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NOMINATION OF JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS

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HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE NINETIETH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON THE

NOMINATION OF JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS TO BE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SEPTEMBER 30, 1968

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NOMINATION OF JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1968

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice at 9:15 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Fulbright, Symington, Dodd, Mundt, and Case.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

The purpose of the meeting this morning is to hear Mr. James Russell Wiggins of the District of Columbia, to be the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations with the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and the Representative of the United States of America in the Security Council of the United Nations.

Mr. Wiggins, we have your biographic sketch. I believe most of us know you, and have known a great deal about you during the years you have been here.

(The biographic data referred to follows:)

JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS

Position for which considered: The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations with the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and the Representative of the United States of America in the Security Council of the United Nations, and a Representative of the United States of America to the Twenty-third Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Present Position: Editor and Executive Vice President, Washington Post Times Herald.

Office Address: 1515 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Born: Luverne, Minnesota, December 4, 1903.

Legal Residence: District of Columbia.

Marital Status: Married February 8, 1923.

Family:

Wife: Mabel E. Preston

Children:

William James

Geraldine (Mrs. Rohland Thomssen, Jr.)

Patricia (Mrs. Thomas Nolan Schroth)

John Russell

Home Address: 2218 Wyoming Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Education: Educated in Luverne public schools; LL.D., Colby College, 1954;

Doctor Laws (honorary), University of Maine, 1967.

Experience:

Non-Government:

1922-25—Reporter, Rock County Star, Luverne, Minnesota

1925-30—Editor and publisher, Luverne Star

1930-33—Editorial writer, Dispatch-Pioneer Press, St. Paul

1933-38—Washington correspondent

1938-45—Managing editor

Military:

1943-44—Served as air combat intelligence officer, Mediterranean theater

1944 —Commissioned rank of captain, Air Corps; then major

Non-Government:

1945-46—Editor

1946-47—Assistant to the publisher, New York Times

1947-53—Managing editor, Washington Post

1953-55—Vice President, managing editor

1955-60—Vice President, executive editor, Washington Post Times Herald

1960 to present—Editor and Executive Vice President, Washington Post Times Herald

Memberships: Member, American Society Newspaper Editors (past president), Sigma Delta Chi, Mason*Clubs:* National Press, Cosmos, Gridiron (Washington)*Author:* Freedom or Secrecy, 1956

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you have anything to add to it?

STATEMENT OF JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, NOMINEE

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I think you are probably fully informed on my biography.

I will say that the President called me last week, advised me he wished to submit my nomination. I am sensible of the high honor involved, in view of the distinction of the great Americans who have served in this post—Warren Austin, Cabot Lodge, Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Goldberg, and George Ball. And I am further sensible of the importance of the post in view of the present troubled state of the world. And I hope that I may live up to the expectations of the President if I am permitted to serve.

SUPPORT FOR UNITED NATIONS EXPRESSED

Senator SPARKMAN. You do believe in the United Nations? Do you support the United Nations?

Mr. WIGGINS. I have followed with enormous interest and concern as a citizen and a newspaperman the history of the United Nations from its commencement at San Francisco, when all our hopes and expectations probably exceeded the bound of any reasonable anticipation. And although its history has been fraught with difficulty, enormous problems have confronted it, I still believe that it is the great hope of our own country and of the world for introducing order and tranquility into nations, and rescue mankind from some of its historic enemies.

Senator SPARKMAN. You recognize what we might term its weaknesses, its failures in some respects. But you believe that it is worth preserving nevertheless.

Mr. WIGGINS. That would be my view, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. That would be your view.

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING

Let me ask you just one more question, and then I will turn you over to my colleagues.

You have been briefed, I presume, in the short time that you have had notice of your appointment?

Mr. WIGGINS. I have had some conferences, but I cannot say that I have been adequately briefed as yet. I arrived here only Thursday night. I had the session with the President and with Mr. Rostow and

Secretary Rusk, and with Secretary Sisco. But I have not gone through the total briefing in the various affairs that come within the comprehension of the United Nations delegation.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST QUESTION

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, the question I was going to ask you is this. I assume you have discussed with the counsel of the State Department or with some of the officials your financial interests and so forth. Have you been advised as to that?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I submitted to the State Department a property statement, and I was advised by Mr. Meeker, the Department legal officer, that it was satisfactory, and there was no conflict of interest.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you feel confident that you have no holdings or interests that would create for you any problems.

Mr. WIGGINS. I do not, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Fulbright is the Chairman, but he insisted I proceed this morning, since he is here only temporarily. Senator Fulbright.

The CHAIRMAN. I have been away on other business, and I thought the continuity of the hearings might be better left in the hands of Senator Sparkman.

Mr. Wiggins, it is very nice to have you here this morning.

REASON FOR NOMINEE'S INTEREST IN APPOINTMENT

While I have known you as a great newspaperman, I have not known or thought of your interest in the diplomatic service. Have you ever served in the diplomatic service before?

Mr. WIGGINS. I have not, sir. I have only had one presidential commission in my life, sir, and that was a commission to serve in the Army of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any idea of taking up diplomacy as a permanent career? Do you look upon this as the beginning of a career in diplomacy?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think it is rather late in my life to contemplate a long career in diplomacy, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Why are you interested in this appointment?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, what I am about to say may sound to a cynical and a somewhat skeptical world differently than I intend it to sound, but I am interested in it for only one reason—I am in love.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. WIGGINS. I am in love. I am in love with the United States. I am in love with its history, which I have read daily for 50 years, and studied its pages as some men study a breviary or a bible or the Koran or the Torah. I am in love with its institutions upon which I believe the freedom and liberty of mankind in this world may chiefly depend. I am in love with the people of this country whose good intentions I believe in with all my heart, and whose spirit I think rises on every occasion that is summoned to serve the good interests of the world. I am in love with this land, with every corner of it that I have visited, and every section of it has filled me with inspiration

and wonder and amazement at the progress that our people have made on this continent.

I believe in the future of my country. I think I can serve this country in this capacity and lend to it something of the common touch. I believe that the President's confidence in me is not entirely misguided. And I hope to be able to vindicate and confirm possession of that love by my conduct in the office in which he has asked me to serve.

U.N. IS A WORLD INSTITUTION

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Wiggins, I appreciate that sentiment. I think it is a very commendable one. But the United Nations is not just a United States institution. It is a world institution, in which there are many members. How many are there now?

Mr. WIGGINS. 125 members, Senator. And I understand that the United States is but one among the great nations assembled here. But I believe that because of its position of power and influence in the world, its conduct at the United Nations is a matter of enormous importance, and I am sure that I speak here upon matters in which you and your colleagues have evidenced greater knowledge and concern over many years.

The CHAIRMAN. You are in love with the United States, but are you in love with the United Nations?

Mr. WIGGINS. I stated earlier, Senator, that I believed the United Nations at the very outset, at its initiation, was attended by probably higher hopes and expectations than were realizable in a less than ideal world. In spite of its difficulties and harassments and tragedies, and complications, it remains the best forum on earth for the resolution of the tragic questions that constantly threaten the survival, not only of this Nation, but of all the nations, and perhaps even the survival of mankind. I think there is no alternative to it for the resolution of the sharp political struggles that constantly recur in the Assembly, and there is no agency in the world that is as well equipped to carry on in every corner of the world the struggles against the even older enemies of mankind, ignorance, illiteracy, disease, and discrimination.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the United Nations has really been effective?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think it has been effective, more effective than any international organization that has preceded it, and that its very difficulties are a tribute to its effectiveness. I believe that history does not disclose the alternatives, so we will never know how much more difficulty we might have had had it not existed, to make an effort to cope with these problems throughout the long years of its struggle.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the United States has used the United Nations as effectively and assiduously as it should have?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think it has tried very hard to make use of the United Nations as an instrument for national policy as well as international policy. But I recognize the thrust of your question—that the United Nations as an institution, and its effectiveness is related only to the skill with which the separate nations use it, and to the spirit

with which they undertake to employ it. And I hope that so far as I may contribute in the future, that we may use it more skillfully and more persistently.

RESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR BALL

The CHAIRMAN. It is rather unusual that your predecessor resigned, I believe, about a week after he was confirmed to this position, did he not?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you explain that? Is that evidence of much interest in this country in the U.N.?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I believe that is a question you should direct to Ambassador Ball. And I believe if you ask him, he will give you a proper answer.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't intend to resign immediately after you have been confirmed, do you?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I do not intend to resign immediately after I am confirmed.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the United Nations could be used to bring about any peace in Vietnam?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think the experience of our Government with the United Nations has been disappointing. As you know very well, the Government has made several attempts to get the Security Council to take cognizance of the problems in Vietnam, and has never been able to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Has it ever brought the matter to a vote in the Security Council?

Mr. WIGGINS. I believe it has never been possible to bring an issue in connection with Vietnam to a vote in the Security Council.

The CHAIRMAN. Have we ever requested a vote in the Security Council?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, you will forgive me. My memory does not serve me precisely as to however we presented it. But I believe there are five occasions when we attempted to get it on the agenda, and no action was taken in the Security Council.

VIEWS ON VIETNAM WAR

The CHAIRMAN. What is your feeling about the war in Vietnam?

Mr. WIGGINS. I hope that the conference at Paris will succeed in arriving at a political solution. I cannot say that my expectations in this respect are exactly euphoric, because I acknowledge the complications and difficulties of the situation. And I should hope, Senator, that I might say nothing here that would in any way complicate the task of those who are trying to move this conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any ideas as to what this country might do to make that conference more fruitful?

Mr. WIGGINS. I must confess that I do not have a solution for the present situation in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think is the objective of the United States in Vietnam? What are we fighting for in Vietnam?

Mr. WIGGINS. As I have understood it, sir, it is to preserve the right of the people of South Vietnam to make their own choice as to the nature and the characteristics of the government under which they wish to live.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you believe that that objective warrants the efforts which we are putting into that battle?

Mr. WIGGINS. This is a judgment that I suspect, Senator, will have to await the verdict of history. I do not believe you can decide at this moment whether the vast expenditure of blood and treasure which we have poured into this country has attained the objectives for which we entered. But I would suppose that the defense of a free people, of a small people against an external aggressor over a long period of history might prove a justifiable expenditure of our effort, particularly if it encouraged other small countries around the world to retain their independence in the face of aggression.

The CHAIRMAN. I have some difficulty in explaining to my constituents—as it happens I have been explaining to my constituents—the policies which I have advocated. And it would be very helpful to me if you could enlighten me about this matter.

I don't quite see that the right to have a free election—I suppose you mean in our fashion—is the kind of activity which would warrant the expenditure here. I notice in the morning paper that the military dictatorship in Greece seems to warrant our approval. There were very complimentary statements in the press about this election Greece recently had with regard to a constitution. Everybody knows that isn't any more of a democracy than is the government in South Vietnam.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I am touched by your invitation to enlighten you. But in view of the number and numerous efforts I have made in the past to do so, and the small success that has attended them, I do not wish to trespass upon the time of the committee on this occasion.

SUPPORT OF PRESENT VIETNAM POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is very interesting to me, Mr. Wiggins. You are one of the most outspoken supporters of our present policy in Vietnam and elsewhere. I thought this would be a good opportunity for you again to justify the policies that we have been following. You don't often have an opportunity before television cameras and a committee to put your views on the record. And, since the President has seen fit to send you to the U.N., don't you think it is part of the function of the Senate to examine these matters? You are certainly very well versed on them. You have been writing about them for many years.

Mr. WIGGINS. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't you like to share with us your reflections and wisdom on this subject?

Mr. WIGGINS. Thank you, Senator. At a moment when I am able to speak with more authority and with an official position, I hope that I will have a frequent opportunity to do so. However, I regard nothing of more importance than that the work of the mission in New York

should be kept closely in touch with the views and sentiments of this body, of the Senate, and you in particular.

And I have, as you state, discussed this matter with you on other occasions.

EDITORIAL SUPPORT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. Not only with me, but you have been the greatest influence that I know of in supporting the present policy in public. Your newspaper is probably the most influential paper, certainly in this city, if not in the whole country, because of its base here in Washington. It is well known that you are on very good terms with the President and the administration.

I thought this would be a good opportunity for you to review the situation and tell us why we should continue our fight in Vietnam until we establish, as you say, a self-governing democracy in South Vietnam.

Wouldn't you like to give us your reflections upon this subject?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, as you know, I am not in a position to give you the views of the Government—

The CHAIRMAN. No. We are asking about your own.

Mr. WIGGINS. Since I have not been confirmed. As you say, my own views are quite well known. But I would be happy to answer any direct questions you wish to make as to those views. That is why I am here.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a fact that for the last three years you have supported the administration's policy in Vietnam. Is that not correct?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think that would be a correct statement.

WHAT DO WE WIN IN VIETNAM?

The CHAIRMAN. And we have from time to time in this committee had hearings with members of the administration, particularly the Secretary of State. If my memory serves me correctly, the Senator from Missouri asked the Secretary, "Mr. Secretary, tell me, if we win in Vietnam, what do we win?" And I have not yet heard a good answer to that. I thought maybe you could tell us. If we win in Vietnam, what do we win? If we continue this war for 5 or 10 years, and finally we take possession of South Vietnam, what do we win that is of value to this country?

Mr. WIGGINS. I suppose, Senator, that one might ask the same question about any international or diplomatic or military effort.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking about any other issue. I am asking about Vietnam. Mr. Rusk has a great facility for evading questions. Can you say what do we win in Vietnam? You are familiar with Vietnam. You have written about it at great length. Tell us what you think is the justification for this war. What do we win in Vietnam? This is the question I believe the Senator from Missouri asked. And I have not yet heard an answer that I thought was very satisfactory.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I think I would be more disposed to discuss what we might lose if the United States took the position here and elsewhere in the world that indicated that it had no interest or concern or no disposition to defend the interests of small nations—either in Europe or in Asia—confronted by the aggression of their more

powerful neighbors with the support of even more powerful allies. I am sure that this cost might not be visible to us at once, it might not even be apparent to us in a decade, it might not even be totally clear in a generation. But ultimately I fear that if the world's greatest power, free power, exhibited total indifference toward and unwillingness to make an effort to defend this small country, other small countries, there would be consequences too painful to contemplate in terms, not only of the nature of the world's society in which we would be compelled to live, but in terms of the comfort and the convenience and the safety and security of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Missouri has to leave. I will yield to him, so that he may put his questions.

Senator SPARKMAN. Surely. Senator Symington.

U.S. DELEGATION AT THE U.N.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Wiggins, it is a privilege to see you. As perhaps you know, I am one of your delegates to the United Nations. Senator Cooper is the other congressional delegate. I hope we have a chance to talk about these things at your convenience. What worries me are statements made recently by U Thant, the general situation. I have worked to understand what Mr. Ball thinks, including his book, "The Discipline of Power." If you have written any, I wish you would give me a crack at them, because I would like to know your thinking. I hope, inasmuch as you will be, as the Chairman points out, representing a world organization, you will be willing to listen to representatives of the United States as much as other countries.

My friendship with you over the years, even though we may not agree on some things, has been one of the rewarding aspects of life in Washington and I look forward to the privilege of working with you for a better world.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I thank you very much. I must say that it makes me extremely happy to think that if confirmed for this position, I will be serving with you and the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, and I look forward to that.

RESPECT FOR CHAIRMAN'S POSITION ON VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. I would add one point. Over the years I have had great respect for some of the thinking of the Chairman of this committee. He has been sincere in his position. I would hope that you would give consideration to that. We have respect for his opinions on this committee, just as we have respect for yours.

Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I too want to welcome you to this committee and express my gratification for the choice that the President has made. I have mixed feelings, as does everyone, I think, about this, because journalism cannot afford to lose you. And I hope it won't be permanent.

I want to carry on a little bit further the question that Senator Fulbright was directing to you—the broad question of what our country's proper role is in the world. Some of your answers did sound a little bit as though it were our job to be a world policeman. You suggested, I think, that we should defend small nations in their independence. Do we defend them all? And if not, what is the test that you would apply to particular cases?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, this is, as you say, the practical question.

Senator CASE. I wish you would expand a little bit on it. As it was left, it sounded like a Dean Rusk answer, which is not acceptable.

Mr. WIGGINS. It is one thing to have a disposition to defend, and an interest in, a concern about, but in each particular case that is involved, choice of action would have to be from the whole arsenal of measures that are open to a great power.

I think that implicit in our international position since World War II has been the major premise that as our policy succeeded, our interventions and involvement would alter and diminish. And I would hope that this is a trend that will continue. I think it is a trend that is in harmony with the spirit of the people of the United States, and—who do not desire these excursions and interventions at a level that is painful to us and to our conditions. But I think at the same time that we are not, even with all our power, totally free in the world. We labor under the agony of a great power. And our failure to employ it or to indicate a willingness to employ it may have an influence upon events as important as the exercise of that power. And in no case or situation do I believe that it is a simple matter of making a broad and generalized conclusion that directs us at once into the fullest intervention as one might, to use your figure of speech, relate to a policeman. Certainly this is not either our purpose or our wish. And in fact, such interventions as those upon which we have been embarked certainly have not sprung from any inherent desire or impulse in this country to impose its will or to assert its power, or to dictate its position upon other countries. But in our situation in the world, unless we choose to retreat to a Fortress America philosophy, which I do not believe is advocated by any member of this committee, and certainly not by the Chairman, who over a long period of his life has been a leader in shaping America's international position—I do not believe we are going to do that.

So that I feel that we are going to agree, committed in the other direction from time to time, And certainly our wish and our impulse is to make agencies like the United Nations more effective, more influential, more persuasive and more powerful, so that the arts of persuasion can be used instead of the implements of force.

Senator CASE. Mr. Wiggins, in substance, then, you do not think we should intervene with all our force at every occasion when a small nation's sovereignty is threatened?

Mr. WIGGINS. Certainly not.

Senator CASE. You cannot answer a question as to whether we should get into this or not on the grounds that a small nation's

sovereignty is threatened, and say that is a complete answer. There must be then in each case individual justification?

Mr. WIGGINS. Surely.

JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Senator CASE. Now we come to the question of the individual justification for Vietnam.

Mr. WIGGINS. You must be governed both by the predicament in that individual country, by the general state of the world, by your own resources—a whole host of considerations.

Senator CASE. This is so sensible, and so right. And it is the point where we ought to have started a long time ago, instead of ending our discussion about why we got into Vietnam. Mr. Chairman, do you agree this is so? The question is not answered—I do not have to ask you—you have said this so many times—perhaps you have taught us all. It is not answered only by the proposition that a small country's sovereignty is threatened, or independence is threatened. So we have to answer each question on its own. Now, would you just develop from there why in this instance our intervention in Vietnam is justified.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, are you talking about our intervention at the beginning?

Senator CASE. You can talk about it anyway you want. I think it would be helpful, because we are not engaged in an investigation of you. You are confirmed already, as far as that goes. But we are engaged in trying to establish, not only the rightness or wrongness of our position here, and guidance in regard to the immediate question of our conduct in Vietnam, but also broadly, the country's position in foreign policy in the world today, for now and for the future.

So I think it is useful if you would go into it from both standpoints. One, in the first place, and now.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, with all deference to you, sir, I doubt that this is either the time or the place, or that I am the man to conduct a post mortem on the entire operation in Vietnam. Frankly, I am not altogether sure that I am sufficiently well equipped to discharge all the solemn responsibilities and duties that the office for which I have been nominated is going to require of me. But I am quite sure that in an impromptu and offhanded way, I am not equipped to conduct a survey of our entire involvement in Southeast Asia, to point to the errors of past policy that have arisen in connection with it, or to cite the instances of successful prosecution of our interests. It is a very difficult and involved and complicated matter which after infinite study of a great many years I certainly do not feel competent to pronounce judgment at each stage of our involvement. And I think that in retrospect one can often see situations that you wish in the light of history might have arisen in a different way, but we cannot go back and reshape all the events in the history of the past. Governments are confronted with the necessity of dealing with them in the present and as they arise in all their dreadful imperfections and obscurities. And I think that I would require—I do not know whether others would require, but I feel sure that I would require a commission from you with a long opportunity to examine and study every aspect of this situation if you expect me to produce a mature review of all the aspects of our involvement there.

INQUIRY INTO VIETNAM INTERVENTION URGED

Senator CASE. Mr. Wiggins, certainly I am not going to press you to do anything you think would in any way impair your usefulness at the United Nations. I have too much personal regard for you as well as respect for you in your profession to do that. But I do think that it is not inappropriate, in considering the beginning of your service, to use this as an instance—and we ought to use every useful instance—for a discussion of the greatest problem this country faces, and particularly the present manifestation of those problems in Vietnam. Certainly you are not coming on this cold. You have written about it, you have studied it for decades. And you are current with it, because you are currently editor of a great newspaper, and writing about it every day.

We are not trying to get a comprehensive text by Beard or anything else about the founding of the Constitution. You and I won't be around when that is written. We have to operate, though, right now. And we are trying constantly both for ourselves and for the people of the country, in this committee. I think it is a most useful function to draw out from the best minds we can have before us the current justification for American policy, and not justification in the sense of attacking and defending it, but of inquiring into it. And this is what I just hoped that you would find possible at this time, along the lines of what I think was the Chairman's intention, to do more than you have done. But if you feel that you cannot, certainly I will not press you further.

Would you respond? I take it you have responded already.

Mr. WIGGINS. Thank you, Senator. I understand your interest and point of view. And I sympathize with your desire to find out further in this area. We are all anxious to know more about this. But I think that my general views I have stated.

Senator CASE. Your general views are not unknown to us, certainly. I am not sure they are known to the general public in this country, as well as I think they deserve to be, frankly. But I wanted you to say explicitly what you have already said implicitly—that we do not intervene simply because a small nation's sovereignty has been attacked and we are a great power, unless in all the circumstances it seems the wisest thing to do, unless the tensions that keep the world in balance are endangered by our not doing it—something of this sort that has some sense and application beyond the mere mouthing of the thing that the sovereignty of a nation is something that we have to attend to, whether we can or not effectively, no matter what the consequences of our military involvement might be and all the rest. This is the kind of thing I mean. And yet when we inquire into Vietnam in these terms, all we get is if you do not defend a small country, then the world is going to pot.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I certainly do take the view that it is necessary to examine each international situation as it arises in the light, not only of all of our own complicated and manifold interests, but in the light of the interests of the whole world. We certainly could not put ourselves in a position, in my view—and I speak now only as a citizen—where we are automatically thrown full scale into a military imbroglio at the very instant of trespass of one nation upon another. I assume that this country, because of its enormous power,

not only physically, but its power in the United Nations—will certainly not act impulsively or in an impatient or ill-tempered, inconsiderate way in any world situation—that it would do what you suggested it always ought to do—examine fully into every aspect of the situation, and commit with only the greatest care, both our moral power and our physical power.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Wiggins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Fulbright.

VIETNAM VIEWS SOUGHT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wiggins, the Senator from New Jersey has put the question. Of course if you do not care to discuss it, why, that is that, I guess. But it would seem to me it would be most interesting to everybody to know what your views about Vietnam are, because it is the critical and most important subject that is disrupting our own affairs, both abroad and at home. The cost of this war has been quite substantial, has it not?

Mr. WIGGINS. It has, indeed, Senator. It has been a very costly war. And I am happy as I know you are happy at the fact that we have negotiations in Paris in which we hope that the decisions may be resolved, and that we may find a way in which the war can be brought—hostilities can be brought to an end.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing under existing conditions to give any substantial hope that those negotiations are going to be fruitful, is there? Don't you think some reexamination perhaps of our attitude towards those negotiations is warranted?

Mr. WIGGINS. I am quite sure, Senator, that nothing I can say here or we can discuss here will open up an avenue to largely improve the prospects for a successful termination of those negotiations. I think at the moment that this is our best hope and our most favorable chance, and I hope myself, and I know you do, too, that we will be able to seize this opportunity, and that within a matter of time we will come to some kind of resolution. That certainly has been an anguishing ordeal.

STATUS OF VIETNAM UNDER GENEVA ACCORDS

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we might make some headway in understanding this issue if we would go back just a bit for review. After all, this is simply a discussion. We are not making policy decisions which are made only by the President.

You said a moment ago that this was a war of defending a small country from external aggression. You are familiar with the Geneva accords, I am sure, are you not?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not implicit in those accords, participated in by the parties who were principally interested in Vietnam, who had more interest in Vietnam than we had then or now—we have now—that Vietnam was one country. Isn't that implicit in the Geneva accords?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, it is. And it was also envisaged in the settlement of the Korean war. It was similarly not envisaged that East and West Germany would be separated. It was similarly not contemplated in the endeavor that North and South Ireland would be separated.

These things have a way of taking on a dynamics of their own which sometimes do not fulfill the expectations of those who perfect the paper arrangements of the negotiators.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not wish to delay the committee, but would it not be feasible to just talk about Vietnam rather than all the other conflicts of the past centuries? Is not that a big enough problem? Vietnam is an involved subject. Was not Vietnam considered a single country at the time of the Geneva accords, and for 2,000 years prior?

Mr. WIGGINS. There have been intervals, Senator, in the history of Vietnam, when it has previously been divided—sometimes into two entities, sometimes into three. The intervention of the French colonial regime altered the previous international boundaries. I think on one occasion there was a division at precisely the same parallel which now divides the north and south.

I believe that in any case, we dealt with—at the commencement of hostilities—with the result that the country was divided, and that the government below that parallel was recognized now by many world powers as a separate country. And it was treated as a separate country in many of the embassies of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not a fact that the Geneva accords explicitly said that the division was not to be regarded as a political division of the country? Is not that a fact?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was agreed to by eight of the nine countries participating?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir. But not the United States or South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. But the United States did agree verbally that they would not use force to upset that agreement; did they not?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes; they did.

IS VIETNAM SITUATION A CIVIL WAR?

The CHAIRMAN. I just wondered. You assume, which is a matter of controversy, on which there is a difference of opinion, that there are two sovereign nations fighting, whereas according to the Geneva accords, there would be the assumption that this is one country, and the only thing to be resolved by the contemplated election was who was to run that country. There was to be an election in 1956, wasn't there?

So I do not see how you are justified in saying this is an external aggression by another country. It was really a civil war, wasn't it?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think it was a little of each. I do not agree with you that the boundary was immaterial or irrelevant. It seems to me that the boundary was acknowledged as a separation of the two powers until such time as unification proceeded according to certain contemplated routes; that unification did not take place—as I tried to say, it has not taken place in some other areas of the world where ultimate unity of two parts of a country or an area were involved.

The effort to force that unification by military power is in my opinion what has been involved in Vietnam, and I think that the policies of this country at the very outset were in opposition to the imposition upon the South of a unity which many of the people in South Vietnam did not wish or desire. And I agree with you perfectly that a point of departure for disagreements about policy in Vietnam is at the place

upon which you have skillfully put your admonitory finger, and that is whether or not this is a purely internal domestic civil discord of the kind perhaps that exists in Nigeria, or whether it does involve an aspect of one power crossing a border which, however it emerges, was a border separating two separate sovereignties at the time of the negotiations, to whatever extent the negotiations contemplated its eventual removal under prescribed conditions. When those prescribed conditions were not fulfilled, and the neighbor to the north endeavored to alter the situation by armed force, a new situation came into being. And while we may invoke the previous arrangements and acknowledge that we had stated that this country will not alter this arrangement, even though it did not subscribe to it, our action was responsive and not initiatory. We did not undertake to alter that boundary, or to overwhelm North Vietnam.

To this day, so far as I know, the Government of the United States has indicated no disposition to trespass upon the sovereignty of North Vietnam, or in any way alter its internal arrangements, or to remove the government that is presently in charge of that region, or to pursue any other act of hostility intended to triumph over or to conquer North Vietnam. The position this country has assumed as I understand it in history has been rather a defensive position, in which our object has been to preserve the territorial integrity of the region to the south of the parallel, while the people in that region, struggling out of the chaos and disorganization of a postwar period, assemble the apparatus and the institutions of government that have a reasonable chance of reflecting the will and the hopes and the aspirations of these people, so that they may come without military intervention of foreign powers to a solution of their own problems and that they may select in the future an affiliation either within the confines laid out by the Geneva accords, or so far as any wishes of this country are concerned, any other international arrangement that accords with their own wishes and aspirations and convenience. I think our position has emerged out of a situation which was not foreseen before we went into Vietnam.

EFFECT OF HO CHI MINH'S BEING A COMMUNIST

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we would have intervened if Ho Chi Minh had not been a Communist? Would we have intervened just on the principle of self-determination?

Mr. WIGGINS. History does not disclose its alternatives, Senator. I do not know whether we would have or would not have intervened. I think that is a conjecture—

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have been in favor of intervening if he had not been a Communist?

Mr. WIGGINS. I am trying to recapture what I think was the situation at that time.

I think I would have been in favor of trying to preserve the integrity and the rights of the people of the south—whether the invader from the north would have been an aggressor of either right or left persuasion. I believe that this disposition has not arisen in the past out of an antipathy or animosity to anyone, but out of an opposition in general to the employment of force to alter a political situation without the consent of the people involved.

IS VIETNAM IN INTERESTS OF UNITED STATES?

The CHAIRMAN. You started out with a very eloquent statement of how devoted you are to this country. But do you not think it is a fact that this country has suffered very great losses in lives and resources and influence throughout the world? In other words, has this war been in the interests of the United States? What I am trying to come back to is the first question, what do we win in a sense if we win this war, balanced against what are we losing, and what have we lost in the pursuance of it. If your primary interest is in the United States rather than in a philosophical proposition as to our duty to protect all people who wish to have self-government, I do not see how you arrive at the conclusion that this is in the interests of the United States. I must say I think all of us on this committee are just as devoted to the United States as you are. The difference here is what is in the interests of the United States. This is why it is important to see your attitude, because you are going to the U.N. And it does seem to me that the main thrust of this hearing would be what your judgment is as to the interests of the United States, which all of us are interested in. It is difficult for me to see how all the people of the United States, 200 million of them, with a great deal to lose, can continue this kind of war—either there or elsewhere.

You say you would intervene even though the issue was not communism. We have often been told by leaders of this Government that the main reason is to stop communism. If it is not to stop communism, but simply to preserve independence of a group of 17 million people, it puts it in a different light. I believe I can remember, that the Secretary of State said, yes, he thought if it had not been communism, we would not have intervened. This is the first time I remember that he differed with the administration's view on a matter of this kind.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, if you will excuse me, I said that so far as I was personally concerned I was opposed to aggression by powers of either the left or the right. I did not attempt at that moment to speak for the Secretary of State or for the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary said that before our committee. I believe he said it in a previous hearing.

ROLE OF UNITED STATES TOWARD SMALL NATIONS

But what I am trying to get at is, as a representative to the United Nations your attitude is very important. If it is that we are going to take the position of protecting all small sovereign countries, of which there are now 125—not all of those are small, but certainly most are—we have quite a role to play. It is going to be a hard role to play.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I wish to understand your view. I feel that we do not differ as much as your statement might suggest. I am confident that you, too, have an interest in seeing that the rights of small countries are protected. I assume that that does not mean that that interest is one that you would prosecute instantaneously by military means. But it is a concern—and I believe it brings us into many organizations, the wish to see if we can, that we remove from the arsenal of instruments used to prosecute nations' policies the utilization of force. But there are infinitely numerous other devices through

which this country expresses its interest and concern for the freedom and liberty of small peoples. And I assume that you and I are in agreement that we would wish to have the state of the world such that the independence and sovereignty of small countries was safe. I assume that in any particular situation you would wish to examine, as I would wish to examine, the precise kind of instrument most suitable to prosecute that purpose. Certainly it would involve a whole variety of diplomatic devices available to us. And I assume myself that it would be greatly to our interest if we could enhance the power and the position and the ability and the capacity of the United Nations to deal with these situations as they arise, in a collective way, and over a period of decades or generations to enhance and support and construct the prestige and power of that institution that it would find it possible on nearly all if not every occasion, by the mere exercise of its prerogatives and power, to subdue and suppress every overt intrusion upon the rights of another nation before it had even broken out into overt and hostile acts.

It seems to me that that is the task upon which we are embarked. It has not been possible to bring the United Nations forward to this ideal situation in a postwar period in which we have essentially been trying to tidy up the remnants of that cataclysmic struggle. So that we have not yet reached a position in which this country or any other of the great powers is prepared totally to dispense with the exercise of military power and commit itself not to employ it anywhere at any time and any place for any purpose. But it certainly is our object: it certainly is the spirit of the U.N. Charter, that ultimately all resorts to force and all wasteful expenditures of human resource in the prosecution of international contests by military means may ultimately be dispensed with, and the problems of the world gathered within that great forum where they may be resolved without resort to arms.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course on your description of the U.N. role, I agree with you. But in this case we have not submitted the Vietnam matter to the U.N.—that is, to the point of forcing a vote. As a matter of fact, even in the initial stages, we did not submit it to the U.N. We have undertaken to handle it ourselves. I agree with what you said about the U.N.'s role, and I regret that we did not find a way to have the United Nations deal with this matter. That is past history, and we have not done it.

It is our own intervention. And when we intervene unilaterally, it certainly doesn't promote the United Nations.

Maybe we ought to talk about the United Nations a little.

NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Have you ever had anything to do with international organizations? Have you ever worked with the United Nations at all?

Mr. WIGGINS. No, sir; I have not had any official connection with the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever had anything to do with the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, any of those specialized agencies?

Mr. WIGGINS. Nothing except as a journalist, Senator. As a matter of policy, I have not ever accepted any appointments on any governmental or quasi-governmental institution or agency, because I regarded it as my duty to maintain my impartiality and objectivity.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the United Nations really can play an important part in the U.S. foreign policy?

Let me give you an illustration, maybe, to point it up.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON VIETNAM

Do you think that the General Assembly debate on the proposed resolution on Vietnam would be a good thing?

Mr. WIGGINS. As I have had the situation described to me, there seems to be little likelihood that this will take place. I believe the Secretary General himself in a recent statement, indicated he thought little likelihood such a resolution would come before the Assembly, be on the agenda.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood the only reason it would not is because of our opposition.

Do you feel we should not favor a General Assembly debate on Vietnam?

Mr. WIGGINS. I believe that is not quite correct, Senator—I am sorry. I don't think it is just because of our view. I believe there is some indication that an overwhelming number of the members of the General Assembly are doubtful that a fruitful purpose would be served by a General Assembly debate on Vietnam at this time. I have no absolute information on the subject. But that is the information that I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Regardless of what the other people think—I don't know what they think either—would you favor a debate? Do you think it would be healthy for us, and perhaps give some new way of approaching it that would make the talks in Paris useful?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I am not in the position of a personal view on this at this juncture. I have not familiarized myself with the views of the Government of the United States for which I am going to have to speak.

If you will forgive me, I do not believe I can express a valid opinion on that at this point.

SECURITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION ON VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that Vietnam ought to be turned over to the Security Council, and that the United States should promise to accept the recommendations of the Security Council?

This has been discussed. This is not a new issue. Members of this committee have talked about it. I just wondered about your views on it.

Mr. WIGGINS. I believe there have been five different occasions on which an effort to get the Security Council to seize itself of this issue have been made unsuccessfully.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that we have ever made any commitment that we would accept a recommendation of the Security Council, have we? I do not think we have.

Mr. WIGGINS. No, not that. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think you would favor that? I wondered how you felt about that? Obviously, we are not getting anywhere.

Is there any new idea that you have with regard to the United Nations trying to get this move for a peace off dead center? We have to do something. The Security Council is there. Do you have any ideas on how it might be used?

One proposal is not new. I am not bringing it up now. I think specifically Senator Morse and others have said that we ought to get the Security Council members to do everything they can, even to the point of promising not to use a veto in order to have a full, free discussion about the resolution of this conflict.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, as I said earlier, I simply do not have any solution for Vietnam—for a way in which the United Nations might be employed to terminate it, or for any alteration in the situation in Paris, or for a different deployment of our troops. I have no present solution of my own for the crisis in Vietnam.

STRENGTHENING THE U.N. CHARTER

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any ideas about how to strengthen the charter of the U.N., or do you believe it should be?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think there are enormous challenging and interesting problems involved with the structure of the U.N. I suspect they are not reducible to an instant and ideal solution—that time and the occasion when it may be accomplished may have to wait a resolution of many of the great problems of the world with the instant machinery, whatever imperfections it may have. I believe this matter is under continuous study at the U.N., and no doubt, as with all human institutions, the time will come and the occasion will arise when it can be further improved.

U.N. SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with some of the specialized agencies of the U.N., and how do you feel about them?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think, Senator, that in a way, in their more quiet and undramatic and unexciting way, the work that these specialized agencies are doing to further the economic predicament of many nations, particularly the underdeveloped countries, the enormous efforts that are being made to improve the lot of deprived citizens throughout the world, the attack that the U.N. has mounted through its manifold independent agencies on the problems of disease, hunger and discrimination, in the long view of history may turn out to be of more importance than the exciting and dramatic debates that have taken place on the floor of the Assembly and in the Security Council.

When these agencies commenced their work, they faced a great disparity of income and general level of culture and prosperity between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. They attacked world problems at a time when more than half the peoples of the world were illiterate, and probably 60 percent of them functionally illiterate, and only half the children of school age in the world attending school, when the production of food in many quarters of the world was not keeping pace with the increase in population.

We will perhaps never know to what degree they have arrested the slide of many sections of the world into outright famine and despair, and probably not for a generation or more fully appreciate the progress that these independent agencies, some of whom existed prior to the creation of the United Nations, have been constantly laboring in a quiet and unobtrusive way on the stubborn and intractable problems that have confronted mankind since he first emerged into the light of history.

ECONOMIC AID CHanneled THROUGH U.N. AGENCIES

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that economic aid should be channeled through the United Nations agencies, rather than given bilaterally by specific countries?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I am familiar with your own interest in the multilateral administration of economic aid. I think that if and when the day arrives when the larger part of American funds are distributed abroad through agencies of the United Nations, a great deal of the credit for that innovation and alteration of national policy will be owing to your farsighted belief—and this is the logical direction in which this country ought to move.

I am aware of the advocacy of multilateral aid as distinguished from unilateral aid in terms of its impact upon the client relationships that have plagued even the most generous disposition of funds in many countries. I feel that the progress that the United Nations has made in the agencies that have been handling aid in a multilateral way indicates that we ought to give this method our closest study, and that we ought to seriously analyze the manner in which it can be further employed to correct the unbalances that are a menace, probably, to the tranquility of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I take it that you would favor channeling economic aid through United Nations agencies?

Mr. WIGGINS. I favor what has been done in the handling of economic aid multilaterally through the United Nations agencies, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Since our own bilateral aid has been cut very severely by the Congress, would you favor, say, in the next Congress trying to increase the efforts of the UN in this area, in view of the cutting of our own programs?

Mr. WIGGINS. I trust that our own aid will not—to the U.N. agencies will not be diminished, for I think that endeavor ought to be increased. Yes, I believe it ought to be increased.

The CHAIRMAN. I will reserve the rest of my questions.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Mundt?

Senator MUNDT. I arrived here a little late. If I ask questions which you have already answered, please tell me, and I will find them in the record.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING MACHINERY NEEDED

This is a very important assignment which you are undertaking, and in my opinion one of the greater forums in which the United States must put its best foot forward, and do its optimum job of trying to win cooperation for the point of view we believe to be sound.

We do not have any peacekeeping machinery at the U.N. It is primarily a debating society now. And we should win some debates up there.

I have felt for a long time it would be most helpful if the U.N. did have some kind of peacekeeping machinery. At different times I have associated myself with legislative measures, dating back as far as when Ely Culbertson left the realm of bridge long enough to get into the realm of foreign policy. He and I worked on a proposal of his, which I thought had some merit, to comprise a United Nations international peacekeeping machinery in which the armed forces would be recruited primarily from the smaller countries, so there would not be the difficulty with the big power, where exercise of its authority in the

Security Council could certainly see that its interests were safeguarded. But it seems so frequently, when disturbances break out in different areas of the world, that Uncle Sam has to go it alone—even though it is a United Nations mission, as we found out in Korea.

Would you think it at all within the realm of possibility that perhaps the U.N. could become more than a debating society by the establishment of some kind of international peace-keeping machinery, to which each country would contribute its share in terms of finances, and, so that we could avoid skepticism and suspicion, the troops of which would be recruited from other than the four major powers?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I am aware of your long interest in the United Nations, and international affairs, and in the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations especially, and I hope that if I am confirmed for this position, I may look forward to the opportunity for frequent consultation with you about the interesting suggestion which you have just made here this morning.

I would like to pause for a moment to say that I trust you did not mean to use the term "a debating society" in derogation.

Senator MUNDT. No. I am an old college debate coach, and I believe definitely in the efficacy of debate.

Mr. WIGGINS. Thank you. I just wanted to have the record clear that the existence of the Assembly and the Security Council as a place of debate and as a means of mobilizing the opinion of mankind, is a contribution of enormous significance and importance.

Senator MUNDT. I accept that, and I believe that. But it seems to me that that is a pretty weak reed to lean upon to meet the kind of contingencies that seem to be occurring everywhere.

Mr. WIGGINS. I shall be happy to explore this with you, and I hope to have an early opportunity to do so.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will the Senator yield at this point?

Senator MUNDT. Surely.

Senator SPARKMAN. With reference to the peace-keeping force, I call your attention to the fact that the Senate is on record by a unanimous vote in favor of it. Both Houses of Congress are on record by concurrent resolution.

Senator MUNDT. They have been in different ways, and by different kinds of resolutions, for a long period of time. I know of your interest in that. It is difficult for me to see why an international assembly of nations of good will toward each other, and toward the goal of permanent peace, should not make at least some faltering steps in that direction.

And even though there is a great and comparatively growing misunderstanding, a cleavage between the so-called Communist world and the rest of the world, which we optimistically call the free world, it seems to me, that there are a great many problems into which such a force could move.

SECURITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE

It would appear somewhat at least, for example, as though both the part of the world controlled by the Soviets and the Communist bloc and the part of the world with which we associate ourselves, have some kind of common desire not to have a war break out in the Mideast. At least there has been self-restraint displayed on both sides, it would appear. And it would seem to me we should have had

some kind of international peacekeeping machinery. As a matter of fact, for a while the U.N. did patrol between Israel and Jordan, and the Arab countries. I passed through this military patrol several times. The blue and white flag of the military forces gives you a feeling of security and stability. And it did work for a while, even though it was just an ad hoc operation to meet a particular problem. Had we had this kind of thing, indeed, it seems to me, the whole world could sleep a little better nights, along with Jack Valenti these days, if the force were standing between people who misunderstand each other, and do not like each other.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I agree with you, the possibility of perfecting and improving the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations is a project that must engage the attention of every sober and thoughtful citizen.

Senator MUNDT. I only just express the hope that as our U.N. Ambassador and with the other responsibilities associated with that, that you would dedicate your career to trying to accomplish something. I think maybe you could make a constructive contribution—by keeping better contact, for example, with this committee, and our sister committee in the House, where the Congress has repeatedly expressed itself, as Senator Sparkman has said, in this direction—pushing and pressing and propagandizing and persuading as best you can your associates at the U.N. that this idea of hastily trying to apply a patch to a turbulent problem place in the world is not really a very safe way in which to protect the world against war—and it all too frequently gets to be an all-out American job.

Certainly it would be more effective in the first place and less subject to criticism if it were a multilateral job. It would be there available for those kinds of patrol jobs.

NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT

Is this your first assignment in the field of national responsibility?

Mr. WIGGINS. It is, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Rather than sitting behind the mahogany desk, telling us what we should be doing, you will be in a position for the first time to do it yourself?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. How long have you had to prepare for this assignment? When did you first hear you were going to be the new U.N. Ambassador?

Mr. WIGGINS. The President called me on Wednesday evening at 5 o'clock and said the situation had arisen in which he thought that I could be of service to my country, and I asked him to have the evening to make some personal arrangements; I called him at 8 o'clock Thursday morning, and I was here at 7 o'clock Thursday night.

Senator MUNDT. I commend you on making a quick decision. You made a quick decision to get in, even faster than Mr. Ball made a decision to get out. I hope when you made the decision, it was to stay in as long as the tides of political warfare permit, because it is an important job. I do not think you should play hanky-panky in domestic politics with a job as important as this one. I hate to see it

booted around, and moved in and out from the field of partisan politics to diplomacy, and back again, at a time when the world really needs dedicated and competent and nonpartisan, as far as our country is concerned, leadership at the U.N. I know that you will provide that kind.

When did you get your notification of your meeting this morning?

Mr. WIGGINS. Saturday, I believe.

Senator MUNDT. What do they do with someone like you, who comes in with a rich background of experience as an observer, convincer, and adviser to Senators and Congressmen, and suddenly say, "Look, old chap, you are it. You are going to have to sit up there in the spotlight, and be televised around the globe while debating some of the most ardent advocates of philosophies with which we disagree."

And you say, "Let me think it over all night." And you say "Yes."

What do they do then? Do they have some kind of tough briefing course, or some kind of training course? Do they give you a kind of counselor for a while until you get your feet on the ground?

I would just like to know how we get prepared for that, how ready you are to meet whatever emergencies may arise.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, as I understand it, as soon as this committee has acted, I will commence an arduous period of briefing. Of course one cannot assume that even the most arduous period of briefing would equip you for so complicated and difficult a task.

The Ambassador to the United Nations has the backing and support of the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of these relations, and the constant help and guidance of an enormously effective professional staff of the U.S. mission in New York, a staff of some 130 people, headed by some of our ablest and most experienced diplomats.

This organization is not, as you well know, an area in which any individual is a free agent or a free spirit. It speaks for the Government and with the continuous consultation and advice of professionals who have devoted their lives to this field.

I hope I will undertake this briefing with thoroughness and attention. I will maintain, as I assure you that I will, the closest connection with and consultation with those who have so long had in hand our interests in the United Nations.

Senator MUNDT. Who stands guard at the American portals while you are being briefed? I think I read in the newspaper that Secretary Rusk is going to pinch-hit in this emergency until you are ready to go; is that right?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir; Secretary Rusk is in New York today and within a day or two presumably will make a speech at the General Assembly—a speech which the Ambassador would make.

Senator MUNDT. I am glad to have your expression that you have given us today. I wish you well. I look forward as one who has received great columns of advice that you have rendered for a long time to be in position now where on occasion I can advise you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Wiggins, may I just interpolate at this point—in naming those that will be working with you to advise and help, I hope you will remember the very able colleagues that you have as delegates to the United Nations, two of whom are from this committee.

Senator Dodd?

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for being late, Mr. Wiggins. I was detained.

I, like Senator Mundt, do not intend to cover any material you have already been queried about. If I do so, just tell me.

REASON FOR U.S. INTERVENTION

I was greatly interested in your response to Senator Fulbright's question with respect to Ho Chi Minh. I believe he asked would you have been in favor of our intervention, if Ho Chi Minh were not a Communist, and I understood you to say you thought you would be. Is that correct?

Mr. WIGGINS. Would have been.

Senator DODD. Would have been.

Well, would be, if another situation arose, I take it.

How do you reason this out? Is it correct for me to understand that you feel that we should, with others, resist aggression whenever and wherever we can? That was your response, I believe.

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. I think that is a good answer.

You are aware, I am sure, from your long experience as a newspaperman, that there have been interventions where it certainly was not clear that the Communists were at work.

U.N. ACTION WITH RESPECT TO RHODESIA

For example, how do you feel about the U.N. action with respect to Rhodesia? Would that be something that you would say you thought the U.N. ought to do, if a situation like it arose again?

Mr. WIGGINS. I believe the United Nations in May last adopted more complete and stringent sanctions against Rhodesia, and I think that that action had the support of this Government, and represents its present policy.

Senator DODD. The U.N. should take action in cases like that?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. Well, I do not hold any brief for Rhodesia. But I think you would agree there certainly was not any allegation of Communist activity in Rhodesia.

Mr. WIGGINS. I believe the interest of the United Nations in Rhodesia sprang out of the anxiety that the course of that Government was such that the affronts that it gave to other nations in the vicinity made the policies, course of action upon which that Government had set forth, a threat to the peace of the world. And I believe it was that impulse that led to the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations, and not any position with reference to any ideology of certain world powers.

Senator DODD. Do I understand you to say that you think the internal difficulties of Rhodesia were a threat to the peace of the world?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think that the impulse of the United Nations arose out of the anxiety that the course upon which Rhodesia had embarked was of an inflammatory nature in the immediate vicinity, and as such constituted a threat to the peace of that part of the world.

Senator DODD. That was because the vast majority of the people were subject to the will of a small minority.

Mr. WIGGINS. I think you state it well.

Senator DODD. That certainly is happening in other places in the world.

Do you think the United Nations should intervene in all those situations? How do you make a decision?

Mr. WIGGINS. I revert to the answer which I gave to Senator Case earlier and to Senator Fulbright, that in each situation a great nation is compelled to examine all of the situation in toto—the threat that is involved, the seriousness of the threat, the forces that are at its disposition to counter and minimize the threat, and the general wisdom springs from a consideration of perhaps hundreds of factors.

SHOULD UNITED NATIONS ACT IN BIAFRA?

Senator DODD. I do not find any fault in your answer. I am merely trying to find out what you think about these things.

How do you feel about Biafra right now?

Mr. WIGGINS. The Biafra situation, Senator, is one that is anguishing—

Senator DODD. Let me be more specific. Do you think the U.N. should do anything there?

Mr. WIGGINS. The Organization of African Unity has let it be known explicitly to the United Nations that under the regional approach of the United Nations Charter, it regards this matter as an area within the competence of the OAU, and the United Nations under the circumstances pretty effectively is stopped from indeed intervening internally in the Nigerian situation, except through its humanitarian agencies, and they are doing what they can to minimize a frightful loss of life under heroic endeavors of UNICEF and other agencies, World Health Organization, International Red Cross.

Senator DODD. Are you aware, or do you understand that the Soviet Union is supplying arms to Nigeria in the Biafra situation?

Mr. WIGGINS. I have no information on that subject, Senator.

Senator DODD. You have never heard of that before?

Mr. WIGGINS. I have no information on that.

Senator DODD. I did not ask if you had any information. Have you heard it?

Mr. WIGGINS. I am not informed about it at all.

Senator DODD. Let's assume that you were informed, and you find it to be a fact. What would your attitude then be toward U.N. intervention, even in the face of the Organization of African Unity having said "No"?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think, sir, that would have to be examined with the greatest care, and I cannot give a hypothetical answer.

Senator DODD. I think that is a problem for a lot of people. It seems to me we don't have any very set policy about these things. I know we can't do everything everywhere, and I don't recommend that we do. But it seems to me there ought to be some policy with respect to these situations.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR EDITORIAL POLICY

I know you have been a newspaperman. I have read about it here in your biographic sketch. I know you are the editor of the Washington Post. There have been a lot of editorials in the Post about foreign affairs. I have not read them all. I have read some.

Do you personally approve of all of them or not? I don't know how this thing works.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, the editor of a newspaper is responsible for the editorials on its editorial page.

Senator DODD. I know that as a general principle.

Mr. WIGGINS. I am responsible for the editorials that are published in the Washington Post.

Senator DODD. Nothing goes on that page that you don't approve of?

Mr. WIGGINS. Well, the page is an institutional approach.

Senator DODD. I know that.

Mr. WIGGINS. And it is the product of a group of scholars—in a climate more like that of an academic institution than a business institution or a government. And the principles that are expressed are not always precisely in the language of an individual, and the point of view may not be precisely that of any individual on an editorial board or staff, but the principles of the Washington Post are those behind which I stand.

Senator DODD. In general there is agreement.

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. I ask it because as you have said—you have had no experience in this area in which you are now entering. And I suppose some people would like to look at the editorials as one way to know what your attitude is or might be.

Mr. WIGGINS. That is a very logical inquiry, Senator.

Senator DODD. That is why I asked the question. I want to be sure I am right generally—not in every specific detail—but generally the editorials published would be those you approve of.

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

PUBLICIZING U.N. MISSION REPORT FINDINGS

Senator DODD. You remember when the Buddhist activity in South Vietnam was quite an issue around the world.

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. Do you know that the U.N. sent a mission, or authorized a mission to investigate this situation and make a report on it?

Mr. WIGGINS. I know nothing of the details of the mission.

Senator DODD. Did you ever hear of that?

Mr. WIGGINS. I heard of it, but I know nothing about the details. You would have to refresh my memory, Senator.

Senator DODD. Well, I think my recollection is that—there was such a mission, or commission—however one describes it. And it did make an investigation. And it made some findings. So far as I know, they were never made public.

I talked to the chairman of that mission, and I don't know why the findings were not made public. But since you are going to be at the U.N., what would your general attitude be toward a similar situation: If the U.N. sent a mission to investigate an important situation, would you be of the opinion that that report ought to be made public, generally speaking?

I know there could be specific reasons in specific cases for not doing so. But I am talking generally. I know you cannot talk about all the specific cases. I think your approach, by the way, about this is right—you said they are not all alike. I am well aware of that. But I was trying to make clear what is in my mind.

You are going to be representing us at that organization. We can't do anything about the Buddhist situation now. But, if what I am told is true, and I am satisfied that it is, great lies were told to the world and to the American people about that Buddhist activity. And yet this was never made public so far as I know.

That would not be anything you would condone, would it? Don't you think in the absence of some very compelling specific reason, U.N. committee reports or findings should be made public?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I think one of the most useful functions the United Nations performs is to shed light upon situations where its missions are officially committed, and where reports are made. I have no knowledge of the incident of which you speak.

APPLICATION OF BETTER PRINCIPLES

Senator DODD. I understand that. I am not challenging that.

I like your answers to the questions I have asked you. I am not trying to find any fault. I am trying to find out how you generally feel. The U.N. is a great problem. My own judgment is it does have to have better standards, better principles, better policies, which can generally be applied. That is the reason why I brought up Rhodesia. I don't like the policy of the Government of Rhodesia. I don't want to be understood as defending it because I asked a question about it. Quite the contrary. But there is a basic question involved. We don't like the Government of Rhodesia, so we do something. We do like the Government of "X" country, so we do nothing.

Is that the way to handle and prosecute the affairs of a great organization like the United Nations? Couldn't there be some more basic principle or policy involved?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I explained to you my own impression of the impulses behind that United Nations intervention.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Senator DODD. Senator Mundt, as I understood his question, suggested that perhaps we could recruit armed forces for a United Nations peacekeeping force. And if I heard you right, you agreed with that.

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. Would you give control over such an organization entirely to the UN? Would there be any considerations in your mind about the size of it, where the troops were recruited from in the world, where they would be deployed, who would be in command, who would decide when to use them, and when not to use them?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, my answer to Senator Mundt is this problem is one that has engaged the attention of the Senate, and engaged the attention of every serious student of the United Nations—the method and the means by which the efficiency and effectiveness of a permanent peacekeeping device could be developed at the United Nations. I believe that problem is one of infinite complexity, and one which every student of the United Nations recognizes as of the greatest importance, the most seriousness.

Senator DODD. I certainly would say that is right. But I think what bothers a lot of people is when, how, where do you go about this. I believe in the principle. But right now if Mr. U Thant had the power to make that decision, I don't think it would be very good for us or for a lot of other people, either.

I don't think it is fair to ask you to make an answer. I know you have not had much time to prepare for this hearing. And I don't say that I have any answer. But it is this type of thing that you are going to be concerned with.

Senator MUNDT. Will the Senator yield?

Senator DODD. Yes.

DECISION TO COMMIT A PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Senator MUNDT. I want to make this clear. I support the concept of a peacekeeping mechanism. But I would not remotely consider making Mr. U Thant or any other Secretary General the commander in chief whereby his own decision could send them. I stated in my colloquy with Mr. Wiggins that I envisioned a recruitment primarily from countries smaller than the big four, or if you please, I would not object to having them recruited exclusively from among the nations which are not on the Security Council. But I would have a committee, certainly, on which we would have representation along with the other major powers of the world, that would have to unanimously agree where they sent them and when they sent them. It would not be left to any one man.

Senator DODD. I am not finding any fault with it. I am trying to get at something. I think that you are right about it. I just don't know how it would work out at this time. I think the day may come when it will work out all right.

I take it Mr. Wiggins is of the same opinion. He wants to see it happen. I thought I heard him say it may take some time to bring about; I think so, too.

U.N. FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I guess the best we can hope to do is the best we can do right now. But it is something to worry about. I want to conclude, if I may, quickly, Mr. Chairman—I don't want to monopolize the time—I was interested in Senator Mundt's question about the U.N. and the Mideast, and particularly on Israel. The U.N. pulled out of its positions on the Israeli frontiers. Do you think that precipitated the war there? Do you think if it had remained, there would not have been an outbreak of war?

Mr. WIGGINS. A very difficult and troublesome question to answer—given the disposition of forces, and the long and historic inability of the Israeli and the Arab neighbors to reach a permanent settlement.

Senator DODD. Well, I understand your answer. But it is a fact that as long as the U.N. was there, the war did not break out.

Mr. WIGGINS. We owe to that force a decade of relative tranquility in the Middle East. And, it is one of the major contributions of the United Nations.

Senator DODD. I thought it had something to do with preserving a kind of peace there. And I thought it was a great tragedy that it pulled out. This allowed Nasser and those supporting him to provoke a war with that little country.

Now, it seems to me here is a place that the U.N. should remain and work every day to prevent the outbreak of war. Don't you think so?

Mr. WIGGINS. I agree, sir. The conditions under which the U.N. forces were stationed at Sharm El Sheik were somewhat complicated, and involved an intricate—presented the Secretary General with a very difficult choice of action.

Senator DODD. Maybe I should just say something. I don't want to plague you with questions. I know you are under a handicap here. I don't think it is easy for a man to come from the life you have very successfully led, and appear here on Monday morning, and have us throw questions at him from all corners of the world. I am not trying to do that.

But I am anxious that the record be as clear as we can make it, in your interests and ours and that of the United States.

Senator Fulbright asked you this question. He said the United States has suffered great losses in Vietnam, lives, blood, money, just about everything one could think of, including prestige, and as I understood the Senator, he asked, what do we win, and what do we lose? I didn't hear you make any specific response. But for the record, I suggest that we lose a good measure of freedom for the people. And if we win, I think we will cut another notch to establish that aggression just isn't going to pay off in this world no matter from what quarter it comes, and I think you said from either the left or the right. I could not agree more. That is what it seems to me we have to win or lose. I don't like it any better than anyone else. I understand Senator Fulbright's attitude. I am not critical of him. But I thought the record ought to be clear.

I think you have been a good witness here under all the circumstances. I thank you for giving me a chance to clear up some things in my own mind.

Mr. WIGGINS. Thank you, Senator.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN EDITOR

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one followup question?

I was interested in your delineation of the functions of an editor, because you were very frank, and quite embracing in what you said. As I understood it, an editor is responsible for everything that appears on the editorial page. While you might not couch it in exactly the same language, the thrust and the significance of all editorials come under the purview of the editor in chief. Does that responsibility also embrace the editorials?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. Excuse me for interrupting. That was the intent of my question. I wasn't talking about anything else. I certainly wasn't talking about cartoons.

Senator MUNDT. Well, let me ask, does it embrace the cartoons?
Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. I didn't mean the political cartoons. I meant the funnypapers.

Senator MUNDT. I meant the political cartoons.

I suppose we ought to have it in the record. I feel confident that when you accept this position, you divorce yourself entirely from any editorial responsibilities, do you?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir, at once.

Senator MUNDT. Are you a substantial stockholder in the Post?

Mr. WIGGINS. I have divested myself of my stock interest in the Washington Post.

Senator MUNDT. So that you are a completely free agent in that regard.

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

CONFLICT BETWEEN U.N. POSITION AND PAST EDITORIAL POLICY

Senator MUNDT. Would you feel bound in any way if, as well may develop, there comes a time when the policy of the United States on a certain issue before the U.N. is diametrically opposed to the Wiggins espoused policies appearing in editorial pages while you were in charge? Would that in any way be embarrassing, or would you feel perfectly free to argue as ardently for a position which you have previously opposed as though you had originated that position itself?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, it would be a situation that would give me infinite pain, and considerable embarrassment, but I trust I could survive it.

Senator MUNDT. My experience has been that while I find the editorials in the Washington Post on domestic problems generally wrong, I have found them generally right on foreign policy. So I don't believe you are going to run into that situation too frequently. But I thought we ought to have that on the record. Somebody is going to cite an editorial someday and say, "This is what Mr. Wiggins believed, and can you be sure he is going to do what Mr. Rusk or the President wants him to do, or is he going to be stuck with what Mr. Wiggins thought was correct 6 or 9 months ago." So even though the pain is excruciating, you are going to do your level best?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I am glad you placed it on the record. It should be made clear I have no further responsibilities for the editorial or news policies of the Washington Post. And it would be improper for me to retain any authority or influence.

Senator MUNDT. I thought that should be in the record. I think maybe we failed to ask George Ball some questions we should have asked him, in view of what has transpired. But as we live, we learn. And I wanted this record complete. I accept your assurance fully.

Senator DODD. Will the Senator yield? Did I understand the Senator to say—it would pertain to what I was trying to find out—that he agrees with all the editorials on foreign policy?

Senator MUNDT. No. I said I was generally disenchanted with the Washington Post editorials on domestic policy, but I felt that on foreign policy, they usually followed the lines which have been followed by our Government, and which in the main I have supported.

READING OF THE EDITORIALS

Senator DODD. I suppose that would be true of our domestic affairs, too. I think the only way I can make up my mind in this case is to read the editorials. I obviously cannot read all of them. But I can read some of them—a good cross section of them. Mr. Wiggins has said very frankly he is not familiar with this problem, the problem of international affairs. He hasn't served in any official capacity. How does one know, then, what he thinks, how he will react, how he would handle his job up there, except by reading the editorials which he tells us generally have met with his approval.

So I think it is incumbent on us to look at them. If he were a businessman or lawyer, a Government official, we would look at the past record. That is the only way I know. And I intend to do that. I hope we have time to do it.

Senator MUNDT. I think what the Senator has said is correct. I was trying to find out from Mr. Wiggins whether he interprets his position, as I have always interpreted the position of our Ambassador to the U.N. to be that is he is not there to give himself a global audience for positions which he individually believes to be correct, but that his job is to represent the policies of the United States as they are hammered out in the constitutional processes. And since he might, unlike the average Ambassador, be on record in print on some point of view which he would, because of the transition of time, or error in judgment, or difference of opinion, call it what you will, be required, if he interprets his office as I interpret his office, and I think as he interprets his office—whether he would feel any inhibitions whatsoever in being gung ho in favor of an American policy which in some previous editorial he may have condemned out of hand.

I think his answer was that it would be painful, but he interprets that to be the requirement of the job, and he would give it the same kind of talent and dedicated effort as though he had originated the idea himself.

Now, have I summarized, Mr. Wiggins, the situation correctly?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. I would like to make another comment. I agree with both the form of the question, and Mr. Wiggins' answer as I understood it. I wonder if it could not be also agreed that past record, reflecting the attitude of an individual, is important, it certainly goes to whether or not he would enthusiastically undertake some things and not others. And I don't think it suffices to say, any more than it would of any other American, that he would become an automaton, after years as a journalist expressing his opinion.

Senator MUNDT. I think your reasoning is good, and it is certainly proper. When I said gung ho, I meant enthusiastically. I meant all out. I meant completely in support of the position.

Senator SPARKMAN. Anything further?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Fulbright.

RELATED ENTERPRISES OF THE WASHINGTON POST

The CHAIRMAN. Following that, I think the record should show—I don't think it was developed—that you were managing editor of the Post a number of years? When did you become managing editor of the Post?

Mr. WIGGINS. 21 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are presently, up until at least last week, editor and executive vice president of the Washington Post-Times Herald, is that correct?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any responsibilities with relation to Newsweek?

Mr. WIGGINS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You never have been on their board?

Mr. WIGGINS. Except as the Washington Post Co. owns Newsweek.

The CHAIRMAN. The Washington Post Co.

Mr. WIGGINS. And I was a member of the board of Washington Post Co., and as such shared responsibility for the conduct of all the affairs of the enterprise.

The CHAIRMAN. So in effect, Newsweek is a subsidiary of the Washington Post Co., is that correct?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is WTOP also a part?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Jacksonville TV station also a part?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other TV stations?

Mr. WIGGINS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the extent of the publishing empire?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. Or radio.

Mr. WIGGINS. And an interest in the Paris Herald Tribune.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a part interest in the Paris Herald?

Mr. WIGGINS. The Washington Post Co. has.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. This prompts a question that I thought ought to be on the record.

You started out with your idea about the United States. Do you believe in the principle of the separation of powers which is provided in our Constitution?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe in the first amendment with regard to the freedom of the press?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you the first officer of the Washington Post that has been appointed to a diplomatic post?

Mr. WIGGINS. No. John Hayes was a director of WTOP and the Jacksonville station.

The CHAIRMAN. What was he appointed to and when?

Mr. WIGGINS. Ambassador to Switzerland.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he presently Ambassador to Switzerland?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether anyone from the New York Times has been appointed to represent the United States at the United Nations in recent years?

Mr. WIGGINS. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Mr. WIGGINS. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you recall that Mr. Bancroft who was, I think, executive vice president of the New York Times, was appointed as a delegate to the United Nations in 1966? Do you know Mr. Bancroft?

Mr. WIGGINS. I know Mr. Bancroft was a delegate.

The CHAIRMAN. I was wondering whether you thought this was a very healthy development for the press, which insists on the freedom to criticize, to be recruited for executive positions by the President. Do you think that is inconsistent with the division of power, and the freedom of the press?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I would not like to think that the newspaper profession—engagement in the newspaper profession proscribed any other public activity. The country would have suffered a great loss if, because your family was engaged in the newspaper business you had been deprived of public service.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not happen to be associated with a newspaper at the present time, and never have had an active position in any newspaper. The press insists upon its independence. I wonder if the Government should not insist upon its independence.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I think that is an interesting question.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is, too. I had not thought of it until Senator Mundt began to bring this up.

RECRUITMENT OF NEWS OFFICIALS BY GOVERNMENT

There is supposed to be an independence of views. Do you think newspapers will continue to be objective and critical if their leading officials are recruited by the executive branch of the Government?

We criticize other countries. We have just been very critical, I believe your paper has, of the imposition of censorship by governments on newspapers. I think your paper has; has it not?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not rather odd that the leading officials in our newspapers are recruited for executive positions?

Do you think the Washington Post is going to be very critical of you if you should make a mistake? I do not think you will. Do you think the Washington Post will be entirely objective in their observations about the United Nations?

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, it would really shake my confidence in the young men who are now operating the Washington Post if they were inhibited to the least degree in any criticism of me upon any occasion whatsoever that they felt that I had made an error or committed a wrong in public office.

I am quite confident that you need have no anxiety that the sharp edge of the editorial page of the Washington Post will be tempered to this particular lamb.

The CHAIRMAN. I admire your confidence in human nature. I think that is the hope of the world—if all of us are completely independent in our views—and especially of our past associations. I have not quite found that to be true in the Senate. But we do not possess that high caliber of independence and objectivity.

Does the Washington Post have on its staff now any former important official employee of the President of the United States?

Mr. WIGGINS. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. Siegel an officer of the Washington Post?

Mr. WIGGINS. Siegel was an employee of the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. He was not associated with the President?

Mr. WIGGINS. An association which I did not find fatal to his abilities.

The CHAIRMAN. He is a very brilliant man. I am just inquiring about him. He was one of the ablest men we have seen over here. I thought he was associated with the President. I wasn't clear about that.

SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE

But it is an interesting aspect of our great democracy, the press with its independence of power. We have a case pending before the Senate now, do we not, in which the question is whether or not the Senate is free to pass judgment upon a certain appointment, free of any coercion. The question has been raised whether or not the Senate is preserving its prerogative in the face of the executive imposition.

Is that not a question that is an issue before the Senate now? Is it not?

Mr. WIGGINS. If you say so, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no.

Mr. WIGGINS. I was not aware that was the principal issue.

Senator MUNDT. I do not think he is alluding to your case.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; I am not referring to his case. I just assumed, as editor of the Post, you were aware of what was going on in the Senate.

Mr. WIGGINS. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I assumed you were. But it is an interesting case—I think it is unprecedented in our history—in which we are confronted with a decision such as is before the Senate today—a contingency resignation, contingent upon the Senate doing the will of the President. If we do not do it, then the resignation does not take place.

I think my colleague on the right has brought this question up—that is, his party has, I do not know whether he personally has or not. But I have not had the advantage of reading the Post in a few weeks. I have had to rely upon our provincial papers in Arkansas. I may be out of touch with what is going on.

But I thought there was a case pending before the Senate and that there is such an issue involved, as to whether or not the Senate can preserve its independence. I am interested in newspapers being independent of the government. I always thought this was a very important part of a democracy.

I would hate to see the executive able to recruit all of our best journalists. We need good journalists who take an independent view, and they should not always look forward, if they behave properly, to fine appointments to this or that position. I would not think this is quite consistent with our historical division of powers.

But that is a side issue.

Senator MUNDT. In that area, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one other question, if I may.

We have some experience lately with books popping up all over. I think maybe we should ask whether or not by any chance you have any book in the mill which is likely to be published during your tenure of office that would create embarrassment.

Mr. WIGGINS. Senator, I have no book in the works.

Senator MUNDT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if the book is favorable, USIA I am sure will print it for you. They have printed many of them.

PLANNED RETIREMENT FROM WASHINGTON POST

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman—you have retired, have you not, Mr. Wiggins? Are you not retired from the position with the Post?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but only as of Thursday. You were not a retired member of the profession. You were a very active member of the profession up until last Thursday; were you not?

Mr. WIGGINS. I had indicated my intention to retire on January 1, and had already made arrangements to retire.

The CHAIRMAN. From the Post?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I never heard of that.

Mr. WIGGINS. I had already retired. It was due to be effective on January 1.

The CHAIRMAN. That is news. Had it been in the Post?

Mr. WIGGINS. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. I read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I missed it.

Senator MUNDT. I saw that.

Senator SPARKMAN. So did I.

Senator DODD. I think it is a good beginning that we get bright people. I would not find any fault with that. I understand the area of concern Senator Fulbright has. But I think balancing things out, it is about as good a place as we could go—that is, to experienced journalists.

I believe the man has had background, and an opportunity to observe a lot of things, and he ought to be well qualified. It would not bother me that you had been the editor of the Post—although I may be too broadminded.

Senator SPARKMAN. Anything further?

Senator MUNDT. You do not view it from Republican eyes, which some of us must do.

Senator DODD. I do it with the eyes of an honest man.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Wiggins.

Mr. Dobriansky has asked permission to testify. Is Mr. Dobriansky here?

Mr. DOBRIANSKY. Right here, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Come around, please.

**STATEMENT OF DR. LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
CAPTIVE NATIONS COMMITTEE**

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Mr. Chairman, I am terribly sorry I do not have a prepared statement, but I did not hear about this hearing until Saturday afternoon. Consequently, I will have to deal from notes.

My name is Lev Dobriansky. I am a professor at Georgetown University, and also chairman of the Captive Nations Committee and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

OPPOSITION TO NOMINATION

I am here to testify in firm opposition to what I consider an ill-considered nomination of Mr. Wiggins as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.

Now, in setting forth the factual evidence justifying this opposition, and insofar as time will permit, my oral statement is actually based on certain assumptions which I believe draw a maximum agreement, and which may well serve as basic criteria of acceptance and approval for nominations to this highly important post in this top world forum. And these assumptions are:

One, the presence of a well-rounded person who has demonstrated in his most recent years a balance and fairness of outlook, an objectivity toward new and fresh ideas which may not conform with what exists—and a proven compassion for the needs and aspirations of all peoples, particularly those in the front yard of what I consider our chief enemy.

Two, in the present context, a sine qua non of the qualifications of any ambassador to the U.N., I believe, is a basic and satisfactory knowledge of the U.S.S.R., its origins, development, chief developments at this time, and conflicts.

Whether we wish to admit it or not, the chief, sole, and serious enemy to the security of the United States is the totalitarian Russian base in that ersatz union.

The old Army admonition—"Know your enemy"—I think applies here with even multiple intensity and consequences.

Three, now, especially in the wake of the Russian rape of Czechoslovakia, a prospective U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. should have demonstrated sober judgment in his assessment of overall developments in Eastern Europe—and as he has proven to be tragically wrong and even absurd, he should not have been considered for the nomination in the first place.

And my fourth assumption is, a nominee for this vital position, in addition to displaying fairness, honesty, and objectivity, even on what may be considered the most controversial issues, should possess a measure of courage, an inner confidence of his own views and convictions, and an ability to defend his views in the open, face to face with his opponent, even as he may have to transmit that and translate that in the leadership of America at the U.N.

At any time, no less the present time, we can ill afford a weakling representing the United States in the U.N., regardless of the motivation behind this twilight representation by a lameduck administration. There is too much at stake even for one day, let alone four months.

With these fundamental assumptions, these basic criteria for approval of a nomination—and I should be most happy to be told where I am wrong—then the present nomination under consideration is the very negation of these criteria.

The approval of this nomination would represent a further deterioration in our responsible foreign relations. Indeed—and I use these terms advisedly—it would even tend to make a joke of the institution, namely the U.S. Ambassadorship in the U.N.

It would seem that we were almost scraping the bottom of the barrel.

In light of these criteria, and for the honor of our responsible relations with other states and nations, particularly the Russian controllers of the U.S.S.R. delegation, I strongly recommend that this nomination be rejected.

Happily, in this case my relation with the nominee has at no point, in nearly 10 years of what you might call ideational conflict with the Washington Post, been personal. My evidence, I want to make this clear, is exclusively based on the written word and techniques of his authorship, and under his direction.

POST EDITORIAL POLICY SCORED

Far more than I can read here—that is unless, Mr. Chairman, you allow me to do it—the documented evidence is considerable. And I urge that it be carefully studied by this committee before a decision is reached.

We have another nomination which is now before the Senate that required a bit of investigation, and I think in this case this should also be carefully looked over and, as was suggested, by a reading of editorials.

As you gentlemen well know, it is no easy task to withstand the editorial harpoons of a powerful newspaper, which, as I shall show, has been abused and misused in the worst tradition of yellow journalism as a means to suppress and distort other points of view on basic foreign policy issues.

Fortunately, many Members of Congress, on both sides, value the fundamental assets of integrity and objectivity, the moral propensity to set forth and see all sides of an issue, and have documented both the Washington Post editorials, written and overlorded by the nominee, in the Congressional Record itself, and also the replies to these editorials.

So I think in one given area, and pertinent to my second assumption here on a matter of satisfactory knowledge, that this will serve as a source of study by this committee before it reaches a decision.

Senator DODD. Could I interrupt?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. I just wanted to get some idea of how long this material is.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I will refer to them in a moment, Senator.

Thus, my evidence giving and providing, unlike the nominee's newspaper organ, both sides of the issue for our citizens to assess fairly and intelligently, is adequately recorded in these congressional reprints, bearing on the most fundamental of all issues, our relations with the imperial, colonialist Moscow Government and its far-flung empire.

By red indicators I have extracted the necessary evidence, and request that it be incorporated as part of the hearing.

Now, let's examine in the short time that I have, the highlights of nominee's factual record—mind you, just a few substantiating items from the sources provided here, including one chapter from my own book on "The Vulnerable Russians"—as a matter of fact, two chapters are devoted to the issue that took place a few years ago.

Bearing on the first assumption, concerning intellectual integrity, objectivity, compassion for all peoples and the like, the nominee, in a very crucial case, manifested all the marks of malicious bias, narrow-mindedness, and cultural insularity.

EDITORIAL OBJECTIVITY QUESTIONED

The extensive case here is the erection of the Shevchenko statue in our Nation's capital. The crucial point is not the ramifications of this event, which he did not understand, nor did his paper, and which extended deep into the Kremlin and all parts of the Russian empire, including even North Vietnam, but the manner in which the nominee, wielding the power of a newspaper, handled it.

I am prepared to answer any questions pertaining to the ramifications of this event, including Moscow's response to erect a similar statue in the Red imperial capital, Khrushchev's hasty departure from Scandinavia to unveil their statue before we did ours, former President Eisenhower's speech at the monument, and many other internationally related aspects.

At this point, let's just concentrate on how—not the substantive content—but on how this journalist of supposed integrity and honesty and objectivity managed the situation.

The nominee waged actually a campaign of inconsistency and uncertainty as to his knowledge of the issue. And it was a campaign of smear and hatred, injecting, as you will see from the editorials, such things as antisemitism, the hyphenated American slur, and employing every filthy trick in the journalistic trade to prevent what the Congress and the Eisenhower administration had willed by process of legislation and execution.

Now, the Washington Post prides itself on a liberal attitude—seeing all sides of the issue, so that citizens can evaluate it.

Well, let's see in the case of the editor-in-chief, who now for some mysterious reason is proposed to be our Ambassador to the UN. Just compare in this first one—and these I offer as the editorials—the first editorial and then Stephen Rosenfeld's write-up about Shevchenko, myself and others, with what succeeded in a whole series of editorials over a couple of months. As a matter of fact, editorialized reporting—this went on literally for about six months—at the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964.

And you will be impressed by it, as I stated—the cultural insularity of and also the distortion of facts by the editor.

Then read his editorial of October 18, 1963, "The Shevchenko Affair," and you will see why this nominee is throughly out of his department in this assignment, a plucked fish on dry sand indulging in factual inaccuracies, conceptual nonsense, and, as I said, a play on disunity and hatred.

Actually, there are passages here where he attempted to incite Jews in the community and beyond Washington on this antisemitism matter, attempted to incite Poles, with presumably Shevchenko being anti-Polish, and used these techniques in the course of these months.

Another, the editorial on "A Monument to Ignorance," November 1, 1963. I bring to your attention, too. Really, this is an editorial monument of ignorance—plays on the theme again of antisemitism to arouse the Jewish opposition and, if you will, even what we are familiar with, a McCarthyist technique of association, which another of our newspapers here, the Evening Star, actually editorialized, "Association Again", in opposition to the Washington Post under the nominee's direction.

EXAMPLES OF EDITORIALS

Now, the importance of all of this, is that hundreds of letters were sent to the Washington Post, and in the editorial, you will find admitted as such by the editor. Yet I would say only about half of one percent of those letters managed to find their way into the editorial page of the Washington Post.

A good number of them are in this record, in the Congressional Record.

Another editorial shows that we even have absurdities, as you will see. I think the matter of his logic, the matter of his concepts should be taken into account when in one editorial he even feared that Khrushchev would come here and lay a wreath at this particular statue—if only he knew what the writing on the statue is. But in all of these cases, this event was completely misjudged. But the main thing was the manner in which it was handled, and I do not hesitate to state—in a filthy, dirty, journalistic manner. And I strongly recommend that the members of this committee read these editorials. They are here, I have cited them, and also I would like, in addition, to submit for this record, this article in the Indianapolis Star, "Ike calls for freedom of all captive nations."

Senator SPARKMAN. Without objection it will be inserted in the record.

Senator DODD. Did the chairman rule on the request that the other editorials be printed in the record?

Senator SPARKMAN. I did not understand him to ask that. Did you ask that other editorials be printed?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. The editorials, and the replies as you will find in this Congressional Record reprint, yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Without objection, they will be printed in the record. If the material is going to be too lengthy, we ought to receive them for our files instead of printing them in the record. Do you want both of them printed in the record?

Senator DODD. I asked how long they were.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. They are not too long, if you take the five editorials and the replies. I am not asking that all of these brochures go into the record of this hearing. Just what I have indicated—the editorials written by the nominee and the specific replies.

Senator SPARKMAN. We would be very glad to have all of them in our committee files, and will print in the record individual editorials that you point out, as you did this last one.

(Some of the material referred to appears in the appendix. The remainder is in the committee files.)

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes, indeed.

The conclusion of this is that there is a very great question as to his integrity, his openmindedness, and his objectivity.

EDITORIALS PERTAINING TO CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

The second—referring to my second criterion or assumption—namely, an adequate knowledge of the U.S.S.R. This goes all the way back to July 1959, with the passage of the Captive Nations Week Resolution. Now, unfortunately, I do not have and was not able to obtain all the editorials pertaining to the resolution and the week in subsequent years. But actually, let me cite some here—and I hope for the record that they will be obtained by the staff to give you a good idea as to the foreign policy orientation of this person, more so in terms of his concepts and his knowledge.

In this case, the July 1959 editorial, "Irritating the Bear," was an editorial denouncing the passage of the resolution by Congress. I, in that month, wrote a reply to it, and my reply was published on July 29, 1959, which incidentally caused much surprise to Senator Douglas that the Post at that time even accommodated the reply. Of course, that experience was not repeated in subsequent years when actually replies were sent in, which were either cut, or misplaced and the like. As a matter of fact, this past July we sent out a press release concerning the 1968 Captive Nations Week, and much to my amazement on Monday morning one of my colleagues at the university asked me if I had overextended myself in writing a letter to the Washington Post. The fact is I did not write any letter to the Washington Post. They simply extracted two sentences from the press release, threw it into the letter to the editor's section of the Washington Post, with my name over it under the caption of "Captive Nations Week." But there are the manipulations by which the Post has handled this matter.

Senator DODD. Just a minute. I want to be sure I understand this.

You say you put out a press release?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. A press release.

Senator DODD. And excerpts from it were printed in the letters to the editor?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. Over your signature?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Right. I never wrote any letter to the editor, having had long experience with the editor at the Washington Post.

Senator DODD. I just wanted to get this factually straightened out. Was the press release put out in your name?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes.

Senator DODD. Did you ever complain to the Post about printing a letter which you never wrote?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Well, Senator, actually I have had long experience with the Post on the matter of complaints and the like. That would have been simply at this state a waste of time.

Senator DODD. You did not write?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. No. But the fact is I did not write a letter to the editor pertaining to the Week, and the two sentences, as I say, just two sentences, presumably constituted this ostensible letter.

Senator DODD. I think it is important.

Did it actually appear as a letter to the editor?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes. You can check on it.

Senator DODD. I am not questioning your integrity about it. But it would interest me that this paper would take something and make out of it a letter to the editor which was never written.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. That is correct.

Senator DODD. This has to do with foreign policy?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. This had to do with Captive Nations Week.

Senator DODD. That is certainly foreign policy.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes.

That is one illustration among many that I can give.

Senator DODD. You say this is just one?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Oh, yes. I mean there have been many. As a matter of fact, if I had time to research this, there were many instances of actually inserting the editorial of the Washington Post, and then my reply to it in the *Congressional Record*. We have had to parenthesize the sections of my reply that had been deleted. In the past two years actually they have not even bothered to incorporate any letters in the Post.

POLICY OF PRINTING LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Senator DODD. I can understand they cannot print all letters. And they have to tailor them to the requirements of the page. Any of us who have written letters to a newspaper have encountered these difficulties.

I am concerned, and I think others will be, if it has been the policy of this paper on matters of foreign policy to print letters to the editor—I do not care whether they came from you or anybody else—which never were written.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. That is correct.

Senator DODD. Do you know of any other instances, while Mr. Wiggins was the editor?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. No. This is the sole one, this past July. And actually, the motivation there appeared to be an attempt to denigrate, you see, or degrade the Week itself.

Senator DODD. That is not my point. Whatever the motivation was, I think it is outrageous for a newspaper to do any such thing. I am concerned here about foreign policy.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Wait a minute. I think this is a very grave matter. If it was done once, only once, that can be explained away—perhaps somebody did something he did not know about. But if it represents a studied policy or attitude—I am talking now about the area of foreign policy—then I think we ought to know about it.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman—if he has this letter or this editorial page, I suggest that it be made a part of the record. I think the doctor suggested that our staff try to find it. But our staff advises me they are tremendously busy. They will make the effort. But if he has access to it himself, it would be much better if he would submit it.

Senator DODD. I quite agree. I think that is a good suggestion. Without objection it is so ordered.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I looked for it. But as I stated, I did not have time.

Senator MUNDT. We will keep the record open.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Now, on this matter concerning the Week, I would like here to submit for the record this article "From Moscow's Izvestia to Washington's Post." I am not inputing any—as it has been in the past—any Communist motivations on the part of the Post and the like. I am, however, stating that there is a common denominator in thought. And Izvestia, in fact, has complimented the Post concerning its position with regard to the Captive Nations Week and the resolution.

Senator DODD. I think that ought to be included in the record.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Yes. And I think you will find it very worthwhile in terms of the contents of the Post editorial, especially the manner in which it inveighed against Congressmen, actually calling them captive, and the like. I mean the invective, the techniques, again, here, are something to be wondered about.

Senator DODD. Without objection, Senator Mundt, that ought to be printed. It seems to me to be relevant to this printing of what was a letter, on this same subject.

(The letter to the editor referred to follows: The article referred to is in the committee files.)

[From the Washington Post July 15, 1968]

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

July 14-20 marks the tenth observance of Captive Nations Week. In addition to observances in this country, citizens in 15 other countries such as Free China, Korea, India, West Germany and Argentina, will be joining in.

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY.

WASHINGTON.

NOMINEE'S KNOWLEDGE OF U.S.S.R. DOUBTED

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Concerning this—I am not going into an analysis of this, other than what I am producing for the record here—but the fact is that the nominee, in my judgment, has absolutely no comprehension of the U.S.S.R. And when it is stated that he is a student of Soviet-American relations, I must say that to me that is for publicity purposes, and of hollow import.

The reason I state this, for example, pertains in this case to another editorial. I want to submit this likewise, bearing on the Washington Post, an editorial that was written in 1964. The editorial states clearly—this is short enough, but it will make my point, which is just one example among many—with reference to the resolution: "It also includes Cossakia and Idel-Ural which never have existed as nations except for intervals of German invasion. They are about as much captives of the Soviet Union as Anacostia and Cleveland Park are captives of the District of Columbia. As far as that goes, White Ruthenia and Ukraine are political concoctions that describe aspirations more than a national entity."

Now, similar rubbish can be found actually in the documented material I am offering here. This reflects the conceptual and also the presumed knowledge background of the individual.

As a matter of fact, if I had the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, not that I wish to infuse any humor here—to be given the opportunity to ask the nominee certain questions, many would consider them fundamental questions pertaining to the Soviet Union.

NOMINEE'S ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

The third, and that is the factor of judgment regarding our assumptions.

Now, if you have followed the editorials of the Washington Post, and the people that they manage to get—Mr. Bryczinski and others to write for it—I think you will agree that the tendency, the whole tone and theme has been detente—for the past 2, 3, 4 years. This advocacy of detentism is their privilege and prerogative—just as it is with regard to the Shevchenko episode, and with regard to his understanding of the U.S.S.R. I am not questioning these things other than to show the pertinency of my assumptions. But in this case, with detentism, I think that the recent case of the rape of Czechoslovakia by the Russians has pretty much exploded that theme. Even a person with whom I have had conflicts, let us say, in the scholarly area, Mr. George Kennan, happily has recognized that there is not an iota of evidence supporting this.

VIEWS OF GEORGE KENNAN

Senator DODD. Are you familiar with Mr. Kennan's earlier statements about this same problem?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Oh, yes. But I am referring to his latest interview, given at Princeton. As a matter of fact, as you know, Mr. Chairman, each time I have appeared before this committee, I have not only criticized, but I have offered constructive alternatives. And despite my, well, I would say, rather turbulent relations with Mr. Kennan in a number of spheres, I would say an alternative recommendation for this time should be Mr. Kennan as the ambassador to the U.N. for the United States.

But the point that I am making is——

Senator DODD. Let me ask you a question about that.

Are you serious when you make that suggestion?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Well, apparently by the present nomination there does not seem to be any alternative thought of by the administration. As I stated, it would almost seem we are scraping the bottom of the barrel.

Senator DODD. I thought you were critical of this nomination because of the policy of the editorials with respect to foreign affairs. I take it you would be just as critical of Mr. Kennan.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. That is correct. But not for this interim period.

Senator DODD. Why do you recommend him?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Well, yes, on the basis of his disclosed ideas of the past week or so and the fact that he has greater knowledge and ability than the present nominee. I am not overly enthusiastic about the nomination. I can think of many other people in the country. But it would hold in terms of his background and the selection being made, if you will, by the present administration.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I missed something in there. Was George Kennan before us as a nominee for some ambassadorship?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. No.

Senator MUNDT. You are recommending him?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I am just recommending him as an alternative to the present nomination. I perhaps should have put "even George Kennan" in light of his recent thinking on our policy.

Senator MUNDT. At least it can be said for George Kennan there was a time in his career when he seemed to very clearly sense the realities of the Communist threat, and the time he was stationed in Moscow with Averell Harriman, I was briefed by him to a considerable extent in Moscow. He gave our committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a very clear-cut and historically accurate analysis of the Communist menace. Some place along the line and in between he seems to have vacillated a great deal. But I also read his statement about Czechoslovakia, with both surprise and gratification. It seemed to me he was reverting back to the days of his service in Moscow.

Senator DODD. Let me say it is my understanding as well. I was not being critical of him. My recollection is that Mr. Kennan has taken a very different position at different times. That is all.

COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP OF NOMINEE QUESTIONED

DR. DOBRIANSKY. My fourth point, and that was with regard to the assumption on courage and leadership. In connection with the present nominee and the Washington Post, and for the benefit, if you will, of our citizenry, I challenged the Post about a year ago when it came out with what I considered a thoroughly absurd editorial, one of which has been included for the record—concerning these areas in the Soviet Union—namely Idel-Ural, Turkistan, White Ruthenia, and Cossakia. Let me state the challenge that was made. The letter was never printed in this case, but this was one of many suppressed letters—of July 17, 1967:

I challenge you to arrange a discussion meeting in the Post auditorium which would bring you face to face with living victims of Soviet Russian imperialism from the Idel-Ural, Turkestan, White Ruthenia and Cossakia. Let us see how courageous you are in meeting these people who you think are ghosts without a national background of independent struggle before the audience of the Post personnel, who in this setting would have the opportunity to gauge the level of their editor's understanding of this vital problem.

Now, these peoples that we referred to amount roughly to about 70 million in the Soviet Union. And surely a U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., especially when we keep in mind in the present context the prime enemy, namely the Russian base in the Soviet Union, would have a familiarity with them, and not present such garbage in the editorials of the Washington Post.

So in conclusion, gentlemen, as I see it, on the basis of these criteria, the nominee fails to measure up to any of these qualifications. The nomination, in my judgment, is an appalling one, and I think that the committee, before it decides, should look carefully at these editorials, to gauge them in terms of the assumptions that I have made. Because it brings up the so-called integrity of the individual, his knowledge, his capacity really to lead with courage, and this matter of objectivity, which I have not found in the course of these years.

And also, if I may—I notice the Chairman is not here—to have two chapters of this book, "The Vulnerable Russians" also made part of the record, in view of the fact that they pertain to the issue. One whole chapter deals with this entire Shevchenko event.

Senator DODD. Unless Senator Mundt has any objection, they will be included.

(The material referred to appears in the committee files.)

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. That concludes my testimony, sir.

POST EDITORIAL POLICY TOWARD U.S.S.R.

Senator DODD. Have you made any study of the Post editorials on foreign policy over any protracted period to time?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. No; I have read them very carefully—in view of the fact that I have to be apprised as to the position taken, and especially to what extent they have editorialized the position of our Government, and the arguments set forth.

Senator DODD. I just thought there might be something handy, if you had done that.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Well, I may say this: No, I do not have it unfortunately. However, in the replies here to many of these editorials, many—and I understand quite well—an average American would say "Well, what is this fuss over a statue?" The point is that it did involve, and we knew it would involve, Moscow, Khrushchev, Washington. If anyone bothered to look into all the reports on it from *Izvestia*, in *Pravda*, and so on—in any sensible way—he would find that this was of great import and reflects—it cannot be in any way disassociated with this basic problem—namely, the need in our Government to concentrate and study the non-Russian nations within the U.S.S.R. I might say this—that the position taken by the Post editorials all these years has been one of just brushing these truths under the rug in order to achieve detente with Moscow.

POST EDITORIAL POLICY ON VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. Have you followed the editorial policies of the Post in connection with the current war in Vietnam? It has been my impression—you correct me if I am wrong—that the Post editorials have supported President Johnson and Secretary Rusk in what I think is a very proper determination to refuse to pull out of Vietnam and accept defeat. Am I wrong in my feeling that they have supported the administration in expressing support for a position which would not take our country out of there in disgrace and defeat and turn Vietnam over to the Communists?

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. I would think you are quite correct, sir. They have taken that position.

Senator MUNDT. That is my impression. As I said earlier, while I have disagreed very generally with the Washington Post editorial policies on domestic affairs, I have found greater areas of agreement in terms of foreign policy. I related that to the Vietnamese situation. I must confess to the fact that I do not read the Washington Post editorials every day, because as a Republican, I find it a most unhappy way to start the day—to read such persistent and pugnacious condemnation of virtually everything for which Republicans stand. So I might have missed something, and I did not want to put myself in the position of saying I generally supported the foreign policy position of the Washington Post. I have not read it meticulously. But it was my impression on the Vietnamese situation they had happily been on the right side of the issue, and it was to that that I related my earlier statement, as I stated to my distinguished friend, Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. That would put Mr. Wiggins in the same category as Mr. Kennan. Mr. Kennan now has changed his mind. Apparently Mr. Wiggins has not about Vietnam.

Senator MUNDT. It could be.

Senator DODD. If you are going to recommend Kennan, why don't you recommend Wiggins.

Senator MUNDT. I have a feeling Mr. Kennan changed his mind from the detentism he had been applauding, back to his original concepts of the Communist aggressive moves, largely because of the rape of Czechoslovakia, which came as a surprise to Mr. Kennan, although it came as a fulfillment of prophecy so far as the Senator from South Dakota is concerned. I was not surprised; he was. And if his reformation remains consistent and permanent I shall be very happy, because George Kennan is an articulate spokesman for any cause that he espouses.

Senator DODD. I think the same can be said for Mr. Wiggins. I take it he is a very effective spokesman for the causes in which he believes.

Senator MUNDT. As a practicing Methodist, I believe in the doctrine of conversion. And I would hope that as it happened to Mr. Kennan, it may have happened to Mr. Wiggins.

Senator DODD. That is just the point. I do not take any position on it. It interested me that Dr. Dobriansky thought Kennan would be a better choice. He has changed his mind. I take it that if the Post has changed some of its policy Mr. Wiggins must have changed his mind.

Senator MUNDT. I must say that I would be happier if an advocate for the ambassador position had the foresight and the background and the consistency to be a target all the time. But those people are difficult to come by.

Senator DODD. Well, Doctor, we will read your testimony, and review it.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Thank you.


Senator DODD. We thank you for taking the time to come here.

Dr. DOBRIANSKY. Thank you, sir.

Senator DODD. No other witnesses.

The meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m. the committee was adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)



APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY DR. DOBRIANSKY

(From pamphlet entitled, "Shevchenko—A Monument to the Liberation, Freedom, and Independence of All Captive Nations" Remarks by Various Members of Congress in the House of Representatives Nov. 13, 14, 20, 21, Dec. 4, 6, 1963; and Jan. 9 and 13, 1964)

A RECORD OF CONSISTENCY

Mr. Speaker, I introduce the first editorial on "Poetic Injustice," which misses the whole point of the Shevchenko statue project by injecting Shakespeare. In the light of a later erroneous reference to anti-Semitism, it is interesting that the editorial overlooked Shakespeare's well-known character:

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1963]

"POETIC INJUSTICE

"We yield to no one in our esteem for the Ukraine and that country's poet and hero, Taras Shevchenko. Yet, like most Americans, we have never read a line of Mr. Shevchenko's verse, in Ukrainian or otherwise, and like most Americans were unaware of his existence until ground was broken last Saturday for a plaza and 14-foot statue consecrated to a distant national idol who died in 1861. A choice site—the triangular plot bounded by 22d, 23d, and P Streets—will henceforth bear witness to Mr. Shevchenko's memory and to the potency of Ukrainian political pressure.

"Yet, without belittling Mr. Shevchenko, some murmur of wonder is in order from those of us who harbor an incorrigible prejudice in favor of poets closer to our own tradition. Next year will be the 400th anniversary of Shakespeare's birth. That the city has found precious space for the Ukraine's national poet and not yet found room for some comparable token to Shakespeare's genius is really remarkable."

Mr. Speaker, for a more balanced view I submit the article by the Post's staff reporter, Stephen S. Rosenfeld on "A Ukrainian Poet Gets Statue Billing," September 29. The contradictions now appear even between the Post's own writers:

"A UKRAINIAN POET GETS STATUE BILLING

"(By Stephen S. Rosenfeld)

"Next Memorial Day, if 40,000 people assemble for a ceremony on a small triangular park at P, 22d, and 23d Streets NW., in Washington, no one who knows Lev E. Dobriansky will be surprised.

"An ordinary man—one who did not speak in the name of a small but solid ethnic minority—would never have believed that the U.S. Congress could be induced to authorize erection of a statue of Taras Hryhorovych Shevchenko, a Ukrainian and a poet at that.

"An ordinary man—one without a keen appetite for cold war—would not have imagined that a regional figure of the last century could be converted into the cutting edge of a propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union today.

"Lev E. Dobriansky of course is no ordinary man. He is a 44-year-old Georgetown economics professor, born in New York of Ukrainian parents, who has energetically pursued twin careers as a dispassionate scholar and a passionate anti-Communist devoted to the Ukraine.

"He is also the 14-year president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (which includes perhaps 100,000 of the estimated 2 million Americans of Ukrainian descent), an adviser on nationalities to the Republican Party, and an expert in ethnic leverage on American politics.

"Add to this a persuasive intelligence and a winning manner and you have the principal reason why, next May, a 14-foot, quarter-million-dollar bronze statue of Taras Shevchenko will be unveiled at a choice Washington location.

"Shevchenko was identified as the Ukraine's 'poet laureate and national hero' in a glowing tribute printed as a House document in 1960.

"This description does him no injustice. He is not just the most—perhaps the only—distinguished poet in more than a millenium of Ukrainian history; he is a most distinguished Ukrainian.

"For his poetry, Ukrainians both under and beyond Soviet rule adore him. Two non-Ukrainian Washingtonians familiar with his work speak of him ask 'Pushkin and more,' 'ah, a Shakespeare.' Few others know him and there is only one incomplete American edition of his poems, published privately in 1945.

"Born a serf in 1814, Shevchenko had his freedom purchased by his artist patrons in St. Petersburg at age 24. Nine years later, for his part in a society of radicals and Ukrainian patriots in Kiev, he was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment and exile. He died, under police supervision, 4 years after that in 1861.

"He belonged to the fermenting, freedom-minded Russian intelligentsia of the mid-19th century and he was an ardent Ukrainian patriot. These elements, expressed both in his life and his poetry, caught fire and made him a regional celebrity in literate circles of his time.

"The Ukraine was then controlled by Czarist Russia; it has known only fleeting intervals of independence from either Russia or Poland in its long history. Shevchenko sang of the exploits of Ukrainians and Cossacks against both of these nations. He also spoke for the oppressed serfs.

"His poetry reflected, too, popular feelings about Jews, who had been persecuted in the Ukraine for several centuries—partially because of their enforced economic role as middlemen and their questioned loyalty to the Ukraine.

"In his poems, he sometimes referred to Jews in the vernacular ('pig,' 'miser') and his epic 'Haydamaki' glorified the Ukrainian band which murdered thousands of Jews—and Poles.

"In person, Shevchenko once signed a petition against anti-Semitism, a brave act for the time. This episode, related in the House document about the poet in order to blunt possible criticism, helped reassure those Congressmen who had qualms on this score.

"Shevchenko's various themes and his enduring stature in the Ukraine have since led to a vigorous contest for his spiritual kinship between Ukrainians abroad and Soviets at home.

"The Soviets encouraged and then crushed a Ukrainian independence movement after the Russian Revolution of 1917. The Ukraine is now a constituent republic of the Soviet Union.

"Moscow treats Shevchenko as a latent Bolshevik who strained for brotherhood with the Russian people while opposing the oppressions of Czarism.

"Ukrainians in the Dobriansky camp see Shevchenko as a fighter for human freedom and Ukrainian nationhood, with a built-in anti-Soviet passion.

"Anticipating Moscow's celebration of the centenary of the poet's death in 1961, he determined to head it off. In 1959 various Congressmen began to learn of their constituents' interest in a statue for Shevchenko.

"Dobriansky was already well known on Capitol Hill for pushing through the Captive Nations resolution of 1959—he considers the Ukraine 'the largest non-Russian nation behind the Iron Curtain.' He now became a virtual fixture.

"There developed not only an awe for Dobriansky's devotion but a sympathy for the anti-Communist aims of the statue project. Even the skeptics thought it harmless and no one wished to be against it. As Dobriansky said in an interview, the goal was not just to venerate the poet but to 'educate' Americans about communism and to use Shevchenko as a 'psychopolitical cold-war weapon.'

"Senator Jacob K. Javits and his fellow New York Republican, Senator Kenneth B. Keating, found themselves sponsors of a 1959 Senate resolution for the statue. A more florid House resolution, written by Dobriansky, was offered by then Representative Alvin Bentley, Republican, of Michigan, in 1960.

"The Senate's resolution was tabled after the Interior Department protested that there were too many statue claimants and too few policy guidelines for selection.

"But Dobriansky, who gives much credit to Representative Paul C. Jones, Democrat, of Missouri, saw the House resolution past Interior's shoals.

"In June 1960, a resolution proudly submitted by Representative John Lesinski, Democrat, of Michigan, authorized the House's printing of the 45-page 'biographical documentary of the life and character of Taras Shevchenko.' Dobriansky wrote the foreword.

"His monumental efforts were crowned with success on September 13, 1960, when President Eisenhower signed the House resolution into law. It authorized erection of a Shevchenko statue 'on public grounds in the District of Columbia * * * without expense to the United States.'

"Details remained: collection of about \$250,000 for the statue; approval of Leo Mol's design by the Fine Arts Commission, and selection of the site by the National Capital Planning Commission. The NCPA balked a bit and again Dobriansky had to patiently minister to doubts.

"Last July, Associated Public Relations Counselors of 1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., began to put out publicity for the ground breaking.

"The publicity made much of a poem in which Shevchenko had asked for a Ukrainian George Washington 'to promulgate his new and righteous law.' This particular passage was embellished by at least four of the speakers at the ground breaking last Saturday.

"The Congressmen honored at that occasion included all those so far named, plus Senators Hugh Scott, Republican, of Pennsylvania and Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, and Representatives Michael A. Feighan, Democrat, of Ohio, Ray J. Madden, Democrat, of Indiana, and Thaddeus J. Dulski, Democrat of New York.

"At Dobriansky's request, Dulski has submitted a House resolution to honor Shevchenko with a champion of liberty stamp next year when the statue is unveiled.

"Dobriansky reports that the 200 people at the ground breaking made up the largest such crowd in the 40-odd years of Washington history recorded by the Board of Trade.

"And that is why those who know Lev Dobriansky do not doubt that the multitude he envisages for the unveiling will be there."

Following this, we now read the first controversial editorial titled "The Shevchenko Affair," October 18. By the Post's own admission, a heavy volume of mail criticizing this editorial for its tone and errors has been received. Up to this time few have been published and at that I understand with careful deletions. Along with the editorial I submit in full text the letter written by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University, from which references to House Document No. 445 and Dr. Frederick Brown Harris' article on Shevchenko were deleted, and also an unpublished letter by former Congressman Charles J. Kersten:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Oct. 18, 1963]

"THE SHEVCHENKO AFFAIR

"The Shevchenko statue should never have been approved by Congress. There is no legitimate reason why a 19th century Ukrainian poet, a cipher to the vast majority of Americans and an object of intense manipulation by the few who know him, should be honored with a statue at an enviable location in the Nation's Capital. Ground has been broken for the statue but it is still not too late to call the whole affair off.

"There are two reasons why the project has gone this far and neither is good. The first is the efforts of a tiny group of Americans of Ukrainian birth or background who managed to convert an errant private passion into a public cause. The second is the misguided and careless reception given the statue proposal by Congress, which allowed itself to be swept along in order to please some insistent constituents.

"The Ukrainian-American sponsors conceive of the statue as a blunt weapon in a fierce cold-war propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union. They are using it to advance their own peculiar notion of how to fight communism and their own implausible goal of Ukrainian nationhood.

"Many people feel that Shevchenko was a fine poet, but his artistry is of no moment to the statue sponsors. If it were, the statue would still be objectionable, simply because as a poet Shevchenko has no universal significance for Americans. He is the pet of a small minority, whatever his poetic merit.

"It has not been possible to assess the rivalries and suspicions which have foamed up around the edges of this project. It is perhaps enough to say that both in the writings of the poet and in the efforts to exploit him there are elements which are offensive in various ways to Americans of Russian, German, Polish, Catholic, Jewish, Orthodox, and even Ukrainian background. A statue of Shevchenko would a monument to disunity and recrimination among Americans.

"The Congressmen who were persuaded to support the Shevchenko statue—Senators Javits and Keating, Representatives Lesinski, Paul Jones and others—should at once act to reverse their earlier error."

"LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THE WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 19, 1963

"I trust you will afford me the same opportunity of replying to your October 18 edition on "The Shevchenko Affair" as you did in July 1959, concerning an editorial on the Captive Nations Week resolution. Your opposition then was based on a medley of factual inaccuracies; bearing the same trait, your present opposition to the Shevchenko statue sounds almost desperately vindictive and, to say the least, unbecoming to an organ of your reputation.

"Two questions immediately arise after reading this misleading piece. One, why this editorial at this time? Second, how expert have your writers become on this project in the span of 3 weeks? The factual answers to these questions are sufficient to indicate the degree of editorial irresponsibility reflected in this self-indicting performance.

"It is very easy to pontificate and hide behind juggled words after a given event. But where were your sheltered writers these past 3 years while the subject was widely reported and discussed in this country and in Soviet Union; The New York Herald Tribune, the Evening Star, the Chicago Tribune and many other papers satisfactorily covered the subject in 1960; and, as in the case of the Captive Nations Week resolution, for a period of 7 months the organs of Moscow and puppet Kiev registered a malicious opposition similar to yours now. In fact, it appears that your own writers don't bother to read the Post itself. Reports on the project and the open congressional hearing were published on April 2 and September 14, 1960; March 7, 1961, October 18 and 26, 1962. Where were your interest and comments then? If the element of dictated pressure has characterized anything, it certainly has this contradictory editorial.

"As to the second question, it is actually amusing to compare this editorial with the one on 'Poetic Injustice' that appeared in your September 23 issue. In the latter, the 3-week experts start out in this vein:

"'We yield to no one in our esteem for the Ukraine and that country's poet and hero, Taras Shevchenko.' They even admit that 'we have never read a line of Mr. Shevchenko's verse * * *.' Three weeks later the reader is fed the supposedly studied and quite absurd conclusion that a "statue of Shevchenko would be a monument to disunity and recrimination among Americans.' Earlier, Shevchenko was a 'country's poet and hero', now, he is 'the pet of a small minority.' With such capricious thinking, one can well imagine the abusive interpretations they've formed by references to his poetry out of historical context. Shevchenko scholars in the United States and Canada have devoted lifetimes to the historic works of this immortal freedom fighter; your writers, with brazen self-contradiction, have rendered their expert judgment—all distilled in 3 weeks.

"If there is anything offensive in various ways to the intelligence of our American people and to their unity against the Soviet Russian threat, it is this brand of irresponsible editorializing. Your fictitious points on some errant private passion of certain Americans, the misguided and careless reception by Congress, and other specimens of groundless rhetoric not only violate available facts but have been openly exploded while your editorial writers slept these past 3 years. Solid reasons for the statue are clearly set forth and explained in House Document No. 445, which was circulated throughout the country and inspired worthy contributions for the statue from Americans of all backgrounds. What did you do with your copy 2 years ago?

"On how to fight communism, the record of your notions is scarcely an enviable one. Taking just the two issues mentioned here, it is most revealing how, in fact, your protests have coincided with Moscow's. The reasons, of course, are different. Moscow is fearful of any outside support given to the powerful force of nationalism among its captive non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R.; you've been too blind to understand this.

"Thank God we have countless Americans who do. As just one among numerous examples, you might profit from reading Dr. Frederick Brown Harris' recent column in the October 13 Sunday Star, wherein he states: "For the years to come this statue will be an altar of intercession for the emancipation of all captive nations. This statue will publish the fact that America is well aware that the U.S.S.R. is not a nation, but a colonial empire claiming sovereignty over non-Russians numbering more millions than there are Russians." The statue is obviously not for those who would appease Moscow by burying or distorting truths which are essential to our own national interest. In its wisdom Congress has recognized this; let us hope that in time and beyond consistent error you will, too.

"LEV E. DOBRIANSKY."

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Nov. 1, 1963.]

"MONUMENT TO IGNORANCE

"Objections of this newspaper to the proposed memorial to the Ukrainian poet, Shevchenko, have inspired a great many letters. The writers of these letters seem to have overlooked the real occasion for our opposition to the statue of Taras Shevchenko.

"It is not just that Shevchenko said many anti Semitic things that are an affront to the Jewish community of this country—in this he was a product of his time and shared the antipathies of his class and his region. Moreover, he did oppose Jewish persecution on one occasion. It is not just that the poet is the idol of Communist Party members who have caused the Soviet Union to flower with libraries, collective farms, plants, villages, and memorials to his name. It is not just that his very name is, by reason of his flaming nationalism, an affront to members of the Polish minority, which also is a very large one in this country."

"These reasons, to be sure, make one wonder why gullible Senators and Representatives should have approved such a memorial, when all of the offended minorities are among their constituents. The larger reason, however, is simply that Shevchenko is neither a universal poet nor a national poet of this country entitled to recognition in the United States. It is inconceivable that a statue would be dedicated to him in Tel-Aviv or in Warsaw, for example. The only tenuous connection he has with American nationalism consists of a single overworked quotation voicing the wish that the Ukraine had a George Washington.

"As a practical matter, during this period of thaw, a memorial to a favorite poet of the Communist world may be in the spirit of the times. If Khrushchev should visit us again, he could lay a wreath on this memorial. But the climate may change and it seems premature to consider a permanent memorial to detente.

"Let us make it clear that we are not asking that any of the memorials to Shevchenko in the Soviet Union be torn down, or that his memory in any way be defiled. It just seems to us very doubtful wisdom to place in the midst of a city that knew him not, a memorial to a poet who knew nothing of this land and who spoke neither to its past nor its present generations. The Congress ought to reverse a decision that can be explained only on the grounds of ignorance."

"NOVEMBER 4, 1963.

"To the EDITOR OF THE WASHINGTON POST:

"Regarding the forthcoming erection of the Shevchenko statue, it is obvious from the evidence at hand that a distinction must be drawn between the neurotic output of the editor—meaning Mr. Wiggins—and that produced by other writers of the Washington Post. The contrast is one of night and day, between fumbling falsities and approximate accuracy, between a base motivation and an attempt at honest objectivity.

"Your November 1 editorial is genuinely a 'Monument to Ignorance.' In fact, all three editorials on the subject so far constitute a literary monument to ignorance. From an educational viewpoint, this series of monumental ignorance well justifies additional constructive projects in honor of Shevchenko on the 150th anniversary of his birth next year. The editorials will serve as prime evidence for the need of such educational endeavors.

"Despite your calculated deletions of my October 19 letter, there was no oversight of the real occasion for your opposition to the statue. In your demonstrated ignorance you well described the occasion by the one consistent strand that infuses some intelligibility to the three editorials; namely, imagined 'Ukrainian political pressure' and your ludicrous attempt to counter it by inciting a hoped-for Jewish and Polish antagonism against the statue project. Russian despots have long used this technique, but one would never have dreamed that an editor of a reputable American newspaper would sink to this level.

As a 4-week expert on Shevchenko you're really going from bad to worse. Like Shakespeare, Dickens, and numerous other expressionists, Shevchenko put into verse and prose what he sensed among the people at the time. Only a small measure of historical perspective, not to say honest intellectuality, is needed to understand this. Your brazen attempt now to associate the poet with whatever prejudices prevailed then among segments of the Ukrainian nation is not only morally despicable but also plainly insulting to the intelligence and stature of Americans of Polish and Jewish backgrounds. For your education you had better bone up on free world developments in close Polish-Ukrainian and Jewish-Ukrainian relations against despotic Russian domination and suppression. We

Americans strongly support these relations and, contrary to your fables, Shevchenko by his own convictions did, too.

"In your editorial of ignorance the height of garbled nonsense is reached when in the same paragraph, Shevchenko is painted as 'the idol of Communist Party members' and also a flaming nationalist whose patriotic trait is supposed to be offensive to a 'Polish minority' here. Again, for the beginning of your education on this, you might start with the report in the Washington Post issue of March 7, 1961, captioned 'Reds Decry Ukrainian's Statue Here.'

"My previous letter pointed out the puerile contradictions between your first two editorials. Now your 'Monument to Ignorance' contradicts 'The Shevchenko Affair.' In the latter, you stressed the 'peculiar notion' of conceiving 'the statue as a blunt weapon in a fierce cold war propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union.' Now the reader is told the memorial conduces to a detente with Moscow, and Khrushchev 'could lay a wreath' on it. Surely a greater respect could be shown toward your editorial readers. The joke circulating about town today is 'What's the Post's latest view on Shevchenko?'

"For one who only 4 weeks ago 'never read a line of Mr. Shevchenko's verse' and, in this time, doubtless hasn't perused the dozen and more volumes of his works, you display an intellectual arrogance beyond cultured expression in your crude brushoff of Shevchenko as a universal poet or as not being uniquely related to our great American tradition. Once again, for the commencement of your education you might look into Clarence Manning's introductory work 'Taras Shevchenko' and, after considerably more reading, perhaps in time you will come to understand Shevchenko's stature not only as a universal poet but also as a powerful East European spirit of freedom who was inspired in many ways by our own tradition. If you knew something about the harsh suppressions in the Russian Empire in mid-19th century, you wouldn't denigrate the poet's call for a Washington.

"Clearly, among its many other purposes, the Shevchenko statue in the capital of both our Nation and the free world will serve as a beacon of enlightenment for the ignorant and uncultured among us. In the current struggle we could ill afford their presence, particularly where a public medium is abused to vent the ignorance of a supposed opinionmaker.

"Our request for the names of the 'scholars' who regard the poet as 'minor' and the 'grumbling' local planning officials, allegedly quoted in the Post's belated October 25 article, has not yet been satisfied. Again, let's not hide behind irresponsible words and opinions. Indeed, out of respect for our many informed legislators and officials supporting this project, are you liberal enough to open up your medium for an article by one of the Shevchenko scholars in our country?

"LEV E. DOBRIANSKY."

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Mar. 7, 1961]

"REDS DECRY UKRAINIAN'S STATUE HERE

"The Soviet press has jumped with both feet into the campaign to limit the monumental statuary of Washington.

"Translations of Moscow and Kiev publications received here show that they have devoted major articles to oppose plans of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America to erect a monument to Taras Shevchenko, Ukrainian poet and national hero.

"A principal target is Lev E. Dobriansky, professor of Soviet economy at Georgetown University, who was described in one article as being one of the 'political intriguers and criminal renegades' backing the statue.

"Dobriansky was one of the main backers of legislation last year authorizing the monument. He predicted at the time that the Russians would try to 'claim this historic figure as one of theirs' and said that the poet actually belongs to the Western tradition of freedom.

"The Moscow publication, Soviet Culture, contended that Shevchenko would not be popular in the United States, because in one of his writings he 'favorably mentioned George Washington, who is not now at all popular in the well-known [House] Committee on Un-American Activities.'

Mr. Speaker, after reading of this controversy it is necessary for us to view this vitally important project with candor, balance, and perspective. Two among many presentations excellently provide the necessary view. I refer to Robert J. Lewis' article on "The Status of a Statue" which appears in the November 10 issue of the Sunday Star and the address on "Human Destiny" delivered by the Honorable MICHAEL A. FEIGAN on the day of the Shevchenko groundbreaking ceremonies, September 21. I include both the article and address at this point:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Star, Nov. 10, 1963]

"THE STATUS OF A STATUE

"(By Robert J. Lewis)

"On March 25, 1961, President Kennedy sent a telegraphic message to the Shevchenko Scientific Society in New York, as follows:

"I am pleased to add my voice to those honoring the great Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko.

"We honor him for his rich contribution to the culture not only of the Ukraine, which he loved so well and described so eloquently, but of the world.

"His work is a noble part of our historical heritage."

"The object of this presidential praise was a Ukrainian nationalist hero who was born a serf on February 25, 1814, and who died 47 years later, on February 26, 1861, as a much-respected poet and symbol of Ukrainian patriotism and aspirations for freedom from Russian domination.

"The Shevchenko symbolism has continued to inspire the Ukrainian people down to the present day.

"His name also has become a weapon in the cold war on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Both the Soviet Union and nationalist Ukrainians claim him as their own because his life and work were so valuable in their symbolism and so exemplary in their dedication to freedom.

"It is for a statue of this man that Congress authorized the use of public grounds in Washington, in a resolution passed by both Houses and approved September 13, 1960, by President Eisenhower.

"The obvious and proper objective of honoring this man as a symbol of the hope for freedom was to demonstrate, once again, to the world and to the Ukrainian people, that the cause of liberty is one which this country can always be depended on to champion.

"In the congressional resolution approved 3 years ago, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized and directed to select an appropriate site upon which to erect the Shevchenko statue.

"Acting in accordance with these directions, Secretary Udall had his representatives go before the National Capital Planning Commission on October 25, 1962, with site recommendations.

"At that session, the Planning Commission voted to defer action, but on December 6, it approved a small triangular site at 22d, 23d and P Streets NW, as the spot for the statue.

"On April 4 this year, the Planning Commission approved the site plan and design for the small landscaped park and Shevchenko statue. The Fine Arts Commission likewise approved the program.

"On September 22, 1963, the 14,000-square-foot plot was dedicated to the memory of Taras Shevchenko—102 years after his death. More than 2,000 persons attended the ceremonies.

"Last week—to complete the record—a motion was made in the National Capital Planning Commission that approval of the site be rescinded so that a statue cannot be erected to Taras Shevchenko.

"Whatever the merits of the reasons for this action—which failed but which may bob up again—the effect would be negation of the will of Congress by an agency which does not have the right to do so.

"Withdrawing a site at this late date also could constitute an affront to many Ukrainian-Americans and others who have raised nearly \$250,000 to pay for this memorial.

"Frustrating this effort also could well have cold-war consequences, since killing the memorial doubtless would be seized on by Soviet propagandists as evidence the U.S. Congress was not sincere in its desire to honor a freedom-loving Ukrainian.

"A sense of perspective and understanding would seem to dictate the proper course. If such a course is followed, Washington will be graced by a memorial to a significant figure in the continuing battle for liberty. It will also have cause to rejoice that human brotherhood and understanding once again have affirmed the cause of freedom."

SHEVCHENKO AGAIN

Mr. Speaker, the various editorials of the Washington Post on this subject appeared in the November 14 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, along with apt replies, some of which were not published by the paper. As an ardent believer in open and responsible discussion, I should like to add to that list another editorial in the

November 12 issue of the Washington Post, titled "Shevchenko Again," along with a reply to that editorial written by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, of Georgetown University:

"SHEVCHENKO AGAIN

"Walter C. Louchheim, Jr., has very rightly asked his colleagues on the National Capital Planning Commission to review that body's approval of a site for the Shevchenko memorial. The Commission clearly was not well informed about the memorial and it ought to reexamine its decision.

"Congress, the Planning Commission, and the Interior Department have been misled by one of the most artful and arrogant lobbies ever operated by a minority group. This lobby has maneuvered the Government into the ridiculous position of approving a memorial to a 19th-century Ukrainian poet, known to few Americans, one who has little or no connection with this country's past, with a reputation for intense Ukrainian nationalism curiously mixed with various other ethnic passions. The real irony of the matter, of course, is that Shevchenko is a hero in the Soviet Union where his name is memorialized in literally hundreds of place names. His monuments there are annually the object of Communist adulation. The advocates of an American memorial to him labor under the strange notion that by putting up a statue to him in Washington they will somehow kidnap a Communist hero and make him into their own hero.

"This dispute over the soul of a Ukrainian poet is a quarrel within the ranks of Ukrainian nationalists in which Americans in general and Washingtonians in particular have no proper interest. Even Americans of Ukrainian descent do not share universally in the enthusiasms of the clique which has agitated for the Shevchenko memorial.

"All the public agencies that had anything to do with this proposal ought to reexamine their decisions. The Ukrainian group that has raised money for the memorial might more appropriately honor some Ukrainian-American whose genius reflects the success of their countrymen in embracing the cause of this country and in leaving the quarrels of their ancestral homeland where they originated."

"NOVEMBER 16, 1963.

"LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THE WASHINGTON POST

"Your November 12 editorial on "Shevchenko Again" reads like a neurotic summary of your three previous editorials. It appears that you have exhausted your supply of fantastic opinions, though your motivation of ignorant intolerance still runs high.

"Mr. Louchheim expressed his fantastic opinions long before you did. A year ago he exceeded the technical jurisdiction of the National Capital Planning Commission to register his unfounded notions about Shevchenko. He, too, labored under the illusion that Moscow would relish a Shevchenko statue here, but, like you, he was way out of his depth in the face of concrete evidence and fact. I strongly advise you to read a piece of honest journalism, Robert J. Lewis' November 10 article on 'The Status of a Statue' in the Sunday Star, in which he rightly states that 'Washington would be graced by a memorial to a significant figure in the continuing battle for liberty.'

"Again, it's a pity that your 6-week expertness on this vital subject hasn't even begun to scratch the surface of available facts. Mr. Wiggins, truly one shudders to think of the assumed factual bases of your other editorials that are supposed to guide your readers on a variety of important issues. I assure you that responsible officials in all three of the mentioned governmental bodies were properly informed about Shevchenko and have a far greater understanding of this project than you can hardly acquire in another 6 weeks. They at least bothered to read House Document No. 445. Really, for a man who by his own admission 'never read a line of Mr. Shevchenko's verse' (September 23 editorial 'Poetic Injustice') you're alone at the summit of editorial irresponsibility in accusing our legislators of being 'gullible' and others of 'being misled.'

"Again, it is also a pity that in the darkness of both your arrogant ignorance and intolerance you cannot possibly see eye-to-eye with our President on the universal significance of this poet and courageous freedom fighter. It is pitiful, too, that your abusive anti-Semitic charges—much like those fabricated in Moscow—have blinded you to the fact that Albert Einstein, one among the many other outstanding Jewish scholars, was a member to the day of his death in the Shevchenko Scientific Society which perpetuates both the name and works of the universal poet. Indeed, the brazenness of your charges is an affront to all intelligent Jews, both here and abroad.

"Again, you're in the realm of self-satisfying fantasy when you write about some 'lobby', 'a minority group,' Shevchenko as 'a Communist hero,' some 'quarrel within the ranks of Ukrainian nationalists,' and some 'Ukrainian group' raising the money for the memorial. It is both interesting and amusing to witness the lengths you have gone to in your groping for argumentative points to justify your basic intolerant motivations. Strangely enough, some of these imagined points have been used consistently by Moscow and its puppets in their opposition to the statue here. Have you been reading the right sources? Again, where have you been these past 3 years when all of this was openly discussed?"

"For the public record, prove that this lobby exists. Are you suggesting that citizens have no right to exercise their power of ideas because some intolerant and unknowledgeable editor might not find these ideas in accord with his burning bias? As to 'a minority group,' in the name of simple logic, pray, do tell us what private American organization is a majority group? The editor of the Washington Post, perhaps? Where basic and tolerant American ideas are expressed, their exponents are of the majority. Simply in point of readable fact, the substance of your editorial fiction have found ready expression in the Soviet Union these past 3 years.

"Once again, the patent nonsense of Shevchenko being 'a Communist hero' can be easily dispensed with. Aside from the published distortions of Shevchenko by Moscow and its puppets, you might advance your cold war education by beginning to ponder over the many good things the Soviet Russian totalitarians have abused and exploited to further their own ends: such as democratic forms, past treaties, the U.N., etc. Or haven't you heard about political Russian cunning and treachery? How nonsensical this characterization is, one needn't go beyond your own editorials. This one contradicts your first two and is even contradictory in itself. In the same paragraph Shevchenko is painted as 'a Communist hero' and one 'with a reputation for intense Ukrainian nationalism.' And so a circle is squared. Haven't you heard about the crime of bourgeoisie nationalism in the U.S.S.R.? Again, your intellectual gap will take some time to overcome, not just 6 weeks.

"Your comments about some quarrel among Ukrainian nationalists and some money-raising Ukrainian group are really reflective of self-inflicted hallucinations. We Americans, who for your information were also born here, would appreciate knowing about this alleged quarrel and the specific identity of these 'nationalists.' Again, you've fabricated your statements, support them with concrete fact. The people supporting this statue in the cause of our own national interests are as American—if not more so, judging by your intolerant and mendacious editorials—as you are. This smear technique is a Russian specialty, not American; and you can't get away with it.

"As to what we should do with our money, your advice is scarcely needed; nor do we heed the insularities of a few 'Americans of Ukrainian descent.' Many objectives of educational and scholarly import will be served by our accumulating funds—in itself a solid measure of the generally enthusiastic response to the statue project. The statue will, of course, be your monument of sorely needed enlightenment. In the meantime, as a self-acclaimed American, have you the integrity of substantiating factually the opinions expressed in your contradictory editorials and the honesty of revealing publicly the names of the 'scholars' who regard Shevchenko as 'a minor poet' and 'the local planning officials' who are grumbling about the statue? My sense of fairness and justice compels me to underscore again the request made in my previous letters, along with the challenge of permitting an American Shevchenko scholar to write an article in your paper and also your publishing the scores of letters I am informed you have been receiving in protest to your editorials. Or, again, is your protracted silence in these respects 'American?'"

"LEV E. DOBRIANSKY."

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Dec. 29, 1963]

"COMMUNISTS LOVE SHEVCHENKO"

"Warm support for a Shevchenko statue in Washington has come from the quarter which the American sponsors of the statue intended as its political target.

"This man-bites-dog turn, giving Communist and Soviet backing to what was conceived as an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet project, was accomplished by the chief of the Soviet Ukraine's mission to the United Nations.

"This official, L. Y. Kizya, said that he favors a statue here of the 19th century Ukrainian poet. It is to be erected on the triangle of land at P Street, between 22d and 23d Streets NW.

"But, said Kizya, he protests the efforts of the American sponsors of the statue to use it "to fan up animosity toward the Soviet Ukraine, and all the more to aggravate the cold war."

"Kizya fueled a growing controversy, Congress approved the statue, private funds are to pay for it and dedication is scheduled next spring.

"But because of the poet's questionable significance and the statue sponsors' tactics in gaining congressional sanction, the National Capital Planning Commission is about to review its earlier approval of the project.

"Kizya's comments were made in a statement sent to the Washington Post 4 weeks after this newspaper solicited his views.

"He showed a reverence for Shevchenko equal to that displayed by the poet's American admirers. Terming him a 'great son of the Ukraine, an uncompromising fighter against slavery and injustice, against social and national oppression,' Kizya said Shevchenko 'deserves to have his statue decorating one of the squares of the U.S. Capital.'

"But where Ukrainian-American sponsors see Shevchenko as the focus of an anti-Russian and anti-Communist campaign for Ukrainian nationhood, Kizya portrayed him as a man with deep ties to the Russians and revolutionaries of his day and as a man now widely respected by all Soviet nationalities, not just by Soviet Ukrainians.

"These contrasts are typical of the tug of war for Shevchenko's mantle between the Soviets and some Americans of Ukrainian descent.

"Kizya said that the 150th anniversary of Shevchenko's birth next year will be marked in the Soviet Union by 'nationwide festivities,' including erection of a monument in Moscow. The Washington statue of Shevchenko is due to be erected at the same time and for the same purpose.

"'Nowadays in the age of radio, movies, and television (Shevchenko) can play an important role in the enrichment of the culture of the American people,' said Kizya. He noted that Mark Twain is revered in the Soviet Union.

"Kizya is the top official of the Soviet Ukraine in the United States, which considers the Ukraine as being 1 of 15 constituent republics of the Soviet Union, not a sovereign state. The Ukraine and another Soviet Republic, Byelorussia, have U.N. General Assembly seats through a proviso that Stalin demanded and received at Yalta in 1945."

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Dec. 5, 1963]

"NEW JERSEY TOWN KILLS PROPOSAL FOR SHEVCHENKO STREET

"Washington no longer has company in its misery over Taras Shevchenko.

"In New Jersey's Hamilton Township, civic uproar greeted a proposal several weeks ago to change the name of one of the small Trenton suburb's streets to Shevchenko Boulevard, in honor of the 19th-century Ukrainian poet. This week, the suggestion was killed.

"In Washington, controversy has developed over a plan to erect a statue of the poet on a small park at 22d and P Streets NW.

"The New Jersey proposal was offered by a township committeeman on behalf of some Ukrainian-Americans who see the poet's nationalistic verses as being anti-Soviet.

"But reaction came immediately from residents along Deutz Avenue, the street to be rechristened. Angrily, they paraded in protest, scuffled with police and bombarded the township officials with petitions.

"Wednesday night the committee backed off quickly from the explosive issue. 'It is clearly evident the committee has made a mistake,' declared Mayor George R. Holland, whereupon the five voted unanimously to drop the subject.

"In Washington, no easy way out is in sight. The statue was authorized by Congress, has cleared all necessary reviewing agencies and is scheduled to be put in place next May.

"The problem here is that the Kremlin also views the poet as a hero and has given his name to at least 1,620 public facilities in the Soviet Union. The Russians interpret his revolutionary writings as anticzarist.

The editorial "Is This the Voice of 'The Washington Post?'" which appeared in the authoritative periodical the Ukrainian Bulletin.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1964]

"RED EMBASSY JOINS ROW ON SHEVCHENKO

"The Soviet Embassy entered the Shevchenko controversy yesterday by releasing a letter endorsing the proposed statue of the Ukrainian poet in Washington.

"In the five-page letter, signed by 36 Soviet Ukrainians and forwarded to the Embassy by an official Soviet press agency, the signers offered to take part in the statue unveiling scheduled for next spring. The site is the triangle formed by P, 22d and 23d Streets NW.

"The signers, described by the Embassy as 'prominent Ukrainian public figures,' also volunteered to 'send to the American continent some sacred soil from the Chernechya hill where Taras (Shevchenko) sleeps the eternal sleep.'

"They applauded the poet, as do Americans of Ukrainian descent, but added: 'We are resolutely against the malicious attempts of the enemies of the Soviet Union to use the poet's works against our country, against the cause of all humanity—the struggle for peace.'

"This was a reference to the anti-Soviet aims of some American sponsors of the Shevchenko statue. Because of these sponsors' tactics in gaining congressional approval for the statue, and because of the poet's questionable stature and significance, the project has become a matter of dispute.

"The National Capital Planning Commission has been asked to review its approval of the statue at its February meeting."

"SHEVCHENKO SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY, INC.,
New York, N.Y., January 3, 1964.

"To the EDITOR, WASHINGTON POST,
Washington, D.C.

"DEAR SIR: The following is written as a supplement to my first letter to you of November 25, 1963. It is written in the spirit and hope of bringing informed and intelligent understanding to the debate regarding the proposed Washington monument to Taras Shevchenko. It is written, too, with the knowledge that editorial writers are sometimes prone to oversimplify problems that are extremely complex both in historical context and contemporary meaning. The great failure of such editorial writers is that they neglect to take the time to make the type of informed and intelligent analysis required of such multifactor problems and events.

"In the interests of bringing complete truth to the formation of intelligent public opinion on this and other vital questions. I feel sure that the Washington Post is among those important American newspapers who are responsibly dedicated to the people's right to know. It is in this sense that I feel assured that you will in fairness print this letter. My comments here and in my first letter are specifically directed against basic statements of misinformation and distortion contained in your editorials of October 18 and 25 and November 1 and 12 as well as your most recent news story of November 29, 1963.

"I have waited patiently—but disappointedly—for the publication of my first letter, the complete text of which has already been published in the Congressional Record. This second letter, however, like its predecessor, is based on the weeks of careful research needed to compile an intelligent reply borne of facts rather than emotion."

(For remainder of letter, see committee files.)

(From Pamphlet Entitled, "Captive Nations Week, From Hungary, to Poland, Ukraine, Turkestan, Mainland China, North Vietnam to Cuba and 20 Other Captive Nations"—Speeches of Hon. Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania and Hon. Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois et al. in the House of Representatives and in the Senate of the United States)

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, July 8, 1966]

"UP WITH IDEL-URAL

"Knowing well that the best way to fight communism is to blow hard on it, the Congress in 1959 'authorized and requested' the President to designate the third week in July as Captive Nations Week. Ever solicitous of the Executive's geographical shortcomings, the Congress identified the nations thereby to be blessed. Its list included not only such ancient and recognized lands as White Ruthenia and Turkestan but historic Cossackia and storied Idel-Ural too.

"The President has unaccountably delayed in issuing the prescribed annual 'Captive Nations Proclamation.' In recent years he has even failed to name the nations for whose benefit he was issuing the proclamation. We trust, nonetheless, that Congress' fervor for the freedom and independence of Cossackia and Idel-Ural will receive its due."

"A REPLY BY DR. LEV E. DOBRIANSKY OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY AND CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL CAPTIVE NATIONS COMMITTEE TO THE WASHINGTON POST'S JULY 8 EDITORIAL 'UP WITH IDEL-URAL'

"The editorial is not without some measure of intellectual humor, mixed with obvious ingredients of sarcasm. When a number of people asked for my reaction to it, I simply replied that 'The editors of this organ should continue writing about Idel-Ural, Cossackia and other integral parts of the Soviet Union. In time they will educate themselves and many of their readers. And this will be all to the good.' In this respect, the apparently irritated editor has done us all a great favor.

"As usual, the editorial is studded with factual inaccuracies and poor judgment. But this, too, is part of the process of education; in, time the condition will be overcome.

"Now for the points. Plainly, the best way to fight 'communism'—in reality Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and the Red Chinese one, too—is to blow hard on it, with firmness, a certitude of one's own position, and with a determined vision of its defeat and demise.

"Second, the President did not 'unaccountably' delay issuing his Captive Nations Week proclamation. In fact, he timed it very well on July 8, the historic date of the announcement of our Declaration of Independence and his announcement of the establishment of the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission.

"Third, to state that in recent years the President has even failed 'to name the nations for whose benefit he was issuing the proclamation' is grossly untrue and typical of the paper's editorial comments. One need only to read all the Presidential proclamations from Eisenhower's in 1959 to Johnson's in 1965 to establish the untruth of such assertions. The references to the captive nations have always been general and all-inclusive.

"Finally, the editor needn't worry that Congress will misplace his trust in its fervor for the independence and freedom of all peoples, including those of Cossackia and Idel-Ural. The President's proclamation was comprehensive to include all; Congress' determinations to have all nations enjoy the blessings of freedom has never been less. It's comforting to note the editor's expression of trust and concern. Yes, indeed, Up With Idel-Ural!"

