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NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

GOVERNMENT

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON
NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

AUGUST 17 AND 31, 1966

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

U.S. SENATE

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NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

Pursuant to call, the committee met at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, Church, Pell, McCarthy, McGee, Aiken, Mundt, and Case.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The hearing this morning is prompted by recent news stories concerning certain activities of the U.S. Information Agency in Vietnam. In my recent letter to Mr. Marks, I suggested that this might be a suitable time to discuss some of the broader problems of news dissemination relative to the conflict in southeast Asia.

Without objection, the texts of the letter and the reply will be inserted in the record.

(The correspondence referred to follows:)

AUGUST 11, 1966.

HON. LEONARD H. MARKS,
Director, U.S. Information Agency, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MARKS: I am writing with reference to a story in today's *Washington Post* concerning the activities of the United States Information Agency in sponsoring visits by foreign newsmen to Vietnam. It is my impression that there is no reason for any particular secrecy with respect to this activity, although the news story indicates that the dimensions of this process at least are being treated as classified material. It does seem to me that Committee members would be interested in learning more about the Agency's undertakings in this field.

Therefore, I suggest that we hold an open hearing on this subject and hope that you will appear as the chief witness. It would be most suitable if this hearing could take place at ten o'clock on Wednesday morning, August 17, in Room 4221 in the New Senate Office Building. I trust that this scheduling is acceptable to you.

While the newspaper article mentioned above has stimulated this public session of the Committee, I would anticipate that our discussions would not be confined to the subject matter of the story. On the contrary, I believe the larger picture of news coverage vis-a-vis the Vietnam problem, and specifically the role of the Information Agency in that sphere, might be explored. I further believe that you might find this occasion a useful means of raising with the Committee any questions which are of particular concern to the Agency.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman.

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, August 15, 1966.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Thank you for your letter of August 11, 1966.

We shall be happy to appear before your Committee on Wednesday, August 17, 1966 in Room 4221 New Senate Office Building.

I look forward to seeing you at that time.

Sincerely,

LEONARD H. MARKS, Director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee's interest stems from the growing debate on the manner in which the war is being reported to the public. There seems to be some disagreement, both within the Government and outside it, over just what the proper role of Government agencies should be in making relevant information available.

It is obvious that the public has been provided with a wide variety of interpretations on political and military developments, both in the American and the foreign press, but it is not clear to me just what policies guide the U.S. Information Agency. Recent reports that transportation is being provided for foreign reporters to the combat area in an attempt to improve our "image" may place the Agency in a somewhat awkward position, since there will be concern among our citizens about whether this is a legitimate function of the USIA.

It would seem in your Agency's best interests to use this occasion to eliminate, explain, and clarify this and other questions.

At a minimum, I hope this morning's testimony will help explain the procedures by which the USIA provides information in Vietnam and elsewhere, and clarify any misunderstandings about what your officials do, and do not do, to influence newsmen.

Mr. Marks, we are very pleased to have you this morning. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, I do, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed, sir?

STATEMENT OF LEONARD H. MARKS, DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY SANFORD MARLOWE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF USIA FOR VIETNAM; AND RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, GENERAL COUNSEL, USIA

Mr. MARKS. For the record, I believe it is customary to say that I am pleased to be here and having an opportunity to present testimony to this committee, and I mean that. It is an opportunity that I haven't had since I assumed the office one year ago. The chairman and I and various members of the committee have informally discussed these problems, so I welcome the chance to put it on the public record.

I want to say at the outset, Senator, that there has been no secrecy attached to any of the activities of the U.S. Information Agency with reference to our program in Vietnam. We operate outside of the United States. Sometimes I wish that there was more information published in the United States about our activities abroad so that the citizens and the taxpayers would understand how their money is being spent, and of the heroic and valiant efforts being made by our staff to acquaint foreign audiences with what our policies and objectives are.

USIA PROGRAM TO ASSIST FOREIGN NEWSMEN

I appreciate this invitation to appear before this committee to discuss USIA's program designed to assist selected foreign correspondents to report on the Vietnam scene from firsthand knowledge. It is an excellent program.

This program was started in the fall of 1965. We in USIA are charged with the responsibility of trying to see that full and objective information regarding the Vietnam situation is available to newspapers, radio, and television outlets abroad. The question is not

whether such media favor or oppose the policies of the U.S. Government, but whether they have the facts upon which to form intelligent opinions.

I have said time and time again that a man's opinion is no better than the facts upon which his opinion is based, and unless he has the facts, his opinion isn't worth anything.

We have found that in some instances reporting has been based on lack of information or on misinformation. The best way to correct this situation is to enable reporters to go to the scene of the story, ask questions, and see for themselves what is happening.

I have talked to foreign journalists and invariably they say to me, "I would like to go there and see what is happening, through my eyes. I would like to report it through the eyes of a Latin American, or an African, or an Asian, and not through the eyes of an American."

PRECEDENTS FOR PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION TO NEWSMEN

The technique of providing transportation to correspondents so they can see for themselves and get a firsthand acquaintance with the facts is not new in the field of foreign affairs or anywhere else. It is a time-honored practice and a respected one and a good one.

To a great extent—

Senator GORE. Why would you say "time-honored"?

Mr. MARKS. It has been going on for a long time, sir; and the major correspondents of the world—

Senator GORE. That is a better description.

Mr. MARKS. Yes. It has been going on for a long time and there is no discredit to a newsman, to an educator, or a scholar, to a scientist, to be the guest of the U.S. Government, or of a business organization, to be transported to a scene so that he can observe for himself.

Senator GORE. The only purpose of my interjection was for clarity. Lots of things have been going on for a long time that are not "time honored."

Mr. MARKS. This has been going on for a long time, and I approve of it. I think every major correspondent in this room, if asked, would tell you that at one time or another he has been pleased to be on the scene of an event, and that the transportation has been furnished through the courtesy of a government or a business organization. I would like to point out that when a new hotel opens in the United States, it is customary to have a flight of newspapermen. I would like to point out that when a new play opens at the National Theater, the newsmen are given tickets so they can report the play. Baseball games take place every day and there are newsmen in the press boxes as guests of the management, so there is nothing new about this, and nothing wrong about it.

Senator GORE. So, in consequence, you take them to Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you mean to equate the significance of these events with the significance of the war in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

USIA PROGRAM COMPARED TO EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE

But I want to point out, Senator, that we have been under the educational exchange program, bringing people to the United States

for more than 20 years so that they can see for themselves what is going on; they can study in this country; they can talk to their counterparts; they can find out firsthand, what the practices are in their industry, or in their field of learning.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marks, I hope you won't get too far afield. Do you mean to equate the exchange program with the USIA's program?

Mr. MARKS. The same theory applies, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it? I don't wish to let that stand.

We had a great battle over this very matter about 15 years ago, whether the USIA should take over the cultural exchange program, and it was very thoroughly discussed and considered. We decided, and I think quite rightly, that the cultural exchange program was not a proper part of our propaganda activities.

I would not want anybody to think either the purpose of that program or its administration is for the same purpose as USIA.

Mr. MARKS. They are different programs, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite different. But you seem to leave the impression that they are just about the same, or are the same.

Mr. MARKS. No, Senator. What I have tried to say is that we invite foreigners to be our guests, to come to the United States, whether they are educational leaders, or scientists, so that they can see firsthand what is happening.

In the program that we are going to discuss this morning, the U.S. Government, through the USIA, transported foreign journalists to the scene in Vietnam so that they could see firsthand what is happening.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Leave it at that. Do not try to take in too much territory and bring in the exchange programs. These are very broad programs and have implications far beyond what we are concerned with this morning.

I did not want the record to stand that I accepted the idea that they were comparable activities.

Mr. MARKS. We are in agreement, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

VISITS TO WAR AREAS BY FOREIGN NEWSMEN

Mr. MARKS. Now, working from this premise, USIA, in September 1965, asked its posts worldwide to encourage visits to Vietnam by responsible newsmen, magazine writers, and radio and television reporters. Where financial assistance by the USIS would be required, our posts were advised that the Agency would attempt to help if the posts so recommended. It was understood that correspondents traveling to Vietnam without assistance were not to expect preferential treatment. They would get the same treatment as that given to the resident press corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this the first instance, in 1965, that the USIA has ever done this?

Mr. MARKS. To my knowledge, as far as Vietnam is concerned—

The CHAIRMAN. Or, any other war; well, any other activities similar to Vietnam.

Mr. MARKS. The Korean war, sir, was in 1952.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they do it then?

Mr. MARKS. There was no USIA in 1952.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a predecessor agency.

Mr. MARKS. I have not determined that, sir; but I do know that we have in many fields brought outstanding men, whether journalists or otherwise—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, wait a minute. The question is: Has the USIA ever before invited foreign correspondents to do a similar thing? Is there a precedent, in other words, for this particular activity?

Mr. MARKS. To bring them to the United States, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. No. Well, all right, to the United States or to other places.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not thinking now of the exchange program; you are thinking of the leader grant program.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

TRANSPORTATION FUNDED BY COUNTERPART FUNDS

Now, the major expense in carrying out this program is the cost of transportation. As the committee knows, all U.S. Government agencies use counterpart funds whenever possible, in lieu of appropriated dollars. The transportation costs, therefore, are funded from this source.

In Saigon the visiting correspondent gets the same assistance as does any other correspondent. This includes expediting prompt press accreditation, arranging briefings on those aspects of the Vietnam situation in which a correspondent has a particular interest, and handling in-country transportation.

NATURE OF NEWS BRIEFINGS

Senator GORE. Do these briefings include brief sessions with General Green?

Mr. MARKS. I am unable to answer that, sir.

A correspondent who comes to Saigon under this program, like all other correspondents in Vietnam, is a free agent in deciding what to report. He goes where he wishes to go. He reports what he wishes to report.

Now, in your letter, Mr. Chairman, you indicated an interest in discussing our Government's news policies in Vietnam. In this regard I should point out to you that the USIA is restricted to non-U.S. correspondents and to the Vietnamese news media. I will be happy to answer any questions concerning the USIS area of responsibility either on the first subject or on the broader question, whichever you prefer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Marks.

NUMBER OF FOREIGN NEWSMEN WHO WENT TO VIETNAM

The articles have prompted a few questions that I would like to get into the record.

In an article on August 11, it stated that 27 foreign newsmen had their way paid to go to Vietnam so they could provide more objective reporting. Is that substantially correct?

Mr. MARKS. I haven't an accurate list; I am trying to get it. I think it may be a few more than 27. I would say maybe in the neighborhood of 30 or 35.

(The information referred to is classified and on file with the committee.)

The CHAIRMAN. You say 30 or 35?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. 30 or 35 visits have been paid for, is that right?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

COST OF VISITS TO VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. What did they cost?

Mr. MARKS. I am trying to get that, exactly, but I would estimate under \$50,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Less than \$2,000 apiece?

Mr. MARKS. Approximately \$1,000 or \$1,500 is my estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. When you get the figures, you will correct that for the record?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, I will.

(The information referred to is classified and on file with the committee.)

USE OF COUNTERPART FUNDS

The CHAIRMAN. What counterpart funds were used? You say counterpart funds were used. Will you tell us what counterpart funds?

Mr. MARKS. Indian rupees, Israeli pounds—

The CHAIRMAN. How could they use Indian rupees? Did they travel on the Indian airline?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, or on the Israel airlines, or buy tickets through their—

The CHAIRMAN. I want to be precise about this. There is a great misunderstanding, both in the press and among the public, as to what "counterpart" is. I would like for you to be specific.

Mr. MARKS. You buy a ticket with the funds of that country, sometimes it is an Indian airline—

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Let me make it clear. I understand that. There is a great difference in some of these currencies.

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard German marks referred to by some of my colleagues as being counterpart, but in my view, that is an absolute distortion of the use of the term.

Mr. MARKS. I am talking about excess foreign currency.

The CHAIRMAN. Excess foreign currency which is not convertible?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all you use?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You will supply for the record exactly which currencies were used?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

(The information referred to is classified and on file with the committee.)

Senator GORE. May I interject?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator GORE. I have doubts that Mr. Marks really means that that is all he used. You don't mean you financed the entire expense, do you?

Mr. MARKS. The transportation expense, sir.

Senator GORE. You financed all of it with counterpart funds?

Mr. MARKS. I am trying to get a complete report, sir.

Senator GORE. I know, but your answer was "all."

Mr. MARKS. To the best of my knowledge now, all transportation came from excess foreign currency.

Senator GORE. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to clarify this point. Now is an occasion to bring some understanding about the nature of counterparts, because we have become accustomed—and I am not blaming you, you understand, at all—to use this term very freely. Very often it is misused, as if counterpart funds didn't cost anything and didn't amount to anything. Now, if it is genuinely nonconvertible excess foreign currency, that is one thing; if it is many other currencies, sometimes referred to as "counterpart," that is quite different.

Mr. MARKS. Well, Senator, my opinion is, that even if it is excess foreign currency, it is still money, and I don't spend it as if it had no value—

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR PAYING TRANSPORTATION COSTS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marks, what do you consider to be the legal authority for this particular activity? Is this authorized in your legislation?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, it is; and I have a legal brief on it, and if the committee would like it, I would be glad to supply it.

The CHAIRMAN. Supply it for the record, so we will have this point clarified.

Mr. MARKS. There isn't any doubt about the legal authority, in the opinion of our counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you correctly, this particular activity has not been done before—that is, bringing foreign correspondents to the scene of a particular activity for the purpose of reporting it. I think this can be distinguished in principle from the cultural exchange or even the leader grant program, because in the leader grant program I don't believe the intention is to bring people here to report on any particular activity. It is much more general in its nature, and the grantees usually come for 3 months—approximately—6 weeks to 3 months.

Mr. MARKS. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So, I think there is a little variation, at least.

Would you call this program of taking foreign correspondents abroad an educational program?

Mr. MARKS. In the broad sense of the word, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the reason for your belief that your authority over educational programs covers this activity?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; it is broader than that. We have responsibility under the Smith-Mundt bill in the information field, and as I

say, the brief covers the complete authority, sir, and I will be glad to supply it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The information referred to follows:)

LEGAL MEMO RE JOURNALIST TOUR PROGRAM—FUNDED WITH EXCESS CURRENCIES

(Prepared by the U.S. Information Agency)

Under the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended (PL 402, 80th Congress) the U.S. Information Agency has a broad mandate "to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad" (Section 501). The Act further provides in Section 1005 that "In carrying out the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the [Director] to utilize to the maximum extent practicable the services and facilities of private agencies, including existing American press, publishing, radio, motion picture, and other agencies through contractual arrangements or otherwise."

The Agency has been given a Congressional mandate to utilize private individuals and agencies wherever possible in explaining United States policy to foreign peoples. Obviously, private foreign informational media has wide acceptance on the part of foreign nationals. The Agency has therefore, in appropriate circumstances, facilitated wide and objective indigenous reportage on American foreign policy and actions.

The Agency has facilitated travel by foreign newsmen to Vietnam with the expectation that reporting will be objective and give a balanced account of U.S. Government actions and policies.

Wherever possible this program has been funded with excess currencies. These currencies are available through appropriation and are generally available for the same purposes as appropriated dollars. The annual Budget estimates presented to the Congress, have included journalist tours as one of the programs to be carried out with such appropriations.

Inter-governmental agreements for the sale of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities which are paid for in foreign currencies include provisions on the use of such currencies by the U.S. Government. The agreements normally specify a percentage of the total sales price which may be used for the payment of U.S. obligations abroad.

With respect to international transportation expenses, the Department of State has secured agreement to the use of currencies of many countries for such travel costs. The six countries which have agreed to such expenditures are India, Israel, Pakistan, UAR, Yugoslavia and Tunisia.

(Amplification of the above memo appears on p. 115 in the appendix.)

SELECTION OF NEWSMEN

The CHAIRMAN. How were the newsmen selected?

Mr. MARKS. We instructed our posts to pick newsmen, and in doing so, to use the broadest discretion. Now, we didn't ask them to invite everybody because you can't invite everybody; some newspapers are very small, they have a limited circulation within a party. In other words, they are party organs, they are not newspapers of general circulation. We didn't feel that those papers were the ones who should be asked to participate because they were not really general-circulation newspapers. So, we tried to confine it to the general-circulation newspapers. We tried to get those who wanted to see for themselves. Let me give you a few illustrations.

In one country, the North Vietnamese invited two reporters to come at their expense, to visit Hanoi in North Vietnam and report. They did. There was a series of articles on the North Vietnamese activities.

Some Western-oriented newsmen, some people who didn't like what these men had reported, came to us and said, "We'd like to report what is going on in South Vietnam. Can you assist us?" And, "We don't have the funds. We would like to be able to see for ourselves."

Now, we assisted those people by providing transportation.

Generally, sir, we chose papers who were representative of the community. We asked them to get men who were competent in their field. The discretion was left to each individual post, in other words, the public affairs officer of USIS would handle this.

The CHAIRMAN. It was really up to the discretion of your representatives in the field.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not pass upon them here?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to submit those names for the committee?

Mr. MARKS. I will be glad to get them together for you, sir; and let the committee decide what they wish to have.

LIST OF NEWSMEN SENT TO VIETNAM BY USIA

The CHAIRMAN. I was sent an article from the Vancouver Sun, dated the 13th of August, and the headline is "Newsmen Flown to Vietnam 'Not Influenced by United States.'" This prints the names of the people from Canada, so it is not any secret.

Mr. MARKS. No, of course not. And, by the way, on three separate occasions there have been stories about this; a story about an Indian journalist; there was a story by a Finnish journalist, so there has been no secrecy about this and we have not attempted to conceal it any way.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, do you have the names to submit?

Mr. MARKS. I do not. I shall try to get them for you and send it up to you for your information.

(The information referred to is classified and on file with the committee.)

The CHAIRMAN. I will insert in the record at this point, the article from the Vancouver Sun.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Vancouver Sun, Aug. 13, 1966]

"NEWSMEN FLOWN TO VIET NAM 'NOT INFLUENCED BY U.S.'"

WASHINGTON (CP).—The U.S. Information Agency said Friday the 27 foreign correspondents for whom it provided transportation to South Viet Nam in the last 10 months were on their own once they got there.

A spokesman said that once in Viet Nam and en route, the correspondents paid their own expenses and were completely free to carry out their reporting in any way they wished.

The Washington Post says the reason behind the USIA action was to focus attention on U.S. aid and economic efforts in Viet Nam.

Three Canadians were among the 27 reporters flown to Viet Nam under the program.

To use counterpart funds for the fares of Canadian newsmen, USIA routed them on airlines belonging to nations which have stocks of such funds.

In Vancouver, Erwin Swangard, Managing Editor of The Sun, identified W. T. Galt as one of the Canadians flown to Viet Nam under the program.

Galt, currently on holiday and unavailable for comment, is former Sun bureau chief in Ottawa and Washington and now is The Sun's assistant managing editor.

The U.S. only arranged for Galt's plane trip from Montreal to Saigon and return. All Galt's other expenses, exceeding \$2,000, were paid for by the The Sun, Swangard said.

NO INFLUENCE

Although Viet Nam is a country at war there is no censorship. And, Swangard added, at no time did the U.S. try to influence Galt in where he would go, what he would see, or what he would write.

"We were pleased to have a reporter of Galt's stature see for himself what is happening in Viet Nam and reports speak for themselves," Swangard said.

The other two Canadians who accepted the U.S. invitation were Larry Henderson of the CTV network and Lubor Zine of the Toronto Telegram.

NO PRESSURE

Henderson said:

"Never at any time was pressure put upon me by the United States government to say anything in their favor.

"I was delighted to accept an invitation to travel to Viet Nam to see the facts and report them . . ."

Zine made a similar statement.

DID UNITED STATES PAY TRAVEL EXPENSES ONLY OR PERSONAL AND REPORTING EXPENSES ALSO?

The CHAIRMAN. This article states that you paid only the travel expenses—the transportation expenses—not the personal expenses. Is that correct?

Mr. MARKS. That is my understanding. I believe the paper in that case spent about \$2,000 beyond travel for the reporter's coverage. This is frequently done. For example, when a television team goes over there the expenses of the filming and all the development, is borne by them.

In most cases, we limited ourselves to the travel, and the estimate I have is \$2,000 over and above the transportation.

"HOSTILE" COVERAGE OF WAR BY CANADIAN PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. There is another news item from the Montreal Star, Washington bureau, which says that "At least one Canadian newspaper—the Toronto Globe and Mail—is reported here to have turned down an offer from the USIA to sponsor a Vietnam trip for one of its editorial staff."

Is that true?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know, sir. I read that but I have not attempted to verify it.

The CHAIRMAN. It also said:

For some time now, USIA officials, here and Ottawa, have been concerned about what they consider to be "hostile" coverage of the Vietnam war in certain Canadian news media including the CBC, the Globe and Mail, and the Montreal Star (which was not invited to Vietnam by the Agency).

Do you know whether or not that is a true statement?

Mr. MARKS. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Who does know about this?

Mr. MARKS. The man in charge of our post in Canada. I will be glad to get a report, if you desire.

(The information referred to appears in a letter from Mr. Schmidt on p. 15 of the hearing.)

The CHAIRMAN. It says that, "It is understood that USIA officials have protested to Ottawa about the CBC's coverage"——

Mr. MARKS. It is quite possible that they have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know anything about that?

Mr. MARKS. It doesn't happen in Washington, it happens in Ottawa.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the CBC is a Government operation——

Mr. MARKS. Yes; it is.

The CHAIRMAN. It would seem to me if we are going to make a formal protest, we would hardly leave that to the discretion of the local man.

Mr. MARKS. Well, the Ambassador is there, and he is head of the country team and, I believe under his authority, he can do that, but I wouldn't pass on that.

DIFFERENCES IN REPORTING THE SAME STORY

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether in Canada the purpose was to give the friendly newsmen a chance to take advantage of our generosity. Is the same offer open to unfriendly newsmen?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, let me get some terms straight.

I have known newsmen all my life. I have the highest respect for their integrity. They attempt to report the facts. Now, no two people will necessarily see a story the same way. I was interested the other day in looking through the press where Ambassador Reischauer made a statement and the Washington Post headline, August 11, said, "Reischauer Backs United States Viet Policy."

The New York Times headline for the same day, "Reischauer Critical of Vietnam Policy."

Now, there you have two distinguished American newspapers; I am sure the reporters are able and have the highest integrity, but they see it differently.

The CHAIRMAN. I read both of those stories and they were not quite as different as the headlines would indicate.

Mr. MARKS. Well, I am just telling you what the leads in the headlines say.

The CHAIRMAN. The headlines indicated what you said. But very often the headlines in papers are in complete variance with the substance of the story. That happens all the time.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, it was my objective, our objective, to give a newsman a chance to see for himself what is happening. There is no substitute for going there, talking to the people, investigating the scene, determining what is going on. When you tell somebody about a Vietcong atrocity, when you show them a picture of men who have been decapitated, men who have been stabbed because they are schoolteachers or officials, it doesn't mean the same as going there.

Now, we put out a booklet which we cannot distribute in the United States, showing pictures of Vietcong atrocities.

Here is one, sir, of a Vietnamese with a spike about 9 inches long driven through the sole of his foot. It is a horrible picture, but when you see these victims you realize the horror and the intensity of the Vietcong atrocities.

These men wanted to see them. They wanted to take television films of it and show it to their people, as they said, through Latin-American eyes, through Asian eyes, European eyes. So, it isn't a

question of whether they are friendly or they are hostile, it is a question of exposing them to the facts, and if they report the facts as they see them, that is all we can ask for.

Senator GORE. May I interrupt?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

CORRESPONDENTS IN VIETNAM CITE DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING FACTS

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the exposure of facts or the privilege of reporting the facts, I recently read an article—by four or five very distinguished correspondents who have served—and some of whom are still serving as reporters or are working as reporters in Vietnam. In this article, the reporters complained rather bitterly about censorship, about the inability to obtain the facts, and the difficulty of reporting the facts.

I do not know to what extent there is censorship in Vietnam; to what extent these foreign reporters will be taken to see what the military wishes them to see; to what extent they will have the liberty of movement. I would like, if the chairman permits at this point, since Mr. Marks has referred several times to the value of seeing firsthand, and obtaining full information, to note to what extent there is censorship, to what extent difficulties are met by reporters, in obtaining and reporting facts.

Mr. MARKS. May I answer Senator Gore's questions, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I not only saw that article, I asked to get a script of the hour-long television program to see what the details were.

Now, I have no jurisdiction over U.S. correspondents. The article you referred to was based on a television program where there were four U.S. correspondents, so it is not my jurisdiction and I cannot comment on it, as to whether they are right or wrong.

Senator GORE. Well, that is what I asked you to comment on. Are you going to comment on the accuracy or inaccuracy of my statement?

Mr. MARKS. Well, I queried our posts just as a matter of interest, my interest, to get their response to it. Now, I am very concerned that at all times there will be free access to the news. My whole career has been based upon the fact that newsmen and news media should have the right to see for themselves and report the facts.

When I was appointed to this job one year ago, the very first action was to ask Frank Stanton, the chairman of the board of Columbia Broadcasting System, and who is chairman of USIA Advisory Commission, Palmer Hoyt, editor of the Denver Post, and Frank Starzel, who had recently retired as the head of the Associated Press. I asked those three distinguished newsmen to go to Vietnam to meet with correspondents, to investigate, to see whether USIA was meeting its responsibility and affording a free access to the facts for foreign correspondents, and to come back and make any suggestions on how we can improve our program.

I am proud to tell you, sir, that they found we were fulfilling our responsibilities. They made certain suggestions on how we could improve, how we could further assist foreign correspondents. Every one of their suggestions has been carried out.

One year has elapsed. Next month I shall ask three other newsmen of the same caliber, and perhaps Mr. Starzel will go back if he is able to, to make the same investigation, because I want, at all times, to have the complete assurance that we are doing the job of making the facts available to the world.

Now, on top of that, I have tried, whenever a congressional committee visited Vietnam, to get a report from a member of that committee on USIA functions, and I am pleased again to tell you that they invariably have come back with no major criticism of what I regard as the fundamental policy of exposing the facts to the journalists.

We do not carry on military briefings. That is something you will have to talk to the Department of Defense about. My job is to make available information other than military information.

EXTENT OF CENSORSHIP

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, we are not talking about this. I asked a question in line with the comment Mr. Marks made about the value of transporting, subsidizing the visits of foreign correspondents to Vietnam in order that they might have full and firsthand information. I asked to what extent they would have availability of this information, and what the censorship rules there were. I asked Mr. Marks to comment upon the accuracy or inaccuracy of the statement or the article jointly prepared, as I understand it, by four distinguished U.S. reporters who have been working in Vietnam. None of his response related to my questions.

Mr. MARKS. Well, on the censorship question, Senator, there is no formal censorship by USIA. There is no informal censorship by USIA.

Military matters are subject to military briefings, over which we have no jurisdiction. We make available anything within the purview of our responsibility, which is nonmilitary.

Have I answered your question?

Senator GORE. No.

Mr. MARKS. What else?

Senator GORE. I started out by asking you about the accuracy or inaccuracy of the article prepared by the four reporters who had been working in Vietnam.

Mr. MARKS. And I told you that I queried the posts for my personal information to find out whether their criticisms were justified, and I have not yet received their reply.

Senator GORE. You do not know whether they are accurate or not?

Mr. MARKS. I do not.

Senator GORE. Therefore, you don't know whether foreign correspondents will have a similar reaction?

Mr. MARKS. Well, I don't know about unnamed, unidentified foreign correspondents, but I do know about correspondents—

Senator GORE. I am not talking about unnamed and unidentified reporters. I am talking about the ones you have sent there. Do you know whether they will receive the same treatment and whether their reactions will be the same as, or different from, the ones reached by the four reporters which I have just described?

Mr. MARKS. Well, I can tell you, Senator, that the post reports that I have received from the ones we have sent have indicated that

the men who were there had a chance to see everything that they wanted to see within our jurisdiction.

Senator GORE. Within USIA jurisdiction?

Mr. MARKS. That is right; I can't speak for anybody else.

Senator GORE. What is the USIA jurisdiction?

Mr. MARKS. Nonmilitary activities in Vietnam related to foreign journalists.

ESTIMATE OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Senator GORE. I heard a gentleman on a television program this morning, a reporter just back from Vietnam. He referred to an estimate, whether his or someone else's, that 5,000 civilians in South Vietnam are being killed or wounded, I believe he said, per month.

Do you know, or do you have an opinion on that estimate?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; I have no information on that, and I wouldn't be the source for that.

Senator GORE. I do not imply by that question that the U.S. operations are killing that many. I should be more accurate in my questioning, but I didn't take down his statements. As I recall the meaning of his report, it was that in consequence of the dramatic incident of which we heard a few days ago—the one of fire being called in upon a village from which Vietcong were firing, and, incidentally, when I was there a few years ago this was not an unusual occurrence—the civilian casualties of the fighting—were an estimated 5,000 a month.

Mr. MARKS. I do not know, sir, and it is not my department.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marks, you mentioned a moment ago that you didn't know about any protests from your Canadian office to the Canadian CBC.

Can you find out for us and inform the committee about that?

Mr. MARKS. I certainly can, sir.

DOES USIA PROTEST REPORTING ON VIETNAM OF FOREIGN NEWSMEN?

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me if the USIA in Washington has ever protested to a Canadian newspaper the reporting of its chief of bureau in Washington?

Mr. MARKS. I would think something like that should come to my attention, and I have no knowledge of that, so I would very much doubt it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, could you check and see whether or not a reporter named Mr. Bruce Phillips was recalled from his position here representing the Canadian newspaper? I have been told that this happened because you had protested his coverage of the Vietnamese war.

Mr. MARKS. I can tell you right now—

The CHAIRMAN. When I say "you," I mean the Washington USIA.

Mr. MARKS. I have no knowledge of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have done it, if you didn't?

Mr. MARKS. The Department of State might have had some relationship with Mr. Phillips, or other correspondents, but I have never heard of this incident so I am not prepared to tell you whether the facts are right or wrong. I will attempt to find out.

(The information referred to earlier and at this point follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, August 30, 1965.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Director of USIA, Mr. Leonard H. Marks, was asked during his appearance before your Committee on August 17, 1966 whether or not the *Toronto Globe and Mail* had turned down an offer of USIA to sponsor a Viet-Nam trip by a member of its editorial staff. We have contacted our office in Ottawa and are informed that no request for participation by the *Toronto Globe and Mail* was ever made by USIA.

We were further asked whether or not USIA had ever protested coverage of the Vietnamese war by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

We were advised by our post in Ottawa, "USIS has made no formal protest CBC treatment".

Mr. Marks was also asked whether or not a reporter named Mr. Bruce Phillips was recalled from his post in Washington representing a Canadian newspaper because USIA had protested his coverage of the Vietnamese war.

USIA, as stated at the time of the hearing by Mr. Marks, did not make any protest relative to Mr. Bruce Phillips. We attach hereto for your consideration a clipping from the *Ottawa Citizen* dated August 18, 1966 under the byline of George Brimmel of Southam News Services quoting Mr. Charles Lynch of said news services, stating "the transfer of correspondent Bruce Phillips from Washington to Ottawa was in line with the policy of rotating assignments within the news service". Further, the story states "he said he had received no protests regarding Phillips' coverage and would have rejected them if they had been made."

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, JR.,
General Counsel.

[From the *Ottawa Citizen*, Aug. 18, 1966]

CANADIANS BENEFITED FROM FREE WAR TRIPS

(By George Brimmell, Southam News Services)

WASHINGTON.—The head of the United States Information Agency faced a Senate committee yesterday and vigorously defended the agency's program of free trips to Viet Nam for foreign newsmen.

Leonard H. Marks, director of the USIA, was called before the Senate foreign relations committee after its chairman, Sen. J. William Fulbright, read stories about the government-paid flights in the press last week.

Three Canadian journalists were named in the account in the *Washington Post*—the only newsmen singled out by name of the 30 to 35 who have been flown to Viet Nam at the expense of Uncle Sam.

Sen. Fulbright suggested the practice of free trips "may place the agency in a somewhat awkward position, since there will be concern among our citizens about whether this is a legitimate function of the USIA."

Mr. Marks said the program of sending foreign reporters to Viet Nam at U.S. expense was started last fall and "it is an excellent program."

He said the USIA had determined that Viet Nam reporting in some foreign countries "has been based on lack of information or misinformation. The best way to correct this situation is to enable reporters to go to the scene of the story, ask questions and see for themselves what is happening."

Asked if the reports of the foreign newsmen benefiting from the free flights were subjected to any censorship, Mr. Marks insisted they were not.

Chairman Fulbright read into the record an account of the free flights for Larry Henderson, commentator with the commercial private Canadian television network CTV—William Galt, assistant managing editor of The Vancouver Sun—and Lubor Zink, Ottawa columnist for the *Toronto Telegram*. He noted that two other Toronto papers, The Star and The Globe and Mail, had both turned down offers of free flights to Viet Nam from the USIA.

He asked Mr. Marks also about a report that the USIA's representative in Ottawa had complained to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation last week about its coverage of the free flights story. Mr. Marks said he would look into this.

The chairman also asked whether correspondent Bruce Phillips "of Southam News Services" was recalled from here "because you (the USIA) had protested his coverage of the Viet Nam war?"

Marks said he personally had "never heard of this incident. I'll attempt to find out," he said. He suggested, however, that such protests might have emanated with the state department.

(In Ottawa, Charles Lynch, chief of Southam News Services, said the transfer of correspondent Bruce Phillips from Washington to Ottawa was in line with the policy of rotating assignments within the news services. Lynch paid tribute to Phillips' work during his three years in Washington.

(He said he had received no protests from the USIA about Phillips' coverage and would have rejected them had they been made. Lynch said he did not know whether or not USIA officials had made representations to any of the individual Southam newspapers, but that nothing of this nature had any bearing on the transfer of Phillips and the decision to place two men—this reporter and Donald McGillivray—in Washington.)

Members of the foreign relations committee appeared to be divided on the value of the free flights program.

Sen. Karl Mundt (R.-S.D.) said he thought the scheme should be expanded and foreign journalists should be sent to other parts of the world to report on U.S. assistance programs.

But Mundt said he was opposed to revealing the names of journalists taking advantage of the free transportation, as chairman Fulbright indicated he was planning to do.

Mr. Marks revealed that the total costs of flying the foreign newsmen to Viet Nam had come to less than \$50,000 in counterpart funds—foreign currencies owned by the United States which are not convertible into dollars.

THE CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you more generally, have you ever protested to a foreign newspaper the reporting by its reporters of the Vietnamese war?

MR. MARKS. I have never protested to any foreign newspaper about its reporter, or its reporting of the Vietnamese war, or any other incident.

THE CHAIRMAN. That is very clear.

HAVE VIETNAM NEWS REPORTS BEEN SATISFACTORY?

You stated a moment ago that you had seen some of the reports and articles written by the people you had sent to Vietnam, didn't you?

MR. MARKS. Yes, I have.

THE CHAIRMAN. Were they generally satisfactory?

MR. MARKS. Now, let's define the word "satisfactory."

If a reporter reports the events that he saw, then I am satisfied. He may take a different slant on it than I would take, but if he reports what we are doing in rebuilding the villages of Vietnam, building of schools, hospitals, and attempting to pacify the areas which have been taken over; if he reports that the Vietnamese are trying to establish their own government again, that there is an election, then he has reported the facts. How he sees them is up to him, just like the New York Times and the Washington Post may disagree on the same story, and it is not a question of whether it is satisfactory. You can't pass on whether a reporter is right or wrong; it is as he sees it. It is surely subjective, sir. There is no yardstick for saying the reporter did the right thing or the wrong thing; if he is reporting an impression, it is his impression.

THE CHAIRMAN. I was asking for your impression. You are the one who instigated and defended the program. Have these reports been satisfactory to you? I didn't mean if they were satisfactory to me. Do you feel that you got your money's worth?

Mr. MARKS. I certainly do.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is all.

Mr. MARKS. The reporters in some cases were critical and in some cases, they found that the effort was far beyond what they had ever dreamed, and they reported the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. On balance, though, you think it was a good investment?

Mr. MARKS. It certainly was.

The CHAIRMAN. I must not take any more time, but something impels me to raise this point which came up first in connection with the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Some of us thought that it was a rather questionable practice for a foreign agent to pay the way of an American newspaper reporter to go abroad and to come back and write articles which usually were favorable to the client's state. We have made a point of this about two years ago. Maybe this situation is different.

Mr. MARKS. It is, Senator, and I want to put on record that I have the highest respect for the integrity of the newsmen. I know a lot of them in this country and elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. I know they all appreciate that. They are all behind you, and they like to hear a word of praise occasionally.

Mr. MARKS. I don't believe that any newsmen worthy of his name would slant a story because he was given a free airplane ride to the scene of an event.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure that they wouldn't. They will never do that.

Mr. MARKS. I want my testimony to reflect that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF THE AID AGENCY

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Marks, to what extent does AID, as distinct from USIA, pay the expenses of American or foreign newsmen to go to South Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. I don't believe AID is participating in this at all.

Senator AIKEN. You don't believe they are participating in this at all?

Mr. MARKS. I would be rather surprised if they were.

Senator AIKEN. Does AID consult with you about USIA's programs?

Mr. MARKS. We provide information to foreign journalists on AID programs. In other words, if AID is helping to build a project, we provide the information for the foreign journalists or for the foreign press.

Senator AIKEN. Do you provide information to and from AID?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. If AID did pay expenses of newsmen going to the same area, that would either be a conflicting interest or a parallel endeavor.

NEWSMEN TO HANOI

How many newsmen have you sent into Hanoi?

Mr. MARKS. None.

Senator AIKEN. Would that not be a good idea?

Mr. MARKS. It would be an excellent idea and I wish Hanoi would open its borders and let these people come and see for themselves and report the facts.

Senator AIKEN. I realize you couldn't send American newspapermen there, but a good many other countries have connections with Hanoi and it seems to me that it would be quite helpful if they went there.

Mr. MARKS. I agree, Senator.

EDITING OF USIA MATERIALS AND MANAGEMENT OF NEWS

Senator AIKEN. You furnish photographs and newsreels and so forth to a good many foreign countries, I believe.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Do you have any control over the editing of this material to make sure it is not turned against the United States? Are you sure that these other countries will produce it as being the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. MARKS. Generally, Senator, when we make a film available or a radio tape, or material of that sort, the stations do carry it intact. Where they tell us they wish to edit it, we may decline to make it available because it can distort and misrepresent.

Senator AIKEN. If you find that they are editing it to our disadvantage, would you simply decline to furnish them any more material?

Mr. MARKS. I have on occasion refused to make our films available where countries wished to delete certain scenes.

Senator AIKEN. I think that is all I have.

We have occasionally heard references to news management in connection with reporting in Vietnam. Would you say that our national interests require any management at all of the news in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir. We do not require management of the news at all. I think we can stand on the facts as they exist and as the reporters have a chance to see them.

REPORTING OF CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. I don't know how long it has been going on, but in the reports of casualties in Vietnam, the combat casualties only are given—that is, they report only the cases of boys who have actually been injured in combat. As I recall, in one hospital in Vietnam which I visited last fall, about 25 percent of the patients in the hospital were combat casualties. Has there been any change in the method of reporting casualties? If there has been no change, you would have to multiply the number of casualties reported each week probably by four, in order to get the true number of casualties which would include, accidents, hepatitis, malaria, and every other thing that could happen.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I regret I don't have information on that. That does not come within our purview.

Senator AIKEN. You don't report on that?

Mr. MARKS. We don't report casualties and military actions.

Senator AIKEN. The Defense Department controls those reports?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Of course, the Defense Department would never undertake to mislead anyone. I am sure of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no.

Senator AIKEN. I have no more questions, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

SELLING THE WAR TO THE PUBLIC

Senator GORE. I have asked for a transcript of the broadcast to which I intermittently listened in part, and have not yet located the particular colloquy to which I referred. But I find another here that I would like to read. I believe Mr. Paul Niven was the moderator of the NET program. He makes this comment:

Getting back to this question of civil war. The President might well take the position that it's his job to sell this war to the Congress and the public. Therefore, he has to paint everything in black-and-white terms. It's your job, presumably, when you feel that things are in terms of various shades of gray to say so. Is it the answer to the eternal conflict between the press and Government?

Mr. BRELIS. Paint them in black and white terms, to be sure, but make them accurate ones. Basically, the reason for this war here is the clash between the Chinese and American spheres of influence in the Western Pacific. And they have met here in Vietnam and that's what's going on. We are not here to defend Vietnamese sovereignty or independence or freedom or any of these other things.

Would you agree with the accuracy of that statement?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, that is such a complicated subject. I don't think I am qualified at this point to go into a discussion of the basic foreign policy. I don't make foreign policy, sir; and my job is to run an information program and, therefore, I don't think I am your spokesman on that question.

Senator GORE. Then I certainly will not ask you questions along these lines further; perhaps it was an inadvertent question.

REPORTING OF PACIFICATION AND STRATEGIC VILLAGE PROGRAMS

But, to come back to this question of censorship of these reporters who are on the scene there, I would like to read you another exchange. This is another statement by Mr. Brelis. Let me read all of it here:

Or to give one side, to give a definite one side, I mean pacification, for example, if you were to believe the canned information on pacification, pacification is one of the greatest successes—

Question. Well, I think any one of us can say, who have been out here and seen pacification at work, that it hasn't made the enormous progress that the information people would like you to believe.

Now, are your men the information people to whom he refers here?

Mr. MARKS. There are a lot of information people. There are military, there are others. I don't think that he is referring to us. He is an American correspondent, but I will tell you, sir, that the pacification program, as a matter of fact, and the reporter's opinion is a matter of opinion, whether it is good or bad; whether it is successful or a failure, is his opinion.

The facts are that we are doing certain things with school and hospitals and civilian government.

Senator GORE. In my visit there I was taken to see these strategic villages. The information people there were ready with wonderful treatises already written and mimeographed, and briefings about what

a wonderful success the strategic village program was, and what a great thing it would be. I came to different conclusions, both as to its present and future value. I believe that program has been completely abandoned long since, has it not?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know the program you are talking about.

Senator GORE. You never heard of the strategic village?

Mr. MARKS. I have heard it under various names, but I don't know when you were there or which program; but there are many, probably, that would disagree with you, and some that would agree with you. Every man is entitled to his opinion.

Senator GORE. Thank you. That was but an incident, but it happened that the opinion of one eyewitness observer, to wit, myself, came to a different conclusion from the information people at that time; and subsequent events have verified the accuracy of my view.

It may be that other observers will have some similar experiences. It may be, of course, that some of our programs are enormous successes. I hope they are.

DOES USIA REPORT COMPLAINTS ABOUT CENSORSHIP AND NEWS
MANAGEMENT?

To go on to this point—this is Mr. Brown, another reporter on the scene:

Yes, I think, returning to Jack's point on censorship, there are different kinds of censorship. There is formal censorship that involves actually cutting pieces or words out of the copy. And there is the kind of censorship that has been described in recent years as news management.

And then he goes on and refers to Mr. Sylvester's eminent qualifications and success in this regard.

What degree of news management is there in Vietnam by the military?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, you will have to ask the military that.

Senator GORE. You don't report on that?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator GORE. Do you think that is legitimate news?

Mr. MARKS. What?

Senator GORE. The extent of news management and censorship.

Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, sir. I am not going to comment on what the Department of Defense does because I don't know the facts. My opinion wouldn't mean anything since I don't know the facts.

Senator GORE. Since you are a reporting service, do you think those facts would be news?

Mr. MARKS. I think that the opinion of reporters is always news, because they write the stories and it is legitimate for them to criticize if they disagree. I am in favor of any criticism, good, bad, or indifferent, because that is the way a free press should operate.

Senator GORE. Do you not know of reporters, employees of your own agency, who gather news and report it widely?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, we do.

Senator GORE. Do they gather information on these facts?

Mr. MARKS. If you are asking whether we report the criticism of those foreign news correspondents over a local radio station, I doubt very much if that is the kind of news that would be of international interest.

Senator GORE. I am referring to the information gathering and information reporting activities of the USIA.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Is that one of your functions?

Mr. MARKS. It certainly is.

Senator GORE. Is that not your principal function?

Mr. MARKS. It is one of them.

Senator GORE. Do you gather information with respect to the facts of news management and censorship in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. To the extent that there are stories in the press which are of international interest, we report it and we report it fully.

IS NEWS MANAGEMENT AND CENSORSHIP IN VIETNAM REPORTED?

Senator GORE. I wasn't asking you if you reported second-hand opinions, I was asking if, in the pursuance of your prime function of gathering and reporting information, you gathered and reported information with respect to the news management and the censorship being practiced in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. Well, sir, your question is based upon a premise that there is censorship.

Senator GORE. Was my question precise?

Mr. MARKS. I will have to check it. I know of no——

Senator GORE. I am asking you if I have submitted a precise question.

Mr. MARKS. You have, but it is based upon a premise of which I have no knowledge, which I didn't agree with without finding out the facts. I have told you I have no basis for an opinion. I will be glad to find out what the facts are and I will report it to you, sir, but right now I don't know.

Senator GORE. I am asking you, since this is a prime function of your agency, if you have gathered these facts and reported upon them; and if you have not, why have you not?

Mr. MARKS. Well, Senator, we reported on the complaints in the past about news management. We have given that full treatment. Now, whether you are talking about this specific story, I can't answer that; I told you I don't know. Whatever the script contains. We have a tremendous output and you wouldn't ask the publisher of the New York Times about every story that appears in his paper. I will have to investigate it for you.

Senator GORE. I am not asking that——

Mr. MARKS. Then I misunderstood. I thought you were asking about this story.

Senator GORE. I had advanced from reference to that, and was asking you generally about the function of your own Agency in gathering facts and reporting them.

Mr. MARKS. Generally, we do report these facts; yes.

Senator GORE. What facts have you gathered and reported upon with respect to news management and censorship?

Mr. MARKS. I will have to get you specific facts, and times, and places where it was published. But I do know we have reported it.

Senator GORE. That is interesting, and I would appreciate it if I may have that story.

(The information referred to appears on p. 118 in the appendix.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator GORE. Yes.

VOICE OF AMERICA COVERS COMMITTEE HEARING

The CHAIRMAN. Do you report on a meeting such as this? Is USIA covering this meeting?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know; I hope they are because the views of this committee are vital in a free society.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wondered as a matter of practice. I thought you might know whether they are doing it here.

Mr. MARKS. I hope we are.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything more?

Senator GORE. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. Let me find out. Is there anybody here from "Voice of America"?

Yes; we are covering it.

OPINION SURVEYS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator GORE. Has the USIA conducted any opinion surveys in southeast Asia?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; not since I became Director.

Senator GORE. Do you know—does the USIA know—if any other agency of Government, per se, or by contract, has done so?

Mr. MARKS. I know of none personally.

Senator GORE. Do you know if your reporters have reported upon such facts?

Mr. MARKS. I have no knowledge of that, sir. I don't know what you are driving at.

Senator GORE. Do you know whether or not the Rand Corporation has conducted opinion surveys under contract with the Defense Department?

Mr. MARKS. I have no knowledge of the details of any of that.

Senator GORE. If your reporters learned about this survey, is it the kind of thing they would gather facts about and report on in the reports which your Agency would disseminate?

Mr. MARKS. It depends upon what is in the report.

Senator GORE. The fact that the Defense Department was conducting an opinion survey in southeast Asia and Vietnam would be a matter of value, would it not?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, I would have to know what was in that report. I can't give you a general answer. These are specific problems.

Senator GORE. As one nonreporter to another, do you think that would be of some news value?

Mr. MARKS. It could be. It could not be. It depends upon what is in it.

Senator GORE. If you do not know if opinion surveys have been conducted, you, of course, would not know the contents of them?

Mr. MARKS. That is right, sir.

Senator GORE. Do you know if your Agency or the military have at any time suggested to foreign publishers or foreign news services, the removal from an area of reporters?

Mr. MARKS. I never have. And, to my knowledge, during the time I have been in the Agency, it has never engaged in that practice, and I know of none prior to that time.

EVALUATION OF OUR PROPAGANDA EFFORT WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM

Senator GORE. Let's come to one of the central concerns of today. In your opinion, why is it that the U.S. position and program and policy in Vietnam are subject to such worldwide questioning and doubt? I am really asking you to evaluate the effectiveness of your Agency in penetrating world public opinions.

Please understand, I don't assess you with any blame or lack thereof, because I know there are competing news sources in many other governments. There are propaganda agencies which have been working assiduously. I only ask you to comment upon the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of our own propaganda program with respect to the Vietnam war.

Mr. MARKS. Sir, I am satisfied that our effort has been effective. I am satisfied that our people are doing a fine and creditable job. I am satisfied that there are major areas of misunderstanding which we must continue to work to correct. I am satisfied that there are some newspapers, there are some governments who are unalterably opposed to our policy and do not wish to have the facts.

Senator GORE. Then why would you say that not only the North Vietnamese, but apparently the Red Chinese as well, and—according to reports—also high Soviet officials, labor under the misapprehension, I think, that public opinion in the United States will force President Johnson to decide to withdraw from Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, you will have to talk to somebody else about U.S. public opinion. You will have to talk to the Soviets about what their assessment of U.S. public opinion is. I am not qualified to do that.

Senator GORE. I understand the primary function of your Agency is to disseminate information, to affect as much as possible public opinion—informed public opinion—both in the United States and around the world.

Mr. MARKS. I must disagree; for by law we have nothing to do with forming public opinion in the United States.

Senator GORE. I stand corrected.

Mr. MARKS. It is a popular misconception; you are not alone.

Senator GORE. I must say I knew that. You are an international agency.

Mr. MARKS. That is right. Our jurisdiction begins at the water's edge.

Senator GORE. I wouldn't call you a foreign agency—

Mr. MARKS. No.

Senator GORE. Your function is outside of the United States.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McGEE. Will the Senator yield on that one for just a minute?

Senator GORE. Yes.

IMPRESSION OVERSEAS OF U.S. PUBLIC OPINION

Senator McGEE. I think it might be to the point to indicate that in this morning's press—in somebody's column, I can't remember

whose it was—a thesis was suggested on the reason for the dissemination of this impression of the role of American public opinion reversing our policy in Vietnam. The reason given was that too many individuals, without being named, were circulating this impression by word of mouth through the cocktail circuit to the Soviet Ambassador and some others of that type, and thus leading them to the wrong conclusion.

I don't know whether this reporter is correct, but I supply it because it seems appropriate here to the Senator's question.

Senator GORE. I think it is certainly an interesting observation. I am not sure of the appropriateness, but it is certainly an interesting footnote.

I will read from a paragraph from an article in the current Newsweek magazine:

But it is unlikely that even a Fulbright intercession could convince the Russians.

The only intercession I know that Senator Fulbright has made is a public statement. What I am really trying to get at, perhaps in an awkward way, Mr. Marks, is your assessment of the success or failure of the USIA in portraying accurately the governmental structure, sites of power and intention of the Government of the United States. Why would there be so much doubt about the program and policy of the U.S. Government?

Mr. MARKS. I thought I answered that, sir.

Senator GORE. I am trying to obtain from you an assessment of whether or not you think your Agency has been successful or unsuccessful.

Mr. MARKS. I think we have been successful. I explained the problems that exist. I explained the unalterable opposition that exists. I can't read the Soviet mind and I am not in a position to interpret why they feel certain things are so.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

Senator MUNDT. Thank you.

USIA'S SIZE AND FUNCTION IN VIETNAM

I am a little bit at a loss after reading the last two sentences of your prepared statement, Mr. Marks, as to just what the function of USIA is in Vietnam.

You say:

In your letter, Mr. Chairman, you indicated an interest in discussing our Government's news policies in Vietnam. In this regard, I should point out to you that the United States Information Agency is restricted to non-U.S. correspondents and to the Vietnamese news media.

That sounds as though we didn't have any USIA newsmen at all in Vietnam. I am sure that is not correct. I just can't understand what you mean to imply.

Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, sir, for that impression. What I was trying to say was that we do not have any jurisdiction in the United States, that our jurisdiction is limited to foreign correspondents, foreign newspapers, and that we do inform the Vietnamese news media; for example, presidential statements, reports about activities on Congress and others go into the Vietnamese news press just as we provide them to the press of the world.

Senator MUNDT. How many USIA employees do you have in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. In the entire service?

Senator MUNDT. In Vietnam.

Mr. MARKS. In Vietnam, we have 113 Americans, 351 Vietnamese employees. Don't hold me to that figure, but it is approximately correct.

Senator MUNDT. A sizable mission.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, it is. It is our largest mission.

Senator MUNDT. Right. And what do you conceive to be the main function of that mission?

Mr. MARKS. One of our main functions is to supply information to the world press about activities in Vietnam.

Let me give an illustration. Let's suppose that the Iranians send a medical team. When that medical team gets there, reports are made as to its activities that go back to Teheran. Let's suppose that the Koreans have supplied certain armed forces and certain assistance.

Senator MUNDT. Which they have.

Mr. MARKS. Which they have. Or the Philippines, or the New Zealanders, or the Australians. We report to those countries about the activities. In addition, we assist the Vietnamese Information Service on their radio programs, on their news coverage. They do not have adequate facilities to handle them themselves. We provide assistance to them in preparing news programs, news releases, booklets, and pamphlets.

Senator MUNDT. In a situation such as we have there, somebody is representing the United States and must have the mission of trying to get across to as many Vietnamese as possible the purpose of our presence and the purpose of the war. Is that the job of the USIA or does someone else have that?

Mr. MARKS. No. It is our job with the Vietnamese Information Service, sir, and we do conduct that. That is why I made reference to the Vietnamese news media. We try to get across to the people of Vietnam through their media what we are there for, what we are trying to do, and what the problems are.

Senator MUNDT. Where is our second largest mission?

Mr. MARKS. Our second largest mission is in India.

PURPOSE OF ORIGINAL LEGISLATION CONSISTENT WITH USIA ACTIVITIES

Senator MUNDT. Back to the original purpose of the hearing—to inquire about whether or not USIA is helping foreign newsmen get to Vietnam and make their reports—may I say, as a member of this committee, I hope you are doing this and I hope you expand the program. That was one of the functions that USIA was established to perform from the outset. The original legislation—Public Law 402, 80th Congress—is referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act. That was precisely one of the jobs set out for, just as we help students in foreign countries go to the American University in Beirut.

It was not intended as just a bilateral exchange between our country and a foreign country, but it was to put the best image of the United States before the world by all legitimate techniques which are available.

My quarrel would be, if any, with the USIA, that we have not done enough of that, rather than the fact that we have done too much. It

is a legitimate device; it is an effective device. You will always find some people who are going to take the trip and thumb their nose at us and write false things about us. That is human nature. But in the main, on balance, I believe this is a very productive way of helping to try to bring about as much public support as is possible in other countries for our war efforts and for public understanding.

This was done even before we had a USIA. I think you were in error when you say we didn't have a USIA. I believe we have had one since 1949. These programs were started then, and the predecessor organization, the OWI, did them during the war. So, this is a desirable function. It seems to me that the question that should be before us is whether or not this function should be expanded, if it can be done with surplus, excess funds which can't be used in any other way in other countries. It is almost for nothing because we have piled up a lot of excess currencies in some countries like India where we can't imagine ways in which we can utilize it.

U.S. LEADERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES

I would like to expand it to take foreign correspondents to the Philippines so that they could find out just what happened to identify the United States as the most successful power in history for decolonizing a backward nation. No other country—no other nation in history—has done as much to help underdeveloped countries evolve into a self-governing, democratic power as we did in the Philippines. I think the world should know that story. It doesn't know it. Many Americans don't know it. Many Europeans don't know it. It is a story which could be told by any legitimate newsman who goes to the Philippines and studies just exactly what is happening in that area.

NAMES OF NEWSMEN SENT TO VIETNAM SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC THROUGH COMMITTEE

Speaking as one member of the committee, I don't think that we should be given the names for public purposes of the people sent to Vietnam, because it seems to me that it would be tremendously embarrassing for the people who have to work under some of the conditions there—

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They have been published, the ones I have—

Senator MUNDT. The ones you mentioned?

The CHAIRMAN. I understood the others had been.

Mr. MARKS. The Indian and the Finnish, just the three.

Senator MUNDT. Have they all been published?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. I would hate to see this committee become the vehicle for publishing the names. In most countries, I imagine that a man from a prominent newspaper can't just disappear for three weeks or a month without having his absence known and, perhaps, having to say openly where he is going. I don't think this committee should become the vehicle for publishing the names. It would be too much like stripping the camouflage off of a sniper. We are in a war and we have to adjust ourselves to this war kind of situation.

USIA REPORTING OF DOMESTIC NEWS

Let me ask you a more general question, just as a matter of interest. How do USIA press and radio services treat such items in your news overseas as these unfortunate riots which are occurring, say, in Chicago? I am talking about, not only about race riots, but riots like we had in the House of Representatives yesterday.

Mr. MARKS. We report that fully, Senator, and I will tell you the rationale behind it.

If you will recall when I was examined by this committee before my appointment was confirmed, I was asked this question, and I stated that I felt that a news medium had to tell the truth. In order to maintain credibility, you had to tell the good and the bad alike, and unless you tell the bad as well as the good you lose credibility.

Now it may be harmful to tell a story about riots and some of the activities that take place, protesting official policy and decrying American statements, but at the same time this is a democracy. We operate in a free and open manner and we must always do that. On balance we also report about the progress of a democracy, how we function, how we determine our policy by the people's mandate. That is part of our story. Although it may seem difficult to tell some of these stories, we insist upon it and we do it, but we don't do it out of perspective.

We can talk about riots, let's say race riots. We report that. We also talk about the progress Negroes have made, the fact that there has been civil rights legislation and that it has received the substantial support of Congress, that there are efforts for fair employment practices and progress in housing. And we are making gains, so we try to put the whole picture in perspective, but I want to assure you that we report the event.

Senator MUNDT. Since everybody doesn't see everything that occurs, I think that it is important that both sides should be reported fully—good and bad—in a truthful way.

Mr. MARKS. We try.

Senator MUNDT. Otherwise, somebody might be curious about the situation that happened in the House of Representatives yesterday. It might sound like an insurrection to a foreigner. I think that it is tremendously important that in the same program there be a conscious effort to keep present a balance of the situation.

Mr. MARKS. We endeavor to put a proper perspective on the news event.

SYMPATHY FOR U.S. ROLE IN VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. Looking back over the last year—during the period that you have been in charge of USIA—would you say that the information media abroad are becoming more or less sympathetic and understanding with regard to the U.S. role in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I would like to claim some credit for the work our people do. I do not want to sound dramatic about it, but they work in many cases under very adverse circumstances. They work in an atmosphere of hostility where the official government policy is violently opposed to our own. They continue to try. They continue to try to get the facts to the editors of the government-controlled papers or the free papers, to the government-controlled radio and

television operation. They try to schedule meetings where American foreign policy can be discussed. They try to distribute pamphlets and books. They have seminars in our libraries and cultural centers and if you could read some of the reports I get every day, you would realize that these men are unsung heroes and they are making progress.

But, I am not here to tell you that all through the world everybody understands us; they don't. As Senator Gore pointed out, there is an opposing force. There are countries at work which disagree with us and have large propaganda machinery and they have indigenous organizations that are working full time. It is a difficult problem but I am satisfied that the year I have spent in this job has been a fruitful one and the U.S. Government has benefited. That is my opinion.

IS THERE A DEVICE FOR MEASURING EXTENT OF SYMPATHY OVERSEAS?

Senator MUNDT. Have you any measurement device which we could use to determine whether or not the information media overseas are more or less sympathetic on any given point in issue in which we may be involved? There must be some way—through clippings, or monitoring, or through reports which you get from your public relations offices overseas—to give you some kind of objective breakdown as to the trend of foreign opinion as manifested by news media concerning the American position in Vietnam.

I am trying to find out from you whether we are gaining or losing in trying to have our position in Vietnam understood by foreign countries generally; excepting, of course, the Communist press which is understandable because it is being supported, of course, by the Communist troops.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, that question isn't susceptible to a yes or no answer and I shall try to answer it to the best of my ability. It has been a subject which plagues me all the time and everybody wants to know the answer in a simple form.

It is not possible to give you a simple answer. Here is my assessment.

If the newspapers and the radio and television outlets of the world would just give the people the facts and give them a chance to make up their own minds, then we have made an improvement. If they will tell about the valiant defense that is being made by the Asian countries who have sent troops there, and why they are fighting, as expressed by their statesmen, if they will talk about the civilian efforts to rebuild that country, if they will talk about the stories of heroism, if they will talk about the statesmen's comments around the world, good or bad, then I am satisfied.

Whether their opinion of us approves or disapproves is a matter of individual temperament. All I am trying to do is to get the facts. Now to answer your question, we have no yardstick. There is no way of putting it, say, putting a piece of paper on a table and saying, we have moved this far. There is no measuring rod, but we can judge from the reports we get today, day in and day out, that we are making some progress, that there are media which are beginning to report more of the facts, and that is a hopeful sign. It is happening now. I have noticed the trend in the past few months.

Now, beyond that, I would have to go to specifics, taking specific countries and specific papers.

USIA MISSION IN INDIA AND INDIAN NEWS MEDIA

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you a specific question. Your second largest mission is in India, you say?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. India is one of the great, powerful, and developing countries of the world. It has been one of the greatest recipients of American aid. We haven't had much success with India in reciprocity, from the standpoint of votes in the United Nations, or from a general standpoint.

What kind of information does the average person living in Calcutta get through the Indian news media concerning what we are doing in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. I will give you a specific answer to that because I happen to have read a report quite recently of a newspaperman, quite well known in Calcutta, who was an outright skeptic and in his editorial comments showed his views without any question. He went to Vietnam and reported on some of the programs which I have described to you. He openly stated that, because he had had a chance to see the facts, see what was going on, talk to the people, he had come around and changed his views. He was not completely in support of everything that was happening but he had altered his views and his reports from Vietnam reflected an on-the-scene report. Now, that is the kind of reaction I think we are getting in India.

There were no Vietnam correspondents of Indian newspapers so the few who have gone from India had for the first time an opportunity to give the people a report as seen by Indian eyes. That is the important thing—as seen by Indian eyes.

OPERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO INDUSTRIES IN INDIA

Senator MUNDT. One other question. How are the TV and radio industries operated there, privately or by the Government?

Mr. MARKS. It is an infant industry run by the Government and there is only one transmitter at the present time, I believe, which has very limited coverage.

Senator MUNDT. Radio?

Mr. MARKS. Television.

In radio, it is all government-owned; government-owned radio.

INDIAN RADIO REPORTS ABOUT U.S. PRESENCE IN VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. Does your monitoring of Indian radio reports indicate what kind of information the listeners generally are getting about our presence in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, I would want to check that more specifically, but Vietnam is not the most important issue in India. They are more concerned about their relationship with Pakistan; they are more concerned about the wheat and famine and the monsoon and internal problems. They are more concerned about the disagreement that exists within their government. We must remember that Vietnam may be the biggest story in the United States, but in some areas of the world it is really of passing or indifferent interest.

Senator MUNDT. Big or little, I would like to have you supply for the record—if you don't have it in mind right now—whether or not the main thrust of Radio India is critical, sympathetic, or neutral regarding what we are doing in Vietnam.

Mr. MARKS. I should be glad to report on that for the committee. (The information referred to follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, September 20, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Mr Leonard H. Marks, Director of USIA, in his appearance before your Committee on August 17, 1966, was asked to file a subsequent report as to whether or not the main thrust of All India Radio was critical of what the U.S. was doing in Viet-Nam, sympathetic or neutral. Our post in India reports that All India Radio has no correspondent in Viet-Nam on a regular basis. Their reporting is for the most part straight news on the Viet-Nam situation. The news is a fairly accurate reflection of material carried by the wire services and statements of Indian officials. Occasional features are carried and they report that press conferences and official statements are treated fairly.

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

Senator MUNDT. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DISTORTED VIEWPOINT OF U.S. VIETNAM POSITION

Mr. Marks, I am rather sympathetic to your predicament in undertaking to make known to the world all the facts concerning our own involvement in South Vietnam.

I am not at all certain that if you were successful in that effort, that many who are now skeptical of the American involvement would be converted into disciples. I certainly had access to all the facts this Government could supply. I have them and remain a skeptic, but I do think that the world is getting an unduly distorted picture of Vietnam. I do not think that this is at all the fault of your Agency or the effort you are making, but I do think it is inherent perhaps in the situation, in the way the world is apt to look at this war.

EUROPEAN CRITICISM OF U.S. EFFORTS IN VIETNAM

I think that the predicament is pretty well capsuled in the August 19 issue of Time magazine. I should like to read this section of the article into the record. It relates to European opinion and, having been in Europe recently, I can personally testify that I encountered very heavy criticism in Europe of the war generally. I think this is a rather accurate summation of European opinion, based upon my own exposure.

Time magazine reports a current poll in France which shows that 30 percent of the Frenchmen think Lyndon Johnson is more dangerous than Communist China's Mao Tse-tung; that 35 percent of the West Germans favor ending the bombing of North Vietnam. "Says West German Vice Chancellor Erich Mende: "There is no question in my mind that the Vietnam war is unpopular largely because of television. People see the horrors and the misery of this war—burning villages,

weeping mothers, maimed children. They see South Vietnamese troops manhandling Vietcong suspects, and they see the more torrid aspects of Siagon's night life.' Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak put it more succinctly. 'The United States,' he said, 'has completely lost the information war in Vietnam.'"

Then the magazine continues: "What is to be done about it? Not much. The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese release a negligible amount of news film on their side of the war and of course do not allow foreign TV crewmen to work with their combat units. That leaves television stations all over the world dependent on the film taken mainly by U.S. TV crewmen and of United States and South Vietnamese troops in action. Inevitably, it leaves a lopsided impression."

I think this is without doubt one of the problems that confronts us. But, if it is, it underscores the need to expose foreign correspondents who are interested to the situation in South Vietnam, and I think that was the objective of your action, was it not?

Mr. MARKS. It was, sir.

Senator CHURCH. I can't quarrel with the objective. I think we do face this serious problem of an unduly distorted picture of this war being widespread in the world.

Whether or not you can succeed in your objective, I think, depends upon how you are conducting the program in South Vietnam itself.

EXTENT OF USIA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN NEWSMEN SENT TO VIETNAM

Now, as I understand your testimony, those foreign correspondents who do come, whose transportation is furnished, are in your custody, so to speak, or at least you undertake when they do come to South Vietnam to see to it that they get access to whatever information may be available; is that correct?

Mr. MARKS. Just as if they had bought their own airplane ticket, in the same manner and with the same procedures.

Senator CHURCH. Are they perfectly free to go within the limits of military security wherever they want to go, and do you undertake to get them to the places they would like to see, or have you a kind of organized tour for them when they come?

Mr. MARKS. There is no organized tour. They go where they want to go, when they want to go. We provide in-country transportation because otherwise you can't get away from Saigon to Da Nang and other places.

Senator CHURCH. But you undertake to help them get to places they want to see?

Mr. MARKS. Exactly. And they choose the places and the subject that they wish to investigate.

Senator CHURCH. When they report, do they report directly back to their own newspapers from South Vietnam? There is no funneling or channeling through your own agency in connection with the news they release, is there?

Mr. MARKS. Absolutely not, Senator; and we find out what they have reported when we read it in their paper.

Senator CHURCH. There is no condition attached to this transportation that they should first submit stories they intend to write, or anything of that kind?

Mr. MARKS. Absolutely not. It would be a gross insult. I wouldn't even think of it.

Senator CHURCH. I didn't anticipate that there was any such wish. I did think that the record ought to be clear on that.

FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN VIETNAM MAKE CONTACTS ON THEIR OWN

To what extent do these correspondents get around the country? How limited are they in where they can go and what they can say?

Mr. MARKS. If you read the reports in the American papers, you will realize that they are getting in everywhere; they are using helicopters, airplanes, and other means of transportation, that are made available so that they can get there. I don't imagine that they all want to go where the fighting takes place, but many of them do want to get to places where actions have taken place; and some do want to see front line battles.

There aren't many frontline battles; as you know the nature of the war doesn't permit that. But if they want to go to a particular place, they are transported; within the limits of transportation, they get it.

Senator CHURCH. Suppose they want to contact critics of Marshal Ky's regime or known opponents, do you help them reach these people?

Mr. MARKS. They are on their own on contacting sources. The only people that we help them with are Americans who are with the mission, people who are in charge of the civilian reconstruction work, field representatives, those who would have the technical information about the nature of the agriculture and the medical programs. They are on their own and I would imagine, although I can't tell you exactly with reference to contacting Vietnamese, if our people know them and can do it, they will, critics or not critics of the Ky administration.

Senator CHURCH. How long, typically, do these foreign correspondents stay when they come under these arrangements?

Mr. MARKS. It depends on their own particular interest; a minimum of two weeks, some of them three weeks, four weeks.

Senator CHURCH. So that they have adequate opportunity to make contacts on their own?

Mr. MARKS. Absolutely, sir.

CONDUCT OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. I think that this is important because, if you are going to serve your own objective, the way that this program is actually handled in South Vietnam is a critical matter.

I was once part of an American delegation that was invited to Moscow under a somewhat different arrangement. We had been at the Interparliamentary Union Conference and were invited by the Russian delegation to come afterward, to Moscow where we had the guided tour. It was very difficult to see anything other than what was scheduled for us.

About the third day, I finally prevailed upon my guide to take me to some other parts of the city than the streets that we had been confined to. The next day, there was a new guide. My general impression was to be adversely affected by the whole experience.

So, I thought we ought to get on the record how you are actually conducting the program in South Vietnam, if the objective to be served is the freest possible access for these foreign correspondents.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I had the guided tour of Moscow and had the same reaction. I have discussed this with the foreign journalists who have been to Moscow and they deplore this. They tell me one of the greatest benefits they find from our policy is the openness. For example, they are taken down to Florida for the space shots, and if the shot fails, they report that it fails. If there is human error, or otherwise, they are told about it; whereas, with the Russians, there is complete secrecy. Nobody knows about it and they report only their successes.

I want our country to continue to operate in the open manner and to the extent that the USIA has any jurisdiction, we will and we have.

Senator CHURCH. This is how you are conducting the foreign correspondents program in South Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. You are correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

BLACK VERSUS WHITE PROPAGANDA

Senator PELL. Mr. Marks, returning to the basic question of the conduct of the foreign correspondents and the responsibility for it, I was wondering in a more general way, how you would define black propaganda as opposed to white propaganda?

Mr. MARKS. I have no definition for it, sir. I will take your definition.

Senator PELL. Would you bear with me that black propaganda is basically a perfectly legitimate function of any government by the influencing of public opinion abroad in ways not entirely known to the leadership or the listening audience involved?

Mr. MARKS. All right. What is white? Is white the opposite; namely, the complete disclosure of all activities?

Senator PELL. No. Please don't be so sensitive to my questions.

Mr. MARKS. No, no; I just want to understand the contrast.

Senator PELL. We have also discussed in this committee the proper function of the CIA. Some of us have regretted its activity in military operations of one sort or another, and some think it should be involved more in political or in black propaganda operations. I was wondering if this did not fall more precisely under the law as something the CIA should be doing. Please understand that I have no criticism of this program—I wish it were expanded. But does it belong to USIA?

Mr. MARKS. In my opinion, it is properly placed in the U.S. Information Agency. It is entirely overt; it is entirely legitimate. I see nothing wrong, nothing to be critical about, and I believe that anybody who has had any association with our Agency would come to that same conclusion.

Senator PELL. Many think that covert activities are perfectly legitimate.

Mr. MARKS. I understand, but I think that this is an activity that should be overt by the U.S. Information Agency because it is an information function. I cast no aspersions on the CIA or anybody else. This is our job, providing information to foreign correspondents.

Senator PELL. Do you think that all black propaganda operations should go to the USIA?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir. I don't count this in that category and I don't accept your definition.

Senator PELL. I thought you started out by saying you did accept it.

Mr. MARKS. I wanted to know what it was.

QUESTION OF PUBLICATION OF LIST OF NAMES

Senator PELL. Thank you. Please understand I am not in any way critical of the operation. It is a fine one and I hope it is expanded. My only criticism of it is that it could detract from the white propaganda activities which you conduct. If you say there is nothing secret about it—that it is completely open and, therefore, does not fall in my definition of black propaganda—then why shouldn't the list of names be published?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, I will make available to the committee the list. I told the chairman I would get that together and supply it.

Senator PELL. For publication?

Mr. MARKS. Before you came in, sir, I made that statement.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I do wish you luck with that program. As I say, my impression is not directed to you. I simply thought it was a proper function for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, let me add one footnote. You see so much in life is based upon labels, and the term, "black propaganda" could have an odious connotation.

Senator PELL. Not to me.

Mr. MARKS. White propaganda is pure, it's the bride's gown. I am proud of what we do.

Senator PELL. Well, we are not talking about civil rights.

Mr. MARKS. It has nothing to do with civil rights, but I don't want any improper connotation about what we are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's clarify the question about the names.

I understood the Senator from South Dakota to say that he didn't think they ought to be published. You said you would supply the committee with the list for executive use. Are you now saying you think they ought to be made public?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, I leave that to the discretion of the committee. You are well versed in the—

The CHAIRMAN. What is your recommendation? Are you going to make them public yourself?

Mr. MARKS. I see nothing wrong, sir, with identifying anybody who has been involved in this program, and I shall make the names available to the committee. And if Senator Mundt still feels the same, or if Senator Pell has his views, that is another thing.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. I asked him to make a recommendation. It isn't just the committee's recommendation.

Mr. MARKS. It is not my job to make them public.

The CHAIRMAN. You are saying that you are not going to make the names public.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That's No. 1. No. 2, you are going to supply them to the committee. No. 3, it is up to the committee whether to make them public or not.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your position?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That's all I want to know.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, may I say that: one, I think the operation is excellent; and two, I don't think the names should be published.

The CHAIRMAN. If they shouldn't be, let's not emphasize it. It's all open and above ground. Let's not be bigger hypocrites than we have to be.

The Senator from Wyoming.

EMPHASIS ON NONMILITARY ASPECT OF REPORTING

Senator McGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARKS, do we understand correctly that the main emphasis of these visiting journalists that are transported to Vietnam is in the nonmilitary field?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McGEE. But they are not barred from the military field?

Mr. MARKS. On the contrary.

Senator McGEE. What they do there is their business?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McGEE. Do you feel that the impact of your concentration on the nonmilitary field is making any headway in the headline news against the preponderance of military reporting?

Mr. MARKS. Some, but not enough. I will be satisfied only when there is a full report on the nonmilitary aspects. We have made improvements, and I hope for more.

Senator McGEE. Would you be willing to expand this program outside of the country—that is, outside of the counterpart category? You made a big point of the fact that it was costing you relatively little because it was in soft currency. Would you be willing to spend directly in support of this program?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

Senator McGEE. I am glad to hear you say that. I was hoping that you would justify this, not in an apologetic way, because you are spending out of soft currency.

Mr. MARKS. No.

Senator McGEE. I think this program has a reason for being, and I think you ought to do more of it. And I agree with the Senator from South Dakota and the Senator from Rhode Island, that if there is any indictment to be made here, it is in not expanding it on a broad enough sphere, but that is constructive.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, the only reference to excess currency was to show that we tried to save money. If we can use that currency, we try, but I am wholeheartedly and enthusiastically behind this program, and we will spend any amounts that are necessary in dollars.

INFORMATION PROGRAMS MAKING HEADWAY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator McGEE. I have tried hard to assess this whole session here this morning, and it seems to me that you have cleared up a great many things that were on the record—although I may say it is a little bit of “much to do about relatively less” in terms of the problem. But I do think this session has been helpful in getting the information, and I would hope that the record would show that somebody has been getting through to somebody in southeast Asia and that general part of the world.

The fact that this getting through coincides with your term of office is irrelevant, because it was going on long before you got there. But, just in the last few weeks or months, the head of the government in Singapore has shifted his view quite substantially toward our activities in Vietnam.

In Rangoon the Burmese government has had a perceptible change of inclination; there has been a measurable change in the Philippines; and there has been a dramatic, violent change in Indonesia. There has even been some shifting reported in Cambodia, although this is being kicked back and forth at the present time.

Senator MUNDT. It is a yo-yo.

Senator McGEE. Somebody is getting through with something, so whether it's “Voice of America,” U.S. Information Service, or somebody else's news agency that is doing it, I think it is fair to note that the tendency toward criticism, particularly in Western Europe to show a rising hostility, is not the measure of the area in which the problem itself is being worked out. I think perhaps the word from the Australian Prime Minister who was here—that somehow Europeans get excited only with Berlin walls, and they forget the world is round—is something in point, and I don't attach too much weight to the opinion of the Europeans.

Some of the Asians were not too excited about Hitler, but they got excited about Tojo in Japan.

These are human elements. I don't think you ought to be shy about the measure of the impact of somebody's program which is making headway, about what we are doing, about what the cause is, about why we are there, or about the consequences of the various alternatives that face us at the present time.

It seems to me it has been a terrible thing, and it is wonderful that we have had a change in the whole atmosphere of southeast Asia in the last 12 or 14 months.

That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

DISCUSSION OF TOTAL NUMBER OF CASUALTIES

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If any of these questions have been asked in my absence, just tell me so and I won't press for a repetitious answer.

Mr. MARKS. All right, sir.

Senator CASE. This morning, I understand that a war correspondent, Dean Brelis, said that at least 5,000 South Vietnamese were killed or seriously wounded per month in the current operations in South Vietnam.

Mr. MARKS. That has been asked, and my answer was, sir, that I have jurisdiction only with foreign correspondents. Mr. Brellis is an American and therefore I have no knowledge of it.

Senator CASE. I am not asking whether you knew he said this. I am asking whether it is true.

Mr. MARKS. I have no information on it. My area of interest is nonmilitary and this is a military matter.

Senator CASE. You don't know what the facts are?

Mr. MARKS. I do not know.

Senator CASE. Are you a member, in that connection, of the National Security Council?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator CASE. Have you attended meetings and have there been meetings recently on this matter?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Isn't this a matter of vital statistics in South Vietnam, a matter currently discussed by the Council?

Mr. MARKS. This question that you have asked has not been discussed.

Senator CASE. Hasn't the Council taken note at any meeting of the situation as far as the results of the war go in South Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. To my knowledge; no.

Senator CASE. How about American casualties there, have they been discussed?

Mr. MARKS. American casualties, military?

Senator CASE. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator CASE. And South Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. And South Vietnam casualties; all casualties. I thought you were talking about the Dean Brellis report. That has not been discussed.

Senator CASE. Dean Brellis just made this report this morning.

Mr. MARKS. I don't know what time period the Brellis story covers—last month, last year, or when.

I don't know anything about this.

Senator CASE. It was this morning, apparently.

Mr. MARKS. I don't know anything about that.

Senator CASE. This morning, apparently on the "Today" show. I didn't hear it myself.

Mr. MARKS. I am not familiar with it.

Senator CASE. I am not interested in whether you heard him say it, or even whether he said it. I am asking you what the facts are.

Mr. MARKS. I do not know.

Senator CASE. About the Vietnamese casualties, the South Vietnamese casualties?

Mr. MARKS. Over what period of time, and where?

Senator CASE. A period of the last 6 months of this year.

Mr. MARKS. I don't have those facts before me, but they have been discussed.

Senator CASE. Have you any general knowledge as to what the rate of casualties is among the South Vietnamese forces?

Mr. MARKS. Military?

Senator CASE. South Vietnamese military.

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator CASE. What rate is it?

Mr. MARKS. I don't have those figures handy; I don't remember them.

Senator CASE. It is a rather important figure.

Mr. MARKS. It changes, sir, from time to time. It is an important figure, but I don't have those figures at my fingertips.

Senator CASE. Do you have a general idea of what their casualties are in relation to our casualties?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, I do.

Senator CASE. What is the relationship?

Mr. MARKS. I would not want to guess, because I have not reviewed those figures, and I haven't had a chance to even consider that within the last few days. That is not my field. I am not involved in military reporting.

Senator CASE. Now, it would seem to me that information about the military factors are certainly paramount in the news. You could get that from other sources, could you not?

Mr. MARKS. Surely.

PROPORTION OF USIA OFFICERS IN VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator CASE. Your knowledge of the situation is what I am interested in at the moment.

What portion of USIA officers, overall, are in South Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. The number has been given, sir. Out of the total of 12,000, there are approximately 113 Americans and approximately 350 Vietnamese.

Senator CASE. What is the proportion of the total?

Mr. MARKS. That would be 500 out of 12,000—

Senator CASE. We are talking now about officers, I take it, rather than clerical and all the rest of it.

Mr. MARKS. Oh, if you are talking about officers, we have approximately 8 to 10 percent of our Foreign Service officers in Vietnam.

Senator CASE. In Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator CASE. How about the proportion in all of southeast Asia?

Mr. MARKS. I would have to get the figure for you.

Senator CASE. Have you a general idea?

Mr. MARKS. In Thailand, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines?

Senator CASE. And Indonesia.

Mr. MARKS. In Indonesia; we have one person, I believe, in Indonesia. I would be guessing, sir. I would say, in all the rest of southeast Asia that would probably be equal to this, another 10 percent.

Senator CASE. Well, 20 percent, although that does not include India?

Mr. MARKS. That does not include India.

Senator CASE. How large is the force in India?

Mr. MARKS. India is our second largest post. I would say there are probably 75 Americans there. Now, when I say Americans I am talking about all personnel, not just Foreign Service officers.

Senator CASE. I want to get a percentage figure on the officers.

Mr. MARKS. I will supply it for you accurately.

(The information referred to follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, September 8, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to a question by Senator Case during the appearance of Mr. Leonard H. Marks before your Committee on August 17, 1966, asking for percentage figures of USIA officers stationed in Viet-Nam, India, and the rest of the Asian area, we submit the following information:

Total number of officers in the USIA Foreign Service.....	1, 834
Total number of USIA officers <i>authorized</i> for Viet-Nam.....	135
(Or 7.4 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers in Viet-Nam.....	121
(Or 6.6 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers <i>authorized</i> for remainder of Far East.....	190
(Or 10.4 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers in remainder of Far East.....	170
(Or 9.3 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of officers <i>authorized</i> for all of Far East, including Viet-Nam..	325
(Or 17.7 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers in all of Far East, including Viet-Nam---	291
(Or 15.9 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers <i>authorized</i> for India.....	63
(Or 3.4 percent of 1,834)	
Total number of USIA officers in India.....	59
(Or 3.2 percent of 1,834)	

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

¹ This figure does not include 184 Foreign Service secretaries and clerks but does include 388 Staff Officers in the Foreign Service.

Senator CASE. Thank you. Do you think you might have 25 percent of the total out there?

Mr. MARKS. Possibly.

Senator CASE. Is that an unreasonable round figure?

Mr. MARKS. It is within the range of 20 to 25 percent, I would guess, in all of southeast Asia.

U.S. IMAGE ABROAD

Senator CASE. I know, or at least I understand, that you do not take polls, but you have access to other people's polls, surveys and opinions, and so forth. What do they show about how we appear to the rest of the world?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, that has been covered, but let me summarize it very briefly.

We cannot generalize. We have to talk about a specific question, asked at a specific time, in a specific country. We have 105 posts around the world.

Senator CASE. I say there were people who at one time talked in very general terms about the American image abroad, and American misdeeds.

Mr. MARKS. Not I.

Senator CASE. You shouldn't; you should stay out of politics.

Mr. MARKS. I am trying to.

Senator CASE. Go ahead.

Mr. MARKS. We have 105 posts; each post is headed by an experienced officer called the country public affairs officer. He is given a large measure of autonomy in determining how he shall execute a

program. He would know about polls on particular topics made at a particular time, in a particular city in his country. I am unable to give you that.

Senator CASE. I assume you have a general view about what America looks like today in southeast Asia, and I wish you would tell me.

Mr. MARKS. I made quite a speech on that.

Senator CASE. Then I won't ask you to repeat it.

Mr. MARKS. It is in the record.

Senator CASE. Can you summarize it in 10 words?

Mr. MARKS. No.

Senator CASE. Are you happy about it?

Mr. MARKS. I am never completely happy; I always see room for improvement.

Senator CASE. That is encouraging. You are not downhearted.

Mr. MARKS. I am not downhearted; I am quite encouraged.

BERTRAND RUSSELL AND PEACE MOVEMENT

Senator CASE. What do you think about this Bertrand Russell business?

Mr. MARKS. I think it is deplorable.

Senator CASE. So, you deplore it?

Mr. MARKS. Yes. I intend to see that something is done about it. I intend to see that our information officers are able to refute some of the statements that have been made and some that I anticipate will be made.

Senator CASE. Of course, I don't agree with what has been said, but there is one thing I would like to know. Is it catching on?

Mr. MARKS. It has not so far. From the complement of people on that committee, I think the intelligent critic can discern what it is trying to do. It certainly does not have a reputation for objectivity.

Senator CASE. Not in North America or in the United States, but there are some people whom we might call of odd distinction or great distinction, perhaps, in some parts of the world—

Mr. MARKS. There has not been time to get a reaction on that, sir. We are studying that very carefully and looking forward to reports from our posts to see what reaction there is in other sections of the world.

Senator CASE. Who is financing it, do you know?

Mr. MARKS. No; and I certainly would like to know.

Senator CASE. Has Lord Russell great sums of money of his own to spend on this?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know.

Senator CASE. Who is financing the peace movement, or movements? There are several of them.

Mr. MARKS. I don't know. That is not within my purview, but I would like to know.

Senator CASE. I take it you will be available to let this committee in on any further developing information you get about this matter. For myself, I think it is something that we want to follow very closely, and I know I will appreciate your keeping us posted.

Mr. MARKS. I certainly will, and we will welcome any suggestions by you or the members of this committee, which you may have on how to meet this.

THE BUDGET OF USIA

Senator CASE. One last question. Are you satisfied with the way the budget is going for your Agency?

Mr. MARKS. No.

Senator CASE. Have you discussed that this morning?

Mr. MARKS. No.

Senator CASE. I would appreciate any comments you might make, because my interest goes back to the time President Johnson, then the majority leader, took the meat ax to the Agency, not so many years ago, and I wonder if you think the same thing is happening now?

Mr. MARKS. It is not.

Senator CASE. It is not as bad as it was?

Mr. MARKS. The Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate last year applied a cut to Western Europe. I inherited that when I was appointed to this job. It was a fait accompli. The Bureau of the Budget has given our request every consideration and is understanding. I have not yet had an opportunity to appear before either the House or the Senate Appropriations Committees. However, in talking to individual members of those committees, I am quite encouraged. I think they understand the problem and hope they are sympathetic and I hope they approve of the way we are trying to run the Agency, and the fact that we have tried to economize and make sure we get our dollar's worth.

I do feel the need for greater efforts in particular areas. I will express that to the Appropriations Committee, and hope they will agree with me.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say that all this has been said by me as a friend of the Agency, and not otherwise.

Mr. MARKS. I understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuing that last question, for the record, what is your budget?

Mr. MARKS. Salaries and expenses, around \$160 million.

The CHAIRMAN. 160? How many employees?

Mr. MARKS. 12,000.

The CHAIRMAN. How many in the United States and how many abroad?

Mr. MARKS. Approximately half in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Six and six.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have 105 posts?

Mr. MARKS. 105 countries; we have 221 posts. In some countries there are several posts.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh; 105 countries and 225 posts?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, 221, to be exact.

VOICE OF AMERICA

The CHAIRMAN. What proportion of your budget is allotted for Voice of America?

Mr. MARKS. \$30 million.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of your employees are devoted to Voice of America?

Mr. MARKS. 2,000.

The CHAIRMAN. How many broadcasting stations?

Mr. MARKS. Over 103 transmitters.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those are in the United States?

Mr. MARKS. Greenville, N.C.; Dixon and Delano, Calif; and Bethany, Ohio.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are the others? Are they small, local ones?

Mr. MARKS. No, they are big ones.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean others, besides those. Are they small ones?

Mr. MARKS. Wolverton, England; Munich; Manila; Rhodes; Liberia; under construction in Greece; Thailand; and the Philippines, a transmitter in Hue, in Vietnam; and one in Tangiers.

PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS BROADCAST PROPAGANDA OVERSEAS

The CHAIRMAN. In the United States are there any privately owned, shortwave radio stations beaming propaganda programs to foreign countries?

Mr. MARKS. There are.

The CHAIRMAN. How many?

Mr. MARKS. Two.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they?

Mr. MARKS. Station WRUL, owned by the Mormon Church, and a transmitter located at Red Lion, Pa., owned by another religious group.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the last one?

Mr. MARKS. Red Lion. One transmitter. WRUL is located in Massachusetts and has a number of high-powered transmitters and beams primarily to Latin America.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that primarily religious?

Mr. MARKS. No, it is a general service.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the Red Lion?

Mr. MARKS. Primarily religious; it has a very minor program service.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the USIA monitor or in any way supervise either or both of those programs?

Mr. MARKS. It does not; it has no association of any kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this not rather unusual for a private company, for purposes which may or may not be consistent with the Government's policies, to be allowed to engage in this kind of activity?

Mr. MARKS. These stations are licensed by the Federal Communications Commission. Station WRUL has been in existence since before World War II. All shortwave services were taken over by the U.S. Government during the war. At one time, the Columbia Broadcasting System, the National Broadcasting Co., Westinghouse, Crosley, and Associated Broadcasters in California had private shortwave stations. After the war they all turned in their permits with the exception of WRUL. As to whether it is unusual, that is a matter of government policy. It is a matter of licensing under existing legislation. The FCC determines that. We have nothing to say about it.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is in your line of business. They could, if they chose to, greatly hinder the effectiveness of your program.

Mr. MARKS. They could.

The CHAIRMAN. Who owns the station at Red Lion, Pa.?

Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, I don't know the name of the person or the religious organization.

The CHAIRMAN. There are all kinds of religious organizations.

Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, I don't know the name of it. I will get it for you.

(The information referred to appears on p. 131 in the appendix.)

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it of sufficient interest to you to warrant your attention? You're not interested in it?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, I am interested in it, sir, but I don't happen to know the name of the denomination. It is a very small religious denomination.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not Mr. Edward Murrow complained to the FCC about this station?

Mr. MARKS. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you find out whether he did?

Mr. MARKS. I will.

(The information referred to follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, November 8, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to your request directed to Mr. Leonard Marks, Director of USIA during his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 17, 1966, we have checked the Agency's records and find that Edward R. Murrow, then Director of USIA, did in 1963, bring to the attention of the Federal Communications Commission international broadcasts of WINB, Red Lion, Pennsylvania.

Also pursuant to your request to Mr. Marks, we submit random audio tape samples of broadcasts over said station taped off the air on September 6, 1966.

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

(Tape appears on p. 159 of the appendix.)

The CHAIRMAN. I only recently heard about this station just casually. I meant to make an inquiry into it, and really forgot about it. I had forgotten about it until this discussion.

U.S. IMAGE ABROAD

We were talking about our image abroad. I have here the August 22 issue of U.S. News & World Report. An item in "Washington Whisper," reads as follows:

In Europe, Western leaders are beginning to call the United States the sick man of the world, plagued with war, strikes, street riots, including arson and looting, crime running wild, and with the dollar facing an uncertain future.

Do you subscribe to that characterization?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I head the U.S. Information Agency. If you and I want to talk about domestic politics or other matters, let's do that in private.

The CHAIRMAN. This rather leaves the impression that our Information Agency isn't as successful as it might be in projecting a favorable image of the United States in Europe.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I think we can discuss that at great length, but I don't think that is anything we want to take up now.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that to say that you can't overcome our policy; that there is a limit to what the USIA can do?

Mr. MARKS. Even I will admit that.

The CHAIRMAN. You will admit that.

Mr. MARKS. But I won't agree with the opinion that you have just read.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I asked you if you—

Mr. MARKS. You are entitled to your opinion. I have a different one.

The CHAIRMAN. It wasn't my opinion. I was reading from the U.S. News & World Report—

Mr. MARKS. They are entitled to their opinion.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Although I find considerable truth in it.

Mr. MARKS. Each of us has his own views.

The CHAIRMAN. The strife, we know we have had that; the riots, we know we have had; and we have had the crime.

FACT VERSUS OPINION

Incidentally, that reminds me. Early in the day, and on several occasions, you seemed to emphasize the distinction between fact and opinion.

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This confuses me a bit. I wonder if you would enlighten us more precisely as to your idea of the difference between a fact which these reporters observe and the opinion which seems to result.

Mr. MARKS. Well, sir, that could lead into a long and philosophical analysis of what are facts. Opinions are the views held on stated and existing circumstances. Facts are subject to interpretation. Whether I happen to be in a chair, that is a fact. This is a pencil. That is a fact. Whether it is a big pencil or a small pencil, is my opinion.

I happen to be before the Foreign Relations Committee. That is a fact. I happen to regard it as a very prestigious group. That is my opinion. I hope others have it too.

The CHAIRMAN. It could be a fact. I want it made clear that I didn't start this, you started it.

Mr. MARKS. I hope I have enlightened you.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy, I will yield momentarily, but I want to pursue this.

Mr. MARKS, you started this by being very positive in several of your statements about the facts of Vietnam as distinguished from the opinions about Vietnam of these reporters.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That's why I have pursued it. I will yield temporarily to the Senator.

FACTS AND TRUE FACTS

Senator McCARTHY. I find more and more in statements not just from the executive branch, but, more commonly, where they talk about

the true facts. Could you distinguish between "facts" and "true facts" for me?

Mr. MARKS. Senator, I am not that able.

Senator McCARTHY. You are not that able?

Mr. MARKS. I have certain limitations.

Senator McCARTHY. This would seem a simple distinction, and I just thought you might be prepared to make it.

I will yield and return the question to the chairman now.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it possible that a fact is a circumstance which agrees with our prejudices, and if it doesn't agree, it is not a fact.

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator CASE. True fact, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; that is a matter of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, one of the greatest problems of members of the Senate, or anyone else in public life, is communicating—

Mr. MARKS. It certainly is.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). The ability to convey what one means.

Mr. MARKS. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. And we all feel—I suppose everyone feels—that we are misunderstood. I suspect that you feel that way occasionally.

Mr. MARKS. I occasionally do. I hope I have not been misunderstood today.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not been misunderstood.

Mr. MARKS. I don't think so. I think you have given me a very good session, and I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. You intrigued me a bit with what you conceive to be the facts in Vietnam. Do you have very clear views as to what the facts are?

Mr. MARKS. On certain subjects, I certainly do.

The CHAIRMAN. What, for example?

Mr. MARKS. I know what we are doing in the field of civilian restoration, and the economy of that country; how many hospitals we have built; how many homes we have built; what we are doing to aid agriculture; what we are doing to provide doctors; what we are doing to build roads; what we are doing to educate the children. Those are facts, sir. Whether it is good is a matter of opinion. My opinion is, it is good.

RED LION BROADCASTING STATION

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the Red Lion broadcasting station is tax exempt or not?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know much about it. How powerful is it?

Mr. MARKS. I think it is 50 kilowatts. That is not my business, sir. It is the Federal Communications Commission that licenses them and the Internal Revenue Service determines whether they are tax exempt.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree, technically, but—

Mr. MARKS. I do not have all the information.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry I brought it up. I thought, being in the same kind of business, you might incidentally have heard of it.

Mr. MARKS. I think I know quite a bit about it, but not all you want to know.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not asked very much. I asked you how powerful it was.

Mr. MARKS. Fifty kilowatts.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that 50,000 kilowatts—

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; 50 kilowatts.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that reach Latin America?

Mr. MARKS. It will reach the northern part of Latin America.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it reach Europe or Africa?

Mr. MARKS. It depends upon the directional antenna that is used, sir. The power of the transmitter is amplified by the antenna. You can beam a program in a particular direction by orienting your antenna. So, it depends upon the configuration of their antenna.

The CHAIRMAN. I meant if they chose to broadcast to Latin America, would it go there?

Mr. MARKS. I think so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it would?

Mr. MARKS. I think it would.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the character of their programs?

Mr. MARKS. Not in detail. Generally, it is a religious program.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any copies of some of their recent broadcasts available?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you obtain them?

Mr. MARKS. We would have to get the monitors on that, but the Federal Communications Commission would be better able than I to furnish you with all that. They licensed the station, their inspectors visit it, their employees determine whether they obey the rules of the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any rules especially provided for people who engage in foreign broadcasting by shortwave?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir; there is a whole section in the FCC rulebook on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. A whole section?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir; a whole section.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be too much trouble to ask your staff to provide this for me with a sample of their broadcasts?

Mr. MARKS. We will be glad to do it.

(The information referred to is on p. 159 in the appendix.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be very interesting to know. I am curious to know what this broadcast is about. I suspect it is the same sort of thing that the Reverend McIntyre and others talk about, isn't it?

Mr. MARKS. I just don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. One other thing I want to clarify. In the course of this, in regards to the newspapers accepting the free trips, I understand your position and I am very sympathetic with it in the same way that the Senator from Rhode Island and others have spoken of it.

QUESTION OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN ACCEPTING TRIPS

The CHAIRMAN. But, why is it, according to the piece I put in the record, that the Toronto Star and Globe and Mail declined your invitation for a free trip to Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know, and I have asked for a report on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand here from the staff that the Washington Post has a policy of declining trips offered by the Pentagon or any Government agency. Is that correct, or do you know?

Mr. MARKS. I am told the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the same thing?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do they do this?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know. You will have to ask them.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Isn't this coming back to the same thing I mentioned earlier—the situation that developed in connection with the foreign agents investigation? I am just trying to get at the truth of this. I am not trying to get into a contest with you about it. But isn't there perhaps implicit in this relationship a kind of conflict of interest? Isn't it a fact that the Post as well as the Canadian papers do this because they are afraid it might, in the eyes of their readers, compromise their objectivity? Isn't that really why they don't?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know, but I would assume the Washington Post is wealthy enough to take care of the transportation of any of its correspondents. That might be one reason.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't mean you put this on the basis of poverty, do you?

Mr. MARKS. You asked me why the Washington Post—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. And I said I didn't know, but I also wanted to make the point that has been made to me by one of the representatives of the Washington Post that they are a pretty wealthy organization and they feel that they can defray the transportation costs. That is up to them, though.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't really believe—or do you believe—that that is the only reason why newspapers decline to accept free trips?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think? I don't know, I haven't talked to them about it.

Mr. MARKS. I just don't know.

Senator MUNDT. Will the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I yield, Senator Mundt.

FORMER USIA POLICY OF EMPLOYING REPORTERS PART TIME

Senator MUNDT. At one time in the history of the USIA, there was a policy of employing the part-time services of reporters and associates of American periodicals. This created a great ruckus, and, to the best of my knowledge, that policy has stopped. I think it was a wrong policy, because implicit in it would be the idea that if you got a lot of reporters, build them up, and gave them extra income, you would induce them to report favorably on USIA, which would be a bad thing? Has that been stopped?

Mr. MARKS. For U.S. correspondents, or what? I am sorry, I missed the first part.

Senator MUNDT. Yes. At one time, the USIA made a practice of employing the services—

Mr. MARKS. Oh, yes; we don't employ anybody in that category.

Senator MUNDT. I know that it created a great ruckus. Have they stopped that?

Mr. MARKS. The type of thing we do, when there is a magazine article published, or a periodical story which we want to use we ask for the rights, and in some cases we have to pay for those rights, or in limited instances, if we want an article on a specialty where only a few people have the ability to write it. Let's say it is a complicated space article; we may go to an experienced man in the field of space science and say, "Will you write this?" and pay them for that piece. We do on occasion, employ part-timers, or stringers.

Senator MUNDT. Perhaps due to that practice, and I presume because of other similar experiences, the Washington Post and other newspapers have decided not to accept the gratuity. It is not a good policy, though it was adopted one time generally. I think there were about 15 or 20 names of people who were reporting news domestically and then moonlighting for USIA. I think it proper that that policy has been discontinued.

Mr. MARKS. That was before my time, sir.

Senator CASE. Will the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. I yield for a question.

ARE TRIPS ABROAD OF U.S. NEWSMEN HANDLED BY USIA?

Senator CASE. The Senator from South Dakota has been talking about the former practice of employing part-time American journalists. I would like to know what the practice is. I wasn't here at the beginning of the session today. What is the practice of your Agency paying the expenses of American journalists on trips abroad?

Mr. MARKS. We do not handle American journalists at all, at any time, on any trips abroad. There is some confusion. Senator Gore, for example, was under the impression that we had responsibility in the United States. We do not deal with U.S. journalists in providing them with an opportunity to cover Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. I made that clear. I was talking in another connection about the trips that the Pentagon—the Navy and the Army—offer.

Senator CASE. I understand. That is what I wanted to have cleared up.

The CHAIRMAN. I made that clear. USIA does not have anything to do with that.

Senator MUNDT. That is in the law.

The CHAIRMAN. That is forbidden.

Mr. MARKS. Our appropriation is limited under the Smith-Mundt Act to overseas activities only.

The CHAIRMAN. You are forbidden to brainwash Americans, but not others.

Mr. MARKS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Minnesota.

REASON FOR INITIATING PROGRAM OF TRANSPORTING NEWSMEN

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Marks, the explanation given for the Defense Department program of transporting newspapermen abroad was that there was not enough coverage when they initiated the program.

Was this the same consideration you took into account when you initiated your program for foreign correspondents?

Mr. MARKS. It certainly was, sir, and the fact that there was misrepresentation in addition to lack of information.

Senator McCARTHY. It was generally reported that the Defense Department visitors came back convinced that the war was a worthy one. Have you found the same thing to be the case with the reporters that you took over?

Mr. MARKS. I answered that earlier, but let me try to summarize it.

I made the distinction, as Senator Fulbright pointed out, between fact and opinion. I conceive our mission to give a newspaperman or a journalist an opportunity to see the facts, to investigate the facts. If he reports them, and he has an opinion, one way or the other, I am satisfied because I have given him a chance to report the facts. Now, on balance, I believe that our program has been eminently successful and well worth the effort we have made because it has exposed men, who did not have a chance to learn about the story, to visit the scene.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you have any measure of improved understanding of the American position in Vietnam in consequence of this project?

Mr. MARKS. Sir, if the reams of newsprint that reflect what the correspondent saw, is any indication, the public in their countries have had this opportunity, our reports from the field indicate that there has been a better understanding as a result.

EVALUATION OF AREAS OF SUCCESS

Senator McCARTHY. Do you think we are gaining, then, in the other countries of the world with reference to the Vietnam problem?

Mr. MARKS. I do think we are making some gains; yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. How do you measure those gains?

Mr. MARKS. By the reports that I get from our individual officers; by the reports that I get from people who come back from foreign countries and who are versed in the knowledge of what these countries have done in the past and what they are now doing; from reports of Ambassadors.

Senator McCARTHY. Which countries in particular, would you say, showed the greatest improvement or change?

Mr. MARKS. I would say that there is very substantial improvement in Japan. Others, in varying degrees, but again, that depends upon a particular question. You can't make a generalized statement on a particular issue. And you may find a better understanding on another issue with a different set of facts.

TRANSPORT OF JAPANESE CORRESPONDENTS TO VIETNAM

Senator McCARTHY. Do you transport the Japanese correspondents?

Mr. MARKS. We have transported Japanese correspondents to Vietnam.

Senator McCARTHY. Any great numbers?

Mr. MARKS. I would have to get the figures.

Senator McCARTHY. About how many?

Mr. MARKS. Several; I can't tell you how many there were. I am trying to get that list together, but there were several.

(The information referred to is classified and on file with the committee.)

RADIO FREE EUROPE

Senator McCARTHY. How does your operation get along with the Radio Free Europe program?

Mr. MARKS. We have nothing to do with that.

Senator McCARTHY. Do your programs and your information generally conform to theirs?

Mr. MARKS. Again, sir, I don't have specific knowledge of that. Our people in Munich would know what Radio Free Europe is doing. They are separate and apart from the Voice of America, and as I say, I just don't have any specific information about their particular programing at this time.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you take it for granted that they are doing essentially the same thing that you are doing, but you don't know?

Mr. MARKS. I don't say they are doing the same thing. Their whole theory is a little different. They are trying to reach audiences with a different kind of information. They are not aiming at the same subject matter, although they do overlap in part. But as I say, I don't have the current information.

Senator McCARTHY. What do you mean by a different kind of information?

Mr. MARKS. They are talking about what is happening in the countries of Eastern Europe. We are talking about what is happening in the United States and the world, as it affects the locale.

Senator McCARTHY. They don't talk about what is happening in the United States?

Mr. MARKS. Not too much. They focus on internal reporting of Eastern Europe.

Senator McCARTHY. What happens in the country is reported back to the people of the country?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McCARTHY. And not the U.S. position?

Mr. MARKS. Right.

Senator McCARTHY. You don't feel it is necessary for you to be concerned about what they have to say about internal problems or American problems.

Mr. MARKS. I say our people in Munich do know what is being said; yes. It is a legitimate area of interest for us.

Senator McCARTHY. That is all, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you contribute to the support of Radio Free Europe?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

USIA CONDUCTS POLLS ABROAD ON SPACE AND DISARMAMENT EFFORTS

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say a moment ago you do not conduct polls abroad?

Mr. MARKS. We conduct polls on specific topics. The Senator was asking me about the Rand Corporation opinion poll. I said I didn't know about that. We do conduct polls on particular topics.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be an example?

Mr. MARKS. The progress of the United States in the space race as compared to the Russians; that would be an illustration.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you take a poll to determine the opinion of the people as to whether the Russians or the Americans are ahead, for instance, in France?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know about France.

The CHAIRMAN. Any country; is that the type of thing you do?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What difference does that make? Why take such a poll?

Mr. MARKS. Whether or not there are peaceful uses of space, that is an important issue; and polls on disarmament questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would you take a poll on whether the Russians or the Americans are ahead in the space field?

Mr. MARKS. That is an important subject around the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is it so important? Is it important to you?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir; it is. The image of the United States as a country with superiority in the space field, dedicated to peaceful purposes, that is an important issue in the world today.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean much to you?

Mr. MARKS. It certainly does.

The CHAIRMAN. Why? This is a mystery to me. It has always seemed rather silly to me. This is a good opportunity to enlighten me.

Mr. MARKS. You and I disagree, Senator. I spend 14 hours a day at this job, studying what is important and what is not important, and this is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you enlighten me a little? Why is it important that we are ahead of Russia in one space field, if we are? I can never understand it. Since it is your profession to enlighten unenlightened people, here is an opportunity for you to enlighten one Senator.

Mr. MARKS. There are some people I cannot convince.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think I am hopeless?

Mr. MARKS. No; I wouldn't put you in that category. I think if I was given enough time, I could give you some facts on which you might change your opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, do you have a question, or two or three short questions?

RADIO FREE CUBA

Senator PELL. In line with the previous questions, I was curious about Radio Free Cuba. Doesn't it broadcast from American soil, Swan Island?

Mr. MARKS. I have nothing to do with that.

Senator PELL. It would be one more station that broadcasting would affect.

Mr. MARKS. Yes; it would.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is it from?

Senator PELL. Swan Island.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that in America?

Senator PELL. I thought so.

Senator MUNDT. It is in the ocean near Cuba.

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't belong to the United States, does it?

Senator PELL. I thought it did.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know. Does anybody know?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know.

Senator MUNDT. I can give you all the information. It is a very small island, and its nationality is a little bit obscure. We and the Cubans have some jurisdictional disagreement over it.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know why.

Senator MUNDT. It is between Florida and Cuba.

The CHAIRMAN. Very small, I take it.

Senator MUNDT. Very small.

The CHAIRMAN. They have a radio station there?

Senator MUNDT. There is.

NUMBER OF HOMES DESTROYED IN VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Another question, sticking to the facts about Vietnam, you cited how many homes we have built. Would not the number of homes we have destroyed also be a fact?

The CHAIRMAN. No; that is opinion.

Senator PELL. In the assessment of the facts, shouldn't both figures go together? I am wondering what your view is on that.

Mr. MARKS. I am sure a good reporter will ask questions on every aspect of the topic he is investigating, and if there are homes that we have destroyed, he should know that.

Senator PELL. Would you submit for the record, figures on how many homes we have built in South Vietnam, with an assessment as to how many homes are being destroyed by military action on the part of the United States and the South Vietnamese?

Mr. MARKS. I will have to get that from AID or somebody else, but I will submit that to them as your request.

(The information referred to follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, September 20, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: At the hearing before your Committee on August 17, 1966, Mr. Leonard H. Marks, Director of USIA, was asked how many homes the United States has built in South Viet-Nam. Mr. Marks stated that he would have to obtain this information from AID, which we have now done.

We are informed by AID as follows:

1. All refugee housing built or proposed is financed by Title XXIII, American Aid Chapter of the Government of Viet-Nam budget. Resettlement housing is

built on a self-help basis, with the Government of Viet-Nam supplying 3,500 piasters per family and USAID supplying cement and roofing. It is estimated approximately 70,000 units have been built with an average capacity of five persons.

2. USAID has built fifty pre-fab homes—two bedroom units—for USAID, US personnel.

3. Fifty pre-fab homes—four bedroom units for USAID, US personnel.

4. USAID constructed three dormitory-type buildings to house thirty Korean mechanics at Phu Tho.

5. USAID is now building two one-bedroom apartments over a garage in GSO-Siagon compound to house USAID, US personnel.

6. The Cam Ranh housing project is in the planning stage at the present time.

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

HOMES DESTROYED IN SVN

(Prepared by the Department of Defense)

It is not possible to identify the specific number of homes destroyed by North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, U.S., RVN, or Free World Forces in South Vietnam. The only statistics available in this area relate to indemnification claims made against U.S., RVN, and Free World Forces by residents of that country. The Government of Vietnam is responsible for all claims that are directly or indirectly related to combat activity of friendly forces. The information that follows has been provided by that government.

The Vietnamese program which handles indemnification claims is entitled Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP). MILCAP makes indemnification funds available to all civilians under the control of the Republic of Vietnam arising from military operations against the enemy. Indemnification is made for bodily injury, personal property, and crop damage. U.S. units in the field initiate action in those incidents involving probable compensation for damage, injuries, or death which occur as a result of U.S. military operations. Prompt investigation by unit claims officers is undertaken in such instances in order to record all relevant information. Claims which are determined to have resulted from combat related activity are then referred to MILCAP, wherein appropriate action is taken.

General Westmoreland has provided for full U.S. cooperation to MILCAP in the settlement of claims resulting from our operations. During calendar year 1965, the Republic of Vietnam received approximately 11,000 claims nationwide. These claims are estimated to cost 168 million piasters. Currently, the Republic of Vietnam is vigorously pushing final settlement of all remaining claims for 1965.

Senator MUNDT. The North Vietnamese have destroyed some, too, have they not?

Senator PELL. Yes. Also, add how many have been destroyed by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.

RATES OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ARE CONFLICTING

This brings me back to the question of civilian casualties which was raised, I think, by the Senator from New Jersey.

Actually, last April or May, I asked Secretary McNamara what the rate of civilian casualties was, and he had by chance a table from General Westmoreland which said that up until the 18th of April, presumably that means this calendar year, there were 137 killed and 243 wounded. He said at that time that he was going to give us a more complete report as to what the rate of casualties was. If those figures were correct, it seemed to me that the troops had behaved with tremendous restraint. The figures showed a remarkable record for a country to be able to conduct a war in that limited a way or in that fashion.

There are other reports—including the one cited today, I think by the chairman—which would indicate a considerably larger number of casualties. Just to clear the record, we have been waiting for those figures which were promised to us in two or three weeks ever since last April or early May; and they have not come.

I just wanted the record to show my own view that I think the program that Mr. Marks has been conducting in getting foreign correspondents and reporters to Vietnam is an excellent one. In my opinion it is black propaganda; in my opinion it should be conducted by the CIA; and to my mind, the list of names should not be published.

That is purely an opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say "should not be"?

Senator PELL. To my mind, this is a CIA function.

POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST INVOLVED

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that there is any use in belaboring this; but I think, Mr. Marks, that the reason the question attracts attention is due to the feeling that, in undertaking to pay their transportation, there arises a certain kind of conflict of interest.

Mr. MARKS. I disagree.

The CHAIRMAN. We have many cases of conflict of interest. Take the people who go into the Defense Department, for example. We had before Mr. McNamara, Mr. McElroy and Mr. Wilson, and you know what the requirements are for these people. The requirements are there not because anyone ever suspects Mr. McNamara or Mr. McElroy or Mr. Wilson, but as a matter of Government policy. It is no reflection on newspapermen that theirs are not honorable newspapers or that they are not honorable reporters any more than it is a reflection on Mr. McNamara that they require, or required Mr. McNamara to dispose of his Ford stock.

Mr. MARKS. I don't see any relevance between the two at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the weak human character is so immune from influence that it makes no difference whatever whether the trip is sponsored or he goes on his own? You don't think it makes any difference at all?

NO ANALOGY SHOULD BE MADE TO EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

Mr. MARKS. Senator, one of the great programs of the United States in foreign relations bears your name. We bring students to the United States; we bring teachers to the United States; and they are honored guests and they have a chance to see the way the United States conducts itself, the way the people live, and what we believe in.

I am proud of that program and I hope that you are; I know you are.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CASE. May I interfere in defense of your position? I don't think this analogy is sound. It might possibly be if USIA just provided x dollars for every country and that country chose its own reporters to carry out the task, or some journalistic association in that country made the selection, and you simply made the arrangement for the transportation where they made the selection. There is a difference, and a conflict of interest is possible there.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from New Jersey. He sees exactly the point. I was hoping that I could at least elicit a sympathetic hearing from Mr. Marks about this distinction. I very much resent your using this analogy now. I think it has absolutely no relevance at all. The whole exchange program is diametrically opposed to this procedure, as the Senator from New Jersey has said.

Mr. MARKS. You didn't let me make my point.

The CHAIRMAN. You have made your point twice now, and you are using the exchange program as an analogy and it is not an analogy. If that is your justification, I thoroughly disagree.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, all I am saying is, that giving people an opportunity to see for themselves, asking questions for themselves, is the fundamental of communication.

Now, I hoped that the program I have described to you, even though you don't like the analogy, and I wouldn't say it was analogous, made you understand we are trying to give people the chance to see for themselves in countries where the press is unable or unwilling to spend the money and there are many newspapers that can't afford this. How can you get them the opportunity of reporting from Asian eyes, from Latin American eyes? The only analogy that I would like to make is the Fulbright program brings people to the United States to see for themselves.

Our program allows reporters to see for themselves. Other than that, I don't know how to get this across.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXCHANGE PROGRAM AND USIA SELECTION OF JOURNALISTS

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman. The distinction you have not recognized is the matter of whether you have selected a group which you choose to receive transportation and expenses, or whether this is available for anybody chosen by some outside party, particularly the government of the journalist concerned, or an association of press people in that country. The difference is very great. I am not necessarily against this being done, but your agency should not do it if there is involved any kind of selection which would cast doubt upon the complete impartiality and integrity of your operation as a pure information service.

Mr. MARKS. Well, Senator, to the extent that there is any inference that the newspaperman's opinions, his reporting, will be influenced by the fact that he is being given an airplane ticket, I disagree. I know newspapermen. I have known many, many foreign correspondents. They have a high standard of ethics, in many cases as great as American journalists have. They are just as honorable. And the fact that they receive an airplane ticket does not change their reporting any more than an American newspaperman will report differently because he gets an airplane ticket.

Senator CASE. It troubles me that you don't see this distinction.

Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, sir, we disagree.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that there is any value in pursuing this, but I hope, Mr. Marks, that you will at least think about it. I agree with the Senator from New Jersey that there could well be some value in pursuing this. There is a distinction in my opinion.

I really don't know whether it will do you in the long run much good or not to pursue the matter, but it may.

You became engaged in this program as sort of an affiliate of warfare. Warfare is inhuman and irrational, and I think you are sort of an adjunct of it at the moment. We have to do things that we normally do not approve of, and that, I think, is the final justification for resorting to an unusual method to achieve one's purpose—just as we drop napalm on innocent women and children. It is a sad thing in warfare, but we are doing it. Maybe you have to do this, but I don't like to accept the explanation you gave—that it is the same as the exchange program.

EXAMPLES OF SAMPLE POLLS ABROAD

One last question about the polls. You do consider those polls classified, and not make them available to this committee or anybody, is that correct?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir. We can make anything this committee wants available. Nobody has ever asked for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am just asking to clarify the situation. I think we might be interested in a few sample polls.

Mr. MARKS. We will be glad to furnish them to you, sir.

(Reference to the information referred to follows:)

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, September 8, 1966.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the hearing before your Committee on August 17, 1966 at which time Leonard H. Marks, Director of USIA appeared, you asked for samples of USIA polls. We submit herewith two such polls.

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

Enclosures.

(The two polls entitled "Community Attitudes Toward Binational Centers in Five Cities in Argentina," and "The Semantics of Socialism and Capitalism," are on file in the committee office.)

USIA'S RESEARCH PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a research program?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What size is the budget of the research branch?

Mr. MARKS. In terms of dollars?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. It is a very modest one, I believe, less than 1 percent of our budget. So I would say in the neighborhood of a million and a half dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the nature of that research program?

Mr. MARKS. We try to find out who reads our magazines, who listens to our Voice of America, who watches our films. This is media research and it is primarily that. It is also an analysis of press reporting, editorial opinions, so we know what the problems are in the countries. Those are the fields, primarily.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you hire the Rand Corporation to do research for you?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anyone in your shop who undertakes to assess the effects of certain activities in this country? For example, is there anyone in USIA who worries about whether or not bombing increases or decreases the will of the people to resist or to fight?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you try to assess or evaluate the impact on our troops in Vietnam?

Mr. MARKS. That is a constant process throughout.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you assess the social effects? Do you have what you might call a sociologist?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. One thing prompted by that is a recent article—just yesterday or the day before—in the Washington Post which said that the officials in Saigon were worried about the social problem in connection with the use of American troops in the Delta region south of Saigon. Now, this is a problem which is not in your jurisdiction?

Mr. MARKS. Not in my jurisdiction.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't concern yourself about the social conditions of our troops in Saigon?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir. Mine is information.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

USIA'S DIRECTIVES—LIMITED TO NONMILITARY NEWS

Senator McCARTHY. I have one question, which has to do with the White House memorandum in 1963 which describes the mission of the U.S. Information Agency. I assume you are still operating pretty much under that directive?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator McCARTHY. The last paragraph states that the Agency staffs abroad, acting under the supervision of chiefs of missions, are responsible for the conduct of overt public information, public relations and cultural activities; that is, those activities intended to inform or influence foreign public opinion for agencies of the U.S. Government, except for commands of the Department of Defense.

How is that distinction made?

Mr. MARKS. Distinction?

Senator McCARTHY. Well, it says that you have responsibility for those activities, information public relations and cultural activities tending to influence foreign public opinion for agencies of the U.S. Government—

Mr. MARKS. Right.

Senator McCARTHY. All agencies?

Mr. MARKS. All agencies.

Senator McCARTHY. Except for commands of the Department of Defense.

Mr. MARKS. Here is how it works, Senator. Let us suppose there is an AID project in a particular country. AID does not have information officers abroad, and we do it for them.

Senator McCARTHY. Who handles the Defense Department?

Mr. MARKS. The military do that themselves.

Senator McCARTHY. All of it?

Mr. MARKS. All of it.

Senator McCARTHY. You have nothing to do with it?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. They tell you what you can say or can't say?

Mr. MARKS. We don't get into it.

Senator McCARTHY. It is all around, the information is around. You just don't take information which is sent to you, do you, by an agency? Don't you screen the news and don't you read the ticker tape and decide what is going to be said and what is not?

THE MILITARY DISSEMINATES ITS OWN NEWS

Mr. MARKS. The military disseminates its own.

Senator McCARTHY. You don't give out any kind of military information?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Any kind of information about a military action is not handled by you?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. None of that is handled or handed out through the USIA?

Mr. MARKS. It is all handled by the military.

Senator McCARTHY. The question of the bombing in North Vietnam or Cambodia, wherever it happens, is that all handled by military information authorities?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Senator McCARTHY. They told you what to say?

Mr. MARKS. They don't tell us what to say. They say it.

Senator McCARTHY. You said nothing about that. USIA didn't handle any information about that, that is?

Mr. MARKS. Well, the Voice of America would broadcast it, based upon the reports of Associated Press, United Press, two or more services, they will carry commentary on it, but they do not release it. The military releases it.

Senator McCARTHY. You release some information.

Mr. MARKS. We broadcast. We don't release.

Senator McCARTHY. What is the difference between release and broadcast? You seem to make a point about releasing and say there is a distinction, and I don't know what it is.

Mr. MARKS. An event happens, it has military significance, the military officers will brief the press corps or hand out a release or make a statement. Secretary McNamara, General Westmoreland, or other military officers will release such material to the Voice of America and then we will broadcast that statement.

Do I make it clear?

USIA IS AGENT IN BROADCASTING MILITARY NEWS

Senator McCARTHY. Then you are the agent?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McCARTHY. What about some of the other stories? This is just as good a one as any, I suppose, even though this involves, say, civilian death, you would still be subject to some kind of military

interpretation of whether this should be released or not so far as your agency is concerned?

Mr. MARKS. It is all handled by the military, Senator.

Senator McCARTHY. It is all handled by the military?

Mr. MARKS. Absolutely.

Senator McCARTHY. Then, isn't most of the information that comes out of Vietnam which you put out in Vietnam, originally determined or cleared by the military?

Mr. MARKS. No. We put out nonmilitary information.

Senator McCARTHY. What kind of information?

Mr. MARKS. Civilian; the building of schools, roads, highways, rehabilitation.

Senator McCARTHY. Action in Saigon—

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Senator McCARTHY. But the other information having to do with the bombing of individuals and things of that sort, that is all determined, whether or not you would use it, that is handled by the military?

Mr. MARKS. We have nothing to do with it.

Senator McCARTHY. Was that true of all of the reporters you took over. Were they limited in that same way?

Mr. MARKS. Limited how?

Senator McCARTHY. Could they report only the things under USIA's jurisdiction?

Mr. MARKS. Sure.

Senator McCARTHY. Not on military matters?

Mr. MARKS. They report on military matters, but I said—

Senator McCARTHY. Only if the military says they may.

Mr. MARKS. We have no authority in the military field.

IS USIA AN OBJECTIVE SOURCE OF NEWS OR A PROPAGANDA AGENCY?

Senator McCARTHY. Do you look upon the Agency primarily as an objective and end source of information and news, or is it primarily a propaganda agency?

Mr. MARKS. It depends upon your definition of propaganda. If you mean by propaganda—

Senator McCARTHY. I am not calling for any misrepresentation, but rather a matter of withholding certain information rather than releasing it so that you could influence opinion?

Mr. MARKS. No, sir; we report these facts as they take place. We do not withhold information.

Senator McCARTHY. You report on all the facts?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir; to the extent they are available, we report them.

Senator McCARTHY. You don't hold them back if they might have an adverse effect—

Mr. MARKS. We do not.

Senator McCARTHY (continuing). Effect on the reaction to the American policy?

Mr. MARKS. We do not, and I made that point quite clear before you came in, and I want to repeat it. We do not. We report bad, we report good, we try to put it in perspective and you can't be a creditable news source without that policy.

Senator McCARTHY. You report the bad and good as given to you by the information officers of the Department of Defense?

Mr. MARKS. You are confusing two things.

Senator McCARTHY. I think this is a vital distinction. If you say that the determination of all the information you put out having to do with military matters depends entirely upon what the Department of Defense says you can say, this is a major area of information in which you are not an independent and objective source of information, by your own determination.

Mr. MARKS. Senator, to the extent that we have any jurisdiction, we are a full, objective, independent, and I hope completely reliable and creditable news service and information service.

Senator McCARTHY. But your jurisdiction is limited.

Mr. MARKS. We do not have any jurisdiction on military matters—period.

I don't know how to make it any clearer.

Senator McCARTHY. That's clear enough. I just wanted it to be clear.

Mr. MARKS. All right.

"THE FACE OF ANGUISH"

The CHAIRMAN. That magazine that you held up a moment ago with the atrocity pictures in it—

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Mr. MARKS. It is called "The Face of Anguish," and it contains pictures of Vietcong atrocities.

The CHAIRMAN. Who published it?

Mr. MARKS. The U.S. Information Service published it and made it available throughout the area.

The CHAIRMAN. Did those pictures come from the military?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know where they came from, sir. I think most of them came from our photographers and the Vietnamese Information Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the military or the Pentagon clear it?

Mr. MARKS. No, they did not clear it. We never submitted it to them for clearing, because this has nothing to do with the military. These are civilians.

Senator McCARTHY. If it was a wounded soldier, you couldn't print it unless they allowed it?

Mr. MARKS. I don't think they would say that we couldn't print it, sir. That is not a military action; that is the only thing that needs clearing.

The CHAIRMAN. The only thing what?

Mr. MARKS. We don't have jurisdiction over military combat action, military events. You can certainly take a picture of a soldier.

DIFFICULTY IN REPORTING NEWS—THE "RIGHT TO LIE"

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arthur Sylvester is reported in the press, I believe, to have a different view about supplying information than you have; is that not correct?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know his views, sir; you will have to ask him. Senator McCARTHY. He talked about the right to lie.

The CHAIRMAN. It was reported in the press—maybe it was just an opinion of some reporter—but it was stated that he felt he had a right to deceive the reporters and the public in the interest of the prosecution of the war. I thought the point the Senator from Minnesota was making was that you are under some handicap when it comes to reporting about the war because you have to get much of your information from the Pentagon. It is not your fault that you don't have firsthand access to it, which I assume you would not, would you? You would be in a very difficult situation to report this information in a fashion contrary and contradictory to that which the Pentagon reports. I wouldn't expect you to do that.

So, in that particular area, you are under some wraps.

Mr. MARKS. That is not my affair.

The CHAIRMAN. To report about the war.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. What is this magazine about?

Mr. MARKS. Those are pictures, sir, not about military engagements, they are pictures about the Vietcong atrocities. The Vietcong come in the stealth of the night and take the mayor or the school-teacher and put a knife through his back in order to intimidate and terrorize that village. The Vietcong come and burn homes and exact payment from people who refuse to submit to their jurisdiction. That is what it is. It has nothing to do with the American military.

The CHAIRMAN. Not just the American military, but I thought it was related to the war.

Mr. MARKS. It is related to the war, it is a Vietcong pamphlet.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Marks.

Mr. MARKS. I genuinely appreciate this opportunity to appear before you and I hope that you will let me come back to talk with you on any problems that we may help with.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee stood adjourned.)

The first of these was the fact that the press was not a free press. It was controlled by the government and the press was not free to report on the government. The second was the fact that the press was not free to report on the government. The third was the fact that the press was not free to report on the government. The fourth was the fact that the press was not free to report on the government. The fifth was the fact that the press was not free to report on the government. The sixth was the fact that the press was not free to report on the government. The seventh was the fact that the press was not free to report on the government. The eighth was the fact that the press was not free to report on the government. The ninth was the fact that the press was not free to report on the government. The tenth was the fact that the press was not free to report on the government.

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NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221 New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Lausche, Clark, McCarthy, McGee, and Aiken.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Committee on Foreign Relations this morning is holding a second public hearing on the subject of Government information policies toward developments in Vietnam and southeast Asia as a whole. We have invited as our witness today Mr. Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

It will be recalled that two weeks ago the committee received testimony from Mr. Leonard Marks, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, concerning both this broad question and the specific issue of USIA-subsidized Vietnam tours by foreign journalists. On the broader question, it is no exaggeration to say that inquiries by committee members on military-related topics were unproductive. Mr. Marks disavowed any direct connection with the dissemination of news about military activities in Vietnam and referred us to the Department of Defense. In these circumstances, I have requested Mr. Sylvester to discuss the policy of the Department of Defense in providing both U.S. and foreign news media with information on developments in southeast Asia.

Almost continuously over the past two years the Defense Department has been charged by responsible journalists and newspapers with managing, or mismanaging, the flow of news from Vietnam. At this point, without objection, I shall insert in the record some of these charges.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the Congressional Record, June 7, 1966]

NEW YORK TIMES, April 23, 1965: "The credibility of the United States government has been one of the numerous casualties of the war in Vietnam . . . Mistaken judgments are understandable—though, if too frequent, indefensible; but deliberate distortion or obfuscation, or the selection or repression of facts for propaganda purposes, is inexcusable. Americans are dying in Vietnam and more will die; there should be no misunderstanding whatsoever about what they are dying for—or why."

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, December 1, 1965: "A government, like a man, can be caught in only a few misrepresentations before people refuse to believe anything it says. Much of the current clamor against the U.S. Vietnamese policy is probably based in just such a feeling. A democratic government has a moral obligation to be candid with its citizens; and lack of candor poisons the open dis-

ussion often necessary to sound policy and public support. But even from the narrow viewpoint of its own self-interest, the Administration should recognize that its credibility is a precious but easily expendable asset."

The WASHINGTON STAR, January 20, 1966: "Now, in 1966, the country certainly could do with a little more truth in government and a little less fiscal sleight of hand."

The WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 23, 1965: "Time after time high-ranking representatives of government—in Washington and in Saigon—have obscured, confused, or distorted news from Vietnam, or have made fatuously erroneous evaluations about the course of the war, for public consumption . . . Yet the contradictions, the double-talk, the half-truths released in the name of the United States government about the Vietnamese War are not the fault of the USIA alone. The problem goes back to the Pentagon, to the State Department, and to the White House."

Joseph Alsop, in a speech to the American Foreign Service Association, March 25, 1965: "An official is a man by definition doing the public's business. The public has a right, and the public has a need, to know about its business . . . The truth is that practices have grown up in the American government in the last years—and particularly quite recently—of a kind that amount to an unseen and . . . extremely unhealthy change in the basic American system."

"Our government . . . lives and moves and acts by public information. It does not matter what an inner group of policymakers may decide. If the public is not adequately informed, if they do not understand the problem, the decisions that the policymakers make will not be publicly supported, and so the job will not be done."

Walter Cronkite, CBS News, speech to the Inland Press Association, Chicago, February 22, 1966: "The very foundation of the democratic system is built on honesty and the belief in the honesty of our fellow men . . . Yet the political lie has become a way of bureaucratic life. It has been called by the more genteel name of 'news management.' I say here now, let's call it what it is—lying."

"I would like to suggest that one of the reasons for the great confusion which wracks this nation today over the Vietnam War is the fact that we were committed without a proper airing of the facts—all the facts. This Administration and preceding ones did not level with the American people on the nature or scope of the commitment which, I submit, they themselves must have known was one of the ultimates of our policy."

Carl T. Rowan, former Director of USIA, in the Washington Star, January 26, 1966: "The question most often asked goes like this: 'Is the government telling the American public the truth about Viet Nam?' . . . 'How much is being held back to cover up other mistakes by McNamara and the rest of the Administration?' You listen and soon sense that the questioners are neither doves nor hawks. They are members of that great middle mass of Americans who want to feel committed in the great Viet Nam debate but feel too poorly informed to take a firm stand . . . The people who have questioned me seem to understand that the national security requires the withholding of certain military and diplomatic information from the public. But these people make the point, a valid one I think, that the public does have a right to know about and discuss the options before major new decisions are made. . . . This is what the public wants and an administration that wants solid public support, as I know this one does, ought quickly to find a way to provide it."

J. Russell Wiggins, editor, Washington Post, in his book, "Freedom or Secrecy": "If a government repeatedly resorts to lies in crises where lies seem to serve its interests best, it will one day be unable to employ the truth effectively when truth would serve its interests best. A government that too readily rationalizes its right to lie in a crisis will never lack for either lies or crises."

Richard Reston, Los Angeles Times, December 29, 1965: "The President's latest problem is one of fading public confidence in official government pronouncements on the conduct of U.S. diplomacy in Viet Nam. Indeed, Washington is having trouble maintaining both at home and abroad the kind of credibility needed to support its political position. It is this loss of confidence that now gives rise to doubts and even suspicions about whether the Administration really means what is being said * * *."

James Reston, New York Times, May 17, 1966: "What he (LBJ) wants is worthy of the faith and confidence of the nation, but this is precisely what he does not have, because his techniques blur his conviction. * * * He is mixing up news and truth. * * * He is confronted, in short, with a crisis of confidence."

David Lawrence, column in the Washington Star, April 27, 1965: "Perhaps the whole controversy would not have reached the climax that it has in recent weeks

if there had not been a prelude—namely, an era of so-called managed news at the Pentagon. This has left an unfortunate blemish on the record. When the only news given out is designed to accomplish a political purpose, confidence on the part of the public in the accuracy of what is printed is bound to wane."

Clark Mollenhoff, Cowles Publications, in his book, "Washington Cover-up": "No single factor is more important to the strength of our democracy than the free flow of accurate information about the government's operation. The citizen in a democracy must know what his government is doing, or he will lack the soundest basis for judging the candidates and the platforms of our political parties."

James Deakin, St. Louis Post Dispatch, in the New Republic, January 29, 1966: "The essential veracity of an American government has seldom been a prolonged case of doubt. This is why persistent charges of a 'credibility gap' in the Johnson Administration merit examination."

Anatole Shub, Washington Post Foreign Service, dispatch from Bonn, May 7, 1966: "The 'credibility gap' which has affected the Johnson Administration's pronouncements on Vietnam appears to have spread to this part of the world. A few West German officials still profess to know what U.S. policy here is going to be over the next year, but even these officials show no great confidence in their beliefs. . . . The trouble is that . . . the Administration has been saying one thing one day, doing something else on the next . . . Wild rumors proliferate in all directions, and most of them seem to have some official source. The impression is strong that either the United States is playing it by ear from day to day, without making up its mind on any of these issues, or else that so many different minds in the Administration have been made up that nobody really knows which one counts."

Doris Fleeson, column in the Washington Star, May 4, 1965: "News management in the Nation's Capital is currently more deliberate and sweeping than it ever was during World War II or the Korean period . . . Before the wellsprings of public discussion are further damaged or dried up, the Johnson Administration urgently needs to recognize that there is no point trying to win the world while doing irreparable injury here at home."

Jack Steele, Scripps-Howard, in the Washington Daily News, March 7, 1966: "There is a big 'confidence gap' today between Mr. McNamara and key Senate and House leaders in the fields of military and foreign policy who do not share President Johnson's faith in his Defense Secretary. . . . (It is) largely the result of heavy-handed Pentagon censorship of questions raised by Congress about the nation's military preparedness and Mr. McNamara's emotional outburst last week in answering charges that the Viet Nam war has stretched thin the nation's military manpower and equipment."

Saul Pett, Associated Press, in the Washington Star, March 6, 1966: "In a town of passing prose favorites, this year's phrase so far is the 'credibility gap' in government. Does it in fact exist? It does, or seems to, and seeming to, it exists. Among students of the Lyndon Johnson school of window dressing, there are those who detect a tendency to be passionately secretive about innocuous details, to become righteously indignant when transparent political motives are suggested, and to overdress the window. . . . Lyndon Johnson has been known to have an acute sense of secrecy dating back to his Senate days. An old friend and aide once tried to explain it: 'I think it's the gambler or politician in him. He just doesn't like to reveal his next move. He plays things close to the vest.'"

Morley Safer, CBS News, in "Dateline 1966," the annual publication of the Overseas Press Club of America. Mr. Safer reports on an informal meeting of war correspondents covering Vietnam in the summer of 1965 with Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester at the residence of Barry Zorthian, Minister Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon:

"Zorthian was less relaxed than usual. He was anxious for Sylvester to get an idea of the mood of the news corps. There had been some annoying moments in previous weeks that had directly involved Sylvester's own office. In the first B-52 raids, Pentagon releases were in direct contradiction to what had actually happened on the ground in Vietnam.

"Also, those of us involved in broadcasting were anxious to discuss the increasing problems of communication. There was general opening banter, which Sylvester quickly brushed aside. He seemed anxious to take a stand—to say something that would jar us. He did:

"I can't understand how you fellows can write what you do while American boys are dying out here," he began. Then he went on to the effect that American correspondents had a patriotic duty to disseminate only information that made the United States look good.

"A network television correspondent said, 'Surely, Arthur, you don't expect the American press to be the handmaidens of government.'

"That's exactly what I expect,' came the reply.

"An agency man raised the problem that had preoccupied Ambassador Taylor and Barry Zorthian—about the credibility of American officials. Responded the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs:

"Look, if you think any American official is going to tell you the truth, then you're stupid. Did you hear that?—*stupid.*'

"One of the most respected of all the newsmen in Vietnam—a veteran of World War II, the Indochina War and Korea—suggested that Sylvester was being deliberately provocative. Sylvester replied:

"Look, I don't even have to talk to you people. I know how to deal with you through your editors and publishers back in the States.'

"At this point, the Hon. Arthur Sylvester put his thumbs in his ears, bulged his eyes, stuck out his tongue and wiggled his fingers.

"A correspondent for one of the New York papers began a question. He never got beyond the first few words. Sylvester interrupted:

"Aw, come on. What does someone in New York care about the war in Vietnam?"

PUBLIC DOUBTS TRUTH OF WAR INFORMATION

The CHAIRMAN. In this most complicated of wars, it is vital that the public be accurately informed about the trend of events in the area. Much of the frustration among the American people is not caused by the difficulties we face abroad—we have an outstanding record of meeting hostile challenges—but by the difficulty experienced in understanding this particular conflict. And the problem seems intensified by a public suspicion that our Government is deliberately refraining from providing adequate and accurate information. Recent public opinion polls indicate that a significant number of people do not feel they have been given the truth about the war.

I am hoping this morning's testimony will clarify this issue by explaining Defense Department policies and procedure in the fullest detail consonant with national security.

Mr. Sylvester, we are very pleased to have you this morning.

Do you have a prepared statement to open with?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you proceed, sir.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF ARTHUR SYLVESTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY COL. WINANT SIDLE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLIC AFFAIRS; AND COL. FORREST I. RETTGERS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LEGAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the war in Vietnam is the most intensely covered conflict in history.

As of last Saturday, August 27, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was providing around-the-clock assistance to 419 news media representatives from 22 different nations. In addition to coverage of military actions, these newsmen are also reporting to readers and viewers around the world on the political, economic, and psychological aspects of this struggle against Communist aggression. Based on the number of requests for assistance received by my office from media members planning to go to Saigon, the number of newsmen in Vietnam will continue to increase.

One hundred and seventy-nine of the reporters in Vietnam today are Americans. Dozens of foreigners also work for American media. A moment's reflection will suggest the intense competition for news that results from this unprecedented coverage.

As you gentlemen may know, I worked as a reporter for many years before I began my present duties more than five years ago. I am well aware of the benefits and problems created by competition on all operations, including relatively small actions and activities. Platoon, even squad actions often are covered in depth in Vietnam and extended reports appear on TV, in our newspapers, and over the radio from that harassed land that would have rated only a paragraph in World War II or during the Korean war. As a result, the big picture frequently is blurred by the mass of material being reported each day. Moreover, any reporter who has listened in a police court to a number of eyewitnesses describe the same automobile accident soon learns to expect discrepancy and divergency in the accounts. There should be no surprise then when 20 to 50 reporters are spread out over a disjointed and ill-defined battlefield in jungle or otherwise rough terrain. The problem is not mendacity but human fallibility.

AMERICAN NEWSMEN IN VIETNAM NEED GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE

It is obvious, and they are the first to say it, that American newsmen in Vietnam need help from their Government if they are to report accurately and objectively to the American public. The Department of Defense public affairs policy is to provide them with all possible help, both in Vietnam and here in the United States.

I believe strongly that we have met the unique public affairs challenge of this war with a dynamic and successful response. I salute particularly the hard-working information personnel of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam—MACV as it is more commonly called. I fear that only a few of us are aware of the magnitude of the service to the media provided by these dedicated officers and enlisted men in support of Gen. William C. Westmoreland.

STATISTICS OF SUPPORT RENDERED BY MACV

I have available some statistics concerning the scope of the support rendered by MACV information personnel since October 1965 when our troop buildup reached major proportions. Since that time, and exclusive of the activities of scores of information personnel of combat and logistics troop units in the field, the MACV information office has:

- Arranged more than 4,700 in-country trips by newsmen, to include ground and air transportation;

- Arranged for or conducted almost 6,900 briefings and 108 background meetings;

- Answered more than 32,000 telephone queries from newsmen;

- Been consulted individually by newsmen on 3,300 occasions;

- Conducted daily press briefings in Saigon, 7 days a week; average attendance—130 correspondents;

- Conducted the U.S. portion of the accreditation of all correspondents arriving in Vietnam.

To handle this unusually large workload, we have put the very best professional information officers and noncommissioned officers we can

find into the information positions at MACV. We have established daily scheduled plane flights for newsmen out of Saigon to eight major areas throughout the country. We have installed sole-user teletype circuits within Vietnam to assist MACV and the press in providing information, transmitting news copy, and answering questions.

Here in Washington, we have done our best to back up the MACV information effort in every way. I have established an office specifically designed for this purpose, manned by three topflight information officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The portion of my office which deals directly and continuously with the press has a southeast Asia desk which does nothing but service media and public requests for information concerning the conflict in Vietnam. Since last October, my office has:

- Issued 577 news releases concerning Vietnam;

- Answered over 16,000 news queries concerning Vietnam;

- Released 641 photos related to Vietnam;

- Released 157 TV-newsfilms about Vietnam;

- Assisted the networks in the production of 24 TV documentaries concerning Vietnam. In addition, MACV assisted with 11 other documentaries;

- Arranged for 74 interviews with DOD officials concerning Vietnam and conducted over 450 briefings for individual newsmen;

- Conducted 28 press conferences to include such individuals as the Secretary of Defense, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Surgeon General of the Army, and top combat leaders returning from Vietnam;

- Arranged for more than 50 background meetings with top Defense officials.

TRANSPORTING U.S. NEWSMEN TO VIETNAM BEGAN IN 1964

I have been talking until now about the public affairs situation in recent months. Back in 1964, this situation was considerably different. Then, there were only about 40 newsmen, including foreign journalists, in Vietnam. As a consequence, there was considerable concern within the Defense Department that the people of the United States were not receiving adequate factual information concerning our efforts in Vietnam.

To assist in remedying this situation we began, in July 1964, a temporary program to transport U.S. correspondents to Vietnam. We had three main reasons for this program: (1) to give U.S.-based newsmen a better understanding of Vietnam and our involvement there, (2) to help assure a balanced output of on-the-scene news, and (3) to stimulate the news media to send experienced reporters to Vietnam under their own sponsorship.

The concept called for transporting two to four newsmen every 4 weeks for a stay of approximately 10 days each. Selection was based on requests for participation, the type of media concerned and the geographical spread of the media involved. Except for transportation all other costs were paid by the news media.

The program began on July 17, 1964, and we sent 82 newsmen to Vietnam before we terminated the program in August of 1965. These newsmen came from large and small newspapers and newspaper groups,

wire services, syndicates, magazines of all types, and TV and radio stations and networks. Every part of the nation was represented.

You will recall that we began our military buildup in Vietnam—first by increasing the number of advisers and later by dispatch of combat troops—in the summer of 1964. By the summer of 1965, the press corps in Vietnam had conducted a buildup of its own and had increased from 40 to about 450. There was a steady increase of newsmen from the United States going without Defense Department assistance, and the flow of news to the American public had been expanded. Since our objectives were largely accomplished, the program was terminated in mid-August 1965.

Since then, the Department of Defense has not approved any military travel by newsmen to Vietnam.

RESULTS OF PROGRAM

I cannot, of course, claim that our program was solely responsible for the attainment of the objectives I mentioned. However, I consider the program to have been a success in that it clearly contributed significantly to “priming the pump” of U.S. and world media interest in the struggle for freedom in Vietnam. Not only are our major media now represented in Vietnam, but also they are generally represented by first-rate correspondents characteristic of first-rate American news organizations.

These newsmen are searching out and filing reports which contribute to broadening public appreciation and understanding of the situation in Vietnam. Some reporters of both sexes, brave men and women like Dickie Chappell of Readers Digest and Sam Kasten of Look, have unfortunately paid with their lives as a result of their untiring search for news. There is no greater evidence of devotion to profession.

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY

Let me say in conclusion that the public affairs policy of the Department of Defense as it relates to Vietnam or, for that matter, to any part of the world or any military activity, is based on two principles.

First, the safety of our fighting men which, of course, relates directly to the safeguarding of information of value to the enemy.

Second, within the limitations of the first principle, the provision of the maximum amount of truthful-factual information to the people of the United States, whether it be sought by news people or not.

I believe that these two principles must govern the public affairs activity of any department or agency of the Government. I also believe that the Department of Defense has applied these principles effectively in its public affairs activities.

I will be glad to try to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sylvester.

SAFEGUARDING INFORMATION VALUABLE TO ENEMY

Regarding the last statement you made—the question of reconciling your No. 1 principle, which you mentioned is the safety of our fighting men, with the limitations on factual information—who makes the decision as to whether or not any given bit of information threatens the safety of our fighting men? Do you make that decision?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman. That decision has been made and a certain number of ground rules have been accepted by newsmen in Vietnam as a consequence of considerations by General Westmoreland and his commanders. They are very few, but important.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not quite follow that. Does Westmoreland exercise a censorship on this basis?

Mr. SYLVESTER. There is no censorship exercised at all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps the word "censorship" offends you. However, if these two principles guide the availability of news, it means that someone has to judge whether any given story will affect the safety of our fighting men. Who applies these principles? This is what I meant by censorship, in a broad sense.

Mr. SYLVESTER. There are few agreed-upon voluntary restrictions which the newsmen in Vietnam observe at the request of our military people out there. There is no other restriction and there is no way any given story is seen beforehand by our people. This puts on each newsman the responsibility for observance of these agreed-upon principles.

The CHAIRMAN. And if the newsman does not conform to your Department's views as to what is useful or dangerous to our fighting men, then he no longer receives the cooperation of the Department?

Mr. SYLVESTER. There have been two cases of men who have jeopardized the security of our troops in the judgment of the military people in Vietnam. These two men have had their accreditation lifted for 30 days. One of them has since gone back; the other one is also operating.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were they? Is that a public matter?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I would consider it in the case of Mr. Jack Foisie—who told the Associated Press that he was wrong and made, in effect, a public confession—a public matter. He writes for the Los Angeles Times.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not urging you to reveal anything.

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, Mr. Foisie, himself, was interviewed by the Associated Press. The stories ran all over the country.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF CENSORSHIP

The CHAIRMAN. What I was leading to is that I do not know how you apply these principles. These principles mean nothing if they are just in a vacuum. Somebody has to determine whether or not a given story is in any way prejudicial to the safety of the fighting men. I just wondered how that is applied.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think we have to point out first that we ask the newsmen out there not to reveal the arrival of troops, not to reveal that troops have been put in action until the military people feel that there is no further value in withholding this information from the enemy. Each newsman has to use his judgment on that. He has at his beck and call a large corps of information officers in Vietnam headed by Col. Rodger Bankson, who can inform him whether this material is releasable.

The CHAIRMAN. I would not think that kind of discretion is particularly difficult for the newsmen. But the way you report how the

war is going, the conditions under which our people fight, and so on, can become very interesting and could arouse feelings in this country about the war that might not be in accord with the views of the Defense Department. I think this is the area where it gets very difficult to apply these principles.

RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT TO LIE

I have a statement, where you are reported to have said at the Sigma Delta Chi dinner in New York:

* * * it's inherent in that government's right, if necessary, to lie to save itself when it's going up into a nuclear war. This seems to me basic. * * *

That is consistent, I assume, with the first principle. I think it is one that probably all governments follow if that actually is the case. The trouble is deciding when you are going to apply this, is it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, the allegation that I have stated the government has a right to lie is without foundation.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that not so?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I can only tell you what I have already told two congressional committees under oath. Obviously, no government information program can be based on lies. It must always be based on truthful facts. When any nation is faced with nuclear disaster, with the life of its people at stake, the representatives of those people do not immediately tell all the facts to the enemy merely to respond to a news inquiry. That and that alone is what I have talked about, despite quotations and misquotations to the contrary.

No government official ever has the right to lie, but he always has the duty to protect his country.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very glad to have you clear up that matter. Sometimes the protection of the country might require a lie, might it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not visualize any. I can understand withholding information for a given time.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you clarified that. Is that also true of a statement attributed to you in which you said, according to Morley Safer of CBS News,

Look, if you think any American official is going to tell the truth, then you're stupid. Did you hear that? Stupid.

Is that not true, either?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would like to say categorically, no. I would like to say the meeting Mr. Safer discussed was a meeting at the home in Saigon of the Minister Counselor of the U.S. Embassy, Mr. Barry Zorthian in July. The meeting included Mr. Safer of CBS. He and his colleagues went there for drinks; drinks were served. It was a completely off the record meeting. There was an exchange—a rather frank exchange of views. Mr. Safer's misrepresentations of what I said are comparable to his misrepresentation of the Marines which won him a prize. I did not say that. I do not believe that. I never lived as a newsmen that way.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you have an opportunity to clarify the record.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It has been clarified. My denial has been in the Congressional Record, but it does not seem to have had much effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Lots of things get in the Record and people pay no attention to them and it takes some different occasion to draw attention to them.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I appreciate the opportunity granted to me.

USIA'S ROLE IN SAIGON

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Leonard Marks in his statement stated that USIA has nothing to do with the news media in Saigon.

It is my understanding that Mr. Barry Zorthian is the head of the U.S. public affairs office in Saigon and that that office basically controls the information given to all journalists in the area.

Is that correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. May I answer it at some length?

It is basically correct. Historically, Mr. Zorthian was formerly attached to the USIA. Because of that association, there was a tendency on the part of some news heads and others to criticize, I think unfairly, the fact that a USIA man was Minister Counselor or the head of information in Saigon. This, of course, is a pattern followed, as I am sure you know even better than I, in all our missions around the world. The Ambassador is basically—not only basically—is actually the head of our operation, regardless of what it may be, information or anything else. He usually has as his chief information officer a USIA man. This had been the case in Vietnam. As I said, some news heads in this country and elsewhere criticized this, saying that inevitably, Mr. Zorthian, as the USIA man, is under a requirement to put our best foot forward. Mr. Zorthian some time back, about two years ago, was detached from the USIA. He reports directly to the State Department. He is the overall head responsible to the Ambassador, who is responsible for all of the news operation.

As a practical matter, this has been divided into two halves, the military and the nonmilitary. The military half is directed by Col. Rodger Bankson under the direction of General Westmoreland. All other information, all other activities in the information field are under Mr. Zorthian. That is the setup today.

I would say that Mr. Leonard Marks was correct in what he said.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES FOR NEWS RELEASES

The CHAIRMAN. Then as far as the military goes, Zorthian merely transmits, you might say, the data from military commanders. Is that correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Mr. Zorthian and Colonel Bankson have a very close working arrangement. Over the years that he has been there, Mr. Zorthian has been one of the strongest exponents for making sure that a wide flow of news has emanated from Vietnam. He continues to advise, he continues to work with, he continues to meet with Colonel Bankson, and there is a very fine back-and-forth flow of information and advice. The military information is given by military officers and the MACV staff, both at briefings and throughout the 24 hours of the day. This information of course is available to USIA and of course, since our Government officials are Government-cleared for security, they have access to even more information.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Defense Department have policy guidelines on what information may be released to the press in Vietnam?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The guidelines have been worked out in Vietnam by Colonel Bankson's office with the newsmen out there. They are the usual guidelines that always develop and are always applied where military operations take place.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you furnish the committee with copies of the guidelines?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I would be happy to.

(The information referred to follows:)

GUIDELINES CURRENTLY VOLUNTARILY USED BY NEWS MEDIA IN VIETNAM
CONCERNING RELEASE OF COMBAT INFORMATION

The current guidelines are contained in three separate documents, all attached. They are:

1. "Release of Combat Information," dated July 14, 1965.
2. "Release of Air Strike Information," undated.
3. "Combat Photography," dated April 25, 1966.

July 14, 1965

RELEASE OF COMBAT INFORMATION

In recent weeks the war in South Vietnam has been characterized by relatively protracted and large-scale engagements. This intensification of combat action beyond that similar periods in previous years raises serious questions about the methods we have hitherto employed to brief newsmen on the military situation. In the past, in view of the scattered and small-scale nature of most combat actions, it has been the practice to (a) report casualties into three categories (KIA, WIA and MIA) on a daily basis with unit identification, and (b) identify and report the deployment of military units even before their commitment to battle.

In the interest of military security, it is essential that we deny the Viet Cong and the Hanoi regime information that would be of value to them in their prosecution of the war effort. Information on the movements to actions and their losses in those actions gives the enemy a tremendous advantage in making tactical decisions. These decisions may relate to deployment of his forces, when, where, and in what strength to launch an offensive or counter-offensive, whether he should establish and ambush or withdraw in the face of superior strength.

Therefore, effective July 15, 1965, it has been agreed between the GVN and U.S. Mission that:

1. There will be no casualty reports and unit identification on a daily basis or related to specific actions except in general terms such as "light, moderate or heavy." Casualty summaries will continue to be reported on a weekly basis, without unit identification, in the weekly briefings in Saigon and the statistical summary released at the Pentagon. Procedures for notifying next of kin will not be changed, nor will the practice of releasing in Washington the name, rank, casualty status, branch of service and emergency addresses of casualties following notification of next of kin.

2. Troop movements or deployments will not repeat not be announced nor confirmed until such time as military evaluation determines such information is clearly in the possession of the Viet Cong.

3. When battles have been joined, units participating therein will not be identified by specific type or number, although the general magnitude of friendly involvement will be announced.

Correspondents are requested to observe those limitations on a voluntary basis.—Particular caution should be exercised in regard to information which correspondents may obtain from their own resources on the movement of troops before their commitment to battle, on identification of units in combat and on official casualty figures. It is recognized that correspondents may speculate on casualty figures based on eyewitness reports but that they are particularly requested to regard any information received from official sources as privileged until announced by appropriate MACV channels.

RELEASE OF AIR STRIKE INFORMATION

The release of information on air strikes in North Vietnam must take into account considerations of military security. Official briefers as well as all other U.S. and Vietnamese civil and military personnel are under instructions to observe necessary security requirements in providing information to correspondents.

However, under the circumstances existing in Vietnam, correspondents frequently will come into possession of such information. In order to provide the maximum protection possible to our military forces, the American Mission requests all correspondents on a voluntary basis to refrain from filing such information or discussing it over communications facilities. This request is made purely for reasons of military security and is based on the assumption that the press corps is prepared to cooperate in observing necessary military security.

The following represents a listing of the ground rules on information pertaining to air strikes which must be observed by official briefers and other American and Vietnamese official personnel. It is made available to correspondents in order to provide a guide to their own observance of what falls under the heading of military security and also to forestall questions which may not be answered at briefings.

The following information will normally be released as soon as available:

1. Target or targets hit, giving location and general category of target.
2. Statement as to whether it was VNAF, U.S. or joint VNAF/U.S. strike.
3. Whether aircraft were land-based and/or naval aircraft. Names of carriers when naval aircraft are involved.
4. Number of crew members who have been picked-up. Total number of aircraft down will not be released as long as it can adversely affect SAR efforts on behalf of crew members not yet retrieved.
5. Time of attack.
6. General characterization of success of the mission.
7. Ordnance expended in general terms such as 250 lb frags, 500 lb general purpose bombs, rockets, 50 calibre ammo, 20mm. Tonnage of ordnance in round numbers.
8. Number of strike aircraft in mission in round numbers. Number of associated support aircraft in round numbers but differentiated from strike aircraft figures.
9. Types of aircraft involved.
10. Weather enroute and over the target during the strike.
11. Enemy anti-aircraft ground fire in general terms as to volume and type.
12. Pilot sightings of unfriendly aircraft.

The following restrictions will be observed for security reasons

1. No information on aircraft taking off for strikes, or on strikes actually in progress or on aircraft enroute to or returning from the target areas. Strikes will be confirmed and available information released as soon as possible after the return of aircraft to their bases.
2. No official comment or identification of names of land bases, either in or out of Vietnam, or any indication of location of bases from which aircraft launched.
3. No information on number of aircraft damaged. Total aircraft lost will be released only when SAR operations have been completed and release of information cannot adversely affect SAR efforts on behalf of crew members not yet retrieved.
4. No tactical specifics such as altitudes, courses, speeds, angle of attack. May use general terms such as "low and fast."
5. No information on planned or future strikes.
6. No confirmation or discussion of planned strikes which do not take place for weather or other reasons.
7. No official comment or discussion on rules of engagement.
8. No information on enemy air reaction other than that actually seen by strike personnel, or on effectiveness on anti-aircraft ground fire and damage to U.S. aircraft.

Members of the Military Assistance Command press information office are available to discuss with you any questions you may have in regard to the above request.

COMBAT PHOTOGRAPHY

1. The most personally sensitive information in any war is that pertaining to casualties. This is particularly true with respect to the notification of next of

kin. It is for this reason that the services have been directed to insure that an officer of the service concerned personally delivers the first notification to the next of kin of a U.S. casualty.

2. During the war in Vietnam there have been instances in which the next of kin first have learned of the death or injury of a loved one through news media coverage. Such instances almost invariably involve visual media. Casualty photographs can show a recognizable face, name tag, distinctive item of jewelry or other identifying feature or item of apparel. Next of kin must learn about casualties first through official channels. The anguish that sudden recognition through unofficial news sources can cause is, without exception, out of all proportion to the "news value" of any commercial news photograph or film.

3. The casualty reporting and notification systems of the services are in effect around the clock and use high priority communications. Names of casualties whose next of kin have been notified can be verified by the MACV Information Office or by the Directorate of Information Services in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

4. An equally important consideration is the fact that a man recently wounded usually is in a state of shock and often is under the effects of pain suppressants. Therefore, he is not normal in his actions, not in the mental condition to remember or be concerned about his right of privacy and not in the physical condition to protect himself. This situation places the burden of responsibility on the media to respect the right of privacy and to observe the principles of propriety and good taste. A man who has been hurt has the right to suffer in private.

5. In the war in Vietnam complete reliance has been placed on news media representatives. There has been no effort to impose restrictions on movement of audio-visual correspondents in the field or to require in-country processing, review and editing of audio-visual material produced by accredited correspondents. We hope to preserve these freedoms and ask that correspondents cooperate by—

a. Not taking close-up pictures of casualties that show faces or anything else that will identify the individual.

b. Not interviewing or recording the voices of casualties until a medical officer determines that the man is physically and mentally able, and the individual gives permission.

CHARGE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AGAINST NEWSMEN

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sylvester, the general manager of the Associated Press, as I understand it, has charged that you have conducted guerrilla warfare against the newsmen. What does he mean by that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have not the slightest idea, Mr. Chairman. I do not believe it can be documented.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought perhaps you had some explanation of that charge.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you repeat your first question on this subject?

The CHAIRMAN. I asked Mr. Sylvester to explain why the general manager of the Associated Press has charged him with conducting a guerrilla warfare against newsmen in Vietnam? He did charge that, I am told. Is that right?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Are you referring to Mr. Wes Gallagher?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It does not come to my mind what he charged. He has been unhappy, but I do not recall things he has charged. I would only say there is no guerrilla warfare and I think the record of any newsman who has written about this in public or in private would indicate that. Obviously, Mr. Gallagher may have reasons, may have cases which he is unhappy about. If he has, I would be happy to try to straighten them out.

The CHAIRMAN. He never complained to you? You were not aware of his unhappiness?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; when I stated his unhappiness, it was on the basis of personal knowledge. It goes back to, as I recall, to the Cuban crisis, when we asked news people at that time to observe certain self-imposed restrictions, which they did magnificently, as they are doing now. Mr. Gallagher felt very strongly in his expression to me, at least, that we ought to have censorship in Vietnam. I believe he has changed that position.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the reports we had was that there was not an official censorship, but if the press persists in writing unfavorable stories that the military does not like, then they are not assisted in their travel. Is there anything to that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think it is absolutely a baseless charge.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not so?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Absolutely not. The interesting thing to me, Mr. Chairman, is that on the one hand, we have complaints from citizens of the United States, much of it coming through congressional offices, that we are permitting too much coverage—television, radio, too much detail, too much horrible material, too much telling the enemy. On the other hand, we are being charged with not having enough coverage. I believe these are mutually exclusive.

NEWS ARTICLES CONCERNING WAR COVERAGE

Almost anybody who wants to get up off his feet and cover it, does. I have brought along a number of articles, although I do not want to clutter your record. I have had newsmen say that never before has there been such easy coverage. One was Eric Sevareid, another was Mr. Veysey of the Chicago Tribune. There are a large number of them. I think if you take a broad sampling, you will find that so far as our assistance is concerned, it is the best that has ever been.

Senator MCGEE. Would it be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to have these articles made a part of the record? Also if you have the others.

The CHAIRMAN. Which ones do you want?

Senator MCGEE. The ones to which Mr. Sylvester just referred.

The CHAIRMAN. If you would like, yes.

Senator MCGEE. I would think in the interest of having the record balanced, that they should be inserted in one record.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have them, you may put them in the record.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have them available. I will be glad to put them in the record.

(The articles referred to appear on p. 147 in the appendix.)

Senator LAUSCHE. Would you repeat what the statements are?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The statements are that never before has it been so easy to cover a war.

STATEMENT BY ERIC SEVAREID

I will be happy, if you will bear with me, to read a short statement by Eric Sevareid. It also, I think, highlights some of the problems of coverage. This is the result of his being there.

Mr. Sevareid said:

The really puzzling problem of reporting this war lies right with the nature of news and its processing. Distance lends excitement if not enchantment. The lens of the camera or the lead paragraph of the newspaper story are like a flash-

light beam in the darkness. They focus upon what happens to be moving. All else ceases to exist, and the phenomenon focused upon tends to become in the minds the distant readers and viewers, the total condition.

So one small riot in Saigon suggests at a distance that all of Saigon is in an uproar. It's not. The shooting up in Danang suggests that all of Vietnam is collapsing into civil war. It's not.

Even if the news itself is not distortion, its effect is distorted. What we have not sufficiently developed in this business are effective and immediate corrective techniques.

For journalists, the physical facilities here, especially transportation, are the best that I have ever seen, and the military press officers, the best trained. The normal, inevitable, and necessary tensions exist between press and military, but the mutual trust here is certainly higher than it is inside the Pentagon.

The CHAIRMAN. Inside the Pentagon. Is that a real compliment or damning with faint praise?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Since Eric does not appear very often in the Pentagon, I just leave it where it is.

The CHAIRMAN. I have the article by the general manager of the Associated Press referred to a moment ago. It appears in the Congressional Record on June 7, 1966, page A3057. I just want to call it to your attention. This is Mr. Wes Gallagher's statement. I shall not read it all. But he says in part:

The war in Vietnam more than any other of recent history has invoked these two axioms. First let us deal with this "inexperience" charge. It is a "Sylvesterism" having been used frequently by the government, principally Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense who conducts his own private guerrilla war against correspondents.

The inexperience charge is neither accurate nor pertinent to the situation.

I do not know whether you are aware of that or not.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am not aware of any guerrilla warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not aware of any guerrilla warfare?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That I am conducting.

Senator McGEE. It sounds like we might need a National Liberation Front in the press.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe they do.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Sometimes there is, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio, do you wish to ask any questions?

REPORT WRITTEN BY ARTHUR VEYSEY

Senator LAUSCHE. You have quoted the statement made by Mr. Sevaireid. Is there another statement that you have, quoting someone else on the same subject?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you read it, please?

Mr. SYLVESTER. This is a report written by Arthur Veysey, London bureau chief of the Chicago Tribune. The interesting part is that he wrote this—rather, it appeared in the Tribune June 20, 1965, dateline, Saigon, Vietnam, June 19.

Covering the war in Vietnam is easy for a reporter. Stories are everywhere waiting to be told. Contrary to often stated charges, reporters willing to skip the conferences of Saigon are free to go wherever they want. If they leave the bars and the restaurants, they are welcome anywhere among American military men. Military transportation of all types is open to the reporter for the asking. He even gets preference on scheduled flights carrying troops and supplies.

I might add that this was written before we had completely instituted the daily flights of a single plane devoted to the press around Vietnam.

If no scheduled flight is available, the reporter need only wait on an airfield and, sooner or later, a plane will come along, the pilot happily giving the reporter a lift. There is no censorship. In two months moving about the country, I met no restrictions that I considered unreasonable. Of course, the reporter is expected to use his commonsense. The reporter who, for example, files a story that planes have taken off for North Vietnam while the planes are still on the way is quite properly shunned by flyers, who feel the reporter's irresponsibility endangers their lives.

Senator LAUSCHE. But does not the shunning by the flyer of the particular reporter who issues news about planes being in flight when they are still on the ground interfere with the principle of free press?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No; I think not, not unless free press means the endangering of our fighters' lives.

Senator LAUSCHE. An argument might be made. But go ahead.

Mr. SYLVESTER. As a former newsman, I am happy to take the other side on that. It seems to me our main interest should be the protection of our flyers' lives. Because some men did do that—in other words, sent news around the world while planes were in flight to a target—that the agreement was made with the newsmen that there would be no reporting of flights until their return. We did not foresee that there would be some people, as Mr. Veysey said, whose commonsense would not tell them that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Proceed with your quotation.

Mr. SYLVESTER (reading):

In Saigon, the reporter lives in a hotel or apartment he provides for himself. Army dining rooms, bars, shops, and motion pictures are open to him. In Danang, the military has taken over a seaside motel for reporters, covering the war from there.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is enough. You have placed the rest of it in the record.

MR. SYLVESTER'S BACKGROUND BEFORE ENTERING DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

What has been your background before you went into the Department of Defense?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I graduated from Princeton University and worked a year with the Macmillan Co. in New York. In 1924, I began as a reporter on the Newark News, a large independent eastern newspaper. I was with the Newark News for 5 years as a reporter and rewrite man. Then in 1929, I became assistant city editor and for the next 15 years was on the executive side. In 1944, I was sent to Washington to head up that office, and from 1944 to 1961 I was the Washington correspondent of the paper. That is about 36 years plus.

Senator LAUSCHE. How old are you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Sixty-four, shortly will be 65.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thirty-six of your sixty-four years were connected with actually working with a newspaper?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. I suppose that in those 36 years you developed an affection and a pride in the profession?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I did.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you are familiar with the zest that newspapermen have in getting the scoop and getting the story out first before any of their competitors do?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is that a pretty dominating force in the psychology of a newspaperman?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I like to think it is.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, since you became connected with the Department of Defense, you have become acquainted with the problems of the Department, especially in a period of war.

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is absolutely so, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Are the reporters in Vietnam provided with the accommodations of your planes—I believe you have already stated so—to take them up into the battlefield?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; indeed, they are. It is the only way they can get there and they are there all the time.

ACCIDENTAL NAPALM BOMBING OF U.S. TROOPS

Senator LAUSCHE. And there they can see what our troops are doing?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Very much. As a matter of fact, a very good instance was the recent unfortunate occasion on which our planes dropped napalm on our own troops. Immediately, Major General DePuy, who was the commanding general concerned, went to Saigon, met with the newsmen, and gave a complete account of what had happened. There were newsmen with him who saw this, as there were other places. They were there only because we took them there. I think it is a very good example of our complete candor in telling bad and good, telling it factually and quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I happen to have a very good illustration of this specific incident right here if you would like me to read it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead.

ARTICLE REGARDING ACCIDENTAL NAPALM-BOMBING

The CHAIRMAN. The article referred to what you just mentioned that a CBS radio correspondent was sitting about 50 yards away. I will read it:

Safer had just witnessed the accidental napalm bombing of members of an American battalion by American Air Force planes.

The battalion, in heavy and close combat with a Vietcong battalion, had radioed for a napalm attack on the Vietcong. Two American jet planes dropped a canister of napalm each. The canisters exploded on the American soldiers. The jellied gasoline burst into flames and set afire an estimated 40 to 50 of our soldiers.

Safer, who was no more than 50 yards away from the scene, described the horrible sight. In a voice that almost broke under the emotional burden of his experience, the CBS correspondent said the American boys streamed out of the jungle, running like madmen, trying to get away from the jellied flames on their bodies which was cooking them alive.

One soldier, his hair and body on fire, ripped huge strips of his flesh off.

Another, a medical corpsman, cut large pieces of his burning flesh with his medical scissors, then dropped to the ground and died.

Still another soldier, afire on one side of his body, from head to foot, raised his unburnt arm and shook his fist at the sky and the disappearing American planes, shouting: "You SOB's, we are down here."

Pretty bad, but I assume that is a firsthand eye witness report of just what you said, is it not?

Senator MCGEE. Who wrote that?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Safer did.

Senator MCGEE. The same one we were talking about earlier?

The CHAIRMAN. Of CBS.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It is the same one.

The CHAIRMAN. He was 50 yards from that incident, and he was taken there by you, I assume.

I just thought the Senator might be interested.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

NEWS DISTORTION FROM PICTURES

I have been intrigued by a part of your statement made a moment ago that when you, with camera, take an isolated picture and publish it, you frequently fail to tell the whole truth and by merely telling the part which is reflected in the picture, you make even that part false. You did not say that, but that is the implication of it. I have seen pictures of American soldiers with gun over a prostrate Vietcong man. It shocked me. Will you illustrate exactly what you mean, that when you emphasize one isolated fact and do not give the whole context, you give bad information instead of truthful information?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I doubt very much that I can improve on what you said, Senator. You express my views as to the overdramatization that inevitably results when, by reason of a limited frame, you editorially take out part of the whole. Since the viewer does not see what goes on in the background and around it, he does have, I think, a distorted picture. This is one of the difficulties and one of the things, I think, that television is learning, will have to overcome and is overcoming.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has the Government suffered that experience?

Mr. SYLVESTER. In my judgment, and particularly in the reporting of the so-called Marine burning of the village, Cam Ne, by Mr. Safer, which I thought, still think, and other newsmen agree with me, was a complete distortion of what took place.

Senator LAUSCHE. If you have, let's say, three or four men around a helpless Communist Vietcong and he lies there sort of begging for mercy, that picture does not tell whether that Vietcong Communist had previously been killing some brother or some comrade of these soldiers?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is the very heart of the problem, Senator, absolutely true, in my judgment, absolutely true. We are not able to get pictures very often of the atrocities, true atrocities, committed by the other side. They do not wait for our cameramen to go there. Those we have are so bad that most newspapers—in fact, no newspapers want to publish them.

IMPACT OF NEWS ON SAFETY OF FIGHTING MEN

Senator LAUSCHE. Getting into the philosophy of this whole problem of your properly performing your function in the matter of news release, you must take into consideration what the impact of that news

will be upon the safety of the men who are either in planes or on the battlefield?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, we do not, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. You do not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, we do not. This would be impinging on the freedom of press, the right of the editor or the right of the newspapers, the right of the television people to make their own decision on what is published and what is not. We do ask them on a voluntary basis, and they are following it, to refrain from using certain military information until it has been released. But we have no control over the sort of thing I understand you are talking about, that sort of information which makes an unfortunate impact such as the material read by the chairman. We do not attempt to assert ourselves in such instances.

From time to time, when something seems to be a complete distortion, we have the right, and I think we have the responsibility, to discuss with the agency or with the organization using it whether this is really what they want to do.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do I understand correctly, then, that the rules of the game are that the right of freedom of press and speech are unlimited?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is correct.

REPORTERS IMPOSE VOLUNTARY RESTRICTIONS

Senator LAUSCHE. You merely request that they impose upon themselves voluntary restrictions?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Military restrictions, right.

Senator LAUSCHE. So you rely completely upon the integrity of these—how many men are there now, 180?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Americans. Four hundred and fifty, altogether.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many Americans?

Mr. SYLVESTER. About 180.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then you rely upon their integrity?

Mr. SYLVESTER. And their good judgment and their bosses' good judgment.

Senator LAUSCHE. And it is only after they have committed an act that has endangered the lives of our men that you challenge them?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. How do you impose this 30-day suspension that you mentioned a moment ago?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The reporter loses his right to access to transportation, to attend briefings, for support or help or information of any kind. He is on his own.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then from what you have said, it would mean that the 180 reporters motivated by their ardent desire to get scoops and news are confronted with their pledge to impose upon themselves voluntary restrictions against the publication of news that will endanger our men?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is the struggle that each one of those men has, and it is a tough one, is it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, Senator, most of them have reported that these agreed-upon restrictions do not very much interfere with their

gathering of legitimate news. Because these restrictions only concern the sort of thing that the reporters themselves, as Americans, and even some non-Americans, would not want to make available to the enemy at any time or in any form since such information would be detrimental to the security of our people.

AN EVALUATION OF REPORTING FROM VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not know whether you would want to answer this question; it is my last one. Summarizing the news that has been published and the pictures that have been carried, what is your evaluation as to the net result of what has been done that is helpful in the presentation of the true facts of our position in Vietnam?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator Lausche, I would suggest that one would have to look at this at different periods of time. But I would say in the last two years that the overall and general effect of the reporting from Vietnam has been good, good in the sense that the information is basically correct, basically sound. I think that the news profession as such, regardless of media, in the last 15 or 20 years has suffered a good deal from so-called interpretive reporting. But I would say the overall effect has been to bring home to the American people important, factual, truthful material.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, it is a strange coincidence that last night, I was reading the second volume of James Boswell's biography on Samuel Johnson. Johnson had great wisdom and commonsense. He wrote the initial English dictionary and he wrote the lives of the poets and the writers of his days prior to 1775. There is one page in which Johnson is in a discussion with Boswell.

Senator MCGEE. This is Samuel Johnson?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, and James Boswell.

The discussion revolves around whether you are ever justified in telling a lie. A number of them were in the discussion. One of them said there are times when telling the truth is hurtful and wrong. Johnson took the position that telling a falsehood is always wrong. One then raised the question, is it proper when information has been given you confidentially to tell what has been said to you? Johnson says that you are not to tell.

Then the climax is reached, if you do not tell, you imply that what has been asked is true. This subject of telling the truth has been one that has not only come into existence in Vietnam, it has been with people through the ages. I think many of us have different views. I am one who believes there are times when a lie is a better thing than the truth, especially if you are going to cut into the flesh and into the soul of someone unnecessarily. That is a white lie. I believe, of course, implicitly in telling the truth and our country will be better off if it does tell the truth.

That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CASUALTIES WHICH ARE COMBAT CASUALTIES

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Sylvester, every week the Department of Defense lists the numbers of our combat casualties—whether 600 or 900 a week. What percentage of our total casualties are represented by those figures?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Every week on Thursday, Senator, the Department of Defense puts out a complete list of casualties, regardless of combat or how they may have died.

Senator AIKEN. If I read that as a list of combat casualties, then, I am not correct. What do you do with this list?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Make it available to newsmen every Thursday at the Pentagon.

Senator AIKEN. The lists I have been reading have related to combat casualties.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have with me a copy of the sample list which is the kind we put out every Thursday. I will be happy to make it part of the record.

Senator AIKEN. My question is what percentage of our total casualties are represented by the combat casualties?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not carry that in my mind. If you will bear with me, I will look at something here.

Senator AIKEN. Would 30 percent be a fair estimate?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have the exact figures here. It will take 1 second.

For the week ending August 25, the total combat deaths since 1961 is 4,832.

Senator AIKEN. You mean since 1959. That is the last 6 years.

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, 1961. From January 1, 1961, through August 20, 1966, issued August 25.

Senator AIKEN. And what is the total?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The total killed in combat, 4,832.

Senator AIKEN. That is killed and wounded?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Killed and wounded or killed?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Killed.

Senator AIKEN. And the wounded, how much?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The total wounded, 26,550. That figure is slightly deceiving, because it means every single person who has had any sort of a wound, scratch, or scrape, whereas the number actually wounded and hospitalized is a very small percentage of that.

DEFINITION OF CASUALTIES

Senator AIKEN. Say the Vietcong would toss a bomb into the Metropole and American soldiers or half of them were killed or wounded, would that be considered a combat casualty?

Mr. SYLVESTER. It is represented in this list, enemy action.

Senator AIKEN. It is considered as a combat casualty?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes. We list them here, casualties resulting from action by hostile forces: killed, wounded, or injured, dead of wounds, nonfatal wounds, missing, died while missing, returned to control, current missing, captured or interned, died while captured or interned, returned to control, current captured or interned; deaths from aircraft accidents, incidents, fixed wing, helicopter, from ground action.

Then come casualties not the result of action by hostile forces: current missing, deaths from aircraft accidents, incidents, fixed wing, helicopter, from other causes, whether it be sickness or collision of jeeps.

Senator AIKEN. Would it include the 40-odd men that we lost through the dropping of napalm bombs?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Oh, yes.

Senator AIKEN. It would include that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. It will. I do not know whether this report has it, but the next report out will.

Senator AIKEN. Will it include casualties inflicted by our own forces as well?

Mr. SYLVESTER. We have made every effort to have all casualties completely, truthfully, and factually reported.

CASUALTIES OTHER THAN COMBAT

Senator AIKEN. And it would include casualties which are caused, for example, by the bombing of the Metropole Hotel? There was a total of 125 Vietnamese and Americans killed.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. It would include those casualties. It would not include casualties caused by disease?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; it would exclude those.

The CHAIRMAN. Which item on this list would they be?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Other causes.

Senator AIKEN. It would include disease casualties, hepatitis, malaria, respiratory, and everything else?

The CHAIRMAN. Was that 4,832 purely combat?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many others are there from other sources?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Casualties not from action by hostile forces, 1,028.

Senator AIKEN. Those who are incapacitated by disease, then, would not be listed. Do you not keep a record of that except as they are discharged from service?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is right.

FREEDOM OF FOREIGN NEWSMEN IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. I notice that the majority of the newsmen in Vietnam are from other countries. Do they have the same freedom of operation as the Americans do?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Those accredited by MACV do.

Senator AIKEN. Do you transport them, too, if they want to go?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Are they restricted in any way? Are they permitted to go out of the South Vietnamese area, perhaps, and consult with Vietcong leaders, or do the Vietcong leaders come into Saigon and consult with them there?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I cannot help you on that. I do not know who they talk with on the Vietcong side.

Senator AIKEN. There is no control over that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No; because we are guests, of course, in a host country. The Vietnamese are our hosts and we cooperate with them.

Senator AIKEN. I noticed particularly the stories printed by, I think, the London Observer, Le Monde in France, and an Australian paper which had some rather vivid portrayals a year or so ago.

Are messages from reporters back to the press monitored in any way?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No; they are not.

Senator AIKEN. They have free use of all communications media.

LEAKING OF NEWS REGARDING THAILAND

I notice you do not get much news from Thailand, where we have about as many men now as we had in South Vietnam a little over a year ago. Are there news restrictions at all in Thailand that do not apply to Vietnam?

Last fall when I was part of the Mansfield mission, we were told what we are doing in Thailand and that it would be very disastrous if we released any of that information. Before we got home, we read a whole story in the New York Times—

Mr. SYLVESTER. That often happens.

Senator AIKEN (continuing). Showing the location of the fields, the ones under construction, the purpose for which they were being constructed, and all the things we were told must not be released under any circumstances. How do news stories like that get out? Because I think the New York Times story was accurate.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It could be.

The CHAIRMAN. This commercializing is going too far.

Senator AIKEN. How does it happen that the press comes out sometimes with a story that the Defense Department tells us a few weeks or months or years later?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That simply, I think, is an evidence of the complete freedom of information and freedom of the press that operates all the time.

Senator AIKEN. The astuteness of the reporters, I suppose?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would say so.

Senator AIKEN. We have very good ones over there, I guess.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if he would answer the first question you asked.

I never did get your answer about Thailand. You looked as if you were about to answer, and did not quite finish.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am disturbed that you asked me that question in public. I would be happy to talk to you about it in executive session.

Senator AIKEN. Do you think that an official of the Defense Department could not tell a lie under any circumstances?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I certainly try not to tell any lies.

Senator AIKEN. Suppose I should ask you a question which you thought might be of comfort to a potential enemy. Would you be sure to give me the right answer?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, Senator Aiken. I would be, of course, surprised that any such question would come from you. I would certainly appeal to you on the ground of what it seemed to me would happen. I certainly cannot give you anything but the truth, whether I was under oath or not.

QUESTIONING OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

Senator AIKEN. I think the questioning of Defense officials is based on news stories which we have read sometime previously.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It seems to me, sir, if I may add, that if you have knowledge of the 39 or 40 reporters covering the Defense Department, topflight reporters, the picture of them standing around waiting for me or one of my colleagues to hand them something is rather absurd.

Those men get news all the time. Every reporter can get news. It is a matter of pride with them. Or the idea that 1,000 or 2,000 reporters in Washington can be led around by the nose by information officers of the Government is another, to my mind, absurd picture. It does not work that way.

You will not find complaints along that line from top reporters. They get the story.

Senator AIKEN. A few months ago, Secretary McNamara made a statement that I believe I quote correctly, as it was in the press report, that we have stopped losing the war. Do you recall any Government announcements or other information prior to that date which would have indicated that we were losing the war?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Well, I would like to go back and look at what the Secretary said in its full context. Without that, I do not think I can comment very intelligently. My guess would be that there were stories and statements made by all sorts of people on both sides, whether you are winning the war or whether you are not, what does winning mean, what does it not mean and so on.

Senator AIKEN. It was not very many days ago that Secretary McNamara made the statement that things might get worse over there. Was there any particular purpose in that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Without attempting to add to or subtract from what the Secretary said, the statement that we have stopped losing the war, as I recall in time, was directed to a situation about a year ago, in February or March of 1965, when the Vietnamese Government was under pretty heavy pressure from the Vietcong and things looked pretty black. Given the time of the statement my understanding is that it had become clear then that the Vietcong would not take over South Vietnam by military means. I think that is what he meant.

USE OF OIL FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Are you able to give a statement as to what percentage of the oil supplies of North Vietnam have now been destroyed?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would have to go back and look at the figures. I have a newspaperman's suspicion of figures, generally, so I would have to go back and check.

Senator AIKEN. Have you any information which would indicate that the Vietcong in South Vietnam were dependent on oil from Hanoi at any time?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think it is clear that the transportation of materiel from north to south in trucks is dependent on oil coming into North Vietnam.

Senator AIKEN. For the transportation of supplies from Hanoi, they had to have oil?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Right.

Senator AIKEN. But have you any information that South Vietnam itself, the Vietcong territory, relied upon Hanoi for oil? Other than to fill their trucks at the other end of the trip?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The use of trucks at the other end is very limited. It is mostly shanks' mare on the part of the Vietcong. The supplies I refer to are those transported by motorized carrier on land or sea.

Senator AIKEN. Is it probably not a fact that we use more oil in a single area than the Vietcong uses in a long time?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would bow to you on that.

Senator AIKEN. I do not know that this has anything to do with reporting on Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Wyoming.

HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Senator McGEE. What do you do, Mr. Sylvester, in cases which I assume arise, where to report the information at all would disclose details about our own sources of intelligence with regard to the enemy?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I try not to comment or in any way discuss it.

Senator McGEE. But you are probed on this for questions by the press?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, the information is sought by the press. But the reporters in the Pentagon that I deal with recognize that there are certain sources that they do not expect me to reveal and if I did, they would not think very well of me.

Senator McGEE. What about the reporting out in the field where the action is?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think there is a very good realization on the part of the reporters in the field in Vietnam, basically.

Senator McGEE. That does not create any real problems, then, in terms of having to impose some tighter strings on what is reported and what is not reported?

Mr. SYLVESTER. As of now, Senator, I see none. I think that the news media, taken overall, have done a rather magnificent job as they always do, being very careful about not handling information or using information that would endanger our troops.

Senator McGEE. I remember a conversation I had over there in April with a minister of a nearby government, who said he still could not understand why the Americans felt they had to talk so much about what was going on. He said, "You want a searchlight on everything; you want to have a public dialog on it and then you want to have a hearing on it." He said, "We appreciate, of course, that you believe in freedom of ideas and freedom of discussion, but, this is a war." And he said, "We orientals, some of us, are mystified by your insistence on putting up in neon lights everything that is taking place."

I suppose you get pressures the other way, to try to restrain some of this, and thereby getting critics on both sides.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, we are in the middle most of the time, Senator.

Senator McGEE. I have had occasion to reflect on the unhappy job that is yours—trying to strike an even balance in all of this. What luck do you have in getting reporters to report anything that goes right?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think we have good luck. If we make available the material, I think we come out pretty well, given the type of news industry we have. I think it is pretty good.

REPORTING OF GOOD NEWS

Senator McGEE. It seems to me from some reading that occasionally, it is rather dullsville if you write about everything going OK this week, no new problems; you have to pick up that which happens

to go wrong if you are going to get a reader. This is not strictly the newsman's responsibility. I think it is that of those of us who buy the paper or those of us who listen to the newscast. We could not care less after a couple of days that everything went all right again today. But if it goes wrong, we prick up our ears. So we are almost in a built-in slant on this, I would think.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think you are right. Basically, people expect their government officials and their government to run right and when it runs right, government officials, regardless of what branch, are doing what they should do and what the people expect of them. When it goes wrong by reason of human fallibility, then it becomes a matter of news.

Senator McGEE. Where you get the wrong, then it becomes the dominant note of the time, does it not? That is, if you repeat this again and again, it is picked up by several.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It can be and has been in many cases.

Senator McGEE. Is it understandable, then, that people get the idea that nothing is going right, everything is going wrong, and somebody has loused up the war in Vietnam?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That would be true. I must also add that since, as I have said, I have spent 15 years on the executive side of the newspaper business, I have argued with many people who insist that the only newsworthy thing in our papers is conflict or bad news. But I think a good many studies have shown that in relation to the total amount of news in the paper, the percentage of constructive or non-conflict or nonsuperdramatic news is heavily in our favor.

PROBLEMS OF REPORTING EVENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator McGEE. Surely, you have had occasion to reflect on the problems that stem from the one-sidedness of the news reporting of this war? I do not mean the slant of the writers of the news, but the fact that every step we take gets full reporting and the only thing we can learn from the other side is what we can learn from a visiting professor or a self-appointed peacemaker or traveler of some sort. Would you mind suggesting the kind of problem that poses to you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The problem, of course, is that we do not get any reporting, any free world reporting, with a few exceptions, of what is happening to the North Vietnamese, and the result is, I think, to make it appear that we alone have problems, whereas I suspect that, compared to what our problems may be, theirs must be many times worse. But since they manage to insure that there is no real news coverage, we do not get that picture. So we stand before the world pretty well exposed most of the time and they stand before the world pretty much clothed as they desire. I think that is one of our basic problems around the world, plus the fact that we do have reporters covering our activities from governments and countries who are not convinced of the validity of our policies, or afraid that they will have to stand up some day and participate, or fearful that our actions will drag the world into war. This is a problem we have.

But these reporters have access to everything everybody else has.

Senator McGEE. Have you thought of any formula or any potions that could be cranked into a formula that would make any allowance for this one-sided coin picture that we are getting?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I must say, Senator, that I do not have a formula. I believe that the freest flow of facts that we can get will eventually result in overall comprehension of what we are doing. As a matter of fact, I think that our people have a pretty clear comprehension of what is at stake. It is painful, but the elections and the primaries this year in our own country have suggested to me that the American people are pretty clear in their evaluation of what their country is confronted with and what it must do.

Senator McGEE. I believe the American people are not deluded, but I believe they are deeply troubled. This surely stems in large measure from the fact that this is the first war they have ever fought themselves in the living room, spilled the blood on the rug, so to speak.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Right.

Senator McGEE. They have never had an experience like this. So I suppose we would have to allow for a sophistication or maturing or growing up on our own part here.

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is certainly one of the all-important factors that we face. As you said, this is the first war covered by television; in other words, in everyone's living room.

Senator McGEE. This may have something to do with the continued bombardment you get.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am sure it has. As a matter of fact, we get calls concerning certain TV shows the next morning or even that night. I do believe that in time, television will improve its coverage. Great as TV is, I think that some larger background explanation will be normally offered together with the dramatic incident, as Mr. Sevareid suggested. That will help, I think. As you say, our people will become accustomed to this.

VIETNAM NEWS COVERAGE COMPARED TO WORLD WAR II

Senator McGEE. I had lunch a week or 10 days ago with one of our correspondents just back from Vietnam, where he said he had been for six or eight weeks. He made this observation; I do not know how valid it is. He had also reported World War II on the European front. He said there was all the difference in the world in the coverage problems. According to him, from his experiences there seemed to be a much tighter lid on the reporters in World War II than there is in Vietnam. He raised the philosophical question about whether we could afford it that way or whether we were being smart playing it that way. But he was ready to confess that he had no alternatives in view of our continual existence on a no censorship or a freedom basis. I thought it was an interesting observation.

Have you picked up anything like that in the trade?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I have talked with a great many men who have covered both wars, some who, I think, have become confused by the fact that this is not World War II, it is utterly different—something I think our people have not faced since our great, great grandparents fought in the French and Indian wars where they were subject to attack at anytime while they were plowing. They plowed with a gun. In this war you have that. You do not know your enemy by dress, place, face, language. It is an entirely different sort of operation, much harder to cover, much harder to report, an undeclared war in the sense that people are being killed. No one has declared war,

though it is very real. All of these facts, I think, contribute to a very, very difficult reporting problem and a very difficult problem of understanding.

Senator McGEE. I was just thinking, as the chairman read the description of the napalm bombing of our own troops that was narrated by Mr. Safer of CBS, how it might have been a good idea if he could have closed his broadcast coverage with a reminder that he was actually reporting this, with no attempt being made to bar him from it. But you see, we take that for granted. We assume that this will be the case and therefore it is not plugged. So we end up with the criticism that comes when someone has an unfortunate experience and we get this slant on reporting in Vietnam.

I would hope, however, that you never let up on listening to this bombardment and keeping the question as open as possible.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I can assure you I shall not, Senator.

Senator McGEE. Again, I want to say that you have the most thankless job of all. I suspect, regardless of your ducking the term, that there is a little bit of guerrilla activity with the press on this business, and probably it is even healthy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sylvester, in order to complete that first matter concerning the Safer article, which I know caused a great deal of soul searching since I realize that you disagreed with it, I will put his article and your reply in the record. You wrote a reply, did you not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I will include also two comments by Murray Fromson and Malcolm Browne.

(The material referred to follows:)

TELEVISION COVERS THE WAR

(By Morley Safer)

There has been no war quite like it. Never have so many words been churned out, never has so much 16-mm. film been exposed. And never has the reporting of a story been so much a part of the story itself.

This has been true whether you are reporting television's first war, as I have been, or for one of the print media. Washington has been critical of American newsmen in Saigon almost continuously since 1961. That criticism has manifested itself in a number of ways—from the cancellation of newspaper subscriptions to orders to put certain correspondents on ice to downright threat.

As my friend and colleague Peter Kalischer puts it, "The brass wants you to get on the team."

To the brass, getting on the team means simply giving the United States government line in little more than handout form. It means accepting what you are told without question. At times it means turning your back on facts.

I know of few reporters in Vietnam who have "gotten on the team."

The fact is, the American people are getting an accurate picture of the war in spite of attempts by various officials—mostly in Washington—to present the facts in a different way. That is why certain correspondents have been vilified privately and publicly.

By late winter of 1964-1965 the war was clearly becoming an American war. And with it came an American responsibility for providing and reporting facts. American officials thus were able to deal directly with reporters. The formality of "checking it out with the Vietnamese" ceased to be relevant.

In Washington the burden of responsibility for giving, controlling and managing the war news from Vietnam fell to—and remains with—one man: Arthur Sylvester, assistant secretary of defense of public affairs.

By early summer of 1965 the first set of ground rules had been laid down for reporting battles and casualties. There was no censorship, but a very loose kind

of honor system that put the responsibility for not breaking security on the shoulders of correspondents. The rules were vague and were therefore continually broken.

For military and civilian officials in Vietnam there was another set of rules—rather another honor system that was not so much laid down as implied. A policy of total candor was to be adhered to. "Total candor" is a phrase used by Barry Zorthian, minister-counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Zorthian is what *Time* calls "the information czar" in Vietnam.

If Zorthian does not have the admiration of all the newsmen in Saigon, he at least has the respect of most of them. It would not be naive to say that the feeling is mutual, even when background briefings are held at the tops of our voices.

The breaking of the vague ground rules was something that annoyed everyone. Correspondents were rocketed by their editors, and the military in Vietnam felt that Allied lives were being endangered. So in midsummer, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara came to Saigon and brought Sylvester with him, we all looked forward to the formulation of a clear-cut policy. Sylvester was to meet the press in an informal session to discuss mutual problems. The meeting was to take the vagueness out of the ground rules.

I know that Zorthian looked forward to this confrontation. He had been concerned for a number of reasons about what he described as the credibility of the United States being questioned. In this he echoed former Ambassador Maxwell Taylor. Zorthian had, on Ambassador Taylor's instructions, assembled four correspondents to meet the ambassador in private and take soundings on the whole question of American credibility. I was one of the four, and what was discussed then remains privileged. The ambassador showed a great deal of sympathy and said questions would be put to people in high places. Unfortunately, before the week was out he announced his resignation.

The Sylvester meeting, on the other hand, was surely one of the most disheartening meetings between reporters and a news manager ever held.

It was a sticky July evening. Zorthian had made the usual Thursday callout to what is known as the inner circle of American correspondents in Saigon. The time was fixed for 9 p.m., just after everyone had finished filing.

I was with Murray Fromson, C.B.S. Southeast Asia correspondent. As we returned from our nightly broadcast to New York we looked forward to the cool drinks that are always available at Zorthian's villa.

Inside it was cool. The chairs had been arranged around a low settee where Zorthian usually holds court.

Zorthian opened by saying that this was not to be the usual briefing "for information," but a bull session. "Let's face it, you fellows have some problems covering this war," he said. "I want Arthur to hear what they are. Maybe we can get something done."

Zorthian was less relaxed than usual. He was anxious for Sylvester to get an idea of the mood of the news corps. There had been some annoying moments in previous weeks that had directly involved Sylvester's own office. In the first B-52 raids, Pentagon releases were in direct contradiction to what had actually happened on the ground in Vietnam.

Also, those of us involved in broadcasting were anxious to discuss the increasing problems of communication. There was general opening banter, which Sylvester quickly brushed aside. He seemed anxious to take a stand—to say something that would jar us. He did:

"I can't understand how you fellows can write what you do while American boys are dying out there," he began. Then he went on to the effect that American correspondents had a patriotic duty to disseminate only information that made the United States look good.

A network television correspondent said, "Surely, Arthur, you don't expect the American press to be the handmaiden of government."

"That's exactly what I expect," came the reply.

An agency man raised the problem that had preoccupied Ambassador Taylor and Barry Zorthian—about the credibility of American officials. Responded the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs:

"Look, if you think any American official is going to tell you the truth, then you're stupid. Did you hear that? —stupid."

One of the most respected of all the newsmen in Vietnam—a veteran of World War II, the Indochina War and Korea—suggested that Sylvester was being deliberately provocative. Sylvester replied:

"Look, I don't even have to talk to you people. I know how to deal with you through your editors and publishers back in the States."

At this point, the Hon. Arthur Sylvester put his thumbs in his ears, bulged his eyes, stuck out his tongue and wiggled his fingers.

A correspondent for one of the New York papers began a question. He never got beyond the first few words, Sylvester interrupted:

"Aw, come on. What does someone in New York care about the war in Vietnam?"

We got down to immediate practical matters—the problems of communication, access to military planes, getting out to battles.

"Do you guys want to be spoonfed? Why don't you get out and cover the war?"

It was a jarring and insulting remark. Most of the people in that room had spent as much time on actual operations as most G.I.'s.

Two television correspondents walked out, saying they had had enough. A few minutes later, two more correspondents left. The discussion went on. It got worse—more offensive. Only a few stayed—mainly out of regard for Zorthian.

The relationship between reporters and P.I.O.'s in Saigon, on the other hand, has been a good, healthy one. The relationship in the field is better, and in dealing with the men who fight the war it is very good indeed.

The P.I.O.'s in Saigon have been as devoted to their jobs as an officer or enlisted man in the field. And in many ways they have it a whole lot tougher. They are hog-tied by impossible ground rules. Certain items may be released by them, others only by Sylvester himself. Pity the career man who forgets it.

The implied threat of the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs—"I know how to deal with you through your editors"—gives some indication of the way the Pentagon tries to exert pressure. Among my colleagues in Vietnam I know of no one who has been asked by an editor to "ease off" or to follow any kind of official line. I do know of attempts by certain American officials in Washington to vilify certain correspondents, among them this one.

It's no secret that the former president of C.B.S. News, Fred W. Friendly, was informed that I was married to an Asian and therefore presumably had some kind of bias in favor of Asians and therefore presumably was not 100 per cent American in my thinking. The fact that I'm not married at all makes the whole thing even more ludicrous.

The pressure can take less subtle forms: "Unless you get Safer out of there he's liable to end up with a bullet in his back."

This is television's first war. It is only in the past few years that the medium has become portable enough to go out on military operations. And this has raised some serious problems—problems, incidentally, which every network correspondent and cameraman in Vietnam is acutely aware of.

The camera can describe in excruciating, harrowing detail what war is all about. The cry of pain, the shattered face—it's all there on film, and out it goes into millions of American homes during the dinner hour. It is true that on its own every piece of war film takes on a certain antiwar character, simply because it does not glamorize or romanticize. In battle men do not die with a clean shot through the heart; they are blown to pieces. Television tells it that way.

It also tells what happens to civilians who are caught in the middle of battle. It tells what happens to soldiers under the stress of the unreal conditions in which they live. American soldiers are not *always* 100 per cent sterling characters, just as American policy is not *always* exactly what is right for the world or for Vietnam's smallest hamlet.

The unfavorable has always been reported along with the favorable—but television tells it with greater impact. When the U.S. blunders, television leaves little doubt.

So when a government official, either in Saigon or Washington, denies what television plainly reports and then attempts to give versimilitude to his denial by damning the reporter—at best that is pure humbug.

The war in Vietnam has become almost entirely an American responsibility. And responsible American officials must accept it. For the most part they have. But there have been glaring examples of miscalculation and a few examples of downright lying. The miscalculations have been reported, the lies have been found out. And it is that kind of honest reporting that in the end measures the rightness of our cause in Vietnam or anywhere else.

COMMENT OF ARTHUR SYLVESTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

While the readers of the current *Dateline*, which is locked up for the year, were denied an opportunity to hear the other side and misled as well, I appreciate the opportunity to be heard in the *Bulletin*.

Why its editor chose, in the April 30th issue, to subject me to further abuse by reprinting from the *Dateline* only to attack me, again without opportunity to reply, is beyond me. Furthermore, I can't understand why the *Bulletin* rewrite couldn't even report Safer correctly. The *Bulletin* said that Safer "told of a briefing held between Vietnam correspondents and the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, Arthur Sylvester." What Safer actually wrote was "Zorthian opened by saying that this was not to be the usual briefing 'for information,' but a bull session." Strange to say Safer got that right but otherwise his recollection of the evening was "bull."

The *Bulletin* excerpted from Safer that statement that "One newsman asked Sylvester, after he had announced to them that it was their duty to report only information that made the U.S. look good, if they were expected to be the 'hand-maidens of government.' 'That's exactly what I expect,' was Sylvester's reply."

This is utterly untrue. Additionally, I must say Safer is the only man I ever heard refer to another man as a "hand-maiden," especially a newsman.

Perhaps I shouldn't be surprised at Safer's distortions, misstatements of fact and self-created quotations attributed to me in view of the fact that he wrote: "I was with Murray Fromson, C.B.S. Southeast Asia correspondent. As we returned from our nightly broadcast to New York we looked forward to the cool drinks that are always available at Zorthian's villa." Apparently Safer's primary interest that night was in working over the drinks and then came his working over me as a clouded and confused afterthought.

Perhaps I shouldn't squawk when I consider the distortion of U.S. Marine Corps activity Safer perpetuated on C.B.S., for which he won a prize and the undying contempt of the Marines.

Maybe I would brush it all off but it was this same Safer who was cited by Colonel Ben W. Legare in Saigon, last August 11, for his violation of well-articulated security rules, thereby endangering American troops. Even Safer's former boss, Fred W. Friendly, vice president of C.B.S., expressed concern at this performance.

Nevertheless, I do feel the treatment given a member of the club by both the *Dateline* and the *Bulletin* was shabby, to say the least.

On receipt of *Dateline* 1966 I was startled to read in the Contributor's Column that the article which Arthur G. Milton, publisher of the Overseas Press Club's annual magazine, had asked me to write was billed as a reply to an abusive piece in the same issue by Morley Safer. Since I had not seen Safer's gem of misrepresentation until it appeared, since your people had not advised me that he was going to write for the issue, and since I was never offered an opportunity to reply, I think this sort of editorial dishonesty directed against a club member is inexcusable.

The enclosed copy of my full article with the deleted portions underlined will show you the sort of editing to which it was subjected. The deleted sections contain much of the thought and substance of my views toward the television medium. It makes me wonder what sort of editorial policy Messrs. Milton, Jess Gorkin and Edwin Kiester, Jr., adhere to. I say this because Safer's attack on me is based on his recollection of what took place on a Saturday night in July, 1965, in Barry Zorthian's home in Saigon.

ARTHUR SYLVESTER,
Washington, D.C.

SAFER REPLIES

Have just seen May 14 bulletin with Sylvester insulting letter. All this does is confirm to any who might have doubted the nature of his activities. As usual he attacked the reporter personally rather than the substance of the report. Let Sylvester produce one eyewitness who would challenge the facts of my article. Congratulations to the *Bulletin* for publishing Sylvester letter because it will provide fleeting moment of hilarity for Saigon correspondents as well as mission personnel who have ceased to be shocked or dismayed by Pentagon press agent.

If Sylvester wants to know something about "undying contempt" he should consult some of his own PIO and joint USIS public affairs people in Viet Nam.

MORLEY SAFER,
London.

'BASED ON CONSENSUS'

It seems that Mr. Sylvester is always asking for equal time to rebut something written or said by a correspondent in Viet Nam. Given the opportunity he invariably engages in some form of character assassination. His letter published in the *Bulletin* May 14 is the latest example. What Sylvester fails to comprehend is that Morley Safer's recollection of how the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs acted that summer night at Barry Zorthian's was based on a consensus of several correspondents who were in attendance. Mr. Sylvester could have made a stronger defense of himself if he had produced just one correspondent who disagreed with the substance of Safer's article. Having failed to do that he should take Harry Truman's advice—if you can't stand the heat get out of the kitchen.

MURRAY FROMSON,
CBS News, Saigon.

BROWNE'S TWO-CENTS

My copy of the May 14 *Bulletin* arrived today, and I noted Arthur Sylvester's reply to Morley Safer. Since I have some knowledge of this incident I would like to add my two-cents'-worth.

At the time of that Sylvester session with newsmen in Saigon I was chief A.P. correspondent for Vietnam. I had just returned from the field that day (July 17, 1965) and asked Ed White to represent me. (Ed replaced me as A.P. chief when I left A.P. last August.) The following day Ed gave me a memo covering the events of that evening, which I have saved in my private files. Morley Safer had no way of seeing that memo so there could have been no collusion. I quote in part from that memo:

"The exchanges often became bitter and personal. Morley Safer, followed closely by Murray Fromson (both of C.B.S.), stalked out indignantly after one hour, slamming the door of Zorthian residence with loud bang. Keyes Beech (*Chicago Daily News*), followed by Sol Sanders (*U.S. News and World Report*), left short time later, but suspect they more concerned with threat of missing dinner rather than issues or principles.

"Sylvester engaged specific correspondents in near name calling wrangles, twice telling Jack Langguth (*New York Times*) he was stupid. Banter between Sylvester and Joe Fried (*New York Daily News*) provided occasion tragi-comic relief.

"At one point Sylvester actually made statement he thought press should be 'handmaiden' of government. Later tried to retrieve that one by passing it off as joke. But his many serious-face statements included such things as 'don't you guys know men are dying out here?'"

"It was a long disagreeable night."

This version certainly tends more to support the Safer version than the Sylvester version, including the reference to "handmaiden of government." In fact, one is basically confronted with the choice of believing Sylvester or the correspondents who were there; there is no middle ground.

In deciding whether the correspondents or Sylvester reported the evening correctly it is well to remember that this is the same Sylvester who, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, went on record with these statements of policy:

"The generation of news by actions taken by the government becomes one weapon in a strained situation. The results, in my opinion, justify the methods we use."

And: "It's inherent in government's right, if necessary, to lie to save itself when it's going up into nuclear war. This seems to me basic."

This attitude has characterized all of Sylvester's dealings with correspondents in Vietnam, and has done more to obstruct fair and comprehensive news coverage here than any other factor that comes to my mind at the moment. And I've lived here for nearly five years.

I do not sleep better at night knowing The Hon. Arthur Sylvester is a member of the Overseas' Press Club. It seems to me that considering his past record giving him the right to reply to Safer's piece at all is giving him more than his due.

MALCOLM W. BROWNE,
Saigon, Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Murray Fromson?

Mr. SYLVESTER. He describes himself as Mr. Safer's CBS colleague.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know him?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I know the name. I do not believe I would be able to identify him if I bumped into him.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who Malcolm W. Browne is?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Oh, yes; I do. He is a man who reported with the Associated Press for awhile, then went with television. He is not now reporting as an active associate with any organization.

The CHAIRMAN. He is no longer active with either one of them?

Mr. SYLVESTER. He is no longer active with any organization that I am aware of. I believe he is freelancing.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE DESERTERS

The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday, August 30, Jack Steele, a Scripps-Howard writer, reported in Saigon that informed sources estimated that South Vietnam now has as many as 400,000 deserters from its armed forces on a cumulative basis. Other news services are reporting that the desertion rate is currently rising. Do you have any way to account for these desertions?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not know the accuracy of the figures. I question the number. But if you will recall, in our War of the Revolution, men from New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, and others went home from time to time to plant crops and came back to fight again. In Vietnam people are very attached to their home district. There is a good deal of going home in Vietnam. The desertions are not to the Vietcong. Very often they are to the home district.

I think, without attempting to discuss the matter at length because I am not qualified to, the question of pay, the question of being away from their families, all of those things are factors in desertions.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no reason to question the numbers that they used?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I question any numbers. I do not know what they are based on.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Steele suggests, I think, that the desertions have increased as the war becomes more Americanized. That would be a logical conclusion, I suppose, would it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Well, I would be doubtful about the logic in these matters. I would think it would be primarily emotional. But I respect Jack Steele's very fine report. I simply do not know the basic figures. I read the story. Probably somebody else could develop another set of figures.

The CHAIRMAN. So you can just take your choice and get any kind of figures you like.

Mr. SYLVESTER. That is right.

PUBLIC FAITH IN OPINION POLLS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Mr. Deakin who covers the White House for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have met him; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He wrote an article which says:

Although Mr. Johnson personally retains his lofty standing in the polls, a public opinion survey conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation for the Columbia

Broadcasting System showed that 67 percent of the American people believe that their government only "sometimes" tells the truth about the Vietnam situation. Thirteen percent said they thought they "almost never" get the truth in official statements about Vietnam, 15 percent said the government always tells the truth, and 5 percent had no opinion.

It is a rather bad situation for the American people to have such doubt about their information, is it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If your basic assumption is the assumption that that poll is correct, it certainly would be. However, I question it.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think the poll is correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have great skepticism about polls since 1948.

The CHAIRMAN. All polls, or just the recent polls?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No; I have great suspicion about polls.

RELEASE OF BOMBING PHOTOGRAPHS

The CHAIRMAN. Area photographs of bombing results in Hanoi and Haiphong seem to have been made freely available to the press. Have photos of other bombing raids over Vietnam been released to newsmen without restriction?

Mr. SYLVESTER. We have released pictures of other air activities from the air and their effects. Off the top of my head, I cannot answer. I would be glad to make a check on that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is my understanding that journalists have been strictly excluded from accompanying flyers on bombing raids against North Vietnam. Is that correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. In South Vietnam?

The CHAIRMAN. North Vietnam.

Mr. SYLVESTER. We have not had newsmen on attack aircraft going to North Vietnam. A large percentage of those aircraft are single-seaters. The remainder are two-seaters. In addition, the search and rescue problems involved are very great. For these and other basic reasons, newsmen have not covered attacks on North Vietnam.

There is a problem also of what their status would be if captured, what would happen to them, et cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. Newsmen do accompany flyers in South Vietnam?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir; and on B-52 raids from Guam.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, that is a practical consideration?

Mr. SYLVESTER. It is exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. The danger and so forth.

Mr. SYLVESTER. The danger and the lack of room on one-seaters; a question of whether the two-seaters should be used for these men. There are search and rescue problems.

RECENT CAMBODIAN BORDER INCIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. We had a situation in Cambodia recently leading to at least one diplomatic rebuff. You are familiar with that, I take it.

I shall refresh your memory. First, we denied quite categorically that the United States had bombed any Cambodian village. Then we denied that the particular village was in Cambodia. Next we read the maps again and decided it was in Cambodia. So we then agreed that we had done what Cambodia had said we had done in the first place.

How do you explain this kind of operation?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Without reference to that specific incident, it seems to me that maps that are available, regardless of whose they are—Cambodian maps, South Vietnamese maps, our own maps—that are certainly something less than precise on the boundary. This leads to that sort of problem, I would say.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me it would have been much better to resolve the indecision in favor of saying "We are sorry if we did, we apologize," rather than doing what we did. It resulted in a cancellation of the trip of Ambassador Harriman, did it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am afraid you are out of my field on that.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in the press. I did not mean you had responsibility for that.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I was not ducking it; I merely meant the details of it. I read the story. I do not know that that was the reason, but I read the story.

FREE TRANSPORTATION FOR JOURNALISTS IN 1965

The CHAIRMAN. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense in 1965 provided free transportation to Vietnam for about 80 American journalists. Is that correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; I testified to that in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you state why you thought it necessary to send 80 American journalists?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; I gave three reasons in that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you refresh my memory on that?

Mr. SYLVESTER (reading):

Back in 1964 this situation was considerably different. Then, there were only about 40 newsmen, including foreign journalists, in Vietnam. As a consequence there was considerable concern within the Defense Department that the people of the United States were not receiving adequate factual information concerning our efforts in Vietnam.

To assist in remedying this situation we began, in July 1964, a temporary program to transport U.S. correspondents to Vietnam. We had three main reasons for this program: (1) to give U.S.-based newsmen a better understanding of Vietnam and our involvement there, (2) to help assure a balanced output of on-the-scene news, and (3) to stimulate the news media to send experienced reporters to Vietnam under their own sponsorship.

The concept called for transporting two to four newsmen every four weeks for a stay of approximately ten days each. Selection was based on requests for participation, the type of media concerned and the geographical spread of the media involved. Except for transportation, all other costs were paid by the news media.

The program began on July 17, 1964, and we sent 82 newsmen to Vietnam before we terminated the program in August of 1965. These newsmen came from large and small newspapers and newspaper groups, wire services, syndicates, magazines of all types, and TV and radio stations and networks. Every part of the nation was represented.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand that it was for 10 days only?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Even though they paid their own expenses?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Precisely.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you limit it to 10 days?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Because our capability to maintain a continuous flow of newsmen during that time and at the same time try to meet the tremendous number of requests resulted in 10 days being about the best period of time for which we could guarantee transportation back

as well as out. If they wanted to stay on—and a number did—then, although we would pay transportation out and return, they had to arrange their own flight, seat, and whatnot. But for an orderly operation we could not go much beyond the 10-day period and guarantee return.

TRANSFER OF AIR FORCE INFORMATION OFFICER

The CHAIRMAN. Here is another story I thought you perhaps should clarify if you can.

In the Washington Post on August 11 this story reports that a basic disagreement had broken out between the U.S. military and an Air Force captain in Saigon. This story is written by Mr. William Tuohy. You probably know who he is.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Los Angeles Times?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The article says:

The controversy surfaced when it was learned that the highly regarded Air Force Information Chief, Colonel William J. McGinty, is being summarily transferred from Saigon to a non-information post in Washington.

His information policy ran afoul of the Military High Command information office in Saigon, where frankness and efficiency are in chronic short supply.

How would you comment on that article? Is it correct?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would say first that Mr. Tuohy apparently lost an important source of information. That would be my first comment. I am not aware of what the case of the colonel's—Colonel McGinty, is it?

The CHAIRMAN. Col. William J. McGinty.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not aware of what, for what reason the Air Force transferred him, if they did.

The CHAIRMAN. Is not the Air Force information office under you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It is entirely independent?

Mr. SYLVESTER. All of the information effort within MACV reports through Colonel Bankson, but the replacement and removal and assignment and changing of Air Force officers, does not come under me.

The CHAIRMAN. So you think this story is probably motivated by Mr. Touhy's friendship for McGinty?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not want to make any comments.

The CHAIRMAN. You know nothing about it, in other words?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not know anything about the reason for his transfer.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see, Mr. Sylvester, on August 25 a UPI report of a story in the Santa Barbara News Press that a U.S. Army sergeant told newsmen of having helped train a battalion of North Vietnamese soldiers two months before they slipped away. Do you know anything about that story and is it accurate?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I did not hear it all, Senator. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe this article was printed here in the Washington Daily News. As it is described here, a U.S. Army sergeant told the newsmen of having helped train a battalion of North Vietnamese soldiers for two months before they slipped away. Do you know anything about it? Is it an accurate picture?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The sergeant apparently has denied in writing the truth of the story.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it is not so, to your information?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I conclude that that is not so.

ARMY EXHIBITION AT JEFFERSON MEMORIAL

The CHAIRMAN. Here is another story. I wonder if you could say whether it is so or not so. Are you familiar with Mr. Drew Pearson's column of August 27 in which he drew attention to and described an Army exhibition of how to kill the enemy? Apparently this torchlight tattoo is being staged weekly in front of the Jefferson Memorial. Is it true that the Army is sponsoring such a program?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I believe it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you explain why they are doing it, particularly at the Jefferson Memorial?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Mr. Chairman, I got back from vacation on Monday and I pretty well devoted my time to preparing myself for this meeting with you and your colleagues. I saw the story when it was handed to me. I have not made an inquiry into why they are doing it. I intend to once I have fulfilled my obligations to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this not a part of your public relations? Apparently it is designed to have some effect upon the general public, is it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I certainly think it does, yes, Mr. Chairman. I simply do not know, and I expect to find out, which section of the Army is responsible, whether this was cleared and how it was put on. I do not know. It would certainly raise some questions in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. It does in mine, too. I thought surely you would say this did not happen. I did not know you were going to admit it. You caught me unprepared.

The program began with one soldier attacking another from behind and strangling him with a piano wire. As the strangulation started, the Army announcer said:

The garrote. Some people feel it is oldfashioned but when pulled taut and twisted violently I can assure you it is most effective.

I cannot understand why the Army would be putting on such a program. I really did not expect you to admit you were doing it. I thought you would say "That is a figment of his imagination."

Mr. SYLVESTER. Well, my reputation for truth has been upheld.

The CHAIRMAN. It has.

Another soldier sneaked up and lunged with a huge sword at an unsuspecting Vietcong played by a marine. I cannot understand the motive of the Defense Department. Can the colonel sitting by you give us a justification for this program?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if your associate, the colonel from the Defense Department, can give us an idea why such a program is being conducted.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not think either of us has had time to delve into the details of it. I understand from what I have heard that it is a show of about 80 or 90 men and this was a very small part of it. It is the sort of demonstration that is made on Army installations and has caused some reaction, as you have noted. Apparently it is about

four or five minutes out of an hour and a half show, but it is the part that got reported.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think from reading the press about riots, and snipers and various other things, that the general public is sufficiently belligerent and warlike already without being encouraged in violence?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator, without knowing all the facts about this show, and assuming, which is a bad assumption, that this story is correct, there would be a great question in my mind whether I would put it on. I would have grave doubts about putting it on. But I do not want to be in a position of responding to something which I have not had an opportunity to see, hear, or get into. But on the face of it, it appears to be something that I think would be better used on military facilities, installations, and training grounds.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me how long it has been going on?

Mr. SYLVESTER. The show itself?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I cannot.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently, it had not been going on long enough to attract attention. Was the first you heard of it in Drew Pearson's column?

Mr. SYLVESTER. That was the first I heard about it.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the first I heard of it, too.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I think I recall an armed services night show in the armory a few years ago in which a part of the show was a demonstration—it may not have been of refined techniques of killing such as these—but as I remember, that program had a demonstration of a mock battle with killing. So this evidently has been going on by way of public display for some time, has it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator, I simply do not know the facts. I cannot answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sylvester, you are an old experienced man in this field.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Certainly old.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not mean that. To me you are very young because we are about the same age.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I consider that young, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean you have had long experience in journalism. That is what I mean to say.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir.

REASSURING AMERICAN PUBLIC ABOUT NEWS

The CHAIRMAN. I realize there is great competition in this field and that journalists, I am sure, are as sensitive as other people to any kind of slight. But is there anything you can think of that might be done to reassure the American people that the news is not being managed? Do you have any suggestion at all that might be made to reconcile some of these journalists who have complained so bitterly about it with some, as you have already said, who do not complain at all? I do not know that I believe in polls. I do believe very much in the integrity of representatives of some of the great newspapers, and I do not think Mr. Deakin would deliberately mislead us. Even if the poll is only half right, it is a very serious matter that so many American

people think they only sometimes get the truth. Do you have any suggestions or comments you would like to make on this problem?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If you are asking me to address myself to managed news—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and how would you disabuse the public's mind that it is managed news? You say it is not. It looks as if we could do a better job of communicating what you are really doing if the news were not managed.

Mr. SYLVESTER. First, I would suggest that the only place where news is managed, the only place where it can be managed, the only place here it should be managed and is managed, is in every news office. Newspapers have managing editors. That is their job. Television and radio news departments have, too. That is the only place that I know of where news can be managed, is managed, and should be managed.

But I think that the use of the term "managed news" on the part of government has never really been taken apart and examined. If you ask somebody what he means, I have yet to find a definition or a case history of what is being talked about. If I, as a reporter, could use a phrase like "managed news" to beat somebody on the head while the thought that I could get something out of him that I could not obtain otherwise, it would be an effective technique. But it does not happen to be true.

It frankly puzzles me. I do not know what "managed news" means.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

INTERPRETATION OF SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S REMARKS

Senator McCARTHY. I think it was last February that the Secretary of Defense appeared before this committee and said that the estimate of the capacity of the North Vietnamese to infiltrate support troops into South Vietnam after the resumption of bombing was up to 4,500 a month. He again appeared before our committee some four or five months later. The report was that they were then infiltrating 5,000 to 7,000 a month. When asked about the "up to 4,500," he said that when he said "up to 4,500," it did not mean that that was the limit. He said the number might be *x*.

Now, how would you have read it, if you were a member of the Senate committee listening to him, or interpreting his remarks, when he said "up to 4,500"? Would you have assumed that that was an upper limit, or did "up to 4,500" mean, as the Secretary later said, *x*?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If I had been following the situation in Vietnam as he has, if I had had the opportunity to do it since 1961, it would have meant to me that the figure was valid as of that time. It would have also meant that that was the best estimate that the intelligence people had at that time, and that the intelligence people in Vietnam—in Saigon—attempt to be as precise as they can.

Senator McCARTHY. So that we should not have assumed that the resumption of bombing was really going to necessarily slow down or set a top limit on the number of troops that might be infiltrated, even though he said that up to 4,500 was what at least we thought he meant as an upper limit. But he came in later and said "up to" does not mean "up to." "Up to" means "*x*."

Mr. SYLVESTER. I cannot very well—

Senator McCARTHY. You have to interpret his remarks, do you not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I cannot very well speak for the Secretary of Defense.

Senator McCARTHY. We are trying to get help.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I shall be glad to help any way I can.

Senator McCARTHY. That is what I am asking you. I am trying to interpret this particular remark. I was surprised when he said "Up to does not mean an upper limit."

Mr. SYLVESTER. I was in Saigon with him at the time that we were briefed, and he was briefed by the intelligence people. That was the figure that they gave. But I think that of all figures, in view of the way you have to get information—

Senator McCARTHY. I think he should have said in February that we do not know how many, that we are going to resume bombing whether it is going to have any effect or not. But this is the approach used which has led to what we refer to as the credibility gap. This issue, which now concerns the Senate, I think would be much less serious if the Secretary had spoken differently.

CONTINGENCY STUDIES OF WAR

There have been a number of newspaper stories to the effect that the executive branch is conducting contingency studies of the war, the number of troops needed, the cost, and so on. These stories have been denied officially several times. Should we accept these denials? Could you say whether or not the administration is conducting contingency studies as to the number of troops that will be needed in Vietnam, the possible duration of the war, and the possible cost of the war?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I would not attempt to discuss what the studies and contingency plans are. If you are referring, and you may be, to a story out of Vietnam that there were contingency plans for x number of troops, the fact is that, to the best of my knowledge and that of the best sources that I can get in the Defense Department, there is no authority for that figure or any other figure.

Senator McCARTHY. Does that mean there are no studies, or does that mean the studies indicate it is open end? You say there are no studies which have said a certain number of troops. But are there studies which indicate that nobody knows the number of troops that may have to go in? That kind of study may be just as significant as one which said 400,000 or 500,000 or a million men.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not aware of any.

NUMBER OF 500,000 TROOPS

Senator McCARTHY. Are you aware of the number of 500,000 troops which is being talked about now?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I am aware of that number.

Senator McCARTHY. Does that have any standing at all in the Department of Defense? Is there any recognition being given to it as a ceiling or as a point that may be passed at a certain time, or as an unusually high estimate?

Mr. SYLVESTER. As the number of troops are approved, to go out there. There has been in each case historically a request from the

commander. The President has made clear that as the commander, General Westmoreland, asked for more troops, they would be provided. So far they have been provided. I cannot predict what the future will be, and I have not any idea what General Westmoreland and his colleagues will do. It is completely out of my area of knowledge.

Senator McCARTHY. You mean that the number of troops that are likely to go in there will be determined solely by the requests of General Westmoreland?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I beg your pardon?

Senator McCARTHY. You mean that the Pentagon is making no estimates, no projections?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think what you are saying would be incorrect, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are taking no part in it.

Senator McCARTHY. The 500,000 figure, is that a Westmoreland figure originally, or is this one which has—

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have no idea what the figure is. I would put no value on it one way or the other. I have not the slightest idea whether it has validity one way or the other.

Suppose tomorrow the Vietcong should cease fighting. Then the figure would certainly have no validity. I have no idea what the figure is. My guess in the past has not been worth anything.

Senator McCARTHY. The point is, you do not know whether or not, if things continue as they are, we will increase the number of troops by 200,000 as quickly as we can.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have no information, sir, that I can give you or that I should attempt to give you. I am simply ignorant. I do not, know. Figures basically in the past seem to me to be figures, news stories. I have written many of them.

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS

Senator McCARTHY. What is the current estimate of the number of the Vietnamese troops?

The CHAIRMAN. South Vietnamese?

Senator McCARTHY. Yes, South Vietnamese.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have not that figure in my head, Senator, but I think it is somewhere between 280,000 and 300,000 in their regular army. I would not want to be held to it. I would rather get the figure accurately for you.

Senator McCARTHY. I do not need it exactly. If we were to send in 500,000 and they maintained roughly the same number they have now, it would be up around 750,000 troops with a population of 15 million. That would be one soldier for every 20 people, would it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, it would.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you think that might help to control the area?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think that comments from me on this would be worthless.

Senator McCARTHY. You are dealing in ratios down there now, and you are doing your publication. You are giving us kill ratios as if they were pretty absolute. What about the ratio of one soldier to 20, to 30? How many soldiers do you think you will need to control the population of that size in that part of the world?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator, on the contrary, we have kept away from hard ratio figures. As a matter of fact, as I think the Secretary has testified, as I know he has testified, the question of ratio is a matter of dispute based on the judgment of different people. Any ratio figure must include consideration of the impact in Vietnam of fire-power and mobility. But for me to attempt to give you or discuss seriously what the ratio should be would simply mean that I was "talking through my hat."

Senator McCARTHY. I think there was some talk about if the kill ratio got up to four or five to one advantageous on our side, this would be significant; that if it were three to one, it was not significant. Was that a Pentagon judgment?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not aware of the official Pentagon judgment. Again, these ratios, as hard, fixed ratios or facts, do not appeal to me very much. I do not put any faith in them one way or another. I have not seen anything to convince me what the ratio should be.

Senator McCARTHY. Can we say then that there is no real, relatively firm judgment about what we have to do to achieve what may be called a victory in Vietnam and that there is no conception as to what such a victory would be?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I would not say this. I would simply say I am not the person to talk substantively with you about it.

Senator McCARTHY. There may be one, but you do not know about it?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not the person, really, to discuss it, because I am not fully aware of it.

MANAGEMENT OF NEWS BY EDITORS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sylvester, coming back to our discussion of a moment ago about managed news, you did not think it is managed by you or by the reporters. You seemed to leave the impression that if it is managed, it is managed by the managers of the newspapers, I suppose the news editors. Is that what you meant?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They exercise the discretion?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If you regard the flow of news today, coming from every part of the world and being provided to the news desks of every sort of news organization, and then consider the fact that the so-called white space—space available for news in newspapers and time on the air—is fixed to deciding and is decreasing; obviously there is a problem what news to use and what news not to use. In a political campaign, I would certainly bow to your experience, but newspapers in a political campaign certainly manage the news. This is the only place that I know where news can be managed. A decision has to be made about what you as a reader are going to read. You as a reader do not get everything that comes into the newspaper; you get what the editor under our system of a free press and free decision, decides that he can sell. That is the basic decision. That is the only way that I know how news can be managed.

I think the question that arises is whether news is accessible and do you have an opportunity to get at it? That is what I, as a newsman, would look for more than anything. I think by any measurement you wanted to take, by pound or liquid measure or any measure,

that the flow of news from the Pentagon in the last five years has been tremendously increased. In fact, we know it has.

The CHAIRMAN. And the selectivity as to what is used, you think, resides primarily in the news editors of the various papers?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Precisely.

MAJOR NEWSPAPERS' CONNECTION WITH TELEVISION STATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of this suspicion on the part of the public that they do not get the truth? Could it be influenced by the fact that so many of our major newspapers have now become connected with television stations, which are more profitable enterprises, and are more sensitive to what the Government position is on any given fact? The Government has complete control, actually, over the existence of a television license, does it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I had not thought about it, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You had not thought about it? As an old pro you should have thought about it.

Mr. SYLVESTER. That could be.

The CHAIRMAN. It could well be, could it not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. It could be.

DO MANY NEWSPAPERS CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT POLICIES?

The CHAIRMAN. It is very interesting that so many of our prominent newspapers have become almost agents or adjuncts of the Government; that they do not contest or even raise questions about Government policy, isn't that true?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not find that so in my job.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have a very friendly press in Washington.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I hope we do.

The CHAIRMAN. You do. No critical articles which have come to my attention have originated in any of the local press. All that we mentioned, even the criticism in the Los Angeles Times, although affiliated with a local paper, is not the local paper's own.

I think it is remarkable how far the consensus has gone in recent years, do you not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Again, my daily life does not necessarily support that view. But we have been belted here in Washington. I expect we will be in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not been aware of it.

Mr. SYLVESTER. If you will look at my back, I have been.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of these accounts I have heard were from individual reporters in the field—CBS's Safer, Browne, to mention a few of them. There may be a degree of personal friction between you and others which affects all of us. I have experienced that myself on occasion. I have gotten into those personal differences.

But I think it is fairly obvious from the volume of criticism that there is a feeling on the part of the American people that they do not get the full truth. I suppose that has always been more or less true.

NEWSPAPERS' ASSOCIATION WITH TELEVISION STATIONS

I have regretted very much the fact that great newspapers become, in a sense, an adjunct of a great television station, which is more profitable. Generally television stations—the large ones—make more money than most newspapers, do they not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If I answered that I would be really talking through my hat. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard that, have you not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I have heard it and I have seen financial statements which certainly suggest that television is profitable.

The CHAIRMAN. Once television stations become the major partner, they become very sensitive to Government regulation, do they not? Newspapers are free from this.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would say the television stations are pretty free in their reporting. I do not see signs of any sensitivity on their part.

The CHAIRMAN. In television?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I do not see it. I think radio and television people are completely free. I do not think they have one iota of this type of concern for the Government at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No. If they did, we are in a bad way.

The CHAIRMAN. Some people think we are in a bad way.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not, Senator.

CBS DID NOT TELEVISION VIETNAM HEARINGS

The CHAIRMAN. If the hearing before this committee does not suit everybody, it is very easy not to use it, is it not? And no one can really ever question this. These are decisions and policies that no one can prove, because they can be justified on other grounds, which you have already mentioned. But there are circumstances which raise doubts in people's minds, do they not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think that the doubts that arise in people's minds are due to a lack of access or lack of presentation to them of the full facts.

The CHAIRMAN. For example, the fact that CBS refused to televise hearings of this committee on Vietnam raised a doubt regardless of what the facts were; whether or not they were directed not to is beside the point. I certainly know nothing about it and could not suggest that they were; however, it did raise a doubt. Why did they not wish to broadcast our hearings?

Mr. SYLVESTER. One of the reasons would be that you are not offering any prizes. I do not think that you can compete with the sort of programs that turn into money. I think it is as simple as that, Mr. Chairman. I am sure you do, too.

The CHAIRMAN. One broadcasting network did do it and the other one did not. Is one more greedy or venal than the other?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I think that, again, is a demonstration of freedom of editorial decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Freedom of decision. All right.

LETTERS OF CONGRATULATIONS TO EDITORS

One last thing. You do not think a letter of congratulations from the CIA would ever affect the attitude of an editor of a newspaper, would it?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. A letter of congratulations from the CIA, or even the White House, would not affect, by any chance, the attitude of an editor of a newspaper, would it?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Not a Republican newspaper.

The CHAIRMAN. Why are Republicans more immune than Democrats?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think it depends on who the editor is and how easily he is flattered and a lot of things like that.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too. I think a lot of things do influence the question of managed news.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we understand each other. I think that is right. And that is where the managed news comes in?

Mr. SYLVESTER. In each newspaper office, television, radio.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Government has ways of being very flattering to people who manage the news, does it not? I do not mean you particularly, but there are people who do.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Oh, I cannot think offhand—all of them are subject to—yes, a newspaperman likes to be close to sources, whether it is a Senator or a Member of the House, member of the executive branch, or what. He likes to be on the "in" and in the know, as I did and would again if I had the chance. But I think that is the most successful way of influencing newsmen—taking them in.

The CHAIRMAN. There is some difference between the availability of news to you from a Senator and, say, the Secretary of Defense, is there not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Not always.

The CHAIRMAN. For example, you do not like to talk about Thailand. I am very curious about Thailand. In fact, we have asked your Defense Department to come up and testify about Thailand. I assume you know that they are very reluctant to do it in public session at this time. You know that, do you not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I am aware of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been advised not to testify about it also?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I have not been advised. My own good judgment, knowing what the situation is, which I am sure you know also, would suggest to me to ask you not to ask me that in public.

FUNCTION OF THE SENATE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The CHAIRMAN. You see, this is what really presents me with a great dilemma. I feel that I was led into the Tonkin Gulf resolution, and I have only myself to blame for it because I should have been more intelligent, more farseeing, and more suspicious, but I was not and I fell for it. Now we are faced with what looks like a repetition—by that I mean, faced with a *fait accompli*, a situation that we have to take. If I have any responsibility at all as chairman of this committee, I think we ought to know what we are getting into and to have an

opportunity to express our opinion about it. I do not know what other function this committee and the Senate should perform in the field of foreign relations unless it is to give some kind of opinion and advice. Certainly we were not created and are not paid to be a rubberstamp. I do not want to be a rubberstamp if I can help it. That is the only reason I want to know what the administration has in mind in Thailand; that is all. It is just that simple. It is not idle curiosity.

I want to know what the obligations and commitments are and how far the administration is going to go. Are we going to have another Vietnam there? I really think we are entitled to know it, or the Senate ought to just give up any pretense of being a junior partner, even, in this advise-and-consent aspect of foreign relations.

Do you see what I mean? Do you think that is an unreasonable attitude on the part of a Senator?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Not in the least. On the contrary, I concur completely.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, we are having some difficulty. I do not wish to violate any security. I do not want to give the enemy anything. I am not at all sure as I look back on the Tonkin Gulf resolution, that it would have prejudiced our case at all. I think it would have been a great service to the country if we had had very thorough hearings on what we were getting into. But I have already apologized for that publicly. I shall not repeat it.

The Senator from Pennsylvania?

VIEWS OF NEWS POLICY IN VIETNAM

Senator CLARK. Mr. Sylvester, I would like to make an observation which you may or may not want to comment on. I have no questions.

In my judgment, our news policy in Vietnam is barbarous, revolting, manipulated, lacking in candor, and largely responsible for the growing gap in credibility as to the point of view of the administration all over the country. I do not know whether you or USIA paid the transportation expenses of all these reporters that went over and who write back pretty much as trained seals what they were told in Vietnam. I thank God for the free American press, for television, and for photography which, despite official policy, is keeping open to the American people a reasonably good flow of information as to what is actually going on in Vietnam. I congratulate you on one thing, and that is that you have not yet imposed censorship.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator, you have made some very serious charges without documentation. I realize they are your views. I think they are ill founded in relation to the facts.

I think that your Government, as the testimony that I have tried to give here shows, has made it possible for newsmen of all kinds to cover this war in a way that no other war has ever been covered. I suggest that you are libeling a large number of newsmen by suggesting that they can be bought for a plane ride to Vietnam and back. I do not believe it, and I do not think there is any record to show that they do.

I do not believe, for example, that the Philadelphia Bulletin was bought when they had one of their men go that way or was any other big paper. I would say we are in complete disagreement.

Senator CLARK. I would only reply that the documentation, in my opinion, is to be found in the daily pages of the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Philadelphia Bulletin. I know that you cannot buy John McCullough but I am not sure that all the other reporters are in that same category.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would like the record to show that there are very many more than John, whom I admire greatly, but I would put with him scores of reporters who have been there and are doing a very fine job. I think if you have the time to examine into each one, your judgment would not be quite as harsh as it is.

Senator CLARK. I notice in the article printed about you in the New York Times on Wednesday, August 31, that it is said that you always like to have the last word, and I am quite content to give it to you.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Mr. Sylvester, it is a very complicated thing. I do not quite agree, myself, with the Senator from Pennsylvania's baldly stated idea that people are bought by such things.

POLICY OF PRESS REGARDING FREE TRAVEL

But let me refer to an exchange we had here with Mr. Marks. USIA pays the way of foreign correspondents abroad. You know that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. The Washington Star is extremely critical of the chairman of this committee; it says that the Senator is seeming to try to impose American press ethics on foreign nations. Then it goes on, "This newspaper, in common with most of the Nation's major newspapers, makes it a practice not to travel on Government-provided transportation whenever there is commercial transportation available."

In other words, they would not take a free ride from here to Vietnam but they would from Saigon out to the field, because that is the only transportation available. I think that is a fairly commonly accepted principle, and I do not think this means that anybody who did take one was necessarily prejudiced in his reporting.

As a matter of fact, I agree with what you said. I find very little evidence, if any, that reporters, either here or abroad, distort the news themselves. I think they report it as they see it. The change results as a matter of individual policy. I do not wish to question the motives of the editors. They have their policies and beliefs. If they believe in one approach to a major activity, then they believe it is their duty to report it as they see it, as all of us do, through our own colored glasses. I think it is a fact of life. I do not mean to question the motives of the local newspapers or anybody else.

It is a fact of life that one of their major operations, television, is subject to Government regulation. This has nothing to do, I think, with the morality of the owners. But if they are going to take a position for or against a particular Government policy, I think they are bound to be influenced by what they think is important and what ought to be printed. I do not think this is any particular reflection upon their ethics.

DID THE WASHINGTON STAR ACCEPT GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION?

Some of the most reputable institutions are very careful about becoming entangled, just as is the Star. However, much as I disagree with their attitude, this is what I think is the common feeling by great newspapers. Do you not agree with what the Star says?

Mr. SYLVESTER. In what part, that the Star does not accept transportation support, you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. That this newspaper, in common with many of the Nation's major newspapers, makes it a practice not to travel on Government-provided transportation whenever there is commercial transportation available.

Do you think that is true, not just peculiar to the Star? Or can you tell me did the Star accept transportation from you?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I can tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes. There is hardly a single big newspaper in the United States that did not.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about within Vietnam.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not talking about that, either.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there commercial transportation available?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Then this report was quite wrong.

I may say it is not the first time I have found the paper to be in error, but on other subjects.

One of the great papers in my State takes this position and I happen to know they were offered, not by you, but by the executive branch, a free trip and they turned it down on the basis that "we will pay our own way."

REPORTING FROM VIETNAM IN 1964

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think you have to look at it, as I pointed out in my statement, in terms of time. In 1964 we did not have very many men out there and Vietnam is 12,000 miles away. It goes, in a sense, as you said about the Tonkin Gulf, that if you could do today what you did then, have another opportunity, you might look at it differently. The newspapers of our country, the news media of our country, were not paying very much attention to Vietnam.

In fact, they were not spending very much money on covering it. The coverage was by young men and by lower priced help. That is why we invited major news organizations in the country to go out and look for themselves. Then, as the conflict escalated, the newspapers, radio, television, magazines, everyone else devoted a tremendous amount of resources and money to their coverage of it. What we attempted to do in 1964 was to interest them in it, and they were not interested at that time.

As a matter of fact, of all the choices they had to make in respect to the expenditure of their money, Vietnam was way down on the list. Now it is way up on the list. They see nothing that they have committed themselves to, nor has it affected anybody's reporting.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not talking about reporting now. We are talking about how the newspaper manages it. I agree with you that that is where it is managed.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Again, in using the word "managing" the news at home, I see nothing evil in it. You cannot put out a news operation unless you manage it.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not say news managing was evil. We were trying to figure out whether the news is managed or not and how it is done.

NEWSPAPERS WHO ACCEPTED FREE TRANSPORTATION

I do not want to leave this record incomplete by simply asking if the Star accepted a trip. I have to ask, did the Washington Post also accept your favors?

Mr. SYLVESTER. An adjunct of the Post, Newsweek did. Post Newsweek did.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the other adjunct, WTOP? They have lots of adjuncts.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not recall that. I have the list and could make it available to you, if you wish.

The CHAIRMAN. It clears up one point, that this is a myth—a myth that the editor of the Star ought to be aware of so he will not write such foolish editorials at the same time that his newspaper is accepting these free junkets.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I do not know, but I do not see any intentional misrepresentation on their part whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it is intentional. He just did not know what his own newspaper was doing.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I think that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not accuse him of doing anything intentional. I think that is the same when he writes about me; he just does not know any better.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I am in the same boat.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED MANAGED NEWS?

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to clarify what you said managed news is, what it consists of. Do you think if the White House should call an editor and publisher and complain bitterly about a news article and they responded, would this be considered managed news or not?

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would rather not involve myself in the White House, because I have always been very careful not to.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a hypothetical question.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Well, if you will accept a change to the Defense Department.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, if the Defense Department did.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would approach my answer from my own operation as a newsman. I feel very strongly and did feel very strongly that if you or any other Senator took an exception to my reporting, you would have that right and should exercise that right to report to my superiors. I would have felt better if you had asked me first, but if you did not, I would not get emotional about it. I think anybody has a right to raise a question about such a story, any Government official, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that remark attributed to you, that you do not care what a reporter thought since you had access to his publisher? Is that a true statement?

Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I do care for what the reporters think, when you go to an editor, you want to be very sure of your ground, because his basic reaction is to support the reporter, if he is good. I expected to be supported by my editors and usually was. Every man in this room expects to be supported by his editor.

You should have very good ground if you go. You cannot go over the head of reporters in the field, to their editors unless you have a very good factual case.

The CHAIRMAN. You feel, then, as I understand it, that the Secretary of State is within his rights and should call up a publisher if he disagrees with an article, and complain about it and set him right?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If he has gotten no satisfaction from the reporter.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. Then, if he does respond properly, it would also be quite proper for him to invite him over to lunch and have a nice private chat.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I would prefer that method.

The CHAIRMAN. So you work it both ways; you have the carrot and the stick?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. I think this would apply to all departments of Government. It is not peculiar to yours.

Mr. SYLVESTER. I can only speak for my own, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been around for awhile.

Mr. SYLVESTER. It is difficult to step out of the character of an official, but if that is possible, I would say my answer to that in 1960 would have been yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it still is the custom. I do not know if there is anything you can do, or if anything should be done about it. I think it is well to know about these things. It is like the Foreign Agents Registration Act. We do not prohibit agents from representing a foreign nation, but we do require, by law, that they are put on record so that we know how their activities are carried out.

PUBLIC'S UNDERSTANDING OF NEWS MANAGEMENT

I think it is very reassuring to the American people to know how the news is managed, as you have described it, and I think you have made a good contribution. And if news management is a fact, since it is obvious that it not only is, but is always going to be, it is good to know that there is absolutely no possibility of avoiding it or preventing it. Knowing about it, we can evaluate the news more accurately. Would you not agree with that?

Mr. SYLVESTER. If I were a wiser man, I would not have gotten into this, but I do agree with it. Yes, I think that is obvious.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not wish to have an attitude of criticism. All I was trying to do was review as much as I could. I do not know if news management is subject to ethical judgment. It is the way we operate. We may as well accept it.

Do you have anything else you would like to say?

Mr. SYLVESTER. Only to thank you very much for giving us this opportunity and for the very fair treatment I have had.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope it is. We are flooded, as all of us are, with all of these stories. I can understand how conflicts arise. Some of them do not look very good in print. I had an idea you would have

some explanation to make, even though there may be some truth in it, that there are always personal conflicts. Goodness knows, public life is made up of them, and it is a matter of degree how far you go. I think you have made a real contribution, telling us how the news actually is managed.

Thank you.

Mr. SYLVESTER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing adjourned.)

in the case of the first two, the only way to determine the
value of the property is to have it appraised by a competent
appraiser. In the case of the third, the value is determined
by the market value of the property at the time of the
death of the decedent.

The value of the property is determined by the market
value of the property at the time of the death of the
decedent.

The value of the property is determined by the market
value of the property at the time of the death of the
decedent.

APPENDIX

AMPLIFICATION OF LEGAL MEMORANDUM

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,
Washington, September 2, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In the absence of Mr. Marks, I have been requested to respond to your letter of August 29, 1966 requesting amplification of the legal authorities cited to your Committee in support of the Agency's program of sponsoring tours to Southeast Asia by foreign newsmen.

As stated in the legal memorandum submitted to your Committee, our basic authority is Section 501 of the U.S. Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948 (Public Law 402—80th Congress). That Section defines the authorized mission of the Agency "To provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media . . ."

This Section of the law constitutes the authority under which all informational activities of the Agency are conducted. Materials prepared under this authority about United States activities and policies in any sector of the world for use in all media of communications, radio, press, television, motion pictures, etc., are disseminated abroad by any available means which will give the widest possible distribution. When feasible, local media within a particular country are used. This not only assures broad distribution but enhances the credibility of the information disseminated.

Agency supported travel of foreign newsmen to areas of the world, particularly where United States policy is in controversy, is an effective and economical program activity. By this means our story is told in newspapers of key countries by local reporters who write about what they have seen and heard.

Funds appropriated for USIA program activities have been used in past years for this and similar programs. The appropriation committees of the Congress have been made aware of the program. For example, in testimony before the House and Senate Appropriations Committees (FY 1963) about the Berlin situation, former director Edward R. Murrow recorded what this Agency had done.

In his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee (for Fiscal Year 1963) Mr. Murrow stated:

"We have cooperated with the Berlin Government in bringing hundreds of foreign leaders and journalists to the city for a personal look." (emphasis supplied) (Page 22 House Hearings, FY 1963)

Further, in hearings before the House Appropriations Committee (Fiscal Year 1966) a statement submitted for the record in justification of budget requests for the European area contained the following statement:

"One of the tested methods of obtaining desirable coverage in foreign publications is the arranging of conducted tours for editors, government officials, and other opinion leaders not only within the United States but also to NATO installations in Europe, Berlin, and to United States Navy ships in or near European ports. Resultant published items—photographs, articles, and books—have reached all types of audience." (emphasis supplied) (Page 127 House Hearings FY 1966)

Tours of foreign newsmen to key areas of the world exemplify how this method is put into practice.

As you were informed, this program is funded, where possible, with excess foreign currencies. This consists of paying transportation costs from excess currency countries which have agreed to the use of its currencies for travel cost.

The Department of State has negotiated such agreements with six countries, India, Israel, Pakistan, UAR, Yugoslavia, and Tunisia.

Expenditures for these costs are, of course, made against the special foreign currency appropriation included in our annual appropriation act. The provisions for Fiscal Year 1966 (P.L. 89-164) reads as follows:

"For payments in foreign currencies which the Treasury Department determines to be excess to the normal requirements of the United States and for payments in Brazilian cruzeiros, for necessary expenses of the United States Information Agency, as authorized by law, \$11,112,000, to remain available until expended." Estimated travel cost chargeable to these funds are included each year in our budget estimates for foreign currency appropriation.

I hope the foregoing will clarify the Agency's legal authority for this program.

Sincerely,

HOWARD L. CHERNOFF,
Executive Assistant to the Director.

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., September 23, 1966.

B-159983.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reference to your letter of August 29, 1966, enclosing for our attention a copy of a memorandum which the United States Information Agency provided the Committee on Foreign Relations as legal justification for that Agency's program of supporting tours in Southeast Asia by foreign newsmen. Such tours, it is reported, are funded with excess foreign currencies wherever possible. You request our views both on the validity of the memorandum and on the Agency's program of subsidizing foreign newsmen.

Section 501 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 9, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 1461, cited in the memorandum as the basic authority under which all informational activities of the Agency are conducted, contains the general authorization "to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad." In addition reference is made in the Agency memorandum to section 1005 of the act, 22 U.S.C. 1437, directing the utilization, to the maximum extent practicable, of private agencies.

Under these broad statutory directives, the Agency, as indicated in the memorandum and as shown by its actions, has determined that the facilitation of travel by foreign newsmen to Vietnam will promote reporting that will be objective and give a balanced account of the United States Government actions and policies. Appropriations are made available to the agency for "expenses necessary to enable the United States Information Agency, as authorized by Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (75 Stat. 527), and the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.) to carry out international information activities * * *" (Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and related agencies Appropriation Act, 1966, 79 Stat. 620). Also, authority for payment in foreign currencies is provided in the same act as follows:

"SALARIES AND EXPENSES (SPECIAL FOREIGN CURRENCY PROGRAM)

"For payments in foreign currencies which the Treasury Department determines to be excess to the normal requirements of the United States and for payments in Brazilian cruzeiros, for necessary expenses of the United States Information Agency, as authorized by law, \$11,112,000, to remain available until expended."

Article I, section 9, clause 7, of the Constitution states that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law," and section 3678, Revised Statutes, 31 U.S.C. 628, provides:

"Except as otherwise provided by law, sums appropriated for the various branches of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no other."

Generally, the Congress in making appropriations leaves largely to administrative discretion the choice of ways and means to accomplish the objects of the appropriation. Administrative discretion may not, of course, transcend the statutes, nor be exercised in conflict with law, nor for the accomplishment of purposes unauthorized by the appropriation. The expending of funds to facilitate tours of foreign newsmen to Vietnam with the expectation that such will be an effective means of disseminating information abroad about the United States does not, in our opinion, transcend the statutes here involved nor conflict with law. As to whether it is one of the ways contemplated for carrying out the object for which appropriations are provided, an examination of the legislative history of the appropriation for the fiscal year 1966 discloses the following statement in the budget justifications as set forth on page 127 of the hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, on Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966:

"One of the tested methods of obtaining desirable coverage in foreign publications is the arranging of conducted tours for editors, government officials, and other opinion leaders, not only within the United States but also to NATO installations in Europe, to Berlin, and to U.S. Navy ships in or near European ports. Resultant published items—photos, articles, and books—have reached all types of audiences."

As to the above reference to "tested methods" we note that it has been in use at least since 1962, for on page 22 of the hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, on the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1963, the late Mr. Edward R. Murrow, former Director, stated to the Subcommittee that "We have cooperated with the Berlin Government in bringing hundreds of foreign leaders and journalists to the city for a personal look." In the hearings on the same appropriations before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Mr. Murrow stated, commencing on page 468, that "In cooperation with the West German Government we arranged to send large numbers of journalists, editors, and reporters to Berlin, in order to let them see for themselves what was happening. We also spent large amounts for films and television to exploit the Berlin wall." The Agency's program of supporting tours in Southeast Asia of foreign newsmen is a continuation of this method. Under these circumstances it is our view that funds appropriated for the Agency are available for supporting such tours.

In regard to funding the program from excess foreign currencies, as you know, the United States has accumulated substantial amounts of foreign currencies throughout the world principally through the sale of surplus agricultural products under the provisions of Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (commonly known as Public Law 480). Under this program the Department of State enters into agreements with foreign countries which provide for the sale of United States agricultural commodities for foreign currencies and such agreements specify the uses that may be made of the foreign currencies. Where possible the instant program is financed from such funds and in this connection the Agency advised us that the Department of State has negotiated agreements with India, Israel, Pakistan, UAR, Yugoslavia, and Tunisia, whereby excess currencies may be used to pay transportation costs. The use of such currencies in lieu of United States dollars for the payment of travel costs is consistent with efforts being made to alleviate the balance-of-payments problem facing the United States today. See in this connection our report to Congress on failure to effectively utilize excess United States-owned foreign currencies to pay international air travel ticket costs being paid in dollars, B-146749, April 15, 1965, a copy of which is enclosed for your ready reference.

The fact that the expenses of the tours are being paid to the extent possible from excess foreign currencies does not circumvent congressional control since estimated travel costs are included each year in the budget estimates for the foreign currency appropriation, and a special foreign currency appropriation is included in the annual appropriation acts. The appropriation provided for the Agency for fiscal year 1966, hereinabove quoted, would in our opinion be properly chargeable with costs of tours such as here concerned.

Sincerely yours,

ELMER B. STAATS,
Comptroller General of the United States.

Enclosure.¹

¹ On file with the Committee on Foreign Relations.

EXAMPLES OF USIA REPORTING CONCERNING NEWS
MANAGEMENT AND CENSORSHIP

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, September 20, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the appearance of Mr. Leonard H. Marks before your Committee on August 17, 1966, he was asked to provide examples of reporting by USIA concerning "news management and censorship".

We submit material that was broadcast on the news programs of the Voice of America and sent to all of our posts by our Press Service. The example enclosed concerned hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the material was reported on February 4, 1966.

We also submit samples on the subject "Freedom of the Press" carried on the Voice of America news and current affairs features at various times during 1965.

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

Enclosures.

SENATE ON VIETNAM—FEBRUARY 4, 1966

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began a searching inquiry into the Vietnamese situation. It questioned U.S. AID Administrator David Bell and his assistant, Rutherford Poats, for much of the day at a session that was nationally televised.

And next week it is scheduled to hear Defense Secretary McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—General Earle Wheeler.

A request from Mr. McNamara and the general that the hearing be private for security reasons drew protests from several Senators. Senator Wayne Morse called it "government by secrecy" and said the American public has the right to know everything.

Committee Chairman Fulbright said he understood the problem but would not predict what the committee would vote to do.

He told newsmen there is no war between the committee and the administration. He said the Senators are simply trying to find out what is going on.

AID Administrator Bell during his appearance said the current situation in Vietnam is about the same as a year ago. But he said he still believes that the allies can overcome the enemy if current efforts to reach a negotiated settlement should fail.

He said the United States is in Vietnam resisting aggression in the interest of peace. And he pointed out that in this work the South Vietnamese are furnishing the most men and suffering the greatest casualties.

Mr. Bell contrasted America's economic help to South Vietnam with the use of terror by the Communists.

At the White House a spokesman said in answer to a question that President Johnson feels the Senate Committee is performing its responsibilities by conducting the hearings.

At his news conference, however, the President defended the right of Mr. McNamara and General Wheeler to testify in closed session.

SENATE HEARINGS—FEBRUARY 4, 1966

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee today began a public inquiry into the Nation's Vietnam policy. It heard testimony today from U.S. Foreign Aid Director David Bell.

Committee Chairman William Fulbright had invited Defense Secretary McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Earle Wheeler to testify at

a public hearing on Monday. But Mr. McNamara said an open meeting would not be in the national interest.

Senator Wayne Morse—a leading critic of U.S. policy in Vietnam—challenged Mr. McNamara's statement and demanded an open hearing. The Oregon Democrat was backed by other committee members in his request. Senator Morse said a closed hearing would be government by secrecy.

At today's hearing, Mr. Bell told the committee that the United States is in Vietnam "resisting aggression in the interest of peace."

He said that only a combination of economic aid and military action can bring peace and security to South Vietnam * * *. That these objectives cannot be achieved by military means alone.

The Foreign Aid official also said most of the 400,000 people in refugee camps had fled from Vietcong terrorism and not from damage resulting from Allied military action.

In answer to questions by Chairman Fulbright, Mr. Bell said he had found considerable support in South Vietnam for the Saigon government. He also agreed that some past statements by U.S. officials about an improving outlook in South Vietnam were more optimistic than the facts justified. He said the current situation is about the same as a year ago.

VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS FEATURES

FEBRUARY 7, 1966.

SPECIAL FEATURE—FREEDOM OF THE PRESS NO. 4

THE WASHINGTON POST

(Tape inserts available in program documentation unit)

ANNOUNCER. The Voice of America now presents another in a series of programs on "Freedom of the Press." Today, this freedom in relation to a daily newspaper is discussed by the editor of the *Washington Post*.

NARRATOR. The right to a free press was guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This freedom was vital to the success of the American Revolution; today, when mass media of communication reach into the farthest corners of the world it is a vital factor in world understanding. Is news in the United States really free, uncontrolled by federal and local government? If so, how is this freedom maintained? How does it work?

For a discussion of these and other questions concerning freedom to print and speak the news in the United States, the Voice of America has gathered the views of responsible editors in press, radio and television.

James Wiggins is the editor of a respected and influential daily newspaper, the *Washington Post*, published in the nation's capital.

NARRATOR. The *Washington Post* is a substantial newspaper in every sense of the word. It carries its name across the eight-column front page in the traditional Gothic lettering, still favored by most of the older newspapers. Its daily edition may run to fifty or more pages, arranged in a number of separate sections giving full coverage to international news, local area news, business, sports, entertainment, diplomatic and social activities and so on. In its news presentation it is moderate with the stability of outlook built up through its eighty-year history. In the words of Mister Wiggins—

Tape—WIGGINS:

"It pursues a policy of an independent paper above any party affiliations and seldom endorses national candidates for office. It usually tries to discuss the ideas and the principles of government and avoid a personal approach to politics."

NARRATOR. Such a newspaper with such a policy can be found in most, if not all, of the large cities in the United States but, in one respect, the *Washington Post* is different. It's a matter of geography. For the *Post* is published in the nation's capital. Its readership includes a high proportion of U.S. government workers and representatives of every foreign government which maintains diplomatic relations with this country. Also, the *Post* is the only morning newspaper in Washington, so the question that is obviously going to be asked is: does the paper cater to its special audience? Is it a vehicle for the views of the administration? Mister Wiggins—

Tape: WIGGINS:

"There are no newspapers in America that have the mark of an administration or that are supported by the state."

NARRATOR. So the *Washington Post* is not influenced by the administration; it is not either wholly or in part supported by the state, nor can it be deprived of its legitimate commercial support. That is, the circulation cannot be restricted, its advertising revenues cannot be controlled, nor can its supply of newsprint be tampered with.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"I have no knowledge of this occurring anywhere in America or anywhere in America's past. The newsprint rate is quite uniform and standard. It is a commercial rate fixed by the market and the government does not distribute newsprint."

NARRATOR. So here is the capital's morning newspaper, read by foreign diplomats and federal employees and the government can't make any use of it—either to publish or suppress news stories.

If you were to glance through a copy of the *Washington Post*, however, you would probably notice one characteristic which identifies it with the area in which it is read. Compared with some other newspapers, it devotes a great deal of space to international news and to the actual workings of government—the debates in Congress, developments in the various federal agencies, statements of ministers and congressmen and, of course, the President himself. As Mister Wiggins points out, such items have a definite news value.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"The papers frankly put a very high estimation on the news value of official utterances by the government, at least by the President. I would say that the major newspapers feel a strong compulsion to convey the essence of what the President says on almost any occasion, but, in no case, does the government possess or use the power to require newspapers, in order to stay in existence, to publish anything that is furnished them by the government. The press possesses the right both affirmatively and negatively to be free. They have the right to print what they want to print and not to print as well."

NARRATOR. There is one thing the government is free to do in regard to the press. It has the right to criticize a publication; just as a publication has the right to criticize the government—its own or that of another country.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"There are, of course, frequent conversations between our reporters and people in the State Department, between our reporters abroad and people in the governments abroad, and, occasionally, if an individual in the government feels that the newspaper has been unfair to somebody, they do not hesitate to say to the reporter that they think so—or they think we have been unfair to a government or misinformed about a situation in a foreign country. They might suggest to us that we had been unfair."

NARRATOR. And the press is free to accept or ignore suggestions made by government representatives. So this is the external picture: there are no rules and regulations by which an administration can control what appears in the nation's newspapers. Nor are there any economic measures they can take to enforce a certain viewpoint. But perhaps there are more subtle means of controlling the flow of news. As the *Washington Post* has so many readers in the foreign embassies and in their governments overseas, is it possible that the administration in some way filters foreign news to the *Post* in order to further United States relations with these various countries? As Mister Wiggins points out, the many sources from which the *Post* draws its information would make such channeling of news an impossibility.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"We have foreign correspondents in Vietnam, in Japan, in South America, in England, Germany, France, Italy and the Soviet Union, and we are affiliated with the *Los Angeles Times* in a news service so that we utilize many of their correspondents elsewhere in a secondary role to our own."

NARRATOR. And coming into every newspaper office is an endless flow of news items from the various independent news gathering services, usually referred to as "wire" services. The *Washington Post* uses seven wire services in addition to its own correspondents. Such broad coverage gives reasonable assurance that the news that goes into the paper is accurate.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"You try to employ responsible reporters and utilize the services of responsible and independent wire services so the material arrives in your office with a high degree of credibility."

NARRATOR. But even if the raw material of news is reliable and accurate, wouldn't it be possible to select and present it in the light of policy considerations? Does the editorial policy of the newspaper itself influence news presentation?

Tape: WIGGINS:

"If you mean—to use the news columns to persuade or convince in conformity with the editorial policy of the paper, the answer would be 'no.' We try very hard to keep news columns devoted to relaying events and facts on the world situation and to confine opinions to plainly labelled comment by columnists or interpretive writers on the editorial page."

NARRATOR. In summing up his views as editor of an old-established and responsible newspaper, Mister Wiggins affirms his belief that freedom of the press in the United States means "freedom" in the broadest sense of the word.

Tape: WIGGINS:

"It contemplates (indicates) a situation in which the press has free access to information, has the right to print without prior restraint, the right to print without fear of confiscatory or fatal punishment for mistaken or wrongful publication, and the right of access to the materials of publication. Also, the ability to get newsprint and buy printing materials, and the right freely to distribute. These rights or privileges all have to exist if a country is to enjoy a press that's free from governmental intervention. I think we enjoy it to a larger degree here than it is enjoyed in any other country in the world."

ANNOUNCER. You've been listening to "Freedom of the Press"—another in a series of programs reporting on newspapers and news services in the United States. Today's speaker was James Wiggins, editor of the *Washington Post*. The program was brought to you by the Voice of America.

CONGRESSMAN'S DIARY NO. 16—DONALD RUMSFELD

JULY 6, 1966.

"FREEDOM OF INFORMATION"

(Tape inserts available in program documentation unit)

ANNOUNCER. The Congress of the United States—the nation's legislature—is made up of five hundred and thirty-five elected men and women who meet in Washington to help carry on the affairs of the nation. One of those members of Congress is Donald Rumsfeld of the mid-western state of Illinois. This is his diary:

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"Should, for example, the photographs of the moon be made available as quickly as they are made available to NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) or is a twenty-four hour delay acceptable? These questions are constantly being debated in the country and I think that it's a healthy thing that they are debated, it's a healthy thing that we are going to have legislation which will provide some statutory guide lines for the first time—and I personally consider the legislation one of the most important bills to pass in the last twenty years."

NARRATOR. The bill Congressman Rumsfeld refers to was one of several signed by President Johnson on July 4th. The day—the anniversary of the American Declaration of Independence—was particularly significant for this new law. For, as President Johnson said upon signing the bill: "This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of the nation permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public interest."

Called the "freedom of information" bill, the legislation provides that a citizen may insist on seeing records held by the Federal Government—with certain specified exceptions—which he believes he has a right to see. There are also procedures established by the new law with which a person can go to court and allege that the Federal government has withheld such information. The court will then decide whether the government action was legal—or illegal. Congressman Donald Rumsfeld has been directly involved with this new law, both as a member of the House of Representatives which gave final passage to the bill, and as a member of the congressional committee that gave the bill its initial consideration. He explains why he believes this law was necessary:

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"Since this country has been a country—and I suppose since there's been government—there is a tendency on the part of individuals in government, from time to time, for various reasons, real or imagined, to feel that it is either in their interest or the government's interest to withhold information from the people. In some cases, it's to protect errors. In some cases it may be to cover up an error of a political party or an individual. But we in this country have staked everything on the involvement of the people in the government. We have said we have a government of the people, and by the people, and for the people."

NARRATOR. The government by the people was a magnificent gamble, says Congressman Rumsfeld—"but it has worked." But in order for the people to guide and direct the course of government, he adds, they cannot operate in a vacuum of ignorance. This has become more crucial in this age when the United States is a nation of over one hundred and ninety-five million people—an age of great complexity—an age when the Federal government is becoming increasingly involved in many aspects of daily life. These factors have had a significant impact on the nature of government today:

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"They tend to make it increasingly difficult for a citizen to be knowledgeable about government, to have full information so that they can be good citizens and help to share and guide and direct the course of government. And so at the time it's becoming more difficult for the citizen, it's becoming more important that he do so. So without government secrecy, it's difficult for a citizen to exercise his responsibilities thoughtfully. With government secrecy it's impossible."

NARRATOR. With these thoughts in mind, Congress has spent about ten years attempting to find an answer—to resolve the problem of a citizen's right to information while still protecting the national security.

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"I am a member of the Government Information and Foreign Operations sub-committee of the Government Operations Committee. The sub-committee, chaired by John Moss, a Democrat, was the legislative committee in the House (of Representatives) which introduced the legislation early last year, which held hearings over a period of many weeks and then participated in the drafting and re-drafting and shaping of the legislation."

NARRATOR. This was a long and complex process. There were hearings—occasions when witnesses from various organizations appeared to testify before the congressman. They represented such interests as newspapers, lawyers, legal associations, civil liberties groups and so forth—all supporting a "freedom of information" bill. And then there were the witnesses from the government—the departments which would be directly affected by the legislation:

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"Every single witness, without exception, from the executive branch of the federal government who appeared or submitted a statement was opposed to it (the bill). So it was perfectly split—they felt it was a bad bill, they felt they couldn't operate with it, they felt it would result in the disclosure of information that would be harmful to the country, some said it was unconstitutional, some said it was unworkable, some said it was all right if you made these exemptions to protect their area of information. And after hearing all the evidence, all the information, we drafted a proposal which we think is a balance and which we think will serve the country well."

NARRATOR. The bill was then placed before the Congress—both the House of Representatives and the Senate—and in its final form, was passed unanimously—a rare occurrence in Congress. The bill was then sent to the President for his signature, making it a law. After signing it, he remarked: "I have always believed that freedom of information is so vital that only the national security, not the desire of public officials or private citizens, should determine when it must be restricted." The Chief Executive continued: "I sign this measure with a deep sense of pride that the United States is an open society in which the people's right to know is cherished and guarded." In July 1967, the "Freedom of Information" law will become effective. Individual citizens will of course be concerned—but of more importance, according to Congressman Rumsfeld, the news media which serve as a communication link between the government and the people have a vital interest in making the legislation work.

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"It's going to require that the press continue to be vigilant, continue to be free and energetic and willing to undertake, if necessary, a legal battle to prove that there was an unlawful withholding (of information). My guess is that the mere existence of this legislation will tend to have a very helpful effect on bureaucrats, on individuals in government who are, for the most part, very fine people, working hard and trying to see that we have a very efficient and responsive government. But the existence, the threat, the ability for a citizen to go into court in the event that an individual unlawfully withholds, I think, will tend to force their conduct into the 'goldfish bowl' theory: to the extent that human beings function in a location that other people can see what they're doing, they seem to function more honorably and more in a way that they would want other people to view them."

NARRATOR. This new law will also be of interest to members of the political parties—especially the opposition party. Currently the Democrats are in the majority in the Congress. The republicans, including Congressman Rumsfeld, believe that the law will give them access to certain information which until now, says the congressman, has been difficult to find—

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"One example, very recently, was a situation where the United States Government's Post Office hired a host of employees for the summer period, mostly young men, to work in the Post Office Department. The names were requested and they were denied (circulation) by the Post Office Department. Now obviously there is nothing security or sensitive about the names of minor postal officials. These should be public information. It was denied by the majority party executive branch of the federal government. After a great deal of work and effort we managed to pry this information out as properly the opposition party should do, and it turned out that the reason that they were being withheld was the simple fact that there were some politicians who had appointed their relatives or had their relatives appointed, and it didn't put them in too good a light."

NARRATOR. Although Congressman Rumsfeld believes this legislation is of major importance, he observes that it has not been of "overwhelming interest to the American people, because for the most part they do have access to information." But he emphasizes his belief that the philosophy behind the new law—freedom of information—is fundamental to American democracy:

Tape: RUMSFELD:

"I think that to the extent any country or any group of people contend that their system is based on the involvement and interest and participation of the people, there's precious little excuse for them not very carefully and diligently seeing that as the problems in the country change, that this communication, this open channel, doesn't remain open, because it belies our position if we don't take these steps."

NARRATOR. The "Freedom of Information" bill was one of many separate pieces of legislation which have been considered by the four hundred and thirty-five members of the House of Representatives and one hundred members of the Senate this year. Such work is part of the job of a man representing the people—a job highlighted on this, "Congressman's Diary."

ANNOUNCER. This has been—"Congressman's Diary"—a series of programs about the work of a man representing the people in the United States House of Representatives . . . seen through the eyes of Congressman Donald Rumsfeld of the mid-western state of Illinois.

VOICE OF AMERICA, CENTRAL PROGRAM SERVICES DIVISION, FEATURES BRANCH

AUGUST 10, 1965.

SPECIAL FEATURE—FREEDOM OF THE PRESS NO. 1

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

(Tape inserts available in program documentation unit are based on interviews obtained by Cambodian Service Chief Philip A. Damon)

ANNOUNCER. The Voice of America presents the first (one) of a series of programs on "Freedom of the Press."

NARRATOR. The right to a free press was guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It was important then; it is, perhaps, even

more important now, in an age when mass-circulation newspapers, periodicals, radio and television news reach into the furthest corners of the world. Is news in the United States really free? Uncontrolled by federal or local government? How is this freedom maintained? How does it work?

For a discussion of these and other questions concerning freedom to print and speak the news in the United States, the Voice of America has gathered the views of responsible editors in press, radio and television. Today, we shall hear the views of Erwin D. Canham, editor-in-chief of a widely respected, national newspaper, the *Christian Science Monitor*.

In talking about freedom of the press in the United States today, Mister Canham stressed the long history of a free press in this country. It was no accident, he said, that freedom of the press was the *first* amendment to the Constitution—

Tape: CANHAM:

"It played a large role in the American revolutionary period. It is useful to remind ourselves we rebelled against colonialism and when we created our own government it was freedom of press, freedom of information, and it was freedom of expression—little flysheets (one page leaflets), little newspapers which came into being—which were essential in establishing the American revolution and making possible its victory over that age of repression."

NARRATOR. And freedom of the press didn't stop there. As in other countries of the Western world, it developed along with the democratic institutions of the nation.

Tape: CANHAM:

"As freedom, as self-government, as the right to choose, the right to vote, the right to have opposition parties, the right to have diversity and conflict and internal criticism, as this grows up, so the media of information will come to be more and more independent."

NARRATOR. And the information outlets also become more and more numerous. There are today in the United States over seventeen hundred daily and evening newspapers and over five hundred Sunday papers. Many of these serve a particular city or area; others are known nationally and internationally. Among the latter, the *Christian Science Monitor* occupies a special position as a serious and responsible publication. In only one way is it different from other newspapers on the same level of responsibility: it is owned by a religious organization. But, Mister Canham emphasizes, it is not a religious newspaper as such.

Tape: CANHAM:

"It is a newspaper writing about general affairs, a broad, public affairs newspaper which happens to be owned by a religious organization."

"This newspaper, which was established in 1908, has at all times had a keen interest in international affairs. It maintains its own staff correspondents throughout the world and has, from its inception to the present day, specialized a good deal in the coverage of world affairs. The circulation is also rather widespread. We publish an edition in Western Europe, printing it in London, another on the Pacific Coast of the United States, but our editing and publishing headquarters are in Boston, Massachusetts, in New England."

NARRATOR. With readers in many countries of the world, it might be thought that the *Monitor* would present its news in a way to influence foreign opinion or that it might, in some way, be induced to present the actions of the United States government in a way that would further the U.S. foreign policy objectives. Not so, says Mister Canham.

Tape: CANHAM:

"Government is one source of news, a major source of news, but our relationship to the government is essentially no different than that of any other independent newspaper to government. Our position is completely uncontrolled and undominated by government as is that of all other newspapers in the United States."

NARRATOR. It is the aim of the *Monitor* to be independent, accurate and informed and this is the spirit in which it reports on the government; the administration and the public personalities connected with it.

Tape: CANHAM:

"We are willing, of course, to not only listen respectfully but try assiduously to understand the significance of government policies, but it is the role of the press to be independent and sometimes to be critical and so, sometimes, quite frequently, we express our own views which are critical of governmental position."

NARRATOR. Newspaper editors in the United States are fiercely proud and protective of this freedom of the press—the freedom to report as truly as it knows how what is going on. Even if a news story makes temporary trouble; if it means, for example, that a U.S. installation overseas is closed up, in the long run, they feel that is not too big a price to pay for the free flow of information. And Mister Canham points out that this tradition is not a new one, nor is it exclusively American. He cites a case involving the *Times of London* during the Crimean War between England and Russia in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Tape: CANHAM:

"During the Crimean War, the *Times* sent a very talented military correspondent to the Crimea. He cabled back to London every night dispatches which were ruthlessly critical of the nepotism (favoritism) and ineptitude of the British officers, the Generals, the aristocracy-ridden, corruption-ridden outfit that had, through apathy, got into control of the British army. This correspondent's dispatches were printed in London, were picked up at once by agents of the Russian Imperial Government, were cabled to St. Petersburg and were used by the Russian general staff to plan its campaigns against the British armies in the Crimea. British lives, no doubt, were lost as a result of the dispatches sent by the *Times* military correspondent but on the long pull, the British nation and the integrity of its military forces were saved because of the role of a free press."

NARRATOR. Applying these standards of reporting news might also lead the *Monitor* or any other U.S. newspaper, to print a story embarrassing, even potentially harmful to the government of this country. In such a case, could the United States government ask the newspaper to tone down or omit such adverse comment? Again the answer is "no".

Tape: CANHAM:

"No, the government can do practically nothing. The government can make its pitch (argue) if it wishes—make its case—say to the editor of a newspaper, 'Look, your publication is getting us into trouble. I wish you'd take it easy.' This is not likely to work, and the government can do nothing by force. It can do nothing to prohibit the publication of such material."

NARRATOR. Even if this material is irresponsible or offensive to a foreign power, there is nothing either positive or negative the United States government can do to stop its publication. That is, there are no special laws that can be invoked to restrain the reporting of news, nor can the government exercise negative control by withholding newsprint or funds from the newspaper concerned. And as Mister Canham says—

Tape: CANHAM:

"I think it is far better to have a sense of decency and restraint, self-applied by the press, rather than have laws which can easily be abused. There have to be some laws. There are laws against the abuse of the privileges of the press in the United States. There are laws about libel. There are laws about indecency and blasphemy and things of that sort. There are a considerable number of laws but the more laws you have and the more ambiguous their language, the easier it is to use them as tools of repression and therefore it is not productive to have these laws."

NARRATOR. Furthermore, says Mister Canham, if restrictions are imposed on the press, public opinion will go underground. And even though it may not be expressed, it will exist and may constitute a powerful force.

Tape: CANHAM:

"Man will be informed. The human race is interested in what is going on. In these days it must know what is happening and the more repressive a regime, the more vigorous are the clandestine or underground sources of information."

NARRATOR. Such is the case, supported by Mister Canham and all other newspaper editors in the United States, for a free press within its own country. But what country today can consider only what happens within its own boundaries?

Tape: CANHAM:

"We live in a magnificent age of universal simultaneous communication. One man's voice could be heard, theoretically at least, by every man on our planet at the same time. In such an age, people sooner or later will be informed. The magic of radio is even more impelling than the jungle tom-tom and the grapevine. So there is this universal appeal, and urgency, and need and hunger of people

for news, for information. Now, if this is denied them by the repressions of government they will get it in some other way, somehow or other, sooner or later."

NARRATOR. And so the ideal of a free society is a free flow of information, unimpeded and undistorted by government pressure or private means * * * information which may reflect adversely on the conduct of government, information which may be unpalatable to other countries, information which must nevertheless be published. For, as Mister Canham says, "There must be internal criticism in any good society * * *."

Tape: CANHAM:

"The society which refuses to listen to analyses of its own short-comings is on the way to ultimate decay and degeneration and collapse. The society which can withstand the most rigorous internal criticism is the society which is going to stand down through the years and the decades and the centuries."

NARRATOR. And Mister Canham looks forward to a day when freedom to publish in whatever medium will be a reality, not for some but for all countries.

Tape: CANHAM:

"I have a deep faith that as the time goes on in our world, the conflict of ideas, internal criticism, will come to be a greater reality and that sooner or later a world society based upon the free flow of information and the free flow of ideas will be a fact. A lot of things will be said which won't be pleasing to those who are criticized, but in the long pull (in the end) they, and all the rest of us, will be the stronger and the more healthy, and the sounder, for it."

ANNOUNCER. You've been listening to "Freedom of the Press"—one of a series of programs reporting on newspapers and news services in the United States. Today's speaker was Erwin D. Canham, editor in chief of the *Christian Science Monitor*. The program was brought to you by the Voice of America.

AUGUST 27, 1965.

SPECIAL FEATURE—FREEDOM OF THE PRESS NO. 2

TIME MAGAZINE

(Tape inserts available in Program documentation unit)

ANNOUNCER. The Voice of America now presents another in a series of programs on—"Freedom of the Press." Today, this freedom in relation to a weekly news periodical is discussed by the head of the Washington Bureau of *Time Magazine*.

NARRATOR. The right to a free press was guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This freedom was vital to the success of the American Revolution; today, when mass media of communication reach into the farthest corners of the world it is a vital factor in world understanding. Is news in the United States really free, uncontrolled by federal and local government? How is this freedom maintained? How does it work?

For a discussion of these and other questions concerning freedom to print and speak the news in the United States, the Voice of America has gathered the views of responsible editors in press, radio and television. John L. Steele is head of the Washington Bureau of *Time Magazine*, an influential and widely read weekly news publication.

On newsstands all over the world, *Time Magazine* is readily identifiable, its red-lined cover bearing a portrait of a personality outstanding in the news of the day. Political news, foreign and domestic, is the magazine's main concern, but each week *Time* also reports newsworthy facts under such headings as Business, the Arts, Books, and Sports. As distinctive as its cover is the style of writing—it is colorful, hard-hitting, outspoken, and it may, on occasion, disturb the sensibilities of readers who do not hold the same opinions as the editors. Yes, *Time* does have a viewpoint of its own; part of its function is to interpret the facts and this, says Mister Steele, has always been its policy.

Tape: STEELE:

"*Time* from its very first days has never felt that it should be completely (in the traditional journalistic sense of the word) objective. We have felt from the very outset that we should leave readers with some ideas and some points of view. We feel that nobody has to read us, nobody has to accept what we have to say, but we don't feel that it is our function to be above the battle. We feel we should be engaged, that any good journalist is engaged, and indeed I personally feel that

the only completely unengaged publication, the only completely objective publication in the world, is the telephone book."

NARRATOR. This editorial outlook has inevitably caused the magazine to be labelled controversial.

Tape: STEELE:

"We are not wilfully controversial but we think that a publication worth its salt and a publication doing the job we try to do should have something to say and that does very often lead us into the realm of differing opinions and controversy both in domestic politics, domestic legislation, foreign politics, and foreign affairs."

NARRATOR. This attitude could conceivably get a news magazine into trouble—particularly if the controversial material were to be concerned with events in another country and unpopular with the head of state of that country.

Would *Time*, therefore, use a more cautious approach to affairs in foreign countries than to domestic matters? Mister Steele—

Tape: STEELE:

"Basically our coverage abroad is the precise kind of journalism that we practice here in the United States. We are interested in people, we are interested in the events that happen around us. We try to do as thorough and as accurate a job as possible. So there is really no great separation between our operations abroad and our operations at home."

NARRATOR. And Mister Steele also points out that there is no difference between the reporters who cover the domestic scene and those who are sent overseas. All correspondents come under the supervision of the Chief of Correspondents and there is a fairly rapid interchange of personnel between the various press posts—very much in the same way that diplomatic personnel are rotated from one country to the other with periods in their home country. So all these reporters are professionals and they are trained simply to report. It is not their intention either to be offensive nor to make a conscious effort to please. As Mister Steele reaffirms—

Tape: STEELE:

"Our aim is to tell everything about a situation if we think the situation is worth reporting. In other words, we don't believe that statesmen or people abroad need special handling, need easier handling or different handling than our own people. We try to be fair. We try to be fair when we report on a piece of legislation in the United States Congress. We try to be fair when we report on a problem in India."

NARRATOR. However with all the efforts made by *Time's* editors and staffers to be fair and accurate, the fact that they are involved, "engaged" to use Mister Steele's word, in what goes on does sometimes lead to a protest from a foreign government. But Mister Steele does not believe that the protest is made because the foreign power thinks that the United States government can restrain the offending publication.

Tape: STEELE:

"It is pretty well known in almost all countries that the press of the United States is not responsible to the government (except in rare instances of classified information or security information) and that the government of the United States has no real control over the press of the United States. Perhaps in the newer, very new countries this may not be understood, but certainly in the older countries with foreign services who have operated in Washington and London and elsewhere around the globe, this is very well understood—that the press of the United States is not a governmental affair. I think often, I think sometimes at least, that the protests made to governments by governments concerning a press report are done as a matter of tactic and for political reasons. They know full well that the government of the United States isn't responsible but it looks pretty good at home. Just as sometimes our own politicians at home do things for tactical reasons and for appearances' sake."

NARRATOR. This does not mean, of course, that the protest is not conveyed to the publication, be it *Time Magazine* or another news medium, but it is done informally, usually by a simple telephone call from the State Department.

Tape: STEELE:

"I think our government people here are pretty sophisticated and they are glad to bring a matter to our attention but not very often, if ever, do they ask us to do anything except tell the truth. In this connection, lest I sound a little

too belligerent, we don't like misunderstandings, we don't like fights, we try to be right. As with every publication in the world, under a system of a free press, we are not always right. We are glad to correct mistakes when we are shown to be wrong. We publish many letters each year in the magazine itself which take issue with us, and the words, 'Time is in error' are by no means unknown by our publication."

NARRATOR. As Mister Steele points out, *Time* will make its own correction where it has erred in matters of fact but there is no agency which can force it to distort or omit facts in its treatment of a news story. Mister Steele also feels that in spite of the occasionally controversial tone of *Time Magazine* that there is no need for any regulation of the press. In common with other responsible news people—

Tape: STEELE:

"We are, we believe, good citizens as well as good journalists. There are some things you happen on that you simply don't report. I don't care to go into them to any great extent but simply to say that they, at times, involve information about future movements, which you know from long experience and which your editors know should not be reported until they occur. This is in the field of high national security policy and it is a question of judgment."

NARRATOR. And this question of judgment being the responsibility of the editorship of the newspaper or magazine holds true even in cases of national crisis or emergency—as in the case of the removal of missile sites from Cuba, in the reporting of the South Vietnam situation today. The result, in the opinion of Mister Steele, is a large body of readers in the United States who are provided with all available information, without pressure from government authority, and equally without harm to national security. And he concludes—

Tape: STEELE:

"We have a very virile, controversial, thought-provoking, interesting press and magazine and radio and television industry."

ANNOUNCER: You've been listening to "Freedom of the Press"—another in a series of programs reporting on newspapers and news services in the United States. Today's speaker was John L. Steele, head of the Washington Bureau of *Time Magazine*. The program was brought to you by the Voice of America.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1965.

SPECIAL FEATURE—FREEDOM ON THE PRESS NO. 3

NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY

(Tape inserts available in program documentation unit)

ANNOUNCER. The Voice of America now presents another in a series of programs on "Freedom of the Press." Today, this freedom in relation to radio and television news services is discussed by the Director of News at the National Broadcasting Company in Washington, D.C.

NARRATOR. The right to a free press was guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This freedom was vital to the success of the American Revolution; today, when communication facilities reach into the farthest corners of the world it is a vital factor in world understanding. This is particularly so in the case of radio and television news, which is likely to reach an even wider and more varied audience than news in print. Is the news which is heard on the airwaves really free, uncontrolled by federal or local government? How is this freedom maintained? How does it work?

For a discussion of these and other questions concerning freedom to print and speak the news in the United States, the Voice of America has gathered the views of responsible editors in press, radio and television. William Monroe is one of them—Director of News for the National Broadcasting Company in Washington, D.C. The guarantee of a free press is as old as the Constitution but radio and television (as mass media) are as new as the twentieth century so why should we suppose that broadcast news has equal freedom with the press? Mister Monroe?

Tape: MONROE:

"The regulations affecting the establishment of radio and television do contain provisions that freedom of speech and freedom of the press apply to radio and television just as they do to the printed media."

NARRATOR. The only difference is that radio and television stations are obliged to have a license to operate, issued by the government, through the Federal Communications Commission. To safeguard the stations, however, there are very rigid restrictions on the FCC and other regulatory agencies in regard to the stations' operations.

Tape: MONROE:

"They are not supposed to get into the matter of influencing programs. They are not supposed to tell a local station to put on more of one kind of program, less of another kind of program, and particularly they are forbidden to get into the matter of news coverage and attempt to influence a station's news coverage. The journalists in radio and television are absolutely as jealous as the journalists in the print media to guard their freedom to say what they feel should be said, and to report the things that they feel need to be reported."

NARRATOR. As Mister Monroe points out, the issuing of a license by the FCC in no way affects the operation of a station as regards the kind of programming and perhaps a word here would be in order as to just why there has to be a license. The license is to ensure certain standards of programming—of responsibility to the listening public. The station obligates itself to provide a certain number of hours of news, of public service programs, of music, entertainment and so on and a license is only withdrawn when the station itself does not live up to its commitments. Incidentally, the National Broadcasting Company itself does not have a license to operate (as a network) but it owns five television stations and six radio stations and each station is licensed.

Tape: MONROE:

"Now if NBC offended a particular president, the president would find it difficult, if not impossible, to influence the FCC, in any way, to punish one of the stations involved, owned by NBC, or to punish the network."

NARRATOR. For one thing, the law requires that the members of the Federal Communications Commission be drawn from both major political parties and this makes it very unlikely that either a president or a party could control it. For that matter, even NBC itself has no editorial control over the stations in its network because the network is made up mainly of stations not owned by but affiliated with the Company. They are, in a sense, customers who make use of the Company's product, which happens to be material for broadcasting. The great majority are privately owned and, says Mister Monroe, are perfectly free to disagree with the network's opinions.

Tape: MONROE:

"The affiliate stations all are free to editorialize, and many editorialize regularly. I was connected with a station in New Orleans, Louisiana, as News Director, a few years ago, and I remember one occasion when the head of the Federal Communications Commission, Newton Minow, made a speech in which he was very extreme about the deficiencies of television."

NARRATOR. This speech, widely quoted since then, referred to television as a "vast wasteland"—a criticism aimed mainly at entertainment programs.

Tape: MONROE:

"We felt that his indictment of television was terribly sweeping and revealed a certain ignorance of some of the better things in television on Mister Minow's part, and this station editorialized on the air critically of Mister Minow; disagreed with what he had to say, gave examples indicating that his indictment of television was extreme. And, having put this editorial on the air both on television and on its sister radio station, wrote Mister Minow and invited him to answer the editorial criticizing him in an amount of time equal to the time occupied by the editorial."

NARRATOR. Mister Minow responded by writing to thank the station for its offer of equal time.

Tape: MONROE:

"He said that he did not wish to avail himself of it but he thought the editorial policy of the station was a good one, a vigorous one, and he liked to see stations editorializing and he recognized the right of the station to editorialize even though the station was criticizing the head of the regulatory agency."

NARRATOR. Perhaps one of the best examples of the independent operation of networks and stations is in their relationship to the President of the United States.

Tape: MONROE:

"There are generally three different times in which the matter of a presidential appearance on the air comes up: one is his news conferences; another is a speech or statement which is to be made available to television, but the White House is not necessarily officially requesting that the speech or statement be put on the air—live or otherwise; and thirdly, an official White House request to the networks that the President be allowed to appear on the air to make an important statement or give a message to the people. Very seldom does the White House ask for time. It may happen only once or twice a year in the middle of a major crisis when the people of the county are worried about something and the President feels that a foreign crisis or a domestic crisis needs explanation."

NARRATOR. Mister Monroe believes that the fact that such a request is made so seldom shows that the President takes special care not to appear to be demanding time. There is, also, the fact that he could be refused. However, what usually happens is that the White House makes known to the networks that a speech or statement by the President is available and from there on they make their own arrangements to broadcast it. Each of the major networks decides for itself whether to give the speech live, that is simultaneously, to record it and put it in a different time period, or to edit it for use in a regular news program.

And so from major presidential speeches to the opinions of a news editor on a local station, there can be no regimentation of broadcast news by government on any level. There is no way to force radio and television stations to reflect government aims or policy. Equally, there is no way in which they can forbid news stories they might consider unfavorable, nor can any legislators forbid access to legitimate news sources.

Referring again to his work in New Orleans, Mister Monroe cited an event concerning the Louisiana State Legislature.

Tape: MONROE:

"We had to decide whether we were going to attempt to cover the floor debates of an upcoming session of the Louisiana Legislature, and we decided that we wanted to cover the floor debates, if possible, with a sound camera so we could have sound film to let people in our television audience see and hear their legislature as they debated various issues. The State Legislature in Louisiana is located about ninety or one hundred miles from New Orleans so most people in New Orleans have never had a chance to go into the legislature and watch it operate."

NARRATOR. The station decided not to ask permission but simply to send a cameraman and reporter with a sound-camera to the debates. Each day the highlights were shown on television and heard on radio. After five or six weeks, one of the legislators protested this form of reporting but, by that time, says Mister Monroe, the station had established the seriousness of its journalistic intentions.

Tape: MONROE:

"The legislators who were familiar with the coverage that we were providing in New Orleans of the legislature had concluded that we were presenting, when any particular issue was being debated, what people had to say for a bill and what people had to say against a bill, so that we were scrupulous in our fairness of approach. They felt that we were performing a legitimate journalistic job and that people in New Orleans were learning more about the legislature than they knew before."

NARRATOR. A small example, but typical of radio and television throughout the United States, showing that broadcasters consider their first responsibility is to the public they serve, and their freedom to exercise it.

ANNOUNCER. You've been listening to "Freedom of the Press"—another in a series of programs reporting on newspapers and news services in the United States. Today's speaker was William Monroe, Director of News for the National Broadcasting Company, Washington, D.C. The program was brought to you by the Voice of America.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., September 8, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the hearing before your Committee on August 17, 1966 at which time Leonard H. Marks, Director of USIA appeared, you asked for material concerning private international broadcasting facilities in the United States. The Federal Communications Commission has furnished us information concerning these operations and we submit herewith the following items:

1. List of International Broadcast Stations currently authorized by the FCC.
2. List of pending International Broadcast applications.
3. FCC rules and regulations covering international broadcast stations, and
4. The Commission's Order of April 17, 1963, imposing a "freeze" on international broadcast station applications.

Please note that station WNYW is the one referred to in Mr. Marks' testimony as WRUL, which has since changed its call sign.

Sincerely,

RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, Jr.,
General Counsel.

INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST STATIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE COMMISSION

1. Station WNYW, Radio New York Worldwide, Inc. is licensed to operate from a site at Scituate, Massachusetts using one 80 kilowatt and four 50 kilowatt transmitters with programs directed to Mexico, Central and South America Western Europe and western Africa. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, a Utah Corporation Sole.

The station holds a construction permit to change transmitter site to Chatsworth, New Jersey, change antennas, and change to two 250 kilowatt, one 100 kilowatt, and two 50 kilowatt transmitters.

2. Station KGEI, Far East Broadcasting Company, Inc. is licensed to operate at a site in Belmont, California using one 50 kilowatt transmitter broadcasting programs directed to Mexico, Central and South America. It is a non-stock corporation.

3. Station WINB, World International Broadcasters, Incorporated holds construction permit to operate from site at Red Lion, Pennsylvania using one 50 kilowatt transmitter with programs directed to areas bounding Mediterranean Sea—Southern Europe, Holy Land, Northern Africa. It operates under program test authorization. 80% of the corporate stock is held by John M. Norris and 20% by his son, John H. Norris.

PENDING INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST APPLICATIONS

1. Application of licensee of Station WNYW for construction permit for new stations with two 250 kilowatt transmitters located on Island of Guam to broadcast to East and West Australia, New Zealand, Philippines and Japan.

2. Application by licensee of WNYW for CP for new station with one 250 kilowatt transmitter located near Deer Park, Florida to broadcast to Europe, North Africa, Central and South America.

3. Application by licensee of Station WNYW for modification of outstanding construction permit (authorizing change in site from Scituate, Massachusetts to Chatsworth, New Jersey and other changes) to change to three 250 kilowatt and two 100 kilowatt transmitters and change antennas.

4. Application by licensee of Station WNYW for renewal of license.

5. Application by licensee of Station WNYW for license to cover construction permit to increase power of one transmitter.

6. Application by licensee of KGEI for renewal of license.
7. Application by licensee of Station KGEI for authorization to broadcast to Japan.
8. Application by permittee of Station WINB for license to cover construction permit.

[Excerpt from FCC Rules and Regulations, vol. I, pt. 1, sec. 1.574]

§ 1.574 Processing of international broadcast applications.

(a) Applications for international broadcast facilities are divided into two groups.

(1) In the first group are applications for new stations for new or additional target zones, or for major changes in the facilities of authorized stations, i.e., a substantial change (other than local) in transmitter location or a significant change in the delivered median field intensity at the target zone: *Provided, however*, That the Commission may, within 15 days after the tender for filing of any other application for modification, advise the applicant that such application is considered to be one for a major change and therefore is subject to the provisions of § 1.580.

(2) The second group consists of applications for licenses and all other changes in the facilities of authorized stations.

(b) If an application is amended so as to effect a major change as defined in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, or so as to result in an assignment or transfer of control which, in the case of an authorized station, would require the filing of an application therefor on FCC Form 314 or 315 (see § 1.540), § 1.580 will apply to such amended application.

(c) Applications for international broadcast stations will be processed as nearly as possible in the order in which they are filed.

NOTE: Pending rule making pertaining to the authorization of international broadcast stations, no application seeking authority to construct a new international broadcast station or seeking authority to operate a greater number of frequency hours than authorized on April 25, 1963, will be granted, and, after April 25 1963, no such application will be accepted for filing.

§ 1.578 Amendments to applications for renewal, assignment and/or transfer of control.

[Excerpt from FCC Rules and Regulations, Vol. III, Pt. 73, Subpart F]

SUBPART F—INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST STATIONS

DEFINITIONS AND ALLOCATION OF FACILITIES

§ 73.701 Definitions.

The following definitions apply to terminology employed in this subpart:

(a) *International broadcast station.* A broadcasting station employing frequencies allocated to the broadcasting service between 5950 and 26100 kc, whose transmissions are intended to be received directly by the general public in foreign countries.

(b) *Frequency-hour.* One frequency used for one hour.

(c) *Day.* Any twenty-four hour period beginning 0000 EST and ending 2400 EST.

(d) *Sunspot number.* The predicted 12 month running average of the number of sunspots for any month as indicated in the National Bureau of Standards CRPL Series D publications.

(e) *Vernal equinox season.* That period of any calendar year starting at 0000 EST on 1 February and ending at 2400 EST on 30 April.

(f) *Summer season.* That period of any calendar year starting at 0000 EST on 1 May and ending at 2400 EST on 31 July.

(g) *Autumnal equinox season.* That period of any calendar year starting at 0000 EST on 1 August and ending at 2400 EST on 31 October.

(h) *Winter season.* That period of any calendar year starting at 0000 EST on 1 November and ending at 2400 EST on 31 January.

(i) *Maximum usable frequency (MUF).* The highest frequency which is returned to the surface of the earth for a particular path and time of day on 50 percent of the days of the reference month.

(j) *Optimum working frequency (OWF).* The frequency which is returned to the surface of the earth for a particular path and time of day on 90 percent of the days of the reference month.

(k) *Reference month.* The middle month of any season listed in § 73.704 "Daily Frequency Hour Availability Table."

(l) *Delivered median field intensity or field intensity.* The field intensity incident upon the target area expressed in microvolts per meter, or decibels above one microvolt per meter, which is exceeded by the hourly median value on 50 percent of the days of the reference month.

(m) *Target area.* Geographic area in which the reception of particular programs is specifically intended and in which adequate broadcast coverage is contemplated.

(n) *Contract operation.* Any non-Government operation of an international broadcast station pursuant to a contract with an agency of the United States Government and subject to Governmental control as to program content, target areas to be covered, and time of broadcast.

(o) *Private operation.* Any non-Government operation of an International Broadcast station which is not contract operation.

§ 73.702 Assignment and use of frequencies.

NOTE: Paragraphs (c) through (k) do not apply to stations when engaged in contract operations as defined in § 73.701.

(a) Frequencies will be assigned by the Commission from time to time and in accordance with the provisions of this section, to authorized international broadcast stations for use at specified hours and for transmission to specified target areas. Licensees may request the assignment of specific frequencies for transmission during given hours of operation to specified target areas by filing informal requests in triplicate with the Commission no less than 15 days prior to the start of a new season. Such requests will be honored to the extent that interference and propagation conditions permit and that they are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of this section. Requests for changes in frequency or hour assignments at other times during the year or which are received less than 15 days before the start of a new season will be processed as rapidly as practical. All specific frequency authorizations will be made only on the express understanding that they are subject to immediate cancellation or change without hearing whenever the Commission determines that interference or propagation conditions so require and that each assignment of frequency hours for a given season is unique unto itself and not subject to renewal, with the result that completely new assignments must be secured for the forthcoming season. Where a station is simultaneously engaged in both private and contract broadcasting, as defined in § 73.701, it must receive separate frequency hour authorizations for each of these operations.

(b) Any foreign standard target areas shown in Figure 1 of § 73.792 may be specified by the licensee, in which case field intensity calculations should be based on the transmission path between the corresponding reference points listed in § 73.703. In the event a broadcast is to be directed to more than one target area in the same region, the *primary* target area should be specified and the reasons for selecting that particular target area given, with special reference to the nature and special suitability, if any, of the programming proposed. Field intensity calculations should be based on the transmission path to the standard reference point in § 73.703 for the primary target area. In the event a licensee wishes to specify target areas other than those shown in Figure 1 of § 73.792, adequate justification must be given to show that the use of standard target areas is inappropriate, with special reference given to any specialized programming proposed which appears suitable only for the nonstandard target areas designated. When nonstandard target areas are proposed, special reference points must be specified (by geographical coordinates) and reasonably chosen so as to insure complete and adequate coverage of the target areas.

(c) Frequencies assigned by the Commission will be within the following bands:

	<i>Kilocycles</i>
Band A.....	5950-6200
Band B.....	9500-9775
Band C.....	11700-11975
Band D.....	15100-15450
Band E.....	17700-17900
Band F.....	21450-21750
Band G.....	25600-26100

(d) No frequency will be assigned which would provide a Delivered Median Field Intensity, either measured or calculated, of less than 150 uv/m—50 percent or 43.5 decibels above one uv/m at the distant foreign target area. (This value of Delivered Median Field Intensity is expected to provide protection against atmospheric and industrial noise for at least 90 percent of each hour during 90

percent of the days of the month.) With each request for frequency assignment, licensees must submit computations which adequately show that this requirement would be met.

NOTE: Standard OWF propagation curves and Delivered Median Field Intensity curves for the various hours and seasons throughout the eleven year sunspot cycle have been computed for transmission paths between standard reference points listed in § 73.703 for the standard target area shown in Figure 1 of § 73.702. These curves, which were developed and used at the Mexico City High Frequency Broadcasting Conference (1948-1949), are available at the Commission's Washington offices and may be used in calculating the propagation data which licensees are required to provide under these Rules. The methods used in computing these data are described in Chapter 7, paragraph 7.7 of the National Bureau of Standards Circular 462. In lieu of that data, and in all cases where nonstandard target areas are specified as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, licensees must develop their own propagation curves for use in computing values of OWF and Delivered Median Field Intensity for the particular transmission paths involved. In doing so, use may be made of the published propagation data of the National Bureau of Standards known as CRPL Series D, "Basic Radio Propagation Predictions", published monthly in conjunction with National Bureau of Standards Circular 465, "Instruction for the use of Basic Radio Propagation Predictions." These publications are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 20402, D.C. A typical example of a computation for a transmission path between standard target areas is from New York (Area 8) to Buenos Aires (Area 15). The Delivered Median Field Intensity for the equinox season, sunspot 5, and for the 6 Mc band for the hours 0200 to 0400 GMT is indicated by the appropriate propagation curve as 24 decibels above one microvolt per meter for 1 kw radiated power. The transmitter power output of 20 decibels (100 kw) is added. The transmitting antenna gain of 12 decibels is added. The resultant total (56 decibels) exceeds the level of 43.5 decibels required to deliver a median field intensity of 150 uv/m at the distant target area.

(e) Frequencies assigned will be as near as possible to the Optimum Working Frequency. In no case will they exceed the Maximum Usable Frequency for more than a total of 15 minutes during any period of transmission. With each request for frequency assignment, licensees must submit computations which adequately show that this requirement would be met. (See note in paragraph (d) of this section regarding methods for computation.)

(f) Not more than one frequency will be authorized for use at any one time for any one program transmission except in instances where a program is intended for reception in more than one target area and the intended target areas cannot be served by a single frequency.

(g) No authorization for use of a particular frequency will be issued which fails to provide a minimum co-channel Delivered Median Field Intensity protection ratio of 40 db to the transmissions of other broadcasting stations at the reference point in the target area being served by such stations which, in the opinion of the Commission, have priority of assignment.

(h) Authorization for use of a particular frequency will not be issued which does not provide a minimum adjacent channel Delivered Median Field Intensity protection ratio of 11 db to the transmissions of other international broadcasting stations at the reference points in the target areas being served by such stations which, in the opinion of the Commission, have priority of assignment.

(i) Any frequency authorized to an international broadcast station shall also be available for assignment to other international broadcast stations.

(j) Not more than one frequency shall be used simultaneously under the same authorization and call letter and equipment installation number designation.

(k) Subject to all other pertinent provisions of this subpart, the total maximum number of frequency-hours which will be authorized to all licensees of private international broadcast stations for private operation combined in any frequency band for any pertinent season during any one day will be those in § 73.704 less the number of frequency-hours in these bands scheduled for use by both (1) government international broadcasting stations, and (2) international broadcast stations licensed by the Commission to use frequencies in these bands for contract operations.

(l) In the event the total number of frequency hours in any band scheduled for both (1) government international broadcasting stations, and (2) international broadcast stations licensed by the Commission to use frequencies in these bands for contract operations equals or exceeds 75 percent of the frequency hour figures given in § 73.704, the maximum number of frequency-hours which will be authorized to all licensees of international broadcast stations for private operation in any frequency band for any pertinent season during any one day will be 25 percent of the frequency hours shown in § 73.704.

(m) If the requests for international broadcasting frequency-hours for private operation in any band or bands exceed those available under the terms of these Rules, in the absence of any voluntary agreement for reduction of frequency-hours requested, the Commission will designate all requests for frequency-hours in the band or bands in question for hearing. Pending such hearing the Commission will temporarily assign the available frequency-hours equally among the several applicants: *Provided, however,* That with respect to such temporary allocation:

(1) An existing license shall not, to the extent such frequency hours are available, receive less than the number of frequency-hours utilized during the preceding season or requested for the forthcoming season, whichever is lesser.

(2) Where the number of frequency-hours available for private international broadcasting during a forthcoming season are insufficient to permit existing licensees to secure a temporary allocation equal to that previously utilized or requested, whichever is lesser, the allocation shall be pro-rated among such persons in a manner which will give them a share of the available frequency-hours proportionate to that utilized in the preceding season.

(3) In any event, where an applicant's share of the available frequency hours would be more than requested, the surplus shall be divided among the remaining applicants in the manner herein prescribed.

§ 73.703 Latitude and longitude of areas used for field intensity calculations.

Area No.	Latitude degrees	Longitude degrees
1	65 N.	150 W.
2	60 N.	125 W.
3	60 N.	100 W.
4	60 N.	80 W.
5	70 N.	40 W.
6	40 N.	120 W.
7	40 N.	100 W.
8	40 N.	80 W.
9	50 N.	60 W.
10	20 N.	100 W.
11	10 N.	80 W.
12	10 S.	70 W.
13	10 S.	50 W.
14	30 S.	60 W.
15	25 S.	50 W.
16	45 S.	70 W.
17	65 N.	20 W.
18	65 N.	15 E.
19	65 N.	40 E.
20	70 N.	60 E.
21	70 N.	80 E.
22	70 N.	100 E.
23	70 N.	120 E.
24	65 N.	140 E.
25	65 N.	160 E.
26	65 N.	180 E.
27	50 N.	0°
28	50 N.	20 E.
29	50 N.	40 E.
30	50 N.	60 E.
31	50 N.	80 E.
32	50 N.	100 E.
33	50 N.	120 E.
34	55 N.	140 E.
35	55 N.	160 E.
36	40 N.	25 W.
37	30 N.	0°
38	30 N.	20 E.
39	30 N.	40 E.
40	30 N.	60 E.
41	20 N.	80 E.
42	40 N.	85 E.
43	35 N.	100 E.
44	30 N.	120 E.
45	35 N.	140 E.
46	10 N.	5 W.
47	10 N.	20 E.
48	10 N.	40 E.
49	15 N.	100 E.
50	10 N.	120 E.
51	0°	140 E.
52	10 S.	20 E.
53	10 S.	40 E.
54	5 S.	105 E.
55	15 S.	140 E.
56	20 S.	165 E.
57	30 S.	25 E.
58	25 S.	120 E.
59	35 S.	150 E.
60	40 S.	170 E.
61	20 N.	160 W.
62	20 S.	170 W.
63	20 S.	150 W.
64	15 N.	145 E.
65	10 N.	170 E.

NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAM

§ 73.704 Daily frequency hour availability table.

Band	Season	Sunspot Numbers									
		0-20	20-35	35-50	50-65	65-80	80-95	95-110	110-125	125-140	
6	June	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	March-September	29	21	14	7	7	0	0	0	0	0
9	December	45	47	48	49	50	50	0	0	0	0
	June	34	30	27	24	21	21	11	12	5	2
11	March-September	52	42	36	31	27	23	19	33	33	10
	December	54	50	47	44	42	41	36	33	33	32
15	June	53	50	48	46	45	44	39	36	33	32
	March-September	47	50	52	54	55	49	40	31	31	14
17	December	31	34	36	38	39	34	30	26	26	24
	June	84	88	91	94	96	87	80	79	69	58
21	March-September	40	54	58	61	64	67	79	99	21	7
	December	35	35	35	35	35	33	31	31	29	27
23	June	23	32	40	47	53	59	66	75	84	84
	March-September	23	22	22	21	20	19	19	19	34	39
25	December	14	18	21	23	25	24	20	17	16	16
	June	2	9	14	18	20	20	20	17	17	16
26	March-September	0	9	16	22	22	22	22	17	16	16
	December	6	11	15	18	21	29	49	66	65	53
		(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Totals	March-September	196	209	220	229	237	240	289	290	288	
	December	200	188	198	186	179	179	166	164	145	
		185	195	202	207	212	158	153	152	151	

1 No limit.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

§ 73.710 Cross reference.

See Subpart D of Part 1, of this chapter, for general requirements as to applications, filing of applications and description of application forms, other forms and information to be filed with the Commission, the manner in which applications are processed, and provisions applying to action on applications. See § 1.1111 of Subpart G of that part for the fees to be paid in connection with applications for facilities in the service covered in this subpart.

§ 73.711 Application for international broadcast stations.

(a) If the application is for a construction permit or for modification of an existing authorization, FCC Form 309 shall be filed; if for a license, FCC Form 310 shall be filed; if for a renewal of license, FCC Form 311 shall be filed.

NOTE: Until these forms are revised, information required by these Rules and not required by the forms shall be submitted as a supplement to the application and will be considered a part thereof.

(b) Authorizations issued to international broadcast stations by the Commission will not specify the frequencies or hours of use, but will be authorizations to permit the construction or use of a particular transmitting equipment combination and related antenna systems for international broadcasting.

NOTE: Requests for the use of frequencies and frequency hours for transmissions to specific target areas shall be submitted separately as provided in § 73.702.

(c) In the case of applications for authorizations to permit contract operations, as defined in § 73.701(n), the contracting agency and contract number should be indicated for each operation.

§ 73.712 Notification of filing of applications.

In order to minimize harmful interference at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory site located at Green Bank, Pocahontas County, West Virginia, and at the Naval Radio Research Observatory at Sugar Grove, Pendleton County, West Virginia, an applicant for authority to construct a new international broadcast station or for authority to make changes in the frequency, power, antenna height, or antenna directivity of an existing station within the area bounded by 39°15' N on the north, 78°30' W on the east, 37°30' N on the south, and 80°30' W on the west shall, at the time of filing such application with the Commission, simultaneously notify the Director, National Radio Astronomy Observatory, P. O. Box No. 2, Green Bank, West Virginia, 24944, in writing, of the technical particulars of the proposed station. Such notification shall include the geographical coordinates of the antenna, antenna height, antenna directivity if any, proposed frequency, type of emission, and power. In addition, the applicant shall indicate in his application to the Commission the date notification was made to the Observatory. After receipt of such applications, the Commission will allow a period of twenty (20) days for comments or objections in response to the notifications indicated. If an objection to the proposed operation is received during the twenty-day period from the National Radio Astronomy Observatory for itself or on behalf of the Naval Radio Research Observatory, the Commission will consider all aspects of the problem and take whatever action is deemed appropriate.

§ 73.716 Equipment tests.

(a) During the process of construction of an international broadcast station, the permittee after notifying the Commission and Engineer in Charge of the radio district in which the station is located may, without further authority of the Commission, conduct equipment tests for the purpose of such adjustments and measurements as may be necessary to assure compliance with the terms of the construction permit, the technical provisions of the application therefor, and the rules and regulations. No programming shall be conducted during equipment tests.

(b) The Commission may notify the permittee to conduct no tests or may cancel, suspend, or change the date for the beginning of equipment tests as and when such action may appear to be in the public interest, convenience, and necessity.

(c) Equipment tests may be continued so long as the construction permit shall remain valid.

(d) Inspection of a station will ordinarily be required during the equipment test period. After construction and after adjustments and measurements have been completed to show compliance with the terms of the construction permit, the technical provisions of the application therefor, and the rules and regulations,

the permittee should notify the Engineer in Charge of the radio district in which the station is located that it is ready for inspection.

(e) The authorization for tests embodied in this section shall not be construed as constituting a license to operate but as a necessary part of construction.

§ 73.718 Normal license period.

All international broadcast station licenses will be issued so as to expire at the hour of 3 a.m. eastern standard time and will be issued for a normal license period of 1 year expiring November 1.

LICENSING POLICIES

§ 73.731 Licensing requirements; necessary showing.

A license for an international broadcast station will be issued only after a satisfactory showing has been made in regard to the following, among others:

(a) That there is a need for the international broadcast service proposed to be rendered.

(b) That the necessary program sources are available to the applicant to render an effective international service.

(c) That directive antennas and other technical facilities will be employed to deliver maximum signals to the target area or areas for which the service is designed.

(d) That the production of the program service and the technical operation of the proposed station will be conducted by qualified persons.

(e) That the applicant is technically and financially qualified and possesses adequate technical facilities to carry forward the service proposed.

(f) That the public interest, convenience and necessity will be served through the operation of the proposed station.

EQUIPMENT

§ 73.751 Power requirement.

No international broadcast station will be authorized to install equipment or licensed for operation with a power less than 50 kilowatts.

§ 73.752 Frequency control.

The transmitter of each international broadcast station shall be equipped with automatic frequency control apparatus so designed and constructed that it is capable of maintaining the operating frequency within 0.003 percent of the assigned frequency.

§ 73.753 Antenna.

The antenna shall be so designed and operated that the signal (field intensity) toward the specific foreign country or countries served shall be at least 3.16 times the average effective signal from the station (power gain of 10).

§ 73.754 Frequency monitors.

(a) The licensee of each international broadcast station shall operate at the transmitter a frequency monitor independent of the frequency control of the transmitter.

(b) The frequency monitor shall be designed and constructed in accordance with good engineering practice and shall have an accuracy sufficient to determine that the operating frequency is within one-half of the allowed tolerance.

§ 73.755 Modulation monitors.

The licensee of each international broadcast station shall have in operation at the transmitter a modulation monitor.

§ 73.756 Required transmitter performance.

(a) The construction, installation, operation, and performance of the international broadcast transmitter system shall be in accordance with good engineering practice.

NOTE: The establishment of specific levels of attenuation for spurious emissions will be the subject of further Rule Making in Docket 10962 pending the completion of additional studies of this matter.

(b) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section in the event spurious emissions cause harmful interference, such additional steps as may be necessary to eliminate the interference must be taken immediately by the licensee.

§ 73.757 Auxiliary transmitters.

Upon showing that a need exists for the use of auxiliary transmitters in addition to the regular transmitters of an international broadcast station, a license therefor may be issued provided that:

(a) Auxiliary transmitters may be installed either at the same location as the main transmitters or at another location.

(b) A licensed operator shall be in control whenever auxiliary transmitters are placed in operation.

(c) The auxiliary transmitters shall be maintained so that they may be put into immediate operation at any time for the following purposes:

(1) The transmission of the regular programs upon the failure of the main transmitters.

(2) The transmission of regular programs during maintenance or modification work on the main transmitter, necessitating discontinuance of its operation for a period not to exceed 5 days. (This includes the equipment changes which may be made without authority as set forth elsewhere in the rules and regulations or as authorized by the Commission by letter or by construction permit. Where such operation is required for periods in excess of 5 days, request therefor shall be in accordance with § 1.542 of this chapter.)

(3) Upon request by a duly authorized representative of the Commission.

(d) The auxiliary transmitters shall be tested at least once each week to determine that they are in proper operating condition and that they are adjusted to the proper frequency except that in the case of operation in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section during any week, the test in that week may be omitted provided the operation under paragraph (c) of this section is satisfactory. A record shall be kept of the time and result of each test. Such records shall be retained for a period of two years.

(e) The auxiliary transmitters shall be equipped with satisfactory control equipment which will enable the maintenance of the frequency emitted by the station within the limits prescribed by the regulations in this part.

(f) The operating power of an auxiliary transmitter may be less than the authorized power of the main transmitters, but in no event shall it be greater than such power.

§ 73.758 Alternate main transmitters.

The licensee of an international broadcast station may be licensed for alternate main transmitters provided that a technical need for such alternate transmitters is shown and that the following conditions are met:

(a) Both transmitters are located at the same place.

(b) Both transmitters shall have the same power rating.

(c) Both transmitters shall meet the construction, installation, operation, and performance requirements of good engineering practice.

§ 73.759 Changes in equipment and antenna system.

Licensees of international broadcast stations shall observe the following provisions with regard to changes in equipment and antenna system:

(a) No changes in equipment shall be made:

(1) That would result in the emission of signals outside of the authorized channel.

(b) Specific authority, upon filing formal application (FCC Form 309) therefor, is required for any of the following changes:

(1) Changes involving an increase or decrease in the power rating of the transmitters.

(2) A replacement of the transmitters as a whole.

(3) Change in the location of the transmitting antenna.

(4) Change in location of main studio, if it is proposed to move the main studio to a different city from that specified in the license.

(5) Change in the power delivered to the antenna.

(6) Change in frequency control and/or modulation system.

(c) Other changes, except as above provided for in this section, may be made at any time without the authority of the Commission, provided that the Commission shall be promptly notified thereof and such changes shall be shown in the next application for renewal of license.

TECHNICAL OPERATION AND OPERATORS

§ 73.761 Time of operation.

(a) All international broadcast stations will be licensed for unlimited time operation except as may be directed by the Commission from time to time. In an emergency however, when, due to causes beyond the control of the licensee, it becomes impossible to continue operation, the station may cease operation for a period not to exceed 10 days, provided that the Commission and the Engineer in Charge of the radio district in which the station is located shall be notified in writing immediately after the emergency develops.

(b) Persons desiring to enter into a voluntary sharing arrangement of an international channel may file application therefor with the Commission. Copies of the time-sharing agreement should be filed with the application.

§ 73.762 Station inspection.

The licensee of any international broadcast station shall make the station available for inspection by representatives of the Commission at any reasonable hour.

§ 73.763 Station license, posting of.

The original or each station license shall be posted in the transmitter room.

§ 73.764 Operator requirements.

One or more licensed radiotelephone first-class operators shall be on duty at the place where the transmitting apparatus of each station is located and in actual charge thereof whenever it is being operated. The original license (or FCC Form 759) of each station operator shall be posted at the place where he is on duty. The licensed operator on duty and in charge of an international broadcast transmitter may, at the discretion of the licensee, be employed for other duties or for the operation of another station or stations in accordance with the class of operator's license which he holds and by the rules and regulations governing such stations. However, such duties shall in no wise interfere with the operation of the broadcast transmitter.

(Sec. 318, 48 Stat. 1089, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 318)

§ 73.765 Operating power; how determined.

The operating power, and its maintenance, of each international broadcast station shall be in conformity with good engineering practice.

§ 73.766 Modulation.

The percentage of modulation of the transmissions shall be maintained as high as possible consistent with good quality of transmission and good broadcast practice and in no case less than 50 percent nor more than 100 percent on peaks of frequent recurrence during any selection which normally is transmitted at the highest level of the program under consideration.

§ 73.767 Frequency tolerance.

The operating frequencies of international broadcast station transmitters shall, at all times, be maintained within the frequency tolerances specified in § 73.752.

§ 73.768 Antenna structure, marking and lighting.

The provisions of Part 17 of this chapter (Construction, Marking, and Lighting of Antenna Structures) require that certain antenna structures be painted and/or lighted in accordance with the provisions of that part. Where the antenna structure of a facility authorized under this subpart is required to be painted or lighted, see §§ 17.37, 17.39, 17.40, 17.41, and 17.42 of that part.

§ 73.769 Discontinuance of operation.

The licensee of each station, except stations operating in Alaska, shall notify the Engineer in Charge of the radio district in which the station is located of any of the following changes in the status of such station at least two days before such change:

- (a) Temporary discontinuance of operation for a period of ten days or more;
- (b) The date of resumption of operation after temporary discontinuance of operation for a period of ten days or more;
- (c) Permanent discontinuance of operation.

In all cases of permanent discontinuance of operation the licensee shall, in addition to notifying the Engineer in Charge of the radio district in which the station is located of intention to discontinue operation, immediately forward the station license to the Washington, D.C., office of the Commission for cancellation.

OTHER OPERATING REQUIREMENTS

§ 73.781 Logs.

The licensee or permittee of each international broadcast station shall maintain program and operating logs in the following manner:

- (a) In the program log:
 - (1) An entry of the time each station identification announcement (call letters and location) is made.
 - (2) An entry briefly describing each program broadcast, such as "music", "drama", "speech", etc., together with the name or title thereof, language, and the sponsor's name, with the time of the beginning and ending of the complete program.
 - (3) An entry showing, for each program of network origin, the name of the network originating the program.
- (b) In the operating log:
 - (1) An entry of the time the station begins to supply power to the antenna, and the time it stops.
 - (2) An entry of the time the program begins and ends.
 - (3) An entry of each interruption to the carrier wave, its cause, and duration.
 - (4) An entry of the following each 30 minutes:
 - (i) Operating constants of last radio stage of the transmitter (total plate current and plate voltage).
 - (ii) Frequency monitor reading.
 - (5) A log must be kept of all experimental operation. If the entries required above are not applicable thereto, then the entries shall be made so as to fully describe the operation.
- (c) Where an antenna structure(s) is required to be illuminated, see § 17.38, *Recording of tower light inspections in the station record*, of Part 17 of this chapter (Construction, Marking and Lighting of Antenna Structures).

§ 73.782 Retention of logs.

Logs of international broadcast stations shall be retained by the licensee or permittee for a period of two years: *Provided, however*, That logs involving communications incident to a disaster or which include communications incident to or involved in an investigation by the Commission and concerning which the licensee or permittee has been notified, shall be retained by the licensee or permittee until he is specifically authorized in writing by the Commission to destroy them: *Provided, further*, That logs incident to or involved in any claim or complaint of which the licensee or permittee has notice shall be retained by the licensee or permittee until such claim or complaint has been fully satisfied or until the same has been barred by statute limiting the time for the filing of suits upon such claims.

§ 73.783 Logs; by whom kept.

Each log shall be kept by the person or persons competent to do so, having actual knowledge of the facts required, who shall sign the log when starting duty and again when going off duty. The logs shall be made available upon request by an authorized representative of the Commission.

§ 73.784 Log form.

The logs shall be kept in an orderly manner, in suitable form, and in such detail that the data required for the particular class of station concerned are readily available. Key letters or abbreviations may be used if proper meaning or explanation is contained elsewhere in the log.

§ 73.785 Correction of logs.

No log or portion thereof shall be erased, obliterated, or willfully destroyed within the period of retention provided by the rules. Any necessary correction may be made only by the person originating the entry who shall strike out the erroneous portion, initial the correction made, and indicate the date of correction.

§ 73.786 Rough logs.

Rough logs may be transcribed into condensed form, but in such case, the original log or memoranda and all portions thereof shall be preserved and made a part of the complete log.

§ 73.787 Station identification.

(a) A licensee of an international broadcast station shall make station identification announcement (call letters and location), at the beginning and ending of each time of operation and during the operation of the hour.

(b) Station identification, program announcements, and oral continuity shall be made with international significance (language particularly) which is designed for the foreign country or countries for which the service is primarily intended.

(c) Identification announcements during operation need not be made when to make such announcement would interrupt a single consecutive speech, play, religious service, symphony concert, or any type of production. In such cases the identification announcement shall be made at the first interruption of the entertainment continuity and at the conclusion thereof.

§ 73.788 Service; commercial or sponsored programs.

(a) A licensee of an international broadcast station shall render only an international broadcast service which will reflect the culture of this country and which will promote international goodwill, understanding, and cooperation. Any program solely intended for, and directed to an audience in the continental United States does not meet the requirements for this service.

(b) Such international broadcast service may include commercial or sponsored programs: *Provided, That:*

(1) Commercial program continuities give no more than the name of the sponsor of the program and the name and general character of the commodity, utility or service, or attraction advertised.

(2) In case of advertising a commodity, the commodity is regularly sold or is being promoted for sale on the open market in the foreign country or countries to which the program is directed in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.

(3) In case of advertising an American utility or service to prospective tourists or visitors to the United States, the advertisement continuity is particularly directed to such persons in the foreign country or countries where they reside and to which the program is directed in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.

(4) In case of advertising an international attraction (such as a world fair, resort, spa, etc.) to prospective tourists or visitors to the United States, the oral continuity concerning such attraction is consistent with the purpose and intent of this section.

(5) In case of any other type of advertising, such advertising is directed to the foreign country or countries to which the program is directed and is consistent with the purpose and intent of this section.

(c) The geographic areas to be served by international broadcast stations are the foreign standard target areas shown in Figure 1 of § 73.792, or foreign non-standard target areas as provided in § 73.702(d), and directive antennas shall be employed to direct the transmission to these specific target areas.

(d) An international broadcast station may transmit the program of a standard broadcast station or network system: *Provided, The conditions in paragraph (v) of this section in regard to any commercial continuities are observed and when station identifications are made, only the call letter designation of the international station is given on its assigned frequency: And provided further, That in the case of chain broadcasting the program is not carried simultaneously by another international station (except another station owned by the same licensee operated on a frequency in a different group to obtain continuity of signal service), the signals from which are directed to the same area. (See section 3(p) of the Communications Act of 1934 for the definition of "chain broadcasting.")*

§ 73.789 Sponsored programs, announcement of.

(a) When an international broadcast station transmits any matter for which money, services, or other valuable consideration is either directly or indirectly paid or promised to, or charged or received by, such station, the station shall broadcast an announcement that such matter is sponsored, paid for, or furnished, either in whole or in part, and by whom or on whose behalf such consideration was supplied: *Provided, however, That "service or other valuable consideration" shall not include any service or property furnished without charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or in connection with, a broadcast unless it is so furnished in consideration for an identification in a broadcast of any person, product, service, trademark, or brand name beyond an identification which is reasonably related to the use of such service or property on the broadcast.*

(b) The licensee of each international broadcast station shall exercise reasonable diligence to obtain from its employees, and from other persons with whom it deals directly in connection with any program matter for broadcast, information to enable such licensee to make the announcement required by this section.

(c) In any case where a report (concerning the providing or accepting of valuable consideration by any person for inclusion of any matter in a program intended for broadcasting) has been made to an international broadcast station, as required by section 508 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, of circumstances which would have required an announcement under this section had the consideration been received by such international broadcast station, an appropriate announcement shall be made by such station.

(d) In the case of any political program or any program involving the discussion of public controversial issues for which any records, transcriptions, talent, scripts, or other material or services of any kind are furnished, either directly or indirectly, to a station as an inducement to the broadcasting of such program, an announcement shall be made both at the beginning and conclusion of such program on which such material or services are used that such records, transcriptions, talent, scripts, or other material or services have been furnished to such station in connection with the broadcasting of such programs: *Provided, however,* That only one such announcement need be made in the case of any such program of 5 minutes' duration or less, which announcement may be made either at the beginning or conclusion of the program.

(e) The announcement required by this section shall fully and fairly disclose the true identity of the person or persons by whom or in whose behalf such payment is made or promised, or from whom or in whose behalf such services or other valuable consideration is received, or by whom the material or services referred to in paragraph (d) of this section are furnished. Where an agent or other person contracts or otherwise makes arrangements with a station on behalf of another, and such fact is known to the station, the announcement shall disclose the identity of the person or persons in whose behalf such agent is acting instead of the name of such agent.

(f) In the case of any program, other than a program advertising commercial products or services, which is sponsored, paid for or furnished, either in whole or in part, or for which material or services referred to in paragraph (d) of this section are furnished, by a corporation, committee, association, or other unincorporated group, the announcement required by this section shall disclose the name of such corporation, committee, association, or other unincorporated group. In each such case the station shall require that a list of the chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or of the board of directors of the corporation, committee, association or other unincorporated group shall be made available for public inspection at the studios or general offices of one of the international broadcast stations carrying the program in each community in which the program is broadcast.

(g) In the case of broadcast matter advertising commercial products or services, an announcement stating the sponsor's corporate or trade name, or the name of the sponsor's product, when it is clear that the mention of the name of the product constitutes a sponsorship identification, shall be deemed sufficient for the purposes of this section and only one such announcement need be made at any time during the course of the program.

(h) Commission interpretations in connection with the foregoing rules may be found in the Commission's Public Notice entitled "Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules" (FCC 63-409; 28 F.R. 4732, May 10, 1963) and such supplements as are issued from time to time.

§ 73.790 Rebroadcast.

(a) The licensee of an international broadcast station may, without further authority of the Commission, rebroadcast the program of a United States standard, FM noncommercial educational, or FM broadcast station, provided the Commission is notified of the call letters of each station rebroadcast and the licensee certifies that express authority has been received from the licensee of the station originating the program. The notice and certification of consent must be given within 3 days of any single rebroadcast, but in case of the regular practice of rebroadcasting certain programs of another broadcast station several times during a license period, notice and certification of consent must be given for the ensuing license period with the application for renewal of license, or at the beginning of such rebroadcast practice if begun during a license period.

NOTE: The broadcasting of a program relayed by a remote pickup broadcast station is not considered a rebroadcast.

(b) No licensee of an international broadcast station shall rebroadcast the programs of any other class of United States radio station without written authority having first been obtained from the Commission.

(c) A licensee of an international broadcast station may authorize the rebroadcast of its programs by any station outside the limits of the North American continent without permission from the Commission: *Provided*, That the station rebroadcasting the programs cannot be received consistently in the United States.

(Sec. 325, 48 Stat. 1091; 47 U.S.C. 325)

§ 73.791 Supplemental report with renewal application.

A supplemental report shall be filed with and made a part of each application for renewal of license and shall include statements of the following:

(a) The number of hours operated on each frequency, listing contract operations and private operations separately.

(b) Outline of reports of reception and interference and conclusions with regard to propagation characteristics of assigned frequencies. (If such information is not available to the applicant in the case of contract operations, a statement to this effect will be considered adequate.)

FCC 63-360B
33472

BEFORE THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

IN THE MATTER OF AMENDMENT OF SECTION 1.357 OF THE COMMISSION'S RULES AND REGULATIONS, CONCERNING PROCESSING OF APPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST STATIONS

ORDER

At a session of the Federal Communications Commission held at its offices in Washington, D.C. on the 17th day of April, 1963:

The Commission having under consideration Part 3, Subpart F, of its Rules and Regulations, pertaining to private international broadcast stations;

It appearing, That several factors point to an immediate need to undertake comprehensive revision of these Rules and Regulations, which were adopted in 1939 and last modified in 1955; and

It further appearing, That the most important such factor is mounting frequency congestion and resultant shortage of available frequency hours in the international broadcast bands for both private and governmental use; and


It further appearing, That this situation has been brought about by (1) decreasing sunspot activity, (2) an increase in frequency hour usage by both private international broadcast stations and by Voice of America facilities since the present rules were adopted, (3) pending applications seeking authorizations for international broadcast stations now on file with the Commission, and (4) an increase in the worldwide level of international broadcasting; and

It further appearing, That the mounting frequency congestion in the high frequency broadcast bands tends to jeopardize the entire international high frequency allocations structure, and may therefore affect the ability of all radio services to make full and effective use of the high frequency region of the spectrum; and

It further appearing, That a second factor necessitating changes in the international broadcast rules is the incompatibility of certain sections of the present rules with Article 10 of the Radio Regulations annexed to the International Telecommunications Convention (Geneva, 1959), which Convention and Regulations have been ratified by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate; and

It further appearing, That the acceptance of new applications for private international broadcast stations or for increased frequency hours by present stations or the granting of such applications currently pending would serve to compound the problems of frequency congestion noted above and could seriously prejudice the results of the rule-making proceeding now necessary in this area (which rule-making will be initiated in the near future), and, therefore, that further acceptance and grant of such applications would not be in the public interest; and

† 73-702. Engineering chart.



It further appearing, That the notice of rule-making and effective date provisions of Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act are not applicable to the rule change set out in the Appendix since the rule change adopted herein is procedural, relating to the manner in which and the time at which the Commission accepts and considers applications.

Accordingly, *It is ordered,* That, effective April 25, 1963, Section 1.357 of the Commission's Rules is amended as set forth in the Appendix hereto. Authority for the adoption of this rule is contained in Sections 4(i) and 303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,¹
BEN F. WAPLE, *Acting Secretary.*

Released April 19, 1963.

¹ See attached dissenting statement of Commissioner Hyde.

NOTE.—Rules changes herein will be covered by T.S. I(62)-4.

APPENDIX

Section 1.357 of the Commission's Rules is amended by the addition of the following note at the end of the present text:

NOTE: Pending rule-making pertaining to the authorization of international broadcast stations, no application seeking authority to construct a new international broadcast station or seeking authority to operate a greater number of frequency hours than authorized on April 25, 1963, will be granted, and, after April 25, 1963, no such application will be accepted for filing.

DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER HYDE

I dissent to the issuance of the attached freeze order. The text of the order, as well as its ordering clause, clearly identify it as a change in regulations defining substantive policy. Such a change in rules should not be made without notice and an opportunity for submission of views by interested persons as contemplated by the Administrative Procedures Act. Labeling the change as "procedural" only compounds the basic error. The situation with respect to applications in this service has not changed in months. No emergency exists which would justify departure from the procedures prescribed by law.

There are important questions on which the Commission might well ask for information and views before making a judgment such as announced in this order:

1. Should the United States conserve frequencies for international broadcasting while engaged in a world competition with other countries which make greater use and show no tendencies to curtail such uses?
2. Would it be advantageous to the United States to restrict international broadcasting largely to a single government agency?
3. Isn't it probable that non-government independent broadcasting from responsible private entities may in many circumstances be more effective in presenting the American concept of a free society than broadcasting by a government agency?

NEWS ARTICLES CONCERNING VIETNAM WAR COVERAGE

[From the Indianapolis Star, July 27, 1966]

ALICE WIDENER SAYS—GOVERNMENT HAS RIGHT TO MAINTAIN SECURITY

NEW YORK.

Nothing is harder to correct than a much publicized untruth; nothing is harder to repair than a vendetta-type injustice.

I don't like untruths, half-truths or injustice, and so I believe it is time to try to correct some unfair propaganda against Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Arthur Sylvester.

Recently I sought an exclusive interview with him to find out facts about his alleged opinion "It's the inherent right of the government to lie to save itself." Also, I wanted to find out some facts about the problem of press reporting on the Viet Nam War in relation to an attack on Secretary Sylvester by Morley Safer, former CBS News correspondent in Viet Nam, which appears in the 1966 annual issue of "Dateline," a publication of the Overseas Press Club, in which I am an active member.

Actually, the headline-getting statement of Secretary Sylvester about the right of government to lie to save itself was only a part of his response to a questioner at a free-swinging discussion during a meeting of Sigma Delta Chi, a newspaper fraternity, in New York City, Dec. 6, 1962. Sylvester addressed that meeting and it was only in the ensuing question period that a questioner, who originally used the term "lie," elicited the secretary's response which, in all justice, should be put in its fair and proper context concerning the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

On the Friday preceding President Kennedy's Monday address to the nation in the eyeball-to-eyeball nuclear U.S.-USSR confrontation, an inquiry was put to the Defense Department information office about the rumored existence of offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba. In a routine answer, a subordinate in the press office—not Secretary Sylvester personally—gave a misleading statement, not out of deliberate falsehood but because he just didn't have the secret information to which only an extremely limited number of highest government officials had access.

In reply to my recent direct question about what Secretary Sylvester believed in 1962 and believes now, he said, "I can only tell you what I told two Congressional committees under oath: Obviously, no government information program can be based on lies; it must always be based on truthful facts. But when any nation is faced with nuclear disaster, with the life or death of your nation, you do not tell all the facts to your enemy. That, and that alone, is what I am talking about."

Moreover, in the Viet Nam War, no reporter has a right to divulge information endangering the lives of our fighting men, and none has a right to divulge information about troop movements or planned military maneuvers that would so endanger them. I believe in government of the people, by the people, and for the people. I do not make an arbitrary separation between government and the people.

"When the government is taking life or death emergency measures to protect the people—as was being done over the weekend prior to President Kennedy's address to the nation in the Cuban missile crisis—it is essential not to give the enemy an advantage by letting him know exactly what you are doing. That is essential to the people's right to survival in a nuclear era. In such event, the interests of the people and the government are one, and I am confident that is the way we want it to be."

I personally am in full agreement. Also, I believe it to be entirely right that President Johnson has asked the FBI to investigate who leaked to a newspaperman advance information about our recent air attacks on the Hanoi and Hai-phong oil installations. Our pilots are human beings with a right to maximum survival chances. No reporter or government employe has a right to leak vital

information about our military action in Viet Nam in defiance of press ground rules laid down by the military, regulations faithfully observed by most reporters.

It is a fact that Assistant Secretary Sylvester's main critic, Morley Safer—who wrote the recent article in the OPC "Dateline"—was cited by Col. Ben W. Legare in Saigon, last August 11, for violation of well articulated security rules, thereby endangering American troops. This fact was stated in Secretary Sylvester's letter dated May 10, 1966, to the President of the Overseas Press Club.

Many critics of our anti-Communist policy in Southeast Asia and Viet Nam are waging vicious propaganda warfare against U.S. officials responsible for conducting the war and furnishing information about it. If Joe Doakes were in Secretary Sylvester's place, then Joe Doakes would be the victim of deliberate attacks for the purpose of discreditation at home and abroad.

I am no respecter of persons and don't believe anyone is perfect—me first. But I think it is about time that my colleagues in the press and the American people give Secretary Sylvester a decent break.

[From the Denver Post, Jan. 23, 1966]

HOYT REPORTS ON WAR, PRESS

CASPER, WYO.—The American public is not being "deceived" about the war in Viet Nam, and is getting the facts "substantially" from the press, but the press could do a better job in gathering and presenting them, according to Palmer Hoyt, editor and publisher of The Denver Post.

Hoyt, a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information, who recently checked on problems of the American press in Viet Nam in covering the war, described the situation in an address Friday night at the annual banquet of the Wyoming Press Association.

He laid part of the problems of informing the public on the extraordinary nature of the Vietnamese war and in part on the tendency of many reporters to concentrate on the fighting to the exclusion of social, economic and political factors of considerable significance.

LESS THAN CANDID

Hoyt acknowledged that "serious charges" had been made "to the effect that the American public is being deceived about the war in Viet Nam." But, he added, "this is not true."

"I do not say that the government's spokesmen have at all times been candid with the press and public or that they wouldn't like to cover up much that has happened in Viet Nam," the publisher explained. "Nor do I say that the press has covered the war to my satisfaction.

"But I do say that the contention that the American public is not able to get the truth out of Viet Nam is, in itself, not true."

Hoyt criticized military briefing officers for attempts to cloud the facts or present them in the best possible light. This he attributed to "the fact that the military does not have its best public relations officers running this phase of the operation in Viet Nam."

He pointed out, however, that good reporters had learned to check questionable points for themselves and that they were thereby able to get the story for the public at home.

CODE ACCEPTED

"There is very little censorship, at least in the accepted sense," said Hoyt. "The newsmen there have agreed voluntarily to a code under which they will not disclose in advance the pending movements of the military. They have also agreed, somewhat more reluctantly, that they will not disclose the number of casualties suffered by our side in any particular engagement."

Other than this, Hoyt explained, the reporters are not restricted in what they can write about, or what they can say.

He said he would like to see more written about the constructive things that are being done—the land reform, the homes that are built, the help being given—but he said this was an approach editors could do something about.

He called on editors to demand more information than they are getting of a non-military nature, and to publish this when they get it.

[From the Chicago Tribune, June 20, 1966]

REPORTER FINDS VIET WAR EASY: PROVIDING

(By Arthur Veysey)

SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 19—Covering the war in Viet Nam is easy for a reporter. Stories are everywhere, waiting to be told.

Contrary to often stated charges, reporters willing to [sic] conferences of Saigon are free to travel where they like. They restaurants, bars, and the press leave the air conditioned hotels, find a welcome everywhere among American military men.

Military transportation of all types is open to the reporter for the asking. He even gets preference on scheduled flights carrying troops and supplies. If no scheduled flight is available, the reporter need only wait on an air field and sooner or later a plane will come along. The pilot happily gives the reporter a lift.

There is no censorship. In two months moving about the country, I met no restriction that I considered unreasonable. Of course, the reporter is expected to use his common sense. The reporter who, for example, files a story that planes have taken off for North Viet Nam while the planes are still on the way is quite properly shunned by fliers who feel the reporter's irresponsibility endangered their lives.

In Saigon, the reporter lives in a hotel or apartment he provides for himself. Army dining rooms, bars, shops, post exchange shops and movies are open to him. In Da Nang, the military has taken over a seaside motel for reporters covering the war from there. Elsewhere, the reporter bunks with whatever outfit he happens to be with at meal time or bed time. The outfit usually gives him the best it has and charges him 50 cents or a dollar.

Each military outfit has an officer or sergeant assigned as public information officer. By and large, the P. I. O.'s do their best to see that the reporter gets the story he seeks, as well as transportation and quarters.

Some reporters accuse the command of using the P. I. O.'s as "prison wardens" to make sure reporters "don't get out of line." But my experience is that the P. I. O.'s are a much greater help than hindrance to an experienced reporter who understands military ways.

The best P. I. O.'s see that the reporter gets to the people with the story, introduces him, and then leaves him to get the facts himself. Sometimes, P. I. O.'s who have had unfortunate experiences with reporters sit in on interviews by reporters they are meeting for the first time.

Some inexperienced or lazy reporters expect P. I. O.'s to do the work for them and give them the story. Ironically, these same reporters are usually those who protest about "restrictions" and "spoon feeding."

The reporter's worst problem lies in poor communications between Saigon and the rest of the world. The cable service is bad and 24 hour delays are common on big news days. The service is expensive—about 25 cents a word to American cities. This is one of the world's highest press rates. Agencies are arranging their own radio circuits. These would tie into existing cable networks in Manila, Hong Kong or Tokyo.

Despite the ease with which a reporter can travel within Viet Nam, most of the reporters spend most of their time in Saigon. A daily briefing by the command P. I. O. in the air conditioned United States information service auditorium supplies the raw material for the bulk of stories filed daily from Viet Nam.

At the briefing, a P. I. O. officer hands out two or three mimeographed pages listing incidents. Reporters can ask for further details, but rarely get them. Sometimes, the P. I. O. produces one or two military men directly involved in some incident. These men seem to speak from carefully prepared statements and seem to hedge when asked for further details.

The briefings lead to charges that the military is "guiding" the news. If a reporter is content with the briefings as his main source of material, the charge sticks. But any reporter is free to seek facts elsewhere and as soon as he leaves headquarters he finds a free world for news gathering.

This is no new situation. It existed in World War II and in the Korean war. In those wars, censorship and long distances between the fronts and the cable-head made the reporter's role much more difficult than that which the reporter meets today in Viet Nam.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Mar. 4, 1966]

THE UNTOLD STORY: REPORTING

(By Joseph Alsop)

WASHINGTON.—It is against custom, but it is an unfortunate necessity to end this series with a warning. Every one should now be warned to suspect some of the most important reporting from Viet Nam.

Consider, for example, a very great newspaper's two successive stories, sent from Saigon on Feb. 17 and 18. Both concerned the big spoiling operation Gen. Westmoreland mounted not long ago in Binh Dinh province. The operation's aim, according to the first story, was to find and destroy four regiments of enemy regulars, half Viet Cong and half North Vietnamese.

In reality, the original aim was to strike only two enemy regiments, the 18th Regiment of the North Vietnamese 325th Division and the 2nd V.C. main force regiment. Almost at once, however, a third predominantly Northern regiment with the enemy code name of "Quyet Tam," was discovered by our troops. All were operating under a temporary divisional headquarters with the code name "Sau Vang." None of this matters much, compared to the following flat, unqualified assertion in the first of these two stories:

"Not one of these (enemy) regiments has yet been drawn into battle."

The story did not stop there, either. Both the Binh Dinh operation and Gen. Westmoreland's basic strategy were roundly condemned as failures, on the ground that the target-regiments were not "drawn into battle." An accompanying editorial all but crowed over this report of failure of American troops in the field.

Hence it was a bit bewildering to learn from the second story, by another reporter, on the same paper, that our troops had captured a very high ranking V.C. officer, Lt. Col. Dong Duan, commander of the 93d Battalion of the 2d V.C. main force regiment. This story also repeated that our troops had "not made contact" with their four target-regiments; but now these regiments were differently described as entirely North Vietnamese.

This change of description was wholly incorrect; for the 2d V.C. main force regiment had been one of the target-regiments from the very outset, as implied in the first story. But as this was the perhaps inconvenient fact, and if Lt. Col. Dong Duan's outfit was never "drawn into battle," how the devil did a battalion commander get himself captured on the battlefield?

These fairly lurid inconsistencies led to consultation of this reporter's Vietnamese notes, and far more important, to telegraphic inquiries to Gen. Westmoreland's headquarters in Saigon. In summarizing the results, one must begin by pointing out that a lot depends on what you mean by "contact" and "battle." The Binh Dinh fighting certainly did not resemble the Ia Drang fighting last October.

The regular troops of the target-regiments were instead brigaded, in battalion and even in company strength, with units of the V. C. local forces and even with guerrilla bands; and all were supported by press-ganged groups of peasant porters. Thus in any engagement, the regulars were likely to be encountered in a mixture with the other listed elements.

Even so, before this reporter left Saigon, Gen. Westmoreland gave the considered judgment that two of the target-regiments of enemy regulars had suffered losses that would put these outfits out of action for another three months.

By Feb. 26 (for the operation in Binh Dinh continued defiantly, despite its stern condemnation as a sad failure on Feb. 17) the U.S. field headquarters was reporting indications of the "complete collapse" of a third target-regiment. These signs of collapse were the continuous increase in numbers of weapons abandoned on the battlefield, plus numbers of defecting enemy troops without precedent in previous experience.

Thus three of the target-regiments, though allegedly never "drawn into battle," were at least very gravely damaged; and one of the three may well have been scrubbed right off the order of battle. As of Feb. 26, Gen. Westmoreland's headquarters tally of the enemy troops killed in action had reached 1799 by body count, with another 1700 estimated as killed but not counted.

There are three things to be said about this. First, duplications in body counts sometimes occur in the heat of combat. Second, these duplications are normally trifling, compared to the enemy losses that are uncounted because of the Communist habit of running extreme risks to remove their dead from the battlefield. Only a very rare body count will include victims of our air power, for instance; yet this is the arm the V. C. fear the most.

Third, it is highly conservative to assume that severely wounded enemy troops were at least double the number of those killed. Add that over 400 enemy troops have been captured, and defecting enemy's losses of all categories, including guerrillas as well as regulars, must clearly run far above 7,000 men.

It can be seen, then, why Gen. Westmoreland's headquarters now estimates that 11 enemy battalions, or the equivalent, have been put out of action in the Binh Dinh fighting, which is proudly characterized as "the most successful combined operation to date." The characterization is justified, unless Gen. Westmoreland's staff are playing ducks and drakes with the facts.

And who is more likely to play ducks and drakes with the facts—reporters rather obviously reflecting the outspoken preconceptions of a great newspaper, or Gen. Westmoreland, who is one of the soberest and most brilliant field commanders in U.S. history?

[May 25 1966]

SAN FRANCISCO (UPI).—Representative John E. Moss, chairman of a House subcommittee on Government information, said Sunday night the U.S. public was being adequately informed about the war in Viet Nam.

"The quality of the reporting, the availability of the men who have the information and the access to areas of activity are without parallel in any other military action," said the California Democrat.

Moss made the statement on arriving here from a fact-finding mission in Saigon, Bangkok and Taipei. He is chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information.

Moss and his committee, consisting of six other Congressmen and a full staff, also investigated alleged black marketing in Saigon. He said such activities existed and that his committee would "Have to come up with recommendations."

"More attention will have to be paid to day-to-day housekeeping details," he said.

[From the Congressional Record, Mar. 21 1966]

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed on another subject.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in the winter issue of the Columbia Journalism Review is an article by Martin Gershen entitled "Press Against Military in Vietnam: A Further View." Anyone who feels confused over some of the press reports from Vietnam would do well to read this article, because it helps to explain the reason for some of the confusion—and the reason, Mr. Gershen points out, lies with a few of the members of the press themselves. During my recent trip to South Vietnam, I had occasion to discuss this problem with some of our military commanders. Their comments were uniformly to the effect that the great majority of members of the press handled themselves and their reporting commendably, but there were always a few who had to abuse the situation. Mr. Gershen's article gives examples of the "abuse." I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"PRESS VERSUS MILITARY IN VIETNAM: A FURTHER VIEW

(NOTE.—Martin Gershen, who wrote the following observations, is a feature writer-photographer for the Newark Star-Ledger, on leave to study in Columbia's advanced international reporting program. He covered the war in Vietnam last summer.)

"There is a basic law of journalism which says that every story should have at least two sides.

"Yet, in too many reports involving censorship in Vietnam, the press seems to have the last word.

"And that word leaves the reader—or viewer—at home no alternative but to assume that the American war in southeast Asia not only is against communism, but against the entire U.S. Military Establishment.

"In an article, 'Censorship and Cam Ne,' by Richard Rustin, which appeared in the fall, 1965, issue of the Columbia Journalism Review, the writer made some

attempt at giving both sides of the controversy that continues between the press and the brass.

"But one had to read carefully and dig deeply to learn that the possibility exists that the press may be partly to blame for its troubles with the censors.

"Edward P. Morgan suggested this possibility when he was quoted as saying there was a 'passel' of young stringers in Vietnam who are trying to become the Ernie Pyles of this war by baiting military officials at press briefings.

"But generally the article seemed to consist of quotations from one famous byliner after another who self-righteously attacked censorship in Vietnam and blamed the military for shackling the free press.

"One of the more disturbing quotations was reported to have been made by UPI foreign news analyst Phil Newsom, who said: 'It is doubtful * * * if the story of U.S. Marines burning a village near Da Nang ever would have come out if newsmen had not seen it.'

"Newsom, of course, was referring to a CBS television report of the burning of Cam Ne—a report which aroused much controversy at home because it suggested that marines arbitrarily burn Vietnamese villages. He implied that a hard-digging U.S. press corps took on a hard-to-get-along-with U.S. Marine Corps and uncovered a terrible secret.

"If this were true, then bully for the newsmen.

"But it wasn't true. The fact is that it is doubtful if newsmen ever would have seen the village razed if it weren't for the U.S. Marines inviting them to the burning.

"I was at the Da Nang press camp when the marine invitation was extended. I turned it down because I had a previous commitment to go on an air raid aboard a B-57 fighter bomber. The squadron took newsmen on flights only one day a week.

"The real reason for burning Cam Ne, of course, was that it was a Vietcong stronghold and William F. Buckley, Jr., who also was quoted in the Rustin article, made this point clear.

"To report properly the story of the Marine operation at Cam Ne would have meant explaining that villages and their civilian populations play a key role in guerrilla warfare.

"This is the why of the story, which of course is too complicated to make a good lead.

"One of the major problems facing U.S. forces in Vietnam is being able to distinguish friend from foe.

"The Marines, like all the services there, are aware too that they must win the people if they are to win the war and they lean over backward to avoid antagonizing local populations.

"It must have taken Marine intelligence a long time to determine for certain that Cam Ne was a Vietcong stronghold.

"Then, when they decided to destroy the village, they invited the press to come along.

"Is it any wonder that they became annoyed when stories of their operation depicted Marines as no better than SS troops who burned villages and pushed around women, children, and old men?

"But even more annoying to military men in Vietnam is the caliber of many of the correspondents out there.

"A ranking Pentagon officer observed recently that editors told him they were having difficulty getting good newsmen to cover Vietnam.

"The problem, he said, was money. It costs about \$1,300 round trip to fly a newsman to the other end of the world and for that amount of cash you would expect him to stay for a while.

"But if he is an experienced newsman, he has a wife and family so the news service would have to bring them along and settle them in Hong Kong or Bangkok.

"Add periodic trips for the newsman to his family, additional life and accident insurance, education expenses for the kids and war becomes an unprofitable news story.

"As a result, the Pentagon officer said, 'American news services are hiring people out there they would never touch at home.'

"It's obviously cheaper to pick up a 'passel' of young stringers who have already paid their way to Vietnam and who will work for peanuts.

"In an effort to encourage the U.S. press to cover the war in Vietnam, the Defense Department last year flew 84 newsmen to southeast Asia.

"'We did it, frankly, to prime the pump,' the Pentagon officer said.

"The military believed that by encouraging more newsmen to come to Vietnam, competition would become keener, resulting in less sensational stories and in more straight reporting.

"The project was discontinued last summer as escalation of the war began in earnest because 'we reasoned the American press was interested enough to pay its own way to Vietnam.'

"It didn't work out that way.

"Of the 106 civilian news organizations from around the world who were represented in Vietnam last August, about 40 were American. Of the 260 newsmen present, approximately 175 were American.

"Three months later, in November, the number of news organizations in Vietnam had increased to 136 but the proportion of U.S. services to the total rose less than 10 percent while U.S. troop strength had increased by the tens of thousands.

"Of the 296 accredited newsmen covering the war, fewer than half were Americans. Foreign newsmen were hired by nearly all the American media. In some of the larger organizations 20 to 60 percent of the staff was foreign.

"In the last two weeks of 1965, the number of U.S. services and staffers had begun to increase slightly, according to a Pentagon official.

"Obviously, a certain number of foreign newsmen are needed on American staffs to overcome language barriers. The rest probably are hired to overcome budgetary problems.

"I remember meeting one of these non-American U.S. correspondents the day after the Cam Ne incident. We both were leaving Da Nang. He was carrying a pouch of television film, which he was bringing to Saigon. I was returning to Pleiku.

"We were picked up at the press camp by two U.S. enlisted men who were ordered to drive us to the airfield where we were to catch a military flight south.

"On the way to the airfield my colleague began berating the two enlisted men over the Cam Ne operation.

"He implied that the Marines were no better than the Gestapo.

"Imagine you Yanks burning a village. I never saw anything like that in my life," said this correspondent, who obviously was too young ever to have covered a war before.

"Enlisted men are taught to treat civilians with respect, especially if they are from the press. The two GI's looked at each other but said nothing.

"I tried, at first, to keep from getting involved, because we newspapermen have to stick together even if we're wrong.

"But his criticism continued and finally I said, 'For Christ's sake, shut up.'

"He looked at me in surprise. Then he said, partly as an explanation, partly as an appeal to my journalistic loyalties and partly to get the last word in:

"But I actually saw a Marine push an old man around."

"I thought of the night I had spent with a Marine company surrounded in a jungle outpost by 300 Vietcong. I remembered the next morning walking down a road with a Marine sergeant who smiled at all the villagers he met because he couldn't tell the good guys from the bad guys and he didn't want to antagonize friendly Vietnamese.

"I thought what a crazy, mixed-up war this is, where you can't tell the front from the rear, Vietcong from Vietnamese, civilians from soldiers. I turned to this young correspondent and very gently said:

"Look, it was a Vietcong village. How did you expect the Marines to handle that situation?'

"He hesitated for a moment, then said, 'Why don't you Yanks get out of Vietnam?'

"And if he is typical of U.S. press representation in Vietnam, then the military people there have been very kind to us.

—MARTIN GERSHEN."

[From the New York Times, Feb. 13, 1966]

IT'S A DIRTY WAR FOR CORRESPONDENTS, TOO

(By Jack Raymond)

WASHINGTON.—Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, the leader of the Civil War march through Georgia, once undertook to have a correspondent hanged for espionage. Angrily, he wrote that he would rather be governed by Jefferson

Davis than "abused by a set of dirty newspaper scribblers who have the impudence of Satan."

"They come into camp," he went on, "poke about among the lazy shirks and pick up their camp rumors and publish them as facts, and the avidity with which these rumors are swallowed by the public makes even some of our officers bow to them. I will not. They are a pest and shall not approach me and I will treat them as spies which in truth they are."

In more restrained language and with no outward evidence yet that any correspondent in Vietnam is in danger of hanging as a spy, military officials here and in Saigon have expressed concern over security breaches in the reporting of the war. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said that the Government will have to "take a very hard look" at the possibility of imposing military censorship. Short of that, however, the Government already has called upon the press to follow certain rules of self-censorship. These rules, pertaining to troop unit identifications and deployments, are similar to restrictions that have been applied formally in past wars and are not serious impediments to free news coverage.

Far more serious are the sporadic clashes between the press and officialdom over the very facts of the war. Dispatches from Vietnam from time to time have questioned the accuracy of official statements. In retaliation, Government spokesmen—military and civilian officials alike—have questioned the competence, good judgment and even patriotism of correspondents. As a consequence, an undercurrent of doubt greets much of the news from Vietnam, official and unofficial. In a war that has engaged the United States for more than a decade, with ever-increasing casualties, both press and Government face crises in credibility.

This is doubly serious. In the United States belief in the reliability of the news media is crucial to the governmental process. At the same time, because in this war there was no Pearl Harbor to arouse emotions, no blatant Communist invasion across a border as in the Korean war, the Government is crucially dependent for support upon the people's belief in and understanding of what they are told is happening that requires Americans to fight and die half way around the world.

All wars are hard to cover. The so-called "fog of war" which envelops combatants does not spare the most professional observer. The war in Vietnam, however, poses unusual problems for the correspondent, although he enjoys more creature comforts than he had in World War II and the Korean war. For example, because South Vietnam is a relatively small country, it is possible to fly to one of the combat positions, spend a few hours and return to Saigon in time for dinner and a comfortable night's sleep in a reasonably good air-conditioned hotel or apartment. The facilities in Pleiku or Danang are not quite so favorable, but only rarely do correspondents have to live in the field with the troops over an extended period of time.

About 300 correspondents are accredited to headquarters in Saigon, 200 of them in the country at any given time. Many correspondents, with home bases elsewhere in the Pacific area, cover the war at intervals. Half of the resident correspondents are American. These totals compare impressively with the 250 to 300 correspondents, half of them American, who covered the much larger Korean war. As in past wars, the official information services are overwhelming in the sheer physical effort to provide the correspondents with facilities, although the never-satisfied press corps can cite chapter and verse on occasional lapses.

Military transport is available to correspondents most of the time. Once having signed the "death chit" absolving authorities in case of accident, a correspondent usually can get a ride in a helicopter or cargo plane. At least one helicopter is permanently assigned to the Saigon press corps on a stand-by basis. Arrangements recently were made to have an airplane similarly assigned for a press run to carry dispatches, film and passengers on a round-trip route including Saigon, Danang, Pleiku and other major places. When military transport is not available, there is always Air Vietnam, the commercial airline, with its daily flight schedule. Typically, Charles Taylor of The Toronto Globe and Mail found military information officers "eager to guide me into the heart of the fighting and disappointed if the action turned out to be tame."

Yes, the military authorities are quite cooperative in facilitating coverage most of the time. The trouble begins when the journalist practices his profession, and much of the trouble is due to objective causes.

In other wars a correspondent knew where the likely action was—at the front. He got stories by going there. He chose a unit and arranged to spend days or weeks or even months with it, knowing that it had certain military objectives.

On dull days, he wrote hometown features, but there was a geographic and quantitative coherence to the campaign and its battles. When territory was taken, cities captured, strongpoints demolished and enemy prisoners, dead and wounded rounded up—these were indicators of military success, just as surely as retreat, surrender and heavy casualties denoted failure. Of course, there were Pyrrhic victories and "tactical" retreats but such events could be reported in a meaningful context.

In this war, not only are there no battle fronts, there are relatively few battles. The insurgency by the Vietcong supported by North Vietnamese Army units is designed to harass the people and shake their confidence in Government security. Despite the increasing number of military clashes, most of the war consists of relatively small-scale attempts to counter Vietcong propaganda, arson, kidnappings, terror raids, murders and various forms of sabotage.

The correspondent refers to most of these with statistical summaries. He cannot afford to spend a month in a village, waiting for a terrorist attack or studying how its people react to Communist propaganda, although that is the substance of the war. It is not feasible for a correspondent to travel with Government forces in professional anticipation of an ambush. The ambush may not occur for days, or even weeks—or ever—with the unit he has selected. Thus, while reporters compete to cover the larger-scale activities of the American combat forces, many of them are nagged by their consequent neglect of the wider role of the South Vietnamese military and civil guard in coping with the enemy.

The distortion of the "real war" as presented in coverage of skirmishes that would not have made the official communiques in past wars is indicated by the estimate of 28,000 incidents provoked by the Vietcong during 1965, compared with 28 combat operations in which more than 200 Vietcong were reported killed. The press picture of the situation in Vietnam is further distorted when reporters, concentrating on the headline-making American troops, find little time to cover political and economic developments without which the military effort is meaningless. Only a few big newspapers devote occasional feature pieces to the undramatic but perhaps decisive effort to "win the hearts and minds" of the people through cultural and economic assistance programs.

Even the correspondent with a unit that engages the enemy is hard put to keep the action in perspective. Most often, he is near but not at the battle. Even when he can see part of it, he is as dependent as a traffic cop at an accident on the coherence of the participants and other witnesses. While this is always true in war, the absence of the customary perspective of territory to be captured leaves the correspondent with no independent criterion for the significance of a battle. He is at the mercy of the excited soldiers, some of whom exaggerate in defeatism and despair as others exaggerate with claims of triumph.

Without place names as milestones toward an enemy capital, the correspondent is almost compelled to play up the sights and sounds of battle. It takes only a few casualties in any skirmish to generate descriptions worthy of the Battle of Iwo Jima. With TV and still cameras on the scene, with color film and sound equipment, the blood and cries of war are soon transported to every living room in America, and then it almost makes no difference what anybody says *really* happened.

The absence of formal censorship has its good and bad points. In the first place, it facilitates speedy communications, and that is good. Lack of censorship also encourages some officers in the field to speak candidly. Most of them observe the American's traditional sense of obligation toward the public's "right to know." As in other wars, local commanders vie for the attention of reporters because they are proud of the job they and their men are doing. Often, officers use the press as a channel of appeal when they find official responses negative or slow.

But the absence of censorship also inhibits some officers. Uncertain of how far they can go, many hardly go far enough in helping the press understand what is taking place. Inevitably, without formal rules of censorship, newsmen in the field will come into conflict with officers over specific wording of their dispatches, or specific scenes filmed in TV newsreels, even when there is no disagreement in principle. In other wars, the official censors could settle such disputes.

While many correspondents go into the field with the troops—seven have been killed and one died of a tropical disease—most correspondents are compelled to spend much of their time in Saigon where they have ready access to international communications. There they attend the daily military briefings and watch political developments (with the help of a South Vietnamese interpreter-assistant). Most stories from Vietnam are based on the regular briefings, amplified by interviews.

The military briefings are rough affairs. When I was in Vietnam last summer I could not help noticing that Pentagon news conferences, notorious for their waspish atmosphere, were mild compared with those held in Saigon. The briefers distribute mimeographed summaries of reported combat operations of the previous 24 hours, adding orally any late-breaking developments they are authorized to mention. Sometimes, combat men are brought in to describe particular actions. But in an ordinary briefing, the official spokesman often is less informed than correspondents who may have just come in from the field. And, while courtesies are observed, correspondents' questions drip with skepticism. Spokesmen are defensive and resort to brief answers, fearing that elaboration will only get them into trouble. In that atmosphere, it is not surprising that correspondents believe the spokesmen are ignorant or less than candid. Rumors and speculation spread easily.

Yet, if the press finds it hard to get at the truth, the men with responsibility for issuing the communiques and other official information also find it hard to serve the press. In Vietnam, as in other areas of national defense, the authorized American policy calls for full disclosure consistent with national security. But, as Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, once pointed out: "Stating a Government policy is easier than applying it."

First of all, there is the matter of security. Certain incidents have outraged American military men. At one time, newsmen customarily reported when military aircraft took off on missions from Danang air base. To complaints about this practice the answer was: "If we can see them take off, so can the Vietcong, so what's the difference?" Officials finally prevailed upon the newsmen to hold off, explaining there was no need to enhance the enemy intelligence with additional and speedier American press bulletins.

One time, despite an informal injunction against reporting troop movements, the press flashed news of reinforcements on the way to relieve a besieged camp. The incident was written off as an accident that ultimately did no damage. But it is still being cited by officials as an example of the kind of accident which, if repeated, could be responsible for serious casualties.

In addition to security, commanders face the problem of morale. This is a subtle issue, for newsmen have learned from experience that precautions against damage to troop morale are often designed to cloak foul-ups. Nevertheless, military commanders are concerned by reporting that concentrates on the grimness of battle, casualties, ambushes, illness and materiel shortages in certain areas without the perspective of the entire war effort. Troop morale has been good, officers point out, but dispatches emphasizing the horrors of battle have aroused the concern of wives, mothers and fathers, and have prompted letters from home that have a depressing effect. As one high officer says: "It would be foolish if I extended cooperation to the press to the point where it endangered my mission."

Perhaps most serious among the military command's press problems is that of obtaining and presenting its own version of what happens before the press presents its version. In battle situations, the squad leader reports to the platoon leader and the platoon leader to the company commander and so on up the line to division headquarters and Saigon. These reports are checked and refined. No commander would accept an afteraction report without verifying its details, for battle-wise commanders know that men under shock always exaggerate. The military reporting process takes time.

But the correspondents, in all honesty, interview the men who fight, take pictures of the wounded and file their accounts with competitive speed, unhampered by censorship delays. Early estimates of casualties may be corrected afterward, but the initial impression already has obtained the headlines and prime time on TV even before military headquarters in Saigon has received its own reports.

On one occasion that distressed Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander, he was advised by telephone from Washington that two major newspapers were headlining a reported ambush in which United States troops had been caught and forced to retreat. The troops had not been ambushed. They had unexpectedly come upon an unsuspecting North Vietnamese Army unit. Both sides were surprised into instantaneous combat. The lead Americans assumed at first they had been ambushed and said so in an on-the-spot interview. Ironically, when it was over, General Westmoreland described the clash as the "greatest victory of the war" up to that time.

TV has caused special concern to the authorities. Intrepid cameramen have gone into battle wherever they could find it and have sent back extraordinary film

depicting war's horrors. One that aroused the American public was the Marines' burning of a South Vietnamese village in order to evict Vietcong snipers. A sequence in the film showed a Marine applying his cigarette lighter to the grass roof of a hut. The emotional impact of that scene was far greater than the most vivid word picture of napalm bombing.

Moreover, American officials point out, American television can show the "inhumanity" of the American side of the war without censorship—burly Marines towering over blindfolded, half-naked little men in shorts, wailing women and battered children. They cannot, however, match these scenes with pictures of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese terrorism. For this, the Vietcong field commanders and the authorities in Hanoi do not cooperate.

TV, of course, is no more guilty than any other news medium in seeking out the best stories. But compared with the writing newsman's battle for column inches of space, the TV correspondent is prodded by a more acute competition with expensive television divertissements. He thus specializes in brief scenes with tremendous emotional impact. In addition, his very presence among the troops, far more than that of a correspondent, may create news angles where none otherwise exists. As one reporter wryly remarked: "Some persons will do things in front of a camera that they would not do in front of a pad and pencil."

To combat these problems the authorities naturally contemplate censorship. While they keep warning of its possibility, however, most American officials would like to avoid it. They fear that outright censorship would only add to the already substantial body of suspicion over the official version of the war. They concede also that censorship would be difficult to apply, since it involves a sovereign right of the South Vietnamese Government. American public opinion, it is assumed, would not accept the ham-handed censorship the South Vietnamese Government exercises over its own press, and two systems of censorship could lead only to confusion resulting in news blackouts and security breaches by turn.

How long the present system of voluntary self-censorship can last is anyone's guess. However, it is important to recognize that many of the current difficulties in the press coverage of the war would exist even with censorship. And it is important also to recognize that while the "crunch" between press and Government is inevitable in American affairs, the hope of easing its consequences is as dependent upon the talent and attitude of the Government as upon the self-restraint of the press.

Moreover, while the press tolerates and cooperates in forms of self-censorship, it cannot ignore distortions, dissimulations and depictions of trends that have turned out to be wrong such as have marred Government information policies on Vietnam for years. A few examples are pertinent:

Early in the war American correspondents reported that it was going badly. They got most of their information from American military advisers in the field, and presumably the White House and Pentagon had the same sources. Yet in October, 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, fresh from a trip to Vietnam, announced that most American troops would go home by the end of 1965.

Similarly, American correspondents at that time reported that the South Vietnamese program to fortify hamlets was making no progress and that official statistics were exaggerated. Again, the correspondents got most of their information from American military advisers in the field, and presumably the White House and Pentagon had the same sources. But the correspondents were assailed by officials. Only last year did Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor concede in a national magazine that the United States had been lied to by the South Vietnamese as to the extent of progress with the hamlet program.

In recent weeks, press dispatches have contained several additional complaints of official distortions. One of the most frequent complaints deals with the so-called "body count" or "kill ratio." This refers to the practice of counting dead bodies of the enemy following a battle, because earlier in the war South Vietnamese estimates of enemy dead were found to be ludicrously exaggerated. Now American estimates similarly are being ridiculed as WEG's (wild-eyed guesses).

In one incident, a military spokesman reported that 90 enemy bodies had been counted hanging on barbed-wire fortifications. But a reporter who went to take a picture while the battle was still under way was told by troops on the scene that there never had been bodies on the wire and that they had never made a count of 90 dead. Another time, in a hot exchange, a reporter offered to show a briefing officer a picture of a disabled Marine Corps tank that the officer said had not been knocked out.

Confidence in official reports is not reinforced, either, with distortions intended to avoid embarrassments. One communique reported that a Vietcong had been shot while attempting to escape, then evacuated and given medical aid. But a reporter was told that the wounded "Vietcong" was a deaf-mute son of a loyal Vietnamese villager who presumably had been unable to hear an order to stop running. The incident was unavoidable in war—the untruth was not.

The handling of the Christmas truce further reinforced press skepticism of the official word. Throughout the truce period, information officers in Saigon insisted there were no truce violations. When it was over, on instructions from Washington, they released information of violations known to them all the time.

The news media have by no means all been paragons of professional competence or other virtues. They have been guilty of their usual quota of inaccurate and even "needled" reports. One serious flaw in the coverage of the war is that many newspapers devote insufficient space to it. In the choice and play of articles about the war, interpretive pieces are sacrificed to the hard-hitting day's developments. The diet of "straight news" and "color stories," unleavened by interpretive background for this most complicated of modern wars, is inadequate for a real understanding of what is going on. In addition, even many rich papers are understaffed in Vietnam and rely upon the news agencies, whose coverage is good but geared to speed rather than depth.

Perhaps the accusatory tone of the press, however justified by official treatment of the facts, is one of the most serious problems in coverage. For example, the reporting last year of the use of non-lethal gases, similar to those used by police, was dramatized as though these were poison gases. The stories did not say they were poison, but the tone of the reporting implied that. Another example, small but symptomatic, concerns an Air Force colonel who was grilled as though he were on trial at a news conference in Saigon. He later vowed never to meet the press again, thus cutting himself off as a source of news.

Yet the frequent allegation by many officials that their troubles are due largely to inexperienced, sensation-seeking youngsters out for journalistic fame overlooks the complaints of many veterans on the scene. Denis Warner, an Australian who has covered every Far Eastern war since World War II, charges that the American military information services in Saigon "are the worst I have known in any war anywhere." Jack Foisie of The Los Angeles Times, a veteran of World War II and Korea, recently reported: "However well the war is going at the moment, the American high command seems unable to speak with candor on battle activity, even after the battle is over."

While most of the press complaints concern "little things" and frequently stem from individual rather than policy actions, the total impact must undermine confidence in the "big things." Thus, it could hardly have been otherwise, when two successive reports of peace offers by Hanoi broke into print in a context that implied they had been rejected by the United States, that Arthur Goldberg, the United States Representative to the United Nations, conceded openly: "The credibility of our Government has been assailed."

No American Government subject as it is to frequent tests of popular approval, can afford repeated assaults upon its credibility. Yet this is precisely what President Johnson's Administration has had to endure with respect to the war in Vietnam, partly at least because a past, calculated policy of optimism in public proved unjustified. The consequent skepticism of the official world has lingered and has become further sharpened by the customary Government penchant for obfuscation in diplomacy and domestic politics. Public suspicion is a frequent outgrowth of fear of growing sacrifices in war, but the Administration is paying an additional penalty now, in draft-card burnings and other demonstrations of less than total support, for its early public-relations inadequacies.

The irony of the present situation is that the Government is doing an increasingly good job of facilitating news coverage of the war. Of course, like its predecessors, this Administration has sought to "manage the news" in order to cast a favorable light on its efforts. Managing the news is not only a prerogative of government, but its proper responsibility. News should not be mismanaged, however. If, as has been contended, news is a weapon in the governmental arsenal, then distortions and cover-ups—even when few in number—can lead only to self-inflicted wounds.

EXAMPLE OF RED LION, PA., STATION BROADCAST

R. K. SCOTT COMMENTARY—NEWS BEHIND THE HEADLINES, SEPTEMBER 6, 1966,
WINB, RED LION, PA.

Does the great menace of the Communist conspiracy come from its military threat? So long as we are strong and willing to defend the United States, we can counter and if necessary meet that threat but what about the much more insidious threat of Communist infiltration and subversion here at home? There is danger, of course, through espionage, sabotage and so on as we ought to know by now but even more dangerous is the careless attack on American institutions because it is carried on not only by avowed Communists but by secret and underground conspirators and much worse, by well meaning but deluded Americans. This brings us to the basic principles which should guide all questions attacking our domestic policies. It is common for nearly all Americans to say they stand for the preservation of the American form of constitutional government and our free enterprise economic system. Even our modern Liberals claim they are merely trying to make that system work better but because they either deliberately ignore or do not understand the basic principles of this system, they unknowingly make the job of the Communists easier and the Communist, no matter what his guise, is dedicated to the eventual destruction of that system. The great underlying principle of this system is freedom, freedom of the individual under God to order his own life as he sees fit, freedom of each sovereign state in the union to run the affairs of its people as they may decide without interference or direction from a central authority. The Declaration of Independence put it briefly and eloquently that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. This is the direct opposite of all collectivist systems whether Communism, Socialism, Welfarism or Facism. Their principle is that man has no natural rights as an individual, that all his rights are conferred on him by government. Therefore, freedom's greatest enemy is bigot government. The Communist knows this and works always to give more power to government. The modern Liberal works toward the same end but under the delusion that he is doing good to the greatest number. In reality, he is undermining the finest forms of the free society the world has ever known. Now, in just a moment I will have a further note on basic principles to guide our domestic policy but first, this message.

Communism is more than a political, economic or social doctrine, it is a way of life, false, brutal, materialistic form of despotism. Communism would strip man of his belief in God, his heritage of freedom, his trust and love, justice and mercy. Under Communism, all would become as so many already have, Twentieth Century slaves. But before you can fight this Godless menace, you must understand what the Communists want and how they go about getting it.

A new twenty-four page pamphlet entitled "The Enemy's New Tactics" will take you behind the scenes in America to show you the people and the organizations behind the student riots and the anti-Vietnam demonstrations. Names, places, dates and details, it is must reading for every American who loves his country and wants to protect it from its sworn enemy, Communism. For your free copy of this timely pamphlet, write to me, R. K. Scott, Box 4460 Grand Central Station, New York, New York, ask for "The Enemy's New Tactics" and remember it is free. And I will repeat that address later in the program.

Now to continue with our commentary. Nowadays whenever one talks about freedom, the Constitution and capitalism, a smart alec replies "you can't eat the Constitution." People who talk like this are not necessarily enemies of the American system but two things have happened to them. Their minds have been poisoned by Leftwing propaganda and they have lost the understanding of the genius of the American system. First, about the poisoned minds. This is where we see the terrible danger from the internal tactics of our native Reds and their dupes. The Communists in the United States do not work through great mass movements. They know that the American people cannot be sold on Communism or Socialism as such but if the Communist can sell the American

people on Communist objectives under pretty labels, he can count on us cutting their own throats. The major objective is to kill freedom since big government is freedom's greatest enemy, the government Communist method is simple. His technique is to get non-Communist Americans to advocate measures which always bring more power to the central government. He finds his unknowing allies among many excellent people who are in the right places to influence public opinion. Through a feeling of wanting to do good or through a misunderstanding of the nature of freedom or through sheer ignorance they work to kill the only system under which they themselves are free. There is, for example, the college professor or high school teacher who instills in his students the notion that the government owes them certain material benefits. There is the newspaper editor who tells his readers the government must take care of the farmers or that it must build houses or schools. There is the labor leader who sells his union members on the notion that the government owes them special privileges. There is the television or movie producer who slants his entertainment toward these and other objectives who considers capitalists and defenders of the traditional Americanism as fair game to be cast in the role of demons. And there is the politician who garners votes by promising pie in the sky from the government. There is even the business man who thinks he must make some sort of compromise with Communist objectives to save his own skin or like the lady who was a little bit pregnant thinks a little socialism or a little Communism is okay. All of these and others like them, even though unaware of what they do, are responsible for the poisoning of many minds. These people have lost or never had an understanding of the genius of the free system. Otherwise, they could not sanction so silly a statement that you can't eat the Constitution. The answer is that you cannot eat, certainly not very well, without the Constitution. This is another way of saying that it is our constitutional system and a free economy operating under the system which has made us the most free and abundant land in the world. And if you stop to think about it, you will realize there are other nations which have resources and energies just as great as ours.

Why then, why, we must ask, has the United States surpassed them all because here for almost the first time in history our energies and resources were released to do their amazing work in the air of freedom and this freedom meant freedom from the depressing and debilitating hand of big government. The system of government blueprinted by the American Constitution has always been called limited government. Its real genius, however, lay in the fact that so long as we lived and acted within the true meaning of the Constitution, a central government with a power to oppress its citizens was impossible in the United States. This was because that government was made the servant, not the master of the people. In reality, the central government was the creature of all individual states, thirteen of them originally, fifty now. They set up a national government under the Constitution to do certain things for all the states which an individual state alone could not do for itself but the Constitution reserved to themselves and to their peoples certain rights and areas of activity which the central government could never touch. They did this to insure that the central government would always remain their servant and never grow big enough to oppress them but in this century we have gradually forgotten this great heritage which the framers of our Constitution bequeathed to us. Almost without realizing it, we have tortured and twisted the meaning of the Constitution or simply brushed it a side in order to bring ever more power to the central government. In so doing, we have played directly into the hands of our Communist enemies. We grow to resemble more and more the thing we hate. Fortunately, we have not gone so far we cannot reverse our steps and return to freedom but we will not do so unless we understand our own basic American principles. Therefore, so far as our domestic policies are concerned, no matter what is proposed, the big test should be this. Does it give more power to the central government? Does it impinge in any way on the rights reserved to the states or the person in the Constitution? If it does, then out with it. For down that road lies slavery. This is the greatest crusade to which Americans must rededicate themselves, not a crusade for a great or good or welfare society but for a free society is also the only kind that brings with it the good things of life.

We are up against an implacable world enemy, an enemy that cannot be divided into bad Reds in Asia and good Reds in Russia. That enemy is Communism in Vietnam, in China, in Russia, in Cuba, in the United States. His tactics may vary from place to place but his goals always the same, world conquest by Communism. What Americans must learn is that we can't fight Communism unless we understand the nature of the enemy, the enemy's tactics. The Enemy's

Tactics is the title of a new 24-page pamphlet, written by Reuben Morey, Pulitzer prize winning chief editorial writer of the New York Daily News. In this hard-hitting, no holds barred pamphlet, Mister Morey takes you behind the scenes of a so-called new Left in America and shows you the people and organizations behind those student riots and anti-Vietnam demonstrations and if you want the full and in many ways fascinating though horrendous story of Communism with names, dates, places and details, you should read this pamphlet. It is a story every real American owes to himself and his children to be fairly informed about. For your free copy of The Enemy's New Tactics, just write to me, R. K. Scott, Box 4460 Grand Central Station, New York. Ask for the pamphlet, "The Enemy's New Tactics" and remember, it is free. You may also have one free copy of this entire broadcast by writing to the same address: R. K. Scott, Box 4460, Grand Central Station, New York, New York.

Now, this is R. K. Scott speaking from New York. Thank you for listening and inviting you to join us next week at this same time over these same stations.

(Other tapes are on file with the committee.)



