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**NOMINATIONS OF PAUL R. IGNATIUS TO BE SECRETARY  
OF THE NAVY AND TOWNSEND HOOPES TO BE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

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**HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**NINETIETH CONGRESS**

**FIRST SESSION**

**ON**

**NOMINATION OF PAUL R. IGNATIUS, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY**

**NOMINATION OF TOWNSEND HOOPES, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

**AUGUST 17, 1967**

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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NOMINATIONS OF PAUL R. IGNATIUS TO BE SECRETARY  
OF THE NAVY AND TOWNSEND HOOPER TO BE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

# HEARING

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

### COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, *Chairman*

- |                                   |                                |
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II

August 1961

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## NOMINATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1967

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Senator John Stennis (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis, Symington, Young of Ohio, Byrd of Virginia, Smith, and Dominick.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief of staff; Charles B. Kirbow, chief clerk; T. Edward Braswell, Jr., professional staff member; and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.

Senator STENNIS. The committee will please come to order.

We have nominations for consideration this morning that I will mention in a few minutes. But as we are assembled especially for this purpose, we want to take note of the fine public service rendered by the late Mr. John McNaughton, whom we had approved to be Secretary of the Navy. We certainly regret his untimely passing, and his wife and son with him. The committee expresses appreciation here for his public service and also great regret at his passing. We also express our condolences to the surviving members of his family as well as his friends.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join in your expressions of sympathy, especially to the son.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator Smith. I know you express the sentiments of all of us, too.

Senator SYMINGTON. I associate myself with those remarks. Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator.

### NOMINATION OF PAUL R. IGNATIUS, OF CALIFORNIA, TO BE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Senator STENNIS. Members of the committee, the chairman has asked me to proceed this morning with the regular meeting for consideration of the pending nominations. The chairman has a slight infection that takes a little time and will be back in the near future.

Mr. Paul R. Ignatius of California has been nominated to be Secretary of the Navy.

(The nomination reference and biographical sketch of Mr. Ignatius follow:)

## NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
August 4, 1967.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Paul R. Ignatius, of California, to be the Secretary of the Navy.

## PAUL R. IGNATIUS

Paul R. Ignatius was born in Los Angeles, California, in 1920. He attended public schools in Glendale, a suburb of Los Angeles. In 1942, he received an A.B. degree with honors from the University of Southern California, and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.

During World War II, Mr. Ignatius served as a Lieutenant in the Navy, principally as an aviation ordnance officer aboard the carrier, *Manila Bay*, in the Pacific.

In February of 1947, Mr. Ignatius was awarded the degree of Master in Business Administration from Harvard University. In the following three years he served as a Research Assistant and as an Instructor in Business Administration at Harvard. He resigned from the Harvard staff in 1950 to form, with two of his Harvard Business School associates, the management consulting and research firm, Harbridge House, Inc.

During the next eleven years, Mr. Ignatius played a major role in the development and expansion of Harbridge House. A great part of this effort was devoted to consulting and research in military supply and procurement, and in the procurement responsibilities of a large segment of defense industry.

On 22 May 1961, Mr. Ignatius was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics) and held that position until he assumed the office of Under Secretary of the Army on 28 February 1964. On 12 December 1964 he became Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics).

In 1947, Mr. Ignatius married Nancy Sharpless Weiser of Holyoke, Massachusetts. They have four children: David, Sarah, Amy and Alan.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Ignatius has been in the Department of Defense since 1961, first as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics, and later as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics.

Mr. Ignatius has written to the committee to inform us that he owns no securities in companies doing business with the Department of Defense. We have that letter in our files.

Mr. Ignatius, you need no introduction to this committee. But we do want to welcome you here today. We congratulate you on your nomination to fill a highly important position. Members of the committee have been furnished with your biographical sketch, but please give us a brief oral summary of this biography, and add such other points that you may wish. And then members of the committee will have a chance to question you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL R. IGNATIUS, NOMINEE TO BE  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY**

Mr. IGNATIUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

First let me say that I am here today because of the untimely death of John McNaughton, who was a colleague of mine in the Department. All of us who knew him and his wife and his son—whom I did not know—regret the tragedy that took their lives. And I am here because of that.

I have served in the Department since 1961, as you have indicated. And except for a period of about 10 months when I was Under Secre-

tary of the Army, my work has involved responsibility for installations and logistics, first in the Army, and over the period of the last approximately 2½ years, in the Department of Defense, in the OSD staff.

I have found this a challenging assignment, Mr. Chairman, as I think all of us do who work with national security problems.

Prior to coming to the Department, I worked for a period of about 11 years in a consulting firm that did a great deal of its work with elements in the Department of Defense and a large segment of the defense industry. And I think I had some appreciation at the time I came in for the magnitude and complexity of some of the problems with which I have dealt over the period of the last 6 years.

I think it is fair to say that I have enjoyed this experience. The hours are long, as they are here in the Congress. But I think there are rewards of many kinds, one of which certainly is the reward of working with very dedicated, patriotic, and effective people, both those in uniform and the civilians in the Department. I really believe that people like me who come from the outside to work in the Government and in the Department of Defense in a sense really take away more than we give. There is a reward, I think, in public service.

If I am confirmed by the Senate for this new post I certainly will give it my best. I count myself particularly fortunate, I think, to have the opportunity, if confirmed, to work with an officer of the great ability of Admiral Moorer. I did not have an opportunity to know Admiral Moorer until the past couple of weeks. In the past 10 days or so I have had a number of occasions to meet with him. He is an officer of great ability. And as I say, I count myself fortunate to have the opportunity to work with him if the Senate confirms my nomination.

Senator STENNIS. All right. You have made a good statement.

I think the Secretary of the Navy is a highly important position, extensive in its responsibilities and obligations. Even if it doesn't have the so-called Cabinet level under the Reorganization Act, I think it should be just as important as it was before we had the Reorganization Act. And I think whether or not it is important depends partly upon the man who fills the office.

Now, we want to know if you are confirmed, if you will feel free always to give this committee or any committee of the Senate or the House, and not only free, but under obligation to give us the facts, upon any matter that you receive any inquiry about.

Mr. IGNATIUS. I would feel free to do that, and under an obligation to do that. I can't conceive of the Navy operating without the understanding and support of the Congress and the committees of the Congress most directly concerned with it.

Senator STENNIS. I like the use of the word "obligation." But I want to go back to the idea that you would feel that it is an obligation of yours, and a duty of yours, and at the same time you will feel free to do it within your functions, and you will not desert that standard that you apply to yourself. Is that right?

Mr. IGNATIUS. Mr. Chairman, I would be a member of the Department. I would be responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of my duties. I would expect to be a staunch and informed advocate of the service which I headed. I would also regard myself as a member of the team concerned with the national defense, and

would in my appearances before these committees to which you make reference testify on behalf of programs that were adopted by the Department.

So far as presentation of facts in response to questions or requests from the committee is concerned, I certainly would feel free to provide whatever facts were requested by the chairman or individual members.

Senator STENNIS. All right, that was my question, would you give us the facts. It is all right to espouse the cause. But my question was, would you give us the facts. And you have said you would. And that sometimes means to give facts whether you are called on expressly on that point or not. Because to fail to disclose facts sometimes is misleading, as you know. I don't know what to ask you about. But if it is anything that the committee needs, even if it is the answer to a letter, you should disclose the facts, whether or not the man dealing with the subject knows just what requests to ask. How do you feel about that?

Mr. IGNATIUS. I would endeavor to be responsive in the manner in which you have raised the question, Mr. Chairman, and provide those facts that would give a balanced presentation of the subject under discussion.

Senator STENNIS. And you will do that come what may, I mean regardless of the circumstances, you will stick to that?

Mr. IGNATIUS. I think that there is one point that occurs to me in connection with this. And that is, decisions are made by higher authority as a result of a process of deliberation over hard problems. And often proponents of a particular course of action do not finally succeed in achieving their objective. I believe that when a decision is made in any organization, the individuals in the organization should carry out the decision cheerfully and affirmatively even though it may have gone against them.

Senator STENNIS. That is true. That is a very different question, though, Mr. Ignatius, from what I raise. I just raise the point of giving the facts to us. And you have said that you would, even to the extent of, when we didn't raise the point, you would feel obligated to go on and give the facts that were relevant in particular to the points involved.

Mr. IGNATIUS. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, if the particular question elicited particular facts that did not give a balanced or accurate portrayal of the situation under discussion, I would want to provide such additional facts in order to make the true situation known to the committee raising the questions.

Senator STENNIS. That is good that you would want to do it. And you would do it?

Mr. IGNATIUS. I would, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Now, expressed one way, the term we lawyers use, we don't want to have to deal with you at arm's length. We are serving the same country, and we have the same problems. We don't want to deal with any official, I don't, and the committee doesn't, I am sure, and have to feel that we are dealing at arm's length. Do you share that sentiment? You don't want to have to deal with us at arm's length, do you?

Mr. IGNATIUS. I do not, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Now, this is not a personal question. Why did you accept public service, or seek it, accept it? Why have you been

engaged since 1961 in this public service? Why did you take this secretaryship? I won't ask you if you sought it. Why did you accept it?

Mr. IGNATIUS. I had thought before coming into the Government, Mr. Chairman, that at some time in my life I would like to have an opportunity to come into the Government. I had thought about that for a number of years. I had guessed that it would have been somewhat later in my life than when in fact it did occur. An opportunity presented itself to me in the early spring of 1961 when the then Secretary of the Army, Elvis Starr, said he had heard about me and asked me if I would come into the Pentagon and talk to him.

I told him at the time that I had been interested in public service, but had not thought that I could embark upon that kind of a career at that particular time.

Well, he said, why don't you come in anyway and let's talk about it.

And we did talk. And I went home and discussed the matter with my wife and family. And we concluded that if this was something that I wanted to do at some time in my career, maybe the time to do it was when the opportunity arose. Since the opportunity was present at that time I said that I would like very much to come in.

I have stayed on, Mr. Chairman, longer than I had thought I would. I did not expect still to be here. I think the reason why I have is that there is a job to do. I hope that in the discharge of my previous responsibilities I have handled my share of this burden. And because we are involved in a number of important things I have elected to stay on for a longer period of time.

Senator STENNIS. Very good. You understand, I wasn't questioning your motives. I have asked many people sitting where you are the same question.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I haven't any questions. But Senator Tower, who had to attend the Banking and Currency Committee meeting on the housing bill, asked me to express his regrets at not being here, and to vest his approval of the two nominees.

Senator STENNIS. All right, Senator Smith.

Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like the record to show that I have known Secretary Ignatius since he came into Government. In the some 28 years I have been associated with the Defense Department I have never known anybody more sincerely anxious to help get the facts out with respect to particular situations nor anyone who understood better the problems we in the Congress have with individual constituents and groups in our States. I believe Mr. Ignatius is a superb public servant. In addition, he has presented, in his statement this morning, why he is in the Government in splendid fashion.

Mr. Secretary, with that premise there are questions I would ask. What worries me today is the extent of the spreading around of misinformation.

For instance, in one of our leading newspapers on the 25th of June there was an article which said that according to a high planner in the Government, all targets in North Vietnam that meant anything had been attacked. The next day, in a local newspaper, was an article, with a byline, stating that not only had this information come from top civilian planners, but also from top military people.

Inasmuch as in classified hearings we are getting exactly opposite information, you can understand why these stories gave us apprehension. That is one of the reasons why you would have a consensus on this committee that, at least to some extent, the relationship of this committee has somewhat deteriorated with the Department of Defense.

Last week, at the time that the distinguished chairman was holding hearings incident to this question of attacks on North Vietnam, a statement was released which was about as misleading as any statement read. It said that 95 percent of all of General Westmoreland's targets had been attacked. To the layman of course that meant 95 percent, of all military targets in North Vietnam had been attacked. The truth is that General Westmoreland has nothing whatever to do with those targets. They are under Admiral Sharp, both Air Force and Navy. Westmoreland is given just a few miles north of the DMZ, so he can control, in effect, the tactical area of that running battle. But the target list is so inconsequential he doesn't even submit a target list. As I understand it, he is just told and properly, not to attack villages. But as a result of this article everybody was led to believe, all around the country, that 95 percent of the North Vietnamese targets have been attacked.

You wouldn't approve any such business if you were confirmed for this position; would you?

Mr. IGNATIUS. Senator Symington, I am not familiar with this particular instance.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have been careful to express it to you accurately.

Mr. IGNATIUS. The colloquy that I had earlier with Chairman Stennis addressed the question of the presentation of relevant facts in connection with appearances before the Congress, and I responded by saying that I would certainly endeavor to do that. I can't appraise this particular matter, because I have not been involved in it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I haven't asked you to appraise it. But you might look into it. I hope the passing around of such misinformation can be stopped in the future.

Another point more directly bearing on your position. You mentioned the new Chief of Naval Operations, who I hardly know. But if there has been a better Chief of Naval Operations than Admiral McDonald I do not know who it was. For a long time it has been no secret that he was sympathetic with the position taken by the chairman of this committee with respect to the utilization of a battleship in the Vietnamese war, a war that is costing us so much in blood and treasure. Now from what we are told it is going to be done. You are taking a battleship out of mothballs. The question I ask with great sincerity, not in any attempt to be snide is, Do you think this appointment is going to make you a military expert overnight?

Mr. IGNATIUS. Well, I hope I am aware of whatever strengths as well as limitations I have, Senator Symington. And I have worked with military people now for more than 6 years in an official capacity in the Department. And I have worked with military people from time to time prior to that in a consulting capacity. I believe that it is possible for civilians and military people to work in close harmony and in a productive and effective manner. And the basis of such a relationship must be mutual respect.

I would hope that I would work in such a manner with the Chief of Naval Operations and the other senior uniformed people both in the Marine Corps and in the Navy. That would certainly be my desire, and hopefully, expectation to do so.

There are many matters that involve a degree of knowledge that can come only from a long career in dealing with professional military matters that I think become apparent to civilians as they penetrate some of the problems.

By the same token, civilians must exercise the right of decision, and they must seek the best military advice that they can obtain in reaching those decisions. And I would certainly do that. And I would not attempt to intrude my own judgment in a matter where it seemed to me clearly there were purely military implications that my previous experience had not acquainted me with sufficiently. But I have found, Senator Symington, that it is possible to work with senior military officials in a productive way. And I have always endeavored to do that in my previous duties.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have had a great deal of business experience. Nobody believes more in civilian control than I. But people who followed me were firm in such convictions as to how many planes should be in a group, and attacks should be made, detailed tactical operations of the military. Although there is nothing excessively modest about me—I never felt I was competent to make such detailed tactical decisions.

I believe when such detailed tactical military decisions are made by political appointees, they destroy many things, including morale. There is an article recently in the papers which sums up some of my apprehensions. It says that all generals have been wrong in all wars at all times. That of course means all admirals too, the military. This article is out this week in one of our leading magazines. It is a direct attack on the military competence of our people over there.

One of the reasons is illustrated by this battleship. Senator Russell has been on this committee for some 35 years. He is hard working, dedicated to his job, and to the responsibilities of being chairman of this committee. It was at least a year ago, closer to a year and a half ago, that he urged we use our seapower, which is going to be your responsibility, more effectively. It doesn't sit well with me that at least a year after he made the suggestion—they now say they are going to follow it, but it is going to take at least a year to put it in force.

These are developments which worry me.

I see the Secretary of the Air Force sitting here, and I assure him what I am saying is not critical of him. But in the past it has happened this way.

Again let me emphasize that I believe in civilian control, but when people work hard over a long period of years, to get to the top of their services, and therefore presumably are the best in their services in the minds of their civilian superiors, or they wouldn't have gotten the job, I believe their opinion is worthy of some recognition on the detailed technical tactical military side of the job they are trying to do.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further comment or questions, except it will be a pleasure to vote for the confirmation of one who has done an outstanding job in all positions that he has held in the Department of Defense since he made the sacrifices obviously he has made so as to come into this Government.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator, thank you very much.

Senator YOUNG of Ohio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I really have no questions. I know I shall be very happy to vote in favor of confirmation.

I like very much the Secretary's attitude and his answers to the questions, and the statement that it was his desire and hope to work in harmony with the Chief of Naval Operations and with other officers of our armed services.

But I like very much your statement, sir, that after all civilians must make the decisions. And I take the view right now that too many noncivilians have been making some decisions. I am very happy to hear you make that statement.

I have an affection for the Navy. I have two boys who served in combat in World War II. Both were wounded, and both have died since. So I have an affection for the Navy.

But very definitely the people who wrote the Constitution of our country provided that civilian authority must always be supreme over noncivilian authority. I am sure you will bear that in mind and try to work in harmony. They are supposed to give expert advice, but naval officers in the Army and Navy go along just the same as in civilian life we go along on things. But you will keep that in mind as I understand it, that it is for you and other civilians to make the decisions in the end?

Mr. IGNATIUS. I will, sir.

Senator YOUNG of Ohio. Thank you. I am glad to approve of this nomination.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you.

Senator INOUE.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to join my colleagues in congratulating Mr. Ignatius. I shall be pleased to support the nomination.

I have no questions.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First I would like to say that every comment that I have heard about Mr. Ignatius in the last few years has been highly complimentary of his ability. And I feel certain that the Navy is getting as a Secretary a very able individual.

I would like to ask a little bit about your basic philosophy. One, do you approve or disapprove of the policy that has been followed to date in the Vietnam war, that is, the policy of graduated response?

Mr. IGNATIUS. First, Senator Byrd, my responsibilities, as you know, have not included any responsibilities for policy on the conduct of the war. I will say that the President is faced with complex and difficult questions in connection with the prosecution of the war. I have supported the President and continue to support the President in the decisions that he has reached.

Senator BYRD of Virginia. Do you feel that the time has come for a reappraisal of basic strategy in Vietnam?

Mr. IGNATIUS. Senator Byrd, I don't think that I can respond to that, because I haven't been close enough to respond to matters of that kind. I am sure that questions of review of past activities and looking at future possibilities go on from time to time and continuously. But what they are and the considerations that may be involved

in such discussions and deliberations I have not been privy to, I have not been involved in, because of the nature of my responsibilities.

Senator BYRD of Virginia. We are involved, of course, in a very costly war in Vietnam, costly in the way of economic resources to our Nation, and costly in the way of casualties. We had 43,000 U.S. casualties during the first 7 months of 1967. And we have been involved in the war for quite awhile. Do you agree or disagree with the assertion that a long war in Vietnam, a long war so far as the United States is concerned, is to the advantage or disadvantage of the Soviet Union?

Mr. IGNATIUS. Senator Byrd, I have never addressed that question, and therefore I have no informed opinion on it.

Senator BYRD of Virginia. In other words, you have no judgment as to whether a long war in Vietnam would be to the advantage or disadvantage of the Soviet Union.

Mr. IGNATIUS. As I say, my responsibilities have not involved consideration of questions of that kind, and therefore I have not devoted thought to provide an informed answer to the question that you are raising.

Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you.

No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Ignatius, do you have any other statement you wish to make?

Mr. IGNATIUS. No, sir, Mr. Chairman, except to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you.

Senator STENNIS. We are delighted to have you, sir. And you may be excused now, and we will hear the next gentleman. You may stay if you wish, but you do not have to stay to be courteous to the committee. You have other duties, I am sure.

(The nomination of Mr. Ignatius to be Secretary of the Navy was subsequently approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate on August 18, 1967.)

#### NOMINATION OF TOWNSEND HOOPES, OF VIRGINIA, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Senator STENNIS. Members of the committee, we now have Mr. Townsend Hoopes of Virginia, who has been nominated to be Under Secretary of the Air Force, vice Norman S. Paul, resigned.

Please be seated at the committee table. You are accompanied, I notice, by the Secretary of the Air Force.

Dr. Brown, do you wish to present Mr. Hoopes?

(The nomination reference and biographical sketch of Mr. Hoopes follow:)

##### NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
August 4, 1967.

*Ordered,* That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Townsend Hoopes, of Virginia, to be the Under Secretary of the Air Force vice Norman S. Paul, resigned.

##### TOWNSEND HOOPES

Present: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

1965-66: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA (Near East-South Asia).  
 1958-64: Partner: Cresap, McCormick and Paget.  
 1955-57: Associate: J. H. Whitney and Company.  
 1953-55: Assistant to the President, Spencer Chemical Company.  
 1948-53: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.  
 1947-48: Assistant to the Chairman: Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.  
 1946: Editorial Writer, *Buffalo Evening News*.  
 1943-46: United States Marine Corps.  
 Education: Phillips Academy, Andover, 1940, Yale University, 1944, National War College, 1951.

Other: Member, Council on Foreign Relations; Consultant to the White House on organization of the National Security Council, 1954; Consultant to the State and Defense Departments on overseas military bases, 1957; Secretary of the Military Panel, Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, 1957-58; Consultant to the President's Committee on United States Information Activities Abroad, 1960; Who's Who in the East.

Publications: Various articles in *Foreign Affairs* and *The Yale Review*, 1954-1960, in *Business Horizons* and other publications, 1962-64.

Clubs: Yale Club of New York City; Chevy Chase Club, Maryland; The Links, New York City; Federal City Club, Washington, D.C.

Residence: 7718 Georgetown Pike, McLean, Virginia 22101.

Born: April 28, 1922.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Hoopes had addressed a letter to the committee concerning his financial interest. He has indicated his intention to dispose of his securities in companies doing business with the Department of Defense if he is confirmed by the Senate as Under Secretary of the Air Force. We have that letter.

Members of the committee, before asking Mr. Hoopes to give us an oral summary of his background and experience, the Chair is glad to recognize the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Brown, to present Mr. Hoopes to the committee.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Dr. BROWN. In accompanying Mr. Hoopes in his appearance before the committee I come to say that I am aware of his very distinguished record of service to the United States, both in the military as an employee of the legislative branch, and in the executive branch, as well as his fine productive experience in private life.

Mr. Hoopes' reputation is extremely high and very well deserved.

I myself have known him only briefly during his tenure as principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. I have found his understanding of the world, of the national security of the United States, and of military problems to be of the highest. If he is confirmed, I am sure that he will make a very fine Under Secretary of the Air Force. I will look forward very much to working with him.

Senator STENNIS. That is right, Dr. Brown.

Mr. Hoopes, we are glad to have you here before the committee. And we ask you now to give us a summary of your background and experience before we have questions by the members of the committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. TOWNSEND HOOPES, NOMINEE TO BE THE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Mr. HOOPES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am greatly honored to be here. Let me just proceed quickly with a summary of my background.

I was born in Duluth, Minn. in 1922. My father was in the steamship business on the Great Lakes, my early life was really a migration eastward, along them. I attended public and private schools in Detroit and Buffalo. I was then sent away to Phillips Academy at Andover and subsequently to Yale.

I graduated in the middle of the Second World War and went immediately in the Marine Corps. I was a second lieutenant in the 5th Marine Division participating in the assault and capture of Iwo Jima and in the initial occupation of southern Japan.

After the war in 1946 I was briefly a reporter and editorial writer for the Buffalo Evening News.

I came to Washington in early 1947 as assistant to the first chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Mr. Walter Gresham Andrews of Buffalo. He was a personal friend and a counselor. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, that President Johnson and the distinguished Senator from Maine, Mrs. Margaret Chase Smith, were members of that committee at that time. I served a privileged apprenticeship in that capacity for 18 months, following which Mr. Forrestal asked me to join his then embryonic Office of the Secretary of Defense.

I served in several different capacities between 1948 and 1953 under several Secretaries of Defense, first as a legislative assistant, and then as a secretary of what was then called the Armed Forces Policy Council, and then as assistant for National Security Council Affairs. I should say, as you perhaps know, Mr. Chairman, that the Office of the Secretary of Defense in those days was rather like a medium-sized law firm. There were something less than a hundred people, with everyone doing a little bit of everything. In subsequent years, of course, it has become a more highly organized structure, and larger.

I was privileged to attend the National War College during this period, and to serve a stint as the Executive Director of a Presidential Commission on Universal Military Training. That Commission was under the chairmanship of the late Senator James Wadsworth of New York, Senator Symington's father-in-law. The membership included Will Clayton, Carl Compton of MIT, and Admiral Kincaid.

During this period, roughly between my 25th and 31st years, I had the honor of working rather closely with a number of the leading and even the great men of the period. Secretary Forrestal, General Marshall, Secretary Robert Lovett, the distinguished Senator from Missouri, who was then the first Secretary of the Air Force, and Mr. Carl Vinson, the venerable chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. I did determine at that time that I did not wish to be a career civil servant, and I left the Government shortly after the end of the Truman administration. But I was very clear that I wanted to come back.

I spent the next 11 years in business in New York, including a period with the investment firm of J. H. Whitney & Co. I was subsequently a partner in the management firm of Cresap, McCormick

& Paget in 1958 to 1964. During that period I was occasionally a consultant to the Government, especially on military and foreign affairs.

I returned to Government in January of 1965 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asian Affairs. And about 18 months later I became Principal Deputy under the late John McNaughton.

I am married to Ann Merrifield Cunningham of Southport, Conn. And we now live in McLean, Va., with a good many children.

That completes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Well, you have a very interesting career.

Since you started out on the committee where Mrs. Smith was a member, and you also served under Secretary Symington, I am going to waive my privilege of asking the first question and call on Senator Smith.

You were on the committee over in the House?

Senator SMITH. Yes. I was brought up by Carl Vinson, which was a privilege.

Mr. Hoopes, I wish you well in your position, which I am sure you will have soon.

I would like to say that you have some awfully big shoes to fill. I have considered Norman Paul one of the best executives in the history of the Department of Defense. I have personally witnessed the courage that he and Secretary Brown have exhibited on different and delicate personnel matters in relations with Congress. And I again wish you well.

Mr. HOOPES. I appreciate that very much, Madam Senator. I have known Norman Paul professionally for some time, and I share your views fully. I am well aware of the comparison that will be made between him and his successor.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator Smith.

Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished senior Senator from Maine with respect to Norman Paul, a good friend of mine and a fine public servant.

Mr. Hoopes has not completed his biography. It is always pleasant to see a Yale man come into a Government so full of Harvard people.

One thing Mr. Hoopes didn't mention which I think ought to be on his record, is that he was a football player in fact captain of the Yale team.

Mr. Hoopes, I look forward to voting for your confirmation. You have been an able public servant.

There are several things I would ask for the record at this time.

I personally have been gratified with actions of the present Secretary and the Chief. And what is more important people I respect now and formerly in the Air Force feel he has done a great deal for the Air Force. That is the acid test.

On the other hand, there are developments in the Air Force which worry me. Going back a long time, when we ran into Pearl Harbor, Admiral Davidson told me we not only did not know the Japanese had hundreds of Zero fighters, we didn't know they had one. Later on, in World War II our Curtiss P-40's were not as good as the best the enemy had.

Then we got into the Korean war, and had to borrow fighter planes from Canada to start off. Their MIG 15's were better than our first F-86's according to the pilots I talked to, especially at fighting altitude.

So I have always worried about the development of airplanes. I remember Assistant Secretary of Defense, Anna Rosenberg, coming back from Korea, and saying to the Secretary of Defense, "Well, Mr. Secretary, as I understand the situation, you have only one problem. That is to teach our pilots how to fly blueprints."

In the first airshow the Russians have had since 1961 at Domodedovo Field outside of Moscow, they flew six new fighters including two variable-wing units, and they also showed major modifications to three others. Almost immediately I read a press story, "Pentagon not impressed with recent air developments as exhibited in the Russian show."

Thereupon I thought to myself, this is where I came in.

Don't you think it important for our air designs to increase at least in pace and development with that of the Soviet Union?

Mr. HOOPES. I would think you are absolutely right, sir. The technological effort to maintain our qualitative military superiority is the essence of our task.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know we have one plane, two planes, depending on how you look at it, the F-111-A, and the F-111-B, under intense development and production. But do we have any other fighter plane you know of beyond the F-105's and the F-104's under research and development?

Mr. HOOPES. I don't really think I am competent to answer that question, Senator. I do not know what the answer to the question is. I hope I will know in a few months.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Secretary is here himself. There is no other plane in research or development. If this article is correct, our defense people are not particularly worried about what the Russians showed the other day with those six new fighters.

I know also that in 1965 in Thailand and off South Vietnam Navy and Air Force pilots plead that some new fighter designs get underway. But, we have nothing really underway at this time.

If we ran into trouble with the one country in the world capable of destroying us, say in the 1970's, we could well be fighting with a 1952 airplane, they with a 1966 airplane. If we found ourselves in a position of that character, based on our past experience with the Zeros and the MIG-15's, that could be serious, could it not?

Mr. HOOPES. I would certainly give great weight to what you have said. And I would look forward to the opportunity to examine this situation personally at an early date.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now my final question, the same asked Secretary Ignatius, just because a man is military I have the title to this newspaper story now—"Almost all generals are almost almost always wrong in all wars."

Is this not somewhat comparable to saying, "Almost all doctors are almost always wrong about all operations." That might have an affect on the morale of the medical profession. You don't come in with any preconceived idea that just because a man is a military man you have to take what he says with a grain of salt relative to his own profession, do you?

Mr. HOOPES. I certainly do not, Senator. If I may say so, I have a personal perspective on the development of civilian-military relationships that I value. I was here in a civilian capacity, as you know, at a very low level immediately after the Second World War, when I thought that the civilian-military relationships were extremely tense. They were so for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was ignorance of each other's basic motivations, purposes, and backgrounds. These two groups have now worked together under conditions of continuing crisis for 20 years, they have exchanged students at civilian and military colleges, and there has been much greater intellectual activity on the subjects of military strategy and foreign affairs, which has immensely broadened both groups. I found when I returned in 1965 a really quite harmonious and remarkable change. I believe that military advice should be sought and followed in particular areas, and I think with equal conviction that civilian authorities must exercise ultimate control, because this is a principle of the Constitution.

Senator SYMINGTON. You were in the attack on Iwo Jima, so I am sure you have seen a lot of action. As to whether or not Iwo Jima should be attacked, of course, would be a civilian decision. But if it was attacked, you would prefer, would you not, to have military people handle the details of the operation?

Mr. HOOPES. I can't conceive of an alternate arrangement, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is refreshing. Although I believe fully in complete civilian control under the Constitution, I am glad to hear your observation incident to a tactical detailed military decision.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator.

May I ask you briefly a few questions here, like those I asked Mr. Ignatius, and I don't want you to limit your answer, but would you just be brief so we can get to the other Senators?

Mr. Hoopes, you are experienced in the Department. Would you feel free in testifying before any congressional committee, or even in response to congressional questions—would you feel free to give us the facts of the case, just a statement of the facts, regardless of what the policy decision might be, or anything else? I am talking about the bare, hard facts that we are entitled to know. That is what I want you to respond to.

Mr. HOOPES. Mr. Chairman, I should say my answer is a ringing, "Yes." I would associate myself fully with what Mr. Ignatius said earlier, that I just do not believe the Military Establishment can work effectively without the cooperation and support of the Congress and the appropriate committees. It seems to me that an exchange of relevant information is the essence of this relationship.

Senator STENNIS. Well, we have to make decisions over here under the Constitution. You say on the question of judgment, a man is no better than his information. And we have a hard time getting the facts. It is like chasing a comet's tail. But do you feel the obligation to give us the facts, and will you do it?

Mr. HOOPES. I do, sir, and I will.

Senator STENNIS. All right, you affirm that.

Now, we do not like the idea, as you heard me say, of feeling that we have to deal at arm's length with those of you who represent any

department. I am sure you don't feel when you come over here, that you have to deal at arm's length with us—or do you? How do you feel about that?

Mr. HOOPES. I do not, sir. I really look forward to a much closer relationship with all the members of this committee than has been possible in the past. One of my regrets of the past 3 years has been that I have had only sporadic contact with the Members of the Congress; it has accordingly not been possible for me to be as responsive to some of their lines of thought as it would have been had I been in rather more continuous contact.

Senator STENNIS. You will have an opportunity now, I suspect. We hope you do. And we welcome you over here.

Mr. HOOPES. I hope so, too.

Senator STENNIS. I asked Mr. Ignatius about why he accepted public service, or why he sought it. And I think you have given us a rather good picture of your feelings on those things.

Senator Young, may I call on you now, sir?

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no questions. I shall be very happy to vote favorably for confirmation.

Mr. HOOPES. Thank you, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Dominick, do you have questions?

Senator DOMINICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to associate myself completely with what Senator Symington said in the questions that he raised, including his welcome of a Yale man to the installation, or the establishment, as they call it.

I have just one or two questions. This pertains, I suspect, to policy matters which you are probably going to have to get into later today. But this includes the question of the type of armament and bombs that we have available to us in the Vietnamese picture.

During my recent tour over there, it became apparent to me that there was at least a quota system being used as far as some of our armament was concerned. I am talking about the question of whether there was an adequate number of 750-pound bombs, or whether there was an adequate number of CBU's. Have you had a chance to go into this at all?

Mr. HOOPES. Senator, I have not had a chance to go into that matter. It is really remote from my present responsibility, and therefore I am not really competent to address the question.

Senator DOMINICK. In your future position, will you have any programs or plans to return to that Asian theater area?

Mr. HOOPES. I would suspect that this is the case, and I look forward to it. I imagine that the problems you just mentioned would be central to my concern as well as to Secretary Brown's.

Senator DOMINICK. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hoopes, I would like to welcome one who lives in Virginia, with many children, to the committee today.

I might say for the record that I have not had the privilege of knowing you, but I am very much impressed by your appearance before the committee this morning.

I would like to ask one or two questions.

Secretary Brown testified as to your understanding of the world and the problems facing the Defense Department, and particularly the problems facing the International Security Affairs, a division of the Department of Defense in which you, I know, have been the Principal Deputy Assistant. This, I believe, includes and is primarily concerned with Vietnam.

Mr. HOOPES. I would say it is not primarily concerned with Vietnam. It is concerned with the world as a whole. And I should say, as a disclaimer, before I answer a specific question, that my professional responsibilities have really been somewhat peripheral as regards Vietnam. I was responsible for Near East and south Asian affairs during the first 18 months I was in the Department.

I acquired broader supervisory responsibilities, which included Europe, Latin America, and Africa, about 18 months later, in September 1966. My boss, the late John McNaughton, however, through a very natural circumstance kept the portfolio of Southeast Asia and Vietnam in his own hands. The decisions were being made at very high levels. The staff work was intensive. I rather imagine that during the last year of his life he spent 60 or 70 percent of his time on this problem. As a matter of management necessity, it fell to me to look after problems in other parts of the world; and it was not efficient for me to try to double team him on Vietnam.

I have not been a source of policy advice to the Government on that subject, and I really doubt that I have authoritative or even useful views.

Senator BYRD. You have had wide experience during the past 2 years with the economic problems throughout the world which confront the service?

Mr. HOOPES. Generally speaking; yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. And that would include Southeast Asia as well as the areas that we mentioned a moment ago?

Mr. HOOPES. It would include Southeast Asia in a broad sense, particularly as far as the impact of what is going on there relates to areas with which I had closer contact and for which I had closer responsibility.

Senator BYRD. In what areas did you have closer contact and closer responsibility?

Mr. HOOPES. I would say the broad area we call the Near East and Southeast Asia. It includes the southeast flank of NATO, Greece, and Turkey. It runs through the Near East, and includes Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon; it stops essentially at the Himalayan frontier.

Senator BYRD. What about the Soviet Union?

Mr. HOOPES. I have had no direct responsibility for the Soviet Union, but of course, that is a pervasive factor in all our considerations.

Senator BYRD. That covers your consideration of all the other matters?

Mr. HOOPES. It does, indeed, in every problem area.

Senator BYRD. Now, another question along that line. You agree, of course, that we are involved in a very costly war in Vietnam?

Mr. HOOPES. I do, indeed, sir.

Senator BYRD. Costly in regard to resources, economic resources; costly in regard to casualties?

Mr. HOOPES. I do, indeed, sir.

Senator BYRD. And it has been a somewhat lengthy war?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes.

Senator BYRD. And I assume you will agree, too, that the end is not now in sight?

Mr. HOOPES. I don't see any evidence of it.

Senator BYRD. Is it your judgment that a long war in Vietnam, insofar as the United States is concerned, would be to the advantage of the Soviet Union?

Mr. HOOPES. I would say not necessarily, Senator, because I think the Soviets would calculate to some extent, as we do, that the longer the war goes on, the larger the opportunity for an escalation. And I believe that the Soviet Union does not desire a confrontation with the United States in any part of the world at this time.

Senator BYRD. Is it your belief that the Soviet Union would like to see the war in Vietnam ended—on their own terms, naturally—do you think that the Soviet Union would like to see the war in Vietnam ended at an early date?

Mr. HOOPES. I would say that, on balance, the Soviet Union would probably like to see an ending of the war in Vietnam.

Senator BYRD. Has there been any evidence that the Soviet Union is decreasing the military materiel that it is sending to North Vietnam?

Mr. HOOPES. I don't believe there is. I have limited information on that subject.

Senator BYRD. Am I correct in interpreting your response to my questions to be that it is your view that the Soviet Union would not be advantaged by a long war in Vietnam?

Mr. HOOPES. I would say from what I know of the prevailing opinion in the Soviet Government that on balance it would like to terminate the war, because it would fear that the longer the war went on, the greater the risk of a military escalation which might involve it directly.

Let me give you an example of why I believe the Soviet Union is quite reticent about confronting the United States at this time. In the recent Middle Eastern War in June, you may recall that Premier Kosygin took the initiative on the hotline to make it completely clear to us that there would be no Soviet intervention on behalf of the Arabs. This was highly disappointing to the Arabs. But I think it was a clear signal of the Soviet reticence about facing this kind of military situation with us.

Senator BYRD. I am pleased to hear you say that you feel the Soviet Union is reticent in regard to a basic situation with the United States. But that is not exactly the purport of my question.

The Soviet Union does not have to face the United States in Vietnam. It has not been facing the United States in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese and the Vietcong have been facing the United States. And the United States has been pouring resources and manpower in opposition, not to the Soviet Union, of course, but to the Vietcong and the Vietnamese.

Now, is it not to the Soviet Union's advantage, in your judgment, that we continue to pour resources and manpower in opposition, not to the Soviet Union but to North Vietnam and to the Vietcong?

Mr. HOOPES. I would agree with that, sir. I think the Soviet Union is not displeased by our expenditure of resources, human and material, in Vietnam. But I don't believe that they would conclude from that

that the United States is being severely weakened. It is a fact of history, I think, that every war we have fought in has rendered us afterward militarily and industrially stronger than before. And the Soviet Union is aware of this. I would say that the Soviets have to balance their desire to see us expend resources wastefully against their fear that a wider war might involve them.

Senator BYRD. Is it your feeling then, that the longer the war goes on, the stronger the United States would be?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir; I wouldn't argue that.

Senator BYRD. You said a moment ago that history shows that after each war we are stronger than we were before. Would that naturally lead to your belief that if this war goes on 2 or 3 or 4 years longer, we would be better off than if it were ended quickly?

Mr. HOOPES. I think it happens to be an historical consequence. But I wouldn't turn it around and argue that it was therefore desirable for us to—

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the Senator yield?

Senator BYRD. I yield.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you are a bit mixed on that, Mr. Secretary. At the end of World War II, this country had \$24.5 billion in gold, and owed \$7 billion abroad redeemable in gold. Today we have \$13.2 billion in gold, and owe over \$30 billion abroad that can be called tomorrow morning. I think the Senator from Virginia is correct in the implications of his question.

The gross national product of the United States does not necessarily have anything to do with our financial position, specifically our fiscal and monetary positions. We had the dollar gap and other things after World War II. Those problems are no longer with us today.

To me, a great problem today is inflation. We will have a trillion dollars' worth of life insurance out among the citizens by the end of this year. We have retirement plans, pension plans, and so forth. I predict all these are going to be vitally affected, especially because of this \$70 million-a-day expense in Vietnam.

So I would hope you would give full consideration to the implications of the questioning of the Senator from Virginia, because I believe the longer this war goes on the more it is weakening the United States, not strengthening it. I hope you never give the impression that wars are what make capitalism work because that is exactly what the Soviets have been preaching for a long time, the theory of Marx.

Thank you, Senator.

Senator STENNIS. Any further questions, Senator?

Senator BYRD. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. Proceed.

Senator BYRD. I want to say again that I feel that you are a tremendously able individual. I am not in any way discounting that. I am interested in the philosophy, however, of those who are in a high position of our Government, who make decisions regarding Vietnam. And certainly, you have been in a position to influence decisions, and you will be in a position to—in even a more important position in regard to influencing decisions of Government. And I am not clear in my own mind from your response to my various questions, and I would be glad if you would correct. The best that I can determine is that you do not agree with my assertions that a long war in Vietnam is to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

Mr. HOOPES. I would like to try to correct what may be a misunderstanding. I certainly am not, obviously, an advocate of war, short or long.

Senator BYRD. I am aware of that; I am certain of that.

Mr. HOOPES. You asked me what I thought the Soviet judgment would be on the question of U.S. involvement in a long war. And I gave you my best judgment, which was that the Soviet Union probably does not believe that we are being decisively weakened by our expenditures at the current level in Vietnam.

Senator BYRD. Do you think we are being weakened?

Mr. HOOPES. I believe we are expending very substantial resources.

Senator BYRD. Am I correct, though, in assuming that you do not agree with me that a long war is to the advantage of the Soviet Union? Leaving out what they think, what is your judgment? Does your judgment coincide with mine, or is it contrary to mine?

Mr. HOOPES. If the Soviets could be assured that this war would stay at a low level, a relatively low level, and would be contained, that it would not escalate in a way that might involve them directly, I think I would probably agree with you, sir.

Senator BYRD. Let me state it once more. My belief is that a long war in Vietnam is advantageous to the Soviet Union. Now, is that your personal view, or is it not your own personal view?

Mr. HOOPES. I would say it is not my personal view, in broad terms.

Senator BYRD. You do not agree with my assumption that a long war in Vietnam is to the advantage of the Soviet Union?

Mr. HOOPES. I couldn't agree with the way you have stated it, which is somewhat in isolation of other factors which would bear upon Soviet considerations.

Senator YOUNG. Will you yield to me for one other observation?

Senator BYRD. Yes.

Senator YOUNG. We are talking about a long war. Our involvement in the civil war—and I call it a civil war in Vietnam—while my colleague, Senator Byrd, is talking about North Vietnam and South Vietnam, historically, we all know that there has never been a North Vietnam or a South Vietnam, and the Geneva accord specifically stated this; there is not a natural boundary, but a temporary demarcation line. But this war is the longest war this Nation has ever engaged in except the Revolutionary War.

Mr. HOOPES. I believe that is a fact.

Senator YOUNG. I just wanted to make that clear.

Senator BYRD. No further questions.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Is there anything further you wish to say, Mr. Hoopes?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir, except to thank the committee for its courtesy.

Senator STENNIS. We thank you for being here.

The committee will now go into executive session.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee moved into executive session.)

(The nomination of Mr. Hoopes to be Under Secretary of the Air Force was subsequently approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate on August 24, 1967.)

Mr. Hoopes: I would like to try to correct what may be a misunderstanding. I certainly am not, of course, an advocate of war, or of force.

Senator Bryan: I am aware of that; I am certain of that. Mr. Hoopes: You asked me what I thought the Soviet judgment would be on the question of U. S. involvement in a four-way war. And I gave you my best judgment, which was that the Soviet Union probably does not believe that we are being decisively weakened by our operations at the tactical level in Vietnam.

Senator Bryan: Do you think we are being weakened?

Mr. Hoopes: I believe we are exposing very substantial weaknesses. Senator Bryan: And I cannot, though, in assuming that you do not agree with me that long run is to the advantage of the Soviet Union, leaving out what I think, what is your judgment? Does your judgment coincide with mine, or is it contrary to mine?

Mr. Hoopes: If the Soviets could be assumed that this war would stay at a low level, a relatively low level, and would be contained, that it would not escalate in a way that might involve them directly, I think I would probably agree with you.

Senator Bryan: And my belief is that a long run advantage to the Soviet Union, now, is that your personal view is not your own personal view, is it not?

Mr. Hoopes: I would say it is not my personal view, in most respects, but I do not agree with my suspicion that means.

Mr. Hoopes: I could disagree with you on the point of the advantage to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hoopes: I could disagree with you on the point of the advantage to the Soviet Union.

Senator Vance: Will you yield to me for one other observation?

Senator Bryan: Yes.

Senator Vance: We are talking about a four-way war. Our involvement in the civil war, and I call it a civil war in Vietnam, is one thing, and our involvement in the Vietnam war, which is talking about North Vietnam and South Vietnam, historically, we all know that there has never been a North Vietnam or a South Vietnam, and the Geneva accord specifically stated that there is not a natural boundary, but a temporary demarcation line. But this war is the longest war this Nation has ever engaged in except the Revolutionary War.

Mr. Hoopes: I believe that is a fact.

Senator Vance: I just wanted to make that clear.

Senator Bryan: No further questions.

Senator Vance: Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. Hoopes: I have nothing further you wish to say, Mr. Hoopes?

Mr. Hoopes: Yes, except to thank the committee for its courtesy.

Senator Vance: We thank you for being here.

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