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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETIETH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION


ON

- CHARLES F. BAIRD, OF MARYLAND, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
- EUGENE M. BECKER, OF NEW YORK, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
- JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, OF ILLINOIS, TO BE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
- ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER, USN, TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
- PAUL H. NITZE, OF MARYLAND, TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
- PAUL C. WARNKE, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUNE 8 AND 28, 1967

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NOMINATIONS

HEARINGS

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE


SIXTY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, <i>Chairman</i> | MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine |
| JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi | STROM THURMOND, South Carolina |
| STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri | JACK MILLER, Iowa |
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| DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland | |
| HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Virginia | |

WILLIAM H. DARDEN, *Chief of Staff*
CHARLES B. KIRBOW, *Chief Clerk*



CONTENTS

June 8, 1967

Statements:	Page
Becker, Eugene M., nominee to be an Assistant Secretary of the Army -	1
Javits, Hon. Jacob K., U.S. Senator from New York.....	2
Moorer, Adm. Thomas H., U.S. Navy, nominee to be Chief of Naval Operations.....	3

June 28, 1967

Baird, Charles F., nominee to be Under Secretary of the Navy.....	32
McNaughton, John T., nominee to be Secretary of the Navy.....	17
Nitze, Paul H., nominee to be Deputy Secretary of Defense.....	9
Warnke, Paul C., nominee to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense....	33

CONTENTS

1. Introduction 1

2. The History of the 10

3. The Development of the 20

4. The Present State of the 30

5. The Future of the 40

6. Conclusion 50

NOMINATIONS

NOMINATION OF EUGENE M. BECKER, OF NEW YORK, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman), Stennis, Symington, Jackson, McIntyre, Brewster, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Smith, Thurmond, and Dominick.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief of staff; T. Edward Braswell, Jr., professional staff member; Gordon A. Neese, professional staff member; Charles N. Kirbow, chief clerk; and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

We will first consider the nomination of Mr. Eugene M. Becker, of New York, who has been nominated by the President to be an Assistant Secretary of the Navy to succeed W. Brewster Kopp.

(The nomination reference and report, together with a biographical sketch of Mr. Becker, follow:)

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 8, 1967.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Eugene M. Becker, of New York, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Army, vice W. Brewster Kopp.

EUGENE M. BECKER

Profession: Banker.

Present position: Fiscal consultant.

Home address: 165 East 83d Street, New York, N.Y.

Born: 1 September 1930, St. Paul, Minn.

Marital status: Bachelor.

Education: B.A., 1952, Colgate University; M.A., 1958, Princeton University; Ph.D., 1959, Princeton University.

Positions held: 1954-56, U.S. Army foreign press analyst; 1960-61, director of information, municipal securities, Investment Bankers Association of America; 1962-65, Assistant Vice President, First National City Bank, New York City; 1966, director of the budget, and fiscal consultant to the mayor, City of New York.

Chairman RUSSELL. We have with us this morning the distinguished senior Senator from New York, Senator Javits, who knows Mr. Becker and we will be glad to have him present Mr. Becker to the committee.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JACOB K. JAVITS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF NEW YORK**

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have the honor to present to the committee Eugene M. Becker, of New York.

Mr. Becker is not only my constituent, Mr. Chairman, but I am here because I recruited him for his job, which was with the mayor of the city of New York as director of the budget. I asked the First National City Bank of New York, the officials of which are very good friends of mine—indeed, my law firm does a little of their real estate business—for the best man they could give the mayor—and the chairman may remember that I was rather active in connection with the election of the new mayor—to handle his finances. That was prior to his election, when he was still campaigning. And they assigned Mr. Becker as the best man that they had on this subject.

I have had considerable occasion to watch his work and become acquainted with him. And I can testify personally, certainly, to his skill. And that isn't only my judgment, it is the judgment of one of the leading banks in the country and its top officials.

The mayor was very satisfied with him, and was very sorry to lose him. I can certainly testify also personally to his diligence, the character that he has displayed to all of us in New York City, and to his patriotism.

And so, Mr. Chairman, based upon this personal experience, I commend him to the committee.

I thank the committee very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, Senator. We are glad to have your opinion of Mr. Becker.

Mr. Becker, we would appreciate it if you would give us a brief sketch of your background and experience.

**STATEMENT OF EUGENE M. BECKER, NOMINEE TO BE AN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**

Mr. BECKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a great pleasure and honor for me to be here before you today.

I might say that the comments of Senator Javits are undeserved, and I thank him, too.

Mr. Chairman, I was born in St. Paul, Minn., on September 1, 1930.

I received a bachelor of arts degree from Colgate University in 1952, an M.A. degree from Princeton University in 1958, and a Ph. D. in 1959.

From 1954 to 1956 I was in the U.S. Army, and acted as a foreign press analyst at the U.S. European Command Depot near Paris, France.

From 1960 to 1961 I was director of information on municipal securities, Investment Bankers Association of America, which is located here in Washington.

Between 1962 and 1965 I was an assistant vice president at the First National City in New York.

Then, in 1966, I served as a director of the budget for the city of New York.

That brings me up to date. And I am here now. That is it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand that you have filed a letter with the committee advising us that you did not hold any securities that could possibly involve a conflict of interest in the pursuit of your duties in this position.

Mr. BECKER. That is correct, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. I haven't any questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have any questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. No questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. We are glad to have you here, Mr. Becker. When we go into executive session we will pass on your nomination. I don't think you need to have any qualms or fears in the interim.

Mr. BECKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The nomination of Mr. Becker to be an Assistant Secretary of the Army was subsequently approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate on June 12, 1967.)

NOMINATION OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY, FOR APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Chairman RUSSELL. The next nomination is that of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, who has been designated to succeed Adm. David L. McDonald as Chief of Naval Operations for a term of 2 years. Admiral McDonald will retire on August 1, 1967.

Admiral Moorer's nomination was received in the Senate on June 5. It will not be eligible for approval until June 12. Because early meetings of the Senate next week will prevent committee meetings and because Admiral Moorer plans an official trip to the Western Pacific later this month, he was able to appear this morning. In executive session the committee can decide the timing of any action on his nomination.

A matter has arisen which prevents the Secretary of the Navy from being with us this morning. He advised the committee that he intended to be here with Admiral Moorer, but unsuspected circumstances have prevented his attendance.

(The nomination reference and report, together with a biographical sketch of Admiral Moorer, follow:)

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
June 5, 1967.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, United States Navy, for appointment as Chief of Naval Operations in the Department of the Navy for a term of two years, pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 5081.

BIOGRAPHY ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY

Thomas Hinman Moorer was born in Mount Willing, Alabama, February 9, 1912, son of the late Dr. R. R. Moorer and the late Mrs. (Hulda Hill Hinson)

Moorer. He was graduated from Cloverdale High School in Montgomery, Alabama, Valedictorian of the Class of 1927, and on June 10, 1929, entered the U.S. Naval Academy. As a midshipman, he played football for three years. He was graduated and commissioned ensign on June 1, 1933, and through subsequent promotions attained the rank of rear admiral to date from August 1, 1958; vice admiral, to date from October 5, 1962; and admiral, to date from June 26, 1964.

After graduation in June 1933 he served six months on board the U.S.S. *Salt Lake City* as a junior officer in the gunnery department. He assisted in fitting out the U.S.S. *New Orleans* at the Navy Yard, New York, and served in that cruiser's gunnery and engineering departments from her commissioning, February 5, 1934, until detached in June 1935. During the next year he was a student at the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida. After completing flight training in July 1936 he was designated a naval aviator.

In August 1936 he was assigned to Fighting Squadron ONE-B, based briefly on the U.S.S. *Langley* and later on the U.S.S. *Lexington*. He was transferred in July 1937 to Fighting Squadron 6, based on the U.S.S. *Enterprise*, and continued duty with that squadron until August 1939. He then joined Patrol Squadron 22, a unit of Fleet Air Wing 2, and later Fleet Air Wing 10, and was with that squadron at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, when the Japanese attacked the Fleet there on December 7, 1941. His squadron was sent to the Southwest Pacific and during the Dutch East Indies Campaign, he was shot down in a PBV on February 1942, north of Darwin, Australia. He was rescued by a ship which was sunk by enemy action the same day.

He was also awarded the Purple Heart Medal for wounds received on February 19, 1942, and the Silver Star for "extremely gallant and intrepid conduct as pilot of a patrol plane during and following the attack by enemy Japanese aircraft in the vicinity of Cape Diemen, February 19, 1942 . . ." The citation continues: ". . . Although he and his co-pilot were wounded in the attack, (he) succeeded in landing his badly damaged and blazing plane. His courage and leadership during a subsequent attack upon the rescue ship and while undergoing hardships and dangers of returning the survivors to the Australian mainland were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

He is entitled to the ribbon for, and a facsimile of the Presidential Unit Citation to Patrol Squadron 22. The citation follows: "For extraordinary heroism in action as a unit of Patrol Wing 10 attached to aircraft, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, operating against enemy Japanese forces in the Philippine and Netherlands East Indies areas from January 1942 to March 3, 1942. Holding fast to their courage as the Japanese ruthlessly hunted them down the pilots of (that squadron) doggedly maintained their patrols in defiance of hostile air and naval supremacy, scouting the enemy and fighting him boldly regardless of overwhelming odds and in spite of the crushing operational inadequacies existing during the first months of war . . ."

Between March and June 1942, he served with Patrol Squadron 101 and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. The citation follows: "For extraordinary achievement and heroic conduct as commander of a patrol plane on a hazardous round-trip flight from Darwin, Australia, to Veco, Island of Timor, on the afternoon and night of May 24, 1942. In an undefended, comparatively slow flying boat, Lieutenant Moorer braved an area dominated by enemy air superiority, effected a precarious landing in the open sea at dusk and took off at night in the midst of threatening swells, with a heavily loaded airplane. His superb skill and courageous determination in organizing and executing this perilous mission resulted in the delivery of urgently needed supplies to a beleaguered garrison and the evacuation of eight seriously wounded men who otherwise might have perished."

After his return to the United States in July 1942, he had temporary duty from August of that year to March of the next in the United Kingdom, as a mining observer for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. He then fitted out and assumed command of Bombing Squadron 132 operating in Cuba and Africa from its base at Key West, Florida, Boco Chica Air Base. Detached from that command, he served as gunnery and tactical officer on the staff of Commander Air Force, Atlantic, from March 1944 to July 1945.

He was awarded the Legion of Merit: "For meritorious conduct . . . as force gunnery and tactical officer on the staff of Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet . . ." The citation states that he "planned and supervised the development and practical application of tactics, doctrines and training methods relating to antisubmarine warfare and gunnery; supervised many experimental and developmental projects; and coordinated information on enemy tactics and counter-

measures . . . By his outstanding executive ability, Commander Moorer contributed materially to the combat effectiveness of aircraft in antisubmarine warfare . . ."

From August 1945 until May 1946, he was assigned to the Strategic Bombing Survey—Japan—of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, engaged in interrogating of Japanese officials. For two years thereafter, he served as executive officer of the Naval Aviation Ordnance Test Station, Chincoteague, Virginia. He next had duty afloat as operations officer of the U.S.S. *Midway* (July 1948–November 1949), and as operations officer on the staff of Commander Carrier Division 4, Atlantic Fleet (December 1949–July 1950).

Reporting in August 1950 to Inyokern, California, he served for a year as experimental officer of the Naval Ordnance Test Station. During the year following, he was a student at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, and in August 1953, again reported for duty on the staff of Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet. In May 1955 he was ordered to the Navy Department to serve as aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Air) and in July 1956 was detached to sea duty as commanding officer of the U.S.S. *Salisbury Sound* (AV 13).

On July 26, 1957, his selection for the rank of rear admiral was approved by the President and in October, the same year, he reported as Special Assistant, Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department. From January 1, 1958 to July 1959, he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (War Gaming Matters), after which he commanded Carrier Division SIX. He returned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in November 1960 and served as director of the Long Range Objectives Group until October 1962 when he assumed command of the 7th Fleet. For his service in this assignment he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. In June 1964 he became Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Admiral Moorer assumed command of NATO's Allied Command Atlantic, the U.S. unified Atlantic Command, and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet on April 30, 1965.

On June 17, 1967, he was awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a second Distinguished Service Medal: "For exceptionally meritorious service as Commander in Chief Atlantic, Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander in Chief Western Atlantic Area, and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic . . ." The citation states in part, "During the Dominican Republic Crises of 1965–66, he directed military operations with utmost professionalism, judgment and diplomacy, resulting in a cease-fire, politico-military stabilization of the situation . . . and finally the orderly and peaceful withdrawal of U.S. forces . . ." The citation continues: "As Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Admiral Moorer foresaw the need, and initiated a major revision in NATO maritime strategy . . . his development of the concept of a standing naval force for the Allied Command Atlantic; and his assistance in establishing the Iberian Atlantic Command Headquarters resulted in major contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

In addition to the Distinguished Service Medal with Gold Star, Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, Purple Heart, and the Ribbon for the Presidential Unit Citation to Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO, Admiral Moorer has the American Defense Service Medal with star; American Campaign Medal; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with two stars; European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal; World War II Victory Medal; Navy Occupation Service Medal, Europe and Asia Clasp; China Service Medal; National Defense Service Medal; Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; the Philippine Defense Ribbon and the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal. In May 1964 he was awarded the Stephen Decatur Award for Operational Competence by the Navy League of the United States.

He also has been decorated by five foreign governments: Portugal (Military Order of Avis), Greece (Silver Naval Medal, First Class), Japan (Double Rays of the Rising Sun), Republic of China (Medal of Pao-Ting), and the Philippines (Legion of Honor).

Admiral Moorer is married to the former Carrie Ellen Foy of Eufaula, Alabama. He has four children, Thomas Randolph, Mary Ellen, Richard Foy and Robert Hill Moorer. His official residence is 402 Barbour Street, Eufaula, Alabama.

On August 1, 1967, Admiral Moorer will assume his present duties as Chief of Naval Operations.

Chairman RUSSELL. Admiral Moorer, we will be glad to have you give us a brief statement as to your background and experience.

**STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, NOMINEE TO BE
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**

Admiral MOORER. I was born in Mount Willing, Ala., in 1912, and finished high school in Montgomery, Ala.; completed the Naval Academy in 1933; flight training in Pensacola, in 1936.

I was in Pearl Harbor on the morning of the attack by the Japanese. And subsequent to that time I served in the Pacific, and also in the Atlantic in command of the bombing and patrol squadron, and in antisubmarine work, ending the war as a member of the strategic bomber survey which visited Japan for the purpose of evaluating the situation at the end of the war as well as the beginning of the war.

Subsequent to that time, sir, I was commander of the seaplane tender *Salisbury Sound*. And while I was in command of the ship I was selected to the rank of rear admiral.

I served as commander of the carrier task forces in the 6th Fleet; as commander of the 7th Fleet; and as commander of the Pacific Fleet.

And I currently hold the assignment of commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, in NATO.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. I just want to comment in this way, Admiral. You are familiar with these matters, of course. I think it is a highly critical time for a man to be a member of the Joint Chiefs, with all the consultations that you have and decisions that you make which are so highly important.

Your list of assignments in the Pacific certainly seem to prepare for it. That is one of the great things about the system.

Of course, you primarily represent the Navy. But, I am sure you are familiar with the fact that the Joint Chiefs have to make our military policy decisions for the Nation; is that right?

Admiral MOORER. I had the unified command, of course, during the Dominican Republic operations, at which time I commanded Army, Air Force, and Navy. And I feel confident that I am familiar with the issues, sir.

Senator STENNIS. I am a believer in civilian control, but I frankly think you fellows are restricted too much now. I feel like you represent not only the Navy but the military people in these composite judgments.

Admiral MOORER. I do, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. If your views as to any particular policy of the military planning are at a complete variance with the civilian officials, would you hesitate to make that fact known to this committee?

Admiral MOORER. I would not, sir. I assure you that I will answer all questions in a forthright and factual manner.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman; I think Senator Russell asked you a question I had in mind. I realize that it is the duty of a military man in uniform to carry out the orders of the civilian superiors, and I want to say that I have the highest respect for them. On the other hand, if a military man is called before a congressional committee, or

if questions are propounded to him by Members of Congress or responsible officials, it appears to me that he should give frank answers, even though he may know that those answers will not please his superiors, especially where the security of the country is concerned.

So I construe from your answer to Senator Russell's question that you would be frank with the Congress, even though your answer might conflict with what the civilian officials feel or would like to have you say?

Admiral MOORER. That is correct, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I have no other questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I would just like to associate myself with the remarks made by Senator Stennis and Senator Russell and Senator Thurmond. I am pleased to hear you reply to the questions put to you by Senator Russell and Senator Thurmond. I would like to say to the committee that I don't know Admiral Moorer well, but I have had the opportunity to see him on several occasions, and I am very much impressed. I have many friends in Norfolk where he has served with such distinction. They do know him well, and they speak most highly of him. I am very pleased that he has been nominated for this very vital and important position as Chief of Naval Operations, particularly at this critical period.

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Dominick?

Senator DOMINICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to congratulate Admiral Moorer for the tremendous job he has done in the past. And I would like to ask these questions. I came in a little late, so if they have already been asked and answered, just say so.

Have you expressed any opinion on the reactivation of a battleship for the Vietnam situation?

Admiral MOORER. No, I have received no questions on this.

Senator DOMINICK. Do you have any opinion on that proposal, sir?

Admiral MOORER. Well, at the moment, as I understand it, sir—as you recognize, this, of course, is a subject that is being considered here in Washington, and would not normally be referred to me in my present assignment. But at this time we are going ahead with a preliminary look at the ship to determine what time will be required and how much it will cost to activate this ship. Certainly a 16-inch gun is impressive.

Senator DOMINICK. But you have expressed no opinion on the policy in this?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir. I would not normally be requested to do so in my present assignment.

Senator DOMINICK. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have a letter here from Senator Tower stating that he worked in the past with Admiral Moorer and regards him as a most talented and dedicated officer. The letter will be printed in the record.

(The letter referred to follows:)

U.S. SENATE,
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
 June 7, 1967.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
 Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
 U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I regret that I will be out of town Thursday for the Committee meeting on Admiral Moorers nomination.

I have worked with him in the past and regard him a most talented and dedicated officer. I hope that you will exercise my proxy in support of his nomination and will make this letter a part of the official Committee record.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN TOWER.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you very much, Admiral. We are glad to have had you here.

Admiral MOORER. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe that is all we have in open session. We will now go into executive session.

(Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the committee went into executive session.)

(The nomination of Adm. Thomas H. Moorers, U.S. Navy, to be Chief of Naval Operations was subsequently approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate on June 13, 1967.)

NOMINATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Stennis, Symington, Jackson, McIntyre, Brewster, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Smith, and Miller.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief of staff; T. Edward Braswell, Jr., and Gordon A. Nease, professional staff members; Charles B. Kirbow, chief clerk; and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.

NOMINATION OF PAUL H. NITZE, OF MARYLAND, TO BE THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, VICE CYRUS ROBERTS VANCE, RESIGNED

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

The committee has before it today nominations that might be called promotions within the Department of Defense. We have the nominations of Paul H. Nitze, to be Deputy Secretary of Defense; John T. McNaughton, to be Secretary of the Navy; Charles F. Baird, to be Under Secretary of the Navy; and Paul C. Warnke, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense.

All these nominees have appeared personally before the committee in connection with their nominations to fill other statutory positions in the Department of Defense.

These nominations have been pending before the committee for the required time.

It has always been the custom of this committee, in the absence of a request from a member, that we do not call the officials of the Department up under these circumstances. I don't say that in any critical sense at all, because I think it is a good idea, when the personnel of the committee changes, for those who exercise the civilian direction of the Department of Defense to be known by the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In addition, some members of the committee did have a few questions they wanted to propound. We will proceed as consistent with protocol as we can. So we will first hear from Mr. Nitze, who has been nominated to be Deputy Secretary of Defense.

I might say that Mr. Nitze appeared personally before the committee in November 1963, in connection with his nomination to be Secretary of the Navy. More than 3 years have elapsed since that appearance.

He has appeared before the committee often and is well known to most of us.

A copy of Mr. Nitze's biography will be printed in the record at this point.

(The nomination reference and report and the biographical sketch of Mr. Nitze follow:)

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
June 12, 1967.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Paul H. Nitze, of Maryland, to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense vice Cyrus Roberts Vance, resigned.

PAUL HENRY NITZE

Paul Henry Nitze has served as the 57th Secretary of the Navy since November 29, 1963.

Graduated "cum laude" in 1928 from Harvard University, Mr. Nitze subsequently joined the New York investment banking firm of Dillon, Read & Company. In 1941, he left his position as vice-president of that firm to become financial director of the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

In 1942, he was Chief of the Metals and Minerals Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare, until named, in 1943, Director, Foreign Procurement and Development Branch of the Foreign Economic Administration.

During the period 1944-1946, Mr. Nitze was Vice Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. He was awarded the Medal of Merit by President Truman for service to the Nation in this capacity.

For the next seven years, he served with the Department of State, beginning in the position of Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade Policy. In 1948, he was named Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. In August 1949, he became Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, and Director the following year.

Mr. Nitze left the Federal Government in 1953 to become President of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation in Washington, D.C., a position he held until January 1961.

Mr. Nitze was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs by President Kennedy, taking his oath of office on January 29, 1961.

Born in Amherst, Massachusetts on January 16, 1907, Mr. Nitze is married to the former Phyllis Pratt. They have four children, Heidi, Peter, William and Phyllis. The family residence is 3120 Woodley Road, N.W., Washington, D.C., but Mr. Nitze maintains his legal residence at Bel Alton, Maryland.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair has no questions of Mr. Nitze.

Senator Miller, you appear to be the ranking minority member.

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, would you please tell us what is your concept of our objectives in the war in Vietnam.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL H. NITZE, NOMINATED TO BE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. NITZE. Our concept of our objectives in the war in Vietnam is to help the South Vietnamese Government expand its control over its people and to restore a Government in South Vietnam that will represent the will of the South Vietnamese people without interference from abroad at the earliest possible date.

Senator MILLER. And that without interference, in effect, is freedom from aggression?

Mr. NITZE. Exactly.

Senator MILLER. Do you regard those as minimal objectives, the absence of achievement of which would mean that our commitment there would have failed?

Mr. NITZE. I do regard those as our objectives. I believe it is correct to say "minimal objectives."

Senator MILLER. So that if we had a negotiated settlement over there that did not attain those objectives in negotiations, did not attain the minimal objectives, would you then say that our commitment had failed?

Mr. NITZE. I think we would not have achieved our minimal objective; that is correct.

Senator MILLER. So then would it be accurate to say that in any negotiated settlement over there the minimal objectives are a *sine qua non* as far as the United States is concerned?

Mr. NITZE. That is my view of it, Senator.

Senator MILLER. In other words, you hear a lot of talk about a win policy in the war in Vietnam. If we attained those objectives we would have won our objectives, would we not?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct.

Senator MILLER. And we would have won the war insofar as our minimal objectives are concerned, would we not?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct.

Senator MILLER. Now, in seeking to win those objectives are you satisfied with the way the war has been conducted to date?

Mr. NITZE. Obviously one would wish that we could have had greater success earlier. But I think we have made progress. And I think the Armed Forces have done an outstanding job in both South Vietnam and in the air effort in the north.

Senator MILLER. Are you satisfied that our air efforts in the north have been productive at least in impeding or slowing up the flow of troops and ammunition and supplies from the north to the south?

Mr. NITZE. This is a very hard matter on which to have firm and conclusive evidence. It is my belief that the air attacks in the north have contributed toward at least putting a ceiling upon the degree of infiltration into the south.

Senator MILLER. At the very least, that would be what has been accomplished?

Mr. NITZE. Yes.

Senator MILLER. And would it be your judgment, then, that a cessation of the bombing activities such as we have been conducting would be disadvantageous to the United States and its allies in the south?

Mr. NITZE. That is a question which would have to be considered by higher authority than the Secretary of the Navy. I can really only speak at the moment for the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator MILLER. I understand.

But I am asking for your opinion as Secretary of the Navy and prospective Under Secretary of Defense. What is your judgment on that?

Mr. NITZE. I think this is a very difficult question to arrive at. I think there are a number of factors which are involved. One is the success of the effort in the south in increasing the degree of control by the Government of South Vietnam over the population of the

south. And another is the degree to which infiltration can be impeded along the DMZ and the Laotian border, and so forth. And the third is the contribution that the air effort makes thereto. A fourth element is the international political scene which must be taken into account by higher authority.

Senator MILLER. Looking at it from the military standpoint, and taking your evaluation that at least this bombing activity in the north has placed a limit on the flow of troops and ammunition and supplies, would it not be a logical result of the cessation of that activity that the ceiling would be lifted, and, therefore, would be disadvantageous to our own troops and those of our allies in the south?

Mr. NITZE. I think this is correct as you have stated it.

Senator MILLER. But at the same time, without committing yourself on the cessation of the bombing, you would want to know what is involved, whether there is any reciprocity from the other side, and whether or not there would be a quid pro quo from a military standpoint which would make it worthwhile, is that so?

Mr. NITZE. It would certainly contribute to the decision.

Senator MILLER. But if it meant, as some of our field commanders have stated, a cost in American lives to cease the bombing, because that would mean more troops and ammunition and supplies coming in to chew up our people, that would, I assume, weigh most heavily in your decision as to whether or not in your judgment it will be desirable to have a cessation of the bombing?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct.

Senator MILLER. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that if battlefield-type nuclear weapons are employed that this will inevitably lead to an all-out nuclear war?

Mr. NITZE. I don't like the word "inevitable," because I don't believe it accurately describes the situation. I think very few things are inevitable. I think the thing that would have to be weighed would be the degree of risk that it would so lead.

Senator MILLER. I have seen some statements by some people who like to call themselves authorities that if battlefield-type nuclear weapons are employed, inevitably we are going to have an all-out nuclear war.

Do you subscribe to that philosophy?

Mr. NITZE. No; I do not subscribe to that philosophy, although I would say that one would have to weigh the risk involved.

Senator MILLER. Do you believe that we have made maximum use of our seapower in the war in Vietnam? And by that I mean, do you feel that our seapower which has been present in Southeast Asia has been used to its fullest effectiveness short of using nuclear weapons?

Mr. NITZE. Obviously our seapower operates under certain restrictions, as does our airpower. And from a purely military point of view, one could contemplate actions beyond those that are now under restriction.

Senator MILLER. Then it would be your answer that from a military standpoint it has not been employed to its fullest effectiveness?

Mr. NITZE. Obviously if you don't have restrictions you can do things that you can't do if you do have restrictions.

Senator MILLER. So your answer would be "Yes; it has not been employed to its fullest extent from a military standpoint"?

Mr. NITZE. It has been employed very effectively. But obviously there are additional things that one could have done if one were not necessarily under restrictions. Personally, I think the restrictions have been wise.

Senator MILLER. But when you say you think they have been wise, are you speaking from a military or a political standpoint?

Mr. NITZE. I am speaking from a combined politicomilitary standpoint. But certainly there are political considerations involved.

Senator MILLER. But my question was premised upon a military standpoint.

Mr. NITZE. I would not quarrel with your statement on a purely military ground.

Senator MILLER. It isn't my statement, Mr. Secretary. I am asking a question as to whether or not from a military standpoint it is your judgment that our Navy power present in Southeast Asia has been used to its maximum effectiveness short of using nuclear weapons. And I would gather from what you said that the answer would be "Yes." But you haven't said yes yet.

Mr. NITZE. I will say yes.

Senator MILLER. I have another question, but I have to search for it. I would like to pass for the moment.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

Mr. Secretary, as Secretary of the Navy, just what part do you have in determining policy?

Mr. NITZE. With respect to the Navy?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; in the application of seapower in Vietnam.

Mr. NITZE. Mr. Chairman, the authority with respect to the unified and specified commanders and their actions goes down the chain from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then to the unified commanders. So the service secretaries are not in that chain. Our responsibility is to see to it that the services provide in a timely fashion the forces that are required to carry out the plans that are thus determined.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is your primary responsibility to see that the means are provided to implement the policy that is set up by someone else?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I wasn't clear on your answer as to whether you thought our seapower had been utilized to the maximum extent in Vietnam.

Did you answer that you did think that it had been?

Mr. NITZE. What I said was that, from a purely military standpoint, without restrictions, there are additional things that seapower could have done; but that I did approve of the restrictions. Within the restrictions I think our seapower has been used to full military effectiveness.

Chairman RUSSELL. Am I to assume from that answer that you think it would be a mistake to use a battleship out there to undertake to interdict the flow of supplies and men from the north to the south?

Mr. NITZE. I do not. We have received authority to open up a battleship to ascertain what will be necessary to put it into operating condition. So we are moving as fast as we can toward having the capability of having a battleship in action.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, you have nothing whatever to do with planning any campaign in Vietnam, do you, the military operations?

Mr. NITZE. I do not.

Chairman RUSSELL. I assume that you aren't even consulted when a batallion of the 1st Cavalry or even of the Marines is moved from one place to the other?

Mr. NITZE. No. I am not. General Westmoreland is in command as MACV.

Chairman RUSSELL. And your job is to see that they have the selected instruments of war to carry with them wherever they are?

Mr. NITZE. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I pass at this time?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, indeed.

Senator JACKSON.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, when Mr. Nitze was up for nomination to be Secretary of the Navy I had the privilege of warmly endorsing his nomination. And I do so again this morning. I have followed his service as Secretary of the Navy with great interest. I think he has been an outstanding Secretary. I am very pleased to support his nomination here this morning.

That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McIntyre.

Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Chairman, I just want to congratulate the Secretary, and to say, too, that he has been Secretary of the Navy during a war that has been extremely difficult for me, during a shipyard phaseout. And during that time I have had occasion to talk to him about problems up there, public relations problems, and so on. I have found him at all times understanding and helpful. I want to commend him for the service that he has rendered and wish him good fortune.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to support Secretary Nitze's nomination.

I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Miller.

Senator MILLER. I have a couple more questions.

Mr. Secretary, a good many military people have strongly urged that the port at Haiphong be denied to the enemy. The methods of denying that port have generally been categorized as a blockade or quarantine, mining of the waters, or destroying the docking facilities.

If the decision should be made to deny the port facilities at Haiphong, would you tell us which in the order of reference you would recommend if you were to make a recommendation on it?

Mr. NITZE. As the chairman has pointed out, this is not a responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator MILLER. I understand.

But you are being proposed to be Under Secretary of Defense, and in the absence of the Secretary of Defense you might well be called upon to make a comment. That is why I am asking the question.

Mr. NITZE. I would prefer not to comment, because I am not yet, pending the confirmation of this committee, in that position.

Senator MILLER. But I would like to get your personal views on it. You certainly have some ideas.

Mr. NITZE. Certainly it is possible for—the Navy has the capability of mining, and the Air Force and the Navy have the capability to conduct air attacks on the docks. And either of these could be done.

Senator MILLER. That is right. And the Navy has a potential of a blockade or a quarantine. I am wondering which of these three you would, in your own views, say should be the No. 1, which would be the No. 2, and which would be the No. 3 alternative.

Mr. NITZE. This is a matter that I would prefer not to comment on, because I don't think my opinion would be an informed opinion at this time.

Senator MILLER. Well, I talked to some people who favored mining the waters, Mr. Secretary, of those three. I talked to some who favored a blockade. And I talked to some Navy people who favored destroying the docking facilities. Now, I am not privileged to give you the names of these people, but they are in your Department. If you are the head of that Department I don't know why you wouldn't care to comment on what your own personal views are as an evaluation of it.

Mr. NITZE. I have heard these issues debated. And as I pointed out, the resolution of this issue is primarily for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. This is not a chain that goes through the service Secretaries.

Senator MILLER. I can understand your reluctance, perhaps, in an open hearing to make a comment on this. Would you mind furnishing your views on this for the record?

Mr. NITZE. I will do so.

(The information, which was classified, was provided separately to the committee.)

Senator MILLER. One last question.

Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Soviet Union genuinely desires to have the war in Vietnam come to a close?

Mr. NITZE. I am not certain.

Senator MILLER. Nobody is certain. But what is your evaluation of it?

Mr. NITZE. I think on balance that they would prefer to have it come to a close, but I think they do not want to take the responsibility for this, because of their relations with the Chinese Communists.

Senator MILLER. Do you think it is likely that they will—you said on balance. Do you think there are any possibilities of slowing down by the Soviet Union and the supplying of the North Vietnamese in the foreseeable future?

Mr. NITZE. There is a possibility, but I would want to see the evidence before I took it too seriously.

Senator MILLER. And you are not counting on it?

Mr. NITZE. That is true.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join you and Senator Jackson, in commending an outstanding public servant. We have not always agreed about everything. But Mr. Nitze regardless

of the office he holds, is an American patriot. I think the President is fortunate to have him in this new high office.

With those comments, Mr. Secretary, I would ask several questions. You were a member of the Strategic Bombing Survey, were you not?

Mr. NITZE. I was, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Both for Germany and Japan?

Mr. NITZE. In different roles in the two areas.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you describe your roles in each.

Mr. NITZE. I was one of the directors in the European survey, and vice chairman of the survey in the Pacific.

Senator SYMINGTON. Therefore you have had a great deal of knowledge as to the effect of all forms of air attack and studied the results?

Mr. NITZE. I have.

Senator SYMINGTON. You believe in the importance of aircraft carriers, do you not?

Mr. NITZE. I do.

Senator SYMINGTON. And in the importance of strategic bombing?

Mr. NITZE. I do.

Senator SYMINGTON. There was an article in the New York Sunday Times. I will quote two paragraphs, if I may:

In the north the outlook is for deceleration.

"We have almost no important targets left", one planner said last week. "In an air campaign, there is a tendency toward movement, either it gets more intense or less so. But it seldom remains at the same level for extended periods of time."

I don't know what computer, or what genius, put out those observations. Do you know who made the statement?

Mr. NITZE. I do not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then the article continues:

The few unbombed targets in the north are not likely to be struck soon, the sources indicated, because it is thought to be necessary to leave some sites unblemished as "hostages." In effect, the sources said, greater pressure can be brought on the North Vietnamese by the unspoken threat of hitting these targets than by actually bombing them.

Do you know where that information came from?

Mr. NITZE. I do not, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. At roughly the same time an article appeared in the Washington Evening Star "Some top U.S. aides doubt Viet air war effectiveness."

I will have some comments about that on the floor later today. We have a great deal of testimony, but which the Defense Department classifies as to the importance and effectiveness of airpower and seapower over North Vietnam. These statements are leaked from somewhere, and are published to the people. But the testimony of the military, those actually doing the air fighting or supervising it from carriers and airfields, is classified.

What suggestion would you have as to how we could get this matter cleared up so the people would have the truth or at least have the military position along with the civilian position. Wouldn't it be fair to declassify all testimony that wouldn't help a possible enemy, so we could have comparison of what the military think as against the civilians?

Mr. NITZE. My understanding is that the military are encouraged to give their frank views on the matters which are not classified.

Senator SYMINGTON. They are encouraged. We encourage them before this committee. But then the testimony is classified.

Mr. NITZE. The reason for the classification of the testimony is because it contains classified material. But there are unclassified versions of the testimony which are then made public, is that not correct?

Senator SYMINGTON. Too many times the thrust of the questions and then the answers are classified.

The article in question carries with it the demand for hundreds of thousands more ground troops. The other article says "Some top U.S. aides doubt Viet air war effectiveness." I know you were not one of those aides, because I know also you are not so stupid to say anything like that.

Mr. NITZE. I think I have testified before this committee that I thought the air campaign had been effective, Mr. Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. The point is, what are we going to do about it? We get testimony from high-ranking military directly contrary to what someone leaks to the press. In my opinion, this conflict, if carried on this way, will result in unnecessary killing and unnecessary expense. Is there not some way we could have the American people be the umpire as to who and what is right?

Mr. NITZE. I think we do make available to the press a vast amount of information, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. If these articles are right, Mr. Secretary, somebody is making available to the press a vast amount of misinformation. That misinformation is creating restlessness and unhappiness among the American people, specifically about whether or not it is worthwhile to continue air or sea attacks against North Vietnam. I won't pursue it, but would hope that, in your new position, which you are adequately trained to fill, you would get into this, because it puts this committee in an impossible situation. It is a depressing business, after the superb job done off your carriers while you have been Secretary of the Navy, and off the fields of the Air Force, that airpower should be so denigrated in this manner.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster, do you have any questions?

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I would perhaps like to pursue the line Senator Symington has been discussing, but I will refrain from doing that now, and save it for later. And now I will only congratulate Secretary Nitze on his new appointment and his new responsibilities and say that we in Maryland are very proud to have him as Secretary, as a resident of Maryland. We congratulate him on the great job that he has done for the country for a great many years.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

(The nomination of Mr. Nitze to be Deputy Secretary of Defense was subsequently approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate on June 29, 1967.)

NOMINATION OF JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, OF ILLINOIS, TO BE THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, VICE PAUL H. NITZE, REASSIGNED

Chairman RUSSELL. The next witness will be the Honorable John T. McNaughton, of Illinois.

Mr. McNaughton, you appeared before the committee in June 1962 in connection with your nomination to be General Counsel of

the Department of Defense, and you were confirmed then. Now you have been nominated to be Secretary of the Navy to succeed Mr Nitze.

Mr. McNaughton's biography will be printed in the record.

(The nomination reference and report and biographical sketch follow:)

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
June 12, 1967.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

John T. McNaughton, of Illinois, to be the Secretary of the Navy vice Paul H. Nitze, reassigned.

JOHN T. McNAUGHTON

John T. McNaughton has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) since July 1, 1964.

Educator, attorney, newspaper columnist and editor, and government official, Mr. McNaughton had served a year as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control when he was appointed General Counsel of the Department of Defense on July 1, 1962. He was General Counsel until he assumed his present position.

He was born in Bicknell, Indiana, the son of F. F. and Cecille (McMillan) McNaughton on November 21, 1921. He received his A.B. degree from DePauw University (Greencastle, Indiana) in 1942, and his LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1948. A Rhodes Scholar, he was granted a B. Litt. from Oxford in 1951. He received an honorary LL.D. degree from DePauw University in 1963. During World War II, Mr. McNaughton achieved the rank of lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve. He first commanded a Navy gun crew on a merchant ship in the Caribbean and North Atlantic and then served on a destroyer escort in the Pacific.

His newspaper experience includes serving as columnist for the Pekin (Illinois) Daily Times, of which he was editor from 1951 to 1953. He was legal counsel for the newspaper during the same period.

Admitted to the Illinois Bar in 1948 and the Massachusetts Bar in 1956, he was appointed assistant professor of law at Harvard Law School in 1953 and became full professor in 1956. Mr. McNaughton was on leave of absence from Harvard during 1961-62.

His government experience includes serving as Assistant General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Special Representative, Economic Cooperation Administration, in Paris from 1949-51. He also served several periods as assistant district attorney, Middlesex County, Massachusetts, 1957-61, and was a candidate for Congress from Illinois in 1952.

He is a member of the American Bar Association, the American Society of International Law, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Institute of Strategic Studies, and Phi Beta Kappa. He is author (with W. Barton Leach) of Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence (1956), of 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) and of books of experimental law teaching materials, as well as of articles.

Mr. McNaughton is married to the former Sarah Elizabeth Fulkman and has two sons, Alexander, aged 18, and Theodore, 11. They reside at 5031 Lowell Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate Mr. McNaughton and wish him well. He has spent quite a bit of time in the Pentagon, and I am sure he will do a good job as Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Chairman, I might say that I have to return to the Senate Interior Committee, where I am presiding. I would like to cast my vote, or leave my proxy with you, for all four of the nominees. I regret that I can't stay any longer.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well, sir.

Senator Symington, do you have any questions of Mr. McNaughton?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, it is a privilege to see you this morning. In the past you have been Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, is that correct?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, NOMINEE
TO BE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Senator, I came into Defense when I came to Washington as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. I then became General Counsel; that was my last appearance here, in 1962.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have served your country well. You heard the interrogation of Secretary Nitze.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Yes; I did.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you agree with his position on these matters?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Generally; yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. You say generally. What do you disagree with?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I don't know to what you are referring, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am thinking specifically of the efforts in some quarters to denigrate the airpower of the Navy and the Air Force, as currently used in Vietnam.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I can answer that point specifically, Senator, I strongly admire what our men are doing out there. And I very much oppose any attempts to denigrate the efforts of these men. Furthermore, I would oppose any attempts, civilian or military, to do what you referred to—leaking information on one side or the other. I think that is roughly what Mr. Nitze was saying. I take the same position.

Senator SYMINGTON. For example, I was disturbed when experts testified before this committee that, as a result of the pause of 5 days, which the North Vietnamese did their best to extend to 7 days, as a result of that cessation we lost a great many more young Americans around the DMZ, because of heavy equipment the Vietnamese brought down during that cessation.

Under such circumstances, would you be for further bombing cessation?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Senator, I can't answer that question. This is really the most difficult kind of question that the President gets on his desk, and as to which he must weigh the considerations that you have mentioned plus others, other longer-term considerations.

Senator SYMINGTON. But as Secretary of the Navy I am confident your opinion will be respected. And when you come up here to be confirmed, along the line of questioning Senator Miller asked Mr. Nitze, I think we have the right, in fact the duty, to ask what your personal opinion is on a subject of this character. If you don't care to answer, that is your privilege, of course.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I will say this, Senator. I have supported the President's position at each point in these decisions that he has made. Some of them, as you point out, have involved a risk of added losses in the short term. The President took this prospect very seriously. And he is very concerned about the possibility that, if we again were to have a pause in the bombing, we might run this same risk again.

I supported his position before, and I intend to support his position in the future as he weighs an acts on these considerations.

Senator SYMINGTON. Some of us would favor, if we are going to stop the bombing, to stop all fighting, because we don't think the fighting will ever be successful if we stop air and sea attacks; and it would be a more inclusive offer to negotiate.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. You must put the proposition in perspective, in my view. Of course, Senator, as Secretary of the Navy I would not be in the chain to make recommendations on subjects of this kind.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why wouldn't you?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Because the Secretary of the Navy is not responsible for advising on such matters.

Senator SYMINGTON. But your opinion would be considered, would it not.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. It is not in the charter of the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator SYMINGTON. What you are saying is that, as Secretary of the Navy you are going to follow whatever policies and philosophies are laid down by Secretary McNamara and the President, is that correct?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want to make an observation. I think that airpower is essential to the security of this country. I may not think it is as effective as some of the Air Force and the Navy air personnel do, because if they didn't think it was all important they wouldn't be doing their job.

But I think the selection of targets has as much to do with the effectiveness of this air effort over North Vietnam as anything else.

And from what I have been able to read lately, we haven't been able to attack any new targets for a long time. We are bombing a lot of old roads and trails, and sending out \$3 or \$4 million planes, and pilots that have cost a quarter of a million dollars to train, and killing a couple of water buffalo. They are not permitted to put the bombs where they will really bring the pressure on the enemy that will bring a conclusion of this war. It is very discouraging to one who knows the nature of potential targets to hear the news handed out to the American people that we flew so many hundred sorties over North Vietnam, when the targets were of no consequence.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the chairman will yield, I think that information will get back to the Department of Defense by my friend, Mr. Stempler, who is here. Mr. Stempler has just been listening to the outstanding civilian expert on the military in this town.

Chairman RUSSELL. I feel very humble to hear that statement from the first Secretary of Air in my country. And I assure you that these views have been expressed not only here, but other places where the policies have been made.

Senator MILLER. Will the Chairman yield at this time?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair yields.

Senator MILLER. I would just like to add a footnote to what Senator Symington has said. I for one would like to see something come out in the press—it could be a quotation from spokesmen of the Department of Defense, and no names would be necessary, but it would have the stamp of Department of Defense or Department of

Navy approval, which would in effect deny something like this that Senator Symington has read. And then the American people would have something in perspective. And then they would be able to more properly evaluate this kind of business.

But as it is now I don't really see anything of that nature.

I think it might be helpful from the standpoint of public opinion if the Department of Defense or one of the Departments would undertake to make a press release—and they don't have to name any names, it could be unnamed spokesmen, it could be you, for that matter, or the Under Secretary of Defense, just so it counterbalances that kind of statement that Senator Symington has pointed out.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the Senator yield for one more observation?

Senator MILLER. Yes, indeed.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is our understanding that in the not-too-distant future you are going to ask for tens of thousands additional ground troops in Vietnam. No one has more respect for the U.S. Army than I, or the U.S. Marine Corps. Next year I will have been in the Army 50 years. One of my sons was in the Army, the other in the Marines. But I am as convinced that you could do a far better job with far less men in Vietnam if you let the Navy and the Air Force hit the meaningful North Vietnam military targets and hit them again and again in accordance with normal air action, as I am that the sun is coming up tomorrow. When you take these tens of thousands of additional ground troops, and let them slug it out, foot by foot, hill by hill, musket by musket, in terrain with which they are totally unfamiliar, and with which the enemy is completely familiar, instead of using the technological and qualitative advantages of U.S. airpower and seapower, you are wasting unnecessarily American lives and American treasure. We have a right to our opinion, as you have to yours. That is why we are so distressed about this latest group of stories coming out which once more attempt to denigrate airpower and seapower.

Mr. Chairman, may I leave my proxy with you? I must go to the Senate floor.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think I should advise the committee that there is going to be a vote in just a few minutes, and we can come back, unless we can conclude.

Any questions, Senator McIntyre?

Senator McINTYRE. No questions, just congratulations.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. No questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McNaughton, I note that you were a newspaper editor for a while.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Yes.

Senator BYRD. I have been one, too.

During the past 3 years, as I understand it, you have been the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the vote. The committee will stand in recess until after the vote on the Senate floor.

Senator Byrd, if I happen to be late, I will ask you to preside.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will now stand in recess.

(Recess 11:25 to 11:45 a.m.)

Senator BYRD (presiding). Gentlemen, the chairman suggested that we start. And if the Secretary will permit, I will continue where I left off.

To restate it so that you will have a full understanding of it, in the past 3 years you have been the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. That is correct, Senator.

Senator BYRD. Now, in that capacity would you consider yourself the principal adviser to Secretary of Defense McNamara on international security affairs, including the Vietnam war?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I would think that I am one of the principal advisers on that subject. Yes, sir. The others are of course Mr. Vance and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the other chiefs. They would be advisers of more importance than I on the same subject.

Senator BYRD. You are very modest, I can say.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. No, that is true, Senator.

Senator BYRD. In your capacity as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs do you evaluate the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I advise the Secretary of Defense on the political implications of the recommendations. It is not my job to evaluate them in the military sense.

I am not trying to evade the question, Senator. It is just that there is a marriage between the political and the military side, and my responsibility relates to the political half of that marriage. I advise the Secretary in this respect.

Senator BYRD. Many people believe, rightly or wrongly, that naval aviation has been hampered in its operations over North Vietnam. Do you believe that naval aviation is being used effectively to bring the maximum pressure on the enemy?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I believe that naval aviation is doing its tasks effectively. That is the first half of that question.

With respect to the second half, maximum pressure, I am afraid, I must yield to others as to what constitutes maximum pressure in the whole equation to which the President must address himself. There is no question but that Secretary Nitze's statement is correct, that more physical damage could be done with fewer restraints. The question of whether more psychological pressure—more helpful psychological pressure from the President's point of view of trying to bring the war to a successful conclusion—would be achieved thereby is a decision he has reached in the negative. In other words, the President, I believe, thinks he has struck the optimum balance in this regard.

Senator BYRD. Is that your view also?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Yes; I support the President's decision on this point.

Senator BYRD. Then I assume that if you answered the question precisely it would be in the negative, the question being, Do you believe that naval aviation is being used effectively to bring the maximum pressure on the enemy? I assume you would answer that in the negative.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. No. I can answer the question only in pieces, as I have. We could achieve more physical damage, Senator. But the question of the word "effective" and the question of the word "pressure" are ones that the President deals with every time he makes a decision. And it is my understanding that he has struck a balance in keeping with what he is trying to do to bring the war to an end. I can only answer your question in that way.

Senator BYRD. Another question: Are you in favor of continuing the present policy of affording a sanctuary to Haiphong and Hanoi while our Army and Marines are incurring mounting losses in ground combat?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I am not in favor of sanctuary at all, Senator, in respect to Hanoi and Haiphong. This takes us back again to the equation that the President addresses. I don't really quite understand the question, because the connection between "sanctuary" and "losses" is not clear to me.

Senator BYRD. Let me phrase it differently.

Is Haiphong a sanctuary?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I am not aware that it is. I understand that the President has authorized strikes in Haiphong area. And he may very well authorize them again.

Senator BYRD. Haiphong, then, is that a sanctuary?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. It has not been a sanctuary. At times——

Senator BYRD. It is not off bounds for bombing?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. At the moment, at this moment in time, Senator, I am not aware of what the rule is with respect to Haiphong. And I would be very indiscreet if I did know and said what it was in a public session.

But the President has authorized bombing there, and very well may authorize it again. That is all I can say.

Senator BYRD. You mentioned Haiphong. Are you speaking now of Haiphong or Hanoi?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I am speaking of Haiphong. Were you speaking of Hanoi?

Senator BYRD. Hanoi.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Hanoi, I think, is in the same category. There have been targets struck there very recently. I am uninformed as to what the rule is as of this moment, as to what the President has authorized at this moment.

Senator MILLER. Would the Senator yield at this point?

Senator BYRD. I yield at this point.

Senator MILLER. I was wondering if the Senator from Virginia was drawing a distinction between Haiphong itself and Haiphong Harbor, the port.

Senator BYRD. I was dealing at that particular point only with Hanoi. I would like to get to Haiphong in a moment.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I thought you were talking about Haiphong. But the same answer would apply to Hanoi, Senator.

Senator BYRD. If you feel that any of these questions should not be considered in open session, I know of no reason, if Senator Miller doesn't—and we will get Mr. Darden's advice, too—that we should not go into executive session if some of these questions appear to be in an area in which you could not answer publicly.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Or I could submit answers to you, Senator, in classified form.

Senator BYRD. Let me ask you this question.

During the past 2 years do you feel that the war has greatly widened?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Widened during the past 2 years? No.

Senator BYRD. Now, could I recite what seems to me areas where it has been greatly widened. Two years ago, that is, April of 1965, we had 29,000 ground troops in Vietnam. Today, we have got in round figures 462,000 ground troops in Vietnam. Now, it seems to me that so far as the American people are concerned that the war has been greatly widened.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I agree that the war has "widened" if you use the word "widened" in that sense.

The war has been greatly intensified.

Senator BYRD. It has not been widened insofar as going beyond the physical boundaries of Vietnam?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. That is correct.

Senator BYRD. It has not been widened insofar as bringing in additional allies to help us?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Well, we have gotten some additional allies. The Koreans and the Australians and New Zealanders and the Thai and the Filipinos have all contributed forces in that period, a total of over 50,000, between 50,000 and 60,000 forces.

Senator BYRD. While it hasn't been widened beyond the borders of Vietnam, it may be widened so far as the contributions of the American people are concerned?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. It has intensified in that sense; that is correct.

Senator BYRD. Intensified both in regard to manpower and in regard to economic resources?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. That is correct. And furthermore—a correction of my original answer, Mr. Senator—the actions against North Vietnam have been intensified in that period.

Senator BYRD. During that same period of 2 years, while the American ground forces were being built from 29,000 to 462,000 today, the harbor at Haiphong has been an open harbor insofar as cargo going to the Vietnamese enemy is concerned; is that correct?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. That is correct, with minor qualification. There have been some strikes on some facilities. The answer in substance is "Yes."

Senator BYRD. In other words, while the war has been greatly widened insofar as the American people are concerned in the way of combat troops, and in the way of economic resources, we have done nothing to shut off the supplies going through the harbor at Haiphong?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. For practical purposes, that is correct.

Senator BYRD. Do you agree with that policy?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I support the President's decision. So far his position has been not to change that policy, and I respect his judgment in balancing the forces and coming out that way.

Senator BYRD. Now, a great aircraft carrier was recently launched, in Virginia, incidentally, driven by a conventional propulsion system instead of nuclear power. The public understands the nuclear power was vetoed by the Secretary of Defense. Now, this vessel has been described as an obsolete vessel from its beginning.

Do you agree with that assertion?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I cannot agree or disagree with that assertion. I think that subject is one of the most interesting ones that I will be

getting into if you approve my nomination. I can't address the question yet.

Senator BYRD. That would eliminate several other questions I have in mind.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. There are a number of fascinating issues that I intend, if the Senate confirms my nomination, to get right into. But it would be presumptuous to give opinions on them now.

Senator BYRD. Do you see an end to the fighting in Vietnam within the next 12 months?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. It could happen. But this is a matter of probability. I think it is unwise for me to say something which could be taken out of context and construed to imply optimism or pessimism. There is a chance.

Senator BYRD. Do you see a long war?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. We have already had a long war, Senator. I believe the best chance for a short war is to be prepared for a long one. The best chance to shorten the war is to be dug in with absolute perseverance to see through a long war if necessary.

Senator BYRD. Is a long war in Vietnam to the advantage of the Soviet Union in your judgment?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. This is similar, Senator, to a question put to Mr. Nitze. And I would answer about the same way. I think that the Soviet Union on balance wants to see the war ended, but not if she has to take steps to bring it to an end which would work to her disadvantage, and not if it came to an end on terms that would severely disadvantage her. And, therefore, the question can only be answered in terms of what the outcome is likely to be. I think the Soviet Union would like to see the war brought to an end on terms acceptable to her.

Senator BYRD. Do you feel that with the United States so deeply involved in Vietnam, suffering heavy casualties, and fighting a very costly war from an economic point of view, that it is or is not to the advantage of the Soviet Union to keep it going?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I think that it is to their disadvantage to keep it going. And I would like to make this strictly a personal opinion, Senator.

Senator BYRD. In all of these I am seeking your own personal judgment.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I am labeling this clearly so that there is no misunderstanding.

Senator BYRD. I was hoping that all of this would be your judgment.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Yes.

I think that the military power of the United States is greater today than it has ever been. I think that the Soviets do not think of the war in Vietnam as something that is weakening the United States in the way you implied your question. I have forgotten the final sentence of your question, but I do not think that they want to keep the war going in order to weaken us. I do not believe that.

Senator BYRD. You do not believe that. I must say that I am 100 percent in disagreement with you.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I am sorry that we are in disagreement.

Senator BYRD. I respect your opinion.

To get back to my original question, to which I assume your answer would be "No," the original was this: Is a long war in Vietnam

to the advantage of the Soviet Union in your own personal judgment? I assume your answer is "No" to that question.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. The answer is "No, if they can bring it to an end on terms that fall within their shaded area of acceptability."

Senator BYRD. If they can accomplish all their objectives, perhaps they would like to. But assume they don't accomplish their objectives.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. They have some minimum objectives. I don't know what they are, unfortunately. But I would suspect that they would like to see this war brought to an end. They do have the problem that Secretary Nitze raised, of their position in the world; and they cannot be in a position of running out on a colleague, or of being put in an embarrassing position vis-a-vis China. They have a very complex problem to face, too. So I just can't answer your question yes or no.

Senator BYRD. I have been fearful that a great many individuals in high positions in our Government have taken that view—that the Russians will not be advantaged by a long war. I can't help but believe that a long war logically from every point of view is an advantage to Russia. We are losing men every day. We have these great economic commitments to Southeast Asia, and the Russians have an opportunity to hit us elsewhere and stimulate adverse activity elsewhere as they did in the Middle East.

But anyway, your judgment may be right and my judgment may be wrong.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Let me add, Senator, that we do not, in our decisions or behavior, count on my being right or your being right on this point.

Senator BYRD. I think it is very important, though, what is the real thinking of the men who have to make these vital decisions. And to me it is a matter of vital consequence whether or not they believe that a long war is to the advantage of the Soviet Union. And I can't help but see that a long war is to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

But if they don't feel that way, naturally they are going to make decisions differently from what they would otherwise.

Let me ask you this. In the capacity that you now hold as Secretary of the Navy, in your present capacity, how heavily do you rely on military judgment in your support as to military matters?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I rely very heavily on the judgment of military men in military matters. In my present position as Assistant Secretary of Defense, more than one-third of my professional staff is military.

Senator BYRD. Do you think we are nearer to an end to the fighting in Vietnam than we were 2 years ago?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Yes.

Senator BYRD. Do you think that the strategy that the Defense Department has been using in Vietnam during the past 2 years has been successful?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Not yet.

Senator BYRD. Is there a difference of opinion between civilian and military leaders in the Defense Department as to the conduct of the Vietnam war?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I can't answer that question in a simple way. There are differences of opinion in less or more detail within the military, among the civilians, and obviously within the whole Depart-

ment. There is a general consensus, I think, as to how the war has been fought to date. I am not denying that there are differences of opinion. But I don't think they necessarily break the way you have broken them.

Senator BYRD. Do you think the time has come when we should take a new, hard look at the strategy we have been using in Vietnam as a result of our last 2 years' experience?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. The answer to that is "Yes," but only in the sense that I think the time comes about every 2 or 3 months to do that. It is a periodic exercise that the President, in a sense, asks his advisers to do because the commitment of the United States in blood and resources is so great. So I could answer your question "Yes" at almost any point in time.

Senator BYRD. As an important adviser, do you think the time has come for basic changes in our policy?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. No, sir.

Senator BYRD. Mr. McNaughton, I assume you have several Deputy Assistant Secretaries immediately under you.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Are any of these people military men?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Yes; one of them is. One of the deputies is a military man.

Senator BYRD. And do you have a principal deputy?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Yes; I have.

Senator BYRD. Is he a military man?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. He is not.

Senator BYRD. This question is being asked at the request of another member of the committee who is not able to be here at the moment. I will read it to you:

On October 28, 1962, the House Armed Services Subcommittee for Special Investigations, the Chairman being Porter Hardy, released to the Press a copy of his letter to Chairman Vinson on the Subcommittee's investigation of the phase-down of six SAGE direction centers and 17 long-range radars. In that connection he indicted the Department of Defense for making a misleading and inaccurate announcement, and stated that the Secretary of Defense had incorrectly informed the President in this matter. I have been informed that in a Closed Session of that Subcommittee Chairman Hardy severely criticized the Department of Defense for withholding important documents and papers on this matter. While you were General Counsel at that time I understand that your deputy made the appearance before that Committee on this occasion. In view of this, and the fact that you have been nominated to be Secretary of the Navy, would you indicate what part you played in this matter that was denounced by Chairman Hardy?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Senator, I don't even recall the event.

Senator BYRD. Could you supply the information?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I will supply the information; yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. The following question would be this: "What role did you have in withholding the documents and papers from that subcommittee?"

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I would be very surprised if I withheld documents from the committee. But, nevertheless, I don't recall at all this event. I will have to submit the answer to you.

Senator BYRD. And there is one followup question in that connection. "And what will be your policy as Secretary of the Navy in responding to requests from Congress and its appropriate committees for information, papers, files, and documents?"

Mr. McNAUGHTON. My policy is based on the fundamental belief that the Navy can't operate effectively without the full support of the Congress. And I intend to cooperate as fully as possible with the Congress in this regard.

Senator BYRD. And I assume, then, in answering your question, that you would make available to the appropriate committees of the Congress papers, files, and documents that the committee asked you to make available?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I will make them available subject to the rules that govern me in this regard as propounded by the President and the Secretary of Defense, with a spirit of cooperation, Senator.

(The following communication was subsequently received from Mr. McNaughton:)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., July 12, 1967.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the hearing on 28 June 1967 on my nomination to be Secretary of the Navy, Senator Byrd of Virginia inquired about my participation in a hearing before the Special Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that was referred to in a letter released to the press by Rep. Porter Hardy, the Subcommittee Chairman, on 28 October 1962. The hearing related to the phase-down of six SAGE direction centers and 17 long-range radars.

I replied that I did not recall this particular event.

Upon inquiry within the Department, I have ascertained that there was an investigation by the House Armed Services Committee into this matter in June and July of 1963; the investigation involved the Department of the Air Force the Comptroller of the Department of Defense. A review of the transcript of those hearings discloses that Charles J. Hitch, the then Comptroller of the Department of Defense, testified on 20 June 1963. He was accompanied by John Klotz of the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. On 18 July the witnesses were Joseph S. Hoover, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Budget), and Lansing R. Felker, a member of the Comptroller's staff, accompanied by Leonard Niederlehner, my then Deputy in the Office of the General Counsel.

It appears that a question arose during the latter hearing as to whether the Committee had been provided with the position paper prepared by the Air Force in support of its reclama to the decision of the Secretary of Defense on the issue under discussion. It was determined, however, that the paper in question had been submitted to the Committee as Tab 15 of the Department of Defense transmittal.

There is no indication that I personally participated in this investigation, and I have no recollection of doing so.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN McNAUGHTON.

Senator BYRD. Senator Miller?

Senator MILLER. I might ask a question on the subject of international security affairs.

To what extent do you have cognizance over military assistance programs?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I am responsible for it by delegation from Secretary McNamara.

Senator MILLER. You may have noted in the paper in the last 2 or 3 days that one of our colleagues made a rather lengthy speech in the Senate in which he severely criticized our policy on military assistance, both on military assistance of grant aid or long-term credit, as well as sales.

Did you by any chance see that article that covered it?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I certainly did.

Senator MILLER. May I ask if there is any thinking going on in the Defense Department on what we might do to change our policies?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Well, this is again a question in which we address the policy issue very frequently. You mean as a consequence of the criticism?

Senator MILLER. Well, not necessarily as a consequence of the criticism, but does the criticism lay a foundation for what one might expect to be a consideration of a change in policy?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Senator, there is no dramatic change of policy envisioned by the Defense Department for military assistance.

Senator MILLER. As I understand it, one of the policies is that in the case of some of the countries we furnish military assistance to, especially on a grant or long-term credit basis, that it is to our national interest to equip people in some of these countries to provide security as a part of the overall world concept of resisting Communist aggression instead of having the United States have to take over that job in that particular part of the world.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. The vast bulk of the military assistance granted is for that purpose.

Senator MILLER. And there is no contemplation that you know of on the part of the Department to change that policy?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. There is no plan to change that policy. And indeed, we hope that the two Houses of the Congress will support it, Senator, in the authorizations, and appropriations.

Senator MILLER. May I say in all deference to my colleague's speech that I continue to agree with that policy, and hope that you will continue that policy.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, on the sales side, I have the greatest respect—

Senator MILLER. I would like to get on the sales side.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Excuse me.

Senator MILLER. As far as the policy on the grant, within the policy that I outlined, I want you to know that I for one thoroughly agree with it, and I hope you will continue it.

Now, with respect to the sales, is there any rethinking of the sales policy?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. No rethinking of the policy that has governed over the past year or so.

Senator MILLER. What is that policy?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I beg your pardon?

Senator MILLER. What is that policy, with respect to the sales?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. The policy has been evolving in the sense of moving out of grant and into sales.

Now, the Senator to whom you referred, for whom I have the greatest respect, implied that the total of the two is going up. This is not so. The total of the two, grant and sales, is staying roughly the same. There is a transition from grant to sales. On the sales side, Senator, about 90 percent of our sales go to developed, industrialized countries—for example, C-130's to the United Kingdom, F-111's to Australia, and the like. Most of your colleague's criticism pertained to the 10 percent of sales which go into the less developed areas. We could spend the next 2 hours discussing the problems in the 10 percent area—where you have the Arab-Israeli problem, the Indian-Pakistani problem, the Latin American problems, and so on. The subject

becomes very difficult. Each one of these cases involves military-political questions of how you somehow help the country to defend itself, of how, by virtue of the military assistance that you can provide, you try to slow down arms races and to restrain the diversion of resources by the country, and so on. It is a highly complex matter.

Senator MILLER. Pardon me.

Are you saying that the policy with respect to the 10 percent of the sales is the same policy as the policy with respect to grants that we have had heretofore?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. In many respects, in those less developed countries, the policy can be very similar, yes.

Senator MILLER. Of course, there is some criticism that our implementation of a policy to furnish military assistance through sales, for example, has been unwise, because it has laid a foundation for friction and possible warfare between undeveloped countries.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. The objection you mention is not to sales versus grant. It is to the supplying of the articles, not to the method by which they are supplied.

Senator MILLER. All right, then, with respect to that, that is a different objective from the objective of enabling a nation, an undeveloped country, perhaps, to provide some security in the overall complex of the world security against Communist aggression.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. You have named two of our areas of problems. That is correct.

Senator MILLER. There is no change coming up in that first policy, at least you didn't think so. And I want you to know that I agree with you.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. There is no change in the policy, that is right.

Senator MILLER. With respect to this second policy of providing security from their neighbors and not as a part of the concept of the overall security from Communist aggression, is there any idea of changing that policy?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Not the policy, Mr. Senator. But facts have changed, obviously—in the past month in some areas. The policy constantly has to be applied to new facts.

I don't intend to run ahead of the Secretary of State, who is supposed to testify before one of your committees in another week or two on the subject of foreign assistance. Therefore, I respectfully request you to permit him to answer the fundamental questions in this area, rather than have me try to deal with his subject ahead of him.

Senator MILLER. Well, I wouldn't want you to usurp his prerogative. But I just wanted to ask you these questions in the light of that speech that I referred to, and point out, first of all, that I thoroughly agree with the policy that we earlier announced here. But at the same time I want to express my concern—and to this extent I am inclined to agree with the speech—over the way the policy has been implemented with respect to enabling a developing country to have security, which in turn has been used as a foundation for friction with its neighbors, such as the Indian-Pakistani situation, such as the Arab-Israeli situation. And on that point I was wondering if there was any change in the policy in the works, or change of implementation of the policy.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. We are not considering any change in the policy. But I think we should be clear that you are characterizing the policy in those cases differently than I would. In this class of situations

that you are talking about, the policy, generally speaking, is to provide arms not only for security in the narrow sense, but in such a way as to restrain the countries from having more arms. In other words, you have the opportunity to say no, and to dampen arms races, because you have the power to say yes.

So in many of these cases we are able to restrain the building of unnecessary military forces because we are not only on friendly relations with the country, but also a source of supply to the country.

Senator MILLER. I follow that.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. So in the less developed areas the policy is to restrain, rather than to encourage. Rather than to pour fuel on the flame, the purpose is to dampen the flame. I suspect that the difficulties that emerged in the Near East recently very well could have happened 2 or 3 years sooner had it not been for the U.S. policy that I am referring to.

Senator MILLER. We are talking about a policy which is calculated to restrain.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. That is correct.

Senator MILLER. Now, that is quite different from the policy that is being advocated by some of the people, in which a defect might have been advocated by this speech that I referred to or providing nothing at all.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. That is a way—and I say this without disrespect to the author of that speech—it is a way of—as the phrase is used—of resigning from the human race. It is a way of closing your eyes to the extraordinarily serious problems facing the United States.

Senator MILLER. Thank you very much. No further questions.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for coming here today. I don't want to detain you except for another moment. I just feel that I should say, as one Member of the Senate, that I do believe that the type of war that we have been fighting in Vietnam and the policy that we have been pursuing in regard to it has lengthened the war, and has increased our casualties. I realize that you have a different viewpoint. And I respect your viewpoint. But I just wanted to express the view of one individual. I believe very strongly that it is to Russia's advantage that we continue to sacrifice men and money and material and everything else in the Far East. For that reason I don't believe that you are going to find her unduly cooperative. But there again it is not a question of motive or objective, it is just a question of judgment. Your judgment might be right. I hope my judgment is wrong.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I did not say that I expected them to be unduly cooperative. I do not expect them to be cooperative.

Senator BYRD. But you do not agree with my assertion that a long war in Vietnam is to Russia's advantage, you do not agree with that assertion?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I cannot agree with that assertion.

Senator BYRD. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

(The nomination of Mr. McNaughton to be Secretary of the Navy was subsequently approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate on June 29, 1967.)

**NOMINATION OF CHARLES F. BAIRD, OF MARYLAND, TO BE
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, VICE ROBERT H. B. BALDWIN,
RESIGNED**

Senator BYRD. Next we have Mr. Charles F. Baird, who is now serving as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management. He has been nominated to be Under Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Baird appeared before the committee in March of 1966 after he was nominated to be an Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

(The nomination reference and report and biographical sketch of Mr. Baird follow:)

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
June 6, 1967.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Charles F. Baird, of Maryland, to be Under Secretary of the Navy vice Robert H. B. Baldwin, resigned.

CHARLES F. BAIRD

Charles F. Baird was born in Southampton, New York, on September 4, 1922, son of George White and Julia (Fitz) Baird. He attended Middlebury College where he majored in economics, was a member of Blue Key Honorary Society, played varsity football and tennis. Enlisting in the Marine Corps he was ordered, under the V-12 program to Dartmouth College, where he completed his senior year and was awarded a Bachelor of Arts degree by Middlebury. After the war he studied at the New York University Graduate School of Business Administration, and in 1960 completed the Advance Management Program of the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration.

Mr. Baird served in the United States Marine Corps from July 1943 until July 1946, including 16 months in the Pacific as a Lieutenant with the 3rd Marine Division and in China with the 3rd Amphibious Corps. Recalled to active duty during the Korean hostilities, he served with the 2nd Marine Division from June 1951 until June 1952 in the rank of Captain.

The majority of Mr. Baird's business career was spent with Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) which employed him initially in 1948 as an analyst in the Treasurer's Department. Specializing in international finance questions, he occupied a series of executive positions in New York, London, and Paris. From 1962 to 1965 he was a Member of the Executive Committee of Esso Standard S. A. Francaise, one of the largest companies in France. At the time of his nomination by President Johnson in November 1965, he was Assistant Treasurer of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey).

Mr. Baird is married to the former Norma Adele White of Rockville Center, New York. They have four children, Susan, Stephen, Charles Jr., and Nancy. His current address is 5316 Woodlawn Avenue, Kenwood, Chevy Chase, Maryland.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you today. We have no questions for you. We are just glad to see you again. And we wish you the best of luck in your new assignment.

Senator MILLER. May I add my best wishes, too.

Mr. BAIRD. Thank you, Senator.

(The nomination of Mr. Baird to be Under Secretary of the Navy was subsequently approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate on June 29, 1967)

NOMINATION OF PAUL C. WARNKE, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, VICE JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, REASSIGNED

Senator BYRD. Next we have Mr. Paul C. Warnke, who is now the General Counsel for the Department of Defense. He appeared before the committee in September of 1966 after his nomination to fill the position he now holds.

Mr. Warnke has been nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense and will succeed Mr. McNaughton as the Assistant Secretary who is responsible for international security affairs.

Mr. Warnke's biography will appear in the record at this point.

(The nomination reference and report and biographical sketch of Mr. Warnke follow:)

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
June 12, 1967.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Paul C. Warnke, of the District of Columbia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense vice John T. McNaughton, reassigned.

PAUL C. WARNKE

Present position: General Counsel, Department of Defense, since October 3 1966.

Previous position: Partner, Covington & Burling, 701 Union Trust Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.

Home address: 5037 Garfield Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016.

Born: January 31, 1920, Webster, Massachusetts.

Married: Jean Rowe in 1948. Five children living; Margaret 17, Georgia 15, Thomas 9, Benjamin and Stephen (twins) 7; one son, Matthew, deceased.

Education: B.A. 1941 Yale University, LL.B. 1948 Columbia Law School. Editor in Chief, Columbia Law Review 1948.

Military service: U.S. Coast Guard 1942-46. Discharged as Lieutenant (senior grade). Served in Atlantic Theater in anti-submarine service and in Pacific on tanker and LST, participating in landings in the Philippines and Borneo.

Professional activities: Admitted to D.C. Bar, 1948; admitted to Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1954; member of American Bar Association; member of Section of Antitrust Laws; member of D.C. Bar Association; Chairman, Committee on Legal Education and Admissions Requirements; member of Federal Bar Association; member of American Society of International Law.

Other activities: Board of Directors and Chairman of Membership Committee, Health and Welfare Council of National Capital Area (local United Community Fund); past Chairman of Board of Trustees, Potomac School, McLean, Virginia; former member, D.C. and Maryland Advisory Committees to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

Senator BYRD. Senator Miller.

Senator MILLER. Mr. Warnke, you heard my questions and discussion with Mr. McNaughton just now?

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL C. WARNKE, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. WARNKE. I read the congressional debate, Senator, yes.

Senator BYRD. Excuse me just a minute.

Would you indicate just which speech that is? I am not clear in my mind.

Senator MILLER. I didn't particularly wish to mention the name of our colleague on this—

Senator BYRD. Leave it out of the record.

Senator MILLER. This was a speech given on the floor of the Senate, I believe, on Monday morning, which lasted approximately 2 hours, and which went into all the aspects of military assistance. And all I want to ask you is whether you agree with the policies which Mr. McNaughton said he agreed with.

Mr. WARNKE. Senator, first of all I would like to preface my comment with the statement that I, of course, am not an expert on the subject, since it has not been part of my responsibility to date. I feel that this is something that I would have to consider. To the extent that I understand the policies which now exist, and certainly after having listened to Mr. McNaughton's expression of views, I am completely in accord with them.

Senator MILLER. In other words, you are not favorably disposed toward a policy which would change a policy that has been existing for a long time, that we provide military assistance to certain countries, including particularly the developing countries, or relatively poor countries, to enable them to provide security not only for themselves but security which entered into the overall complex of security against Communist aggression, in place of having the United States do that?

Mr. WARNKE. I would certainly agree with that policy, Senator. I think that in furnishing arms on either a grant or a sales basis that we do so with a view toward, first of all, insuring greater security against the Communist enemies, and, second, toward preserving internal stability, which, of course, is a contributing factor in our overall security.

I would also agree with Mr. McNaughton that, if you were to abdicate completely from this role of arms supplier, you would lose the control that you could otherwise exercise as to the degree of the buildup and the way in which the arms are utilized.

Senator MILLER. Thank you. I have no further questions. And best wishes to you.

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you very much.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Warnke, I am sorry I have to ask you to wait. I wanted to ask you several questions. We have to go to the floor to vote now. So we will ask you to wait.

Mr. WARNKE. I would be happy to wait.

(Recess 12:25 to 1:50 p.m.)

Senator BYRD. As I understand it, in your new capacity you will be one of the principal advisers to the Secretary of Defense, particularly as it concerns Vietnam?

Mr. WARNKE. That is my understanding, Senator, yes.

Senator BYRD. So you have an unusually sensitive position, and one which would have a tremendous effect on the course of the war one way or the other, is that true?

Mr. WARNKE. I would think that could be true, Senator.

Senator BYRD. Could I ask you this: Do you think that the strategy that the Defense Department has been using in Vietnam during the past several years has been a successful strategy?

Mr. WARNKE. Well, Senator, I don't think that anybody feels that it has been as successful as we could hope, because the war is still

continuing, and we have not yet achieved what Mr. Nitze referred to as our minimal objectives.

Senator BYRD. Do you feel that the time has come for a change in our basic strategy?

Mr. WARNKE. Senator, I don't really feel that I am qualified at the present time to express an opinion on that subject.

Senator BYRD. In your judgment, should the bombing of North Vietnam be ended or reduced without a firm commitment on the part of the North Vietnamese to cease sending materials to South Vietnam?

Mr. WARNKE. Well, again, Senator, as I pointed out, my responsibilities in the Defense Department at the present time have not included this area, so that any opinion that I have would have to be an uninformed one.

Now, I think that it is certainly correct that we should not give up anything without receiving a quid pro quo. And I think that is what our policy has been.

Senator BYRD. Speaking now of your own personal views; I am not interested in somebody else's views, but your own views. In your own view would it be unwise or not wise to end or reduce the bombing under the present conditions?

Mr. WARNKE. I think, Senator, that we certainly should not forfeit any one of our tools without receiving something in exchange for it. And I am sure that these are the considerations that influence the President in reaching his decisions with respect to bombing or with respect to any of our other military activities in Vietnam.

Senator BYRD. Do you think it was wise to build up our manpower in Vietnam from 29,000 to 462,000, and simultaneously permit the free flow of cargo, war material and other cargo, through the North Vietnamese Port of Haiphong?

Mr. WARNKE. Senator, I really could not express an opinion on that subject, since I was not even in the Defense Department until some 8 months ago. So I don't know what the considerations are that influenced our policy with respect to the selection of particular targets in North Vietnam.

Senator BYRD. But as an individual citizen, and one who is very knowledgeable, and tremendously able, and who has been in the Department—how long?

Mr. WARNKE. Just about 8 months, sir.

Senator BYRD. In the Department 8 months?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes.

Senator BYRD. But you have been in Washington since—

Mr. WARNKE. I have been in Washington for almost 19 years, Senator.

Senator BYRD. Anyway, as a very knowledgeable individual citizen, could I ask your personal view as to whether you think it is logical to continue a big buildup of ground personnel and simultaneously do nothing to prevent the flow of equipment and cargo and military materials and nonmilitary materials also through the North Vietnamese Port of Haiphong?

Mr. WARNKE. I think if you are looking at just those two phenomena, Senator, by themselves, obviously it would not be advisable to permit that flow of material.

Now, there are other considerations obviously that the President must take into account in reaching a decision.

Senator BYRD. Do you foresee an end to the fighting in Vietnam within the next 12 months?

Mr. WARNKE. I have no information, Senator, that would lead me to feel that the fighting would be stopped within the next 12 months unless the Communists were to change their policy.

Senator BYRD. Let me ask you the same question with regard to 24 months.

Mr. WARNKE. I would not be able to answer that question, Senator.

Senator BYRD. Put it another way.

There is little to indicate that under the present conditions the war will not be a long one?

Mr. WARNKE. I think we have to assume that we are in for a long war, Senator Byrd. But I think in trying to estimate its duration we have to have certain information, which certainly I don't have, and I don't think anybody else has. And that is how badly the North Vietnamese are hurting at the present time.

Senator BYRD. You say you don't think anybody else has?

Mr. WARNKE. None of us in this country can be sure.

Senator BYRD. Here again I am interested in your personal thinking.

In your opinion is a long war in Vietnam to the advantage of the Soviet Union?

Mr. WARNKE. That is a difficult question for me to answer, Senator. Could I try it this way. Certainly a long war in Vietnam is not in our interest. And to that extent it would be in the interest of the Soviet Union.

Now, again there are conflicting considerations, I am sure, which must influence their judgment with respect to the war. For example, what is the effect insofar as their relations with Communist China are concerned? There are a number of imponderables. And I am afraid I could not psychoanalyze the Soviet rationalization. But as I say, from our standpoint, certainly we are losing heavily in terms of economic investment and in terms of human life. And from that standpoint alone, war is certainly not in our interest, and, therefore, would to that extent be in the interest of our adversary.

Senator BYRD. In that same context, then, a long war would definitely be to the advantage of the Soviet Union?

Mr. WARNKE. To that extent it would be, sir; there is no question about it.

But what other considerations might be involved is another matter. As Mr. McNaughton mentioned, for example, there is no question that this sort of military activity to some extent improves our preparedness, improves our military posture. But on the other hand, we do have the economic loss and the loss of human life. But I think that my answer would be that from our standpoint, which is the standpoint which is important, it is important to get the war over as soon as possible with a successful conclusion.

Senator BYRD. Now, are the policies that we are pursuing calculated to do that?

Mr. WARNKE. I am sure they are, sir, in the best judgment of the President of the United States.

Senator BYRD. The policies that we are pursuing are the policies that will get the war over with the soonest?

Mr. WARNKE. I would say, sir, that the President has to consider not only the interest of the successful and speedy conclusion of the

Vietnamese war, but also all of the other international complications which are involved. And I am sure that he is exercising his best judgment on the basis of objective information, which he is receiving from a variety of sources which I don't have.

Senator BYRD. I am not interested in the President's thinking; I would want to go directly to him on that. I was more interested in your view on it, because you are advising him, and you are in a key and important position.

Mr. WARNKE. My advice, of course, would go to the Secretary of Defense and not directly to the President.

Senator BYRD. I understand.

But certainly the Secretary of Defense will rely heavily on your judgment, or else he would not have selected you.

Mr. WARNKE. I am certain he will.

Senator BYRD. I am sure he will. And I am sure his confidence is well expressed.

What I want to say is, I feel so deeply about this Vietnam war, and I don't feel any more deeply, I know, than you do, and Mr. McNaughton does, and Mr. McNamara, and the President. So it is not a question of motive or objective, it is just a question of what appears to be judgment as to how to get it over with. And I just want to express again the view of one individual Senator, that it seems to me that the policies we have been pursuing have not been successful along that line. I can't see that we are much closer to ending the fighting today than we were 2 years ago when we started this great big buildup. I realize you can say, well, 2 years ago the enemy were in a better position than they are today. But we are a long way off from ending the fighting in Vietnam today.

Do you agree with that?

Mr. WARNKE. As I have said previously, Senator, I have no information which would indicate that the war would come to a speedy conclusion in our favor.

Senator BYRD. I just wanted to have your own personal idea or views, and also to express the hope of one individual that you will in your new capacity be willing to take a new look and a fresh look at the strategy and the policies we have been following.

I would hope that the views of the professional military men in the Department would be given greater consideration than, in my opinion, they have been given in the past.

But there again it is a matter of opinion. But I do believe so very strongly, contrary to what Mr. McNaughton feels, and maybe contrary to what you and others may feel, that a long war is to the Soviet Union's advantage, and it is to our serious disadvantage. And what weighs so heavily on me are these tremendous casualties, which are increasing considerably.

Last year it was up to 35,000 casualties, and in the first 5 months of this year it is 31,000.

I don't want to hold you any longer.

Mr. WARNKE. Senator, I certainly appreciate your views, sir. And you have my assurance that if I did not feel that I was in a position to take a fresh look and a hard look and an objective look at all these factors in giving my views to the Secretary of Defense, I would not be interested in taking this job.

Senator BYRD. I am sure of that. And I support your confirmation. And we will look to you to get this thing straightened out.

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you very much.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

We will go into executive session.

(Whereupon, at 2:05 p.m., the committee went into executive session.)

(The nomination of Mr. Warnke to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense was subsequently approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate on June 29, 1967.)



