# HARRISON E. SALISBURY'S TRIP TO NORTH VIETNAM



## HEARING

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
## UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETIETH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

WITH

HARRISON E. SALISBURY, ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITOR
OF THE NEW YORK TIMES

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# HARRISON E. SALISBURY'S TRIP TO NORTH VIETNAM

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1967

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: Senators McGee, Percy, and Hatfield.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee is meeting this morning to hear Mr. Harrison E. Salisbury, assistant managing editor of the New York Times, the first American newsman admitted to North Vietnam since the bombing of the north began. I wish to make it clear that this hearing is not a part of the series of hearings on "America's Responsibilities as a World Power" begun by the committee on Monday, but is simply an opportunity to discuss in public some of Mr. Salisbury's observations on his two-week visit to North Vietnam where we know very little about the people.

The conflict in Vietnam, as is often said, may be the best reported war in history, but there has probably never been a war in which we knew so little about the people with whom and against whom we are fighting. Our ignorance of the history, culture, and traditions of Vietnam and Southeast Asia have contributed much to the tragic conflict in which we now find ourselves. Some 500,000 American men are engaged in fighting a tough, dedicated, and resourceful opponent. The public needs to know more about this opponent—why he is fighting and what he is fighting for—in order to evaluate our policies in an objective manner. I am sure that Mr. Salisbury can shed some light on these factors by giving us a better understanding of the war as seen from North Vietnam.

Mr. Salisbury, we appreciate very much you taking the trouble and time to come down here and discuss with us this most important matter. I believe you have a prepared statement to begin our discussion.

(The prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY HARRISON E. SALISBURY AT THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. SENATE ON FEBRUARY 2, 1967

The situation in Vietnam appears to me to be reaching a turning-point—one which may lead either to a negotiated settlement or to a sharp and dangerous escalation.

I bring this impression back from Hanoi and it is based on my talks with the North Vietnamese leaders, my observations of the state of war in the north, the complicated tensions centering around China and the progress of our own efforts to achieve a military solution in Southeast Asia.

We have now been pursuing with occasional interruptions a policy of bombing North Vietnam for about two years. The offensive was launched in February of 1965 and has gradually been extended and stepped up in its scope. First the attacks were made just north of the 17th parallel. Then they were moved up to the 20th and 21st parallels, and following that we began to attack in the north, in the northeast and in the northwest. Our air operations now extend to virtually every area of North Vietnam and have included since last July targets within the metropolitan areas of Hanoi and Haiphong. The result of this offensive has been to cause the Hanoi regime to lay plans for continuing the war in case of an eventual attack on Hanoi and Haiphong. We have already attacked all of their other cities and towns and a rather substantial number of their villages.

The objective of the offensive, as I understand it, is to punish the North Vietnamese regime, to make it more difficult for them to support operations in the south, and to compel them to negotiate with us at the conference table.

My on-the-spot observations of the physical results of the bombing in the Hanoi area and in regions as far south as 80 to 90 miles below Hanoi and north to a distance of 15 or 20 miles show that we have been able to inflict severe punishment upon many of the military facilities located in that region.

Our principal targets have been the railroads, the highways and the bridges which form the communications and supply network whereby arms, munitions, food and men are moved south, ultimately reaching and reinforcing the so-called Vietcong.

The damage inflicted on these facilities as well as upon storage and transshipment areas has been considerable. I was told by Westerners who have frequently visited the Haiphong area that we have successfully taken out most of North Vietnam's oil storage capacity. I saw tacit confirmation of this fact in the widespread dispersal of petroleum products in 55-gallon steel drums, literally strewn over the landscape in practically every direction that you move outside of Hanoi.

## CONSEQUENCE OF BOMBING

One important consequence of the bombing program has been the dispersal of North Vietnamese supplies, material and facilities. Not only have they moved their population in large numbers out of the cities and towns into the small villages and countryside but they now do not, in so far as I was able to observe, maintain large concentrations of any kind of vulnerable materials (except in the Haiphong area). Instead they scatter stores out along the roads and in the fields through the country, generally in areas with easy access to the highway. This makes it extremely difficult for our bombing attacks to do very much damage to them.

There is no doubt in my mind that our bombing of the north has made it more difficult for the regime to continue the war and to continue its supply of materials to the south. But at the same time it is quite obvious that the supplies continue to move south in massive quantities. Despite continuous and very heavy bombing, both roads and railroads were operative during the time I was there, and other foreigners report that there has never been any serious disruption in communications to the south. The Vietnamese have an extremely efficient system for repairing the railroad. The railroad is a light one. The rolling stock is light. It is a single track affair and they scatter along its whole route vast quantities of spare rails, ties and ballast. When the road is hit, labor battalions are amassed from the countryside and instantly put to work, replacing the rails and filling in holes. Bridges are replaced with pontoons constructed of wooden canal boats, lashed together with a surface of bamboo poles. The materials are cheap, light and everywhere available, and the pontoons can be put in place within an hour or two of the destruction of a steel or conventional wooden bridge.

Where the railroad is cut and repairs will take some time, bicycle battalions are mobilized, each bike carrying a load of 600 pounds, and the train is unloaded onto bikes which then move forward past the break in the line to an empty train which is pulled up and reloaded. The process does not require more than two or three hours and there seems to be plenty of labor available to carry it out.

In the process of our bombing offensive there has been, of course, serious damage to civilian housing, loss of civilian life and damage and destruction of many non-military facilities. This kind of damage is readily observable in some areas of Hanoi itself, in the outskirts of the city and along the highways going south and in every city or town of any size which I visited. The damage is particularly evident in areas adjacent to the railroad, especially where there may have been railroad sidings which our bombers have attacked.

While there has been much reaction in this country over my reports of the damage to civilians and the casualties among civilians, I myself was not surprised at the results from our bombings, since past experience has shown that it is impossible to bomb military targets, particularly in a heavily populated country, without causing civilian casualties. What has proved true in the past has proved true in the present bombing offensive of North Vietnam.

One must balance against the deterring effects of our bombing to the movement of men and supplies to the south the strong reaction which the bombing has stimulated among the general populace. The people of North Vietnam, in so far as I observed them, seemed to be very strong and united in support of the war effort—to an extent which I found surprising in a Communist country—and I think this is clearly attributable to the stimulus to their patriotic feelings which has been evoked by the common peril which they all experience—that of the general bombing offensive.

Whether we have gained more in deterring movement of men and material to the south than is lost by the stiffening of this Vietnamese national feeling is difficult to say.

## FUTURE OF WAR

With regard to the future of the war it seems clear to me that the major factor which has caused Hanoi seriously to consider a possible negotiated settlement in China. The Chinese situation is extremely touchy, fraught with very dangerous possibilities for Hanoi, and the most elementary kind of prudence, it would seem to me, would necessitate Hanoi's exploring what kind of settlement terms might be obtained at this moment rather than waiting until later when China's aid might be denied them. Hanoi requires both Chinese aid and Russian aid to maintain the war effort at its present level and would be severely handicapped if China closed its borders, cut off the supply routes or ceased sending aid. There is also the possibility ever present in the minds of the people in Hanoi that civil war might break out in China, which would limit China's ability to assist North Vietnam.

Thus, regardless of published statements, events seem to propel Hanoi toward exploration of a settlement of the war.

At the same time, the dangers of escalation seem grave to me. There are many American military strategists who see in the present indications of difficulty and stress for Hanoi an opportunity to escalate the war and thus, in their view, to make unnecessary any consideration of Hanoi's side in imposing a settlement.

The dangers of such a course lie in the possibility that we may by one act or another trigger the entry of China into the war. I was told specifically by the North Vietnamese that China would enter the war if we did one of several things: crossed the 17th parallel with land forces, made amphibious landings in the north from the coast, or, as it was said in general terms "brought the war closer to the Chinese frontier". In these circumstances Hanoi left no doubt that the call for Chinese intervention would go out and with that we would be confronted with direct warfare between the United States and China.

The possibility of Chinese intervention exists on other grounds as well. There are Chinese-oriented members of the Hanoi government. China is resolutely opposed to any settlement of the war. China wishes it to continue into the indefinite future. If Hanoi were to embark on a course designed to lead to a settlement the Chinese might well seek to overturn the Hanoi leadership and replace it with men dedicated to their special theories of protracted warfare.

In my view the most profitable course for the United States at the present time would be a quiet and entirely secret exploration with the representatives of Hanoi to see if elements of a reasonable and honorable settlement, which would be generally acceptable to both sides, could not be worked out. I have

no doubt about the difficulties of this procedure, but considering the dangers involved I think it would be a worthwhile endeavor.

## STATEMENT OF HARRISON E. SALISBURY

Mr. SALISBURY. Senator Fulbright, I am very pleased to be here, and I will try to share with you, as much as I can, some of my observations in North Vietnam.

By chance I do happen to have been behind the enemy lines and this is a most unique experience, and I think that some of my observations should be of value in studying the policies we have been following in Southeast Asia and Vietnam and perhaps in evaluating any changes or any new lines for the future.

I thought perhaps I would start out by talking a bit about the war out there, that is the evidence one sees in Hanoi and in that area of the actual military conflict, and then perhaps go on to some of the ideas which I brought back concerning possible settlement of the war.

It is now almost exactly two years since we started our bombing offensive in the north, and the bombing offensive, of course, has been a controversial technique from the very beginning. There was, I believe, a good deal of discussion in the Government back and forth before it was embarked upon, but when it was begun—it had certain definite objectives, and one of them, I believe, was to try and persuade North Vietnam that they should negotiate, that they should come to the conference table, and militarily speaking, I believe the principal objective was designed to halt or to cut down on the flow of material, munitions, men from the north to the south.

### PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF BOMBING

In the time that I was in North Vietnam, which covered a period of about two weeks, I had quite a good opportunity to observe the physical effects of our bombing offensive. I traveled south from Hanoi distances of about 80 or 85 miles on two occasions, traveling along two or three of the principal highways, and I traveled in the area of Hanoi and to the north out to a distance of 10 or 15 miles.

Now I must say that throughout that region you can see the physical evidence of our bombing almost everywhere you go. It is very difficult to be out of sight of the results of the bombing. The principal targets that we have aimed at are the ones that you might suppose: they are means of communication, highways, railroads, bridges, supply depots, and other things which are important to the Vietnamese in sending supplies to the south, and the damage to these facilities has been considerable.

### COUNTRYSIDE IS POOR

I might say just by way of describing the countryside that this is a poor country, our enemy there. It is a country of poor Asiatic peasants for the most part. Its principal occupation is rice culture. The country itself, at least in the Red River delta, it is one large rice granary, and most of the people are occupied in that particular pursuit. It is not an industrialized country

In the five years or so that Ho Chi Minh was in power between 1954 and 1959, when the war began to become more serious, no very great

industrial endeavors were embarked upon. You immediately feel or sense that you are in a poor country that does not have very much in the way of modern facilities.

### BOMBING EFFECT IS LIMITED

Now this has a direct bearing, I think, on the effectiveness of our bombing policy because it does not give us very many outstanding targets to hit at. This is not a country with large munitions factories, large steel plants, large oil refineries, and things of that kind. They had some oil storage capacity and that was taken out, I believe, very effectively around Haiphong in one of our very early attacks last July. I did not see any substantial oil storage capacity anywhere that I visited, and I doubt if very much is left in the country.

This has an effect, as I say, on the bombing because it limits in a sense, the results of that bombing. If you are attacking largely roads and the rather small railroads that they have there, the results may not be terribly impressive.

Traveling outside Hanoi on the highways, highway No. 1, that is the main highway going down south, you run for considerable distances along side a rather narrow gauge railroad, a light railroad, the rolling stock of which is small. It is not comparable to our heavy railroads, and this railroad, and the others that I saw, have been damaged a good deal by our offensive, not infrequently you find large patches of track that have been blasted out by our bombs, and repaired. This is perhaps the most significant thing about it—that the railroad still is operative in spite of having been damaged repeatedly.

The same is true of the highways. On the trips that I made south, which were often made during darkness since we do not bomb during the night, at least in the north, I found the highways very heavily cluttered with truck traffic, and even columns of men and women carting stuff down to the south.

This is important because it indicates the scope of the effort that they put into continuing to move materials to the south in spite of our bombing offensive. I do not want to give you the impression that the offensive has not had results because it has. It has knocked out a great many of the bridges. In fact outside of the very large and important main bridge which connects Hanoi itself across the Red River, a bridge called the Long Bien Bridge, which runs for about three kilometers and which is the main connection between Hanoi and the north bank of the Red River, I did not see a single bridge which had not been damaged to some extent by our attacks.

Now some of the bridges have been taken out entirely. Some of them have only been damaged, and they have been put back into service. In some cases you will find a bridge, which normally took two traffic lanes, now taking one traffic lane.

### HOW TRAFFIC CONTINUES TO MOVE

Of course, the bridges are one of the most vulnerable things that you find in that area since the Red River delta is crisscrossed by endless streams, canals, rivers and things of that kind, but in spite of very severe damage to the bridges, I did not find that traffic, the

heavy truck flow to the south, had been materially halted. The reason for this is that they have evolved an extremely efficient and rather cheap way of throwing pontoons across these streams which enables them to maintain a traffic with very little interruption.

These pontoons are constructed out of the simplest of materials. The are built out of flat-botton canal boats. These are rather long narrow boats, probably they would run from the distance of that table to this one over here, and they are only perhaps two or three feet wide. They lash these boats together in a chain across the stream and put on top of the boats a platform of cut bamboo poles. The poles are often not even lashed down to the boats. They are not planks. They are just loose on top of the boats and as the trucks go over them, they make a tremendous rumble but they seem to be heavy enough to carry very substantial loads, and you can see the materials that are involved in putting across a pontoon like that are available all over the country and with practically no expense. All that you have to have is labor power.

Now, in most instances where the bridge has been taken out and pontoons have replaced it they divided the traffic flow. These canal boats are about wide enough to take one traffic stream, so they will divide the traffic flow and the south-moving trucks will go on one and then there will be another pontoon on the other side and the empties coming back north will be coming back on the other pontoon bridge.

I did not see these bridges actually being put into place but I did speak with foreigners in Hanoi who had seen the actual process, and they said it often took them not more than an hour or two to get a bridge in place. The materials are kept adjacent to the bridges ready for use if the bridge is knocked out.

In the case of railroad bridges, it is a more complicated proposition, because you cannot replace a railroad bridge with a wooden pontoon.

However, they have along the railroad, and this was true of every railroad that I saw, strewn along these railroads are great masses of railroad building material. These are the light rails that they use, and railroad ties, and ballast, and they have, of course, quantities of manpower which are available to be thrown into the task of repairing the roads.

Now, they do have a certain amount of bridge-building equipment, too, to replace the broken railroad bridges. However, that is a task which takes them longer. They cannot do that in a few hours, and so they have a different procedure there. When the bridge is knocked out or where the railroad has been knocked out for some considerable period of time, they will bring up a bicycle brigade.

Now these bicycle brigades are quite an extraordinary feature of the landscape. The bikes will carry about 600 pounds, a 600-pound load on an individual bicycle. It is balanced across the bike with 300 pounds on one side and 300 on the other, and they wheel the bikes along. They will bring a brigade up to a train which is blocked because of a cut in the railroad or a broken bridge, and they will unload that train in a matter of an hour or two, put the stuff on the bikes, move across a pontoon on the bikes to a train which is brought up on the other side, and reload the train and move along.

### LARGE INVESTMENT IN MANPOWER

Now you can see that this kind of endeavor which is engaged in every day—because the principal targets of our bombing are the railroads and the highways—this causes them to invest large numbers of manpower to keep the traffic moving. But so far as I was able to observe, they do keep the traffic moving probably at about the rate that they are capable of absorbing the material and supplies in the south. There may be a little bit of a choking down on the reinforcements, but I doubt it myself, and so do most of the observers who have watched this process in Hanoi. They point out that there is a limit to the amount of men and materiel which can be absorbed in the south, and they think that the north is able to keep it going about at the rate that they want to.

That does not mean, however, that this does not put a heavy burden on the North Vietnamese regime because the investment in manpower, the investment in time and labor and in material is substantial. The materiel mostly comes from their allies, principally, I think, from China. I think they get most of their rails and railroad supply equipment, I think they get their rolling stock from the Chinese. It comes down on the railroad from China. The Chinese have a great interest in maintaining that railroad because one link of the railroad coming from China also links another part of China. It is a most convenient way between these two areas and so the Chinese have a substantial interest in keeping that going. And I think they invest a lot in that.

So that I think one might say from the military standpoint, just looking at the railroad operation and the highway operation, that we get a small military benefit from this, because of the investment in manpower that we compel them to put into this effort.

### SPIRIT OF NATIONAL UNITY

I would say this must be balanced, on the other hand, by what has happened to the country as a result of the bombing, and this is an observation which I made, and which was supported by the foreign diplomats, the westerners, and to some extent the Eastern Europeans who are in Hanoi. It is my feeling that the bombing has caused the country to acquire a spirit of national purpose or unity which it would not have otherwise. I think that this is perhaps akin to what we saw in England during the war. We did not see this but it occurred in Germany under the very heavy air attacks that went on there.

The people have a feeling of the mass participation in this war. They feel that they are in it with their leaders. I do not believe they would have that feeling otherwise. I think that without the bombing there would be natural lines of clevage in that population. I do not believe the Government is a hundred percent popular with the peasants. I am certain it is not all that popular with some elements in the population, the Catholic elements, for example, but because of the feeling that they are all being attacked in the same manner, they have rallied around the national cause on the basis of patriotism rather than communism.

The Government, as might be expected, plays very strongly on this theme. You find in their propaganda very little talk of communism,

a great deal of talk about nationalism, national spirit, the traditions of the Vietnamese people, and their unity in fighting this enemy.

In their propaganda you hear about national heroes. You do not hear about Communist heroes. I think this is an effective means of propaganda and I think it has created a fighting spirit in the north which they would not have otherwise, and I do not think that the Government could have created this without the bombing.

They have been clever about it. They have done one thing which I think has done a great deal to keep their morale up. They have encouraged the ordinary population to fight back against the airplanes. Now this fighting back is really more symbolic, I think, than real. They have issued guns, rifles, ordinary rifles to large masses of the population, and when the planes come over they are encouraged to fire back and occasionally, of course, they will shoot down an American plane. This gives the people a feeling that they are fighting against the enemy up in the sky and that they are all in this thing together. I think it is quite a clever propaganda device regardless of its military value which of course is quite slight.

### EFFECT OF BOMBING ON NEGOTIATIONS

It would seem to me on the basis of what I was able to see, that the North Vienamese Government is able to continue the movement of supplies to the south, they are able to continue to maintain the war about on the present level despite the bombardment that is going on. What would happen if we were to sharply increase the bombardment is another question.

I tried to evaluate as best I could whether we were moving them toward the conference table as a result of the bombing, and I must say it does not seem to me that this is the result.

On the other hand, I do feel that there is a certain movement on the part of Hanoi toward the conference table, and I believe this derives not really from the bombardment but from certain other external factors which are extremely important, and the most important of these, I believe, is the situation vis-a-vis China.

### SUPPLY OF WAR MATERIALS FROM RUSSIA

To evaluate this, I think you have to know a little bit about where North Vietnam gets its supplies and how dependent they are on outside sources for maintaining their present war effort. They principally get their military support from two sources; one is China and one is the Soviet Union, and I will expand on that a little bit, because it is interesting to see the difference in materials that come from one source and from the other.

From the Soviet Union they get in large part their most advanced military technology. They get from the Russians the SAM–2s, the surface-to-air missile 2's. These are not the latest Soviet model, as I am sure you gentlemen know, the SAM–3s are the latest ones that the Russians have, but the SAM–2s are quite good and they have a substantial number of these weapons, which they received from the Soviets.

Now, those weapons, for the most part, so far as I was able to observe, or to find out, come into North Vietnam by ship. They come to Haiphong.

The larger part of Soviet materiel arrives in Haiphong. They get the SAMs that way, they also get their advanced radar without which they can not operate their SAM systems, nor can they operate their antiaircraft, their conventional antiaircraft weapons with any great proficiency without good radar and they get a lot of that from the Soviet Union. They get their MIG–21s from the same source, and they also come in largely by boat and they come to Haiphong.

### SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT SUPPLIES

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, Mr. Salisbury, did they tell you this or did you observe this?

Mr. SALISBURY. This information comes to me from a series of sources. Some comes directly from them because they do not make any bones about some of this stuff that you might expect them to. Some of it comes from the foreign diplomats in Hanoi who were extremely well informed as to the sources of supply, and who frequently visit Haiphong and see the material actually coming in there. I did not visit Haiphong myself, and I regard that as being a mistake on my part. I did not ask to go to Haiphong thinking that this was a very sensitive military area. I discovered later on that it may be sensitive, but it is often visited, in fact is freely visited by the foreigners in Hanoi, and I should have gone down there and had a look myself, but I got a lot of secondhand information which I think is quite reliable in that respect.

### PETROLEUM PRODUCTS RECEIPT AND STORAGE

Now, the other major item which they receive from the Soviet Union and which also comes in through Haiphong is petroleum products, gasoline, oil, lubricants, all the things that they need to keep the trucks rolling to the south. They are not a producer of petroleum products themselves, and they are vitally dependent on this source of supply. They get some of it from Rumania but most of it comes in from the Soviet Union.

I mentioned earlier that their storage facilities, their large-scale tanks and things of that kind, have been taken out by our bombing offensive, indeed were taken out very early, and, as a result of that, for the most part the petroleum, the gasoline, the oil, is now stored in 55-gallon steel drums and these drums are scattered literally all over the countryside. You cannot drive a mile outside of Hanoi without seeing drums scattered into the field and along the highways. They are so dispersed that it would be literally impossible to knock out all their oil supplies at the present time.

Of course, this is a great bother for them. It is not very convenient if you have all your oil strewn over the countryside like that, but the truth of it is they have an awful lot of their material strewn out that way, again as a measure of dispersal to avoid losing it in a large-scale American attack.

I do not believe—in fact I am certain that they could not maintain the level of military operations in the South without these supplies that come in from the Soviet Union through Haiphong. There has been an increase, according to the information that I received, in the last year of the amount of material coming in through the port, but the port is now at about its maximum capacity. In fact it is jammed, according to the foreigners who have seen it. They do not believe it can handle any more than is now being handled there.

### SUPPLY ROUTE FROM CHINA

Now the other source of supply, of course, is the railroad and the highway route coming down from China, and in many respects this is still perhaps the most important supply route.

Now they get from China itself several items that are extremely important. The number one item is food, rice. The North Vietnamese regime normally would perhaps be able to supply itself with rice, although it is not as large a producer of rice as the south. But due to the bad weather of last year, and also due, in my opinion, to the diversion of labor, manpower and womanpower, from the rice paddies to construction and maintenance of the railroads and highways, they are falling quite short in their food production and they are becoming more and more dependent upon China to replace these supplies.

It is difficult to get a precise estimate of the shortfall in the rice crop in North Vietnam last year. We know that it was a bad rice year in all of Southeast Asia. The crops in Cambodia, in Laos, and in Burma were also off. I talked to the Russians about this, and a little bit to my amusement I found they had as much trouble getting figures and statistics from the North Vietnamese as I used to have getting them from the Russians when I was a correspondent there. But their estimate is that the North Vietnamese will be short by 600,000 to 800,000 tons of rice this year. This will have to be made up from the Chinese, and it is expected to be made up by the Chinese. This comes down by railroad principally from China directly to North Vietnam.

### SMALL ARMS AND CONSUMER GOODS FROM CHINA

In addition to the rice and other food products, and I think they get some minor supplies of other kinds of food from China, they also get their small arms, their rifles, and their machineguns and in all probability some of their lighter antiaircraft weapons from the Chinese, and they get the munitions for these weapons from China.

They get a considerable portion of their consumer goods from China. They do not have much capacity themselves, and what capacity they have is badly off as a result of the war effort and to some extent as a result of the bombardment.

The consumer goods they get from China are not terribly important, each individual item in itself, and yet when you go into the stores in Hanoi, and the stores are badly stocked because they are short of almost everything you can imagine. You find that if there are yard goods there they came from China. If there is porcelain china, it came from China. If there are tin pans, they came from China.

The little items of food, crackers, and biscuits, and things of that kind came from China.

The items of clothing, if you find knit goods, that probably came from China. So they are quite dependent on that source, for consumer goods.

They are dependent upon China for another item which astonished me but which I found to be very, very important, and this is bicycles. They have a bicycle factory in Hanoi and they produce a number themselves, but the main source of their bikes is China, and without those bikes the country just could not operate. I literally believe that without bikes they would have to get out of the war. They use them for transportation, they carry most of their—well, I think probably almost a hundred percent of the freight that moves down in the southern part of the country, that goes across the line into South Vietnam, moves on the bikes, and they have to have them. They get them from China.

### POSSIBLE CUTOFF OF SUPPLIES FROM CHINA

Now, the fact that they are dependent on these two great allies for these vital supplies puts North Vietnam, in my opinion, in a position in which at the present time they are now interested at least in exploring whether there could be a negotiated settlement of the war. The reason for this is their acute awareness of the danger that their source of supplies from China may be cut off. There are a number of reasons why this might happen.

In the first place there is the Chinese situation itself, extremely disorderly, extremely disturbed, with a possibility at any moment that it might flare out into civil war. In that event, they are well aware that it would not be likely that China would be able to maintain the flow of supplies that come south now, and it is also possible that the flow of supplies, which has been considerably diminished but which is still important, which comes in from the Soviet Union and from Eastern Europe via Siberia and the China route, this also might be cut off.

Another possibility which is discussed in private conversations by the Eastern European diplomats, and occasionally even mentioned by the Russians themselves, is the possibility that out of this very serious conflict between China and the Soviet Union some actual military conflict might evolve. Russia and China might actually come to blows and in this event also the possibility of the cutoff of supplies through China would be very real.

There is a third possibility, and this is one which I think bothers them almost as much as the other two. This is that the Chinese, acting on their own, because of a feeling that Hanoi either was preparing to negotiate with us or was beginning to follow a more pro-Russian line than a pro-Chinese line, would arbitrarily close the supply route across the frontier, and in that event the North Vietnamese would be in a very serious situation indeed, because the materials which they get from China, they would no longer receive, and the Russians would be compelled then to do all of their shipping by sea, and I simply do not believe the port of Haiphong would accommodate these supplies. I do not think the Russians have the shipping available and it would be quite a critical situation.

PROPITIOUS TIME FOR NEGOTIATIONS

Now, I think it is apparent, if you consider these factors, that any reasonable or prudent government, regardless of its nature, communist or non-communist, must, looking at the future, see that the chances are that they are stronger today than they may be a few months from now or a year from now. They are stronger today while the supplies are coming in from China than they would be if they were cut off, and I think that this factor, if none other existed, would compel them to take a good close look to see whether or not it might be possible to find some honorable and decent terms on which they might bring the war to an end.

Whether they would feel at the present time sufficient urgency to be willing to agree to the kind of terms that we might seek to impose is another matter. This I do not know. It is because of the existence of this situation which is perfectly apparent in Hanoi, and I think is becoming more and more evident here and elsewhere in the world, that I have made the public suggestion and which seems to me to be one of some virtue, both from their standpoint and ours, that some kind of private exploration be undertaken by both sides to see whether or not there might be a foundation for a settlement which could be arrived at. I say "private" because it seems to me that if we go the public route, it is much more likely to wind up in a propaganda contest in which their delegate makes a statement designed to please the communist world, and our delegate makes a statement designed to please ourselves, and we do not produce anything very effective in the way of negotiation or settlement, and things go on, the casualties mount up, the war goes on in the same grim way that it did in Korea during the protracted negotiations there.

I have always thought that the best kind of settlement that you can get, and this is true in a war or any other kind of circumstance, is the one where a couple of men meet privately and see whether they can agree before they come out in public and go through the procedure of ratifying that agreement.

I have no notion of whether my suggestion has fallen on fruitful ground or fruitful soil over in Hanoi or here in Washington, but I still think that it is the sensible way to try to approach this very difficult situation. I do not think it would be easy; I am certain that their positions are dug in, I know ours are, and there is every reason for each side to be highly suspicious of the other, and yet if some end is going to be made to this very difficult and very—this war which is costing us so much in men and materiel and blood and treasure, that I think it at least is worthy of exploration.

That is what I thought would be useful to tell you gentlemen. I would be delighted to try to answer any questions if you have any.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Salisbury. I have a few questions.

NON-COMMUNIST REPORTERS IN HANOI

You went there, of course, as a representative of the New York Times simply to report conditions as you saw them. Is that correct?

Mr. SALISBURY. That is absolutely correct.

The CHAIRMAN. How many non-communist reporteres were in Hanoi that you know of? Were you the only one?

Mr. SALISBURY. At the time I arrived there was one non-communist reporter there.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was he from?

Mr. SALISBURY. There was the reporter from Agence France Presse, the French news agency. He is stationed there permanently; AFP has had a man there perhaps for nearly a year. But I am not absolutely certain.

Before I left, two other Americans arrived on the scene. Mr. Baggs of the Miami News, and Harry Ashmore, an ex-newspaperman from Little Rock.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they there as reporters or private citizens?

Mr. SALISBURY. They came there as reporters not basically, although Mr. Baggs operated as a reporter.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see them and talk to them?

Mr. SALISBURY. No. They came the night I was leaving, and I must say I was busy writing at my typewriter and I was leaving at 4 a.m. that morning, and I did not get a chance to talk to them.

### REASON FOR NO MEETING WITH HO CHI MINH

The CHAIRMAN. Did you talk to Ho Chi Minh?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I did not have an interview with Ho Chi Minh, although I requested one. My only important interview with a member of the Government was with the Prime Minister, Mr. Pham Van Dong.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you not see Ho Chi Minh? I understand Baggs and Ashmore did.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is quite correct. I requested, when I arrived, interviews with three individuals. Ho was No. 1. General Giap was No. 2, and Pham Van Dong was No. 3. These were the three men whom I thought were very important and whom I should talk to. It was indicated to me by the Foreign Office that in all probability I would be allowed to see only one of these individuals. They suggested that I put in questions to each one of them with a letter indicating what I wanted talk to them about. I put in the three letters, and I must say I put in about the same questions phrased somewhat differently since I realized I was only going to get one of the three men. In the end they said my interview would be with the Prime Minister.

Now, I have a theory as to why I talked to the Prime Minister and not Ho Chi Minh. I will elucidate that. Ho, in the week or the two weeks that I was there, and the week following, gave four interviews or received four groups of foreign visitors. He received Mr. Baggs and Mr. Ashmore. He received a German group who were in there—excuse me, I forgot to mention there was a German newspaperman there too, a non-communist, and they were received. He received these four American women who went over there on a peace mission, and he received someone else whom I forget, and on each occasion it was a rather ceremonial meeting.

These people came in and they had tea, and Ho spoke with them rather briefly and informally, and in a rather flowery manner, and you may have read in the papers some of the statements that he made

such as if we stop bombing, then we can have a cup of tea together or something of that kind.

I would not say that these were really working meetings. They were more ceremonial meetings.

I think that they realized that I had a more serious purpose, that I really wanted to find out more about their position, at least I hoped that that was their belief, because that was true, and so Pham Van Dong received me and we had a meeting that lasted four and a half hours in which he expounded their position very, very extensively, and I might say I took it upon myself to expound some thoughts as well.

### NONSOURCING OF CASUALTY FIGURES

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Salisbury, would you clarify this question about why you did not reveal the source of your statistics in early reports? This has been commented on in the press here, and for our information I would like to have your views about that.

Mr. SALISBURY. I would be delighted to comment on that. The question of nonsourcing of the casualty figures—this is what it related to in, I think it was, my first story from Hanoi—arose a couple of days after the story came in. This was an error on my part, a simple journalistic error. I should have put the source in there as I was taught in my journalism school to do.

The story was put together very hastily on Christmas Eve, and inadvertently I did not say that the figures that I used for the casualties in Hanoi or in the streets came from the municipal officials of Hanoi. I think it was quite apparent to everyone who read the story that they must have come from the officials, that I did not invent them myself.

I had a feeling, and maybe I am unfair in this, that the question of the sourcing of those figures was introduced really to sort of start a false hare on this matter because the statistics themselves were really not very impressive.

If you go back and look at them, I think there were five people killed in one street and four in another, and the number of houses knocked down again were not very impressive so I do not think there can be any real question of these figures being inflated for propaganda purposes or anything of the kind.

In fact, I noticed that later on, Mr. Sylvester of the Defense Department who raised the question in the first place, and it was a proper question to raise, used my figures, the same figures that I quoted. He used these figures to show that our bombing had been extremely precise because we had caused only a very small number of casualties, and indeed the figures could be used that way because the casualties were not very great.

That, I think, really summarizes the situation so far as the question of sourcing of the figures is concerned.

Someone, again I believe it was the Defense Department, made a remarkable discovery that I used exactly the same figures in connection with Namdinh as the North Vietnamese had put out earlier in a propoganda pamphlet about the casualties in Namdinh, and I think that Mr. Clifton Daniel, our managing editor, made a very appropriate comment on that. He said, "Of course the figures are the same, they come from the same source," which is quite right. Had there been a difference in these figures, I think it might have been quite

significant. It would have been evidence they were attempting to make some sort of propaganda, using one set of figures for me and another one in a propaganda pamphlet. The figures were the same in both cases.

STANDARD OF LIVING IN HANOI

The CHAIRMAN. You described to some extent the life in North Vietnam as relatively simple. Is it very, very difficult for the ordinary people in Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not think it is very, very difficult for them. It would be very difficult for Americans in Hanoi because we are accustomed to a different standard of living. These people are people who have lived at a very miserable level really for years and years. It is a little poorer now than it was a year ago. They made apologies. They said, "Our girls do not look so pretty this year because their clothes are getting shabby and they are not eating as much as they should." They do not look as though they were too well off.

Having traveled as I have for many, many years in some of the poorest communist countries of the world, Mongolia and Albania and places like that, eastern Siberia, I would say that the people are certainly still living on a standard which is perhaps above the standard of the poor communist countries, but it is a low standard of living, no doubt about that.

SERVICE AS REPORTER IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, how long have you served in the communist countries as a reporter.

Mr. SALISBURY. I first went to the Soviet Union in 1944 during World War II. I was there for about eight months. I went back for the Times in 1949, and I was there for five years. I have been back to the Soviet Union three or four times on trips. I made trips on reporting expeditions through all of the communist countries of Eastern Europe, and all of them now of the Far East, with the great big exception of China, and the smaller exception of North Korea.

CONDITIONS IN HANOI

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have a curfew in Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, they do not have a curfew, but they are on one of the most difficult schedules of living hours that I have had to confront in a long time. They get up at 5 a.m., and the stores open at 5 a.m. Many of my appointments were at 6 a.m. They go to bed about 9 in the evening.

Now, I guess they always have been an early-rising town, but these are specially early hours because they want to have the shopping and the various activities which involve a congregation of people in numbers over before daylight, the reason being that our bombing operations do not begin until after daylight in most cases, and so that the risks of having concentrations of people are lower at those hours.

A great deal of their activity now goes on at night, that is so far as movement of supplies and gathering of supplies and things of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

How are the conditions in Hanoi, is it safe to walk about the streets at night?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I walked about the streets at night without any problem. It is dark and you are apt to fall into one of these air raid shelters they have along the side.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you likely to be held up and mugged and murdered? I just wondered how their conditions are compared to ours. [Laughter.]

Mr. SALISBURY. I think there are dangers there, but I did not hear of any muggings.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard of no muggings?

Mr. SALISBURY. Not a single one.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any rioting in the shops?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, in fact I don't think there is much there to loot.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing in the shops. Is there relative discipline?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes, it seems to be quiet and orderly. The only activity you know is normal street activity such as you would find in an Asian city but not as much of that at night.

I saw some interesting things that happened at night. I saw one evening a large throng of people, there must have been 200 of them, with their bicycles and they were congregated in a street and I didn't know what they were doing there until I came up and I saw there were two great trucks loaded with new bicycles there in the street and these people were turning in their old ones for new ones.

I think the bicycles are issued on a kind of a ration, you have to pay for them but you also have to get the authority to see to it that the people working in a particular shop or living in a particular apartment get them.

That was an interesting thing to see.

They are great moviegoers.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they Chinese bicycles or their own?

Mr. SALISBURY. Chinese bikes.

### IMPORTANCE OF BICYCLES

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned the importance of bicycles. Why don't we concentrate on bicycles instead of other items, bridges, and so on? You said they couldn't possibly survive without bicycles. If they only have one or two plants, that might be a major objective.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, it sounds very sensible, Senator, and I really don't know the answer to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Pentagon know about this?

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you tell them about the bicycles?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I wrote a story in which I pointed this out very sharply. I said what I had heard was that the best present you can give your girl in Hanoi is a new bicycle gear because they are in very short supply, and indeed that is what you—a fellow does give his girl if he can get ahold of one.

I also said if they could figure out some way to disable the bikes in North Vietnam the war would be over tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Bicycles play the same role as hairspray does in Saigon.

Mr. SALISBURY. I wouldn't be surprised.

### NORTH VIETNAM'S DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE FIGHTING

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say in North Vietnam there is any appearance of discouragement? You describe their being in bad shape and so on, but do you feel a sense of discouragement and readiness to give up?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I did not feel that they were ready to give up. On the contrary, they act and talk very tough. They constantly are talking about fighting on ten, twenty years, something of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain to me why they are so stubborn in their refusal to give up? Why don't they give up and accept our aid? We have offered them aid. What makes them so stubborn?

Mr. SALISBURY. They don't trust us.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? You know we are trustworthy people.

Mr. SALISBURY. I certainly do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't they trust us?

Mr. SALISBURY. They say that we haven't given them any reason to cause them to trust us thus far, and that so far as they can see we are trying to knock them out, we want to exterminate them and if that is what our intention is they judge us by our acts rather than—our deeds rather than our words—and they say, "You keep on fighting us harder, dropping more bombs. We just don't think you are as peaceful as you say you are."

The CHAIRMAN. This bothers me. I don't quite see why they are so misguided, why they don't accept the fact we are good people.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, all I can say, Mr. Senator, is that they don't know many Americans. They don't see them, except they see these airplanes coming over and dropping bombs on them, and they have a feeling that we have evil intentions toward them as a result of that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very unreasonable of them, isn't it?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I think so.

### BOMBING CAUSES NATIONAL UNITY

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand why the bombing over there creates such unanimity. You stated that in your written statement as well as later. It seems to me it would discourage them. When we have riots in Watts, riots in Chicago, and so on, that doesn't unite us. Why should it unite the Vietnamese?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, to take that question very seriously——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is a serious question.

Mr. SALISBURY. I think it is a very serious question.

I am absolutely certain that if the bombs were coming down from the air and they were being dropped on us, let's say, by the Chinese and the Russians, that this Nation would be unified as it has never been before. I just don't have any doubt about it. I saw this happening in England when the Germans dropped bombs on them, and, as I say, I was not in Germany when we and the RAF were bombing in Ger-

many, but I heard the very same sort of reaction occurred. This is human nature.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are so convinced of that as others have been, explain to me again why we are doing it. It apparently is to our disadvantage to do it.

Mr. SALISBURY. You know, I can't really explain that because I didn't—I am not the author of that policy and I just don't think it is a very sound one to begin with. I think it is one in which there are diminishing returns. On balance, I think that it probably works against us. So it is difficult to say why we do it, unless one adopts the explanation that we started doing it, and we don't like to admit that perhaps it was a wrong idea.

The CHAIRMAN. The administration is unwilling to admit it was a mistake, is that your view?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, it could be.

### DISADVANTAGE TO UNITED STATES IF CHINA ENTERS THE WAR

The CHAIRMAN. You seemed to feel it would be a great disadvantage to us if China entered this war. In view of her present difficulties, why do you think it would be a disadvantage to us when obviously we have the power to destroy China?

Mr. SALISBURY. We do have the power to destroy China.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is it to our disadvantage for them to enter the war?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think that is a very complicated question.

We have the power to destroy China, but we have the power only if we utilize nuclear weapons to do this. It seems to me that there is no more grave question that could be put before this Nation than the decision to use nuclear weapons; to use them in a great power conflict. Regardless of the fact that Russian and China are completely at sword's points and almost on the verge possibly of war, if we were to embark on a war with China or China were to enter this war and we would then begin to fight back, as I say, with nuclear weapons, I am not at all convinced that the Soviet Union would not come to China's aid. The Soviet Union unfortunately does possess nuclear weapons, and the prospect of a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and this country is one which appalls me.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me this is what is involved in this whole matter and is a question that everyone wishes to avoid discussing. You did discuss it in your written statement, but I think it ought to be brought out into the open and discussed. You have seen statements in our press advocating our bombing them back into the stone age. Haven't you seen that?

Mr. SALISBURY. I certainly have seen that, and I would say that if it were a matter of—if you are talking about straight bombing such as we are doing in North Vietnam, it certainly is possible to bomb North Vietnam back to the stone age. It isn't a very great distance there, you know.

The CHAIRMAN. It is possible?

Mr. SALISBURY. It is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't serve anybody's advantage.

Mr. SALISBURY. I don't think it serves anybody's advantage. No, I do not.

### CHINESE PHILOSOPHY TOWARD THE U.S. FORCES IN ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the statement which appeared in the Peking Peoples Daily? I think it is a rather ominous statement. It is taken from the August 30 issue and I quote:

". . . To be quite frank, if the United States imperialism kept its forces in Europe and America, the Asian people would have no way of wiping them out. Now, that it is so obliging as to deliver its goods to the customers' door, the Asian people cannot but express welcome. The more forces United States imperialism throws into Asia, the more will it be bogged down there and the deeper will be the grave it digs for itself.

". . . The tying down of large numbers of United States troops by the Asian people creates a favorable condition for the further growth of the anti-United States struggle of the people in other parts of the world. With the people rising to attack it, one hitting it at its head and the other at its feet, United States imperialism can be nibbled up bit by bit."

In view of your experience there, I will ask you to comment on this.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is a very effective description of the basic Chinese philosophy regarding the United States, the basic Chinese idea for the ultimate conquest of the world by the Chinese kind of communism.

The Chinese have stated this many times. That is one quotation. You could easily cite a dozen or twenty more in which they expound this often to the extent of thousands of words.

Their idea is that the more they can engage the United States and its forces in the more different places, particularly in backward and remote parts of the world, the more they tie us down, the more they wear us down, the more they weaken our system the more they prepare us for the ultimate slaughter which they think is going to happen.

They literally believe their kind of communism is going to someday dominate the world, not only our world but Russia's world and the European world as well and they think this is the way to start out on that road.

This is the reason why, were Hanoi to start tomorrow publicly to negotiate with the United States, you would find the Chinese moving to intervene in that situation radically. They not only would cut off the supply route to Hanoi, cut off their own supplies, cut off Russian supplies, I am convinced that they would attempt to move through their supporters within the Hanoi Government to try to subvert the Hanoi Government and bring them over to the Chinese line.

### UNITED STATES INTENTIONS IN ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Pursue that a little further: Is there any validity in their idea that this is the only way to destroy the United States? In other words, in doing this, in submitting our men and materials into a fight in Asia, is it playing their game or is it our interests? In other words, take the other side of that argument, if we did not do it, then there would be no way for them to accomplish their purpose?

Mr. SALISBURY. They have made that quite clear.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your view about it? Is this a feasible undertaking for us to conquer Asia?

Mr. SALISBURY. I doubt that very much, Mr. Fulbright. I think this is a grandiose idea. I don't think that we really intend to conquer Asia. I hope that isn't our intention.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think we do, either. We didn't intend to get as far as we are now. Nearly everyone agrees that our involvement came without anyone intending it to become what it is, isn't that correct?

Mr. SALISBURY. I am sure that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard most of the commentators and even those who are most anxious to escalate the war say, well, we didn't intend to do it but here we are.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. So the intention is not very relevant, is it?

What's relevant is what actually evolved.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is quite true.

The CHAIRMAN. If the statement of the Chinese is correct, and I accept what you say about it, it seems to me we ought to consider very seriously whether or not to pursue our present policy.

Mr. SALISBURY. I hope that we are considering that.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope so, too.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, will you yield for a moment?

The CHAIRMAN. I yield to Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. I yield to Senator Lausche.

### THE TEN-MINUTE RULE

Senator LAUSCHE. In our executive meeting the other day it was said by the chairman that the ten-minute rule would be abandoned but each Senator would, on his own, comply with it.

Now, I submit——

The CHAIRMAN. I submit nothing of that sort was said.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is exactly what was said and I submit to the chairman that it is not fair to the junior members of this committee nor to the people of the country to have a one-slanted, one-sided view developed as it is being done in the manner in which we are proceeding. I resent it and I resent the implication that by my presence I am confirming the effort of the chairman to create a portrait that doesn't quite accurately reflect the position of our country.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I say to the Senator from Ohio I shall not use more than ten minutes.

### U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IS UNPRODUCTIVE

Mr. Salisbury, you say that you feel that our bombing North Vietnam is unsound policy.

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes, in general I——

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to be sure.

Mr. SALISBURY. I don't know whether I would use the word unsound, I think it is unproductive.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I think Senator Fulbright used the word "unsound" and you agreed with it.

Mr. SALISBURY. I would use the word "unproductive," counter-productive.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what I want to follow up. I understand from what you said that it was having considerable effect.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is quite true.

Senator SPARKMAN. What do you mean by being unproductive?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, Senator, I put my valuation of the bombing policy in two categories. I described as best I could the physical results of that bombing, the damage to the roads and the highways and that sort of thing. And I pointed out that in my opinion, at least as far as I could figure out in spite of that damage they are getting the stuff through, the stuff they want to get through, but it is costing them manpower and it is costing material, it is taking labor away from the rice paddies.

This is a military plus and I emphasize that, because it is a military plus.

The military minus which we pay for that is produced in this will to resist, this spirit of national patriotism which is stimulated by the bombing.

To my way of thinking, the one cancels out the other or there may be a slight negative there. That is the reason I make that statement.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought perhaps you misunderstood. I thought you said it had slowed up the flow of men and materials into the south.

Mr. SALISBURY. It may have been in some small degree, but that would be very difficult to measure. I think they are sending out about as much as they are prepared to absorb down there.

### CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AN INEVITABLE RESULT OF BOMBING

Senator SPARKMAN. You say in your written statement:

> While there has been much reaction in this country over my reports of the damage to civilians and the casualties among civilians, I myself was not surprised at the results from our bombings, since past experience has shown that it is impossible to bomb military targets, particularly in a heavily populated country, without causing civilian casualties.

As I recall, about the time your articles came out most of the criticism that developed was over the fact that you had apparently criticized the civilian losses and particularly the civilian casualties without going as far as you go in this statement to the effect that it was an almost inevitable result.

In fact, I go a little further. I recall there was one city, I don't remember which one it was, in which you detailed the losses and you said either outright or by implication that it was not a military area. Yet I noticed right after that an officer who had served there, I believe he was a flier, said this particular place was filled with military.

Mr. SALISBURY. He said it was heavily defended by antiaircraft. I would say, in the first place, my reports were not designed as criticisms and I don't think it is the role of the reporter in his reporting of what he sees to include criticism and I don't believe I included any criticism in the reports——

Senator SPARKMAN. I probably used the wrong word there, but at least you put forth those statements——

Mr. SALISBURY. I sent back——

Senator SPARKMAN. From which inferences were drawn.

Mr. SALISBURY. Inferences were drawn from them. I described the actual physical results of the bombing and I described the results to this particular city which is Nam Dinh, a large textile manufacturing city. They call it large; it is small by our standards, about 90,000 population, and I described in that dispatch a considerable area of the residential part of that city which had been destroyed as a result of bombing. This was largely around this textile plant.

This is true. It was destroyed all right, and this did not really surprise me very much, frankly, since I have seen a great deal of bombing in my life. I saw a great deal of it in England, I saw the results of it in Germany after the war, and I saw it in the Soviet Union, and I know perfectly well it is very hard to hit a military target in any kind of a built-up area without hitting other things as well. As I make this statement here that I was not surprised at the results of the bombing because I wasn't.

I was surprised at the reaction in this country when I reported what seemed to me to be a perfectly ordinary result. I frankly agreed entirely with President Eisenhower when he said, "Well, of course, you can't hit military objectives without some civilians being killed." This is true. This is commonsense.

The only reason I can suppose that there was a big reaction to this thing was because, I believe it may be true that the Pentagon had sort of encouraged the feeling that we were able to drop our bombs without hitting any civilians. I just don't know whether that was true or not, but I suspect it may be.

### MENTION OF NAM DINH IN U.S. COMMUNIQUÉS

Senator SPARKMAN. In the USIA reaction analysis dated for the week ending December 30, 1966, there seems to be something to be pleased with, anyhow. It quotes the Paris paper, France Soir, that—

> * * * must be stressed that "the Americans are playing fair." The paper spelled out this assertion in these words: "Washington has validated a passport for a country with which the United States is in a de facto conflict. The U.S. press has not hesitated to publish reports contradicting those of the Government, and the latter has done nothing to prevent it. So many facts prove that American democracy is not a mere word." Still, the paper said, "the American people had had to learn from Salisbury that 'the third largest city in North Vietnam, Nam Dinh, had been systematically attacked since June 28 * * * yet American communiques had never mentioned those bombings,"

and so forth.

Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes. I think that is probably a pretty fair comment about the European reaction to the reports. I think there was very favorable reaction so far as their image of this country was concerned, because it demonstrated that we are a democracy and we don't try to stifle conflicting views.

With respect to the report about Nam Dinh and it not having been mentioned in communiques, this became a matter of some controversy with the Pentagon as well but, again, I think slightly off the point. I didn't say it hadn't been mentioned by the Pentagon, I said the people in Nam Dinh were not aware of it ever having been mentioned in the communique. That was the specific language I used.

Well, after several days the Pentagon did discover that they had mentioned it, I think three times, twice about a year ago last spring and one other date which I never did get from them. So I really don't know what that proves one way or the other.

Senator SPARKMAN. I remind you again that this is put out by our own Government.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems that the statements made that we were fair indicated it.

Mr. SALISBURY. I think so.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hickenlooper?

AREA COVERED BY MR. SALISBURY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Salisbury, how long were you in the Hanoi area?

Mr. SALISBURY. Two weeks.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I believe your statement says that you got as far as 80 to 90 miles below Hanoi south and north to a distance of 15 or 20 miles.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In area.

Did you confine your on-the-ground inspection to a particular highway or a particular route of travel?

Mr. SALISBURY. Not any particular one, but the principal observations were made in the course of two trips along the road, although we didn't follow the same highway in both cases, one was a trip to this town of Nam Dinh we are just talking about and the other was a trip to an area which is generally called Phat Diem, which is somewhat south of Nam Dinh, and to the west of it.

And these were—in both cases these were trips that—one was a weekend trip and one was a long day trip.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did you get north of Hanoi and west to the railroad junctions that come in from China?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, unfortunately I didn't. I was going to make a trip up there one day and instead of that we went off to the Phat Diem trip so I didn't see that junction which has been quite heavily bombed, of course, by ourselves.

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF AREAS BOMBED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the connotation which resulted from at least your earlier stories about Hanoi and the surrounding area, whether it is a correct understanding or not, is that you thought we were bombing nothing but metropolitan areas with no military significance of any kind and were killing civilians.

I think the general impression came about that there was no real military significance of these areas bombed.

Mr. SALISBURY. I would say, Senator, that such an impression would only occur from a very superficial or hasty looking at the stories, because this is not the correct impression nor is it—I think if you examine the stories again you will see, that is not correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did you find installations of significant military importance in the bombed areas you visited?

Mr. SALISBURY. In some areas they exist. In others, they don't, and this is hard to generalize about.

The principal military objectives which have been bombed in North Vietnam, and the ones which I described and I described in great detail in one of my very earliest dispatches, are the highways and the railroads and the bridges. These are, for the most part, the basic military objectives that we go after. In addition to this, we attack oil storage capacity, where it exists, and as I described earlier we knocked that out. There is practically none left.

We attacked certain areas which are transshipment areas where stuff may be moved, let's say, from Haiphong by barge and then transshipped by truck or vice versa. We attack such things as motor depots if they exist, although they are mostly fairly small scale, and then the only other things of any great consequence that I know of at any rate that we attacked are antiaircraft installations.

### ATTACK ON MIG AIRFIELDS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did you find that we attacked any major airfields where the Migs are on the ground, or did we let them alone?

Mr. SALISBURY. I didn't see—there is one field as you perhaps know, where the MIG–21s are based which is outside of Hanoi. I didn't see that but I think you know it has not been attacked.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did you find out in your investigation why our pilots are not allowed to attack that airfield, leaving the Migs sitting there on the ground to come out and attack us?

Mr. SALISBURY. I have read in the Times a good deal about that. I believe there are specific orders against that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand there are specific orders against that. My question was, did you find out why?

Mr. SALISBURY. No. Nobody over there knew why. [Laughter.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think they share our wonder here, also. [Laughter.]

Mr. SALISBURY. It could be.

### PAYMENT OF GOODS FROM RUSSIA AND CHINA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are the goods that come into North Vietnam from China and from Russia donations? Are they sold on credit? How do the North Vietnamese pay for these?

Mr. SALISBURY. That is a pretty good question, and I don't know the answer to it. I am pretty sure that they are given to them.

If they are given on loan or if they expect to get paid, they are going to be waiting a long time because North Vietnam doesn't have anything to pay with.

Knowing the Russians as I do I wouldn't be surprised if technically this staff is all being provided on credit, but again, I would hate to have to wait for any pay.

VIETCONG IS SUPPORTING FORCE BEHIND VIETNAM CONFLICT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In connection with your entire statement here about the activity of the North Vietnamese, the flow of goods and the supplies which come in, is there any question in your mind but that North Vietnam, that is the Vietcong, is the sustaining force behind the conflict in South Vietnam?

Mr. SALISBURY. There is absolutely no question in my mind, and indeed they make no bones about this over there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that it is not simply a revolution within South Vietnam; it is a movement of the North Vietnamese against the existing regime in South Vietnam?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think I would describe that in a little bit more complicated way. I would say that perhaps, and I am not so sure of these fact, and I don't want to be—I wouldn't want to be pinned down on them, perhaps the movement began in the south without the north being involved in it, but that the north became more and more involved and now is, as you say, involved in it to the point of being the principal supplier of materiel, munitions and things of that kind, food, but not the principal supplier, of course, of manpower. That mostly is indigenous.

EVIDENCE OF CHINESE IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did you find any evidence there, Mr. Salisbury, that the Chinese are in North Vietnam with troops or cadres or labor battalions or any units of that kind?

Mr. SALISBURY. I didn't see any such units myself, and I asked about them, of course. I couldn't get firm evidence on that except that there is a general impression among the foreigners—and this goes for both the westerners and the easterners in Hanoi—that there are no Chinese military units there.

There is, however, a general impression—and again, as I say, this is hearsay—that there is probably—there are probably Chinese railroad labor battalions or units stationed along the railroad in the north to keep that railroad running that comes down from China.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are there any service battalions there of any kind to maintain equipment and service military equipment or electrical equipment, let's say?

Mr. SALISBURY. I would think not, because I don't know of any major military equipment or electrical equipment that comes in from the Chinese. I didn't see any, and I didn't hear of any.

DURATION OF VIETNAM STRUGGLE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the North Vietnamese withdrew their support for this activity in Vietnam generally, how long would the struggle in South Vietnam last, in your judgment?

Mr. SALISBURY. I would hate to predict how long it would last. I think it would continue on a reduced scale probably much as the struggle would go on in the north if they had to go on without aid. I doubt very much if these people would give up in our generation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield?

REBUTTAL TO ALLEGATIONS

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I am just listening and learning. I want to make one comment.

I am delighted, Mr. Salisbury, that you have had this chance to refute some of these allegations which were raised against you, not only on the basis of your first dispatches from North Vietnam, but on the series as a whole. It appeared to me that, in effect, there was a vendetta being waged against your stories, and I am delighted that you have had a chance in an open forum to rebut some of those statements.

SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON CASUALTY FIGURES

I have one question to ask: Insofar as American correspondents in South Vietnam are concerned, to whom do they go to get the lists of casualties and the type of casualties which are inflicted?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, Senator, I think this is rather difficult. So far as American military casualties are concerned, they receive those from our own military authorities, and there are regular lists, as you know, published every week.

Now, when you come to the question of casualty figures from the South Vietnamese forces themselves and then from the rather cloudy area of South Vietnamese civilians, the best evidence on that that I have seen was a story which appeared in the New York Times, I believe yesterday, by Neil Sheehan in which for the first time I saw some rather detailed figures on the civilian casualties, and I believe that this was the product of a number of inquiries that had been made over a period of about a year before these statistics had finally been produced.

Apparently there is no common source for figures of this kind.

Senator MANSFIELD. To carry that one question a step further, the correspondents themselves do not go out and count the dead and the wounded to check whether they are civilian or military.

Mr. SALISBURY. No, they do not.

Senator MANSFIELD. They are given them from sources in South Vietnam just as you were given them from sources in North Vietnam.

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIP TO VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Salisbury, who made the arrangements for your trip to North Vietnam?

Mr. SALISBURY. The trip to North Vietnam? I made the arrangements myself, I conducted the negotiations myself, with the North Vietnamese authorities, I made my own application for the visa last June, and conducted a correspondence over the period of time that ultimately resulted in it.

Senator AIKEN. Where did you find North Vietnamese authorities to make arrangements with?

Mr. SALISBURY. The first ones that I was personally in contact with outside of cables and letters was the consulate in Pnom Penh, in Cambodia.

Senator AIKEN. Pnom Penh?

Mr. SALISBURY. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. And when you got to Hanoi, where did you stay?

Mr. SALISBURY. I stayed in a hotel which used to be called the Metropole and is now called the Reunification Hotel.

Senator AIKEN. How did you pay the bills?

Mr. SALISBURY. I paid my bill in dongs, which are the currency there, which I obtained by exchanging dollars in the state bank for dongs.

Senator AIKEN. That is in Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. In Hanoi.

Senator AIKEN. And who decided where you should go to observe what was going on in North Vietnam?

Mr. SALISBURY. I put in requests to the Foreign Office for permission to visit certain types of facilities, certain types of areas without, in most cases, specifying an individual one or a particular facility since I wanted to avoid the suspicion in their minds that I was acting as an intelligence officer. I wanted the categories but not the specified point.

Senator AIKEN. I read somewhere that you only saw the spots where damage from bombing had been greatest and where there had been civilian damage. Is that correct?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, Senator, that is not correct. I saw a great many places where there was hardly any damage, some places where there wasn't any, and there were many places where there was much more damage which I did not go to see at all.

Senator AIKEN. Do you suppose the North Vietnamese Government would have been interested in showing you the rest of the country if it hadn't been damaged?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think they might very well have. To be quite honest there were very few places in the country that haven't been damaged in one way or another.

### ULTIMATE AIM OF NORTH VIETNAMESE

Senator AIKEN. When you were there, did you get any understanding as to whether the ultimate aim of the North Vietnamese was the uniting of the two Vietnams?

Mr. SALISBURY. They certainly have that as their ultimate aim. I think their primary aim is survival. They would like to unite the two.

I did detect some very definite indications that they are not sanguine about reuniting them even if there should be a favorable settlement of the war, for a long period of time, maybe fifteen, twenty years.

Senator AIKEN. Did you get the impression they would still be willing to go along with the terms of the Geneva conference?

Mr. SALISBURY. I suppose so. They said this several times, and I suppose one has to accept that.

I am not absolutely certain of that, myself.

Senator AIKEN. Annexation of South Vietnam would not be one of the conditions for terminating hostilities?

Mr. SALISBURY. Not at all, and they specifically denied that that was their intention or their wish.

ORGANIZED BANDITRY IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Does North Vietnam have organized banditry such as existed in South Vietnam previous to the sending of combat troops to South Vietnam?

Mr. SALISBURY. Not so far as I know. But I wouldn't say that my evidence was conclusive on that.

Senator AIKEN. You said so far as you could see there was not any lawlessness in Hanoi itself.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is right. It seems to be a fairly orderly country.

BOMBINGS FOLLOWED BY TERRORISM

Senator AIKEN. I was just wondering whether the conditions there would be similar to conditions in China where it is reported that the rural areas would take one viewpoint and the urban areas another.

Did you get the impression that Hanoi and Saigon might be counterhostages? That the bombing of nonmilitary targets in the Hanoi area might be followed up by more terrorism in Saigon?

Mr. SALISBURY. I didn't get that impression there, Senator. I have heard that here, but I saw no—no one mentioned it to me in Hanoi and I saw no particular reason to think that that was true.

Senator AIKEN. Now, it is apparent that following what might be described as civilian bombing, rightly or wrongly, in North Vietnam, that there usually was an increase in the bombing or terrorism in Saigon also?

Mr. SALISBURY. It could be, but I just wouldn't know about that.

SUPPLIES FROM THE SOVIET UNION

Senator AIKEN. Where does North Vietnam get its oil?

Mr. SALISBURY. The oil for North Vietnam comes largely from the Soviet Union but in part from Rumania.

Senator AIKEN. And you would say that most of the antiaircraft weapons also come from the Soviet Union?

Mr. SALISBURY. The SAMs, the surface-to-air missiles, all come from the Soviet Union.

The larger antiaircraft, I believe, comes from the Soviet Union. Some small, light antiaircraft probably from China.

Senator AIKEN. But which type of antiaircraft weapon would you estimate was responsible for the heaviest loss of American planes?

Mr. SALISBURY. Conventional antiaircraft, because the operation of the SAMs is at a high altitude, and they are very powerful, very dangerous weapons, and our fliers fly under them. When the SAMs are operative they come down low and, therefore, are exposed to conventional antiaircraft.

Senator AIKEN. Perhaps we give Russia too much credit or blame for the loss of 500 or 600 planes over North Vietnam.

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes, that may be true.

Senator AIKEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Thank you. Mr. Salisbury, I want to commend you for the factual reporting which we have read for the more than

20 years that you have served as a foreign correspondent abroad. I recognize critics sometimes do not like to face up to facts, but I want to thank you for the factual statements that have characterized your reporting for more than 20 years that I have read your accounts from abroad.

DISTRUST BY NORTH VIETNAMESE OF THE UNITED STATES

My first question is, do you really think it is unreasonable for the North Vietnamese people to distrust the United States?

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not think it is terribly unreasonable.

You see, they do not see us as we see ourselves. They see us only in rather unpleasant manifestations, and from what they have seen of us we do not seem to be very friendly to them.

Senator MORSE. I asked the question because I thought the public would gain the impression that, in response to an observation put to you by the chairman of the committee, you seemed to answer in the affirmative that you thought it was unreasonable for them to mistrust us.

Mr. SALISBURY. I am sorry if I gave that impression.

Senator MORSE. Let the record speak for itself.

But I want to make this observation so that your view could be made known on the record.

Do you think it is unreasonable for the North Vietnamese people to distrust a country that refused to sign the Geneva Accords of 1954 and then proceeded to ship large quantities of military supplies and large numbers of men into South Vietnam in open violation of the literal language of the treaty itself?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I do not know, to be honest. And forgive me for my ignorance. I do not know if this is exactly what we did. But the impression certainly of our conduct as a result of our refusal to sign the Geneva agreements did not get us off to a very good start with the people in the north.

Senator MORSE. We do know that the Geneva Accords prohibit the sending by a foreign power of military personnel and military supplies into either one of the two zones.

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes, I presume that is right.

Senator MORSE. And we did that.

Do you think it is unreasonable for people to mistrust the United States in view of the fact that at the time of the Tonkin Bay incident—and the history of it still has to be written—we equipped the boats that bombarded the North Vietnamese islands that happened to be the prelude to the subsequent action of North Vietnam to start giving open support to South Vietnam, and our country issued the official statement at first that our boats were 75 miles away, and yet they knew that our boats were within 11 to 13 miles away from the islands that were being bombed. They interpreted it, and rightly, as an American naval cover available for protection if these South Vietnamese boats got into difficulty. And it was only after those facts became known that we started to get some modification of the official statements of our Government.

Do you think this unreasonable for the North Vietnamese people to mistrust a country that issued that kind of propaganda when, with their own eyes, they knew where the boats were?

Mr. SALISBURY. Senator, I would have to say, since I am not familiar with all those circumstances, I would have to say if the facts are as you described them, it would not be unreasonable for the North Vietnamese to be suspicious of the United States.

Senator MORSE. As a correspondent you do know what the United States has done on a unilateral basis in regard to the building of the regime in South Vietnam, or rather a whole series of regimes in South Vietnam, leading to our eventually getting 4,000 American troops over there, increasing numbers of them being killed in a war that we have not even declared, and yet we talk to the North Vietnamese about peace. Do you think it is unreasonable for the people of North Vietnam to mistrust a government that follows that warlike course of action in their area of the world?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I again would have to say that, in general, it seems to me not unnatural for the North Vietnamese to be suspicious of us and distrustful of us because, as they see our conduct, it has been hostile toward them.

Senator MORSE. I will leave that question. However, I could continue to add incident after incident relating to our course of action in South Vietnam in open violation of the Geneva Accords which are bound to make us a mistrusted nation, and rightly so.

If we were North Vietnamese, I think we would hold the same mistrust against the United States when we are trying to exist, as you have described it, under the bombing policy that we are following in North Vietnam.

Now, 400,000 troops—Senator Sparkman says I said 4,000—400,000 troops.

UNITED STATES POWER TO DESTROY CHINA

Mr. Salisbury, would you say that we have the power to destroy China, agreeing with Senator Fulbright's observation? What do you mean by the destruction of China?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I mean if we were to unleash our nuclear weapons, we could destroy Chinese nuclear facilities, their large cities and, I suppose, extensive areas of their farming land.

I am not familiar with how many nuclear weapons we have. I do not know whether we have enough to cover that whole vast territory, but I think we could undoubtedly cripple the country and damage it beyond, maybe even beyond, repair. That is to say, we could do all this if we simply used all the forces at our command and no one else interferred with this operation while we engaged in it.

Senator MORSE. You used the word "destruction." Do you mean to use it definitively to mean also conquer?

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not use it to mean conquer because, as you perhaps know, the Chinese rather anticipate that eventually we are going to try something like this, and they have evolved a strategy which may or may not be an effective one, but which they think will enable them to survive as a nation by retreating into caves and underground shelters and places like that, and just hanging on and forcing us to come in across the nuclear poisoned soil and fight them out.

I do not know whether they could do that or not, but it might require a long period of time.

Senator MORSE. Would you agree, Mr. Salisbury, that if we inflicted that destruction, and we certainly have the power to inflict

that destruction, that we would not succeed in either conquering China or obtaining a peace with China, but that we would have to keep large numbers of men, far in excess of what we already have in South Vietnam, to police the nation that we have so destroyed?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, the only parallel or precedent that we have to give us some guidance on that point is Japan's experience with China, and I think we are fairly familiar with the enormous manpower demands that China required for Japan in the years before the opening of World War II.

It seems to be insatiable so far as trying to occupy China is concerned.

### CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. USE OF NUCLEAR BOMBS

Senator MORSE. I ask these questions, Mr. Salisbury, because, as I am sure you know, there are people in this country in very influential positions who seem to think we ought to bomb China; we ought to knock out the nuclear bases; we ought to use our nuclear power. But these people never stop to tell the American people what some of the consequences would be. So I would ask you what your reaction would be to this possible consequence which was told to me by the American consul general in Hong Kong, that once we got through with that kind of destruction we had better be ready for the great damage to our own country from the psychological bombs that would be dropped on us from all around the world for, as he put it, we would lose the support of the people of all the major countries of Asia, of Africa, of much of Latin America, and millions of people in Europe.

Would you disagree with that observation?

Mr. SALISBURY. I have no doubt that any nation which invokes nuclear war, and that would include the United States, would bring about in the world a cataclysmic effect as far as public opinion is concerned, and one which I think is almost impossible to evaluate at the present time—the consequences of it.

### BOMBING OF HANOI BRIDGE

Senator MORSE. I will ask you one more question dealing with our present bombing practice. You mentioned that a big bridge that extends from Hanoi over to the north bank of the river has not as yet been touched. Do you consider that a major military target, and what do you think the effect of bombing it would be on the North Vietnamese people?

Mr. SALISBURY. To my way of thinking, it is a prime military target which has not been attacked in North Vietnam. It provides the sole rail link and the principal highway link between Hanoi and the north of the country.

I do not know why it has not been attacked, except that it is right in Hanoi, it is right in the middle of Hanoi. It links one side of the city with the industrial suburbs and the airport and everything else on the other side, and I believe our policy has been not to bomb Hanoi.

The consequence of knocking out that bridge would be considerable. It would interrupt, make more difficult, the flow of rail traffic and truck traffic from the north.

On the other hand, I do know they have their pontoon preparations, and also some barges, ferry installations, ready to put into use if the bridge is knocked out.

I would say it would be a severe blow to them but not a fatal one.

Senator MORSE. If we are to continue our bombing in North Vietnam, and I pray that we stop it, would you advocate bombing this bridge?

Mr. SALISBURY. If we are, if our bombing policy is to be based purely on military calculations, I see no reason at all why we do not take the bridge out, take out the Mig fields, take out Hanoi. This is what the North Vietnamese expect us to do.

Senator MORSE. And by doing it you would also conclude that we would not lessen the distrust of the Vietnamese people to the United States?

Mr. SALISBURY. It certainly would not encourage them to love us very much.

Senator MORSE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

### OPENING UP OF HANOI TO NEWSMEN

Senator MUNDT. Is Hanoi now a city which is open to American newsmen, generally, or did you negotiate something of a scoop?

Mr. SALISBURY. I negotiated a scoop all right. But in the process of doing that, or perhaps the process had happened before that, it seems to be opening up. There will be more newsmen in there month by month, as we go along.

Senator MUNDT. Do you know of other newspapers or other newsmen who have tried to get in and failed—American newsmen?

Mr. SALISBURY. I only know specifically of one of my colleagues. There were two of us on the Times who had applied at about the same time. Our foreign editor, Mr. Topping, was also working on this, perhaps not as vigorously as I was. I understand from reading in the Times that there had been about 30 people who had had their passports cleared for travel to North Vietnam, and I presume they were all working as I was.

Senator MUNDT. Well, I am glad that you went, and I wish other newsmen would go, because it is interesting to get this information. I am especially pleased that you appeared before the committee and straightened out, for me at least, what quite apparently was a misunderstanding I had from reading part of your reports and reading what four New York ladies who were over there at about the same time were saying and reading some of the critics of your comments. It always gets to be one mishmash.

### MILITARY EFFECT OF BOMBING

I felt that the purport of your report was that, first we had been deliberately bombing civilian targets, and from reading your statement I do not believe that is your report at all. And, second, I thought that you felt that the bombing was futile and was not really minimizing or curtailing their military effectiveness. If I read your report correctly, you do not hold that position. Is that right?

Mr. SALISBURY. My position about the military effect of the bombing, Senator, is one in which I feel that probably we lose enough on the plus that they get out of greater national unity than we make up on the destructive side. In other words, I think it is a marginal question, one way or the other, but I do not minimize, and I do not want to minimize, the fact that it has inflicted military damage, particularly their communications facilities, their ability to deliver the supplies to the south. It certainly has damaged that.

Senator MUNDT. And you do not submit any evidence to our committee that there has been a deliberate bombing of civilian areas.

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I do not, and I think that would be——

Senator MUNDT. That it was a consequence of—like President Eisenhower said, when you hit a military target you are going to hit some civilians. But there has been no civilian bombing, to your knowledge.

Mr. SALISBURY. Not to my knowledge in the north, and I think it would be very difficult to establish such a thing.

This is not to say, and I think we ought in all fairness to say, that the people in North Vietnam think that they are deliberately being bombed. This is a very natural human reaction. The bombs come down and they hit their house, and they kill their wife or something like that, and they do not know what the aviator up there who may be going at 12,000 miles an hour was actually aiming for. He may have been aiming for something a mile away.

The CHAIRMAN. 1,200.

Senator MUNDT. That is a little fast.

The CHAIRMAN. 1,200, not 12,000.

Mr. SALISBURY. 1,200.

Senator MUNDT. I agree that the psychology could be as you describe it, even though the speed of the plane, unhappily, is not quite that fast.

### EVIDENCE OF RUSSIAN PERSONNEL IN NORTH VIETNAM

Did you see any Russians over there?

Mr. SALISBURY. I saw some Russians, particularly in the bar at the hotel and in what passes for the PX in Hanoi, a special store where you can buy vodka but, unfortunately, no caviar.

I did not see Russians very visibly around the place. They are not in uniform, and I talked to the foreigners there, and they said that the Russians did not seem to be there in large numbers.

Senator MUNDT. Any idea as to why they are there?

Mr. SALISBURY. The ones that I saw, and here you will have to forgive me for being very subjective, I have seen a lot of Russians out in Siberia, these fellows from their looks and their shirts, and their lack of ties and general appearance, looked to me like construction engineers from Siberia. They were probably in there to either aid with the railroad or maybe to aid in some sort of installation work. They did not look like military people, in other words.

The Russian military are a little better groomed than that.

Senator MUNDT. More likely to be engineers or scientists or scientific advisers, or something of that nature?

Mr. SALISBURY. Engineers of a construction type.

SUPPLY ROUTES FROM RUSSIA AND CHINA

Senator MUNDT. I read from your statement that Hanoi requires both Chinese aid and Russian aid to maintain the war effort at its present level. It would be severely handicapped if China closes its borders and if it cut off its supply routes or ceased sending aid.

You have described, I think, the nature of the aid in the general area of small arms, arms which can be built with a less sophisticated industry. Those come primarily from China?

Mr. SALISBURY. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. The SAMs and the MIGs, the superior grades of antiaircraft guns come from Russia, and the presence of the SAM you have correctly described. This is borne out by what we hear from other committees. They cause our aircraft to fly low to escape them because they are highly devastating, and that brings them within the range of the antiaircraft weapons that surround Hanoi and other installations over there.

So that, if in some way, we could discourage either the Russians, or the Chinese, or both from supplying their respective types of aid, it would seem to me that this would tend to decrease our casualty lists in South Vietnam. Would you agree with that?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think that is quite true.

PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI

Senator MUNDT. One other question only. In your last statement, you say the most profitable course of the United States to take would be to quietly and secretly explore with Hanoi to see if a reasonable and honorable settlement might be forthcoming. I think you related that to the fact that the people of Hanoi must be exceedingly nervous about what is going on in China. They do not know for sure whether friends of theirs or people less likely to be friendly are going to come out on top in this disruption in China, which we call a civil war—whether it is or not we do not know. In any event, it is highly probable that it is decreasing their industrial production and making it less certain that they are going to be able to continue to rely on a Chinese influx of arms, and without them they would really be in serious difficulty.

Did you have that in mind when you indicated that this might be a propitious time to explore——

Mr. SALISBURY. That is exactly right, Senator, precisely.

Senator MUNDT. I agree with you, but I would be completely shocked if I felt that our Government were not doing that. It seems to me that Mr. Rusk, President Johnson, and his advisers must also come to that very natural reaction. Since you listed as a proposal such a thing, my question is, have you any reason to believe that it is not being done by our Government now?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I would say about that—I will be very frank—what I said both Hanoi and Washington, that if it is being done, I do not want to know about it. I do not want to read about it in Scotty's column. I do not want to see it in Newsweek's periscope, because if that is true, then it is not secret, and it probably would not be productive. So I just do not know whether it is going on or not. I hope so.

Senator MUNDT. There is no question, in my opinion, that in approaching peace things can best be done in secret. I think there have been some counterproductive results from our open effort oftentimes to say, "It looks like we had enough, and you have had enough, and let's sit around the table."

It seems to me that the oriental mind might conclude that, "We are winning the war because you are going to ask for some kind of settlement." I think you have to relate this to the psychological reactions of the people over there. But surely I would expect, and certainly hope, that those who properly should make those approaches are making them, especially right now. This would seem to be a time when normally smart and astute individuals, and I am sure they have them at the head of the Government in Hanoi, would be worried about the future as far as their assistance from China is concerned.

So I raise the question not thinking that you would know more than we would as to whether it is being done, but as to whether you have any reason to believe it is not being done.

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not have any reason one way or the other. I share your hope entirely.

Senator MUNDT. Thank you.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

## THE TEN-MINUTE RULE

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I have found the report of Mr Salisbury, whom I have known and respected for a long while, very interesting and informative. I shall refrain from asking questions.

I would like to observe that the question of a ten-minute rule is not in effect in the committee. This matter was put to the committee in my motion which the chairman submitted to the committee as a whole.

The motion was tabled with only a vote of four in support of the proposition, so that each member was left to his own self-discipline.

I feel that since my distinguished colleague, Senator Lausche, thinks that a point of view not yet expressed would add to the balance of the hearing, I would ask unanimous consent that I may yield to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you very much. I am glad the Senator from Tennessee did make the statement that it was the conclusion that each of the Senators ought to voluntarily impose upon himself the ten-minute limitation rather than have it done by rule. I will try to stay within the ten-minute limitation.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for an observation? Actually the questioning has been less than ten minutes, on the average, of every member since we began, so I take it that all the Senator really objects to is, not the time, but the nature of my questions.

Senator LAUSCHE. No, not at all. I sat for two hours and 50 minutes two days ago listening to the Chairman and others, and I never did get to utter a single word.

Senator GORE. I yielded. Go ahead.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am just answering the Chairman.

Senator CASE. We are here to hear Mr. Salisbury in any event.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I would like to hear Mr. Salisbury.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. ACTIONS IN VIETNAM

What do you recommend that we should do, Mr. Salisbury?

First, do you recommend that we should pull out?

Mr. SALISBURY. I certainly do not recommend our pulling out, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, if you do not recommend that we should pull out, do you subscribe to the theory of General Gavin that we should stay there in enclaves?

Mr. SALISBURY. I am not terribly enamored of the enclave theory. Perhaps, in the end, if the war goes on and on and on, and there are no results, and the fighting continues, and everybody get worn out, maybe we have to go back and retreat to the Indian fort, maybe so. I would hope there might be some other solution.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you recommend that we stop bombing the north, their military installations and strategic areas?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think, in general, that I would say that this might be a good move. I think that the situation is a little bit more complicated at the moment. I think maybe that is not the most important thing to do at this precise moment, but I am sure that it would not be adverse to our interests if we did do it.

ATTACKS ON UNITED STATES MILITARY

Senator LAUSCHE. What would be your comment about the arguments that are made that it would be unfair to our military men entrenched in South Vietnam to allow them to sit there waiting for attacks chosen as to time and place by the enemy without our Government doing anything to stop the influx of material that is used to destroy them?

Mr. SALISBURY. I would be very sympathetic to the view of the military not wanting to sit with folded hands while the enemy increases its strength. I think this is just plain commonsense.

Senator LAUSCHE. But it is also good plain commonsense for a decent, honest American to say that he will not tolerate our men sitting there like ducks on the open water to be knocked out with the enemy choosing the time and place when the attack will be made? Do you subscribe to that?

Mr. SALISBURY. I subscribe to it except for one thing, if you will permit me to say it, and that is the enemy usually does choose the time for attack. Unfortunately, this is the rule of war. He decides, not you.

The question involved here is, I think, a double one. Do we stop bombing out of the blue without any assurance that they are going to do anything else? I would say, no, that we have a right to know if we stopped the bombing what move they are prepared to take.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am very grateful to you for your objectivity in this matter, for it is my belief that we have explored every source available, hoping to find some means to stop the shooting. It is the persistence and the unwillingness of Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues to enter into any discussions that will bring the shooting to an end.

### AVENUES TO NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE EXPLORED

What avenues would you explore beyond those that have been explored by the United States in trying to bring about a negotiation?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think there are avenues that exist right today which can be explored, which may actually be in the process of being explored, Senator. I do not know that I entirely agree with your thesis that we have always made the gestures toward a negotiation and they have always rebutted them.

In a war things get extremely complicated. You get an atmosphere on either side of suspicion and distrust which is only normal. I think when two fellows are slugging at each other they do not have much confidence in the other fellow, and I do not know why they should.

So it is awfully hard to stop a war. It is fairly easy to start a war, but it is awfully hard to stop when, particularly when, both combatants are still in the ring, they can still fight and we can still fight. So it is pretty hard to get that kind of thing stopped.

I believe that it would be possible to stop it now. I hope to God it is possible to stop it before any more people get killed in this war, and I think there are explorations that can be undertaken by ourselves and by the other side which would lead to a solution. At least, the explorations ought to be undertaken.

### HO CHI MINH'S INSISTENCE ON NLF PLAN

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Salisbury, how would you overcome the firm position taken by Ho Chi Minh that there must be a reformation of the Government on the plan of the National Liberation Front, and only on that plan?

Mr. SALISBURY. I would discuss this matter—

Senator LAUSCHE. You are familiar with what I have in mind?

Mr. SALISBURY. Oh, yes, I am very familiar.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you know that Ho Chi Minh says that the South Vietnamese Government must be reformed on the basis of the National Liberation Front program? You are familiar with that?

Mr. SALISBURY. Oh, yes, I am.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has he yielded at all with respect to that proposal?

Mr. SALISBURY. There has been no public change on that proposal, but it is my impression, and this is a subjective one, but I think it may be accurate, that there is less hardness on that particular point than you might imagine.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, we are in complete accord. And, although I frequently disagree with the President, I am obliged to say that, in my opinion, he has explored every source that he thinks might bring Ho Chi Minh to the negotiation table. If there are other sources, they ought to be suggested to him. I think they will find a favorable reception.

Now, I want to just put some questions concerning the full credit that should be given to you in your testimony, and this is no reflection upon your purpose to try to help.

### HOW MR. SALISBURY ENTERED NORTH VIETNAM

How is it that you got into North Vietnam?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I believe there are two or possibly three factors involved in that.

The first thing had to be some change in the position of the Hanoi Government to admit in foreign correspondents, particularly from the West.

I think they must have arrived at a conclusion some time in the course of last year, probably as much as six or eight months ago, that they were going to embark on this course.

I think they had to decide on who they were going to admit. They had, to the best of my knowledge, probably 28 or 30 applications from various correspondents.

I think, in all honesty, that when they decided to admit an American correspondent they first thought of the New York Times. I think it was a natural thing for them to think of.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. SALISBURY. It is the most influential paper in the United States. [Laughter.]

They wanted the number one. They did not want Avis. So they decided on the Times.

Well, there were two applications in from the Times, one from me, and one, as I mentioned earlier, from Mr. Topping.

Senator CASE. They took number one again, didn't they? [Laughter.]

Mr. SALISBURY. But I had pestered them more. I really had been at them from all kinds of angles, and I think that is why they picked me. I might be wrong.

Senator LAUSCHE. I read somewhere within the last two or three weeks your statement that it was the belief of Ho Chi Minh that the New York Times exercised the greatest impact upon the minds of the public in the United States. Did you make some such statement?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I did not make that statement, but I might support it. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHE. That is exactly the point that I wanted to get to.

### HERBERT MATTHEWS' ARTICLES ON CUBA

Did the Matthews' visit to Cuba induce you to try to make a scoop in North Vietnam?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I do not think so. It never entered my mind.

Senator LAUSCHE. Just let me follow this. The New York Times did write extensively about the heroism of Castro, did it not?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I do not know that I would describe Mr. Matthews' articles in exactly those terms. We wrote a lot about Castro, there is no question about that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, you wrote three stories about Castro, and some people have said that the New York Times gave Castro to the United States.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, somebody made a cartoon once parodying a cartoon that we used to run to boost our classified ads, saying, "I

got my job through the New York Times," and they had a picture of Castro there. I do not think that was true. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to quote from one Matthews' article:

The personality of the man (Castro) is overpowering. * * * Here was an educated, dedicated fanatic, a man of ideals, of courage of remarkable qualities of leadership.

Maybe you cannot say whether or not this was in the Matthews' article?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I am terribly sorry, Senator, but I cannot because I have not seen them for years and years.

Senator LAUSCHE. I quote again:

I could not claim, myself, at the time to have had any idea of the terrific impact my—

That is, Matthews'

story was going to have, or the chain reaction it was going to set up in the whole of the Western Hemisphere.

Do you think that his stories had that impact on the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think he exaggerates a little bit.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, all right. Here is Matthews again:

I was always in touch with the rebels in the Sierra Maestra and with the civic resistance. No Cuban came to New York without seeing me or trying to see my associates.

Do you know whether that was said?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, but, Senator, just from the——

Senator LAUSCHE. Just answer it.

Mr. SALISBURY. Excuse me, but I wonder if you could tell me what you are reading from.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am reading from quotations from the Matthews' articles taken out of the New York Times.

Mr. SALISBURY. But that does not sound as though it could have been one of his original pieces because it does not relate to the Sierra Maestra, does it?

Senator LAUSCHE. Then I just want to quote—this is not by Matthews:

Be it said in fairness to the New York Times, whose stories and editorials helped to make Castro and his movement acceptable to as yet undecided Cubans and all of the liberals and progressive opinion throughout the United States.

Did you or didn't you do that?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I did not. [Laughter and applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I must say it is against the rules of the committee——

Senator LAUSCHE. Did the New York Times do it?

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. May I have order in the chamber. It is entirely against the rules of the committee to demonstrate your approval or disapproval of the proceedings here, and I must ask you not to demonstrate regardless of how provocative it may be. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, did the New York Times do it because of its tremendous influence on public opinion?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, that is a subjective question, Senator. I do not believe we did, frankly.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. That is all. Thanks very much.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief observation?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is recognized. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Many people make a misjudgmennt with respect to Castro. I remember, for instance, that he was invited to address a national convention of newspaper editors and publishers here in Washington to which I was invited, and which I attended. Erelong many people, including the senior Senator from Tennessee, were disillusioned.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to make a statement, too. You have just seen one of the principal reasons for major difficulties in conducting this committee.

Senator Case.

CONSEQUENCES OF CESSATION OF BOMBING

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, to carry on with questions that were asked before, if we stopped the bombing, then what do we do?

First, would you comment on the suggestion that if we stop the bombing it would not have the effect desired but would rather tend to prolong the war? I have heard some people estimate it would add two years to the resistance, because it would strengthen the North Vietnamese in the view that they were gaining more by not negotiating than by negotiating.

Now, this is a matter of subjective judgment. I would like to have your subjective judgment about it.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, my guess is that if you stopped the bombing and nothing happened, there is no negotiation, there is no reciprocal move on their part, you have not advanced the situation very far except in one area which we have not mentioned here, and this is in the area of world public opinion.

I think there is very little doubt that around the world public opinion does not support the U.S. bombing policy. There are even people in this country who do not support it.

If the bombing were halted and no reciprocal move were made on the part of North Vietnam, I think they would be subjected to enormous pressure. That pressure, I believe, would come not only from the western world, it would also come from within the communist world, from Eastern Europe and from the Soviet Union to shove them into negotiations, to shove them into taking some reciprocal step to match our move.

I cannot guarantee that would happen, but it seems logical to me that such a thing would happen so that while from the military standpoint, or viewed only in military terms, there might be some slight loss by stopping the bombing, there might be an enormous gain diplomatically and in the direction of moving this war toward a solution.

I think there is, however, even another plus in that direction. I believe, without being able to prove it, that Hanoi is ready to begin to talk business with us. I believe that if the bombing were halted, they would take a reciprocal step, and we would then move into the negotiative period.

My own concern in that event would be, not that we get into negotiations, but that we not get into negotiations before we know what we are going to negotiate, and I think before the bombing stops, before anything happens, there should be exploration to see whether there can be worked out some terms for a settlement.

Senator CASE. I personally agree with you down to the ground that neither side will come to the negotiation table in public, certainly, until it has explored thoroughly and has a pretty good idea where it is going to end up.

Like everyone else here, I assume we are doing our very best to find out in private whether this is possible, and to explore all possibilities. If I did not believe this, I would insist on throwing this Government out tomorrow. Of course, it may not be doing as well as it should.

### OBJECTIVE OF SEIZING AND HOLDING TERRITORY

Now there have been other people who have suggested that we can win the war by the bombing, and that in any event we have got to think seriously of either winning the war or getting ourselves out of Vietnam.

What is your view on this? I think it was the view of Mr. Reischauer the other day, and others have suggested, that we should seriously pursue the matter of seizing and holding territory and go into this in a way that would be pursued until we had achieved our objective of an independent free South Vietnam.

Mr. SALISBURY. I find myself not in any disagreement with the objective of seizing and holding territory if by that we mean establishing large areas over which the South Vietnamese Government, not ourselves, but the South Vietnamese Government exercises effective control, possibly with some protection from ourselves.

But for us ourselves to seize and control territory and turn this into islands protected by Marines all the way around the outside, does not seem to me the route to follow toward political health and stability in South Vietnam.

It may create an isolated situation which you can protect, but the longer run gain seems to me to be minimal.

Now, maybe that is all we can hope for. Maybe we have to live with a series of hedgehogs or something like that in South Vietnam. I suspect we can do better. I suspect that we can do better along the route of negotiation. I suspect we may even find it possible to negotiate ourselves a viable government in South Vietnam.

This sounds maybe far out at this time, but I would like to see it explored a lot further before giving up that possibility.

Senator CASE. I would fully agree with this, and my point was that assuming we do not find they are not willing to negotiate, that our optimistic thoughts about this are wrong, we will have to do something, and this seems to me the only feasible thing that can be done. I am not talking about enclaves now, but talking about the systematic effort to see that this country is free.

### ATTITUDES OF THE NORTH VIETNAM MAN IN THE STREET

Have you from this past trip or from your earlier experiences, or perhaps from both, any evidence that you regard as factual, as opposed

to impressions or assumptions, as to the actual attitude of the man in the street in North Vietnam about the war, the United States, the Hanoi regime, China, and the Chinese?

Is the hostility of the Vietnamese to China still strong and a fact? Please tell me about these things.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, on China, I can answer quite clearly because so many people mentioned China to me without my mentioning China to them, and through this always runs the strain of national and patriotic antagonism toward China.

China is their hereditary enemy. Their greatest victories, with the exception of Dienbienphu, have been scored against the Chinese. They are proud of them. They talk about them and they leave no doubt in their mind that they have this antagonism toward them.

They do not want the Chinese in, taking over their country. There is no doubt about that. And the same attitude is expressed by the small man and the big man.

Now, so far as their attitude toward their government is concerned, I did not find people saying that they thought Ho Chi Minh was a great man, or their Government was a great one, but I found them expressing sentiments of resolve and of support for the program of their government, of resistance to the United States, of fighting for the unity, the independence, and the sovereignty of their country, which they believe is threatened by this war, and they support overall the objective of reunification of the two parts of the country.

I do not think you would find much disagreement among the ordinary Vietnamese between those people and their government on these points.

### IGNORANCE ABOUT WESTERN WORLD IN GENERAL

Now, in another area, I found them excessively ignorant, and this is so far as the United States is concerned, or the western world in general.

Unfortunately, the few impressions that they have of what the West is like come to them through their years of being subjected to colonialism under the French, and they are very apt to transfer to the present images from the past that they acquired from the French, and they think of the United States in terms of the way they used to think of France.

Now, some of these images are very damaging to them because they give them a very imperfect idea of what the world is about or what the United States is about. They think of us as a much weaker country than we actually are, because they think of us in terms of the France that they knew in 1946 or something like that.

They are apt to come to the wrong conclusion about what we would like to do with their country.

For example, they find it inconceivable that we do not want to turn all of Vietnam into another colony such as the French had, and when I told them what I really believed, that there is nothing in Vietnam that we want, because there is not much that is worth anything, they are appalled at that idea, because they think their country is very valuable, and they think it would be very natural that we would want to take it over because it is stuffed with all sorts of goodies. When I said to them, "Look, if we ever take this country over it would

cost us ever so much more than we could possibly put into it," they did not know what I was talking about because they do not know of a country that is based on the kind of economy and with the productivity that we have.

So this is certainly a difficulty in trying to get into realistic talk with these people because they do not see us really for the kind of power we are, nor do they see the outer world, really, very well.

Their contacts are limited. They are rather ignorant people. They do not even know other communist worlds very well. So these are the impressions that I get of the kind of ideas that these people have.

SETTLEMENT BASED ON A DIVIDED VIETNAM

Senator CASE. Just one more question. Is it your opinion that it would be impossible to negotiate a settlement on the basis of a division of the country?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I do not think that is impossible. I think it would be difficult, but I think it could be done.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

EFFECT OF CESSATION OF BOMBING ON NEGOTIATIONS

Senator COOPER. Mr. Salisbury, you have just said, in response to one of Senator Case's questions, that you believed that if bombing of North Vietnam were stopped that there be a reciprocal action upon the part of the North Vietnamese. I know this is difficult, but may I ask if that opinion is wholly subjective, or is it based upon your talks with Vietnamese officials?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, it is not wholly subjective. I would say probably the easiest way of answering that is that this is my interpretation of some of the things that I was told.

Senator COOPER. You said before that bombing had actually unified the people and stimulated them to make plans to continue the war.

Would you say that if this bombing should be stopped, that it might not have the effect, too, of making them believe that they were stronger than at the beginning of the war?

Mr. SALISBURY. This is certainly something that we would certainly have to risk—the possibility that they would draw this deduction.

However, as I said before, if the bombing were halted in anticipation and in foreknowledge that some move would be coming from their side and that we were moving into a negotiation, then I do not think that this consideration would be necessarily a very important one.

INTERVENTION OF CHINA IF NORTH VIETNAM ENGAGES IN NEGOTIATIONS

Senator COOPER. I was very much interested in your statement that if the North Vienamese should actually move toward negotiation there was a danger that China would intervene because China wants so much to continue the war.

Is the view held in Hanoi that the Chinese might actually intervene?

Mr. SALISBURY. It is held in Hanoi, it is held by some of the Vietnamese, at least, and it is very strongly held by Eastern European com-

munist diplomats and by some of the Russians with whom I have spoken.

Senator COOPER. What do you mean by intervention? Would there be an effort to overthrow the government in Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. Specifically that, yes.

Senator COOPER. You are not talking about an actual intervention of Chinese forces.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, it might take both forms. You might get the effort at a coup d'etat in Hanoi coincident with a movement of Chinese volunteers, as they would call them, into the country.

Senator COOPER. A statement is often made of the long history of warfare between Vietnam and China and the desire of the Vietnamese people not to be taken over by the Chinese. Is that correct, in your view?

Mr. SALISBURY. Absolutely 100 percent correct, yes, sir.

### VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVE IN HANOI

Senator COOPER. Are there Vietcong representatives in Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. There is a representative, I think they call him a delegate or something like that, of what goes by the formal name of the National Liberation Front in Hanoi, and I had a rather extensive interview with this man.

Senator COOPER. Does the Government of Vietnam treat him as a representative of another government?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes. He is treated as a diplomat, and his embassy or his mission is regarded as an embassy.

Now, whether this goes over into all of their intimate contacts, it is impossible to tell just on the basis of discussion with either side. But it is my impression from talking with him and looking up the structure which has been set up in, well, in recent—the last year or two, by the Vietcong or the "Front" as they are more properly called, which involves a whole series of these embassies in not only—not only in communist countries but in some of the African countries as well, that that "Front" organization is moving in the direction of becoming an actual government. They do not have diplomatic representation at their headquarters, wherever that may be, in the south, but they are establishing diplomatic contact and they are acting more and more as though they were a government and not just a guerrilla movement.

### RISKS IN CESSATION OF BOMBING

Senator COOPER. If this war continues, of course, that means greater and greater loss of American lives, and there will be some risk, of course, in stopping bombing. But would you say that in the long run it would be a lesser risk to stop bombing than to continue it, with the possibility of a greater and greater and greater loss of American lives?

Mr. SALISBURY. I would think that the advantages lie with halting the bombing, yes.

### EFFECT OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S VISIT

Senator COOPER. One other question: What effect, if any, did the visit of General de Gaulle have in Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not believe that De Gaulle's trip out—I believe he went to Cambodia, made a speech out there, and they had some contact with him there. I do not think this did very much except to enhance his prestige in Hanoi. He is regarded as a very outstanding world figure there. In fact, they think France is doing fine now. They do not think they did so well before.

I do not believe, however, that this means that he necessarily has great influence or that he might be an intermediary in this situation.

I had a very definite feeling that they were quite leery of intermediaries; that they would much prefer man-to-man American and North Vietnamese negotiations, to having somebody else get mixed into it. A number of people, of course, have tried to do this, and I have a feeling they are not too keen on that.

Senator COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

### NLF REPRESENTATIVE IN HANOI

The CHAIRMAN. May I pursue that a little. Do you mind saying whom you saw representing the NLF in Hanoi or is it better not to?

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not mind at all. I reported it in my stories. I am sorry to say his name escapes me at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

Mr. SALISBURY. But it is their official representative in Hanoi, and it is on record.

The CHAIRMAN. You did write an article on this?

Mr. SALISBURY. I wrote a rather full report of the conversation.

The CHAIRMAN. I was a little surprised that he had diplomatic prestige as if he were recognized as a sovereign government, is that right?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, yes. They have the appurtenances of that, and they sort of make a point of this, as he kept telling me, that these are matters—I asked him, for example, I said, "How do you negotiate for supplies? You get your supplies from all sort of countries. You get them from Russia, you get them from Poland, Czechoslovakia. Do you go to, come to, the government here in Hanoi and say, 'We need so many machineguns' and get them from some place?"

He said, "No, we conduct our own direct negotiations with the Poles, or with the Russians and then they ship the stuff in."

I do not know whether that is true, but that is what he said.

The CHAIRMAN. And the shipped goods are consigned, I assume, to the NLF and not to Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. That is what he said precisely.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what he said. It is very curious, because, you know our attitude has been the NLF is just a tool or a puppet, if you like, of Hanoi.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say your best information is that this is not so?

Mr. SALISBURY. My impression is that whatever they may have been in the past, and they may have been a tool or a puppet, that they are growing up, and that they have an identity, and a unity, and an organizational structure of their own.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one of your articles which says, "The picture of the Front and its role in Vietnam was presented by Nguyen Van Tien"——

Mr. SALISBURY. That is the man.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). "A former Saigon professor, a member of the resistance movement since 1945 * * *."

He is a southerner, not a northerner?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes, he is; that is right.

### GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN OF THE NLF MEMBERS

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your impression from your discussions with him that the leaders of the NLF are primarily southerners or are they northerners?

Mr. SALISBURY. No. I asked him about that, and I am sorry to say I cannot remember exactly what he told me. But my impression was that most of them were southerners. There are some northerners in the movement as well, but I think almost all of the leadership is southern.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask him in his opinion what percentage of the NLF are communists and what percentage are non-communists?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes; I asked him that question, too.

The CHAIRMAN. What did he say?

Mr. SALISBURY. And he contended that a minority were communists, and that they had a broad representation, including some ordinary political people of one sort and another, some religious people. He mentioned all of the different parties and movements represented. Unfortunately I cannot recall all of them at the present time. I honestly believe that they do include these other elements, but I also believe that the communists do dominate that government.

### GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. It is a fact—at least it has been reported in the paper—that most of the leaders of the official government that we recognize in South Vietnam are from the north, is that not right?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think that is true; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I have seen that one of the ten generals, nine were emigrés from the north. Is that correct?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think it is something on that order, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that General Ky is a native of Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. My impression is he comes from the north someplace, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered if you talked about this in your discussions with the people in Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. I did because I was interested.

You see, the country is very mixed up. In the Hanoi Government it is——

The CHAIRMAN. Are they as mixed up as we are? [Laughter.]

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. About the war, I mean.

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I did not mean about the war. I meant about their population.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, oh; I see.

Mr. SALISBURY. The government in the north, for example, if I have the figures correctly in my mind, consists of six northerners and six southerners, and it is my impression that the Front government has somewhat of an equal mixture of north and south but not as many north as the northern government has.

### IMPRESSION OF NORTH VIETNAM PRIME MINISTER

The CHAIRMAN. You spoke at great length with the Prime Minister. I wonder if you would give us a little better impression of this man. I do not wish to press you too much, but you are the first American we have ever had, to my knowledge, who has spoken to these people. Everything we have had is secondhand. I wonder if you would go a little bit further of your impressions of Pham Van Dong.

Mr. SALISBURY. Pham Van Dong.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he an intelligent, able, alert man or does he suffer from this lack of information you described a moment ago, namely, lack of knowledge of the outside world, particularly this country?

I understand Ho Chi Minh spent two years in this country. It is true it was in New York and perhaps he did not learn much about the country, but he was in New York, according to some of the New York papers. Is that correct?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I believe that is right. He was in the United States for awhile. I think he was working as a waiter in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. I heard it as a busboy for two years.

Mr. SALISBURY. Maybe it was as a busboy.

The CHAIRMAN. The papers said for two years, and that he does speak English.

Mr. SALISBURY. He does speak English?

The CHAIRMAN. Does Pham Van Dong speak English?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, he does not. He speaks French and unfortunately, I do not speak very good French, and we had to converse through an interpreter.

He struck me as a very able man, a very bright man, an interesting man to talk to.

I have talked to a great many communist leaders, and they are not all interesting. Some of them are very dull indeed, because their minds are very routine and they go into the Marxist dialectics and they never come out of it.

Now, this man is not that sort of a fellow. He is very direct. He is bright. He kept me interested all during the time I was talking with him.

So far as his knowledge of the world is concerned, he has a pretty good idea of what goes on in the world. He is much better than the average man in the street that I described.

The CHAIRMAN. That description you gave, I believe, to Senator Case a moment ago of their limited knowledge does not apply to him?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, it does not apply to him.

The CHAIRMAN. It applies to only the man in the street?

Mr. SALISBURY. The description I gave to Senator Case applies to the ordinary person and to some of the lower levels of officials.

The CHAIRMAN. But not to Pham Van Dong.

Mr. SALISBURY. Not to Pham Van Dong.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel he has some feeling of the realities of the matter?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes, I think he has. I think he exaggerates on some things. I think he exaggerates, for example, on the extent of their successes, as he calls them, in the south.

I do not think they are doing as well as he tried to make me think they were doing. Now, maybe he knows better himself, but he put up a big case for their getting along very well there. I do not think they are doing all that well.

### U.S. BASE INVESTMENT AND CONSEQUENT CREDIBILITY

The CHAIRMAN. Did you discuss with him the question that has been raised about our investing vast sums in places like Camranh Bay and Sattahip, and the indication that we have no intention of ever leaving there? Did that matter ever arise?

Mr. SALISBURY. No. The questions of the bases never did arise.

The CHAIRMAN. As you know this matter has been raised.

Mr. SALISBURY. I know it has been raised.

The CHAIRMAN. And it has been said that our having invested so much we would not leave bears upon our—this terrible word—credibility.

I notice that the Senator from Missouri has returned and I yield to him as he has not had an opportunity.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for not being here the entire time. I had Armed Services and a Joint Economic Committee meeting this morning.

I do have a few questions.

### INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH

You say in your statement:

> Despite continuous and very heavy bombing, both roads and railroads were operative during the time I was there, and other foreigners report that there has never been any serious disruption in communications to the south.

When you say "communications," does that word imply infiltration?

Mr. SALISBURY. It certainly does; absolutely. I did not really have it in mind when I was using that. I was thinking basically of the movement of the men and the arms and the food to the south, but it certainly applies to that as well.

Senator SYMINGTON. The infiltration has been heavily cut, according to our authorities, and that is why I asked about the language.

Later you say:

> The people of North Vietnam, insofar as I observed them, seemed to be very strong and united in support of the war effort—to an extent which I found surprising in a Communist country * * *.

You said earlier this morning that you had been in Russia a great deal, had written many books about it. Wouldn't you say the Russians had been strong and united in their resistance to the Nazis?

Mr. SALISBURY. They were, Senator, but they were not really in the early part of the war. You probably recall when the Germans

first came in there, particularly in the Ukraine and some of those areas, they were greeted as heroes rather than as enemies.

The resistance of the Russians grew during the war, and I think it grew due to a number of different factors, one being the invocation of national patriotic motifs by Stalin, and also the fact that the Germans conducted themselves in such a beastly manner when they got into the country that they stimulated resistance to themselves.

### DEFENSE DEPARTMENT LETTER ABOUT NAM DINH

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. I have a letter in reply to a Congressman which came from the Department of Defense. The reply states:

> You asked about the accuracy of the statement in the New York Times that "No American communique has asserted that Nam Dinh contains some facility that the United States regards as a military objective.
>
> This statement is without accuracy.
>
> We receive each day from the MACV information office in Saigon a copy of the lengthy release that is made each night there at their 5 o'clock briefing. We also receive a tape recording of the briefer's amplifying remarks and of the subsequent question-and-answer session with the press. No transcript is made of the latter, although the tape is made available to the Washington press corps within two hours of the live briefing in Saigon.
>
> A rapid spot check here of the releases as cabled to us shows that strikes in the Nam Dinh area were announced on at least three occasions—once in April and twice in May, 1966. I am enclosing transmission copies of the pertinent pages of those public announcements.
>
> The New York Times simply did not take the time to research the matter themselves—or, indeed, to ask our assistance.

Have you any comments?

Mr. SALISBURY. I certainly have. That is Art Sylvester's statement and it starts from a faulty premise. The article in the Times——

Senator SYMINGTON. This letter was not signed by Mr. Sylvester. It was signed by Mr. Goulding.

Mr. SALISBURY. He made a similar public statement, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

Mr. SALISBURY. Neither the Times nor myself said that Nam Dinh had never been listed as a military objective by the Defense Department. The stories specifically said that the residents of Nam Dinh were not aware of it ever having been mentioned in an American communique. That is what the story said. That was their belief, and it seems that they have been mistaken or at least on some occasions the Nam Dinh area was mentioned by the briefing officer in Saigon.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

### ALLEGED ATTACKS ON DIKES

The letter, in answer to the question about the articles from Congressman Reid of New York states:

> You also asked about the alleged attacks on the Dao River dike. I mentioned in our telephone conversation that I knew of no such attack. I have double checked, both with the operations people and with the Defense Intelligence Agency. I am informed that no attack on any dike in North Vietnam has been targeted or approved.

This applies also to the Red River dike mentioned in another New York Times story.

So as not to mislead you, I want to point out that the Dao River is one boundary of the transshipment facility in Nam Dinh. That facility is an approved military target. It has been bombed and a good many storage buildings have been destroyed. The dike is adjacent to that target.

We cannot and do not state, therefore, that the dike has never been struck. Our intelligence people inform me that they have no knowledge of accidental hits on it. But they point out also that the dike is made of earth, that repairs would not be difficult and that accidental damage inflicted on it would not necessarily show up on later intelligence photography taken subsequent to the repairs.

I am unaware of any charges, even by Mr. Salisbury and the Communists that dikes have been destroyed and the surrounding area flooded. It seems evident that there would be no doubt whatever had the United States targeted and deliberately attacked any dikes.

Have you any comments about that?

Mr. SALISBURY. Of course, I cannot challenge any statement that dikes are not listed as targets. I know they have said they are not. All I can say is, to repeat what I said in the story, which was that bombs had fallen on the dikes and they had to be repaired and the residents of that area believed that they were being attacked, because the bombs fell on them, and a number fell very close to the dikes, too.

I happened to see some of these bomb craters myself. It is quite true, as they say, that the dikes are made of earth and they can be refilled and they have been refilled.

I also reported something which I think is fairly significant as far as the belief of the people in that area is concerned. I reported that I had seen them working on a very large supplementary dike which was designed to hold back the Dao waters if the main dike was burst, and it involved the expenditure of a great deal of manpower and effort to build this darned thing.

They also had constructed dikes in the city of Nam Dinh itself running through the city, because they obviously felt the danger was great. Now, they can be completely fooled.

We were just trying for something else, but the truth is some of the bombs did fall on the dikes, enough that they were willing to invest large amounts of manpower in this project.

Now, we might say, "Well, that is a very good military operation. We have caused them to put a lot of effort into something we were not going to attack, and if that is true, well, then, that is fine."

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

### NAM DINH AS A MILITARY OBJECTIVE

Now, the letter goes on:

As you know, Nam Dinh is the third largest city in North Vietnam. It is a major trans-shipment point along the Hanoi-Dong Hoi rail line. It is on the only major highway to the south and the only rail line to the south. Major military targets within it are four: the power plant, a POL storage depot, a railroad yard and the trans-shipment installation of large size. In the trans-shipment area are many storage buildings; with it are the naval facilities for unloading from Dao River. Antiaircraft defenses are heavy, both in the city itself and in the area around it. Some anti-aircraft sites have been put in the midst of the city. In response to any suggestion that the North Vietnamese consider Nam Dinh to be without military targets, I would point out that the North Vietnamese have established more than 500 anti-aircraft weapons in the Nam Dinh air defense area.

There is a pencil notation on this letter given me which says "(including 165 in Nam Dinh itself.)"

The care taken to avoid damage to civilian areas can be indicated in another way.

The United States has flown more than 50 missions in 1965 and 1966 against military targets in the Nam Dinh area. Numbers of aircraft on each mission vary.

Mr. Salisbury made the flat statement that 89 persons have been killed in Nam Dinh. He offered no evidence to support this statement. Presumably it was given to him by his Communist hosts. Certainly he accepted it as fact and reported it as fact.

We have no possible way of ascertaining whether the figure of 89 is an accurate one. Even if we were to accept it as accurate, which we do not, we would have no way of knowing how many of those 89 civilians might have been workers in the railroad yard, the trans-shipment facility, or the other military targets.

But those who do accept the figure as legitimate must acknowledge the care taken by the United States to avoid damage to civilian areas if no more than 89 persons have been killed during more than fifty raids against military targets in and around a city of 90,000 persons—and a city heavily defended by anti-aircraft weapons. (One can scarcely believe that the Communists have given Mr. Salisbury a low figure on their casualties).

Would you comment on that?

Mr. SALISBURY. I would agree that they are not likely to have given me a low figure. I would be very surprised if they did. They probably gave me a figure as close to being accurate as they could make it. I think it is a low figure myself.

They would offer, perhaps, another explanation or one in addition to the one that the Defense Department does for the reason that the casualties were so low. They would say, as they told me, that the city had been very extensively evacuated. I believe this is true since I saw large areas of the city where no one was living. They had just packed up and gone away. The population was around 90,000 before the war started. I believe it is down in the neighborhood of 30,000 or 40,000.

I think I may have reported the figure in one of my dispatches, but I do not have it in my mind at the present time.

They would also say that their antiaircraft precautions are extensive and quite effective, and I would support them on that, having seen them.

They have a very good trench and bunker system. They have excellent individual air raid shelters of the manhole type, flush concrete things that are very secure unless you get a direct hit. So I would say so far as the low loss of life is concerned, these played a factor in that low loss.

Now, so far as the bombardment of the military targets or the statement that they had no military targets in their city, this, of course, is a matter of opinion.

I was reporting, and I did report, and specifically said that the civilian officials of this city did not believe that their city contained military objectives. They described it as a textile manufacturing city, which it is in large measure, and the damage which I saw, and which I reported about, was in the area of the textile plant, also in the area of a silk plant, which has been bombed out of existence.

Now, there is no doubt in my mind that there are other things in that city, and the things which are listed there which sound quite impres-

sive, undoubtedly do exist there, although they sound more impressive than they are.

To take, for example, the transshipment area they are talking about, which is adjacent to the dikes, this would appear to be not a large series of wharves and naval installations and things of that kind, but actually an open area alongside the Dao River, where stuff that is brought down in barges and things of that kind is dumped out on the shore and then reshipped. I think this is quite a legitimate military target and I have no doubt we have attacked it. I also have no doubt of the statement that they make that some of these bombs may have gone on and hit the dike or other areas around that. This is just what you would expect from bombardment.

Now we come down to the busines about the number of antiaircraft sites around Nam Dinh. I am not an intelligence officer and I could be quite wrong about what I saw. It did not appear to me that the antiaircraft installations were as dense as these statistics would lead one to believe.

I have been told since, in discussing this matter with someone who should have some opinion, that these figures relate not necessarily to Nam Dinh city but to the Nam Dinh area, and the Nam Dinh area is defined in rather broad terms; in fact, it extends right up into what I would call sort of the outskirts of Hanoi.

Now, if we take an area of that size, certainly I would not challenge the number of antiaircraft installations. It is probably true.

So far as there being a lot of them right in the city themselves, maybe they are, and I am not going to challenge a fellow who had to fly over that to get through ack-ack. He knows better than I do.

The antiaircraft installations in North Vietnam are not very well camouflaged. I saw plenty of them and I would not have thought myself that Nam Dinh was as heavily defended as they say it is.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

### POLICY TO AVOID CIVILIAN TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM

The letter continues:

In summary:

No United States aircraft have been ordered to strike any civilian targets in North Vietnam at any time.

United States policy is to target military targets only. There has been no deviation from this policy.

All reasonable care is taken to avoid civilian casualties.

No official of the United States Government, to my knowledge, has even stated that there have been no civilian casualties caused by U.S. bombing of North Vietnam or that there has been no damage to any civilian areas.

In Nam Dinh are four major military targets.

Additionally, in and around it are the major highways south and the only rail line south.

The United States has not targeted such installations as textile plants, fruit-canning plants, silk factories and thread cooperatives.

No dikes have been targeted in North Vietnam, in Nam Dinh or elsewhere.

We have no knowledge that any pilot has disobeyed his orders and deliberately attacked these or any other nonmilitary targets in North Vietnam.

It is impossible to avoid all damage to civilian areas, particularly in view of the concerted effort of the North Vietnamese to emplace anti-aircraft and critical military targets among the civilian population.

In view of the great strength of the United States air power, it is patently obvious that the damage would be very much greater ,and, indeed, unmistakeable, had the U.S. deliberately attacked any civilian targets in Vietnam.

Would you have any comments? Probably you have already answered much of that.

Mr. SALISBURY. It seems to me, Senator, I covered it pretty well.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. SALISBURY. I have no knowledge of my own that we have targeted civilian objectives, and I think any inference drawn from my dispatches that we did do that is false.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. SALISBURY. On the other hand, that the civilians feel that they are being attacked I think this is also obvious.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator from Missouri yield for a question?

NORTH VIETNAM CHARGES THAT WE TARGET CIVILIAN TARGETS

Has anyone charged that our Government has deliberately targeted nonmilitary targets? I did not know that anyone has.

Mr. SALISBURY. North Vietnam has charged that. Hanoi has charged that repeatedly.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought they charged only that we hit them, not that we targeted them?

Mr. SALISBURY. They charged it?

The CHAIRMAN. Which is different?

Mr. SALISBURY. North Vietnam has specifically charged us with deliberate attacks on the civilian population.

The CHAIRMAN. That is still different from what I was trying to get at in this business of the Government having targeted a church, for example. How would Hanoi know whether the Government targeted it? They do not know, nobody here, except the President and those in his confidence, know what he targets.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sure the President has never targeted any churches.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but Hanoi does not know either. I did not know anyone had charged it.

Senator SYMINGTON. As long as this aspect of the subject has come, up, I would mention what a young American who has a right to talk said to me. He has had over 200 combat missions. He said the greatest proof of morale of air force and naval aviators is that when they often go over a large airfield, many miles from Hanoi and watch MIGs taking off to attack them at 6 o'clock, nobody has dropped a bomb on the field by mistake.

ACCURACY OF U.S. PILOTS

The letter says:

One final point should be made.

More than 450 United States aircraft have been shot down over North Vietnam. Many of the pilots have been rescued by the unbelievable bravery of Air Rescue Units. Many have died. Some have been captured.

These men are doing an incredible job for their country. Their morale is unsurpassed. Their skill in operating high-performance aircraft under combat conditions is unparalleled. The air defenses they face are described by top Air Force officers as the heaviest ever encountered by any pilot anywhere.

That is also true of the top naval officers, incidentally.

The discipline under which they fly is without precedent.

I know of no United States official—in Washington, in Honolulu or in Saigon—who has contended that every bomb dropped by these men in 24,000 missions over North Vietnam has impacted precisely on target.

You have asked for examples of accidental damage.

Bomb release mechanisms do not always work flawlessly. Pilots have jettisoned armed bombs in order to take evasive action to save their lives when MIG fighters are bearing in on them. Despite his skill, his training and his courage, not every pilot who sees the aircraft ahead of him burst into flames as a result of enemy fire always delivers his own weapons with surgical accuracy.

Each day announcements have been made of the number of missions flown over North Vietnam. Periodically, the total losses of United States aircraft have been made public. The total ordnance tonnage delivered in Vietnam—hundreds of thousands of tons—has been disclosed. While military security prevents disclosure of the exact weight of effort, the general magnitude of it is known to everyone.

United States pilots who are flying these missions over this heavily defended territory and dropping these amounts of bombs under the most stringent controls in the history of air warfare are performing magnificently.

I hope that this information answers your questions. Please let me know if I can be of additional assistance.

Have you any comments?

Mr. SALISBURY. No.

### MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF PHU LY

Senator SYMINGTON. Another letter is to Mr. Frank Leonard of New York City. It says:

You have asked for comment on another one of Mr. Harrison Salisbury's Hanoi stories. You point out that on December 27 last he stated in the New York Times that "every house and building" in the town of Phu Ly had been destroyed by United States bombing. The relevant paragraphs about Phy [sic] Ly read:

"A notable example is Phuly, a town about 35 miles south of Hanoi on Route 1. The town had a population of about 10,000. In attacks on October 1, 2 and 9, every house and building was destroyed. Only 40 were killed and wounded because many people had left town and because an excellent manhole-shelter system was available.

"The community had no industry, but lay astride a highway and a railroad line running from Hanoi, which had a couple of sidings in town. Presumably, planes were attacking the railroad. But in the process they destroyed another residential community."

Mr. Salisbury's statement that "every house and building" was destroyed is false. It is true that there has been damage to civilian structure. But the Department of Defense has at no time said or suggested that U.S. bombing attacks on North Vietnam were causing no civilian damage.

Mr. Salisbury did point out Phu Ly is astride a highway and railroad line running from Hanoi. This is, in fact, the major highway to the south. The railroad is the primary railroad south and also a major resupply avenue.

You suggest that the railroad and highway could be cut on either side of the town. Railways and highways are bombed outside populated areas. Attacks are made on a truck-by-truck basis. But it is still necessary to strike bridges, rail yards, storage areas, and other such military targets.

Intelligence reports indicate that the North Vietnamese are using some 300,000 persons to offset the bomb damage to roads, rail lines and other military facilities used to infiltrate soldiers and material into South Vietnam to attack American and South Vietnamese forces.

There has never been doubt that roads and railroads could be repaired—and repaired rapidly, given sufficient manpower and material. This was proven over and over again in both World Wars and the Korean War.

Storage areas and port facilities can also be rebuilt. But the military advantages of destroying them and of destroying military material in a storage

area should be measured in terms of cost, delay and diversion of manpower to the enemy.

Mr. Salisbury neglected to mention the military targets in Phu Ly. They include a railroad bridge, two military storage areas in different parts of the town, a barracks and adjacent military complex, a railroad yard, a control center and a long stretch of port facilities along the river.

Mr. Salisbury also failed to report the existence of several antiaircraft sites in and around the town.

Have you any comments as to those points?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I think this illustrates the difficulty of looking at the same situation from two different viewpoints.

I saw Phu Ly on the ground, and I described it very accurately. Phu Ly is not much of a town itself. The railroad runs through it and, of course, it is the main railroad, it is obvious; the main highway, that is obvious, and it does have some, a couple of lines or maybe more of freight yards.

This is a one-track railroad, and you have to have slips so that the trains can bypass there.

There is a railroad bridge and a highway bridge there, and stuff does come down and is transshipped through that point. There is no doubt about that.

The real question is, and I do not think this is really, should be, much of a matter of argument between the Defense Department and myself, you try to take out these facilities and the town is narrow, the houses and everything built right along this track, it does not extend out very much this way, and when you come down to bomb it you are going to bomb some of those houses out, and in this case, this place has been bombed repeatedly, and there is just nothing left.

Later on, I gather, there is a part of the town away from the highway, I do not think it was involved in our action at all, which has not been attacked, and where some of the houses still stand.

Well, I do not know what you make out of that one way or the other. The Defense Department says, "We had to do this." Maybe they did. Somebody else says, "Why didn't you hit the railroad outside the town?"

The truth of the matter is they have hit the railroad outside the town a number of times. I do not have very much argument with them. I do not think they have much argument with me because the facts in this particular case fit each other pretty darned well.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

### PAMPHLET ON WAR CRIMES IN NAM DINH

Now, the Washington Post on January 1 had an article, "Salisbury 'Casualties' Tally with Viet Reds." I will read the first three paragraphs:

Civilian casualty figures in the bombing of Namdinh in North Vietnam—reported without attribution last week by Harrison E. Salisbury of the New York Times—are identical to those in a Communist propaganda pamphlet issued in November.

The pamphlet, entitled "Report on U.S. War Crimes in Namdinh City" was prepared by the Committee for the investigation of U.S. imperialists war crimes in Vietnam of Nam Ha Province, October 1966.

The pamphlet is in English. Intelligence sources here, who have copies of it, said a North Vietnamese official distributed the pamphlet in November to foreign correspondents in Moscow.

What are your comments on that, sir?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes. I commented on that a little earlier, Senator, when you were not here, but I will repeat the comment because it is a pretty simple matter.

These figures are identical with the ones I got, and they are identical because the source is the same. The sources are the communist officials at Nam Dinh. This comment was made at the time by Mr. Daniel, our managing editor, that the surprising thing would be if they put out different figures for me than they put out in some other connection. They obviously come from the same source.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then, in an accompaniment to this, it says that in the Salisbury piece datelined Hanoi, December 25, he includes this paragraph:

> The cathedral tower looks out on block after block of utter desolation; the city's population of 90,000 has been reduced to less than 20,000 because of evacuation; 13 percent of the city's housing, including the homes of 12,464 people, have been destroyed; 89 people have been killed and 405 wounded.

On page 4 of the communist document distributed the previous November in Moscow it states:

> During the 33 above said air attacks against Nam Dinh, they caused many losses in lives and property to the city's inhabitants, 89 persons were killed, among them 23 children, 36 women and 405 wounded, among them 61 women, 44 old men, and 41 children * * *.

Have you any comments on that?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, that is merely an extension of what we were talking about before.

PHU XA CASUALTIES

Senator SYMINGTON. An accompanying note states that Mr. Salisbury says:

> Those missiles were reported to have caused most of the Phu Xa casualties. The North Vietnamese cite as an instance the village of Phu Xa, a market gardening suburb possibly four miles from the city center. A village of 24 houses was reported attacked at 12:17 p.m., August 13 by a United States pilot trying to bomb a Red River dike. The village was destroyed and 24 people were killed and 23 wounded. The pilot was shot down.

Then the question how you knew there were 24 people killed. Did you visit Phu Xa, Mr. Salisbury?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes. I inspected the site and these figures, as is apparent from that story, come from the people who live in that village.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I ask unanimous consent that a pamphlet distributed in Moscow to foreign correspondents during a press conference last November 10, 1966 entitled "Report on U.S. War Crimes in Nam Dinh City" be included as a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

(The document referred to appears in the appendix.)

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I hesitate to keep Mr. Salisbury longer. He has been very patient, and I know he must be weary, but I would like to ask one question about a matter. Had you finished?

Senator SYMINGTON. I had not finished.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said you had.

Senator SYMINGTON. I asked permission to include that document in the record at this point.

Senator GORE. I apologize.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Senator should never apologize to me. He knows of my high respect for him.

### SAVING OF AMERICAN LIVES BY AIR ATTACKS

Mr. Salisbury, we have recent testimony before other committees that the air attacks in North Vietnam have saved many American lives—"a great many" is one quote from one of the members of the Joint Chiefs; "hundreds" is the quote from another. This is my question to you.

If we stay in South Vietnam, should not the fact that we have saved hundreds of young American lives by these attacks over North Vietnam be considered as much as should North Vietnamese casualties?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, naturally.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

### BOMBING PAUSE AND INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH

My next question. If the current worldwide campaign to stop these air attacks against North Vietnam should result in our agreeing to a bombing pause, shouldn't the people of Hanoi do something in return? For example, would it not be proper and right for them in turn to stop infiltration of troops into South Vietnam? How do you feel about that?

Mr. SALISBURY. Absolutely 100-percent agreed.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

### CAUSE OF BOMB EXPLOSIONS IN CIVILIAN AREAS

You reported seeing houses destroyed. Many American pilots I talked with, and last month I talked to over 100 myself who were bombing North Vietnam, said that they saw North Vietnamese SAM missiles, quite a few of them, fall and explode in civilian areas. When you saw a house destroyed, could you tell whether it had been destroyed by a bomb, or whether it had been destroyed by one of their SAMs?

Mr. SALISBURY. You cannot always tell that, Senator, but you can sometimes make a judgment on it, on the extent of the damage.

The SAMs, of course, are extremely powerful things, and they destroy a large area around, usually cause a fire along with that.

In most of the areas I saw, the destruction was not of a magnitude that would cause you to suspect that it was a SAM, and in most areas, and I reported on this, I talked to the people who had been residents in the area and who had seen what had happened, and who have their account of it. That does not mean that their account was necessarily accurate, but at least it was supportive evidence in one direction or another.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

RIGHT OF U.S. PILOTS TO JETTISON BOMBS

Now, our pilots stated that when they are attacked by MIGs, their only chance of getting away is to jettison their bomb load, else they are overtaken and in all probability shot down, as many of them have been. Under such attack, do you believe they should have the right to jettison those bombs in order to save the plane and themselves?

Mr. SALISBURY. Naturally.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

NORTH VIETNAMESE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ATTACKS ON HANOI

Is it true that the North Vietnamese announce any attack within 25 miles of Hanoi as actually an attack on Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. Not to my knowledge, Senator. I have not heard that.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have not heard that?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I have not.

No, I had not heard that. It may be true but I had not heard it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you hear any figure of proximity to the city which the North Vietnamese announce as an attack on the city itself?

Mr. SALISBURY. No. The only thing relating to that, that would bear on it at all is the announcement that they put on their loudspeaker system or their radio when planes are approaching, and if there is an announcement before the planes are overhead, and this seldom happens really because the planes come in so fast, they will say they are 25 kilometers or 30 kilometers out of Hanoi, and I would assume that meant right out of the heart of the city.

NEWS ARTICLES RELATING TO INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH

Senator SYMINGTON. Without giving detailed figures, the hard estimate now of the reduction of infiltration in North Vietnam is a reduction of 25 percent in the first part of last year, and 50 percent of that latter figure later on.

In yesterday's Washington Post, an article stated there was a hard figure for August of 2,000.

Your paper this morning says, and I quote:

> * * * competent military sources here also insist that North Vietnamese infiltration is continuing at the same high rate of about 8,000 a month that they claim was maintained in 1966 * * *.

I checked today with the Defense Department. They say that the Washington Post figure is correct, and that the figure that the New York Times had this morning is wrong.

Would you comment?

Mr. SALISBURY. Gosh, no. I do not know anything about that at all.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that these two articles be inserted at this point in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

(The two articles referred to follow:)

[Editorial from the Washington Post, Feb. 1, 1967]

THE BIGGEST NEWS

(By Joseph Alsop)

The biggest news at the moment is not getting into the newspapers. There are two closely related items. On the one hand, Hanoi is actively sounding out the Johnson Administration, through diplomatic third parties, to discover whether the President will "stop the bombing to get talks."

Whether the President will be wise enough to insist on the essential quid pro quo for stopping the bombing, still remains to be seen. And it also remains to be seen whether Hanoi really wants negotiations, or merely desires a badly needed respite or breathing spell in which to reinforce the Vietcong units in the South and start the war all over again.

This move forward, from noisy propaganda to quiet diplomatic inquiry, is none the less a very big development. The reason for it can be easily discerned in the other big, as yet unnoticed piece of news. In brief, U.S. bombing of North Vietnam has now begun to produce precisely the strangling effect that it was designed to produce from the outset.

To be specific, the southward movement of North Vietnamese regular troops, to reinforce the Vietcong, has been reduced by no less than 75 per cent in the past six months. The Pentagon estimates of month-by-month infiltration in 1966 show many a peak and valley, on both sides of the dividing line. This is at the end of June, just after the bombing of North Vietnamese oil stores began. But the contrast between the first six months and the last six months is dramatic.

In the first six months, the average rate of infiltration of northern troops into South Vietnam was just under 7,000 a month. But in the last six months, the rate of infiltration dropped to around 1,700 men a month, or one quarter of the former input.

One must say "around 1,700" a month because the U.S. Government is currently riven by a vicious insiders' debate about the exact figures for infiltration in November and December. (This kind of argument, it may be noted, can make the religious wars look like fun and games.) But the argument is merely about whether the right figure for these two months is in the range of 1,500 men or 2,000 men.

As this argument indicates, the formal estimate for each month is only made long after the month in question has passed into history. More time has to pass after that, before the ultimate dependability of the formal estimate is properly cross-checked by additional defector-interrogations, captured documents, agent-intelligence and the like.

Thus the figures for July and August infiltration, having been cross-checked, can now be regarded as pretty hard data. Rounded off, they show 2,700 infiltrators in July and 2,000 in August. The rounded estimate for September, only 1,400 infiltrators, is also hardening fast. The October estimate, well under 1,000, seems really too low to be hard. The problem of November–December estimates has already been covered.

There are two reasons why this incalculably important development, previously surfaced in part by Lloyd Norman in Newsweek, has received almost no attention. One is the idiotic information-policy of the McNamara Pentagon and the Johnson Administration.

The other reason is the equally idiotic conviction of the lower echelons in U.S. Headquarters in Saigon, that if they admit to making the smallest progress in the war, the civilians at home will instantly begin clamoring to "bring the boys home." Thus "possible" infiltrators, generally imaginary as the event has repeatedly proven, are included in the infiltration rates cited in Saigon.

The fact remains that the very low Pentagon estimates of infiltration for the last six months of 1966 were produced by precisely the same process, and were based on precisely the same kinds of information, that produced the exceedingly high estimates of infiltration for the first six months of last year. The high estimates were used by opponents of the President's policy to prove that "the northern bombing does no good anyway." Logically, these people ought now to eat their words—although nothing, of course, could be more wildly unlikely.

They will instead attack the figures which they formerly cited to prove their case; or they will talk inspissated nonsense about "voluntary de-escalation." But in fact what has happened is perfectly clear.

Bombing lines of communication, which is what the United States is doing in North Vietnam, is a very long, very slow business. Immediate results are never to be looked for. Results are only obtained, in fact, by the gradual accumulation of thousands of bridge-breaks and roadbreaks and convoy-losses and bomb-caused shortages of this or that.

At a certain stage, however, the cumulative process reaches what may be called a critical point. When that point is reached, all traffic does not stop, of course. But when that point is reached, there is a great reduction of traffic on the lines of communication that are under attack. This is what quite clearly began to happen in July, and has gone on happening to date.

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[From the New York Times, Feb. 2, 1967]

VIETNAM: IF ASTROLOGERS WERE DIPLOMATS

(By Tom Wicker)

SAIGON, Feb. 1.—The Year of the Goat begins next week in Asia, and Vietnamese astrologers predict on the basis of past performance that it ought to be a good year for peace. That is the clearest forecast available here as to what the next twelve months may bring.

Among American civilian and military officials, few of whom set much store by the stars, there is little agreement on the outlook. Some exhibit a growing sense of skepticism at trying to get anything done in this lackadaisical, intricately layered country. Others hopefully eye the omens from the north for signs of weakness. Some, passionately committed to the job at hand, abhor the thought of anything less than victory, whatever that may be. The military, still confident of its battle prowess but frustrated at its frequent inability to find anybody to fight, has a better grasp of the length and difficulty of the struggle ahead.

THE CAPTURED DOCUMENT

Some military officials are impressed with a document recently captured in the field, prepared in December by what was described as "the leadership in Hanoi." It is said to have asserted that Hanoi would negotiate only when it suited North Vietnamese interests, that the Communists intended to continue the fight until that point and were banking heavily on rising American casualties to undermine the political endurance of the United States.

Competent military sources here also insist that North Vietnamese infiltration is continuing at the same high rate of about 8,000 a month that they claim was maintained in 1966.

These officials think Hanoi probably has been taken aback by the progress the South Vietnamese are making toward an elected government this year. Above all, they see the Hanoi leaders looking fearfully over their shoulders at the gigantic convulsion in China—apprehensive that it may yet cut off the Chinese small arms, ammunition and rice upon which North Vietnamese depends.

They believe therefore, that the time may be ripe for Hanoi or the Front, or both, to enter negotiations secretly with the United States or Saigon, or both.

Others believe this is only wishful thinking. In their view, Hanoi and the National Liberation Front have no reason to believe they are losing the war, despite the punishment they are taking. That is because no one here denies that the highly disciplined organization of the Vietcong and their political supporters in the hamlets and villages is still intact, still active and unlikely to be rooted out of the countryside anytime soon. American military action so far has had to be directed mainly at the North Vietnamese main force units. Saigon's revolutionary development program, aimed at winning the people away from the Vietcong, is off the ground in only a few provinces. And the South Vietnamese Army has yet to show that it can deal with guerrillas, even if the Americans keep the big North Vietnamese units off their backs.

TWO-EDGED SWORD

Everything seems to have at least two sides in Vietnam. The military are pleased, for instance, that in the recent Operation Cedar Falls they struck a blow at the guerrillas by destroying an important base complex and tons of supplies. But in the process they also destroyed some villages and turned most of the population of the area into refugees, and an experienced diplomat asks acidly: "Is that the way to win the support of the people for Saigon?"

POPULAR GOVERNMENT

Even the progress being made here toward the election of a legitimate government is eyed with skepticism by some American officials. They do not believe the South Vietnamese officer corps, the only power center in this diffuse country (save the Vietcong), is yet ready to permit real civilian government—or that civilian politicians are yet able to manage national affairs. But no regime dominated by the officer corps is likely to win the popular support that any truly effective Saigon Government must have.

Thus, the Tet holiday that ushers in the Year of the Goat does not seem a particularly happy time for Americans in Saigon. Almost everyone agrees that the situation is better than it was a year ago but no one knows where things are headed or how long it will take to get there. The astrologers may be talking of peace but, as one high military official put it, the more probable outlook is just for "more of the same."

Senator SYMINGTON. I have two more questions.

DO CASUALTY FIGURES JUSTIFY CRITICISM OF OUR BOMBING OF NORTH?

Our best estimates are that between 1,000 and 2,000 people have been killed in North Vietnam who were not engaged in combat or logistic support for the military; i.e., killed by our raids over North Vietnam. There are no figures for South Vietnamese civilians, but the number of South Vietnamese military who have been killed in the same period of time—to wit, 1966—are 9,469; and the number of Americans who have lost their lives, 5,008.

You have been out there. You know the situation. Do you think that a comparison of those figures justifies the heavy criticism of the damage we are doing to the communists in North Vietnam as against what they are doing in South Vietnam?

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not think I would add it up exactly that way. There is a very "iffy" figure in there, as you can recognize, on the casualties in the north.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I used both extremes. Our experts are certain in their own minds that the maximum is 2,000, and the minimum 1,000, so I said 1,000 to 2,000.

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not really think this is terribly important, whether it is 1,000 or 2,000. In fact, I do not think——

Senator SYMINGTON. Its pretty important to the 1,000 who were killed.

Mr. SALISBURY. It is important to the people who are killed, that is right, but I do not think this is terribly important on whether we should—a terribly important bearing on whether we should bomb in the North. I do not think these civilian casualties, while they have a very strong effect on public opinion, as a military matter they are not a decisive question.

The question is: Are we doing so much damage to them in the north? Are we making it so hard for them to conduct the war in the south that we get a payoff there. Is it in our favor and, as I argued before,

and it is an argument, in my judgment, while we do a certain amount of damage to them, we make it much harder for them to supply the south and put their people through, I do not think we make it that much harder to be worth this, and to be worth the price which I think we pay in giving them a greater sense of national will and purpose, and fighting back.

Senator SYMINGTON. Of course, there are a lot of us who believe that if we attacked more meaningful military targets, power, military airfields, the results would be much better; and I do think it is interesting that our figures also show, to the best of our intelligence estimates, that we have inflicted about four times more casualties through armed reconnaissance roaming the countryside as against casualties resulting from hitting more meaningful military targets.

Mr. SALISBURY. Don't you think—I may be wrong about this, Senator—but isn't the armed reconnaissance limited to the DMZ and the very southern part?

Senator SYMINGTON. Not all of it.

Mr. SALISBURY. No?

PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS URGED

Senator SYMINGTON. Now my last question, and I appreciate your tolerance and courtesy in answering all this for the record. I was in Thailand and South Vietnam when your articles came out. Naturally, they created consternation, I would say in some quarters, distress, in others, delight. But we are all in this whether we like it or not together.

We have only one Government here. I am now sure there are a lot of things you think that I agree with. But if you had the decision—this runs through my mind every day and, I believe, in the minds of all my colleagues—what would you do? If you had the decision to make, based on your trip, your articles, and the tremendous worldwide interest those articles have created, what would you do, yourself?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I would do exactly what I said earlier here, that I have recommended that people do. I would embark on the quietest and most secret kind of exploration to see if my intuition that there is a possibility that this time we might move on to a negotiation with some idea of a settlement is borne out.

I certainly would not say anything about it publicly, and I would go into it, knowing that, perhaps, the chances are not too good and it would take some time, but I would certainly explore that quite carefully, because I think the overall objective balance of forces is favorable to us. It is quite favorable.

I think that the chances are that it may become less favorable to them because of the Chinese uncertainty and, therefore, if they have any sense they ought to be talking to us and trying to get out of this thing at this time before it gets worse.

That is what I would do.

Senator SYMINGTON. You inspire me to ask one more question. Are you sure that is what we are not doing?

Mr. SALISBURY. I am not sure at all. I wish I could be absolutely sure we were doing it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CLARIFICATION OF CASUALTY STATISTICS

The CHAIRMAN. Regarding those statistics for 1966, you gave 5,008 Americans dead?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. The figures I gave were killed in action.

The CHAIRMAN. And death from other causes, 945, and nonfatal wounds, 30,093, making a total of the military death and casualties of 36,046 for U.S. forces.

Senator SYMINGTON. The figures I gave were those killed in action.

The CHAIRMAN. The interesting part to me is that the figures of South Vietnamese casualties, the nonfatal wounds are much less than ours, making a total of 30,444.

Senator SYMINGTON. I gave only the KIAs, and should have given the wounded, also.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

NORTH VIETNAMESE INTEREST IN DIRECT TALKS AND ROLE OF NLF

Senator GORE. Mr. Salisbury, I prolong the interrogation only because of my keen interest in an observation you made that may have some value upon negotiation.

You were reporting that you found some aversion, on the part of the Vietnamese officials or people, I am not sure, to negotiation through or with or among third parties, or rather, perhaps, some reference to direct United States-North Vietnamese conferences.

Would you elucidate upon that, and also if you have some information on it, relate that to the Liberation Front and such attitude as you may have obtained from this representative, if any, on that point. I will not ask further questions, but ask you to elucidate on that.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, the evidence I have to bear on the question of third parties intervening is of a negative nature, and it derives from the disparagement and disparaging remarks they made about various individuals who have attempted to act or play some role in mediation.

Senator GORE. Were these remarks by officials?

Mr. SALISBURY. By very high officials in North Vietnam, and it seemed to be that I could very clearly draw the implication that if there were to be talks, they would prefer those talks to be directly with the United States and not going through some third party. I could be wrong about that, but I think I am pretty sure that is correct.

Now, so far as the role of the Liberation Front is concerned, it was curious to me that in discussing questions of negotiation the Hanoi people almost did not mention the Liberation Front. They simply assumed that they would sit down and negotiate with the United States, not necessarily about matters in the south, but about our own direct confrontation with the north.

Sometimes they would drag in, almost as an afterthought, the question of the Liberation Front and how those matters we would have to—the south, we would have to—deal with them on that particular point.

Now, in talking to the Front man in Hanoi, he took the attitude from the very beginning that any matters relating to the south had to be man-to-man negotiations between the United States and them.

Now, as to whether it would be possible between the Front and the United States, so far as the South is concerned——

Senator GORE. In other words, the representative of the Liberation Front also maintained that he would prefer direct negotiation between the United States and the Vietcong?

Mr. SALISBURY. That is correct, direct negotiations.

I do not mean to say there would necessarily—if we started talking to Hanoi, that the Front would say, "We don't want to talk." I think they would go along and anticipate that we would talk to them, too, perhaps a little bit later on. But I think that they would assume, or they take the posture now, that matters about the South should be negotiated with them.

At the same time, by intimation, not directly, by intimation and by questions that they asked. I got the impression that the Front did not see themselves as emerging as the sole Government without any representatives of the present Government or any representatives of the constituent assembly. I think they are looking toward some sort of a coalition. I think that is what they would like to have. Whether we can get a coalition favorable to us, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. The south said that?

Mr. SALISBURY. That is the south.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse has a question.

Senator MORSE. I have two or three, and then I want to make a comment on the procedure of the committee.

### IMPREGNABLE LINE OF DEFENSE ALONG 17TH PARALLEL INTO LAOS

What do you think of Senator Mansfield's proposal that we seek to stretch an impregnable line of defense along the 17th parallel into Laos and stop our bombing in Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think it would be more effective as far as halting infiltration than our present technique. It would be an expensive and difficult operation, though.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that that would result in greater loss of American manpower than the bombing that we are doing in the North, and resulting in intensification, at least, of their determination to continue the war, which results in further infiltration of their forces, which results in the loss of American lives?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think it probably would cut down our losses.

Senator MORSE. At least General Ridgway and General Gavin have made statements which are to the effect that we could stretch lines of defense and hold them without resulting in as much loss. Is that your understanding of it?

Mr. SALISBURY. They would be better judges than I am, but I think that would be quite possible.

Senator MORSE. If that were the result, and neither you nor I pretend to be military experts, then there are a good many questions that my good friend from Missouri, Senator Symington, raised which would become academic.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is right.

Senator MORSE. Because you would not have the problems created by the bombing, is that not true?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes.

WAS SITUATION IN VIETNAM A CIVIL WAR?

Senator MORSE. What is your opinion as to whether or not the conflict in Vietnam, prior to United States intervention, was a civil war?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I am not a very good witness on that, Senator, because I was not following it too closely.

My impression was that it was of the nature of a civil war or guerrilla operations of some kind.

Senator MORSE. His articles will have to speak for themselves, but I recall, the articles that Neil Sheehan has been writing ever since he went to South Vietnam from time to time point out what the situation was, that the situation was a civil war. Incidentally, he also points out that many of the leaders of the now South Vietnamese Government were, to use his language, mandarins from the north.

Is that your understanding?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, Neil is a good reporter, and he knows more about it than I do. I will accept his testimony.

Senator MORSE. I think in support of my position and in fairness to Mr. Sheehan, Mr. Chairman, I will ask to insert in the record two articles, which appeared in the New York Times, on April 27, 1964, and October 9, 1966, to which I allude.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The articles referred to follow:)

[From the New York Times, Apr. 27, 1964]

CRISIS IN VIETNAM: ANTECEDENTS OF THE STRUGGLE

*The following assessment of developments in South Vietnam is by Neil Sheehan of United Press International, who recently returned from two years there.*

The second Indochina war began early in 1957, not with the crash and thunder of a Pearl Harbor, but with the midnight assassination of a few South Vietnemese officials. The killers were black-garbed men called "terrorists."

Since those assassinations, the fighting has spread to the point where casualties are running in the thousands each month.

From a few scattered armed bands backed by a fairly extensive secret political organization, the Communist Vietcong have built a formidable fighting force estimated at 40,000 men. These are organized into 45 battalions throughout the country and armed with modern infantry weapons. They are supported by well over 100,000 less well armed but still effective local and regional guerrillas.

In the vital Mekong delta, where most of South Vietnam's population and economic resources are concentrated, roughly 80 per cent of the peasantry now live in one form or another under a Communist shadow Government. This Government maintains its own schools and dispensaries and collects taxes, like a legitimate administrative organization.

AID OF $1.5 A DAY

The United States has sent in 15,500 military personnel and is spending more than $1.5 million a day in economic and military aid to prevent the South Vietnamese Government from collapsing.

On the average, an American is killed in every three days' fighting beside Government troops. This year the United States will pump in an additional $50 million in an effort to retrieve a steadily worsening situation.

The question many Americans are asking themselves these days is, "How did things get this way?"

One of the major problems during most of the first four years of the war was that the now-defunct Ngo family regime and high-ranking American officials refused to admit that a war was actually being waged.

The official Vietnamese position was that the rule of President Ngo Dinh Diem had restored "peace, prosperity and progress" to the country after the ravages of the war against the French colonial rulers, which ended in 1954.

Anyone who warned that Communist guerrillas had began the first stage of a full-fledged revolution was accused of fabrications.

### AMERICANS GAVE SUPPORT

High American officials went along with the Ngo family's position and asserted that the growing Vietcong bands were simply "last remnants" of the Communist Vietminh guerrillas, who fought the French. These were rapidly being wiped out by the South Vietnamese police and armed forces, it was said.

As the assassination of officials steadily increased, a Saigon newspaper warned at the end of 1957:

"Today the menace is heavier than ever with the terrorists no longer limiting themselves to the notables in charge of security. Everything suits them—village chiefs, chairman of liaison committees, simple village guards and even former notables."

The newspaper was suspended by the Government on a charge of having spread false rumors.

The fiction that nothing was amiss in South Vietnam was preserved through 1959 and well into 1960. President Diem assured his people in a major speech in 1959 that his rule had brought a "countrywide return to peace and security."

Attacks by armed Vietcong bands on Government outposts and assassinations of village officials soared in 1960. According to official reports, the Government suffered 7,526 casualties and lost 4,853 weapons that year.

The Government claimed to have inflicted 14,535 casualties on the Vietcong and captured 921 weapons in return. The figures were not released for publication until late in 1962.

### EXTERNAL THREAT SEEN

The Pentagon had decided, on the basis of the Korean war, that the most likely threat to South Vietnam was an invasion from the Communist north. Despite warnings that this might later prove a disaster, United States military missions in South Vietnam since 1955 had thus trained, organized and equipped the South Vietnamese Army to meet such an external threat.

When the invasion did not materialize and the threat came instead from steadily growing guerrilla forces, the Vietnamese regular army, organized into conventional divisions and corps and roadbound through its thousands of United States supplied vehicles, was at a loss.

A visit to South Vietnam in May of that year by Lyndon B. Johnson, then Vice President, brought promises from President Diem of administrative and political reforms to win support for his regime in the countryside. In return, the United States promised more aid.

American aid increased but the promised reforms did not come. The corruption, unpopularity and administrative ineptitude of the Ngo regime continued. By the fall of 1961, the situation had deteriorated to a point that was considered critical.

A high-level mission under Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrived at the end of September 1961. President Diem again promised major political and administrative reforms and the United States committed itself to massive economic and military backing for the war against the Communists.

Thousands of American officers and men to advise infantry units, Air Force pilots to fly helicopters and bombers into battle and United States Army helicopter companies to give the Vietnamese greater mobility against the elusive foe began to flow into Vietnam. Once again the promised political and administrative reforms did not materialize.

As the United States military buildup that followed the Taylor mission gained momentum, high-ranking American officials began to express "cautious optimism". Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara said on his first visit to Vietnam in May, 1962, that he had seen "nothing but progress and hopeful indications of further progress in the future."

A series of sizable military victories over the guerrillas in the Mekong delta that summer and early fall inflated official American optimism.

The series of Government military successes was mainly due to the fact that the Vietcong had not yet learned to cope with the increased mobility afforded

Vietnamese troops by American helicopters. It was a failing the Communists later overcame.

The stunning defeat of Government troops by the Vietcong at Ap Bac, a hamlet 40 miles south of Saigon, on Jan. 2, 1963, failed to reduce official optimism.

REDS BEAT BIGGER FORCE

A vietcong battalion, outnumbered nine to one by attacking Government troops, supported by helicopters, fighter-bombers and artillery, fought off the superior forces all day, shot down five helicopters and slipped away that night.

Sixty-five Government soldiers and three Americans were killed and 100 Vietnamese wounded. Forty-seven of the Vietcong were killed and an unknown number wounded.

Angry American field advisers attributed the defeat to bungling and moral cowardice by Vietnamese commanders. These commanders were poltical appointees of the Ngo regime.

United States military chiefs in South Vietnam assured reporters that Ap Bac had been a Government "victory."

Growing popular discontent with the Ngo family began to come to an issue after Government troops opened fire and kill eight Buddhist demonstrators in the former imperial capital of Hue on May 8, 1963.

The crowd had been protesting a ban by President Diem, a Roman Catholic, on the flying of Buddhist flags. The incident set off a major crisis between the leaders of South Vietnam's Buddhist clergy and the Ngo family.

By that time the military advantage given to the Government by the massive American buildup had been overcome by Communist political and administrative gains in peasant villages.

VIETCONG STRENGTHENED

Throughout the spring, summer and fall of 1963 the Vietcong steadily increased their political, administrative and military strength in the countryside, especially in the key Mekong delta.

As the Buddhist crisis deepened, several monks burned themselves to death in protest. A massive crackdown on Buddhist and other dissidents brought United States support for the Ngo regime to an end.

In two days of shooting, Nov. 1 and 2, 1963, the Diem regime was overthrown. Both President Diem and his brother and principal adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated. A military junta under Gen. Duong Van Minh took over.

Taking advantage of gains they had made and the dislocation after the coup, the Vietcong then began a major offensive in the northern Mekong delta.

When the United States military buildup began in South Vietnam in November, 1961, the situation had been considered "critical" because the Vietcong had become strong enough to initiate no fewer than 1,782 attacks and small-scale incidents in that month.

But in November 1963, after two years of massive American military and economic aid, the number of Vietcong attacks and incidents jumped to 3,182 for the month.

Last Jan. 30, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh seized power in a bloodless coup d'etat.

Secretary of Defense McNamara arrived in March with a high-ranking American group, promising complete United States support for General Khanh and increases in military and economic aid.

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[From the New York Times, Oct. 9, 1966]

NOT A DOVE, BUT NO LONGER A HAWK

(By Neil Sheehan)

Americans, because they are Americans, arrive in Vietnam full of enthusiasm and with the best of intentions. After a prolonged period of residence, they leave with their enthusiasm a victim of the cynicism that pervades Vietnamese life and with their good intentions lost somewhere in a paddy field. I am no exception. When I first walked across the tarmac of Saigon's Tansonnhut Airport on a warm evening in April, 1962, nervous that the customs officers might

not accept the journalist's visa I had hurriedly obtained from the South Vietnamese consulate in Hong Kong, I believed in what my country was doing in Vietnam. With military and economic aid and a few thousand pilots and Army advisers, the United States was attempting to help the non-Communists Vietnamese build a viable and independent nation-state and defeat a Communist guerrilla insurgency that would subject them to a dour tyranny. This seemed to me a worthy cause and something that needed to be done if other Southeast Asian peoples were to be allowed some freedom of choice in determining their course in history. Although I often disagreed with the implementation of American policy during my first two years in Vietnam, I was in accord with its basic aims.

I remember distinctly the thrill of climbing aboard a U.S. Army helicopter in the cool of the morning and taking off across the rice fields with a South Vietnamese battalion for a day's jousting with the Vietcong guerrillas. There was hope then that the non-Communist Vietnamese might win their war. I was proud of the young American pilots sitting at the controls in the cockpit and I was grateful for the opportunity to witness this adventure and to report it. We are fighting now, I used to think, and some day we will triumph and this will be a better country.

There were many disappointments those first two years, but when I left Vietnam in 1964, I was still, to use the current parlance, a hawk. I returned to Saigon in 1965 for another year. Now I have left again, and much has changed. There were 17,000 American servicemen in Vietnam at the time of my first departure and there are now 317,000 and I, while not a dove, am no longer a hawk.

If I had been wiser and could have foreseen the present consequences of that earlier and relatively small-scale American intervention in the affairs of this country, I doubt that I would have been enthusiastic during those first two years. I realize now, perhaps because this past year has impressed upon me more forcefully the realities of the war and of Vietnamese society, that I was naive in believing the non-Communist Vietnamese could defeat the Communist insurgency and build a decent and progressive social structure.

At a farewell dinner before my second departure from Saigon, the conversation drifted to the endlesly discussed but never resolved problem of gaining the sympathy of the peasantry. My host was a Vietnamese general, involuntarily retired through the vagaries of Saigon politics. To amuse us, he recounted an episode that had occurred in mid-1953 while he was commander of Franco-Vietnamese troops in the province of Buichu in what is now Communist North Vietnam.

That year, the Vietminh guerrillas, as the Vietcong were formerly called, accelerated their land-reform program. Communist cadres began confiscating the rice fields of landlords and dividing them up among the peasantry. To compete with the Vietminh and to arouse some popular support for the cause of his feeble Government and for France, the pro-French Emperor, Bao Dai, issued a decree reducing land rents from the traditional 40 to 50 per cent of the rice crop to 15 per cent.

Buichu was a predominantly Roman Catholic province. The two principal landlords there were the Catholic Bishop and the father of the Interior Minister in Bao Dai's Government. My host knew he would have to gain the Bishop's cooperation if he was successfully to enforce the decree.

"Impossible," said the Bishop. "How can I feed 3,000 priests, nuns, seminarians and coolies on 15 per cent of the crop?"

"I agree, Your Excellency," said my host, "it will be difficult. But perhaps it is better to make sacrifices now while there is still time. If we don't do something to win the sympathy of the population, you may lose more than your rice. You may lose your Bishopric, your land and perhaps even your head."

"Impossible," said the Bishop. "I will write to the Interior Minister."

Three months later, for attempting to implement the decree despite the Bishop's opposition, my friend was removed on the initiative of the Interior Minister. By the following summer, the Vietminh were so strong in Buichu that the French decided to evacuate the province. The Bishop, his priests, nuns and seminarians fled to Hanoi and thence to South Vietnam when the Geneva accords shortly thereafter sealed France's defeat at Dienbienphu and divided Vietnam at the 17th Parallel.

Over the 13 years since 1953, the United States has supplanted France in Vietnam. Yet among the Vietnamese themselves, the two opposing sides have changed little.

Precolonial Vietnam was administered by mandarins drawn from the merchant and land-owning families. When France colonized the country in the 19th century, much of this native aristocracy became, in effect, colonial civil servants, intermediaries between their own people and the foreigner. During the First Indochina War these Vietnamese, with a stake in the traditional society which a French presence would preserve, cooperated with France. Now the same Vietnamese, for identical reasons, cooperate with the United States.

Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, the current Premier of South Vietnam, was a French pilot. On occasional visits to the countryside he appears before the peasants in a trim black flight suit with a lavender scarf around his neck and a pearl-handled pistol at his waist—a kind of Asian Captain Marvel.

The Deputy Premier, Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Huu Co, and other generals in the Saigon military junta, were officers or sergeants in the French colonial forces. Their fondness for French cuisine, snappy uniforms and cocktail parties and receptions creates a pale but faithful reflection of the social round of colonial days. They are the Vietnamese who have inherited the worst of two cultures—the pretentiousness of the native mandarins and the rigidity of the French colonial officers and administrators. Premier Ky and the earlier successors of Bao Dai have also promulgated rent-reduction and land-reform laws at the urging of American advisers eager for social progress. All of these measures have been sabotaged because the regimes were and are composed of men who are members of, or who are allied with, mandarin families that held title to properties they have no intention of renouncing. While there are some patriotic and decent individuals among them, most of the men who rule Saigon have, like the Bourbons, learned nothing and forgotten nothing. They seek to retain what privileges they have and to regain those they have lost.

In Vietnam, only the Communists represent revolution and social change, for better or worse according to a man's politics. The Communist party is the one truly national organization that permeates both North and South Vietnam. The men who lead the party today, Ho Chi Minh and the other members of the Politburo in Hanoi, directed the struggle for independence from France and in the process captured much of the deeply felt nationalism of the Vietnamese people. Perhaps because of this, the Communists, despite their brutality and deceit, remain the only Vietnamese capable of rallying millions of their countrymen to sacrifice and hardship in the name of the nation and the only group not dependent on foreign bayonets for survival.

It is the tragedy of Vietnam that what began as a war of independence from France developed, as a result of its Communist leadership, into a civil conflict. Attempts to describe the current war as a geographically based struggle between North and South Vietnam breaks down almost immediately when it is recalled that Premier Ky and several other important members of his Government are North Vietnamse by birth, who fled south after the French defeat, while Pham Van Dong, the Premier of North Vietnam, was born in the South. The war is, rather a struggle between different elements of the Vietnamese people as a whole.

The division of the country into two separate states at the 17th Parallel in 1954 was a provisional arrangement ending one scene in the drama. Vietnam's larger political realities extended then and still extend now in both directions across the demarcation line. North Vietnam controls and supports with men and matériel the Vietcong guerrillas in the South because the Vietcong leaders, although native Southerners, are members of the Vietnamese Communist party and obey orders from the Politburo in Hanoi.

In 1958 the late President Ngo Dinh Diem organized a Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam, and since 1960 the Saigon Government, with American connivance and aid, has been smuggling saboteurs and commando teams into the North in a so-far vain effort to instigate a guerrilla movement among the Northern Catholics and mountain tribesmen. The opposing sides, in short, have never recognized the 17th Parallel as a permanent boundary and have violated the frontier whenever it suited them.

Communist leadership of the anti-colonial movement led to the involvement of Vietnam in the larger context of the cold war and brought the intervention of the United States, first to aid the French and then to develop and support a non-Communist administration and army in the South. For its own strategic and political ends, the United States is thus protecting a non-Communist Vietnamese social structure that cannot defend itself and that perhaps does not deserve to be defended. Our responsibility for prolonging what is esesntially a

civil conflict may be one of the major reasons for the considerable amount of confusion, guilt and soul-searching among Americans over the Vietnam war.

I know this is true in my own case and in the case of many Americans of my acquaintance who have lived for long periods in Vietnam. We are continually chagrined to discover that idealism and dedication are largely the prerogative of the enemy. The American soldier makes the lack of aggressiveness of the Government forces the butt of unending gibes. He grows to hate "Charlie," the G.I. slang name for the Vietcong guerrilla and the North Vietnamese regular, because "Charlie" kills his friends, but he soon learns to respect Communist bravery and cunning.

An American general recently paid a strange tribute to a Vietcong guerrilla who held up an entire U.S. Army infantry company for an hour in the jungle north of Saigon. The guerrilla was the lone survivor of several Communists defending a bunker. He fired off all his own ammunition and that of his dead comrades, and hurled back at the Americans the grenades they tossed into the bunker. He was finally killed while throwing rocks in a last gesture of defiance. "If one of our men had fought like that," the general said, "he would have been awarded the Medal of Honor."

Since the beginning of last year, Hanoi has increased the size of its regular army contingent in the South to a total of about 47,000 men. In the face of sustained bombing of the road and rail system in the North and the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos, the Communists continue to infiltrate men at an estimated rate of 4,500 to 5,000 a month. Many of these young men are conscripts who march south because of pressure on themselves and their families. Yet, once in the South, they fight well, and desertions are few despite the hardships and the severe losses through disease and battle. The Vietcong guerrillas have also managed steadily to expand their forces through recruitment and conscription.

The Saigon regime, on the other hand, has experienced great difficulty in increasing the strength of its armed forces because of a very high desertion rate. Desertions are greatest among conscripts, an indication that the average South Vietnamese feels little or no commitment to defend his own society. About 85 percent of Saigon's armed forces are, consequently, volunteers who take up arms for pay. This gives the Government forces a distinctly mercenary cast that affects both their attitude toward the population and, except for a few elite units, their performance in combat.

From the contrast in behavior of the two sides, I can only conclude that Vietnamese will die more willingly for a regime which, though Communist, is at least genuinely Vietnamese and offers them some hope of improving their lives, than for one which is committed to the galling status quo and is the creation of Washington. The official assertion that the Communist soldier endures the appalling conditions of his daily life and behaves so commendably in combat out of terror of his superiors becomes patently ridiculous to anyone who has witnessed a battle. Terror may drive a man to march toward the enemy's guns, but it will not make him fight valiantly. The course of the conflict has made apparent that the Communists are able to arouse and to exploit the native Vietnamese qualities of hardihood and resilience, and to convince large numbers of their people that the cause of their Government is just.

Most non-Communist Vietnamese are incapable, because of the values of the society in which they live, of looking beyond individual and family interests. Their overwhelming concern with "me and my relatives" deprives the society of a social consciousness Americans take for granted in their own culture and fosters the corruption and nepotism that exist throughout the administration. The disease of corruption appears to be worsening in direct proportion to the burgeoning amounts of American aid flowing into the country. Stories of embezzlement are legion and repeatedly embitter Americans.

Province and district chiefs' positions are frequently sold to the highest bidders by those responsible for making the appointments. The incumbent is then expected both to recoup the cost of his job from corruption and to make payoffs to the higher officials who sold it to him. Some American officials with long experience in Vietnam estimate that about 20 per cent of United States aid supplied for counter-insurgency projects in the countryside finds its way to the Vietcong and that another 30 to 40 per cent is diverted by Government officials. Cement, roofing, steel bars and other building materials destined for schools and refugee housing mysteriously end up on the open market or in private villas and apartment buildings. "What gets down to the poor son of a bitch in the paddy field," one official said, "is a trickle." A U.S. Army Special Forces captain once told me how he had arranged for rice to be flown

in American planes to a camp of several thousand refugees in a remote area who were suffering from malnutrition. The local district chief confiscated the rice and sold it to the refugees at exorbitant prices.

While Americans worry about winning the war and creating an effective Vietnamese Government that can gain the support of its people, the mandarin families that run the regime have a different set of priorities. In one important province on the central coast this spring a rare honest and effective Vietnamese official, who was a favorite of the Americans, was fired because he began to talk about corruption by the two senior military commanders in the region. He was replaced by a cousin of one of the generals.

Numerous complaints from the American Embassy led Premier Ky to warn his fellow generals at one meeting of the junta that they were embezzling too much and should exercise some restraint. Their reply was that they had to think of their families. Vows by the Premier that corrupt officials will be shot have brought periodic headlines in the Saigon newspapers and the execution of one Chinese businessman and a half-dozen common hoodlums. Ordinary Vietnamese assume that Premier Ky has found it imprudent to arrange firing squads for some of his colleagues on the junta. One general's wife is sometimes referred to as "Queen of the Payoff."

Promises of land reform are solemnly reported in the American press and are apparently taken with some seriousness in official circles in Washington. I have often wondered why, since the promises are never carried out and the speeches made today are practically identical in content and phrasing to those made four years ago by some other Government leader. To gain their own ends, Asians frequently tell Americans what they think Americans want to hear. The Vietnamese, possibly because of their greater experience with Americans, seem to have developed a particular talent for this. Last April, during one of his more candid moments, Premier Ky told a group of correspondents: "Never believe what any Vietnamese tells you, including me."

In February, amid the hoopla following the Honolulu conference that was to lead to an intensive program of social, political and economic reform, the junta organized a "Social Revolution Day" in Saigon. Two thousand civil servants, soldiers, students and religious leaders were assembled on the lawn of the former presidential palace in the center of the city. The social reformers arrived in their Mercedes-Benz sedans and, dressed in well-tailored suits or bemedaled uniforms, began to read the usual speeches. The scene had a disturbing atmosphere of déjà vu. Within 10 minutes, a segment of the crowd, less polite than the rest, began walking out in boredom. The police, having apparently anticipated what would happen, had locked the gates of the palace grounds. No one was allowed to leave until the speeches had ended, despite a good deal of shouting and arguing back and forth through the steel bars.

The current social system discriminates against the poor and prevents social mobility. The mandarin families resist all efforts to change it, since it works in their favor. Although the United States has spent millions of dollars building primary schools in Vietnam, for example, it has been unable to bring about any fundamental reform of the Vietnamese educational structure, which makes certain that the sons of the prosperous, and almost no one else, will achieve the secondary education necessary to social advancement—whether in the army, the civil service or the professions.

Sending a peasant boy to primary school and then making it virtually impossible for him to achieve a decent secondary-school education fosters discontent, rather than lessening it. There is considerable evidence that many young Vietnamese of peasant origin join the Vietcong because the Communists, who have been forced by the nature of their revolution to develop leadership from the countryside, offer them their best hope of avoiding a life on the rung of the ladder when they began—at the bottom.

A friend of mine once visited a hamlet with a South Vietnamese Army major who is one of the few field grade officers to defeat the system by rising from a humble beginning. The major spoke to the farmers in peasant dialect instead of in the sophisticated urban Vietnamese most Government officials use.

"You're not a major," said one farmer in astonishment.

"Yes, I am," said the major.

"No, you're not," said the farmer. "You talk like a peasant and no peasant could become a major."

A drive through Saigon demonstrates another fashion in which the social system works. Virtually all the new construction consists of luxury apartments, hotels and office buildings financed by Chinese businessmen or affluent Vietna-

mese with relatives or connections within the regime. The buildings are destined to be rented to Americans. Saigon's workers live, as they always have, in fetid slums on the city's outskirts.

Since 1954, the United States has poured more than $3.2 billion of economic aid into South Vietnam, but no Saigon regime has ever undertaken a low-cost housing project of any size. The Singapore Government, in contrast, is erecting thousands of low-cost housing units for its people.

While Vietnamese with influence prosper in the cities and towns, the war has created a different world in the countryside. It is a world in which the masses of the peasantry no longer live—they endure.

Each afternoon, in the air-conditioned press-briefing room in Saigon, the United States Military Command releases a communiqué reporting that 300 or more "enemy structures" have been destroyed by American fighter-bombers or by the guns of Seventh Fleet warships that day. The statistics imply sound military progress until a visit to the countryside reveals that what is meant by an "enemy structure" is usually a peasant hut in a hamlet the Communists control, or which the American and South Vietnamese authorities suspect the Communists control.

No comprehensive statistics on civilian casualties are available. The nature of the war would make the assembling of such statistics very difficult, but the military authorities have also never seriously attempted to gather them.

An indication of what civilian casualties may be, however, is given by the fact that American and other foreign medical teams working in three-quarters of the country's 43 provinces treat 2,000 civilian war-wounded each month. If one accepts the normal military ratio of one dead for two wounded, the monthly figure is 1,000 civilian dead.

The number of wounded handled by the medical teams, I believe from my own observation, is merely a fraction of the total. The medical terms treat only those wounded who reach the hospitals in provincial capitals. There are undoubtedly many more who never get that far. These victims are helped at Government district headquarters of militia outposts, or by Vietcong field hospitals and dispensaries—or they simply survive, or die, without treatment. Most of the wounds I have seen in the provincial hospitals are the type a victim could survive for two or three days without medical attention. Wounds that require rapid treatment are not usually in evidence, presumably because the victims die before they can obtain hospitalization.

Although civilians are being killed and wounded by both sides, my own investigations have indicated that the majority of civilians casualties result from American and South Vietnamese airstrikes and artillery and naval gunfire. Last November, I found one fishing village in Quangngai province, on the central coast north of Saigon, in which at least 180 persons—and possibly 600—had been killed during the previous two months by aircraft and Seventh Fleet destroyers. The five hamlets that composed the village, once a prosperous community of 15,000 people, had been reduced to rubble.

The gun and the knife of the Vietcong assassin are, in contrast, far more selective than cannon and fragmentation bombs; the victims are usually limited to Government officials and sympathizers. It has been estimated that, over the past decade, about 20,000 persons have been assassinated by Communist terrorists. This is a gruesome total, but the annual average is a great deal lower than the probable yearly number of ordinary civilian victims of the war.

Lack of sufficient American troops to occupy and hold ground when it has been wrested from the Communists is one of the major reasons for the extent of damage to civilian life and property. Once a battle has ended, the American and South Vietnamese troops withdraw. The theoretical follow-up by South Vietnamese territorial forces, police and administrators to pacify the region does not materialize except in a very limited number of instances, and the Vietcong guerrillas and their North Vietnamese allies move in again. The Americans eventually return and the same region is thus fought over repeatedly.

It would be easy to blame the American military authorities for the destruction, but this would not be fair. The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese regulars habitually fortify hamlets with elaborate trenchwork and bunker systems. Infantry attacking in classic style across open paddy fields would suffer prohibitive casualties. Under these circumstances, military commanders can only be expected to use whatever force is at their disposal.

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the United States military commander in Vietnam, has ordered that all possible care be taken to avoid killing and wounding the innocent and that, whenever feasible, civilians be warned to leave their

hamlets prior to airstrikes and artillery bombardments. Unfortunately, General Westmoreland's order has sometimes been ignored by subordinate commanders.

Hamlets are also habitually bombed and shelled at the request of a South Vietnamese province or district chief who has been told by some paid informer that Communist troops are present there. Information from informers is notoriously unreliable, the peasants are often not responsible for the presence of the Communists and, since ground units do not exploit the bombings and shellings, these attacks seem to have negligible military value. American officials excuse the practice by claiming that the Vietnamese, as the legal authorities, have the right to destroy their own hamlets, even if Americans perform the destructive acts—a fine bit of legalism that ignores the basic moral issue. I have occasionally thought that the practice results largely from the cynicism of South Vietnamese officialdom and a superfluity of aircraft and artillery.

The extraordinary firepower of American weaponry, whose ferocity must be witnessed to be comprehended, is another contributing factor to widespread civilian suffering. On an average day, U.S. warplanes alone loose 175 to 200 tons of explosives on the South Vietnamese countryside. Then there are the thousands of artillery and naval shells and the hundreds of thousands of rounds of mortar and small-arms ammunition. The cratered landscape seen from an airplane window is an excellent advertisement for the ingenuity of American munitions makers.

The flow of refugees from the countryside is the most eloquent evidence available of the gradual destruction of rural society under the impact of the war. The number of refugees has now passed the million mark. It takes a great deal to make a Vietnamese peasant forsake his land and the graves of his ancestors.

Most refugees I have questioned told me that the Vietcong taxed them and made them work harder than usual, but that they could live with the Communists. They left their homes, they said, because they could no longer bear American and South Vietnamese bombs and shells.

If resettled properly, the refugees could conceivably develop into an asset for the Saigon Government. Yet, true to its usual behavior, the regime neglects them and the majority are left to shift for themselves. Refugee slums have risen in the cities almost as fast as G.I. bars.

Deserted hamlets and barren rice fields, now a common sight, are other evidence of what the war is doing to rural South Vietnam. In several provinces on the northern central coast as much as one-third of the rice land has been forsaken. The American policy of killing crops in Communist-held areas by spraying them with chemical defoliants from aircraft is hastening this process. During the first six months of this year 59,000 acres were destroyed.

The corrosive effect on the country of the American presence is not confined to military operations. Economically and culturally, the advent of the Americans has introduced maladies only time can cure. One is inflation. The primitive economy, already seriously disrupted by the war, has now been swamped by the purchasing power of tens of millions of dollars being dispensed for the construction of bases, airfields and port facilities and by the free spending of the individual American soldier.

This year the United States will pump a minimum of $140-million into the Vietnamese economy to cover the locally generated costs of the construction of new bases and the maintenance of existing ones. This sum constitutes about one-seventh of the country's entire money supply. American troops are themselves currently spending another $7-million a month.

The moral degeneration caused by the G.I. culture that has mushroomed in the cities and towns is another malady. Bars and bordellos, thousands of young Vietnamese women degrading themselves as bar girls and prostitutes, gangs of hoodlums and beggars and children selling their older sisters and picking pockets have become ubiquitous features of urban life. I have sometimes thought, when a street urchin with sores covering his legs, stopped me and begged for a few cents' worth of Vietnamese piastres, that he might be better off growing up as a political commissar. He would then, at least, have some self-respect.

Rarely in any war has the name of the people been evoked more by both sides than in the Vietnam conflict. Yet the Vietnamese peasantry, who serve as cannon fodder for Communists and non-Communists, remain curiously mute—a hushed Greek chorus to their own tragedy.

The conditions of life in Vietnam will probably always make an accurate assessment of the peasants' attitudes toward the war impossible to obtain. I have received the impression, however, on visits to accessible hamlets, that

many of the peasants are so weary of the fighting they would accept any settlement that brought them peace.

Last March, I spent two days in one hamlet south of the port of Danang on the central coast. A company of U.S. Marines had seized the hamlet from the Vietcong six months previously, and a Government pacification team, protected by the Marines, was working there. In three years, the hamlet had changed hands three times. There were almost no young men in the community. Roughly half of the families had sons, brothers or husbands in the Communist ranks. The remaining families were about equally divided between those with neutral attitudes and those who were Government sympathizers.

The morning after I arrived, the peasants, under the supervision of the Government pacification workers, began constructing a fence around the hamlet perimeter to keep out Vietcong infiltrators. Through an interpreter, I asked two farmers among a group of old men, women and children digging postholes, if they thought the fence would be of any use.

"Maybe it will," one said, "but I don't think so. A fence won't keep out the Vietcong."

"What did the Vietcong make you do when they controlled the hamlet?" I asked.

"They made us pull down the fence we had put up before, and dig trenches and lay booby traps," the second farmer said.

"Well, if you don't think the fence will do any good," I asked, "why are you putting it up?"

"We are just plain farmers," the first peasant said, glancing apprehensively at a policeman a few feet away with a carbine slung across his arm. "We have to obey any Government here."

As he spoke, a Vietcong sniper, hidden in a patch of sugar cane beyond the paddy fields, fired two shots. The old men, women and children scurried for cover, their fear and lack of enthusiasm for fence-building evident on their faces.

During a tour of South Vietnam in 1963, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, referred to the conflict as a "dirty little war." While the Vietnam conflict may be even dirtier now that it was in 1963, it can no longer be termed little.

Reliable statistics are very elusive in Vietnam, but I would estimate that at least 250,000 persons have been killed since the war began in 1957. Last year, according to official figures, 34,585 Communists were killed and the Saigon Government forces suffered 11,200 deaths. Through mid-September of this year, again according to official statistics, 37,299 Vietcong and North Vietnamese regulars have died in battle and 7,017 Government troops have been killed.

American losses remained at a relatively low level until 1965, when the Johnson Administration committed ground combat units and began to create an expeditionary corps. That year, 1,369 American servicemen died in North and South Vietnam and neighboring Laos, and 6,114 were wounded. This year, as American offensive operations have picked up stride with the strenthening of the logistical apparatus, casualties have soared to 3,524 killed and 21,107 wounded, through mid-September. American dead are now averaging nearly a hundred a week and can be expected to increase as the expeditionary corps grows and more Americans are exposed to hostile fire.

The attitudes of the leadership in Hanoi and Washington indicate that the contest is far from being resolved. The rate at which North Vietnam is infiltrating its regular troops into the South and the willingness of the United States to engage its own ground forces and to escalate the air war against the North portend several more years of serious bloodshed. The world may hope for peace, but neither side has yet hurt the other sufficiently to prevent it from continuing. Both sides are trapped in a dilemma created by their history and political and strategic considerations. Washington cannot withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, as Hanoi demands, without making certain an eventual Communist seizure of power there and negating all the efforts of the last decade to maintain a friendly Government in Saigon.

Hanoi's best chance of winning now lies in prolonging the bloodletting to the point where the American public will tire of a war for a small land whose name most Americans cannot even pronounce correctly (they tend to say "Veetnam"). If the North de-escalates the fighting it will remove the principal source of political pressure on the Johnson Administration—the number of coffins being flown home from Saigon. Without the killing, the United States might be able to occupy South Vietnam indefinitely. The fact that 60,000 U.S. troops are sta-

tioned in South Korea brings no demonstrators into the streets and arouses no anxiety among American mothers, because the shooting in Korea has stopped.

A year ago, I worried that the patience of the American people would run out, that Ho Chi Minh would have his way and that the United States would lose the Vietnam war. This fear no longer troubles me nearly as much. I have the feeling that somehow we can muddle through this grim business. We may not win in Vietnam as we won in World War II, yet we may well prevail. Given our overwhelming military superiority, it is entirely possible that Washington, over a period of years, may be able to destroy the Vietcong and North Vietnamese main-force units in the South, and to transform what is currently a military sound but politically weak position into one of some, if doubtful, political strength.

Rather, my quiet worry concerns what we are doing to ourselves in the course of prosecuting and possibly some day winning this war. In World War II and in Korea the aggression of one state against another was an established fact. The United States acted with clear moral justification and Americans fought as they always like to think they fight—for human freedom and dignity. In Vietnam this moral superiority has given way to the amorality of great power politics, specifically, to the problem of maintaining the United States as the paramount power in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese people have become mere pawns in the struggle. Whatever desires they might possess have become incidental. The United States can no longer make any pretense of fighting to safeguard South Vietnam's independence. The prescence of 317,000 American troops in the country has made a mockery of its sovereignty and the military junta in Saigon would not last a week without American bayonets to protect it.

Precisely because the Saigon Government represents nothing beyond its administration and army, the United States has had to fall back on its own military force to maintain its position and to win the war. Washington can dispense the latest in weaponry, but the First Air Cavalry Division and the Third Marine Amphibious Force cannot inspire the loyalty of the Vietnamese peasantry, and General Motors cannot manufacture decent non-Communist Vietnamese leadership, effective government and dedication. Only Vietnamese can supply these and the non-Communist Vietnamese have proven themselves incapable of providing them.

Thus, in the final analysis, American strategy in Vietnam consists of creating a killing machine in the form of a highly equipped expeditionary corps and then turning this machine on the enemy in the hope that over the years enough killing will be done to force the enemy's collapse through exhaustion and despair. This strategy, although possibly the only feasible alternative open to a modern industrial power in such a situation, is of necessity brutal and heedless of many of its victims.

Despite these misgivings, I do not see how we can do anything but continue to prosecute the war. We can and should limit the violence and the suffering being inflicted on the civilians as much as possible, but, for whatever reasons, successive Administrations in Washington have carried the commitment in Vietnam to the point where it would be very difficult to prevent any precipitate retreat from degenerating into a rout. If the United States were to disengage from Vietnam under adverse conditions, I believe that the resulting political and psychological shockwaves might undermine our entire position in Southeast Asia. We shall, I am afraid, have to put up with our Vietnamese mandarin allies. We shall not be able to reform them and it is unlikely that we shall be able to find any other Vietnamese willing to cooperate with us. We shall have to continue to rely mainly on our military power, accept the odium attached to its use and hope that someday this power will bring us to a favorable settlement.

But I simply cannot help worrying that, in the process of waging this war, we are corrupting ourselves. I wonder, when I look at the bombed-out peasant hamlets, the orphans begging and stealing on the streets of Saigon and the women and children with napalm burns lying on the hospital cots, whether the United States or any nation has the right to inflict this suffering and degradation on another people for its own ends. And I hope we will not, in the name of some anti-communist crusade, do this again.

### PRAISE FOR CHAIRMAN'S CONDUCT OF COMMITTEE

Senator MORSE. Those are all my questions. But in closing the hearing this morning, and you can close your ears for a moment, Mr. Chairman, but because of certain observations that have become

a matter of public record, I want the record to show that I highly commend your leadership of this committee and the manner in which you are conducting these hearings, and your interrogation of witnesses.

They have been fact-searching questions. They speak for themselves. But to characterize them as slanted questions, in my judgment, is answered by a reading of the questions themselves.

I want the record also to show that you have followed the procedure, as chairman of this committee, that the committee itself has approved, because when there was an attempt within the committee to limit members to a ten-minute rule, it was rejected and there was the approval that each man should be his own judge of the necessary period of time that he found necessary to take to complete the approach that he wanted to make in the examination of the witnesses, which is the way it should be.

Furthermore, as one who is ready any time to support a resolution that would bring to an end our system of seniority in the Senate, so long as it exists, I am going to see that it is enforced, and there is not a single member of this committee, I care not how junior he is, who is not given the opportunity to question a witness before the witness is excused by the committee.

Just the other afternoon, for example, the Chairman called the committee back in session because we could not finish all the examination of the morning session, and some members did not come back for that questioning. That is their responsibility, and I imagine they were very busy and could not come back.

But I think it is very unfortunate, Mr. Chairman, to have the notion go out across this country that the chairman of this committee is not conducting these hearings in complete consonance with the instructions of the committee.

I want to say that the overwhelming majority of this committee have time and time again expressed their complete confidence in the work of the chairmanship of the Senator from Arkansas. I want the record to show that he and I do not always agree on substantive matters, but I want him to know that I have great admiration for his fairness and impartiality in carrying out his duties as chairman of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that statement from the Senator from Oregon.

I know it is difficult to please so many in such a large committee, and some people get impatient. But it is unfortunate that this is necessarily so. I suppose I was impatient, too, but I do not know any better answer to it than the rules we have.

I must say that the effort to discredit this witness because of something another journalist said did not appeal to me very much. It did not seem to me that that was the purpose of this hearing.

I just have one or two things for the record.

You have reported, I believe, your experiences to the State Department, have you not?

Mr. SALISBURY. I have, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I thought.

### DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND NONMILITARY TARGETS

In following the questioning of the Senator from Missouri, which was quite searching and obviously extremely well prepared, with full

statistics, it occurred to me that the assumption that this Nation can, or any nation can, perform this pinpoint bombing efficiently to the point of not killing large numbers of civilians is an unwarranted assumption. This is an assumption of perfection which conditions simply do not justify. Is that true? In other words, it could not be otherwise. It is just not that good.

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not see how it could. My observation of all military matters is that wars are won by the fellow who makes one less mistake than the other guy.

The CHAIRMAN. But to believe, as the policy stated, that now we are going to target only military targets is difficult. In the first place, you have a very difficult job in determining the distinction between a military and a nonmilitary target, do you not?

Mr. SALISBURY. You do, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. As you already described everybody with a bicycle could be considered a military objective, because as you said, the war would end if they stopped the bicycles, did you not?

Mr. SALISBURY. That is right, absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. So this seems to me to be the concept of what had been called surgical bombing to avoid the killing of civilians, is basically faulty.

Mr. SALISBURY. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. You agree with that?

Mr. SALISBURY. I agree with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then why argue about all of these little details. It cannot be done. We are—I hesitate to say—arrogant in assuming such perfection, but we are. It is just something than cannot be done. No other country can do it.

Mr. SALISBURY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to pursue this matter.

### CONTENTION THAT NORTH AND SOUTH ARE ONE PEOPLE

I think that if it has not been put in the record, your article dated January 5, on your interview with Mr. Tien, should be put in the record. It is a short one. I think we will put the whole series in the record. They ought to be there because they are very interesting, and should be in one place to refer to.

(The articles referred to appear in the appendix.)

I was particularly interested in this passage which you wrote, and I wondered whether you have any second thoughts about it:

"He"—that is, Tien—"emphasized that north and south were one people and one nation and engaged in a common struggle and said that this was why each had the right to demand aid from the other."

Did you pursue this question of whether they are one people or not?

Mr. SALISBURY. I did not go much further with it than what is indicated in that article. This is the basic assumption that you find in speaking to anyone in North Vietnam, that it is all one nation, but from the practical standpoint both the people in the Front and in Hanoi realize that it has been divided, and it was my impression that they are prepared to see it stay divided for a considerable period of time and, indeed, that they have no specific plans for putting it together again at the present moment.

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PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG INTERVIEW

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, I also want the Pham Van Dong interview inserted in the record.

(The document referred to appears in the appendix.)

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A NORTHERNER AND A SOUTHERNER

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is at least a tenable position on their part that it is a country, a single country, with a relatively homogeneous racial background. Is that correct?

Mr. SALISBURY. That is true, although the differences between the north and the south, the sort of cultural differences, are somewhat greater than I expected to find. I found that I could quite readily identify a southerner in the northern atmosphere.

Senator MORSE. That is true in this country, is it not?

Mr. SALISBURY. I have heard that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to ask you, are the differences any greater or less than they are in this country?

Mr. SALISBURY. They are less.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. The differences are less?

Mr. SALISBURY. The differences are less than they are in this country. [Laughter.]

Senator MORSE. Don't overtry your case.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe I had better not press you on that by specifying in what respect.

MR. SALISBURY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMITTEE

It is very interesting. There are a lot of other questions. It is too late, I think. It is a quarter past one. I find, Mr. Salisbury, your articles to be extremely interesting, and I think your testimony this morning has been most enlightening.

It is very difficult for us, and I feel as if I were operating in the dark, not having available people who have had any firsthand information about what we are dealing with in this whole affair. So you really have made a great contribution to this committee.

So you really have made a great contribution to this committee.

I hope that the country will take notice not only of your articles, but of your testimony this morning. We are very grateful to you for coming and giving us your time.

I know it is very unpleasant and, from the point of view of time and comfort, to have the insinuation made in some way that your testimony is compromised by your association with Herbert Matthews, or anybody else. I apologize for it, but there is no feasible way under our system that I can prevent it.

APPROVAL OF CONSULAR TREATY URGED

I have one last question on another matter. You need not answer it, but it is a matter before us, and I ask it only because of your long service in the Soviet Union and other places.

Would you care to express your opinion about the wisdom of our approving the Consular Treaty presently before us? You would be

perfectly justified in not answering it, but you do know about the conditions in Russia, you know about the conditions that Americans encounter in traveling there, living there, the possibilities of espionage. You know all of the aspects. It is only for that reason that I ask. Do you think it is wise or not for us to approve the Consular Treaty?

Mr. SALISBURY. I would say that it would be very wise on several counts. I think it would be good from the standpoint of general relations with the Soviet Union. I think it would be very good as a step toward normalcy.

I would say so far as I myself am concerned, if I had to go and visit the Soviet Union I would feel much safer and much better protected if I knew there were additional American consuls or that there were American consulates available in the Soviet Union.

I wish they had been there in the years when I worked there. I think it is a very useful function that they serve.

I do not really see what the basis of the opposition may be. I know the question has been raised of the consuls, the Soviet consuls, in this country and the danger of espionage. But it would seem to me we have wonderful agencies in this country who are dedicated to preventing espionage, and I should think that this would be within their competence and ability to handle it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell is here. I had not noticed your coming in.

Senator PELL. I am late.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize.

### PRAISE FOR MR. SALISBURY

Senator PELL. I am late and I just wanted to say how much I, too, benefited from reading Mr. Salisbury's articles, and I congratulate him on their clarity. I wish him well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Well, Mr. Salisbury, we are greatly in your debt. Thank you so much.

The committee will meet tomorrow, in our regular room, to hear certain witnesses in opposition to the Consular Treaty.

The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.)

# APPENDIX

## Report on U.S. War Crimes in Nam-Dinh City

(Committee for the Investigation of U.S. Imperialists' War Crimes in Vietnam of Nam Hà Province, October 1966)

In their air war of destruction against the DRV, the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen have perpetrated innumerable crimes: massacre of civilians, destruction of property, devastation of populated areas, many prosperous towns and villages in North Vietnam. Namdinh city is one of their victims.

It is a densely populated area with a population consisting of 93,000 mostly of women and children crowding an area of over 5 square kilometers. Namdinh's population density is very high: 17,000 people per square kilometer. The city lies in the middle of an expanse of paddy fields on the right bank of the Red River, South of the Dao canal, South West of the Bay River, and 30 kms from the seacoast.

Namdinh is also a well known textile city. After the last devastating 9 year war, it spent 11 years restoring and expanding its Textile Complex. Series of new factories have been built. Nearly all of the population of Namdinh are workers and handicraftsmen working in factories among which the Textile Complex which employs 13,000 workers of whom 70 percent are women. Handicraftsmen alone number nearly ten thousand.

Namdinh is also a famous cultural centre of North Vietnam. It boasts ancient historical sites and natural beauty spots such as the "Scholar Campus", the Scholar Lane, The Vixuyên Lake etc. * * * The talented poet Tran-ke-Xuong was born there. Continuing Namdinh's cultural tradition, general education schools have been vigorously developed. Namdinh city has 2 schools of the third level, 6 schools of the second level and 20 of the first level, with a total enrolment of 24,066 pupils. Besides there are many vocational schools such as assistant-doctor school, technical school No 3, school of Architecture etc. Nam Dinh city has a big polyclinic with modern equipment and numerous beds, sanitary stations, maternity houses, nurseries, kindergartens, cinemas, theatres and other public utilities. The workers' living quarter is one of the city's biggest installations.

### I. U.S. WAR CRIMES

U.S. war crimes against the religious and non-religious people have kept on increasing. Up to July 20, 1966, in 1,135 sorties, they carried out 270 strafings and dropped over 2,000 bombs of all types (some localities received thousands of shrapnel bombs), fired 1,800 rockets and hundreds of missiles on many villages, dykes etc. Their air attacks against Nam Dinh city have been more atrocious for the civilian population.

In the early days of 1965 the peaceful life of Nam Dinh's people began to be directly menaced by the U.S. aggressors.

On January 17, 1965 at 10:37 a.m. (local time) a reconnaissance plane flew over the city at the altitude of 16 kms. On May 14, 1965, 4 jets carried out another reconnaissance flight over the city.

After a few months of reconnaissance, on June 28, 1965, at 7:30 a.m. (local time) when it was cloudy and raining hard 2 F.105s and 2 F.4Hs from 11 kms south of the city launched 2 Bullpup missiles on the living quarters of the textile workers. The first surprise attack killed 10 civilians including 2 old men and 3 children, and wounded 12 others. During this raid, 5 members of the family of weaver Hoang Thi Sinh were killed (3 children among them).

From early 1965 to September 20, 1966, the U.S. aggressors conducted 33 air-raids over Nam Dinh city (11 times in 1965 and 22 times in the first 9 months of 1966). If night attacks are to be mentioned, from 3 night air strikes in 1965, they were brought to 11 in the first 9 months of this year.

The American aggressors bombed and strafed many densely populated districts of the city like Hang Thao, Hoang Van Thu, Hang Cau streets, the workers' living quarters and so on. They bombed the Textile Complex when the weavers were working and blew up the dyke protecting the city. The U.S. aggressors went to the length of destroying hospitals, schools, nurseries, kindergartens and even churches and pagodas.

In their bombings and strafings of the city they have used various ultra-modern planes such as A.4A, A.6A, A.3J, F.105, F.4H, RB.57 * * *. They have showered over Nam Dinh more than 700 bombs totaling 200 tons, including MK.81, MK.82, MK.83, MK.84 * * *, fired 54 Bullpups and 248 rockets. Particularly, in the two raids of August 4, 1965, and May 31, 1966, the Americans flew in as many as 27 planes of all types and poured more than one hundred bombs on the city each time.

In an attempt to carry out their extremely savage schemes, U.S. pilots have deliberately and wickedly resorted to surprise attacks. From the 7th Fleet, U.S. Navy aircraft made a quick dash through 30 kms from the coast to the city, flying at various low altitudes and in different directions along the basins of the Red River and Day River, or at times very high, hiding themselves amidst dark clouds in rainy days or in morning mist. Most disastrous for the civilians were the 14 sneaky night raids by Yankee murderers between mid-1965 and September 20, 1966.

During the 33 abovesaid air attacks against Nam Dinh, they caused many losses in lives and property to the city's inhabitants, 89 persons were killed, among them 23 children, 36 women, and 405 wounded, among them 81 women, 44 old men and 41 children. 881 dwelling houses (accounting for 13 per cent of the city housing) with an area of 86,847 square metres, were destroyed, leaving 12,464 inhabitants homeless.

Losses in housing after the two raids on Hang Thao and Hoang Van Thu streets alone amounted to millions of dongs (Vietnamese currency).

Many industrial and handicraft enterprises were attacked like the Textile Complex.

Together with dozens of most savage attacks on dykes and hydraulic works in Nam Ha province, U.S. planes bombed 3 times the dyke network surrounding the city, seriously threatening the life of the inhabitants in the province and the city.

While strafing Nam Dinh's populous quarters, the U.S. aggressors did not spare hospitals, schools, nurseries and kindergartens. The city's hospital was bombed twice, and its consulting room, maternity room and X-ray room damaged. Than Quoc Toan, Nguyen Van Cu, Ho Tung Mau schools were also destroyed by the Yankees. A kindergarten in the Textile Complex was bombed time and again; many buildings razed to the ground and equipment damaged. Fortunately, all the children had been evacuated to safety. As public welfare facilities, hospitals were built in special areas with visible Red Cross marking; schools and nurseries bore no sign which might cause them to be mistaken for military targets. Churches, pagodas, holy sites with religious symbols have been indiscriminately strafed, damaged and wrecked by U.S. planes.

Following are some typical air raids in which the U.S. aggressors mercilessly bombed and strafed several populated quarters:

(*a*) The April 14, 1966 air raid over Hang Thao street was one of these biggest deliberate U.S. attacks on human lives.

Hang Thao street was a populous one, with a population of 17,680. People had evacuated before April 14, 1966, and there were only 2,300 left. They were workers and handicraftsmen who had to stick to their factories, enterprises and cooperatives to live and work.

Before attacking Hang Thao street, U.S. aircraft had carried out 7 reconnaissance flights over Nam Dinh.

At 10:35 a.m. (local time) on December 1, 1965, 2 F.8Us flew in from the South West;

At 7:02 a.m. (local time) on December 12, 1965, 2 A.4s flew in from the South East direction of the city;

At 10:32 a.m. (local time) on December 18, 1965, 6 aircraft flew over the the city;

At 2 p.m. (local time) on January 12, 1966, 2 F.4s flew over the Southern part of the city;

At 3:35 p.m. (local time) on February 4, 1966, 2 four-plane formations operating in the South East and South West, 20 kilometers from the city, dropping anti-radar materials on the city;

At 1:05 p.m. on February 18, 1966, 2 F.8Us flew from the South West to the North, 9 kms from the city;

At 1:06 p.m. on February 7, 1966, an unmanned plane flew over the city. At 6:30 a.m., when those who had just come back from a night shift were still sleeping, those who were about to work were having breakfast, women were getting ready for their shopping or for their house work, and children were getting ready for the kindergartens or infant classes, two U.S. planes came flying at low altitude along Ninh Binh Highway No. 10 and furtively intruded into Hang Thao, Hang Cau, Tran Hung Dao streets and Ben Thoo area, dropped 8 MK.84 bombs killing 49 people, among them 15 children, 8 old men, 20 women, wounding 135 people, and destroying 240 houses on an area of 31,440 square metres in which 810 households with 4,129 people were living.

Recalling Hang Thao street raid, nobody can forget the grievous losses caused by the U.S. aggressors.

Mr. Tran Dang Van, 30, married to Nguyen Thi Kim Dung living at No. 28 Hang Thao street, was manager of Van Tuong Tailoring Co-operative. On April 14, which was the anniversary of his father's death, his brothers and sisters gathered at his house. On April 14 morning, Van went to his shop. Having finished feeding her baby, his sister Hoi was getting ready for her shopping. Her husband Xanh was sitting in a hammock, fondling his first baby, Vo Thi Thu Ha, who was five months old. The two sisters were busy buying things for the anniversary of their father's death at Dragon Market, when suddenly they heard a terrible bomb explosion. Seeing high columns of smoke in Hang Thao street direction, they rushed home. In their street they saw demolished houses and corpses all over the ground. What remained of their houses was only heaps of debris. Dung rushed to the tailoring co-operative's shop; it was also demolished. Together with the cadres of the district, she calmly cleared the ruins and it was not until 8 a.m. on April 15, 1966, that she found her husband's body still holding a pair of scissors in a hand. As for Hoi, together with her relatives, she cleared the debris of her house and at 9 a.m. on April 14, 1966, she found Xanh's corpse, still holding little Thu Ha, both wrapped up in the hammock. Nam Dinh citizens will never forget what Hoi said: "I didn't expect that the death anniversary of my father would also be that of my husband, brother and first child".

Mrs. Nguyen Thi Quy, 36, became a widow in 1963, when she was expecting her fourth baby Kieu Dung. She worked hard to bring up her four children: Nguyen Cao Thang, 11; Thanh Huong, 8; Thanh Thuy, 6, and Kieu Dung, 3. In May 1965, she evacuated her three daughters to Ninh Cuong village, Truc Ninh district. Thang went to Thanh Hoa to live with his great uncle. She remained in the city to produce joss-sticks. After some months as she missed them very much, her mother agreed to let her bring back her three daughters to the city to spend some days with her.

The three children were very happy, they sang and danced all day long. On April 14, they got up early. No sooner had Mrs. Quy gone down to the kitchen to take the pot of soup, than a bomb exploded by her, wounded her in a leg. With the help of a stick she came up to see what had happened to her children but found no traces of them. The people in her street had to spend a lot of time digging out their corpses buried in the ground. Those three pretty children had been killed by U.S. aggressors. There were only three pairs of shoes left.

Mrs. Dang Thi Suu, 42, is Mr. Cay's wife. Her two elder children were already working, her five younger ones evacuated to Thai Binh. Her youngest child was Tran Thi To Hoan, 4 years old. In the beginning of April 1966, as she had measles, Mrs. Cay brought her back to the city to look after her. From the evacuation place, her brother Thai, 13, came to the city to bring her back. No sooner had Thai stepped out of the house with his sister on his back, than both were killed by U.S. bombs. Little Hung, Mrs. Suu's second son, was killed by a bomb splinter piercing his side and another blasting off his upper jaw. Mrs. Suu became almost mad and together with the cadres of the district she took her children to the infirmary. Hardly had she laid them in bed, when the first-aid cadres carried her husband in. He suffered from a bomb blast and was wounded in the head by bomb splinters. Mr. Cay asked his wife: "How are children?" Facing the family's tragedy, in order to set her dying husband's mind at peace she answered: "Don't worry dear, they are all right". Not long after that, Mr. Cay died. Together

with the cadres of the district, Mrs. Cay buried her husband and children. She suppressed her suffering and resumed giving first-aid care to other victims of the Hang Thao street raid.

On April 14 morning, little Binh was sleeping by his mother Tran Thi Mai, 32, and his two brothers Nguyen Dang Ngee, 6, and Nguyen Dang Tuan, 45 days old. All the family was sound asleep, when a MK.84 bomb exploded at the back of the house, killing the three children and wounding their mother. Before Binh died he could only say: "Save me, father!". Binh's father repressed his grief and resumed the digging out of victims.

Tens of other children became orphans because their parents were killed by U.S. bombs. Mr. Sanh is a joiner. His wife, a textile worker, was killed by U.S. bombs and left him 4 children: Nguyen Van Binh, 11; Nguyen Van Minh, 8; Nguyen Thi Dung, 4, and Nguyen Thi Hong, 2. Phan Viet Hai and his wife were textile workers. They were killed together with their three children. There survived only the youngest one born 25 days before. Little Binh, 11; not only lost his parents in this raid but also got two wounds in the head which caused a trauma. Each time he thought of his parents he shouted, asking people to take revenge on the U.S. aggressors.

Besides a host of orphans, there are numerous old people and women who have been disabled for life by U.S. bombs.

Mrs. Nhung, a textile worker, was six months gone with her first child. She was returning home from work. When she was passing by the city hospital, a bomb exploded, many blocks of walls stroke against her and wounded her spleen. She fainted but the doctors gave her most dedicated care. They removed the wounded spleen, took out a litre of blood coagulated in her lung and she was saved. One month later, she gave birth to her first baby daughter two months premature.

(*b*) A month after the air raid on Hang Thao street, on May 18, 1965, U.S. aircraft attacked Hoang Van Thu populous street next to it. Hoang Van Thu street was formerly called the Chinese quarter. The street which covers an area of nearly 400 square metres was inhabited by 1,734 households with 7,856 persons. The houses there were built long ago, with some accommodating up to 10 households comprising nearly 100 persons. In the street were many handicraft shops, eastern and western medicine shops, thread-producing co-ops, the Thanh Quan Temple of the Chinese residents and the municipal church. Aware of the perfidious scheme of the U.S. aggressors, the Municipal Administrative Committee had evacuated most of the inhabitants and had air-raid shelters dug. On May 18, there remained in the street only 230 persons. At 11.04 a.m., when the population was either lunching or resting and when it was raining heavily, the street was flooded and water filled up all air-raid shelters, foxholes and trenches, two F.4Hs flying at a 600-metre altitude sneaked in and dropped 8 thin-shelled bombs causing many casualties. The U.S. aggressors air-attacked the city during heavy rain, so the victims did not have time to take shelter. Mr. Duc, 38, a worker at a rice-husking mill, had just returned from his work. He was preparing lunch in the kitchen when he was thrown out by a bomb explosion in the middle of his house. The second bomb blast in front of the Cathedral threw him back into the first bomb crater full of water. His corpse was taken out 5 hours later from water and ruins. He died leaving a widow and 3 orphans. Mr. Hung, upon hearing the bomb blast, hastily jumped into a trench full of water. A wall fell down into the trench and he got drowned leaving a widow and two orphans. Among 13 persons killed and 11 wounded, was Nguyen Van Vinh, 25, who had survived after the previous air raid on Hang Thao street. He moved to Hoang Van Thu street after his house was destroyed.

The air raid on Hoang Van Thu street resulted in great material losses: 372 houses which covered 46,333 $m^2$ and accommodated 1,129 households consisting of 5,555 people were destroyed or heavily damaged. The Cathedral area was bombed, the Jesus stone-cavern collapsed. The Lac Thein Temple and the meeting hall of the Chinese residents were demolished.

(*c*) The surprise night raids conducted by the U.S. aggressors inflicted heavy losses on the population inside and outside the city.

At 9.24 p.m. (local time), on September 12, 1965, two A.6As sneaked in over the city and released 16 bombs on the Textile Complex killing 6 workers and wounding 28 others at work. Among the dead was Mrs. Minh who was four months gone with child.

At 00.50 a.m., on July 4, 1966, two A.6As flew in and dropped 14 bombs, wounding 11 civilians and killing a medical worker of the 4th living quarters in his sleep.

At 11.38 p.m., on July 30, 1966, two A.6As dropped 26 bombs on Phu Long hamlet, My Tan villiage, in the outskirt of the city, killing 12 persons including a whole family of 7 and wounding 10 others.

(*d*) U.S. piratical aircraft besides committing massacres in densely-populated areas in the city, attacked factories and enterprises which produced daily necessities for the people. They carried out 19 air raids on the textile complex on which they dropped more than 100 bombs, causing heavy losses. Thanks to good anti-air raid precautions, the workers did not suffer any human losses.

(*e*) The U.S. imperialists also attacked the dyke surrounding the city in an attempt to sabotage the peaceful work of the population. On May 31 and July 14, 1966, they dropped 6 bombs on the 2-kilometre long dyke which protects the city against floods, damaging many sections. The population in the city spent 20 days removing 1,209 $m^3$ of earth to repair the damaged parts. One day later, the water-level of the Dao River rose to 0.4 m above street level and continued to rise to 0.9 m. During the last days of July 1966, when the water level kept rising, at 11.38 p.m., on July 20 and at 2.26 a.m., on July 31, 1966, U.S. aircraft repeatedly struck at this dyke.

The destruction of the Nam Dinh city's dyke was only part of the systematic attack on the dykes and irrigation projects in Nam Ha; these air raids seriously jeopardized the life of the urban population and the people in Nam Ha province.

## II. THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS MUST REPAY THEIR BLOOD DEBT

The U.S. imperialists have, in the course of their aggressive war against Vietnam, committed untold crimes against the people of Nam Dinh. They have used all types of modern jet planes to rain hundreds of tons of bombs, shells and rockets on this populous city of socialist North Vietnam, killing civilians, even newly-born and babies still in their mothers' wombs, making tens of children orphans including sucklings.

Hundreds of people, among whom many children and old folk have been painfully incapacitated for life. Not satisfied with killing people, they have destroyed factories, enterprises, hospitals, schools, nurseries, thousands of dwellings and even dams and dykes.

The Nam Dinh population still keep these sufferings engraved upon their memory. The hatred for the U.S. will be for ever graven in the hearts of the population of this textile city. All town folk are determined to defeat the U.S. aggressors in defence of their independence, freedom and right to live. The U.S. imperialists have been dealt telling counter-blows: 15 jet planes have been downed, many others shot ablaze, a number of U.S. pilots captured. Along with the fight against U.S. air attacks, the town folk have actively increased production so as to safeguard their lives. In the first six months of 1966, the evacuated city plants and factories have all fulfilled and overfulfilled the State plan.

Together with the people throughout the country, the Nam Dinh population are determined to defend their national rights recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

The Committee for the investigation of U.S. imperialists' war crimes in Nam Ha province strongly denounces to home and world public opinion the extremely barbarous and inhuman crimes perpetrated by the U.S. aggressors against the people of Nam Ha province in general and of the Nam Dinh city in particular.

The U.S. big shots in the White House and the Pentagon will have to answer for their crimes before world public opinion and history.

A SERIES OF ARTICLES IN THE NEW YORK TIMES ON NORTH VIETNAM—DECEMBER 26, 1966,–JANUARY 18, 1967

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CORRESPONDENT REACHED HANOI ON AN I.C.C. PLANE

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Harrison E. Salisbury, an assistant managing editor of The New York Times, flew Friday to Hanoi aboard an aircraft of the International Control Commission, according to a message received in New York.

Mr. Salisbury boarded the commission aircraft in Pnom-penh, the capital of Cambodia. The commission, a truce supervisory organization, is made up of delegates of Canada, Poland and India.

Set up under the 1954 Geneva agreement, which ended the French Indochina war, it sends a liaison aircraft periodically to Hanoi, where it maintains an office.

Mr. Salisbury, who won the Pulitzer Prize in 1955 for a series of articles on the Soviet Union, applied for a North Vietnamese visa last summer while visiting Pnom-penh, where Hanoi has a diplomatic mission. His passport had been validated earlier by the State Department for travel to North Vietnam. Mr. Salisbury was notified last week that the visa had been granted and he left soon afterward for Pnom-penh.

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VISITOR TO HANOI INSPECTS DAMAGE

*The writer of the following dispatch, reprinted from yesterday's late editions, is an assistant managing editor of The New York Times, who reached Hanoi Friday.*

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, Dec. 24.—Late in the afternoon of this drizzly Christmas Eve the bicycle throngs on the roads leading into Hanoi increased.

Riding sidesaddle behind husbands were hundreds of slender young Hanoi wives returning to the city from evacuation to spend Christmas with their families. Hundreds of mothers had small children perched on the backs of bicycles—children being returned to the city for reunions during the Christmas cease-fire.

In Hanoi's Catholic churches mass was celebrated, and here and there in the small foreign quarter there were more elaborate holiday observances. Five Canadian members of the International Control Commission had a fat Christmas goose brought in specially for them from Vientiane, Laos, on the I.C.C. flight into Hanoi yesterday.

VISITORS HAVE A PARTY

And in Hanoi's rambling, old high-ceilinged Thongnhat (Reunification) Hotel (formerly the Metropole), there was a special Christmas party for a handful of foreign visitors who chanced to be here.

But this random evidence of Christmas spirit did not convey the mood of North Vietnam's capital, at least not as it seemed to an unexpected observer from the United States.

The mood of Hanoi seemed much more that of a wartime city going about its business briskly, energetically, purposefully. Streets are lined with cylindrical, one-man air-raid shelters set in the ground at 10-foot intervals.

The shelters are formed of prestressed concrete with concrete lids left ajar for quick occupancy—and they are reported to have been occupied quite a bit in recent days with the sudden burst of United States air raids. There is damage, attributed by officials here to the raids, as close as 200 yards from this hotel.

Hanoi was laid out by French architects with broad boulevards over which arch leafy trees, and with squares, public gardens and pleasant lakes. Today

it seems a bit like a mixture of the Moscow and Algiers of World War II. There are khaki and uniforms everywhere and hardly a truck moves without its green boughs of camouflage. Even pretty girls camouflage their bicycles and conical straw hats.

MANY COMB WRECKAGE

Christmas Eve found residents in several parts of Hanoi still picking over the wreckage of homes said to have been damaged in the United States raids of Dec. 13 and 14. United States officials have contended that no attacks in built-up or residential Hanoi have been authorized or carried out. They have also suggested that Hanoi residential damage in the two raids could have been caused by defensive surface-to-air missiles that misfired or fell short.

[Although American authorities have said that they were satisfied no bombs fell inside Hanoi and that only military targets were attacked, the State Department said Thursday that "the possibility of an accident" could not be ruled out. A spokesman said that if the bombing had caused civilian injury or damage, the United States regretted it.]

This correspondent is no ballistics specialist, but inspection of several damaged sites and talks with witnesses make it clear that Hanoi residents certainly believe they were bombed by United States planes, that they certainly observed United States planes overhead and that damage certainly occurred right in the center of town.

LARGE, SPRAWLING CITY

Hanoi is a very large, sprawling city. The city proper has a population of 600,000, and the surrounding metropolitan area brings the total to 1,100,000.

The built-up, densely populated urban area extends for a substantial distance in all directions beyond the heavy-lined city boundaries shown on a map issued by the State Department and published in the New York Times of Dec. 17.

For instance, the Yenvien rail yard, which was listed as one of the targets in the raids Dec. 14 and 15, is in a built-up area that continues south west to the Red River with no visible breaks in residential quarters. Much the same is true of the Vandien truck park south of the city, which was another listed target.

Oil tanks between Yenvien and Gialam, listed as another target, are in a similarly populated region. It is unlikely that any bombing attack on such targets could be carried out without civilian damage and casualties.

The location of two of the damaged areas inspected today suggests that the western approaches to the Paul Doumer Bridge may have been the targets.

Both damaged areas lie in the Hoankiem quarter of Hanoi. Other administrative quarters of the city are Badinh, Haiba and Dongda. All have suffered some damage.

The first area inspected was Pho Nguyen Thiap Street, about a three-minute drive from the hotel and 100 yards from the central market. Thirteen houses were destroyed—one-story brick and stucco structures for the most part. The Phuc Lan Buddhist pagoda in the same street was badly damaged.

SAYS BOMB EXPLODED

Five persons were reported killed and 11 injured, and 39 families were said to be homeless.

Tuan Ngoc Trac, a medical assistant who lived at 46 Pho Nguyen Thiep Street, said he was just going to the clinic where he works when an air alert sounded, indicating planes 25 kilometers (about 15 miles) from Hanoi. He had stepped to the street with his medical bag in his hand when he heard a plane and flung himself to the ground.

He said that the next instant a bomb exploded just over a row of houses, collapsing nine on the other side of the street. Tuan Ngoc Trac displayed an American leaflet, which he said he had found in the street, warning Hanoi residents not to remain in the vicinity of military objectives.

The North Vietnamese say that almost simultaneously—also about 3 P.M. Dec. 13—about 300 hatch and brick homes and huts along the Red River embankment, possibly a quarter of a mile from Pho Nguyen Thiep Street and equally distant from the Thongnhat Hotel, were hit. The principal damage was again done by a burst just above the houses, but there were also three ground craters caused either by rocket bursts or small bombs.

This area, 200 by 70 yards, was leveled by blast and fire. Four persons were reported killed and 10 injured, most of the residents having been at work or in large, well-constructed shelter.

HOUSE IS INSPECTED

Another damage site inspected was in the Badinh quarter, which is Hanoi's diplomatic section. There, on Khuc Hao Street, lies the rear of the very large Chinese Embassy compound, backing on the Rumanian Embassy. Minor damage was done to the roofs of the Chinese and Rumanian Embassies by what was said to have looked like rocket fire. Both embassies produced fragments, which they said had come from United States rocket bursts.

Also examined was a house on Hue Lane in the Haiba quarter. It was reported hit Dec. 2, with the death of one person and the wounding of seven others, including two children.

Contrary to the impression given by United States communiques, on-the-spot inspection indicates that American bombing has been inflicting considerable civilian casualties in Hanoi and its environs for some time past.

The North Vietnamese cite as an instance the village of Phuxa, a market gardening suburb possibly four miles from the city center. The village of 24 houses was reported attacked at 12:17 P.M. Aug. 13 by a United States pilot trying to bomb a Red River dike. The village was destroyed and 24 people were killed and 23 wounded. The pilot was shot down.

A crater 25 feet deep was reported blasted in the dike, but it was said to have been filled within three hours. The village has now been completely rebuilt, and has a small museum of mementos of the attack. In the museum is the casing of a United States fragmentation bomb, which bears the legend, "Loaded 7/66." A month after that date it was said to have fallen on Phuxa village, releasing 300 iron spheres, each about the size of a baseball and each loaded with 300 steel pellets about the size and shape of bicycle bearings. Those missiles are reported to have caused most of the Phuxa casualties.

It is the reality of such casualties and such apparent byproducts of the United States bombing policy that lend an atmosphere of grimness and foreboding to Hanoi's Christmas cease-fire. It is fair to say that, based on evidence of their own eyes, Hanoi residents do not find much credibility in United States bombing communiques.

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U.S. RAIDS BATTER TWO TOWNS; SUPPLY ROUTE IS LITTLE HURT

*These dispatches depict two aspects of the war in North Vietnam—the extensive bombings and the enemy's speed in repairing communications. The writer is an assistant managing editor of The New York Times. He reached Hanoi on Friday from Pnompenh, Cambodia, on a plane of the International Control Commission for Vietnam after his visa application had been approved by Hanoi and his passport validated by Washington for travel to North Vietnam.*

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, Dec. 25.—Hanoi's Christmas quiet was shattered at 2:30 P.M. today when an air alert sounded, antiaircraft guns roared and a United States plane was reported shot down.

Residents in the center of Hanoi reported that they had heard the sound of aircraft shortly after the alert sounded. Almost immediately, antiaircraft guns fired and the United States plane was reported downed. Another alert was sounded when a second plane appeared about 12 miles from the city.

Hanoi's alert was apparently the same as that touched off in Namdinh, 50 miles to the southeast, where this correspondent was inspecting earlier bomb damage. The alarm sounded at Namdinh at 2:26 P.M., when it was announced the plane had been sighted approaching from the north.

Mayor Tran Thi Doan, a petite 40-year-old women, led a group of officials to a shelter beside the City Hall, where she continued to tell of a series of 51 raids on the city up to Friday. None of the raids, as far as she knew, had ever been announced in the West.

The Namdinh alert continued until 2:47 P.M.—which residents thought remarkably long since fast-flying planes had time to make several round trips from the vicinity of Hanoi in that period. However, this duration may have

been occasioned by the reported downing of the American plane. The 2:26 alert at Namdinh was the third on Christmas Day. Namdinh officials attributed the alerts to American reconnaissance, which they believed had been continued despite the Christmas truce.

Christmas wasn't a joyous occasion for Namdinh although strings of small red pennants decorated the old gray, stucco Catholic church and a white Star of Bethlehem had been mounted on the pinnacle of the tower. Few Americans have heard of Namdinh, although until recently it was the third largest North Vietnamese city.

Mayor Doan regards her city as essentially a cotton-and-silk textile town containing nothing of military significance. Namdinh has been systematically attacked by American planes since June 28, 1965.

The cathedral tower looks out on block after block of utter desolation; the city's population of 90,000 has been reduced to less than 20,000 because of evacuation; 13 per cent of the city's housing, including the homes of 12,464 people, have been destroyed: 89 people have been killed and 405 wounded.

No American communique has asserted that Namdinh contains some facility that the United States regards as a military objective. It is apparent, on personal inspection, that block after block of ordinary housing, particularly surrounding a textile plant, has been smashed to rubble by repeated attacks by Seventh Fleet planes.

The town lies only 20 miles inland, which may explain why the Seventh Fleet seems to have made it its particular target. The textile plant, whose most dangerous output from a military point of view would presumably be cloth for uniforms, has been bombed 19 times, but is still operating under great difficulty.

Other industries, in Namdinh include a rice-processing plant, a silk factory, an agricultural-tool plant, a fruit-canning plant and a thread cooperative. All have been damaged in raids. The least affected operation is the rice mill, which is working at normal capacity.

Street after street in Namdinh has been abandoned and houses stand torn and gaping. One deserted street is Hang Thao or Silk Street, which was the center of the silk industry. Almost every house on the street was blasted down April 14 at about 6:30 A.M. just as the factory shifts were changing.

Forty-nine people were killed, 135 were wounded on Hang Thao and 240 houses collapsed. Eight bombs—MK–84's—accomplished this. These are huge weapons weighing about 2,000 pounds.

The residents of Namdinh have become specialists in United States weapons. They rattle off names like MK–81, MK–83 and MK–84 and various categories of missiles, including Bullpups, as baseball fans do batting averages, most attacks have been carried out by F–105's and F–4's but B–57's, A–3's, A–4's and A–6A's have also been used.

Another target in Namdinh has been the Dao (Black) River dike. The dike has been hit six times and there have been many near-misses. Breaching of the dike would seriously affect the region's rice agriculture. However, supplemental and reinforcing dikes have been built. And with a plentiful labor force always at hand to repair gaps quickly, the danger of serious damage by air attack seems minimal.

### CALLED AN OBJECT LESSON

Why have American planes devoted all this unannounced attention to Namdinh? "Americans think they can touch our hearts," Nguyen Tien Canh of Namdinh's City Council said, apparently meaning that Americans thought they could intimidate the populace by continuous attacks.

A second suggestion was that the unannounced assault on Namdinh was supposed to be an object lesson to show Hanoi what United States air power could accomplish if it were directed more powerfully to North Vietnam's capital.

Whatever the explanation, one can see that United States planes are dropping an enormous weight of explosives on purely civilian targets. Whatever else there may be or might have been in Namdinh, it is the civilians who have taken the punishment.

A brief tour of Namha Province in which Namdinh lies, shows Namdinh is far from being exceptional.

President Johnson's announced policy that American targets in North Vietnam are steel and concrete rather than human lives seems to have little connection with the reality of attacks carried out by United States planes.

A notable example is Phuly, a town about 35 miles south of Hanoi on Route 1. The town had a population of about 10,000. In attacks on Oct. 1, 2, and 9, every

house and building was destroyed. Only 40 were killed and wounded because many people had left town and because an excellent manhole-shelter system was available.

The community had no industry, but lay astride a highway and a railroad line running from Hanoi, which had a couple of sidings in town. Presumably, planes were attacking the railroad. But in the process they destroyed another residential community.

Since bombing is far from an accurate process, at best, and since people in Vietnam work, live, study and amuse themselves in the same streets as those on which military targets are situated or on adjacent blocks, the outlook is for more destruction to life, residential quarters, schools and every other variety of nonmilitary facility. The same rule applies whether the target is so-called Hanoi vicinity, a crossroads, a village or a hamlet.

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### Damage to Churches Charged

Tokyo, Dec. 26 (Reuters).—United States aircraft have "deliberately" bombed and strafed more than 200 parish districts and nearly 100 churches in North Vietnam in the last two years, the North Vietnamese press agency reported today.

It said United States bombs had killed two ministers in Hatinh Province and hundreds of Catholics in North Vietnam.

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### Foe's Transport Little Affected by Raids on Key Supply Route

Hanoi, North Vietnam, Dec. 26.—Viewed from air reconnaissance or on photographic maps, National Route 1, the old French-built highway that runs south from Hanoi to Saigon, must look like a bombardier's dream target.

The highway and a railroad run parallel only a few feet apart, mile after mile, straight across the table-flat delta of the Red River. The highway is marked by lovely, regularly planted shade trees, and camouflage, disguise or concealment is utterly impossible.

This is no jungle country. This is no tricky mountain terrain. This is rich, flat ricelands, crisscrossed by irrigation flows and paddy fields. The railroad and highway could not be a plainer target if they were picked out by continuously flashing beacon lights.

It is easy to imagine Air Force strategists inspecting a map and concurring that Hanoi's southward supply services can easily be interdicted by a few easily placed bombs.

But appearances can be remarkably deceiving, as ground level inspection of Route 1 quickly discloses. Viewed on the ground, it is obvious that the "dream target" is in reality a snare and a delusion.

The railroad and highway have been bombed again and again and again, but it is doubtful that rail traffic has ever been held up more than a few hours, and the highway seems capable of operating almost continuously regardless of how many bombs are dropped.

The secret of the railroad is simple and it lies beyond the ability of air power to interdict.

If the track uses small, light equipment when a bomb smashes the rails or overturns a car, removal and repair problems are simple. Gangs of workmen can easily clear the line. Moreover, repair materials probably sufficient to construct two or three additional railroads are kept on hand, seldom more than a few hundred yards from any possible break.

The same thing, only more so, is true of the highway, which can be repaired and restored even more rapidly by the use of readily available manpower and repair materials similarly stockpiled in advance, apparently along the whole expanse of Route 1.

The results of American bombing of the route are readily visible—particularly in small villages and hamlets along the route. They have suffered severely, often being almost obliterated. But the effect on transportation has been minimal.

Another factor in this situation is not visible to reconnaissance planes. This is that almost everything movable in North Vietnam can be moved equally well either by train or by truck, and the truck routes are virtually noninterdictable.

There is a third major alternative—human backs, bicycles and carts. As the Korean War demonstrated, where trucks and human carrying power are available as alternatives, it is impossible to interdict supply movements.

Even in the region of the Seventeenth Parallel, which divides North and South Vietnam, where United States bombs have leveled the whole countryside, movement continues by night with little impediment.

A basic flaw in the bombing policy from a military viewpoint would seem to be its failure to take into account the nature of the country and the people to which it being applied. If the Pennsylvania Railroad and the major highway to Washington were bombed out, the disruption of United States supplies and services would be enormous and the military consequences in wartime would be grave.

Here it is hardly felt. Traffic and supplies simply flow around and past the point of interruption and the damage to rail or highway is quickly made good. The principal sufferers are the people who have the misfortune to live along the railroad and highway and on whose homes far more bombs rain down.

Another example of the ground-level reality of United States bombing compared with the communiqué version relates to air attacks carried out Dec. 13 and 14 in Hanoi. One of the United States targets was specified by the communiqué as a "truck park at Vandien."

Vandien is in the southern part of Hanoi along Route 1. Administratively it is separate from Hanoi, but actually it is a continuous part of the urban center. United States maps show the truck park as situated just east of Route 1.

In fact, there is a large, open area with light buildings and compounds that may or may not have been a truck park, lying possibly a quarter-mile east of Route 1, which has been badly smashed by bombs.

But the bomb damage does not halt at the compound line. It extends over an area of probably a mile or so on both sides of the highway, and among the structures destroyed in the attack was the Vietnam-Polish Friendship senior high school, lying on the west side of the highway, probably three-quarters of a mile from the presumed United States target.

It is the conviction of the North Vietnamese that the United States is deliberately directing bombs against the civilian population although ostensibly contending that "military objectives" are the target.

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### Hanoi During an Air Alert: Waitresses Take Up Rifles

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Hanoi, North Vietnam, Dec. 27.—Just before 2:25 P.M. yesterday, there was a muffled distant roar, 10-foot windows in this old French-built hotel rattled and heavy gray curtains gently swayed inward.

At the count of three there was another tremendous distant rumble and again the windows shook and the curtains swayed. Moments later came a third.

The wail of a siren then sounded the alert, and the hotel's defense staff scrambled for tin hats and rifles.

Guests emerged from their rooms and hurried down the great marble staircase, through the long lounge with its slightly bedraggled tropical Christmas tree, its bar with a remarkable collection of liquors of all lands—including Stolichnaya vodka from Moscow, rice wine from Peking and Gordon's gin from London—and out across the interior courtyard, where shelters are situated.

By the time the guests had begun to descend into the sturdy concrete bunker, little waitresses in their black sateen trousers and white blouses stood ready with rifles to fire at any low-flying planes.

Inside the shelter, by curious coincidence, Americans found themselves in the majority. Four members of an American peace delegation, Mrs. Grace Newman of New York; Mrs. Joe Griffith, whose husband is a Cornell instructor; Mrs. Diane Bevel, associated with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and Miss Barbara Deming of Liberation magazine, and this correspondent.

But it was a widely international group, including the deputy director of Tass, Aleksandra A. Vishnevsky, who chanced to be in town; a correspondent of the Italian Communist newspaper L'Unita, members of a Soviet trade-union delegation, two Cubans and an East German. There were no Chinese.

The foreigners chatted a little excitedly about what was to most a new thrill. But to the Vietnamese air alerts and air raids are no novelty and no thrill; they are deadly serious business.

The pretty waitresses with rifles are part of this serious business. It is unlikely that United States planes are brought down by rifle fire, but the population is trained to man posts and throw up a hurricane of small-arms fire in support of conventional antiaircraft and missile defenses.

The small-arms fire has two purposes.

First, it is designed to make United States low-level attacks increasingly hazardous. According to Hanoi residents, low-level bombing is frequently employed by United States planes in an effort to circumvent the radar and missile system.

Second, the firing of rifles gives the populace a feeling of participation and of fighting back—important in maintaining morale and counteracting the feelings of helplessness and defenselessness that civilian populations often experience.

The alert yesterday was only six or seven minutes long. It was caused, the authorities said, by the appearance of a pilotless American reconnaissance craft near the city. The three tremendous blasts presumably were SAM surface-to-air missiles. The same kind of robot plane, it was disclosed, caused Hanoi's Christmas alert at almost the same hour.

Today the foreign press corps was taken to see where the drone that appeared on Christmas was shot down. They went in a convoy of half a dozen cars, most of them covered with camouflage fishnet, which quickly slides over the roof and hood and into which leaves and greenery can be slipped.

Hardly a car or truck moves outside Hanoi without camouflage, and most cars in the city are permanently bedecked. So, for that matter, are many people, who wear sprays of leaves and branches in their helmets or strawhats. This too is part of an organized, well-designed effort to reduce bombing hazards.

The caravan made its way northeast across the Paul Doumer Bridge. It appeared, from this trip across the bridge, that bombing on Dec. 14 was directed at its approaches and fell short in each case, striking residential quarters. The bombs dropped in the Hoan Kiem and Gialem and Yenvien quarters.

Describing the Yenvien attack, and American communiqué said the target was rail yards. Some bombs certainly fell along the railroad. But there are large numbers of apartment houses close by, and one after another was blasted out.

Because of the highly organized repair facilities, rail traffic is moving normally, but residents who were not casualties have been compelled to leave their destroyed homes.

The drone downed on Christmas Day fell 12 or 13 miles northeast of the city in the Tienson district of Habac Province. It proved to be a Ryan model with a wingspread of about 18 feet that the Americans call the Firebee.

The wing and fuselage, somewhat crumpled, lay in a pile. Eight or nine girls dug in muck about seven feet deep for the engine, which was gradually being recovered.

The robot plane, which was shot down adjacent to the main rail line linking Hanoi to China, presumably had been dispatched to transmit photographic intelligence on rail conditions and traffic movements. According to the girls digging out the engine, the drone was at an altitude of only about a mile when downed.

The seriousness with which the North Vietnamese take the air threat has undoubtedly kept civilian casualties lower than might be expected in comparison with the vast damage said to have been done to ordinary living quarters and the destruction reported in small towns and villages.

The key to this is the manhole concrete shelter, which seems to be a North Vietnamese invention. There are hundreds of thousands of them along every highway and every city street, and they are still being put in place by the thousands.

At 5 o'clock the other morning I saw one lonely man patiently digging one in. They are made with concrete exteriors like drain pipes, largely by hand. With their two-inch-thick concrete covers they are impervious to anything but a direct or very close hit.

The other factor reducing casualties and loss is dispersion. Everything dispersible has been dispersed. The countryside is strewn with dispersed goods and supplies. The same is true of the people.

Two-thirds of the machinery and workers at the big textile plant near Gialem have been sent to the countryside. The wisdom of the precaution was demonstrated, it was said, when the plant suffered damage from United States rocket fire Dec. 13 and 14.

NEW CAPITAL CITY PLANNED BY HANOI—NORTH VIETNAMESE ASSUME WAR WILL RUIN PRESENT ONE

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, Dec. 28.—Hanoi officials say they have blueprints for a complete new capital to be built after the war on a site already selected not far from the present capital. The new capital is being planned on the assumption that sooner or later Hanoi will be destroyed in the war.

President Ho Chi Minh has warned the country that it must be prepared to face the destruction of both Hanoi and its port, Haiphong, as well as all other cities or towns of any size.

The new capital will probably be built in any case, since the present city is small, shabby and incredibly run down after more than 20 years of almost continuous warfare involving the French, the Japanese and now the Americans.

Unlike most capitals of Communist countries, Hanoi has no massive new government buildings, no grandiose sports palaces, no glittering opera house. The old French-built opera house is still the city's biggest assembly hall, and it is closed now because the authorities forbid large gatherings for fear of air-raid casualties.

Such funds as have been available to North Vietnam in the war-torn years since it came into existence in 1954 have gone largely into factories and the construction of housing.

A visitor finds that shops are generally open for only a few hours early in the morning—Hanoi still rises at 5 or 6 A.M.—and again early in the evening.

Bicycles are almost the universal form of transport, and in late afternoon and early evening the streets are jammed eight abreast with whirring cycles, most of them carrying two persons or one person and a burden of some kind.

A consensus of officials suggests that about one-third of the city's population has been evacuated or dispersed to the nearby countryside. Many institutions have been evacuated. Most of the Polytechnic University's departments have been sent to the provinces. The Museum of Fine Arts was sent to out-of-town caves for the safekeeping of most of its more valuable collections, including 14th-century Buddhas.

CHILDREN ARE EVACUATED

About half the walls of the museum, which is a relic of French days, is occupied by full-size photographic reproductions of the objects, which were sent away last year and early this year.

An intense effort has been made to send schoolchildren away from Hanoi, although not necessarily far. A visit to a high school at Xuandinh, about seven miles outside the capital, found 300 pupils from Hanoi in a body of 710. The evacuated youngsters include many whose parents are officials and workers in Hanoi.

The school provided an example of the intensive precautions against air attack. The school is dispersed throughout the village, with not more than one class in any building and no classes less than 150 yards apart.

The classes are installed in simple structures, including huts with earth floors. Foxhole shelters are dug right under the children's desks. The schoolrooms are surrounded by great walls of earth and clay and the network of paths from one class to another is edged with slit trenches, concrete manhole shelters and earth-packed lean-to shelters.

The children—and many adults—wear heavy, woven straw hats about an inch thick, that are said to be highly effective against fragmentation bombs. They also carry first-aid kits along with their books.

Xuandinh has not suffered from air attacks, but the authorities said several youngsters were injured Aug. 13 when they were buried in a shelter in a nearby village.

BASIS OF CASUALTY ESTIMATES

It should be noted, incidentally, that all casualty estimates and statistics in these dispatches are those of North Vietnamese officials.

However, descriptions of bomb damage are based wholly on visual inspection.

As far as this correspondent is aware, there has been no censorship of his dispatches although they are read by North Vietnamese officials before being transmitted. A number of photographs have been taken by this correspondent,

and these must be cleared by officials before they can be mailed or otherwise transmitted.

Dispersion of population and enterprises has brought hardship and difficulty to individuals and to the economy. To ease supply problems, the distribution of foodstuffs and consumers goods has been decentralized and is controlled by provincial authorities. This is also designed to minimize the effect of any strikes on major depots in Hanoi and Haiphong.

The authorities contend that there has been little fluctuation in food prices although shortages have occurred. In the villages and in many places in Hanoi and vicinity, peasant women appear with their straw baskets of cabbages, cauliflower, lettuce, greens, leeks and other vegetables and squat beside them along the roadsides.

At this season there appears to be no shortages of vegetables. Restaurants, at least, have ample supplies of rice and all the ingredients of the spicy Vietnamese cookery—peppers, pork, chicken, turkey, beans, onions, bean sprouts, carrots, soy sauce, pepper sauce, delicate China tea, and thick French-style café noir made from a coffee that North Vietnam grows and exports.

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## Hanoi Propaganda Stresses Tradition: War Against Odds

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Hanoi, North Vietnam, Dec. 20.—The Vietnamese fighting tradition, a tradition of struggle against long odds, of unyielding battle against powerful foreign enemies, is the focal point of North Vietnam's central internal propaganda. It is carried into every aspect of daily life.

At a concert presented in a chilly converted movie house last night, 12 of 14 song-and-dance numbers celebrated the heroic feats of individual Vietnamese against Americans. In each case the Vietnamese won against overwhelming odds.

One ballet depicted a group of ferry men who pulled their craft across a stream despite United States air attacks. Several were killed but the ferryboat crossed the river and the plane was shot down.

There were songs celebrating Hanoi's antiaircraft defenders, South Vietnamese jungle troops and the defenders of Conco Island, which lies off the coast not far north of the demarcation line between North and South Vietnam and has been the scene of intense antiaircraft barrages.

### BINDING UP THE WOUNDS

Another dance number dealt with a Red Cross worker whose husband had fallen in the war and who takes from her brow the traditional white mourning band and uses it to bind up the wounds of an antiaircraft gunner. Still another ballet shows Vietcong troops storming a United States strongpoint and unfurling a banner after capturing it with heavy casualties.

One note of satire was introduced: A Vietcong youngster captured a horrible appearing American captain and chased off ferocious G.I.'s with an imitation hand grenade made of a jungle nut.

By the end of the evening the United States Air Force had suffered heavy losses, but it was notable that Vietnamese casualties were not light. The audience was being conditioned to accept heavy sacrifices in the war.

The audience which included large numbers of youngsters wearing a variety of uniforms and semi-uniforms reacted with vociferrous applause. However, it did not seem to take too seriously a group of maidens in native costumes who sang, to the plucking of long-necked, three-stringed mandolins, that they were going to shoot down a United States plane and promptly announced that they had downed not one but two.

The theme of the Vietnamese David conquering the United States Goliath is struck constantly. The State Revolutionary Museum here is largely devoted to exposition of the Vietnamese military tradition.

### TWO LEGENDARY QUEENS

The story begins in A.D. 40, when Vietnam's legendary Trung sisters raised an army against a Chinese garrison, slaughtered it and reigned as joint queens until a Chinese expeditionary force defeated them. The queens, who then took

their own lives, are venerated as a kind of double Joan of Arc, with both religious and patriotic significance.

The next Vietnamese hero was Than Hung Dao, honored as the commander who defeated an invading force of 300,000 Mongols. Than's 31-year battle is much celebrated these days. So is the great victory of Nguyen Trai in the 15th century against invading Chinese of the Ming Dynasty. A monument to his feat still stands in Hanoi.

The Vietnamese frequently recall that the Chinese were defeated after a 10-year battle and, when they admitted defeat, were given food and assistance to return home. This exemplary tale is often recited to Americans.

The main line of the museum's theme really begins with the French take-over in the eighteen-seventies and the opening of the long struggle for Vietnamese independence, which is presented as a constant battle continuing to the present.

### LIKE A CHAMBER OF HORRORS

The museum then becomes something like a chamber of horrors—an endless catalogue of the cruelties and tortures inflicted on the Vietnamese and of the ingenious and terrible weapons by which they fought back.

From the earliest times the Vietnamese employed iron arrowheads with a fishhook configuration that are impossible to withdraw. They were used against the French, and now, it is said, are still used by hill tribesmen against the Americans. Jagged spikes were implanted in jungle trails to pierce the bare feet of troops. A similar, more complex trap, constructed of dozens of whirling, barbed hooks that bite into a soldier's legs in a dozen points when he crashes through its leafy cover, is used against the Americans.

The museum displays daggers used to kill French officers and disemboweling knives assertedly used against Vietnamese men and women.

There are also contemporary horrors—captured arms turned against the French and then against the Americans, as well as samples of bombs dropped in Vietnam and photos of the effects of napalm and air bombardment.

Most of the Hanoi institution visited have at least a small collection of bomb fragments or samples of United States aerial weaponry, including fragmentation bombs. Two varieties are displayed.

An older type known to the North Vietnamese as the pineapple, which was dropped with wind vanes and exploded on contact, has a yellow canister about the size of a coffee mug. This, the North Vietnamese say, is being replaced by a more efficient device known as a Guava, which is a small cylinder. Three hundred Guavas, dropped in a large canister, scatter and roll some distance, then explode, saturating 600 square yards with pellets.

### A FADING DISTINCTION

In Hanoi's propaganda, distinctions between the French and the Americans virtually disappear. Thus the great Dienbienphu defeat of the French becomes a classic example of the ability of a small Vietnamese force to deal a shattering blow to a powerful foreign enemy. If the North Vietnamese only fight on, eventually another Dienbienphu will be achieved—so goes the official line.

Official after official insists that there is no alternative to the continuing struggle because otherwise freedom and independence will be lost, and, they say, it is better to die than to be enslaved.

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## No Military Targets, Namdinh Insists

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, Dec. 30.—North Vietnamese sources said today that, as far as they are aware, a United States communiqué yesterday was the first to mention Namdinh as a bombing target. The communiqué said the Namdinh freight yards had been bombed.

> [Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, said in Washington Thursday that Namdinh had been mentioned three times as a target in communiqués from Saigon. He also said the targets in 64 attacks on the city were military ones.]

Namdinh, North Vietnam's third largest city, is about sixty miles south of Hanoi. Its population until recently was given by officials as a little more than 90,000.

### REPEATED RAIDS ALLEGED

Namdinh has been repeatedly bombed since June 28, 1965, according to city officials. They contend that the city is essentially a cotton and silk textile center containing no military objectives.

It is the contention of city officials that, at least until yesterday's communiqué, the United States had never officially described Namdinh as having military objectives.

Are there or have there been military objectives in Namdinh? the railroad runs through town and presumably there are freight yards and depots.

There are a textile factory and a rice mill, both of which this correspondent saw. Both are operating, but the textile mill has been severely damaged.

There was also a silk mill, which officials said had been destroyed. There are a fruit-canning plant and a thread cooperative.

Whether the cannery is operative this correspondent cannot report since he did not see it and the officials did not say. They said the thread cooperative had been destroyed. I saw the main street, where the thread co-op was said to have been situated, and it is badly smashed up.

### UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

About an agricultural-implement plant nothing was said except that it was one of the city's industries. Was it converted to war production? This correspondent cannot say. Are there other war plants in town? This correspondent cannot say.

He saw intensive destruction of civilian housing and ordinary business streets in considerable areas—damage so severe that whole blocks have been abandoned. These areas lie largely but not entirely in the vicinity of the textile plant. There is severe damage all over town.

The bombed areas of Namdinh possess an appearance familiar to anyone who saw blitzed London, devastated Berlin and Warsaw, or smashed Soviet cities like Stalingrad and Kharkov. The effects of bombing at ground level seem to have changed little since World War II.

How was the destruction of Namdinh accomplished? The data on the bombings come from city officials, who have an elaborate dossier of times, dates, places, numbers of planes, casualties, houses destroyed, and so on.

### OTHER PLANES MENTIONED

They contend that Seventh Fleet bombers carried out the most persistent and destructive of the raids, but they did not say that only the Seventh Fleet was involved. They listed strikes by F–105's and F–4's, RB–57's, A–4A's, A–6A's and A–3J's.

According to the officials, the first serious attack was that on Hang Thao (Silk Street) at about 6:30 A.M. on April 14 by two low-flying United States planes of unspecified type that dropped eight mark 84, bombs. Casualties in this attack were put at 49 killed, and 135 wounded, with 240 houses demolished.

The officials said the casualty rate was sharply reduced because only 2300 of the normal population of 17,680 remained there, the rest having been evacuated.

The officials contend an attack was made on nearby Hoang Van Thu Street, formerly the Chinese quarter, on May 18. This attack, they say, was carried out by two F–4H's from an altitude of about 1,800 feet at 11:04 A.M. in heavy rain, which had flooded many raid shelters. Casualties were put at 13 dead, including a number drowned, and 11 wounded, and 372 houses were listed as destroyed. Only 230 of the normal population of 7,858 remained in the street, the others having been evacuated.

Regarding the question whether United States planes deliberately attempted to breach the Black River dikes, the city officials contend that on May 31 and July 14 six bombs were dropped on a mile-long section of the dike, causing a number of breaches.

There were other raids on July 20 and July 31, they say, and a large number of near misses at other times.

The damage has been repaired the officials say. However, bomb craters are still visible.

[The United States insists that no effort has been made to breach dikes, though it is conceded that they may have been hit accidentally.]

ATTACKS CALLED DELIBERATE

The Namdinh officials think the attacks were deliberate. The dikes are in the open area outside the city with no recognizable targets in the surrounding landscape, at least at this time.

In any event, officials take the view that the Americans will breach the dikes and are expending tens of thousands of man-hours building emergency supplementary dikes, which snake through the city itself, as well as massive secondary reinforcing earthworks outside the city.

The question of dikes is a question of life and death in this Red River delta. In the high-water season Hanoi lies possibly 20 feet below river level and most of the countryside would be inundated, with the ruin of crops and enormous loss of life should the dikes be blasted.

Vivid in North Vietnamese memories is the 1945 flood, when the dikes burst partly as a result of Japanese action. In the resulting disaster of flood, crop failure and famine, it is estimated, 1.5 million to 2 million lives were lost.

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PROBLEMS OF COVERAGE

*In the following dispatch, Mr. Salisbury describes how he arranged to get to Hanoi and the conditions under which he is working there.*

HANOI, Dec. 30.—To a correspondent with years of experience in Communist countries, reporting from Hanoi has many familiar aspects. But the fact that the reporter is behind enemy lines in a real, if undeclared, war gives the experience a special atmosphere.

The first problem in reporting from North Vietnam is of course, to get there. The effort to win Hanoi's permission for a visit began nearly 18 months ago and was pursued systematically through a number of channels.

The effort was intensified just a year ago when the fact that Hanoi had permitted a visit by Prof. Staughton Lynd of Yale University suggested that a reporting opportunity might be ripe. However, telegrams and letters to North Vietnamese officials produced no response then.

The endeavor was renewed last spring as a preliminary to a long trip around the perimeter of Communist China. In the hope that representations on the spot in Asia might bring a favorable response, this correspondent had his passport and that of his wife, who accompanied him then, cleared by the State Department for travel to North Vietnam, China and North Korea.

VISA AVAILABLE IN PARIS

In June Hanoi indicated that it might be possible to make the trip, but after hesitation, North Vietnamese officials advised that the time was not convenient but would probably be before the end of the year. After that there was nothing to do but wait and send frequent reminders of continuing interest.

The break finally came just before Christmas, when North Vietnam advised that a visa could be picked up in Paris.

Another problem in covering Hanoi, for an American journalist, is getting here. Communist China is issuing no transit visas for United States newsmen. The sole entry route for them is on the once-weekly plane of the International Control Commission, which flies the Saigon-Pnompenh-Vientaine-Hanoi route.

I picked up my North Vietnamese visa in Paris Dec. 20, and boarded the Hanoi plane in Pnompenh Dec. 23, arriving at 7:30 P.M.

Details of coverage have been handled about as they would be for a correspondent visiting an Eastern European country a few years ago. Interviews, trips and visits are arranged by the Foreign Ministry's press department.

The first request submitted was for an opportunity to inspect sites in Hanoi that it was reported United States planes bombed on Dec. 13 and 14. The Foreign Ministry made a car and interpreter available and sent the party to streets where damage had occurred.

On the question of pictures, it was said that black and white film could be shot but not color film, apparently since facilities for developing color were not available. All film must be developed here for inspection by the military authorities. No photos taken by this correspondent have been held up so far.

ONE REQUEST REFUSED

Permission to take a picture has been refused only once—by the director of a textile factory in Hanoi who did not want photos of his girls working at their looms. In this case the objection seemed bureaucratic rather than military.

Again because of the sensitive position behind the lines, this correspondent asked in general terms to be shown around the country where the authorities would permit. A trip to Namdinh on Christmas Day was the fruit of such a request.

Most trips are made with one or another correspondent. With the exception of the Agence France Presse man, all the others here are from either Communist countries or the Communist or left-wing press. There are always interpreters or Foreign Ministry or press officials accompanying the press parties.

Dispatches are submitted to the cable office through the Foreign Ministry, which obviously reads them before transmission but, as far as is known, has not censored anything.

ONE REQUEST REFUSED

These procedures are about what one would encounter on brief trips to many Communist countries. The authorities are not willing to expose a correspondent to the hazards of bombing, which are only too real outside Hanoi. Even for a trip of six or seven miles outside the city, cars are camouflaged.

The trip to Namdinh was deliberately timed for the Christmas truce and would not have been made otherwise.

Hanoi's Western colony is small. There is a French representative who is something like a consul. There is the Canadian component of the Control Commission, which is assigned to enforce the Geneva agreements on Vietnam. There is also a scattering of non-Communist diplomats, including the Indian consul general and the Indian component of the Control Commission, which also has Polish members.

There are two hotels populated generally by foreigners. Including a mixture of Eastern Europeans, visiting delegations and representatives of Asian and African countries.

Hanoi is not exactly a swinging town, but there is more bounce to it than one American at least had foreseen.

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## North's Economy Badly Disrupted—Despite Big Drain, It Seems Able to Continue War

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Hanoi, North Vietnam, Dec. 31.—The North Vietnamese agree that the conflict in Vietnam is a rough affair for them.

Every official interviewed stresses the difficulties, handicaps and hardships that must be overcome to carry on in the face of American bombing.

A colossal number of manhours must be devoted to the transport of goods and supplies, to the repair of bombed railroads, highways and bridges, and to the dispersal of goods, people and industries over the countryside.

Effects on industry and agriculture are inevitable, but no precise statistics are available, possibly because they are regarded as military secrets. One official estimated food production last year at 6 per cent above 1964, but he had no figures for 1966.

Eastern Europeans here say the rice crop has fallen short by a substantial margin, largely because of bad weather but possibly in part because of a diversion of men and women to the war effort. The result is expected to be additional rice imports from Communist China and the Soviet Union, probably mostly from China.

Food is rationed and thus far, according to foreign sources, supplies have apparently been maintained. The rice ration ranges from 13.5 to 20 kilograms (29.7 to 44 pounds) a month, supplied at a low, fixed price. In December 10 per cent of the ration was provided in maize.

There is a monthly ration of half a kilo to a kilo of sugar and about the same for meat, which may be provided in the form of butter and fat. Vegetables and fruits are available in peasant markets, as are some chicken and other meats.

It is the conviction of non-Vietnamese that as long as the Communist Government is able to maintain the rice ration at about the present level, the ability of the populace to sustain the fighting effort will be unaffected.

The question of distribution is serious because of United States bombing of supply routes, but is being met at least in part by radical decentralization.

Observers from Eastern Europe who have been resident in Hanoi for a year or two concur that there has been a decline in the living standard in the last year and that the American bombing has had a serious impact on North Vietnamese industry despite valiant efforts to keep factories going.

In this connection, they point out that North Vietnamese industry never was extensive and that the general level of the economy was not dependent on advanced technology and comforts. The life of the Vietnamese is hard, but the Eastern Europeans say it has always been hard, so that the deterioration is not really tangible.

The Government has reduced prices on a handful of consumers goods, notably bicycles, which have been cut 30 per cent to 200 dongs (the dong is nominally valued at 3.53 to the dollar and there is no free rate). Bicycles, which are manufactured in North Vietnam, are vital to every aspect of life.

There has been a 50 per cent cut in the cost of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals, 30 per cent in radios, to bring their price to 100 to 200 dongs, and 50 per cent in school textbooks, but none of these have much effect on every-day life.

As far as interdiction of supply movement by American bombing of highways, railroads, supply depots, bridges and rail yards is concerned, discrepancies between United States estimates and ground-level observations will undoubtedly continue. Essentially the same argument raced all through World War II and was repeated in the Korean war, which provided conditions more nearly parallel to those in North Vietnam.

Korea demonstrated that, by the liberal use of manpower, night transport and multiple routes, amazing quantities of materials could be moved in the face of the heaviest bombing. North Vietnamese conditions are somewhat more difficult for ground movement, however, because so much must be transported across the flat delta region around Hanoi and Haiphong.

That is no easy task in view of United States air strength. It requires an enormous concentration of manpower, and the North has a population of only 17 million.

This population is almost totally organized. Even foreign embassies' cooks and maids must devote at least two of their free days to Government work each month. Children spend about a third of their time on studies, a third on defense or defense-related tasks and a third on farm or industrial production.

The same sort of utilization of labor runs across the board. In July, according to an official announcement, a million men and women were mobilized. They are used on defense, civil defense, and labor tasks such as repair of railroads and emergency dikes.

It is no secret that for months almost all supply and personnel movements have been as in Korea, only at night.

What happens when a bridge is knocked out by bombing? One non-Communist diplomat described a particular bridge between Hanoi and Haiphong that, to his knowledge, has been knocked out and quickly restored four times. Pontoon ferries of boats and bamboo are kept available and put into service within a short time. A labor force appears and goes to work with previously stockpiled materials to put the bridge back into service.

Another non-Communist source told of passing through Vandien, which is on the southern outskirts of Hanoi, and has been specified by United States communiques as the site of a truck park that has been attacked several times. The foreigner reached Vandien a couple of hours after a raid, he said, and found about a quarter-mile of railroad track plowed up by bombs. By the time he departed, he added, 1,000 men and women were at work and had already relaid a substantial section of the track.

One key favor in North Vietnam's ability to fight on lies in the aid poured in by the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, and China. The quantities are closely guarded military secrets, but it is no secret that they are large and vital to the maintenance of the war effort.

Westerners who have visited Haiphong recently agree with Eastern Europeans that the port is jammed with shipping carrying huge quantities of essential supplies.

There has been no bombing of the Haiphong port area. One Westerner said the city was untouched and that the attacks on oil depots there had been precise and effective.

The great quantities of supplies and, presumably, arms are moved out of Haiphong into the countryside. It is certainly true, as a British observer, Norman Barrymaine, has reported, that quantities of material are scattered over the landscape. This is particularly visible at distances from Hanoi.

To this observer it looked like deliberate dispersion. Half the supplies in the country seemed to this correspondent to be dumped at random. However, they looked normal for wartime military dispersion.

The basic question would seem to be: Has all this hurt the North Vietnamese so much that they are ready to quit? Their answer is, "By no means!" And they say that they expect their task to get a lot harder before it gets easier.

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PHAM VAN DONG PLACES STRESS IN INTERVIEW ON ENDING THE FIGHTING

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, Jan. 3.—In a detailed discussion of North Vietnam's views on the war in Vietnam, Premier Pham Van Dong emphasized that once hostilities were brought to an end, it would be possible to "speak of other things."

"The moment the United States puts an end to the war, we will respect each other and settle every question," he said. "Why don't you [the United States] think that way?"

At another point, he said that with a cessation of hostilities, "we can speak about other things." He added: "After this there will be no lack of generosity on our part—you may be sure of that."

The Premier, who conducted the four-hour conversation in a reception room of the Presidential Palace, spoke vivaciously, swinging around in his chair to face his interviewer directly.

He said that he did not care for interviews because he thought they hampered a free exchange of opinions. He took as a framework for his remarks a series of questions put to him by the correspondent in advance, but these were merely take-off points in a wide-ranging discussion.

The Premier also took the occasion to discuss proposals from various quarters for bringing the war to an end by discussion. He appeared thoroughly aware of the wide variety of proposals that have been advanced, and did not hesitate to express his views on some questions privately.

The discussion closed on an optimistic note. Mr. Dong said that frank talk was a good thing and was essential to understanding.

"If we do not agree today we will agree tomorrow," he said. "Otherwise the day after tomorrow."

At the same time the Premier stressed again and again that North Vietnam was prepared to fight 10 years, 20 years, or any number of years in support of its sovereignty and independence in its "sacred war."

"We are determined to fight on until our sacred rights are recognized," he said, stressing Vietnam's valiant history in resisting invaders.

Three times the Vietnamese drove the Mongols out of their country, he recalled, and he asked how many times the Pentagon wanted to fight.

"We are an independent country," he said. "We have our policy of independence and sovereignty. We are masters of our destiny, of our affairs, of our policy, of our policy both major and minor. If we were not independent we could not wage such a war as we are now waging. We are independent and sovereign in all our foreign policy. That is the situation up to the present, and so it will be in the future."

He stressed Vietnam's independence, he said, because in the United States "there has been so much misunderstadning on this point."

One question submitted to him was: Under what circumstances North Vietnam would accept volunteers? The Premier replied:

"This depends on the situation. We have made preparations. Volunteers are not lacking—volunteers for the armed forces and civilians as well. If we need

them, many will come. This is an important point on which we rely. This point also shows the independence of our foreign policy."

By this he presumably meant that volunteers would come only if North Vietnam asked for them and set the conditions for their coming.

Premier Dong entered into an extended discussion of Hanoi's four-points for ending the war, which are as follows:

Recognition of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam, and the withdrawal of United States forces from the area; pending reunification of Vietnam, respect for the military provisions of the Geneva agreements barring foreign forces; settlement of South Vietnam's internal affairs by the South Vietnamese under the guidance of the National Liberation Front and peaceful reunification of Vietnam by the peoples of North and South without foreign interference.

The Premier stressed that the four points were not to be considered as "conditions" for peace talks. He described them as providing a "basis of settlement of the Vietnam problem." He said they were to be understood as "valid conclusions for discussion."

"The big question," he added, "is to reach a settlement which can be enforced."

"The party which has to make first steps is Washington," he continued. "We have no doubt on this point. We cannot press history forward. If this does not come about today, it will come tomorrow. It's no use to make haste. If we show haste, the question will be put wrongly and we will have to wait again. So let the situation ripen."

Mr. Dong said he thought the most difficult of Hanoi's points for the United States to accept was the third, concerning South Vietnam. On this, he said, the North fully supports the Communist-led Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong, and nothing can divide the two parts of the country. However, he thought actual reunification would not be a sudden process and he said there was no intention in the North to annex the South.

"We will consider this among ourselves," he said. "We will settle it by the most convenient means. There is no rush about it."

As to how long the war might go on if unresolved by negotiation, he said:

"We are prepared for a long war because a people's war must be a long war, a war against aggression has to be a long war. Nobody knows how long it will be. It lasts until there is no more aggression.

"We are preparing for that kind of war. Everyone of our citizens thinks like that. This is the kind of question often put to us by foreigners because they don't understand."

"This kind of question surprises us," the Premier commented. "How many years? What I used to tell our friends was that the younger generation will fight better than we—even kids just so high. They are preparing themselves. That's the situation.

"I'm not telling that to impress anyone. It's the truth. It's the logical consequence of the situation. Our Vietnam nation is a very proud nation. Our history is one of a very proud nation."

"How many years the war goes on depends on you and not on us," he added.

A repeatedly emphasized point was that the determining aspect lay not in American material superiority but in the fact that the Vietnamese fought for "independence, freedom, for life itself." The Premier said that the war "stands for everything for this generation and for future generations."

He conceded that this determination on the part, of the Vietnamese was difficult to understand, not only for Americans but for many of North Vietnam's friends in Europe who did not see how the North Vietnamese could withstand an American expeditionary force well equipped with weapons and the nearby Seventh Fleet.

Now, however, he said, the North Vietnamese are able to demonstrate to their friends their ability to stand up to American material force.

"I have no hope of convincing you on this point," he added, "but I must tell it to you because it is very important."

Premier Dong based his presentation on an analysis that found the North Vietnamese position one of strength, not weakness. He said Saigon and Washington did not agree with this analysis, but suggested that perhaps they would in the future. The bombing of the North, in his view, has on balance proved a military failure.

It has caused severe damage, he said, but it has not compelled the North to capitulate. On the contrary, he indicated, northern military strength has increased and will continue to do so after passing through a most difficult period.

The key factor in this, Mr. Dong said, is the courageous strength of North Vietnamese youth. He said three million had volunteered for the army.

The economic aspects of bombing have been overcome, he said, and the country is in a position to continue the war and expand its potential.

He insisted that the situation in the South had turned very favorably for the Vietcong and he particularly stressed political weakness in Saigon where, he said, intensification of the political struggle against the regime was to be expected.

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AIDE SAYS LIBERATION FRONT IS INDEPENDENT OF THE NORTH—HE ASSERTS IN HANOI INTERVIEW THAT IT MUST BE HEARD ON ALL SOUTHERN ISSUES, INCLUDING A SETTLEMENT OF WAR

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, Jan. 4.—The aims, aspirations and operations of the National Liberation Front are viewed by its leadership in terms sharply different from the picture held by many Americans.

This contrast in view was the highlight of an interview given by a member of the Central Committee of the Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong. [The Vietcong are the Communist-led South Vietnamese force fighting against the Saigon regime and its allies, principally the United States.]

The picture of the Front and its role in Vietnam was presented by Nguyen Van Tien, a former Saigon professor, a member of the resistance movement since 1945, a member of the Front's Central Committee and its permanent representative in Hanoi.

Mr. Tien is a distinguished-looking, gray-haired man of quiet manner who has a considerable grasp of English. His office is housed in a newly refurbished villa close to the Foreign Ministry that once was the United States mission's headquarters in Hanoi.

As described by Mr. Tien, the Front is an independent entity. It now has 15 offices in Communist capitals, and several others such as that in Algeria.

His own task in Hanoi is not precisely a diplomatic one but "a special form not seen anywhere in the world," he said. But on all questions relating to the South, he added, his people and the North Vietnamese conduct discussions on the same footing.

"The North cannot speak for the South," he said. "Anyone who has to discuss South Vietnam must speak with the Front."

If North Vietnam has some question concerning the South, he said, its representatives have to talk the matter over with him.

He was asked whether all aid to his cause had to go to North Vietnam, and whether it was then funneled to the South. Not at all, he responded, explaining that if aid is for the South it has to be arranged directly with the Front. There has to be clear specification of what is destined for the North and what is for the South, he said.

PLACE AT PEACE TABLE

He emphasized that North and South were one people and one nation and engaged in a common struggle and said that this was why each had the right to demand aid from the other.

Asked who ran the armed struggle in the South—the North, as is presumed abroad, or the South—he replied: "The direction of the struggle is run by the South, not the North."

Since all questions on the South are settled by the Front, Mr. Tien said, it naturally must be represented at the conference table when peace talks begin.

What about reunification? The Front and the North would have to discuss that on the basis of equality, he insisted, and the Front would then decide all matters for the South as far as reunification is concerned.

He said Southern thinking was that reunification could occur only step by step. The first step would be to renew trade, mail and travel between North and South. Because of the division of the country, many people have not seen their relatives for 10 years, Mr. Tien remarked.

As to what steps would be taken after that or what time period might be involved, he offered no specifics but conveyed the impression that there would be no hurry and that there were many complicated questions to be resolved.

Some of these may arise from differences between the program of the Front and the policies of North Vietnam.

The Front has a five-point program calling for national independence, democratic freedom, peace, neutrality and reunification. The neutrality plank envisages a government generally aligned with neutralist Asian states such as Cambodia, Laos and Burma. In contrast, North Vietnam is a firm member of the Communist block.

The Front says it wants to end all alignments to any bloc or system, whether American or Communist.

How the neutrality question might be worked out has not been indicated.

Another point of some divergence lies in the political complexion of the Front's Central Committee (which includes, according to Mr. Tien, not only Communists but bourgeois intellectuals and members of the religious sects and other parties. There are differences among them as to the type of government that should be set up after the war, he said, some believing it should follow the socialist path and some the Communist, with the most powerful group standing firm for neutrality.

Mr. Tien's picture of the Liberation Front differed sharply from that held by many in the United States that it is an organization created and directed by and subservient to the Hanoi regime. Such ideals, he contended, are a serious miscalculation.

He said the United States should recognize the leading role of the Front in the South, both now and in the future, once peace is restored.

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NORTH VIETNAM RUNS ON BICYCLES—PARTS ARE PRICELESS—OTHER TRANSPORT IS USUALLY POOR

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, Jan. 5.—The best present you can give your girl friend in Hanoi is not a box of candy or even a diamond ring. It's a new chain for her bicycle.

The bicycle is just as essential to the North Vietnamese as the auto is in Los Angeles. Without the bicycle Hanoi's life would come to a halt. If by some magic weapon all the bikes in North Vietnam could be immobilized, the war would be over in a twinkling.

Hanoi citizens, according to foreign residents, are notably honest and theft is almost unknown. Diplomats say there is only one thing that sometimes disappears—a bicycle.

On the broad boulevards great sections of sidewalk are roped off in the early evening just before the movies start. Outside the theaters 600 bikes each with its wheel lock, will be parked row on row in portable wooden racks. Each also has a license tag issued by the municipal authority, which averts confusion since so many of the bikes are identical.

One of North Vietnam's leading light industries is bicycle production. Bicycles are also imported in large numbers from Communist China and from Eastern European countries particularly East Germany.

A bicycle from China costs 200 dongs since a 30 per cent price cut this year. The dong is nominally valued at 3.53 to the dollar, but its purchasing power is more clearly reflected by pay rates, which for factory or office workers range from 70 to 80 dongs a month.

Bicycles are not rationed, but the market is controlled by the issuance of purchase permits through places of employment. The same Chinese bicycle that costs 200 dongs in a store will fetch 1,000 in a private sale.

TIRES AND GEARS, TOO

Under wartime conditions spare parts are often in short supply, which is why a new bicycle chain is such a priceless present. Tires are good presents, too, as are gears, wheels and other components.

Hanoi has no taxis. Only diplomats and high officials have cars, and they are provided for foreign visitors. There is a small number of hand-hauled, rubber-tired carts, but these are more likely to be filled with boxes and bundles than passengers.

Hanoi has a small municipal streetcar system using half-size tandem cars, but it operates only in the evening and early morning because of the bombing. There is a bus system for the suburbs and nearby towns, but it seems to run irregularly, mostly at night, utilizing a beat-up fleet of old, camouflaged buses.

The bicycle is the key to transport in the country as well as in Hanoi. It is the bicycle that carries fantastic burdens when rail and truck links are impeded by bombing.

FROM TRAINS TO BIKES

One foreign resident told of coming upon a place near Haiphong where bombing had severed a rail line. A brigade of hundreds of bikes was on the scene. Freight was transferred from the train to the bicycles—600 pounds on each. In a remarkably short time, the foreigner related, the freight was moving along the bombed-out tracks to a point where it could be reloaded onto another train.

The most active period for transport is at night since the American air effort slackens then or is more easily evaded. Then the big truck convoys and myriad bicycle caravans roll.

The whole rhythm of city life has been geared to bombing schedules. Most shops open from 5 A.M. to 8 A.M., then close until late afternoon or early evening. The 5 A.M. shopping hour is not difficult for a Hanoi resident. Government offices and factories begin their working day at 6 o'clock, and by 7 o'clock the city is bustling with life.

The slackest period comes from 1 P.M. to 5 P.M., the period when bombing attacks have most frequently occurred.

In those hours foreigners usually stay in hotels or embassies rather than face the prospect of being caught on the street and having to take refuge in one of Hanoi's many individual manhole shelters. They are just the right size for the Vietnamese but Russians, Frenchmen or Britons often find them uncomfortable.

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HANOI REITERATES ITS STAND THAT FOUR POINTS ARE BASIC—IT COMMENTS ON THEORIES THAT DONG'S REMARKS HINTED A CHANGE

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, Jan. 6.—So much speculation and excitment were generated in Washington, London and Paris by Premier Pham Van Dong's remarks this week on the war that Hanoi issued an official statement today designed to bring the matter back to earth.

The speculation centered on Premier Dong's statement to this correspondent defining the nature of North Vietnam's program for resolution of the Vietnamese conflict. Foreign diplomats and press commentators read into his declaration two interpretations: that North Vietnam's position had changed and that its four-point program was negotiable.

The passage in the interview that stirred excitment was as follows:

"We have our point of view and we have put forward four points, which constitute the basis for settlement of the Vietnam question. These should not be considered 'conditions.' They are merely truths.

"The most simple thing is to recognize our sovereignty and our independence. It involves only recognizing the points in the Geneva agreements. The ruling circles of the United States do not like to accept our four points, and particularly the third point. That means that they are still clinging to South Vietnam, that means they are still introducing themselves into a tunnel.

"Now what can you do about that? We must come to a solution on the basis of the four points. Whichever way you may go around, finally you must come to the four points."

The Premier continued:

"Besides the four points, we have also put another point. That is to demand that the United States put, unconditionally and for good, an end to the bombing and all hostile activity against the North."

In discussion later on, when Mr. Dong was asked to clarify further the status of the four points, he phrased his response thus:

"It is wrong to say that we are putting some conditions. What I have told you are not our 'conditions,' but conditions for valid settlement. The question is how to reach a settlement which can be enforced."

Those are the Premier's precise words. Today they were officially restated as follows:

"The four-point stand of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam constitutes the basis of a settlement of the Vietnamese problem."

The four-point program is as follows:

1. Recognition of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam and the withdrawal of United States forces from the area pending reunification of Vietnam.

2. Respect for the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreement, including those barring foreign forces.

3. Settlement of South Vietnam's internal affairs by the South Vietnamese in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front.

4. Peaceful reunification of Vietnam by the peoples of North and South without foreign interference.

The circumstances of the Premier's statements should be explained. He received this correspondent last Monday afternoon in the Presidential Palace. He had familiarized himself beforehand with a detailed group of questions submitted in advance.

List of questions had been prepared not only for himself but for President Ho Chi Minh and the Defense Minister, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. It was tacitly understood that the correspondent probably would be received by one, but there was no advance indication of which one.

Premier Dong said he would endeavor to discuss the questions, but not in a formal interview, which he finds uncomfortable. He said he would make a series of observations, then the observations could be discussed and questions put in an informal manner.

He asked that since the interview was being conducted so informally, anything written about it be submitted for checking to make certain that the quotations were precise.

With agreement on these ground rules, the discussion was launched. Mr. Dong divided his remarks into two main sections. The first was devoted to the war, its origin and prospects. The second deal with questions involved in a settlement. There then was considereable interchange, the whole discussion occupying about 4½ hours and touching on most of the vital issues in the conflict.

Certain segments of the discussion were placed off the record. A dispatch reporting on the talk was submitted Tuesday to the Foreign Ministry, which checked it closely, proposing certain textual changes and deletions. Thus the dispatch as transmitted and published represented a careful, accurate report of the Premier's views.

Today's statement was not designed to dispute that dispatch. The ministry rechecked the text after the wave of speculation arose and made some minor clarifications, which are incorporated in the passages quoted in this dispatch as well as in the textual version that accompanies it.

What is the significance of all this?

It appears that the greatest care and caution should be observed in attempting to analyze official North Vietnamese statements. Even when precisely made, they may not be fully understood in the West.

The question of the four points is particularly complex. When Premier Dong says they are not conditions that must be accepted prior to peace negotiation, he is speaking quite sincerely. While Hanoi does not insist that they be agreed upon before it will sit down at the conference table, it does insist on a solution based on them.

Whether this is a distinction without a difference remains to be seen.

If the four points were made the agenda of a conference, the West would certainly presume that there would be give and take and that, in effect, the points were negotiable. But this may not be Hanoi's view at all, especially since the Premier says that the points constitute "conditions for a valid settlement" that "can be enforced."

The speculation and excitement aroused by the interview have been intensified, in the opinion of some diplomats in Hanoi, by a widespread failure in the West to realize that Hanoi has said much the same thing several times."

Whatever the situation, the Premier's entire statement contained a number of illuminating insights into North Vietnamese thinking, not all of which are readily apparent.

## Clearing Skies Bring U.S. Planes Over the Capital of North Vietnam

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Hanoi, North Vietnam, Jan. 7.—When the sun finally broke through Hanoi's gray skies at noon yesterday, a resident of the Thongnhat Hotel nodded and said, "We'll be having visitors after lunch." He was right.

Almost on the dot of 2:30 P.M., Hanoi's sirens wailed, the pretty hotel waitresses grabbed their rifles and helmets and the guests filed out into the rear courtyard, where the hotel's three white roosters majestically strut in a tall cage.

Despite the urgings of a small, helmeted, gun-carrying porter, the guests did not enter the air raid shelter, but instead dallied in the warm sun, peering up at the almost cloudless sky.

### RIFLEMEN ON ROOFS

On the roofs of nearby buildings, including the State Bank, men with rifles were wheeling right and left watching for planes. Suddenly came the crack of an old-fashioned antiaircraft gun close by, certainly within a block or so.

The guests edged a little closer to the bunker's entrance. There was a pause. Then, with deep Martian thunder, Hanoi's SAM's, surface-to-air missiles, opened up and the guests heeded the warden's plea and walked down the concrete steps into the bunker.

The Thongnhat hotel's bunker probably is the flossiest in town. It has park benches and folding chairs on which to recline and a couple of fluorescent lights. It is long and narrow and the concrete floor is clean. It is equipped with old-fashioned red fire extinguishers made by a French concern with the unlikely name of "Compagnie Knock-Out."

After the SAM's had let go once or twice, a high-pitched distant whine was heard. It was the first time this correspondent had actually heard hostile planes overhead, although it was the eighth alert he had undergone in a fortnight in North Vietnam. The characteristic sound of supersonic planes was unmistakable. Veteran's of Hanoi's air raids identified them as F–105's, Republic Thunderchiefs, which may or may not have been accurate.

With the sound of the planes high over the city, the SAM's let go several more times and there was a heavy crash of conventional antiaircraft batteries, though they were mostly some distance away.

This was Hanoi's second alert of the day; there had been a 10-minute alert in the morning but without audible gunfire or planes.

After 20 minutes the all-clear sounded and the guests emerged from the bunker.

### RESIDENTS NOTE A LULL

Hanoi residents say there has been a decided lull in close-in bombing since the attacks of Dec. 13 and 14.

Some have attributed this to the presence of a United States correspondent and have predicted that with his departure today the attacks will intensify.

Actually there apparently has been considerable air action over Hanoi's more distant approaches.

Efforts by this correspondent to revisit Namdinh, the scene of controversial bombings by United States warplanes, were frustrated because of heavy air action reported in the last few days in areas between Hanoi and Namdinh, about 65 miles to the south.

Many Hanoi residents now consider themselves experts on United States bombing tactics. In recent weeks, they say, American planes have come in from almost any direction and not infrequently are over the city before, or almost simultaneous with, the siren's sound. They attribute this to a low-level approach, which makes radar detection and plotting more difficult.

Not infrequently United States planes are over Hanoi, according to residents, for considerable periods of time. They were reported to have been overhead for about 45 minutes in the Dec. 13 attack, criss-crossing the city as they singled out their targets.

One military observer here expressed some puzzlement over the Dec. 13 and 14 attacks.

He said the targets were small and difficult to hit and had to be approached through antiaircraft fire. He said he was not certain why they had been picked

out, since some seemed to have such small military value. The observers said that he knew from personal observation that there were only 12 or 14 trucks and buses being repaired at Vandien, in the southern outskirts of Hanoi, which was heavily hit.

It was reported that in this attack the Vietnam Polish Friendship Highschool, about three-quarters of a mile from the repair yard, was hit.

"There would seem to be more important military objectives in Hanoi, including, for instance, the Paul Doumer Bridge or the city power plant," the military observer said. "Bombs were dropped at either end of the bridge. But whether the bridge was not a target or the action was accidental or designed to show the bridge could be hit if the United States wanted to certainly wasn't clear."

Diplomats in Hanoi are not exactly pleased at the United States air action in and around Hanoi.

"I know just how the Hanoi people feel," one diplomat's wife said, "When American planes are overhead I'd shoot at them, too, if I had a rifle."

### CANADIAN MISSION HIT

Among the buildings that have been hit, reportedly in the Dec. 13 attack, was one housing the Canadian mission to the International Control Commission.

One Canadian took some metal fragments, put them in a box and sent it off to friends in Saigon with a note saying, "Look here, chaps, this is getting to be a little bit much!"

"I don't know how well they appreciated his sense of humor down in Saigon," another Canadian said.

A Western diplomat said it was only luck that prevented serious casualties and damage on Dec. 13 at the Chinese, Polish, Rumanian and Russian embassies, which form a quadrangle.

Diplomats from both East and West said that in the attack, a rocket from a United States plane hit a tree just outside the Rumanian Embassy. The rocket engine lodged there. A red-hot chunk of metal was said to have blasted through an open window into Rumanian military attache's office.

The blast is reported to have knocked Rumanians in a shelter in their garden to the floor. Pieces of the rocket shattered a corner of the Chinese Embassy and knocked many tiles from the roof.

Many of the charges and countercharges of the air war remain unresolved as this correspondent's fortnight in Hanoi draws to a close.

Efforts to prolong the stay have been gently discouraged. The original plan was for a one-week visit. This was doubled at this correspondent's request.

One thing seems certain: this may have been the first visit of an American correspondent to wartime Hanoi, but it is not likely to be the last.

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## Catholic Charity Aide Visiting Hanoi

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Hanoi, North Vietnam, Jan. 7.—Msgr. Georg Hüssler, secretary general of a West German Roman Catholic welfare organization, has arrived in Hanoi—the first foreign Catholic functionary to visit North Vietnam since the establishment of the Communist regime.

Monsignor Hüssler's mission is one of relief. He came to Hanoi with the Rev. Martin Niemöller, a German Evangelical pastor and one-time submarine commander, who was imprisoned by the Nazis, to hold talks with North Vietnamese Red Cross and medical officials.

For some time the German organization, part of Caritas International, has been making a financial contribution to the North Vietnamese Red Cross, to the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front's Red Cross organization and to the Red Cross in South Vietnam.

Now Monsignor Hüssler is seeking to ascertain what medical supplies North Vietnam can use—possibly penicillin and other antibiotics, quinine and surgical instruments.

His visit is regarded in other aspects as well. It is taken as a symbol of Pope Paul's deep interest in peace in Vietnam and of the Vatican's abiding interest in strengthening ties with Roman Catholics in the North.

Monsignor Hüssler was to confer with the Catholic hierarchy here, instituting the first personal contact between Rome and the Hanoi churches since the Communist regime took over the North in 1954.

One important aspect of Monsignor Hüssler's visit was understood to be a tangible demonstration that the Vatican's interest is not concentrated exclusively on the church in South Vietnam. The intimate association of the southern church with the Diem regime through the late dictator's brother, the Most Rev. Ngo Dinh Thuc, then Archbishop of Hue, was taken by many in the North as a sign of partisanship in the North-South struggle.

According to an estimate provided by the Rev. Ho Thanh Bien, pastor of St. Dominique Church here, and by what is called the Liaison Committee of Patriotic Catholics, a lay organization, there are just under a million Catholics in the North. No estimate of the number who went South in 1954 was offered, but the generally accepted figure outside Vietnam is a million.

Monsignor Hüssler puts membership in North Vietnam now at something over 700,000.

In the heavily Catholic district of the Phatdiem area, 75 miles south of Hanoi, local officials said approximately 10,000 of the region's population of 80,000 went south. The officials attributed the exodus to an intensive campaign by representatives of the Diem regime, who said that under the Communists the church would be suppressed.

The local authorities in the Phatdiem area maintain that they still have 82 churches functioning for a population that is again about 80,000.

Father Bien said that six of the North's 10 Bishops went south, and with them all 10 seminaries operating in the North. He estimated that two-thirds of the North's priests also went south.

He said, and Monsignor Hüssler confirmed, that since 1955 the Vatican had confirmed six new bishops and that all 10 dioceses now had bishops. Father Bien also said that the 10 seminaries had reopened and that about 100 priests were in training. He said the Most Rev. Trinh Nhu Khue, named Archbishop of Hanoi in 1962, was the principal church functionary in North Vietnam.

Both Father Bien and officials of the Patriotic Catholics said that they were in mail communication with Rome, that the Pope's edicts and other materials were being received and that they sent back acknowledgements.

Asked why there had been no personal contact, they insisted that this was not due to Government interference but that such contacts "depend on the situation," which they described as being complicated, at least in part because of the war.

They estimated that 300 to 400 priests were serving churches in the North. Hanoi has 12 churches, with 10 priests and possibly 20,000 worshippers, they said, explaining that Hanoi had never been as strongly Catholic as the countryside.

There are no schools of general education run by the Catholics, but children are given instruction at church, particularly during the two regular vacation periods each year, the churchmen said.

There are still a number of nuns and many convents operating, the churchmen said, but they conceded that many nuns had gone south.

They said the official position was one of noninterference in religious matters. According to these spokesmen, the Government provided considerable funds for rebuilding churches after partition.

Roman Catholic members of the diplomatic colony attend mass in Hanoi churches but have had little contact with the priests. One Frenchwoman goes to a Hanoi priest for confession. Another Catholic, a diplomat, does not, feeling that it might be embarrassing for the priest.

There are constant references in conversations with both laymen and priests to the exodus of Catholics in 1954, and it is evident that deep and bitter wounds have been left.

Regarding the Vatican's efforts for peace in Vietnam, neither priests nor clergy offered any more specific comment than that the church fully supported North Vietnam's peace proposals.

It was said that many churches had been destroyed or damaged by United States bombing and that two priests had been killed.

## HANOI INVITING WESTERNERS TO INSPECT BOMB DAMAGE

*Following is the first of a series of articles by an assistant managing editor of The New York Times summing up observations on his visit to North Vietnam.*

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HONG KONG, Jan. 10.—The parade to North Vietnam has begun—not merely just of newsmen or of Americans—but of Westerners of all kinds.

The North Vietnamese Government has reached a momentous decision—to open its doors and invite the world in to inspect the results of American bombings.

The trip of this correspondent to Hanoi was not the last there for an American correspondent.

There are indications that hardly a week will pass through the winter when one American newsman or another or a distinguished West European guest will not be taken for a walk through the shattered streets of Namdinh.

Visitors will tour the complex of Roman Catholic villages around Phatdiem, south of Hanoi, inspect the flattened village of Phuly or poke through the ruins of Hanoi's Pho Nguyen Thiep Street and the wasteland of the Phuctan area along the Hanoi Red River levee.

Before this correspondent left Hanoi in the pre-dawn hours Saturday on the plane of the International Control Commission, the truce observation body set up under the 1954 Geneva accords ending the Indochina war, the North Vietnamese capital was already receiving more visitors from the West.

The same plane that took this correspondent out of Hanoi had brought in two other Americans, Harry Ashmore, one-time editor of The Arkansas Gazette of Little Rock and now chairman of the executive committee of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, and William C. Baggs, editor of The Miami News. With them was Luis Quintanilla, a former Mexican Ambassador to the United States, who made the trip as a private citizen.

Already in Hanoi were the Rev. Martin Niemöller, a West German Evangelical pastor and one-time submarine commander, and Msgr. Georg Hüssler, secretary general of Caritas, West German Catholic welfare organization. They came for talks on North Vietnam's relief needs.

Hanoi at long last has decided to open North Vietnam's doors not merely to Communists, fellow travelers, leftists, peace advocates and supporters of North Vietnam's cause. It has decided to admit a cross-section of political beliefs and sympathies and visitors from all kinds of countries, but particularly from the United States and Western Europe. Actually Hanoi has seemed to be inching toward this decision for months. For instance, this correspondent began his effort nearly 18 months ago, to persuade North Vietnam's authorities to permit him to visit Hanoi. The first indication that a visit might be possible came six months before the visa actually was granted, namely last June, when a formal visa application was accepted in Pnompenh, Cambodia.

In June the North Vietnamese authorities thought the trip could be made, then changed their mind and said it would have to be postponed, but promised it could be carried out by the end of the year.

It was about that time that Hanoi, after more than six months of requests, permitted the first resident Western correspondent to take up his duties in Hanoi—Jean Raffaelli of Agence France-Presse. During the summer and autumn two or three West European visitors were admitted, including Jacques Decornoy, correspondent of the newspaper Le Monde of Paris, who completed a visit to North Vietnam in early December.

### APPLICATIONS RECEIVED

Ngo Dien, chief of information of the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry said Friday that his ministry had received so many cables in the last fortnight for permission to visit Hanoi that it had been unable to read them all. He said the applications made a stack of cables nearly half a foot high and numbered in the hundreds from all countries of the world, but particularly from the United States.

This does not mean that North Vietnam will be admitting, all those who apply. It simply does not have the facilities to cope with more than a handful of visitors at a time. But the flow of visitors will undoubtedly be maintained, to include many Americans, especially journalists, and to cover all varieties of sympathies and viewpoints.

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This decision by Hanoi may well, in the opinion of diplomats in Hanoi, have a major impact on the course of the war.

Visible evidence of damage caused by bombing is apparent to outsiders who walk down the streets of Namdinh or who try to reconstruct in their minds what the village of Phuly may have looked like before bombs virtually obliterated it. It is against these impressions of human suffering and devastation that air strategists' arguments concerning military objectives will have to be placed.

BOMBINGS INVESTIGATED

A Scottish member of a seven-man team that is investigating the bombings for Bertrand Russell, the philosopher, said:

"I am willing to concede that the Americans did not deliberately order their pilots to destroy villages, bomb out housing and kill civilians. It is even possible that the bombers consistently were striving to strike at purely military targets although this seems hard to believe in the case of miserable peasant villages that have been devastated.

"But the fact remains that, whatever the reason, bombs actually have leveled villages, killed large numbers of civilians and destroyed a very great deal that cannot be considered military by any stretch of the imagination."

Lord Russell's group is seeking evidence on "war crimes" to be used at a planned "trial" of President Johnson and other United States leaders. The tribunal, which has no legal standing, is scheduled to meet in Paris in March.

The impact of continuous and detailed reports of the bombing by Westerners should not, in the opinion of diplomats sympathetic to the United States, be underestimated in Washington.

"Who remembers that the Nazis were trying to destroy the motor works in Coventry?" one diplomat said. "All we remember is that the Luftwaffe destroyed the cathedral."

The effect on world opinion may be heightened by television and documentary film coverage of North Vietnam. Japanese and French film crews are already at work there. It is likely that Hanoi will soon also let an American team take pictures for American television audiences of what the bombing looks like from the victims' side.

This involves delicate decisions for the North Vietnamese. Their military men are a little nervous about having so many foreigners, particularly Americans, moving about, making observations and taking pictures. But the basic decision clearly has been made that the advantages outweigh possible risks.

This correspondent has worked under wartime conditions in many countries. Restrictions imposed during his fortnight in North Vietnam were remarkably light. There was no censorship of dispatches although they were read before being transmitted. Nothing was changed or deleted as far as he could ascertain.

The only restriction encountered concerned his interview with Premier Pham Van Dong, which was granted with the understanding that certain parts of the talk were to be off the record. In addition the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry proposed certain textual changes and deletions in a dispatch reporting the interview.

Jacques Moalic, the present resident correspondent of Agence France-Presse, said he encountered no censorship in four months' work in Hanoi with one exception. The authorities told him that they could not permit him to mention certain trips by Communist party secretaries outside the country.

On picture-taking this correspondent encountered similar liberality. Color pictures were not permitted because the North Vietnamese lack processing facilities. Black-and-white photography was permitted, but the film had to be developed and inspected by the military authorities. There was no military objection to any photos submitted.

The authorities asked that one picture not be used, not for military reasons, but because they thought it conveyed a poor impression of people who had been photographed.

No pictures were taken without permission. A textile factory manager once objected to having his factory girls photographed. His reason is difficult to guess. On another occasion a picture was snapped at Phatdien, showing a view across a canal and open field. A security man requested that no more pictures be taken in that direction. Presumably there was a military reason, possibly an anticraft battery beyond the rim of the trees.

This correspondent exercised care not to propose pictures that might involve military objectives such as railroads, bridges or antiaircraft guns. In more

than 20 years of work as a correspondent in virtually every Communist country of the world, one acquires a sense of what is likely to be regarded as a legitimate news photo by Communist officials and one that is likely to be regarded as violating either military security or the propaganda image of the country.

Comparatively speaking, the North Vietnamese were more relaxed than, for instance, Soviet officials even under today's so-called "relaxed" Soviet regime. Many pictures of village life were taken that revealed a low standard of North Vietnamese life. Such pictures would probably have aroused objections by local authorities, for instance, in Mongolia.

All visits, trips and interviews were arranged through the press department of the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry. Because of the delicacy of the correspondent's position "behind the lines," requests were submitted in general rather than specific terms.

For example, a request was made to visit areas in Hanoi that had been bombed without specifying which ones, requests were made for trips to towns and cities outside Hanoi where bombing could be inspected without specifying them by name, a request was made to visit country villages to see the life of people without saying which villages, to visit factories, schools and hospitals without specifying precisely which ones.

Some requests for interviews were specific—to talk with the Premier, with President Ho Chi Minh, with Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the Defense Minister, with the ministers of health, education and planning, with leaders of the Roman Catholic and Buddhist faiths.

Most requests were met. An interview was granted by Premier Dong, but not by President Ho Chi Minh or General Giap, but it was understood that only one of the trio was likely to receive the correspondent. The Planning Minister was said to be out of town and no good economic spokesman was forthcoming as a substitute.

A request to revisit Namdinh fell through, but this was not the fault of officials. A visit had been set up for New Year's day, but delays on a trip to Phatdiem made it impossible to carry out the Namdinh trip. Efforts to reschedule failed because renewed air activity after the New Year's truce caused the authorities to regard the trip as hazardous.

No request was made, specifically to visit Haiphong, and such a trip was not proposed by the authorities. The request was not made because of a feeling that Haiphong might be a sensitive military area. Actually, as conversations with diplomats revealed, the Hanoi-Haiphong triangle is open to diplomats, who travel there constantly despite air attacks.

Thus information on Haiphong and on the routes between Hanoi and Haiphong is already available in detail in world chancellories. Since Haiphong is constantly visited by foreign shipping; there is no real question of military security in that area.

One major request made to the North Vietnamese authorities failed of a positive response. This was a request for interviews with or information concerning American prisoners held in North Vietnam.

It was immediately indicated that this request would be "difficult." It was said that the prisoners were in the custody of the military and that it did not seem likely that the military would grant permission. The request was repeated up to the last day of the visit, but without success.

> [Mrs. Joe Griffith, of Ithaca, N.Y., one of four American women who visited North Vietnam while Mr. Salisbury was there, reported after her return to the United States that her group had met two captured American airmen and brought back letters from other captured fliers.]

Efforts to piece together information about the prisoners from other sources, including diplomats, provided little data. It was said by the diplomats that they believed the prisoners were being given relatively good care although it was understood some prisoners found the rice diet of the Vietnamese difficult.

The authorities said the prisoners were not held in Hanoi, but had been dispersed in small groups to various places because of the bombing danger. The prisoners were paraded through the streets of Hanoi last Aug. 1. Foreign diplomats who witnessed the spectacle found it unpleasant, particularly when one Communist diplomat stepped from the ranks and struck one of the wounded Americans.

North Vietnam's decision to open the country for Western inspection has been vigorously urged for many months by East European representatives, especially

Czechs, Poles and Hungarians. As far as is known to the East Europeans, neither the Russians nor the Chinese have urged North Vietnam to open its doors to the West.

"We told them again and again and again," said one Polish diplomat, "that they must let the outside world know their story. All they wanted to do was to invite delegations of their closest supporters. We told them that would not do. They must invite right-wing visitors, persons who do not sympathize with Communism, persons who are antagonistic to their system."

This diplomat told how he intervened with the North Vietnamese on behalf of a Scandinavian diplomat who wanted to come to Hanoi and how impressed the Scandinavian was with the results of American bombing and the North Vietnamese war effort.

"This man was a good bourgeois," the Pole said, "he was no friend of Communism. But he could not help but be impressed with what he saw."

The problem of handling the continuous influx of Western journalists and visitors will not be easy for Hanoi. In many cases the North Vietnamese Authorities attach a physician to the visiting groups, although in the case of this correspondent they apparently felt he was rugged enough to get along without medical aid.

They do not like to move people on highways in the daylight as there is never any certainty that American bombers may not appear at any moment. Visitors are usually driven in the early evening or pre-dawn hours to points outside Hanoi. This is not always possible, of course, and diplomats visiting Haiphong have had to take shelter en route.

Hotel facilities for visitors exist only at Hanoi and Haiphong, and even if hotels in Namdinh and Ninhbinh, for example, had not been bombed out, the authorities would be unlikely to permit visitors to stay overnight because of the possibility of attack. On trips about the country, visitors are more likely to be put up in small village hostels.

The number of interpreters and escorts is small and provides another limitation on the size of any Western influx.

Outside of casual shopping and errands and visits to foreign missions in Hanoi, this correspondent did not venture out without an interpreter, not only because of the language barrier, but also because of the delicacy of his position "behind the lines." This provides an unusual quality to a visit by an American to North Vietnam.

To an American who is constantly taken to see houses blasted by American rockets; hospitals where men, women and children hurt in the bombing are being treated; who hears survivors tell how wives, husbands or children were killed, or who hears provincial authorities proudly announce the number of American planes shot down or describe the capture of an American pilot, there is a nightmarish quality that is hard to avoid.

### TWO KINDS OF AMERICANS

This aspect seldom leaves the mind of an American visitor, but seems hardly to bother the North Vietnamese, who have been trained by the Government's propaganda to divide Americans into two categories—"American ruling circles," responsible for the war, and ordinary Americans, presented as individuals of goodwill and sympathy. The average North Vietnamese, on meeting an American in Hanoi, automatically classifies him as a "good" American as distinguished from "bad" Americans in Washington and up in the skies.

An additional factor that limits the number of visitors that may be received in North Vietnam is air transportation. There are only two routes open—the plane of the International Control Commission which links Saigon, Pnompenh, Vientiane and Hanoi, and a Chinese plane that connects with services to Canton and Peking at Nanning.

The control commission plane, an old four-motor Constellation, makes the flight three times every fortnight. The service formerly was more frequent but the commission lost a plane over Laos last year, presumably shot down although the wreckage has never been found.

Because of the dangers of flying over North Vietnam in the daytime, the commission plane remains on the ground at Vientiane until dusk, then takes off for a two-hour circuitous journey to Hanoi. The Cambodian airline maintained a Pnompenh-Hanoi service until late last summer, but suspended it after a plane had encountered United States jets on a bombing mission. The jets warned the

Cambodian plane away. It flew back to Pnompenh without landing at Hanoi and further service was suspended.

The commission plane normally arrives in Hanoi about 9 P.M. and takes off on the return trip about 4 A.M. the following morning. This enables it to get across North Vietnam and northern Laos in darkness when ground fire is not likely to be encountered. The impression of travelers is that people on the ground in Laos and North Vietnam are trigger-happy and open up on anything they see in the skies on the assumption that it is out to bomb or strafe.

The Chinese planes flying in from Nanning also make the trip in darkness, usually coming in and taking off the same evening. There are one or two planes weekly on the Chinese service. Both the commission and the Chinese cancel flights at any indication of possible trouble.

Thus access to Hanoi is not easy and has not been made easier by the increasing reluctance of the Chinese to permit the transit of Western visitors bound for Hanoi. There has been speculation that the Czechoslovak airline, which now flies to Pnompenh, may add the Hanoi link, but nothing has been done thus far.

It was an eerie experience to touch down in Hanoi shortly after 9 P.M. on Dec. 23, wondering what kind of reception lay ahead. All the way from Pnompenh and through a pause of several hours at Vientiane, while waiting for darkness to fall, a Canadian sergeant who frequently traveled from Saigon to Hanoi, talked dourly about the dangers of the flight, the possibility of being shot down by ground gunfire or fighter planes of the two or three fighting forces engaged in the mountains of northern Laos.

When Hanoi came into sight, it was not the brilliant pool of light that might have been expected from a city that was supposed to have a population of more than 1,000,000 with its suburbs. The streets were marked by strings of dim little bulbs and the edges of the city faded raggedly into darkness.

When the plane touched down, the runway lights were almost immediately switched off and the aircraft taxied up to the ramp in darkness. When the engines were cut off, the plane was dark except for the wavering light of one flashlight in the hands of a stewardess. The doors opened and two North Vietnamese border control officers stepped aboard and, by the light of the flashlight, checked off the names of passengers and took up passports.

### COLOR FILM SURRENDERED

On the ground two young men who identified themselves as a representative of the Foreign Ministry and a representative of the Hanoi Journalists Association, stepped up and led the way into the dimly lighted small terminal.

There was a half-hour wait while baggage was unloaded from the plane and the authorities checked the passports. The only questions dealt with films and the only request made was that all color film be surrendered against a receipt with the proviso that it could be picked up on exit from the country.

Then the correspondent and the two young Vietnamese got into a black Russian Volga automobile and drove into town along streets that were as dimly lighted as they had seemed from the air.

The weather was on the chilly side and the first impression was one of great activity in the streets and on the highway leading out past the airport. There were bicycles and trucks and people in constant motion in the darkness. This, as soon became evident, was a customary feature of the Vietnamese nighttime landscape.

The highway paralleled a railroad line and a long train, moving slowly behind a small locomotive, first could be heard and then dimly seen in the gloom.

The hotel, once called the Metropole, but rechristened the Thong Nhat (Reunification Hotel, proved to be a cavernous old French establishment. Four or five Europeans were chatting under potted palm trees in the lobby. The dining room was empty except for a head waiter and two waitresses.

A quick dinner was rustled up and the headwaiter then explained that the restaurant's working hours were 6 A.M. to 8:30 for breakfast, 10:30 to 2 P.M. for lunch and 5 P.M. to 8:30 for dinner. The restaurant had been kept open after hours to provide dinner for the late arrival. A bar at the end of the hotel lobby began work at 8 A.M. and stayed open until 11:30 P.M.

While this correspondent was in North Vietnam, foreign visitors included a labor union delegation from Moscow, four American women representing peace organizations, a Japanese group to investigate "American war crimes," another investigating committee sponsored by Lord Russell, the English philosopher, a

group of four West Germans including Pastor Niemöller and Msgr. Hüssler and a Cuban camera crew.

To each of the larger groups, several interpreters and guides were assigned. A physician accompanied the American women and examined Pastor Niemöller, who is 74 years old, to be sure that he could stand the physical strain of traveling in the countryside.

Different organizations appeared to be acting as hosts for various groups. Some were under the wing of North Vietnamese peace organizations and others were attached to a North Vienamese organization devoted to collecting evidence of American "war crimes."

The groups were all housed in the same hotel. Some were given private dining rooms for their meals, others took their meals in the public restaurant.

Most of the visitors were taken to see the same towns and villages damaged by bombing. But in each case the schedule seemed to be made up individually. For example, on the New Year's weekend, this correspondent was taken to Phatdiem.

He drove to the village complex Saturday evening, spent the night there and then toured the villages Sunday, talking with local inhabitants and officials. That same day at least two groups of visitors were brought to Phatdiem—the Russell committee members and the four American women, but their paths did not cross.

The Japanese group made an extensive tour of North Vietnam. Some of its members went to the demarcation line at the 17th parallel, studying the effects of bombing in many of the smaller villages in the demilitarized zone and along the coast.

The Russell committee split into two sections to carry out inquiries in different parts of the country. Most of the trips arranged for visitors were to the south. The American women were taken on one trip about forty miles north of Hanoi.

As the volume of visitors to North Vietnam grows, it seems likely that most parts of the country will be covered although there is an obvious reluctance to take groups into areas where heavy bombing is expected.

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### North Vietnamese Roads Come to Life at Nightfall

*Following is the second of a series of articles by an assistant managing editor of The New York Times summing up observations on his visit to North Vietnam.*

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Hong Kong, Jan. 11.—At 3 o'clock Friday morning, across Long Bien Bridge in Hanoi, moved a procession of women, each with a bamboo pole on a bowed shoulder and burdens balanced on each end.

The women moved silently through the night with a delicate half-step, half-shuffle that carried them rapidly across the bridge. Occasionally they halted to rest. The burdens on the carrying poles, mostly bulk paper, vegetables and wrapped bundles weighed 50 or 60 pounds.

There was nothing unusual in the sight—nothing for Hanoi and North Vietnam, that is. All through the night, people are carrying heavy burdens on their backs into and out of the city and out along the network of roads and trails that thread through a maze of rice paddies and canals in the Red River delta, moving supplies south and moving food into the city.

#### CYCLISTS CARRY GOODS

The movement goes on not only on the backs of women with their delicate, swaying bamboo carrying poles. Goods also move on bicycles. Toward dusk, groups of 100 or 200 cyclists collect at various points in Hanoi and outside.

There the burdens are put on bicycles, up to 600 pounds per bike, and the bicycle caravans start out on their way through the darkness.

With the coming of dusk, olive-drab, jungle-camouflaged trucks, topped with brush and leaves, start rumbling out of Hanoi onto the southward trails, and empty trucks begin moving back into the city, having delivered their goods farther south. At nightfall, the central railroad station of Hanoi comes alive, and trains begin to pull out, laden with people and freight.

To a remarkable extent North Vietnam has become a night country. It is darkness that provides the greatest protection against American bombers. And it is in the dark hours when movements of supplies and troops are carried out.

This is a pattern that was first seen by the West in the Korean war. The Chinese "volunteers" supplied themselves and reinforced themselves at night over routes and trails dominated in the daytime by United States air power. The same practice is being repeated on a vast scale in North Vietnam.

### VISITORS MOVE AT NIGHT

The sight must be seen to be appreciated. This correspondent several times was taken out of Hanoi by car either after nightfall or in the early morning hours before dawn. Because of the bombing, the North Vietnamese prefer to move their visitors from point to point under shelter of darkness.

Only during the weekend truce periods over Christmas and New Year's did this correspondent travel over highways in daylight except for brief visits into the countryside outside Hanoi. Even on trips into the Hanoi countryside a few miles beyond the city, the precaution was taken to cover the car, a Soviet Volga, with camouflage net into which branches and leaves were stuck.

It is safe to say that not one vehicle moves on North Vietnamese roads without leafy camouflage on its roof. Trucks are painted olive drab or splashed with camouflage. The same is true of the buses that carry people through the countryside, and of the miniature trains that chug across the rice delta. They are all coal burners, and the engines, freight cars and dilapidated coaches are daubed in gray and dirty brown camouflage.

### STREET LIGHTS AT MINIMUM

Hanoi is not blacked out at night, but street lighting is held to a minimum to conserve power, giving an eerie aspect to nighttime travel. The streets become archways of big shade trees with tiny lights burning vaguely in the distance.

Outside Hanoi and its suburbs strict blackout precautions are taken. There are no lights whatever showing in villages although occasionally one catches a glimpse of a glowing cookfire in a thatched house or a tiny candle flickering in a window. From dusk to dawn the countryside is dominated by velvet black shadows vaguely illuminated by the stars or, on one trip, by a silver moon that cast a baleful glow over endless rice paddies and clumps of bananas and palms.

Along the highways, columns of trucks, bicycle caravans, men and women with their carrying poles move quietly and endlessly. Alongside the main highways, rail lines usually run, and occasional trains can be heard and then dimly seen moving along in the darkness.

The flow of traffic seems shapeless, but it is carefully organized, planned and controlled. There are sentries at the outskirts of the city who control all movement in and out, both by day and by night.

### DETOURS ARE EFFICIENT

Guards emerge from roadside sentry boxes, examine passes and then direct caravans onward. They are not only security guards, but traffic officers.

American bombing daily knocks out segments of road, disables bridges or destroys them, makes detours and diversions of traffic necessary if the flow of men and supplies is to be maintained. Convoys move along detours in a brisk and efficient manner. Road blocks are set up at diversion points and traffic is diverted by roundabouts to a point beyond the blockage.

Not infrequently, traffic streams are split, with southward traffic following one route and northward movement coming along a different route. Sometimes detours may lengthen the route by as much as 10 miles, but they seem to provide no really serious handicap to movement.

### PONTOON SYSTEM DEPICTED

American bombers concentrate their attention on bridges, which are numerous in the delta area where highways cross canal after canal and many tributaries of the Red River. Many bridges have been knocked out, some as often as four times. But repair crews work constantly to put them back in order.

Since bridges are generally not very long and of relatively light construction, this is done with a speed surprising to an American who is familiar with painstaking construction tasks on United States highways where bridge building or repair may require many months.

At any given moment a large number of bridges on highways leading south from Hanoi may be out of service. However, this does not halt the traffic flow. The

North Vietnamese have the best pontoon bridge system this correspondent has ever seen. It is one that beats the British Bailey bridge system of World War II all hollow.

Alongside every bridge that this correspondent crossed, there were materials available for at least one or two pontoons to be constructed and put into use in an hour's time. The pontoons are made of canal boats lashed together, and the roadway is formed of loose bamboo poles of timbers laid across.

This correspondent crossed dozens of these bridges and watched heavy truck traffic move across them with no more problem than the thunderous reverberation of the loose bamboo roadbed.

Even if the pontoons are destroyed daily, they can be replaced promptly with indigenous materials that cost virtually nothing but the manpower required for assembly and transport.

The efficiency of the pontoons raised the question why the North Vietnamese also employed so much manpower to repair conventional bridges along the highways. There may be a psychological factor involved since the pontoons seem to equal conventional bridges in weight capacity and certainly provide a minimum maintenance problem.

### RAILROADS AN OBVIOUS TARGET

The same question arises concerning North Vietnam's railroads. This correspondent did not inspect railroads north of Hanoi since all his trips were southward across the delta. However, according to foreigners who have seen the railroad to the north, in the direction of China, there is not much difference between the bombing destruction and repair program in the north and south.

An enormous effort is expended by the Government to keep the railroads working. They offer a gleaming target for attack, impossible to camouflage, easy to hit. And they are being hit.

Bomb damage and craters pepper the railroad mile after mile, thickening in the vicinity of bridges and villages. Life alongside the railroad would seem to be one of the greatest hazards in North Vietnam. As bombers come in to attack the track, there is inevitable damage to civilian habitations along the rail lines and for a substantial distance away from the rail lines. This is particularly true around rail sidings.

North Vietnam's railroad is a single-track affair. Sidings are therefore necessary to permit trains to pass each other. Bombing of such sidings has been devastating to adjoining villages like Phuly, which, for all practical purposes, has been removed from the map by American bombing.

### MINIATURE ROLLING STOCK

The North Vietnam railroad is not to be compared with an American railroad. It uses what seem to an American to be miniature locomotives and freight cars. The total amount of rolling stock isn't known to this reporter, but it would be surprising if it totaled as much as the Erie-Lackawanna Railroad has in its truncated New York commuter service.

Unless there is a factor in the situation that escapes observation, the total tonnage moved by railroad must be a small part of the freight moved by truck or by bicycle or by carrying poles.

Nonetheless the North Vietnamese authorities and the United States Air Force seem agreed that the railroad is vital to the war. It is a principal target of United States attacks and the North Vietnamese exert an enormous effort to keep the railroad going, and with remarkable success.

They keep it running by placing alongside it, mile after mile, enough rail metal, ballast, ties and bridge construction equipment to rebuild the railroad several times over. Rail building materials litter the landscape of North Vietnam.

It would be difficult to estimate the total volume of rails that are on hand, as well as angle iron, steel rods, wire for reinforcement, ties and processed ballast. As far as the labor force is concerned, it is available in the countryside and has often been seen by foreign residents rushing into action.

### ENDLESS TUG OF WAR

Labor is thrown into the task in such numbers that even serious breaches of the railroad are repaired in times that seem remarkable to Western observers. Trucks and earth-moving equipment are kept on hand, scattered and dispersed, so that they cannot be wiped out by lucky bomb hits. It was the opinion of this

observer that the tug of war between the air force and North Vietnam for maintenance of the railroad could go on indefinitely. The only question was whether the effort was worth it, whether the North Vietnamese might not more economically expend their labor on keeping and improving the highway and truck transport system.

However, there is another factor involved here. To maintain truck movement on highways requires constant expenditure of gasoline and oil. Oil storage depots at Haiphong have been successfully taken out of operation by United States air attacks. The capacity of North Vietnam to store oil and gasoline thus has been considerably reduced.

The country is dependent on a steady renewal of supplies by freighter and tanker through Haiphong and probably by tank cars on the railroad coming from China.

The railroad runs on coal and probably could run on wood as well. North Vietnam produces its own coal in ample supply from mines in the northeast so that the railroad may provide a guarantee of a heavy freight route in the event that gasoline and oil stocks are interdicted by the United States.

If the railroad is not being maintained as an alternative to truck movement, then the only explanation for the enormous expenditure of the labor force and materials would lie in reasons of morale and prestige. These are not unimportant considerations in a small country that has been heavily attacked and in which there is a common pride in keeping the war effort up against a powerful opponent.

From this standpoint the sight of trains continuing to move along the tracks through the dusk, rails being relaid and reballasted within hours of a heavy air attack, and bridges being restored by one means or another within days must bolster the morale of ordinary North Vietnamese.

### MANPOWER PLENTIFUL

It is apparent after even casual inspection that the American air offensive has cost the North Vietnamese heavily. It compels them to commit manpower that otherwise would be available to reinforce the armed services, build up factory production, lift agricultural output or simply convey supplies to the south.

Now hundreds of thousands of man-hours are needed to maintain supply routes. This burdens North Vietnam's war effort substantially. But, at the same time, there is no sign that the task of maintaining supply routes southward is beyond the country's capacity.

Manpower is still plentiful and this kind of task is one with which the North Vietnamese are familiar and have in effect lived for many years.

The investment of manpower in the movement of supplies has been a basic part of North Vietnamese strategy and tactics from earliest times. For example, in setting a trap for the French at Dienbienphu in 1953 and 1954, the North Vietnamese moved in from China, largely by human power, heavy artillery and munitions that enabled them to outgun the French.

They had to move all the rice to feed their forces about 1,000 miles from Yunnan. Every grain of rice moved either on carrying poles or on bicycles. It is estimated that only 10 per cent of the rice eventually reached the encampments of the hills around Dienbienphu. But it was enough for the troops, accustomed to tighten their belts and carry on.

The North Vietnamese undoubtedly will grow leaner and thinner if the war of attrition goes on. But this has been their history for so many years that it is questionable whether it will produce the effect that this policy is designed to produce—a willingness on Hanoi's part to negotiate peace.

### SHORTAGES FREQUENT

The effects of the war on the populace are noticeable to foreign residents of Hanoi. They say that the standard of living has gone down in the past year, that clothing is shabbier and harder to come by, that the diet is harsher. This is confirmed by the North Vietnamese themselves.

One of them said: "You should see us in peacetime conditions. We aren't very good-looking now. We are thin and worn and the girls aren't so pretty."

But the North Vietnam living standard has never been high. It probably was not as low under the French as the Vietnamese now contend. They insist that under the French many people in the north had nothing more than rags for

clothing and one of the regime's bragged-of achievements is that now everyone in the north has a dress or trousers and a shirt to wear.

Still, shortages are frequent. During the fortnight this correspondent was in Hanoi, matches were not to be had in stores. Not long previously cigarettes were scarce for several weeks. Soap has been hard to get. Salt supplies have not always been available in villages.

Meat is scarce for ordinary Vietnamese and chickens are expensive in village markets—about 8 dongs a kilogram (2.2 pounds). The dong is officially valued at 3.53 to the dollar. The average wage is 70 to 80 dongs a month. Women get a ration of five or six yards of cotton cloth a year and men the equivalent in cloth or clothing.

Long-time Hanoi residents say these shortages are reflected in the shabbier appearance of residents compared with the period before the bombing began. The city itself is badly run down. Few buildings have been painted in recent years and bombed wreckage remains, with no effort to repair. Cars are worn and gasoline makes them spit and cough.

### NO EFFECT IS SEEN

But none of this seems likely to have much effect on North Vietnam's war effort. In villages, where houses and huts are bombed, they usually are repaired quickly if the damage is not too serious, or new houses are built. Houses are mostly of simple clay and wattle construction with thatched roofs. If residents survive the attack, they can rebuild houses with their neighbors' help in a short time.

It is different with more substantial buildings. In most villages and towns that this correspondent saw, bigger buildings tended to suffer more damage. Residents contended that bigger buildings were more frequently singled out for bombing attacks. In many towns most bigger buildings had suffered damage. Brick structures, whether damaged or not, had simply been abandoned and residences, offices, schools, artisan cooperatives and hospitals had been dispersed into small one-room huts and houses.

### FACILITIES ARE DISPERSED

The dispersal puts an economic burden on North Vietnam and almost anything that is now hit by a United States bomb is likely to be an institution of some kind. This is particularly true in the environs of Hanoi.

In expecting heavy bombing of Hanoi, the authorities have scattered offices, schools, factories and almost everything moveable into villages and towns nearby. Since the Air Force has been paying more attention to the environs of Hanoi than to the city itself, substantial casualties have been caused in evacuated schools. The authorities admit this but say they are caught in a dilemma. If the United States starts a saturation attack on Hanoi, they do not wish to expose the people to mass casualties. They prefer to risk scattered casualties resulting from the evacuation.

The net conclusion of many foreign residents of Hanoi is that while American bombing has damaged North Vietnam severely, causing heavy material and human losses and compelling the Government to invest men and material in neutralizing the attack, it is not likely to provide a decisive factor in maintaining the fight in the south or in compelling Hanoi to capitulate.

Foreigners in Hanoi believe the North Vietnamese when they say they are prepared to sacrifice Hanoi, Haiphong, all their cities and towns, rather than yield under American bomb power.

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## Bomb Controversy: View From the Ground—U.S. Says Its Targets Are All Military—Hanoi Dissents

*Following is the third of a series of articles by an assistant managing editor of The New York Times summing up observations on his recent visit to North Vietnam.*

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Hong Kong, Jan. 11.—The most controversial subject concerning military operations in Vietnam is the United States air bombardment, what the United States is seeking to bomb and what the bombs are hitting.

President Johnson has stated American policy in simple terms. He said that the United States was bombing "steel and concrete" and that he was convinced American pilots were carrying out those orders.

The North Vietnamese contend that the United States is pursuing a deliberate policy of terror bombing, with civilian population and nonmilitary objectives as the target.

Wherein lies the truth? After two weeks of painstaking observation and inquiry on the ground in North Vietnam, this correspondent can report only what he saw and what he heard. Many bombs have fallen on targets that unquestionably are military objectives by any definition. Many bombs have also fallen on targets that are not military targets.

What are the military targets that have evidently been bombed? Foremost are the railroad and the railroad bridges running south across the delta from Hanoi and Haiphong. Foreigners in Hanoi report that the railroad north from Hanoi has also been bombed.

Highways running south and bridges along them have been bombed.

Other targets that this correspondent saw and that had been bombed are railroad sidings, antiaircraft gun sites, the Yenvien railroad yards and the so-called Vandien truck park in the Hanoi metropolitan area, several factories, and several buildings that probably served as military barracks.

In addition, Westerners in Hanoi confirmed that oil storage depots in Haiphong were destroyed in the initial United States attack last June 29.

What are the nonmilitary targets that can be seen to have been bombed? They are several residence areas in Hanoi, substantial areas of mixed housing, small shops and miscellaneous buildings in the suburbs of Gialam, Yenvien and Vandien in the Hanoi metropolitan area, several schools in the Hanoi area, villages and hamlets along highways leading south from Hanoi, large areas of housing and shops in towns like Namdinh and Ninhbinh and in the Phatdiem village complex, and a variety of other objectives, including cemeteries.

### MISSILES MISFIRED

When Hanoi officials first reported that American bombs and aircraft-fired rockets had struck the city Dec. 13 and 14, United States officials contended that the damage might have been caused by the misfiring of one of the surface-to-air missiles used by the North Vietnamese to protect Hanoi against American air attack.

Later one American airman who had participated in the attack said he had seen two missiles misfire and had observed the missiles hitting the earth in open areas outside Hanoi.

The possibility of misfiring of missiles is not excluded by this correspondent. But no person with whom he talked in Hanoi, either official or unofficial, either North Vietnamese or foreign, either Western or Eastern, believes that the major areas of damage in the attacks of Dec. 13 and 14 resulted from missiles. Rightly or wrongly the opinion in Hanoi is that the damage was caused by the Americans, not the North Vietnamese.

### THE ISSUE OF THE DIKES

There is also the question of dikes and levees. Are they legitimate military targets? That seems to be a matter of definition. If they were to be destroyed, the richest areas of North Vietnam would be devastated with a heavy loss of life. The United States contends that the dikes have never been cleared as targets and in fact have never been bombed.

However, North Vietnamese officials charge that the levees have been attacked repeatedly, particularly last summer during the high-water stage, when a breach in the dike system could have been catastrophic.

This correspondent has seen craters in and around dikes where bombs have fallen. Other Westerners have seen bomb hits on dikes and strings of craters along a line of levees.

Whatever the reason for the bombs falling on dikes, the effect was the same as if the bombing had been intentional. The North Vietnamese authorities regard the attacks with such seriousness that they have mobilized thousands of laborers to throw up auxiliary walls and dikes to hold back the water if the main system is breached.

### CARRIER BRIEFINGS REPORTED

It is easy to establish that widespread harm has been done to civilian housing and nonmilitary institutions and that civilian casualties have been extensive

during the United States bombardment of North Vietnam. It is not so easy to determine the cause of the damage and the casualties.

This correspondent has talked with two non-Americans who have been present at Seventh Fleet carrier briefings on the bombing of North Vietnam. According to these witnesses, pilots are assigned precise targets. They are warned against jettisoning bombs on civilians or at random in the countryside.

The instructions for attacks on North Vietnam differ radically from briefings for attacks on the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam, the witnesses said. In the demilitarized zone, pilots are given wider latitude.

"They are permitted to fire on anything that moves," one witness said. "Man, woman, child or goat. But they do not have permission to bomb at random in the North."

Those on the ground in North Vietnam cannot tell whether pilots jettison bombs at random despite instructions, but in the view of at least one Western military observer in Hanoi the fliers undoubtedly do.

A pilot en route back from a mission may "lighten his load" by disposing of remaining bombs or letting off a rocket or two for causes that cannot always be precisely ascertained, according to this view. And if bombs or rockets hit civilian targets, who is to know?

There is a good deal of speculation among Westerners in Hanoi about United States target selection. Some Westerners believe United States target specialists tend to pick imposing buildings as military objectives without necessarily precise information.

This line of speculation is stirred by the consistency with which buildings of more than one story seem to have been hit in town after town and hamlet after hamlet.

The North Vietnamese like to point to Roman Catholic churches that have been damaged, some severely. There are also bomb-battered Buddhist temples. Despite North Vietnamese contentions that churches and pagodas have been deliberately attacked, few Westerners accept this explanation. It seems more likely that churches are damaged accidentally in attacks directed at adjacent buildings, even if they are nothing more than ordinary stores or houses.

Damage to school buildings, hospitals and other public institutions, which is also readily visible, may be attributed to the same tendency to attack buildings of prominence and to the fact that hospitals and schools inevitably are situated in built-up areas.

### LIKELIHOOD OF ERROR

Another factor that cannot be ignored in an examination of American bombing is pilot error, bombing error and error in target selection.

In the opinion of those who have witnessed attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong, errors are more likely than the United States defense authorities may recognize.

"It is not easy to bomb around Hanoi," one Westerner said. "Hanoi and Haiphong are heavily defended. This is where the Vietnamese have concentrated their air-defense missiles, their MIG–21's and other MIG's. This is where there is a heavy concentration of conventional anti-aircraft guns.

"For United States planes to slip through all these defenses, precisely place bombs on a small target located amidst nonmilitary objectives and think that pilots can carry out a mission without bombs splattering over nonmilitary targets just is not realistic."

As described by foreigners who have watched Americans come over Hanoi, the planes appear suddenly, often simultaneously with or ahead of an air alert. They achieve surprise by approaching from the sea, where the North Vietnamese lack radar stations, and they come up the Red River flying low to avoid radar detection.

The Americans are said to possess a healthy respect for the air-defense missiles and for this reason avoid coming over the city at high altitudes where the missiles are effective. But by coming in low, the Americans expose themselves to conventional antiaircraft guns and to small-arms fire that Hanoi residents send up in volume as soon as a plane whisks into sight.

MIG's are seldom used in actions directly over Hanoi or Haiphong, it was said, because they cannot be employed together with ground fire, at the risk of being shot down along with the Americans.

The air defense of the Hanoi-Haiphong triangle is regarded by foreigners as effective enough to present a problem for attacking American bombers. How many batteries are in the Hanoi area, this correspondent would not guess. They opened up heavily only twice during his fortnight stay in Hanoi. On other occa-

sions, gunfire was desultory or at such a distance that it was impossible to judge the volume.

COMPARISON WITH LAST WAR

The only standard of comparison for this correspondent is World War II. The titanic crash of modern air-defense missiles is a sound new to his ears. It is very impressive. The conventional antiaircraft guns, however, sound as they did in London during the Blitz or during occasional experiences in North Africa or the Soviet Union.

Hanoi's conventional air defense did not impress this correspondent, either when the guns were firing or when judged by the number of emplacements observed or suggested during trips out of the city. Its antiaircraft guns do not appear to be in a class with the defenses of London or of German cities during World War II.

Of course, the raiders sent to attack Hanoi and Haiphong also are not to be compared in numbers with World War II offensives. For what it may be worth, the opinion of one non-Western military observer in Hanoi is that North Vietnam's defenses are far from first class.

"I don't like to say this," he commented, "but our Vietnamese comrades simply haven't got the experience and the technical ability to man their defenses as well as they should. They insist on running their own radar and, as soon as they get basic instruction in missiles, they insist on manning these, too. It would be more difficult for the Americans to attack Hanoi if the crews manning the defenses were more skillful in handling the advanced equipment they now possess."

A Western resident in Hanoi said the compartively light losses suffered by the Americans supported the contention that North Vietnam's defenses were not very efficient, at least by World War II standards.

If the defenses in the Hanoi area are not regarded as being first-class what about the defenses in the countryside?

Conventional antiaircraft emplacements are visible near bridges, crossroads and towns. One American pilot estimated that there were 500 installations in the Namdinh area. Based on what this correspondent saw, 500 would overstate the number of installations in the entire Hanoi-Haiphong complex by a wide margin.

Many North Vietnamese batteries are mobile and are evidently moved from place to place to make the task of American aircraft more difficult. The North Vietnamese also use false gun emplacements in which dummy wooden guns are mounted to divert American attention from camouflaged emplacements nearby.

Americans also employ ruses to confuse North Vietnamese defenses. For example, United States robot planes are sent over Hanoi, both to touch off radar systems and to communicate back electronic data on the defenses. The robot planes bring guns into action as vigorously as piloted planes. Some foreigners think the Americans put robots into the air at the same time as bombing missions to confuse North Vietnamese ground defenses.

American statements justifying damage to civilian targets on the ground that Americans are seeking to silence adjacent antiaircraft batteries arouse indignation among Hanoi residents.

"What are we supposed to do," one North Vietnamese exclaimed, "sit with hands crossed when American bombers come over to bomb us? It seems to us a curious philosophy to justify an attack on the ground that the person being attacked is trying to defend himself."

GUNS FAR FROM TARGETS

Actually, the North Vietnamese do not seem to place their antiaircraft installations especially close to civilian housing or nonmilitary installations. There are many guns in open rice fields on the approaches to Hanoi. This correspondent saw installations defending the railroad and crossroads emplaced at some distance from the potential targets.

In Hanoi itself, it did not appear that guns had been installed next to civilian objectives, but in a big city ordinary people are never far away. Even if guns are installed in parks, as was the case in London, civilians are right alongside.

It seems certain to Hanoi's foreigners that as long as Americans attack targets that are physically small and situated in a great metropolitan Asian complex where residential and industrial areas are not clearly defined, there will inevitably be a toll of civilian damage and casualties.

INTENT IS QUESTIONED

Justly or unjustly, there is a persistent feeling among foreigners in Hanoi that the United States attacks of Dec. 13 and 14 had a psychological motivation as well as military.

"I can't help but feel that the United States was trying to tell Hanoi something during that bombing," a Westerner, friendly to the United States, said. "The actual targets that they seemed to be aiming for were so small, in fact, almost trivial. It seemed to me that the United States was exposing its pilots to enormous risks and dangers for very small military consequences."

This Westerner thought that the United States might be trying to demonstrate to Hanoi its ability to attack more important targets in Hanoi if orders were given.

"I am still puzzled by bombs and rockets dropped on the Hanoi side so close to the Long Bien [Paul Doumer] bridge," this Westerner said. "Of course, it could simply have been a mistake. Pilots were up there for three-quarters of an hour and ack-ack fire was really intense.

"A pilot may have been in trouble and simply jettisoned his bombs to get out of the neighborhood fast. But that wouldn't explain the rocket fire in Pho Nguyen Thiep Street or the rocket fired in the embassy quarter. I keep thinking that the United States wanted Hanoi to understand what could happen if the signal were given."

Although the bombing occurred at both ends of the two-mile-long Long Bien bridge and causeway, most Westerners are not convinced that this was the actual target of the American planes.

If the Americans had wanted to take out of the bridge," said one military man who is not from the West, "I would have expected them to attack it in the middle of the river, where presumably it is more vulnerable. Attacks at either end seem rather puzzling."

BRIDGE A MAJOR TARGET

Hanoi residents regard the Long Bien bridge as the most shining target in town. It is the only rail and road link with the east side of the Red River. Traffic moves in two lanes, going east on the left side and west on the right side while a railroad runs in the middle.

While the bridge is long and seemingly vulnerable, it is also heavily defended. Unless a plane scored a lucky hit, it might prove a costly target to attack.

However, American planes in the raids of Dec. 13 and 14 attacked targets that were just about as well defended and had only minimal military value, in the opinion of Westerners. Thus diplomats reached the conclusion that the primary objective of the December bombings must have been in the nature of a threat of worse to come.

What has the North Vietnamese bombing offensive cost the United States in planes lost? The American official total now runs to more than 500. The North Vietnamese place the losses three times higher, about 1,500. The North Vietnamese insist that they are conservative in listing kills and that President Ho Chi Minh has revised claims downward when the army is unable to provide positive evidence of a downed plane.

Past wars have demonstrated that the defending side overstates kills and the attacking side understates losses. It is known that the North Vietnamese total includes robots while the United States total does not. While American losses on a percentage basis are low by World War II standards in terms of missions flown, the losses are beginning to mount to a considerable figure and the cost in plane replacements is not small.

DATA ON BOMB TONNAGE

The weight of the bombs dropped in the North has been estimated by the Pentagon at more than 300,000 tons, a high figure in relation to the kinds of targets attacked. North Vietnam is not a built-up, industrialized nation. It is essentially a peasant country. Most of its people are peasants and they live in poor villages. Even if every town in the country were destroyed, the total urban area destroyed would hardly equal that of one big German industrial target of World War II.

It is apparent that most American bombs are falling in mud and wattle villages, on dirt roads, on rice fields or around gun sites that are more often set in fields than in towns.

Based on cost calculation, it seems likely that bomb expenditure per enemy soldier killed or enemy installation destroyed must run higher than in any previous war.

Some North Vietnamese, in estimating the net tonnage of bombs dropped on particular villages or areas near the demarcation line, use figures of several hundred or even several thousand tons per acre.

American bombs are apparently being replenished at a rapid rate. The North Vietnamese are impressed when they pick up bomb fragments and find they bear assembly dates sometimes less than a month earlier.

The American arsenal includes a number of technological innovations that makes World War II bombs seem outmoded. There is less reliance on conventional high explosive bombs in North Vietnam than there was in strategic air force bombings of World War II. Incendiary bombs and napalm have been little used in the North.

High explosive weapons are usually 1,000- or 2,000-pound bombs and they are employed against large industrial installations and bridges. Sometimes they are delayed-action bombs. In one effort to knock out a particularly important bridge, the North Vietnamese contend, naval mines were floated down river but were intercepted before they could take effect.

A particularly destructive weapon against light Vietnamese structures is rocket fire from planes. A rocket can knock down or damage a whole block of houses on both sides of a narrow street. The Americans also use air-burst bombs that explode over structures by the use of proximity fuses.

Two terms often on North Vietnamese lips are "Bullpup" and "Lazy Dog", expressions not yet in the vocabulary of most Americans.

These are new developments in American military technology. The Bullpup is a guided missile fired by a plane. It has a range of four miles, according to the North Vietnamese. The pilot feeds distance data into the missile's memory bank, then fires it.

The missile is capable of changing direction up to 90 or more degrees, can dive, bank and turn if so instructed by the pilot. The Bullpup carries a heavy charge and samples of damage attributed to it by the North Vietnamese were impressive.

The Lazy Dog is an advanced anti-personnel weapon introduced last spring. It consists of a mother bomb made of light metal that bursts over a target at low altitude or on the ground. Within the mother bomb are 300 metal balls about the size of a baseball that roll out across the ground.

The have a delicate time fuse that enables them to scatter over a widespread area and then explode, sending a rain of murderous steel splinters in all directions. One Lazy Dog is supposed to cover an area of 300 square yards with lethal fragments.

United States authorities say that the Lazy Dog has never been used on civilian populations and that it is designed primarily for use in attacking anti-aircraft installations and other manned military posts.

It is evident from examining this weapon that it is indeed designed for anti-personnel use and, judging from its effects on civilians, the casualty rate among exposed troops must be considerable.

The problem that is posed by the use of this type of weapon in North Vietnam is that if it is dropped over gunsites, for example, there is no real assurance that a small pilot error will not cause the explosion to include within its effective area some civilian foxholes or even peasant huts where there may still be children or adults.

The bombs scatter so deadly a hail of steel fragments over so large an area that they can easily encompass segments of the terrain that the bombardier may not aim for at all.

These bombs are plummeting out of aircraft that may be moving at speeds of 600 miles an hour or more. A fraction of a second's delay in release may make the difference of hundreds of feet in the landing point.

### PINEAPPLE ANOTHER WEAPON

A considerable numbers of Lazy Dogs have not exploded for one reason or another and the North Vietnamese now possess a collection of them that they display to visitors before taking them to hospitals to see children wounded by Lazy Dog fragments.

The Lazy Dog with its cargo of what the North Vietnamese call guavas has begun to replace earlier antipersonnel weapons called pineapples," with which

the North Vietnamese are also familiar. The pineapple is a small cannister about the size of a large tuna fish can, to which aluminum vanes are attached. It is filled with steel pellets and has a sensitive pressure trigger that is set off by impact. Sometimes pineapples fall into trees where they may hang undetonated.

The North Vietnamese have a collection of these weapons, too. They say that in South Vietnam undamaged pineapples are widely used as lamps in huts, either standing on up-ended vanes or swinging from bamboo poles and fitted with wicks and kerosene.

So many American bombs of all types have fallen on North Vietnam that collections are found almost everywhere. They are to be seen in peasant cottages and in government offices. The metal from downed American planes is beginning to be put to a variety of uses. At first it was largely used for souvenir cigarette cases, lighters and rings. Now it's beginning to turn up fashioned into kitchen articles and even surgical instruments.

One Hanoi resident commented on the American bombing that "when the war is over, the North Vietnamese will have the foundation of a good little steel industry. They will have more scrap iron available than any other Asian country."

The appearance of new kinds of military technology in North Vietnam causes its people to charge that the United States is using the country as a field laboratory for testing armaments. Visitors to North Vietnam are likely to hear many expressions of outrage on this subject.

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## Hanoi's Industry Being Dispersed—Plants Continue To Operate With Remaining Machines

*Following is the fourth of a series of articles by an assistant managing editor of The New York Times summing up observations on his recent visit to North Vietnam.*

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Hong Kong, Jan. 11.—The main hall of the March 8 Textile Factory in Hanoi has a lopsided appearance. To the right stand row on row of looms, busily weaving cotton yard goods. To the left is open cement flooring, broken by patches where machines have been wrenched out.

The factory is typical of North Vietnamese industry. About two-thirds of its equipment, in the estimate of the assistant director, Mai Uan But, has been moved out to villages and towns in a radius of 40 to 60 miles from Hanoi.

The assistant director described the work of his factory over cups of steaming green tea in a chilly office at about 6 A.M., an hour that North Vietnamese officials favor for interviews. This is the hour Government offices begin work. It is also the hour the day shift goes to work in factories.

The factory, whose name derives from International Women's Day, celebrated in the Communist world on March 8, normally employs about 7,000 workers, of whom more than 70 percent are women, mostly young women.

Mr. But contended that despite the evacuation of much machinery, the plant continued to produce close to normal levels. It operated on three eight-hour shifts—seven and one-half hours of working time and a half hour off for a meal.

The office was decorated with a portrait of President Ho Chi Minh, before which was placed a vase of salmon-colored gladiolas, a feature observed in almost every Hanoi office. There were also a small panorama of Moscow's Kremlin, a colored photograph of Peking's Tienamen Square and three Chinese silk embroideries.

On a tour of the plant, the assistant director said the cultural and social activities of the plant, the workers' club, the library and kindergarten had been evacuated.

### CLUB NOW A DRILL HALL

He did not say what the workers' club across an open square from the main plant was now being used for. Judging from a throng of workers moving in and out in fairly orderly fashion it seemed a reasonable guess that it was now being used as a drill hall.

Drill halls and defense training fields were a feature of most factories that this correspondent saw in North Vietnam. Each factory has its own civil defense unit to which rifles and helmets are issued.

Despite air defense training, civil defense work, military training, life goes on in Hanoi. Women visit the beauty parlors to have their hair waved, children play in the streets, couples visit the lakeside cafes, shoppers throng the stores, strollers pause to look at newspapers posted on the walls or inspect exhibits of news photographs, and the eternal cyclists course through the street, some pausing to have the bicycles repaired.

When an alert sounds the workers take their guns and tin hats and rush for the roof or posts in the open beside the air-raid shelters. There they stand with guns at the ready, scanning the sky for sight of an American plane. If one comes, they open fire.

A diplomat's wife in Hanoi whose residence was next door to a factory said she was in almost more fear from the rifle fire than the bombs, so intense was it when the planes came over.

In Namdinh, a textile town south of Hanoi that has been heavily bombed, workers in a rice-flour mill had guns beside them or stacked on nearby walls.

### GIRLS RUN OBSTACLE COURSE

Outside the mill an obstacle course had been set up with hurdles and jumps. Young factory girls carrying rifles were running the course—about 100 or 150 yards and hurling themselves at its end full-length on the concrete, aiming their guns at an imaginary enemy.

Guns seemed to be everywhere in North Vietnam. Sometimes it appeared that every other person walking down the street had a rifle or a submachine gun slung across his or her back.

In World War II guns were not so evident among the civilian populace. This is another kind of war and everyone in North Vietnam, whether schoolteacher, textile weaver or housewife, is enrolled in civil defense.

The North Vietnamese are aware that it is unusual, especially in a Communist country, to find so many ordinary persons with guns in their hands.

"Where else have you ever seen this?" one asked. "Can you imagine the regime in the South giving guns to its people? They would never dare. Here you can see for yourself that the people support their Government. If they didn't, they have the weapons in their hands with which to change it."

The March 8 textile factory suffered a small hit in an air attack Dec 13. A rocket exploded over the main building or might even have hit the roof. Large sections of broken glass roofing were replaced with oiled paper.

There were still shards of glass on the cement floor and the factory director, like other North Vietnamese enterprise managers, had a stack of bomb fragments piled on a table next to a display case where the factory's cotton print goods were being exhibited.

### WORK ON DEFENSE CHORES

One of the principal products of the plant was black sateen cloth, from which North Vietnamese women make their trousers. Workers in the textile plant are expected to devote one-third of their time to work, one-third to defense chores and one-third to their home and family.

They have drills several times a week, and several times a month they are rounded up for road building, rubble clearing, digging of gun sites, repairing bridges or other defense tasks.

It could hardly be said that they were overexerting themselves in the textile plant. The work force seemed small by the standards of similar establishments in Mongolia or Bulgaria. But it did not seem to be overworked.

Girls were gathered in twos and threes giggling over their private talks. They looked up when the assistant director and a foreign visitor came by, but hardly paused in their personal preoccupations.

North Vietnam's economy, in general, is organized along the lines of other small Communist countries. All industry and commercial establishments are run by the state. However, small private trade is permitted—sellers of cakes and buns, repairers of bicycles, street venders of soft drinks, peasant women selling flowers, bootblacks, sidewalk brazier cooks, and similar one-man ventures.

Two kinds of industrial establishments exist.

The larger factories are owned, organized and run by the state. The textile factory is an example of this type of industry. Its production quotas are fixed

by a state plan, its wage scale is set by the state and its price structure is state-controlled. Workers are paid a small minimum wage and the take-home pay is determined by output.

In the textile plant they earned 70 to 80 dongs a month. The dong is nominally valued at 3.53 to the dollar. Workers receive a 20 per cent premium for night work. Their minimum base pay is 2 dongs a day. The factory director estimated their cost of living at one-third their base pay. He said rent cost about 1 per cent of wages and health and medical services were free.

The other common type of enterprise is the cooperative handicraft shop. Workers in the cooperatives share the profits of their enterprise and work under conditions closely resembling those of private enterprise.

Agriculture has been collectivized, with farming put in the hands of cooperatives or communes that seem to resemble the Chinese commune more than the Soviet collective farm.

It was difficult to determine how well the system worked since all efforts, both industrial and agricultural, were geared to the war effort. However, it was evident that the country had not proceeded far along the path to industralization when war hit.

The most serious effect of the war on industry, outside of physical destruction of plant, seemed to be the extensive evacuation and decentralization program.

The evacuation of the textile plant began in February, 1965, at the start of the American bombing. In conversations with directors of other institutions, it was disclosed that a general evacuation program got under way at that time and was still in progress.

One problem was that while institutions could be moved out of Hanoi, people had a tendency to drift back. Many offices and plants were scattered in suburban villages and towns, producing heavy traffic in and out of Hanoi over the weekends.

Husbands who are working during the week in an office 10 miles away are likely to hop on a bicycle and go to the city for Saturday and Sunday. If the man cannot leave his job, his wife in Hanoi gets on her bicycle, puts the two children on behind, and pedals out to visit him.

The roads in and out of Hanoi, already cluttered with vehicular traffic moving south and empty trucks coming back, thus are even more jammed.

The national treasures in the Museum of Fine Arts began to be evacuated in the winter of 1965, largely to caves in the north. Much remains to be moved and there were packing boxes and valuable buddhas disassembled and awaiting removal in several museum halls one evening in late December.

The evacuation of schools from Hanoi and Haiphong began about the same time, on the theory that, whatever the United States might say, the ultimate targets were Hanoi and Haiphong and the two cities would ultimately be hit hard.

"Our calculation was very simple and I think it was correct," one of North Vietnam's editors said. "First, the bombing was extended from the 17th parallel to the 19th. Then to the 20th and 21st, then to the northwest part of the country. Then to the extreme north along the Chinese frontier. And after that to the northeast. Finally to Hanoi and Haiphong.

"Now all the provinces of the North are being bombed. Don't you think it is reasonable to expect that Hanoi and Haiphong will be attacked more strongly? All our preparations have been based on that expectation."

At the same time, according to North Vietnamese calculations, the weight of the United States attack has steadily increased. The North Vietnamese say that 1,700 missions were flown in the North in January, 1966. This rose to 2,300 in February, to 3,300 in April and more than 5,000 in September, 1966.

The total missions dropped in October and November to 2,500 and 2,000 because of bad weather. Figures for December, 1966, are not yet in. The North Vietnamese said nearly 30 per cent of the missions were now being flown at night.

What this kind of bombing means at the provincial level was explained by Nguyen Xuan Luong, deputy editor of the provincial newspaper of Ninnbina, the capital of Ninnbina Province south of Hanoi. He said Ninbinh Province, with a population of 500,000 had been badly damaged by repeated United States attacks.

Up to Dec. 15, 1966, provincial authorities calculated that 2,338 missions had been flown against the province, including 303 night missions. They contended that 24 raids had been on military targets, 31 on economic targets and the rest at random, including populated areas.

Of 123 agricultural cooperatives in the province, 96 were attacked, and 24 towns and the provincial capital as well, the authorities reported. They added

that 13 dikes, 10 sluices and 20 markets and other agricultural facilities had also been struck as well as five hospitals and 10 churches.

The provincial authorities said 6,347 bombs had been dropped in the province. As of Dec. 1, the province claimed 41 United States planes, including four unmanned reconaissance planes. Three were said to have been brought down by rifle fire.

It is against this scale of bombing that North Vietnam's dispersal effort must be viewed.

All of Hanoi's schools have now been evacuated from the city. The move began in the late winter and early spring of 1965. The entire Polytechnic University, the highest educational institution in North Vietnam, was evacuated at the same time. Its 2,500 students were dispersed in half a dozen provinces. The 5,000 students of the teachers' college were also moved out.

These steps have not prevented casualties among students and school children nor the destruction of schools in outlying regions. Many classes are now being conducted in village huts quite indistinguishable from the air or from the ground from ordinary peasant habitations.

For example, the Polish Friendship School, which is situated in the Hanoi suburbs, in the same general area as the Vandiem truck depot, was first hit in a bombing raid Dec. 2, according to Nguyen Van Huyen, minister of Education.

Mr. Huyen, a long-faced serious educator who wore a blue serge suit, discussed the problem of evacuation and protection of children over endless cups of China tea.

Because the Polish Friendship School was located in the suburbs, it had not been evacuated. But on Dec. 2, Mr. Huyen said, 10 bombs fell around the school. The pupils and teachers were in shelters. One shelter caved in from the blast. Six pupils and two teachers were trapped, but were rescued with minor injuries. The building was again struck Dec. 13–14 and damaged so badly that it can no longer be used.

"We have great anxiety about the loss of life among our children," the minister said, "and about their nervous systems. The first thing we teach our kindergarten children now is how to get quickly into a shelter and how to maintain the shelter in good order."

The shelters are, in fact, foxholes dug right under the children's wooden desks so they merely have to slip down into them.

"We have no real way of protecting our schools," the minister said. "If bombs drop right on the school or beside them there is little chance for the children. We can't protect them against a direct hit."

The schools that this correspondent saw in small towns and suburbs were generally equipped with earthen blast walls to protect doorways. They had intricate trench systems connecting each hut in which classes were held so that children or teachers could move from one to another under some cover.

While all of Hanoi's schools have been evacuated, far from all of Hanoi's children are out of the city. Some are still there because the parents have no one to whom to send the children. Some are there because parents are unwilling to part with them.

The Hanoi authorities said the toll of child casualties in the raids of Dec. 13–14, which they placed at 14, was unusually high because many were small children left unattended at home while their parents were working. The youngsters either did not know how to get into shelters or did not realize that the attacks were in progress.

The same factor was cited by municipal authorities in Namdinh and by village authorities. They said the most difficult task was in coping with small children, big enough to be left alone but too small to understand the bombing danger.

The problems that the war has created for North Vietnamese health authorities are as great as those in the educational field. According to Dr. Nguyen Dan Tin, Deputy Minister of Health, 180 medical institutions were badly damaged or destroyed in United States bombing between February, 1965 and June, 1966. Among these institutions were six provincial hospitals and 10 district hospitals.

The most important target of United States bombers, according to Dr. Tin, was the North Vietnamese leprosarium at Quynhlap on the coast in Nghean Province. The question of whether the United States attacked the leprosarium and, if so, why, has become a matter of controversy.

The institution was a comprehensive center for care and treatment of leprosy and included 160 buildings with accommodations for 2,000 patients. The North Vietnamese contend that the United States, in a series of attacks from July,

1965 to May, 1966, methodically destroyed the institution. The United States position is that only military targets were attacked.

The health official said the lepers had been dispersed in a number of small makeshift hospitals in other rural areas.

The Health Ministry has concentrated on building up small secondary hospitals in villages, evacuating nurses, doctors and patients from city institutions. However, many Hanoi hospitals remain fully staffed to handle victims of any mass raids that may occur.

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### North Vietnam Spirit Found High

*Following is the fifth of a series of articles by an assistant managing editor of The New York Times summing up observations on his recent visit to North Vietnam.*

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Hong Kong, Jan. 11.—"I know that you will not understand what I am going to tell you," Premier Pham Van Dong said, "but I must say it anyway because it is the most important thing."

And the Premier proceeded to talk with earnestness and intensity of the spirit of the North Vietnamese people that is such an important aspect of their war effort.

The Premier said he had tried hard to explain that spirit to close friends in Europe and had failed. It seems to be a combination of natural vitality and intense patriotism, a determination to run Vietnam for and by Vietnamese and an element of teen-age cockiness and daredevilery.

There are other elements, too. A middle-aged English visitor to Hanoi said after a few days: "Somehow the spirit of these people reminds me of the days of the Spanish civil war—a civil war without the International Brigade."

Last week almost every movie house in Hanoi was jammed with youngsters going to see the newest hit. It was the story of Nguyen Van Troi, a Saigon teen-ager who was executed after having been convicted of an attempt on the life of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara during a visit to Saigon in 1964.

This episode suited the ideals of the North Vietnamese. It represented a heroic effort by a single youngster against the symbol of an enormous enemy who gave his life in battle against great odds.

The would-be assassin of Mr. McNamara has become the object of a virtual cult in North Vietnam. There are books and biographies and fictionalized versions of his story everywhere. The North Vietnamese were amazed to meet an American visitor who not only had never heard of the Saigon youngster, but only vaguely recalled the incident.

The Vietnamese are a warm, direct people. They tend to glorify martyrs to their cause. Often mentioned in North Vietnam is the name of Norman R. Morrison, who burned himself to death in front of the Pentagon in November, 1965 to protest United States policy in Vietnam.

The fierce independence of the North Vietnamese is a source of anecdotes in the Hanoi diplomatic colony. Premier Dong, in speaking with this correspondent, went out of his way to deliver a homily on North Vietnam's independence of its foreign friends. He had in mind the persistent view in the United States that North Vietnam was a "puppet" of the Soviet Union or China or both.

No one in Hanoi's diplomatic colony believes that the North Vietnamese are anyone's puppets. In fact it is their determination to be independent of both the Soviet Union and China that often drives their closest friends to despair.

A Westerner was talking recently with an East European diplomat. They were discussing a military matter and the East European criticized certain North Vietnamese tactics.

"Why don't you tell them your views?" the Westerner asked.

#### INTERFERENCE IS RESENTED

The East European laughed.

"You're joking," he said. "Even the Russians don't dare give the Vietnamese advice on military subjects."

The gossip in Hanoi is that the Russians are not pleased at the way the North Vietnamese handle Soviet-made air-defense missiles and MIG-21 jet fighters. But there is nothing they can do about it.

"Do you know how the Vietnamese handle the SAM's [surface-air missiles]?" one Westerner said. "The SAM's arrive in crates and packing boxes. A Russian procurement officer and a Vietnamese procurement officier check over the shipment. They exchange the signed papers and the Vietnamese take the SAM's away. That's the last the Russians know of them. If they learn where the SAM's have been emplaced, it is only by accident."

True, Soviet specialists were assigned to instruct the North Vietnamese in the use of missiles and of MIG–21's. But as soon as the elementary operational technique was imparted to the North Vietnamese, it was said, the North Vietnamese thanked the Russians and said that henceforth they would be capable of training their own teams and using the equipment on their own.

Easterners confirmed that the North Vietnamese insisted on handling all materials themselves. They are quick to resent anything that they interpret as interference in their internal affairs.

North Vietnam's independence even affects its relations with the Cubans. Psychologically the Vietnamese feel drawn to Cuba, and vice versa. Many Cuban delegations come to North Vietnam, and friendship is pledged with great emotion.

"But can you imagine?" one Cuban said. "They are very polite, but they decline our help."

This attitude saddens the Cubans. In fact, they find it hard to comprehend. They regard themselves as experts in fighting against the United States and are certain they could be of assistance to North Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese thank them warmly and say they prefer to do it themselves.

North Vietnam's spirit seems to consist of strong elements of nationalism and patriotism engendered in years of struggle for independence against the French. The struggle against the French is now cited as merely the opening phase of the war against the United States.

Official propaganda blurs the line between French and Americans by contending, for example, that 80 percent of the arms and materiel used by the French at Dienbienphu was provided by the Americans. Dienbienphu was the site of a major Vietnamese victory in the Indochina war that led to French withdrawal from Vietnam in 1954.

In this capsulized version of the struggle against the French, the Americans appear at an early stage and, as the French fade out of the picture, they take over the war against the Vietnamese.

In the fusing of the national spirit, the full panoply of Vietnamese national heroines is employed. The first were the Trung sisters, Trung-Trac and Trung Nghi, who raised an army against Chinese garrisons that occupied Vietnam in the year 40 A.D. The sisters defeated the Chinese and established a joint queenly regime.

But the Chinese returned, the sisters were defeated and they committed suicide. Thereafter they were elevated to godhood in the Vietnamese iconostasis. Their heroic deeds are glorified in Hanoi as the first step in Vietnam's passage to nationhood.

By a bizarre coincidence that goes unnoted in the North, the Trung sisters were venerated by Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister in law of the late President Ngo Diem of South Vietnam. After his downfall, a great statue of the Trung sisters that Mrs. Nhu had ordered set up in Saigon was pulled down.

### BATTLES AGAINST MONGOLS

Vietnamese battles against the Mongols and the Chinese of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) play an important role. They are constantly discussed by North Vietnamese as indications of the ability of the Vietnamese to defend their independence.

Mongol invasions and Ming invasions are mentioned in terms almost interchangeable with those employed in discussing the present war against the Americans.

A central role in the current self-image of North Vietnam is provided by Dienbienphu. That victory against the French burns in Vietnamese memory and is constantly refurbished. It is memorialized in paintings and poems.

Dienbienphu is the name of one of Hanoi's principal streets. It is the name of a brand of cigarettes. Exhibits associated with the battle occupy special sections in the Museum of the Revolution and in the Army Museum.

There is probably not a single North Vietnamese youngster who cannot tell in glowing detail about the defeat of the French (or the Americans—sometimes

the two are confused) at Dienbienphu. In the national ethos the battle has assumed the importance of a combination of Waterloo, San Juan Hill and the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781.

As the war against the United States continues, new epics of heroism are elaborated and woven into the fabric of national patriotism.

### ISLAND BATTLE GLORIFIED

One of these revolves around the defense of Conco Island. Few Americans, except possibly some in South Vietnam, have ever heard of Conco Island. But few North Vietnamese have not. It has assumed a role in their war similar to that of Corregidor in the Pacific war of the United States against Japan in 1941.

The island is a small one, about a mile off the coast near the demarcation line. Judging from a film glorifying its battle, it bristles with antiaircraft defenses and presumably serves as an important radar installation.

The battle of Conco Island goes on day after day and week after week in newsreels, newspaper articles and radio talks. The theme is the one that is constantly stressed in North Vietnam—of the struggle of a small determined band of men and women against the enormous material superiority of the United States.

A documentary film shows Conco defenders manning antiaircraft guns and firing rifles at wave after wave of attacking American fighter-bombers, holding their posts through violent bombardments, and repeatedly shooting American planes into the sea.

Premier Dong conceded that many of North Vietnam's friends did not see how such a small, poor country could stand up against the Americans' superiority. But he added that North Vietnam offered a practical demonstration of what an inspired populace could achieve.

Another epic that has been publicized concerns Hamrong Bridge across the Ma River at Thanhhoa. This bridge, on the main supply route to the south, has been attacked hundreds of times by the Americans, but by some quirk remains intact though badly battered. The bridge is defended by strong antiaircraft batteries.

### SPEAK SIMPLY OF HEROISM

Its defense has been publicized as a demonstration of what bravery and determination can achieve against determined American air attacks. The defenders of Hamrong Bridge are pictured as models for other North Vietnamese to emulate.

North Vietnamese speak simply and often about heroism and their willingness to die for their country. They say that they are no more willing to die than anyone else, but that, if they must die, the best way is to die fighting for Vietnam.

"We do not fear death," an official said. "We try to stay alive and to fight the enemy. We do not wish to die unnecessarily. It is important to stay alive because we have so much to do. We have to grow rice and we have to fight at the same time. We think heroism is both courage and creation."

A Communist visitor who had visited a North Vietnamese air force unit said he could not imagine other people carrying on under similar conditions.

"Imagine!" this man said, "Their pilots get up at 4 A.M. They go out into rice paddies and work for three or four hours standing in cold water up to their hips. Then they come in and fly their planes against the Americans. I have never heard of such people."

### PATRIOTISM AVOWED

It was impossible to finish any conversation, even with a family that had been bombed out of a house or a mother who lay on a hospital cot with a youngster wounded in the bombing, without winding up with a patriotic declaration.

At first it seemed as if all these people must have been coached to make little patriotic speeches testifying to their anger against "United States aggressors" and to their determination to fight to the end for "independence and sovereignty."

But finally it began to appear that no one had to do any coaching. This spirit has been dinned into the people so that it comes naturally. Or perhaps it was always there and is just brought out by their long-odds war. Whatever the cause, a priest even could not conclude a discussion of the Roman Catholic position under a Communist regime without a soliloquy along the same lines.

One official contrasted what he thought was the attitude of American youth with that of North Vietnamese youth.

"We don't underestimate American youth," he said. "If American youth had to fight and defend the United States, it would fight well. But American youth has been sent over here to fight a war that they do not understand and is not a just war. So they do not fight like our youth. Americans have good weapons, but they cannot cope with our fighters because they do not have the kind of spirit that we possess."

One Communist observer who has been in North Vietnam for two or three years said he had noted a steady growth in the intensity of nationalist feeling as the war went on. He said nationalism had been particularly strong since the launching of American air attacks on the North. He said that while the attacks had confronted the regime with serious economic problems and had made the support and supply of the South more difficult, they had stimulated mass patriotism among the people, who, in his opinion, now felt that they were all in the war together.

"I think something like this happened in England in the blitz," this diplomat said. "As a Communist I have been interested to see ideological propaganda gradually replaced by national patriotic appeals. Maybe you remember this in the Soviet Union during the critical days of the German attack."

Patriotic fervor in North Vietnam is also lashed by one of war's most frequent handmaidens—atrocity propaganda. The kind of atrocities that are ascribed in the most casual manner to Americans and their South Vietnamese allies are blood-curdling and revolting.

They are recited daily to the North Vietnamese populace. Whether people take them at face value is difficult to say, but history suggests that it is easy to believe anything terrible concerning an enemy.

Nevertheless this correspondent did not experience the slightest sign of ill will, unfriendliness or hatred because of being American. Other Westerners said they had never noted any animosity from Vietnamese.

North Vietnamese officials attributed the lack of ill will toward ordinary Americans to the Government's propaganda line that draws a distinction between "American aggressors" and the mass of the American citizenry, which is pictured either as friendly to Vietnam or as kept in ignorance of the true state of affairs.

However, the North Vietnamese do particularize some propaganda targets. Chief among these are President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Commander of United States forces in South Vietnam.

All four are caricatured savagely and are the object of vituperation and ridicule in the press and radio. President Johnson is probably the most frequent subject of wall caricatures in North Vietnamese towns. They are drawn in chalk directly on walls of buildings.

It should not be supposed that the North Vietnamese go about the war scowling and grim. On the contrary, teen-agers in the army, in transport brigades and construction teams seem to be full of jokes, judging from their chatter mixed with outbursts of laughter.

Youngsters throng to the movies and concert halls. There they devour a fare that is about 90 per cent patriotic propaganda, such as the story of a girl sharpshooter who brought down a United States plane or of a truck driver who got his cargo through in spite of being wounded in an air raid.

### THE FEAT OF FEATS

The feat of feats is the shooting down of a United States plane. Everyone who has a rifle participates if planes come into sight. If by chance one is brought down by rifle fire—and the North Vietnamese say this occurs several times a month—villagers for miles around rush to the scene to share in the glory.

The only thing that tops the downing of a plane in popular esteem is the capture of an airman. Legends of such captures are legion and generally involve an unarmed villager who spots an airman coming down by parachute, grabs a hoe or pitchfork and captures the airman, who is armed to the teeth with survival weapons.

Or the story may be of a band of villagers who see pilots coming down and manage to surround the field and head them off before they can escape into the jungle.

Such feats are the subjects of popular ballads, music-hall skits and songs. The shooting down of United States planes has become a kind of national contest. Papers print the official North Vietnamese figure on downed planes daily, now

1,600 by Hanoi's count. Commemorative postage stamps have been issued to mark important milestones—500, 1,000, 1,500.

It is all of these factors taken together that fuse into North Vietnam's spirit. Probably there are other factors that have been overlooked. But one thing appears certain: it is a powerful force and there is no doubt that this, more than anything else, is what keeps North Vietnam in the battle.

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HANOI DENIES AIM IS TO ANNEX SOUTH—PROGRAM OF NORTH IS FOUND TO DIFFER FROM VIETCONG'S

*Following is the sixth article by an assistant managing editor of The New York Times summing up observations on his recent visit to North Vietnam.*

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HONG KONG, Jan. 11.—About 10 days ago Le Duan, First Secretary of the North Vietnamese Workers' (Communist) party, made a speech to army cadets, outlining the basis of party policy.

The party, he said, stands for "socialism in the North, democracy in the South."

His declaration was the talk of Hanoi, not because he had enunciated a new line, but because he had found it essential to restate the policy at this particular moment.

The party secretary's name is not well known outside North Vietnam. But there it is regarded as quite possibly even more important in party circles than that of Premier Pham Van Dong.

There are some who believe that if President Ho Chi Minh were to die, he would be succeeded either by Mr. Le Duan or another figure equally little known in the West, Truong Chinh, a Politburo member, who heads the Party Control Commission.

### ALLIES HAVE DIFFERENT PROGRAMS

The fact that North Vietnam and its southern ally, the National Liberation Front, possess basically different foreign policies seems to have gone almost unreported in the Western press. It came as a surprise to hear their representatives talk in casual terms of these differences, which are of long standing, and in a way that made it apparent that neither side expected an early change.

The existence of different programs raises a question that has hardly been studied in the United States. It is whether the differences are so large that even in the event of a victory for the North Vietnamese and for the Liberation Front, which is the formal name for the organization that most Americans call the Vietcong, a coalition and unification of North and South would not automatically occur.

### PROPAGANDA PERVASIVE

Both the Northern regime and the Liberation Front are committed to reunification and the creation of a single Vietnamese state. Northern propaganda for reunification is pervasive. The old Metropole Hotel in Hanoi has been renamed Thong Nhat (Reunification) Hotel. A new park built by young people around the lake adjacent to the Polytechnic University is called Reunification Park.

No speech by a North Vietnamese politician is complete without a demand for reunification. No official, even when presenting statistics on health or education, would think of concluding his presentation without putting on record North Vietnam's insistence upon reunification.

Yet, when the question of when and how is posed, the answers begin to become vaguer and vaguer. Premier Dong, in speaking with this correspondent, emphasized the insistence of North Vietnam on reunification. But as to when this might be accomplished, that, he said, was for North and South to work out "as between brothers."

### ANNEXATION AIM DISAVOWED

In discussing the same question, the spokesman of the Liberation Front in Hanoi, Nguyen Van Tien, said reunification was a matter that would require substantial time and a careful working out of details.

Premier Dong rebuked those who, he said, mistakenly credited the North with a desire to annex the South. The North has no intention of doing such a "stupid, criminal" thing, he asserted.

Most Americans have assumed that the Liberation Front is a puppet of the North, that was created by the North, that it is the creature of the North and that it is directed by the North.

This was not the impression given by representatives of the Liberation Front or of the North.

But, it may be asked, aren't the North and the Front just putting on an act? Won't they drop the mask and eliminate all their supposed differences if they win the war?

There is no way of telling, but if the published programs of the two groups are genuine reflections of attitudes, there seem to be sufficiently wide differences to make rapid unification difficult.

### REGIONAL PERSONALITIES

Specialists in Vietnam have also noted marked differences of temperament and personality between natives of the South and of the North. These regional differences have been evident in the governments of Hanoi and Saigon, both of which include natives of the two parts of Vietnam. Saigon residents seem to possess a certain sophistication and big city gloss not found in the average Northerner. The Southerner seems to be more a man of the world. The Northerner is simpler, more direct, blunt and forceful.

These differences could be put aside for the sake of the common cause of Communism. But in other countries it has been demonstrated that Communism does not necessarily eliminate regional conflicts. This has been noted in the Soviet Union and in some of the Eastern European countries.

The Front has now been in existence as a separate quasi-governmental organization for six years. In that period of time its leaders have acquired vested interests.

In the last few years they have established quasi-diplomatic missions in each of the Communist countries and in some other African and Asian countries. However, no foreign governments are represented at Liberation Front headquarters in South Vietnam. Only North Vietnam maintains a permanent representative in the South.

Who conducts the war in the South? The Front insists that it does, that all military operations are under its command and under its directions. Its representative in Hanoi was asked whether this meant that any forces sent south by Hanoi were put under Front command. He insisted that this was true.

### TROOP JURISDICTION AN ISSUE

Diplomats in Hanoi are dubious about this. They doubt that regular North Vietnamese army units sent to the South are taken out of the North Vietnamese command. There have been rumors of disagreement between North and South regarding the employment of troops and the tactics to be followed in combatting the Americans.

The basic difference, the diplomats said, lies in a desire by Hanoi to engage the Americans in large-scale battles whereas the Front, with years of experience and confidence in hit-and-run tactics, is reluctant to commit large units.

Some Hanoi diplomats also contended that while the North Vietnamese were splendid combat troops, they had not proved as capable as the Front in carrying out guerrilla operations since their basic training had been for normal military service rather than special combat.

Neither Northern nor Southern representatives said in so many words that the North was sending regular combat troops to the South. But no one said that this was not the case. In two weeks in Hanoi, this correspondent never heard a denial of the presence of Northern forces in the South.

### INDEPENDENCE IS AVOWED

On the contrary, the idea that the North was rendering aid to its Southern allies was stressed repeatedly.

The Front insisted that one reason for its success in the South was the independence of its leadership. It stressed its independence in contrast to what it called the dependence of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and his Saigon Government upon American backing.

On one point both the Front and the North were agreed. This was that the Front was the only legitimate representative of the people of the South and that

no settlement of the war could be expected without direct United States dealing with the Front.

"Anyone who has anything to discuss in connection with South Vietnam" said Mr. Tien, "must discuss it with the Front. The North cannot speak for the South."

Premier Dong said the same thing and asked how the United States expected to settle the war unless it was willing to negotiate with the Front.

"The National Liberation Front must be represented at the conference table," Mr. Tien said. "Later on, the Front and the North will have to have discussions of reunification on the basis of equality."

### DIFFERENCES ILLUSTRATED

Neither North nor South suggested any means for reconciling the divergent economic and political platforms on which they stand. The North stands for a system of Communist organization of the economy in which industry and commerce are run and directed by the state and agriculture is organized on a collective basis.

The South stands for a mixed economy in which there would be both socialized, or state-run, elements and private and cooperative elements, something on the order of the systems of Cambodia and Burma.

The political policy differences are equally marked. The North bases itself on membership in the so-called camp of socialism, the Communist world bloc.

The South proposes a policy of nonalignment, without adherence to any bloc, either Communist or non-Communist. It seems to envisage itself as a possible member of a neutralist bloc of states that would include Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Indonesia.

How these two policies could be reconciled in a reunified Vietnam is difficult to imagine. Either one or the other presumably would have to be given up or the two segments of Vietnam could not be rejoined.

The party basis of North and South is also different. The North has a tightly integrated Communist party. True, there are a few so-called nonparty men in government posts, but the leadership of the Communist party is supreme.

The Front represents a coalition of Communist and non-Communist parties and groupings in which the Communists are a minority. It is believed, however, that because of superior ability, cohesiveness and leadership the Communists dominate the Front. They say, however, that they do not intend to pre-empt political leadership of the South and that the Front will go on after the war with a diversity of membership.

### REDS MAY SEIZE POWER

This, too, would seem to make a coalition difficult unless the Southern Communists simply seized power for themselves as has happened in past coalition governments, particularly in Eastern Europe immediately after World War II.

In population the South has 14 million people, the North 19 million. Both areas are mixed, however, since possibly one million Northerners took refuge in the South after the Communists came to power in Hanoi. Many thousands from the South went North at that time.

The North and South have been separated politically for 12 years now. Contact between the two areas is physically cut not only by the war but by restrictions established by both sides. Persons from one region are not permitted to visit the other. No direct mail service is provided between South to North.

The only way families can communicate is through third countries. The only way members of separated families can be reunited is by being smuggled across the frontier or arranging a meeting outside either North or South—a difficult matter in wartime.

In these circumstances the first step proposed by both the Front and the North is the restoration of trade, visits, travel, mail and similar facilities between North and South.

No steps beyond that have been publicly proposed by either side. If a well thought-out or coordinated plan for reunification existed, it would undoubtedly be publicized. Both the North and the Front insist no such plan has been drafted.

TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

The Front's picture of its political power and dominance in the South differs from what most Americans believe.

The Front has prepared maps that purport to show that four-fifths of the total area of the South is now in its control and that more than 10 million of the region's 14 million people live in "liberated" areas. It contends that even in Saigon large city areas are for practical purposes under secret Front control.

It insists that underground Front organizations exist in all communities of the South and that when Front forces "liberate" a region the underground groups simply come to the surface and begin to carry out publicly functions that previously were accomplished secretly.

Even if only part of the contentions of the North Vietnamese and the Front are founded in fact, it would seem evident that the question of what would happen in Vietnam when peace comes is far more complex than is generally realized.

It is difficult to imagine a powerful, self-centered group like the North Vietnamese Communist party sharing power in any coalition rule, even if the other group is Communist or Communist-dominated. The possibility of open divergencies between the Front and Hanoi is a subject of speculation among Hanoi diplomats and is discussed seriously by Eastern European Communists.

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SOVIET-CHINA RIFT HURTING HANOI AID—BUT NORTH VIETNAM KEEPS CLOSE TIES WITH TWO ALLIES

*Following is the seventh article by an assistant managing editor of The New York Times summing up observations on his recent visit to North Vietnam.*

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HONG KONG, Jan. 11.—Nowhere are the tensions, conflicts and delicate sensibilities engendered by the clash of the Communist giants, China and the Soviet Union, more excruciatingly felt than in North Vietnam.

North Vietnam's fighting ability is almost completely dependent upon the aid and support of both China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the conflict between these two nations, in effect, poses a threat to the virtual existence of the small Indochinese Communist state, to its ability to maintain the struggle against America's superior material power.

An East European diplomat who has deep affection for the North Vietnamese and the Hanoi leadership spoke sadly of the "wonderful days," now long gone, when "we were all comrades together." That was back in 1954, just after the Geneva agreements that ended the Indochina war and established North and South Vietnam.

"I wish you could have seen Hanoi then," he said. "The city was so lovely. Every building had been painted, the streets were spruced up and there were flowers everywhere."

It was not only physically that Hanoi was attractive in that time, the diplomat said. The atmosphere for a Communist was fresh and invigorating.

"Everything seemed possible then," he recalled.

"There was no hint of a split in the camp. Russia, China, all of us were working shoulder to shoulder to help Vietnam, to enable the Vietnamese people to create a Communist future."

Another man, also a Communist diplomat, but one of the contemporary generation, said seriously:

"I don't know how they do it, but the Vietnamese have managed so far to keep their relations with both Moscow and Peking. But, honestly, I don't think there is another man in the world who could have accomplished it. I give full credit to Premier Pham Van Dong. He is a miracle of tact and he has had to be."

Both the Soviet Union and China are vital to North Vietnam's defense effort. Both provide supplies, arms and material without which North Vietnam would be hard pressed to stay in the war. Without such aid, Hanoi and its allies in the South, the National Liberation Front, would be compelled to revert to small-scale guerrilla actions.

They would have to take cover in the mountains and jungles and dig in for the long 20-year pull that President Ho Chi Minh and the other leaders have warned may be necessary.

### TWO ROUTES FOR SUPPLIES

There are two routes by which supplies from the Soviet Union and China and from other Communist states reach North Vietnam. The first is the railroad from China, which can be supplemented by truck deliveries. The second is the shipping route to Haiphong.

North Vietnam receives not only Communist aid through Haiphong. It is through this port that the country maintains small-scale trade with some Asian states, mostly in food products and consumer goods. This traffic is handled in ships of a number of flags in addition to Communist shipping. The United States has blacklisted shipping lines for engaging in this traffc, but it continues.

The Chinese said in late December that they were providing 70 per cent of the aid Hanoi was receiving. The Russians have not indicated what percentage they are supplying.

Foreign diplomats in Hanoi believe that China is the main supplier of foodstuffs, particularly rice. North Vietnam has been running a deficit in rice in the last two or three years, largely because of the war. Much manpower has been diverted from the paddies. And this past year was a poor year for a number of rice-producing countries, including parts of Indochina.

It is believed that the North Vietnamese may be dependent on China for as much as 600,000 to 800,000 tons of rice in 1967 because of a shortfall in the domestic crop.

Rice and similar bulk commodities are delivered by the land routes from China. It is probable that the North Vietnamese receive much of the rail replacement and angle irons and other repair materials for their rail system from the Chinese by rail and truck.

In addition to materials that originate in China, the North Vietnamese have been obtaining across Siberia and through the Chinese rail network a substantial part of the goods, including heavy armaments coming from the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe.

As the Chinese-Soviet split worsened, the problems of maintaining these shipments across China steadily increased. As long ago as last spring the Chinese were pointedly suggesting to the Russians that they ship their military material by sea. The Russians countered that the Chinese had held up shipments, sometimes for weeks, sometimes for months. There were occasions, the Russians charged, when the Chinese did not permit the Soviet arms to cross China at all.

### ARGUMENTS OVER TRAFFIC

The Chinese rejoined that the Russians were putting up a smokescreen, that they had in fact been dilatory or reluctant to send aid to Hanoi and that Peking was the main supporter of the North Vietnam regime.

Peking said that far from being a true friend of North Vietnam the Russians were conspiring with the United States against North Vietnam's interests.

The facts behind these charges and counter-charges have been obscured by the polemics of Moscow and Peking. But knowledgeable East Europeans in Hanoi concur that there is fire behind the smoke. They say that on some occasions the Chinese have refused to let Soviet supplies come in and have told North Vietnam that the Chinese will provide the needed item.

"Then months go by and they send nothing," an East European Communist said.

The French Communist secretary, Waldeck Rochet, charged at his party's congress that the Russians, unable to get speedy delivery of essential supplies via the Chinese rail network, had petitioned Peking for permission to set up a special airlift for delivering urgently needed items. Peking was said to have refused.

Asked about this specific charge, a North Vietnamese official observed: "When people are angry with one another, they don't always tell the truth."

There have been rumors that the Chinese removed from flat cars some of the advanced military equipment that Moscow was sending to Hanoi, specifically, unassembled MIG–21 fighters, radar equipment and ground-to-air missiles. This allegation was doubted in Hanoi. It was said that most major shipments of this kind of materiel are supposedly now coming in by sea at Haiphong.

### OIL STORAGE DISPERSED

The Chinese are not able to provide such items to Hanoi. They do not produce them themselves. In the armaments line, the Chinese are thought to have provided ammunition, some artillery, rifles, machine guns and possibly mortars.

Oil supplies apparently come from the Soviet Union. At least the oil barrels strewn all over the North Vietnamese landscape seemed largely if not entirely of Soviet origin. These are big 50-gallon oil drums that presumably have replaced Haiphong and Hanoi oil storage facilities destroyed in United States air strikes. It would seem to be difficult to make a major dent in the oil storage reserves in the future since they have been dispersed in big steel drums over thousands of fields and roadsides.

### CHINESE PRESENCE DOUBTED

There have been rumors in the West that the Chinese have provided labor battalions and construction crews to keep the North Vietnamese rail system functioning to the Chinese frontier. This correspondent can offer no direct evidence on that aspect of Chinese aid. No one in Hanoi, however, seemed able to confirm or deny the report. The general opinion among foreigners was that the North Vietnamese had mobilized ample labor resources of their own for this purpose.

It is generally agreed among foreigners in Hanoi that the North Vietnamese regime must have the continued support of both the Soviet Union and China to maintain its defense against the United States at the current level.

If the Chinese were to close their railroad to Soviet shipments entirely, it would be difficult to divert all the needed supplies to Haiphong. Neither shipping nor harbor facilities are readily available. Foreign visitors believe that Haiphong is already strained beyond capacity in attempting to handle the volume of freight pouring in.

It would be equally disastrous if the Chinese were to halt their own shipments, particularly foodstuffs. It would not be easy for Moscow to replace Peking as a supplier of rice, for instance.

### THEORY OF 'PEOPLE'S WAR'

Thus far Hanoi has managed to maintain working relations with both Moscow and Peking because of a variety of factors. Historically, President Ho Chi Minh has had close connections with the Soviet Communists. Among his earliest Communist experience was work with Moscow's Comintern, the Communist International, between the two world wars. His relations with the Moscow leadership have been warm.

At the same time, during much of his revolutionary career, he was actually based in China. He has equally close and long-standing ties with the Chinese party and at one time was a member of that party.

In ideology and political orientation, the North Vietnamese regime has always drawn on both Soviet and Chinese sources of inspiration. Its industry is set up largely on the Soviet model, its rural communes are much like those established by Mao Tse-tung in China.

Listening to North Vietnamese explain their theories of "people's war," a protracted popular struggle against an "imperialist" power like the United States, one hears echoes of the philosophy that underlies the essay of Lin Piao, Chinese Defense Minister, on the same subject. The psychology is much the same. But when asked about this relationship, the North Vietnamese will smile and say, yes, there are similarities, but each country has its own way of doing things.

### RUSSIANS AND CHINESE

Because of the extended relationships that the North Vietnamese leaders have had with both the Soviet Union and the Chinese, they seem to have found it possible to a remarkable degree to keep their two great friends from coming to blows over the Vietnam aid issue.

Since Peking denounces any party or group that maintains speaking terms with Moscow, and since Moscow is almost as violent against any friends of Peking, this has required skillful tightrope walking.

One technique that North Vietnam has employed is to deemphasize foreign aid in its internal propaganda. On wall bulletin boards there are no displays

honoring the Soviet Union or China. There are group exhibits with pictures and displays from all Communist countries, arranged in alphabetical order.

There are important differences in the way the Russians and the Chinese conduct themselves in North Vietnam. The Russians are gregarious, attend receptions, have personal friends among the North Vietnamese and are prominent both because of their numbers and because of their presence in public places like hotels, restaurants, theaters and stores.

The Russians entertain much as diplomats do in any capital. They invite the French, the Canadians, the British, the Indians, anyone who happens to be in town, to their dinners and receptions.

The Hanoi diplomatic colony is small but active. The West is represented by the French, which maintain what is called a "delegation" headed by François de Quirielle. This is the largest Western establishment in Hanoi, about the equivalent of a consulate general.

The British maintain a "resident" carefully spelled with a small "r" by the North Vietnamese. He is John Colvin and his calling cards bear the designation "Her Britannic Majesty's Consul General."

There are an Indian consul general and a number of Asian representatives, including those of Indonesia and Algeria.

In addition, there are missions of the three powers represented on the International Control Commission—India, Poland and Canada. The commission, established to supervise implementation of the 1954 Geneva accords on Indochina, occupies one of the largest office buildings in downtown Hanoi, on the shore of the Lake of the Recovered Sword. It is hardly more than one-tenth occupied, however, with the withering away of the commission's functions.

These Western and neutral diplomats mix freely with those of the East. The Russians go out socially with the representatives of the West. Soviet newsmen associate with both their North Vietnamese colleagues and with any foreign correspondents or visitors who chance into town.

### CHINESE KEEP ALOOF

Not so the Chinese. They are aloof and withdrawn. They do not appear in public or, when they do, they hold themselves in tight little groups. For instance, one day the Foreign Ministry's press department arranged a trip for accredited newsmen to go out of Hanoi a few miles to visit the place where an American robot plane had been shot down.

Except for the Chinese, the correspondents rode out to the countryside in ordinary cars, Russian Volgas. The Chinese, five or six of them, rode together in an olive-drab command car. They walked stiffly over the fields to the downed drone, peered at it, took pictures, jotted down some notes, returned to their car, climbed in and went back to town, without a word to any of their colleagues.

The Chinese are said by East European Communists to be unhappy concerning many aspects of Hanoi's policies. They do not, for instance, approve of the relationship between the Liberation Front and the Hanoi regime. They do not believe in the programs of "neutrality" and "democracy" that are the official policy of the Front. They do not believe there should be any programmatic differences between North and South Vietnam and, particularly, they do not approve of what they regard as the "revisionist" or "deviationist" content of the Front program.

One of the controversies between Moscow and Peking centers on the Chinese preoccupation with theories of permanent, or long-range, revolution, the "people's war" theory enunciated by Defense Minister Lin, which underlies part of Hanoi's propaganda concerning its struggle against the United States.

The Soviet Union has indicated that it is not enamoured of the "people's war" theory.

### SPLIT AFFECTS THE WAR

Not a few diplomats believe that one of the factors that tend to keep the war in Vietnam locked in its present status with little or no progress toward negotiation or any diplomatic attempt to end the conflict is the vise that the conflicting positions of the Soviet Union and China have created for North Vietnam.

Thus far it has been possible by tact and diplomatic skill for Hanoi to keep both the big Communist powers at its side. But any move by North Vietnam either toward a conference table or toward any new status for the war would set in motion diplomatic groundswells both in Moscow and Peking that may wreck the delicate balance of Hanoi's relations with its allies.

The rise of centrifugal forces within China, the growing preoccupation of the Chinese with their own internal quarrel, Moscow's increasing concern over the possible explosive results of that quarrel further complicate the tasks of Hanoi's leadership.

So far the skill of President Ho Chi Minh, the diplomacy of Premier Dong, the talents of Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the Defense Minister, and possibly the special pro-Chinese alignment of Le Duan, the party secretary, have kept the skein of aid and alliance more or less intact. But the question in the minds of informed Hanoi observers is: How much longer can it go on? The answer they believe, lies not in Hanoi but in Moscow and Peking.

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A Turning Point in War Is Seen by Hanoi Visitor—Meetings With Officials and Diplomats Indicate That New Phase May Result in Eventual Peace or Sudden Escalation

*Following is the eighth and final article by an assistant managing editor of The New York Times summing up observations on his recent visit to North Vietnam.*

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

Hong Kong, Jan. 11.—Nearly two years after the United States began bombing North Vietnam, the war appears to be entering a new phase—one that may lead to eventual settlement or to a sudden and extreme escalation.

Two weeks of on-the-scene inspection of North Vietnam, dozens of talks with Hanoi officials, including very high officials, and discussions with leaders of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong guerillas, and with informed neutral, Communist and Western diplomats indicate the long war has reached a turning point.

Although both Hanoi and Washington suggest in public statements that their positions on negotiations have not changed, there appear to be signs of below-the-surface movement that could lead in that direction.

Neither Hanoi nor Washington, it is apparent, is as immune to the forces of world opinion as the propaganda statements sometimes would indicate. And it is behind the facade of that propaganda that soundings suggest that not every position may be quite as rigid, fixed and unchanging as the public declarations would indicate.

Nonetheless, a visitor to Hanoi comes away with a feeling that the road to peace cannot be anything but an arduous one.

And the alternative to a successful negotiated settlement looms on the horizon; a deadlier, vastly escalated war. Both the North and the United States, it seems clear, are prepared for the possibility of such an escalation.

Premier Pham Van Dong made plain that it is within the power of North Vietnam to call in "volunteers" that are waiting in the Communist states of the world. The country where they stand nearest and in greatest numbers and perhaps most eagerly waiting the call is China.

The volunteers have not been called thus far. The Hanoi leaders make it abundantly clear that it is their fervent hope that the call will never go out.

They see in the presence of volunteers a possibly deadly blow to their most cherished ideal—national independence.

They have gone to what seems to an outsider to be fantastic lengths to preserve and maintain independent control of their affairs and their destiny. But they give the impression that if, and the "if" is a big one, the United States takes another important step to increase the level of the war the call will almost certainly go out.

At lower levels North Vietnamese officials say that if the United States takes another major escalation step, China will be called in. This is not said in unequivocal terms by the highest leadership. The decision probably remains to be made. But the weight of probability appears to be on the side of acceptance of volunteers.

EXPLOSIVE EFFECT SEEN

The result of such fateful action could be explosive, in terms not only of Vietnam but also of the world. If Chinese volunteers went in, could Soviet volunteers stay out? Possibly, but not probably, observers feel, in view of the present balance of forces in the Communist world. In other words, when the North

Vietnamese pose this question, they are really posing the question of direct confrontation between the United States and the two leading Communist powers in the world.

Lurking in the shadow of such a confrontation are the deadly armories of nuclear weapons now possessed by all three powers.

What would North Vietnam regard as an escalation so marked as to evoke the call for volunteers? At lower levels this was described specifically: carrying the land war north of the 17th Parallel, amphibious landings in the North, military action to cut off the land supply routes to China, possibly the bombing of Vietnam's dikes.

Would the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong produce a call? This is not being said specifically. At higher levels none of these eventualities is specified. The impression is left that in any of these events a determination would have to be made.

In North Vietnam there appears to be a general conviction that, judged by past conduct, the United States sooner or later will escalate and not merely by introducing 100,000 more troops. The indication given by North Vietnamese officials was that such an increase in United States strength was not what they were speaking of. They seemed to feel confident that they could handle many more troops in the South. Indeed, they suggested that more troops in the South would be more of a hindrance to the United States than a help.

But radical intensification of the war in the air or a move of land forces into North Vietnam apparently would come under a different category.

If a negotiated settlement is not achieved, what course does Hanoi think the war will take? Everyone there talks in terms of a war that will go on 10 or 20 more years if that is what the United States wants. They seem to have confidence that their people, particularly their youth, will not become exhausted.

### APPEAR TO BE SERIOUS

When they speak of retiring into the hills and the jungles to carry on interminable guerrilla warfare against the United States, they appear to speak in utter seriousness. They point out that they have been fighting that kind of war for 20 or 30 years, that they have survived the experience and grown tougher in the process. And they think they can do it for two or three decades more and in the end come out with the possession they say is their most priceless, their liberty and independence.

Hanoi's version of what those 20 years of guerrilla warfare would be like is a picture of a total population dedicated to the struggle, to fighting the enemy, to providing an eternally hostile environment for the United States forces.

In this vision it is the total population that occupies the central position rather than the organized armed forces. Or there would be, as there already is, a blending of the regular army and the civilian population.

In two weeks in Hanoi this correspondent did not see a major unit of the North Vietnamese Army. But by the same token he seldom failed to see some members or units of the North Vietnamese defense forces.

The reason is that the defense forces now combine regular troops, newly mobilized youth groups, home guard units, civil defense units and ordinary housewives who carry a rifle with which to fire at United States planes.

They are all around, in the city streets, on bicycles or riding in big olive drab Russian trucks toward the south.

Is it possible to see any path toward a negotiated peace? It is possible but the path is thorny. The chief obstacle is certainly the deep suspicion held by Hanoi toward any and all suggestions of peace talks made by the Americans or others such as Secretary General Thant or the British Foreign Secretary, George Brown, or Pope Paul VI.

The suspicion the North Vietnamese feel is reinforced in part by experience with the Americans and perhaps in greater measure by experience with the French.

Hanoi feels that twice it went in to peaceful negotiations and twice it was robbed or cheated of the fruit of those negotiations.

The first time was when the French, in Hanoi's view, repudiated the 1946 postwar agreement made with Ho Chi Minh.

The second was when, again in Hanoi's view, the United States at French instigation repudiated the 1954 Geneva agreement and started the country down the path that has led to the tragic present.

Those two experiences, whether the North Vietnamese interpret them correctly or not, have left deep and possibly permanent scars. These have been exacerbated by the experience of the last two years with the United States.

Hanoi contends that each peace move by the United States has been accompanied by or has been designed to conceal a step toward further escalation.

It does not propose to be caught short again. The war has become a war for survival, for "life," as Premier Dong put it.

The populace has been aroused to a state of solidarity that represents a formidable asset for a country struggling against a foe many times more powerful in material means and techniques.

If negotiations should be embarked upon and came to nothing, officials feel, the fighting edge of the North Vietnamese would be lost and might not be regained, and if the war were resumed it might be on terms much less favorable to Hanoi. Since the struggle is viewed as a life-and-death one for Hanoi this is a risk it will not take. Premier Dong said this specifically. Other North Vietnamese echoed the thought.

Since the United States possesses the somewhat similar fear that if it starts on the path to the conference table it may touch off irreversible changes in the South Vietnamese political situation, the inhibitions toward taking the first step toward a conference are great on both sides.

There is another inhibition on the North Vietnamese side. Hanoi regards itself as the aggrieved party. Hanoi says it was the United States that attacked and has been bombing its territory, actions it categorizes as both aggressive and illegal.

Therefore, Hanoi says, the United States must be the one to halt—not North Vietnam. Nor, says Hanoi, should it be compelled to pay a "price" to persuade the United States to halt what it ought not to be doing in the first place.

This is not a mere semantic point. It bears directly on the question of which side will take the first step toward the conference table and what the other side will do once a first step has been taken.

The United States contends that it has said again and again it tis ready to negotiate but that Hanoi has not responded. Hanoi rejoins that there will be no response so long as the United States continues to attack her.

If the United States took a first step, would North Vietnam respond? This is the great question but the answer to it seems to have been given quite clearly in the past week.

### QUESTION OF RESPONSE

While he made no specific promise or pledge, Premier Dong in speaking with this correspondent left the impression that if the United States acted positively, for example, by halting the bombing, North Vietnam would not ignore it.

This impression was strengthened by the statement of North Vietnam's representative in Paris, a senior envoy, who said that if the bombing stopped Hanoi would respond.

Speaking with a West German correspondent a few dyas later, President Ho Chi Minh echoed the same sentiment, saying that if the United States halted the war, "then we would take tea."

Mr. Thant has offered the opinion that a halt in bombing is a requisite to talks. This is the view this correspondent brought away from Hanoi.

But, if a conference were agreed upon, what kind of solution could be evolved?

Here is the thorniset question of all. For the real issue then is the question of the fate of South iVetnam. Hanoi has said repeatedly and echoed the statement last week that the fate of South Vietnam must be settled between the North and South, dealing together as partners and that the appropriae representative of the South is not the Saigon Government but the National Liberation Front.

There is no reason to doubt that North Vietnam would adhere to this position in any conference.

Would the United States accept such a solution? There has been no sign of it up to now. However, this correspondent uncovered some interesting areas for further research in talking with representatives of the Front and the government in Hanoi.

The two are not a single entity in so far as political, social and economic views are concerned. The stated differences are deep and would be difficult to compromise or bridge—if they are real. They suggest that another and closer look might be taken at the Front to see whether on inspection it proves to be the puppet of the North that the common United States view has supposed.

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PEKING FROWNS ON FRONT

It might prove that the Front possesses not only more independence but more iconoclastic views in Communist terms than have been attributed to it. One thing is certain: the Chinese Communists take a very dim view of the Front's platform.

Behind the maneuver and countermaneuver in Vietnam are other forces that cannot be ignored. The Chinese, for example, have made no secret of their strong approval of the general nature of the Vietnamese conflict. They think it is going very well. They see it as the opening phase of possibly 25 or even 50 years of similar guerrilla conflicts that will spread through Asia, Africa and Latin America, eventually leading to the "encirclement" of the West.

By "West" they mean North America, Western Europe and the Soviet bloc. It is the great phase of the battle of the "country versus the city"—the same struggle that was won in China by the "country" and which the Chinese see as being won in world terms by the "country"—that is, the peasant masses, which they would lead.

China apparently has no interest in seeing the Vietnam war ended. It has no interest in a peaceful negotiated settlement. Not only has it no interest but also it is likely to oppose any step in that direction with great force.

This includes some powerful persuasives. China could at a single stroke close the frontier to the passage of arms and aid to Hanoi. China could cut off the supplies it provides. It might even do more. It might seek to reverse Hanoi's policy by calling on sympathizers within North Vietnam's leadership to oppose any effort to end the war.

A small clue as to China's reactions: diplomats of Eastern Europe eagerly inquired into the significance of this correspondent's trip to Hanoi. They wondered if he was bringing a peace bid from Washington or taking one back from Hanoi.

When he told them that he was not acting as a messenger, they plainly did not entirely believe the denial. They made no secret of their earnest desire that an end be found to the war in Vietnam. They expressed fervent hope that maybe at long last some steps toward that end were being taken.

The Soviet reaction was more restrained. But the Soviet press published and commented on this reporter's dispatches from Hanoi and their possible significance on the progress toward the conference table. There was no reaction from China or the Chinese. Not a word about the visit appeared in the Chinese press.

There was even speculation among some Hanoi diplomats that the visit of an American journalist to Hanoi and the succession of visits of other non-Communists might bring some real problems in North Vietnam's relations with Peking.

One diplomat thought that the Hanoi reaction to the peace proposals of Mr. Brown were couched in somewhat sharper language than might have been expected, simply to reassure the Chinese that Hanoi was holding the line.

There is another nightmare that haunts Hanoi's leaders as they ponder the future. This is the possibility that at some moment the Chinese internal political struggle will bring on an open struggle between the contending factions and that in the process China's ability to continue aid to Hanoi will be radically affected.

DEEPENING OF SPLIT FEARED

Associated with this fear is another: that the quarrel between Moscow and Peking might grow from a polemic and diplomatic struggle into a major military conflict. While many diplomats who closely follow events in the Communist world feel that this is an extreme possibility, they cannot entirely discount the angry mutterings the Russians now make for almost anyone to hear, mutterings that the quarrel may evolve into a military conflict.

No one in Hanoi can fail to observe the signs of the intra-Communist struggle. They are visible in personal and diplomatic relations, in difficulties North Vietnam has in getting transit facilities for invited guests, in the open wranging between Moscow and Peking about methods of shipping in aid.

"North Vietnam has enough problems with the Americans," a Communist diplomat said, "without having this terrible quarrel with all its dangerous possibilities going on all around her."

With these factors in the background, it would seem to be prudent to watch carefully for any sign of a situation that might lead to an honorable settlement. But here North Vietnam is divided against itself.

The declarations that Hanoi statesmen make about national honor, about independence, about survival seem entirely genuine. That is what they believe they are fighting for.

They look askance at suggestions that the object of their struggle is to spread the influence of "international communism." Once, perhaps, that might have been a goal. Some day in the future it might be again. But today the struggle as they see it is for the survival of Vietnam as a nation. They feel that the United States seeks to establish a "puppet" regime for the whole of Vietnam. This they are willing to give their lives to prevent and in this the Hanoi leadership appears to have the strong support of the country.

It is generally believed by non-Communist diplomats in Hanoi, rightly or wrongly, that the American bombing in the North not only has strengthened the regime in its conviction that the Americans aim at its destruction but also has crystalized a national spirit of patriotism and self-defense that gives the country a united aspect in standing against the United States regardless of how some citizens may privately feel on the question of Communism.

"The United States has never shown any signs of goodwill," Premier Dong said. The same sentiment was echoed by other Government members and by ordinary North Vietnamese. It was their conviction that the United States had set itself resolutely against them and that there was no real alternative but to fight it out to the end.

### ADAMANT ON SUBMISSION

"We will die but we will not submit," was a phrase echoed repeatedly. It was apparent that to the North Vietnamese mind there was no alternative—no real road to an honorable conference to resolve the disagreements without further fighting.

This kind of attitude makes it difficult to take even a small step toward peaceful talk. When this was pointed out to the North Vietnamese, they fell back on the view that it was up to the United States not them to take the first steps toward halting the conflict. As to what would come later they did not say precisely but did leave an impression that they would not sit with folded hands if—against all their expectations—the United States did halt its bombing.

What influence do the Russians have on Hanoi's attitude toward negotiation? Not much, it seems evident. Soviet representatives stress the independence of the Hanoi officials.

One Soviet diplomat, bemoaning a New Year's hangover, said in despair: "And this is the day I'm supposed to turn in my annual report on the North Vietnamese economy!"

A friendly Westerner expressed his sympathy, adding, "After all, it's just a matter of writing up the figures."

"Don't make jokes," the Russian said. "That's the whole problem. They won't give us the figures on anything."

The North Vietnamese resent suggestions from Moscow about the conduct of the war and they resent suggestions from Moscow about making peace. In part, it would seem, this is deliberate policy on Hanoi's part. In order to maintain some kind of relations with its two big allies it emphasizes its independence of both. It takes no advice from Moscow and none from Peking.

In that fashion neither side can accuse it of favoritism. But if this acts to reduce the effectiveness of Peking's arguments in favor of protracted war, it equally reduces any advice that Moscow may proffer about the advisability of cutting the conflict short.

The continuation of the war is difficult for the North Vietnamese people—they make no bones about that. But they insist that on balance it is not going too badly. Their towns, villages, cities, roads and railroads have taken a beating. The danger to the dikes is considered great. The rice crop is down because of bad weather and lack of manpower.

But the movement of forces, materials and arms to the south goes on. And in the south, too, although rosy expectations of major victories against the Americans have not been fulfilled, the Front says that in 1966 it actually extended its territorial sway over larger areas than in 1965—a claim that some neutral observers believe is pretty well founded.

The Americans have conducted some effective "spoiling" operations in the South but when they are completed the control of the territory drifts back into the hands of the Vietcong. Nothing has happened that has made either the North or the South feel continued persecution of the war impossible or too costly.

READY TO GO INTO CAVES

And, as Hanoi says, if worst comes to worst and the people are bombed back into the caves—well, they will go into the caves and the jungles and carry on from there until the Americans tire of it all.

That is a grim prospect, but the North Vietnamese have faced up to it and this correspondent found no one, Vietnamese, Communist or non-Communist, who doubted that they were prepared to go through with it if necessary.

Nonetheless, this correspondent left Hanoi with a private impression that if the conference table ever was reached it would be possible for statesmen on both sides to hammer out a settlement that could well surprise each side by its effectiveness.

One other impression: in spite of all the harsh language that each side has used against the other, in spite of the desperate fighting, the death and destruction and cruelty, if the war could be ended, the North Vietnamese and the Americans could well end up excellent friends.

It would not, for one thing, require much actual contact with Hanoi for Washington to come to a clear understanding that, whatever else they may be, the North Vietnamese leaders are never going to be stooges for Peking, Moscow—or for that matter, the United States.

They have—or think they have—fought all comers to a standstill for nearly 2,000 years. That is one reason the thought of ending the present war ever comes as a shock and a surprise to some youthful North Vietnamese.

"End the war?" one said recently. "End the war? What would we do with ourselves without the war?"

[From the Washington Post, Monday, Jan. 9, 1967]

## TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY PREMIER PHAM IN HANOI

HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, Jan. 6.—Following is the transcript of Premier Pham Van Dong's statment made last Monday to The New York Times. The text has been checked by the Foreign Ministry for translation errors. The Premier spoke in Vietnamese and the conversation was translated into English by interpreters. The text does not include the informal discussion of the Vietnamese situation that followed the general statement.

First we will talk about the war and proceed from that to talk about a settlement—do you agree?

Maybe about the war your viewpoint and mine might be different—that's why we must talk. Because if we don't have correct understanding of the war, any question relating to the war may not be understood.

The fundamental question is the origin of the war. The main questions are: Who started the war? Who was the cause of the war? Concerning this question our point of view is very clear, and in this we have the agreement of so many people in the world. Have you read the statement of de Gaulle on the occasion of New Year's? De Gaulle says this war was caused by the Americans. He says the war is an unjust, despicable war and he draws the conclusion that the Americans should withdraw.

What do you think?

If you agree, later on the Government, sooner or later, must arrive at that conclusion, and if not now they must agree next year and if this party does not agree another party must agree. If American responsibe authorities don't agree with this, then they may commit more errors.

Sometime they must arrive at this conclusion—do you agree?

I think politics is the main thing. I think you are right in expressing doubts. It is a very big problem relating to us and to you. You and individuals like yourself must make a contribution to solving it.

### TRACING THE CAUSES

Sooner or later American ruling circles must realize the truth—it is becoming clearer and clearer and binds people to accept it.

I want to trace with you the cause of the war in South Vietnam and over the whole country.

You remember how the United States intervened in South Vietnam after the Geneva accords? How they undermined the elections? How they helped the then Diem government to rule over South Vietnam? How the situation in South Vietnam became explosive in spite of everything in the years 1958 to 1960? Nineteen sixty-one was the year Johnson paid a visit to Diem and made some agreement with Diem.

From 1962 on the Americans put a military command into South Vietnam. They sent in more advisers. Then it was the Taylor plan, thinking that they would be able to pacify Vietnam in 18 months. Of course that plan failed. Then there was the assassination of Diem and Nhu, and the fighting in Vietnam became very explosive, both militarily and politically. It was at that time that in South Vietnam heavy fighting took place, and that was also the time of the burning of Buddhist monks and priests.

After the overthrow of the Diem government, the situation in South Vietnam became even more complicated. The Americans had at that time begun to admit that they faced a tunnel, and a man like Kennedy had to admit that at the end of the tunnel there was no light.

That was the situation at the end of 1964. The military then started a new phase. The American Government was confronted with new escalation, which was very serious. They saw that it was very difficult for them to win the war in South Vietnam and they thought that if, perhaps, they struck at the North, they might save the situation in the South.

The military are rather short-sighted, and if you will pardon my saying so, very stupid, and now they have to pay for their stupidity. They had thought that after some months we would have to kneel before them, and if we had to succumb it would be very easy for them to solve the question in South Vietnam.

EVOLVING SITUATION

How the situation in North Vietnam has developed I will tell you later on. But what is clear is that between February and April in 1965, we did not capitulate. President Johnson delievered on April 7 his Baltimore speech, and he started sending an expeditionary corps to South Vietnam. Now then, the Pentagon generals had a very short-sighted calculation. The generals thought that, sending an army of 150,000 to 200,000, they would be masters in South Vietnam. By the end of 1965 they had something like 160,000 to 170,000 in South Vietnam and a very large arsenal of armor, tanks, guns, planes and navy.

But how did the situation evolve?

At the start of the first dry season, the Americans thought they would be victorious. You remember the four points of General Westmoreland? But the first dry season passed and the aims of General Westmoreland were not materialized and the expeditionary corps of the United States grew continuously, and also the number of mercenary troops from satellite countries. This is not to include the South Vietnam puppet troops numbering half a million. In spite of all that, the Liberation Army scored victories after victories, and its strength was further increased.

After the dry season came the rainy season. Because of the defeat in the dry season, they continued to increase the size of the expeditionary corps in the rainy season. Still the strength of the Liberation Army also grew, and the Liberation Army's strength was shown in very heavy victories in main-force engagements and in guerrilla war.

Now we are in the second dry season. How is the situation? It is clear that the situation is very bad for the expeditionary corps of the United States. This is not clear to everybody. Perhaps it is known to the Americans in Saigon and Washington. As for us, we know it very well. The situation is very bad—worse than ever before. And they are now facing an impasse.

What are they bound to do? Increase their strength in South Vietnam? How much? Where will they fight? And how to win victories? These are problems which are unsolved by the United States military, and if ever you meet General Westmoreland and put the question to him, I don't think he would be able to answer it.

POINTS INTERPRETED

You agree that he might once have thought he had the answer, but now he does not. Shall I repeat to you his four point program? First to smash the force of the Liberation Army—its battle force; secondly, pacification; thirdly, consolidation of the puppet administration and army; fourthly, cut the lines between North and South.

It is now clear that these points cannot be achieved. But Americans will not admit that. They even say the first point could be achieved—that they would be able to crush the battle corps of the Liberation Army. They will not be able to do that. On the contrary, the strength of the Liberation Army is growing stronger and stronger—and stronger than the Americans think.

On the second point, the Americans have been defeated.

On the third point, they do not like to admit the truth, but they must admit collapse of the puppet army and administration.

On the fourth point, they are not able to put it into effect.

In a word, the whole Westmoreland plan has collapsed. Moreover, there is no possibility in the future for him to succeed. In South Vietnam the Americans find themselves in an impasse.

We should talk at length about these points. So many think that the material superiority of the Americans will finally win the war in South Vietnam. However, it is very dangerous to think this way, particularly for the Americans to think that way—that by new escalations they will be victorious due to material strength. They increase the first time to bring victory. Then a second time. Then a third step and even after the third step a fourth step. Is it necessary to think that after the fifth step they will be victorious? I affirm to you that they will not be able to win.

I would like to tell you about the nature of the war because this is a crucial point. I take this opportunity to talk about the question which you raised for General Giap. You would like to know how we compare American and French generals, American and French troops. The problem does lie in that the problem involves what kind of war it is for the Americans.

We can say it is an unjust war, carried on for no reason, a kind of war in which the Americans have no advantage. From our point of view it is a sacred war for independence, freedom, life. It stands for everything. This war, for this generation and for future generations.

### DETERMINED TO FIGHT

That is why we are determined to fight this war and win this war. Our victory stems from this very resoluteness. That is the key to a solution of all our problems. I think that this is something very difficult for you to understand. Not only for you—I say this to lot of our friends in Europe. They do not understand. They are afraid of American strength. They do not see how we resist an expeditionary corps of 400,000 well-equipped with weapons, and the nearby Seventh Fleet. And they are concerned that we could not win the war. But now we are being victorious and we are telling them that, finally, we will win. They admit that truth, but they do not understand it.

I have no hope of convincing you, but I must tell you because it is very important.

Concerning the generals and troops, I will tell you that in South Vietnam there are puppet generals and half a million troops well equipped. But what could they do? The Liberation Army is not so numerically strong and their weapons are not so good, but they are winning. All are Vietnamese, but why on the other side are they so bad and on our side so talented, so supremely talented—talented without precedent? I think in history there has never been such a people's war fought with so much talent, and the Americans have to admit that.

Why? Because we are fighting a just war. That is clear and that is the explanation of our victory. We have won because of that. We are winning because of that. And if necessary we will win next year because of that. And if necessary the war may last many years and we will win because of that.

I want to tell you something which is very important. Military men of the United States found that raising their force to 400,000 troops was not helping to solve the problem. They think with half a million they can solve it. Some even speak six hundred thousand. Some say they may increase even more.

I have told you the crucial problem does not lie in numbers. I want to tell you another important point. The more American troops are put into South Vietnam, the more complicated problems they create, something which even cannot be foreseen. Politically speaking, this is something very dangerous for the American troops. If up to now the puppet administration is able to deceive some people, in the future it will not be able to deceive anyone.

The Vietnamese people in South Vietnam are seeing for themselves that the United States is fighting a colonial war, the most brutal in history. Do you agree? The expeditionary corps is entirely upsetting the economy of South Vietnam. There is increasing inflation. People cannot live.

### THE WAR'S EFFECTS

And another thing. There is bad effect on social and cultural life. You have heard it said that Saigon is now a very huge brothel. Even girls of the upper classes are prostitutes to American officers.

From these three points we may say that the more American troops we put into South Vietnam, the more hatred it will cause among the Vietnam people.

And from this there arises a very new situation in Saigon—a movement in the cities, a struggle in the cities. You have heard of the dockers' strike. The movement in the cities will grow stronger and wider. It will embrace all strata of the population of the laboring classes, the bourgeoisie, even the upper classes, intellectuals, religious sects. It is a political development that you would never think of, that is a very, very important political development that will evolve according to the military situation and collapse the puppet regime.

These are things which should be admitted by the Americans. There may be some clear-sighted Americans who admit them. What will you obtain by intro-

ducing more and more troops? The puppets are collapsing. These are fundamental points in South Vietnam politics.

We will consider these points, you and I.

As far as the North is concerned, you have been visiting in the North the last few days. You have seen what it is. The most important thing is that the air war of the Americans is a defeat. World opinion admits it is a defeat, because it has not been able to force us to capitulate. It has had no influence on the situation in South Vietnam.

ACHIEVEMENTS CITED

On the contrary the situation is better for the National Liberation Front and more and more dangerous for the Americans.

As far as we are concerned, we have achieved a few more things. First, our defense potential is increasing very clearly. This is something very fortunate. Our antiaircraft defense is on the increase and, generally speaking, our armed forces are growing stronger and steadily. We have passed the most difficult stages. Now it is time for us to expand widely and rapidly. What counts most is that we have very important and courageous strength in our youth. You may have heard of the very courageous potentials of our youth. In this war we have seen very clearly the immense courage and potential of our youth—three million stand ready and proved their capability in every respect.

Secondly, in the economic aspects. First, the ravages caused by the air war—of course they exist. But there is a second aspect. We have sought in every way to develop economic potential in keeping with wartime conditions and so as to avoid the ravages caused by the American bombers. We can draw some conclusions. We have built what we could and what we can defend in agriculture, in industry, in communications and in all other fields. On this basis we are in a position to expand our economic potential for the war and to prepare for a protracted war.

Now we come to the big question—the prospects of the war. How long will the war last? In this connection we are preparing for a long war because a people's war must be a long war. A war against an aggressor has to be a long war. Nobody knows how long it is to be. It lasts until there will be no aggressors any longer. We are preparing for that kind of war. Every citizen thinks like that.

I do not think you have much time left here to talk with our citizens. How long will the war last?—this is the kind of question which foreigners often put to us because they do not understand. That kind of question surprises us, and any Vietnamese. How can we decide how long the war will be and how can we decide when aggression will stop, when aggressors will stop sending troops to crush us?

*That is why we are preparing for a long war. How many years? Ten, 20—what do you think, about 20?*

What I used to tell our friends is that the younger generation will fight better than we—even kids so high. They are preparing themselves. That is the situation. I am not telling that to impress anyone. It's the truth. That is a logical consequence of the situation. Our Vietnam nation is a very proud nation. Our history is one of a very proud nation. Mongol invaders came. They were defeated the first time, the second time and the third time. Now how many times does the Pentagon want to fight? So how many years the war goes on depends on you not on us.

That is the first point.

AGGRESSION CHARGED

Now the second point—the question about a settlement.

Of course, you are interested in a settlement, I fully understand I agree to talk with you about this, but to have good talk we must start with the origin of the war that we were just talking about.

For us a settlement is a very simple question. As far as we are concerned, is a war of aggerssion, a colonial war, an *unjust war.*

So a settlement is to stop it.

This kind of logic is flawless and irrefutable. Do you agree?

We must live with this world. But we must have our point of view and fight for what is sound and sacred. Our struggle is a sacred struggle for our independence and freedom, no more and no less, and any settlement must stem from

this and lead to this point. For us that is something that cannot be compromised.

Now for the best solution is that the American stop their war of aggression. The whole problem lies in that. So long as the Americans do not think that way, there will be no solution to the war. They will continue to fight against us and we will continue to oppose them.

Is there any way to make them understand? That is your business, and people like you must shoulder the responsibility. People sometimes say something which is not very correct and speak about the honor of America. Where lies the honor of the United States? The legitimate honor of the United States consists in not fighting an unjust war, and if the United States have fought an unjust war, it would be better for them not to speak of honor any longer. There is no other war. Am I correct in saying this? I think that I am. There is a precedent in history—the French in Algeria. Why could not America do the same?

QUESTION OF RESPECT

As far as we are concerned, we must fight the patriotic war. We do not think of humiliating the United States. The United States is a big power. America respects its own honor. But we also respect our honor, and the moment the United States rulers put an end to the war, we will respect each other and settle every question. Why don't you think that way? We have our point of view and we have put forward four points which constitute a basis for settlement of the Vietnam question. These should not be considered "conditions."

They are merely truths. The most simple thing is to recognize our sovereignty and our independence. It involves only recognizing points in the Geneva agreements. The ruling circles of the United States do not like to accept our four points and particularly the third point. That means that they are still clinging to South Vietnam, that means they are still introducing themselves into the tunnel. Now what can you do about that? *We must come to solution on the basis of the four points.* Whichever way you go around, finally you must come to the four points.

*Besides the four points we have also put another point. That is to demand that the United States put, unconditionally and for good, an end to bombing and all hostile activity against the North.* This point has its own logic, and the reaction and support of the world testifies to its importance. It is crystal clear that throughout the world people demand it—General de Gaulle and even U Thant.

What is the reason? It is not necessary to elaborate because I think you are of the same opinion. But the ruling circles and the Pentagon do not agree with this. Of course, it is still very difficult for them to agree. As far as we are concerned, our position is very clear and simple because the truth is always simple. It is composed of our four-point stand and the point I have just mentioned. Concerning South Vietnam, we have the third of four points.

*Now here is something else. Up to now there has not been a bit of goodwill from the United States Government side. In such a complicated war, if there is a lack of goodwill, nothing can be settled.* We will never be decieved. We know that while speaking of peace the United States ruling circles and the Pentagon are continuing their war. So we are not to be cheated. As far as world opinion is concerned, maybe at first it was deceived, but slowly it came to understand, as experience showed, that *each time the Americans want to escalate, it is always accompanied by a peace move,* from the Baltimore speech to the present.

Of course, I understand this better than you because there are many things I cannot tell you. That does not bring any good to the United States. *If you really want a settlement, the first thing is to have goodwill.*

That is all that I want to tell you about a settlement. Now I want to talk to you about South Vietnam and the reunification problem. Concerning South Vietnam, we think the political program of the N.L.F. is a very sound program—for independence, democracy, peace, neutrality.

SUPPORT FOR NLF

We think that it is a very clear-sighted and intelligent program, fully conforming to the situation in South Vietnam. It has won the warm support of the South Vietnam people. It has become more and more the objective of the South Vietnam people—the whole people.

That is the demand of the situation. Since the National Front is the clear-sighted leader of the struggle of the people, it has won warm support, it is now the only genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. I must say the American ruling circles are very short-sighted in not admitting the situation. *Whom are they fighting against? The N.L.F. They do not recognize the N.L.F. That is impossible. With whom will they settle? Of course, they must recognize the Front and talk with it. Surely the situation will evolve that way.*

If the American ruling circles persist in not recognizing the truth, they will come up against bitter surprises.

I must tell you about the relationship of the Front and us. Vietnam is one country, one nation. But there are the Geneva accords. There is the present situation, and in South Vietnam there is the N.L.F., which is the leader of the struggle. We are fellow countrymen; we love and respect our fellow compatriots in the South. We respect their hard and courageous struggle. We respect their program of the N.L.F. The problem of the war in South Vietnam is to be settled with the N.L.F. in the present and in the future.

That is one of our main policies and a very important policy. So how will reunification occur?

We have made public many times our position. So did the N.L.F. We must be reunified. There is no force in the world which can divide us. Because we are a united nation. I myself am from the South.

How will reunification happen? On the basis of independence and democracy. By peaceful means. The two parts of the country will have to discuss together as between brothers what is the best way, by which means and through which stages reunification has to be carried out. There are many misunderstandings. People say we will annex the South. We are not doing this stupid, criminal act. We deeply respect the feelings of our brothers in South Vietnam. That is why we are supporting each other and uniting our strength in the fight against the common enemy.

### REACTION TO BOMBING

You know what a strong reaction there was in South Vietnam when Hanoi was bombed. The motto was, if the Americans do any damage to Hanoi, our compatriots in South Vietnam will fight 10 times harder. That is not something we are boasting about. Our compatriots in the South say that Hanoi is the heart of the country and that is true. That is why we say we must be reunified, but we will settle this among ourselves. We will consider the situation, what is the most convenient means, and there is no haste in doing it. There are not many new things about reunifications, so I do not want to elaborate.

Now the last point I would like to make. We are an independent country. We have our independent and sovereign policy. We are the masters of our country, our affairs, our policy, our major and minor policies. This is very clear. If we have no independence, we could not wage such a war as we are now waging. We are independent and sovereign in all our foreign policy. That is the situation so far. And it will be the same in the future. I have to tell you this because in America there has been so much misunderstanding on this point. They are wrong. We do not want that they miscalculate on this. Because if there is miscalculation by the United States rulers, the situation is not good.

Among your questions there is another question. You ask when we will accept volunteers. I answered you that this depends on the situation. We have made preparations. Volunteers are not lacking—volunteers for the armed forces and civilians. If we need them, many will come. This is an important point on which we rely. This point also shows the independence of our policy.

I think that I have explained in the main all the points. Now let us talk. On what do you disagree and have you any suggestions? I said at the beginning that I would speak frankly because I am talking with a good-willed American. That is the basis of this talk.

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### FOUR POINTS LIST HANOI CONDITIONS

Here are the "four points" proclaimed by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong on April 8, 1965, as the basis for peace in Vietnam and reiterated last week:

- Withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel, equipment and bases from South Vietnam.

• Pending reunification of the country, North and South Vietnam must refrain from entering into any foreign military alliances and there must be no foreign troops, equipment or bases on the territory of either one.

• The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled in acordance with the program of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong.

• The peaceful reunification of the country must be worked out by the people of both North and South without foreign interference.

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