


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WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMITMENTS



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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 25 AND 30, 1966

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

PART 1

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WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMITMENTS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 25, 1966

U.S. SENATE,
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee (composed of Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Saltonstall, Smith, and Thurmond) met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Senator John Stennis presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Saltonstall, Smith, and Thurmond.

Also present: James T. Kendall, chief counsel; Robert M. Neal, professional staff member; Stuart French, professional staff member; Ben Gilleas, professional staff member; Glenn A. Smith, professional staff member; Samuel R. Shaw, professional staff member.

CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT

Senator STENNIS. The subcommittee will please come to order.

Secretary Rusk, first, I want to say that you and your staff have certainly been cooperative with the subcommittee and we appreciate it very much. You have been quite helpful and we want to thank you. We know that your assistance will continue.

Another thing, in this open hearing, every member of this subcommittee is concerned, as you are, about the security of our Nation, and you will be the judge with reference to a question that may tend to get over the line and should not be answered in the open for reasons of security.

I want to say further to you that my special effort on this subject has caused me to have a new appreciation of the problems that you are up against and your fine efforts to try to solve them. I want to express that to you.

We are having this open hearing, Mr. Secretary, so that, as far as possible, we can get this problem before the American people and let them have a better understanding of some of the military problems—the military aspects of these worldwide problems that confront us.

I understand further that, since your appointment with us, the President has called an important meeting of the Cabinet at 12 o'clock and you will have to leave us at 11:45. I have a brief opening statement and then we will call on you.

Today we open hearings on the extent and nature of our worldwide military commitments and our ability to respond to them. We are pleased to have the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, as our first witness in this important inquiry.

This could become a historical hearing, a turning point in the legislative branch of the Government, seeking information on its own of this particular kind in order to have it available in case of an emergency or available in case of having matters suddenly submitted to us to pass on. It is our hope that, through these hearings, we will provide the Congress with its own factual information which can be used as its measuring rod against which to assess our strength, our weaknesses, and a measuring rod to measure the possibilities of our contemplated allies. This will be of special value to the whole Congress, but especially so to the Senate, which has to pass especially on matters of this kind.

We do not expect to infringe or intrude in any way on the prerogatives and the useful and valuable function discharged by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Secretary Rusk stated last February that there were 40 countries with which we have formed an agreement committing us to assist them militarily in the case of aggression. That assures us of the magnitude of our global commitments. It indicates also that, as a truly world power, we cannot afford to become overly preoccupied with one area of the world or one set of problems.

We cannot let the requirements and demands of southeast Asia, for example, degrade the importance of the NATO area which is still the decisive region for the United States and Western Europe. Although changes in and reductions of force commitments may be inevitable, it is still of primary importance that we and our NATO allies maintain adequate forces for deterrence and defense.

Yet we are faced with the hard fact that a relatively small and undeveloped country such as North Vietnam has been able to tie us down and require a very substantial commitment of our military manpower and resources over many months. This has impressed me tremendously. This clearly shows us what we can and must expect if similar wars of aggression or similar outbreaks should occur at other points around the world. This also makes it necessary that we face up realistically to the situation and make a hard-headed and realistic assessment of the problems with which we would be confronted if two, three, or more of such contingencies should occur simultaneously.

The Congress needs and must have all of the facts. We cannot afford to be satisfied with rosy generalizations to the effect that we are fully prepared to meet all of our treaty commitments throughout the world. We must have the facts and, in the last analysis, may very well have to make a distinction between what we are willing to do and what we are reasonably able to do within the limits of our military manpower, resources, and assets.

Further, we must always think in terms of using our manpower and resources in such a way that we will protect ourselves; we must guard against overcommitments that would drain away our manpower and resources, and thus leave us weakened and unable to protect ourselves.

Further, we are concerned about the military capability of our allies, as well as their willingness to respond in times of emergency.

I am also concerned about the economic support of those allies toward us, not the giving of funds or goods to us, but trading with our enemies when we are gripped in mortal conflict with them. I am concerned about the lack of moral and diplomatic support, too, from these same allies.

Among other matters which we propose to examine and study to a degree as we proceed with this matter is our military aid program and the status and effectiveness of it, although this is not an inquiry in and of itself.

To the extent possible, open hearings will be held on this matter. However, it is clear that the great majority of the testimony will have to be taken behind closed doors for security reasons. Secretary Rusk will appear before us again, which shall include a closed session.

There may be another open session, but it will certainly include an important closed session.

(Complete statement of Senator Stennis is as follows:)

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN STENNIS, CHAIRMAN, PREPAREDNESS
INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Today we open hearings on the extent and nature of our worldwide military commitments and our ability to respond to them. We are pleased to have the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, as our first witness in this important inquiry.

We believe that this study and inquiry has a special significance. It marks the first occasion, so far as we have been able to determine, when the legislative branch of the government has consciously undertaken a careful and deliberate assessment and survey of our military commitments and an evaluation of what is required of us and our allies in manpower, equipment and other resources if we are to be able to respond to these commitments.

It is our hope that, through this study, Congress will be provided with factual information which will serve as a measuring rod against which to assess our strength and our weaknesses as emergencies occur and as additional military commitments are being considered. Such a measuring rod—available in advance and kept up to date as far as possible—should be of immense value to the Congress in the future, since, with such information already developed, the Congress will not be forced to rely entirely on hastily prepared statements, information and estimates presented to us by the executive department in times of emergency or semi-emergency.

This information will be useful to the entire Congress but particularly to the Senate since it is to the Senate that all of the treaties by which we assume military commitments and obligations to other nations are referred for approval or rejection.

Although both the facts and the policy with respect to the military implications of this matter necessarily overlap to some extent, we do not expect to infringe or intrude upon the most useful and valuable functions discharged by the Committee on Foreign Relations. We are primarily interested in the extent of our military commitments and our ability to respond to them—in short, whether or not we are or may be over-extended either now or in the future.

These questions are of direct and primary concern to the military committees of the Congress since it is through these committees, and the Committees on Appropriations, that the Congress discharges its obligation to provide for the common defense and raise and support our military forces. To do this effectively we must have all facts which are necessary to enable us to reach informed and intelligent conclusions.

Secretary Rusk said in his appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations last February that there were over 40 countries with which we have formal agreements committing us to assist them militarily in the event of aggression. This indicates the magnitude of our global commitments. It indicates also that, as a truly world power, we cannot afford to become overly pre-occupied with one area of the world or one set of problems. We cannot let the requirements and demands of Southeast Asia, for example, degrade the importance of the NATO area which is still the decisive region of the United States and Western Europe. Although changes in and reductions in force commitments may be inevitable, it is still of primary importance that we and our NATO allies maintain adequate forces for deterrence and defense.

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months. This clearly shows us what we can and must expect if similar wars of aggression or similar outbreaks should occur at other points around the world. This also makes it necessary that we face up realistically to the situation and make a hardheaded and realistic assessment of the problems with which we would be confronted if two, three or more of such contingencies should occur simultaneously.

The Congress needs and must have all of the facts. We cannot afford to be satisfied with rosy generalizations to the effect that we are fully prepared to meet all of our treaty commitments throughout the world. We must have the facts and, in the last analysis, may very well have to make a distinction between what we are willing to do and what we are reasonably able to do within the limits of our military manpower, resources and assets.

Further, we must always think in terms of using our manpower and resources in such a way that we will protect ourselves; we must guard against over commitment that would drain away our manpower and resources and thus leave us weakened and unable to protect ourselves.

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To the extent possible, open hearings will be held on this matter. However, it is clear that the great majority of the testimony will have to be taken behind closed doors for security reasons. Secretary Rusk will appear before us again which shall include a closed session.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, I emphasize, sir, we are glad to have you and you may proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS; LEONARD C. MEEKER, LEGAL ADVISER; AND STANLEY FUTTERMAN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE LEGAL ADVISER

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Senator, distinguished Senators.

I appreciate, sir, your generous remarks about me personally, and I am also grateful that you have recognized that when we are discussing security and military matters, there are a number of things which ought to be discussed in private session rather than public session. As a matter of fact, if we Americans could talk about these things among ourselves, there would be very few secrets. Our problem is that there are other vast audiences listening in to everything that is said here, in the Congress or in its committee or by public speeches of officials—our allies, the nonaligned world, the Communist world. Sometimes in our discussions, we provide information which others ought not to have. Sometimes we cause effects in other parts of the world that we do not wish to cause. So I much appreciate your understanding on that point.

I am pleased to appear before this committee at the beginning of its hearings on the subject of this country's international defense commitments. I should like to begin by reviewing briefly with the committee the reasons lying behind those commitments.

The central object of our foreign policy, as I have stated often before, is what it has been since the founding of the Republic—to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." To this should be added our determination, expressed so eloquently in

the preamble to the U.N. Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind."

The basic political and military means that we and many other nations have chosen to achieve a lasting peace is, in the words of article 1 of the U.N. Charter:

To take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

This is a central purpose of the U.N. These, Mr. Chairman, are not just words. They represent the lessons drawn from World War II and the events which led up to World War II. They are the lessons upon which we have to build the prevention of World War III. An enormous price was paid for these lessons. Before the guns of World War II were silent, the nations of the world drew together to try to derive those lessons and to construct a peaceful world order.

So the United Nations itself represents the world's most ambitious attempt to organize collective security during peacetime. It is well to recall that, while the United Nations has perhaps fallen short of the far-reaching hopes that many entertained for it in 1945, the world organization has had many notable successes. The contribution it has made to maintaining some semblance of order in the postwar world has been indispensable.

U.N. machinery has been used for peacekeeping operations in such diverse situations as Indonesia, Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, Korea, Trieste, Suez, Lebanon, Laos, the Congo, West New Guinea, the Yemen, and Cyprus. We have as a U.N. member participated in the financing of all these operations. We have furnished logistic support and personnel for international observer teams in several instances. We contributed, as everyone knows, large combat forces in the case of the aggression against Korea.

The United Nations has not been able to deal effectively with all threats to the peace, nor will it be able to do so as long as certain of its members believe they must continue to compromise between their professed desire for peace and their short-range interest in achieving greater power or place in the world. Some member states have not been willing to place at the disposal of the United Nations means adequate to deal with all crises. There has not yet been found a solution to the problem of financing in the future such peacekeeping operations as those in the Middle East and in the Congo. Saddest of all, the United Nations has not been able to bring to the conference table the parties engaged in war in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the United Nations continues to offer the nations of the world the most promising means of maintaining international peace and security. A major share of the credit for preventing the sharp clash between India and Pakistan of last year from erupting into a major conflagration must go to the prompt action of the Security Council in bringing world opinion so forcefully and so quickly to bear on the parties.

It was recognized from the outset, however, that the United Nations might not prove able by itself to carry the full burden of collective

security. The charter explicitly provides for the existence of regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States, which would deal with problems of international peace and security in their respective areas. It also explicitly recognizes, in article 51, the inherent right of both individual and collective self-defense.

Consistently with the U.N. Charter, we have entered into multi-lateral and bilateral treaty arrangements with more than 40 countries on 5 continents. Chronologically, these arrangements begin, appropriately enough, with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, commonly called the Rio Treaty of 1947. It is the basic collective security instrument of the inter-American system and has been ratified by all 21 American republics. The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on our part by a vote of 72 to 1.

While we were turning to the problems of collective security in our hemisphere, the nations of Western Europe, faced with the fact of Soviet military power and unmistakable evidence of pressures by the Soviet Union against Europe, were organizing for security on their continent.

In March 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom concluded the Treaty of Brussels by which each nation pledged itself to assist the others in the case of military attack. One month later these five nations established a permanent military committee.

In June of 1948 the U.S. Senate adopted the resolution proposed by Senator Arthur Vandenberg calling for the "association of the United States by constitutional process with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid and as affect its national security." Pursuant to the Vandenberg resolution, negotiations for a wider defense arrangement in the North Atlantic area were begun, and in April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the United States and Canada and 10 nations of Western Europe. The Senate advised ratification by a vote of 82 to 13. In 1952 Greece and Turkey became parties, and in 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany did so.

The subsequent commitment of forces to NATO by the member countries, and the integrated planning for the use of these forces, represent an achievement in international organization that it had been hoped would be reached in the United Nations itself. Despite explicit provisions for such arrangements in chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, it has so far not been possible to implement them within the world organization. These arrangements, Mr. Chairman, have to do with the organization of United Nations forces under the Military Staff Committee under the terms of chapter VII of the charter.

The outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 in an area in which we had entered into no collective security arrangements brought home forcefully the need to try to prevent potential aggressors from again miscalculating what our reaction would be to an aggression threatening U.S. security interests as well as the peace of the world. In August 1951 we signed a mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent by a voice vote. The next month saw concluded a security treaty with Japan, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent by a vote of 58 to 9, and a tripartite security pact with Australia and New Zealand, commonly known as

ANZUS, approved by the Senate by voice vote. Mutual defense treaties were also concluded with the Republic of Korea in October 1953 and the Republic of China in December 1954, and a new treaty of mutual cooperation and security with Japan was signed by the United States in January 1960, replacing the treaty signed in 1951. The Senate gave its advice and consent to these treaties by votes of 81 to 6, 65 to 6, and 90 to 2, respectively.

The ANZUS Treaty of 1951 with Australian and New Zealand stated that it was entered into "pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area." In 1954 Communist military successes in Vietnam accentuated the need for such a system. Even before the Geneva Accords were concluded negotiations were proceeding among the governments concerned for a south-east Asia defense pact. In September at Manila eight nations—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States—concluded the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

The Southeast Asia Treaty was designed to protect from aggression not only the parties to it, but also the States and territory unanimously designated in a protocol—the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

I might insert here, Mr. Chairman, the remark that, in the 1962 agreements on Laos, the Government of Laos indicated that it would not call upon the SEATO Treaty and take advantage of the protections afforded under the protocol. Similarly, the Government of Cambodia has indicated that it would not expect to call upon SEATO for that protection. So what the protocol states is for all practical purposes at the present time limited to Vietnam.

Inasmuch as the United States was the one party to the treaty without territory of its own in the region, its commitment was limited by her understanding, made a part of the treaty, that only Communist aggression would be regarded as necessarily dangerous to its own peace and security and thus would activate its commitment to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. It was well understood at the time that these obligations covered the case of attacks by the North Vietnamese regime against parties to the treaty and protocol states. In the event of other than Communist aggression in the area, we are obligated to consult immediately in order to agree on the measures to be taken. The Senate's advice and consent to this treaty was given by a vote of 82 to 1.

These treaties represent legally binding commitments to take appropriate action at the request of an ally that is the victim of aggression. These commitments do not bind us to any particular course of action. Most of them state that in the event of aggression we would act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. How we act in fulfillment of these obligations will depend upon the facts of the situation. Some situations will require less participation on our part than others. What is fundamental to the fulfillment of our obligations under these agreements is that we act in good faith to fulfill their purpose. Thus, while the agreements permit great flexibility in choosing the means by which we would assist other countries in their defense, we could not expect that we would be regarded as fulfilling our obligation through the provision of

minimum assistance when the survival of the country concerned clearly necessitated greater aid.

The Committee on Foreign Relations well expressed the purpose of these commitments in its report on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. In urging the Senate to give its advice and consent to the treaty, the report stated:

The principle underlying this treaty is that advance notice of our intentions and the intentions of the nations associated with us may serve to deter potential aggressors from reckless action that could plunge the Pacific into war. To that end, the treaty makes it clear that the United States will not remain indifferent to conduct threatening the peace of Southeast Asia.

The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

I should like to emphasize that our defense commitments are fundamentally efforts to avoid the eventuality of armed conflict in which this country might become involved. They are basically defensive and deterrent.

These commitments do not increase the likelihood that we will have to fight. Rather, by making clear in advance our estimation of the requirements of national security, they reduce that likelihood.

In addition to U.S. treaty commitments, both the Congress through joint resolutions, and the executive branch through executive agreements and statements by the President, have indicated the U.S. interest in the security of a particular area or a particular country. Our interest in the stability of the Near East has been indicated through such means. In the 1950 Tripartite Declaration the United States, the United Kingdom, and France expressed their opposition to the use of force or threat of force in that area. Our policy was given further expression by the 1957 joint resolution of Congress to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. There the Congress declared that the "United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East" and that "if the President determines the necessity thereof the United States is prepared to use armed force to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."

Pursuant to this authorization, our interest in the security of the Near East has been further evidenced by our association, albeit as a nonmember, with the Central Treaty Organization. The United States maintains membership on the Scientific Council and on the Military, Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees of CENTO, and is an observer on the Ministers Council. In the 1958 declaration respecting the Baghdad Pact the United States expressed its intention to cooperate with the members of the pact for their security and defense and followed that up with identical bilateral agreements of cooperation, which are public, with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. These agreements declared that in the event of aggression the United States would take such appropriate action as may be mutually agreed upon.

In Europe and in Africa we have similarly indicated our interest in the security of particular countries not covered by treaty arrangements. For example, the 1959 Agreement on Cooperation with Liberia, an expression of the historic ties that have existed between the two countries, states that in the event of aggression or its threat the two governments will immediately determine what action may be appropriate for the defense of Liberia.

Similarly, the joint declaration concerning the 1963 renewal of the defense agreement with Spain states that:

A threat to either country and to the joint facilities that each provide for the common defense, would be a matter of common concern to both countries, and each country would take such action as it may consider appropriate within the framework of its constitutional processes.

Joint resolutions and executive agreements such as I have discussed, as well as statements by the President indicating our intentions should a country fall victim to aggression, may be regarded as supplementing our treaty arrangements. In common with the commitments expressed in those arrangements, they serve two purposes:

1. They warn potential aggressors that aggression would risk action by the United States.
2. They provide confidence to the country concerned which knows that the United States does not lightly indicate its intention to provide support.

As the subcommittee is aware, the United States has military bases in a number of countries in different parts of the world. The great majority of these are in countries with which we have defense and security treaties. Whether or not we have such a treaty with a particular country, the presence there of a U.S. base clearly signifies an interest and concern on our part with the security of that country. In the event of aggression against the country, or a threat to its security, which at the same time affected our military base, the United States would of course consult about the situation with the host government.

I should add a further word on the possibility that the U.S. Armed Forces might be used in collective defense against an armed aggression. No would-be aggressor should suppose that the absence of a defense treaty, congressional declaration, or U.S. military presence grants immunity to aggression. For one thing and most important, the responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to aggression are worldwide. There have been many occasions when the United Nations have moved to meet a breach of international peace. The United States, as an important and responsible member of the United Nations, may be required in the future, in accordance with established Charter procedures, to take action that cannot now be anticipated with any precision. Moreover, although the matter is somewhat hypothetical because we are looking into the fog of the future, the United States cannot overlook the possibility that its own national interests and its concern for the maintenance of international peace might require us to take some action in some situation we do not now foresee. This would be for the President and the Congress at that time to determine in the light of the circumstances.

The United States does not conceive itself to be the world's policeman. A glance at the lengthy continuing agenda of the United Nations Security Council discloses many situations posing potential threats

to the peace in which the United States has not undertaken any direct responsibility.

I think, for example, on that cumulative agenda of the Security Council, there are now some 71 items. At least half of those items on the agenda have to do with quarrels or situations which lead to violence or could easily lead to violence. We have ourselves been directly involved in only a minority of those 30 to 40 instances.

In addition, other nations, of course, have responsibilities that do not directly involve the United States. For example, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have commitments to their fellow Commonwealth member Malaysia. On the African Continent we have been pleased to see that the Organization of African Unity has succeeded in dealing with certain disputes between African States.

So we are not trying to establish a pax Americana, but rather to play our part in establishing a general system of peace among nations. The United States remains committed, over the long term, to strengthen world machinery for keeping peace throughout the world. This cannot be the task of one nation or a few. We look forward to the time when all will join in the effort, and specifically to the time when all will join in the effort by themselves keeping the peace and living at peace with their neighbors.

Meanwhile, we shall do our part, in the United Nations and in the discharge of our other security commitments.

COMPILATION OF U.S. DEFENSE COMMITMENTS

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

For the record, members of the subcommittee, I wish to insert following Secretary Rusk's remarks a compilation of our defense commitments and obligations prepared at our request and transmitted to us by Ambassador MacArthur on August 19.

(The compilation referred to is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 19, 1966.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am transmitting herewith at your request a compilation of United States commitments and assurances prepared by the Department. It consists of those provisions of formal treaties and agreements, and official declarations by the Congress, the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State, concerning actions the United States would take if another country were the victim of aggression. Commitments to provide military assistance during peacetime are not included.

The compilation is in two parts. Part I includes the relevant provisions of treaties and agreements that have been published in United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (TIAS). Part II includes official declarations, both joint and unilateral, that have not been published in the TIAS volumes, and which supplement existing inter-governmental agreements.

I trust that this compilation will be helpful in the work of your Committee.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Hon. JOHN STENNIS,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Preparedness Investigation,
Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.

U.S. DEFENSE COMMITMENTS AND ASSURANCES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AUGUST 1966

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I. PROVISIONS IN TREATIES AND OTHER FORMAL AGREEMENTS

A. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, JUNE 26, 1945¹

Parties

United States
116 other countries [as of June 20, 1966]

Relevant Provisions

Art. 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Art. 43: All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

* * * * *

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. . . .

Art. 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

* * * * *

¹59 Stat. 1031. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945; entered into force for the United States October 24, 1945.

B. WESTERN HEMISPHERE

1. *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact), September 2, 1947*¹*Parties*

| | |
|--------------------|-----------|
| United States | Guatemala |
| Argentina | Haiti |
| Bolivia | Honduras |
| Brazil | Mexico |
| Chile | Nicaragua |
| Colombia | Panama |
| Costa Rica | Paraguay |
| Cuba ² | Peru |
| Dominican Republic | Uruguay |
| Ecuador | Venezuela |
| El Salvador | |

Relevant Provisions

Art. 3: (i) The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(ii) On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

(iii) The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American State. When the attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provisions of Article 6 shall be applied.

(iv) * * *

Art. 6: If the inviolability of the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intracontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

Art. 8: For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: * * * and use of armed force.

Art. 20: Decisions which require the application of the measures specified in Article 8 shall be binding upon all the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty, with the sole exception that no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent.

2. *Applicability of North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949*

[Canada and Iceland, as signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty, are covered by the commitments embodied in that Treaty. Greenland, as part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and the Bahamas and Bermuda as "islands under the jurisdiction of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer" are likewise covered by that Treaty. For the NATO commitments, see C.1, below.]

¹ TIAS 1838. Opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947; entered into force for the United States December 3, 1948.

² Resolution VI, of the Final Act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Punta del Este; signed January 31, 1962, excluded "the present Government of Cuba, which has officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government" from participation in the inter-American system.

3. *Bilateral Agreements—*a. *Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, concerning the defense of Greenland, April 27, 1951*¹

Relevant Provisions

Art. 1: The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, in order to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Treaty area² by uniting their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security and for the development of their collective capacity to resist armed attack, will each take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry out expeditiously their respective and joint responsibilities in Greenland, in accordance with NATO plans.

Art. 2: In order that the Government of the United States of America as a party to the North Atlantic Treaty may assist the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark by establishing and/or operating such defense areas as the two Governments, on the basis of NATO defense plans, may from time to time agree to be necessary for the development of the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty Area, and which the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark is unable to establish and operate single-handed, the two Governments in respect of the defense areas thus selected, agree to the following:

* * * * *

(3) In cases where it is agreed that responsibility for the operation and maintenance of any defense area shall fall to the Government of the United States of America, the following provisions shall apply:

* * * * *

(b) * * * the Government of the United States of America, without compensation to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, shall be entitled within such defense area and the air spaces and waters adjacent thereto:

* * * * *

(iii) to station and house personnel and to provide for their health, recreation and welfare.

* * * * *

(4) In cases where it is agreed that responsibility for the operation and maintenance of any defense area shall fall to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Government of the United States of America may attach United States military personnel to the staff of the commanding officer of such defense area, under the command of an officer with whom the Danish commanding officer shall consult of all important local matters affecting United States interest pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(b) The Government of the United States of America * * * may use such defense area in cooperation with the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark for the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area * * *

* * * * *

Art. 4: In connection with activities for the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area, the defense area will so far as practicable, be made available to vessels and aircraft belonging to other Governments parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and to the armed forces of such Governments.

* * * * *

b. *Defense Agreement Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Iceland, May 5, 1951*³

Relevant Provisions

Having regard to the fact that the people of Iceland cannot themselves adequately secure their own defenses, * * * [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has requested the U.S. and Iceland to] make arrangements for the use of facilities in Iceland in defense of Iceland. * * *

Art. 1: The United States on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in accordance with its responsibilities under the North Atlantic Treaty will

¹ TIAS 2292. Signed at Copenhagen April 27, 1951; entered into force June 8, 1951.
² Both the United States and Denmark are members of NATO. See *ante*, p. 10.
³ TIAS 2266. Signed at Reykjavik May 5, 1951; entered into force May 5, 1951.

make arrangements regarding the defense of Iceland subject to the conditions set forth in this agreement. For this purpose and in view of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, Iceland will provide such facilities in Iceland as are mutually agreed to be necessary.

[Arts. 2-8 relate to the use of facilities, the composition of forces, the status of Keflavik Airport, etc.]

c. North American Air Defense Command Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, United States-Canada, May 12, 1958¹

Relevant Provisions

Studies made by representatives of our two Governments led to the conclusion that the problem of the air defence of our two countries could best be met by delegating to an integrated headquarters the task of exercising operational control over combat units of the national forces made available for the air defence of the two countries. * * * The agreed integration is intended to assist the two Governments to develop and maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist air attack on their territories in North America in mutual self-defense.

* * * My Government proposes that the following principles should govern the future organization and operations of the North American Air Defence Command.

1. * * *

2. The North American Air Defence Command will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two Governments. The jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD, over those units and individuals is limited to operational control as hereinafter defined.

3. "Operational Control" is the power to direct, co-ordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available. * * *

4-11. * * *

d. General Treaty Between the United States and Panama, March 2, 1936²

Article X

In case of an international conflagration or the existence of any threat of aggression which would endanger the security of the Republic of Panama or the neutrality or security of the Panama Canal, the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Panama will take such measures of prevention and defense as they may consider necessary for the protection of their common interests. Any measures, in safeguarding such interests, which it shall appear essential to one Government to take, and which may affect the territory under the jurisdiction of the other Government, will be the subject of consultation between the two Governments.

C. EUROPE

1. North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949³

Parties

| | |
|---------------|--|
| United States | Netherlands |
| Belgium | Norway |
| Canada | Portugal |
| Denmark | United Kingdom |
| France | Greece ⁴ |
| Iceland | Turkey ⁴ |
| Italy | Federal Republic of Germany ⁵ |
| Luxembourg | |

¹ TIAS 4031. Signed at Washington May 12, 1958; entered into force May 12, 1958.

² Treaty Series No. 945. Signed March 2, 1936; ratification advised by Senate, July 25, 1939; ratified by President, July 26, 1939; proclaimed by President, July 27, 1939.

³ TIAS 1964. Signed April 4, 1949; ratification advised by Senate, July 21, 1949; ratified by President, July 25, 1949; proclaimed by President, August 24, 1949; entered into force August 29, 1949.

⁴ Acceded by Protocol, February 18, 1952, TIAS 2390, October 17, 1951.

⁵ Acceded by Protocol, May 5, 1955, TIAS 3428, October 23, 1954.

Relevant Provisions

Art. 3: * * * The Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Art. 4: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Art. 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, * * * [on the basis of Art. 51 of the UN Charter] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. [Provides also for "immediately" reporting to the UN Security Council any armed attacks and all consequent measures, and for terminating such measures when the Security Council has acted to restore and maintain peace and security.]

Art. 6: [As modified by the Protocol on the Accession of Greece and Turkey] For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack—

(i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,¹ on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

(ii) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

2. *Joint Declaration Concerning the Renewal of the Defense Agreement of September 26, 1953, United States-Spain, September 26, 1963*²

Relevant Provisions

* * * In affirming the importance of their bilateral Defense Agreement [signed Sept. 26, 1953, TIAS 2850], which will be applied in the new five year period of its validity in the spirit of this Declaration, they [the Governments of the United States of America and of Spain] consider it to be necessary and appropriate that the Agreement form a part of the security arrangements for the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas.

The United States Government reaffirms its recognition of the importance of Spain to the security, well-being and development of the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. The two governments recognize that the security and integrity of both the United States and Spain are necessary for the common security. A threat to either country, and to the joint facilities that each provides for the common defense, would be a matter of common concern to both countries, and each country would take such action as it may consider appropriate within the frame work of its constitutional processes.

* * * * *

[Signed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk for the United States]

D. NEAR EAST—MIDDLE EAST

1. *Applicability of North Atlantic Treaty Since 1952*

[On February 18, 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty. Since that date they have been covered by the commitments of that Treaty. (See C.I., above).]

2. *United States Membership in CENTO Committees*

The Pact of Mutual Cooperation (Baghdad Pact) between Iraq, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Iran was signed at Baghdad, February 24, 1955. (Text in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 1257-1259.)

¹ Considering the independence of Algeria, the North Atlantic Council on January 16, 1963, noted that insofar as the former Algerian Department of France were concerned the relevant clauses of this treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

² TIAS 5437. Signed at New York, September 26, 1953.

It was redesignated the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) by a resolution of the Council of the Treaty Organization adopted August 21, 1959 following the announcement by Iraq of its decision to withdraw. The United States is a member of the Military, Economic, and Anti-Subversion Committees of CENTO and an observer at the Council meetings.

3. *Bilateral Agreements— a. Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Imperial Government of Iran, March 5, 1959*¹

Relevant Provisions

Art. 1: The Imperial Government of Iran is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Iran, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Iran at its request.

b. *Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Turkey, March 5, 1959*²

Relevant Provisions

1. The Government of Turkey is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Turkey, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Turkey at its request.

E. AFRICA: AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA, JULY 8, 1959³

Relevant Provisions

Art. 1: In the event of aggression or threat of aggression against Liberia, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Liberia will immediately determine what action may be appropriate for the defense of Liberia.

F. SOUTH ASIA

1. *United States Membership in CENTO Committees*

[Pakistan is a member of CENTO, in certain activities of which the United States participates. (See Sect. I.D.2., above).]

2. *Membership of the United States and Pakistan in SEATO*

[See Sections G.1., "Southeast Asia-Southwest Pacific".]

3. *Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Pakistan, March 5, 1959*⁴

Relevant Provisions

Art. 1: The Government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.

¹ TIAS 4189. Signed at Ankara March 5, 1959; entered into force March 5, 1959.

² TIAS 4191. Signed at Ankara March 5, 1959; entered into force March 5, 1959.

³ TIAS 4303. Signed July 8, 1959; entered into force July 8, 1959.

⁴ TIAS 4190. Signed March 5, 1959; entered into force March 5, 1959. This bilateral agreement of cooperation was entered into pursuant to the Declaration Relating to the Baghdad Pact signed at London July 28, 1958 (see Section D, "Near East—Middle East").

G. SOUTH ASIA—SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

1. *Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954*¹*Parties*

United States
Australia
France
New Zealand
Pakistan
Philippines

Thailand
United Kingdom
Cambodia²
Laos²
Free territory under the jurisdiction of
the State of Vietnam²

Relevant Provisions

Art. 2: In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Art. 4: (i) Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

(ii) If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

(iii) It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

Understanding of the United States of America

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

2. *Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS Pact), September 1, 1951*³*Relevant Provisions*

Art. 4: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

¹ TIAS 3170. Signed September 8, 1954; ratification advised by the Senate, February 1, 1955; ratified by the President, February 4, 1955; proclaimed by the President, February 19, 1955; entered into force, February 19, 1955.

² Included (for the purposes of Article IV) by the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, TIAS 3170, signed September 8, 1954; entered into force, February 19, 1955. Cambodia has indicated disinterest in the protection of the Southeast Asia Treaty. In the Geneva Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, the Royal Government of Laos declared that it will not "recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition including SEATO," and the United States and other nations agreed to "respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO."

³ TIAS 2493. Signed September 1, 1951; ratification advised by the Senate, March 20, 1952; ratified by the President, April 15, 1952; proclaimed by the President, May 9, 1952; entered into force April 29, 1952.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

3. *Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, August 30, 1951*¹

Relevant Provisions

Art. 4: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Art. 5: * * * an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

H. EAST ASIA

1. *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan, January 19, 1960*²

Relevant Provisions

Art. 5: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

2. *Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China, December 2, 1954*³

Relevant Provisions

Art. 2: In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Art 5: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

[In its report on the Treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations included the following: "It is the understanding of the Senate that the obligations of the parties under Article V apply only in the event of external armed attack;

¹ TIAS 2529. Signed August 30, 1951; ratification advised by the Senate, March 20, 1952; ratified by the President, April 15, 1952; proclaimed by the President, September 15, 1952; entered into force, August 27, 1952.

² TIAS 4509. Signed January 19, 1960; ratification advised by the Senate, June 22, 1960; ratified by the President, June 22, 1960; proclaimed by the President, June 27, 1960; entered into force, June 23, 1960.

³ TIAS 3178. Signed December 2, 1954; ratification advised by the Senate, February 9, 1955; ratified by the President, February 11, 1955; proclaimed by the President, April 1, 1955; entered into force March 3, 1955.

and that military operations by either party from the territories held by the Republic of China shall not be undertaken except by joint agreement.”]

3. *Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October 1, 1953*¹

Relevant Provisions

Art. 2: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separate and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

Art. 3: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter, recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

[In advising and consenting to the ratification of the treaty the Senate added the following understanding: “It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article III of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea.”]

II. PROVISIONS OF OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS

A. WESTERN HEMISPHERE

1. *Seventh Annual Message of President Monroe to Congress (“The Monroe Doctrine”), December 2, 1823*²

Relevant Passages

* * * The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interest of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. * * * The political system of the allied powers [the “Holy Alliance”] is essentially different * * * from that of America. * * * We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. * * * With the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. * * *

2. *Statement by the Department of State on the Monroe Doctrine, July 14, 1960*³

Relevant Passage

* * * * *
 The principles [of the Monroe Doctrine] which the United States Government enunciated in the face of the attempts of the old imperialism to intervene in the affairs of this hemisphere are as valid today for the attempts of the new im-

¹ TIAS 3097. Signed October 1, 1953; ratification advised by the Senate, with an understanding, January 26, 1954; ratified by the President, subject to the said understanding, February 5, 1954; proclaimed by the President, December 1, 1954; entered into force, November 17, 1954.

² J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897*, volume II, pp. 207-220.

³ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 210-212.

perialism. * * * Today, nearly a century and a half later, the United States is gratified that these principles are not professed by itself alone but represent through solemn agreements the views of the American community as a whole.

3. *The Ogdensburg Agreement: Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada, August 18, 1940*¹

Relevant Passages

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall be set up at once by the two countries.

This Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land, and air problems including personnel and matériel.

It will consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.

* * * * *

4. *Joint Announcement on Defense, United States-Canada, February 12, 1947*²

Relevant Passages

In the interest of efficiency and economy, each Government has decided that its national defense establishment shall, to the extent authorized by law, continue to collaborate for peacetime joint security purposes. * * *

[Citing the "identity of view and interest between the two countries", and noting that "no treaty, executive agreement, or contractual obligation has been entered into"³, the announcement quoted the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 1940 which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.]

In discharging this continuing responsibility [for the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere] the Board's work led to the building up of a pattern of close defense cooperation. The principles announced on February 12 are in continuance of this cooperation. * * *

5. *Joint Statement at Washington by President Kennedy and President Betancourt of Venezuela, February 20, 1963*⁴

Relevant Passage

* * * * *

The President of the United States pledged the full support of his country to the Republic of Venezuela in resisting the all-out campaign of the international Communists, aided especially by their Cuban allies, to overthrow the constitutional Government of President Betancourt.

* * * * *

[When asked at a news conference on March 6, 1963 about the nature of the "full support" in case of a serious or successful revolution against Betancourt, President Kennedy replied:

"Well, it would depend a good deal on the conditions and what our obligations might be under the Rio treaty. We strongly support President Betancourt's efforts in Venezuela in a good number of ways. But if you are asking me, I would have to see what the conditions were, what the responsibilities were under the Rio treaty, the OAS, if we knew we were going into a more substantial situation. If you are talking about aggression from the outside, the answer is very clear. If you are talking about internal acts, we would have to judge those acts and depend a good deal on what the Government of Venezuela decided was the appropriate response."]

¹ Made at Ogdensburg, New York; text in *Department of State Bulletin*, August 24, 1940, p. 154.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, volume XVI, No. 399, February 23, 1947, p. 361.

³ Subsequently both Canada and the United States becomes parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

⁴ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy*, 1963, p. 188.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

B. EUROPE

1. *Statement by President Eisenhower on United States Policy Toward the Western European Union, March 10, 1955*¹

[In a message to the Prime Ministers of the signatories to the Western European Union protocols—Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—President Eisenhower referred to a similar statement of principles he had made on April 15, 1954, in anticipation of the European Defense Community, and to the fact that the latter had evolved into the Western European Union plan.]

Relevant Passages

I am glad to affirm that when the Paris Agreements [establishing the Western European Union arrangements] have been ratified and have come into force, it will be the policy of the United States:

* * * * *

(3) To continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and will continue [sic] to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area;

* * * * *

(6) * * * to regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens the integrity and unity of the Western European Union as a threat to the security of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty calling for consultation in accordance with Article 4 of that Treaty.

2. *Communique, North Atlantic Council Ministerial Session, Athens, May 6, 1962*²*Relevant Passage*

* * * the Ministers welcomed the confirmation by the United States that it will continue to make available for the Alliance the nuclear weapons necessary for NATO defense, concerting with its allies on basic plans and arrangements in regard to these weapons. In addition, both the United Kingdom and the United States Governments have given firm assurances that their strategic forces will continue to provide defense against threats to the Alliance beyond the capability of NATO-committed forces to deal with.

3. *Final Act, London Nine-Power Conference, Declaration by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, October 3, 1954*³*Relevant Passages*

5. The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

6. They will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three Governments, * * * will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty [which calls for consultation] with a view to taking other measures which may be appropriate.

4. *Statement by President Kennedy Regarding Berlin, in Address to the Nation, July 25, 1961*⁴*Relevant Passage*

We are there [Berlin] as a result of our victory over Nazi Germany, and our basic rights to be there deriving from that victory include both our presence in

¹ *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, volume I, pp. 989-991.

² *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 541-543.

³ *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, volume I, pp. 1481-1483.

⁴ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, pp. 604-612.

West Berlin and the enjoyment of access across East Germany. * * * But in addition to those rights is our commitment to sustain—and defend, if need be—the opportunity for more than 2 million people to determine their own future and choose their own way of life. * * * The NATO shield was long ago extended to cover West Berlin, and we have given our word that an attack in that city will be regarded as an attack upon us all.

5. *Address by Vice-President Johnson before the West Berlin House of Representatives, August 19, 1961*¹

Relevant Passage

I have come to Berlin by direction of President Kennedy. He wants you to know—and I want you to know—that the pledge he has given to the freedom of West Berlin and to the rights of Western access to Berlin is firm. To the survival and to the creative future of this city we Americans have pledged, in effect, what our ancestors pledged in forming the United States: “* * * our Lives, our Fortunes and our Sacred Honor”. * * *

6. *Statement by Secretary of State Rusk Regarding Berlin, in Address at Davidson College, February 22, 1962*²

Relevant Passage

The Western allies, backed by all the NATO powers have the most solemn obligation to protect the freedom of the West Berliners. * * * To protect this freedom requires the continued presence of Allied troops and free rights of access. * * *

7. *Joint Communique, President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer of Germany, November 15, 1962*³

Relevant Passage

It is agreed * * * that the freedom and viability of Berlin will be preserved in all circumstances and with all means.

8. *Joint Communique, President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard of Germany, June 12, 1964*⁴

Relevant Passage

The President restated the determination of the United States to carry out fully its commitments with respect to Berlin, including the maintenance of the right of free access to West Berlin and the continued freedom and viability of the city.

C. NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EAST

1. *Message of President Truman to Congress (“The Truman Doctrine”), March 12, 1947*⁵

Relevant Passage

* * * * *
 I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly processes.

* * * * *

¹ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 634-635.

² *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 689-690.

³ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 626-627.

⁴ *Department of State Bulletin*, volume L, No. 1305, June 29, 1964, pp. 992-994.

⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, Supplement of May 4, 1947, pp. 829-832. The message was delivered by the President before a joint session of Congress.

2. *Joint Resolution To Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East ("The Eisenhower Doctrine")*, March 9, 1957¹

Relevant Passage

Sec. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or groups of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

3. *Tripartite Declaration (United States-United Kingdom-France) regarding Security in the Near East*, May 25, 1950²

Relevant Passage

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states [i.e. the Arab states and Israel] was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

4. *Multilateral Declaration respecting the Baghdad Pact*, July 28, 1958³

Parties

United States
Pakistan
Iran

Turkey
United Kingdom

Relevant Passages

1. The members of the Baghdad Pact attending the Ministerial meeting in London * * * declare their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect.

4. Article 1 of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, provides that the parties will co-operate for their security and defense and that such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements. Similarly, the United States in the interest of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional authorization, agrees to co-operate with the nations making this Declaration for their security and defense, and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation.

5. *Joint Communiqué, President Kennedy and the Shah of Iran (Mohammed Reza Pahlavi)*, Washington, April 13, 1962⁵

Relevant Passages

* * * * *

Their talks included a review of political and military situations in the world; a discussion of the progress which Iran is making in economic and social advancement; a review of defense arrangements in which the two countries are associated; and aspects of United States economic and military aid programs in Iran.

* * * * *

¹ House Joint Resolution 117, 85th Cong., 1st sess.; approved by the President, March 9, 1957.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886.

³ TIAS 4084. Signed at London July 28, 1958; entered into force for the United States July 28, 1958.

⁴ Iraq was not present.

⁵ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 778-779.

They discussed and were in complete agreement on the subject of the nature of the threat to the Middle East and to all free peoples. They reaffirmed the provisions of the bilateral agreement of 1959 concerning the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Iran, and agreed on the necessity of collective security arrangements to achieve this end.

- * * * * *
6. *Letter from President Kennedy to Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia, October 25, 1962*¹

Relevant Passage

* * * * *

... Under your firm and enlightened leadership I am confident Saudi Arabia will move ahead successfully on the path of modernization and reform which it has already charted for itself. In pursuing this course you may be assured of full United States support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity.

- * * * * *
7. *Statement on Jordan and Saudi Arabia by Secretary of State Rusk, in a News Conference, March 8, 1963*²

Relevant Passages

[In response to a question on political stability in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Secretary Rusk stated:]

* * * * *

We of course are concerned about the independence of these Arab states and their freedom from external penetration. * * * We are very much interested in the independence and the security of our friends in Jordan and Arabia and will be very much alert to any threats against them.

8. *Reply by President Kennedy to a News Conference Question Concerning the Middle East, May 8, 1963*³

Relevant Passage

* * * * *

We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East, and we also seek to limit the spread of communism in the Middle East which would, of course, destroy the independence of the people. This Government has been and remains strongly opposed to the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East. In the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or put a stop to such aggression, which, of course, has been the policy which the United States has followed for some time.

9. *Remarks of President Johnson During Exchange of Toasts With President Shazar of Israel, August 2, 1966*⁴

Relevant Passage

[Reaffirming President Kennedy's statement of May 8, 1963 which expressed American support for the security of both Israel and her neighbors,⁵ President Johnson said:]

We subscribe to that policy.

D. AFRICA

The Department is not aware of any published official statements by the Congress, the President, the Vice-President, or the Secretary of State containing United States defense assurances to African countries.

¹ White House press release dated January 8, 1963 (text in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, p. 783).

² Department of State Press Release 121, Mar. 8, 1963, text in *Department of State Bulletin XLVIII*, No. 1239, Mar. 25, 1963, p. 435.

³ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, p. 373.

⁴ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Aug. 8, 1966, Vol. 2, No. 31, p. 1019.

⁵ See Item II, C. 7., p. 48.

E. SOUTH ASIA

1. *Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Nehru of India, February 24, 1954*¹

Relevant Passage

* * * * *

* * * I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the U.N. to thwart such aggression. * * *

* * * * *

2. *Assurances to Pakistan Respecting the Extension of Military Assistance to India; Statement by the Department of State, November 17, 1962*²

Relevant Passages

[Referring to an exchange of notes between the United States Government and the Government of India released the same day (November 17), which concerned the provision of military aid to India, and citing the assurances given to India in 1954 when similar aid was extended to Pakistan,³ the statement continued:]

* * * * *

The Government of the United States of America has similarly assured the Government of Pakistan that, if our assistance to India should be misused and directed against another in aggression, the United States would undertake immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression.

Needless to say, in giving these assurances the United States is confident that neither of the countries which it is aiding harbors aggressive designs.

F. SOUTHEAST ASIA⁴

1. *Joint Resolution To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf Resolution), August 10, 1964*⁴

Relevant Passages

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

2. *Joint Statement, Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand, March 6, 1962*⁵

Relevant Passages

* * * * *

The Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United States regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United States and to world peace. He expressed the firm intention of

¹ Text as printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, XXX, No. 768, Mar. 15, 1954, pp. 400-401.

² Dept. of State press release 683, Nov. 17, 1962, text as printed in *Dept. of State Bulletin*, XLVII, No. 1223, Dec. 3, 1962, pp. 837-838.

³ See item E.1., p. 50.

⁴ House Joint Resolution 1145, 88th Cong., 2d sess., August 10, 1964; 78 Stats. 384.

⁵ Department of State Press Release, No. 145, March 6, 1962.

the United States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in resisting Communist aggression and subversion.

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State * * * agreed that the Treaty [Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty] provides the basis for the signatories collectively to assist Thailand in case of [direct] Communist armed attack against that country. The Secretary of State assured the Foreign Minister that in the event of such aggression, the United States intends to give full effect to its obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as well as collective.

In reviewing measures to meet indirect aggression, the Secretary of State stated that the United States regards its commitments to Thailand under the Southeast Asia Collective Treaty and under its bilateral economic and military assistance agreements with Thailand as providing an important basis for United States actions to help Thailand meet indirect aggression. In this connection the Secretary reviewed with the Foreign Minister the actions being taken by the United States to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam to meet the threat of indirect aggression.

* * * * *

3. *Declaration of Honolulu, President Johnson, Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, February 8, 1966*¹

Relevant Passage

The President of the United States and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam are thus pledged again—

- to defense against aggression,
- to the work of social revolution,
- to the goal of free self-government,
- to the attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease, and
- to the unending quest for peace.

G. EAST ASIA

1. *Joint Resolution Authorizing the President to Employ the Armed Forces of the United States for Protecting the Security of Formosa, the Pescadores and Related Positions and Territories of that Area (Formosa Straits Resolution), January 29, 1955*²

Relevant Passage

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purposes of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. * * *

2. *Statement on Formosa and the offshore Islands by President Kennedy in a Press Conference, June 27, 1962*³

Our basic position has always always been that we are opposed to the use of force in this area. * * * [In the event of] aggressive action against the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy * * * the United States will take the action necessary to assure the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. * * * In my own discussion of this issue in the campaign of 1960, * * * I stated this position very plainly, for example, on October 16, 1960: "The position of the administration has been that we would defend Quemoy and Matsu if there were an attack which was part of an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores. * * *" Under this policy sustained continuously by the United States Government since 1954, it is clear

¹ Text in LIV Department of State Bulletin 305-307.

² House Joint Resolution 159, 84th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 29, 1955 (Text in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Document* (2 volumes, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957). Volume II, pp. 2486-2487.)

³ *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 509-517.

that any threat to the offshore islands must be judged in relation to its wider meaning for the safety of Formosa and the peace of the area. Exactly what action would be necessary in the event of any such act of force would depend on the situation as it developed. * * *

3. *Reply to question at Press Conference in Korea by Vice President Humphrey, February 23, 1966*¹

Relevant Passage

The United States Government and the people of the United States have a firm commitment to the defense of Korea. As long as there is one American soldier on the line of the border, the demarkation line, the whole and the entire power of the United States of America is committed to the security and defense of Korea. Korea today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. America today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. We are allies, we are friends, you should have no questions, no doubts.

II. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC: JOINT COMMUNIQUE, PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT MACAPAGAL, OCTOBER 6, 1964²

Relevant Passage

The two Presidents recognized that the aggressive intentions and activities of Communist China continue to present an imminent threat in the Far East and in Southeast Asia. They reviewed, in this connection, the importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States in maintaining the security of both countries, and reaffirmed their commitment to meet any threat that might arise against their security. President Johnson made it clear that, in accordance with these existing alliances and the deployment and dispositions thereunder, any armed attack against the Philippines would be regarded as an attack against United States forces stationed there and against the United States and would instantly be repelled.

ROLE OF JAPAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, let me make clear that this subcommittee is not, in this hearing or in any other way, suggesting that we turn our back on any agreement that we have made. Certainly, we are not discrediting the United Nations or any organization of that kind. I was not here in the Senate when the United Nations Treaty was passed. I certainly would have voted for it. I voted for a goodly number of those that you mentioned, and those that I did not vote for, I did so because it seemed to me that they were too unilateral, there was not any prospect for any promise of any real help, and that we were getting overcommitted. But I do not want to discredit any of those. We must carry them out the best we can.

But, now, getting down to specifics, we think in terms of American manpower to meet the actualities and realities of today in Asia. Our subcommittee just does not think in terms of manpower that may be available from the United Nations or manpower that may be available from our Western allies, and only to a small degree, so far, of manpower that may be available in the Pacific area.

One thing that has come to my mind—I do not know how far you want to go into this—but in that vast western Pacific area the nation that is most capable in this age of doing a real military thrust is Japan. Even though it is valuable to us to have bases there, and I do not discount that, I do not see how we can continue to hold the line in that great area of the world without Japan's active help. Do you want to

¹ Korea Times, February 24, 1966.

² Text in LI Department of State Bulletin, pp. 632-634.

comment on that in open session? I do not know how far you would want to go into that, but it is of great concern to some of us.

Secretary RUSK. I would be glad to make a remark on that in open session and then pursue it further, if you would like, in private session.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I think there is a special historical background there that affects the position of Japan. It was one of our enemies in World War II. At the conclusion of that war, those who fought against Japanese militarism were determined to insure that that kind of Japan would not again threaten the peace of the Pacific. During the period of General MacArthur's occupation, Japan was for all practical purposes demilitarized. Indeed, in their Constitution there were written provisions against the reconstruction of a significant military force. There are legal and constitutional barriers about their using force outside of their own country for other than the defense of Japan.

Now, it is true that Japan has been playing an increasingly important and larger role, not only in the Pacific but in world affairs. We have a security treaty with Japan. Japan has been increasing its own ability to defend itself somewhat. But there has been in this postwar period a strong tradition, both in Japan and among its neighbors, against the building up of a Japan that might resemble in any way pre-World War II Japan.

I should be glad to pursue this further in private about what the future might hold. I think Japan itself is recognizing that it has a major interest in peace in the Pacific and a stabilization of the situation there.

EXTENT OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES

Senator STENNIS. We shall be glad to hear you further. I was not suggesting that Japan could immediately move into the broader military field. I know what the commitments and restrictions are.

You make the statement at the top of page 10, "The United States does not conceive itself to be the world's policeman." We applaud that statement. But I put this in the form of a question. Some of us have about decided that everyone else conceives us to be the world's policeman and expects us to protect them. Having the enormous power that we have, including our special nonconventional weapons, I am concerned, and I think others are concerned, that it is taken for granted that we have that power and that they can coast along. I say that with all respect to other nations. Do you want to respond to that?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator. I think it might be well for me to furnish to the committee on this subject a scanning of the crises that have developed in various parts of the world, say over the last 5 years, in order that the committee might see the extent to which we ourselves are directly involved in the large number of crises that developed. The last time I looked at such a list, out of the last 70 or so such crises of one sort or another, we were directly involved in only about 6 of them.

We did not, for example, rush with military force into the recent situation between India and Pakistan. We did not consider it our

role to play a military role in the violence between Algeria and Morocco in recent years, or between Somalia and Ethiopia. We are looking for ways in which such matters can be handled expeditiously and promptly in order to bring them back to a peaceful settlement.

In the case of the last two instances I mentioned, the Organization of African Unity took these matters up and brought them to a peaceful conclusion. In the case of India and Pakistan, the U.N. Security Council, with a very significant majority of the members of the Council, without the paralysis of the usual veto, was able to bring these two to disengage their forces and start talking about peace between themselves.

So our basic commitments, Mr. Chairman, seem to lie in those areas which are vital to the security of the United States—in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, in this hemisphere. If we were to start today to consider that question all over again and consider it deeply and seriously, the security requirements of the United States and our appropriate part to play in the organization of a peaceful world, my guess is that our judgments now would not be very different from those in the late 1940's and the 1950's.

I would say on this point that you will have observed that President Johnson has not come to the Senate for an extension of our commitments by concluding additional pacts. These are commitments which were undertaken after the war and during the decade of the fifties in an effort to organize a peace—as the Senate in its Foreign Relations Committee indicated in its consideration of the Southeast Asia Treaty to try to stabilize the peace by indicating in advance what the problems are that an aggressor would face.

(The list of crises as referred to is as follows:)

DEGREE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CRISES AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS, 1961 TO MID-1966¹

A. Direct involvement

1. Vietnamese struggle with Viet Minh and Viet Cong (1945-)—Partial (from 1950) to direct (from 1954) involvement as supplier of military assistance, military advisers, then combat troops at the request of the Republic of Vietnam.
2. Berlin (1948-)—Direct involvement as one of four occupying powers under 1945-1945 quadripartite agreements.
3. Communist Chinese threat to Formosa Straits (1950-)—Direct involvement under Truman (1950) and Eisenhower (1953) instructions to U.S. Seventh Fleet and Formosa Resolution (1955).
4. Korea (1950-)—Direct involvement as a principal contributor of forces under U.N. Command during Korean War and to present.
5. Bay of Pigs episode (1961)—Direct involvement as unofficial, partial protector of invasion force.
6. Panamanian-United States dispute over conditions in and administration of the Canal Zone (1962-1966)—Direct involvement as a party to the dispute; OAS and U.N. action; bilateral negotiations.
7. Cuban missile crisis (1962-1963)—Direct involvement as power enforcing OAS quarantine on shipment of missiles to Cuba.
8. Cambodian complaint of border violations by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces (1964-)—Direct involvement as a party named in the complaint; U.N. action.
9. Stanleyville (Congo) rebel mistreatment of European prisoners (1964)—Direct involvement in bringing matter to U.N. attention and in providing air-lift for Belgian para-commando rescue mission.

¹This list does not include temporary crises brought about by *coups d'etat* (e.g., the Syrian Army coup of 1962) or by internal rebellions (e.g., the revolt of the Kurds in Iraq in 1962).

10. Dominican crisis (1965-1966)—Direct involvement through initial action to stabilize the situation; contributor to OAS peace force.
- B. No direct involvement or only limited involvement*
11. South African treatment of Indian minority (1946-)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
12. India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir (1948-)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
13. Arab-Israel dispute (1948-)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
14. Netherlands-Indonesian dispute over West New Guinea (West Irian) (1949-1962)—No direct involvement; U.N. action; U.S. good offices.
15. South African *Apartheid* policy (1952-)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
16. Algerian independence movement (1954-1962)—No direct involvement; U.N. action; bilateral French-Algerian negotiations.
17. Disputed claim of Sultan of Muscat over Imam of Oman (1955-)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
18. Laotian struggle with Viet Minh-supported Pathet Lao (1959-)—Partial involvement as co-signer of 1962 Geneva agreements.
19. Tibetan revolt against Communist China (1959-1961)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
20. Congo crisis over secession of Katanga Province (1960-1964)—No direct involvement; U.S. financial contribution to and air carriage of U.N. forces in the Congo.
21. Dominican Republic abuse of human rights (1960-1962)—No direct involvement; OAS action.
22. Threat of Castro government of Cuba to political stability in the Western Hemisphere (1961-)—No direct involvement; OAS action.
23. Portuguese violation of human rights in Angola (1961-)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
24. Kuwait complaint of threat from Iraq (1961)—No direct involvement; U.N. and Arab League action.
25. French-Tunisian crisis over Bizerta (1961)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
26. Indian seizure of Portuguese colonies in India (1961)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
27. Sino-Indian border war (1962-1963)—Partial involvement as supplier of increased military aid to India.
28. United Arab Republic-Saudi Arabian intervention in Yemen (1962-1965)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
29. Southern Rhodesian apartheid policy and move to independence (1962-)—Partial involvement to the extent of implementing the oil embargo and refusing to purchase Southern Rhodesian sugar; U.K.-Southern Rhodesian negotiation; U.N. action.
30. Venezuelan-British Guianan border dispute (1962)—No direct involvement; U.N. action.
31. Cambodian-Thai dispute (1962-1963)—No direct involvement; U.N. good offices.
32. Malaysian-Indonesian conflict (1963-1966)—Partial involvement in arranging cease-fire and supplying good-offices mission; U.N. action; multilateral and bilateral negotiations.
33. Haitian complaint of threats from the Dominican Republic (1963)—No direct involvement; OAS and U.N. action.
34. Algerian-Moroccan border dispute (1963-1964)—No direct involvement; OAU action.
35. Greek-Turkish-Cypriot dispute (1963-)—Partial involvement as principal financial contributor to U.N. peacekeeping force and through efforts to promote a peaceful settlement.
36. Somalian-Ethiopian border dispute (1964-)—No direct involvement; OAU action.
37. Indian-Pakistani conflict in Rann of Cutch (1965)—No direct involvement; British mediation.
- Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, with all deference, your quotations, at least some of them, are prior to the Korean war and all of them are prior to the present war in Vietnam. Certainly, those two experi-

ences have changed the whole situation, the outlook and certainly the judgment of many of us, to a degree. So I really think, and I say with all deference to you, that with such a new and different world based on the experiences we have had, instead of reviewing this matter, we have to knuckle down to these problems more realistically, including an item like manpower.

I know in SEATO, I was convinced that there would be a unified action with other nations before we would move. Here, we got into this war—and I am not trying to assess blame—where we were not even bound by any commitment. I mean the present war.

Each member of the subcommittee now has approximately 10 minutes. May I say I will keep time, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Saltonstall?

EXPRESSION OF PRAISE FOR RUSK'S PERFORMANCE AS SECRETARY OF STATE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rusk, may I just say I respect the way you have been handling your office for the last number of years and the spirit in which you work and the helpfulness you offer to the Members of our Senate. I am glad to see you here this morning.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, sir.

WHY THE UNITED STATES IS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask two general questions first, then I have several more of a specific nature I want to ask.

First, I am asked frequently how did we become committed in Vietnam? Are we in Vietnam because they asked us to help them against an aggression, or are we there because of our obligations under the Southeast Asia Treaty?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, in the background and underlying this Southeast Asia Treaty itself has been a policy conclusion of all administrations since 1945 that the security of southeast Asia is of great importance, sometimes it was referred to as of vital importance, to the security of the United States. That has been consistently the view of successive administrations as they have examined the total world scene and the relationship between what happens in southeast Asia and the general balance of power and the possibilities of maintaining the peace.

Now, the Southeast Asia Treaty itself was a specific and solemn confirmation of that judgment by the most solemn constitutional processes of the United States. Article IV of that treaty says that each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or the protocol states would endanger its own peace and safety and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

That gives each party the right to make the decision as to how it will act, but the standard of the treaty, to which all of us are committed, is that we act to meet the common danger. It does not mean that we do nothing. It does not mean that we disregard the common danger. So we are there because of the importance of southeast Asia to the security of the United States, and specifically because this was

registered very solemnly in a treaty in our most formal constitutional process.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It has often been said that we wanted to help South Vietnam economically and in every other way. On that basis, of course, we have sent in more and more troops. But essentially, today, we are there then, in your opinion, because the situation there affects the security of the United States?

Secretary RUSK. That is the underlying policy which has persisted since 1945, but, more precisely, we are there because of our commitments under the treaty. The two go together, Senator.

SUPPORT OF U.N. FUNCTIONS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Another question along the same lines. You spoke about the United Nations in the second paragraph on page 2 of your statement. Then again you mentioned it on page 9 of your statement with relation to moving to meet a breach of the international peace, the United States as an important, responsible member of the United Nations may be required in the future, to take action that cannot now be anticipated with any precision.

What disturbed me very much, not only as a member of this committee but as a member of the Appropriations Committee, is the ability of the U.N. over the long run to perform its functions. Functionally, it seems to be in a very difficult situation. If other nations will not go along in meeting their obligations, how far should we go in supporting the United Nations as an individual country? That has disturbed me very much.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, that is a problem that we also find disturbing. It is one for which the U.N. has not yet found an answer. As you know, sir, two of the important members, the Soviet Union and France, have withheld certain contributions or assessments made by the General Assembly. The General Assembly itself determined that it would not apply article XIX of the charter and thereby, perhaps, run the risk of paralyzing the Assembly or having these certain countries withdraw. That financial problem has not been solved. We hope very much that, in this forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly, some progress can be made on it.

But I would think that the great majority, including ourselves, ought to go ahead with an attempt to make the United Nations function to the best of our ability. Because if you will look over—and I will furnish to the committee the so-called continuing agenda of the Security Council—if you will look over the 71 items that have been on the agenda of the Security Council, to see the way in which it moves in promptly, in the usual case, to try to get the processes of peaceful settlement started where there is violence or threat of violence, this has been a very great contribution in this postwar period. If we should find the U.N. paralyzed, we would have to find something in substitution for it that would be almost identical in function and purpose. So I think our best course would be to do what we can to strengthen it, make it function, give it a chance to play its role, even though at a particular time there may be one or two important members and certain others are not prepared to see it function.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The chairman says, Mr. Rusk, that my time is up. I had two more questions but I shall not ask them now.

Senator STENNIS. We will get back to you. Senator Symington?

MUTUALITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER DEFENSE COMMITMENTS

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I only received your statement this morning, so these comments and questions which were drawn up last night do not bear entirely on it, but I think they are pertinent.

First, let me associate myself with the remarks made by the Senator from Massachusetts with respect to you and the work you are doing.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Before the Foreign Relations Committee last winter and again this morning, you have testified the United States has over 40 military commitments or agreements with other nations and have detailed some of those commitments this morning. I worry about the mutuality of these commitments, how much they are reciprocal, how much other countries agree to help the United States in exchange for our agreements to help them. One gets the impression that with few exceptions, it is always the United States that is supplying men, material, and money when commitments are to be satisfied.

For example, there are billions of American dollars and over 50,000 American troops still in Korea. How many troops from other U.N. countries are in Korea?

Another example: There are hundreds of millions of American dollars and tens of thousands of American troops in Thailand. How many other NATO or SEATO troops are in Thailand?

Upon returning from visits to the Far East and Europe early this year, I reported to the Senate that in my opinion, worldwide, the United States was overcommitted. This would not be so unfortunate if in the main these nations were helping us with our commitments, but they are not. The Germans objected to withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Europe to help in Asia. The British have less than 20 men in Vietnam. Putting it mildly, the French, the Pakistanis, and the Indians are doing nothing to help the United States, but we are committed to help them. Not only have these three countries, to which three we have given billions and loaned billions, failed to send even token forces to help us in this Vietnam war, but they in fact criticize and deprecate consistently U.S. actions in Vietnam.

Just a few days ago, the head of the Indian Government blasted our policies in Vietnam and a few days after that, under its current operations, the World Bank announced plans for a new \$900 million soft loan to India, the terms of which actually make this purported loan a gift.

If say, only a half, 20 of the 40 countries to which we are committed, were to send even token fighting men to Vietnam, do you not believe American public attitudes would be much less critical of our involvement there? It is the United States who put billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of men into Europe for the defense of Europe. It is the United States that puts billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of men into South Vietnam for the defense of South Vietnam. It is the United States that puts billions of dollars and tens of thousands of men into Korea for the defense of Korea. It is the United States who puts billions of dollars and tens of thousands of people into Japan for the defense of Japan, and it is the United States who puts billions of dollars, and people, into Formosa for the defense of Formosa. So it goes all over the world.

But there is much more in the way of commitments. It is and always has been the United States which puts up by far the most money for the foreign aid program, for the World Bank, for the International Development Association, for the Inter-American Development Bank, and for other comparable agencies. Now, we already have in this country multibillion-dollar domestic programs for education, for slum clearance, for poverty eradication, for space, for supersonic transport. Money is now tight to the point where collateral securities are being advertised with a yield of eight and a quarter percent.

The value of the dollar is currently based on gold. We have lost over 45 percent of our gold reserve in the past 10 years. At the same time, the other highly developed countries, which we are both defending and financing, have increased their gold holdings up to 500 percent.

I have two final questions, and ask them together.

First, if the United States is willing to continue to carry this burden to this extent, both defending the so-called free world and financing that world, why should anyone else help?

Second, with the premise that a sound economy is equally as important as diplomatic and military success, how long can this economy or any economy stand the present load?

Those are thoughts which persist in my mind. I have taken 5 minutes and have 5 minutes further. I will file the statement with you, and Mr. Chairman, ask unanimous consent that these questions be answered in detail for the record.

Senator STENNIS. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, it might be possible for me to extend my comments somewhat for the record, because these are very relevant and very important questions.

In terms of what others are doing, let me say at the beginning that we would be glad to see others do more. I think there would be no quarrel between Senator Symington and myself or the administration on that point. I think that, sometimes, we minimize what some of the others have been doing. In the case of Vietnam, there are five of the members of the SEATO treaty, plus Korea, and, of course, plus the South Vietnamese themselves, who are actively taking part. There are substantial numbers of Korean forces there; over 30,000 at the present time. There are Austrialians and New Zealanders giving a good account of themselves. The Thais and the Filipinos are present. But most important is the effort of the South Vietnamese. Our own reporters tend to concentrate, naturally, on what our forces are doing, but in the daily military reports I get, the majority of the ground actions there are conducted by the South Vietnamese.

In Europe, we would like to see the NATO forces meet an agreed common standard. We had such a standard along about 1959 or 1960. We have ourselves met that standard. A number of the other NATO countries have not. We have ourselves recently raised in NATO the problem of the double standard. We hope that there will be discussions shortly—as a matter of fact, they are beginning to go on now—about the nature of the threat to NATO and, in the light of whatever that threat is, what the prudent action would be by all of us to deal prudently with that threat in order that we are all on the same basis, along the lines to which Senator Symington referred.

It is true that we have carried a very large burden in this postwar period. But others have carried burdens, too, including the forces that they have used. The Greek guerrilla operations were conducted by Greek forces. We have 400,000 Korean troops alongside our divisions in Korea. But we have the strength, we have the resources, and we have also the deep interest in and commitment to this problem of building a world order.

On the balance-of-payments problem, I believe the committee is aware of the steps that have been taken over the last few years to reduce the balance-of-payments burden of our defense effort abroad. From 1961 to 1965, that has been reduced by approximately 50 percent by a number of actions taken with regard to PX's and things of that sort. It may be somewhat up again this next fiscal year because of the additional costs involving South Vietnam. But these are all matters that we are concerned with. We would like to find better answers than we have found thus far.

But I must say that, at the end of the day, I am impressed by the fact that these great security arrangements we have with a number of countries have by and large worked pretty well in defending ourselves and defending those with whom we are allied.

I think one can say without exaggeration that there seems to be a deep recognition among the governments of the world, for example, that a nuclear exchange is not a rational act of policy.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, pardon me, but you can extend your remarks in the record, please.

Senator Smith?

(The information requested is as follows:)

AUGUST 30, 1966.

Hon. STUART SYMINGTON,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR SYMINGTON: I appreciate the opportunity your letter of August 25 affords to answer more fully the questions posed in your statement at the Preparedness Subcommittee hearing held that morning. Your questions and my answers to them follow:

1. How many troops do other United Nations countries have in Korea?

The total number of non-U.S. components of the United Nations Command in Korea, as of July 15, 1966, was 243. The Republic of Korea itself maintains approximately 600,000 troops, including Korean forces now in Viet Nam. It should be noted that the 16 member countries of the United Nations Command pledged in 1953 at the time of the Armistice agreement that if there was a renewal of the armed attack they would be prompt to resist. At that time there were over 39,000 non-U.S. personnel in the United Nations Command.

2. How many other NATO or SEATO troops are in Thailand?

SEATO members, other than the United States, which have military personnel in Thailand include the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. The troops from these countries are involved mainly in construction and road-building projects and in air and vehicle maintenance and technical training activities. The number of personnel involved has been classified by the countries concerned. Thailand, which is presently combatting a subversive insurgency in its Northeast area with both suppressive operations and extensive civic action programs, is of course a member of SEATO.

3. If say only one-half, twenty, of the forty countries to which we are committed, were to send even token fighting men to Viet Nam, don't you believe American public attitudes would be much less critical of our involvement there?

I believe this question suggests, perhaps inadvertently, two assumptions that I should like to dispel. First, I think it is clear that the overwhelming majority of Americans support the two basic elements of this nation's policy in Viet Nam—our determination to assist South Viet Nam in resisting aggression from the North, and our dedication to leaving no stone unturned in seeking to end the

conflict through other than military means. Certainly the Congress has given its unstinting support to these two objectives.

Second, I should like to call to your attention the substantial support that many nations of the Free World, in accordance with their own resources, are providing to the South Vietnamese. I am enclosing a summary of the efforts in this regard, as of August 1, of 36 nations other than the United States. The free nations of the area, whose security is most directly affected by what happens in Viet Nam, have been in the forefront of this effort. Thus Australia has placed 4,500 combat troops in the field; South Korea's contribution will soon be increased to 43,000 troops; New Zealand has contributed an artillery battery and an army engineer detachment; the Philippine Government has approved the sending of a 2,000 man military engineering unit with security support personnel; and the Thais, who face a serious threat of communist insurgency in their own country, have sent a military air detachment. All this is in addition to generous materiel support and economic assistance.

4. " * * * if the United States is willing to continue to carry this burden to this extent, both defending the so-called free world, and financing that world, why should anyone else help?"

The fact is that we do not carry the burdens of freedom alone. Other nations too have substantial economic assistance programs. I am enclosing some charts prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development which convey some idea of this. Other nations too have carried out defense responsibilities in areas far from their shores. The United Kingdom, for example, which has financial difficulties to contend with, has no doubt contributed to the easing of the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia by the maintenance for a number of years of large numbers of forces in the area.

We would do a grave disservice to the pride and sense of responsibility of other nations if we were to believe that they are anxious to have the United States carry their responsibilities for them. A heartening example of a nation that required the generous assistance of other countries in its time of peril, and has not forgotten that assistance, is afforded by the presence now of over 30,000 Koreans in Viet Nam.

There are times, of course, when we believe that other nations are not doing all they could, and we believe that our own record entitles us to speak with them about it. But any shortcomings on the part of others cannot be an excuse for retreating from our own responsibilities and the requirements of our own security.

With respect to economic assistance in particular, it must be recognized that it contributes vitally to our own security by seeking to close the widening gap between the have and have-not nations of the world and by lessening the likelihood that totalitarian governments will arise in areas of deprivation. A rising standard of living in the developing countries is also in our long-run economic interest since trade between the United States and these countries should increase as their incomes rise. But a more fundamental reason for such assistance is moral. So long as less-developed nations are anxious to help themselves I am confident that the people of the United States will want to set aside part of their resources to help them to a better life. While I believe other rich nations will continue to provide increasing assistance, I do not think that we would want to turn our backs on the disadvantaged of the world even if other rich nations did so, and even if our national security was not involved.

5. " * * * with the premise that a sound economy is as important as diplomatic and military success, how long can this economy, or any economy, stand this load?"

I see no indication that our economy is buckling under its load. As the President said the other day in speaking of the economy, our problems are the problems of prosperity. I am, of course, concerned at the diversion of our resources from the unfinished business at home to military needs. But we do not spend billions of dollars on military requirements because we can afford it, but because we believe they are essential if we are to preserve what we have at home. This huge expenditure is a major reason, though certainly not the most important, why one whole agency of this Government is devoted to seeking means of disarmament and why we would so much prefer a political solution to a military solution in Viet Nam. Fortunately, our economy is strong enough to permit us to make substantial progress in meeting our domestic needs at the

same time that we meet the nation's other requirements, although I have no doubt that more could and should be spent at home were we able to spend less on these other requirements.

Sincerely,

DEAN RUSK.

[Enclosures]

FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE TO VIET-NAM AS OF AUGUST 1, 1966

FAR EAST

Australia

Australia is providing a wide and substantial range of aid to Viet-Nam under the Colombo Plan and by direct bilateral assistance.

Military aid consists of:

Approximately 4,500 combat troops including a brigade and support, 100 combat advisors (primarily specialists in jungle warfare), and a 73-man air force unit at Vung Tau with six Australian caribou planes which fly daily logistical transport missions in support of Vietnamese military forces.

Economic and technical assistance has totalled roughly \$8 million including:

1. Two surgical teams. These teams in addition to performing major operations have established a blood bank and are giving lessons in nursing.
2. A group of civil engineers working on water supply and road construction projects.
3. Three experts in dairy and crop practices and radio techniques.
4. Training of 110 Vietnamese in Australia.
5. In goods and materials: 1,000,000 textbooks in Vietnamese for rural schools; 3,300 tons of corrugated roofing for Vietnamese military dependents housing; 6 large community windmills; 15,750 sets of hand tools; 400 radio sets and 2,400 loudspeakers, 16,000 blankets and 14,000 cases of condensed milk.
6. A 50 kilowatt broadcasting station at Ban Me Thout.

Republic of China

The Republic of China has provided:

1. An 80-odd-man agricultural team.
2. An 18-man military psychological warfare team.
3. An 9-man electrical power mission under the leadership of Taipower.
4. A 10-man surgical team.

China is also providing training for more than 200 Vietnamese in Taiwan. In the way of goods and materials, they have provided 26 aluminum prefabricated warehouses, agricultural tools, seeds and fertilizers, 500,000 copies of mathematics textbooks and electrical power substations.

Japan

Japan has provided over \$55 million worth of economic assistance to Viet-Nam, chiefly through reparations. Japan has sent two medical teams, considerable amounts of medical goods (4,544 cases), 20,000 transistor radios and 25 ambulances. It has provided technical personnel and funds for the construction of a large power dam across the Da Nhim river and electrical transmission line and agreed to participate in the construction of a bridge over the Mekong River near Vinh Long.

Korea

Korea is providing a total of approximately 25,000 troops (soon to be increased to approximately 43,000) including:

1. 1 combat division force. An additional division and brigade.
2. A 130-man Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH).
3. 10 military instructors in Korean karate for training Vietnamese military in hand-to-hand combat.
4. A 2,200-man Task Force Unit composed of the following elements:
 - 1 Army engineer battalion
 - 1 Headquarters group
 - 1 Army Transportation company
 - 1 Marine Corps Engineer company
 - 1 Infantry battalion
 - 1 LST and 2 LSM's
 - 1 Composite support unit (communications, medical supplies, etc.).

Laos

One million kip (\$4,167) for flood relief as of February, 1965.

Malaysia

Since 1962, Malaysia has trained about 2,000 Vietnamese military officers. Groups of 30-60 are regularly sent for about a month's training in counter-insurgency with Malaysian Police Special Constabulary. Malaysia has previously provided substantial amounts of counterinsurgency materials, primarily military and police transport such as armored vehicles.

New Zealand

New Zealand has sent a 6-howitzer artillery battery of approximately 125 men. It also has provided a 25-man army engineer detachment, a soon to be enlarged 8-man surgical team, and a professor in English language for the University of Saigon. The New Zealanders plan to send two or three mobile health teams to work in refugee camps, and four or five village level vocational training experts. They are presently training 62 Vietnamese in New Zealand and have provided 7,500£ for equipment for a technical high school. They are also assisting by providing approximately \$200,000 for a science building at the University of Saigon.

Philippines

At present, the Philippines has about 60 personnel in Viet-Nam. These consist of military and civilian medical teams and a military psychological warfare detachment. The Philippine Government has approved the early dispatch of a 2,000-man military engineering unit with security support personnel, a station hospital, and rural health and civic action teams.

Thailand

The Thais have a 19-man military air detachment flying operational transport missions for the Vietnamese forces. In addition, they have provided cement and zinc roofing materials and provided jet training for Vietnamese pilots in Thailand. On May 4 the Thai Government announced it will send an LST, a PGM patrol craft, and two transport aircraft all with Thai crews.

MIDDLE EAST

Greece has contributed medical supplies.

Turkey has provided medicines and also offered to provide a substantial amount of cement.

Iran has contributed 1,000 tons of petroleum products to Viet-Nam and has dispatched a medical team consisting of 22 personnel to Viet-Nam.

Israel made a gift of pharmaceutical supplies and has offered to train Vietnamese in Israel in various fields.

India has provided cloth for flood relief and has under study the creation in Viet-Nam of a factory for the preparation of tea and another for sugar, within the framework of a program of technical assistance and economic cooperation. India is also considering the provision of equipment necessary for a blood transfusion center.

Pakistan has contributed financial relief assistance for flood victims and has also donated clothing.

EUROPE

Austria has agreed to supply medical supplies, blankets, tents, through the Austrian Red Cross.

Belgium has provided medicines and an ambulance.

Canada is providing:

1. Personnel in Viet-Nam: A professor of orthopedics at the Saigon University section of Cho Ray Hospital, Saigon.

2. Vietnamese in Canada: About 200 on scholarships both academic and technical, most of them for about four to five years of training, many in engineering. About 65 more students will go this year.

3. \$150,000 worth of flour. Funds generated by sales are used for capital construction projects in Viet-Nam. Since 1958, Canada has provided \$350,000 worth of flour and butter for Viet-Nam.

4. A new science building for the medical faculty at the University of Hue, costing 17,000,000 piastres. Construction has passed the half-way mark, with completion expected this year. (17,000,000 piastres—\$230,000)

They have agreed to construct an auditorium for the Faculty of Sciences at Hue University, scheduled to begin soon, costing 7,500,000 piastres. (7,500,000 piastres—\$102,500)

Canada is increasing its aid to South Viet-Nam this year with several humanitarian projects including ten 200-bed emergency hospital units.

Denmark has provided medical supplies and is willing to train Vietnamese nurses in Denmark.

France:

Since 1956, France has contributed \$111 million in assistance to South Viet-Nam.

France has nearly 500 persons serving in South Viet-Nam. Among them are 65 experts under France's program of economic and technical assistance, including 32 physicians, professors and other medical personnel. Under its cultural programs, France sent 417 professors to teach in Vietnamese universities and schools. There are 168 Vietnamese in France, 88 under fellowships for technical training and 80 academic fellowships.

France has provided low-interest credits of 100 million francs (20 million dollars) for financing imports of French equipment for Vietnamese industry, and a grant of 500,000 francs for equipment for L'Ecole Nationale d'Ingenieurs des Arts Industriels. (F500,000=\$100,000)

In 1960 France extended a low-interest credit of 70 million francs to aid construction of the major coal and chemical complex at An Hoa-Nong Son south of Da Nang which is well underway. It also provided a low-interest, five-year credit of 60 million francs for construction of Viet-Nam's largest cement-producing complex with plants at Hatien and Thu Duc. In 1964, France provided a 930,000 franc grant for the installation of a training center for electrical technicians.

Germany:

Personnel in Viet-Nam:

Provided: Six Germans, a director and five instructors for the new Vietnamese-German Technical High School at Thu Duc near Saigon.

Provided: At Hue University, five experts: Three physicians in the Medical School, a professor of music, a professor of German language.

Agreed: Addition of about nine more experts for Hue Medical School.

Provided: An expert in forestry at the Department of Rural Affairs, Saigon.

Agreed: Two experts, for planning and in exportation.

Vietnamese in Germany: 40 provided, agreed 30 more primarily for training as future instructors in the technical high school. A considerable number have previously been trained.

Goods and materials:

Provided: 30 ambulances for Ministry of Health.

Provided: A commodity credit of DM 15 million for import of German products such as machine tools, fertilizer, etc. The piastre funds generated go to the National Office of Agricultural Credit to aid farmers, particularly with loans. (DM 4=\$1.00)

Provided: A credit of DM 50 million for development of the major industrial complex at An Hoan-Nong Son.

Provided: A credit for DM 20 million for construction of an abattoir at Saigon-Cholon, and for construction of three merchant ships.

Provided: A credit of DM 500,000 for construction of the Vietnamese-German Technical High School at Thu Duc.

Provided: A grant with a value of DM 1,000,000 to purchase batteries for receiver-transmitter radios for the Ministry of Information and Psychological Warfare, and of gasoline pumps for the Department of Rural Affairs.

Agreed: A 3,000-ton hospital ship for duty in Viet-Nam which is expected to sail in August.

Agreed: \$4,500,000 worth of pharmaceuticals, the first shipments of which have arrived.

Agreed: Two mobile dental clinics.

On June 29, the Cabinet voted DM 25 million (US \$6.25 million) for new aid to Viet-Nam including: 1) sending 25 experts to establish a refugee center; 2) building a home for wayward youths; 3) expansion of 8 social centers and construction of a ninth; establishment of a training center for social workers, and 5) the gift of 100 buses and a maintenance and repair facility in Saigon.

Ireland The Irish people have contributed 1,000£ to Viet-Nam through their Red Cross.

Italy The Italians have provided a 9-man surgical team and are providing science scholarships to 10 Vietnamese to study in Italy.

Luxembourg has provided plasma and blood transfusion equipment.

The Netherlands The Dutch have given antibiotics worth \$2,735 (November 1964) and a dredge. They are considering additional medical aid.

Spain has provided 800 pounds of medicines, medical equipment and blankets and is sending a 12-man military medical team to Viet-Nam.

Switzerland The Swiss have provided microscopes for the University of Saigon. The Swiss Red Cross has sent an 11-man medical team through the International Committee of the Red Cross to work in a provincial hospital in the Central Highland of South Viet-Nam.

United Kingdom The United Kingdom has provided six civilians for the British Advisory Mission and a Professor of English at Hue University. Twenty-one Vietnamese are receiving training in the United Kingdom. A pediatric team of four British doctors and five nurses is going to Viet-Nam in August.

In 1963-64 the United Kingdom provided the following goods and materials: Laboratory equipment for Saigon University; a type-setting machine for the Government Printing Office; a cobalt deep-ray therapy unit for the National Cancer Institute; various equipment for the Faculties of Medicine, Science and Pharmacy at Saigon University, the Meteorological Service and the Agricultural School at Saigon, and Atomic Research Establishment at Dalat and the Faculty of Education at Hue. The United Kingdom also agreed to provide 50,000 British pounds worth of roadbuilding equipment and 6,000 pounds worth of diesel fishing boat engines. (£ 1=\$2.80)

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina The Argentines have sent two observers to Viet-Nam to examine the possibilities for Argentina assistance and have agreed to send material to assist in refugee relief. They are now sending 5000 tons of wheat flour.

Brazil is providing coffee and has sent a substantial quantity of medical supplies.

Dominican Republic has offered cement for use in Viet-Nam.

Ecuador has sent medical supplies to Viet-Nam.

Guatemala has sent 15,000 doses of typhoid-paratyphoid serum for use in Viet-Nam.

Uruguay has promised to send foodstuffs and medicines to Viet-Nam.

Venezuela has provided 500 tons of rice for refugee relief and two civilian doctors are working in Viet-Nam.

TABLE 1.—The flow of official financial resources to less-developed countries and multilateral agencies, 1956-65

[Millions of U. S. dollars]

| | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 ¹ |
|------------------------|------------------|---------|------------------|---------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------------------|
| Australia ¹ | 2 39 | 2 47 | 2 47 | 2 57 | 2 66 | 2 72.9 | 2 84.5 | 2 96.4 | 2 106.8 | 120.7 |
| Austria | (²) | -1 | 2 | 7 | (⁴) | 2.2 | 13.8 | 2. | 14.6 | 33.9 |
| Belgium | 20 | 20 | 23 | 79 | 101 | 92.1 | 79.8 | 93.7 | 83.5 | 120.0 |
| Canada | 30 | 48 | 91 | 60 | 75 | 61.5 | 54.5 | 98. | 197.7 | 120.0 |
| Denmark | 3 | 2 | 5 | 13 | 6 | 8.1 | 7.4 | 3. | 110.6 | 13.3 |
| France | 647 | 819 | 884 | 835 | 848 | 943.3 | 977.0 | 850. | 831.2 | 756.7 |
| Germany | 161 | 297 | 278 | 325 | 343 | 615.3 | 449.8 | 424.2 | 422.0 | 427.1 |
| Italy | 43 | 164 | 73 | 84 | 110 | 85.3 | 110.1 | 110.2 | 154.7 | 65.9 |
| Japan ³ | 2 96 | 2 92 | 2 285 | 2 150 | 98 | 108.5 | 88.0 | 140.4 | 113.7 | 243.8 |
| Netherlands | 48 | 23 | 40 | 49 | 47 | 69.3 | 90.8 | 37.8 | 48.4 | 12.0 |
| Norway | 8 | 9 | (³) | 5 | 10 | 9.0 | 6.9 | 20.0 | 17.0 | 21.4 |
| Portugal | 3 | 2 | 1 | 17 | 37 | 43.8 | 40.8 | 51.1 | 61.0 | 38.9 |
| Sweden | 3 | 12 | 4 | 18 | 7 | 8.4 | 18.5 | 22.9 | 32.8 | 479.8 |
| United Kingdom | 205 | 284 | 276 | 377 | 407 | 456.8 | 421.0 | 414.5 | 493.4 | 3,766.0 |
| United States | 2,006 | 2,091 | 2,410 | 2,322 | 2,834 | 3,530.0 | 3,671.0 | 3,765.0 | 3,462.6 | |
| Total DAC countries | 2 3,312 | 2 3,859 | 2 4,419 | 2 4,398 | 4,989 | 6,103.5 | 6,113.8 | 6,125.3 | 5,883.3 | 6,280.5 |

¹ Figures shown for the years 1956-63 are gross flows on a fiscal year basis.

² Preliminary figures or secretariat estimate.

³ Nil.

⁴ Less than half the final digit shown.

⁵ Figures for Japan for the years 1956-59 are still on an unrevised basis and are not comparable to the figures of the following years.

NOTE.—Slight discrepancies in totals are due to rounding. Decimal places are separated by a point.

WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMITMENTS

TABLE 2.—The net flow of private capital to less-developed countries and multilateral agencies, 1956-65

[Millions of U.S. dollars]

| | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 ¹ |
|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Australia..... | (²) 4 | (²) -3 | (³) 4 | (²) -8 | (²) 6 | (²) 18.0 | (²) 17.2 | (²) 3.8 | \$ 20.0 | 22.9 |
| Austria..... | 70 | 16 | 89 | 89 | 81 | 82.4 | 48.4 | 3.8 | 6.7 | 13.5 |
| Belgium..... | 76 | 83 | 64 | 23 | 70 | 39.4 | 55.2 | 95.0 | 93.0 | 119.5 |
| Canada..... | 7 | (⁴) | (⁴) | 8 | 82 | 25.2 | 7.3 | 32.5 | 29.2 | 33.0 |
| Denmark..... | 477 | 408 | 453 | 337 | 477 | 489.0 | 430.5 | 8 | 21.2 | 32.7 |
| France..... | 275 | 248 | 242 | 474 | 274 | 219.3 | 182.2 | 413.9 | 550.3 | 561.9 |
| Germany..... | 91 | 45 | 82 | 65 | 183 | 177.1 | 301.8 | 164.8 | 267.9 | 278.2 |
| Italy..... | 37 | 326 | 335 | 345 | 151 | 278.9 | 207.1 | 233.0 | 187.7 | 183.8 |
| Japan..... | 252 | 124 | 160 | 215 | 203 | 144.4 | 52.2 | 138.0 | 188.1 | 241.8 |
| Netherlands..... | 1 | (⁴) | (⁴) 3 | 2 | (⁴) | .9 | 4.0 | 109.4 | 79.9 | 164.3 |
| Norway..... | (²) 1 | (⁴) | (⁴) | (²) 2 | (⁴) | (²) | (²) | 8.1 | (²) 9.6 | 26.2 |
| Portugal..... | 12 | 13 | 23 | 27 | 40 | 43.5 | 18.8 | (²) | (²) 34.4 | 30.6 |
| Sweden..... | 384 | 723 | 392 | 467 | 389 | 443.8 | 306.4 | 30.5 | 414.5 | 443.3 |
| United Kingdom..... | 1,230 | 2,009 | 1,275 | 954 | 1,042 | 1,095.2 | 819.0 | 880.0 | 1,297.0 | 1,747.8 |
| United States..... | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total DAC countries..... | \$ 2,881 | \$ 3,692 | \$ 2,822 | \$ 2,698 | 2,958 | 3,061.1 | 2,450.1 | 2,389.9 | 3,199.5 | 3,869.5 |

¹ In order to permit totaling, 1964 data have been used for Denmark.² Not available.³ Preliminary figures or Secretariat estimate.⁴ Less than half the final figure shown.⁵ Figures for Japan for the years 1956-59 are still on an unrevised basis and are not comparable to the figures of the following years.

Note.—Slight discrepancies in totals are due to rounding. Decimal places are separated by a point.

TABLE 3.—Total official and private flow to less-developed countries and multilateral agencies, 1956-65

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

| | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 ¹ |
|------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------|
| Australia ² | 3 39 | 3 47 | 3 47 | 3 57 | 3 66 | 3 72.9 | 3 84.5 | 3 96.4 | 3 126.8 | 143.6 |
| Austria..... | 4 | -4 | 112 | -1 | 6 | 20.2 | 31.0 | 5.9 | 21.3 | 47.4 |
| Belgium..... | 90 | 36 | 155 | 168 | 182 | 174.5 | 128.2 | 186.7 | 176.5 | 947.5 |
| Canada..... | 106 | 131 | 155 | 83 | 145 | 100.9 | 109.5 | 130.5 | 156.9 | 143.0 |
| Denmark..... | 5 | 2 | 5 | 21 | 38 | 33.3 | 14.7 | 31.8 | 31.8 | 416.0 |
| France..... | 1, 124 | 1, 227 | 1, 337 | 1, 172 | 1, 325 | 1, 432.3 | 1, 407.5 | 1, 264.6 | 1, 381.5 | 1, 705.3 |
| Germany..... | 436 | 545 | 520 | 799 | 616 | 834.6 | 632.0 | 589.0 | 690.8 | 940.7 |
| Italy..... | 134 | 209 | 155 | 303 | 303 | 292.4 | 343.2 | 241.8 | 241.8 | 435.6 |
| Japan..... | 123 | 118 | 320 | 149 | 249 | 387.4 | 295.1 | 278.4 | 303.8 | 485.6 |
| Netherlands..... | 280 | 147 | 200 | 195 | 250 | 213.7 | 143.0 | 147.2 | 128.3 | 224.3 |
| Norway..... | 9 | 9 | 3 | 264 | 10 | 9.9 | 10.9 | 28.7 | 26.7 | 31.4 |
| Portugal ³ | 3 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 37 | 43.8 | 40.8 | 51.1 | 61.9 | 60.5 |
| Sweden..... | 15 | 25 | 27 | 45 | 47 | 51.9 | 37.3 | 53.4 | 67.2 | 93.1 |
| Switzerland..... | 589 | 957 | 688 | 844 | 766 | 900.6 | 727.4 | 694.6 | 907.9 | 931.1 |
| United Kingdom..... | 3, 236 | 4, 100 | 3, 685 | 3, 276 | 3, 876 | 4, 269.3 | 4, 490.0 | 4, 635.0 | 4, 759.6 | 5, 513.8 |
| Total DAC countries..... | 6, 193 | 7, 551 | 7, 241 | 7, 096 | 7, 947 | 9, 167.6 | 8, 563.9 | 8, 515.2 | 9, 082.8 | 10, 150.0 |

¹ In order to permit totaling, 1964 private data have been used for Denmark.

² For the years 1956-63 figures relate only to official gross flows on a fiscal year basis.

³ Preliminary figures or Secretariat estimate.

⁴ Figure of previous year carried over.

⁵ Official flows only.

NOTE.—Slight discrepancies in totals are due to rounding. Decimal places are separated by a point.

TABLE 4.—*The flow of financial resources as a percentage of national income, 1962-65*
 [Percentages]

| | Total official flow | | | | | Total private flow | | | | Total official and private flow | | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|--------|--------|------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 |
| Australia..... | 2 0.59 | 2 0.60 | 2 0.61 | 0.64 | (⁵) | (⁵) | (⁵) 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 2 0.59 | 3 0.60 | 2 0.72 | 0.76 | 1965 1 |
| Austria..... | .25 | .04 | .22 | .49 | .47 | .31 | .86 | .10 | .19 | .56 | .10 | .33 | .68 | |
| Belgium..... | .77 | .83 | .68 | .92 | .83 | .47 | .11 | .76 | .83 | 1.24 | 1.69 | 1.44 | 1.75 | |
| Canada..... | .19 | .32 | .39 | .34 | .19 | .12 | 2 0.11 | .09 | .09 | .38 | .43 | .48 | .43 | |
| Denmark..... | .12 | .15 | .15 | .17 | .12 | .12 | 2 0.30 | .30 | .03 | 2.53 | 2.07 | 2.08 | 4.21 | |
| France..... | 1.76 | 1.39 | 1.25 | 1.08 | .77 | .77 | .08 | .83 | .80 | 2.53 | 2.07 | 2.08 | 1.88 | |
| Germany..... | .66 | .59 | .53 | .50 | .27 | .27 | .23 | .34 | .33 | .93 | .82 | .87 | .83 | |
| Italy..... | .35 | .31 | .14 | .16 | .06 | .06 | .06 | .48 | .41 | 1.32 | .96 | .62 | .57 | |
| Japan..... | .19 | .26 | .19 | .37 | .44 | .44 | .26 | .31 | .37 | .63 | .52 | .50 | .74 | |
| Netherlands..... | .83 | .32 | .35 | .41 | .48 | .48 | .32 | .58 | 1.12 | 1.30 | 1.24 | .93 | 1.53 | |
| Norway..... | .17 | .48 | .35 | .22 | .22 | .10 | .19 | (⁶) | .49 | .27 | .66 | .55 | .71 | |
| Portugal..... | 1.69 | 1.98 | 2.29 | 4.21 | .16 | (⁶) | (⁶) | .24 | (⁶) | 3 1.69 | 3 1.98 | 3 2.29 | 3 2.17 | |
| Sweden..... | .16 | .18 | .24 | .25 | .47 | .16 | .40 | .56 | .20 | .32 | .42 | .48 | .45 | |
| United Kingdom..... | .64 | .60 | .67 | .61 | .47 | .47 | .18 | .25 | .56 | 1.11 | 1.00 | 1.22 | 1.17 | |
| United States..... | .80 | .78 | .67 | .68 | .18 | .18 | .18 | .25 | .31 | .97 | .96 | .92 | .96 | |
| Total DAC countries..... | .74 | .70 | .62 | .62 | .30 | .30 | .27 | .34 | .38 | 1.04 | .97 | .96 | 1.00 | |

1 See note to table 3.

2 Preliminary figures or Secretariat estimate.

3 Official contributions only.

4 Figure of previous year carried over.

5 See note 2 to table 7(f).

6 Not available.

NOTE.—Slight discrepancies in totals are due to rounding. Decimal places are separated by a point.

WHETHER PRESIDENT KENNEDY WOULD HAVE VETOED ESCALATION IN VIETNAM

Senator SMITH. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I do not think that we can completely sever the De Gaulle pullout of NATO from the Vietnam situation, since France does not support us on Vietnam and urges our withdrawal from Vietnam. Not only has De Gaulle criticized our involvement in Vietnam, but several Senators have criticized the Johnson policy on Vietnam, particularly on the escalation—Senators Fulbright, Morse, Gruening, Robert Kennedy, and others like Senator Mansfield, Senator Aiken. Many Americans feels that Robert Kennedy, in his criticism of President Johnson, reflects the philosophy of the late President John Kennedy. You have served as Secretary of State under both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Do you feel that President Kennedy would have vetoed the escalation of the Vietnam war that President Johnson has put into effect?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I really do not believe that I ought to try to put into President Kennedy's mouth what he would do were he in the Presidency at the moment. What I can base myself on is not only the statements he made, the declarations he made, but the decisions he made while he was President in facing the full responsibility with respect to southeast Asia. From his public statements from 1961 through 1963, it was very clear that he considered our southeast Asia commitment a solemn one, that we would do our duty. He made himself the decision that brought our forces there from about 600 or 700 advisers on the logistics side to something in the range of 20,000 men in uniform.

WHETHER COUNTERPART FUNDS CAN BE USED FOR CERTAIN U.S. FOREIGN PAYMENTS

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

It appears that at least some of our restraint in the face of the actions of De Gaulle against the best interests of the United States stems from fear of the danger that he can further cause to us on the gold flow problem and the balance of payments. There is a considerable amount of money that the United States pays out in social security, retirement, pension, dependent allowances, employment of foreign nationals, and other matters that cause a flow out of this country. There is also a considerable amount of so-called counterpart funds in many of these countries.

Mr. Secretary, I would think that one very specific and immediate manner in which we could act on the gold flow and balance-of-payments problem would be to make such payments in counterpart funds. Because of this, I would like to urge you and President Johnson to take this under serious advisement and I would appreciate your comment now as I intend to ask for an investigation of these payments and the possible application of counterpart funds on them.

Secretary RUSK. I will have to check to see whether there are counterpart funds that are available for this purpose. We have been getting some advance payments from World War II—post-World War II debts as a part of—to help us with a part of the gold-flow problem. I am not aware that there are substantial counterpart funds that would

be available for this purpose. We do have, as you know, certain offset arrangements with certain countries. The flow to France, of course, will be dried up because we are moving our people and our facilities out of France at the request of President de Gaulle. Some of those will be telescoped with other installations; and there will be some saving as a result. But I would have to look further into that particular point of the counterpart, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Will you do that, and perhaps expand a little on your answer?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

(The information requested is as follows:)

SEPTEMBER 7, 1966.

DEAR SENATOR SMITH: During Secretary Rusk's recent appearance before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee you inquired as to whether so-called "counterpart" funds were being used for the payment of U.S. Government pensioners and annuitants living abroad.

The U.S. Government generally pays pensioners and annuitants living abroad out of excess local currencies in all cases where it will help our balance of payments. The only exceptions to this policy are those (1) necessitated by the personal hardships that would result from not making payment in dollars, (2) required by an understanding reached in the course of economic negotiations with the country concerned, or (3) made impractical by the small number of annuitants involved.

The savings in various countries from this practice amount to about \$8 million annually. Although the U.S. Government owns about \$2.9 billion worth of the currencies of 78 countries, our holdings are in excess of official U.S. Government requirements in only 11 countries. In an additional 9 countries our supply is in excess only of our immediate needs; in these 9 countries local currencies are used in preference to U.S. dollars wherever and whenever possible. Countries in which U.S. Government beneficiaries living abroad presently receive payment in local currency are Burma, Republic of China, Finland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia.

If you should require any further information, I hope you will not hesitate to inquire.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

HON. MARGARET CHASE SMITH, *U. S. Senate.*

ROLE OF DE GAULLE IN EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Senator SMITH. On October 14, 1954, I had a long conference with General de Gaulle in Paris. In that conference, General de Gaulle expressed his personal view that it was necessary to go to Russia and propose a European collective security agreement based upon control of armaments on both sides, that this should first be done through what he called, and I quote, "classic secret diplomacy," that France alone should take the initiative of such talks with Russia and that he was the man who should do it, because, he stated, and I quote, "I am the man who signed the Franco-Soviet Treaty in 1944."

At that time, General de Gaulle was in what might be called a self-imposed political exile. But now, 12 years later, the situation is reversed. I think it is clear that there is no change in his attitude. I would like you to comment on his attitude as he expressed it in 1954 to me.

Secretary RUSK. We gather from his recent visit to Moscow that no significant change occurred in the relations between himself and the Soviet Union, nor did any major change occur in matters as between

East and West. We are aware of the fact that he has, for all practical purposes, withdrawn from the SEATO organization in southeast Asia. He has had an observer at the ministerial conferences at the last two or three meetings of the Ministers. We do know he is withdrawing from the integrated force structure of NATO. But his attitude toward the shape of a settlement of the great issues in Central Europe, such as the reunification of Germany, seem to be what they have traditionally been.

We would like very much, Senator, to have him and his government participate much more actively in the field of disarmament discussions. As you know, he is not occupying the chair for France at the disarmament conference at Geneva, which recessed today for a period. We would like for them to be there, because we feel that we must pursue these disarmament discussions between East and West to see if we cannot reduce some of the burden which both sides are carrying in the present circumstance. Those discussions have been frustrating thus far largely by the passionate commitment of the Soviet Union to secrecy and to the refusal to accept measures of assurance and inspection so that any steps that can be taken can be relied upon by those who take part.

President de Gaulle's interest in improved relations with Eastern Europe is shared by the other NATO countries. In our last NATO ministerial meeting, we had in front of us an 11-page report simply listing the contacts between 5 NATO countries and countries who are members of the Warsaw Pact. There is a substantial amount of contact going on in the trade field and in exchanges, as well as in the political field. We would hope that something would develop along that line, but it still is going to take some more time to show dramatic results.

IMBALANCE IN NATO FORCE STRUCTURE

Senator SMITH. The Secretary of Defense, in his appearance before the Joint Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committee on the fiscal year 1967 budget, said—

In our view, what needs to be done now is to bring NATO strategic force goals and resources in a better balance with each other and the threat. Throughout its entire history, NATO force goals have far exceeded the resources actually made available by the member nations and this has resulted in serious imbalance throughout the entire NATO force structure.

As you know, Mr. Secretary, the force goals represent the number and types of forces deemed to be required of each member of NATO. Do you believe that the NATO Council of Ministers, through their Defense Planning Committee, will successfully resolve these serious imbalances referred to by the Secretary of Defense?

Secretary RUSK. I cannot guarantee the outcome. I can say that Secretary McNamara and I both—he with the Defense Ministers, I with the Foreign Ministers—have raised this question quite urgently in order to try to get at a common view of the nature of the threat and a common program among the NATO countries as to what all of us would do about it on an equitable basis. If there is some reduction of the threat, some think that in prudence perhaps we ought to take that into account. If that threat, however, is still as the NATO Ministers stated in their last communique—that is, they pointed to the fact that

the Soviet forces are still present in central Europe in great strength and that a large portion of their national budget still goes to military expenditures—then, as the NATO Ministers concluded, it is imperative for the West to maintain adequate forces for deterrence and defense.

The question of what is adequate is something we ought to work out together in NATO. If our existing force goals are not correct, then we ought to have other agreed force goals for all of us, so that we are all on the same basis and so that there are not disparities between the efforts made by the different members.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator Smith. Senator Jackson?

LEVEL OF MILITARY EFFORT REQUIRED FOR U.S. COMMITMENTS

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, I would like to associate myself with the remarks previously made by my colleagues with regard to your fine stewardship as Secretary of State.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, you said in testimony earlier this year that the United States has commitments in formal agreements with over 40 countries. Our chairman has said that this made it "imperative that we take a new and sober look at them and make a hard and realistic appraisal of what level of military effort and response should be required of us if two, three, or more contingencies or outbreaks should occur simultaneously."

I wonder if you could indicate to us what, if anything, you and your colleagues have done to take this new and sober look and what results can we expect?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that some of the details on the military side would be for Secretary McNamara to discuss. As you know, we have maintained the 7th Army in Europe at full strength and effectiveness during this period of major involvement in southeast Asia. The matter of preparedness is a question on which a judgment has to be made, Senator, given all of the other purposes of our national life. When I was in staff college as an Army officer, I was familiar with the doctrine of the worst case; that is, the regimental or division commander has to be sure that he is prepared for what appears to him to be the worst case on the battlefield in order for him to maintain his force. But, as a matter of national policy, if all of us, the principal nations, tried to prepare for the worst case in terms of how many engagements they might become involved in simultaneously, the principal nations would steadily turn themselves into armed camps. So a judgment has to be made of whether, under all of the circumstances, the military forces of a country are adequate to its needs as a prudent safeguard.

Now, we do have very large standing forces, very effective standing forces, but we also have very large potential forces. The increase in the strength of the United States in the last several years has been very great indeed, not only in the nuclear field, but in the conventional field; not only in hardware, but in mobility. Those are judgments which the President, the Secretary of Defense, with some advice from the Secretary of State, and the Congress have to make under the circumstances as they appear at a given time.

ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

Senator JACKSON. Do we not need to balance what we would like to do with what we can do?

In other words, do we not need to establish proper national priorities? I wondered how you and your colleagues go about the establishment of such national priorities?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we discuss the levels of our Defense Establishment not only each year, but several times during the year, in relation to the requirements that are in front of us, along with the other great national purposes. This has itself led to a considerable strengthening of our military forces in recent years. But I think we ought to keep in mind that the purpose of all this is an ordered and durable peace, that our primary purpose is to try to prevent a war by making clear to the other side that war has no profitable outcome if aggression should be resorted to, and that we ourselves would like to participate in any international effort to reduce those threats and those risks.

Our greatest problem, I think, Senator, is the problem of miscalculation on the part of the other side. We have had, in our most recent history over the decades, some very important examples of war and violence that broke out through miscalculation. I would think that a prudent Defense Establishment and prudent alliance arrangements would be aimed primarily at preventing miscalculation by the potential aggressor in order that we might have reasonable assurance that those miscalculations will not appear.

POSSIBLE BENEFITS FROM DE GAULLE VISIT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator JACKSON. Following up the remarks and questions made by Senator Smith regarding General de Gaulle, do you see anything useful coming out of his trip to Cambodia?

Secretary RUSK. We have not been consulted by them on what they expect to do on that trip. Quite frankly, I would hope for some benefits, because there are two points particularly on which they might be of some help. One is to underline to Prince Sihanouk that we ourselves are very much interested in keeping Cambodia from becoming involved in the present violence in southeast Asia, that we are interested in supporting Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity and indeed in improving its relations with its own two neighbors. If President de Gaulle can be of any assistance on that point, we would be very grateful indeed.

Secondly, if he could be of some help in bringing this matter of Vietnam itself to the conference table or to some peaceful process and away from the battlefield, that could be important.

As you know, sir, it has been extremely difficult to engage the other side in serious discussion, or indeed, in any discussion at all, about a peaceful settlement; and, if he had any way in which he could contribute to that process, again so much the better.

We have no indication that Hanoi or Peking would respond to any overtures that might be made or any suggestions we might make in this direction. But those are two things which we might hope could come out of his visit to southeast Asia.

POSSIBILITY OF DE FACTO SETTLEMENT OF VIETNAMESE CONFLICT

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, over the years, we have done everything we can to try to bring about a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Discussions have all centered around possible peace negotiations. Is it not possible that that conflict out there might be resolved, as so many guerrilla conflicts have come to an end since the end of World War II, by simply petering out? Is it not possible that a resolution might be had through this process?

Secretary RUSK. It is possible, Senator, that that would be the manner in which this matter ends. As a matter of fact, you might recall that the Greek guerrilla operations ended that way, without negotiations.

Senator JACKSON. Malaysia.

Secretary RUSK. As a matter of fact, this is a simpler way to do it, because negotiations can be extremely complicated. I simply want to say here that if the other side should indicate that it is deescalating and taking steps de facto that would be moving the thing toward peace, we would be quickly aware of that and take some corresponding steps, and the other side knows that. We have not been able to get them to discuss the question of deescalation, although we are prepared to do so. It could come about de facto, as you say.

Senator JACKSON. As a matter of fact, it might help to save face, so to speak, for the North Vietnamese and those allied with them if this process were followed to that kind of conclusion.

Secretary RUSK. There are many reasons—this would be the principal one—why a de facto solution might be attractive at some point.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, just one other question.

Senator STENNIS. All right.

NATO FORCE LEVELS AND THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

Senator JACKSON. May I turn to NATO for a moment? There have been discussions for a long time about cutting back our forces. Some have suggested that we maintain only a token force, one or two divisions. It is my recollection that the decision was made at the outset that we should have a substantial American commitment because, in the event of a Soviet-Russian move, it would then be not just a European problem but it would become an American-Soviet crisis which would add to the deterrent. Do you think that that philosophy that was the basis for our commitment in the beginning, as I understand it, is valid today?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator; I do. Looking at it purely from a selfish and national point of view, we have a tremendous stake in the character of the settlement in central Europe and a tremendous stake in the security and well-being of Western Europe. We and our NATO partners together have about 90 percent of the industrial capacity of the world. The security of the two sides of the Atlantic seem to me to be indissoluble. They just have to be taken together.

Senator JACKSON. Together, our gross national product is a little over a trillion dollars, I believe.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, is it wise for us to have a discussion going on about a cutback in our forces without relating it to a similar commitment from the Soviets? Should not there be a quid pro quo on this?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I do not—I am in no position to suggest that public discussion is unwise, because—

Senator JACKSON. Well, I shall modify that.

Secretary RUSK. I am sure you are not indicating that. But could I comment—

Senator JACKSON. It should be related, should it not, to the question of a similar cutback?

Secretary RUSK. I believe, sir, that the force goals in NATO ought to be related to the nature of the threat. Now, there are very large Soviet forces still in Central Europe and we are just 4 years away from a very, very severe crisis over Berlin, and just a little more than 3 years away from a terrible missile crisis in Cuba. I would hope that NATO would look at these matters and that there could be worked out some mutual reduction of forces.

After all, there are more than 20 Soviet divisions in Germany and they are not there as tourists. So if there could be some reduction of the tension in a way that produces these practical results, that might give greater assurance to the security of Europe.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator Jackson. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you with us.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

EFFECT OF STATEMENTS REGARDING DRAWDOWN OF U.S. FORCES IN NATO

Senator THURMOND. I have several questions. I think the answers can be rather brief, and we can cover them within the 10-minute period.

I think you will agree, Mr. Secretary, that it is essential that our public statements do not cast any doubt whatsoever on our credibility, our reliability, or our determination. There have been many official declarations that our strengths in Europe will not be withdrawn for southeast Asia. Yet we have in fact made such withdrawals to some extent. Since these withdrawals cannot be concealed and, in fact, have been reported in the press, does not the difference between what we say and what we do affect the U.S. image in Europe and elsewhere?

Secretary RUSK. The statements we have made in such places as NATO ministerial councils have to do with maintaining the major combat elements in our forces there. We have had some drawdown, temporary drawdown, of certain types of specialists from the NATO forces, and there has been some rotation of service, as you know, with southeast Asia.

I do not, myself, find any significant gap between what we have said and what we have done in terms of maintaining the 7th Army and the related forces in the NATO area.

EFFECT OF FRENCH NATO TROOP WITHDRAWAL ON OTHER NATO MEMBERS

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, France is sort of half in and half out of NATO. It remains a party to the treaty, but has withdrawn from the integrated military structure. It would appear that this involves some serious problems that must be clarified. It would also appear that other NATO members might possibly feel that they can escape their obligations to NATO by following France's example. Would you comment on both of these matters?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. France has indicated that, although they are withdrawing from the integrated military structure of NATO, they remain members of the treaty and expect to remain members of the treaty and consider article V of the treaty binding upon them. That is the key article which says that an attack on one is an attack on all.

Now, we would have preferred very much that France continue in the integrated forces, for military efficiency and to emphasize the deterrent aspects of those forces. I see no reason to believe other nations would follow the French example. The other 14 reacted promptly and with complete unanimity in their determination to maintain the integrated forces despite the action of France. The negotiations between France and the members of NATO are on the basis of the 14 and France, and the 14 are acting with a high degree of solidarity here.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN NATO FORCE LEVELS

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, what is of some concern to us is the continued suggestion that economic considerations might ultimately dictate the size of the United States and some allied forces in Europe, rather than what should be the compelling requirement for forces; that is, the threat represented by the Soviet bloc military forces. What are your comments on this?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think in general, I would agree with that. That is what I had in mind when I said earlier that there should be in NATO a common view of the nature of the threat and a common view of the action that should be taken by all of the NATO countries in relation to that threat, and that the action we all take should be on an equitable basis among the different members of NATO. I would hope very much that the great issues of war and peace in NATO would not come to be decided on purely economic grounds, because our great problem is to prevent a great war which would make many of these economic considerations utterly irrelevant.

EFFECT OF FRANCE-SOVIET DECLARATION ON U.S. ROLE IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would comment on the implications of General de Gaulle's visit to the U.S.S.R. and particularly the joint declaration issued at the close of his visit? This declaration refers to the consideration of the problems of Europe in a European framework, to normalizing relations between all European countries, to the association of all the European countries, and so on. Does this not seem to be an isolationist's declaration of Europe

for Europeans and, by inference at least, an exclusion of the United States from European problems? What is your thinking?

Secretary RUSK. Well, to the extent that this statement includes the possibility of bilateral improvement of relations between particular countries of Western Europe and particular countries of Eastern Europe, we have no objection. But the United States has the most vital and far-reaching interests in what happens in Europe. We, ourselves, have been drawn into two World Wars because of events that developed first in Europe. We have major commitments there. So it is not my view that the Western European countries generally, or indeed, Eastern European countries, feel that they can resolve these issues in which we have such a great interest, without our participation.

U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM IS TO STOP AGGRESSION

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, as my last question, is it the policy of our Government to win the war in Vietnam, or are we going to fight to a stalemate?

Secretary RUSK. I think President Johnson, Senator, has made it very clear that the heart of the matter there is what North Vietnam continues to try to do to South Vietnam. That is what must stop. That is what must be resisted. That is what must not succeed.

Those troops continue to come down. There are more than 17 regiments, not as strong in number as, say, our own regiments would be, but 17 or more regiments of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. It is this factor of aggression from the north that brought American combat troops and other combat troops into South Vietnam. We did not go in there because there was some sort of local civil war by Southern members of something called the Vietcong or the Liberation Front. Our combat troops came in there because there were organized combat troops coming in from North Vietnam to take over South Vietnam by force.

That is what has developed this situation. I do not know of any idea that we should turn South Vietnam over to North Vietnam or that we should give up the central objective of bringing that aggression to a close.

PATTERN OF WAR IN VIETNAM

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, has it been determined yet whether we are going to use our full power in Vietnam, airpower and seapower, or are we going to continue to make it chiefly a ground war, fought in the rice paddies and on the ground, and be forced to continue to send possibly 700,000 more American boys to Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. I would not want to speculate on numbers of men, Senator. The decisions on these matters are made in the face of the situation as it develops, chiefly develops from the other side. We have made very extensive use of both air and naval power. The ground action continues to be typically the ground action in a guerrilla situation. It is not a pattern of, say, a great land war in Asia in the sense that there are heavily organized forces on both sides opposing each other. The problem still is to find the other side in South Vietnam.

As far as guerrilla action is concerned, there are things which airpower alone cannot accomplish with respect to guerrilla-type activity. Bombing in North Vietnam has been very extensive, as you know.

We have struck most of the military targets in which we have any military interest. But I could not speculate, I think, today about how the situation may develop in the future.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Senator Cannon?

CONTRIBUTIONS OF NATO MEMBERS TO NATO FORCE GOALS

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I want to join my colleagues in expressing my thoughts that I think you have performed very well in your stewardship of this very important point for our country.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

Senator CNNON. I am going to relate most of my questions to NATO in view of the guidelines laid down by the chairman when he suggested that we first take up the NATO area. I do not want this to be interpreted as a lack of interest in South Vietnam, because I am very much concerned about that matter. However, I assume we shall get into it at a later time.

You mentioned a little while ago, in answer to one of the questions, that the NATO ministers had pointed out that it was imperative that we keep a strong force in NATO in view of the reassessment of the threat. I find this somewhat difficult to understand when we realize that most of the NATO countries have not met the commitments that they have actually agreed upon. Therefore, I wonder if you would address yourself to that question with this thought in mind: are they suggesting that the threat is perhaps less than it was and while we should keep a strong force—while it is imperative that we keep a strong force—it need not be as strong as we had anticipated in the force agreement which has been negotiated between these countries?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, during the past 5 years, during the period in which I have had some personal knowledge of the details of the situation, there has been some significant increase in the total force structure of NATO. Secretary McNamara could provide the detailed figures on that, but we have been encouraged by the strengthening of a number of the NATO forces. They have not come up to the NATO force goals agreed upon in about 1959 or 1960 as at least a military target.

The governments of NATO have the same kinds of problems that we all face in terms of allocation of national resources. There are many pressures on their budgets. We have encouraged them to increase their defense budgets. In fact, their defense budgets have been increased over the past several years.

But it is true that basically, we are the country that is most in accordance with our share of the NATO force structure and a number of the others have not come up to the point that we would hope they would reach. We ought to look at this in terms, again, of the nature of the threat, what all of us ought to do about it, and how we each play our respective and proper share in the total effort of NATO.

Senator CANNON. Is it not reasonable to assume that if we negotiated the level of force agreement among the various NATO countries in

the light of the threat at that time and none of the other countries has met their requirement under the agreement, perhaps we are assessing the nature of the threat a little higher than they are?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is something that ought to be thoroughly talked about. We want to be sure that there is not a double standard on these matters, but that all of us have the same view on the nature of the threat and that we take common action to deal with it.

I think it is possible that we have been more aware of certain aspects of the threat than have some of our friends in NATO. We had to carry a very large part of the burden during the very bitter Berlin crisis of 1961-62. We have our problems with the Soviet Union in bilateral relationships, some of them linked to or related to the Vietnamese problem.

But in any event, these things ought to be the matter of a NATO conclusion on the basis of which we move together and on the basis of complete solidarity in what ought to be done in prudence, given the present situation.

MIX OF NATO FORCES: WILLINGNESS OF MEMBERS TO BEAR COSTS

Senator CANNON. The British white paper of February 1966 said, "Until progress is made toward disarmament the only alternative to NATO's present dependence on nuclear weapons would be a massive buildup of its conventional forces in Europe. Even if Britain were prepared to face the heavy economic cost of this alternative, NATO as a whole is not willing to do so."

Do you agree that NATO is not willing to bear the costs, and if so, what is your view about the necessity to rely on nuclear weapons?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think, sir, that the NATO forces must include a mixed and balanced force. The conventional forces ought to be there in order to deal with lesser acts of violences and to clarify the intention of the other side so that you do not get involved in such an automaticity that everyone finds himself in a situation that no one wanted to begin with—the "Guns of August" kind of problem.

But I have no doubt whatever, sir, that powerful nuclear forces are vital to the deterrent capacity of NATO and to the security of the free world and that NATO forces should have that increment in their arsenal. Of course, all of us would hope that those forces would never have to be used. In fact, we would hope that no aggression would occur that would even activate the NATO Treaty. It is a defensive treaty, and, if other people live in peace, it does not become activated in the military sphere. But I would think the nuclear weapons should be there, and that's in the case of a major, large-scale, overwhelming type of attack that made it clear that someone was trying to overrun Western Europe, those weapons would come into play.

Senator CANNON. Mr. Secretary, you did not address yourself to the first part of my question, which was, Do you agree that NATO is not willing to bear the cost? Am I to assume that, by implication, you are agreeing that they are not willing to bear the cost?

Secretary RUSK. No, I think that varies somewhat from country to country. There are some countries; for example, Turkey and Greece, who are supporting larger forces than they themselves can afford, and the others in NATO have to help them somewhat on it. There are others who are much closer to their NATO force goals.

The Germans have been increasing their defense budgets over recent years. Whether that will continue or not is something the German Government is now deciding, but they have substantially added to their forces in the last few years.

But it varies from country to country. We would like to see this resolved on the basis of a common judgment as to what each of us ought to do.

Senator CANNON. I still do not feel that my question is completely answered as to whether or not NATO is willing to bear the cost, because it would seem to me that while some of them, it is true, have been increasing their budgets; for example, the Germans and the United Kingdom both, I think, could well afford to meet the cost of the commitment that they have made. But neither of them seems to be willing to do so. I do not want to single them out especially, because I think this is true in almost every one of the NATO countries.

Secretary RUSK. I think, Mr. Chairman, you might wish to have in the record here some comment as to the status of NATO forces and how that has appeared over the past 5 years, because it is relevant to Senator Cannon's question.

Senator STENNIS. Without objection, you may submit that for the record later.

(The document above referred to is as follows:)

Trends in defense expenditures of NATO countries

[Dollars in millions]

| Country | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | Preliminary, 1965 | Estimated, 1966 |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Belgium: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 391 | 422 | 445 | 497 | 501 | 535 |
| Percent change..... | 2.1 | 7.9 | 5.5 | 11.7 | .8 | 6.8 |
| Percent GNP..... | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
| Canada: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 1,587 | 1,674 | 1,584 | 1,678 | 1,625 | 1,675 |
| Percent change..... | 3.7 | | -5.6 | 5.9 | -3.4 | 3.1 |
| Percent GNP..... | 5.2 | 5.1 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| Denmark: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 171 | 224 | 239 | 255 | 286 | 290 |
| Percent change..... | 6.2 | 31.0 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 12.7 | 1.4 |
| Percent GNP..... | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| France: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 4,131 | 4,493 | 4,628 | 4,918 | 5,215 | 5,300 |
| Percent change..... | 6.4 | 8.8 | 3.0 | 6.3 | 6.0 | 1.6 |
| Percent GNP..... | 7.4 | 7.3 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.4 |
| Germany: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 3,294 | 4,308 | 4,981 | 4,888 | 4,979 | 5,000 |
| Percent change..... | 8.7 | 30.8 | 15.6 | -1.9 | 1.9 | .4 |
| Percent GNP..... | 4.6 | 5.6 | 6.1 | 5.5 | 5.1 | 5.0 |
| Greece: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 168 | 170 | 179 | 188 | 200 | 212 |
| Percent change..... | -1.2 | 1.2 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 6.4 | 6.0 |
| Percent GNP..... | 5.1 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Italy: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 1,199 | 1,377 | 1,649 | 1,789 | 1,939 | 1,990 |
| Percent change..... | 5.5 | 14.8 | 19.8 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 2.6 |
| Percent GNP..... | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.1 |
| Luxembourg: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 5.8 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 10 |
| Percent change..... | 9.4 | 16.7 | 0 | 28.6 | 0 | 11.1 |
| Percent GNP..... | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Netherlands: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 556 | 604 | 637 | 735 | 735 | 750 |
| Percent change..... | 16.6 | 8.6 | 5.4 | 15.4 | 0 | 20.4 |
| Percent GNP..... | 4.8 | 5.0 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.4 | 4.2 |
| Norway: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 165 | 192 | 205 | 220 | 266 | 270 |
| Percent change..... | 11.5 | 16.4 | 6.8 | 7.3 | 20.9 | 1.5 |
| Percent GNP..... | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 4.2 |

Trends in defense expenditures of NATO countries—Continued

[Dollars in millions]

| Country | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | Preliminary, 1965 | Estimated, 1966 |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Portugal: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 171 | 200 | 199 | 224 | 250 | 240 |
| Percent change..... | 62.8 | 17.0 | -0.5 | 12.6 | 11.6 | -4.0 |
| Percent GNP..... | 7.1 | 7.8 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 7.0 | 6.4 |
| Turkey: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 302 | 331 | 351 | 382 | 400 | 410 |
| Percent change..... | 13.1 | 9.6 | 6.0 | 8.8 | 4.7 | 2.5 |
| Percent GNP..... | 6.1 | 6.0 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 5.2 | 5.0 |
| United Kingdom: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 4,785 | 5,078 | 5,238 | 5,599 | 5,928 | 6,224 |
| Percent change..... | 3.3 | 6.1 | 3.2 | 6.9 | 5.9 | 4.9 |
| Percent GNP..... | 7.0 | 7.1 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 6.8 |
| NATO less United States: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 16,926 | 19,080 | 20,341 | 21,382 | 22,333 | 22,906 |
| Percent change..... | 6.3 | 11.9 | 6.7 | 5.1 | 4.4 | 2.6 |
| Percent GNP..... | 5.6 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 5.4 | ----- |
| United States: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 47,808 | 52,381 | 52,295 | 51,213 | 51,848 | 57,900 |
| Percent change..... | 5.3 | 9.6 | -0.2 | -2.1 | 1.5 | 11.1 |
| Percent GNP..... | 10.1 | 10.3 | 9.8 | 9.0 | 8.5 | 8.8 |
| Total: | | | | | | |
| In U.S. dollars..... | 64,734 | 71,461 | 72,636 | 72,595 | 74,181 | 80,806 |
| Percent change..... | 5.6 | 11.7 | 1.1 | -0.1 | 2.1 | 9.0 |
| Percent GNP..... | 8.3 | 8.5 | 8.2 | 7.5 | 7.1 | ----- |

Secretary RUSK. In order, Senator, not to appear to avoid your question on what they are willing to do, I will have to say that up to this point, the various NATO governments in general have not come fully up to the NATO force structure that was tentatively agreed upon in 1959 or 1960.

FRENCH PURPOSE IN NATO WITHDRAWAL

Senator CANNON. When Mr. Dean Acheson appeared before Senator Jackson's subcommittee on April 27, he said:

The present attack from Paris is no mere criticism of the plans for the defense of Europe, the united command which has been set up near Versailles to take over in the event of conflict—and not before—and the forces in being which all allies have stationed in Europe, including in France, to respond to that command. The attack is upon the whole idea of having such a plan and forces to carry it out, upon the idea of American presence in Europe, but, even more, upon the great European effort toward unity of the past 15 years.

Do you agree with this assessment, and if not, in what respects do you disagree? I realize you have already related somewhat to this question, but I do not think quite fully.

Secretary RUSK. We do not, quite frankly, have a full exposition of all that might be in the mind of the present French Government about some of the actions they have presently taken. It is quite clear that they want to withdraw from all the military structure of NATO. We are quite clear what it is they want to do, but we are not quite sure about why they are doing it. While I have the highest respect for Mr. Dean Acheson, I think I would prefer to postpone my own response to at least part of those questions until the present discussions in the NATO Council between the 14 and France and our own bilateral discussions with France about our own facilities and the discussions about the future role of French forces in relation to the NATO

forces have gotten along to a later stage than they are at the present time.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Byrd?

ADEQUACY OF ALLIED SUPPORT OF U.S. POLICIES IN CUBA AND VIETNAM

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, Rhodesia does not threaten the peace. It is threatening no other nation. The United States has joined unreservedly in Britain's economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Great Britain and other nations ignore our policy and continue to trade freely with Castro's Cuba, where there is at least some threat to peace in Latin America. In Vietnam, where the threat to peace long ago erupted into a grim and costly war, trade with Hanoi is carried on by Great Britain. Why do we not insist upon a quid pro quo in return for our support of Britain's sanctions against Rhodesia?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, when there are literally hundreds of issues that exist among 120 or more governments, linking various things together gets to be a very complicated problem. We are pursuing a policy with respect to Rhodesia which, in fact, is a United Nations policy generally adopted by the international organization. Further, we are doing it because of our own national interest in what happens in the African Continent. The sharp clash there in Rhodesia between the white minority and the colored large majority is potentially a very explosive and dangerous situation that could affect the entire continent and does have in it the seeds of violence.

As far as Cuba is concerned, we have not only ourselves pressed our friends to be abstemious in their trade with Cuba, but the entire hemisphere, in the summer of 1964, applied to Cuba, as far as the hemisphere is concerned, all of the peaceful sanctions available under the Rio Pact. This was in response to Venezuela's request for support when Castro agents landed large quantities of arms and agents and so forth in Venezuela. At the same time, the hemisphere nations called upon other nations to demonstrate their solidarity with the hemisphere in abstaining from trade with Cuba. That has not been fully responded to by all the free world countries, and Britain has had some long-term trade policies which they still pursue.

As far as North Vietnam is concerned, I think the free world trade with Hanoi has been reduced very rapidly indeed. I think I am correct in reporting that in the month of July, there was one free world flagship visiting Haiphong. That was a British flagship operating out of Hong Kong under charter to Communist China. There has been a very, very sharp reduction indeed in free world trade with North Vietnam.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, are we continuing to exert pressure upon Great Britain in an effort to exact a quid pro quo and encourage Great Britain to shut off her trade with North Vietnam and Cuba in return for our support of her actions against Rhodesia?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think our attitude on these matters you have mentioned is well known to everybody. I think that the British view is also known. I would be glad to pursue in private session the question of what kind of conversations we have had and what we think might be the results of them. But I think that the respective positions

are a matter of public information. I think I cannot produce more than that this morning.

BRITISH SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM AND CUBA

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, would you supply for the record information concerning the volume of British shipping to North Vietnam and to Cuba and indicate that volume over the past year? Could you do that for us?

Secretary RUSK. I shall try to do so, yes, sir.
(The information requested appears on p. 109.)

REDUCTION OF U.S. NATO FORCES

Senator BYRD. Western European countries are enjoying a healthy prosperity. The economies there are strong and they are stable. Our own country is having its economic tribulations, with rising inflation, prices, and wages, a budget which is preponderantly military in nature, a dwindling gold supply, and a serious balance-of-payments problem. Additionally, we are drafting more and more young men and sending them to Vietnam. In view of the fact that we have a demonstrated area of capability, why should not we withdraw at least a sizable number of our military personnel from Europe, thus relieving our Treasury of the drain imposed upon it for the cost of maintaining military personnel and dependents in affluent countries which are capable of spending more in the interest of their own defense, but who show no disposition, or little disposition at least, to do so as long as the American taxpayer foots the bill?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, we did not put our forces into NATO to start with on the basis that we could afford to do it. We put them there as our contribution toward the deterrence of Eastern Europe from an attack on Western Europe and the NATO area. If there is anything that seems to me to be fundamental in the situation of a free Europe, it is that, from the United States' point of view, the security and safety of North America and Western Europe just have to be taken together.

Senator STENNIS. Would you repeat that, please?

Secretary RUSK. The safety of North America and Western Europe have to be considered together because of the enormous stakes that are involved in that situation.

Now, as I have indicated earlier, I think that all of us in NATO have to make prudent judgments from time to time as to what is required to meet whatever threat appears to be on hand. But I would certainly feel that it would not be in the interest of the United States to become negligent about, or reckless about, our deterrent effort in NATO or our capacities in NATO because we are called upon to make substantial effort in another part of the world. The issues are just too vital.

SHORTFALL IN NATO FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I recognize that we do have a tremendous stake there. I also believe that as long as we are willing to bear the burden, our Western European friends will let us do it. Now, we

recognize the vital nature of our maintaining forces there and, at the same time, the Ministers concluded at the conclusion of the June meeting of the Ministerial Council in Brussels, to which you alluded earlier, that "It is imperative for the West to maintain adequate forces for deterrence and defense." You were quoting the Ministers.

On the other side of the coin, our NATO friends overall have not met their force goals and, because of the feeling that the threat has diminished, seem likely to reduce them during the current negotiations. How can we reconcile this situation, particularly when any suggestion that we might reduce our forces in Europe is met with alarm and the feeling among the NATO members seems to be that our forces must be based on a sense of greater urgency, confrontation, threat and danger?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think it is important that we not let the idea of the shortfall in meeting NATO forces create the impression here this morning that the other NATO countries have done nothing or done very little about their own defenses. I think when the committee has before it the total record on this and the increases made in NATO in the past few years, they will see that although there are some margins of shortfalls that concern us, nevertheless there has been a substantial defense effort on the part of the other NATO countries. There are some 300,000 German troops, for example, in the German Army assigned to NATO. We have, I think, about 225,000 Army forces there in that capacity.

Nevertheless, as I have said on several occasions this morning, the answers to the questions you posed just then ought to be reached on a NATO-wide basis, on a common judgment as to what the situation is and what is required of all of us to deal with it.

BRITISH FORCES IN MALAYSIA

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I hope we can arrive at that answer. How many men do the British have in Malaysia today?

Secretary RUSK. Over 50,000 of their own forces. As a matter of fact, although I did not mention Britain in connection with forces in Vietnam, Britain has had very substantial forces in Malaysia because of the confrontation with Indonesia. We have felt that that was a very important role for Britain to play there. At one time, they had at least 25 percent of their total defense budget committed in the Malaysian area.

BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM MALAYSIA

Senator BYRD. Is Britain today withdrawing its forces?

Secretary RUSK. That depends on what happens on this question of confrontation. It appears that confrontation is being removed as an issue. At least, everyone hopes the recent agreements would mean that. It is our understanding that Britain, in that event, would withdraw some of her forces from Southeast Asia.

STATUS OF FRENCH FORCES IN GERMANY

Senator BYRD. Has the status of the French troops stationed in Germany been resolved yet?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; that matter was being discussed bilaterally between the Federal Republic and France, and was the subject also of some discussion in the NATO Council. In a recent meeting between De Gaulle and Chancellor Erhard, there was some feeling that there was agreement in principle on the part of the two of them that Germany did want the troops to remain, that France was willing for the French troops to remain, but there were some other points in detail that have to be worked out.

EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION

Senator STENNIS. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I want to take just a half minute to make a very brief statement. First of all, Ambassador MacArthur, the subcommittee appreciates greatly your fine cooperation in preparation for these hearings. You have been very helpful indeed.

U.S. MILITARY MANPOWER PROBLEMS

Mr. Secretary, I think Secretary of Defense McNamara's recent announcement that he plans to take in 40,000 men this year and then next year and successive years thereafter, as long as needed, 100,000 men all from a group that have heretofore been considered below standards physically or mentally, or both, underscores the manpower problem, as nothing else perhaps could, that we have been wrestling with on this subcommittee.

If I may, without alluding to any individual and not thinking of individuals, I am sure you are deeply impressed with deep concern in the minds of the members of the subcommittee regarding this manpower problem, the money problem, and military planning as a whole. Some of these members are on the Appropriations Committee in addition to the Armed Services Committee. They have the first responsibility in trying to form policy for the Senate in this field and the first responsibility in shaping up a Selective Service Act which must be renewed next year. I think we have reflected our concern here this morning, at least in part. Our contact with you has been helpful, too.

Now, the Senator from Massachusetts is a very close calculator. He thinks I overcharged him in time. We are going to stop on time, but the 2 minutes remaining are his.

ADMISSION OF CHICOMS TO UNITED NATIONS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, you are a fair man, but I think your watch is wrong.

May I ask just one question, Mr. Secretary? We have been hearing a great deal about both the United Nations and NATO here this morning. My question is a very simple one. I would be glad to express my opinion if you are willing to express yours with relation to the Chinese Communists being admitted to the United Nations. Personally, I feel we should continue to oppose the entrance of the Chinese Communists, but if we are voted down in the United Nations General Assembly, then we certainly should stay within the Assembly—stay within the United Nations—even though they become members.

Would you care to comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. I think I can comment on that very briefly. I can agree with the second part of what you said. On the first part, I would point out the United Nations itself would run into exactly the same question we have run into in our bilateral talks with Peking: that is, what do you do with the Republic of China on Formosa?

Peking has continued to say to us, year after year, that there is nothing to discuss unless we are prepared to surrender Formosa. When we tell them that we cannot do that, then they say that they will not talk about southeast Asia, disarmament, or anything else.

The United Nations is faced with this problem because, unless the United Nations expels the Republic of China, then Peking will not discuss membership or anything else. I do not think they are going to expel this permanent member of the Security Council, that has been there as a loyal member, and that at the present time is giving technical assistance to more than 25 members of the United Nations, in the food field particularly. So it is the position of Peking that makes the question rather empty at the present time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, it is a moot question?

THE PRESIDENT SHARES SUBCOMMITTEE'S CONCERN?

Secretary RUSK. I think so.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and say that these concerns we have discussed here are also the President's concerns. These are grave questions, affecting the life and death of the Nation. I am quite sure that this great country can find ways and means of doing what has to be done with respect to these vital interests of ours.

RECESS OF SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator STENNIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The committee will have another session where Mr. Rusk will be with us next Tuesday, in this room, beginning at 10 o'clock. It will be an open session to start with and will continue so long as the committee and the Secretary may wish, and then we shall go into a closed session.

Mr. Secretary, we thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing recessed until the following Tuesday, Aug. 30, 1966, at 10 a.m.)

WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMITMENTS

TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1966

U.S. SENATE,
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee (composed of Senator Stennis (chairman), Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Saltonstall, Smith, and Thurmond) met, pursuant to notice at 10 a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Senator John Stennis presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Saltonstall, Smith, and Thurmond.

Also present: James T. Kendall, chief counsel; Robert M. Neal, professional staff member; Stuart French, professional staff member; Glenn A. Smith, professional staff member; Samuel R. Shaw, professional staff member.

CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT

Senator STENNIS. The subcommittee will please come to order.

Mr. Secretary, we are delighted to have you with us again. We will have this open session for such time as the members of the subcommittee may wish to ask questions appropriate for an open session, after which, if time permits, we will retire to our own conference room where we have arrangements to continue the testimony in executive session.

I do not have a formal statement at this point. The Secretary has already presented his formal statement. I do want to make just a few remarks for the subcommittee. Then I will have some brief questions and we will proceed in the same fashion as before.

If our subcommittee does not make its mission and its purposes clear so that they are properly understood it is our own fault. I want to emphasize again, therefore, that in the course of this survey and study and these hearings, we will get down to the military hardware, the nuts and bolts, so to speak. We will also get down to the details of the manpower situation. We hope to get at least partly into the question of money requirements, and something with reference to the manpower and other capabilities of our probable allies, particularly in these alliances.

We are endeavoring to measure and evaluate our military preparedness, our military potential against our existing military commitments and other phases of our vital defenses. We have to find a starting place.

Now, I think we all understand that any nation, when put to a test and crowded, will do everything which is necessary for its own defense and survival. I think it is understood that we will do that, alliance or no alliance, as anyone else would.

USE OF U.S. FORCES WHERE NO TREATY EXISTS

But last week, Mr. Secretary, you recited to us in a very fine way the alliances that we have. Then you went on further to point out that even nations that are not allied with us formally could depend upon us to help them under certain circumstances in the preservation of peace. That is not altogether a new concept, but you emphasized it to such an extent that I feel it is very definitely a part of these hearings. And I am glad you brought it out, because that is one thing that makes me believe, at least, that the old lines are all gone, the old tests are all gone, the old safeguards are all gone; that is, the caution we used to have, and we are now in an age of alliances and implied alliances and ideas of proceeding even without declared war.

To be specific, on page 9 of your opening statement, you indicated that the U.S. Armed Forces might be used in collective defense against armed aggression, even in cases where no treaty is involved. You suggested that this might result because of our general obligation under the Charter of the United Nations or because of our own vital or national interest. Now, this is very definite, and it appears clearly to me to be an escalation of our potential obligations and responsibilities, and it also gives an open-end effect to our situation today. What is your response to my suggestion on that?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS; LEONARD C. MEEKER, LEGAL ADVISER; AND STANLEY FUTTERMAN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE LEGAL ADVISER

POSSIBLE ACTIONS WHERE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST IS INVOLVED

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, it was not my purpose in this statement to indicate, as at least one headline indicated, that I thought it was our task to defend the peace everywhere and anywhere. I did point out that situations could arise under circumstances in which the President and the Congress at that time would decide that American national interests are so much involved or our obligations under the charter are so much involved that some action by us would be required.

We had a case of that in the Congo, for example. When the Congo situation blew up, President Eisenhower pressed that matter in the United Nations, along with some other governments. We did not put combat troops in the Congo, but we did provide certain logistic support for U.N. forces in the Congo. Now, we had no treaty with respect to the Congo except the U.N. Charter. We joined in a general effort there. I can imagine—if I may speak hypothetically, and I am hesitant to do so on such a serious subject—I could imagine, for example, that although Trinidad is not at the moment a member of the OAS system,

if there were an attack on Trinidad of a sort that was a threat to this hemisphere, the sort that would not be acceptable in the hemisphere, I do not believe that the Inter-American States as a group would look with indifference upon such an attack.

UNITED STATES NOT POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD

That does not mean that we consider ourselves, as I said in the next following paragraph in the statement to which you referred, to be the world's policeman. If you look back over the crises in this postwar period, we have been directly involved only in a small fraction of those crises. There are many other ways in which quarrels and disputes or the use of violence across frontiers might be handled—some of those directly between the parties, some through the United Nations machinery, some through such regional organizations as the Organization of African Unity. What I did not want to do was to have my statement incomplete, in fairness to the committee and to our understanding of our problems.

ALLIANCES DO NOT EXTEND COMMITMENTS

As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, if we were to start today, afresh, if we eliminated all of these alliances, that would not solve the problem as to where our national interest might lie in the event of aggression. We do have some vital interests, both in the Atlantic area and in the Pacific area, to which we would have to give our most serious attention.

Now, the purpose of the alliances into which we have entered since 1945 is not to extend our commitments in the sense of hoping thereby to bring them into operation, but as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee put it, in recommending approval of the Southeast Asia Treaty, there are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

I think the committee in the course of its considerations—and I think this is a most important set of hearings and discussions which you are having, Mr. Chairman—I think you might want to look at certain case studies which have arisen in this postwar period to look at the question of miscalculation by the other side.

COMMUNIST MISCALCULATION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

Now, did we contribute to the miscalculation on the part of the Communist countries with respect to Korea? I think it would be a very interesting thing to examine how that miscalculation arose. The first purpose of a treaty is to prevent the miscalculation which would produce the action so threatening to our vital interests that we would be required to take action.

On the whole, although we have had some difficult and painful times since 1945, these treaties have served very well as a deterrent to aggression.

POSSIBLE ACTION IN A SITUATION NOT ANTICIPATED

Senator STENNIS. All right. If I may interrupt you, you have about covered that. You are saying that your announcement last week did not mean any new policy or any particular extension of a present policy or anything of that kind. You were merely saying, as I understand you now, that you were letting it be known that we do not just close the door on the idea of helping out in some trouble spots.

Secretary RUSK. I was trying to be fair to the committee in putting forth the entire set of contingencies, I think it would have been unfair for me to lead the committee to suppose that a future President and a future Congress might not feel it essential to act in a situation which we cannot now readily anticipate, which is not covered by a treaty.

CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

Senator STENNIS. You mentioned the matter of the Congo. If I may just refer to it quite briefly, I remember that very well. I was not in on the top-level conferences, but I did know what was happening. I know that there were those who urged that we go in with a uniformed force and I know some Members of the Senate were very much opposed to that and advised against it very strongly. We wound up by abandoning the idea entirely and I think it did work out right well by the methods that were adopted.

Now, that is an illustration, to me, of the need for more congressional consideration, regardless of circumstances. I will not say the advice of Congress, but consideration of their views. It concerns many of us that we have all these alliances and the implications of them. If they are going to be interpreted as putting us in issue and committing us to what can develop into a war, as it did in Vietnam, and using what seems to us strange language at times with reference to these commitments and not having the caution anymore, apparently, of a formal declaration of war—I do not mean to argue that now, but it is more or less a fact of life. About the only thing that is left for us is to appropriate the money.

I do not say this critically, but the Appropriations Committee, even in closed session, cannot get an estimate of how many more men will be needed in Vietnam during the remainder of this fiscal year. No one knows. We could not get a loose estimate the other day in closed session of what probably would or might be needed in money for the remainder of this currently running fiscal year for that war.

As I say, I do not raise those questions critically, but I think Congress has to assert itself more and air the facts more, frankly. I think you are doing the best you can. You are handicapped, in a way, in this by testifying in public. But I agree with you that the public ought to know more about it.

RUSK ASSERTS THAT CONGRESS IS CONSULTED

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would suggest that our security commitments are those that arise from formal action taken by the Congress—by the Senate, ratifying treaties and by resolutions of the Congress. In the case of Vietnam, I do not know of any situation in

which there has been more frequent, more persistent, more complete consultation with the Congress than in that situation.

In terms of the future, of course, the other side helps to make the future. We cannot know with certainty what the other side is going to do—they have some 17 to 19 regiments of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam today. We see no present prospect that they are prepared to bring that matter to the conference table or to take part in deescalation or to turn away from their announced intention of seizing South Vietnam. But that situation could change up or down. So estimates of what will surely be required over a period of months ahead can only be of the most tentative character because they depend so much on what the other side is going to do.

Senator STENNIS. Pardon me, you used the word "surely," I did not use the word "surely". I said even a loose estimate in the privacy of our chambers. It has gone too far that way, I think. Certainly the Congress has been consulted a lot on Vietnam, before we got so much involved particularly, and we have had a chance to make suggestions as to what to do about it. I am fully aware of that, and I do know that I am supporting these.

My time is up. Senator Saltonstall.

POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN JOHNSON AND DE GAULLE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have several questions, Mr. Secretary, and if you do not believe it prudent to answer them in public, why, you can certainly say so. I just came down from Boston, Mass., this morning and have read the Boston papers. Both our papers headline Mr. Mansfield's statements yesterday about the meeting between the President and President de Gaulle. Would you care to comment upon that at all, or would you prefer not to?

Secretary RUSK. I would prefer not to comment on that under these circumstances, Senator. There are no present plans for such a meeting, but I would be prepared to discuss the problem itself somewhat more in private session.

ROLE OF ASIAN NATIONS IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Senator SALTONSTALL. All I can say is apparently the newspaper comment up there was very sympathetic to what Mr. Mansfield had said.

Perhaps, you will not want to answer this, either, but it seems to me it is very important. What is your estimate of the possibility of the southeast Asia nations getting together and working out negotiations that might lead to more favorable settlement in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. We were very much interested in the initiative taken by the three so-called ASA nations—Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines—in their recent meeting, proposing that there be a conference of Asian nations to take this matter up and see if they can work out some peace. We have noted that certain countries such as Japan have indicated their support for such a proposal. We have been disappointed but not surprised that Hanoi and Peking have prematurely rejected any such idea. We, ourselves, said at the very

beginning that we thought this was a constructive step. We tried to say so quietly, because we did not wish to get in the way of the possibility that the Asian countries might produce a conference which Hanoi and Peking might attend. But I would think today the prospect is that Hanoi and Peking will not come to such a conference. We thought it would be a very constructive thing.

You see, the suggestion for a conference of Asian nations takes its place along with 15 to 20 other important initiatives taken by somebody somewhere, ranging from the nonaligned nations to his Holiness, the Pope, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the British Commonwealth Committee. On all of those, we have said yes. The regime in Hanoi has said no.

Now, contacts with the other side continue. But thus far we do not see a readiness on their part to bring this matter to a peaceful solution.

U.S. WOULD BE GLAD TO PARTICIPATE IN ASIAN CONFERENCE

Senator SALTONSTALL. And certainly, we would be only too happy to join or to participate in whatever way we felt it would be helpful if such a conference were called?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, indeed, if the Asian countries had such a conference, and if they wanted us to be present, we would be present. If they thought it would be better to proceed on the basis of Asian countries alone, who, in turn, would be in contact with the principal parties in this situation, we would be for that. Whatever way they would find to move on this, they would find us helpful.

CONFERENCE OF ASIAN NATIONS MIGHT BE HELPFUL

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would it be helpful at all, in your opinion, if nations such as Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, and others in that area of the world got together for a conference and proposed some suggestions or recommendations, even if Hanoi and Peking would not attend such a conference? Would that be helpful?

Secretary RUSK. Seventeen nonaligned nations, for example, last year got together on a joint statement urging negotiations without preconditions.

I think it would be useful for any group of nations that were interested in a settlement in this matter to talk it over among themselves. It may be that some suggestions could come out that would help in this process. Whether such a meeting will occur, I am not sure. They did have a meeting, as you know, of ten Asian and Pacific countries in Korea, and there was considerable discussion of this Vietnamese problem. That included not just allies of the United States, but some countries that are not allied. They expressed appreciation for the assistance that was being given to South Vietnam to maintain its safety. But also, they put great emphasis upon the importance of trying to find a way to bring this matter to a peaceful solution. We would be glad to have any such group of nations meet to consider it.

STATUS OF GERMANY'S OFFSET AGREEMENT

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, just one more question on another part of the world. It has been called to my attention that

West Germany, which has agreed to purchase \$1,300 million of U.S. goods during this fiscal year, has not been living up to their agreements. Is that so? Do you know anything about that?

Secretary RUSK. The agreement runs to July 1 next year, and I have no doubt that that agreement will be carried out. I have no doubt that is the purpose and the intention of the German Government. I am not concerned about that problem.

Senator SALTONSTALL. They are slow in their payments.

Secretary RUSK. I believe the actual payments are not on a pro rata basis, but that was not required under the agreement. The agreement was a comprehensive agreement, extending to July 1 next year.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Could I ask what the time limitation is?

Senator STENNIS. We are not as firm as before. So 12 or 13 minutes in the first round.

SENATOR SYMINGTON'S OBSERVATIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, in a report made to the Senate on May 4 after a trip to the Far East and Europe, I made the following observations, pulled at random from the report. It may be difficult to decide whether or not the United States is economically or politically overextended from the fiscal and monetary standpoint, but if military commitments are an important part of political and economic commitments, then this Nation is overextended in all three categories. Rich and powerful though we are, the United States cannot continue individually both financing and defending the so-called free world with such little support from our friends and allies. They should live up to their commitments as we have to ours.

In addition, unless we change the normalcy approach now characteristic of our problems and programs incident to handling these worldwide commitments, there should be a reduction in the nature and scope of these commitments and even so, some reduction would be desirable. These considerations, along with others contained in the attached classified report and including the previously referred to heavy commitments in southeast Asia, confirm to me that the United States is now overcommitted.

Without substantially more assistance from the countries that have an equal stake in the ultimate outcome, we cannot continue in the future to the extent that we have in the past. In addition, major changes should be made in our domestic policies and programs in recognition of the scope of our present worldwide commitments; otherwise, we have no course but to reduce these commitments.

That was part of a report I made on May 4 to the Senate. I must say, based on the growing fiscal and monetary crisis, I think I am even more right now than at that time.

Now, I asked you five questions last Thursday, and know you have been very busy and this is quite near Thursday.

I would repeat them, if I may:

NON-UNITED STATES U.N. TROOPS IN KOREA

How many troops of other U.N. countries are in Korea?

Secretary RUSK. The total number of non-U.S. components of the U.N. Command in Korea as of June 1966 was only 243. The Republic of Korea itself maintains approximately 600,000 troops, including the Korean forces now in Vietnam.

The 16 member nations of the U.N. Command pledged in 1953 at the time of the armistice agreement that, if there was a renewal of the attack, they would be ready to resist. At that time, there were more than 31,000 non-U.S. personnel in the U.N. Command.

KOREAN TROOPS IN KOREA

Senator SYMINGTON. On Thursday you said we have 400,000 Korean troops alongside our divisions in Korea. That would be the right place for the Koreans to have their own troops, would it not?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. I made the remark and I apparently underestimated when I checked the figures. It is nearer 600,000. I wanted to point out that, although we are the only significant military power in Korea other than Korea, there are 600,000 Koreans there.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is where you would expect them to be, right?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

But it is not automatic that they would go that far in taking care of their own defense. They have made a major effort in that regard.

Senator SYMINGTON. If they will not defend their own land, whose land would they?

Secretary RUSK. That is true.

NATO AND SEATO TROOPS IN THAILAND

Senator SYMINGTON. How many NATO and SEATO troops are in Thailand besides our own?

Secretary RUSK. SEATO members with forces in Thailand other than the United States include the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. They are involved mainly in roadbuilding projects and in air and vehicle maintenance and protection of air activity.

The number of personnel involved has been classified by those countries, and I would be glad to go into that in classified session.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is very small?

Secretary RUSK. Relatively small.

U.S. TROOPS IN THAILAND

Senator SYMINGTON. How many troops do we have in Thailand?

Secretary RUSK. I would prefer to go into that in private session.

LACK OF SUPPORT BY ALLIES IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you not believe that if say, 20, or one-half, of the 40 countries to which we are committed, would send even token fighting men to Vietnam, the American public would be much less critical of our involvement there?

Secretary RUSK. I think it is possible, sir, that that is true. In fact, I am quite sure that would be true as far as the American attitude is concerned. But I think it is important to point out that some of the countries with whom we have alliances are not themselves allied for purposes of defending southeast Asia. Under the SEATO Treaty, five signatories of that treaty do have forces in South Vietnam—those have been increasing in recent months—in addition to one non-SEATO country, Korea, that has significant forces there.

EFFECT OF UNITED STATES CARRYING MILITARY AND FINANCIAL BURDEN

Senator SYMINGTON. I will get to that. My fourth question to you Thursday: if the United States is willing to continue to carry this burden of both defending the so-called free world and financing that world to the extent we do, why should anyone help us?

Secretary RUSK. The question is who does what under which commitments and obligations. In the case of southeast Asia, as you know, five nations have troops in South Vietnam; a sixth, the United Kingdom, has had substantial forces in southeast Asia with respect to the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia. France has, for all practical purposes, I think, withdrawn from security arrangements in southeast Asia. Pakistan has been so very much absorbed in its own problems with India that it has not taken an active part, certainly on the military side, in southeast Asia. But the countries who are closest to the danger and who feel their own security immediately involved have been making a significant contribution.

AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, let us discuss sometime the definition of "significant."

In effect, I have asked my fifth question. On Thursday, you mentioned that the three countries fighting with us in South Vietnam were Korea, Australia, New Zealand. How many Australians are there in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Approximately 4,500.

Senator SYMINGTON. And how many New Zealanders?

Secretary RUSK. Whether all are present or not, there has been an artillery unit, a battery, and that is being increased by 50 percent. It will be in effect a six-gun battery in direct support of the Australians. Both of these countries have had troops involved in the Malaysian situation, have had commitments to Malaysia.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I understand it, the Australians have about one-fourth per capita that we do, the New Zealanders between one-twentieth and one-twenty-eighth.

NECESSITY FOR HELP AND COOPERATION FROM ALLIES

I ask these questions because it is getting increasingly obvious that we are not getting comparable help from countries we have been defending for such a long time.

Mr. Chairman, I have other questions, but would close with a quotation by one of our colleagues, from a fine book by Senator Paul

Douglas. The later is not considered a conservative and is closer to many of these problems than the rest of us.

Senator Douglas says on page 95 of his book, "The American Market Place"—

It is to the credit of our Government and people that despite the disadvantages which we have suffered, we have nevertheless persisted throughout the post-war period in giving vast amounts of economic and military aid to the other nations of the free world, aid now amounting to more than \$115 billion. At the same time, we have patiently borne discriminatory acts against our trade while we have worked for the reduction of trade barriers and for broader and more extensive commerce between the countries. In a world of political and economic realities, no nation could have acted more unselfishly or with greater concern for the long-run welfare of the world.

It is not improper, therefore, for us to ask for some reciprocal consideration and cooperation from the other nations of the Western World.

The thrust of my questions this morning was to express the hope we can get more cooperation and consideration, if not in wealth, at least in manpower, in these increasing jobs that we have. I will defer until the next round.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Smith?

CIA DOES NOT INTRUDE ON FOREIGN POLICY

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, there has been mounting criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency for alleged invasion of foreign policy, with critics pointing to the Bay of Pigs, to Indonesia, and to Vietnam. That criticism, led by Senator McCarthy and Senator Fulbright, reached the point of a demand and drive for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to share membership on the Senate Watchdog Committee on the CIA with the Appropriations Committee and Armed Services Committee and to one of the very rare instances when the Senate closed the doors to the public and held a secret session on this issue. You are perhaps in the most unique position of any living person to have knowledge of this allegation of CIA invasion of foreign policy. In the first place, you are the Secretary of State, against whose Department such an alleged invasion would be made. In the second place, you are a member of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency is established under the National Security Council. It advises and makes recommendations to the National Security Council and performs under the direction of the National Security Council.

My question, Mr. Secretary, is, Are these charges against the CIA and its alleged invasion of foreign policy true?

Secretary RUSK. They are not, to my knowledge. I think I would certainly know, because we have interagency machinery by which the things that are done by CIA—which are greatly exaggerated, by the way, in the press around the world—are done as a matter of policy.

In the particular case of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy and I have taken our full share of responsibility for that. I am not one of those who would try to unload that one on the CIA. We had a full chance at that one. Neither one of us has backed away from that responsibility.

Now, we have machinery by which this is done. We are subject to a good many attacks and charges in many different places about the involvement of the CIA in situations in which they are not involved.

In private session, I shall go over with you the fact that, since I have been Secretary of State, there have been some 53 or 54 coup d'etats somewhere in the world. The CIA did not bring them about. These came about through actions and through pressures and forces inside of these various countries.

I think there is no question whatever that the CIA is operating under the policy direction of those that have policy responsibility.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, in answer to my direct question, Are these charges against the CIA of invasion of foreign policy true? Your answer is "No"?

Secretary RUSK. My answer is "No." I think it is true, as a matter of fact, that we who have the policy responsibility exercise it. I have not known of a situation since I have been Secretary of State when the CIA has tried to usurp that function.

ESTIMATE OF THREAT WHICH NATO FACES

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much. Last Friday, you indicated that the NATO countries were attempting to reach an agreement on the nature of the threat. As you know better than I, there already is an agreed estimate of the threat as far as the military capabilities of the Soviet satellite forces are concerned. Would I, therefore, be correct in assuming that the NATO countries are now trying to agree upon an assessment of the intentions of the Soviet satellite bloc as distinguished from that of military capabilities?

Secretary RUSK. The political factor of intentions certainly has to be taken into account when one thinks about what kind of Military Establishment is required in the light of the total situation that one faces. The question of intention is a very difficult one to be sure about, but it is a matter which, at the political level, has to be examined very carefully. I would think, subject to those remarks, that my answer to your question would be yes, we are trying to examine that.

DISCUSSION OF NATO'S FUTURE PROSPECTS

Senator SMITH. I would like to have you give your opinion as to the future of NATO in the light of the hard realities which now exist and not from the standpoint of the desired but unobtainable objectives.

Secretary RUSK. In the last NATO Council meeting, we took into consideration recognition of the fact that there are established Soviet forces, particularly in Europe, in East Germany, that these forces have not been reduced in recent years, that they are there, they are becoming stronger in terms of equipment, in terms of more modern types of equipment. Now, we hope that there is some reality in the feeling of a good many people, including, especially, a good many people in Western Europe, that there has been some reduction in tension. But I feel that we must be a little careful about making a premature judgment on that point, because we are only 4 years away from a very severe crisis over Berlin and just less than 4 years away from the crisis over the Cuban missiles.

NECESSITY OF PREVENTING MISCALCULATION BY ADVERSARIES

But I think we ought to keep our eyes on what the other side is doing. If they were to change their military dispositions, the NATO countries, perhaps, could take that into account in making their own assessment as to what we should do. But I think it would be hazardous for us to have the NATO forces reduced to a point where the other side could make a miscalculation. This is the great problem that democracies always have in dealing with systems that are not democratic and not open and exposed to general public discussion of these questions.

How can democracies avoid the problem of miscalculation on the other side? How can we let them know that, where our vital interests are concerned, at the end of the day, we will do what has to be done and let them know in time so that the aggression does not occur? That is the central problem, and it is the one that this country tried to get at during the period when it was making these important alliances which I discussed at our last meeting.

To avoid the miscalculation is the central purpose of these alliances. They are purely defensive in character. If, over a period of time, those on the other side demonstrate that they are prepared to live at peace with us and our allies, then the alliances themselves perhaps in time become reduced somewhat in importance, because their purpose is to assure the peace.

If the peace is assured, then that is fine, that is the object. But we do need to keep in mind the fact that there are forces and there are declared policies which do and can constitute a threat. The necessity is to let it be known clearly that that threat must not become operational and active through aggression.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SPAIN

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, it would appear that Spain, because of her geographic location, will become of increasing strategic importance, particularly in view of France's actions. Would you comment on this and give your views on the prospects of Spain becoming a member of NATO?

Secretary RUSK. On the second part of your question, Senator, I would prefer to go into that a little bit in private session. As far as the United States is concerned, over the years, we have felt that it would be a good thing for Spain to join in the total community of Western Europe in defense and to become a member of NATO. But there is some background and there are some problems there that I would be happy to go into in private session.

REDUCTION OF U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

Senator SMITH. If, as appears possible or probable, the current discussions result in a reduction of the force goals of our NATO allies, do you not feel that as a practical matter and out of political necessity, our contribution will have to be reduced at some point in the future?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would think, Senator, that that judgment ought to be based upon the largest questions of national security, or

an assessment of the nature of the threat and what all of us in NATO ought to do about that threat. I would hope that we would not take up such a question on the basis of what might be called purely internal political considerations. I am not now referring to differences between two parties. I also would not, I think, wish to take it up on the basis of the fact that it is costing us a considerable amount. We have a gross national product of over \$700 billion. Our defense budget has been a diminishing part of our gross national product in recent years—slightly. Our foreign aid has been a diminishing part of our gross national product. It seems to me that this great Nation can afford what has to be done for the vital security interests of the Nation. So I would hope that we would make that judgment on the largest strategic considerations rather than on other types of considerations that may not be related to the safety of the country.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator Smith.

Senator JACKSON?

UNREST IN RED CHINA

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, we have all been reading about the stories that have appeared in the press recently in connection with the demonstrations going on in Peiping. I wonder if you could comment on this to indicate whether or not it might mean a hardening of the line in Peiping with reference to a possible agreement for a conference on Vietnam? As I understand it, the so-called antirevisionists, the Stalinists, the Mao Tse-tung people, the extremists within the Communist apparatus, appear to be in the ascendancy, at least from what appears in the press. Would you comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we are under the impression that some very important things are happening there in mainland China. To be completely truthful, I think I ought to say that we have no clear view as to the full meaning of these events. The full meaning is hidden among relationships among maybe two dozen people at the top of that system. They have a better ability than we have in keeping their mouths shut when events like this occur.

It appears that the armed forces, the leadership of the armed forces, have strengthened their position. That seems to be the impact of Lin Piao's move up the scale. I would hope that that military leadership is authentically and professionally military and can make some sound and prudent military judgments about the future and move toward a policy of reasonable restraint. The professional military men ought to know the nature of the dangers if this Vietnam situation should move into a larger war.

But it appears that the so-called revisionists in China, those who might have been talking about the possibility of peaceful coexistence, are the principal victims here in this situation, unless there is some curious, unknown, underneath sort of development that we have seen no real evidence of yet.

But I do not want to appear to speak with any real confidence about the real meaning of these events yet, Senator.

POSITION OF LIN PIAO

Senator JACKSON. According to statements in the press, in the past, Marshal Lin Piao has been marked as one of the militants within the Communist apparatus, is that not correct? His article last September was not very—

Secretary RUSK. Yes, he has said these things. He has included a development of doctrine of militancy for the advancement of communism. He has posed the issue of the war between what he calls the peasants or the countryside and the cities, and he has by analogy called Europe and the United States the cities and the rest of the world the countryside. There have been moments when people have interpreted his words to these other places as saying, do it yourself. But we do not interpret it quite that way. To Hanoi, for example, he has not denied that there might be some kind of assistance to the military activity of those people.

This is a matter in flux. We are trying to watch it very closely, but I could not offer a real conclusion about what these things mean today.

RED CHINA IS NOT MOVING TOWARD PEACE IN VIETNAM

Senator JACKSON. It is not hopeful as far as the advocacy of an early peace conference on Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. It is clearly not moving in that direction. It seems not to be moving in that direction at all.

AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH MALAYSIAN FORCES FOR VIETNAM

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, following up on Senator Symington's questions with reference to the commitment of our allies in southeast Asia, is it not fair to say that the situation viz-a-viz Malaysia and Indonesia has changed for the better? Apparently, they have reached an agreement. The British have had, according to published accounts, some 70,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen out there. The Australians and New Zealanders have a fair representation. What are the possibilities, or what encouragement can you give us as to making available some of those forces for commitment in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we are in the process now of some change in the confrontation situation. One cannot be clear that it has been completely liquidated and wound up, although the recent agreement certainly points strongly in that direction.

I would be glad to go into the possible implications of this for mainland southeast Asia—that is, Vietnam, Thailand, and so forth—but I think I ought really to do that, under present circumstances, in private session, Senator.

NECESSITY OF BALANCING COMMITMENTS WITH CAPABILITIES

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, I think you would agree that the problem of balancing our commitments with our capabilities and establishing an intelligent order of priorities is a continuing task, certainly at the summit of government.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Is not this matter of intelligent priorities a matter that the National Security Council should follow very closely and is not the Security Council deeply involved in this?

Secretary RUSK. We do look at these problems against the full background of the alternatives. We do have some sense of priorities in particular situations. We, of course, give first priority to these great security arrangements that are present in areas of vital interest to the United States. We give a very high priority, indeed, to the possibility of protecting our interest by peaceful means and by diplomacy, by means other than force. In the broadest sense, we have a lot of discussions, Senator, on the question of where and how our main effort ought to lie.

ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator JACKSON. What is the general philosophy of the administration as to the utilization of the National Security Council in this area? Could you comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. These questions which are before this subcommittee are primarily discussed in the National Security Council, both in its meetings and in discussions among the members of the National Security Council throughout the week. These come up directly at luncheons with the President and in other ways. And, from time to time, we have a fairly full discussion of particular foreign policy issues in the Cabinet. But I would say that these primarily are the responsibility of the National Security Council.

WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM WESTERN EUROPE

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question on the matter of consultation, with special reference to NATO. I think we can all agree that we and our allies have not always fully consulted and mistakes have been made in the past. We are preoccupied in various areas. I wonder if you could tell us with reference to the recent cutback in forces whether we did consult properly with our NATO partners and especially West Germany? There was a lot of discussion in the newspapers.

Secretary RUSK. Are you referring now to the reduction of certain individuals, specialists, and things of that sort?

Senator JACKSON. Yes; many thousand troops, some logistic, but also some select troops. Reports of this appeared in the press.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, quite frankly, that matter became public some weeks before any action was contemplated under that idea. It was contemplated that there would be consultation in NATO, but it leaked to the press before that consultation occurred. So, if anyone could suggest to me how we do a better job of keeping our own counsel until consultation takes place, it would improve our relations, I think, with our allies.

NECESSITY FOR CONSULTATION WITH NATO ALLIES

Senator JACKSON. Does it not mean, though, that we have to be in touch almost continuously on these matters and when we start to move in a given area, in view of all the leaks that we have in this town, it would be wise to let them know at the inception that we are contem-

plating certain possible moves, and we are merely studying them. Maybe it will be leaked in Bonn instead of Washington.

Secretary RUSK. The first thing we have to know in consulting allies is what we want to say to them.

Senator JACKSON. I understand, but I want to emphasize the necessity for consultation.

Secretary RUSK. This is a matter that is a part of the continuing discussion of troops, troop levels in NATO, the continuing discussion that goes on throughout the year. But in this particular instance, the leak occurred a significant amount of time before the action was to be taken and it was in that interval that we were expecting to consult with our allies so they would know what was and was not involved.

NECESSITY FOR ADVANCE INFORMATION TO OUR ALLIES OF REDUCTIONS

Senator JACKSON. Suppose we find it necessary in connection with Vietnam, or for any other reason, to reduce our forces in NATO. Will we frankly inform our allies and let them know well in advance what we are contemplating?

Secretary RUSK. If that contingency should arise—I think you will learn from Secretary McNamara that we do not at the present time see that contingency as it might affect major combat forces arising from specifically the Vietnam problem. We do believe that the NATO forces ought to be worked out on the basis of the requirements in NATO in relation to the threat that it faces.

Senator JACKSON. You mentioned combat forces, but the trouble is when they announce a reduction in forces that might not even affect our combat capability. It does, however, cause immediate consternation in certain capitals in Europe when they are not informed in advance. I take it that our policy will be to—

Secretary RUSK. Well, we prefer to inform them in advance ourselves and not through the press, Senator.

Senator JACKSON. I take it that every effort will be made to keep them currently and continuously informed, regardless of whether it is a reduction in individuals that will not affect our combat capability.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

I might say on that matter of consultation that no member of NATO raises for discussion around the NATO table anything like as many questions as does the United States. If you look at the schedule of serious discussions over a period of 2 or 3 years, we bring matters up there at the rate of 25 or 30 a year. We do believe very strongly in NATO consultation and it occurs all the time on the widest range of subjects.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, do I have time for one more question?

Senator STENNIS. You can briefly ask one more.

Senator JACKSON. I do not know whether the response can be brief, but I will try to be brief on the question.

QUESTION OF NUCLEAR SHARING

Mr. Secretary, on the question of nuclear sharing, there is certainly nothing that has been more disruptive within the alliance than the problem of how we should handle our nuclear capability. Do you

see any reason for any requirement to actually turn over nuclear hardware to any country in order to manage properly and direct this strategic deterrent?

Secretary RUSK. It has not been our policy from the very beginning, Senator, to transfer or turn over nuclear weapons to any country that is not now a nuclear power. None of the arrangements we have ever discussed would involve that kind of transfer or turnover. This matter arose on the initiative of our allies in NATO. It was not, as some people have supposed, a sort of invention here on this side of the Atlantic.

In the summer of 1960, our allies came to us and said, "We must have, in view of all these intermediate range ballistic missiles being put up by the Soviet Union, much greater participation in nuclear questions." That led to Secretary Herter's suggestion at the NATO meeting of 1960. Since then, we have been trying to find out what kind of an arrangement would meet these expressed views on the other side of the Atlantic without involving proliferation. Thus far, we have not come to any final conclusion.

As you know, Secretary McNamara is sitting on a committee which has been going into much more depth in the nuclear question than we did in earlier years. But this has never involved the idea of proliferation of nuclear weapons to those who do not now have them.

NUCLEAR STRATEGIC PLANNING

Senator JACKSON. Do you see some possibilities of nuclear strategic planning, which the McNamara committee is involved in at the present time?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I would not reject today any of the alternatives that have been discussed, but I would think that what is really of primary concern to people, our allies in Europe, is to know more about this matter which is intimately related to the life and death of their own countries and to have their share of influence on the final decisions that are made by the alliance as a whole with respect to such questions.

Senator STENNIS. All right, gentlemen, thank you. We can come back to that, if necessary. Senator Thurmond?

MOTIVATION FOR FRANCE'S RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in your opinion, did General de Gaulle diplomatically recognize Red China in January 1964 because he felt we were playing "footsie" with the Soviets and felt this was necessary in the national interest of France?

Secretary RUSK. I do not believe he connected that with any discussions that were going on between us and the Soviets. In the first place, those discussions were not all that significant or far reaching. I think he did it for what he considered to be French reasons. We regretted the action taken at the time, not so much because of France itself, but because we thought that it might be seriously misinterpreted by Peking and might lead them to believe that their doctrine of militancy had put them on the right road and, if they would just stay militant, things would begin to turn their way. It has not worked out that way in the

past 18 months. Peking has suffered a series of reverses. But I think President de Gaulle did that on the basis of his own assessment of where French interests lie.

QUESTION OF FRANCE'S FEELINGS ABOUT U.S. RELATIONS WITH U.S.S.R.

Senator THURMOND. You know, of course, that he did feel that we were playing "footsie" with the Soviets, do you not?

Secretary RUSK. I do know that during the Berlin crisis of 1961-62, the French Government did not wish to take a direct part in the discussions with the Soviet Union which were carried on by us and the British, in part by the Germans, to try to bring a conclusion to that crisis. I know that. I do not recall any objections he has raised to anything we have talked about other than that, except, of course, he wanted nothing to do with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. He did not sign it, wanted nothing to do with it. The French Government does not occupy its chair in the Disarmament Conference that has been taking place in Geneva.

Now, I suppose that means he does not really want to talk about disarmament, at least in a forum in which a good many smaller countries are represented. I just do not know all that might be on his mind on these subjects.

Senator THURMOND. Is it not fairly well known in inner circles that he felt that he had to get closer to Red China because we were working too closely with the Soviets?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; I am not under that impression.

DISCUSSION OF FRANCE'S MOTIVES FOR NATO WITHDRAWAL

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, a number of reasons have been suggested as to why General de Gaulle withdrew from the integrated military structure of NATO. Some of these were resentment of American influence in European affairs, a distrust in the willingness of the United States to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe, a belief that France would automatically become involved in a NATO war. I wonder if you would care to give your views on General de Gaulle's reasons?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think I pointed out at our last meeting that we know now what it is that President de Gaulle plans to do with respect to NATO forces. In effect, he wants to get French forces out of the integrated command structure of NATO and to get NATO elements out of France. You put your finger on the more important question; that is, why? I would be glad to go into that in private session. He has explained this to some extent publicly. I think he seemed to indicate that the integrated command structure is too automatic in terms of the independent position of France, independent not just of us but of the other members of NATO. But the "why" needs full exploration. I shall be glad to speculate about that a bit in private session.

Senator THURMOND. In your opinion, if you care to answer in public session, does he have a distrust of the United States using such weapons as may be necessary in the event of war if the Soviets are on the other side?

Secretary RUSK. I do not know how to assess the element of trust in his mind. By withdrawing French forces from the integrated structure of NATO, he of course raises the same issue for the other members of NATO.

ADEQUACY OF FRANCE'S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, General de Gaulle is also developing a nuclear capability for France, as you know. It was once known as the Force de Frappe. It is now called the force de dissuasion. Does France have the power base by which to deter the nuclear power of the Soviet Union? If not, what is his reason for devoting so much of France's resources to this purpose?

Secretary RUSK. I would suppose, sir, that his basic purposes are political in character. It has to do with what he considers to be the position of France in the international community. I would not suppose that he feels that the addition of French hardware would make a decisive difference on the question of deterrence. But I do not know exactly what his view on that would be. I think he felt that France ought to join the nuclear powers as a matter of making France one of the leading nations, as he saw it, and that the objectives were primarily political in character.

RESULTS OF FRANCE'S ACTION; POSSIBILITY OF BALKANIZATION OF EUROPE

Senator THURMOND. Do you see in General de Gaulle's policies the likelihood of the Balkanization of Europe consisting of a number of small, competing nationalistic states which could lead to the emergence of Germany as the most powerful European country?

Secretary RUSK. I think it would be a most unfortunate development, Senator, if old-fashioned nationalism in Western Europe should lead to the reintroduction of national states competing with each other within Western Europe in the traditional sense. We were very much encouraged that the other 14 members of NATO, immediately upon the announcement by President de Gaulle of his decisions, closed ranks on these questions and indicated that NATO should proceed on an integrated basis, and not go down the road of breaking themselves up into these independent, competing pieces. I think this is a danger. It is a danger which Western Europe thus far has rejected. But we would hope that the continued solidarity of the 14 would reduce the possibility that that becomes a real problem in the future. It would be a serious development.

We, ourselves, have a tremendous interest in this. We were drawn into two world wars which originated in the national rivalries within Western Europe.

SOVIETS STILL COMMITTED TO IDEA OF WORLD DOMINATION

Senator THURMOND. A great many people in this country have been led to believe that Red China is the big bad wolf. Is there any question in your mind that if you go over the Soviet aim today, it is the same as it was when it took over Russia in 1917, that is, to dominate and enslave the rest of the world and that there lies the heart of commu-

nism and that there lies the greatest danger to the free world and that is the country today that is providing the modern antiaircraft and other complex weapons of war that are now being used in North Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that the leadership of all of the Communist countries, including that of the Soviet Union, remains committed to the idea of a world revolution. There has been considerable discussion and debate within the free world about the tactics by which they pursue this. We have had some crises with the Soviet Union in this postwar period, indeed in the last 5 years. There have been some indications that they are trying to find some basis for what is called peaceful coexistence, while at the same time supporting some of these wars of national liberation.

On the other hand, the authorities in Peking, both as a matter of doctrine and as a matter of practice, seem to be committed to a much more militant doctrine in terms of method. As to future, long-range objective, I think this remain the same; world revolution. There are some differences about how best to further that world revolution.

We have an interest in rejecting the objective of both. We have some interest, however, in the difference between peaceful coexistence, so called, and outright militancy on the other hand.

Senator THURMOND. As a last question—presumably my time is just about up.

Senator STENNIS. You have time to ask one question, Senator.

CUBAN SITUATION

Senator THURMOND. Communism is getting mighty close to home. In the Cuban missile crisis, we stood up to the Soviets and they agreed to withdraw their offensive missiles. But why did we have to go so far as to guarantee that we would not disturb communism in Cuba and would not permit other countries or our own people or even the Cubans to disturb it there? Now, it remains a strong Communist bastion, getting stronger every year. We, as powerful as we were, were unable to eliminate it at that time. As a matter of fact, we have protected it since the Bay of Pigs.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it was not the intention or desire of the United States at that time to invade Cuba in connection with the missile crisis unless the missiles required us to. This is a matter that had been discussed with the leaders of the rest of the hemisphere, including leaders who were most strongly objecting to what Castro was trying to do in this hemisphere. There was a consensus around the hemisphere that we should not, together with the other members or singly, go into Cuba by armed force, if it were not absolutely necessary, in an operation that would inflict very substantial casualties upon the Cuban people and thereby leave scars which might take a generation or two to heal.

But over the past 2 years, 3 years, the hemisphere itself has become much more alert to the nature of the threat from Castroism. The foreign ministers made that clear in January 1962 at the Punta del Este Conference. In the summer of 1964, at the request of Venezuela, they applied all of the existing nonmilitary sanctions available under the Rio Pact against Cuba, calling upon other nations outside the

hemisphere to show solidarity with the hemisphere in adopting the same policy. At the same time, they warned Cuba that further acts, such as the unloading of substantial quantities of arms in Venezuela, with agents and so forth, could raise the question of armed action against Cuba.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Cannon?

REDUCTION IN BRITISH INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, last week I quoted from the Great Britain white paper in our discussion to try to find out what our NATO allies were contemplating and what we expected them to do in relation to their commitments. The British have clearly and publicly stated that they will reduce their international commitments. In the white paper of February 1988, they said, "To sum up, we have planned a reduction in the tasks which we will undertake in the 1970's and we have taken major decisions about our arms and equipment."

Thus, our only ally with major international commitments around the world is reducing rather than increasing its commitments, or its contributions to those commitments. Now, this is going to leave a vacuum, obviously. I would like to ask you how this vacuum is going to be filled, whether we will propose to fill it ourselves, or whether there is a likelihood that the Communists will attempt to move in and fill this vacuum.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, some of these questions we ought to discuss in private session. I would be able to give a little more detail about what seems to be in the minds of our colleagues in London. It is not the purpose of the United States to move in and pick up any commitments which the British may turn away from. For example, they have indicated they were withdrawing from Aden. We do not propose to undertake fresh commitments or any commitments with respect to Aden.

Now, in the case of Aden, we hope that there will be an independent state which has reasonable relations with its own neighbors and that the question of the security of that area will be taken care of primarily by the states of the area.

But there are a good many complex questions here that I will be prepared to pursue further in private session.

NATO DEFENSE BUDGETS IN PERCENT OF GNP

Senator CANNON. Mr. Secretary, when you appeared last week, you made the point that the defense budgets of the NATO allies have been increased in the last few years, even though I think we agreed that none of them have actually met their commitments and that none have done what they agreed previously to do. Now, I know that the amounts have increased in terms of gross amounts, but I do not believe that this is true in relation to their gross national product or to their overall percentage of total national budget. I wonder if you would relate the amounts they are spending now to their overall budget and also to their GNP?

Secretary RUSK. I have that material, because you mentioned it in our last meeting, Senator. I would be glad to provide some material for the committee. Certain parts of it are classified. I would have to take a moment here to look at it.

(The information referred to appears on pp. 58 and 59.)

In the case of Germany, for example, the percentage of gross national product has been, from 1961, 4.7, roughly. It went up to 5.6 in 1962, 6.1 in 1963. Now, it is about 5. Part of that is related to the increase in the gross national product.

In the case of France, the total is somewhat lower today than it was in 1961; Belgium is about the same. Canada is somewhat less. Italy is somewhat more, Netherlands is somewhat less, Norway is somewhat more, Portugal slightly less, the United Kingdom is slightly less, and the United States is slightly less. We dropped from 10.1 in 1961 to 8.8 in 1966.

Senator CANNON. We have the highest pro rata or highest percentage contribution as far as GNP is concerned, do we not?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. Looking along, it is the United States first, the United Kingdom second, France, third, then Portugal comes in there. Then it drops down among the others.

AVAILABILITY OF PIPELINES IN FRANCE

Senator CANNON. Now in attempting to bolster NATO and strengthen our posture vis-a-vis the eastern part of that part of the world, we went to considerable expense in building pipelines across France. I am wondering what the French position now is going to do to the availability of these pipelines that we thought we were creating to such a great advantage?

Secretary RUSK. That pipeline, Senator, has in fact been operated by a French company under an agreement with the United States. I am not now referring to the NATO pipeline, I am thinking of the U.S. pipeline. The key question for us, of course, is the availability of that pipeline, whether POL comes out of the other end. The question is under what circumstances we can rely upon the use of that pipe, the product of that pipeline. It is a matter that we are now discussing with France. Those discussions have not been concluded. But of course, from our point of view, a pipeline which is not available under all circumstances is not much of a pipeline and we would have to think of alternative arrangements.

Senator CANNON. Are you far enough along in the discussions to form a judgment as to whether or not we are going to have it available?

Secretary RUSK. I will be glad to comment on that in private session, Senator. I prefer not to now, since the discussions are continuing.

GREECE-TURKEY DIFFERENCES OVER CYPRUS

Senator CANNON. Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO and they still have differences over Cyprus that are potentially explosive. Is this presently or potentially damaging the unity and strength of NATO, and if so, what is being done about it?

Secretary RUSK. We have been very much concerned about the weakening of the southern flank of NATO by this very serious difference between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. We have been hoping

that the U.N. machinery would find an answer to it. We have not felt the Cyprus question was a primary U.S. responsibility. These questions arose and agreements were made some years ago without the participation of the United States. At the present time, we think that the best chance for resolving it would be direct discussions among the three governments principally involved.

This matter has been discussed regularly in each of our NATO ministerial meetings. The two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, have been in touch with each other about it. We would hope that matter could be resolved.

GREECE-TURKEY DIFFERENCES HAVE WEAKENED NATO

Specifically to your question, "Has it weakened NATO?", we think it has. We would like to see it resolved so that that stress in the alliance would be eliminated.

Senator CANNON. As long as it remains unsolved, we will probably have some weakness in that southern flank?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, although I must say that the attitude of both Turkey and Greece toward NATO itself has remained constructive and positive, but this is a very grievous question between them which is deeply caught up in a long history and the strong feelings of public opinion in both countries. I cannot tell you today that I see an immediate or an early and satisfactory solution of it. But the governments concerned are working on it and we are doing our best to give friendly counsel to try to find some way to bring this matter to a peaceful conclusion.

POSSIBILITY OF SPAIN JOINING NATO

Senator CANNON. Spain has been very helpful to us over the years with respect to our commitments to NATO, that is, in meeting the agreements that we have made. Senator Smith got into this with you. I think you indicated that we would favor Spain becoming a member of NATO. Is anything specific being done by us to try to bring Spain into the NATO organization?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the addition of a new member to NATO requires unanimity of the existing members. This is a matter which has been discussed among the members of NATO from time to time rather informally. There is no formal application from Spain on the table at the present time. I would be able to go into that in somewhat more detail in private session, Senator.

SPAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSES OF WESTERN EUROPE

Senator CANNON. But it is a fact, is it not, that Spain has been very helpful to us and has contributed greatly to our strength in the NATO alliance?

Secretary RUSK. There is no question about it, that our common facilities in Spain are a very important part of the total defenses of the West.

USE OF NATIONALIST CHINA'S TROOPS IN VIETNAM

Senator CANNON. Now, getting back to Vietnam, Mr. Secretary, it is stated in many circles that the Republic of China has offered to provide troops and to assist us in South Vietnam. I would like to know whether or not that is true and, if it is, why we have not accepted that offer and let them assist us in this very difficult situation?

Secretary RUSK. We do not have an official offer in front of us, but that is a matter that I think ought really to be discussed in private session, Senator, if you do not mind.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Byrd?

ASSISTANCE IN SEA BY COUNTRIES RECEIVING U.S. FOREIGN AID

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, under our foreign aid program since World War I, we have paid out huge sums of the taxpayers' money in military and economic aid to many nations, among which are these: India, something on the order of \$4 billion; Japan, \$3.5 billion; Philippine Republic, \$1.7 billion; France, \$9.5 billion; Great Britain, \$8.7 billion; West Germany, \$5 billion. Mr. Secretary, in our moment of need and sacrifice, have any of these nations whose future security interests are just as endangered as ours are, sent even one soldier to fight alongside our American fighting men in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Of those you mentioned, I do not believe that any have. We did have there an advisory group for a considerable period under Mr. Thompson from the United Kingdom. But as far as combat forces are concerned, they have not; no, sir.

BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEM

Senator BYRD. The southeast Asia military commitment by the United States has resulted in a substantial adverse effect on our balance-of-payments problem. During the depression, a 1-year moratorium was placed, I believe, on World War I debts to ease the international monetary crisis. Thereafter, Great Britain, our largest debtor, with about \$9.4 billion, made only one token payment, and France defaulted completely. In World War II, most of the obligations were settled, I believe, after the war, but of the \$38 billion borrowed during World War II, something like \$16 billion is still outstanding. For the two combined wars, our biggest debtors, I believe, are Great Britain, with something like \$13 billion, and France with about \$7.1 billion.

WORLD WAR I AND II DEBTS

Mr. Secretary, when France persisted in making claims upon our dwindling gold supply, why did we not give them credit on their old World War I and World War II debts, instead of gold?

Secretary RUSK. In the first place, the World War II debts are being repaid on schedule—those that were agreed for repayment. I believe France has made one or two advance payments.

In the case of World War I debts, they were caught up in the problem of reparations from Germany to the Allies. Our European allies took the view in the 1920's that they could not pay these debts to us unless they collected those equivalent sums from Germany in reparations. At that time, the attitude of the U.S. Government was we did not see how Germany could bear the burden of those reparation costs and build the kind of society that would have been an integral part of the West. We never legally accepted a direct organic connection between the two, but in opposing the last drop of reparations to be squeezed from Germany, we made it very difficult for us ourselves to collect these World War I debts from France and Great Britain.

Senator BYRD. Of course, the situation has so drastically changed now from what it was at that time, why should we not insist upon the payments of these debts by France as she insists upon converting her credits into U.S. gold? Why should we not be just as insistent upon her paying what is due the United States?

Secretary RUSK. I think they would not pay, Senator.

Senator BYRD. You think they would not?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Did you say that payments are presently being made?

Secretary RUSK. You see, this would raise the entire question of reparations from World War I. I would think that the total effect on the world situation would be negative if we were to make an all-out effort to collect World War I debts under the circumstances of the last 40 years.

Senator BYRD. I thought you said, though, we had not admitted any legal connection between the subject of reparation and the debts which France owed to us?

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Senator BYRD. Then I do not get the point you are making.

Secretary RUSK. There is a very large political connection between them and the willingness and ability of governments to take up a question of this sort.

Senator BYRD. When was the last payment made by France?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to provide that for the record.

Senator BYRD. What was the amount?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to provide that, sir. I do not have that information with me.

Senator BYRD. If you will, please.

(The information requested appears on p. 109.)

EMPLOYMENT OF FRENCH NATIONALS IN CONNECTION WITH NATO RELOCATION

Senator BYRD. Press accounts of relocation of NATO military forces from France as a result of the NATO realignments forced by France indicate that French employees are being asked to accept employment in the new locations. Does this mean that in order to ameliorate the effect of such unemployment on the French economy, American forces are going to arrange to employ French personnel wherever its various headquarters and military installations are now to be located?

Secretary RUSK. I am not aware of any functions that French officers would have in such commands. I would have to check that and let you know. I am a little surprised by that.

(The information requested appears on p. 110.)

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I hope the French will not be allowed to use NATO for further enrichment when its national action unilaterally is going to cost member nations of NATO considerable money in meeting France's demands to move.

WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM WEST GERMANY

The British are reported to be considering the withdrawal of some of the troops presently in West Germany because of lack of funds to support them. At one time, the Department of State, I believe, was purported to be negotiating with the British to furnish a token force in Vietnam. Would not the State Department be justified in negotiating for retention of British troops in West Germany and a token force in Vietnam as a means of enabling some adjustment of our own forces in Europe now, particularly, as I think Senators Jackson and Symington mentioned, now that the Malaysia situation has become somewhat more stable?

Secretary RUSK. The question of British troops in NATO is being discussed in the NATO Council, among the NATO members around the table. As I believe I indicated earlier on the South Vietnam problem, I would prefer to continue that in private session.

Senator BYRD. Do you prefer to pursue this whole question in private session?

Secretary RUSK. I think so.

PLAN TO FURNISH STEEL MILLS TO RED CHINA

Senator BYRD. I am pleased to note your protest, Mr. Secretary, to the European countries, including West Germany, which have combined in a consortium to furnish hot and cold rolling mills to supplement Red China's steel manufacturing industry. American servicemen in South Vietnam cannot help but think that this represents a threat to their well-being. What is the present status of the deal?

Secretary RUSK. It is still under consideration in Europe. We hope very much that they would slow down on that and wait until they see what kind of a China it is that they are dealing with, because there is no question that the authorities in mainland China seem to be the most implacable and adamant obstacle to any kind of discussion of a peaceful settlement in southeast Asia. Indeed, they are giving substantial help to North Vietnam to assist it in trying to seize South Vietnam by force. We would hope and we believe that trade is something that can contribute toward peace. But we think that it ought to be used to contribute toward peace and not to something else.

TRADE BETWEEN FREE WORLD AND RED CHINA

Senator BYRD. Do you know of any additional similar deals that presently are being considered, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Not on that scale. There has been an increase in trade between mainland China and the free world. I will be glad to

submit estimates on that. The proportion of China's trade as between the free world and other Communist countries has increased. Much of that increase has to do with their food purchases from Canada and Australia, but I would be glad to provide statistics for the record on that.

(The information requested appears on p. 110.)

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, do I have any further time?

Senator STENNIS. Yes, you do, 2 minutes, Senator.

POSSIBILITY OF REDUCTION IN NATO FORCE GOALS

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate any reduction in overall force goals as a result of the present negotiations? Would you anticipate—

Secretary RUSK. I would not want to anticipate those discussions at this point, Senator. The purpose is to get a broad agreement in NATO about what is prudently required and what all of us do about it.

POSSIBILITY IN REDUCTION OF U.S. NATO COMMITMENT

Senator BYRD. Would you anticipate an agreed-upon reduction of the size of the U.S. force commitment to NATO in that if the force goals of other nations are to be reduced, why should not those of the United States similarly be reduced?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think the force goals ought to be applied on an equitable basis throughout the alliance. But in determining what those forces ought to be, we have to take into account what the force deployment is among the so-called Warsaw Pact countries. So I would be a little cautious at this point in assuming that a thorough review of this question would bring about, in itself, major reductions in forces. This has to take into account the fact that there are 22 Soviet divisions sitting in East Germany, for example.

PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING NATO FORCE GOALS

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, would you briefly describe the procedures by which these goals are established and the factors that are taken into consideration insofar as they pertain to a particular member nation?

Secretary RUSK. The military authorities of NATO themselves make an estimate within broad guidelines established by the political authorities of NATO—the North Atlantic Council, and the ministers meeting. There is also discussion among the governments as to how those force goals ought to be divided among the various nations. There was general agreement in NATO that the goals that were established in 1958, 1959, and 1960 were reasonable from the military point of view. It is not clear that all the member governments of NATO accepted these force goals as a political commitment with respect to their own contribution, as outlined in those force goals.

Now, we feel that we ought to look at this situation, determine what forces are needed, determine the equitable distribution, and then we should all perform at about the same pace, with the same ratios.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator STENNIS. Members of the subcommittee, we will proceed now. As far as I am concerned, I have only a few questions. Mr. Secretary, within limits, if you can, please be brief. That will help us along, because we want to have some time for a closed session.

VIETNAM DRAIN ON MILITARY MANPOWER

I do want at least to raise a major point here. As a prelude to that, we all think that the commitment of nearly 400,000 men in Vietnam has been a very serious drain on our military, particularly the Army. We know the thin spots that we have been through. We know the almost hazardous situation we were in that time has cured—and some good work on the part of the Department of Defense helped cure it, too. But very strong assurances have been given the American people here in the last few days. Secretary McNamara spoke about it and you intimated in a way that everything is rosy and there is no strain, no drain, particularly on our military. Specifically, do you not think that committing almost 400,000 of our men over there, and that is still mounting, has put a very severe strain in our military manpower, and particularly the Army? And I might say that those who have been sent represent many of the very finest we have, officers and non-commissioned officers in particular. And it has left the other divisions in not near as good shape as they could be in that respect. It was announced last week that we are lowering the standards to get raw recruits. Do you not think that it is a very serious matter we are faced with? I am not suggesting that we turn back and get out, but the very opposite. Do you not consider that a very serious situation indeed?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I am not aware, with due respect, that I had referred to the situation as being rosy. Of course, these are serious problems and they do impose a major effort upon us. I think that I would agree with you that our Defense Department has done an extraordinary job in the rapid deployment of the necessary men in South Vietnam, with the logistic backup and support to put them in a position to do that fine job which they are doing up there. In the broadest sense, of course, these are matters for which the Secretary of Defense is primarily responsible and you want to talk with him about that.

But we have, as you know, sir, increased the total numbers in our Armed Forces. That is at about the same level, or roughly, within 50,000 or 100,000—

Senator STENNIS. If I may interrupt you right there just to say, Mr. Secretary, that we have increased the numbers of untrained men. That is a long way to a soldier. But my point is this, my major point, if I may interrupt you there. I do not press this for an answer.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

ABILITY TO MEET COMMITMENTS WITHOUT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator STENNIS. I know we have to talk up our side, and absolute assurance is being given to the American people that everything is fine about our being able to meet all commitments, whatever they are. That must include the possible use—and I am not suggesting that it is

intended that way—of nuclear weapons in some way. As I say, I do not suggest that anyone intended to do that, but to get at this matter and understand what we mean in these sweeping statements, we have to exclude the consideration of the use of nuclear weapons for the purpose of argument. I am not suggesting that we tell our adversaries we are not going to use them. But anyway, your estimate of the situation, I assume, was with reference to conventional military power?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. We have, as you know, on the nuclear side, almost unimaginable power, of course.

Senator STENNIS. But your estimate, or your opinion is based on nonnuclear or conventional weapons?

Secretary RUSK. I was thinking of the total world situation. A major onslaught, for example, on NATO would be a very reckless and highly dangerous business for everybody concerned. But the total strength of the opposing forces has to be taken into account. We have, literally, strength that goes almost beyond the mind of man to comprehend—at the end of the day. Of course, no one wants to get to the end of the day. The purpose of the strength is to see that we do not get there.

Senator STENNIS. I wanted to bring that up to make clear, and thereby exclude this idea of nuclear weapons from all of our estimates and opinions.

Secretary RUSK. I was not in any way at any point involving the use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnamese problem.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. But at the same time, for myself, I do not want to throw out the idea that we will not use them at all, because I think that would be misleading.

CONSULTATION WITH MILITARY BEFORE ASSUMING COMMITMENTS

I want to ask you this: In the State Department you have to consider positions and what you are going to do about various matters when you consider assuming an obligation involving military strength and its probable consequences. How do you go about this? Do you call in the professional military men and get their opinions about the probabilities, militarywise, the probable strength required, the drain it might require? How do you go about it?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, when judgments are made on these matters, every possible effort is made to take into account every relevant consideration—the views of the military, the capabilities of the military, what steps they would have to take in order to carry out the policy that we might decide upon, the maximum gathering of every piece of information relevant—

Senator STENNIS. The maximum what?

Secretary RUSK. Gathering of every relevant piece of information about the particular crisis. All of these things are taken into account. We make every possible effort to avoid the omission of any vital factor that has a bearing on those decisions. Those are discussed in our talks with the leadership and with the committees of Congress, as well as in our own private examinations.

Senator STENNIS. I am not referring now to conferring with leaders in Congress. With all deference, I do not know, with some excep-

tions, that their official military advice would be very valuable. I am talking about advising directly. Do you advise directly with our professional military men in responsible positions for their professional opinions?

Secretary RUSK. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are represented through their chairman in most of our discussions of these questions around the National Security Council table. We have at all times the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff on the questions in front of us.

Senator STENNIS. When you go into something that might involve further military participation, is that carefully weighed by these professional military men? I would think more than one of them ought to pass on it and give you a report as to what would be the situation, the drain on them, or what their commitments might have to be.

Secretary RUSK. That communication is continuous and occurs not only at the top but extends through the different levels down below, the colonels on the general staff, the assistant secretaries and country directors in the State Department. We are in constant touch about these things.

There was full military consultation, for example, on the rescue of the hostages in Stanleyville, full consultation on the Dominican Republic problem. There has been complete and continuous consultation on these Vietnam issues and questions with our military. The civilian leadership has had their advice at all times.

Senator STENNIS. All right, I do not want to take too much time. Senator Saltonstall?

COMMITMENTS RELEVANT TO ISRAEL-SYRIA DISPUTE

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, you have been very patient. We have taken you around the world and asked a number of questions. May I ask this one as I do not think it has been covered yet. If it has, please state so.

What, if any, commitment have we outside of our membership in the United Nations which is related to this very serious dispute between Israel and Syria at the present time?

Secretary RUSK. We have, for example, in the Middle East resolution passed by the Congress in the midfifties and otherwise, declared our great interest in the safety of these countries in that part of the world. We do not have a formal alliance with Israel. But it is not the only country in that area in which we feel we have an important interest. I could go into this present situation a little bit more in closed session, but the major responsibility there lies in the United Nations machinery that is on the spot, on the ground, whose function it is to reduce these incidents and to keep these various countries apart in the area. The central responsibility there is in the United Nations.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, it involves a serious problem of water, does it not?

Secretary RUSK. That is one of the issues; yes, sir. We have supported the so-called Johnson plan for the distribution of the waters.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Is it a situation that may escalate into greater difficulties, or is it, in your opinion, a situation that can be negotiated?

Secretary RUSK. One hesitates to make a categorical statement about the future. It seems to me that it is not in the interest of any state

in the area to let such questions blow up into a war. The United Nations machinery ought to be given a full chance to work out a settlement of such issues.

I doubt very much that negotiations directly between the parties will be able to find the solution, but maybe the United Nations machinery or a third party assistance will be able to bring these matters under more manageable control.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But it is an old dispute that has not really ever been settled and is still far from being settled?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. There are a number of these very stubborn issues around the world that have not produced a major war but do not yield readily to settlement.

SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask just one more question on another part of the world? I do not think the Dominican Republic and our problems there have been brought up at all at this meeting. Could you tell us very briefly your feelings about the present situation there?

Secretary RUSK. We have been very pleased that, through the help of the OAS and the Inter-American Peace Force, the Dominican people were given a chance to have a free election and get their own government in position, a government which excludes the two alternatives which had long since been rejected by the Inter-American system. You will recall that during the Eisenhower administration, the Inter-American system imposed sanctions upon Trujillo in connection with an attempt or alleged attempt to assassinate the President of Venezuela. Later on, the Castro type solution was rejected by the hemisphere: at Punta del Este in January 1962, and then in the summer of 1964.

We had no doubt that if the Dominican people had a chance to make their own decision, they would, in fact, prefer a constitutional government elected by themselves which would avoid either one of these extremes. That result has come into being.

The Inter-American Peace Force has now been substantially reduced and, unless something unusual happens, it would expect to be fully withdrawn sometime during the month of September. It seems to me that was a very effective process by which the Dominican people had a chance to do something which the rest of the hemisphere wanted them to have a chance to do and I feel that the solution there has been a very constructive one.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And you are optimistic?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, although there are still problems on the economic side and there may be some political problems still in fully establishing, on the basis of complete confidence, the new constitutional political system which has evolved there.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you. Senator Symington?

VALIDITY OF USE OF GNP

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, as to the importance of GNP, you and others defend the terrific war costs on the basis of the GNP. I would be careful about that. There are a lot of ways you can raise the GNP. We can increase wages, increase prices, increase interest

rates; and the GNP naturally goes up. There are two sides to that, which is all too clear.

ALLIES WITH TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

You stated last Thursday that the United States has entered into multilateral and bilateral treaty arrangements with more than 40 countries on 5 continents. As I understand it, 3 of those 40 countries have troops in Vietnam—Korea, Australia, New Zealand.

Secretary RUSK. The Philippines and Thailand.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am talking about combat troops.

Secretary RUSK. The Thais have some combat forces and the Philippines have some security forces along with the others.

U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

Senator SYMINGTON. Last Thursday you said there are over 30,000 Koreans in Vietnam at the present time. How many Americans are in Korea?

Secretary RUSK. Two divisions of approximately—I think the figure is about 57,000.

Senator SYMINGTON. How long have they been there?

Secretary RUSK. With the exception of a brief period, 1949 to 1950, we have had U.S. forces in Korea since the end of the war.

U.S. PAYMENT OF COST OF KOREAN TROOPS IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. Does the United States assume the cost of sending and supplying these forces to Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. There are certain incountry costs that we have undertaken to supply. I would have to provide the details of that for the record. I do not have the details immediately at my fingertips. I did at one time, but they have slipped my mind.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you also supply for the record whether we have increased economic and military assistance to South Korea as a quid pro quo for their assistance and whether we have extended military and economic assistance to the Philippines as a quid pro quo for their assistance?

Secretary RUSK. I can provide information on what we have been doing in the military and economic assistance field. I would be just a little wary about the quid pro quo aspect of it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

(The unclassified portion of the information requested is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 23, 1966.

HON. STUART SYMINGTON,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR SYMINGTON: During Secretary Rusk's recent appearance before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee you asked whether the United States (1) had assumed the cost of sending and supplying South Korean troops to South Viet Nam, and (2) had extended or increased military and economic assistance to South Korea or the Philippines as a "quid pro quo" for their contributions to the war effort in Viet Nam.

With respect to the first question, the Secretary noted that there were certain costs that we have undertaken to supply and offered to provide the details on that. These are that while the Republic of Korea contributes the forces and

continues to pay their base pay, the United States Government has assumed the responsibility of paying the rest of the cost of their deployment to Viet Nam, including transportation, equipment, construction, training, subsistence, and logistical support. It has been our judgment that since Korea is not a rich country and must remain strong and constantly alert against the threat of renewed aggression against its northern border, the Korean Government would be unable to pay the additional costs of a major overseas military operation without weakening its security and interrupting its economic development.

With respect to your second question, the Secretary offered to provide information on what we have been doing in the military and economic assistance field while denying that this should be regarded as a "quid pro quo." This information is contained in the enclosures to this letter.

If you have any further questions, I hope you will not hesitate to inquire.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

United States assistance programs (Korea), obligations and loan authorizations

[In millions of dollars]

| | Fiscal years | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | 1963 actual | 1964 actual | 1965 actual | 1966 actual |
| AID..... | 126.0 | 109.5 | 122.5 | 145.5 |
| Supporting assistance..... | 90.0 | 76.2 | 70.4 | 60.0 |
| Technical cooperation..... | 7.3 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 5.5 |
| Development loans..... | 28.7 | 29.6 | 48.8 | 80.0 |
| Public Law 480..... | 85.6 | 132.4 | 72.9 | 101.5 |
| Title I sales agreement..... | 74.0 | 97.3 | 45.0 | 51.8 |
| Title II CCC value..... | 1.5 | 24.9 | 20.3 | 35.9 |
| Title III CCC value..... | 10.1 | 10.2 | 7.6 | 13.8 |
| Total, economic assistance..... | 211.6 | 241.9 | 195.4 | 247.0 |
| Military assistance program..... | 204.7 | 147.1 | 129.7 | 157.5 |
| Total, U.S. assistance..... | 416.3 | 389.0 | 325.1 | 404.5 |

United States assistance programs (Philippines), obligations and loan authorizations

[In billions of dollars]

| | Fiscal years | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | 1946-64 actual | 1965 actual | 1966 actual |
| AID..... | 274.3 | 3.0 | 3.7 |
| Technical cooperation..... | ¹ 247.3 | 3.0 | 3.7 |
| Development loans..... | 27.0 | | |
| Public Law 480..... | 109.2 | 23.1 | 15.8 |
| Title I sales agreements..... | 47.0 | 12.6 | |
| Title II CCC value..... | 1.1 | .5 | 5.8 |
| Title III CCC value..... | 60.6 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Other country agreements..... | .5 | | |
| Export-Import Bank (long term)..... | 160.7 | 18.2 | |
| War claims..... | 73.0 | | |
| Peace Corps..... | 9.3 | 3.7 | 3.5 |
| Other U.S. economic programs..... | ² 779.7 | | |
| Total, economic assistance..... | 1,406.2 | 48.0 | 23.0 |
| Military assistance program..... | 344.3 | 23.7 | 22.0 |
| Total, U.S. assistance..... | 1,750.5 | 71.7 | 45.0 |

¹ Includes prior years supporting assistance and mutual security loans.

² Includes Philippine rehabilitation grants, RFC loan, etc.

THIRD COUNTRY FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it not a fact that, for many years now, one of the basic arguments for the foreign military assistance program has been that it costs the United States much less to train and equip a foreign soldier than it does to train and equip an American soldier?

Secretary RUSK. That is one of the points that has been brought out.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it not also a fact that with the exception of Koreans, no troops of any nation that has received assistance from the United States has even token fighting forces in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Well, if you exclude Thailand and the Philippines because of size, and after all, the Thais—

Senator SYMINGTON. The Philippines have no combat troops. I will check the Thailand figure. I got my figures from the Pentagon. I was surprised at your answer, because they said all Thais were non-combat troops.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct, sir, except that I do think we ought not to leave out South Vietnam. They have had substantial military assistance and they have the great bulk of the forces there, as you would expect in their own country.

PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. I was not leaving them out.

The State Department Legal Adviser on March 8, 1966, submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee a memorandum entitled "The Legality of the U.S. participation in the defense of Vietnam." Addressing myself to the legal question, is the view of the Department of State that the commitments which we have now to more than 40 states are of such a nature that the President could, without further authorization by the Congress, send armed forces to defend these countries?

Secretary RUSK. The treaties refer to constitutional processes. I think that is a question which would be for the President and the Congress to determine if new situations arose. At the time of Korea, you will recall that the advice of the congressional leadership was not to bring that matter before the Congress in a resolution. There were those who later felt that that was a mistaken conclusion and it was better to start with a resolution.

It was agreed in August 1964, to submit this question to the Congress in a resolution, and a very strong resolution was passed, with an overwhelming vote of the entire Congress.

No, I would not generalize on that subject at all, sir. There may be circumstances in the case of a sudden and overwhelming onslaught—for example, in the NATO area—where the basic commitment is to treat an attack on one as an attack on all, or an attack on oneself, where certain action would have to be taken in a matter of hours. But I cannot imagine that a President would not be in complete touch with the leadership of the Congress if situations of that gravity were to arise.

COMMITMENTS DO NOT MAKE OBSOLETE CONGRESS' POWER TO
DECLARE WAR

Senator SYMINGTON. Do these commitments have the practical effect, of making obsolete that provision of the Constitution which gives the Congress the power to declare war?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I think that would be pressing the point too far. There have been many instances in history where the President of the United States has used the forces of the United States to defend American interests without a declaration of war. As a matter of fact, I am not aware of a single declaration of war that has been used in this postwar period since the signing of the U.N. charter.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am asking you these questions because people in my State are very interested in them.

Secretary RUSK. I would be very glad, if a group of them wanted to come and talk this over with our legal adviser, to have them do that.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is fine.

MAINTENANCE OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH OR EXPANSION OF WAR?

If you had to choose between continued expansion of the war and the maintenance of domestic economic strength, the way things are developing, which would you choose?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, those are not the only two alternatives. I am not sure that we ought to take the view in these great matters of war and peace of deciding them on the basis of what we think we can comfortably afford. We can afford to do what is necessary for the safety of this country.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is true, but the basis of these hearings is the extent of our commitments. I stated my view last May 4 that we are overcommitted.

Do we go on, in Vietnam, at the expense of domestic programs, or do we cut down some on domestic programs, in order to continue to chase these fellows around the Vietnam woods; or do you feel we can do both? As I understand it, you do feel we can continue to do both?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

NECESSITY FOR ASIANS TO DEVELOP OWN FORCES

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have a few observations. It would seem that unless the states of southeast Asia begin immediately to develop their own indigenous forces to react to Communist expansion, whether from China or guerrilla forces in their own countries, American efforts out there can only be doomed to some form of failure. Taking, say, a half million as a fair rounding of all U.S. forces in South Vietnam, this would mean that one out of 30 men, women, and children in South Vietnam would be an American. It would seem unavoidable that there would be a reaction to such an omnipotent American presence, no matter how laudable or worthy our aims. On a population basis, this would be comparable to over 6 million foreigners on U.S. soil. There would appear little indigenous

concern, however, about either China or Communist threat over there. India, Indonesia, and Japan have between them nearly as many people as China, and Japan alone has industrial production far greater than anything in China. These states, in cooperation with others in the area, have a potentiality of providing a tremendous counterweight to the tremendous expansion of Chinese power. This would appear important, because over a period, I do not see how American manpower and wealth outside the area can substitute for a cooperative effort of the states within the area. As long as we almost alone try to wage freedom fights for these countries of Asia, they will let us do it. One cannot blame them. But where does that leave the United States?

I say that especially because of the gigantic commitments we have in Europe. Senator Jackson mentioned the British situation. As you know, they have never been over 60 percent of their strength in Europe and now they are heavily cutting that. The United States supplies most of the money for training. If worse came to worst, and some unknown event put Chinese manpower in the Vietnam battle, what nation would have men fighting side by side with our own in southeast Asia?

Secretary RUSK. I am not sure how much time we have for a comment. Some of these are very far-reaching observations.

Senator STENNIS. Well, legally under the rules, his time is about exhausted. Could you make a brief comment on that? I know you should be given time to answer, and I will.

OTHER NATIONS SHOULD DO MORE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Secretary RUSK. If you believe, Senator, that other nations ought to do more with regard to the security of southeast Asia, I would agree with you. There would be no disagreement between us on that. If you feel that the South Vietnamese are not doing a great deal for their own defense, then, I would urge you to look at that question closely, because they have been making a major effort. They are concerned, of course, about what Hanoi, with the support of Peking, is trying to do to them. I would hope we would not draw the conclusion that because others are not doing as much as we would hope they would do, we would not do those things which are necessary for the vital security interests of the United States. It is a heavy burden to bear. We have borne many of these burdens since Pearl Harbor Day. But I do not think the future safety of this country should be left at the disposal of the willingness of others to do things in situations that are vital to us.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. How long can we continue to finance, to the extent we do, the free world, and defend, to the extent we do, the free world? We constantly get into increasing fiscal and monetary problems. The people we defend are constantly improving their fiscal and monetary problems. Something has to give.

TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION A DOUBTFUL CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS FOR WAR

Senator STENNIS. May I make this comment, with all deference, Mr. Secretary. I really do not think we need a legal adviser to tell us what the Tonkin Gulf resolution means or what the Constitution means when it talks about declaring war. The Congress has just failed to comply with that requirement, and I am not raising any fuss about that now. I am a guilty party, if anyone is guilty, on the Tonkin Gulf resolution. I am concerned about this, though, as a precedent it may set. We are already in Vietnam. We have to win. But the precedent the Tonkin Gulf resolution sets, as I understand it, was directed toward aggression, primarily aggression on us. We are in Vietnam because of aggression on those people.

But now is not time to argue that. I have looked at that language rather closely. But more than that, I know the debates we had on it and the discussions we had on it. It seems to me that you stand on mightily thin ice if you rely upon the Tonkin Gulf resolution as a constitutional basis for this war. But we are not trying to measure that.

Secretary RUSK. That is only one of the bases, sir.

Senator STENNIS. We are not trying to measure what you are standing on. But I did want to refute the idea that we needed a legal adviser on that.

RUSK DEFENDS RELIANCE ON TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

Secretary RUSK. I do think, Senator, that it ought to be recalled that, in the Tonkin Gulf resolution, section 2 said that the United States regarded, "as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia and that, consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations, and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is therefore prepared, as the President determines, to take all these steps, including the use of armed force," to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in assisting in its defense.

Senator STENNIS. If you want to take that in its broad implications, it looks like it is almost a mandate to go on and win the war as quickly as we can at whatever military cost and make a reality out of it and get this thing over with rather than pushing it off or putting it off. You know that is my opinion generally. But I think it is just a mighty bad precedent to rely chiefly on the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

I think it is a bad precedent, too, when we get into a war like this, now approaching the size of the Korean war, as far as our men are concerned, and it is a great mistake to fail to be just frank about it and say we are in a bad situation and we have to push it through. But I am imposing on someone else's time.

Senator Thurmond, we are back to you.

Senator THURMOND. How much time do we have, Mr. Chairman?

Senator STENNIS. It is a question of how we are going to use our time here. Mr. Secretary, you have to leave at 12; do you not?

Secretary RUSK. I had a luncheon appointment, but I am at your disposal.

Senator STENNIS. It seems that we are not going to have time for a closed session. Senator, suppose we make it 10 minutes.

DIVISION OF WORLD IDEOLOGICALLY

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, the world is now divided into the free world and the Communist world, is it not, insofar as ideology goes and insofar as freedom goes?

Secretary RUSK. Well, there are, I think, more than two elements in the situation. There are so-called nonaligned countries; there are those who are allied with each other in such instruments as NATO. I think there are some important differences developing inside the Communist world among themselves.

Peking, for example, is relatively isolated within the Communist world, and we see today a half million people demonstrating in front of the Soviet Embassy in Peking. So I would think that the solidarity of this sort of two groups has been broken up into a larger number of groupings.

Senator THURMOND. Those who demonstrated in Peking were more aggressive, though, than the regular Communists; were they not?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator THURMOND. They were not demonstrating for freedom, were they?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. They were demonstrating for stronger communism.

Secretary RUSK. I am just pointing out there are different kinds of communism.

Senator THURMOND. I have heard this talk for years about the difference in the Communist world, but with our aid and assistance, it seems the Communists are able to continue.

PURPOSE OF UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM

I am very concerned about the answer you gave last week about winning the war in Korea. You did not give a direct answer. Are we going to win the war or not?

Secretary RUSK. In Korea?

Senator THURMOND. I mean in Vietnam. Are we there to win it or are we just going to placate and appease, like we did in Korea?

Secretary RUSK. We are there to see to it that North Vietnam does not seize South Vietnam by force and we will accomplish that result.

UNITED STATES IS IN VIETNAM BECAUSE OF OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS

Senator THURMOND. Is that the only justification for being there, Mr. Secretary, our own national interest? We are not there just to save the freedom of the people of South Vietnam. We are not there

just to prevent that country, to stop the fighting between the north and the south. Is it not a matter of fact that if it were just a war as some people would say, between the north and the south, purely a civil war in the country as some would lead the public to believe, that we would not be there? We are there because the Communists wage this war, they are the aggressors, and if they take South Vietnam, it means losing not only that country but Laos and Cambodia and Thailand, Burma, possibly India and many other countries in south-east Asia. Is that not our real reason for being there, to protect our own national interests? And is that not the only justification we can have for being there?

Secretary RUSK. We are there, sir, because of our national interest. That was clearly brought out at the time the Senate ratified the SEATO Treaty with only one dissenting vote. We formally inscribed our understanding of our national interest in the SEATO Treaty in 1954 and 1955. Our national interest does lie in there not being launched a course of aggression that has no end to it. It is based on our experience with aggression before and during World War II, that aggression ought to be stopped at its beginnings and not wait until it leads into a great conflagration that catches up the entire world.

So I do not object at all that we are there for our national interest. We are there exactly for that purpose, and we have so demonstrated and so defined it.

Senator THURMOND. And we are now in a war there, are we not?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct; not in the legal sense of a war, but we are fighting it out.

COMPARISON WITH WAR IN KOREA

Senator THURMOND. Now, I am concerned about our policy, because I think that is going to determine whether we win or lose it. We did not win in Korea, did we? We had a stalemate. General MacArthur wanted to win it. He said you could have won at one point in 10 days.

Is it not a matter of fact that our policy is what kept us from winning? The Communists at that time said, "If you go beyond the Yalu River, or if you try to win over here, you are going to start World War III"?

Incidentally, I believe that was the same propaganda of the State Department at that time. You were not Secretary of State, of course, then. But we did not win because the policy was to follow that course.

Someone has said that a defeat of communism there would have been a setback for socialism here and socialism had been projected for the future of this country, and that is the reason we did not win in Korea. I wonder if that policy is going to be followed in Vietnam and whether we are going to follow the same course and not have victory there and then have to fight it all over again at some other place at a later date. Or if we have a military victory there, just like if we had one in Korea, I do not think we would have been fighting now in North Vietnam. If we had had a clean-cut victory in Korea, my feeling is we would not have been fighting now in Vietnam. I am very concerned.

THURMOND'S DISCUSSION WITH MACARTHUR IN 1961

I went to see General MacArthur in his home in New York in 1961, when we started the muzzling of the military investigations, to get his opinion of why the military was being muzzled. He knew they were being muzzled; he said so. The muzzling began in the spring of 1961. Not since then have you heard a military man or men in the State Department or any high official of the executive branch make the strong speech against communism, although communism is the main enemy of the free world, including the United States today.

General MacArthur made this observation to me, and it impressed me. He said the trouble is in the second and third echelons of the State Department. General MacArthur said there are people there who espouse international socialism and who would go too far to placate and appease the Communists.

Now, unless we change our policy—I realize the President can order otherwise, but the State Department makes recommendations to the President. Unless we do change our policy and decide to win in Vietnam, are we not going to be there for years and years?

Ordinarily, when you are in a war, you go and you strike fast with everything you have. You try to clobber the enemy, win and get through. We are not doing that in Vietnam. We have power there we are not using, air power and sea power, and we are sending more and more boys there. This war could last so many years that every boy in high school today could end up in Vietnam.

Are we not making a mistake to follow this weak-kneed, spineless policy of not winning? I have called it a no-win policy. Are we not making a mistake to follow that kind of policy instead of a strong, firm policy to win when we are at war?

RUSK REJECTS SUGGESTION THAT STATE DEPARTMENT WAS SOFT ON COMMUNISM

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would reject utterly and out of hand any suggestion that there are people in the State Department who are trying to give aid and comfort to the success of the Communist effort in any part of the world. That, with all due respect, sir, is just not true.

Senator THURMOND. I stated that you were not the Secretary of State at the time that General MacArthur made that statement.

Secretary RUSK. I was Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs during the Korean war and am familiar with the circumstances of that war. Senator, we can have a great war any 5 minutes we want it. If we are taking a hundred men killed a week, we can make that 10,000 a week or 100,000 a week. We can let this move into a general war that would knock out 300 million people in the first hour.

U.S. POLICY EXPLAINED

Now, what we have been trying to do since 1945 is to build a little peace in the world. We did not go to war on the blockade of Berlin. We could have. In the 19th century, that was casus belli. We used an airlift to try to bring that matter to a conclusion without a general war, and we did.

We did not go to general war with the Communist world because of the Greek guerrillas. We tried to throw them back.

In these several crises, the effort has been to take the action necessary to sustain the peace and prevent a course of aggression from being launched and, at the same time, if possible, prevent us all from sliding down the slippery slope into a general war. That requires discipline and self-restraint and prudence; it also requires great gallantry on the part of those men in uniform who, in a series of crises since 1945, have had to do their professional duty with such valor, and without the psychology of a nation infuriated by the circumstances of a general war. There is too much power in the world, Senator, to move quickly into a general war, too much power. We are too powerful to be infuriated. We have to try to find a reasonable and rational way to do what is required to stop aggression, especially in those areas where we have a commitment, and not let a course of aggression get started, as was started with Manchuria, Ethiopia, and Czechoslovakia, and so forth, before World War II. The purpose is to build a peace, not just to try to destroy somebody.

Senator THURMOND. Do you not run a much greater risk in bringing on a big war by stringing out this, if you want to call it the little war, over the years? Is there not a much greater chance that we will end up in a big war unless we go ahead and win this little war and win it quickly?

Senator STENNIS. Gentlemen, let me ask you to suspend there. You can supply that for the record, if it is all right, Mr. Secretary. We do not have unlimited time. Senator JACKSON?

NECESSITY FOR SETTLEMENT OF EUROPEAN PROBLEMS AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, probably the most important unfinished business of NATO is the settlement of the problems left over in central Europe after World War II; that is, a genuine European settlement, and, of course, the problem of German unification. General de Gaulle has been moving in this area. I wonder if you could indicate to the subcommittee whether or not we and our NATO allies are giving this sufficient priority and are really endeavoring to do something about it.

Secretary RUSK. There is no question that we and our allies are interested in a permanent settlement in Eastern Europe. If one looks back on the very large defense budgets which we have undertaken since the year, say, 1947, one could ascribe, I think fairly, a considerable portion of those defense budgets—I would not try to set an exact figure—40, 50 percent of them—to the fact that central Europe has not come to a final settlement. We also feel that there cannot be permanent peace in central Europe, that there will always be unease and unrest and the possibilities of conflict, unless the German people are given a chance to make their own decision about their own future with respect to reunification. The central problem has been that the Soviet Union has not been willing to see those wartime understandings move toward free choice on the part of the German people.

Now, the question of what can be done short of that is a question that has been discussed many times. We have discussed these issues with the Soviets on many occasions since 1945, sometimes under conditions of relative quiet, sometimes under conditions of high crisis. We would hope that a situation could develop in which all sides could agree that it will be to the advantage of everybody to let these German people themselves decide what they want to do with their future, open up the possibilities for permanent and assured security arrangements in central Europe, and then maybe open wider the door to the possibilities of some reduction in the burden of arms which all of us have been carrying for the last 20 years.

I must confess I do not see major opportunities for that at the present time. Therefore, the possibilities of results coming from particular initiatives are not great, but it is a matter that we continue to explore and probe from time to time as the opportunity arises.

Senator JACKSON. We are giving it a high priority within the NATO community.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. It is the overriding question about the stability of peace in the longer run for not only the NATO countries but the Warsaw Pact countries.

Senator STENNIS. Pardon me. You said it is the overriding question.

Secretary RUSK. "It" being the question of reunification.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, how do you view the Sino-Soviet split as it relates to our worldwide commitments. Do you view it, as long as this split continues, as a factor of lessening the danger of involvement elsewhere, or do you view it as a possibility in which the competition between the two Communist camps might be such that involvement elsewhere could be more certain than if they were united.

Secretary RUSK. It is something of a mixed picture, Senator. It is difficult for us to be completely precise about the state of relations between Moscow and Peking. Part of that, I suspect, derives from the fact that neither Moscow nor Peking is completely certain about what those relations are at a given time. I say it is a mixed picture, because it is true that competition between Peking and Moscow may cause both of them to do more in certain areas, and the net effect of what both sides do in certain areas will be adverse to our interests.

I think there have been occasions, for example, on the continent of Africa where competition between these two has had a net effect injurious to the broader interests of the free nations of Africa and to the West. I think it would depend upon the terms on which these two capitals would work together.

For example, if they should repair this breach in the direction of peaceful coexistence, opening up the possibilities of negotiating out some of the issues that divide the Communist world and the free world, that is one thing. If the gap should be closed in the other direction on the basis of Peking's militancy, I think that would greatly increase the dangers we would face.

Senator JACKSON. The greater effort now, the danger of Chinese direct involvement would probably be greater, would it not?

Secretary RUSK. It would depend on the basis on which they got together, whether on the basis of peaceful coexistence or on the basis of militancy.

Senator JACKSON. China might not have been involved in Korea if the split had existed at that time to the extent that it now exists.

Secretary RUSK. It is possible. I have not really addressed myself to that question.

Senator JACKSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman. I have other questions, but they should be asked in closed session.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Cannon?

UNITED STATES NOT OVERCOMMITTED AT THIS TIME

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, when you were with us last week, you pointed out that the United States has military agreements with 40 different countries. In our discussion here it has been emphasized that we are very heavily, and very actively committed in NATO, in Korea, and in South Vietnam and, of course, this has us spread very thin. In addition, in your statement last week, you said no one aggressor should suppose that the absence of a defense treaty, congressional declaration, or U.S. military presence grants immunity to aggression. For one thing, the responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to aggression are worldwide, thus indicating that perhaps our real commitments may be far beyond the 40 countries with which we have military commitments.

Now, we all know that we are spread quite thin at the present time in view of these three heaviest commitments with which we are confronted today. I would like to ask you, in view of that picture, do you believe that we are overcommitted under the commitments that we are carrying in the world today?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, first, on the matter of the United Nations, I was referring, when I said what I said in that section of my statement, to hypothetical questions that might arise in the future, in order to be complete in the statement of the problem which your distinguished committee faces. Actually, in the course of the United Nations attempt to deal with a great many disputes on the long agenda of the United Nations Security Council, we have not been called upon to put in troops, except in a very, very few instances. And indeed, the great tendency now is to look to the nongreat powers to furnish the troops to be used by the United Nations. Canada, the Scandinavian countries, and others have taken leadership to try to build up this capability on the part of some of the nongreat powers.

I do not myself, sir, think that we are overcommitted. I think there are very great dangers in our being undercommitted in areas where we have vital security and national interest, along with other countries with whom we are closely working.

LIKELIHOOD OF ADDITIONAL MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Senator CANNON. When you say you do not believe we are overcommitted, then, is it fair to assume that you think the likelihood of our having additional military requirements in other areas is somewhat slight at this time?

Secretary RUSK. I am saying, sir, that eliminating all of our present commitments will not get rid of the problem that we would face in our vital national interest if aggression should occur in those areas where we now have commitments, and that, as the Senate committee very ably brought out in connection with the ratification of the SEATO Treaty, it is prudent to let people know in advance where we consider our vital interest to be, so that we can, to the maximum extent possible, avoid a miscalculation on their part.

RUSK SAYS U.S. COMMITMENTS SHOULD NOT BE LESS

Senator CANNON. I was relating my question of overcommitment in the context of the ability we have today to carry out those commitments. You seem to indicate that you think perhaps our commitments should really be greater but—

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, I just said they should not be less.

Senator CANNON. That the commitments should not be less.

Secretary RUSK. I did not say our commitments should be greater. I said I would be concerned if we found ourselves undercommitted by in any way indicating to anyone on the other side that they could move in on areas of vital national interest to the United States with impunity, because there is where the great danger lies.

Senator CANNON. Well, then, to get back to my basic question, your feeling is, I take it, that we are not overcommitted based on our capabilities today in light of the general discussion we have had.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir, because behind our commitments stand not only the active forces in being but the potential of the United States, and that is very great indeed.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator. Senator Byrd, you are next, and I recognize you, sir.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

POSSIBILITY OF RETURN OF EXILES TO GREECE

Mr. Secretary, there is some indication that Greek Communists in exile will return to Greece. Do you have any information as to when this will occur, or how it will occur?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I have no information on that this morning. That has not been brought to my attention in any significant way, and I would have to look up that point to see what we know about that.

(The information requested appears on p. 110.)

Senator BYRD. I thought I had heard over the radio yesterday afternoon something to the effect that about 30,000 would be returning in the very near future.

U.S. POLICY REGARDING RHODESIA

Last week, Mr. Secretary, you indicated, I believe, that our policy with regard to Rhodesia in supporting British economic sanctions against that country was largely a policy that had been enunciated by the United Nations. Is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

SUPPORT OF U.N. BY EMERGING NATIONS OF AFRICA

Senator BYRD. How many countries are there in the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. Approximately 117 at the present time, sir.

Senator BYRD. How many of these are the so-called newly emerging nations of Africa?

Secretary RUSK. There are about 35 new countries in Africa.

Senator BYRD. Thirty-five out of the one hundred and seventeen are newly emerging countries of Africa.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator BYRD. What contributions are being made by these nations to the upkeep of the United Nations and to its programs?

Secretary RUSK. The assessment scale is determined on the basis of computation of ability to pay. I would have to supply the list of the particular assessments of the African countries. Many of them are on the minimum scale of 0.04 percent of the U.N. budget, based upon their gross national product and their ability to pay.

(This and other information requested by Senator Byrd follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 16, 1966.

Hon. ROBERT C. BYRD,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR BYRD: During Secretary Rusk's recent appearances before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee you raised a number of questions which the Secretary said he would look into further. I am pleased to provide you with the answers to those questions.

1. *British shipping to North Viet Nam and Cuba*

During 1965 57 British flag ships made 126 calls at Cuban ports. From January through July 1966 provisional figures indicate that 41 British flag ships made 69 calls at Cuban ports.

During the past year the percentage of British flag vessels arriving at North Vietnamese ports has declined from 31% of the total arrivals in June 1965 to less than 4% in June and July 1966. There was one call by a British flag vessel in each of the months of June and July 1966. The enclosed table provides the monthly figures from June 1965 through July 1966. Most British flag vessels engaged in the trade have been small coastal freighters owned by Hong Kong shipping companies. Often they have been under charter to the Chinese Communists and North Vietnamese.

2. *World War I debts*

The date of France's last payment to the United States on her World War I debts was June 15, 1931. The amount was \$20,675,000.

3. *Employment of French nationals in relocated NATO installations*

You inquired whether "in order to ameliorate the effect of * * * unemployment on the French economy, American forces are going to arrange to employ French personnel wherever its various headquarters and military installations are now to be located?" (P. 122 of transcript)

While it is correct that consideration is being given to re-employing elsewhere in Europe certain French civilians whose services will be terminated when U.S. forces leave France, this consideration does not result from a desire to ameliorate the effect of this move on the French economy. It does result from a desire to retain the services of a limited number of French nationals who possess unusual skills, background or experience and who would be difficult to replace.

4. *Free world trade with Communist China*

Secretary Rusk offered to submit estimates on the increase in trade between Mainland China and the Free World, a matter in which you had indicated your interest.

Total free-world exports to Communist China rose from \$670 million in 1960 to approximately \$1 billion in 1964, compared with imports of \$777 million in 1960 and \$1.2 billion in 1964. The increase in exports is accounted for mainly by shipments of wheat and other food products. Free-world exports to the China mainland of food and preparations reached a low of \$37 million in 1960, but have averaged more than \$400 million per year since then. Exports to Communist China of wheat from Australia averaged nearly \$125 million annually from 1961-65 and those from Canada averaged more than \$100 million per year.

5. *Status of Greek Communists in exile*

You inquired as to whether the Secretary had any information on reports that a number of Greek Communists in exile would soon be returning to Greece.

There have been reports that some 30,000 expatriate Greek Communists are massing on the Greek-Bulgarian border preparatory to move into Greece, but these are given little credence by informed military and diplomatic observers in Athens. Reports of this type have circulated over the years in Greece, particularly during election campaigns. The prospects for the renewal of the Communist guerrilla action against Greece are extremely slight, both because of the increased Greek military capability (and particularly Greece's membership in NATO) and the efforts in recent years of the Bloc nations to improve relations with Greece.

6. *United Nations assessment rates of African States*

You inquired as to the financial contributions that the newly emerging nations of Africa were making to the United Nations.

The total assessment rate of the African members of the United Nations that have achieved independence since 1945 is 1.66 of the regular UN budget for the years 1965-67. The four African members that achieved independence before 1945 (including the Republic of South Africa) contribute an additional .83%. A table providing a further breakdown of the assessments is enclosed.

I hope that if you desire any further information you will not hesitate to inquire.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Number of calls at North Vietnamese ports

| | Communist | Free world | British | Total | British (percent of total) |
|----------------|-----------|------------|---------|-------|----------------------------------|
| 1965: | | | | | |
| June..... | 18 | 24 | 13 | 42 | 31.0 |
| July..... | 17 | 21 | 9 | 38 | 23.7 |
| August..... | 24 | 12 | 7 | 36 | 19.4 |
| September..... | 18 | 11 | 8 | 29 | 27.6 |
| October..... | 17 | 17 | 13 | 34 | 38.2 |
| November..... | 30 | 14 | 12 | 44 | 27.3 |
| December..... | 28 | 13 | 10 | 41 | 24.4 |
| 1966: | | | | | |
| January..... | 29 | 18 | 13 | 47 | 27.7 |
| February..... | 25 | 12 | 11 | 37 | 29.7 |
| March..... | 29 | 6 | 5 | 35 | 14.3 |
| April..... | 24 | 7 | 4 | 31 | 12.9 |
| May..... | 19 | 6 | 4 | 25 | 16.0 |
| June..... | 23 | 5 | 1 | 28 | 3.6 |
| July..... | 26 | 1 | 1 | 27 | 3.7 |

Assessment rates of African States members of the United Nations

| | <i>Assessment rate</i> |
|--|----------------------------|
| 1. States achieving independence since 1945 : | |
| Algeria | 0.10 |
| Burundi | .04 |
| Cameroon | .04 |
| Central African Republic | .04 |
| Chad | .04 |
| Congo (Brazzaville) | .04 |
| Congo (Kinshasa) | .05 |
| Dahomey | .04 |
| Gabon | .04 |
| Gambia | .04 |
| Ghana | .08 |
| Guinea | .04 |
| Ivory Coast | .04 |
| Kenya | .04 |
| Libya | .04 |
| Madagascar | .04 |
| Malawi | .04 |
| Mali | .04 |
| Mauritania | .04 |
| Morocco | .11 |
| Niger | .04 |
| Nigeria | .17 |
| Rwanda | .04 |
| Senegal | .04 |
| Sierra Leone | .04 |
| Somalia | .04 |
| Sudan | .06 |
| Tanzania | .04 |
| Togo | .04 |
| Tunisia | .05 |
| Uganda | .04 |
| Upper Volta | .04 |
| Zambia | .04 |
| Subtotal (33 members) | <u>1.66</u> |
| 2. States achieving independence before 1945 : | |
| Ethiopia | .04 |
| Liberia | .04 |
| Republic of South Africa | .52 |
| United Arab Republic | .23 |
| Subtotal (4 members) | <u>.83</u> |
| Africa, total (37 members) | <u>2.49</u> |

NOTE.—Assessment rates are those applicable to assessments for the regular budget of the U.N. for the years 1965-67. On the same scale, the U.S. assessment rate was 31.91 percent.

Senator BYRD. Could you estimate percentagewise what the total amount of contribution by these newly emerging countries in Africa might be? What percentage of the total budget of the United Nations is presented by this bloc?

Secretary RUSK. If I could broaden that—I would have to look at the particular statistics on Africa itself. But one of the constitutional problems in the United Nations is that, with the multiplication of states, many of them quite small states, 10 percent of the world's population can cast two-thirds of the vote in the General Assembly, and 5 percent of the contributions to the United Nations budget can cast two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly. That is a matter which has been discussed at some length in the United Nations, and we our-

selves would propose that on financial matters there be a finance committee established on which the major contributors would be more heavily represented, so that responsible advice from those who bring in the major resources would be before the Assembly before such votes are cast. But we have not yet found a final answer to that particular question.

But the voting situation in the General Assembly, as contrasted with the Security Council, now is heavily weighted in favor of the very large number of smaller countries.

Senator BYRD. What is the combined vote of these newly emerging African countries?

Secretary RUSK. I think there are about 38 African members of the General Assembly, total. Certain ones of them—Ethopia, Liberia—have been independent states long before 1945.

CHANGE IN RHODESIAN POLICY ADVOCATED

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, with such a large percentage of the total makeup of nations of the United Nations making such a minor contribution to the overall cost and effort of the United Nations, it would seem to me that it would be in our own best interest to follow policies that are geared to the long-run welfare and security of our own country, as certain other countries in the United Nations at times follow policies which they deem to be in their own best interests, regardless of whether or not those policies are in contravention of the policies enunciated by the United Nations. As one who feels that we are following the wrong policy with regard to Rhodesia, it seems to me we at least ought to insist upon Great Britain supporting us in our efforts in Vietnam. We ought also, I think, to review our policy with regard to supporting Britain's economic sanction against Rhodesia, with the idea in mind of insisting that Great Britain cut out her trade with Vietnam and with Cuba, if we are going to continue to support her stand against Rhodesia. I just feel that we are letting a large bloc of nations in the United Nations whose impact upon world history is just about the impact of a fly speck upon a large map, determine our policy in regard to things like the Rhodesian question, when this policy is not really in the best interest of our own country in the long run.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this was not a case of our supinely accepting a policy from the rest of the United Nations. We took part actively in the discussion of that policy and took into account our own national interest. We do have an important interest in what happens on that vast continent of Africa, 10 minutes' flying time from Western Europe, and a continent which, in the future, will be of great importance in the total situation in the world. We would hope that these problems inside Africa could be solved by a peaceful process in a way that would permit a combination of stability and progress in that continent so that institutions of their own choice which are congenial to and compatible with the commitments of the United Nations Charter and the national interests of the United States could come into being with some strength and durability about them.

So there are very large issues involved here. I would not wish to leave the impression that we simply were overrun by 35 or 38 African votes in the General Assembly.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate the vast interest we have in Africa and the future history of that continent. But at the same time, I think that Great Britain should recognize the vast interest that we have and that she has in the future determination of the conflict in Vietnam. I would hope that we would continue to insist that Great Britain curtail her trade with Hanoi and also with Cuba.

Mr. Chairman, I have one final question if I may ask it. Senator STENNIS. Yes.

DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO PRESENT POLICY

Senator BYRD. A nation which commits \$58 billion or certainly between \$50 and \$60 billion annually for military purposes should not permit itself to be interminably bogged down in all too singular efforts in the line of mutual defense of allied nations. What workable alternative is there to our continuance indefinitely in Europe on the present basis? What other suggestions can the Department of State make that might be considered to offer some reasonable means of better serving our own longrun national interests than that of more or less statically continuing our present European troop commitments?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, the principal alternatives to what we are doing in NATO is to do a lot more or do a lot less. We have an utterly vital interest in the safety and security of Western Europe. We in North America and Western Europe together make up about 90 percent of the industrial power of the free world. This combination of force that stands with the broad commitments of the United Nations Charter and with the notion of democracy and free societies is of the utmost importance to shaping the kind of world in which our own institutions of freedom can survive and flourish. I would think that what we are doing now is what was worked out over a very long period of time, with frequent reexaminations along with our NATO allies. We do think that that ought to be reviewed in terms of the nature of the threat, as I have said many times before this committee. But I would hope that we would be very careful before we made any unilateral decisions to do less in a circumstance where we might mislead the other side as to what our commitments are and what our real intentions are and our view of our national interest is. Because if there is anything at all, it seems to me that we can draw from the experience of the last three decades, it is that down that path lies war.

Senator BYRD. I take it, then, Mr. Secretary, that we have no present alternative or solution to this problem.

Secretary RUSK. I would not suggest a major alternative at this time.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the Secretary for his fine statement and for doing a very competent and admirable job in this difficult period of our national history.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Senator.

RECESS OF SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator. Members of the subcommittee, we did not get to have the executive session with the Secretary.

We are very glad, Mr. Secretary, that we chose you for the first witness. You have given us a good start. You are a good witness, especially in support of your views. You carry yourself well. We want to give you certain written questions now of a classified nature that will allow us to travel part of the road for executive matters, and then sometime later, we want you to come back and let us have the benefit of further counsel from you on these classified matters.

Now, the Secretary is under a pressing time schedule. We want especially to thank him again. I am going to ask everyone to keep their seats while the Secretary and his group retire.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Members of the subcommittee, we will not have a chance to meet any more this week. The staff is going to digest further the Secretary's statement and put other matters before us. We will have further sessions, though, of the subcommittee during this congressional session.

We will now take a recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

