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PRESENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETIETH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

WITH

GENERAL DAVID M. SHOUP, FORMER COMMANDANT,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARCH 20, 1968

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PRESENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1968

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice at 10:05 a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, Aiken, Williams, Case and Cooper.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are meeting this morning to discuss the present situation in Vietnam with General David M. Shoup, of the U.S. Marine Corps, retired.

While it has been said that war is too important to be left to the generals, it is nevertheless a fact that generals do conduct wars and that political solutions to conflicts must reflect military realities. To explore with the committee the military realities in Vietnam, the military prospects for the future, and other questions, we are fortunate indeed to have one of the Nation's most distinguished and experienced generals. General Shoup spent 27 years in the Marine Corps, advancing from the rank of lieutenant to the rank of general and ending his career as Commandant of the Corps. He holds this Nation's highest award for valor, the Congressional Medal of Honor, and a number of other decorations. Inasmuch as it is not a common occurrence for us to have a Congressional Medal of Honor winner as a witness, I would like to read the General's citation. I quote:

> For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of all Marine Corps troops in action against enemy Japanese forces on Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Islands, from 20 to 22 November, 1943. Although severely shocked by an exploding enemy shell soon after landing at the pier and suffering from a serious, painful leg wound which had become infected, Colonel Shoup fearlessly exposed himself to the terriffic and relentless artillery, machinegun, and rifle fire from hostile shore emplacements. Rallying his hesitant troops by his own inspiring heroism, he gallantly led them across the fringing reefs to charge the heavily fortified island and reinforce our hard-pressed, thinly held lines. Upon arrival on shore, he assumed command of all landed forces and, working without rest under constant, withering enemy fire during the next two days, conducted smashing attacks against unbelievably strong and fanatically defended Japanese positions despite innumerable obstacles and heavy casualties. By his brilliant leadership, daring tactics, and selfless devotion to duty, Colonel Shoup was largely responsible for the final decisive defeat of the enemy, and his indomitable fighting spirit reflects great credit upon the United States Naval service.

I think that citation is a great compliment to General Shoup and it certainly leaves him immune from any charge of a lack of will.

I will insert at this point a more complete biographic statement for the record.

(The biographic sketch of General Shoup follows:)

BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL DAVID M. SHOUP

General Shoup (USMC, Ret.) was Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1960 to 1963.

He was born in Battle Ground, Indiana, in 1904, received an A.B. degree at De Pauw University in 1926 and entered the Marine Corps in that year. He served on the USS Maryland 1929–31; was an instructor at the Marine Corps School thereafter; and held various other assignments until 1941 when he became Operations Officer for the First Marine Brigade in Iceland. He commanded the Second Battalion of the Sixth Marine Regiment in 1942; became Assistant Operations Officer of the Second Marine Division; commanded the forces ashore at Tarawa in 1943; was a Division Chief of Staff with the Second Division in 1944; and returned to Marine Corps Headquarters in that year. General Shoup was Commanding Officer, Service Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in 1947; appointed Division Chief of Staff, First Marine Division in 1949; commanded the Basic School at Quantico 1950–52; and was Fiscal Director in Washington in 1953–56. He served as Inspector General of the United States Marine Corps 1956–58; Commanding General, Third Marine Division, Okinawa 1958–59; Commanding General, Recruit Depot, Parris Island 1959; Chief of Staff, United States Marine Corps 1959; and Commandant, United States Marine Corps 1960–63. He retired in 1963.

General Shoup holds the Congressional Medal of Honor, Purple Heart with Oakleaf Cluster, Legion of Merit with Combat V, Distinguished Service Medal, and the British Distinguished Service Order.

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot resist recalling at this time that during a public controversy about 4 or 5 years ago on the question of the Pentagon's indoctrinating our soldiers, General Shoup very wisely observed that he did not have to teach his Marines to hate people because of their ideology. I am not quoting him exactly, but he said something to the effect that all he had to do was to teach them to be good fighters. This bit of common sense did not endear him to those who pose as superpatriots, but it did endear him, I believe, to all reasonable men.

General, we are very honored to have you with us this morning. As I understand it, you do not have a prepared statement. Would you care to make any observations before we start questioning?

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID M. SHOUP, FORMER COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General SHOUP. Mr. Chairman, I feel quite inadequate here, in this sit-in, but I do consider it a privilege to be able to appear here and participate in this great democratic process of our country, particularly when you think that now an Indiana farm boy has been asked to come here and to talk about matters of great national interest and to give his views without any fear of reprisal whatsoever except being called a dissenter, a traitor, and being accused of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. General, it is a great comfort to have you here.

Senator GORE. You mean to have company? [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. We will proceed to specific questions. I appreciate

very much your being willing to come and expose yourself to such charges, however unfounded I believe them to be.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM TO UNITED STATES

General, as you know, the most troublesome question before the country—the origin, of most of our troubles—is Vietnam. In view of your long experience as a military man, what is your assessment of the real strategic importance of South Vietnam to the United States? In other words, what do you think is our national interest in being there?

General SHOUP. Mr. Chairman, I have never felt that we had absolutely no national interests in Southeast Asia. But rather that the reasons given for what we are doing there now are not supportable, particularly the first two reasons that we were given. I think my contention that those were rather subject to erosion is proved by the fact that we have now been given a third reason; that is, more or less the containment of China.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, General, which were the first two you had in mind?

General SHOUP. The first reason I believe that we were given was that we were there in order that the South Vietnamese might determine their own destiny without outside interference and at the very time this was given as a reason the people we were fighting were almost 99 percent South Vietnamese.

The second reason, as I remember it, was that if we don't stop this there the Communists will be crawling up or soon attack Pearl Harbor or crawl up the beaches of Los Angeles or the Palisades or in words of that substance. I think that our strategic requirements——

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think either of those reasons is valid?

General SHOUP. I do not think they are supportable.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHOUP. Now, if we have those who have had the clairvoyance to tell us over the past several months and years now what was going to come to pass in the war in South Vietnam, if those are the people who have used the same kind of clairvoyance to look into the future and determine that this place, Southeast Asia, is very important to our existence and our continued existence—I believe that is a definition of vital—then I think if that is true we should have pictured for us what would be the predicament of America 5 years, 10 years, 15, 20, or 30 years if we didn't do what we are doing down there. I have never seen any such thing.

I do believe that it would be almost impossible to make an intelligent decision to commit ourselves, as we are without such a clairvoyance, but I haven't heard of any, I haven't seen any, and I don't think there is any that you can put down in black and white.

It is ludicrous to think that just because we lose in South Vietnam that very soon somebody is going to be crawling and knocking at the doors of Pearl Harbor. We still have the Philippines and, as far as I know today, contrary to what the clairvoyants said a few years ago, Indonesia seems to be a little bit in our favor. Maybe we could help them considerably and we wouldn't have to worry about anybody from South Vietnam.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a question?

The CHAIRMAN. I yield.

IS VIETNAM VITAL TO OUR INTERESTS?

Senator GORE. General, in order that I may be certain that I understand the purport of what you have said, is it a fair conclusion that though you think the United States has an interest in what happens in Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia, you do not hold that it is vital to the security of the United States for the United States to have intervened and to have remained a combatant in the Vietnam war?

General SHOUP. That is correct.

Senator GORE. If it were vital to the security of the United States would there, in fact, be anything about which we ought to negotiate? If our country was in mortal peril, depending on the outcome in Vietnam, should we have a goal of negotiation or should we proceed to fight to a military victory?

General SHOUP. Well, I think that is a pretty big "iffy" question. I don't think they would ask any such question. I am certain like Tom in the "Mill on the Floss," there is no bear.

Senator GORE. In other words, you don't accept the "if," the hypothesis?

General SHOUP. That is right. What would you do if there was a bear, but there is no bear.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you do not accept self-determination as justification for the idea that if you don't stop them in Vietnam they will come to San Francisco or Los Angeles? I believe you have been quoted in rather more colorful language on what you thought about their coming across the water.

COMMITMENT UNDER SEATO TREATY

Would you care to comment about a further point on which the Secretary of State relied very heavily, but on which certainly I do not rely and about which a number of members of the committee, in times past, have voiced their reservations; that is, the nature of the commitment under the SEATO treaty. That treaty, as you know, was signed and submitted to the Senate in 1954 and approved in 1955. It has often been said that it was an effort on the part of our Government to offset the Geneva accords, to which we had not agreed.

Some agree with the Administration, but some of us do not agree that the treaty in itself constitutes a commitment to do what we are now doing in Vietnam.

It was at most a commitment to consult with our allies. We do not accept it as a commitment on the part of Congress or the country to do what we are doing.

Do you have any thoughts on that?

General SHOUP. Well, Senator, first, I make no claim to being a student of treaties. But I have read it, and my understanding of the treaty would be this: That there is no absolute requirement that we participate in this kind of thing because of the words of the SEATO treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly my position.

Senator GORE. Will the Chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. I yield.

Senator GORE. The Chairman will recall when former Secretary Dulles negotiated and signed the treaty, and appeared before this committee urging its ratification, he specifically said it did not contain such a commitment.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator GORE. And, moreover, Great Britain, France, and Pakistan signed the treaty, and they do not consider it to involve such a commitment.

The CHAIRMAN. I raise this point because the present Secretary of State says that it does. There is a direct conflict between what Secretary Dulles said at the time the treaty was presented to the committee and what the present Secretary of State said last Monday and Tuesday.

There is a difference of opinion on that point I suppose that reasonable men may differ, but I think it very clear that the treaty does not require us to do what we are doing.

TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

The Administration goes further when pressed on this point and says that the Tonkin Gulf resolution is a further step which fortifies the commitment because the Congress has there made certain statements with regard to our vital interests, and so on.

Do you have any comment to make about the Tonkin Gulf resolution? You probably are aware of our recent hearings, are you not?

General SHOUP. I am; I think they have been covered very thoroughly. I think a few years in the future we will probably get the total truth.

The CHAIRMAN. It is true that the hearing does not cover every single point, but I think that it covers the principal points concerning provocation and the awareness of the Navy about what was going on. It covers those points completely to my satisfaction. There was a high degree of inaccuracy in the presentation of the Administration to this committee, and to the Senate through this committee. I believe that can be said, at a minimum.

UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF VIETNAM WAR

General, do you think that this war differs from other wars in which the United States has been involved? In other words, do you think that this war has characteristics that are different from World War I or World War II or the Korean war?

General SHOUP. Well, Mr. Chairman, I definitely do.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you describe them for us?

General SHOUP. I think there is just one important one. If my recollections are correct, we had an entirely different objective in these wars you mentioned as contrasted to Vietnam. As far as I know the Armed Forces objective in South Vietnam is not to defeat the Armed Forces of North Vietnam, but rather their objective is to rid this country, rid South Vietnam, of these interlopers, so-called, from the north and any others who have developed in the south. That makes a considerable difference.

I would suppose you could say that this kind of thing limits our actions, our actions are limited to unlimited escalation in the South

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Vietnam area, because we have no objective as far as I know to defeat the armed forces of the enemy. I think that is the great difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this difference grow out of the fact that this is a war which is really in the nature of a civil war—a war between two different factions of Vietnamese people—as distinguished from an overt invasion as, for example, when Germany invaded France?

General SHOUP. Well, that has always been my contention that this was a civil war amongst South Vietnamese, and if we leave them alone to solve their own problems in the manner that they want to solve them they would be proud of their solution, support whatever conclusions they finally came to, and go ahead in the business of being a nation.

The CHAIRMAN. I can't think of any similar case in our history in which we have intervened in a civil war. Can you think of one?

General SHOUP. Well, I suppose it would be facetious maybe but if you want to call the North a government, we had a little intervention in the South here. [Laughter.]

Senator GORE. May I say it is still resented in some parts of the country. [Laughter.]

CONCEPT OF STOPPING AGGRESSION

The CHAIRMAN. General, your answer prompts me to ask you another question—it is not an easy question—which also relates to the justification of this war which the Administration continues to give, and that is that we are stopping aggression. The Secretary of State, as well as other members of the Administration, has often used the argument that we are showing that aggression doesn't pay; that we are stopping aggression. You use the analogy of our own civil war. I suppose that the Yankees throughout the South were the aggressors, and we thought the Yankees were the aggressors; is that about right?

General SHOUP. I think that is probably correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would you say is the aggressor in the war in Vietnam, if this concept is applicable at all?

General SHOUP. Well, we are back in that place where I suppose it would be correct to say we would have to define our terms, but in my feeling——

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let's start with a definition of terms. That is a good idea.

General SHOUP. What is the aggressor that you refer to? If it is someone who goes from where they are because they think they have the business to do so and involve themselves in warfare within the confines of another nation or another country, if that is what is meant then I think perhaps North Vietnam is the aggressor and the United States is the aggressor.

The CHAIRMAN. Both aggressors?

General SHOUP. Right.

TRYING TO PROVE THAT AGGRESSION DOES NOT PAY

The CHAIRMAN. There is a justification commonly offered that this war is supposed to prove that aggression doesn't pay, not only in Vietnam, but everywhere else. We are supposed to be proving now a

principle to be applied for all time. If we win this war, and if we stay the course, and if our will does not weaken, from now on all Communists are going to be good boys and there will be no more aggression. Isn't that the theory?

General SHOUP. I am glad you asked that, because in my mind if we were as successful as we hoped to be a few months ago and this came to a favorable conclusion, what is the reason, where is the proof, that the same situation wouldn't break out within months in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Korea, and you could keep on going.

Now, if there was any permanency here, permanency to this, or any finality to this statement that we have stopped them and now they are going to stay stopped, but I don't believe that. Are we then going to commit ourselves every time to this extent, and I don't know what this extent is going to escalate to, and if we are committed, giving the same kind of help to all the SEATO and then about 40 other nations, some place up the line it is too much for us, and at that spot whether we like it or not, we are going to have to say "we can't help to that extent." And then our promises are just as false as they might be today if we didn't keep on doing what we are doing.

I see no difference, if we face the facts of life some day we are going to have to say we can't do it if this kind of thing keeps up. There is no finality; no finish to this thing if we win in South Vietnam.

Have we during this conflict, except indirectly, harmed the two great Communist—so-called Communist—powers?

Have we caused them any problems? Very few, and are those the two great nations that are causing us trouble? If they are we are not harming them. In fact, they are harming us by using up our men, money, and materials. And we don't solve anything permanently, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you, General. This idea of aggression seems to me to be very misleading. It is a word that carries with it a certain connotation of evil, and it is used as though everyone admits that this is an aggression solely by the North. I think this is a very misleading concept and causes confusion in the minds of our own people.

I think your description of the nature of the conflict is much more accurate—intervention in a civil war. All it is going to prove is that people shouldn't intervene in civil wars. That is about the only thing it proves, rather than that aggression doesn't pay.

EFFECT OF ADDITIONAL AMERICAN TROOPS

General, do you think that additional American troops in South Vietnam will insure success?

General SHOUP. Was the question in South Vietnam?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been reported in the press that the Administration is considering a very substantial increase in our troops. Do you think that an increase will improve our situation?

General SHOUP. We can increase the number of troops in South Vietnam but we are quite certain that North Vietnam can match us man for man. If we want to win militarily, that is, defeat the North Vietnamese armed forces, we cannot do it in South Vietnam, because they don't have to send the bulk of their armed forces down there. We

might come closer to meeting our objective, and that is pushing them out, but up to date I believe the record will show that we haven't been too successful at that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the record will show that the more people we have put in, the more North Vietnamese appear in the South.

General SHOUP. Well, I think a little arithmetic will spell it out. They had about 4,000 troops there, I think in 1964 and now they must have at least 40,000. They must have been doing something, they didn't come down out of a parachute.

IS A MILITARY VICTORY FEASIBLE?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you really think that a military victory, in the traditional sense of the word, is feasible in South Vietnam?

General SHOUP. If you will use the word possible instead of feasible, I will say that it is not possible to defeat the North Vietnamese Army, and without doing that, while we haven't a declaration of war we surely must be considered to be at war with the North Vietnamese, and, as I said before, I don't believe that you can defeat the armed forces of North Vietnam by winning, so-called, in South Vietnam, because their big army is not there. So a military victory, staying below the demilitarized zone, with everything except bombers cannot come to pass, in my opinion.

FIGHTING QUALITIES OF THE ENEMY FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. You had a good deal of experience in the Far East. I think that you served on three different occasions in China or the Far East, and you have a familiarity with some of these people. How do you explain the determined fighting qualities of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese in contrast to what we read about the army of South Vietnam? There seems to be quite a difference as far as determination and efficiency are concerned.

General SHOUP. Well, Mr. Chairman, that seems to be an all-inclusive statement, and I would like to talk to that just a little bit.

First, let me talk to those who meet the criterion that you gave of not fighting. I think that category of South Vietnamese army forces are fearful that no matter how many legs and arms they give, things won't be any different than they have ever been. They have no loyalty to the Saigon government, in other words, in contrast to the North Vietnamese they don't have any George Washington.

Further, I think that the North Vietnamese, perhaps there is a bit of psychology that helps them and that is that Ho Chi Minh feels that he got a pretty raw deal when he didn't get to have the elections that were promised him in the treaty, and Ho Chi Minh holding the status he does amongst his people gives them an additional incentive, you get some retribution for the dirty tricks played on their boss, on their George Washington.

I am sure that those in the armed forces in South Vietnam who meet the criterion you gave of not seeming to fight as well as the north, can see no reason for losing a leg and an arm and an eye and a life for the only thing that they can see is continued, continued, and continued—same attitude by the South Vietnamese Saigon Government.

They have never had anything in the history of their generations that they have any knowledge of and what has happened in the last 2 or 3 years does not give them any greater hope. Further, I think that this business of telling the American people how vital, how important, how necessary to our present existence and our future existence South Vietnam is has convinced them that that is true, and so if it is, why should they fight so much if this is so really important to Uncle Sam. Let him do the fighting. There is a little bit of that.

Let us go to the other side of the picture. I do not think it is fair, and I shall not take the position that all of the South Vietnamese forces are included in this category, because rather I seem to believe that many an outfit should be given credit for the great stamina, the great valor they have shown in these battles and I don't think we have to go back too far only to Hué where, as I understand it, there were something like two Vietnamese Marine battalions and two ARVN battalions, all of which, to my knowledge, gave a great account of themselves and nothing could be asked about their valor and their determination.

I think we have examples also recently in the north where we have a squad of armed forces in a village and a platoon of the local Vietnamese, I think there were six or seven of those villages in the north attacked during the Tet offensive, all of those people fought to the death, and not a Vietcong ever got in one of those villages.

So, Mr. Chairman, let us give credit to those who have fought like we think they ought to and not belittle all of them and put them in the category of not fighting.

FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO DESTRUCTION OF HUÉ

Senator CLARK. Would the Senator yield for a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator CLARK. General, I was in Hué in January before the Tet offensive. I think I was the last civilian to go through that magnificent city with all the wonderful display of Vietnamese imperial art. The American officer, State Department officer, who took me through, was a splendid individual doing a great job. He is now dead.

My question to you is this: Was there any feasible way of handling the Hué situation militarily without destroying those priceless cultural memorials, devastating the city, rendering homeless perhaps 30, 40, 50, 60 percent of the population and leaving behind it pretty nearly a scorched earth? Is there any feasible military alternative to doing what we and the South Vietnamese did?

General SHOUP. Senator, that is surely a $64 question and I am——

Senator CLARK. It puzzles me.

General SHOUP. I am 8,000 miles away and I would have to defer to the judgment of the military commanders in that area. I suppose if you talk in the realm of possibility, the answer is yes, because you could all run away. I mean all we had to do was retreat and I don't think the North Vietnamese would have torn it up. But I would have to defer any judgment like that to those in command in South Vietnam.

Senator CLARK. That raises just one further question: If there is no feasible alternative except withdrawal and retreat, can there be any reasonable hope that the independence of our military efforts over

there will do other than to destroy most of the cities and countryside of South Vietnam?

General SHOUP. Well, I think a partial answer to that has been given to you by the destruction which has taken place. But I suppose it is fair to say that if you want to think of history in terms of the millenium we can point out many, many cities over the world that have been destroyed by war, rebuilt. I guess Paris is one of them.

Senator CLARK. This is true. Warsaw is another.

It does raise important moral values in my mind as to whether the cost of what we are doing can be justified on any feasible ethical ground. Would you comment on that?

General SHOUP. I don't think it can.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BOMBING DURING WORLD WAR II

The CHAIRMAN. If I might just ask you, I don't know the answer but in World War II we were fighting a fairly fanatical group of people under Mr. Hitler and yet they found a way to avoid destroying Paris and Rome, why, I am not at the moment, I don't recall how that was accomplished, but why couldn't the same thing have been done at Hué?

General SHOUP. Well, Senator, if you want me to speak to the realm of possibility, obviously it could have.

The CHAIRMAN. I honestly don't recall why the Nazi's did not destroy Paris. Why didn't they? Do you remember why they didn't in World War II? They were there and they gave it up without destroying it.

General SHOUP. Well, there was a great deal of destruction, and my memory is not that good either, but there was a great deal of destruction within Paris. They had it pretty well mined with sappers; you could blow it up.

The CHAIRMAN. Their great monuments, comparable to the Citadel, in Paris were not destroyed, were they? I really don't recall precisely, but I didn't think that very substantial destruction of Paris occurred, or Rome for that matter, at least to the great historical monuments, and the Nazis evacuated both of those cities without destroying them.

General SHOUP. Well, I think part of it may be military because once you get the military directive to take a place and not bother this and that and that and that—I am reminded of—I went to the neighbors for a Christmas dinner and we went out to shoot a particular duck with a shotgun and killed three. Well, I don't think that this relates to that kind of thing. Once you turn the armed forces loose and say "take it," even though you say don't hit this and don't hit that, you don't have any conception whatsoever of what you are doing at x hundreds of miles an hour with a big bomb coming out of the belly of our aircraft. Example: I saw dive bombers at Tarawa, three of them, going after a big ship and there wasn't anybody shooting back and they missed it. Now, you can't say don't hit this and don't hit that and still give proper support for the men who are risking their lives to defeat the enemy people in the area.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I have some other questions I will hold and allow my colleagues to question.

Senator Gore?

VIEWS OF OTHER FORMER MILITARY LEADERS ABOUT WAR

Senator GORE. General, can you identify for this committee other former military leaders of high rank, now retired, who share your reservations about the policy we are following in Vietnam?

General SHOUP. It may be a very strange answer, but I have very little reason to know them. I don't associate with them. I simply know there are a good many, and I am pretty sure that this committee must surely have the names and addresses that I don't even have. I could refer you to a place where some of them are mentioned, and that is the December issue of the Esquire magazine. Now, there are some of the names in there. But I do not know them all personally. In fact I never met them.

Senator GORE. I am speaking of some—well, you know General Norstad.

General SHOUP. I know him, yes, sir.

Senator GORE. General Ridgway.

General SHOUP. I know him.

Senator GORE. Have you discussed this with him?

General SHOUP. No; but I have heard him state what his views are.

Senator GORE. Have you discussed it with General Gavin?

General SHOUP. No, sir.

Senator GORE. In other words, you are stating your own views?

General SHOUP. That is right.

I have not asked anybody to help me come to my own conclusions.

BOTH SIDES ACCUSED OF AGGRESSION

Senator GORE. You and Senator Fulbright had some discussion about aggression. A few days ago, in the hearing with Secretary Rusk, in order to illustrate that both sides are accusing the other of aggresssion, I said I did not know which country was first to introduce or send to South Vietnam organized military units. I have had letters of both approval and disapproval of that statement and I began to look at some records of this committee and the State Department and other sources and I find there are apparently interchangeable terms. On some occasions the State Department uses the term organized military units; on other occasions the Department will refer to units of military units. Another time, when referring to the introduction of troops, it may speak of cadres; another time advisers; another time infiltrators. But you say that both North Vietnam and the United States have been, in your view, aggressors in South Vietnam.

General SHOUP. Yes, sir; I think the confusion sometimes comes when we say an organized military unit. Well, we hope that is true, but most military units are a little bit disorganized, but nevertheless we should refer to combatant units.

Now, a combatant unit is one which is organized and so equipped and has a mission of the destruction of the enemy.

Now, for example, that is a completely different thing than an organized helicopter squadron that has no arms, which they did not have in the early days. So which side put the first organized combatant unit into South Vietnam is one thing. But who first put in the advisers and then the people to help the advisers and to help transport the ad-

visers, the truck companies, the jeep platoons or the helicopter squadrons, none of which were combatant type units? They were not designed to destroy the enemy or anybody else.

Now, when you get to putting in combatant type units that is something else.

Senator GORE. Well, this seems to further illustrate the advisability of the reservations you stated when Senator Fulbright first asked the question and you said there must be some definition of terms.

General SHOUP. Right.

SPECIFIC TROOP RECOMMENDATION

Senator GORE. I asked Secretary Rusk a few days ago if President Johnson was considering General Westmoreland's request for more troops, and he said no specific recommendation was before the President. How would you define that term? I didn't quite understand—

General SHOUP. No specific recommendations?

Senator GORE. Yes.

General SHOUP. Well, I would interpret it to mean that at this point the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not recommended to the Commander in Chief a definite overall number of troops nor the tactical organizations which he would recommend be sent to augment the forces in South Vietnam.

Senator GORE. Well, thank you. That is helpful.

From your experience, this would not indicate then that the overall policy was not under review, but indicates that a specific figure had not been recommended or had not been submitted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General SHOUP. Right.

Senator GORE. General, are not the number of troops to be used, the tactics to be followed, the strategy to be pursued, do not the answers to all these questions depend upon decisions as to policy?

General SHOUP. Well, if you are referring to the, what I believe to be the, greatest features of the organization of our Government, our country, and that is that the civilians control the military forces, then I suppose the proper answer to your question, is yes, if you said policy and not politics.

Senator GORE. I am speaking of policy.

General SHOUP. Well, true, obviously. In other words, and it is always true, that for the Armed Forces, they will set a policy and, well, I could take from my own experience, "you, the Marine Corps, will maintain three combat divisions, three aircraft wings," so, so, so and so, that is the policy. But then we, as military people, tell the Congress and the Commander in Chief and the Secretaries what we require to maintain, to carry out that order.

POLICY DECISION INVOLVED IN TROOP INCREASE

Senator GORE. Well, I think you and I are in agreement, that if out of the reassessment from A to Z, as Secretary Rusk described it, there has been reached or is reached a policy decision to achieve a victory in Vietnam, as President Johnson said, I believe, on Saturday, then the number of troops, the tactics to follow, the strategy to implement the policy will follow, as a matter of course, is that not correct.

General SHOUP. Absolutely, while they may be going on concurrently and there may be questions asked if this kind of decision were made and ask the Armed Forces what it would take to support that policy before the decision is made to do it while we gather the information, what is this going to cost in terms of men, money, and material and time, and to do this and this or this or this or this, and the Armed Forces are constantly working to produce information to support any number of possible policy decisions. If they didn't do that we would really be out of luck. I think I am correct, that the decisionmaking process is a good one. All we have to do is to follow it.

Senator GORE. Well, again, with respect to policy, I must say, General, that insofar as any activity with respect to this committee's hearing is concerned, it has been related to policy determinations. This committee should not, in my opinion, concern itself about whether or not the military has followed a wise tactical course in fortifying Khesanh, or whether there be 15,000 additional troops for replacement or other purposes. The question with which this committee is concerned is that of policy.

DEFINITION OF MODERATE NUMBER OF TROOPS

Now, this committee has not been informed if an overall policy decision has been reached as a result of the review, except as it is informed by public speeches of officials of the Government. Perhaps if we knew what decision was reached as to numbers of troops, this might be an indication of the overall policy decision. But, actually, the only information we have was published—and I don't know why the press, television and radio falls for this kind of managed news—quoting an anonymous source, an unidentified source, as saying that the troop increase to Vietnam would be a "moderate number."

Would you mind, from your long experience, giving us your interpretation of moderate number of troops in this or any other situation?

General SHOUP. Senator, somehow I begin to feel that this seat hasn't cooled off since last Monday. But I will give you an answer. Moderate is a word of relative meaning. I would think anything could be moderate up to a certain point, if you didn't intend to, if the policy was not to, defeat the armed forces of North Vietnam. Now, if the decision, if the policy—and you hit the nail on the head—is changed, all military buildup, all military action results from the efforts of those responsible for military action to do what the policymakers decided they wanted done, and the part the armed forces must play in it.

You are absolutely right, and the military forces don't know what to prepare for or what to do for unless they are told "We want to get this war over in 90 days" well, somebody can say "How can you do it?" I am sure somebody with a uniform on can tell. Well, that is their business to say "What can you do to support?" First they determine likely policies. I mean strip out the stupid ones that even I would know were stupid, and then on the basis of those policies ask the military forces or direct them to tell "What can you do with the forces available to support this policy?" And then and only then is a determination made as to what we will try to do.

Senator GORE. Well, support what policy?

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WINNING A MILITARY VICTORY

You say that it is impossible to win a military victory if our activities are confined to South Vietnam?

General SHOUP. May I say, a military victory over the armed forces of North Vietnam.

Senator GORE. And yet it seems that most of the opposition we face in South Vietnam is indigenous to South Vietnam. I believe you said the North Vietnamese had some 40 or more thousand troops there. I believe Secretary Rusk last week gave us the estimate of 65,000 North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.

Why is it that the more than 500,000 United States troops in South Vietnam cannot defeat the 65,000 or something in that order, troops of North Vietnam?

General SHOUP. Well, I think Mao Tse-Tung gave us all the answer to that in his writings long ago. The fish are still swimming in the river.

Senator GORE. What we really face in South Vietnam is largely the Vietcong, which are rebellious elements within South Vietnam, is that correct?

General SHOUP. Well, I wouldn't discount the 40,000 hard core troops from the North and another X thousand in the demilitarized zone that aren't technically in South Vietnam and another X thousand that are just North of that. I don't think we can discount those people. But the point is to meet the objective that I understand we have set out as far as the military business in South Vietnam was and is, to get these jokers out of there so the people can sit back and determine their destiny and not be bothered every night and every day by some magistrate getting shot and all these things. That might be accomplished. If you poured sufficient troops in and if you also violated the sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia, you could probably drive them out in time. But even then you have not defeated the nation or the armed forces of the nation, with which we surely, surely must be at war in spite of there being no declaration.

Senator GORE. Then, from your experience, as I understand you, you are saying that with a war in which the ground operations are limited to South Vietnam, there is no possible way to win a victory over North Vietnam?

General SHOUP. That is what I tried to say, yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Though I do not wish to identify any high military authorities not yet retired who take a similar view, there are large numbers of them, and some of them closely allied with the war in Vietnam. And yet if out of this current review has come the policy, "We will win in Vietnam," will this not of necessity cause a readjustment of tactics and strategy to achieve that policy of victory over North Vietnam?

General SHOUP. Undoubtedly so.

Senator CLARK. Would the Senator yield for one question along the same line?

Senator GORE. Yes.

APPRAISAL OF NUMBER U.S. TROOPS NEEDED

Senator CLARK. General Shoup, following up the question Senator Gore just asked you, if we assume—and I think it is fair to assume—that the mission of our armed forces is to clear the enemy—which means the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese—from the territory of South Vietnam so that the people there may live in peace, what is your best military appraisal as to the American force needed to accomplish that mission?

General SHOUP. Well, again I don't like to appear facetious and I am not being ficticious but if you will first tell me how many more people North Vietnam is going to put down there I would give you a better idea. We can't do it. You can't answer a question like that, Senator, or I can't. I give up. You can't do it.

Senator CLARK. Let me qualify my question then by saying that one would assume that the enemy would react to escalation on our part by sending in the 6, 8, 10, 12, whatever number of well-trained divisions they have in North Vietnam, not yet committed to the battle rather than permit us to accomplish our mission. Would that help you in your answer?

General SHOUP. Well, again I would have to say I don't think Ho Chi Minh is that stupid. He hasn't appeared to be so far.

Senator CLARK. You mean that you don't think he would commit the other divisions?

General SHOUP. No, and no more than we talk every day in the papers about we don't want to pull out a few divisions that are still here in America because we want to be ready to protect ourselves. Well, he has the same predicament. He may think we are going to land up there. Do you think he is going to send all of his forces down there and have this great nation with unlimited forces and amphibious forces come in there when he has nothing left? Oh, no.

NEEDED TROOPS TO PACIFY VIETNAM

Senator CLARK. All right, let's assume he won't substantially increase the present strength in South Vietnam of North Vietnamese regular troops. What is your appraisal of what would be necessary on our part, from a military point of view, to clear the present North Vietnamese troops out; to pacify or overcome the Viet Cong; and to pacify the country?

General SHOUP. And to protect their cities?

Senator CLARK. Yes.

General SHOUP. I would like to give you just a little bit of arithmetic.

When we first started out there, the enemy had a mortar range of about 800 yards. Now, they have a PFX missile or whatever you want to call it. We fiddle-faddled out there, giving them sufficient time to bring in these sophisticated missiles that shoot 8,000 yards.

Senator CLARK. I saw that Russian rocket which goes 9 miles.

General SHOUP. Well, I am just giving them 8,000 yards, but I want to show you just what 8,000 means.

Two times 8,000 is 16,000 and then stir in a little π, and you have got something like 30 miles, circumference, meaning that you have to

protect a 30-mile circumference to keep from getting a missile in the middle of Danang.

Senator CLARK. General Cushman told me that his troops had to patrol 200 square miles of territory every night in Danang.

General SHOUP. That is why I am getting around to this business. We have information anyway, and this is, I presume, the minimum, you see they attacked and mortared or missiled, a minimum of 103 cities during the Tet offensive. Now, just by a little arithmetic and a little bit of military knowledge you know what it would take to protect those cities from mortars or missiles, just 103 of them let alone another 50 or so which are vulnerable, you are up in the minimum number of troops of 700,000, 800,000 just to do that, without any to stand against the North Vietnamese Army. So I think you can just pull any figure you wanted out of the hat and that would not be enough.

Senator CLARK. As a practical matter, it is not feasible is it?

General SHOUP. I don't think it is feasible to say we can protect every city out there, why, no, I am absolutely sure of that. It is not feasible.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

WINNING A MILITARY VICTORY OVER CHINA

Senator GORE. General, you are being very helpful and I am trying to draw upon your experience as one of the highest ranking and most decorated military leaders of our country. Members of this committee are not military experts. Some of us have about the same amount of military experience that our new Secretary of Defense has, or that our Commander in Chief had before becoming President. Nevertheless, as civilians without military training, we must wrestle with these problems of policy, and it is policy to which I keep trying to direct your attention to and get your advice.

Now, if the policy is to defeat North Vietnam, then you say it is necessary to widen the war beyond South Vietnam.

General SHOUP. Absolutely.

Senator GORE. Now, this illustrates the predicament that a Senator is in when he hears military leaders such as you say—and many others say less publicly—that there is no way to win a military victory with the present policy.

I write this in a letter to my constituents, I say this in a speech, and immediately I am attacked as being of, or at least as having some color of limited patriotism, and yet you say, the same thing.

Let us suppose we invade North Vietnam, we have been advised that an invasion of North Vietnam would bring China into the war. Then how would we win a victory over China, in your opinion?

General SHOUP. Nuclear weapons is the only way to do it.

Senator GORE. Then, in order to achieve a victory in Asia, you say nuclear warfare is the only way?

General SHOUP. No, I didn't say that. I accepted your "if."

Senator GORE. Yes.

General SHOUP. With respect to China.

Senator GORE. I meant to include that. There is no effort here to entrap you into something. In other words, if it leads to a war with China, the only hope of victory there is a nuclear one?

General SHOUP. If we then determined a policy to defeat the armed forces of China.

Senator GORE. The answer, then, is "Yes," if the goal then is to——

General SHOUP. If we invade North Vietnam with an idea of defeating militarily the armed forces of North Vietnam, and by such action the Chinese Armed Forces come into the war on an all-out basis we cannot win a ground warfare against China without nuclear weapons.

Senator GORE. In a plainly spoken, but to me, a very dramatic way, you have described the dilemma which has driven me as a member of this committee and many other people to question in the most vigorous terms the wisdom of the policy we are pursuing. This is why we are so apprehensive of this talk of determination to win a victory in Vietnam, because as you have said, a victory is not possible against North Vietnam, whom we fight and who is our avowed enemy, without an invasion of North Vietnam. We are advised, this committee has been alerted for a long while, that China has warned us that an invasion of North Vietnam would be an occasion for their entrance into the war. If the goal then would be to defeat China, you say we could do so only in a nuclear war. So this is why so many of us have felt that we are on the brink of a third world war and a nuclear holocaust if we pursue blindly a policy of military victory in Southeast Asia.

General SHOUP. Senator, many millions of people are suffering the same dilemma.

WAR OF ATTRITION

However, there is, there are other methods. We can place more troops and more troops into South Vietnam and keep fighting, destroying and what have you, with the hope, if we are going to continue this murderous method, with the hope that finally North Vietnam will have enough of it. In other words, what you hear about attrition. We don't have to go outside of North Vietnam. We can pour the people in there. We don't have to defeat the army that is up in the north. Maybe if we keep more troops, more troops, more troops, keep on doing what we are doing, the idea I think is in some people's minds that finally North Vietnam will have been bled so much that they say "well, this is useless. Let's sit down and talk this over."

Senator GORE. Well now, let's examine that. It seems to me that out of your very interesting testimony three possible choices have emerged. One, continuing what we are doing as you have just described it.

General SHOUP. It is possible.

Senator GORE. However long and at whatever price.

Another is escalation in a way designed to win a victory over North Vietnam.

Another, perhaps, is a move toward deescalation.

Now, you have just referred to the possibility of ultimately winning a victory in a war of attrition.

General SHOUP. Without the greater risk of going into North Vietnam and inciting the Chinese.

Senator GORE. Now, can you give us some estimate of how long that would take?

General SHOUP. Senator, I would be—it would be preposterous of me to say that I could give you an estimate.

Senator GORE. Could you give us an estimate——

General SHOUP. It depends entirely upon the will of the North Vietnamese, Ho Chi Minh and his followers and how much additional help and for how long will China and Russia help North Vietnam. I don't know.

Senator GORE. Would it, do you think it might possibly take 10 years?

General SHOUP. It might be possible in 6 months or 1 month if we send sufficient troops in the south. If finally you make the enemy commander in chief believe that no matter how much he sends down there we are finally going to chew them up. So what can he gain?

At the same time the real thing that has to have so much thought with respect to America is, yes, we can do it in this way, we can do this, but you have to consider the cost and then what do we expect to gain from it in the end?

Senator GORE. Will you talk about that?

General SHOUP. Sir?

Senator GORE. We have been following this policy which you say it might be possible to pursue further and ultimately win with. This has been the policy we have been following all along, is that right?

General SHOUP. I think that is correct. In other words——

Senator GORE. In addition to chewing them up in South Vietnam they have been chewing us up in South Vietnam.

General SHOUP. There is a little reciprocity between armed forces, you know.

COST OF CONTINUING PRESENT POLICY

Senator GORE. And we have been destroying the country we profess to be saving. And we set out to bomb North Vietnam until they came to the conference table. That has not succeeded, either. So here we are now. What now? Do we continue to do what we are doing? Do we escalate; do we continue doing what we are doing; do we deescalate? Now, you have mentioned the cost. Let's talk about the cost to the United States in continuing the present policy? You were about to give us some estimates, I believe, or express some views about it.

General SHOUP. No, I simply said that is one of the many factors that must enter in before the painful decision is made as to whether or not we continue our policy of escalation, escalation, escalation, with the hope that Ho Chi Minh finally gets tired of this and says "well, let's sit down and talk this over." Or whether we take another tack and decide to defeat the armed forces of North Vietnam, close their harbors, declare war on them, invade the north and all those things that would have to be considered if you made a decision to defeat the armed forces of North Vietnam. The cost, considering the cost to date, and if you had to multiply 10 or 20, 30 or 40 times, it is very difficult for my mentality to believe that we want to do something like that particularly if you add to it the risk involved in getting the Chinese armed forces into it.

EXTENT OF U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST IN VIETNAM

Senator GORE. Well, no one can really calculate the cost. I didn't expect you to give an estimate of how many years, how many lives. No one can foresee the costs. Assuming it lasts a long time and that the further destruction is vast, we then come to the question that Senator Symington asked; what do we win if we win?

General SHOUP. I just tried to express that, but not quite so well. The cost against—what have we gained, and I do not think that the gain, no matter how greatly it may be embellished will ever equal one-one thousandth of the cost.

Senator GORE. I must conclude. You have said that South Vietnam from a strategic military standpoint is not vital to our national security.

General SHOUP. That is right.

Senator GORE. Now, from an economic standpoint——

General SHOUP. Not necessary to our existence today nor to our continued existence.

Senator GORE. Well, from an economic standpoint the only export they have ever had is rice. We don't particularly need that. It is not a matter of vital necessity to our security, is it?

General SHOUP. Well, a little tin and rubber down there, but science takes care of that. You can't use that as an excuse any more for holding on to Malaya and those areas. Tin and rubber, you used to use that, you know, to say why we had to be there, but you can't——

The CHAIRMAN. You can buy it a lot cheaper on the market than you can take it with troops, can't you?

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

Senator GORE. Since I referred to a statement by President Johnson last Saturday, before the National Alliance of Businessmen I think it is only fair that I read his exact words as reported by the press. I might say before I read it that it is a striking negotiating position:

> As your President, I want to say this to you today: we must meet our commitments in the world and in Vietnam. We shall and we are going to win.

It is not South Vietnam, it is Vietnam. Continuing the quote:

> To meet the needs of these fighting men, we shall do whatever is required. We and our allies seek only a just and an honorable peace. * * * We seek nothing else. The communists have made it clear that up to now, thus far, they are unwilling to negotiate or work out a settlement except on the battlefield. If that is what they choose, then we shall win a settlement on the battlefield. If their position changes—as we fervently hope it will—then we in the U.S. and our allies then are prepared to immediately meet anywhere, any time, in the spirit of flexibility and understanding and generosity. But make no mistake about it—we are going to win.

I thought it fair to read the verbatim statements as reported by the press.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator from Missouri.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Shoup, it is a pleasure to see you. Of all military, there is none that I admire more than I do you.

General SHOUP. Thank you.

GENERAL LEW WALT

Senator SYMINGTON. I still remember your testimony in this room before the Armed Services Committee not many years ago about the way you trained Marines.

Do you think General Lew Walt is a good commander?

General SHOUP. I say if you are not a good one you get relieved.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then your answer would be yes?

General SHOUP. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know him personally?

General SHOUP. For many years.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sure you have the same very high opinion of him that I do? I never met a finer leader of men.

SUCCESS OF PACIFICATION PROGRAM

Why do you think he has been unsuccessful in what he has been trying to do in the northern part of South Vietnam?

General SHOUP. Well, I don't know what degree of or lack of success he has. But I think that I would have to have a lot more information than I do have before I could make an intelligent answer. I know that this business of pacification is an extremely difficult thing, and I think one of the biggest assets to it is that when the Vietcong come into an area, whoever has the gun, whoever has the weapon, is the head man. That is why even though a lot of these people are converted to our side perhaps, they are reluctant to help because they endanger their family. I think that while we have tried hard, there is so much evidence that they can see, I suppose they have the same kind of grapevines that we do, that instead of winning the minds and hearts of their people, we have rather closed their minds and broken their hearts. There is a great deal of that.

And then secondly, thirdly, fourthly, and fifthly I don't think the South Vietnamese people—and we have pretty good evidence of this like us, and they don't like us meddling in their business and they don't like us trying to tell them what kind of a house they ought to live in, what kind of bandage they ought to put on their foot, and all the rest of it. They would like to live the way they want to live.

Senator SYMINGTON. Speaking of the pacification program, General Moishe Dayan, who has had experience in war himself, as have you, when out of the Government, a little over a year and a half ago, was here. Then he went to Vietnam, spent a lot of time with the troops. I saw him later in the Middle East on one of my trips back from Vietnam, and asked him if it was correct, as reported in the press, that he had said that if the Vietnamese reverted to guerrilla warfare, the United States could never defeat them. He said yes, and added no American was ever going to sell his choice for village chief to the villagers. Is that, in effect, what you are implying in your answer?

General SHOUP. I think so. I don't think I said it as well. But that is a more specific indication.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know General Cushman?

General SHOUP. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Another outstanding officer, I visited with him at Danang recently.

LACK OF SUCCESS IN VIETNAM

Why do you think he isn't having more success up there?

General SHOUP. Well, Senator, you have me rather in a dilemma because when you say any more success, that would imply that he had some and I am sure he has.

Senator SYMINGTON. They both have had some and they are both fine leaders. They both lead the Marine Corps, in which there is no finer group of Americans. You have forgotten more about that than I will ever know. But what is the problem? Is it lack of troops or lack of permission to counterattack, a factor which in previous wars was considered important to success? I don't pretend to be any military expert. But what is the problem? Why are we, regardless of the gigantic amount of money we are spending, running around $2½ billion a month, plus steadily increasing the number of troops put in, why is it we are making so little progress?

General SHOUP. Well, Senator, I think you probably asked a question, the wrong question at the wrong time of the wrong person.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I might take the first two but I won't take the third. I have been reading what you have been saying, and am interested.

General SHOUP. Senator, I am not—I have not been filled in much on what we have been unsuccessful in doing.

I think all of these commanders, Army, Marine, Navy, Air Force are assigned to a task to do and they have tried to their very level best to do it with the material at hand.

Senator SYMINGTON. No question.

General SHOUP. And as you know they never have enough. If you gave them twice as much that wouldn't be enough, but nevertheless with what they have had available, I think they have really in some instances made a miraculous success considering that the entire countryside, as I say, the man with the gun runs it, the entire countryside is against them. They are with them in the daytime and they are against them at night. I don't think our armed forces have ever experienced anything like that.

HOW TO BE MORE SUCCESSFUL IN I AND II CORPS

Senator SYMINGTON. I respect your modesty which is typical, but you come before the Senate to give your frank opinion. If the Secretary of Defense called you in and asked what you thought should be done to be more successful in I Corps, what would be your answer?

General SHOUP. In I Corps alone?

Senator SYMINGTON. Let's say I Corps and the II Corps. I don't want to include the III Corps because there are problems which have been brought up, increasingly apparent, namely the solid dislike of the South Vietnamese people for the United States, corruption in the Government of South Vietnam. If you go further down in the delta, we have never really operated there until fairly recently with our own troops in any quantity. So let's take I Corps and the II Corps.

General SHOUP. Senator, I have had considerable experience in knowing how unwelcome another question is as to the answer to your question, but I think if I were asked that question by the Secretary of Defense I would say: "Mr. Secretary, what is the policy of the Com-

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mander-In-Chief with respect to the final objective of our commitment in Vietnam?"

And then and only then could I give him my answer.

Senator SYMINGTON. You don't feel we know that yet?

General SHOUP. No, sir, I don't. I think this decisionmaking process that surely must be going on now and which is undoubtedly vital to these United States, I don't believe it could be made that quickly. I think the assessment of what happened to us in the Viet—whatever that was, Tet offensive is going to play a great role in this. If they can do that so completely, while we undoubtedly knew something was going to happen, there was intelligence to indicate that something was going to happen, some strange thing was going to happen on New Year's, but the extent of it was never conceived to be what it was. I think there are so many factors involved that I do not believe, in spite of the greatness of our armed forces and our Administration to make decisions, I don't think they could have possibly made a decision on the overall basis in this length of time, but they could have made a decision to keep on doing what we are doing with a few more troops. Whether they have or not I am sure you are in a more enviable position to know that than I am.

Senator SYMINGTON. More enviable?

General SHOUP. I think so, enviable. I would envy you if you could find out.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mean you would envy me if I could tell you? [Laughter.]

U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

As a former respected member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, don't you have some apprehension, about not only the nature, but the degree, of the military and economic commitments we have made in this little country in Southeast Asia?

General SHOUP. Senator, it is a serious thing to me considering all the treaty commitments we have and all the promises we have made that this great Nation can be so shaken by such a little nation with such a few people, with such unsophisticated weapons, that they had, particularly in the first 6 or 7 or 8 or 10 or 15 months. But all we have to do is keep on what we are doing not winning anything, not negotiating and they will have even more sophisticated weapons certainly.

Senator SYMINGTON. They are adding to those sophisticated weapons all the time.

General SHOUP. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Anybody opposed to the United States, on a global scale, would relish the opportunity to put increasingly sophisticated weapons into Vietnam. It is just plain commonsense, isn't it?

General SHOUP. Yes, sir, it is good practice ground.

Senator SYMINGTON. A year ago last January I asked the Secretary of Defense how long he thought we could continue to put two and a half billion dollars a month in chasing people around the jungles over there. His answer was forever. Do you agree?

General SHOUP. Well, considering how long forever is, I don't agree with him.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is a pretty long time.

Then this year, last January 22, the Secretary testified that we could handle the Vietnam situation, and at the same time handle all the domestic programs we plan, and at the same time do what was necessary to reduce, if not eliminate, poverty and unemployment in all the other countries of the world. Would you agree with that?

General SHOUP. Well, I think that that is very similar to during several years before Pearl Harbor all we heard was, well, we could whip those boys with one arm tied behind our back. I think that is the answer. No, I don't believe so.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know how you feel about some of the moral problems involved, and respect your thinking; and now you have expressed your feeling about the military situation.

INCREASING UNREST ABOUT VIETNAM WAR

Doesn't the increasing unrest around the country because of failure to bring the Vietnam war to some form of conclusion disturb you from a political standpoint?

General SHOUP. Well, I suppose I would have to say first that I am apolitical but I am interested in politics because that is the process which produces our Commander in Chief. People are concerned and I think that what really strikes them, Senator, is that for many, many months they had the wrong viewpoint. They thought this was just going to be another Santo Domingo and soon over with. They went ahead with their business trying to find out where the next cloverleaf was going to be built so they could buy the land ahead of time instead of thinking about the Vietnam war. But this is beginning——

Senator SYMINGTON. My question——

General SHOUP. Yes, it is definitely political.

Senator SYMINGTON. My question was not about domestic political problems; rather international politics, the increasing interest on the part of our allies who watch us with over 200 million people and $800 billion gross national product not getting very far. This seems to be lowering the respect of our allies for us. That is what I mean by political.

General SHOUP. Well, also sir, I am sure, I agree with that, it is eroding and I have some reasons to know this personally myself.

Senator SYMINGTON. Eroding in what way? That is an interesting word.

General SHOUP. Well, their great respect for our image. Our great image is beginning to erode in the foreign countries, obviously in the foreign press, and I can hardly blame them when they now view a situation with the greatest country in the world, the greatest armed forces, the greatest this, the greatest that, would now be convulsed by what a few months ago was referred to as a little affair in Southeast Asia.

INTEGRITY OF THE DOLLAR AT STAKE

Senator SYMINGTON. My final series of questions has to do with what might be called the third leg of our platform of security and well-being, the economic. We have talked about the military and the political legs and I would talk a minute about the economic. For 5 years I have been predicting to my colleagues that this heavy excess

of export over import could only result in a monetary crisis. Now we have been looking at one. This morning, one of the ablest men in the field, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, says this two-price decision is only temporary, but if we continue to pour out our treasure and more important, lives—we have lost a lot of fine young men—to the point where there it increasing distrust of the integrity of the dollar, couldn't we lose whatever it is we are fighting for just as much as from a military standpoint?

General SHOUP. We certainly are going to lose it in the minds of all of those countries whose high opinion of us is so important to our continued position in the world, without a doubt, and, of course, to borrow your word "forever" since a small boy I have heard that spending more than you take in can't go on forever.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can you imagine anything which would be a greater disservice to the American people than spending to the point where, in major fashion, you reduced the value of the dollar and thereby reduced heavily the value of life insurance, of pension plans, of retirement funds, and of social security itself. Should we not face up as to how we are going to distribute our wealth, or do you think the wealth of the United States and its human resources are of no limit?

General SHOUP. Senator, nothing could have a greater impact on America and its future except a nuclear exchange and, of course, that solves insurance problems, real estate mortgages and you can start from the bottom again.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you General. It is always constructive to get your thinking.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator from New Jersey mind if the Senator from Pennsylvania proceeds; he has another appointment?

Senator CASE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is recognized.

Senator CLARK. I shall be very brief.

EVALUATION OF THE TET OFFENSIVE

General, as a military man do you think that the Tet offensive can fairly be described as an American military victory? It was, you know.

General SHOUP. Well, did you get that description from St. Elizabeth's some place?

Senator CLARK. I hate to say it but it came from the White House.

General SHOUP. Well, there are all kinds of people there, too. I would think it would take a rather great stretch of the imagination. Somebody asked me the other day, somebody asked me how I was, and I said if I had to go through another one of these Tet holiday winning streaks, I didn't know whether I could take it or not.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, General.

My colleague from Pennsylvania, Congressman William Moorhead, has submitted House Concurrent Resolution 675, which reads: "Resolved, that it is the sense of Congress that the United States should not increase its military involvement in Vietnam."

Would you support such a resolution?

General SHOUP. Well, I think Congress has one resolution on the books already.

Senator CLARK. You mean the Tonkin Bay Resolution?

General SHOUP. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. This resolution would indicate a change in policy, of course.

General SHOUP. All right, that is just my point. If the policy be changed, then OK.

ROLE OF CONGRESS IN DETERMINING POLICY

Senator CLARK. Don't you think Congress has a part to play in determining policy?

General SHOUP. Well, if they don't, there are a lot of people in America being deceived.

Senator CLARK. And, therefore—I don't want to press you, General, and perhaps it is unfair to say if you were in Congress—as a citizen, would you support a resolution which resolved that we should not further increase our military intervention in Vietnam?

General SHOUP. Not unless the decision was made about what we are going to do in Vietnam.

Senator CLARK. I understand.

General SHOUP. I think it would be very stupid to make some categorical statement that we don't give any more, and then stick with it without saying at the same time we are going to get out of there or something like that, because all you do would be to have all of our people murdered out there.

Senator CLARK. Yes; I understand your point of view.

It seems to me, though, that there is a time at which the Congress has to move into the policymaking area. And the first thing to do is to make it clear—if it is the Congress' view—that we have had enough in terms of further escalation.

MILITARY THEORIES OF GENERAL GAVIN AND RIDGWAY

That leads me to my second question: Do you put any credence in the military theories advocated by Generals Gavin and Ridgway—as General Gavin said when we only had 200,000 men there—that we should make do with what we had and not further escalate the war. I am sure, now that we have over 500,000 men there that he would feel the same way, but is it not feasible—from a military point of view—to pull back from Khe Sanh and the jungles and the highlands, and attempt to defend ourselves around the major cities?

General SHOUP. If you change the mission of the armed forces; yes, sir. But their mission is to get these people out of there.

You see, they are trying to do what their orders call for.

Senator CLARK. I understand, General, and I am not trying to put you into the policymaking arena.

General SHOUP. But the answer to your question is, you can retreat clear down to around Saigon or Danang or any other place all you want to, but you won't be carrying out the objectives that the armed forces have been given.

Senator CLARK. Of course, and I am assuming that we abandon that objective because it is not feasible, as you answered in reply to a question from me a little while ago.

MAINTAINING ONLY AIR AND SEA POWER IN ASIA

Now, my final question: As a matter of mixed diplomacy and military policy, do you think that we could get off the land mass of Asia, maintain bases on the island chain running from Japan to Okinawa to Taiwan to the Philippines to the Malaysian Peninsula—which is almost an island—and to Indonesia, utilize our airpower and our seapower to support our diplomacy; and have a policy on that basis which would be in the national interest?

General SHOUP. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, Senator Case.

Senator CASE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST IN VIETNAM

Senator PELL. General Shoup, I have always admired you and followed your statements with very great interest. At one time I think you said that you felt our national interest in Southeast Asia was really not worth the death of another American young man. I believe this is correct. I must say I agree with you.

If you were the commander in chief, what would you do? What would be your policy? I realize you are a military man and this may seem a little unfair, but if you could lay out the broad strategy, what would it be?

General SHOUP. Well, Senator, I will just have to say in my time I have never been so presumptuous as to play like I was the commander in chief, so I haven't had much experience thinking about what I ought to do as commander in chief.

Senator PELL. Here is your chance.

General SHOUP. Without that experience, I don't think it would be fair to try to answer it.

Senator PELL. I appreciate that. I think you are much more modest than most of us are on this side of the table, and I won't press you further on that. [Laughter.]

U.S. GARRISON AT KHE SANH

To be a little more specific and perhaps fairer to you as a military man, what is your view with regard to the positioning of our garrison at Khe Sanh? Do you feel it is sound militarily under the present set of circumstances?

General SHOUP. I am one of those who refuses to believe that our great commanders, that we have at all levels out there, would have that force out there, that they would just stumble into this situation that they would have it out there expecting to sacrifice it. I am one of those who believes that somewhere along the line there is some strategy with respect to this that we don't know, and this is one thing I don't think we should know else the enemy might find it out, too. I have to feel that there is some strategy in which it is expected that eventually we will gain a great deal by maintaining Khe Sanh. And I don't think that they are going to take Khe Sanh.

Senator PELL. Do you believe that even with their full resources,

with their manpower five times, or whatever figure you wish, more than ours, that we have means to control it?

General SHOUP. Are you talking about, specifically about Khe Sanh?

Senator PELL. Yes; Khe Sanh.

General SHOUP. Until—yes; we do, I am sure, until there may come a situation under which we would want to get out of the place, and I don't think pride or anything else of that nature would be sufficient to keep us in there just to get that many people annihilated. I think there is some strategy to this that has not been made public, and I don't think it should.

But I continue to believe that there is, there must be, some good sound reason for being there.

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator PELL. Are there any circumstances, that would justify our using any sort of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia?

General SHOUP. You are excluding the Chinese mainland?

Senator PELL. I am excluding the war you mentioned earlier.

General SHOUP. I can't imagine any such situations.

Senator PELL. I would very much agree with you, and I would hope that our Commander in Chief would, too, and trust that he does.

NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL TO FIGHT

One of the things that has bothered me in this war is that it is sort of an example of counterpurposes, as the military force gets larger, as we have a larger amount of presence there, we automatically sap the Vietnamese vitality. If we reduce our presence there, then they are subject to the boring from within in their own country. How do you account, from your experience as a fighting man, for the apparent more intense will to fight, belief in their cause, of the North Vietnamese as opposed to that of the South Vietnamese?

The CHAIRMAN. I may say to the Senator we went over that before you came in.

General SHOUP. I would say my reply to that is in the record.

Senator PELL. I apologize and withdraw the question.

The CHAIRMAN. We talked about that at length before you came in.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

EFFECT OF BOMBING CIVILIAN AREAS

Finally, also from a military viewpoint, do you subscribe to the theory that bombing of civilian areas does not sap the will of the people to resist but rather increases it?

General SHOUP. I think the only example we have is that it increases the will of the people to resist.

Senator PELL. Wasn't that the result of the strategic bombing survey after World War II?

General SHOUP. Yes, sir, I think so, and in addition, we didn't decrease the will of the Japanese to resist by bombing Iwo Jima for 46 or 47 straight days with every airplane and every bomber we could get hold of. It didn't stop London. Germany—we knocked a city off of

the top of the submarine pens but they kept on building submarines. I think there is no evidence on the other side of the question.

EFFECT OF CESSATION OF BOMBING AND DEESCALATION

Senator PELL. Finally, subscribing as I do to the belief we should cease the bombing of the North and deescalate in the South, I ask, would you believe that one could hang on there, with some development of the Gavin-Ridgway theory, for some indefinite period with far fewer casualties, far fewer deaths, and with far less expenditure of money?

General SHOUP. I am sure we could hang on, but we wouldn't be accomplishing the objective assigned to the armed forces.

Senator PELL. That would be correct. The objectives would be changed, but we would be a substantial nuisance value to the Communists and have some kind of a quid pro quo to negotiate with when it came to finally getting out.

General SHOUP. If holding three or four city enclaves, so to speak, is going to be equated with controlling the entire countryside outside of that, the hundreds of thousands of acres, I don't believe they could be equated.

Senator PELL. I wouldn't equate them. I am saying this would increase the chips we have of trying to work out some kind of reasonable settlement in the end.

General SHOUP. Further, I feel quite confident by doing, taking such position we would guarantee our presence there for 20, 30, 40, 50 years.

Senator PELL. But even that might be preferable to the present direction of our course, might it not?

General SHOUP. I think it would require an analysis and a lot more clairvoyance than I have to determine an answer to that, sir.

Senator PELL. Right.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REAL OBJECTIVE OF POLICY UNCLEAR

The CHAIRMAN. General, I think that you have given us some very fine testimony this morning. In your discussion with Senator Gore, you raised a question that is to me most important and that is the question of policy and goals and objectives, and the reconciliation of what is actually being said and done today.

Last week, when we had the Secretary of State here, the main purpose of my questioning was to urge the Secretary, and through him the Administration, to have genuine consultation—discussion with the Congress over this very question of our goals and our policy, rather than the question of tactics. We have never been interested in day-to-day military tactics, interested in the sense of trying to advise or to seek consultation. We may be interested, but we don't presume to have any right to know secrets of that kind. But we are interested, and believe we do have a right to know, what goals we are seeking to achieve.

I gather from your testimony that you are very much in the same state that I am and that the committee is—we don't know what the real objective of our policy is.

I want to read you a short statement from General Ridgway's book, "The Korean War," and ask you to comment on it, I will read from page 232 of "The Korean War," published last year. I quote:

Yet, under today's conditions, when men have control of machines capable of laying a world to waste, there must be a close interweaving of political and military goals, lest some misstep set up suddenly beyond the hope of salvaging more than a few scraps of our civilization. Civilian authorities, therefore, need to work closely with military authorities in setting attainable goals and in selecting means to attain them. A war without goals would be most dangerous of all, and nearly as dangerous would be a war with only some vaguely stated aim, such as "victory" or "freedom from aggression" or "the right of the people to choose their own government." Generalities like these make admirable slogans, but authorities today must be hardheaded and specific in naming exactly what the goal we are trying to reach and exactly what price we are willing to pay for reaching it. Otherwise, we may find that, in spite of ourselves, the whole conduct of the war will be left in the hands of men who see only victory as the proper objective and who have never had to define that word in terms plain enough to be understood by all the worlds people.

What do you think of that statement?

General SHOUP. I think he is a great seer.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he is, too. He wrote this some time ago and he described almost word for word what is happening today.

The point that I and other of my colleagues here are trying to make is that the Administration should tell us, and through us, the Senate and the American people, what our goals are. We don't accept—I don't accept—victory or freedom from aggression, or the right to choose a government as legitimate goals and certainly not goals justifying what we are doing.

I understand that you have the same feeling, is that right?

General SHOUP. I believe I said that several times.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have said it. I just thought that General Ridgway described what is going on some time in advance remarkably well.

Here is another statement. I won't read it all, but I will put it in the record. Here is one paragraph:

A war that is "open-ended"—that has no clearly delineated geographical, political and military goals beyond "victory"—is a war that may escalate itself indefinitely, as wars will, with one success requiring still another to insure the first one. An insistence on going all out to win a war may have a fine masculine ring, and a call to "defend freedom" may have a messianic sound that stirs our blood. But the ending of an all-out war in these times is beyond imagining. It may mean the turning back of civilization by several thousand years, with no one left capable of signaling the victory.

It seems to me that he has put it extremely well.

I will put the whole statement in the record as well as a reprint of a chapter from his memoirs.

(The material referred to follows:)

EXCERPTS FROM "THE KOREAN WAR" BY MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, (DOUBLEDAY & CO., INC., GARDEN CITY, N.Y., 1967)

"Yet, under today's conditions, when men have control of machines capable of laying a world to waste, there must be a close interweaving of political and military goals, lest some misstep set us suddenly beyond the hope of salvaging more than a few scraps of our civilization. Civilian authorities, therefore, need

to work closely with military authorities in setting attainable goals and in selecting means to attain them. A war without goals would be most dangerous of all, and nearly as dangerous would be a war with only some vaguely stated aim, such as 'victory' or 'freedom from aggression' or 'the right of the people to choose their own government.' Generalities like these make admirable slogans, but authorities today must be hardheaded and specific in naming exactly what goal we are trying to reach and exactly what price we are willing to pay for reaching it. Otherwise, we may find that, in spite of ourselves, the whole conduct of the war will be left in the hands of men who see only victory as the proper objective and who have never had to define that word in terms plain enough to be understood by all the world's people." (p. 232)

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"One mistake we avoided in Korea was an insistence on 'total victory' or 'unconditional surrender' or even a 'halt to aggression' before talking peace. But in the light of many of the slogans that fill the air and the public prints nowadays, I am moved to wonder if all our citizens have come to understand the concept of limited war. A limited war is not merely a small war that has not yet grown to full size. It is a war in which the objectives are specifically limited in the light of our national interest and our current capabilities. A war that is 'open-ended'—that has no clearly delineated geographical, political, and military goals beyond 'victory'—is war that may escalate itself indefinitely, as wars will, with one success requiring still another to insure the first one. An insistence on going all-out to win a war may have a fine masculine ring, and a call to 'defend freedom' may have a messianic sound that stirs our blood. But the ending of an all-out war in these times is beyond imagining. It may mean the turning back of civilization by several thousand years, with no one left capable of signaling the victory.

"In setting our military goals we need first of all to recognize that most of the world's most basic woes does not lend themselves to purely military solutions. In our clashes with ideologies that deride the dignity of man and deny him his individual freedom, solutions must be sought through combined political, economic, and military efforts." (p. 245)

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"While I am, as I said, not at all convinced that our political objectives in Southeast Asia—manifold, tenuous, and imprecise as have been those set forth by our government officials—really harmonize with our national interests, I do not believe that these misstatements should be our primary concern. Rather we should ask ourselves now if we are not, in this open-ended conflict, so impairing our strength through overdrawing on our resources—political, economic, and military—as to find ourselves unduly weakened when we need to meet new challenges in other more vital areas of the world. For there surely will be threats that bear more closely on our true national interests." (p. 250)

[From U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 3, 1966]

From chapter 32 of General Ridgway's memoirs:

In the spring of 1954, when the Department of Defense was concentrating its greatest efforts on developing our capability to strike massive atomic blows, we very nearly found ourselves involved in a bloody jungle war in which our nuclear capability would have been almost useless.

It was during the time when a gallant French garrison, made up mainly of mercenaries of the Foreign Legion—for France had lacked the will to draft its own young men for service in Indo-China—was making its brave but futile stand at Dienbienphu.

To military men familiar with the maps of Indo-China, the outcome of that siege was a foregone conclusion. The fight could end in but one way—in death or capture for the defenders. The decision to fight at Dienbienphu had not been made on a basis of military considerations. It had been basically political in motive—an effort to stiffen the backbone of shaken Laos, whose boundaries were exposed by the march of the Chinese.

However futile it might have been to stand and fight in that spot, still, the gallantry of the hard-fighting French garrison did capture the imagination of the world. Soon I was deeply concerned to hear individuals of great influence, both in and out of Government, raising the cry that now was the time, and here, in

Indo-China, was the place to "test the new look," for us to intervene, to come to the aid of France with arms.

At the same time that same old delusive idea was advanced—that we could do things the cheap and easy way, by going into Indo-China with air and naval forces alone.

To me this had an ominous ring. For I felt sure that if we committed air and naval power to that area, we would have to follow them immediately with ground forces in support.

I also knew that none of those advocating such a step had any accurate idea what such an operation would cost us in blood and money and national effort. I felt that it was essential therefore that all who had any influence in making the decision on this grave matter should be fully aware of all the factors involved.

To provide these facts, I sent out to Indo-China an Army team of experts in every field: engineers, signal and communications specialists, medical officers, and experienced combat leaders who knew how to evaluate terrain in terms of battle tactics. They went out to get the answers to a thousand questions that those who had so blithely recommended that we go to war there had never taken the trouble to ask.

How deep was the water over the bar at Saigon? What were the harbor and dock facilities? Where could we store the tons of supplies we would need to support us there? How good was the road net—how could supplies be transported as the fighting forces moved inland, and in what tonnages? What of the climate? The rainfall? What tropical diseases would attack the combat soldier in that jungle land? Their report was complete. The area, they found, was practically devoid of those facilities which modern forces such as ours find essential to the waging of war. Its telecommunications, highways, railways—all the things that make possible the operation of a modern combat force on land—were almost nonexistent.

Its port facilities and airfields were totally inadequate, and to provide the facilities we would need would require a tremendous engineering and logistical effort.

The land was a land of rice paddy and jungle—particularly adapted to the guerrilla-type warfare at which the Chinese soldier is a master. This meant that every little detachment, every individual that tried to move about that country would have to be protected by riflemen. Every telephone lineman, road-repair party, every ambulance and every rear-area aid station would have to be under armed guard or they would be shot at around the clock. If we did go into Indo-China, we would have to win.

We would have to go in with a military force adequate in all its branches, and that meant a very strong ground force—an Army that could not only stand the normal attrition of battle, but could absorb heavy casualties from the jungle heat, and the rots and fevers which afflict the white man in the tropics. We could not again afford to accept anything short of decisive military victory.

We could have fought in Indo-China. We could have won, if we had been willing to pay the tremendous cost in men and money that such intervention would have required—a cost that in my opinion would have eventually been as great as, or greater than we paid in Korea.

In Korea, we had learned that air and naval power alone cannot win a war and that inadequate ground forces cannot win one either.

It was incredible to me that we had forgotten that bitter lesson so soon—that we were on the verge of making the same tragic error.

That error, thank God, was not repeated.

As soon as the full report was in, I lost no time in having it passed on up the chain of command. It reached President Eisenhower. To a man of his military experience its implications were immediately clear. The idea of intervening was abandoned, and it is my belief that the analysis which the Army made and presented to higher authority played a considerable, perhaps a decisive, part in persuading our Government not to embark on that tragic adventure.

It is easy for people to dream up intriguing tactical schemes. It is a pastime in which any high-school ROTC cadet can indulge, for it requires only a modicum of military knowledge, and even professionals of long service engage in the same game from time to time.

What throws you in combat is rarely the fact that your tactical scheme was wrong—though, of course, history is replete with examples of faulty tactical planning—but that you failed to think through the hard, cold facts of logistics.

You failed to ask yourself, "How am I going to get Force A from X to Y—and how am I going to supply and sustain it once it gets there?"

There is always a great temptation to think only of the objective to be attained, to ignore the basic planning in the hope that in some way the Lord will provide.

That sort of wishful thinking prevailed in the early days of the Indo-China discussion—prevailed, in fact, until the Army took the time and trouble painstakingly to survey the ground and then to sit down with paper and pencil and laboriously and unglamorously spell the whole thing out in an analysis that revealed all its costs and implications. As I have pointed out earlier in this narrative, when the day comes for me to face my Maker and account for my actions, the thing I would be most humbly proud of was the fact that I fought against, and perhaps contributed to preventing, the carrying out of some harebrained tactical schemes which would have cost the lives of thousands of men. To that list of tragic accidents that fortunately never happened I would add the Indo-China intervention.

Not long after the abortive idea of intervention in Indo-China had been laid to rest, there came the flare-up over Quemoy and Matsu. Again there was strong feeling in high places that here we should take a stand. And again I found myself in disagreement with the interventionists.

I do not for a moment wish to impugn the intellectual honesty of any others who did not share this view. They sincerely felt, I think, that it was better to face the issue then and there, to make it clear to the Reds that any encroachment on Chinese Nationalist territory, however slight, would mean war.

To me that concept is completely repugnant. I make no pretense to clairvoyance. God alone knows what would happen. But such an action would be almost impossible to limit. It would bring us into direct conflict with the Red Chinese. It could spread to full and all-out war, employing all the terrible weapons at our command.

And we could, by such an all-out effort, conquer China.

But I challenge any thesis that destroying the military might of Red China would be in our own longrange interest. We could create there, by military means, a great power vacuum.

Then we would have to go in there with hundreds of thousands of men to fill that vacuum—which would bring us face to face with Russia along a 7,000-mile frontier. If we failed to go in, then Russia herself would fill it, and the threat to our own security would not have abated one iota.

The CHAIRMAN. In this connection, I also want to put in the record an article by General Gavin who, as we all know, was a colleague and a deputy, I believe, of General Ridgway.

(The article referred to follows:)

[Reprint of Saturday Evening Post article in the Congressional Record, Feb. 27, 1968]

WE CAN GET OUT OF VIETNAM

(By James M. Gavin, in collaboration with Arthur T. Hadley)

Vietnam is the least understood conflict in our nation's history. We have committed more than 480,000 troops and the might of our air and sea power. We have fought skillfully and bravely. Yet "victory" is nowhere in sight. Will more troops bring a quicker victory? More air strikes?

Unfortunately, there will be no "victory" in Vietnam. Only more victims. This is the difficult and unfortunate truth we have yet to understand. To see the Vietnam problem, we must first trace briefly the history of our involvement there, and then set Vietnam in the context of our present military and diplomatic capabilities. When we have done that, we may not have "victory" but we can at least plan toward a successful conclusion of the war.

Before beginning this study of the Vietnamese situation, I want to make one point absolutely clear. On the level of combat itself Vietnam is the best fought war in our history. I have watched officers and noncoms leading the troops in the field, and they are highly professional, the troops start out well-trained, battle-ready Americans, whatever they think of the conflict, can be proud of these soldiers and their dedication. Let no debate on Vietnam divide us from the knowledge of our soldiers courage. The errors of his tragic war are made not on the battlefield but in Washington.

My own involvement with Vietnam began in 1954. I was then Chief of Plans of the Army, serving under Matthew B. Ridgway, the Chief of Staff. I had served with him in the past, a man of incisive intelligence and great moral courage, a good man to work for.

In 1954 the French in Vietnam were involved at Dienbienphu. They had dug into this isolated fortified area to provoke the Viet-minh into a major battle in which the Communist troops would be destroyed. But then it became clear that the battle was not going as the French had planned. They stepped up their already tremendous demands on the United States for war material.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been doubtful about the Dienbienphu strategy from the beginning. I felt that genuine French concessions to make Vietnam independent were far more important than mere firepower.

As the situation at Dienbienphu worsened, the French in desperation asked us for carrier strikes against the attacking Communists. Adm. Arthur W. Radford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a strong advocate of carrier air power, favored this. So did Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Adm. Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations. There was even talk of using one or two nuclear weapons. Our allies, sounded out by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, were opposed. General Ridgway believed that the air attacks would be indecisive, and that they would lead to involvement of American ground troops. We in the Army felt that this was a war that America certainly did not want.

Ridgway carried his disagreement to President Eisenhower, who finally decided against the air strike. I am convinced that Ridgway along with our allies, played a crucial role in aborting this 1954 effort to involve us in Vietnam.

Dienbienphu fell on May 7. The next day the French and the Vietminh met in Geneva and—with speed that surprised us in the Pentagon—agreed to end the war. They wrote the Geneva accords of July, 1954, partitioning Vietnam at the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam, and providing for nationwide elections to be held by July 20, 1956, to decide the nature of reunification.

To understand what happened next, it is important to understand the attitude of the Pentagon in 1954, because this attitude produced the initial decisions that led to where we are in Vietnam today and because this attitude is still all too prevalent in our military thinking.

In 1954 the Korean War controlled Pentagon thinking. For the Air Force it had been a disillusioning and frustrating experience. They had assumed that air power would demolish the North Korean military. They had trumpeted this point of view to the public and to the President. When bombing failed to halt the North Korean war effort, the Air Force developed the myth of the Yalu sanctuary. If only they could bomb Manchuria, beyond the Yalu, everything would turn out all right. Thus, at least in public, the Air Force was able to avoid confronting the evidence that in Korea air power had failed, strategically and tactically. Unfortunately, from their frustration sprang a readiness to reply to any challenge to American power with threats of total nuclear war.

To the Army, Korea had been embittering and costly. Of the more than 147,000 casualties, most had been in the ground forces. Despite the Army's wealth of combat experience, abundant logistical support and modern equipment, major units had been surprised and routed by Chinese forces. We felt that more Korea-type wars—wars fought out on the ground—were a possibility, and that we should have funds to train and equip ourselves for them. Instead, we were beginning to feel the pressure of the "new look" cutbacks that flowed out of the doctrine of massive retaliation. Our funds and troop strengths were slashed, while the forces for strategic nuclear bombing were built up.

In addition all of us in the Pentagon—and I include myself—tended to see the world in terms of good guys and bad guys. It was a simple vision, and in the era of Stalinism it held much truth.

Still, we should have been wiser. We assumed that Peking was a pawn of Moscow, that Russia—thwarted in Europe by NATO and the Marshall Plan—was on the march in Asia. The Communist world was assumed to be an integrated, monolithic block. Only a few of us were beginning to distinguish between the nationalistic Communism of Tito and the Stalinism of Russia. And even fewer extended that concept to Ho Chi Minh's brand of Communism in Vietnam. The whole idea was near-heresy, but the fact was that Communism was changing; the future would show that there were brands of nationalistic Communism with which the United States could quite safely coexist.

This was the Pentagon atmosphere as we followed the Geneva talks. We felt that the French, despite the lavish support they had had from us, were acting almost entirely out of self-interest—protecting French investments—rather than in the interest of democracy as a whole.

With the folding of the French the Pentagon staff assumed that the burden of fighting Communism in Asia had now fallen upon the United States. Secretary of State Dulles and the CIA agreed with the Pentagon. At that time Secretary Dulles was building a paper wall of treaties to contain Communism. The Joint Chiefs began a high-priority study of a proposal to send combat troops into the Red River Delta of North Vietnam.

It was my responsibility as Chief of Plans of the Army Staff to recommend a position for the Army. I began by bringing in Asian experts. We had to face the fact that if we entered North Vietnam we were, in effect, going to war with Red China. Red China would be providing most of the arms, vehicles and ammunition, and would feel that our move was a threat to her national self-interest.

(Let me reiterate: the Army staff and I had wanted no war with Red China. We argued forcefully and frequently against such a war. We simply considered the alternatives.)

The Army staff anticipated a bloody and costly war that would engage a tremendous portion of our manpower and resources, at the expense of our obligations in other parts of the world and at home.

As they had during the Dienbienphu crisis, the Joint Chiefs divided. Admiral Radford strongly favored landing a force in the Haiphong-Hanoi area, even at the risk of war with Red China. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations supported him.

In my opinion the risk of war would have been great. Just southeast of Haiphong harbor is the island of Hainan, which is actually part of Red China. The Navy was unwilling to risk ships in the Haiphong area without first taking the island.

Once more the embattled Ridgeway dissented. Using the staff study we had prepared in the Army, he wrote directly to President Eisenhower, pointing out the hazards of a war in Vietnam. Again, fortunately, the President decided not to commit U.S. forces to Southeast Asia.

However, there was a compromise. We decided to support what we hoped would be a stable, representative, independent government in South Vietnam. The fact that this was contrary to the Geneva accords seemed irrelevant.

We thought then that our most serious problem was the selection of a premier for South Vietnam, to serve under the technical head of state, Emperor Bao Dai. The job fell to Ngo Dinh Diem.

I visited Saigon early in 1955 to discuss political- and military-aid matters. I met Diem, who struck me as very nonpolitical, self-centered and quite unresponsive to the needs of his people. Nonetheless, the Defense Department, the State Department and the CIA supported him. Once more we were acting from honest conviction: The world was black and white, no gray in between. We had stopped Communism in Europe. We had stopped it in Korea. Now we were going to stop it at the 17th parallel in Vietnam.

On July 16, 1955, the Diem government announced—with American backing—that it would not comply with the provision of the Geneva accords calling for free elections. The reason given was that free choice was impossible in the North. In supporting Diem in this, the United States violated its own unilateral "Declaration of Support for the Geneva Conference."

At the time of Diem's announcement there still were significant numbers of French troops in South Vietnam. But thereafter the French began thinning out rapidly. On October 26, 1955, Premier Diem deposed the absentee Emperor Bao Dai and became the first president of the Republic of South Vietnam. President Eisenhower wrote to Diem offering U.S. assistance "in maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression." Later President Eisenhower explained that this meant aid only. And during his Administration the U.S. Military Advisory and Assistance Group did not increase significantly; it averaged 650 men.

President Kennedy began to occupy himself with Southeast Asia immediately after his inauguration. By then the resistance movement in South Vietnam by the National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong, had gained strength.

My growing concern with the doctrine of "massive retaliation" and American over-reliance on nuclear weapons led me to resign in 1958. With the election of President Kennedy I returned to government service as Ambassador to France. Early in the Kennedy Administration the United States accepted the independence

of Laos, led by Prince Souvanna Phouma, whom many in our Government believed to be Communist-controlled if not outright Communist. During the negotiations I met several times with Souvanna Phouma in Paris, at the request of President Kennedy, to persuade him that he could trust the United States.

While Laos then is not Vietnam now, there are distinct parallels. The Laotian experience convinced me of the need to work with national leaders of all political persuasions, as we had with Tito in Yugoslavia, Laos also convinced me of the fallacy of the falling-domino theory. Laos went neutral. Neither Cambodia nor Thailand fell.

In the meantime things were not going well with Diem's government in Vietnam, though we were doing our verbal best to help him. Vice President Johnson, visiting there in 1961, referred to Diem as the "Churchill of today." Yet the Diem government became more isolated and oppressive. And by 1963 the war in Vietnam also was going very badly. President Kennedy was having grave doubts about our course of action (we now had more than 15,000 men there). Recent books have indicated the depth and bitterness of the division in the Kennedy Administration over Vietnam.

The President himself stated publicly:

"In the final analysis it is their war. They are the ones that have to win it or lose it. We can help them, give them equipment. We can send our men out there as advisers. But they have to win it."

However, the President's military advisers continued to tell him the war was going well. On October 2, 1963, after another quick Vietnam trip McNamara insisted that the President issue the following statement:

"The military program in South Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought. . . . Secretary McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the United States military task can be completed by the end of 1965. . . . They reported that by the end of this year [1963] the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point that one thousand U.S. military personnel assigned to South Vietnam can be withdrawn."

There has been much speculation about what President Kennedy would or would not have done in Vietnam had he lived. Having discussed military affairs with him often and in detail for 15 years, I know he was totally opposed to the introduction of combat troops in Southeast Asia. His public statements just before his murder support this view. Let us not lay on the dead the blame for our own failures.

By 1964 Vietnam had become a major political issue in the presidential campaign. (There were, by then, 23,000 U.S. troops there, mostly advisers. President Johnson said: "We aren't going to send American boys nine thousand or ten thousand miles away to do what the Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."

In August of 1964, in circumstances still not totally clear, two U.S. destroyers were attacked in Tonkin Bay by North Vietnamese PT boats. In the excitement following the attack, Congress, at the behest of the Administration, adopted the Southeast Asia (Tonkin Bay) Resolution upon which the Administration bases its actions today. On February 7, 1965, the first air strikes were ordered against North Vietnam. On March 6, U.S. Marines were ordered to land in the Danang area, north of Saigon. By October of 1965, American forces in South Vietnam totaled 132,300.

At this time it was already perfectly clear to me that as a military operation Vietnam made no sense. It was obvious that bombing was not going to bring Ho Chi Minh to his knees. This was the lesson of World War II bombing—German war production actually rose despite the devastating attacks. And—more immediately to the point—it was the lesson learned by the British in the war they won against Communist guerrillas in Malaya. The British high command began bombing suspected guerrilla areas but stopped when they found that the bombing's indiscriminate brutality alienated the people and strengthened the guerrillas.

It followed, then, that to get our "victory" we would have to commit an ever-growing number of ground troops. But this is no panacea either. There are definite contributions that ground troops, handled with sophistication, can make in a guerrilla war, but if the people of the country like the guerrillas better than they like the government that the foreign troops are supporting, the mere pouring in of more and better-equipped ground troops won't win the war.

As the government at Saigon did not appear to have this popular support, I believe the war would not go well, and that when this became clear the Pentagon and certain sections of Congress would call for more troops and heavier

bombing until we escalated into a direct confrontation with Red China. This could lead directly to a nuclear World War III.

With this grave concern I tried in my own mind to develop some strategy that could stop the escalation and end the war. I evolved in 1965 what has come to be known as the "enclave" strategy. And I promptly found myself at the center of violent controversy. I believe that the enclave strategy is even more valid today than it was in 1965. Combined with a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, it would constitute a vital first step in our de-escalation of the war.

I reasoned that a primary tactical problem, once a war occurs, is to keep it limited. This is particularly true of a war in which we should not have become involved, and in which U.S. interests are, at best, marginal. Therefore I sought a way to halt the buildup, hold what we had, and open negotiations for peace.

By the fall of 1965 the United States had built up enclaves—vast logistical facilities at Camranh Bay, Danang, Saigon and other places. If we concentrated in these centers, we could immediately stop the ever-increasing inflow of U.S. troops and probably reduce the number of men involved. At the same time, we could encourage the development of democracy in the large areas dominated by these enclaves, and could help the South Vietnamese bring their own troops to a high standard of combat performance.

While doing this, we could search for a diplomatic solution of the war, using our hold on the big enclaves as a decisive counter in the bargaining.

I fully realize the problems of negotiating with the N.L.F. and the North Vietnamese. They are a tough, determined foe. They have fought the Japanese, European colonists, and Americans for more than 20 years. Our knowledge of them is distorted by distance and by propaganda—ours and theirs.

The Hanoi government has several times stated its position on ending the war, probably most significantly in the four points laid down by Premier Pham Van Dong on April 13, 1965:

1. In accordance with the Geneva Agreement, the United States must withdraw from South Vietnam United States troops, military bases, etc.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreement pertaining to no military alliances, foreign bases, etc., must be respected.

3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled in accordance with the N.L.F. program.

4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

Hanoi had indicated on several occasions that these points were a basis for talks rather than preconditions. Their more recent statement was they would talk if the bombing stopped.

Meanwhile, the war assumes a distinct Orwellian character. Images of violence and blood flash into our living rooms on TV screens. The goal and principles for which we began the conflict lie close to forgotten. Brave men die. Experts in Vietnam told me privately that the war could last 5 to 10 more years. Yet both sides seem to lack the will, or the ability, to extricate themselves from the nightmare.

We seem to have forgotten that one of the vital aspects of a limited war is that it be limited in time also. A war may involve a minor portion of the total resources of a nation and may be limited to a small area; but if it goes on for four or five years at a reasonably intense level, it is not truly limited.

A Vietnamese solution, based on a "free, neutral and independent" nation—on the pattern of Laos—should be acceptable in Vietnam. Such a government, without ties to China, the Soviet Union or the West, would be in the best interests of Vietnamese and Americans. I do not believe that Ho Chi Minh ever wanted to be a puppet or satellite of China, or of Russia. The information we have indicates he is a patriot, an intense nationalist, albeit a Communist—a Tito.

In Vietnam, war forces the N.L.F. into dependence upon Hanoi, and Hanoi into dependence on China and Russia. This compromises not only the prospects for peace but also the independence of any post-peace action by the N.L.F. Thus our military action tends to create the very Communist monolith we entered the war to avoid.

We should take extraordinary diplomatic steps to get fruitful negotiations. The President should appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a special cabinet-level official of great stature to negotiate with the N.L.F. and Hanoi. The sole responsibility of this official should be termination of the war. He should be served by his own staff, free from bureaucratic interference and the burden

of past positions. With a reasoned military strategy and the full energies of our Government devoted to diplomacy, I am convinced that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese will negotiate.

The following steps should be taken promptly:

1. All the bombing of North Vietnam should be stopped, not just because the Communists want it stopped, but because strategic bombing of the North is counter-productive. In a bombing termination, strategy and morality coincide. It should be undertaken immediately.

2. Extraordinary and energetic measures should be taken by our Government to enter into negotiations with the N.L.F. and Hanoi governments. We have contacted these governments in the past. These contacts should be reopened. Negotiations should be handled by a specially appointed cabinet-level official, operating with the full confidence of the President.

3. We should develop and put into operation a plan for the de-escalation of our forces, to be based on the enclave strategy outlined earlier.

Although I think that by now the American people realize that we are on an unwise course, I anticipate bitter criticism of any plan that involves a United States phase-out from Vietnam. Harsh words will come from congressional leaders who have advocated increased bombing. Some in veterans' organizations and the military will find it difficult to accept what appears to them to be not "victory" but "appeasement." And the far left will decry as "imperialism" any safeguards necessary for ourselves and our South Vietnamese friends.

A settlement will be emotionally difficult, taxing in time, wearing on our wisdom and patience. But a settlement is imperative in our own self-interest. Its alternative is continued escalation until we oppose the forces of Red China in World War III.

With Vietnam we have grown up into tragedy. We cannot end our involvement without some cost, some pain. A mature nation can face such realities and take actions that, while they are less than some want, nevertheless lead away from the risk of self-destruction. I am sure we can.

NO LAND WAR IN ASIA—DEPARTURE FROM POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. General, it is my understanding that up until this war, leading military experts—including General MacArthur—were opposed to the United States becoming involved in a land war in Asia? As you know, in 1954 General Ridgway and Gavin successfully opposed plans for U.S. intervention in Vietnam on the side of the French.

What, in your opinion, has happened to make our present military leaders, including the Commander in Chief, change this assessment, an assessment that had lasted for so many years?

General SHOUP. I think you have mentioned an area there that would be well worth finding out some day in history. I don't believe from my limited knowledge, and I don't know, but somehow I am unable to make myself believe that the armed forces officers, flag officers, ever changed their minds. The reason I say this is that in all of my studies and all of my associations over the years with hundreds of flag officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, always the conclusion after every study, every discussion was that under no circumstances should we get engaged in a land warfare in South Asia, in Asia, on the Asian mainland.

If my memory serves me as well as I hope it does, in addition to those people I have personally heard three Presidents say the same thing, and yet there we are, bogged down in the same manner that had been predicted over the last 25 years at least by all those military people who studied the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. And who advised against it.

General SHOUP. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any theory at all as to why we have departed from this?

General SHOUP. I do not; I cannot know.

The CHAIRMAN. I can't, either. I have no idea what has caused this aberration.

General SHOUP. The ability some place along the line to convince people that it is necessary to stop it there. When we were in Laos, this same thing would have happened except it was a provable situation that we could not logically support the number of armed forces organization that would be required to fight this out in Laos. We couldn't do it.

But then the next time a confrontation possibility came to pass, and we had the seashore on our flank, increasing our capabilities of logistics support, we went right at it. I do not know why, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a mystery to me. This is one of the reasons reinforcing my belief that this committee and the Senate and the Congress have a duty to insist upon a public discussion of the reasons we have departed from this well-established policy, and a discussion too of what is present policy; what is meant by victory, as used by the Administration; is it a goal which is either feasible or justifiable; are we willing to pay the cost; and what is the cost. These are the questions, that just must be discussed in a democracy. They should be discussed in any case but certainly before any escalation or any change in the number of troops in Vietnam.

Senator GORE. Will the Senator yield there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I yield.

NEW COURSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POLICY

Senator GORE. In connection with a possible new course of Presidential policy about which this committee has not been consulted, and which this committee does not have a part in developing, President Johnson was quoted in today's press. I am reading now from the New York Times. He is quoted as having said yesterday: "We have set our course and we will pursue it just as long as aggression threatens us. Make no mistake about it: America will prevail."

I am not sure whether the President was using "we" as an editorial "we" or whether he was using it in its normal sense. It is the President's privilege to use the editorial "we," but I would object to the use of "we" if it includes the elected representatives of the American people. The elected representatives of the American people have not set this course of a wider war in Vietnam. Yet it may be that a new policy, a policy leading to a wider war has been determined. The statements of the President in the last 3 days indicate that that is the case. All we know about the tactics to implement it is an increase in troops to supplement it will be "moderate."

What does this mean? We are not even given an indication from the tactics to be followed as to what the policy may be. "Moderate," as you say, is a relative term. It could mean 1,000, it could mean 100,000, depending upon the policy. If it is a policy to win a victory

in Vietnam, then would you say 200,000 would be a moderate increase in the light of what would be required?

General SHOUP. I wouldn't have the slightest idea.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

"PUEBLO" INCIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. General, this is a question on a different subject. It occurred to me that you might have a comment upon the recent *Pueblo* incident that occurred off North Korean waters. Do you have any thoughts about it?

General SHOUP. The *Pueblo?*

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHOUP. Mr. Chairman, no such aircraft ever flew over Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. That answers it very well. We had a long hearing on the U–2. I think we spent several weeks on that incident.

IS THERE A COURSE FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT?

I would like to end with this question: Do you have any thoughts about how the United States might get into a position, through the use of its military power, to provide a basis for negotiation or do you foresee an alternative to the present course that could lead to a negotiated settlement?

General SHOUP. Well, my feeling is that in the past we have been in that position time after time after time, and we might even be in it today. We will have armed forces down there. A fine organization, not demoralized, ready to fight, and I think that Ho Chi Minh is well aware of their capabilities. So I would say that, in effect, we are in a military position to bring about negotiations any time they want to do it or can do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that we could stop the bombing, without any undue harm to our military forces, as a gesture leading to a negotiation?

General SHOUP. Well, when you say "stop the bombing"——

The CHAIRMAN. Of the north.

General SHOUP. I presume you mean above the demilitarized zone.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHOUP. As a military man, as a foot soldier, an infantryman, I would say that every bomb that would eliminate any item which, if not interdicted, would be used against the foot soldier in South Vietnam should be dropped.

Now, where it should be dropped is something else. This pushing of the bombing up north was based on obviously not just a desire to tear up civilians' homes and all that, but rather to interdict at a more vulnerable and more profitable location the supplies that were coming into the ports and coming down from the rail lines and what have you, where it was a more concentrated thing.

I would feel if the bombing were to stop totally, that my conscience wouldn't let me say that you couldn't bomb an ammunition truck just north of the demilitarized zone.

Senator GORE. Well, General, isn't bombing and the place of bombing, aren't those things also tactics and purely secondary to policy?

General SHOUP. I suppose in the old military frame of mind everything that goes on in North Vietnam is strategic and everything that goes on down there around the troops is tactical bombing.

MORE LIVES SAVED BY STOPPING THE BOMBING

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me, though, General, that if we stop the bombing and negotiations begin—and we have as you know, been told time after time, by various people all the way from Kosygin to Wilson and others, that this will happen—we are doing more to save the lives of our soldiers, if stopping the bombing is a prerequisite for negotiation, than if we continue the bombing sporadically with not too much effect, obviously, because the North Vietnamese have continued to bring in lots of troops and arms. The bombing hasn't been very successful. As between the two alternatives, it seems to me that we would be saving more lives and protecting our men better if we stopped the bombing and got a negotiation than continuing to do what we are doing.

General SHOUP. If you could stop it—if by stopping the bombing you could start negotiations concurrently with a cease-fire, you have provided the ultimate for the armed forces.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. Of course, we can't guarantee that it will do that; but we have been told that it would. You know the position of the Administration. I must say, in all fairness, that I think the so-called San Antonio formula is a reasonable proposal. But the North Vietnamese, Ho Chi Minh, does not. They have a different view; it is their country that is being bombed. However reasonable I might think it, that is not very important or material. The fact that they don't think it is reasonable is sufficient to prevent its being effective, and, therefore, I think it would be wise to give it a try. I don't consider that this would be appeasement or anything of the sort. I think it would be simply trying to find a solution, an alternative to doing what we are doing.

COMMENTS ON TODAY'S YOUTH

Lastly, you have had great experience with young people, and you have already shown in many different ways your understanding of human nature, particularly of your soldiers. A great deal of attention is given every day, including in this morning's paper, to the younger people of this country—in and out of the armed services, all kinds of young people—and their disillusionment and dissent. I wonder, in view of your experience, whether you would wish to make any comment about these young people.

General SHOUP. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have been amongst them quite a bit in the last 3 or 4 years. I have some in my own family. I personally believe that, on a long-range basis for—as something vital to our Nation, the problems that are pointed out to us today through the actions of our youngsters is far more important than the Vietnam war. The Vietnam war will soon be over, and I am talking in relative terms, but these people we are talking about, and their children are going to be with this Nation—as Senator Symington said—forever.

I think they are just confused. It is interesting, I was asked to come to Los Angeles to make a speech which finally erupted over here

in the Congressional Record, and I was asked to go there to unconfuse the students, that was the request that was made to me. I talked to many of them, and, well, they didn't go clear back to Santa Claus and a lot of other false things like Columbus discovered America. After they get more time in college, and there are hundreds of thousands more in college now than there used to be and they got 4 more years to study and think before they have to use the pickax or the IBM machine, they really wonder. It is a wonderment to them, and here is one of the things that I will just give you one example, I could give you many.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

General SHOUP. They say, "Well, here we are. We went through the political campaign, and we listened to everybody," and many of these people weren't yet old enough to vote but they are really a whole lot smarter than my generation was; they study America, America's requirements, and the great history of America, and they say, "Well, what good did it do to vote if that is our system? The ballot instead of the bullet. But what good did the ballot do us? We balloted for one thing and we defeated the other and now we got what we defeated."

They just can't understand it. And I think those are some of the things that confront the youngsters today. They are thinking people, and it is pretty hard to answer that question.

But you don't want to try to make these people believe that there is no use to vote.

Yet that is being expressed a lot of places, and I think our political parties have got to do a little bit of work in that area and prove that it is worthwhile to vote, that you sometimes do get what you vote for. That is one of the principal positions I found amongst the young people of America, as well as a feeling that they deserve the truth. They go clear back to Ike and U–2 and our not going to bomb from Thailand and 8 days later they announced B–52's were taking off and the fighter bombers had been doing it for 2 or 3 months and on and on and on and they just can't understand it.

They are adults, they don't get their total education from the boilerplate newspapers. They have good newspapers, as good as there are, and the books, they listen to fine television, and they think, but they are not given enough credit for the fact that they think and neither is the American public. They are willing to take this, they are willing to take bad news with the good and so finally they just shrug their shoulders and say, "Well, why don't they just once, just once, try telling us the truth first?"

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, could I interject there?

The CHAIRMAN. I thought that was a very fine statement.

COLLEGE CAMPUS IN THE BODY POLITIC

Senator GORE. I have been very impressed during the past year I have been on a number of college campuses. I have found the situation, attitudes, prevailing which the General has described very precisely.

I would like to add this: During this past weekend I spoke to student bodies at three universities, and the university campus has now come alive, whereas a year ago there was almost a total alienation and feeling of resistance and resentment against the body politic as you so well have described.

Now that they feel there is some opportunity to rectify a policy which they consider to be immoral and unwise, the college campus is the most sensitive and dynamic and volatile element in our body politic today, and I hope that, as you say, that we can give them once again confidence in our political process, confidence that it is possible through the democratic process to work change and to achieve goals, and confidence that what they work for and win will be real.

General SHOUP. That is a great deal.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I think that you have made a great contribution this morning to finding the truth, and it will be very reassuring to the young people of this country. I am very glad to hear you say that you haven't lost confidence in the young people—that, on the contrary, they are the hope of the country. I agree.

These hearings, and many of our activities, are inspired by that same purpose which is to try to bring to light, as well as we can, what the truth is; where our national interest really lies; and what policy is in the best interest of this country. I appreciate very much your coming this morning.

I am sorry, Senator, do you wish to ask questions?

Senator Cooper just came in.

Senator COOPER. Just one.

MEANS OF ARRIVING AT A NEGOTIATION

General Shoup, I am very sorry I was not able to hear all of your testimony because I had to leave to attend another committee meeting and was only able to just now return. I do have one question to ask, but I think it is an important one.

Looking at the present situation in Vietnam and the prospect of an expanded war—would you make a suggestion as to ways, means and procedures by which we might now be able to arrive at negotiation, either with a cease fire or entering into a fight and negotiate situation?

General SHOUP. Senator, I am something in the position of Senator Symington, as I believe he expressed the other day. There was so much pressure when I first accepted this speaking engagement in which the purpose was to help unconfuse the students, that I got all of this playback about, yes, I should say this is wrong or that is wrong and then not have any solution. I mean you have seen that and heard that by so many.

I had a solution, I proposed it. I actually visited one of the distinguished members of this committee and presented my proposal in a rough way. I went to the Secretary of Defense with it. Now, what has happened to it since then, I don't know.

But I still believe that my proposal is the best one I have read or heard and I believe it would provide for us the answer to the one real, real big question that has to be answered before we know what the next step in this war is and if you want me to just briefly give it, I will. If you have this much time.

Senator COOPER. I would like to hear it, and I am sure the committee would.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; go ahead.

PROPOSAL FOR ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATION

General SHOUP. The two governments, I mean the Presidents of the United States and South Vietnam, say in that kind of diplomatic

language they use—I am not good at that—to Ho Chi Minh, "You, Ho Chi Minh, set the time and place for negotiation, in collaboration to the degree that you believe warranted with the NLF. We will have our representatives there at that time." Then we say, "when the gavel strikes for the beginning of negotiation we, South Vietnam and America, will cease all offensive operations," when they are at the table.

And, parenthetically, that eliminates all this trouble we see in all this rhetorical hokey-pokey that goes on in which we have, we make a proposal but we have a built-in failure in it.

So to hit the gavel, this provides, and this has something to do with the oriental mind that you mentioned, maybe I had some feeling for, this provides Ho Chi Minh, makes him a big man to his people. He can stop this thing by setting the time and the place. He can stop it, and then we say that as long as negotiations are in progress we shall not again begin offensive operations.

Therefore, Ho Chi Minh can keep the bombing stopped that he so badly wants to do or says he does.

Then we say that we reserve the right to continue reconnaissance both aerial and ground as is necessary for defense, and we go further and say at a time during these negotiations when it shall appear that we are making progress which will eventually end in a peaceful settlement, we will begin to withdraw all of the combatant forces of the United States from South Vietnam and we will as our allies to do the same.

Senator GORE. But add, "Make no mistake about it, make no mistake about it, we will win a victory."

General SHOUP. I wouldn't even mention to Ho Chi Minh that he has to stop his offensive operation. We give him credit for what he is, the head of a sovereign state, easily insulted because we belittle his intelligence. We just say, "We are going to stop offensive operations."

Of course we say, we reserve the right to defend ourselves.

Well, give him some credit. He will stop offensive operations. And now let me tell you this, and this is the great part of this proposition:

If Ho Chi Minh turns down that kind of a proposition, then this great surge of pro opinion that is being sought by our Administration will go up a million percent overnight. The feeling of the other nations of this world will change overnight, and they will be for us and not Ho Chi Minh. This will tell us, if he says no, that he knows exactly what China is going to do and he has a guarantee of it, and that China will come with all the help he wants when he asks for it, because only with that knowledge could he say no to this proposition.

Senator COOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a further question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE

Senator COOPER. Would I be correct in saying, then, that one of the basic points of your proposal is, that the United States should take the initiative?

General SHOUP. The United States in collaboration with the South Vietnamese President.

Senator COOPER. I understand.

General SHOUP. Right.

Senator COOPER. Of course the Government of South Vietnam would have to be involved, but it is essentially the United States who should take the initiative in moving toward this goal of negotiations.

General SHOUP. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Secondly, you are proposing that the United States say that we are not imposing any condition upon the North Vietnamese, that we would not impose on ourselves.

General SHOUP. Well, we are not even doing that in that proposition. We are just hoping he has got sense enough to do it.

Senator COOPER. I agree. I have stated many times that, while we say that North Vietnam is imposing conditions on us, we always manage to impose a condition on them which makes it impossible to come to the negotiating table.

General SHOUP. A built-in failure, Senator. We have always had some built-in failures, you know, like we stop the bombing, you stop supplying your troops. That is like saying, "Mother, don't feed your baby." Obviously, they are not going to agree to it.

Senator COOPER. That is all. Thank you for your constructive proposals, General.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much indeed. You have been extremely helpful, and we appreciate your taking the time to come here and help the committee. I think your testimony will be very helpful to the public and to the Senate as a whole.

Thank you, sir.

General SHOUP. It is a privilege to be here, and be accorded such fine treatment.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. For the record, I would like included a statement made almost 2 years ago by General Shoup.

(The statement referred follows:)

REMARKS BY GEN. DAVID M. SHOUP, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RETIRED), AT THE 10TH ANNUAL JUNIOR COLLEGE WORLD AFFAIRS DAY, PIERCE COLLEGE, LOS ANGELES, CALIF., MAY, 14, 1966.

To this fine cross-section of America's future, the students, their friends; and their teachers, good afternoon!

Thank you General Coursey for such a generous introduction. Somehow it makes me feel as if I should sit down now and let the facts catch up with the legend. One thing was correct though. I did major in math. And I learned a lot about figures. It is rather distressing to note that young men today seem to use figures only to help get on the moon. But I am gladdened when I can see so plainly that the young ladies still are using figures to get on the honeymoon.

It was an honor to be invited to make a few remarks here today. But it is not an enviable position to be the last speaker, and have to follow such a fine program in which you have been privileged to participate. I do hope listening to just one more talk will not drive you into the Valley of the Dolls.

Soon after accepting this assignment, I realized that perhaps I'd made a gross error. Faced with this predicament, I talked with many of my friends, searching for help. Their reactions were varied. Some said, "You were stupid to accept. You don't have anything in common with these young people."

I didn't agree that we have nothing in common. I think we do. How about this? We were all brought into this world at birth without any solicitation on our part. And at that very moment we were sentenced to death by the same great Creator that gave us life. Between these two events there is a relatively tiny speck of time that is ours. Albeit, of this we are doomed to sleep away at least one third. This we have in common.

Soon we realize that "created equal" means equal at birth and death. But what about that tiny speck of time in between? Man will use most of this time doing things to show his differences, prove his superiority to his fellowmen. This, we have in common.

Already you have come to know, as have I, that the foot of man has not always made the same track, nor his hands fashioned the same tools; but essentially his problems remain the same. Basically, they are the satisfaction of his physical and mental gnawings, and his fellowman. This, we have in common.

By this discourse, it is not intended to bring on distress or hasten despair. I just want to point out to you that all generations do have some important things in common. I want to make an observation; and I want to leave you with a question to ponder.

You've heard a few things I think we have in common. My observation is, that in your lifetime your greatest problems will be people. Aren't most of our rules and laws and even a great part of our Constitution designed to protect people from people? Yes, your real enemy in war or peace will be people. So, study them. Read, read, read. Try to find out why they do do like they do do.

Now the question: What are you going to do with this tiny speck of time that is yours? It's shorter than it was when I first mentioned it, and for most of you, one fourth of your total allotment is already gone.

Are you just going to reproduce excessively and multiply the already painfully perplexing people problems? Or will you also sincerely and actively participate in what I believe to be man's most noble efforts on earth—first, his struggle to free mankind from the affluent who gorge on delicacies, while children starve for the lack of milk and bread; and, second, his striving for peace on earth?

I suppose there are loads of things to talk about. And this reminds me of a story that may prove timely. This risk I take full well knowing that there's probably no story I could tell, well here anyway, that won't be old-hat-to-you.

I don't propose to dump the whole load here either. I do plan to throw off a few forkfulls as a kind of fertilizer for your thinking.

I will try to deliver this but—I mean Vigoro, in four packages: (1) Confusion and Compassion; (2) Communism and Confrontation; (3) Combat and Conscription; and (3) Conclusion.

CONFUSION AND COMPASSION

Now a little about this confusion which a lot of writers and most of your elders specify as being the universal state of mind of the student today. You are just a generation of confused, superficially animated asci, so they say. I'm certain your confusion is doubly justified and I'm pretty sure that at least, you're not asexual. Let me cue you in on a little secret. These same people that place students in the category of the confused are just as confused, always have been, and always will be. They've simply suffered more years of it and have accepted it as the normal state of man. And thus they are mistakenly surprised that young students are confused.

There should be no wonderment about it. First, you're taught there is a Santa Claus. Lovely thing at the right time. But a lot of people want you to keep believing this for your whole life. In fact, they want you to be about as vibrant and thoughtful as the inhabitants of a second-hand wax museum.

You are taught that Columbus was the first to discover America which is as false as my grandmother's teeth.

You are taught that our people can get what the majority wants, by the ballot. Well, we got President Wilson that way because his campaign slogan was "He kept us out of war." A few days after his inauguration we were in the First World War.

I don't have to tell you what we have now, how we got it; nor whats happened since. You've seen it happen.

You learn that when military forces are fighting and killing and maiming each other with rifles, cannon, naplam, and bombs, that that's war. There's something of that kind going on now but confusingly enough this isn't war.

Everyone talks peace, peace, World peace, while for years our government has sold or approved the sale of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of war material to other countries. Confusing?

You're taught how in August 1619 the Dutch man-of-war came to the Jamestown plantation and offered by auction twenty Africans, so starting the slave trade and slavery in America. But of course we started slave trade ourselves by capturing Indians and selling them into slavery in the West Indies.

You learn how later we emancipated all the descendents of these Africans. We gave the slaves their freedom, made them subject to the provisions of our Constitution. For a hundred years our great democracy has been at work on this. All of you know the facts of the last few years. Oh, of course we did, in

places, modernize the treatment of Negroes; instead of the club and the blacksnake whip, the white man substituted the ultra-modern device of the electric cattle prod.

We spend millions to build churches in which people profess their love for their fellowman, while right in the same community they are soliciting a few dollars to help the poor.

We elect officials to represent all the people and they take an oath to do it. Then we read that some take money from the few for their political and personal uses. Surely confusing.

You read the glowing ads for autos only to learn of their defects.

You're sold drugs, and there are armless babies.

You read, you're televised to, you're radioed to, you're preached to, that it is necessary that we have our armed forces fight, get killed and maimed, and kill and maim other human beings including women and children because now is the time we must stop some kind of unwanted ideology from creeping up on this nation. The people we chose to do this is 8000 miles away with water in between. I believe there's a record of but two men walking on water and one of them failed. Yes, we must fight out there 'cause even this great democracy, so fearful of its world image, just must not stand by in complacency while village chiefs, mayors, farmers, and others are being murdered by day and night by the believers in this terrible ideology. We're told it is creeping dangerously closer and closer to our shores. This must be confusing.

Surely a decision to get this nation into the predicament we're in, trying to stop these creeps, must have been based on an all inclusive study by those with the greatest of clairvoyance. And there must have been a time-table depicting the untenable position, and irreparable effects upon this nation at the end of 5, 10, 15, 20 years, else our government could not have chosen the present course of action. If such an estimate of the situation was not made, our leaders have been derelict in their duties and responsibilities. If it was done, the public should be informed. I ask you, have you read or been instructed about any time-table of disaster for this nation and her world position if we hadn't done and weren't doing what we are in South East Asia today? I haven't.

The reasons fed to us are too shallow and narrow for students, as well as other citizens. Especially so, when you realize that what is happening, no matter how carefully and slowly the military escalation has progressed, may be projecting us toward world catastrophe. Surely, it is confusing.

Particularly is this true when we know that a great deal closer there are essentially the same situations which our leaders say made it impossible for us *not* to fight and *not* to escalate the fighting in Vietnam. See if this doesn't sound about the same:

(1) Since last July, Peru's national army has been battling red guerrillas in more than half its states.

(2) Red guerrillas run areas in several states of Colombia.

(2) Many businessmen are leaving Guatemala following ransom kidnappings by communist bands.

(4) At least a dozen combat guerrilla brigades are operating in some areas in over half of Venezuela's 20 states, while terrorists blows take place in Venezuelan cities, like the Viet Cong in Saigon.

We should remember, too, that it's over water and 8000 miles to Vietnam, but there is an isthmus between this country and South America and it's much, much closer.

It must be a bit confusing, too, to read and hear about fighting for freedom. Supposedly, we have it, and I don't think anyone is going to take it away from us by playing cops and robbers in South East Asia. Even so, we urge others to fight for freedom. There may be a little confusion here. We insist they should sacrifice arms and legs and their lives for freedom. The people we urge this upon in South East Asia, South America and many other places have no idea of our meaning of freedom. In the history of their ancestors they've never experienced what we except them to understand and fight for. The word or even the idea is not in the mores of their people. Freedom will remain a foreign word and idea to these people until scores of them are brought here for six months or a year and then returned to their native lands to sing to their fellowmen the song of freedom with notes of music they can understand.

These masses of people and their ancestors have always lived where the few have everything. Everything that is produced by the burdensome labor of the many. And the many have nothing except for the barest subsistence and not always that. Even as little as $150 a year. In many cases much, much less. In fact

in their memory they've never had as much as a pot to—well, they've not even had a pot.

I want to tell you, I don't think the whole of South East Asia, as related to the present and future safety and freedom of the people of this country, is worth the life or limb of a single American. But maybe the people are and maybe the people of South America are, too. And maybe that's confusing.

I believe that if we had and would keep our dirty, bloody, dollar-crooked fingers out of the business of these nations so full of depressed, exploited people, they will arrive at a solution of their own. That they design and want. That they fight and work for. And if unfortunately their revolution must be of the violent type because the "haves" refuse to share with the "have-nots" by any peaceful method, at least what they get will be their own, and not the American style, which they don't want and above all don't want crammed down their throats by Americans.

Time and history has proved how wrong our leadership was about Mexico in the second decade of this century. More recently, perhaps there's a lesson or two to be heeded in the Indonesian situation, also.

Until you're 21 you can't vote. Can't participate in this great democratic process, where some are still kept from the polls by threat, where a vote can still be bought for two dollars or a half-pint of whiskey, where many don't vote because they feel it's useless.

But you can make your vote heard. You don't have to be a vegetable 'til you're 21. You can demonstrate. Historically, demonstrations intended to bring unrealistic regimes to heel, have on balance produced good for the exploited masses. Brought to mind are magna carta, Joan of Arc, India, South American countries, China, the Buddhists in South Vietnam, and where would the Negro be today without the demonstrations of the recent past which awakened many sleepy American whites? It may be well that this technique has finally come in an exploding fashion to America and American students. It shows that you are thinking. That you're interested and want to do something to be heard. That you're going to grow up as participants in America and her future. That you don't intend to sit ignorantly and idly by and watch this world panorama of confusion trot by under camouflage and not express yourselves about how you want the future to be. The future that will soon be your responsibility.

For this confused state ascribed to students by those senior citizens I mentioned earlier, they give you compassion. They say youth was always that way, at least in their elders' day.

Now:

COMMUNISM AND CONFRONTATION

(This is only the second time I have ever used the word communism in over 100 talks, the first was a few minutes ago.)

Peculiar? Yes. But is can be said that we seem, forever to be menaced by something red. 190 years ago it was the bodies of men wrapped in red-coats. Today, it is the minds of men that are warped into belief in a theory of visionary and impractical nature, communism. Those that espouse it, we call reds. This ism that holds forth the promise that finally man shall have share and share alike of all things is not readily cast aside by the masses who for generations upon generations have shared not at all.

And likely as not when they tried to share they got the pike. But it is the goal of this theory and it's supposed to happen right here on earth where man can experience it with his physical senses. It is not a goal like the Happy Hunting Grounds, Heaven or Valhalla which must be imagined. Not any great salesmanship is needed to sell this ideology to the longing, eager, wanting masses of deprived, depressed, distressed people.

I say, that today there is no such thing on the face of the earth as a communistic state. I believe the nearest thing to it was right here in America. In Iowa and New England some years ago. I feel certain there never will be such a thing as a communist state. Sure there are some where the idea has been sold to or forced upon the people, and there are several countries where the selling is pretty well along.

Yes, Marx and Engels contrived an idea for a goal that was easy to sell to the right people. But the attainment of the goal is strictly dependent upon a complete metamorphosis of human nature, which I contend will never come to pass. Do you think that the presidents, the managers of business, will ever permit a situation to come to pass where they and their family will be allotted two hours on Thursday on the state yachts and the floor sweepers in their plants get exactly the same thing? Don't believe it.

The leaders of these nations with the goal of communism know full well it won't come to pass, either.

The same leaders who sold the idea to the masses also described to them the long arduous, treacherous pathway of self-sacrifice and deprivation which must be followed to get to this great goal of their eventual salvation. Further, they emphasized that there must be competent leaders during this trek to help navigate these perilous ways. And who are these leaders to be? Why the same people who sold the idea of the great goal. Of course, they know there'll be no arrival at the promised distination. They just mean to keep on leading those they have duped. They never intend to divide up their lion's share.

In fact, the U.S.A. unwittingly or at least on an unplanned, unforeseen, basis, has helped to steer Russia further and further away from the goal of communism.

Russia had no nuclear weapons. We encircled her with nuclear bombs and missile bases. With missiles, I might add. By so doing, we gave her the greatest psychological booster possible. One they could not conjure up themselves. The bombs and missiles were there. Whose were they? Uncle Sugar's. And who does Uncle intend to use them on? Who does he threaten? The great homeland of the Russian people. From here it was easy to get these people to forego butter for guns. To sacrifice and toil cheerfully so they could have some weapons to protect their homeland from the threat of destruction or at least be able to wreak heavy damage on the nation who sighted-in these missiles on Russia. They did it. They have the weapons. Weapons enough to shove everything above ground in Western Europe, including the British Isles, right out into the Atlantic Ocean. And enough of the transcontinental weapons to clobber America from coast to coast and produce unacceptable destruction. That's what they confront us with. We confront them with a like predicament. Perhaps we should thank God for this balance of confrontation. Thank God that hopefully America and Russia have finally realized that there are things an H-bomb cannot do.

An H-bomb cannot project national policy ashore.

An H-bomb cannot restore law and order.

An H-bomb can only destroy.

Of course, while Russia was building this weaponry we spoke of, she also put up the Sputnik, several space vehicles, moon shots, etc, etc. Yet, believe it or not there are some people in America so unrealistic they still think the Sputnik was a fake.

But what now for Russia? Under the umbrella of protection which they so dearly paid for there is time and security for having a little more butter, a few more bicycles, more automobiles, radios, televisions, and more of other things and things and things. And more and more people are being paid in accordance with their personal ability to manage or produce. The goal of communism becomes less and less desirable to more and more people. A kind of capitalism emerges. The idea of communism it fading, except to the minds of those where an acceptable participation in the having of material things has not yet come to pass.

Who will gainsay that most of the Russian people are not better off today than they've ever been before? And to what must the credit be given? The system they've been working for, of course.

We provided China with the same booster. She has reacted the same. From my experiences over parts of five years in China and what I know of conditions there today, I'm sure that more Chinese know where tomorrow's food is coming from, than ever in the history of living man. And to what must go the credit? The system they're serving under.

The alienation of the friendship of the great and wonderful Chinese people will surely vie for decades to come as the greatest blunder this country ever made in her relations with other nations, unless the final results from our Vietnam commitment overshadows it.

You say, what about the Republic of China vis a vis Red China? I reply, time is on the side of the one with the bigger hunk of earth. And that's not Taiwan.

COMBAT WITH CONSCRIPTION

About conscription first. I think it is only fair to conclude that whenever a nation embarks on a line of action in which a prerequisite for success is sufficient manpower, and there are insufficient volunteers for the task, the only recourse is conscription or the draft. This doesn't, of course, answer all the pros and cons regarding the right or wrong of drafting men to fight for their country. But we did have a war, the winning of which, I have always thought turned out to be

a pretty good thing. The Revolutionary War. Without conscription we would surely have lost that war.

In the administration of the draft it is impossible to insure happiness to all. At best, it is an undesirable, complicated matter. But I have always thought it should be on a strictly lottery basis. To exempt this one and that one for this and that makes no sense to me. If his number drops out of the barrel he should serve. After all, I don't think this nation would completely disintegrate if a few "A" students, pre-medics, and budding scientists served in uniform for a year or two.

What about the draft card burners? I'm sure that sooner or later they'll regret they did it. It does intrigue me though that we've yet to hear of anyone who has done this burning without an audience. If they don't want to pay even a tiny bit of the premium on the long range insurance policy for their country that so many have paid so much for, why don't they just refuse to report when called, and let due process of law take its course?

About combat. Those that have experienced it soon learn that there is no common language with which to communicate with those lacking such experience.

Robert E. Lee once said, "It is well that war is so terrible, otherwise we might grow too fond of it." Maybe it hasn't been terrible enough. One would be led to believe that man is too fond of war when we realize that in the past 20 years he has resorted to fighting some 40 or more times. Meaning, of course, that nations and peoples have failed to succeed with their established policies by any means other than murder.

Yes, man's oldest plague is war! And I believe, it is a sad, sad commentary on centuries of so-called enlightenment when the mentality of man has been unable to prevent killing and maiming of men, women and children in war!

But so it has been, and so it is today.

Many over the years have thought and written about this plight of mankind. May I quote in part:

"The bells will peal, long haired men will dress in golden sacks to pray for successful slaughter. And the old story will begin again, the awful customary acts. The editors of the daily press will begin virulently to stir men up to hatred and manslaughter, manslaughter in the name of patriotism. Manufacturers, merchants, contractors for military stores—will hurry joyously about their business, in the hope of double receipts.

"* * * Idle ladies and gentlemen will make a great fuss, entering their names in advance for the Red Cross Society, and they will imagine that in so doing they are performing a most christian work.

"And smothering despair within their souls, men will trail along, torn from peaceful labor, from their wives, mothers and children; hundreds of thousands and simple-minded, good-natured men with murderous weapons in their hands—anywhere they may be driven. They will march, freeze, hunger, suffer sickness and die from it, or finally come to some place where they will be slain by thousands or kill thousands themselves.

"And when the number of sick, wounded and killed becomes so great that the air is so infected with the putrifying scent of the "food for powder" that even the authorities find it disagreeable, a truce will be made."

Who wrote these words? It was a Russian. These were the words of a soldier and great writer named Tolstoy, born some 140 years ago.

Another interesting observation on the same subject goes something like this:

"* * * I can see a million years ahead and this rule will never change in so many as half a dozen instances. The loud little handful—as usual—will shout for the war. The pulpit will—warily and cautiously—object—at first; the great, big dull bulk of the nation will rub its sleepy eyes and try to make out why there should be a war and will say, earnestly and indignantly, "It is unjust and dishonorable and there is no necessity for it." Then the handful will shout louder. A few fair men on the other side will argue and reason against the war with speech and pen, and at first will have a hearing and be applauded, but it will not last long; those others will outshout them, and presently the antiwar audiences will thin out and lose popularity. Before long you will see these curious things: speakers stoned from the platform, and free speech strangled by hordes of furious men who in their secret hearts are still at one with those stoned speakers—as earlier—but do not dare to say so. And now the whole nation—pulpit and all—will take up the war-cry and shout itself hoarse, and mob any honest man who ventures to open his mouth, and presently such mouths will cease to open. Next the statemen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-

soothing falsities and will diligently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them, and thus he will by and by convince himself that the war is just and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception." Our own Mark Twain recorded these thoughts. (Mark Twain, The Mysterious Stranger, 1898.)

These have been the words of a Russian and an American, years apart in time, but thinking the same thoughts. Today millions of Russians and Americans don't want war. Russia and America could prevent war on this earth. Why don't they team-up and do it?

Now, maybe we should reflect a bit on the fact that even last night while we enjoyed the Los Angeles way of life, American men were giving their lives to help ensure that we can continue to have such happy times in this country.

Who are these American men? They are members of the greatest military team on earth. Members of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. They are the real minutemen of 1966.

Now what can you do on a day-to-day basis to support this great American Armed Forces team which is fighting because they are legally ordered to do so?

First you could help increase the stature of the soldier in the eyes of those not in the armed services. The relegation of the soldier to a position of inferior status (except when the actual shooting is going on) has, unfortunately, been a pastime of those not in the service for lo these many centuries. An old, old stone sentry box in Gibraltar carries this inscription:

"God and the soldier we adore,
in time of danger, not before;
The danger passed, and all things righted
God is forgotten and the soldier slighted."

So you see this lack of concern for the soldier is an aged thing.

Perhaps you could be a bit more understanding of his plight.

Our press might be somewhat more considerate, too. All too often the headlines today read "ex-soldier, ex-sailor, ex-Marine, ex-airman, rapes, murders, robs, etc." But I never see "ex-General Motors" or "ex-U.S. Steel" employees referred to this way.

The best example—some time ago headlines flared "Ex-Marine carves up school teacher." A check revealed he had been discharged 20 years before!

Also, you can help in the development of the determination of our people to resist, at all costs, any encroachment on the freedom we enjoy here in America. Just how much destruction are we willing to accept? How many casualties—men, women and children? Who can say what it will take to destroy the will of our people?

And remember!! Under our form of government, civilians always have, and always will—and they should—tell the military when to begin and when to stop war.

But, also remember, that most of our people haven't seen flying arms and legs, and guts and blood, and piles of dead from a bomb blast. They view this war business in much the same perspective as the man who was asked whether he had ever seen Halley's Comet. He said, "Yes, I have, but only from a distance!"

Further, you can help in the prevention of forgetfulness by the living, that men have died for the cause of peace and freedom. (I repeat, man's striving to free mankind and have a peaceful world, I believe, constitutes his most noble effort on this earth.)

It seems clear that if we are ever to reach the goal of peace, we must orient our thinking and our actions more toward this end. It is essential that we, in our time, make a measurable contribution toward this ultimate goal—peace.

Still we wonder, how many more bloodsmeared battlefields and contentious centuries shall separate us from a permanent peace? This we cannot know. We do know that during the time we wait for this constant hope of mankind to come to pass, we must at all times be prepared—prepared for any eventuality!

I conceive it a fundamental duty that you and our schools and churches emphasize that this nation stands as it is today—not because of the easy life of our predecessors, but instead because thousands sacrificed their time, their efforts and their lives with an unselfish devotion to the idea that under the Kingdom of God there were things greater than their own individual gain and comfort.

Let me conclude with a brief summation:

a. Don't worry about being confused.
b. Keep on being curious.
c. Be constructive in your thoughts and actions.

d. Be assured that our system of government and production is the best ever devised to satisfy the instinctive yearnings of human beings. Participate in it and learn to protect yourself from it. At least, know the meaning of caveat emptor.

e. Don't let yourself get too shook-up by the over-advertised encroachment of communism. Help people to get things and the idea of communism will strangle by its own umbilical cord.

f. Remember that the armed forces don't start wars; that the soldiers plight is unsolicited; that when he becomes a soldier he gives up much of the very freedom he's fighting for. And that if he serves to retirement, he never in his lifetime gets back his freedom.

Now one final word about those who have given their lives for America in war:

I believe that gathered here above us right now, watching intently and listening carefully, are the invisible spirits of those same gallant men, who over the years—even unto today—have given their full measure of devotion. Their presence may be unseen, but they shall not be unheard.

Someone must speak for them. What do they want mankind to hear? Many, many things, of course, but I feel, they want the fears and hopes of their eternal years to be expressed in an admonition, a hope, and a prayer.

They admonish: "You must strive for peace—but not peace at any price. You must view peace in its proper perspective. Do not give up one bit of the priceless heritage of liberty which we have helped to preserve. Accept and discharge your responsibilities to civilization as the unreluctant world leaders of those who are willing to fight to protect this liberty. And, if by these actions you enjoy peace in your time, let it be the welcome product of fair dealing, hard work, sound planning and a readiness to fight against aggression."

Their hope: Someday, may there be a meeting at the summit, which shall become as everlastingly important to humanity as the sermon on the mount."

Finally, the spirits of these undying dead pray: "Please God, may our ship of state sail on and on in a world, forever at peace."

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.)

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