJ, the International Court of Justice, by the former registrar, and now delegate from Norway, when he was saying, he thought the International Court should be increased in size, even though it would be unwieldy, from its present 15 to a larger number to more properly represent the different political forces in the world.

I am wondering if the form we used in San Francisco has become passed over by events, and more seats in the Security Council should not be added if we follow this idea out. Should we admit more seats from Asia and Africa, Latin America?

Mr. Yost. As you remember, Senator, it was enlarged not very long ago from 11 to 15.

I would question whether it should be enlarged any further.

Senator PELL. At this time.

Mr. Yost. At this time.

Whenever any subject arises which is of particular interest to non-members, they are usually invited to participate in the proceedings, and sometimes you have as many as 25 or 30 really participating. I think this is really enough, and new countries are adequately represented.

Senator PELL. What do you think should be the role of the United Nations with respect to the true mini states like Liechtenstein, Andorra, and Monaco? Do they have a role in there or not?

Mr. Yost. Well, unfortunately, they have never suggested that they should join. I personally feel some device should be found whereby all of these very tiny states that are now still coming up, and there may be many of them, can come into a system of some associate membership or something of that kind, whereby they feel themselves independent yet part of the U.N. system, but not have all of the obligations and costs that are involved in full membership.

PROBLEM OF COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator PELL. To go from a mini state to a maxi state, how do you see the problem of Communist China being resolved? My own view has been that it is to our national interest to have China as a member of the United Nations, but it is against our interest to change our policy publicly on it because if we advocated admission we would be pulling the rug out from under our friends in the Far East, Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. I think there is a diplo-

matic adage always to let the other man have your way. If we desisted from blackballing the entrance of China, would it not just work itself out? What is your view from your experience?

Mr. Yost. Well, I think it well might once the present state of great internal disarray in China has passed.

But I personally would go farther and change our position. I took part a year or two ago in a panel that the United Nations Association set up on this subject, and we issued a report in which we recommended, in effect, the two China policy, that is, where both Chinas would be represented, and whether or not Peking agreed under those circumstances to come in, at least the barrier would be removed. She would have been invited under a condition which the majority of all U.N. members felt was reasonable. If she wanted to stay out the responsibility would be on her and not on the U.N. or on the United States.

Senator PELL. Why do you feel that we should take a leading role in this one way or the other? If you can let a thing happen by doing nothing, is it not better, more diplomatic and less throwing of weight around, to do nothing rather than taking an initiative?

Mr. Yost. Well, I do not think we have to take a vigorous, aggressive initiative on this subject. I do think, in view of our whole history, our stand in precisely the opposite direction, that we would have to make very clear to all and sundry that we had changed that position. Otherwise I do not think anybody else among our friends would feel free to take the initiative or feel that it would be successful.

Senator PELL. You do not feel that we can continue with the same old position but simply let it happen?

Mr. Yost. No, no. I think we would have to indicate, although we could do it in a low key, perhaps, that we no longer thought that it was wise to try to keep the largest nation in the world from being represented in the United Nations and I think the whole experience of the impotence of the U.N. in the Vietnam business, which is largely a factor of the absence of China and North Vietnam, and North Korea from the U.N. is a very good argument for changing the situation.

Senator PELL. But don't you feel that the reason China is not a member now is not just because we have been opposed to it, but because we have taken vigorous actions to block her entrance? What I am suggesting is if we just ceased those actions, the threat of the veto, the various arguments that we made against it in the past, and simply sat on our hands, that it would happen. Surely it would in a couple of years?

Mr. Yost. Well, I am not sure. Every year, first, those interested in changing the present situation come to us and say, "What are you going to do? What is your position?"

Senator PELL. Excuse me for interrupting now, but talking in political terms, you could then do and say as we so often do, "I disagree with you. I will vote against it, but please do what you like."

Mr. Yost. Under the circumstances I do not think that would be very credible. In view of the fact that we have opposed it so strongly in the past they would be afraid that we would pull the rug out from under them—although that might be the view of our principal delegate, for example, that a month later when the thing came up he would get instructions from Washington to pursue the old line.

Therefore, they would have to have pretty positive assurance that our position had changed. I must say from my going around the country and talking with people about this—wherever I speak, it is very apt to come up—I find many more who wonder why we do not change our policy than those who insist on standing pat.

So I do not think this would be such a serious political problem inside the United States.

Senator PELL. I do not think it would be here either. I think it would be a problem for our friends in the Far East, and I was trying to figure out a way of doing it that would not pull the rug out from under our allies.

Mr. Yost. I think so long as it is a two-China policy it would cause not too serious trouble with our friends.

Of course, if we should propose to throw Taiwan overboard then it would be very serious.

U.S. CONTACT WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Senator PELL. Another question on a completely different subject, but drawing on your long experience, do you have any thoughts or reactions as to how we can get to a point, I will not say of negotiation or even of conversation, but simply of contact with the North Vietnamese at this time?

Mr. Yost. Well, I feel reasonably confident that these present difficulties about finding a site, and so on, will be overcome before long because I think that both sides feel they have an interest, at least, in getting that far, and I think it has been unfortunate that we have permitted it to develop into, it seems, a rather ridiculous hassle on this point.

But, as I say, I do not think this will last much longer, and I would expect to see these contacts, first exploratory meetings, to take place before long.

Now, what happens after that is a much more difficult and serious question.

U.N. FACILITIES IN NEW YORK

Senator PELL. One final and very specific and local question, and that is now that you are no longer the Deputy Representative and Arthur Goldberg has left as our representative at the U.S. mission to the U.N., I have wondered why New York City has not done more in the way of providing facilities for the United Nations.

For instance, should there not be a helicopter landing pad there? Should there not be a decent dock so a man from a nation which does not want to come through New York City itself, could land directly from a boat? Why have not more travel arrangements been made, whereas now everybody has to be funneled through—not through our Customs Service—but at least go through our domestic immigration channels?

Mr. Yost. Well, you are quite right, Senator. They do need more space and more facilities and, as you might have seen, there now is a project which, I think, will be going through, although it will take some time, to give them quite a bit more space, which would give them

room for a lot more facilities, and I think it would be very desirable if one of the additional facilities were the ones you mentioned.

Senator PELL. Two. A heliport and a dock.

Mr. YOST. Yes, some way of getting into the international terrain without coming through the city. I think actually this would simplify some of our problems.

Senator PELL. I think it would, and it requires—all it requires is a rather small expenditure on the part of New York City, which derives tremendous benefits from the U.N. being there.

Mr. YOST. I hope that will be done.

Senator PELL. I do, too.

Thank you very much.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Ambassador, I think, for the record, we ought to get a statement of what you are doing now.

Mr. YOST. I am a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Senator CLARK. Good for you.

Thank you very much indeed for your most helpful testimony. It has been a treat to listen to you.

Mr. YOST. Thank you.

Senator CLARK. The subcommittee will stand in recess until 10 a.m. tomorrow, at which time we will hear from the Honorable Joseph J. Sisco, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; the Honorable William C. Foster and/or the Honorable Adrian Fisher, Director and Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and the Honorable Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

(Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m., on Thursday, May 2, 1968.)

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

THURSDAY, MAY 2, 1968

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph S. Clark presiding.

Present: Senators Clark, Sparkman, Church, Pell, and Case.

Senator CLARK. The subcommittee will resume its sessions. Our first witness this morning is the Honorable Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

Mr. Sisco, it is a pleasure to welcome you here.

We know of your long record of dedicated and effective service to the cause of international peace, and we are looking forward with keen interest to your comments on Senate Concurrent Resolution 47. You have been kind enough to furnish me with a copy of your statement. I will ask to have it printed in full in the record at this point and suggest that you hit the highlights.

(The full statement of Mr. Sisco follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH J. SISCO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, I am glad to come at your invitation to discuss Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 which would reaffirm the support of Congress for UN peacekeeping and peacemaking, and makes recommendations to strengthen UN peacekeeping operations.

Its principal sponsor, Senator Clark, has been a leading advocate of strengthening the effectiveness of international institutions for peacekeeping and development. His devotion to this objective we profoundly share. He has spurred the Executive Branch to transcend preoccupation with emergencies and look to the future. We welcome his interest and even his spur. In particular I welcome the opportunity to comment on this resolution which deals with a problem that will be with us for many years to come.

This resolution points in a constructive manner toward steps that could improve the capacity of the UN to carry out its central function of maintaining peace. It correctly places the problem in two time frames, what can and should be done now and what enlargement of effort may be possible in the future.

As an immediate objective the resolution urges that the United States (1) encourage and support the earmarking and specialized training of units by United Nations member states for employment in United Nations peacekeeping operations; (2) be prepared to make available to the United Nations transport, communications, and logistical personnel and facilities; and (3) be prepared to advocate or support on all appropriate occasions proposals for guidelines to govern the financing, training, and equipping of peacekeeping forces for effective use.

As part of the long-range development of the United Nations as a more effective instrument for building and keeping peace, the resolution would "encourage

and support the creation of a permanent, individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties."

I

The overall aim of this resolution corresponds to a key objective of US policy in the UN—that UN peacekeeping and peacemaking machinery and procedures should be strengthened in the interest of world peace and that the responsibilities and costs should be as widely shared as possible through collective efforts.

We live in a fast-changing and fast-shrinking world in which obsolete habits of thought can be suicidal. Great powers cannot and should not alone be responsible for policing trouble spots, settling quarrels and protecting weaker nations. All nations share obligations to uphold international law and the Charter and to help each other maintain their integrity and independence. It is far better when possible for nations to discharge these obligations collectively, and to mobilize the power for peace through international institutions.

To this end every Administration since the establishment of the UN in 1945 has supported UN peacekeeping. Indeed, the United States has been at the forefront of efforts to engage the United Nations in peacekeeping whenever this was likely to be effective. Again and again in recent years we have advanced initiatives to improve procedures for financing and conducting UN peacekeeping and to strengthen peacekeeping machinery.

Twelve times since its founding the UN has stationed military observers or forces to keep the peace in conflicts between nations or to maintain law and order in tense and disordered parts of the world. We have supported every UN peacekeeping mission with political and financial support, with the provision of crucial logistical services, and in some cases with the provision of military observers and military specialists. We are now giving full cooperation and support to the three current peacekeeping operations—the UN Force in Cyprus and the military observers on the cease fire lines in the Middle East and Kashmir.

As many of you know, the peacekeeping system has grown up on an ad hoc basis in response to specific emergencies. Each case has required a different mix of forces depending on the mandate governing the operation. No permanent arrangements have been made for assuring manpower and facilities. Article 43 of the Charter provides the basis for agreements to supply forces and facilities for military operations by the United Nations but these arrangements—on which no agreement has yet been reached—were specifically designed to support "enforcement actions" considered to be a binding decision under Article 42. "Peacekeeping" actions rely on the voluntary provision of men and facilities by member states and on the readiness of parties to cooperate.

II

What can we do now to strengthen the peacekeeping system? The resolution recommends several steps. Let me consider them in order. As one immediate step the resolution urges the U.S. Government to advocate or support guidelines to govern the financing, training, and equipping of peacekeeping forces. Beginning with the early sixties, the United States has pressed for an understanding on such guidelines or basic principles. These are the basic principles we have advocated. First, the capacity of the UN to deploy peacekeeping forces promptly in an emergency must be maintained and strengthened. Second, the active support or at least acquiescence of all major powers is needed, but no single country should be permitted to frustrate by the veto a peacekeeping operation of the UN properly initiated by an appropriate organ. Third, viable and equitable financial arrangements should be agreed upon and faithfully implemented to support this capacity. Lastly, there needs to be practical machinery and procedures for assuring that the manpower and facilities are available and that the Secretary General has the staff and executive authority to manage peacekeeping efficiently.

These principles are sound. History shows that the vast majority of UN members accept their validity. However, as this committee knows, the many attempts in the past several years to reach some understanding on guidelines, principles and arrangements for peacekeeping in the future have foundered on the adamant opposition of the Soviet Union and France and the consequent reluctance of

many members to take sides on what became a divisive issue. Consequently, we have concluded that in the immediate future peacekeeping possibilities should be realistically considered on a case by case basis, and that little headway can be made in developing general principles. Indeed, we are convinced that in existing circumstances any common denominator on broad guidelines could only be achieved at a level substantially below the actual practice in current operations.

Realism has led us to accept as hard truth that peacekeeping improvements now must mean concentrating on practical steps and practical requirements in developing methods of financing on the broadest possible basis, ensuring that the Secretary General has the staff and tools he needs to administer operations effectively, and ensuring that the necessary forces, facilities and services will be ready, trained and available.

This is what we have concentrated on. We welcome support from the Congress for this approach.

III

As a second immediate objective the resolution calls on us to encourage and support the earmarking and training of units by UN members for employment in UN peacekeeping. We emphatically concur. The most constructive and practical way of assuring the availability of trained forces for UN peacekeeping is to encourage and support UN members to earmark, train and equip units to be available on a standby basis to the UN when needed.

The earmarking and training of organized units has been undertaken or planned by Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden; preliminary steps have been taken by Iran, Italy and New Zealand. Another group of states, including Ireland, India, Brazil, and Australia, which have regularly supplied the United Nations with personnel, have developed internal procedures for designating certain units to be available on short notice for UN service. Many countries have supplied individual military observers. Officers manning the two current UN observer missions—in Kashmir and on the Arab-Israel cease-fire lines—come from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and the United States.

We believe that it is important to sustain and strengthen such advance preparations. At present our effort is centered on helping the UN carry through a technical study of measures to improve advance preparations for the conduct of peacekeeping, and in particular measures to strengthen the training and readiness of voluntary standby units—a study authorized by the General Assembly largely because of U.S. initiative and persistence.

The United States has indicated that it is prepared to cooperate in appropriate ways to aid countries which may be unable to assume the full burdens of training and equipping units for UN service. In November 1965 the United States suggested to the General Assembly that through the United Nations or through bilateral arrangements there should be organized a program to help troop-contributing countries train officers and specialized personnel whose scarcity has hampered previous peacekeeping operations. In November 1967, Congressman L. H. Fountain, speaking as U.S. Representative, reaffirmed our readiness to cooperate in such a program. Regrettably, no progress has been made. As we reported to the Congress on March 31, we are studying further possibilities of providing such assistance to eligible countries under Section 502 (formerly 505) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which provides authority to give military assistance "to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security."

IV

The resolution recommends as a third step that the United States be prepared to make available to the United Nations transport, communications and logistical personnel and facilities. The United States has an outstanding record on this score. In all the major UN peacekeeping operations we made available to the United Nations crucial logistical support and specialized services, particularly airlift. We are actively considering what further actions might be taken to assist in sustaining UN peacekeeping and to assure that an operation will not

be hampered for lack of ready logistical support. Our military establishment has a wide range of facilities and specialists and can respond to a UN call on short notice when we consider it appropriate. We have been studying the question whether it would be advantageous, from the standpoint of the United States and the United Nations, to indicate in advance specific measures of logical support which the U.S. would stand ready to make available to the UN in appropriate cases.

V

Now let me turn to the longer-range suggestion in part B of the resolution, which deals with the concept of establishing "a permanent, individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties". Placing this idea in the context of the long-range development of the United Nations as a more effective instrument for building and keeping the peace is, I believe, a wise consideration. Only a constructive evolution in the overall strength, authority and effectiveness of the United Nations and a concurrent improvement in the political climate of the organization could offer the proper setting for considering the establishment of such a force. The U.S. Government is not in a position to determine now whether such a force would be best organized through individual recruitment or through the contributions of national units. Any decisions in this regard would be premature.

As the Department of State has noted with respect to similar proposals in the past, any proposal for a permanent UN force raises crucial questions not only about the composition, financing, stationing and command of such a force, but also about the political conditions under which it would be deployed. Clearly in the present political climate at the UN, it is virtually certain that these questions could not be satisfactorily resolved. This remains a moot question and I do not believe that it would be helpful to speculate on whether the future will hold promise for a permanent force.

VI

We have always been in the vanguard of efforts to strengthen peacekeeping. However, the UN's ability to move ahead has been inhibited by the opposition of the Soviets and French to any arrangements not controlled in detail by the Security Council, and thus subject to the veto and the consequent reluctance of many middle powers to press for reforms opposed by the great powers. Also we need to consider whether it is wise to press for changes in the peacekeeping system if this were possible only at the expense of US-USSR division which might impair cooperation on other matters. Despite these obstacles and limitations, the U.S. has never ceased its efforts to improve UN peacekeeping possibilities—to move as rapidly as others are prepared to move.

In the final analysis, the strengthening of peacekeeping arrangements depends not so much on improved machinery—though this is important—as on the political will and cooperation of countries involved. Cooperation is essential from the parties to the dispute, from the major powers who must supply the political muscle and money, and from those that contribute men and facilities. We can provide leadership and indicate our readiness to provide logistical support and cooperate in appropriate ways. Much depends on the political support of the middle and small nations which make up the bulk of the membership, which supply the bulk of the troops, and which must join in overcoming Soviet resistance to progress in this vital area.

The key challenge to the UN is whether it can move from peacekeeping to peacemaking. The resolution wisely brackets both. I regret to say that the UN has progressed at a snail's pace on this important matter. The UN's potential for peaceful settlement is woefully unused and remains underdeveloped. The UN today is more effective in bringing fighting to an end than in coping with sources of conflict. This is not primarily a matter of mechanisms, such as conciliation and mediation procedures although these are important, but of underlying political interests. The United Nations cannot impose solutions for which parties are not ready. The UN finds it easier to keep the lid on through peacekeeping than to grapple with underlying problems. The ultimate test of the UN will be its ability to foster orderly, peaceful change.

I want to assure this Committee that we want to strengthen the peacekeeping capacity of the UN as quickly as additional steps become feasible.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH J. SISCO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. Sisco. Thank you very much, Senator.

I thank you for your comments in particular and, in turn, I really would like to say to you, as the principal sponsor of this resolution, that I welcome the opportunity. You have been a leading advocate of strengthening the effectiveness of international institutions, peace-keeping, and peacemaking—

Senator CLARK. I will return the compliment, so have you.

Mr. Sisco. We welcome, in particular, this opportunity to comment on a proposal that transcends preoccupation with the present. On this kind of a problem you really need to look back as to where you have come from and where you are presently in terms of current difficulties, but then, more important, where you want to lead to in the future.

Senator CLARK. Neither of us would want to use the words inflexible bureaucracy; would we?

Mr. Sisco. No, sir; we wouldn't.

I would make just a couple of very brief observations, Mr. Chairman.

UNITED STATES FOREMOST SUPPORTER OF U.N.

The United States has been the foremost supporter of the United Nations of any country in the organization. We have long believed in a United Nations with a capacity to act, a United Nations with teeth, a United Nations that could help keep the peace. And for this reason, I think the record of the last 20-plus years demonstrates that we have been in the forefront of those trying to strengthen the collective security system of the United Nations, and when it was found not possible to come to agreements that were originally contemplated in the charter under article 43, to improve and to use all of the available resources in order for the U.N. to act in what we have euphemistically referred to as the peacekeeping field.

The U.N. possesses both capacities as well as limitations. If the success of the last 20 years, during which the United States has really been the firmest supporter of the dozen or so peacekeeping operations that the U.N. has been directly involved in, has encountered limitations, it is largely because of the context in which the United Nations operates today.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have long held the view that the Security Council has the prime, but not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining the peace, and this has been our fundamental approach to this whole peacekeeping problem.

Unfortunately, other major powers in the organization do not view the organization essentially in these terms.

Senator CLARK. This is notably the Soviet Union and France, isn't it?

Mr. Sisco. Principally.

I think it is fair to say that the Soviet Union, in particular continues to view the organization largely in terms of what the late Dag Hammarskjöld used to refer to as a static conference, rather than an action organization with an executive capacity to act and to help keep the peace.

Therefore, the difficulties over the past years have really boiled down to our willingness to strengthen the peace capacity of the U.N., primarily the Security Council. We believe deeply that in the event the Security Council is unable to act, that the General Assembly had a residual power to act, and for that reason in 1950 the United States was the principal proponent of the so-called uniting for peace resolution, which was intended to refurbish the resources of the General Assembly.

The difficulty is that there has been a fundamental cleavage between the United States and the Soviet Union as to what the role of international organization ought to be in this field.

The Soviets have taken the view that the Security Council itself has not the prime responsibility, but it has the exclusive responsibility. It denies that the General Assembly really has any role beyond discussion. I think this reflects much more broadly the fundamental difference between ourselves and the Soviet Union as to what the role of this organization ought to be in the long range. The United Nations has been able to act in the last 10 to 15 years in limited peacekeeping operations largely and principally because there happen to be a parallelism of interest between ourselves and the Soviet Union in a given peacekeeping operation to assure that a local hostility did not mushroom into something much more serious.

Senator CLARK. Now, as long as we have the veto in the Security Council, that is going to limit very much these peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts to cases where there is really substantial unanimity; is this not correct?

Mr. SISCO. Yes; there is a limiting effect, Mr. Chairman, but not a crippling effect, because, as you know, under articles 10 and 11 of the charter, the General Assembly has, in fact, acted in the past, and there is this alternative route whenever a veto is applied to a given situation.

Senator CLARK. It would be pretty difficult if you had very many more of these mini states.

Mr. SISCO. It is difficult because as you know power and responsibility are not as accurately reflected in the Assembly as in the Security Council and, therefore, the General Assembly, with a present membership of 124 countries—with the addition of Mauritius the other day—is a very, very cumbersome operation. Moreover, you don't really have a consensus of view in the General Assembly as to what the role of the organization ought to be in this field. So this cleavage that I have talked about principally within the context of the Security Council, also reflects itself in the General Assembly.

DETERRENENTS TO EFFECTIVE ACTION

Senator CLARK. You would agree, would you not, that the great deterrent to effective action by the Security Council is the veto and the great deterrent to effective action in the General Assembly is the one-nation, one-vote rule?

Mr. SISCO. Yes, I would agree that the one-nation, one-vote rule reflects a disparity of the real power situation.

Senator CLARK. It is really very much like the U.S. Senate where we have two votes for each State regardless of size, economic effect, and anything else.

Mr. SISCO. Well, of course, in the Senate and the Congress you know better than I we have some other balancing factors in terms, of course, of our Representatives on the other side of the fence.

Senator CLARK. You had better not comment on that observation of mine. [Laughter.]

Mr. SISCO. Mr. Chairman, that is about all by way of general observations.

There are a number of specific comments that are included in my prepared statement and I would be very glad to try to respond to specific questions.

Senator CLARK. I think that you concur, do you not, with the letter furnished on behalf of the Department of State by Assistant Secretary William Macomber that you support Senate Concurrent Resolution 47?

Mr. SISCO. Yes, sir; we do.

Senator CLARK. Do you have any amendment to suggests?

Mr. SISCO. No, sir; we do not.

REACTIVATING THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Senator CLARK. There was a thought expressed yesterday by some of the witnesses—we had a most interesting panel discussion and former Ambassador Yost was most helpful—that perhaps there should be an addition to the resolution which would make reference to article 43 of the charter, and the mechanics prescribed there for peacekeeping efforts, in particular the activation of the military staff committee. I am a little bit fearful that while I personally would support such an amendment that would include also article 47, that perhaps we might run into some difficulty not only in the Senate but possibly from the Department. What would be the position of the Department with respect to activating to a much greater extent than at present the Military Staff Committee, making it an advisory body to the Secretary General, and calling on it for more effective advice, planning, programing in connection with peacekeeping.

Mr. SISCO. I think that there are some inherent practical difficulties in reactivating in any vigorous sense, Senator, the Military Staff Committee. The principal difficulty is this: as you know, the Soviet Union does not agree that the present representative of China on the Security Council is, from their point of view, the true representative; and on a matter of such important substance, such as peacekeeping and collective security per se, the Soviet Union would be unwilling—I will put it that flatly—unwilling to engage in important substantive discussions of this sort in a forum where a principal representative would be a representative of the Republic of China.

Senator CLARK. If we were to solve the China problem by a two-China solution, that difficulty would disappear; would it not? That is, assuming mainland China took the place of Taiwan in the Security Council. I don't see how we could keep Taiwan as a permanent member of the Security Council if we were to change our position—which I

personally hope we will—with respect to the position of mainland China. Would you comment on that?

Mr. Sisco. Yes, my comment on that would be, that the Soviets, on this kind of a matter, recognizing that it has very important political as well as military connotations would, regardless of what the composition of the Security Council might be, prefer a political forum and political representatives discussing this kind of a matter, with the technicians on the military side being part of a political delegation.

In my judgment, whatever the composition of the Military Staff Committee, the Soviets would prefer political representatives in a political forum.

Senator CLARK. I would quite agree.

Mr. Sisco. Particularly, if I might add, particularly in view of the continuing differences between themselves and the Chinese Communists. They would be most reluctant to sit down in a military staff context, given the present differences within the Communist world itself.

Senator CLARK. Well, I don't want to particularly advocate this solution because I suspect it isn't feasible, but the thought would be that, just as we hope that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in our country are subordinate to civilian control, and sometimes I wonder, so the Military Staff Committee would be subordinate to both the Security Council and to the Secretary General.

VIETNAM WAR AND U.S.-U.S.S.R. RELATIONS

I am assuming now that you are going to stretch your mind, which I know you are quite capable of doing, to a situation where the war in Vietnam is over, and hopefully there will be a thaw in the present relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States. In other words, this whole resolution looks to the future in terms of long-range planning.

I don't know whether that observation of mine results in any comment from you and if so I would be glad to hear it.

Mr. Sisco. Well, I think it is very relevant because there have been, as you know, a number of cases where our interests parallel those of the Soviet Union and, therefore, the U.N. has been able to act in a provisional sort of way in these ad hoc peacekeeping operations.

If, in fact, you had a situation that developed over the next 2, 3, 4, 5 years, where there were a further betterment of relationships between ourselves and the Soviet Union, I would think that there would be a reasonable chance this might be reflected in discussions, with respect to the institution of the United Nations, broadly, not only in the peacekeeping field, but in other areas.

But, I think you would agree, too, Senator, that it is not so much the institutional mechanism or the institutional arrangement.

I would maintain that the record of the U.N. in the peacekeeping field has been on the whole, very good, even though very limited; and any improvement in this area basically is less a legal and an institutional problem, and much more a political problem, one of political attitudes of states, and a willingness to act in common or in parallel on the assumption that maintaining the peace is in the mutual interest of both.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING MACHINERY

Senator CLARK. Senator Case and Mrs. McVitty had a rather spirited discussion yesterday in which the Senator felt that Mrs. McVitty was advocating a too rigid institutionalization of peacekeeping machinery. It does seem to me, however, that to return to the terms of the charter and create a framework within which international politics can operate, is perhaps, a better way in the long run of dealing with these peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts to put out what so far have been brush wars than to deal with them in a panic on an ad hoc basis every time something comes up. I wonder if you would comment on that?

Mr. SISCO. Well, I endorse that statement a hundred percent, Senator because the architects of the Charter of the U.N. learned one thing about the Covenant of the League and that is they put together here a political document which is sufficiently flexible for all sorts of adjustments to be made. In other words, this takes the Jeffersonian approach, that you give life to a constitution and a charter by the actual practice.

Now, take what you and I have been referring to as peacekeeping. This phrase was unheard of at the San Francisco Conference. The phrase that was used was "collective security," chapter 7, the principle of unanimity and acting in concert to "enforce the peace." The whole concept of peacekeeping in the last 20 years, which I have euphemistically called chapter 6¾, is really an adaptation between collective security and peaceful adjustment, within the framework of this broad political document. It illustrates, I think, the viability and the flexibility of the charter itself, and it illustrates that the architects of the charter did a good job. I think reopening the charter at this particular stage or approaching it from an over-institutionalization not only is unrealistic, but you run the risk of opening a Pandora's box. You will end up with a charter which is not half as strong and with a United Nations which is not half as strong as the one we have today.

REVISION OF U.N. CHARTER

Senator CLARK. In other words you stick to the classic State Department position that a revision of the Charter of the U.N. is undesirable from the point of view of the United States?

Mr. SISCO. I think that a revision of the charter is undesirable as long as the fundamental differences exist, which do exist today, regarding what the role of this organization ought to be in the peacekeeping field.

My feeling is if you did this you would amend the charter in such a way that there would probably be less flexibility and less strength and less option.

Senator CLARK. Is your view based largely on the differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the United States, or are there other factors?

Mr. SISCO. I think that is one factor. But the other factor is the lack of accurate reflection of power and responsibility in the 124-member organization. After all, when you begin to equate the real power of

the Soviet Union and the United States as against the Maldivé Islands that has a population of 85,000 people, with a principal economic resource of flying fish, well, you can see what the disparity is. I think this is a very relevant factor.

USE OF 18-NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Senator CLARK. As Mr. Foster knows, I have often discussed the possibility of abandoning the United Nations in our search for a permanent peace because of the difficulties which we have outlined—one, the veto; two, the one-man, one-vote; and three, the inadequate financing, and some other things, too—and turn to the 18-nation disarmament conference at Geneva which incorporates most if not all of the major military parties. Two treaties of general and complete disarmament have been tabled before it, one by the Soviet Union and one by ourselves which for quite understandable reasons are just gathering dust. If we could come to some agreement with the Soviet Union such an organization might be a better format for keeping peace than the United Nations, laboring as it does under these very difficult provisions. I would not expect you to agree with me, but I would like to have your observation.

Mr. Sisco. Well, my own feeling would be that the United Nations really today represents the furthest advance in international cooperation and international institutions that the power realities and the political realities of today allow. For this reason I think it is much better to build on the present charter and on the present institutional framework rather than to junk it and to start from scratch.

One other comment if I could, very quickly, Senator, I would agree with you that the one-man, one-vote element in the charter has some very serious disadvantages. But as I pointed out earlier, it is not a crippling situation. Sovereignty and nationalism are still very principal forces, and I think we have to continue to operate within the one-man, one-vote framework.

Senator CLARK. Of course, I don't think we start from scratch when we pick up these two treaties in Geneva, but let's not go into the discussion because that is far removed from Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.

USE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

There are two matters I would like to ask your views on. We had considerable discussion yesterday on the extent to which, if at all, article 8 of the charter, dealing with regional agreements, could be utilized effectively in these brush-war situations. The consensus of yesterday's witnesses was, no, they are not much good. They raise more problems than they solve, and we had better stick to peacekeeping by the United Nations itself as opposed to trying to utilize the Organization of American States, the Organization for African Unity, whatever might come some day out of a Southeast Asia regional organization.

What is your thinking on that?

Mr. Sisco. My own view is that, as the charter indicates, the principal reliance should be on the United Nations itself, but having said that, I think we have to recognize the limitations and the realities of the United Nations at the present time. And, therefore, I view the

role of the regional organizations in no way competitive with the United Nations, I view them as complementary.

Senator CLARK. Well, they got competitive in the Dominican Republic, didn't they?

Mr. SISCO. I would only say this about the Dominican Republic. I think that the preponderant majority of Latin American States have a long tradition of wanting to deal with their difficulties within the framework of the OAS.

Senator CLARK. They really didn't, did they? In the end we went in unilaterally. The U.N. went in and finally we dragged a reluctant and screaming OAS in by its hair. The end result was very constructive. We kept the peace. But I think it was U.S. Marines more than any other institution, regional or U.N., which did it.

Mr. SISCO. Well, what you say really illustrates that peacekeeping, whether it be on a regional basis or a near universal basis in the U.N., is still very much in—

Senator CLARK. Or a unilateral basis, as in the Dominican Republic and to some extent in Lebanon.

Mr. SISCO. But I think you would agree in terms of the regional and near universal they are very much in the embryonic stages. I think, for example, the OAU in the African area is even more illustrative on this particular point, so that if one is to eliminate unilateralism, it seems to me that you have to find a strong substitute, and the strong substitute is really collective action. I would contend that collective action is, and should be, possible in a complementary way, both in regional organizations for more limited purposes and in the more universal organization of the U.N.

Senator CLARK. Of course, the trouble is you have to practically have unanimity. You can act no matter where you go.

FINANCING OF PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS

Let me ask you finally to turn your attention to the best means of financing peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in the light of our rather disastrous experience with article 19.

Mr. SISCO. For the foreseeable future, Senator, I think we are going to have to rely primarily on the method which is being pursued at the present time; namely, voluntary contributions from the more advanced countries and those that are in a position to contribute.

Unfortunately, one of the results of the article 19 issue is that you do not have a broad consensus in the organization that these peacekeeping operations are and should be a regular charge on the regular budget of the U.N. itself. As long as that is the case, I think we will have to rely primarily on this improvised method of voluntary contributions, which is working reasonably well in Cyprus. Of course, the smaller observer operations in Kashmir and the Middle East are financed collectively through the U.N. regular budget.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, sir.

I have no further questions.

Senator CHURCH (presiding). Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you this morning. I shall read your full testimony. I am sorry that I was unable to get here at the very beginning of the committee hearing.

I have one or two questions I would like to put to you.

STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING FINANCING POSITION

Since I served on the Fifth Committee for a time when I was at the U.N., I became aware of the great financial weakness of the organization, which has been struggling on the brink of insolvency for some time. If we were to resolve the war in Vietnam, and if a better, more hopeful, more optimistic climate were to be created at the United Nations, and if it were possible to reach a better understanding with the Soviet Union concerning the role of the U.N.—all of these are big “if’s” I realize, but all of these things are within the realm of possibility looking ahead—what would be your assessment of the chances that we could strengthen the financial position of the United Nations by building a reserve, let us say, to which the U.N. could look and the Secretary General could look at the time of emergency, for financing peacekeeping operations? It seems to me that up until now the problem has been to get the member states to pay their current assessments and to make up for arrearages. But if we could ever become current, what would be the prospect for building a reserve that would greatly strengthen, it seems to me, the financial capacity of the U.N. to respond at a time of crisis?

Mr. Sisco. Well, I think the possibilities would be reasonably good, Senator Church. But I think you will agree that the so-called financial crisis at the U.N. is not primarily a financial problem. It is a political problem, and the principal political problem, in my judgment, is still the continuing fundamental difference between ourselves and the Soviet Union, as to what the role of the U.N. ought to be in the field of collective security, in the field of peacekeeping. We are building precedents, as you know. The U.N. has been able to act where there has been a parallelism of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States that a given local hostility should not broaden out. And, therefore, whether the Soviets did or did not support a particular operation financially, they at least gave its political acquiescence and permitted the Security Council to act on the assumption that there was some kind of a common interest between the United States and the Soviet Union that no broader war should break out.

Now, first, the U.N. as you well know, is not an entity apart from its membership. It is an institution that is operating within a broad political world context, and to the degree that we and the Soviet Union can build on these precedents in our own mutual interest—and I have felt that these dozen peacekeeping operations over the past 20 years have been in our own mutual interest as well as served the common cause of peace in the world—then I think to the degree to which we can broaden this political base the financial problem will be subsumed under this and ways will then be found to put the finances on a more stable basis. I would think the kind of fund, for example, that you referred to is one of a number of institutional ways which could be very helpful. But what has to come first is the common position politically.

Senator CHURCH. Yes. That is why I prefaced my questions with a series of “if’s.”

FINDING AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF INCOME

What do you think the prospects might be for finding a larger independent source of revenue for the United Nations in the years ahead? That is to say, a number of suggestions have been made. It has been proposed, for example, that the members countries might agree to a one cent surtax on international mail that would then help to finance the U.N. in operation. I think that alone would amount to about \$35 million a year, rather a considerable sum.

Mr. SISCO. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. I myself have been interested in the possibility of the U.N. utilizing some royalty from the minerals taken in international waters in the deep seas as a possible future source of revenue. What I am thinking of is revenue that would be independent of the contribution of the member states, which would give some semblance of financial independence to the U.N. as an international organization.

Mr. SISCO. Senator Church, I would make two observations on that: First, I think preferably if this political consensus that you and I refer to could be developed, the organization would be stronger if this were reflected, both politically and financially, in governments directly being legally, morally, and otherwise responsible for putting financial teeth behind and the political consensus and the political support for these peacekeeping operations. I think that is the best way. It would reflect the maximum amount of political responsibility and financial obligation on the part of the entire membership.

We are giving a very thorough study to independent sources of revenue, including the specifics you mentioned. Again, if the political preconditions were there, and a consensus were to develop, in relationship to one or two of these, these might be feasible.

My own feeling would be it would be preferable if the responsibility were direct, but one should not preclude these other methods.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Pell, have you any questions?

Senator PELL. No.

I would like to congratulate you, Senator Church, and Senator Clark, for being among the very small band of persons who have carried the banner for this cause of world peace through law for a long time. I am glad you have organized these hearings.

STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION ON PROPOSED RESOLUTION

I have one query, if I might, to the witness. As I read your statement, Mr. Secretary—and I apologize for not being here for the whole of your testimony—I notice the statement does not specifically say that the Department of State approves or disapproves of the resolution. What is the official position of the Department?

Mr. SISCO. I stated quite explicitly, I think, that we do support the resolution.

Senator PELL. Right.

Mr. SISCO. And the testimony is intended to make specific comment on the four principal parts.

Senator PELL. Right, I am very glad indeed to hear that.

INTERNATIONAL SEA GUARD

Also, in connection with the point raised by our chairman, Senator Church, concerning the use of some of the revenues from ocean space—as you know, you have been up before the Foreign Relations Committee earlier in connection with my own draft treaty in that connection—I was wondering if you thought one way of backing into the idea of an international peacekeeping force might be through the creation of the international sea guard that is proposed in that treaty, where there are actual international responsibilities as of now to be performed by an international body, whether it would be sealing or whaling conventions, iceberg patrol, or safety of life at sea. These actual responsibilities are carried out on an international basis. For instance, the iceberg patrol as you know is paid for by all nations that use the Atlantic lanes and actually some of them put ships in. This might be a handy way of backing into a peacekeeping force, because if you get a police force at sea, an international sea guard, that might provide the nucleus or the kernel to go a little bit further. What would be your reaction to that thought?

Mr. SISCO. My reaction would be very positive, Senator. As you know, we are, and have been making efforts to encourage a number of countries to earmark forces and facilities needed for U.N. peacekeeping. The history of these peacekeeping operations illustrates that each one of these operations is different, and a different mix of forces is used depending on what the situation is.

Take the Middle East, and the whole problem that has arisen this past year in terms of the Strait of Tiran by way of an illustration. Eventually there is going to have to be an agreement with respect to freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal, and I believe that the U.N. may play a role in this situation, if we can achieve some kind of an agreement between the parties. And certainly when one talks in terms of forces that might be used or earmarked, one should include sea forces as well as the others.

Senator PELL. The point I am making here is that one way of backing into it is perhaps more through using the police functions first and then you get into the idea of the principles of military forces. If we back into it to maintain law and order and discipline not between nations but between individual citizens of nations—and this is what these agreements are concerned with—I am thinking that a police force could be created with very little problem. Then you could move into the international peacekeeping. I would like to see us move right into international peacekeeping. I hope this resolution is passed and the U.N. acts on it. But if they don't, is there any reason in the world why an international sea guard could not be set up very quickly?

Mr. SISCO. First, let me say I do agree with the general notion if one starts out with the more modest tasks one will begin to build up potential for more difficult tasks. The history of peacekeeping illustrates this because in a sense all of the numerous observer groups—and I am using the concept of observer group in the broadest sense—constitute a precedent on which the whole peacekeeping operations have been built in the last 20 years.

The difficulties in terms of the sea guard, the political difficulties, regrettably are just about as relevant as they are to the whole concept of establishment of a standby force.

Senator PELL. Excuse me for interrupting, but I would take exception to that statement, because we already have these activities going on, which is not true in the other case. For instance the iceberg patrol today is participated in by a dozen nations with actually three or four countries furnishing ships and there should be an international secretariat and some form of coordination which presently doesn't exist. And the same thing with the ICAO.

When you mention articles 43, 44, and 45 of the charter I could not help but recall how we at San Francisco—I was Assistant Secretary of the Committee that wrote those paragraphs—for 3 months, labored on providing the perfect words which have never yet been implemented.

U.N. POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS OFFICE

I congratulate you, Mr. Secretary, on the leadership you have shown in this whole field and in closing I wonder if you have given thought to the idea of setting up in your own bureau a form of office similar to that set up in the days under Alger Hiss and Leo Pasvolsky, which was the Office of International Security Affairs. I don't think you have one now, do you, of that same sort? In other words, we have almost retrogressed in 20 years.

Mr. Sisco. I don't believe so, Senator. We have an Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, which is a direct outgrowth of the office you referred to. Whenever the U.N. is involved in a peacekeeping operation, that office is the crisis center in coordinating, for example, what the force is doing, the contributions and so on. Let me give you a very personal illustration. I came into the State Department in 1951 as a very junior officer, and the first job that I was given in that particular office was to coordinate the military contributions of the 16 countries that were then comprised in the United Nations force in Korea, and we are a lot more efficient office than we were in those days because we have had a dozen such experiences since then.

Senator PELL. And you were smaller then, too.

After San Francisco there was a separate office just for international security affairs and I am wondering if that still is true? As I understand it the office now is concerned with international political and security affairs?

Mr. Sisco. Well, what has happened is that it has been combined. We have a section in this Office of U.N. Political and Security Affairs that devotes itself almost exclusively to peacekeeping and disarmament from the point of view of the U.N. where we concert very closely with our ACDA colleagues, as well as with the Defense Department. This section also works on the ocean beds and outer space as well as relevant political-legal questions. Out of this particular office, I am proud to say, that over the last 10 or 15 years there have come a number of these ideas with respect to the U.N. Outer Space Committee and the ocean beds, and so on, and it is really one of the strongest sections in the entire bureau.

Senator PELL. Who is the chief of that particular section?

Mr. SISCO. The present director of the office is one of our most distinguished and one of our best lady Foreign Service officers, who has had 20 years of experience in the U.N. field, Elizabeth Brown. The head of that particular section itself is a young man by the name of Gerald Helman, whom I recruited in that office when I was director some 5 years ago, and he has been there ever since, and he has done an outstanding job. In addition, on longer range problems, my special assistant for planning, Nathan A. Pelcovits, devotes a substantial part of his efforts to peacekeeping and related political-military problems.

Senator PELL. Right.

STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAU CONCERNING OCEAN SPACE

As you know, in the State Department the world is divided up on a geographic basis. We have the American Republics section and the European and so on and so forth, yet 70 percent of the earth is covered with ocean space. Is thought being given in the Department of State to setting up a geographic bureau concerning ocean space where people will be increasingly living where wars may be fought and which will be more and more at issue between nations? Where is the subject of ocean space handled today?

Mr. SISCO. I am not aware that specific idea is under consideration, Senator.

Senator PELL. Nor am I.

Mr. SISCO. However, there are, as you know, a good many important areas of the Government that are giving full or near full time to this particular problem, not only our bureau. You know, of course, that we have a Marine Council, which is chaired by the Vice President, and which is very active. You have the other parts of the State Department, the Scientific Adviser's Office in the Deputy Under Secretary's Office. ACDA is also quite involved in this. Mr. Warnke, I am sure, could address himself to the organization in the Department of Defense, and I think you would agree there is just no lack of interest in this, because I think it is the horizon of the future.

Senator PELL. Right.

It is just a little scattered, which fact I think you have brought out yourself.

Mr. SISCO. But reasonably well coordinated if I might say, Senator.

Senator PELL. Who is coordinating it?

Mr. SISCO. At the top it is coordinated at the Marine Council level, and I have no evidence that the Government is (a) not moving rapidly, or (b) not moving in a very systematic and in a very progressive way.

Senator PELL. I want to thank you too for all the able work that your office did in the meeting of the ad hoc subcommittee in New York and thank you for your support there.

Mr. SISCO. Thank you very much. Thank you, Senator.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Our next witness is William C. Foster, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

We are very pleased to see you, Bill, and want to commend you on the very wonderful work you have done in connection with the non-proliferation treaty. This has been long in hatching, and it has taken great persistence.

I wonder if you might just give us the benefit of your assessment as to the present prospects concerning that treaty?

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. FOSTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be before you and Senator Pell, and I would be happy to talk about my favorite subject at any length that you wish to sit and listen.

We are in the state presently of a consideration of this treaty by the organization where you and I had the pleasure of serving together a couple of years ago.

The discussion is somewhat publicly languid, I would say at the moment, but there is a great deal of activity going on under the surface, and I think not unfavorably.

As you know, there was introduced yesterday at the General Assembly a resolution sponsored by 20 nations asking that the General Assembly endorse the draft treaty and forward it for signature to the world.

We think this resolution will pass in the course of the next few weeks. There are, of course, concerns in the minds of some of the members of the General Assembly as to whether all of their interests are fully met. I think this is inevitable in a treaty which attempts to deal with the basic interests of 124 nations. I think, however, the draft as it stands is a good consensus. It is not a perfect treaty. One could never get a perfect treaty. Any two countries might make a perfect treaty, but 124, with the infinite number of variables which have to be met, cannot do so.

So the question is: Is it good to have a good treaty and put limits on these dangerous possibilities of the spread of nuclear weapons? This is a good treaty, and I think the philosophy is well expressed by the saying, "Let not the best be the enemy of the good." This has been hammered out, as you indicated, over many months and many years of listening to ideas, attempting to make compromises between basic interests of many countries.

So that I think we are at a point where, while I don't like to be too dogmatic, it will either be this or nothing, because if we attempt to take in the basic considerations that have been put forward by certain of our fellow members of the United Nations and attempt to work out the inclusion of those ideas in the present draft, it will delay it to such an extent that it will never pass and I doubt that it will improve it enough to be of significant moment.

The treaty does have built into it flexibility so that as conditions change, as the interests of individual nations are affected, there are

the amendment processes, there is the process of review at stated intervals in which progress can be matched against the concerns of various nations, and, of course, there is the 25-year period at which a meeting will be called, and the nations at that point can review whether this treaty is still in the interests of the world. We think it is. We think, therefore, that not long hence and I think the President stated it well, he hopes to have this treaty before you gentlemen before summer and I certainly share in that hope. I can go into whatever detail you like.

Senator CHURCH. I want to say I share in it, too.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I did have a very brief statement on Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 which, as you will note, also takes the opportunity to relate that resolution to the current interest which I have just expressed.

We are pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you to express our support for the objectives of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.

RELATIONSHIP OF RESOLUTION TO NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

We, in ACDA, welcome such congressional reaffirmations of support for United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, since they are subjects closely related to our business. I have long been aware of the deep interest shown by the principal sponsor of this resolution, Senator Clark, and by other members of this committee in both U.N. peacekeeping and in arms control. If I may, I would like to emphasize particularly, at this moment in history, the relationship of the nonproliferation treaty to the objectives of the resolution.

We are currently involved in the U.N. General Assembly in what we hope will be the final stage of consideration of the nonproliferation treaty. We recognize that to try to solve all the problems would result in no agreement at all.

Similarly we recognize the resolution before us today recognizes that improving the U.N. peacekeeping system must be done gradually, moving ahead, but not so far ahead that the suggestions will surely be rejected.

I should like to speak briefly of the way in which the nonproliferation treaty itself could help in some degree to carry out objectives analogous to those of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47. As you know, the functions of peacekeeping forces are several. One is to act as a fireman, to put out a fire once it has begun, and to keep it from spreading. This, as Secretary Sisco said in referring to the many instances that the U.N. has functioned in—this, the U.N. did in the Congo in 1960 and in Cyprus. Peacekeeping forces also act in a preventive way, to try to make certain that a "fire" does not start, by maintaining international peace and security before a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression has occurred.

We believe that safeguards under the nonproliferation treaty serve a very similar function. By requiring the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ascertain that there has been no diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to bombs, the treaty safeguards serve a preventive purpose.

The nonproliferation treaty will serve objectives in the IAEA safeguards field parallel to those described in the resolution for the U.N. field. For example, part (a) of the resolution lists as an immediate objective, encouraging and supporting the earmarking and specialized training of units by the U.N. members for employment in U.N. peace-keeping operations.

AVAILABILITY OF TRAINED FORCES

As you know, the United States now takes the position in the U.N. that the most practical way of assuring the availability of trained forces for U.N. peacekeeping is to encourage and support U.N. members to earmark and train units to be available on a standby basis to respond to a U.N. call. The United States also supports the expansion of the IAEA inspection staff to meet the needs of increased use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the wider application of IAEA safeguards when the nonproliferation treaty becomes effective. To help meet those needs, the United States has encouraged countries to send qualified scientists and technicians to work in Vienna for the IAEA. We have established a program at the Argonne Laboratory in Chicago for the training of inspectors which is open to IAEA inspectors, and have let the IAEA use nuclear installations in the United States to give their inspectors experience with advanced types of facilities. Thus we are promoting the specialized training of this member of the U.N. family.

PERMANENT PEACEKEEPING FORCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY

Part (b) of the resolution contains a longer range suggestion for the creation of a permanent U.N. peacekeeping force. This suggestion bears careful consideration. As Assistant Secretary Sisco has indicated, it is hard to assess now whether a future force would be more effective if it were individually recruited or selected through national units.

We believe that pursuit of the objectives stated in the resolution under discussion today will help us to achieve the kind of society that is receptive to a strong and effective U.N. If members of legislative bodies in other countries throughout the world—large and small—were to demonstrate the same concern as have Senator Clark and the co-sponsors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, then the day would be a bit closer when the words of this resolution could more easily be translated into action. We support and commend this effort.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Foster.

INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION PROVISIONS OF TREATY

As long as you are testifying, I would appreciate it if you would elaborate a little on the international enforcement provisions, international inspection provisions, of the nonproliferation treaty, and what you envision would be worked out if the treaty itself is approved.

Mr. FOSTER. I would be very glad to do that, Senator, because as you know, this was the stickiest part of the draft treaty. And actu-

ally article 3 which encompasses this proposed arrangement, took us not a month, not a year, but several years to arrive at.

The present draft asks that the signatories to the treaty negotiate and conclude arrangements for the safeguarding of nuclear materials to prevent their diversion to weapons purposes with the IAEA which, as you know, is an international body under the U.N. in which there are about 100 members now, and an executive board of some 25 members, which has rotation. The signatories can either work this out as a state or together with other states. Now, this is a way of making it clear that Euratom, which is the European Atomic Energy Agency, and which is the owner of the fissionable material in Western European countries and the owner of certain joint research laboratories can, as an organization, come under these safeguards in a way to preserve those advances in safeguards which they have made, and yet to be consistent in their adhering to inspection with other nations who have not been in such an organization.

The negotiations for this must start within 180 days after the treaty comes into force. Each nation has 18 months additional to work it out individually or together with other states, and we believe that what is worked out will be a verification procedure by the IAEA of the safeguards system of Euratom, as an example. We believe that this will be somewhere between simply taking a paper record from the present inspection system of Euratom or another organization, if there be such, and a complete duplication of such safeguards. We think this is a reasonable way to preserve the assets which have been developed, for instance, in Europe, and to preserve their common ownership of material, and their common research activities, and this was finally worked out in this form, in agreement with the Soviet Union, who was unwilling for reasons that will be obvious, to designate Euratom as something that was specially set apart, and, therefore, would have a special discriminatory position as contrasted with other signatories.

OTHER SAFEGUARDS PROPOSALS

The rest of the safeguards proposals simply state that consistent with articles 1 and 2 no nation, no signatory, may either ship material to another without safeguards nor receive such material without safeguards. The emphasis is on the initial materials since out of them come the weapons, and this is done in a way not to interfere with the peaceful technological developments of any nation. It applies by treaty only to the nonnuclear weapon states since only in those states is the danger that a peaceful material will be diverted to weapons use. But in order to assure the world that this is not a discriminatory provision, as you know, the President on December 2 announced that the United States would open its peaceful reactors and materials to international inspection, and we were joined in that by the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union has been unwilling to accept this kind of inspection.

As you know this is a basic approach by the Soviet Union to many kinds of inspection, and they make the point, however, which has some logic, that since they do not use the materials produced in peaceful reactors for weapons purposes it would be futile to expose their reactors to such inspections since it would not control any diversion to weapons purposes which is the objective of the treaty.

The other points in article 3 are strengthened as far as the peaceful uses go by article 4, and the other peaceful uses which have been

objected to, the peaceful nuclear explosive devices, are covered by a paragraph which states that the nuclear powers will make available to non-nuclear-weapon states peaceful nuclear explosive devices when, as, and if such are developed economically and safely and will do it at a cost eliminating any research expense which was necessary to achieve the design of those devices.

As you know, sir, the United States has spent many, many millions of dollars and still does not have a device of this sort which they consider to be safe and economical although they are working toward it still actively in the Plowshare program.

WORKING OUT SETS OF ARRANGEMENTS WITH IAEA

Senator CHURCH. Under the terms of the present draft, will it be possible for one signatory to work out a different set of arrangements with the IAEA relating to inspection safeguards than another signatory might work out?

Mr. FOSTER. The treaty requirement is that the safeguards be consistent with the basic safeguards documents of the IAEA, and it reads, as you recall, "each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the agency's safeguard system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this treaty with a view to preventing diversions of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

If it is consistent with the basic statute and the safeguards document, it is possible that there would be variations in the kind of inspections undertaken.

I would think, for instance, in our country, which has the most elaborate inspection system in the world for the control of fissionable materials, I would think it would be only wise for the IAEA to utilize our own safeguards making sure, through verification, satisfactory to them, that it meets these standards.

Now, a nation that has no safeguards system and was getting a reactor for the production of electric power through nuclear energy for the first time, I would think the IAEA would have to have a very complete system, although it would be only focused on the materials since that is what if diverted could create nuclear weapons. So answering your question it would be possible there would be shadings and certainly I am sure the Euratom people have in mind, with their good system, that they should utilize that to meet these requirements.

Senator CHURCH. When the time comes for consideration of the treaty in the Committee as a Whole, we will pursue these matters in much greater detail. But I appreciate your bringing me up to date, Mr. Foster on the progress because I have followed it with a great deal of interest. I remember the enormity of the difficulties 2 or 3 years ago when I was in Geneva and then later when we were together at the United Nations.

Mr. FOSTER. We appreciated very much your personal interest and help, Mr. Chairman, when you were a member of the delegation and subsequently in discussions of this committee.

Senator CHURCH. I am extremely pleased at the progress you have made. I think it is too bad that the painful, slow works of peace re-

ceive so little appreciation and attention in our times, considering the enormity of their importance to the survival of the human race. I think that the work in which you are engaged is as important to the country and the future well-being of the people of this country as any work that goes on in government today, and I think it is unfortunate that the proper focus of attention is not placed upon.

Mr. FOSTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have been a help and I am sure you will be in the future.

I would like to point out for the record that, in order to carry this work on, it is a very heavy burden on the people of the United States since it costs each citizen 5 cents a year to do this.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Thank you, Mr. Foster.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Our next witness is Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

Mr. Warnke, I want to welcome you to the committee this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL C. WARNKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't have a prepared statement. I am here, as you know, to support the Senate Concurrent Resolution, and to express my agreement with the position that has been taken by Secretary Sisco and by Mr. Foster.

We believe that peacekeeping, of course, contributes substantially to the security of the United States and as a result we endorse the efforts that have been made in the past and look forward to their improved effectiveness in the future.

I have some brief comments on matters of particular concern to the Department of Defense. One of them is the question of the earmarking of forces.

EARMARKING OF FORCES

We believe that this is the most effective way of improving the peacekeeping potential of the nations that are in a position to provide these kinds of forces.

As you know, we have had under study the question of earmarking American forces. We are not sure at the present time whether this is appropriate for a variety of reasons. I think one of them, of course, is the fact we do have available trained forces that could be utilized, for peacekeeping functions, in situations in which this might be acceptable to the nations concerned. The acceptability of the middle powers and the small powers is, of course, much easier to establish under these circumstances.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

A second item on which I would like to comment briefly is the question of logistic support. The U.S. Armed Forces have in the past given logistic support to peacekeeping efforts. We think our record on this is quite good. We would anticipate that the record would continue to be good in the future.

MILITARY AID

Then, finally, one third point that falls particularly within the province of the Department of Defense, is the question of the use of military aid for improving the peacekeeping capability of aid recipients.

As you know, the Foreign Assistance Act in section 502 makes specific provision for the use of military aid to improve the peacekeeping capabilities of aid recipients. This has been utilized in the past, and it will be utilized in the future. Its utility is somewhat limited by the fact that the recipients of military aid, in many instances are not the countries that would be best suited for peacekeeping activities.

However, to the extent that it can be utilized I can assure the committee that it will be in the future.

Those are the specific comments I wanted to make. I would be very happy to answer any questions that the committee might have.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE U.N.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, President Eisenhower has suggested that the United Nations be given tactical nuclear weapons for their use in peacekeeping. What do you think of that suggestion?

Mr. WARNKE. I am afraid that my position on it, Senator, would be quite negative at the present time. I think that the United Nations is not presently structured in a fashion in which this would be appropriate.

Senator CHURCH. What safeguards would be required, in your judgment for this step, before it could be taken?

Mr. WARNKE. I am afraid, sir, that my view of it would be so negative that no safeguards would strike me as being adequate to avoid the damage that the use of tactical nuclear weapons might result in.

I think that basically you have the difficulty of determining what is a tactical nuclear weapon, and the question as to whether or not the weapon is strategic or tactical, I suppose depends on whether you are the user or the recipient.

Another problem that I have is that the principal value of nuclear weapons lies in their deterrent efficacy. Now, the deterrent efficacy, it seems to me, is probably greater under the present circumstances where the United States has the control of the nuclear weapons. I think that the number of safeguards that would be necessary in connection with the actual deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the United Nations would be such as to eliminate any sort of deterrent efficacy.

Senator CHURCH. This is a proposal that goes far beyond any that have been made heretofore concerning the possible use of such weapons by any United Nations force, and I thought it would be well to have some reaction to it from a spokesman for the Defense Department.

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Sparkman, do you have questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. I shall not ask any questions at this time, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RESOLUTION FAVORED

I am sorry I was not able to be here before. In the rush to get out before convention time we have about five subcommittees meeting at the same time and it is hard to be all places at the same time. I am sorry to have missed the testimony before you and your own, sir. Are you in favor of the resolution?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes; we are, sir.

APPEARANCE OF SECRETARY CLIFFORD BEFORE COMMITTEE

Senator CASE. Just one other question, just for the sake of helping us, do you happen to know when the Secretary, Mr. Clifford, will come up before the committee on foreign aid?

Mr. WARNKE. I don't believe that a date has been set. He is planning to come up.

Senator CASE. He is planning to come up?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. I don't think I have any further questions.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I should like to say just this: I have not heard the testimony, but I am glad to hear the Secretary say he favors the resolution, and furthermore, I would be glad to hear his comment on the proposal of some kind of conventional nuclear weapons being used as part of the force.

PREVIOUS RESOLUTION

I have long felt that the United Nations ought to have a peace-keeping force. In fact, I introduced the original resolution that was agreed to. It was first passed by unanimous consent by the Senate and, as I recall, we also had a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses of Congress, making it a policy of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. to advocate a peacekeeping force. It is too bad that the U.N. has not been able to agree upon a permanent police force. My attention has just been called to the fact that the first clause of the present concurrent resolution refers to the Senate Concurrent Resolution 109, 85th Congress. That is the concurrent resolution to which I made reference that was agreed to by both Houses of Congress.

I am glad to see this renewed interest in the program, and I hope something can be worked out that will give us a security force. I think it will mean a great deal toward peacekeeping.

I think many of these brush fires, if you want to call them that, might be avoided by having a relatively small force on hand available for the use by the U.N.

Thank you,

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Senator.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, there are no further questions.

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you, sir.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD WITNESS

Senator CHURCH. It has been called to my attention by the staff that due to a misunderstanding a representative for the Council for a Livable World thought that he was scheduled to appear this morning rather than this afternoon and he has a noon train to catch as a

consequence. We do have time to accommodate him this morning, and we want to oblige everyone as best we can. Is Dr. Charles Price here? Dr. Price, if you will come forward. Dr. Price is the Benjamin Franklin Professor of Chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania. He was president of the American Chemical Society and chairman of the Federation of American Scientists, 1957.

I want to say that we appreciate having you here this morning, Dr. Price, and we would be pleased to hear from you at this time.

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES C. PRICE, MEMBER, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD; ACCOMPANIED BY THOMAS A. HALSTEAD, NATIONAL DIRECTOR

Dr. PRICE. I would like to first say I am grateful for your accommodation to my schedule, Mr. Chairman, and Senators.

Senator CHURCH. Certainly.

Dr. PRICE. While I have served other organizations in the past, I am here today as a member of the board of directors of the Council for a Livable World, and am accompanied by Mr. Thomas Halstead, the national director of the council.

I thought it might be appropriate to say just a word or two about the Council for a Livable World.

Senator CASE. That reminds me of a story I used to tell when I was campaigning about a fellow who committed a murder somewhere outside of New Jersey. They caught him and tried him, and sentenced him to be hanged. On the scaffold, the sheriff asked him if he had anything to say, saying the laws of the State gave him 5 minutes to talk on any subject he wanted to, and the man said, "No, thank you very much, I understand my rights, but I have no use for the time."

Then a guy in the back of the crowd said, "Sheriff, if this man don't want his 5 minutes may I have them to speak on behalf of my candidacy for the U.S. Senate?" [Laughter.]

And the man said "No, of course not, sheriff. But if you don't mind, let's get the hanging over with first and then let him have the 5 minutes."

There are no aspersions intended, but when you said you would like to say a word or two, I thought my story might improve the shining hour, especially on behalf of an organization as admirable and perspicacious as yours.

Dr. PRICE. I hope I won't wind up the party being hanged here.

Senator CHURCH. You mentioned that Mr. Halstead, the national director, was here. Would he like to sit with you while you testify?

Dr. PRICE. I would be delighted if he could do so.

BACKGROUND OF COUNCIL

The Council was founded by a distinguished scientist, professor, Dr. Leo Szilard in 1962, with a purpose of trying to reflect responsible scientific opinion in political affairs and particularly in the field of international relations. The Council works through practical political measures to stimulate congressional and public discussion of foreign and defense policies by supporting the election campaigns of thoughtful and responsible congressional candidates willing to speak out on the problems of securing a peaceful world, and particularly Members

of the U.S. Senate. The Council also provides the Congress advice and expert opinion through a program of conferences and seminars, and through testimony on issues of critical current importance.

Since its inception the council has supported and encouraged the concept of a United Nations peacekeeping force. We have learned all too well in recent years—from events in the Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America, and, most tragically, in Vietnam—that it is impossible for any one of the great powers to act effectively as policeman for a world beset by rapidly shifting patterns of social and political change.

RESOLUTION FULLY SUPPORTED

We, therefore, fully support this resolution. In its action programs the Council has over the years repeatedly urged the U.S. Government to support the strengthening of constructive relationships among nations and to encourage the development of mechanisms for peaceful settlement of conflicts between them. As an essential and concrete first step in this direction, the Council has long urged the U.S. Government to assure the United Nations of substantial materiel, logistic, and technical support in establishing small standby peacekeeping and mediating forces to be provided by the member states of the United Nations.

But in supporting this resolution we particularly wish to call attention to part (b). It is our deepest conviction that a most urgent task of mankind is to end the war system as the basis for international organizations characterized by opposing military alliances and to replace it by a United Nations properly authorized and constituted as an effective instrument of law and order. Certainly one of the several requirements must be to have a directly recruited United Nations peace force as envisaged in section (b), of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.

We cannot look upon the Vietnam war as an excuse to avoid action on such problems as the strengthening of the United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking capacities as envisaged in this resolution. In fact, the regrettable resort to military force in Vietnam underscores the imperative need for exactly this kind of United Nations capacity. Until such capabilities exist for injecting a responsible international presence into local conflicts, we foresee the recurrence of more Vietnams as not only likely but probable. We therefore believe it to be both timely and important for the Senate to urge action by the U.S. Government in support of the policy called for by this resolution.

Thank you very much.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Dr. Price. It is a very clear and succinct statement that you have given us.

Senator SPARKMAN, do you have any questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to compliment Dr. Price upon his statement. It is very fine.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Case?

PREVENTIVE ACTION

Senator CASE. I join in this warmly and wholeheartedly. I notice with interest you use of the words "small standby peacekeeping and mediating forces." It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that this parallels the view given us yesterday morning by our distinguished witnesses.

Their emphasis, as I understood it, and it seemed very sensible to me, was not upon the U.N.'s role as a police operation, but upon development to the greatest extent possible, perhaps by an extension of the powers of the Secretary General, of preventive action before it becomes necessary to move in with police to break up a brawl. They seemed to think, this is where it is most useful to think of the United Nations role, especially in the present and immediate future, and I take it that is pretty much what you were getting at here; is that not so?

Dr. PRICE. Yes; indeed, sir. The intervention of the United Nations might be effective with a much smaller peacekeeping force than is possible by any unilateral intervention with the legitimate and moral backing of the United Nations and a relatively small force could have much more effectively handled these problems than by any unilateral action as we have been presently involved in.

Senator CASE. Not only the size of the force, but its chief focus and chief interest. It is not to be thought of as a military operation primarily, but rather in the role of a mediation and the effort to prevent the dispute from breaking into open violence that would require force on a large scale to subdue it or put it down.

Dr. PRICE. Well, I think we have seen historical examples where the presence of a relatively small force, backed by the political and moral support of the United Nations has been much more effective than a much larger force of national—

Senator CASE. The reason I am hoping that this is the right approach, is my own experience as a member along with our chairman of our delegation at the U.N. a couple of years ago. I was interested particularly in this matter of peacekeeping and saw very clearly that the Russians, for example, were not going to let a conventional police force be created or set into operation. Therefore, we had better attempt to use the United Nations in ways that we could use it, particularly in this matter of the Secretary General's own person and the small staff that he controlled, in efforts to prevent disputes from breaking out, and to bring matters to the attention of the United Nations organism, and of the public.

Dr. PRICE. I suppose another analogy that one might consider is that in many, many instances in peacekeeping inside the United State, an unarmed U.S. marshal is fairly effective, not unfortunately in all instances. But one would hope largely that peacekeeping could be this kind of an operation rather than a major military effort.

INSTITUTIONALIZING PROCEDURES

Senator CASE. There was also a general feeling yesterday that it would be a pretty good idea not to institutionalize this too much, not to get too rigid in procedures. Otherwise parties to any dispute are likely to calculate whether their advantage would be greater in refusing to try to come to an agreement with the other side and in going through the United Nations procedures, and that could be a deterrent rather than an incentive to settlement of their disputes among themselves. Does this seem to have merit to you?

Dr. PRICE. Indeed so; yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Senator Case.

I think the past history of peacekeeping activities by the U.N. pretty well demonstrates that there are situations in which the United Nations

is the only welcome policeman on the beat, where the disputes are inclined to oppose intervention on the part of any outside power, while they can be persuaded to accept intervention by the international organization. That of course, is the great hope that we have for utilizing a peacekeeping force by the U.N. in the future. I think it is quite impractical to conceive of the U.N. shooting its way into a crisis situation. Heretofore U.N. forces have been only in those cases where they have been invited, either by both parties, where the crisis was international in character, or by the presiding government where the crisis was internal in character and I think that that is likely to be the pattern in the future.

Thank you very much, Dr. Price.

Dr. PRICE. My appreciation again.

Senator CHURCH. Perhaps we can oblige anyone else, who might be here since we have a few minutes left this morning, and who is scheduled to appear before the committee and who would like to do it now rather than wait until this afternoon. I see Mrs. Betty Goetz Lall. She prefers to testify this morning and we happy to oblige her. It is nice to see you again.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say for the record I didn't know you had invited her to testify otherwise I would have refused to accept the invitation of my other two subcommittees, but I have to go now.

Mrs. LALL. Thank you, Senator.

Shall I proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator CHURCH. Yes, please do.

STATEMENT OF BETTY GOETZ LALL, MEMBER, SANE NUCLEAR POLICY COMMITTEE

Mrs. LALL. Let me say just informally to both Senator Church and Senator Sparkman how delighted I am to be here today, back at my old committee, if I may say so.

Senator CHURCH. Where you did exceptionally fine work for several years.

Mrs. LALL. Thank you very much.

Senator CHURCH. We are glad to see you back.

Senator SPARKMAN. I join in saying how good it is to have you back again even if it is for just a brief time.

Mrs. LALL. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Chairman, I appear before this committee at the request of the Sane Nuclear Policy Committee. I am a new member of its national board and because of my interest and experience in problems of international peace and security Sane asked me to share some ideas on this subject with the committee. These ideas, while they are generally consistent with the broad policy of Sane, are my own.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED

Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 would be an important document expressing the views of the U.S. Senate toward the United Nations at this particular time. It recommends a direction for U.S. policy; namely, that the United States should seek to strengthen the ability of the United Nations to maintain peace by making available to the United Nations forces of member states which could be used in peace-

keeping operations. Ultimately the resolution envisages the creation of United Nations forces through the recruitment of individuals. The timing of this discussion is important especially since we are hopefully nearing the beginning of the end of the Vietnam conflict. If this is so then the policy to be pursued by the United States in the future toward local conflicts needs to be reviewed. None of us relishes the thought of future U.S. involvements in local conflicts similar to that in Vietnam. We need to determine whether the United Nations can be strengthened to help to avoid such involvements.

DESIGNATION OF FORCES BY MEMBER STATES

The first part of my statement is directed to the question of member states designating forces for use in United Nations peacekeeping operations. As the committee knows, several members of the United Nations have declared that a part of their armed forces would be held in readiness for this purpose. These nations include Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada, and Iran; I might also add, I believe, Australia has also designated a contingent of her force for the UN. Knowledge that such forces may be called upon on short notice has been cited by U.N. officials as being extremely helpful when emergency peacekeeping operations have been necessary. This development is commendable as far as it goes, but since each declaration by a member state about the availability of its force to the United Nations is essentially unilateral, this means that the declaration could be withdrawn if the Government has a change of policy. Just recently the new Government of Canada has indicated that it was reviewing its commitment of forces to the United Nations.

One way that the United Nations might have greater assurance that forces of certain member states would be available in emergency peacekeeping operations would be if each state now designating forces would translate this unilateral declaration into a formal bilateral agreement between itself and the U.N. Security Council. Article 43 of the U.N. Charter calls upon member states—

to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided * * *

This article was never implemented, because of the early disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union about the role of the United Nations in maintaining peace. I suggest that to a limited extent article 43 might now be implemented. If the seven countries which have already designated armed forces to be available to the United Nations for peacekeeping operations, plus Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria which have offered to sign bilateral agreements with the United Nations, and other suppliers of forces to past and present U.N. operations, could each formalize this development into a formal agreement, to some extent, like that envisaged by article 43, the United Nations would have moved one step closer to the creation of a permanent peace force.

These bilateral agreements need not all be similar and there is nothing in the language of article 43 that indicates that similarity is required. Some agreements might be more comprehensive than others.

Some might provide specific details for the financing of the use of the armed forces, while others might leave this vague. However, the agreements would specify the number and type of forces to be made available including certain specialists to handle special situations. The main point to stress is that having such agreement would give more stability to the U.N. peacekeeping system than the current situation whereby a nation can modify, and on short notice, the extent of its commitment to provide forces. If such agreements are started with a few nations it is likely that others will follow.

U.S. POSITION ON FORMALIZATION OF AGREEMENTS

The United States, as far as I know, has not been willing to advocate the formalization of agreements under article 43 for the more permanent use of a country's armed forces. The executive branch has seemed to take the view, incorrectly in my judgment, that agreements under article 43 can only be used in enforcement action and not in action as most peacekeeping operations have been in which one or more of the states involved have given their consent for the placement of troops on their territory. There is nothing in chapter VII of the charter of which article 43 is a part which states that article 43 agreements could not be used in operations that did not fall under the classification of enforcement action. Forces made available under article 43 agreements could presumably have been used in such peacekeeping operations as Cyprus, in Suez, Kashmir, and the Congo. The main determinant would have been their acceptability to the member state on whose territory they were to be placed and any provisions of the agreement with the Security Council which might limit either the area or the manner in which the forces could be used.

The United States has also seemed to feel that agreements under article 43 might prejudice at some future time the ability of the U.N. General Assembly to recommend a peacekeeping operation; as the committee knows the United States has wanted to be able to take an issue of international peace and security to the General Assembly for consideration in the event the Security Council was unable to act. Even with this position it does not seem likely that the existence of article 43 agreements would preclude consideration of an issue in the General Assembly.

Another possible objection that some have argued is that the command of any troops organized as a result of agreements under article 43 would be under the U.N. Military Staff Committee and that this would not be desirable because the Military Staff Committee, being composed of the military representatives of the major powers on the Security Council, could not give proper direction to such forces. It is true that the Military Staff Committee has never been able to function as envisaged by the founders of the charter. But it is not true that all peacekeeping operations of the United Nations under article 43 arrangements would have to be directed by the Military Staff Committee. The charter, in article 47, states only that:

The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

The meaning of this clearly is that the Military Staff Committee is supposed to give direction particularly when the mission is enforcement and when the Security Council orders it to give direction. Other missions, such as those undertaken in most peacekeeping operations, need not be placed under the Military Staff Committee. The Security Council might specify, as it has done on several occasions in the past, that the Secretary General or his representative be in charge of directing a specific peacekeeping operation.

In summary it is difficult to imagine any situation arising where it would not be more advantageous to the U.N. and to the promotion of international peace and stability to have some article 43 agreements in existence than to have none and to continue operating all U.N. peacekeeping operations on an ad hoc basis. Certainly if the Senate could recommend this step to the executive branch it would help to strengthen the provisions of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.

U.S. POST-VIETNAM POLICY

Now, I wish to turn to the other proposal to be presented before this committee. It has a relationship to the first proposal and it is directed to consideration of a post-Vietnam policy for the United States. My point is that the people of the United States will not look with favor on the executive branch pursuing policies that are likely to result in an American involvement in a local war similar to Vietnam. At the same time it would be fatal for both U.S. and world security if the United States were to try to isolate itself from acts of aggression and threats to world peace. As a third factor to consider it is probable that given the kind of political and economic instability existing in many nations there will be local disorders of the nature of civil or internal strife and there will be local conflict between two or more states in a given area.

One possible approach for the United States is for the executive branch with the advice and endorsement of the Congress to pursue in the United Nations a policy of nonintervention militarily in the affairs of other states. The United States should seek in the United Nations the negotiation of a treaty or several treaties which will establish an adherence to this principle on the part of the necessary number of other states. The treaties would contain provision for an automatic investigation by a team authorized by the United Nations in the event a country claimed it was the victim of intervention.

GENERAL NONINTERVENTION TREATY

Let me now outline the points in this proposal.

Under the present situation the United States is pledged to consider aiding with military force those countries threatened with outside intervention and with whom we have commitments. Other countries not having such commitments with the United States must rely on the general security provisions of the United Nations if they are threatened by an outside power. Under the first situation; that is, the pledge of possible U.S. aid to countries signing mutual defense treaties with us, the United States may be called upon again and again by

itself and without involvement by the United Nations to come to their defense. Such a situation not only undermines the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security as was the case in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, but it also can be extremely costly for the United States. Moreover, it invites the further or additional intervention by other states such as the current involvement of the Soviet Union and China in Vietnam. I believe that the United States should now try to shift its policy wherever it can away from bilateral or regional mutual defense treaties and instead attempt to negotiate treaties of nonintervention.

I do not expect that a nonintervention treaty could be negotiated with a large number of states at the outset for at least two reasons. The first is that not all countries would be prepared immediately to relinquish the military aid they are now receiving from the United States or the Soviet Union. The second is that the United Nations cannot be given added responsibilities to implement nonintervention treaties in some areas if China is not a member of the United Nations. Where a country thought China might intervene militarily in its affairs it would want China to be a signatory to the treaty, but China would not sign a treaty involving the United Nations unless it was a member. In this connection, as it is in others, it is in the national interest of the United States to bring closer the day when China will join the United Nations. I believe that the United States is contributing to the weakening of the United Nations by using its immense influence there to keep China out. If the United Nations is not able to perform its duties properly, especially in Asia, the United States must share part of the responsibility for this failure because of our policy to keep China out of the United Nations. And just as a noninterventionist approach cannot in the long run succeed in much of Asia without U.N. membership for China, it cannot succeed in Europe without the membership of Germany or two Germanies in the United Nations.

SEPARATE TREATIES

If a general treaty on nonintervention could not be negotiated now the process toward that end might be advanced if several separate treaties could be negotiated. What might be the provisions of such treaties?

1. The United States, the Soviet Union, other major powers, and an individual country would agree that there should be no military or paramilitary intervention or outside military presence in that individual country. In other words, foreign military aid, foreign military bases, and the training of troops through a foreign military aid program would be forbidden.

2. If the government of a country signatory to a nonintervention treaty felt that another power was intervening militarily in its affairs, through subversion, infiltration, guerrilla warfare, or other means, it could request and obtain automatically from the United Nations a team to investigate the charge of intervention. The composition, payment for, and functions of such a team would be worked out ahead of time by the members of the Security Council so that no delay would occur in the sending of such a team. There would be different teams organized so that a country requesting an investigation could have a choice of the national representation on the team.

The nation receiving the team should be able to name on it some of its own nationals. The latter would not be so numerous as to influence the report and conclusions of the team, but having host nationals on the team would increase the likelihood of identifying infiltrators when that was considered to be a problem. I make this recommendation after reviewing the experience of international investigating teams in the cases of Kashmir and Vietnam. In the former when Pakistan had sent infiltrators into Kashmir in 1965 they were able to be identified because Indians knew when outsiders were entering the area and when the infiltrators left, the Indians for the same reason knew that was so. In the case of the International Control Commission in Vietnam, teams of investigators composed of Indians, Canadians, and Poles could not always tell whether infiltration had occurred because they did not know the local population well enough.

3. If an investigating team does not find evidence of intervention then it reports this to the United Nations and that is the end of the present U.N. involvement in the case. If the team does find evidence of intervention then this is a matter to be dealt with by the United Nations, primarily by the Security Council. If the United Nations fails to act to stop the intervention then this country which is a victim of intervention should be able to call for assistance under the self-defense provisions of the charter.

4. To say that a nonintervention treaty would preclude a major or other power from providing military aid, training, or bases to a party to such a treaty should not mean that such a party cannot purchase military equipment or assistance for its legitimate defense needs. To argue otherwise would be to prevent countries from fulfilling a basic function of government. But purchasing equipment is different from getting it free or at vastly reduced terms; under aid programs countries do become dependent to a degree and in some cases when foreign military aid is used to carry out controversial internal policies this invites other countries to intervene by supplying military aid to rebel groups.

5. One step which would help to differentiate between legitimate purchases of military equipment and the supply of military aid in violation of provisions of a nonintervention treaty is to revive the publication of an international yearbook in the sale and supply of military equipment. Each country would supply the United Nations with a statement of its imports and exports of armaments and this would be published each year. This may not stop all clandestine trade in arms but it would furnish a basis for comparing what a country reported it was importing and exporting in the way of arms and what others may think a nation is carrying on in the way of such trade. Malta over 2 years ago offered a resolution in the U.N. General Assembly to begin to study the creation of a yearbook in armaments, not unlike that published by the League of Nations, but objections particularly by the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to discourage that country as well as others to pursue the matter. If the Congress were to go on record favoring this as well as the other steps recommended here this would give the proposal some impetus toward eventual implementation.

POLICY BETWEEN ISOLATIONISM AND UNILATERAL INTERVENTION

In conclusion I would stress that the steps outlined in this presentation would promote the growth of a community of nations acting together to prevent war and threats to the integrity and independence of nation states. We need to examine various ways to pursue policies that will be neither isolationism nor unilateral military intervention. I think that the people of the United States would be sympathetic to some important shifts in foreign policy along the lines I have suggested. I further believe as a result of discussing the proposals mentioned here with diplomats and officials from many countries, including those from the Soviet Union, that some progress might be forthcoming if the United States indicated it was prepared to explore the proposals always suggested here.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Betty.

I certainly concur in your statement that we need to examine various ways to pursue policies that will neither be isolationism nor unilateral military intervention. I think that these are two horns of a dilemma which face this country, and much useful work needs to be done between. And you certainly have made some very original proposals here, particularly in connection with the discussion you have given us of the nonintervention treaty as a possible device that could involve the U.N. in a practical way. That, to my knowledge, is a new proposal, at least it is one that has not heretofore come to my attention in precisely the same terms as you have offered it here this morning.

Senator SPARKMAN.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it is a very fine statement. I enjoyed it. There are some good ideas, and I hope we will profit by them.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much.

Mrs. LALL. Thank you very much.

Senator CHURCH. I understand we have one other witness this morning who would like to testify this morning rather than this afternoon. We have 10 more minutes available and such additional time as she may need.

Mrs. Dorothy Hutchinson, who is the representative for the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, will be the next witness.

STATEMENT OF DOROTHY HUTCHINSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAIRMAN, WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM; ACCOMPANIED BY KATHERINE L. CAMP, PRESIDENT, U.S. SECTION

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I am Dorothy Hutchinson, international chairman of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, whose headquarters are in Geneva, Switzerland. This organization is 53 years old and has 20 national sections, on five continents. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has often heard testimony from the U.S. section of the Women's International League for Peace and Free-

dom; in fact I myself appeared before you when I was president of the U.S. section.

The present president of the U.S. section, Mrs. Katherine Camp, is here with me today, and I should like to introduce her, in order that you may know her, because you may be hearing from her in the future.

Senator CHURCH. Mrs. Camp, we are very pleased to have you here.

Mrs. CAMP. Thank you.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. I am a member of the Society of Friends—called Quakers—and am also testifying today on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation which has been interpreting the Quaker viewpoint to our Government for the past 25 years. While this Quaker committee does not claim to speak for all Friends, we have, as you know, a long tradition of opposition to war and of concern for the development of international organizations equipped to prevent wars.

INTERRELATION OF DISARMAMENT TO U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCES

Both the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) have always advocated general and complete world disarmament. However, they have also recognized the interrelation of disarmament to the establishment of United Nations peacekeeping forces and the dependence of both disarmament and peacekeeping operations on adequate peacemaking machinery. For some time the WILPF (international) has had a standing committee on Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes studying the present state of United Nations peacemaking machinery and means for its improvement. I have put into the hands of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee present at this hearing copies of a pamphlet called "Toward World Political Community," specifically dealing with the interrelationships of peace forces, disarmament, and the peaceful resolution of conflict. I wrote this pamphlet in 1965 and brought it up to date in this second edition published in 1967. Section I, pages 3-11, of this pamphlet deals with peacekeeping by means of peace forces which is the main concern of today's hearings.

It deals with the functions and equipment of peace forces, revenue for them, political control, and next steps in their development, and so forth.

I should add to what is in that section that we are very often concerned at the present time with a study of the possibility of using the riches of the ocean bed as a source of revenue. That came up earlier this morning.

I am glad, both as chairman of an international organization and as an American citizen, to have this opportunity to speak in support of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, sponsored by Senator Clark of my home State, and others, among whom are a number of the Senators whom I most admire because they so often sponsor legislation in harmony with the principles of peace and freedom for which my organization stands.

NEED FOR SPECIALIZED TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPING FORCES

Referring to the text of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47—WILPF and FCNL have long advocated "earmarking and specialized training of units by United Nations member states for employment in United Nations peacekeeping operations."

WILPF has commended the Scandinavian and other nations which undertook to do this as many as 4 years ago. The WILPF sections in those countries encouraged their governments to take this step. It is, therefore, to be expected that we favor the United States making available to the United Nations "personnel and facilities" in support of its peacekeeping operations. We also encourage the United States to "support the creation of a permanent, individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties," since such a force would be more certain to be readily and reliably available for United Nations use than would units of national land forces, even though these had been promised in advance.

What we should like particularly to emphasize is the need for "specialized training" of all peacekeeping forces to be used by the United Nations. The United Nations is not authorized to use "peacekeeping" forces for warmaking nor for taking sides in order to impose political solutions to conflicts. Since the duties of peacekeeping forces are patrolling trouble spots with the consent of the nations involved and bringing moral rather than military pressure to bear in order to prevent or halt violence, these forces need a totally different type of training than that given to combat troops.

What United Nations forces need is training in exercising control without the use of violence and training in psychologically effective techniques for damping down the violent reactions of the parties to inflamed situations. In some situations they might function most effectively without incurring suspicion or fear—this possibility is being explored at the moment by a Quaker working party—The outline of their work is in hand but I would like to send to Senator Church later the final document if he would be interested in receiving it.

Further, in order to keep the morale of the United Nations Forces high, even though their work involves long, dull periods, and in order to increase good will toward them on the part of the country where they are stationed, United Nations Forces could be trained for constructive service in disaster relief, education, and community development activities insofar as their peacekeeping duties permit.

This is an area which very much needs exploration.

I simply lay it before you as a possibility.

BASIC IMPORTANCE OF PEACEMAKING MACHINERY

As Resolution 47 indicates, guidelines insuring United Nations control of the "financing, training, equipping, and duration" of its peacekeeping forces are of vital importance. What I wish particularly to emphasize is that past experience with the use of United Nations peacekeeping forces shows that the "duration" of peacekeeping operations presents a very great problem. In the Middle East, for instance, peacekeeping operations went on for 10 years until the

pressures built up to the point where the unresolved dispute broke out more violently than ever. This was largely because there was no reliable machinery for solving the dispute which necessitated the use of peacekeeping forces in the first place. Peacekeeping forces are, by their terms of reference, merely to halt violence and keep order pending resolution of the conflict. In the absence of any reliable means for resolving the conflict, peace forces can only sit on the lid pending an almost inevitable explosion.

The main point I want to make before this committee is that both the effective use of peacekeeping forces now and the eventual possibility of world disarmament depend on the development and routine use of what the resolution before us calls "concomitant machinery for peacemaking," that is, for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

I think the inability of Senator Case and Dr. Price to meet each other on this subject a few minutes ago indicates that we aren't thinking on the same wavelength on this sometimes, and that this is really a new idea of the importance of the peacemaking aspect of the machinery which the United Nations needs.

Article 33 of the United Nations Charter lays down the rule that the parties to international disputes "shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." However, adequate machinery for this has yet received scant attention.

I think this is very surprising.

The establishment of such machinery will not be easy. Nations have strong reservations about turning to any type of third party for help in settling disputes, even though resorting to war becomes increasingly futile and disastrous. Yet, if there had been reliable machinery for peacemaking and prior agreement to its use which could have obviated United States military involvement in Vietnam, consider for a moment what this could have saved the United States, the Vietnamese people, and the whole world, which now shudders before the growing probability of World War III as the Vietnam war threatens to escalate out of control.

And this is still timely in view of the present peace efforts because the war, though more contained geographically is escalating at the same time within those geographical limits.

TYPES OF DANGEROUS DISPUTES

I commend to your attention pages 18 to 21 of my pamphlet which deal with questions which must be researched to find out what types of disputes are so dangerous that they may need to be the first for which reliable peaceful settlement machinery must be provided.

It is my feeling that it is likely that a precedent shattering prior consent to third-party intervention of any kind may be achievable, not for the inconsequential but for very dangerous types of international behavior, and it is these that I would just like to list here, although these and others are described in much more detail in the pamphlet.

(1) Incursions across national boundaries.

(2) Fomenting or aggravating violence within a nation by shipping arms from outside, which is one form of military intervention, about which Mrs. Lall was talking about.

(3) Beaming inflammatory propoganda across national borders in order to incite to internal or international violence.

(4) Expropriating property without just recompense.

(5) Deliberate economic strangulation of one country by another, by a boycott, and so forth.

TYPES OF PEACEMAKING MACHINERY

I also commend to your attention pages 24 to 26 of the same pamphlet which describes some types of peacemaking machinery which might be considered. For instance:

(1) A permanent mediation board made up of professional diplomats who should routinely offer both parties in international disputes nonbinding suggestions for peaceful settlement,

(2) Several arbitration boards each charged with arbitrating a different type of dispute and each made up of experts in that particular field such as boundary disputes, international economic relations, and so forth.

(3) Authorization of the United Nation's Sixth (Legal) Committee to render an opinion on the status of the purely legal aspects of international disputes in order to exert moral pressure toward seeking judicial settlement of these aspects of the dispute by the International Court of Justice.

(4) A general proposal has been made for exerting on nations which request the services of U.N. peace forces, pressure to seek peaceful settlement of their disputes. That would be done in this way or could be done in this way:

If the U.N. authorized the use of its peacekeeping forces for only a specified period, after which a new authorization must be sought, it could urge that the parties enter into negotiations for a settlement during this period. If negotiations fail, and a second period of U.N. peacekeeping service was requested, the parties could be required during this second period, to accept the help of mediators. If mediation also fails, they might expect to be required to submit to arbitration during the third period of peacekeeping operations. By this method the parties to the dispute might be progressively pressed to agree to a reasonably just settlement.

These and other suggestions are in the pamphlet and are elaborated on there.

I don't claim that these are all in final form. All they indicate by their paucity and vagueness by which they are phrased is that whole subject is still in a very embryonic stage, a dangerously embryonic stage, and the definition of any aspect of this vital problem has really not yet been made and these are offered only to stimulate the imagination as to the directions in which we ought to be thinking if we really take seriously the need of U.N. peacemaking machinery.

If, as I believe, first steps toward establishing acceptable and routinely used machinery for peaceful settlement are basic to the effective use of the necessary and desirable peacekeeping machinery envisaged in the resolution before us, the Foreign Relations Committee of the

Senate should be taking most seriously the elaboration of those small references in this resolution which refer to machinery for peacemaking and in no way define it. If I were to suggest an amendment, it would be that these very cursory references to peacemaking should be more carefully defined in order that it would be clear what the difference is between concomitant peacemaking machinery and the machinery envisaged in the resolution itself with only a bow in the direction of this.

And that, failing the possibility of putting an amendment to the resolution itself, that the committee at least begin a very serious study of the problems of improving peacemaking machinery of the United Nations within the framework of the present charter because I don't think it requires revision.

But to focus exclusively on the need for disarmament and peace forces in a world which makes no adequate provision for peaceful settlement of disputes, is as unrealistic as it would be to focus on university and secondary school education in a country which as yet had no elementary schools.

STUDY OF PROBLEM OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS

For your convenience, I have attached an appendix to this testimony which contains excerpts from my pamphlet because I would like them in the record. I should also like to call to the attention of Senator Church a very extraordinary book which just came into my hands a few days ago although I have been trying to get it for months. This is a report of a study group on peaceful settlements of disputes of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, London, which is a professional job done since I first tried this very amateurish job of mine. I commend it to the committee's attention as a basis for study of the whole problem of peaceful settlements because it is extremely comprehensive and good.

Thank you.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mrs. Hutchinson.

And your appendix, which you have submitted, which outlines the points contained in your pamphlet, will be included in the record immediately following your testimony—

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Thank you.

Senator CHURCH (continuing). So that the full statement will be in the record of these proceedings.

(The appendix referred to follows:)

APPENDIX TO TESTIMONY OF DOROTHY HUTCHINSON

EXCERPTS FROM "TOWARD WORLD POLITICAL COMMUNITY" * DEALING WITH THE DEPENDENCE OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING UPON ADEQUATE MACHINERY FOR PEACEMAKING

I. Effective use of Peacekeeping Forces Depends on Machinery for Peaceful Settlement

The use of UN "presences" to forestall violence and of peace forces to halt outbreaks of violence are now accepted as a necessary way station between threatened or actual violence and the resolution of the conflict which gives rise to the violence.

*Dorothy Hutchinson, 2nd Edition, 1967, published by Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 206 Walnut St., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.

However, the use of peace forces, no matter how adequate, may often turn out to be a way station to *Nouche* unless reliable means for the peaceful resolution of international conflict are simultaneously devised.

Present "peace-keeping forces" of the UN could be more accurately described as "order-restoring forces" or "violence-suppressing forces." Police activity of this sort is really lid-sitting which may be necessary as a temporary expedient but unacceptable as a permanent solution.

The use of peace forces is intentionally not designed to resolve the underlying conflict and offers the possibility either of an endless policing operation, as in the Gaza Strip, or of an explosion like that in the Congo, when lack of consensus or lack of funds forces the withdrawal of the police. Even in the case of a direct military attack at a border, if the world police were authorized to halt the violence but there were no means for arriving at a binding decision on the location of the border itself and who is the aggressor, simply halting the violence and policing the *status quo* could serve to jell indefinitely the advantage gained by the aggressor! Moreover, to leave everything to negotiation with no other recourse for solving disputes puts a premium on intransigence. Refusal to make concessions can then perpetuate an injustice forever. On the other hand, the mere existence of a compulsory means for the peaceful settlement of disputes often obviates the need of using these means! It is a powerful incentive to reasonable negotiation, called in civil life "settling out of court."

In the absence of any such means of compulsory settlement, the use of order-restoring forces of the UN tends to become a long and hazardous operation. Peace researchers are, therefore, devising ingenious formulae for the political control of these forces in order to strike a balance between the danger that the force may be inadequate, unless it can be increased at times sufficiently to meet various enforcement needs, and the danger that it may become so strong that it will get out of political control altogether.

Since the balance between too little and too much power in the hands of the UN forces is admitted to be extremely delicate and difficult to maintain, it seems strange that the peace researchers are giving slight attention to devising any such ingenious formulae for the peaceful resolution of tension-producing international conflicts as could serve to shorten peace-keeping operations or obviate many of them entirely.

II. Research Needed on Kinds of International Disputes Requiring Recourse of Peaceful Settlement

Nations may be less likely to set the tradition-shattering precedent of accepting binding rules of behavior subject to third-party judgments on inconsequential than on matters of vital consequence. Only in matters where they very much need protection from the unlimited sovereignty of others will they be likely to accept curtailment of their own sovereignty.

The following may be vital questions of this sort:

1. What about incursions across national boundaries? Could nations agree that the world authority must have the right to stop the invasion of any nation by armed or by unarmed invaders and insist that the problem be submitted to third party judgment unless the nations involved can settle it promptly by direct negotiation? This might involve a third-party decision not only on whether there had been an invasion but also on where the boundary itself is in cases where this is uncertain (cf. Sino-Indian dispute).

2. What about shipping arms across national borders? Even in a disarmed world nations are to be permitted sufficient arms to "maintain internal order." Large nations will, of course, be allowed more arms than small nations and could ship these around in sufficient quantity either to prevent the governments of small nations from "maintaining internal order" or, on the other hand, to enable these governments to prevent legitimate peaceful changes desired by their people. Could international shipment of arms be regulated with power of enforcement given to the world authority? (cf. outside involvement in Vietnam).

3. What about inflammatory propaganda beamed across national borders in order to incite to internal or international violence? Could enforceable rules against this be agreed to? (cf. Iraq's complaints *vs.* Egypt).

4. What about expropriation of property owned by nationals of other countries? While recognizing the right to expropriate, could agreement be reached in advance of some formula for determining whether and what compensation is just and for authority to apply this formula to situations as they arise? (cf. U.S.-Argentina dispute).

5. What about boycott as a means of furthering a nation's interests? Could it be agreed that these and perhaps other forms of economic strangulation must be subject to third-party review and decision? (cf. U.S.-Cuban relations.)

6. What about colonies which may not have achieved independence when the disarmament agreement goes into effect? Could a formula be agreed upon which would permit peaceful changes in the *status quo* and insure self-determination of peoples? (cf. Angolan-Portuguese relations.)

7. What about outbreaks of violence within a nation which the UN finds to be threatening to world peace? Could a formula be agreed upon whereby the world authority could be empowered to employ a graduated series of measures to halt the violence, pending settlement, with each increasingly coercive step requiring more international consensus for its use? (cf. Cyprus crisis.)

These are but a few sample questions to demonstrate the wide range requiring research. It seems possible that nations can agree that it is more dangerous to leave some of these inflammatory situations to ad hoc UN decisions, crisis by crisis, than to give prior consent to a few general rules for international behavior and the means for seeing that these are respected. Even those who advocate "disarmed disorder" recognize that some of these questions require affirmative answers. Only as answers to all these questions and more are found can the world judge whether present U.N. machinery for peaceful settlement is adequate to its needs or whether some new machinery is required.

As for means of enforcing the decisions of international courts or tribunals (ie., means for coercing compliance with a third-party judgment, when agreed rules of international conduct appear to have been broken). Arthur Larson, a leading authority on international law does not consider this of paramount importance. In his book, "When Nations Disagree," he states that, in the past, only about twenty of the many hundreds of decisions made by international tribunals have been disobeyed, even though there was no enforcement procedure. During the whole 45 years of World Court history there has been non-compliance with only one portion of one court judgment.

Prior consent to the rules and to submit their infringements to third-party judgment is, in itself, a great step toward peaceful settlement. A nation seems to hesitate to fly in the face of a judgment arrived at with its own prior consent. In the rare cases where this may not prove true, Dr. Larson suggests means, other than physical force, for inducing compliance. These should be further investigated.

Another subject urgently needing research is what various sorts of agencies should be entrusted with judging international conflicts. Which of any agreed rules of international conduct would be put in the form of law and be subject to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice? Which might better be subject to arbitration under a permanent Court of Arbitration or Equity Tribunal? Which disputes might be left to conciliation or mediation?

May it be advisable to set up *separate commissions* to deal with various types of dispute, e.g., a Commission on Boundary Disputes, a Commission on International Investment and Expropriation Practices, an International Broadcasting Commission, etc.? Such an arrangement could provide the necessary machinery for third-party decisions for resolving disputes while *avoiding the centralization of authority* which nations seem to fear.

Regulations to the end that intolerable conditions can be rectified without resort to violence is the *sine qua non* for the elimination of violence as has been clearly affirmed by Harlan Cleveland, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs, "*Peace—is an organized system for the peaceful resolution of difference and the peaceful management of needed change.* The alternative to missiles is not just absence of missiles; the alternative is the presence of workable, reliable institutions."

III. Some Suggestions for First Steps Toward Establishing Machinery for Peaceful Settlements.

Some suggestions for *first steps* toward more reliable means for achieving peaceful change and the peaceful settlement of disputes are already emerging here and there, mostly from non-governmental sources. A few of these are listed simply to indicate the many possible approaches to this basic problem on which our imaginations have as yet scarcely begun to work.

FACTFINDING, CONCILIATION, AND MEDIATION

1. International treaties of non-intervention may be coupled with UN guarantees and provisions for UN teams automatically to investigate one party's complaints that the other is openly intervening, shipping in arms, or either infiltrating or training armed agents within the country.

2. The UN might investigate and publicize international arms transfers which often indicate where violence may be brewing or being fomented.

3. The General Assembly might revitalize its Panel of Inquiry and Conciliation authorized in 1949 and re-establish its Peace Observation Commission appointed in 1950.

4. For each dispute which threatens world peace, a *rapporteur* from a non-involved nation might be appointed to report to the Security Council the facts and possible terms of settlement which the Security Council could then recommend as authorized by Article 37 of the UN Charter.

5. In every region of the world where political tensions exist between countries, the UN might have its own permanent Peace Ambassadors, who would work actively by means of conciliation to reduce areas of conflict, and to lessen the chances of war. These Peace Ambassadors would also keep in touch with the Secretary-General so that the UN would be kept up to date on developing situations and might act to prevent crises.

6. The UN might set up a Permanent Mediation and Conciliation Board (or boards) made up of professional diplomats whose task would be simply to bring the parties together and make non-binding suggestions for peaceful settlement.

ARBITRATION

7. International agreements might be sought to submit to a Board of Arbitration *certain specified types of disputes* if these do not prove amenable to negotiation or mediation and may endanger world peace. (See pp. 3-4)

8. There might be established *several* Boards of Arbitration each charged with a different type of dispute and made up of experts in each particular field such as boundary disputes, international economic relations, etc. Such separation might also allay fears of excessive centralization of power under the guise of arbitration. (See p. 5)

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD LAW

9. Where the parties are loath to turn to the International Court of Justice, the UN's Sixth (Legal) Committee might be charged with sorting out the legal from the political facets of the conflict, and rendering an opinion on the status of the legal aspects under international law. This could exert moral pressure toward seeking judicial settlement.

10. International agreements might be sought to submit to the International Court of Justice *specified types of legal disputes* which are intolerably dangerous to the vital interests of the nations involved and, therefore, to world peace. (See pp. 3-4)

11. Outer space and the sub-soil of the high seas might be put under UN jurisdiction as a step toward building up UN authority, preventing new and dangerous forms of international competition; and also toward furnishing the UN with a reliable source of income for peacekeeping operations, etc.

TIME LIMITATION ON PEACE FORCES

12. A general proposal has been made for exerting on nations which request the services of UN peace forces, pressure to seek peaceful settlement of their disputes. If the UN authorized the use of its peacekeeping forces for only a specified period, after which a new authorization must be sought, it could urge that the parties enter into negotiations for a settlement during this period. If negotiations fail, and a second period of UN peacekeeping service was requested, the parties could be required, during this second period to accept the help of mediators. If mediation also fails, they might expect to be required to submit to arbitration during the third period of peacekeeping operations. By this method the parties to the dispute, might be progressively pressed to agree to a reasonably just settlement.

Whether all or any of the above suggestions are feasible, as they stand, is open to question. They merely indicate that, in the now desperate search for peace, many paths have not even been explored.

Books, like the monumental "World Peace Through World Law," set forth in some detail possible *eventual* international institutions for dealing with all three of the prerequisites of peace:

1. Peaceful settlement of both legal and political disputes
2. Disarmament
3. The peace forces to be used as an adjunct to the other two.

However, even the disciples of Clark and Sohn who have, for many years, tirelessly formulated and pled for all sorts of small steps toward general and complete disarmament, and toward more reliable peacekeeping operations, are still giving little or no attention to *steps* toward more reliable means for solving the international disputes which stand in the way of progress in either of the other directions. They rejoice in the few *pre-world-disarmament* agreements which have been achieved and in the partial (and often very temporary) successes of the UN peace forces in what might be called *pre-world-police* activities. But they continue to assume that "peace-keeping" involves only the use of military forces to halt violence pending the peaceful settlement for which there is as yet no adequate provision. Not even the smallest steps toward *pre-world-law* are being seriously discussed.

Senator CHURCH. We appreciate, too, the mention you have made of this new work. This has been called to my attention, but I haven't yet had an opportunity to look at it. And I am glad to know that you think highly of it.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. Do you have any questions?

PEACEMAKING MACHINERY IS ESSENTIAL

Senator CHURCH. I think not. I think your statement is perfectly clear and it is obvious that this is, of course, the great deficiency. Peacemaking machinery is essential in many of these U.N. peacekeeping operations if they are to be ultimately successful.

For years, as you know, the U.N. did control the uneasy border between Egypt and Israel; but the failure to resolve the underlying dispute between the two countries led eventually to the withdrawal of the U.N. force and to the outbreak of new warfare between the disputants.

In Cyprus today, we continue to maintain a U.N. peacekeeping force between the Greek and the Turks; and here, again, there has been little or no progress toward a resolution of the underlying dispute. In those circumstances we might well see a new outcropping of violence in Cyprus of the character that would be beyond the capacity of the U.N. peace force to contain, and I think that there is little argument but what the ultimate necessity is the peaceful resolution of the disputes that give rise to violence. And here, of course, is the most complicated and difficult problem of all.

Mrs. HUTCHINSON. It is just my contention, I think, that this is basic and, therefore, should be studied very seriously now. As you know, the British initiative of December 1965 at the U.N. to get the U.N. to study this was defeated by a very curious combination of the Soviet bloc which never wants anything considered which might take any authority out of the hands of the Security Council, and the Afro-Asian bloc which was not interested in that at all, but was very much concerned lest this be a diversionary tactic of Britain because they wanted her to use more militant efforts against Rhodesia.

So that there were two totally different reasons for blocking this.

But the result is that the many, many speeches in support of the study of this in the Assembly at that time have come to absolutely nothing and the U.N. is not even giving this matter serious considera-

tion. If it is basic to the other two things—disarmament, which probably can't take place until nations see some means of protecting their vital interests other than resorting to arms, which means peaceful settlement by third parties that they can rely on, and peacekeeping operations which cannot really in the long pull be successful, even in individual cases, unless you have some means for getting at the dispute behind it—then it is the feeling of my organizations that I represent here that this ought to be being worked at very much harder than it is right now, not ultimately but right now.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mrs. Hutchinson, for your testimony.

The committee will adjourn now for the noon hour and return to hear the balance of the witnesses who are scheduled to testify at 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator CHURCH. The hearing will come to order.

I want to apologize for being late.

This afternoon we have four witnesses scheduled, the first of whom is Mr. Charles W. Davis, of the United World Federalists.

Mr. Davis, we are very pleased to have you with us today. Won't you come forward and give us the benefit of your testimony.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES W. DAVIS, CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS; ACCOMPANIED BY SANDFORD Z. PERSONS, CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Charles W. Davis, attorney, of Chicago, Ill., chairman of the executive committee of the United World Federalists, and I am accompanied by Mr. Sandford Z. Persons, congressional liaison for United World Federalists here in Washington. It is my privilege to present the testimony of our president, Mr. James G. Patton, who would have been here but for untimely illness of Mrs. Patton.

Mr. Chairman, I am here to register our strong support for Senate Concurrent Resolution 47. Since the founding of our organization in 1947, we have consistently called for strengthening the United Nations and its peacekeeping and peacemaking capacity. As you know, the credo of United World Federalists is world peace through world law.

We find it encouraging that over one-fifth of the Members of the U.S. Senate are sponsoring this resolution. We commend these sponsors, including the distinguished members of this subcommittee.

PERMANENT, INDIVIDUALLY CREATED FORCE URGED

Despite this fact, Mr. Chairman, we find it a tragic commentary on our world's concern for peace that so little progress has been made toward establishing a permanent, individually recruited United Nations peacekeeping force. It was 11 years ago, in the first session of the 85th Congress, that the Senate agreed to Senate Resolution 15.

That resolution expressed the sense of the Senate on peacekeeping by stating, "a force of a similar character should be made a permanent arm of the United Nations." This referred to the then recently created United Nations Emergency Force.

In the second session of the 85th Congress, the Senate passed Senate Concurrent Resolution 109 stating "that it is the sense of the Congress that consideration should immediately be given by the General Assembly of the United Nations to the development, within its permanent structure, of such organization and procedures as will enable the United Nations promptly to employ suitable United Nations forces for such purposes as observation and patrol in situations that threaten international peace and security."

While we support the resolution before you, we find it discouraging that it makes a permanent U.N. force a less urgent objective than it was in these earlier Senate resolutions. Though Senate Concurrent Resolution 109 asked that the United Nations immediately consider development of organization and procedures within the U.N.'s permanent structure for prompt use of U.N. forces, and Senate Resolution 15 asked that they be a permanent arm of the U.N., this resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, asks that a permanent U.N. force be considered as "part of the long-range development of the United Nations as a more effective instrument for building and keeping peace. * * *" We believe it should be "an immediate objective" of the U.S. Government to at least "encourage and support" the creation of a permanent, individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties. We, therefore, recommend that lines 19, 20, and 21, on page 2, be stricken and that the balance of section (b), commencing with the word "encourage" be added under section (a) as item number (4). The fourth paragraph under (a) would thus read: "encourage and support the creation of a permanent, individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties."

NATIONAL CONTINGENTS IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE

We fully support the present concept of using national contingents to put together a U.N. peacekeeping force and applaud the efforts of Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, India, and other nations to make units available with special training for such use. However, Mr. Chairman, we strongly believe that every effort should be exerted to take at least a small first step toward creating a permanent volunteer U.N. force. It might be only 1,000 men to start with, but this would enable the U.N. to gain valuable experience in training an impartial force of its own for various observation, patrol, and other peacekeeping functions. Such a force would also enable the United Nations to act without delay in getting peacekeepers to a troubled area. This small nucleus force could then be augmented by national contingents, if necessary. As experience was gained and as confidence grew through actual usage, this small nucleus U.N. peacekeeping force could then be gradually enlarged. The time to start promoting the creation of such a force is now, despite all obstacles.

If the international confrontations which are bound to arise in the future are to be prevented from sparking world war III, it is imperative that the United States now explore every avenue toward development of the United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking machinery called for in the resolution before you. In this regard, I would like to quote the excellent statement made by Senator Clifford P. Case as a member of the U.S. delegation to the 21st General Assembly:

We must move now, in this General Assembly, on concrete matters, on assuring reliable financing and on strengthening the capacity and readiness of the U.N. to act for peace. The ability of the U.N. to engage in peacekeeping depends as much on political will as on finances or mechanisms for mustering peacekeeping forces. This political will, the General Assembly must demonstrate. If we are to go beyond rhetoric, if nations are indeed in real life to depend on the U.N. for their security, we must demonstrate that the U.N. is willing and able to respond to appeals for help when the peace is threatened or violence menaces the sovereignty or political independence of member states who ask for help.

Let me now discuss two specific points. First, in section (a) (3) on page 2, we commend the inclusion of the word "duration" on line 15. The controversy surrounding the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the United Arab Republic last year demonstrates the mandatory need to establish in advance a definite period of time, subject to renewal, during which a U.N. peacekeeping force would be authorized. A condition so established would mean that a force could not be removed by the unilateral action of any party.

Second, we urge the addition of the words "control" and "use" following the word "equipping" in line 15. It is clear from the record that unless guidelines can be agreed upon in advance to govern the control and the use of a U.N. peacekeeping force, its financing may prove extremely difficult.

We are pleased to see the relationship in this section (3) between peacemaking machinery and peacekeeping forces. Unless peacemaking procedures are instituted whenever peacekeeping forces are requested, the United Nations will continue to find itself maintaining forces in situations where no efforts are being made to solve the basic problems which necessitated the forces in the first place.

BOLD STEPS TOWARD PEACEKEEPING URGED

Finally, let me say that while we support the objectives of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, we believe that the inadequacies of the United Nations and the future of peace on this planet make this resolution appear as a very small step in the right direction. What is demanded at this point in our history are bold steps to transform the United Nations into the peacekeeping agency that the people of the world expected it to be following San Francisco. Peacekeeping forces are only part of the picture. Since peace is fundamentally a product of law and order, statesmen should be moving urgently to endow the United Nations with authority to make, interpret, and enforce world law. As an indication of how this might be done, I ask that the policy statement of the United World Federalists be included, Mr. Chairman, in the record of these hearings at the conclusion of my remarks. It is a very small concise statement.

Senator CHURCH. It will be included in full at the conclusion of your remarks. (See p. 149).

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REMARKS OF AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

In support of our contention, Mr. Chairman, that our country and the other members of the United Nations should be moving urgently to endow the U.N. with authority to make, interpret, and enforce world law, I take great pleasure in quoting the words of our illustrious Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg. In his statement on April 24 confirming his resignation, Ambassador Goldberg said:

In departing, I reaffirm my faith in the United Nations, I profoundly believe that nations, including our own, will never know real security until they acknowledge some impartial and effective international agency designed to keep the peace, control national armaments, negotiate peaceful settlements, advance human rights, and facilitate social and economic progress.

We agree, too, with the following statement of Ambassador Goldberg:

In a world in which survival is still an open question, we have no choice but to persist in the effort to organize a system of international security extending the benefits and restraints of the rule of law to all peoples and to all governments.

Mr. Chairman, we are convinced that far more time and attention must be devoted to building peace than is now being given. Mankind can no longer afford to live on the brink of terror. It can no longer afford to spend over \$150 billion a year on arms in a world where the vast majority of the people cry out for a decent life. It is high time that this Nation begin to give peace the priority it deserves. While our military budget soars toward \$80 billion a year, we devote less than \$10 million to the work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We must realize that if we are serious about peace, then we must devote the kind of attention, if not resources, to finding the road to peace that we devoted to the Manhattan project during World War II.

PEACE PANELS RECOMMENDED

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, we recommend that the Government of the United States establish by law a Permanent Council for Peace within the executive branch. Such a council would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It would report directly to the President and would have equal status with the Council of Economic Advisers, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Council. We also recommend that there be established a standing Joint Congressional Committee on Peace which would hold hearings and make recommendations for legislative actions on how to keep the peace. We commend these proposals to your serious consideration.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The statement referred to earlier follows:)

POLICY STATEMENT OF THE WORLD FEDERALISTS, JUNE 1967

WHAT WE SEEK

The goal of United World Federalists is lasting world peace. Peace is more than the absence of war. Peace is more than disarmament, though disarmament is essential to peace. Peace requires that a world community of nations substitute the processes of law for armed conflict in setting disputes, as individuals

have learned to do at home. Peace demands a world-wide system of justice, law, and order. The alternative is the continuation of existing international anarchy.

We believe a world federal government, with powers limited to those necessary for establishing and maintaining law and order on a world level, is the only practical way to achieve just and lasting peace. We seek to convince the people and government of the United States that a world federal government is essential to human survival, would preserve our basic freedoms, and can be achieved by orderly constitutional means.

UWF is aware that a just and lasting peace also requires growing use of the world's resources—economic, scientific and moral—to meet the problems of poverty, hunger, disease, population pressure, and ignorance.

WHY WE SEEK IT

Until we have world law, nations will inevitably maintain the armaments, armed forces and alliances which have traditionally been depended upon to deter aggression. But there can be no adequate military defense against modern weapons. No nation, therefore, can be secure until the world is disarmed and at peace under a limited world government.

World federation would facilitate the settlement of international disputes and eliminate military and strategic obstacles to the achievement of self-government by all peoples. It would allow the peoples of the world to pursue their moral and material development free from external violence and protected from outside interference. By lifting the intolerable burden of armaments, it would free the world's resources and manpower to raise the world's standards of living.

Furthermore, we cannot believe that man is doomed to die by his own hand. We must believe that he possesses the foresight and initiative to solve problems created by man. Our generation, like all those which have gone before us, is endowed with resources of reason, spirit and dedication sufficient so that the will of man to live at peace with his fellows on this earth can prevail.

HOW WORLD ORDER CAN BE ACHIEVED

We believe the United Nations offers the best available basis for world peace if it can be given adequate power to make, interpret and enforce world law. We believe this can be achieved by amendments to the United Nations Charter which:

1. Grant the United Nations power to make laws implementing Charter provisions which prohibit any nation from using force or threats of force in international disputes and which also prohibit the manufacture, possession, or use of armaments beyond those required for internal policing. These laws must be binding on individuals as well as on nations. At the same time a schedule for universal and complete disarmament must be adopted.
2. Grant the United Nations power to govern the high seas and outer space, as well as other carefully defined international jurisdictions.
3. Grant the United Nations authority to raise adequate and dependable revenue under carefully defined and limited taxing power.
4. Establish a system for enforcing world law through inspectors, civilian police, courts and an adequate armed peace force.
5. Establish a civilian executive branch of the UN, without the veto, responsible to the General Assembly for controlling the UN forces which will maintain law and order.
6. Provide a voting system on legislative matters more just and realistic than the present one-nation-one-vote formula in the General Assembly.
7. Provide for universal membership without right of secession.
8. Confer on an expanded UN judiciary the final authority to interpret world laws, including existing international law; to settle disputes between nations by peaceful means; to try all individuals accused of violating world laws governing disarmament and prohibiting aggression.
9. Provide a Bill of Rights protecting individuals against arbitrary or unjust action by the United Nations, and prohibiting UN interference with any rights or liberties guaranteed to citizens by their own national or state institutions.
10. Reserve to individual nations and their people all powers not expressly delegated to the United Nations, thus guaranteeing each nation complete freedom to manage its domestic affairs and to choose its own political, economic and social institution.

MORE IMMEDIATE STEPS TOWARD WORLD PEACE

1. All nations, including our own, should accept as binding the rulings of the International Court of Justice on disarmament, on interpretation of the UN Charter and laws, and on international treaties. UWF urges the repeal of the Connally Amendment as an essential U.S. move toward this goal.

2. While we are building world law, we must encourage channeling world problems through the UN. It must more and more be the means of mobilizing world public opinion and developing the feeling of world community.

3. The United Nations will develop by evolution as it copes with crises which come before it. We urge that such evolution advance the cause of world federal government within the scope of the UN Charter.

4. New approaches to world federation, whether by treaty or otherwise, may become desirable at any time. We must be alert to capitalize on such opportunities. It may be found more practical at first to achieve early stages of the plan without revision of the UN Charter. For instance, controlled disarmament might initially be directed by a special commission or new agency of the United Nations established for that purpose.

WE MUST KEEP OUR GOAL IN SIGHT

1. The structure of a just and secure world peace must be composed of many related elements. These elements are indivisible. Those who seek to separate them in order to achieve practical first steps may find that no one of them is obtainable in isolation from the rest. World-wide disarmament without a UN Police Force is unrealistic. A world police force not subject to world law is an invitation for tyranny. World law without the means for its enforcement will command neither respect nor compliance. Nations cannot be expected to renounce the use of force to protect their interests unless international courts are given authority to decide international disputes with justice by peaceful means.

2. United World Federalists will, therefore, support any immediate measures which reduce world tensions, but will continue to point out the need for a comprehensive approach to world government.

3. Serious and thoughtful preparation must precede any meaningful Charter Review Conference. Our own and other countries must study how to achieve the necessary changes with the least possible conflict. Careful thought must also be given to the effect of disarmament on national economies and to the most advantages world-wide use of the resources now wasted on armaments.

A WORLD-WIDE TASK

Since any world federation must be based on the free consent of the governed, all peoples must know the views and feelings of other peoples. It is imperative that we begin consultations to this end with the representatives of all other nations, both by direct contact and through the United Nations.

The World Association of World Federalists, with headquarters at The Hague, is already working to enlist public understanding and support on a world-wide scale. It has a Secretary General, an overall staff and active associated groups in 32 nations. UWF is one of its affiliates.

HERE WE STAND TOGETHER

Members of United World Federalists may not always agree on details and reserve the right, as free citizens, to support or reject specific steps. We are agreed, however, that a just and lasting peace requires a world federation with the limited powers necessary to maintain law and order on a world level.

HOW UWF WORKS

United World Federalists is a voluntary, nonpartisan organization supported by dues from many thousands of thoughtful Americans. With branches in every part of the country, it works locally through meetings, discussion groups and talks to build wider support for the concept of world federation.

UWF has national headquarters in Washington, D.C., from which a field staff and press department operate. Our Legislative Director is in constant touch with members of Congress, the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the White House staff. When any government decision is pending

which might affect our objectives, UWF alerts its members and swings into action with letter-writing campaigns, press briefings, statements before Congress and visits of UWF delegations. UWF maintains a permanent representative at the United Nations to report and interpret its proceedings to our members and to urge whatever attitudes and actions may promote the cause of world peace through world law.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much for your statement, Mr. Davis.

I want to say that I am sorry that your president, James Patton, couldn't be here today. I hope that the illness in his family is not serious.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. We will give him your message.

Senator CHURCH. And I wish you would convey to him my very best.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

Our next witness is Mr. Edward Lippert, of the Americans for Democratic Action.

Mr. Lippert?

STATEMENT OF EDWARD B. LIPPERT, FOREIGN POLICY SPECIALIST, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION

Mr. LIPPERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Edward B. Lippert. I am the foreign policy specialist for the national staff of Americans for Democratic Action. I appear representing Americans for Democratic Action whose national office is located at 1424 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. Although ADA is in general agreement concerning the matter stated, not everything included in my testimony should necessarily be construed as ADA policy.

ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION URGED

Let me say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, we strongly urge a full and complete adoption of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47. In today's world we are faced by a never-ending proliferation of national and transnational disputes. The focus in resolving such disturbances in the international system has consistently been on settling these disputes through traditional methods—arbitration, conciliation, mediation, and diplomacy. Certainly, the United Nations has been instrumental in keeping down inflammable situations.

The United Nations has been able to control these explosive situations through what may be termed peaceful perpetuation. In other words, there have not been any settlements obtained. Instead, pacification measures have been extended indefinitely; for example, U.N. peacekeeping force in the Mideast. Actual resolution of these disputes, where feasible, has been attempted. I believe it can be said this shows a weakness of the organization but certainly not the fact that it is not indispensable. The object clearly is to control violence through supervision until reconciliation is possible; that is, Kashmir. That particular situation has been virtually controlled, with minor outbreaks, but at least it has not assumed proportions that have led to major crisis.

The long-range feasibility of these peacekeeping missions, although leaving much to be desired, still has to be recognized as a very important instrument in leading this world to peace, stability, and order.

From the U.N. Charter it appears that the member states are unequivocally obligated to settle their disputes peacefully, while the U.N. is limited to settling disputes or situations which may lead to a breach of the peace.

ADMISSION OF RED CHINA RECOMMENDED

In regard to the universality of the U.N. it should be pointed out that there are various states which presently are not members, particularly China, and I should like to recommend that the United States once again reconsider the admission of Red China to the U.N. We strongly believe this would facilitate the reduction of tensions and improvement of the international environment.

The charter expressly limits the U.N.'s authority to disputes which are likely "to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." It is, therefore, clear that the role and functions of the United Nations in the settlement of disputes doesn't cover all disputes between states.

REGIONAL GROUPINGS

Consequently, as an alternative to international organizations but one that should be considered also complementary, we believe, the establishment of regional groupings which frequently have formed permanent institutional frameworks should be facilitated.

These arrangements seem to be flourishing in a world aggravated by national intransigence and may very well be able to fill the gaps where the U.N. cannot, or for some other reason will not, intercede.

There is a strong desire to discuss and resolve disputes within a group of states who mutually feel some "greater common interest." The concept of regional organizations is far from being new. One may simply recall Thucydides urging for "mutual security groupings," concerning the Greek situation.

Since 1945 and more contemporary there has been a large growth in the number of regional organizations. Both the United States and Soviet Union have resorted to intrabloc mechanisms to remove or lessen tensions. This shouldn't necessarily be interpreted to mean that such groupings are flouting the U.N. Instead, regional institutions represent a method in which to bring about settlement without subjecting members of the bloc in question to interference of other blocs. Although the resolution of disputes by regional institutions is not unhealthy, we should not lose sight of the fact that when great powers use that device it is frequently to maintain their dominance and power over a particular area. This is a very real factor which a number of states must confront, particularly the less developed areas; for example, Africa.

In Africa there is an increasing awareness that such regional groupings may not only facilitate the resolution of disputes, but also remove the controversy from great power influence. This development should be strongly encouraged especially in light of the great powers' tendency to exploit crises for their own benefit.

Furthermore, the U.N. Charter itself emphasizes the resort to regional groupings before submitting disputes to the U.N. article 33, paragraph 1.

REFUSAL OF SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT

Another unresolved problem for the U.N. has been the refusal of the Security Council to act under all circumstances that require it to do so, that is, the Palestine question. Under these conditions, the question clearly comes to mind whether the General Assembly may take the necessary action if the Security Council fails to. According to the late Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold only the Security Council has the authority to order the use of forces. If we accept this rather parochial viewpoint, although it may be very realistic, it means that if one member of the Security Council desires to abdicate its responsibility to preserve peace and order, the U.N., in effect, can be paralyzed. We believe such centralized authority severely circumscribes the beneficial role that the United Nations should play. It is time that we limit the paralyzing effects of great power rivalries and authorize the General Assembly to dispatch peacekeeping forces when the Security Council is prevented from doing so.

U.N. PEACE OBSERVATION CORPS

Throughout my discussion the focus has been on the reduction of tension through traditional means of diplomacy. What is noted is that we have been dealing with a dispute after it is an accomplished fact, and how to turn the situation back to its nondisruptive stage. I believe that equal if not more attention should be paid to developing mechanisms that can be used, such as the creation of a U.N. Peace Observation Corps, before a dispute ever reaches the point of breaking out.

I think under such circumstances possibly the evolution of the dispute would be much more controlled.

We should concentrate on developing communication and command control centers which can intercede before disputes reach dangerous levels.

Moreover, if we direct our energies at fractionalizing conflict, conceivably some crises may be avoided. By fractionalizing a dispute the emphasis is placed on issue control as opposed to arms control. The object is to break down the dispute into fragments thereby making each part of the dispute manageable and obtainable.

This method has recently been applied, I believe, in British Honduras.

Where parties to a dispute often are unyielding on the general issue they may give in on one point in order to gain another, and, consequently, it is believed that the ultimate issue at dispute may be thereby brought down to negotiable terms.

In support of this idea ADA urges the United States to propose the institution of a permanent body of professional mediators to assist the Secretary General in the resolution of disputes.

Thank you very much for your consideration, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Lippert.

I take it that the ADA does endorse the resolution under consideration by the committee.

Mr. LIPPERT. Absolutely, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Fine.

Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. LIPPERT. You are welcome.

Senator CHURCH. The next witness is Mr. W. B. Hicks, Jr., of the Liberty Lobby. Mr. Hicks.

STATEMENT OF W. B. HICKS, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, LIBERTY LOBBY; ACCOMPANIED BY MICHAEL JAFFE, GENERAL COUNSEL

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I have with me today, Michael Jaffe, our general counsel.

Mr. Chairman, I am W. B. Hicks, Jr., executive secretary of the Liberty Lobby. I appear today to present the views of Liberty Lobby's 12,000-member board of policy, on behalf of the nearly 200,000 subscribers to our monthly legislative report, Liberty Letter.

ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION OPPOSED

Liberty Lobby opposes adoption of this resolution. We strongly oppose the entire concept of a supranational military force as a threat to American national independence. Such a force would be highly detrimental to the national security of the United States. We also believe that, in view of the alarming record of irresponsibility and failure which the United Nations has compiled over the course of its 23-year history, it would be dangerous to put the Congress of the United States on record as encouraging that body to undertake further military adventures.

Since 1946, American taxpayers have invested more than \$3 billion in the United Nations. We will not now go into the full record of the U.N.'s activities in opposition to the best interests of the United States, for such a presentation would take weeks. Rather, we will confine ourselves to the U.N. record in "peacekeeping operations," which record has varied from fumbling futility to naked aggression.

U.N. RECORD IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The resolution under consideration today advocates that the United States "be prepared to make available to the United Nations transport, communications, the logistical personnel and facilities" (Sec. (a) (2)). It should be recalled that in the U.N.'s war in the Congo, the largest U.N. "peacekeeping operation" to date, the United States did in fact provide the bulk of logistical support. From 1960 to 1964, the U.S. Department of Defense airlifted 43,303 U.N. troops into the Congo, and 31,093 out. Our Government also sealifted 20,352 U.N. troops into the Congo and 23,343 out.

The Congo operation, described by columnist Arthur Krock as "the bloody war to suppress the establishment of Katanga as a separate state," was not a "peacekeeping operation," but rather, was a large-scale warmaking adventure. For nearly 3 years, the United Nations Force in the Congo exceeded 15,000 men, and at its height in 1962, totaled almost 20,000 men. All told, over 93,000 U.N. troops served in

the Congo from 1960 through 1964. The total cost of the operation was \$402 million, of which the United States supplied \$168.2 million (figures supplied by the Brookings Institution). It should be emphasized that this U.S. contribution does not include the American foreign aid money used by many nations as their U.N. "contribution."

Therefore, the Congo operation should be carefully studied by this committee before it encourages a repeat performance elsewhere. In the Congo, American involvement was limited to political and logistical support of the U.N. invasion. We might not always be so fortunate. None of our personnel in the Congo were captured or killed by the forces opposing the U.N. Can any members of the committee say that this will always be the case? Members of this committee have publicly questioned the manner in which the United States became involved in the Vietnamese war. What if our participation—no matter how limited in scope—in a future U.N. war should result in the death or capture of American logistical support troops?

Future Congos can easily see such involvement escalate into full scale combat operations by Americans. And such operations would not necessarily be under the command of American officers. The commitment of American troops to a U.N. army could well cause Americans, enlisted or drafted to serve their country, to be forced to fight in a war unsanctioned by Congress, under the command of foreign officers, who, judging by the Congo experience, may well be incompetent, barbarian, or Communist inclined.

United Nations forces were sent to the Congo starting in July 1960, by authority of a resolution of the U.N. Security Council. Once in the Congo, they functioned not as an impartial "police force," but as an army dedicated to the destruction of anti-Communist Katanga. They finally succeeded in subduing Katanga by the end of 1962, and restored control of that once prosperous province to the Communist-dominated central government of the Congo. To add insult to injury, the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc nations refused to pay their share of UN "peacekeeping expenses," and the United States had to make up the difference.

ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY U.N. TROOPS CLAIMED

The frequent and blatant atrocities committed by Indian and African U.N. troops during the Congo operations should forever lay to rest the cynical description of the United Nations as "the last hope for a peaceful world." During "Operation Morthar"—named by the peaceful U.N. for the Hindu word for "smash"—in late 1961, U.N. forces seized control of the largest and most modern hospital in Elisabethville, Katanga's capital, for use as U.N. headquarters. It was destroyed to such an extent that it was impossible to reconvert it to hospital use. On December 6, 1961, another hospital was subjected to a U.N. mortar bombardment. Even though 22 mortar bombs fell in the hospital enclosure, the U.N. command insisted that the attack was a mistake. One week later, the same hospital was again attacked, and the remaining undamaged portion of it was destroyed. There are other cases of U.N. attacks on hospitals, in clear violation of the Geneva Convention. Numerous cases of murder, rape, and wholesale looting by undisciplined U.N. troops are on record.

Again in December 1962, during the operation which finally subjugated Katanga, the violent nature of the supposedly "peace-loving" United Nations was demonstrated. The city of Elisabethville was sacked before opposition to the U.N. was finally subdued.

Civilians, both white and black, were wantonly beaten and killed. Time—January 4, 1963—described the scene of a once peaceful area under U.N. attack as follows:

The sound of Christmas in Katanga was the thunk of mortar shells and the rattle of machineguns * * * Blue helmeted U.N. soldiers swarmed through Elisabethville, seized roadblocks on the highways. Swedish U.N. jets swooped low over Katanga's airfield at Kolwezi, destroying four planes on the ground and setting oil tanks ablaze.

U.N. officers from pro-Communist African countries such as Ghana freely disseminated Communist propaganda to the Congolese. A prominent American Negro reporter, Philippa Schuyler, reported that:

Some African U.N. officers I interviewed surprised me by revealing they spoke Russian, had visited Russia, and were openly sympathetic to the Red cause. "The U.N. opens the doors to communism," was a comment I heard all over the Congo.

GETTING THE U.S. MORE INVOLVED ALLEGED

Shocking as the U.N.'s violent and aggressive "peacekeeping" tactics in the Congo proved to be, the majority of member nations of the U.N. are anxious to get the United States even more deeply involved in a far more costly and bloody military adventure. The Afro-Asian-Communist bloc which dominates the U.N. wants to destroy the anti-Communist and pro-American nations of southern Africa at all costs, including that of full-scale military action.

Recent U.N. resolution on the subjects of Rhodesia and South-West Africa demonstrate this. The recent terrorist intrusions into Rhodesia are seen as being designed to create a pretext for the deployment of a Congo-type peacekeeping force in that country, which the Communists and their allies hope will lead to a full-scale military invasion of southern Africa. A blueprint for such an invasion was prepared by the strangely named Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1965.

Most members of this committee, regardless of their present feeling on the conduct of the war in Vietnam, have deplored the manner in which the United States seems to have drifted into its present position in Vietnam, without considering the consequences of our earlier actions there. It would therefore be well to consider that adoption of this resolution, encouraging the United Nations in its military ambitions, may well be an important step in a drift toward American involvement in a full-scale war in southern Africa.

U.N. FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

While U.N. military operations in Africa have been marked by aggression and wanton bloodshed, U.N. attempts at peacekeeping in other parts of the world have been ineffective. The U.N. force in the middle East, supposedly designed to preserve peace in that area, left quickly and quietly at the first indication of trouble. All they suc-

ceeded in doing during their 11-year stay was to eat up a large amount of the American taxpayers' hard-earned money.

Similarly, the U.N. force stationed on Cyprus did nothing to preserve the peace. War between Greece and Turkey was imminent in spite of the presence of U.N. troops, and only the success of conventional diplomacy averted such a war.

INDEPENDENT U.N. MILITARY FORCE

The dangers inherent in section (b) of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, looking "toward the creation of a permanent, individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties," appear to speak for themselves.

To give the United Nations the power, and the funds, to create its own military forces, responsible to the citizens of no nation, would be a highly dangerous first step toward the establishment of a new tyranny in the world.

In the final analysis, sovereignty depends on the power of a nation to defend its own independence. As the United Nations is granted independent military force, and as this force grows in relation to that of the nations which are its members, it will inevitably take on more and more of the attributes of a sovereign world government. At some point in the process, this development will become irreversible. At such a point, the United States will have lost its sovereignty as a nation and the American people would have lost their citizenship—our possession of which has made us the envy of the world.

We suggest that those who honestly favor the subordination of American national independence to an all-powerful world government do so openly, rather than hiding their plans under the guise of "impartial peacekeeping duties."

In conclusion, Liberty Lobby suggests that this resolution, and the entire concept of United Nations "peacekeeping activities" has nothing to do with peace. It merely contemplates a different kind of war, to be fought under the flag of the United Nations rather than that of the United States. Unless it is to be contended that "war" is magically turned into "peace" by the invocation of the name of the United Nations, we suggest that all Americans who place a high priority on peace should join us in opposing this resolution.

Thank you.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Hicks, for your testimony this afternoon.

Our last witness is Mr. Vernon L. Ferwerda of the United Church of Christ.

STATEMENT OF VERNON L. FERWERDA, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, COUNCIL FOR CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ACTION, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST

Mr. FERWERDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Vernon L. Ferwerda. I appear here on behalf of the Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ. I am chairman of the International Relations Committee of the Council which is an official agency of the denomination, consisting of 27 men and women elected by the General Synod.

The United Church of Christ was formed in 1957 as a result of the merger of the Congregational Christian Churches and the Evangelical and Reform Church. Its total membership is over 2 million persons.

I cannot presume to speak for our churches as a whole, or for every one of its members. I do, however, reflect policies and positions formally voted by our General Synod, which consists of elected delegates from our conferences and churches in every one of the 50 States. The Council for Christian Social Action, moreover, is charged with responsibility for carrying out positions taken by our General Synod.

As members of the worldwide community of Christians, the United Church of Christ and its predecessor churches have from the beginning supported the United Nations, and called for its strengthening to better carry out the immense responsibilities assigned to it by the member states in the United Nations Charter. Our General Synod in 1961, for example, noted that "the United Nations is the symbol and the central instrument of a community of interest and service that includes all mankind," and further urged that "the member nations should in every possible way and area make the United Nations the chief instrument of concerting and executing international policies."

FAVORABLE ACTION ON RESOLUTION URGED

This is why we wish to congratulate those Senators who have sponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, and to urge that the Senate act favorably on this resolution before the end of the current session. We sense that the main purpose of the resolution is to put Congress on record in favor of renewed U.S. leadership in developing the peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities of the United Nations.

The United Nations has learned that it can count on the United States to come to its assistance when the international organization becomes seized of a situation where international peace has been disrupted. After the United Nations agencies have debated the problem, and voted to undertake peacekeeping operations, the world has come to expect the United States to do its share, and it has not been disappointed. The record of the United States in following the decisions of the United Nations with concrete action is a good one.

But in today's dangerous world this is not enough. The United States should lead, not follow, the United Nations as it grapples with situations endangering to engulf the world in wider conflict. Nearly two decades ago the United States did in fact lead the United Nations in the search for more adequate international means to restore the peace. In 1950 the United States introduced the Uniting for Peace resolution, which as passed by the General Assembly incorporated our call for the member states of the organization to earmark some of their forces in advance for United Nations peacekeeping.

Many of us know how much disappointment there has been in the United Nations over the fact that the United States, originator of the idea of earmarked forces ready for United Nations use, has never seen fit to actually declare to the United Nations its readiness to provide such earmarked forces. We have steadfastly refused to follow our good words at the United Nations with the good works that can give to the United Nations the strength it needs in today's world.

Time is the element of greatest importance in dealing with situations where armed conflict has broken out. The United Nations has not al-

ways lived up to the hopes of the world in swiftly concluding its debate and deciding upon the steps which must be taken to restore the peace. But with some American leadership the United Nations decisionmaking machinery has had some improvement. Most notably this has been true in the American-sponsored provision for immediate convening of the General Assembly when the Security Council has proved itself unable to act with reference to the crisis at hand.

What still needs to be done is to provide the United Nations with the forces and facilities in advance of any specific conflict so that additional precious time is not lost in dealing with the conflict once the United Nations decisions have been made. As noted in the resolution now before this subcommittee, this would involve not only the earmarking but also the specialized training of forces to be used in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The experience of the United Nations in the past two decades demonstrates the wisdom of the provision of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 in calling for U.S. willingness to pledge in advance "to make available to the United Nations transport, communications, and logistical personnel and facilities." This we have done but only after the United Nations has put together the peacekeeping force to deal with the conflict. Prior U.S. involvement in planning for such operations would help ascertain that American support forces were positioned and trained for most effective use.

U.S. LEADERSHIP IN DEVELOPING GUIDELINES WELCOMED

We welcome also the resolution's call for U.S. leadership in the development of guidelines to govern concomitant machinery for peacemaking where peacekeeping forces are in use. Important as is the development of forces for peacekeeping, the United Nations needs even more urgently new U.S. leadership in finding an end to the many crisis situations which periodically disrupt the peace, and make necessary expensive peacekeeping operations. Perhaps it is too much to hope that in our lifetime the world will see an end to those problems in Cyprus, the Middle East, Kashmir, and elsewhere, that annually have placed so great a strain upon the limited resources of the United Nations. But peacemaking must be begun. Perhaps the only way to bring peace to troubled Cyprus is through a massive movement of peoples within the island, or even to other places.

But this is where new leadership must be given by the United States, in pressing the United Nations members to accompany their votes for peacekeeping forces with more adequate machinery to finally make the peace in the given situation. Certainly there are those in the private sector who would respond with enthusiasm, and imagination, to a call from the U.S. Government for ideas and proposals on peacemaking in the world's troubled spots.

PERMANENT, INDIVIDUALLY RECRUITED FORCE SUPPORTED

Finally, we wish to pledge our support for the resolution's call to the U.S. Government to "encourage and support the creation of a permanent, individually recruited force under United Nations command for impartial peacekeeping duties." The same widespread sup-

port which first greeted the proposals for a Peace Corps, for youth service to those in need of assistance in all parts of the world, could be expected for imaginatively framed proposals to give U.S. citizens an opportunity to put on a United Nations uniform to help the international organization keep the peace in troubled spots. One can hope that the troubled Middle East might soon be ready for a truly international force, to keep the peace in positions on both sides of the Israeli-Arab frontiers, subject to the authority of United Nations commanders trained to represent the broad objectives of the world community, and not subject to untimely recall at the dictates of a national state. U.S. leadership is needed in developing without further delay, plans for such a force, and in bringing it into being.

U.N. SHOULD BE MADE MORE EFFECTIVE

We live at a dangerous time, in a dangerous world. The United Church of Christ believe that the United Nations should be moved to the center of the world, rather than used when convenient by the member states. In a resolution addressed to its 2 million members, our General Synod in 1965 asked us all to "encourage and support our Government in helping to find ways to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for making peace and for settling international disputes." This request arose from convictions expressed by our Synod in these words with which I close:

We can be clear in our own minds that the maintenance of world peace and order demands an international organization to assist the nations in dealing with disputes between them and to represent the common interest in situations that threaten the peace of the world. Here there should be no wavering. In our closely interdependent world, and with the possibility that any war may escalate to nuclear disaster, we dare not leave the question of peace or war to the unrestricted will and power of single nations. The sovereignty of nations must yield to the sovereign good of humanity.

Thank you.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Ferwerda, for your statement on the position of the United Church of Christ. We appreciate having it.

That concludes the witnesses. However, the hearing record will be held open temporarily at the request of Senator Clark in the hope that it may be possible for the subcommittee to hear Mr. George Ball and former Ambassador Goldberg.

I also want to insert in the record some communications we have received from the Friends Peace Committee, the Minnesota Branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the Church Women United, and other organizations.

(The communications referred to follow:)

FRIENDS PEACE COMMITTEE,
Philadelphia, Pa., April 4, 1968.

HON. JOSEPH S. CLARK,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CLARK: In connection with the current hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, which you submitted on October 10, 1967, I am sure that you have the support of every member of Friends Peace Committee, and also of the vast majority of Quakers, for we are looking toward its thorough consideration and early adoption by the Congress.

It would indeed be a wonderful thing if this expression of policy could be adopted before the next President takes office, so he may be guided accordingly during his term.

Even though the United Nations Charter or other compact may limit the use of U.N. peacekeeping forces to situations where external aggression or external support of disorder are involved, it would seem that some language to this effect might be included in the Resolution. It is conceivable that there be a temptation to use U.N. forces to settle internal disputes, a practice quite as likely to smack of oppression as to promote social justice.

Sincerely,

F. MILES DAY, *Policy Committee.*

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM,
Minneapolis, Minn.

Re resolution on U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: The Minnesota Branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, at its Annual Meeting, April 20, 1968, expresses gratitude regarding the dozens of resolutions offered by members of both houses of congress proposing a permanent U.N. Peacekeeping Force. Included among the authors is Congressman Donald Fraser and Senator Walter Mondale is listed among sponsors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 authored by Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania.

Whereas the Senate Resolution not only recognizes the need for suitable United Nations forces for purposes of observation and patrol, in situations threatening international peace, but also urges the U.S. Government be prepared to advocate or support . . . proposals for guidelines to govern the financing, training, etc. of peacekeeping and peacemaking.

We therefore, in keeping with our Peace League's long dedication to both peacekeeping and peacemaking, respectfully ask to offer some guidelines and implore the author and sponsors of S. Con. Res. 47 to give thoughtful consideration to the following proposals by way of amendments or additions to their concurrent resolution:

1. Begin immediate exploration of available resources which can or may provide revenue for the United Nations, with special concentration directed to such natural resources as the wealth in the world's sea-bed and ocean floor; this to be followed with appropriate legal action to claim and affirm this wealth for the United Nations; and from the income made available, specific funds be allocated for U.N. Peacekeeping and Peacemaking functions.

(a) We urge serious study be given to Malta's August 1967 recommendation to the U.N. General Assembly, calling for a treaty to assure the wealth of the sea-bed and ocean floor be safe-guarded for the welfare and interests of mankind.

(b) We also call attention to the proposal of Emily Green Balch, one of our Peace League's founders, who as early as 1942 called for the internationalization of all waterways.

2. Strengthen and augment the United Nations' present peacekeeping and peacemaking role on the non-military level by providing intensive training of men and women (to be sent to troubled areas) in the languages, history, education, culture, government, religions, industries and mores of given geographical areas. We firmly believe peacemakers should be sent to disturbed areas before turbulence begins rather than after and must therefore also be highly skilled in the techniques of mediation, negotiation, diplomacy, international law and protocol.

Whereas the role and need for the military peace-keeping force is recognized and emphasized in most nations, including our own, we believe today's continuing turmoil at home and abroad, in spite of military might, calls for the accelerated implementation and recognition of the great potential, which lies pregnant within the non-military role and skills of peacemakers—a fact which has been eluded or subordinated to the detriment of world peace, cooperation and understanding.

We conclude with the earnest hope already expressed, that the author and sponsors of S. Con. Res. 47, give their careful, concerned consideration to our proposals, to augment the effectiveness and implementation of their own good resolution.

Respectfully submitted,

VIENA HENDRICKSON
(For WILPF Annual Meeting, Minnesota Branch.)

(The identical letter was sent to Sen. Clark.)

CHURCH WOMEN UNITED,
New York, N.Y., April 1, 1968.

HON. JOSEPH S. CLARK,
*U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR CLARK: The Executive Committee of Church Women United believes the adoption of S. Con. Res. 47 by the U.S. Senate and the House would give authority to U.S. Delegates to the United Nations to play a positive role in strengthening U.N. peacekeeping machinery. Support by the U.S. for more effective arrangements could give impetus to the reexamination by the member nations of procedures now available and stir fresh thinking which could give to the United Nations the capacity so sorely needed in this critical period to act firmly and creatively to prevent armed conflict and to become a major instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. The general sense and objectives of this are approved and it is hoped that the resolution will be reported out favorably by the Subcommittee on International Organizations and adopted by the Senate and the House as a step toward the establishment of international structures necessary for order and peace in a world of revolutionary change.

The above statement was sent to the Honorable Frank Church, Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations, by night letter on March 30. Please make this statement a part of the record of the hearings.

Sincerely yours,

DOROTHY DOLBEY,
Mrs. James M. Dolbey, President.
MARGARET SHANNON,
Miss Margaret Shannon, Director.

(The identical letter was sent to Senators Fulbright and Case and requested to be inserted by these Senators.)

UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS, INC.,
AFFILIATED WITH THE WORLD ASSOCIATION OF WORLD FEDERALISTS,
BALTIMORE AREA COUNCIL,
Baltimore, Md., April 26, 1968.

HON. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: Now that the United States has been given a second chance to assume leadership toward an effective international organization with powers adequate to assure world peace through legal means, we must exert every possible effort to make the maximum possible use of this opportunity.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 represents an important forward stride by the United States in its role of political and moral leadership among the nations of the world. If our Congress fails to give serious and affirmative consideration to these proposals, we cannot help but be confronted with suspicion and distrust by our allies as well as our enemies. If we support this resolution, we will have, at least, gone on record as evidencing our willingness to do our share toward realizing the dream of the founders of the United Nations. Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 is a meaningful, positive first step toward a peaceful world. It should rank, along with the resolutions of immediate crises, as a prime objective of American foreign policy.

On behalf of the membership of United World Federalists, Baltimore Area Council, I urge that this letter be included among the records of the hearings of your subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

CONSTANCE K. PUTZEL, *Chairman.*

CORVALLIS, OREG., April 25, 1968.

HON. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: We favor the passage of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.

It is our conviction that neither our nor any other nation or group of allied nations has proved itself capable of keeping the peace. The world has become so small that only the United Nations can be a satisfactory peace-keeper under world law.

Please include this letter in the record of the hearings.

Yours sincerely,

F. H. SUMNER,
JESSIE M. SUMNER.

PAN AMERICAN UNION,
Washington, D.C., April 30, 1968.

HON. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: I beg to report my strong support for Concurrent Resolution 47 which comes before your Committee on May 1-2.

For the past twenty years or more I have done all in my power, by debate and technical articles, to strengthen the United Nations, and I am strongly convinced that it holds the chief hope of international peace. Your resolution will meet one of the chief weaknesses of the United Nations, the absence of a permanent peace-keeping force to meet emergencies as they arise. Prompt action may in many cases prevent minor controversies from developing into open conflict.

The United States must take the lead in constructive plans to enable the United Nations to live up to its high principles for the maintenance of international law and order.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES G. FENWICK,
Consultant, Department of Legal Affairs, Pan American Union.

P.S. Please be so good as to include this letter in the record of the hearings.

THEODORE R. MCKELDIN,
Baltimore, Md., April 29, 1968.

HON. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: Between my terms as Governor of Maryland and Mayor of Baltimore, I had the privilege of serving as President of the United Nations Association of Maryland, and as a result of that experience have a greater understanding of the United Nations, a greater appreciation for its accomplishments, and a greater loyalty to it as an organization we must support with all our intelligence, as well as all our energy.

I am writing this letter to urge strongly that the subcommittee report favorably on Senate Concurrent Resolution 47. While we concern ourselves with military strength, and defense, we must not overlook the one bright spot on the international horizon—that great organization of the nations—friendly nations and potential foes—the United Nations. The fact that it has been unable to keep the peace in its present form, is reason not to abandon it, but to strengthen it.

I request and urge that this letter be included among the records of the hearings of your subcommittee.

Sincerely,

THEODORE R. MCKELDIN.

THE ROUSE CO.,
April 30, 1968.

HON. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 is a significant step on the part of the United States Government to the nations of the world that we are paying not only lip service to "peace", but that we are willing to take an affirmative step in that direction.

I strongly urge that the subcommittee report favorably on Sen. Con. Res. 47 and that this letter be included among the records of the hearings.

Sincerely,

JAMES W. ROUSE.

ONE VILLAGE SQUARE,
THE VILLAGE OF CROSS KEYS,
April 29, 1968.

HON. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

SENATOR CHURCH: As a long term advocate of a more vigorous role by this country in the cause of world peace, I am strongly in favor of Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 47. More than at any time in history it is important for the United States to demonstrate by unequivocal action its support of machinery for world peace. As a leading world power, it is incumbent upon us to take responsibility for leadership in this area. I strongly urge that your Subcommittee report favorably on Resolution 47.

I would further urge that this letter be included among the records of the hearings of the Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

ALBERT KEIDEL, JR.

EUGENE H. SCHREIBER,
Baltimore, Md., April 29, 1968.

HON. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: I understand that the Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs has scheduled hearings for May 1 and 2 on Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.

It is especially important at this time, when the United States is making serious efforts to end the war in Vietnam, for Congress to take a strong stand in support of U.N. peacekeeping. Many of us feel that the greatest mistake made by the United States in Vietnam was the unilateral nature of its actions. Hopefully, that chapter may be brought to a close without nuclear disaster.

However, we dare not continue to take such risks. If we have learned anything from this bitter lesson, it should be that peacekeeping must be a collective function, one that is too serious and too volatile to be left in the hands of individual nations. It is a function ideally suited to the concept of the United Nations, but if that organization is to undertake effectively the role of peacekeeper, its organization and ability must be brought up to the necessary standards. The least our government can do is to support such an endeavor.

It is requested that this letter be included in the record of the hearings of your Subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

EUGENE H. SCHREIBER.

SPRINGFIELD CHAPTER, UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS, INC.,
Springfield, Mass., April 28, 1968.

HON. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: At this time I am writing on behalf of the Board of Directors of the Springfield (Mass.) Chapter of United World Federalists to express our strong support for Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 pertaining to

UN peacekeeping abilities. As persons who are deeply concerned with the possibility of world peace under world law we believe that strengthened peacekeeping facilities of the UN are essential and hope for the establishment of a permanent UN peace force.

Particularly in view of the likelihood of further disturbances in the Middle East as well as the possible occurrence of other Southeast Asian situations like that in Vietnam it would seem most important to have a peace force and plans for operation in such crises *prepared in advance*, rather than taking hasty measures at short notice. We are convinced that if the world is ever to know real peace it must be on the basis of some such multilateral action as might be achieved through a strengthened UN and a UN peacekeeping force rather than through unilateral action.

If possible we should appreciate having this letter included in the record of the hearings on Sen. Con. Res. 47 about to be held.

Respectfully yours,

MARY W. KILLAM, *Corresponding Secretary.*

PATTERNS FOR PEACEMAKING

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WOMEN-UNITED STATES RESOLUTION

Reminded daily of the many and varied kinds of continuing threats to peace. Aware of the inadequacies in present procedures for settling international conflicts.

Cognizant of the need for the United Nations to respond rapidly to an international crisis.

Recognizing the urgent need to establish adequate and workable peacekeeping machinery under international sponsorship.

Acknowledging that ad hoc forces are often inadequately trained, ineffective, inefficient and economically wasteful.

Applauding, nevertheless, the actions taken or contemplated by many countries including Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iran, Italy, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom in pioneering in the designation of national military contingents for use in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

And because the National Council of Women of the United States has always welcomed the strengthening, expansion and improvement of peacekeeping machinery we, therefore, recommend that the International Council of Women suggest that the following be taken, within the United Nations structure, as positive steps towards these ends—

that nations be urged to designate national contingents of civilian police and armed forces with special training who can respond immediately to United Nations emergency appeals;

that United Nations peacekeeping operations (not undertaken under Chapter VII of the Charter) be assessed and that guidelines be developed for the proper and effective use of United Nations peace forces in the future;

that the Secretary-General's military staff be strengthened so that it is in a better position to advise the Secretary-General on the composition and conduct of peacekeeping operations and to produce in conjunction with member states, plans and training programs to ensure that peacekeeping missions can be put into effect quickly and be conducted efficiently and economically;

that a study by UNITAR of past United Nations peacekeeping experience be applauded and encouraged.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, FOURTEENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs.

I appreciate the opportunity to submit my views in support of Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.

First, let me say that I am proud that my fellow Pennsylvanian, the Honorable Joseph S. Clark, introduced this visionary Resolution. We Pennsylvanians like

to think of ourselves as forward-looking, progressive people, and Senator Clark's leadership in this and other legislative areas serves to confirm this.

Next, I applaud the Subcommittee for exploring this Resolution in this critical phase of the United Nations' history and during this period of evolution in the role of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in shaping our foreign policy.

Finally, I am personally proud and gratified that the Subcommittee has begun consideration of a Resolution of whose language I am co-author. We introduced the House counterparts to S. Con. Res. 47, H. Con. Res. 130 and 131, on February 8, 1967, after consultation with our Ambassador to the United Nations, the Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg.

To date, some 75 members of the House have introduced Resolutions identical to H. Con. Res. 130 and 131, or similar to them. We are hopeful that the leadership taken by this Subcommittee will result in hearings on our Resolutions before the House Foreign Affairs Committee or one of its Subcommittees in the near future.

I might add that H. Con. Res. 130, 131 and the other similar Resolutions introduced in the House during 1967 are outgrowths and refinements of our 1966 Resolutions (H. Con. Res. 689 and 690) calling for the creation of a permanent U.N. peacekeeping force and for the submission of positive proposals in this direction by American representatives in the 21st General Assembly. These resolutions gained the co-sponsorship of 81 House members of both parties.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that the Resolution you are now considering is of fundamental importance to the future of the United Nations, and more significantly, to its key contribution to international security—peacekeeping.

It is unquestionable that among the many useful and valuable services the U.N. has rendered, peacekeeping has become by far the most important.

Since 1945, the U.N. has authorized 13 significant peacekeeping operations. U.N. forces have either made or enforced peace in Kashmir, Cyprus, the Congo, Egypt and Israel, to name only a few trouble spots.

Now, the United Nations peacekeeping is heading for an era of new international responsibilities, and of new challenges to its effectiveness as an instrument of international law.

I would like to point to several developments that indicate both the need for and the challenge to U.N. peacekeeping:

1) Vietnam, clearly is the next big challenge for peacekeeping. Canada, already a key contributor of peacekeeping forces to the U.N., announced more than a year ago its plans to send troops to Vietnam for peacekeeping duty, if and when a settlement is reached.

2) Southern Africa poses still another possible need for capable U.N. peacekeeping forces in the future. The tense relations between white supremacist Rhodesia and her neighbors and the problem of South Africa's trusteeship over Southwest Africa could well result in situations in which U.N. peacekeeping forces could play a constructive role.

3) Rising tensions in the Middle East and the continuing confrontation between Israel and the Arab States have grave implications for the world. U.N. peacekeeping forces could be used in this area to handle disputes that would surely escalate if the United States or other nations intervened unilaterally.

In the face of these existing and potential challenges, U.N. peacekeeping machinery as it is now constituted is cumbersome, time-consuming and difficult. Secretary General U Thant now has to round up a new peacekeeping force each time a crisis erupts. Troops of neutral countries must be collected and trained in peacekeeping techniques before being committed and valuable time is lost.

U Thant's position is analogous to that of a local police chief who cannot send his own men to riot area, but must enlist men from other forces, train them, and belatedly send them into action.

In view of the swiftness with which events move in the world, this procedure is clearly inadequate.

There has been some progress over the years in streamlining the management, preparation and financing of peacekeeping operations, but this progress has been painfully slow.

Strengthening of the mechanism for peacekeeping has been continually sidetracked by larger disputes over which branch, the General Assembly or the Security Council, can authorize peacekeeping operations; over financing; over the degree of control member nations retain when their military personnel are involved in U.N. operations.

And realistically, I think we must assume that these larger barriers to effective U.N. peacekeeping will not soon be overcome.

However, I am convinced that further progress can and should be made. I would like to cite for the Subcommittee some developments that lead me to this conclusion.

First, a foundation for more effective peacekeeping already exists. Sixteen foreign nations either provide troops for current U.N. operations or have earmarked units for future peacekeeping assignments.

Second, there is a huge reservoir of military personnel around the world with direct peacekeeping experience. During the ten-year life of the 3400-man United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip, its troops were rotated completely every six months. Canada has redesigned its armed forces chiefly for peacekeeping purposes, and Scandinavian troops are routinely trained in peacekeeping techniques.

Third, I think it should be remembered that U.N. peacekeeping operations to date have been very much in the interest of the United States.

For example, if the U.N. had not intervened in 1964 to prevent a clash between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, the United States might now be directly involved there for the sake of protecting its own bases and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean for its allies.

Fourth, the Congress has already expressed its interest in more effective peacekeeping through Section 304 of last year's foreign aid bill. This section reads as follows:

"Sec. 304. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING.—It is the sense of the Congress that the cause of international order and peace can be enhanced by the establishment, within the United Nations Organization, of improved arrangements for standby forces being maintained by United Nations members for United Nations peacekeeping purposes in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The President is therefore requested to explore through the United States Representative to the United Nations, and in cooperation with other members of the United Nations and the United Nations Secretariat, both the means and the prospects of establishing such peacekeeping arrangements. The President shall submit to the Congress, not later than March 31, 1968, a report upon the outcome of his initiatives, together with such recommendations as he may deem appropriate."

I might add, parenthetically, that the President has submitted his report under this section, and that it is brief and undramatic in its summary of initiatives taken and its recommendations for action.

This section is significant, in that it embodies the first of the four steps recommended in the Resolution the Subcommittee is considering.

With these four developments as background, I would like to turn to the Resolution itself.

It is clear to me that the future of U.N. peacekeeping depends primarily on the United States and the Soviet Union. In recent years, the Soviet Union has taken a much more positive and pragmatic position on peacekeeping operations. The United States, however, while tacitly supporting U.N. peacekeeping operations, has given insufficient priority to taking advantage of the softening Soviet position by urging the strengthening of U.N. peacekeeping machinery.

This resolution offers a feasible, realistic framework for greater United States initiative in improving the peacemaking and peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. In my opinion, it is incumbent upon the United States, as the strongest of the U.N. member nations, to take the lead in this critical area of U.N. activity.

Briefly, the resolution proposes that the United States:

- (1) encourage the earmarking of troops by U.N. members other than the United States for possible duty on U.N. peacekeeping forces.
- (2) be prepared to make available for U.N. peacekeeping use American transport, communications and logistics units.
- (3) advocate and support proposals for guidelines to govern the financing, training and equipping of U.N. peacekeeping forces.
- (4) encourage and support the creation of a permanent, individually recruited U.N. peace force when the time is right.

The three steps proposed by the Resolution are either already being done or are clearly possible in the near future.

First, as I said earlier, 16 nations, including Canada and the Scandinavian countries, have either contributed forces to U.S. peacekeeping operations now in progress, or have earmarked peacekeeping-trained units for future U.N. assignment.

The resolution would put the United States explicitly in favor of this interim technique for improving the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping. Earmarking offers a way of speeding the formation of a peacekeeping force when a crisis erupts, even though it does not solve the inevitable problems of an *ad hoc* undertaking.

Second, the United States has furnished logistical, transport and communications personnel and equipment to past U.N. peacekeeping operations—the Congo Airlift, for example—and this kind of support has frequently been essential. The resolution would make it clear that pending the creation of a permanent U.N. force, the United States will furnish these sophisticated non-combatant units to assure the mobility, supply and inter-unit contact of U.N. peacekeeping forces.

The great advantages of our offering support units to U.N. operations are as follows: 1) these units are unavailable from most other U.N. member nations and hence are usually critical to the effectiveness of any peacekeeping operation; 2) furnishing non-combatant units allows the United States to escape the charge that it dominates U.N. peacekeeping operations. Too much U.S. participation, particularly by its combat units, might make other nations suspect the impartiality of U.N. peacekeeping and discourage their efforts to develop units for assignment to U.N. operations.

As for the third point, it is clear to me that the U.N. must develop guidelines and rules that can be applied quickly to the financing, equipping and training of peacekeeping forces, so that valuable time can be saved in fielding such forces. The United States should lend its considerable prestige to any efforts to clarify both the formation and the use of peacekeeping forces, and the resolution would give our representative in the U.N. a mandate for constructive support and advocacy of impartial guidelines and rules for peacekeeping.

By debating and hammering out rules and guidelines for *ad hoc* operations, the U.N. will be preparing itself for meaningful discussion of the fourth objective of this resolution—the creation of a permanent, individually recruited force under U.N. command for impartial peacekeeping duties.

You will note that the resolution describes the creation of such a force as a "part of the long-range development of the United Nations as a more effective instrument for building and keeping peace." I am very much aware that the international political climate today is not conducive to productive discussion of a world police force operating under international law.

But the fact remains that we will not have world order and peace merely by wishing for it. As the world's strongest, and, I believe, most benign and selfless nation, we should not only put ourselves on record in favor of a permanent peace permanently policed by a permanent international force, but also take positive action to bring about this objective.

I am sure the Subcommittee is aware that the House version of this resolution was enthusiastically endorsed by the State Department last July 31 in a letter from William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to the Honorable Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. I have been informed that this endorsement is still valid.

Mr. Macomber's letter hailed the House resolutions as "a constructive way of demonstrating Congressional and public support for a cardinal purpose of our participation in the U.N., namely to share equitably with other nations' responsibilities for keeping the peace." He continued:

"We agree with the principle that as part of the long-range development of the United Nations as a more effective instrument for building and keeping peace, the United States Government should encourage and support the creation, at such time as conditions warrant, of a permanent U.N. force."

Gentlemen, I believe that the Resolution under consideration provides an appropriate framework for American leadership in putting U.N. peacekeeping forces on a more permanent footing, and I urge the Subcommittee to approve it. For only if we give it our most ardent support will the United Nations be able to fulfill its stated purpose: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

Thank you again for permitting me to submit this statement.

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION CENTER OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS,
Paris, France, May 13, 1968.

Senator FRANK CHURCH,

Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: During a recent visit to Washington, I listened with great interest to a part of the public hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 47. Since the field of peace-keeping is one on which I have been spending full time over the past two years, it may be that your Subcommittee would be interested in the results of our efforts. I am accordingly enclosing herewith a copy of the final report on this endeavor. I feel that the Analysis and Recommendations sections of this report may be particularly pertinent as regards Senate Concurrent Resolution 47.

The International Information Center on Peace-Keeping Operations, which I direct under the auspices of the World Veterans Federation, was established in October 1966 with the encouragement of UN Secretary-General U Thant. It has received financial support or pledges from nineteen different countries and has been a modest, but we believe thorough, attempt to explore the possibility of international cooperation on this difficult subject in a nongovernmental framework. While we have had to conclude that there is an insufficient level of international interest to merit continuation of the Center, it is our hope that the lessons of our experience and the publications we have produced will be of value to those who wish to promote progress in this field.

Yours sincerely,

JAMES E. KNOTT, *Director.*

FINAL REPORT, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. An initiative, such as that of launching the International Information Center on Peace-Keeping Operations (IPKO), is inevitably one of exploration. That something needs to be done in this field of peace-keeping is obvious. That something could be accomplished on a private basis to meet this need appeared possible. There proved to be a sufficient degree of interest in this possibility to merit the exploration being undertaken. What was being explored was whether there was a sufficient feeling of urgency, and a sufficient level of interest and cooperation, to merit the continued existence of the Center and its activities.

2. We have with reluctance, but we believe also with realism, concluded that the basis for continuation does not exist. The Center began in October 1966. Based upon IPKO's recommendation, the Executive Board of the World Veterans Federation has agreed that the Center should be closed in June 1968. We are deeply grateful to those who have helped and who have made these twenty-one months of experience and exploration possible. We want them to understand as fully as possible the reasons for this decision. We also want to provide recommendations for further action which our experience would indicate have merit. Therefore, this report attempts to answer the following questions:

Why was the Center established? (Purpose.)

What has IPKO done and what have been the results? (Activities and results.)

What appears to be the significance of these results? (Analysis.)

What further action might be suggested? (Recommendations.)

3. The staff of IPKO has consisted of myself as Director, Dr. Albert Legault as Assistant Director, and Mrs. S. Penso as Secretary. In addition, we have benefited from the sponsorship and some of the supporting services of the World Veterans Federation. The views expressed in this report are, however, my own, and the report is written accordingly.

II. PURPOSE

1. The purpose of IPKO has been to see whether the potential existed for an improvement in the functioning of peace-keeping operations through a non-governmental cooperative effort among those with interest and experience in these operations. There has been no other international body which has had this function as its major purpose. We have been fortunate to have had the encouragement of Secretary-General U Thant for IPKO in "its successful development

as a means of increasing interest in and support for the work of keeping the peace." We also received endorsements from leading figures concerned with this field, many of whom joined the IPKO Advisory Committee.

2. The subject of peace-keeping has been one of long term interest to the World Veterans Federation. It is one very important line of development in a practical approach toward achieving a world at peace. The WVF therefore welcomed and joined its interest with an approach made to it by a group of Norwegians who had been working along the same lines. Plans were drawn up and approved by the WVF statutory bodies and funds were sought to launch the Center.

3. Within their necessarily limited objectives, peace-keeping operations have had a proven utility. This type of voluntary consent operation, which completely respects the sovereign will of the countries involved, is as far as the international community has found it possible to go in moving toward a system of international security. It has been, and remains, an extremely important facility for the international community to have at its disposal. In many instances, it is clearly the best means of meeting a threat to world peace: alternatives leave much to be desired. There have been eleven principal United Nations peace-keeping operations. Over fifty countries have participated in one or more of these operations. Tens of thousands of men have served the United Nations as participants in these forces and observer missions. Nine countries have made stand-by commitments to the United Nations to maintain men and units ready to serve in these operations, and other countries have indicated an interest in following their example. There are three on-going peace-keeping operations in the Middle East, in Cyprus, and in Kashmir.

4. It would appear illogical that the body of experience and degree of commitment indicated above would not result in an international effort to benefit from the lessons of the past in preparing at least for the present. If one makes the further assumption that there will be future additional occasions to turn to UN peace-keeping operations, the lack of such an effort is even more to be regretted. So far this has been blocked by the political controversy which surrounds this question on the inter-governmental level. In the absence of regularized arrangements, the United Nations has dealt with these demands on an ad hoc basis; the opposing sides on this question have been able to agree on the necessity for these operations on a case by case basis, and it would appear likely that they will reach such agreement on future crises. In view of this and the impasse on the diplomatic level, might it not be possible to bring about a cooperative action on the non-governmental level on the technical aspects of these operations which might be considered relatively non-controversial? This was the question to which IPKO devoted itself. It did this by proposing a service that it felt might be of interest to governments and also to the academic community. I would like to emphasize that point again—it did this by offering a service. It was not proposed that IPKO should be an instrument of propaganda or pressure.

5. During the course of its exploration as to whether there was sufficient interest in the service it could provide, IPKO was to collect documentation, issue publications, undertake and encourage research and liaison, and possibly hold one or more meetings. The continuation of IPKO was dependent upon the inter-related factors of demonstrated interest and finding additional funds to supplement the limited resources the WVF could make available.

III. ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS

1. *Document Collection.*—On such a specialized topic, there is not a vast amount of material publicly available. IPKO now possesses, however, one of the most extensive collections of publications and documents known to exist in this field. We have a large proportion of the unrestricted United Nations documentation on the subject but, of course, do not have, nor do we have access to, the large amount of relevant restricted UN records and documentation. In terms of governmental documentation, IPKO has had somewhat disappointing results. The type of information we were seeking is indicated by our questionnaires which are carried as Annexes A and B to this report. In most cases, these were discussed individually with the authorities in a position to know what documentation existed. In some cases, cooperation has been lacking, and in others, such material evidently does not exist. In many cases, however, documentation cannot be made available due to governmental classification procedures which IPKO

would fully wish to respect. For one reason or another, therefore, there are large amounts of material in such countries as Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia, which it has not been possible for IPKO to obtain. There are also, unfortunately, many cases where answers to our questionnaires were promised by national authorities but no results have been forthcoming.

2. Nevertheless, as stated, IPKO does possess a considerable amount of material, centralized in one place to facilitate research and answers to questions. IPKO has itself used its collection to good advantage; however, it is too soon to have expected many visits from scholars. So far, scholars from Japan, Norway, and the United States have used the library.

3. *Publications.*—IPKO has published the most comprehensive bibliography of material on peace-keeping operations which has appeared to date. Incorporated in this is a classification system of categories of material which in itself represents a contribution to the field. We have printed five Monographs and a Documentation Series consisting of 26 numbers (see Annex C). A second group of Monographs and Documentation is under preparation (see Annex D). Compliments on the material we have issued, as being of lasting value to the field, have been received from some of the leading experts on the subject. From August to November 1967, with the cooperation of some outstanding periodicals, 20,000 leaflets (Annex C) were distributed. In June 1967, a letter and the leaflet were sent to 3,000 selected individuals and institutions, followed by a second letter in December. The total of leaflets thus distributed was some 23,000. Among the materials we have produced, I believe it is a reasonable assumption that there would be at least one item of interest to anyone seriously concerned with the subject of peace-keeping operations. As of 1 April, there have only been 190 orders. It may be that orders will increase when and if reviews of the material appear in any of the 15 leading journals to which review copies of the publications have been sent. However, even though further and continuing orders may be expected, it appears evident that volume will not reach a level justifying a further publication effort beyond present commitments. Because the response to our leaflet distributions forms such a key element of our assessment of interest in IPKO, I attach the description of this distribution as Annex E.

4. *National and International Interviews.*—With international expert advice, twenty-five countries were selected for visits by myself. Such personal contact obviously represents a much more effective means of assessing interest (and collecting documents) than would be an attempt to do this by correspondence. It should further be added that these interviews were used to determine what areas of inquiry might be considered as most useful and realistic. The selection of these twenty-five countries was aimed at achieving geographical and political balance and was based upon national peace-keeping experience (see Annex F). In most cases, interviews were arranged with the assistance of WVF member associations. In addition to these selected countries, Swiss authorities were contacted and interviews were also held with United Nations officials, personnel of the UN operations in Gaza and Cyprus and with private international organizations. Former WVF Secretary General Norman Acton explored possible interest in Poland and the USSR on visits to those countries. Lt. Col. Björn Egge, a member of the IPKO Advisory Committee, has also explored this question in Moscow where he has been stationed. Lastly, I have also used the occasion of several international conferences to explain the purpose of IPKO and invite individual cooperation, in particular from citizens of Poland and Czechoslovakia—two countries which have been involved in non-UN peace-keeping operations. In all, I have held something over 300 individual interviews which included two Heads of State, five Ministers of Defense, three Foreign Ministers, two Deputy Foreign Ministers, and many other high officials and directors of research institutes.

5. In other words, IPKO has been given a fair hearing and, in most cases, has been heard by people who have the capability of making a decision on cooperation. In many instances, there was a very positive response to what IPKO was attempting to do. In other cases, the reaction was negative. The over-all conclusion based on the majority of these contacts, however, is that while a fairly general sympathy may exist for IPKO's objectives, the potential for cooperation and support is not at a level that would be needed for a really effective program.

6. *Advisory Committee.*—The nucleus of the IPKO Advisory Committee began with individuals who had been called together by the Norwegian group mentioned earlier and this was expanded to bring it to its present membership (see Annex G). IPKO has been greatly honored by the outstanding men who re-

sponded to the invitation to serve on this Committee and who have assisted us in many ways. A major event planned by IPKO had been the convening of its Advisory Committee in a conference at the end of its first year of operation. To our very great regret, a mutually convenient time could not be arranged, and subsequent financial difficulties forced a cancellation of these plans.

7. It must also be mentioned, however, that three further individuals who were eminently qualified to serve on this Committee and who indicated an interest in joining it, did not respond to our invitations to do so. Further additions to the Committee were considered and in some cases explored, but none were made. In part, this was due to the individual's own inability to serve or his disinterest, and in part, to the WVF's eventual decision not to proceed because of uncertainty as to the future of IPKO. Lastly, it is also true that some countries which promised to suggest candidates did not do so.

8. *Research Analysis.*—IPKO has conducted a comprehensive review of the problems of peace-keeping operations and of the research which has been done on these problems. It has been able to suggest specific topics for research which should be undertaken, and, in most cases, these suggestions remain valid. Monograph No. 5 by Dr. Legault is completely devoted to this analysis. The second series of Monographs is aimed at helping to meet some of the areas of research which have been identified. It would be too early to say whether or not IPKO's analysis has been used in planning new research projects elsewhere.

9. *Training Liaison.*—Training for peace-keeping now takes place in many countries, most particularly in those which have made a stand-by commitment. With the exception of the Nordic countries, there is a minimum of coordination between countries engaged in such training. In the course of my contacts, I have found that several countries would be willing in principle to have foreign observers or participants in their courses. I have passed this possible opportunity along to potentially interested countries with, I believe, useful if limited results. We also explored the possibility of sponsoring a project to assist in the production of coordinated training manuals. It was proposed that such a project could be conducted by one or more officers seconded to IPKO for that purpose. At least two countries have had such secondment under serious consideration. However, this project was not sufficiently advanced, when the time came for a decision on IPKO's continuation, for us to proceed with sufficient assurance that we could responsibly carry it through to completion. In the context of other considerations, we therefore regretfully felt obliged to cancel the proposal.

10. *Fund Raising.*—A very extensive fund-raising effort has been made for IPKO. An early grant of \$5,000 from the Government of Norway, subsequently granted a second time, was of great encouragement to our effort. However, in spite of other governmental approaches we have made, only Canada followed the Norwegian example, while we had considered it a reasonable expectation that at least some of the other stand-by countries would also help us. Although veterans associations have limited means, we are gratified that several found it possible to make special donations for IPKO. Based upon previously published reports of grants which appeared to indicate a possible interest in IPKO's field, we applied to some thirty foundations in the United States. In some cases, we were able to follow this with personal contacts. We also applied to fourteen German firms and foundations, to two British foundations and to a Danish foundation. On our behalf, several Japanese institutions were approached for possible support. In the end, contributions or pledges have been received from nineteen different countries (see Annex H).

11. In addition to our hopes for realizing income from sale of publications, other means of support were explored. Included in these were the possibilities of sponsorship subscription to publications and the underwriting of transportation costs to IPKO meetings. There was not, however, an encouraging response to these possibilities. Nevertheless, our fund-raising potential was not exhausted when we reached the point where we felt the effort should be discontinued in view of the unlikelihood of IPKO's continuation—an unlikelihood based not only on the difficulty of finding longer range support but also on the evaluation of insufficient international interest in the Center.

IV. ANALYSIS

What then lies behind the results recorded above; what would appear to be their significance? The answers I would propose can be grouped in three categories: 1) attitudes toward a non-governmental effort; 2) political attitudes toward peace-keeping; and 3) military attitudes toward peace-keeping.

A. Attitudes toward a nongovernmental effort

1. *Sponsorship, Concept, and Scope.*—Would more money, a longer time period, different auspices and direction, and a different approach have produced better results? Possibly, but I am inclined to the opinion that they would have been substantially the same. Every organizational mechanism, and every person, obviously has its or his shortcomings, but on balance I believe we have mounted as strong and as appropriate an effort as any alternative known to me would have produced—and no other organization was proposing such an activity. The World Veterans Federation has close working relationships with the United Nations, world-wide membership, past cases of cooperation with Eastern European countries on technical subjects, a reputation for objective treatment of controversial subjects, a record of support for pragmatic strengthening of the United Nations, a historical interest in peace-keeping operations and affiliate members who have served in these operations. Our aim was to try to achieve as wide a degree of participation as possible in the IPKO effort. Success in this would depend upon whether interest in non-official examination of these problems in fact already existed; an interest which would welcome the opportunity of cooperation on the least controversial aspects of the peace-keeping field. Such participation could not have been gained by a pressure campaign, nor would this have been appropriate for the WVF. As regards funds, we have been fortunate to have had an adequate amount to engage in a fairly extensive and thorough exploration. Further funds, which would have allowed a longer period of investigation and meetings, would have been desirable, but, again, I doubt if this would have led to substantially different results.

2. *Governmental Cooperation in a Non-Governmental Framework.*—There are, of course, many instances of governments and governmental figures participating in the activities of non-governmental organizations. However, this is not a normal state of affairs—the preference and habit is definitely on the side of formal inter-governmental consultation with its agreed discipline and procedure. Further, the controversial nature of the peace-keeping field cannot help but reinforce a hesitation of governments or individuals as regards involvement of the “serving soldier”—or, for that matter, the “serving civilian”—in such a proposed non-governmental setting. One might foresee a stage in the evolution of the peace-keeping question when the differing parties were close enough to coming to agreement, yet not quite ready to enter into formal negotiating discussions, when a non-governmental forum might be of interest. This may be conceivable, but the evidence is that this stage has not yet been reached. At this stage, it is probably more possible for a government to secure wider participation in a conference on this subject, due to the more natural aspect of such procedure and diplomatic respect for its position, than it would be for a non-governmental organization. Lastly, it has been charged that the innate factors of bureaucracy work against the kind of participation we have been aiming at. I have no doubt they do, but it is also a fact that within bureaucracy there are imaginative and capable individuals who wish to promote realistic progress in peace-keeping.

3. *Access to Restricted Material.*—It has often been pointed out to me that the scope of the work and the validity of the conclusions of a non-governmental effort in this field must necessarily be limited because it cannot have access to restricted governmental and United Nations material. I would not contest that such limitations do exist and must always be kept in mind. Incorporating the judgment of men who have been through these peace-keeping operations and who have had access to restricted material is at least a partial means of compensating for this inevitable handicap. A good deal of material is a matter of public record. Useful and accurate material can be produced under non-governmental auspices. Nevertheless, the handicap is an obvious one which leads many persons to question the significance of what can only be a partial attempt to fill a very large need.

4. *Proper UN Function.*—IPKO's effort has been a modest one. I believe it is clear that we have no pretensions as to being capable of doing the thorough job that only the United Nations staff can do. But I would hope it was also clear that political conditions have prevented and probably will prevent the United Nations for some time from doing this job. Nevertheless, there is an attitude in many places that the work is proper only to the United Nations; that it is their clear responsibility and that it is a mistake to try to provide even a minimal substitute. There is a feeling that somehow an IPKO effort represents duplication or even that it in some way relieves the pressure on the UN to do this job itself. Among other

things, this has affected our ability to secure governmental financing, leaving to one side the fact that it is not normal for a government to support private international institutions. This is perhaps an understandable reaction in governmental financial circles, which feel that they are already called upon to support an overly numerous panoply of international inter-governmental institutions.

5. *The Scholarly Community.*—A number of scholars have welcomed the materials that IPKO has produced, and we have responded by increasing the types of material we feel will be of most interest to them. However, a word needs to be said about their attitude toward IPKO. For reasons stated above, IPKO has concentrated on the technical aspects of peace-keeping, on which, in fact, much work needs to be done. However, these technical subjects are of limited interest to most scholars. They are most interested in and challenged by the controversial aspects of the peace-keeping question—as doubtless they should be.

B. Political attitudes toward peacekeeping

1. *Comprehensive Controversy.*—The controversy over peace-keeping, while it centers on the authorization issue, nevertheless encompasses all aspects of peace-keeping—including the technical aspects which we had hoped could be considered relatively non-controversial. Therefore, in spite of the obvious inequities to participants in future operations; in spite of the fair probability of future *ad hoc* Security Council authorization of peace-keeping; as long as there is the alternative possibility of a UN force coming into existence on General Assembly recommendation (as unlikely as such a possibility may be), all aspects of peace-keeping would appear to remain too controversial for East-West cooperation toward regularization. This means that many countries, which perhaps might otherwise be willing to separate the technical from the political, will not do so in order to avoid the appearance of "taking sides."

2. *UNEF Withdrawal.*—The withdrawal of UNEF from Gaza and Sinai occurred at the mid-point of IPKO's existence. It vividly illustrated both the limitations and the importance of U.N. peace-keeping. However, the predominant reaction was one of disillusionment with U.N. peace-keeping, and this has had its effect on IPKO. The most disturbing feature of this reaction has been the attitude that UNEF (and thereby peace-keeping in general) has been ineffective for its purpose, without recognizing that it was never meant to be effective for the purpose implied—that of *imposing* peace on the Middle East. The argument over this event should be, as it sometimes is, on the question of whether or not all that was possible was done to get the UAR to reconsider its demand for UNEF withdrawal. Instead, the argument most often heard is that the U.N. should somehow have refused to withdraw. It could not have refused and still remained a peace-keeping effort. The illusion that somehow had been built up was destroyed, and people are frustrated that UNEF was not what they thought it *ought* to have been. This has had a negative effect upon pursuit of what IPKO feels *can* be done in keeping with present political realities.

3. *Enforcement-Consent Confusion.*—In the arguments one hears against peace-keeping operations, there is very often a basic confusion between peace-keeping and enforcement action. In part, this confusion has been deliberately fostered; in part, it exists because both involve military personnel; and, in particular, it exists because of the Congo operation. In the internal dispute in the Congo, actions were taken without the consent of one of the disputing parties. There is a very legitimate concern about the possibility of such action in an internal dispute, and there is no doubt that this is a matter in which clarification is needed. However, this does not invalidate the very essential difference between peace-keeping and enforcement actions as they relate to interstate disputes or action which might be taken against a state. The vital distinction is that peace-keeping would very clearly not be undertaken without the consent of the Government or Governments on whose territory the operation would take place. Because of confusion on this, the very valid apprehensions on U.N. enforcement action are transferred to peace-keeping operations. There is also the concern that peace-keeping action could easily escalate to enforcement action. This by no means need be the case. There is a much lesser degree of difference between observer missions and peace-keeping forces, but beginning the former carries no inevitability that it will grow to the latter. The probable need for a Military Staff Committee for an enforcement action does not mean that such a structure is needed for the lesser demands of peace-keeping action, which may more effectively be conducted by a smaller military staff in

the Secretariat. The existence of such a small Secretariat military staff for consent operations does not imply an autonomy or scale to justify the fears of some that "militarism" would develop in the Secretariat.

4. *"Freezing" the Situation.*—The criticism is made of peace-keeping operations that they merely freeze the dispute and do not solve it; that both sides are thus given a respite in which to build up their strength for a renewal of fighting. This is a legitimate criticism of the total *peace-making* process but not of peace-keeping operations whose essential purpose is exactly that—to "freeze" the situation so that time for reconciliation becomes available. Peace-keeping operations should not be seen as providing a military solution to political problems. It is true that when they are effective, they remove some of the urgency from finding a solution. But this is inevitable, and this criticism implies that it would be better to allow the parties to go on fighting, which I regard as a dubious conclusion. I think it would also be well to admit that some political problems indeed do defy solution and justify a continuing presence. I would not deny, however, as one person I talked to put it, that there is an "art" in the timing of interposition to achieve a "freeze." Consent operations involve stalemate and a compromise that is not really a mutually acceptable solution but rather involves arrangements that are mutually equally unacceptable. For this purpose of a "freeze," peace-keeping operations are a valuable and important facility to have. Progress in their development is possible but not as urgent as the other components of the peace-making process, which are what is really being criticized. In this state of affairs, governments tend to shy away from participation in peace-keeping since it can result in open-ended commitments. This fact and the shifting of interest to the other elements of peace-keeping have had their effect on IPKO.

5. *Maintenance of the Status Quo.*—Fears have been expressed that peace-keeping may be used to preserve or maintain an unjustified status quo; that they may impede necessary change. It is true that, as regards border disputes, they could be used to maintain the status quo, but this would have to be with the consent of the States concerned and thereby would take place when the necessity of change was open to serious question. However, what is usually in mind when unjustified maintenance of the status quo is mentioned is the possibility of a peace-keeping operation taking place within the borders of a recognized State. There are those who fear it might be used to sustain an unpopular regime, and no doubt there are those who fear the opposite—that it might be used to assist in the replacement of an unpopular regime. The latter is very unlikely in view of the consent principle. Here again one has the confusion with enforcement action. As regards the former—whatever one's opinions on the Congo operation may be, it seems to me that such a possibility has become increasingly unlikely and that these fears are exaggerated. But they exist.

6. *Admission of Defeat.*—Among States which might possibly become the scene of peace-keeping operations themselves, there is an understandable lack of enthusiasm about these operations since they are most naturally considered as measures of last resort. For instance, peace-keeping operations do not repulse an invader; they "freeze" the situation with the invader resting on the territory he has occupied. For such a State to call for a peace-keeping operation is for it to tacitly admit defeat or an inability to carry out its objectives by its own means or with other help it could arrange. To save it from disaster, shame, or useless bloodshed, it may welcome a peace-keeping operation as a last resort. But again, no one prepares with enthusiasm for a last resort measure.

7. *International Complications and Uncertainties.*—Along the same lines as the foregoing, there are hesitations about peace-keeping which stem from complications that become involved when the dispute is transferred to the international arena. A greater or lesser degree of opportunity for national initiative is lost. A State likes to keep control over many things, including the issuing of information, in its own hands. In the international forum, decision-making can become a bargaining process in which national positions and loyalties on many other issues come into play and where each state is concerned about precedents that may be set. As Secretary-General U Thant has said in discussing the uncertainties of this field, "the decisions of these political bodies are always subject to political considerations." Thus, even though we are dealing here with an operation based on voluntary consent of the Governments involved, it is possible

that it might be blocked by veto or an unfavorable majority—perhaps on partially unrelated grounds. In this latter respect, there have been increasing fears expressed related to the emergence of the “mini-states.” It is pointed out that $\frac{2}{3}$ of the General Assembly pays 5% of the UN budget. However, again, I would feel these fears are exaggerated as regards consent operations. Enforcement action is clearly invested in the Security Council. The chances that the UN might take an unjustified peace-keeping operation, I believe, have become quite small. The chances are greater that it might be prevented from undertaking a justified operation.

8. *National Defense Priorities.*—As useful a facility as peace-keeping may be from time to time, no one would deny that a nation's security must still depend upon its own military strength augmented in most cases by the normal alliances it makes. Therefore, it is obvious that its first priorities will be to its own national security and that peace-keeping—to the extent that it is willing to devote resources to it—will have a relatively low priority. If it is already engaged externally in alliance obligations, peace-keeping moves even lower on its list of priorities. If it has its own internal security problem, it is understandable that such a country would regard any attention to peace-keeping elsewhere as a luxury it could not afford. It should further be mentioned, as indicative of the problem, that the tie between national security and international security as represented by peace-keeping is sufficiently indistinct in most countries so that special arrangements must be made in order to legally allow their nationals to participate in such operations.

9. *Stand-by Commitments.*—As stated earlier, there are currently nine countries which have made stand-by commitments to the United Nations. There are others which have considered such a commitment, and further countries, such as Eire, Australia and France, which have an on-going commitment of participation in current peace-keeping operations. But why have only nine countries made these stand-by arrangements? Many of the reasons have been indicated earlier. However, there is little doubt that the main reason stems from the traumatic crisis over Article 19 which brought the UN to a standstill. Following upon this, most countries consider that making a stand-by commitment would appear as a provocative act. A further reason is that they consider that such a stand-by commitment infers an automatic involvement in a future peace-keeping operation. They feel there may be operations they will not wish to participate in and it is more embarrassing to turn down a request if you have made a stand-by commitment. In other words, even though in fact every stand-by country insists on the right to consider participation on a case-by-case basis, an existing stand-by arrangement constitutes a moral engagement to the general principle of peace-keeping which many do not wish to make. There are additional factors such as the fact that many countries are still engaged in the formative process of providing basically well-trained troops for their own armies—peace-keeping can be considered only after this is accomplished—and some also consider that the additional increment of peace-keeping training will result in a further burden upon limited financial resources. I feel this latter is far exaggerated. There is some mistaken concept that a stand-by unit needs to be separate and distinct from a country's regular armed forces. This is not necessarily so. In many cases, it should be possible to have a unit serve a dual purpose. Likewise, as distinct from complete units, all too few countries have considered the possibility of earmarking officer observers who would normally be fulfilling regular duties. If many countries did this, it would be a very significant step forward. However, for many reasons, the general attitude is one of not engaging in stand-by commitments but rather espousing a willingness to consider a specific request from the UN and a confidence in being able to meet such a request for participation in an operation of which the Government concerned approved. Without people specifically assigned to this task, however, there is not the demand for the kind of advance preparation and training materials which IPKO has been exploring. Perhaps turning to Article 43 arrangements could break through this road block. I have found that very few countries believe that Article 43 arrangements could be made which would specify obligatory participation as implied in the Charter. Countries, I am convinced, would insist on retaining the right of individual decision on participation in a UN operation, whether it be enforcement action or a peace-keeping operation. In my opinion, units could be prepared for both types of operation, and many would be available for alternate use without modifying current positions on the authorization issue.

C. Military attitudes toward peacekeeping

1. *Variety of operations.*—Military men have pointed out to me the very great differences between the various peace-keeping operations—the variety in size, composition, operating conditions, objectives, etc. They therefore question whether generalized standards, applicable to future operations, can be drawn up based upon the “lessons of experience” when the experience has differed so greatly. Certainly it is true that generalizations can be carried too far, but there are many military men who have also told me that an awareness of all the types of problems one *might* have to deal with is useful and that there are certain common elements in the different operations which do merit standardization.

2. *National Traditions and Methods.*—National traditions and methods vary greatly, and this is a problem which any attempt to provide common international material and procedure must cope with. But it can be coped with. I feel that this objection based on national dissimilarities implies an attempt at uniformity in depth which is not necessary and which is not really under serious consideration. International standards or guidelines can be set while the detailed methods of meeting these can be worked out in accordance with individual national approaches. It is the officer level which it is important to reach; it is not necessary to think in terms of an all-encompassing system involving every individual soldier. Both national and international efforts have their roles to play, and one should not exclude the other. It is recognized that a national effort is facilitated by a large degree of mutual understanding, common loyalties, and unified control; one trusts one's own materials and tends to resist those produced by other countries. However, the eventual peace-keeping action will be one requiring international cooperation, so why not start with the admittedly more demanding effort of joint action?

3. *Unclear Directives and Limited Action.*—There are many military men who view peace-keeping as a misuse of the military. They point out that these operations are essentially “police actions.” Their main training is in the use of force to obtain well-defined objectives against a clearly identifiable enemy. Within such a framework, they know how to use their own possibilities of initiative based upon a military justification. In peace-keeping, the use of force is confined to the unclear doctrine of “self-defense”; there is no “enemy”; and every action has political and not just military connotations. Command involves a degree of political judgment and diplomatic ability in which few have had any extensive training and which many question as proper attributes to be expected of a soldier. On the other hand, there are many military men who tire of the sterility of exercises for potential national defense; who wish to put their professional capabilities to practical use; and these welcome the opportunity of peace-keeping service. They accept peace-keeping as a legitimate mission while nevertheless being disturbed by its *ad hoc* nature and the lack of attention to regularized improvement of its techniques. Further, it should be noted that several military establishments, which originally looked upon peace-keeping with deep reserve, now consider it as very useful training for their personnel.

4. *A Central Military Staff.*—Military organization by tradition and logic requires a central staff at the headquarters of the directing organization. The lack of one at U.N. Headquarters is resented by many military men who are inclined to feel that peace-keeping duty cannot be taken seriously until such a staff exists. Many feel that measures short of that are bound to be unrealistic and ineffective. The fact remains that something still needs to be done and might be done elsewhere. It also needs to be recognized that the political conditions of the U.N. framework are quite different from traditional alliances and governmental structures. There is a considerable residue of U.N. civilian experience and competence in these operations, and there is the additional factor that apparently the field staff of a peace-keeping operation assumes a good many of what are normally considered to be headquarter functions. Until there is a mandate for advance planning, analysis of past operations, preparation of standard procedures and training directives, a central staff would have little to do. Yet peace-keeping operations go on and must be taken seriously while waiting for the more logical organizational development. No one can deny that in particular when the initial launching phase of a peace-keeping operation is begun—what someone has called the “peace establishment” phase—a competent central staff is very badly needed.

5. *Peace-Keeping Techniques.*—Many military men feel that peace-keeping techniques are not so different from normal military techniques that they require special training. Indeed they do bear considerable resemblance in many respects

to what in most military establishments comes under the headings of "aid to the civil power" or "civil affairs." These professionals take pride in the flexibility of their training and feel—with considerable historical justification—that they can adjust to and cope with the special demands of peace-keeping. I would nevertheless maintain that there are differences, and differences of a degree which merit special attention, especially as regards the "peace-establishment" phase. Many agree with me and the special techniques of peace-keeping are being taught in many places. I have wondered why, with the exception of the Nordic countries, there was not more of a coordinated approach to this. Diplomatic/political reasons are, of course, one answer to this. I have also come to the conclusion that another of the reasons is that common experience and doctrine are in fact developed at the scene of the operations themselves and that this is transferred back to the national training procedures by the former participants. However, I would still consider this as inadequate to the needs and that more of a coordinated action should be undertaken.

6. *Staff Systems in the Field.*—In peace-keeping forces, national contingents can be internally organized in a fairly autonomous manner. However, central field staffs and observer missions involve developing an integrated international teamwork. I do not believe anyone would deny that this has caused considerable problems. I have been told that these have not been as serious as one might have expected and many military men deny that it particularly requires special attention. The reasons given for this are that all military systems have a great deal in common; that in fact military personnel from such sources as the Commonwealth countries have identical training; that there is a very considerable degree of international exchange between military training institutions; and that existing alliances have developed common procedures. In addition to this is the fact that the peace-keeping operations themselves, many of which have lasted for considerable periods, have produced a large reserve of experienced men who can be drawn upon. This does not mean that more cannot and should not be done to formalize and standardize, but rather that a greater common basis exists, upon which teamwork can be based, than one might suspect.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. I have no particularly radical suggestions to make. A sudden US-USSR reconciliation on the subject of peace-keeping does not seem probable—although I would not wish to exclude this as a possibility. Even if such reconciliation took place, I suspect there would be an accompanying need to reassure other countries as regards fears of great power hegemony. Therefore, I would view this field as primarily one in which progress will come through a process of gradual adjustment. My suggestions are aimed at this process. I should further add that I have confined my suggestions almost exclusively to the field of peace-keeping although I am fully aware of the urgent need for progress in the fields of peaceful settlement and peaceful change.

2. *Documentation Center.*—A separate private institution devoted to peace-keeping may not be justified, but it would be very valuable to have an existing research institution in the field of international relations become the focal point for this field. This would entail an active program on its part to collect documentation and to make widely known its willingness to answer inquires and to provide facilities for visiting scholars. The institution should have its own research program in this field which could involve either a member of its permanent staff or a visiting fellow, who, for some periods, could possibly be a former peace-keeping participant on secondment to the institution.

3. *Research Topics.*—There are a very great number of research topics to be recommended for this field. As stated earlier, many are to be found in IPKO's Monograph No. 5, *Research on Peace-Keeping Operations—Current Status and Future Needs*, by Dr. Legault. Areas which need further attention are also indicated in the Introduction and Observations sections of the Secretary-General's final report on the United Nations Emergency Force (UN Document A/6672), which we are reprinting in No. 32 of our Documentation Series. I attach as Annex I a list of topics which are particularly recommended for consideration.

4. *Private Conferences.*—Many organizations have considered peace-keeping topics in the course of their normal meetings, and several have held special conferences on the subject. It is highly recommended that they continue to do so. There is a continued need for a wider understanding of the realities of peace-keeping and enlightened support for improvements. There are many lines these

can take, such as the practical and humanitarian measures urged by the WVF's last General Assembly that common goals be established for the treatment of disability and for death benefits arising from peace-keeping participation. There are two special conferences that I would particularly like to recommend:

(a) There should be a further specialized conference with high level participation from both private and governmental sources. Such a conference could consider topics such as those suggested in Annex I. Discussion could be off-the-record, but the papers prepared for the conference could then be revised in accordance with the discussion.

(b) Peace-keeping has of late been discussed at Pugwash conferences and there are other indications that some unfreezing of positions may be taking place. A continuing exploration should be made of a possible East-West conference in this field and what topics may lend themselves to bringing fourth the most useful exchange views in an off-the-record discussion.

5. *Cooperation between the Stand-by Countries.*—The stand-by countries could cooperate much more closely than is now the case. One of them should take the initiative to bring about a greater degree of coordination. This would not need to entail a major effort; it could be modest and fairly informal in nature. For their own benefit, and not as a "substitute" for UN action, nor necessarily for possible utilization by others, they could pool their knowledge and ensure that their own individual programs were based on commonly agreed standards and procedures.

6. *Future Stand-by Countries.*—Additional countries should take the individual decision of making a stand-by commitment, and organizations interested in this field should continue to urge them to do so. The simplest commitment would be to earmark a limited number of officers for possible use in unarmed observer missions. They would continue to fulfill their normal functions but would maintain a state of readiness and receive the additional degree of training to prepare them for this task. Some countries may find it possible to earmark a military unit, but again I would urge that it serve a dual purpose, combining stand-by commitment with an on-going national defense mission. Such designation of technical units is particularly needed. Lastly, there is a need for further countries to consider making a stand-by commitment of equipment—a vital element of help to a United Nations that cannot stockpile.

7. *United Nations.*—Little progress can be expected on peace-keeping within the United Nations framework itself pending further US-USSR rapprochement which would include this question. The controversy still centers on the authorization issue and the "residual authority" of the General Assembly in this peace-keeping field. It is difficult at this point, however, to foresee much, if any, possibility of General Assembly-authorized peace-keeping operations. Still, it is not excluded that the USSR might even come to conclude that the General Assembly is a useful safety valve for the recommendation of consent operations. The possible entry of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and current calculations of General Assembly majorities are reasons sometimes put forward for such a change in attitude taking place. A lesser change would be a recognition that voluntary consent operations are basically different from enforcement actions and that the former do not require the same type of mechanism foreseen in the Charter. An unarmed observer mission is not a "UN armed force" in need of "strategic direction." Nor does a static UN force engaged in the consent operation of providing a buffer zone between disputants need "strategic direction." There are different requirements for different types of peace-keeping missions, but again the major distinction to be made is that between enforcement and peace-keeping. To help achieve this distinction, it may be necessary to clarify the situation as regards internal disputes. Could it be understood that peace-keeping would not be applied to an internal dispute unless both parties to the dispute consent to UN intervention? That is to say, that a "law and order" operation would not be used to suppress an organized opposition—an action that would only be taken, if ever, as an enforcement action.

8. In the meantime, few, if any, countries are really prepared to go ahead with the organization of enforcement action—if they stop to think about its generalized application. As I have said earlier, I think this will be made clear if one ever comes to the point of negotiating Article 43 agreements. Therefore, within the above framework, most suggestions which could be put forward are already being advocated at the United Nations. The principal ones to recommend are: a) Unarmed observer missions should be recognized as a separate

category of peace-keeping allowing for advance preparation and regularization; b) The experience of all past operations should be analyzed and common elements of these operations standardized; c) Further voluntary commitments of stand-by personnel, units, and equipment should be urged and the possibility of achieving Article 43 agreements explored; d) There should be a limited but highly capable military staff unit in the Secretariat; and e) A high-level military-civilian training course should be held, perhaps on an annual basis.

ANNEX A

STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS

1. Legislation enabling the stand-by commitment to be made.
2. Details of the commitment as communicated to the United Nations.
3. Special national regulations established for the stand-by contingents or individuals.
4. Governmental process by which the actual decision to participate in a UN operation would be made and the length of the mobilization period required after the decision is made.
5. The types of forces earmarked.
 - How are they selected or recruited? Are special qualifications desired or required?
 - What is the period during which they are kept on this basis? How long an overseas period of service is it expected they would have?
 - What would be the replacement system for rotation?
 - What are the structures of the units and numbers of men and officers involved?
 - What special augmentation over normal staffing patterns is provided for?
 - What is the national administrative structure for these units when these are in the home country? What would it be if they are overseas?
 - Are these units kept separate from or integrated with regular units of the military forces? Do they also serve a continuing national mission?
6. What equipment and supplies do they have and in particular what special extra equipment and supplies are they provided with?
7. What special training do they receive? Officer? Enlisted? Are there special installations?
8. What guidance is provided for training based upon past experience, or coordination with training programs in other stand-by countries?
9. What are the extra costs to the national government for this stand-by arrangement? Are they budgeted for separately?
10. What are the pay scales and overseas allowances which would be used? (Note: A similar list of questions was prepared for Participating Countries in peace-keeping operations.)

ANNEX B

QUESTIONS ON NATIONAL POLICY REGARDING PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

1. Peace-keeping operations vary widely in size and mission. Are there certain categories of peace-keeping operations which the Government considers could be non-controversial, which could be separated from the other categories, and for which orderly advance preparation could be undertaken by the United Nations (for example: peace observation missions)?
2. Does the Government feel that peace-keeping operations should be authorized solely by the Security Council or does it feel that in certain circumstances the General Assembly should also be able to authorize certain kinds of peace-keeping operations? In the case of an affirmative response to the latter, what are the circumstances in which such General Assembly action might be envisaged?
3. What are the views of the Government on the procedure which has developed of voluntary announcement by certain countries that they are earmarking stand-by units for possible use in UN peace-keeping? Does it feel this is a practice to be encouraged or discouraged? Has it considered some type of such earmarking itself?
4. What are the views of the Government on the implementation of the Article 43 agreements? Under what conditions would the Government be willing to enter into such an agreement?

5. What are the views of the Government on the relationship between regional peace-keeping efforts and UN peace-keeping operations?

6. Under what conditions does the Government feel that peace-keeping operations may appropriately be used for internal disputes?

7. What are the views of the Government on the question of financing peace-keeping operations? Under what conditions does it feel that the payment of assessments should be obligatory for all Member States? Does it have any suggestions for a procedure under which such obligatory assessments could be agreed upon?

8. Does the Government have any views as to the degree to which UN peace-keeping operations should have freedom of movement in the host state (or states)?

9. What are its views regarding restrictions on the use of force in such operations, i.e. how does it interpret the use of force in self defense?

Senator CHURCH. If there is no further testimony to be heard at this time, the hearing will be adjourned. I want to thank you all for your patience in waiting so long to be heard this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.)

APPENDIX

"UNITING FOR PEACE": RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 3, 1950

RESOLUTION A

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the first two stated Purposes of the United Nations are:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

"To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;"

Reaffirming that it remains to the primary duty of all Members of the United Nations, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the successful achievements of the United Nations in this regard on a number of previous occasions,

Finding that international tension exists on a dangerous scale.

Recalling its resolution 290 (IV) entitled "Essentials of peace," which states that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is primarily responsible for the continuance of international tension, and desiring to contribute further to the objectives of that resolution.

Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,

Reaffirming that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council, and desiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such agreements, the United Nations has at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security.

Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Members States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security.

Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its right or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Recognizing that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities in these respects calls for possibilities of observation which would ascertain the facts and expose aggressors; for the existence of armed forces which could be used collectively; and for the possibility of timely recommendation by the General Assembly to Members of the United Nations for collective action which, to be effective, should be prompt,

A.

1. *Resolves* that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in

session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;

2. *Adopts* for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set forth in the annex to the present resolution;

B.

3. *Establishes* a Peace Observation Commission for which the calendar years 1951 and 1942, shall be composed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay, and which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon the invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commission would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session, may utilize the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Commission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The Security Council may also utilize the Commission in accordance with its authority under the Charter;

4. *The Commission shall have* authority in its discretion to appoint sub-commissions and to utilize the services of observers to assist it in the performance of its functions;

5. *Recommends* to all governments and authorities that they cooperate with the Commission and assist it in the performance of its functions;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities, utilizing, where directed by the Commission, the United Nations Panel of Field Observers envisaged in General Assembly resolution 297 B (IV);

C.

7. *Invites* each Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of the General Assembly for the restoration of international peace and security;

8. *Recommends* to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional process, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter;

9. *Invites* the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective Measures Committee provided for in paragraph 11 as soon as possible of the measures taken in implementation of the preceding paragraph;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint, with the approval of the Committee provided for in paragraph 11, a panel of military experts who could be made available, on request, to Member States wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the organization, training, and equipment for prompt service as United Nations units of the elements referred to in paragraph 8;

D.

11. *Establishes* a Collective Measures Committee consisting of fourteen Members, namely: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia, and directs the Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General and with such Member States as the Committee finds appropriate, to study and make a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, not later than 1 September 1951, on methods, including those in Section C of the present resolution, which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance

with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking into account of collective self-defence and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter) ;

12. *Recommends* to all Member States that they co-operate with the Committee and assist it in the performance of its functions ;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish the staff and facilities necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes set forth in sections C and D of the present resolution ;

E.

14. The General Assembly, in adopting the proposals set forth above, is fully conscious that enduring peace will not be secured solely by collective security arrangements against breaches of international peace and acts of aggression, but that a genuine and lasting peace depends also upon the observance of all the Principle and Purposes established in the Charter of the United Nations, upon the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other principal organs of the United Nations intended to achieve the maintenance of international peace and security, and especially upon respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and on the establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well-being in all countries ; and accordingly

15. *Urges* Member States to respect fully, and to intensify, joint action, in co-operation with the United Nations, to develop and stimulate universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to intensify individual and collective efforts to achieve conditions of economic stability and social progress, particularly through the development of underdeveloped countries and areas.

ANNEX

The rules of procedure of the General Assembly are amended in the following respects :

1. The present text of rule 8 shall become paragraph (a) of that rule, and a new paragraph (b) shall be added to read as follows :

"Emergency special sessions pursuant to resolution—(V) shall be convened within twenty-four hours of the receipt by the Secretary-General of a request for such a session from the Security Council, on the vote of any seven members thereof, or of a request from a majority of the Members of the United Nations expressed by vote in the Interim Committee or otherwise, or of the concurrence of a majority of Members as provided in rule 9."

2. The present text of rule 9 shall become paragraph (a) of that rule and a new paragraph (b) shall be added to read as follows :

"This rule shall apply also to a request by any Member for an emergency special session pursuant to resolution—(V). In such a case the Secretary-General shall communicate with other Members by the most expeditious means of communication available."

3. Rule 10 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following :

"In the case of an emergency special session convened pursuant to rule 8(b), the Secretary-General shall notify the Members of the United Nations at least twelve hours in advance of the opening of the session."

4. Rule 16 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following :

"The provisional agenda of an emergency special session shall be communicated to the Members of the United Nations simultaneously with the communication summoning the session."

5. Rule 19 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following :

"During an emergency special session additional items concerning the matters dealt with in resolution—(V) may be added to the agenda by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting."

6. There is added a new rule to precede rule 65 to read as follows :

"Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule and unless the General Assembly decides otherwise, the Assembly in case of an emergency special session, shall convene in plenary session only and proceed directly to consider the item proposed for consideration in the request for the holding of the session, without previous reference to the General Committee or to any other Committee ; the President and Vice-Presidents for such emergency special sessions shall be, respectively, the Chairman of those delegations from which were elected the President and Vice-Presidents of the previous session."

RESOLUTION B

For the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and, in particular, with Chapters V, VI and VII of the Charter,

*The General Assembly**Recommends to the Security Council:*

That it should take the necessary steps to ensure that the action provided for under the Charter is taken with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression and with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security:

That it should devise measures for the earliest application of Articles 43, 45, 46 and 47 of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council by the States Members of the United Nations and the effective functioning of the Military Staff Committee.

The above dispositions should in no manner prevent the General Assembly from fulfilling its functions under resolution—(V).

RESOLUTION C

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the primary function of the United Nations Organization is to maintain and promote peace, security and justice among all nations.

Recognizing the responsibility of all Member States to promote the cause of international peace in accordance with their obligations as provided in the Charter,

Recognizing that the Charter charges the Security Council with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,

Reaffirming the importance of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council on all problems which are likely to threaten world peace,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 190 (III) entitled "Appeal to the Great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace,"

Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that:

(a) They meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, and, if necessary, with other States concerned, all problems which are likely to threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter;

(b) They advise the General Assembly and, when it is not in session, the Members of the United Nations, as soon as appropriate, of the results of their consultations.

VI. VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL (VETO)

[Under the Charter the members of the United Nations conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and agreed that in fulfilling this responsibility the Council acted on their behalf. The Council has encountered difficulties in the discharge of its duties due to the lack of agreement between the Big Five powers which are permanent members of the Council. Symptomatic of this disagreement are the attitudes toward the voting provisions of the Council. The majorities in the Council have followed a policy of liberal interpretation of the Charter's voting provisions. Recommendations of the General Assembly have also called for further liberalization outside the strict terms of the Charter. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has, with one possible exception, insisted on full use of its voting privileges. The exception has been the practice developed in the Council of not regarding an abstention or absence of a permanent member as a veto.]



