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**SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
FISCAL YEAR 1966—VIETNAM**

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 2793


TO AMEND FURTHER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT
OF 1961, AS AMENDED


JANUARY 28; FEBRUARY 4, 8, 10, 17, AND 18, 1966

PART 1



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations





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SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, FISCAL YEAR 1966—VIETNAM

FRIDAY, JANUARY 28, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Morse, Gore, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt, and Case.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The committee is meeting this morning to consider S. 2793, which would authorize an additional \$415 million in foreign economic aid for the current fiscal year. Of the \$315 million requested for supporting assistance, \$275 million is for Vietnam; and much of the \$100 million requested for the President's contingency fund will undoubtedly be used in that country.

(S. 2793 referred to follows:)

[S. 2793, 89th Cong., 2d sess.]

A BILL To amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 402 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which relates to supporting assistance, is amended as follows:

(a) Strike out "\$369,200,000" and substitute "\$684,200,000".

(b) In the first sentence, after "President" insert ", without regard to section 649,".

SEC. 2. Section 451(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which relates to the contingency fund, is amended by striking out "\$50,000,000" and substituting "\$150,000,000".

SEC. 3. Funds made available pursuant to section 1 of this Act shall be available for transfer for expenses authorized by section 637(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and incurred in connection with programs in the Republic of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. A related question, not formally before the committee, is the manner in which military assistance to Vietnam will be authorized in the future. The Secretary of Defense has proposed that the financing of South Vietnamese and Korean forces in Vietnam be transferred from the military assistance program to direct funding from regular military appropriations.

These requests for additional aid cannot be considered in a vacuum, but must be related to the overall political and military situation in Vietnam.

I am sure that this hearing will be helpful to the committee and to the public in gaining a better understanding of fundamental questions concerning our involvement in the war.

We are pleased to have as a witness this morning the Secretary of State, who is accompanied by the Administrator of AID.

TIME OF MEETING

Mr. Secretary, I want to apologize for the procedure which has required you to come so early in the morning. As you know, it has grown out of the difficulty on the floor of the Senate. I had to change our meeting time last night at a very late hour, having received word that there might be objection on the floor to our meeting while the Senate is in session.

That, however, is still not definite. You have had very long experience in these affairs, I know. We are very pleased to have you this morning.

Would you care to open up with a statement, a short statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DAVID E. BELL, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND HON. RUTHERFORD M. POATS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, FAR EAST, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee; I am pleased to be here this morning, and I understand very fully the circumstances with regard to our schedule. I am especially glad to have Mr. David Bell, Administrator of AID, with me because, among some other things, he has spent some time in southeast Asia; in South Vietnam and in Laos and in Thailand, three countries that make up a very important part of this proposed supplement.

I am pleased to appear before the committee to support the President's request to authorize appropriation of supplemental funds. A major portion of this request, \$275 million in supporting assistance funds, arises from the continuing and bitter struggle in Vietnam.

In March 1947 in connection with our then assistance to Greece, which was under guerrilla attack, President Truman stated:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

That is the policy we are applying in Vietnam in connection with specific commitments which we have taken in regard to that country.

The heart of the problem in South Vietnam is the effort of North Vietnam to impose its will by force. For that purpose, Hanoi has infiltrated into South Vietnam large quantities of arms and tens of thousands of trained and armed men, including units of the North Vietnamese Regular Army. It is that external aggression, which the north has repeatedly escalated, that is responsible for the presence of U.S. combat forces.

While assisting the South Vietnamese to repel this aggression, the United States has made persistent efforts to find a peaceful solu-

tion. The initiatives for peace undertaken by us and by many other governments during the last 5 years are almost innumerable. You are familiar with the vigorous and far-reaching peace probes which the United States has made during the past month, which I have had a chance to discuss with the committee in executive session.

None has brought a positive or encouraging response from Hanoi. Indeed, during this period—and while the South Vietnamese and ourselves refrained from bombing North Vietnam—the infiltrations from the north have continued, and the Communists have continued both their military operations and their campaigns of terror in the south. Even during the TET “cease fire” there were approximately 100 attacks on South Vietnamese, ROK, and U.S. forces.

The United States has a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Vietnam against external attack. The integrity of our commitments is absolutely essential to the preservation of peace right around the globe.

At stake also is the still broader question whether aggression is to be permitted, once again, to succeed. We know from painful experience that aggression feeds on aggression.

A central issue in the dispute between the two leading Communist powers today is to what extent it is effective—and prudent—to use force to promote the spread of communism. If the bellicose doctrines of the Asian Communists should reap a substantial reward, the outlook for peace in this world would be grim indeed.

The steady purpose of the United States is to build a world in which all nations—large and small, rich and poor—can progress in peace, secure against external interference. In Vietnam we shall continue to seek a peaceful solution—but we shall do what is necessary to assist the South Vietnamese to repel the aggression against them.

As President Johnson put it just last week:

The door of peace must be kept wide open for all who wish to avoid the scourge of war, but the door of aggression must be closed and bolted if man himself is to survive.

The challenge in Vietnam demands the selective application of our U.S. military power in support of the forces of the Government of Vietnam. In the absence of a willingness on the part of the other side to sit down and make peace, there is no alternative—except defeat and surrender—to meeting force with force.

The free Vietnam we seek to preserve through military efforts and sacrifices must not be undermined by economic and social chaos and despair. The expanding scale of Communist aggression and our military response have added new dimensions to the task of AID. Without our AID programs we could win the major military battles in Vietnam and still lose the war and the peace.

For this reason I regard our economic assistance programs in Vietnam as equal in importance with our military assistance. We fully intend to reinforce the economic and social progress that South Vietnam has been making during a brutal war and in spite of unremitting destructive efforts by the enemy.

We can only help those who wish to defend and strengthen their freedom and to build a better future. The struggle—and the choice—is ultimately theirs to make. The South Vietnamese must believe that they and we are fighting for something worth great sacrifice. It is not enough to fight against something. All the people still able to

make this choice in South Vietnam—farmers, schoolteachers, merchants, workers, mothers, students, police, soldiers, and government officials—must know that the long struggle is worth their suffering and personal tragedies. They must know that by this hard course their future will be better than their past.

The first essential in Vietnam, of course, is security against Vietcong terror and murder. The second is a unifying spirit or cause to which the people can subscribe, in the hamlets and in the cities. In this spirit, the villager and his local leaders and the security forces can cooperate to build ever-expanding areas of progress and resistance to Communist appeals and threats. In this spirit, the people of the cities can cooperate with their government in devoting their talents and efforts to strengthening the nation against those who would destroy or enslave it.

These essential conditions of success in Vietnam sound commonplace to Americans. In Vietnam their achievement requires performance—now—by Government in responding to the needs of the people and creating a partnership with the people. These are basic needs: security, social justice, a chance to grow and market crops at fair prices, protection of the value of incomes, safe water and medical care, and education for the children.

With our help and that of other free nations, enlightened elements in South Vietnam are bringing about this social revolution in the midst of war. The Government of Vietnam, in Saigon and in the countryside, is struggling with great handicaps to carry out this constructive effort, which it calls "rural construction." This, coupled with the military defense against the Vietcong forces, is the heart of our joint strategy.

Without our economic assistance, the entire effort to maintain a sound economy and to build for the future would quickly fail. Destructive inflation would be spawned by the Vietnamese Government's necessarily mounting budget and by the wartime dislocations of the economy. Supplies for the rural development program could not be obtained or shipped. Internal transportation, communications, electricity, and other essential services disrupted or overloaded by the war could not be maintained or expanded. A half million refugees could not be sheltered and fed. Millions of Vietnamese would be without any medical attention. Industry would not be able to import the materials and equipment it needs to operate and grow. The development of effective local government, and agricultural and educational institutions would be handicapped by a lack of expert advisers.

The funds which Congress has appropriated for economic assistance to Vietnam cover less than half the presently estimated requirements for fiscal year 1966.

There are two principal elements in the request for additional funds. First, to meet the rising and severe threat of inflationary pressures, additional funds are needed to finance imported goods; \$175 million are now needed to finance importation for commercial sale of goods such as rice, construction materials, petroleum products, fertilizer, drugs, and many other commodities. In this way we contribute to economic and political stability, by offsetting shortages in local production and maintaining morale essential to the entire effort.

Second, \$100 million is needed to fund new or expanded activities to strengthen the Government of Vietnam's work in contested rural

areas. These AID operations include refugee relief; provision of medical teams and individual doctors and nurses; building or repairing of hospitals and veterans' rehabilitation centers; leasing of ships for coastal and ocean supply operations; expanding civil airlift capacity; building of warehouses, bridges, and roads; repair of war-damaged rail and other facilities; installation of temporary and permanent electric power services; construction of workers' housing and training centers; police equipment and training—the list grows long.

While we look—and work and fight—for the day when South Vietnam will enjoy peace, we must apply our resources and ingenuity to building the foundation for that future.

We are also requesting additional fiscal year 1966 funds to meet other existing or potentially dangerous situations. The sum of \$7.5 million in supporting assistance is for Thailand and Laos each; \$25 million is for the Dominican Republic. In addition, \$100 million is required to replenish the AID contingency fund, which is already exhausted.

Additional funds for Thailand and Laos are necessary to assist these nations in developing and maintaining the economic and political stability to withstand increasingly threatening Communist pressures. These funds are earmarked for nonmilitary security activities and intensified rural development projects in vulnerable areas.

In the Dominican Republic, economic and political instability have followed in the wake of last April's revolution. We are determined to help the provisional government create and maintain a stable environment prior to the coming elections in June. It is equally important that we assist the provisional government in meeting its essential current operations so that the new government will not be saddled with a crippling financial crisis, which would threaten its very existence. Additional economic assistance is needed to cover the gap between existing operating and capital budget costs of the government and tax revenues. These revenues have not increased as quickly as expected because of continued political unrest. We expect these additional funds to alleviate the high level of unemployment, which itself has contributed to Dominican instability.

In addition, as I noted above, the President has requested Congress to provide \$100 million in supplemental funds to the AID contingency fund.

The fiscal year 1966 contingency fund was small; it is now depleted. It is absolutely necessary that a sufficient amount of contingency funds be on hand for the remainder of this fiscal year to permit us to respond immediately and effectively to emergency situations or unforeseen requirements which engage the interests of the United States.

It might be well, Mr. Chairman, for the committee in executive session to consider some of those situations which we see potentially on the horizon.

I would also like to note that the President's request includes provision for the transfer of funds required for military assistance to South Vietnam from the account of the military assistance program to the account of the Department of Defense. U.S. and other free world military forces have joined in the defense effort in South Vietnam in large numbers. It is more efficient, and less cumbersome, to program and budget for all U.S. military operations in Vietnam

under one unified system. The military assistance program was not created to bear the costs of such combat forces. I commend to the Congress this recommendation.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I urge the committee's support of this urgent request in its entirety, and I welcome any questions or comments which you may have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

BEGINNING OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

Mr. Secretary, I need not tell you that many of us are deeply troubled about our involvement in Vietnam and it seems to us that since this is the first bill this session dealing with the subject now is an appropriate opportunity for some examination of our involvement there for the clarification of the people of this country.

I know you have had long experience out there. Could you tell us very briefly, when did we first become involved in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. I think the first involvement was the assistance that we provided to France during the period of the Marshall plan at a time when France was faced there with the Vietminh movement, a very large part of which was nationalist but which also had within it a very strong Communist increment.

The CHAIRMAN. What year was that?

Secretary RUSK. That began in 1949-50, Mr. Chairman.

At that time, the attitude of the United States was that it would provide assistance to France in the expectation that France would move promptly to make its own agreement with the nationalist elements in Indochina, and make it clear that the Associated States of Indochina, which later became Vietnam, or the two Vietnams, Laos, and Cambodia, would, in effect, be independent.

The political movement by the French Government of that day was slower than the United States had hoped for, and the military operations came to the conclusion of the Geneva Conference of 1954.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in the State Department at that time, 1950?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; I was.

The CHAIRMAN. In what position?

Secretary RUSK. In the spring of 1950 I became Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at that time concerned with the original involvement?

Secretary RUSK. We had been involved in South—in Indochina before that.

The CHAIRMAN. In what respect were we involved before that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the question of aid to France came up in the spring of 1950, but the policy involvement and the discussions with the French Government over it preceded it by some period. I just wanted to point out that the spring of 1950 was not our first expression of concern about Indochina.

The CHAIRMAN. But it was the first financial commitment, wasn't it?

Secretary RUSK. I believe so.

The CHAIRMAN. Was France at that time trying to reassert her colonial domination of Vietnam? Was that her objective at that time?

Secretary RUSK. I think, just at the conclusion of the war, in that part of the world, the first step that was taken was the restoration of the status quo ante bellum in the broadest sense in India, Burma, Malaysia, Indochina, Indonesia, and indeed in part in the Philippines, although the Philippines moved almost immediately to independence.

In varying degrees each of these areas became independent from her former colonial country, and in different circumstances.

In the case of France, the first step that was made was to work out something like a commonwealth arrangement: Associated States in which France would retain certain authority with respect to defense and foreign affairs. But there was never a firm basis of agreement with most of the Indochinese peoples themselves. So they moved—proceeded inevitably and I think, properly—toward a more clear independence.

The CHAIRMAN. I confess I was scarcely conscious about problems of any significance there until the last few years because our attention was directed largely to Europe. But I am puzzled about what moved our Government to assist France to retain her control of Vietnam in contrast to our actions in Indonesia, for example.

Secretary RUSK. The problem there, sir, was—I am trying my best to remember something which happened quite a few years ago—the problem was not just that, or was not at all that, really, of assisting France in establishing and reenforcing a colonial position. Rather it was to give France a chance to work out its political settlement with these states on the basis of their own independence, and without having communism as a basic—without giving to the Communists a basic position in southeast Asia.

After the Communists took over authority in Peiping, we and the British and the French were consulted on this situation and pretty well agreed that the security of southeast Asia was of vital interest to the free world. The joint effort therefore to find an agreement with the nationalists on the one side and to prevent a Communist takeover on the other was a common thread of policy throughout that period.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember how much aid we gave France for that struggle in Vietnam, between 1950 and 1954?

Secretary RUSK. I think it was approximately \$2 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated in your original statement that we have a very clear commitment.

What is the origin and basis for a clear commitment for the action we are now taking in Vietnam?

COMMITMENT UNDER SEATO

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, there are a combination of components in that commitment. We have the Southeast Asia Treaty, to which South Vietnam was a protocol state.

The CHAIRMAN. What does that commit us to in that regard? This is where there is a good deal of confusion in my mind and I think in the public mind about the nature of that commitment.

Does the southeast treaty, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization commit us to do what we are now doing in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; I have no doubt that it does.

A protocol state has a right to call on the members of the organization for assistance. The obligations of that treaty are both joint and several. That is they are both collective and individual.

So that there seems to be no doubt that we are entitled to offer that assistance. But the underlying legal basis for the assistance is the right of individual and collective self-defense against an aggressor. There is clearly an aggression from the North here which has been persistent and since 1960 has been sharply increased.

The CHAIRMAN. You say we are entitled to do this.

Are we obligated to do this under the treaty?

Secretary RUSK. I would not want to get into the question of whether, if we were not interested in the commitments, policy and principle under the Southeast Asia Treaty, we have some legal way in order to avoid those commitments. I suppose that one could frame some argument which would make that case.

But it would seem to us that the policy, which was discussed and passed upon by the Executive and the Senate of that day, is that we are opposed to aggression against these countries in southeast Asia: both the members of the Organization and the protocol states.

OTHER ASPECTS OF COMMITMENT

In addition to that, we have bilateral assistance agreements to South Vietnam. We have had several actions of the Congress. We have had the annual aid appropriations in which the purposes of the aid have been fully set out before the Congress. We have had special resolutions such as the one of August 1964, and we have had the most important policy declarations by successive Presidents with respect to the protection of South Vietnam against Communist aggression.

QUESTION OF PAX AMERICANA

The CHAIRMAN. This question arose the other night in your "Meet the Press" appearance last Sunday night, particularly with regard to a question by the British correspondent. I think he suggested that it would be easier for all, for them to understand and for many people to understand this operation if it was put on the basis of straight out containing communism rather than the other way of protecting their right to self-determination.

What would you comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Mr. Chairman, the particular correspondent invited me to subscribe to the doctrine of Pax Americana.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Secretary RUSK. That is not our policy. We do not have worldwide commitments to all 117 countries with whom we have relations. We have some 42 allies, very specific commitments to those allies.

Now, it is true that, in the appropriate way in the United Nations and elsewhere, we would presumably give sympathy and support to those who are victims of the kind of aggression which would have worldwide implications. But we are not putting ourselves in the position of the gendarmes of the universe. There has been a good deal of fighting within this postwar period in which we did not partici-

pate. We are not trying to impose a Pax Americana on the world. We are trying to create a situation in which, in accordance with the charter, all nations, large and small, can live unmolested by their neighbors and have a chance to work out their own decisions in their own way. We support that policy in different ways at different times and under different circumstances. In the case of our specific allies and those with whom we have specific commitments if they are subject to an attack from those who declare a policy of aggression as a systematic course in the world, we have on a number of occasions joined with them to meet those attacks.

OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. How do you foresee the end of this struggle? Do you think we are likely to be there, 5, 10, or 20 years?

What do you foresee as the outcome of this—even if we are successful in the military activities?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would hate to try to cast myself in the role of a specific prophet in the development of this particular situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe I will put it another way, what is our objective? Can you define our objective in terms of what we seek to achieve?

Secretary RUSK. To put it in its simplest terms, Mr. Chairman, we believe that the South Vietnamese are entitled to a chance to make their own decisions about their own affairs and their own future course of policy: that they are entitled to make these decisions without having them imposed on them by force from North Vietnam or elsewhere from the outside. We are perfectly prepared to rely upon the South Vietnamese themselves to make that judgment by elections, through their own Government, by whatever way is suitable for them to make that decision.

Now, we have indicated a good many points which have a bearing on this matter. We are not, for example, trying to acquire a new ally. If South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese people wish to pursue a nonaligned course by their own option, that is an option which is open to them.

If they wish to join in the regional activities in the area, such as Mekong River development and projects of that sort, that is open to them. But we do believe they are entitled not to have these answers decided for them on the basis of military force organized from Hanoi through an aggression initiated from Hanoi, in the leadership of a front which was organized in Hanoi in 1960 for the purpose of taking over South Vietnam by force.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think they can be a completely free agent with our occupation of the land with 200,000 or 400,000 men?

Secretary RUSK. If the infiltration of men and arms from the north were not in the picture, these troops of ours could come home. We have said that repeatedly. They went in there, the combat troops went in there, because of infiltration of men and arms from the north. That is the simple and elementary basis for the presence of American combat forces.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator Morse?

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MORSE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask the Secretary any questions this morning for the reason that I now state. I disagree with practically every major premise not only contained in his prepared statement but in his discussion in the last few minutes.

I completely disagree with his interpretation of the SEATO Treaty. I do not think the SEATO Treaty justifies in any way the unilateral American action in South Vietnam based on the SEATO Treaty. But what I do propose to do at the first executive session of this committee, Mr. Chairman, is to move that this committee proceed with hearings in depth on the Vietnam crisis. If the committee does not see fit to do that, I shall introduce a resolution with some cosponsors in the Senate calling for an investigation and hearing on our policy in Vietnam for the American people. They are entitled to it.

In such hearings I shall then proceed to ask questions of whoever the administration sends up. I think we have got to have the time to go into depth on this matter. We can't possibly do it within the procedures this morning.

I only want the record to show that I completely disagree with the administration's policies in Vietnam from the aspect of international law or treaty obligations and sound foreign policy, and I think that point of view is prairie firing across the country. This committee, in my opinion, has the clear duty to proceed at once with prolonged hearings in depth on the Vietnam crisis.

Therefore, I will defer my questions until such a hearing is held.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa?

SIZE OF AID PROGRAM IN REGULAR BUDGET

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, perhaps I should ask this question of Mr. Bell, but do you recall whether or not the authorization bill of last year cut down the AID program below the budget request?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir, it did to some extent, not very much, 7 percent overall, as I remember it, not very much of that applied to supporting assistance.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well then, why wasn't a sufficient amount requested in the budget last year?

Mr. BELL. We simply underestimated, Senator Hickenlooper. We prepared that budget, as you will recall, something over a year ago now, it was defended before the Congress last spring and in the early summer. At that time the escalation of military activity resulting from the entrance of North Vietnamese troops and the introduction of American troops was not clearly visible and its economic effects were uncertain.

During the summer and fall, particularly in October and November, it became apparent that the dimensions of the economic aspects of this struggle in South Vietnam had simply been grossly underestimated in our previous budget estimates.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would there be any possibilities that that gross underestimation was partly due to the fact that it was announced that the budget would be kept under a hundred billion dollars last year?

Mr. BELL. Oh, no, sir, not at all. No one in Saigon or in Washington at any level of the executive branch had foreseen the dimension of the economic requirements that became clear in late last fall and that we have before you today.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't want to belabor this point too much, but I seem to recall that a number of Members of Congress made a statement last year that the budget wasn't asking for enough and they would have to come back for more after the first of the year.

Mr. BELL. We did have, sir, in the original request, we had a proposal that the Congress, because we were clear that we could not be very precise about the requirements in Vietnam, we did have a proposal that the Congress authorize such sums that might be necessary in southeast Asia which would permit us to come back with just an appropriation request, but that was diverted in the process of the congressional procedures, during the spring and summer into a special \$89 million contingency fund for southeast Asia which has all been used up and committed, and we are now, therefore, back asking for an additional authorization and appropriation as the Secretary indicated.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

DOLLARS GENERATED BY AMERICAN PRESENCE

Mr. Secretary, do you have an estimate as to how much in dollars is generated in the South Vietnamese economy by the spending of American forces there?

Do you have any estimate of that at the moment?

Mr. BELL. The two principal sources of such spending, Senator, are the spending of troops in their off-duty hours, and the expenditures by the Defense Department for construction of military bases. In both cases numerous steps have been undertaken in an effort to limit the impact of the spending on the Vietnamese economy. In the case of the troops, for example, there are careful attempts to encourage troops to put as much of their money into savings as they are able to—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I didn't mean to go into a lengthy history of this situation. I just asked if you had any estimate as to how much in dollars is generated into the South Vietnamese economy by our presence there.

Mr. BELL. The estimate is around \$275 to \$300 million, sir, in the coming year.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How much last year, do you have any idea?

Mr. BELL. Perhaps \$100 million, sir. It is much larger in 1966 than in 1965.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wonder if we could get an estimate, a better estimate than, perhaps, on that?

Mr. BELL. We will be glad to put the best estimate that we can into the record.

(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, how much in economic aid are other nations providing in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. We have not computed the exact dollar amount because a good deal of it is in terms of goods and services, but there are some 35 countries providing assistance to Vietnam, and I will be glad to furnish the details of that for the record. I think on the economic side, for example, we could look at Germany: they have provided directors, instructors, for vocational schools; they have provided experts in universities, for the medical school; they have provided ambulances, commodity credits of 15 million deutsche marks, for German products such as machine tools and fertilizer, a credit of another 50 million for development of the major industrial complex at Kien Hung and An Xuyen; and other credits of a similar sort which are fairly substantial. They recently contributed a 3,000-ton hospital ship in Vietnam.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have those credits been taken up and used or are they still in the offing from the standpoint of actual application?

Secretary RUSK. Some have been drawn on and some in the process of being used at the present time.

RURAL RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I notice there is a hundred million dollars being requested for the rural reconstruction program which would bring the total, I think, up to around \$160 million plus.

Mr. BELL. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. For fiscal 1966. Does that include the building of REA plants and lines and projects like that in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. There are three rural electric co-op systems being established, sir. The funds for those are already committed from the previous funds available, and nothing would be added in that particular phase under the new request.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Where are those three located?

Mr. BELL. One is located in An Xuyen Province in the delta which is the area where the so-called Hoa Hao sect live and where the security is quite good.

The other two are north and northeast of Saigon, one quite close to Saigon. Again, each of these three were selected because they are areas of relative security.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you find the Vietcong tear them down as fast as you can get them up there?

Mr. BELL. No, sir; they have not. There hasn't been much construction under these projects yet. But there has been no direct action against these projects so far.

PLANNED TELEVISION PROGRAMING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are you planning a television network in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. There is not a network in the American sense. There is a television project which is underway to provide television services both for the cities of Vietnam and for the American troops who are there. Part of this is financed by the Defense Department, part is financed by our AID program.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is that program limited to Saigon or does it go out over the country?

Mr. BELL. It is limited to Saigon at the present, initial stage, but it is expected that there will be sets put into smaller communities and even eventually into villages.

The principal programing element for the countryside is expected to be, what we would call here, educational television, the kind of thing we have in the American rural areas and has been used so extensively on home economics, on agricultural practices, on education in the strict sense for children, and so on, in the villages.

CORRUPTION IN SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On another phase of this, it seems to me that I heard a radio news story either last night or the day before, saying that one high official in Vietnam said something to the effect that he hoped that he would be one of the first of the top officials of Vietnam that didn't leave office up to his eyes in gold.

Secretary RUSK. Prime Minister Ky, I believe, made that statement, according to one of your colleagues in the other body.

This question of corruption is one which has been troublesome. I think that on the one side, we cannot say that it has been completely dealt with and rooted out.

On the other side, I do not believe it is a major factor in the total effort there. We and the present Government in South Vietnam are working very hard and closely on that. I have had my own inspector general out there to help work out checks against possibilities of diversion of American aid. But in this war situation, we cannot guarantee perfection on this subject but we are working on it very hard, Senator.

NUMBER OF AID PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One other question: How many people are working in the AID program in South Vietnam now?

Mr. BELL. There are about 650 direct-hire Americans on board at the present time, Senator. That is going up through this present year to between 900 and a thousand.

In addition, there are another, perhaps 200 to 300 contract employees of AID contractors, such as the International Volunteer Services, IVS volunteers, and then there is a substantial number of Vietnamese and some people from other countries. We have—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many are in Saigon and how many are out in the country?

Mr. BELL. About two-thirds/one-third—one-third in the country. There are some of the 900 or 1,000 who will be there by the end of this year, we think 400 will be living in our 4 regional headquarters and in each provincial capital and some of them in districts, towns, and villages.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What are the 600 doing in Saigon?

Mr. BELL. Do you mean what will they be doing?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. BELL. Well, the headquarters of the Vietnamese Government is there, of course, and a great number of them will be working directly as

advisers to elements of the Vietnamese Government. We have a major logistics effort. This is the largest AID program in the world at the present time, and that means that we are responsible for the shipping and distribution and accounting and auditing and inspection related to a flow of commodities of very major dimensions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. I think my time is more than past and I don't want to trespass on somebody else's time. We will talk about this later.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

IS OUR INVOLVEMENT JUSTIFIED?

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, as the Chairman has said, your pending request is pertinent to the issue which troubles most of our citizenry, and this would seem an appropriate time to begin an examination of our undertaking in southeast Asia.

I suppose you and I, like most men, are victims of our past pronouncements. I would just like to say, as a preface to my question, that I draw a fine line between support and approval. I have not approved of our policy in southeast Asia from 1954 until now. I have supported and expect to support funds sufficient to give weapons, ammunition, materiel to our Armed Forces who are there, not at their choice but at the orders of their Government.

Whether you have been correct in advocating our escalated involvement there over the years, or whether I have been correct in disapproval is really beside the point now. We are committed and are likely to be there a long time.

With that brief preface, I would like to refer first to your own statement this morning on the bottom of page 4 and 5 when you say of the South Vietnamese people:

They must know that the struggle is worth their suffering and personal tragedies.

I would like to reread that paragraph and apply it not to the South Vietnamese people but to the American people.

They must know that the long struggle is worth their suffering and personal tragedies. They must know that by this hard course their future will be better than their past.

I think when you apply that to the American people you come to the heart of one of the excruciating difficulties of our democratic society today. Many people do not believe, many Members of Congress do not believe, that the costs, the risk of a nuclear war, the dangers of a war with China or perhaps with both China and Russia, are worth the endeavor.

I would like to pause and, in fairness, give you a chance to comment on that.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

First I would like to say that, although I welcome the continuing examination of this very great matter of public policy by the Congress, I would point out that this is not a beginning. I know of no subject in the past 5 years—that is, since I have been directly and intimately involved—which has been discussed more frequently, in greater depth, month in and month out over a period of time, with the Congress than has Vietnam.

More time has been spent on it than any single subject so far as our foreign policy is concerned. Nevertheless, discussion should continue, and with greater depth and with greater expense.

Senator, it is tragic that in the year 1966 we should be called upon to use force to deal with armed aggression after all that has happened since 1945.

At the end of World War II this country demobilized so rapidly that by 1946 we were told by our military that we did not have a single division ready for combat nor a single air group ready for combat.

Our defense budget came down to within reach of \$10 million, say, in 1947 and 1948.

We tried to get rid of the nuclear bomb for everybody, including the United States, in the Baruch proposals. As soon as the war was over we went into the commitment of large resources for binding up the wounds of war and helping the reconstruction of that war-torn world.

But then we found that there was such a thing as aggression in the world, that there were those who were prepared to use force contrary to the elementary purposes of the U.N. Charter, to upset the kind of world that was anticipated in the U.N. Charter. We have had a series of pressures by force in Iran, in Greece, in Berlin, and in Korea, and in other places.

One would suppose that it is too late in history for that kind of technique to be used any more. But, if it is used, then we have the most searching question to answer, and that is whether we shall get out of the way of those who are prepared to seize their neighbors by force, particularly those to whom we have commitments; whether we should let them succeed and come to the conclusion that force is profitable, that their brand of world revolution can succeed on the basis of militancy and armed action, and that there is, therefore, no reasonable prospect for the kind of world that we set as a goal in the U.N. Charter.

Now, in this process in this postwar period the American people have taken over 165,000 casualties in a combination of crises. Others have taken more. It is tragic that this problem could arise. It could end literally in 24 hours, Senator, if these people in Hanoi should come to the conclusion that they are not going to try to seize Vietnam and Laos by force. If they are determined to try to do so, then we and others have some very fundamental decisions to make, and in making them, it seems to me, sir, that we have to reflect upon how one builds a peace.

Do we build it by standing aside when aggression occurs, or do we build it by meeting our commitments?

Now, human beings can't be absolutely certain what the right answer to these things is to be. We who are older have the problem of deciding what it is we ought to forget. Those who are young have the problem of discovering the reality in those things they have had no chance to remember. So these are difficult questions, Senator, and we hope that we can find the right answer.

Senator GORE. I certainly concur that they are very difficult.

I yield temporarily to the Senator.

Senator MORSE. Just 15 seconds, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Bell, I have to leave, and I want you to know why I am leaving. I would

like to hear you, I am scheduled to open the administration's case for the repeal of 14(b) in the morning and that is the only reason I have to leave this morning.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much.

Senator GORE. Let me repeat that I concur with your statement that these are very difficult questions and like you hope and pray that we may find the right answers.

My remarks and questions today are not in antagonism or criticism of either you or the President, but in pursuit of those right answers.

Secretary RUSK. We understand, sir.

Senator GORE. Accepting the fact that we are there, rightly or wrongly, where are we, where do we go, what do we do, what are the risks, and where do we arrive—these are questions which the committee will seek in the days and weeks ahead.

INFILTRATION DURING CESSATION OF BOMBING

I was not too favorably impressed in the last few days with the statements by administration leaders, including yourself this morning, that during the bombing pause infiltration had continued from the North. Has it not continued also from the South, and did you expect—

Secretary RUSK. Senator, there is a fundamental difference—

Senator GORE (continuing). Did you honestly expect that because there was a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam that they would ipso facto stop all their military movements? The question I am trying to pose is: Is this a realistic approach or is this a propagandistic approach?

Secretary RUSK. No, Senator, I think it would be a great mistake to put those two forces on the same footing, and not just on the basis that we are on our side.

The North Vietnamese armed forces have no right whatever to move from North Vietnam into South Vietnam to seize South Vietnam. That is aggression. It is contrary to the military clauses of the 1954 agreement, contrary to the general principles of international law, contrary to general standards set forth in such documents as the U.N. Charter.

We have joined in supporting South Vietnam as a part of their right of individual and collective self-defense. I have related our activity to a treaty as far as the United States is concerned.

It has been approved also by legislation. The point is that there could be peace if North Vietnam would give up its illegal and aggressive effort to take over South Vietnam by force. Of course, we used an airlift to supply Berlin when it was blockaded, but no one suggested that that airlift was illegal. Of course, we aided Greece when the guerrillas were moving in from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but nobody suggested that our assistance was illegal.

We have probed every conceivable—maybe there are some we have not been able to imagine—but we have probed every possibility of bringing this matter off the battlefield to the conference table. And we had hoped—we didn't know what the chances were; they appeared to be somewhat small, I must admit—but we had hoped on the basis of what a good many governments had told us, including some Communist governments, that, if the bombing were suspended, there might be a chance to bring this matter to the conference table.

Now, the infiltration continued and there were no signs from the other side that they were going to give up their effort. Obviously we can't stop our reinforcements of our own men and can't stop urging others to do the same.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up. I am sorry. We will come back to him.

The Senator from Delaware.

PORTION OF SOUTH VIETNAM BUDGET FINANCED BY UNITED STATES

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, what portion of South Vietnamese budget are we paying, military and civilian?

Secretary RUSK. On military expenses?

Senator WILLIAMS. Both military and civilian.

Secretary RUSK. Both military and economic?

Mr. Bell, would you deal with it?

Mr. BELL. Yes, Senator; the 1966 Vietnamese budget is about 55 billion piasters. Their revenues are expected to be around 21 or 22 billion piasters. They will borrow; there will be deficit credit creation, to about 10 billion, and we will be providing about 24 billion piasters of the total.

Senator WILLIAMS. We are providing a little better than 50 percent?

Mr. BELL. No; a little less than 50 percent, sir, 24 out of 55.

Senator WILLIAMS. Ten is being borrowed, but I mean of what is being put up, they are putting up 21 and we are putting up 24?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; although the borrowing comes out of the Vietnamese economy. It doesn't come from us.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for a clarification?

Senator WILLIAMS. Yes.

REVENUES FROM IMPORT DUTIES OF U.S. GOODS

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of their Government revenues arise from import duties on goods which we ship into Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. I should suppose a fairly significant amount.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, a large part of that 22 billion that they lack we pay in the form of import duties on goods we send there; is that correct?

Mr. BELL. Yes; but we don't pay them, sir. We don't pay those import duties.

The CHAIRMAN. Who does?

Mr. BELL. The people of South Vietnam do from their own income.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator WILLIAMS. Do we have to pay any import duties on the aid that we put in Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

FINANCING OF FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator WILLIAMS. Are we paying the costs of any of the Korean troops that are there and the troops of other nations that are in Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. The military equipment which those Korean troops are using is provided by the United States. I am sure that a good part

of the transportation is also provided by us. There are PX arrangements of certain kinds. I am sure there are substantial costs that the United States is bearing for those Korean troops; yes, sir.

EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON AID PROGRAM

Senator WILLIAMS. I understand that inflation is one of your big problems; that it is eating up the aid program to a large extent, is that true?

Mr. BELL. Inflation is a serious problem, Senator. I wouldn't say it is eating away the aid program. The three principal sources of inflation have been the growing budget deficit of the South Vietnamese Government, the increased spending by American troops, and the spending on the American military construction program.

We have tried to develop a strong anti-inflationary program, holding down the Vietnamese budget, limiting the troop spending, limiting the construction spending. Nevertheless, inflation is still a severe problem. We are meeting it in part by proposing larger imports into the economy both financed by the Government of Vietnam and by us under the aid program, by a series of monetary measures, by the Vietnamese raising taxes.

We do not consider, however, that we are firmly and surely and completely on top of the inflation problem. We are continuing to work with the Vietnamese Government on it.

Senator WILLIAMS. But to correct that inflation you are trying to minimize the deficits, is that correct?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; oh, yes, sir. The most important step that has been taken so far to limit the inflationary pressure has been the decision of the Vietnamese Government, a very courageous and sensible decision, to hold their budget to 55 billion piasters this year, which is a really very austere budget in terms of the requirements. It involves some increase on the military side and some decrease on the civil side.

Senator WILLIAMS. I compliment them on their restraint but do they ever ask you how you reconcile your recommendation that they curtail their deficit with your statement to the committee some time back that there was virtue in a deficit here in this country.

Mr. BELL. I think, sir, you are referring to the time when I was budget director. I have suggested there is virtue in a deficit in the U.S. budget under some circumstances but there is also very great virtue and I strongly defend the proposition that under some circumstances we should run a surplus in the American budget.

COMPETITION FROM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

Senator WILLIAMS. I agree with you and I am looking forward to the day when we can.

I noticed in an article in the Wall Street Journal of December 29 which states:

In some cases local contractors are too busy putting up barracks and fortifications or lucrative Pentagon projects to bother with modest AID projects.

Have you run into that difficulty?

Mr. BELL. We have run into that difficulty, Senator, in isolated cases. As a result of that problem showing up in the late fall there

has been a special committee established in the American mission in Saigon, including representatives of the military assistance command, and of the AID mission and other elements of the country team, under chairmanship of the Deputy Ambassador, Mr. Porter. They are assessing the entire requirements for construction in the Vietnamese economy and trying to stack that up, those requirements, up against the anticipated availability of labor, of construction materials, and of other needs to permit the construction to go forward, and they have already arranged for stopping certain construction projects which could be deferred, I should say the deferral of certain project which could wait because of the shortage that is referred to in that article.

INVESTMENT GUARANTEE PROGRAM FOR VIETNAM

Senator WILLIAMS. Is there an investment guarantee program in operation in Vietnam at this time?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

There has been, I don't think we issued any guarantees this past year, did we, but we have issued them in previous years and it is available to American investors.

Senator WILLIAMS. But it has not been issued in the past 12 months; is that correct?

Mr. BELL. I think that is correct, none in the past 12 months.

TOTAL ECONOMIC AID FOR VIETNAM IN FISCAL 1966 AND 1967

Senator WILLIAMS. Assuming Congress approves this request what will that bring the total of our AID program in Vietnam for fiscal 1966?

Mr. BELL. The economic aid would come to about \$541 million.

Senator WILLIAMS. Now, in next year's budget how much are we asking for?

Mr. BELL. \$550 million.

Senator WILLIAMS. The same amount approximately?

Mr. BELL. That is right.

Senator WILLIAMS. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?

SUSPENSION OF BOMBING

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, let me just say by way of preface, that with indications gathering that the suspended bombing may soon be resumed, I would like to commend you for having undertaken the suspension. Even if it fails to bring Hanoi to the bargaining table, I think that we will emerge the stronger for having tried, and I just want to go on the public record in support of the effort that the President has made in the past month, because, as you know, I have been in disagreement with some aspects of our policy in southeast Asia over the years.

You have often said, Mr. Secretary, and I believe you said again this morning, that the United States doesn't want, that our national interests don't require, the establishment of any permanent American military base in South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

MILITARY BASES IN SOUTH KOREA

Senator CHURCH. Does our national interest require, and is it our intention to retain, a permanent American military base in South Korea?

Secretary RUSK. We have no present plans to withdraw our forces from there. This has to be judged on the basis of the total situation in the Far East.

Senator, let me say that the doctrines and the policies espoused by Peiping today constitute perhaps the most important single problem of peace. I have heard a foreign minister on the other side of the curtain—I prefer not to name him—say that moving Peiping to peaceful coexistence is the No. 1 problem in the world today.

We would like to reduce our military forces abroad, if we can do so consistent with our commitments and the maintenance of peace.

Senator CHURCH. How many American combat troops are now stationed in South Korea?

Secretary RUSK. In South Korea, I think it is approximately 55,000.

Senator CHURCH. It has been 12 years now, roughly, since the truce; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator CHURCH. How many Chinese combat troops are stationed in North Korea?

Secretary RUSK. I think there are no Chinese there at the present.

Senator CHURCH. There are none?

Secretary RUSK. Not in significant numbers.

Senator CHURCH. For how long have there been none?

Secretary RUSK. Since about 1954 or 1955, I believe, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Haven't we spent a great deal of money over the years in building up a very large and efficient South Korean Army?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Do you regard that army as adequate to protect South Korea against any threat that might be posed by North Korea?

Secretary RUSK. That would be a close question.

I think it is not—

Senator CHURCH. But a division of that army has been removed from South Korea to Vietnam, isn't that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, and the South Korean forces are effective and well trained and have a fine combat capability. The difficulty is that just across the Yalu River are very, very large forces indeed.

Senator CHURCH. In China itself?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Well, that difficulty is likely to continue as long as China is there.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Very well.

POSSIBILITIES OF WITHDRAWING AMERICAN TROOPS IN FUTURE

We presently have 200,000 American troops in South Vietnam. Indications are that the buildup is going to continue. I notice Senator Stennis, who has often been right in predicting the military course of events in Vietnam, indicated yesterday his belief that it

might require as many as 600,000 American troops, I know Hanson Baldwin, the military commentator of the New York Times, has indicated that it might require a million.

(The full statement by Senator Stennis referred to above appears in the appendix.)

Supposing that, whatever the requirement may turn out to be, our military concentration, our American buildup of military forces in South Vietnam, is finally sufficient to suppress the Vietcong, and to pacify South Vietnam, would you then think that it is likely to be any easier for us to withdraw from South Vietnam than it has been for us to withdraw from South Korea?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have stated, Senator, in good faith and sincerity that we do not wish to retain our own forces in South Vietnam. Indeed—

Senator CHURCH. That is clear, but the question is—

Secretary RUSK. Indeed the only reason for their presence is the infiltration of men and arms from North Vietnam. So the answer to your question would turn on what North Vietnam's conduct and attitude is.

Senator CHURCH. But North Korea hasn't been engaging in that kind of activity in South Korea for many years, has it?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; but you will recall—

Senator CHURCH. But our troops are still in South Korea.

Secretary RUSK. You will recall that, in the case of Korea, there was considerable discussion before the outbreak of the fighting in Korea about whether we should keep our troops in Korea following the war. There were some on the military side who wished to withdraw them completely, because our forces were rather thin in relation to our commitments all over the world. There are—were—those on the political side who doubted that that was a wise course in 1948-49 and urged that we keep at least some force in Korea. The decision was finally made that we would withdraw, and then a year later the attack occurred.

There have been indications that the withdrawal of those forces in 1948 and 1949 contributed to a miscalculation on the other side as to what the situation would be in Korea. We would hope there wouldn't be such a miscalculation again.

I don't know what the future will hold on this particular point. It would depend a good deal on the general orientation, attitude, and posture of Peiping.

HYPOTHETICAL CASE OF CHINESE MILITARY AID IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, I fully share your repugnance of the kind of system that exists in China. Quite apart from the kind of system that the Chinese have, and quite apart from what their own national ambitions or national objectives may be, suppose that Cuba were to invite China into Cuba with Chinese military forces to strengthen Cuba's defenses, and suppose that China were to respond by stationing 50,000 troops in Cuba, and suppose, further, that a newly established Communist government in, say, Guatemala were to invite the Chinese to intervene with troops there to assist in putting down a guerrilla war against it, would you regard such Chinese intervention in the case that I have postulated as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, the contingencies are rather hypothetical.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, of course, but I mean in that situation would you regard it as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe, in the first place any of these countries would invite China to do so, I don't believe China would do so, and I don't think China would be well advised to do so.

Senator CHURCH. I agree with that. As a matter of fact, when the Russians moved considerable numbers of Russian troops into Cuba it brought on a crisis that shook the world.

Secretary RUSK. You see, it is more than the violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Any such action would cut right across the most formal declarations of the hemisphere as a whole about the policies of this hemisphere: about the intrusion into this hemisphere of communism from the outside.

Senator CHURCH. However, the Monroe Doctrine was originally a unilateral declaration and remained so for a century, isn't that right?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would congratulate you, on your ability and sincerity in speaking of the administration's position.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

FLOW OF FUNDS FROM VIETNAM TO FRANCE

Senator SYMINGTON. I have an article here which says:

We have been pumping money into Vietnam at the rate of \$600 million a year. Vietnam has been pumping nearly half of these AID dollars right back again into France.

The article closes by saying:

France has a billion-dollar payment surplus and its No. 1 source is our Government dollar drain to Vietnam. If we mean business we had better stop arming the other side.

As you know, for some time I have been worried about the increasing unfavorable balance of payments, and am wondering if you would comment.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

We have watched this point very closely. We believe that there is no significant flow of dollars from Vietnam to France at this time. U.S. aid dollars are paid directly to exporters supplying the needed goods, and the dollars are at no time in the hands of the Vietnamese importer.

Since the procurement sources of the Vietnam aid program are the United States and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan, Korea, and Thailand, French exporters are not receiving the dollars.

But an estimated 2 or 3 million U.S. dollars are probably fleeing Vietnam each month. Some Vietnamese are selling piasters on the black market and buying dollars or dollar instruments to send abroad.

In order to prevent our involvement in that black market we asked the Vietnamese Government to create a special currency fund through which U.S. and third country personnel can legally purchase piasters at a special favorable rate. This takes private American dollars out

of the currency black market. It is not large from the overall point of view.

SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL

Senator SYMINGTON. Although not pertinent to what we are specifically discussing, my next question does involve the AID program. The United Arab Republic has either the third or fourth finest fighter air force in the world. Some of its fighter planes are considered by some of our people to be better than our best. Why won't we sell modern airplanes to Israel?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, that is a very complex and delicate matter. I would much prefer to get into that in executive session, if I may.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would be glad to do that.

Secretary RUSK. We have tried over the years ourselves not to stimulate and promote the arms race in the Near East and not to encourage it by our own direct participation.

We have sold, as you know, weapons to Israel. We are concerned about the general question of balance. We have been disappointed over time—through a period of almost 15 years—in trying to find some basis for quantitative and qualitative limitations on the arms race in the Near East. We have not made any headway on that really.

This is a matter of great concern to us, but I think the sensitivities are such that if you would agree, sir, it ought better to be discussed in executive session.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would be glad to, have discussed it in executive session, but have never gotten the answer.

Secretary RUSK. There are some questions to which there is not a very good answer.

COST OF AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE ABROAD

Senator SYMINGTON. At the end of the German war, European war, we split Germany and stayed over there with billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of people. We have nearly a million people living in Europe today, counting dependents.

The next split was China. Everybody else went home but we stayed around with billions of dollars and some people.

Then we agreed to split Korea, and just about everybody else went home and we stayed around, with billions of dollars and tens of thousands of people.

Now, it looks as if we may split a fourth country, and stick around with billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of people.

How many more splits do you think this economy can take? Putting it another way, how long do you think the United States can be almost the only financier of freedom and at the same time the defender of freedom, as it is, if our balance-of-payments problems continue to worsen?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think, sir, that with all respect, we didn't ourselves split these countries.

Senator SYMINGTON. They were split. We agreed to the split; I correct myself.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

The Soviet Army was in Berlin and Germany, and in Korea at the end of the Second World War.

The systematic split that occurred was the split of Vietnam in 1954, and that was basically a result of a situation on the ground and the attitude of the French Government at that time.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am not questioning the decision.

Secretary RUSK. I know.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am just asking how long do you think we can stand it?

Secretary RUSK. We would like to see these matters resolved. I think we have to look at them when they come before us, and look at the total world situation in the American interests and decide what we have to do in our own interests. Then I would have to say also, Senator, that we would like more help from our allies and from others who have a direct interest in these results. We have been able, over time, to reduce costs in certain areas such as Taiwan. There has been some reduction in costs in Korea. But I think we have to do what is required—and what is required turns primarily on our own interests as a nation, and on our commitments—and then try to get as much help as we can from others.

As I say, we are disappointed by the fact that there is not more help coming from others in these critical situations.

Senator SYMINGTON. Don't you think that if more frankness were expressed publicly by the administration with respect to the growing problem incident to the Chinese becoming a nuclear power, plus their current political intransigence, and the relation of those facts to the South Vietnam problem, at least reasonably comparable to the information given in executive, military, and other briefings, would that not help clarify the Vietnamese problem for the American people and perhaps reduce some of the criticism that comes from various sources about what is going on today?

FOURTEEN POINTS

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have tried to expose fully to the public, subject to a very limited number of security problems, the elements in this situation. We have talked a great deal—people don't remember things that are said very long.

At the end of 1965 I drew together what was already on the public record, the things which had been said, about the content of a possible peace in Vietnam, but these so-called 14 points were looked upon by some people as something quite new.

We do talk a great deal—there are those who think I talk too much. It is hard for the news media to get the space or the time or the attention of their readers and listeners for background and context. I think this is one of our problems of public exposition. I think this is something in which not only the executive branch but Members of the Senate and House can help us with as they talk about these things with their people back home.

INFLUENCE OF PEIPING OVER HANOI

We have tried to make it clear over and over again that, although Hanoi is the prime actor in this situation, it is the policy of Peiping that has greatly stimulated Hanoi and has apparently blocked the path toward a conference.

For example, a few months ago Hanoi had a delegation in Moscow. In their joint communique they made a statement which seemed to refer with approval to the idea of a conference on Cambodia and Laos. We would be glad to be present at such a conference and so indicated.

It was our information that Peiping moved in on Hanoi and possibly on Cambodia, to block the prospect of such a conference.

I think there is no doubt about the militancy and the aggressiveness of Peiping's policy. Indeed it has caused great problems inside the Communist world, quite apart from the problems it has caused in the free world.

We shall take your suggestion to heart and see whether there are things that we ought to be saying and doing in this direction that we have not been doing.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will make one final comment.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You are talking about a very broad strategic picture. I was talking about a short-term tactical picture in relation to our current operations in South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

POLICY DISAGREEMENT WITH ADMINISTRATION

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, as you know, I have become progressively more in disagreement with your and the administration's policy in Vietnam as the war there continues to accelerate. I regret that very much. I think you know my very high personal regard and respect and, indeed, affection for you, and it makes me very unhappy that we are not in accord.

INCREASING AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN WAR

President Kennedy in a CBS television interview on September 2, 1963, said, and I wrote:

In the final analysis it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam against the Communists.

Why have we turned this into what is becoming more and more every day an American war? In your opinion, is this essential to the security of the United States?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that—I welcome this question because I think that there is a substantial misunderstanding about what is happening in South Vietnam on this very point.

The fact that we have larger numbers of U.S. combat forces there causes our own press to concentrate very heavily on the activities of our forces. The truth is that the South Vietnamese continue to carry the great bulk of the struggle there. On any given day there might be, say, 2, 3, or 4 U.S. battalions in operation, say 1 Korean battalion, but 15 to 20 South Vietnamese battalions. The hundreds of incidents that occur every week and are maintained at a high level have their major impact upon the South Vietnamese. The 550,000 South Vietnamese forces are taking the heaviest casualties.

They are the ones who are out over the countryside every day in large numbers, and in not only substantial numbers of large unit actions but hundreds of small units actions around the country, looking for the guerrillas, trying to find them, and trying to deal with them.

So, although the U.S. effort has increased, the great bulk of the effort continues to be South Vietnamese.

That would not apply to the air, where we have a predominant role. The South Vietnamese Air Force is active but we have much the larger share of the air effort.

POINT AT WHICH IT BECOMES U.S. WAR

Senator CLARK. And yet 2 years ago I have been informed we had a total of 10,000 Americans in Vietnam, 1 year ago there were only 30,000, today there are 200,000.

If Senator Stennis is correct, the administration is going to build that force up to around 600,000, at what point does it become our war and not their war?

Secretary RUSK. Well, sir, I have seen various figures used. Most of them are not the figures that I know about or have been discussing in our own consultations. I really would prefer not to speculate on the problem of figures this morning, Senator.

Senator CLARK. Well, I am prepared to leave the whole subject with the observation that I would hope very much that we are going to stop escalating this war any further. I think it was about a year ago that you told me, and I don't think I am revealing any confidences because I think you have said it publicly, that we have lots of wiggle room. I think we are running out of wiggle room. I think we are coming pretty close to the point of no return and personally I am scared to death we are on our way to a nuclear world war III.

If you would care to comment I would be happy but I certainly am not asking you.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, first on this matter of escalation, I did indicate to the committee the other day that we would try to provide a chronology of this Vietnam affair, because it does show that the escalation has been escalation by the north.

For 4 years there was infiltration from the north before there was any bombing of North Vietnam. The 325th North Vietnamese Division moved from North Vietnam through Laos to South Vietnam before there was bombing of North Vietnam. If the other side would deescalate and get these infiltrators home, things could move very fast, sir—they could move very fast.

EFFECT OF BOMBING ON INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH

Senator CLARK. Well, since the bombing of North Vietnam began last February and ended in December, it did not prevent the infiltration and build up of regular troops of the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam in addition to substantial equipment and supplies, what reason is there to think that a resumption of bombing would do what wasn't done when we bombed before?

Secretary RUSK. Well, these strikes have undoubtedly made infiltration more difficult, more costly, and have imposed some limits

on the movement of arms and other supplies. Certainly no bombing—nonbombing—did not prevent the infiltration of regular units of the North Vietnamese forces into South Vietnam.

Senator CLARK. Well, two zeros don't make a plus.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I don't want to speculate on problems that are before us at the moment, but when a truck goes 45 miles in 5 days because of procedures that are directly related to the danger of air attack, I should think that it is of some advantage that it takes that truck 5 days instead of 5 hours, or less, to move those 45 miles.

RELATIONSHIP OF SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST TO REGULAR 1967 BUDGET

Senator CLARK. Mr. Bell, there is a cynical school of thought around to the effect that this request for supplemental appropriation is in part due to the necessity of keeping fiscal 1967's request lower and that really you are getting this money in order to help fix the budget for next year.

Can you demolish that thought; will you spend all this money before June 30?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Well, there is in this request \$315 million which is expected to be obligated by June 30. That is based on a careful calculation of exactly what we think is necessary to be obligated by the 30th of June. There is a hundred million dollars requested to replenish the contingency fund. That may or may not be obligated depending on what—on whether there is or is not the kind of circumstance that would be called upon to use that money. But none of it is intended or planned or expected to be asked for now and carried over into next year.

Senator CLARK. I am very happy to have that answer.

FINANCING IMPORTS INTO VIETNAM

Now, on page 6 of the Secretary's statement at the bottom, you state as one of the two principal elements in the request for additional funds that you want the \$175 million to finance the importation for commercial sale of certain goods and supplies.

You use the word "finance." Will any of that money come back?

Mr. BELL. The bulk of it, sir, will be spent in the United States.

Senator CLARK. No; but I mean this is not a financing loan.

Mr. BELL. I beg your pardon. No; these funds would be granted in the technical sense. They are not loans but grants.

Senator CLARK. So they are outgo and won't come back?

Mr. BELL. That is correct.

REQUEST FOR RURAL RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Senator CLARK. With respect to the rest of the money which you request for South Vietnam, a hundred million dollars to fund new or expanded activities.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. Actually won't you have to spend most of that money in taking care of the refugees and in assuring some reasonably decent standard of living in the cities which are about all we have got left, and that there will be very little which can be spent for the

rehabilitation of the villages and countryside of South Vietnam in view of the military situation. In that connection I have seen in the press the statement that of some 2,600 villages in South Vietnam the Government controls only 700.

Mr. BELL. There are two questions there. Let me answer the first one, to begin with: Of the \$100 million, we estimate that only about \$11 or \$11½ million will be necessary for refugees. Some \$25 million of it is expected to go directly into rural operations for schools, health, water supplies, agricultural improvement, and so on.

Another \$31 million is needed for transportation and logistics, both inland and at the ports and a substantial air transport. And \$10 million is for electricity, telecommunications, and the work at Cam Ranh, which is the civilian side of the work there.

So that of the total you might roughly say that around half of it is maintenance and half of it is positive contribution to constructive improvement, the economic development, the economic and social progress.

AREAS WHERE AID PROGRAM CAN OPERATE

Now, as to the areas of the country that we can work, when I was there at the beginning of the month, I inquired very carefully into this. The situation roughly is that while you would describe only about 25 percent of the countryside as being quite secure, that is the 700 villages you are talking about another 50 percent of the countryside we can work in with varying degrees of insecurity.

There are only about 24 percent of the inhabited areas of the countryside which really are not reachable at the present time.

Senator CLARK. When you say you can work in that 50 percent, you don't mean, do you, that you could actually construct schools there?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; I do mean exactly that.

TERRITORY CONTROL BY GOVERNMENT AND VIETCONG

Secretary RUSK. You see, Senator, this question has turned on ambiguity in the word "control." When we talk about government control, the tendency is to insist upon a very high standard of security. That does not mean that all that is not under government control is under Vietcong control. The government controls all 43 of the Provincial capitals and is in full control of all but 16 of 240 district capitals. But there are considerable areas where the Vietcong do wander around in bands of various sorts—and if you go in there you run the risk of running into one of those bands. But the areas which the Vietcong have organized and administer and control in the same sense that the government controls those areas that we call areas under government control are relatively small. There is a considerable area that for all practical purposes is contested—in the sense that, if you go in there, you might run across the Vietcong.

Senator CLARK. One final question, Mr. Chairman. We have all seen maps and I have one in my hand which I regret to state is classified. I think it ought to be declassified. But those maps would at least superficially cast some doubt on the complete validity of what you and Mr. Bell just said.

Secretary RUSK. Our discussion of this came up specifically in connection with that map, and I told the committee that we would try

to provide a map which compared comparable things—that we would try to show those areas that were under the same kind of control by the Vietcong that the Government has in areas under Government control. Those areas would be quite small. The danger areas referred to as under Vietcong control are not organized by the Vietcong. They are simply places where you can run into these fellows if you are not careful.

Mr. BELL. Excuse me, Senator, there is one very important point in addition.

If you are looking at a map you may be misled. I don't mean you, but one can be misled by large areas which show as Vietcong controlled or contested in which hardly anybody lives. Mountain areas, jungle areas so that you have to be careful to look at the areas where the people are, and concentrate your attention on what is the situation in those areas, and what we are, the figures that the Secretary and I are referring to relate to the inhabited areas of the countryside.

Secretary RUSK. Please don't misunderstand me, Senator Clark, I am not suggesting everything is fine—it is tough enough.

Senator CLARK. I don't want to violate security and I feel quite provoked that this map is classified but if I could put this map in the record it would show that the jungle areas are shown in white, the Vietcong controlled areas are shown in pink, and Vietnamese areas are shown in gray, so that your report about the jungle areas is well taken care of.

And I guess I have gone a little further than I should and I am going to stop.

Secretary RUSK. It may not be classified now, sir—there are some cameras behind you. [Laughter.]

Senator CLARK. The colors are such that they wouldn't show up. [Laughter.]

Unless it is a live color camera.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Mr. Secretary, I think we all have a terrific admiration and regard for your own job and the way you do it under very trying circumstances. I share that as an old friend, too.

PERCENTAGE OF VIETCONG NOT NATIVES OF THE SOUTH

There are a couple of questions I have. First, what percentage of the Vietcong forces are basically not South Vietnamese, natives born in South Vietnam? As I understand there are about a quarter of a million Vietcong.

What portion of those would be from North Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. I think there are a good many South Vietnamese ethnic people who were sent down by North Vietnam. I would include those as North Vietnamese for the purpose of deciding where the aggression lies. They were armed and trained and sent down to provide the cadres for the bands and the terrorists in South Vietnam.

I would suppose that that would be comparable to, say, the Federal Republic of Germany organizing people who used to live in East Germany into similar bands to be sent into East Germany.

I would suppose that 80 percent of those who are called Vietcong are or have been southerners.

Senator PELL. Well, then——

Secretary RUSK. And that North Vietnamese ethnic people might be in the percentage of about 20, although they play a very important role and they are there now as organized elements of the North Vietnamese Army.

Senator PELL. But then I realize that one can't play with figures but it would be a fact that the U.S. forces in South Vietnam would be about four times the number of those born in North Vietnam who are with the Vietcong and there would be no Chinese in South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. We have not seen Chinese in South Vietnam. There have been occasional rumors to that effect, but, whenever we have checked them out, we have not found Chinese taking part in the Vietcong operations.

CIVIL WAR

Senator PELL. This question of whether it is a Vietnamese war or an American war is one that concerns us here because we see so many signs of South Vietnamese or Vietnamese concern, the more you read it the more you realize it is really one country, one people, one basic language with various divisions. If there were any ethnic divisions it would be the Montagnards, I guess, so we have to determine how much of this is a civil war and how much is not.

Your view is, I know, that the major portion of the aggression originates in the north, would that be correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. The present effort was decided upon in 1959 in Hanoi. It was publicly organized and announced in Hanoi during 1960, and it has been followed up ever since.

Then there is, Senator, I think a very special case here in these divided countries. We could not accept the argument that, because West Germans and East Germans are both Germans, if they went after each other, that would be simply an indigenous affair. I can assure you the Russians wouldn't accept it on that basis.

When the North Koreans went after the South Koreans with many organized divisions we couldn't accept that as an indigenous affair, a civil war among Koreans. There have been agreements, there have been settlements, there have been demarcation lines that are as important as frontiers. If we are going to organize the peace, we had better insist in the case of these divided countries that, if there are any problems, those problems should be settled by peaceful means and not by force. Otherwise this world is going to go up in smoke.

Senator PELL. Was there a question in the Korean war of whether most of the North Koreans were natives of South Korea?

NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO WENT SOUTH AFTER 1954 AGREEMENT

Secretary RUSK. Almost a million North Vietnamese left Hanoi in 1954-55 to live in the south because they did not wish to live under a Communist regime. I am sure you would discourage us from the idea of organizing those North Vietnamese now in South Vietnam and sending them to the north.

Senator PELL. Not at all. Maybe it would be an excellent idea then it would have been a Vietnamese war.

Secretary RUSK. I had thought you were concerned about escalation, Senator. That would be a major escalation. [Laughter.]

PREVIOUS OPTIMISTIC PREDICTIONS

Senator PELL. Another point here, on the problem as I see it, we were out there several years ago and the military told us with a little more force and with a little more effort the war could be won, that they could see light at the end of the road. I know how you must be concerned with hearing these statements from your military colleagues year after year, and yet each year we do what the military asks us, and we give them what they want. I don't think any of their requests for money or materiel have been turned down and we seem no nearer the end of the road now than we were then.

The alternatives, as I see them, are unacceptable, either to have an Algerian kind of withdrawal or, on the other hand, to bring about a general escalation into world war III.

GENERAL GAVIN'S RECOMMENDATIONS

I am trying to figure out what cost is acceptable in between. I wonder why you find the Gavin theory wrong. I have read Gavin's recommendations for putting our troops in enclaves and trying to deescalate.

Where do you think General Gavin is incorrect?

Secretary RUSK. First, let me say I am grateful to you for raising the issue of alternatives.

It is easy to worry about the problems we have on our present course of action. All of us can worry about them. But we have to choose among the courses of action that are available, and I think that there have been a good many people who have concentrated on worrying about the problems we see in front of us without grappling with the choices that have to be made among alternatives.

I am grateful to you for emphasizing that point.

Now, some aspects of the Gavin doctrine I think we can talk about much more frankly in executive session, but we see no sign that the other side is deescalating, we see no sign that they are prepared to stop doing what they are doing.

Now, to use a rather vernacular expression, I don't believe, myself, that we can ask our men in uniform just to put themselves into half a dozen or a dozen Guantanos and then hunker down and let the other side pick the time and the place and the weapon and the build-up of forces, and take them on one enclave at a time.

There are people who are shooting at you, and I am inclined to think that, unless they stop, you have to shoot back, and that the initiative in that sense should not be left to those who are marauding through the countryside there.

Now, if the other side had any interest in deescalating, there are many ways in which that could be registered and that could be a pretty important step toward peace. But that is—the word we have had from them is just the opposite, it is just the opposite. There are specific military aspects to it that I would prefer not to get into in open hearing. But I would want to be sure this is not simply a next step to withdrawal. Suppose we had those enclaves. Then the Vietcong could organize the rest of the country, organize people who don't want the Vietcong—the Buddhists and the Catholics and the others have made it clear they don't want what the Vietcong is offering. Our

forces then would be holding certain small cells there, and I just don't see any future outcome to that except failure.

LIKELIHOOD OF CHINESE INTERVENTION

Senator PELL. But, Mr. Secretary, as you pointed out the question here is alternatives and many of us have wrestled with it and have tried to come up with alternative approaches. They all seem equally unpleasant, but don't you see the end of the road we are following now? After we have erased Hanoi and Haiphong, which we could do in a couple of hours, and after we have chewed up their army of 300,000 as Senator Mansfield in his report points out in an open-ended situation, the vacuum would be filled in by the Chinese forces.

Secretary RUSK. I don't see the future in as precise terms as that. I think when we look back over the crises we have had since 1945, one cannot spell them out that clearly and that far into the future. I think the other side has some problems. They have got to be looking at alternatives, if they have some elements of rationality, as we think they must have despite some of the difficulty in getting across to them in communications. They have some serious problems, just as we do—and in a number of these postwar situations that has led to the possibility of peace.

NATIONAL INTERESTS OF CHINA AND RUSSIA IN CONFLICT

Senator PELL. In conclusion then, Mr. Secretary, would you not think that the course we have followed so far and the expansion so far has resulted in little expense and no real loss to China and that this has really coincided with China's national interests.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think what China considers to be a national interest of theirs is very much engaged here; that is, the application of the technique of a militant "war of liberation," as they call it. I don't believe myself that Peiping welcomes us in southeast Asia. I don't subscribe to the view I have heard expressed by some, that the Soviet Union is very glad that we are all mixed up in this problem, and that China is very glad to see us all mixed up in this problem. I think that they would prefer that we not come there at all. They would prefer to have seen their world revolution move ahead. I don't think that they are getting what they want in this present situation—nor are we, yet.

Senator PELL. Do you see an end to the corridor we are following at this time?

Secretary RUSK. No; I would be misleading you if I told you that I thought that I know where, when, and how this matter will be resolved. I can't say that, sir, and I don't know anybody in any capital who can say that with complete assurance.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy?

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Secretary, the views you just expressed with reference to the Russian and Chinese attitude involvement in southeast Asia is that generally shared in the State Department?

Secretary RUSK. You mean as to whether Russia and China are pleased that we are in southeast Asia?

Senator McCARTHY. You say they are not pleased?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.
Senator McCARTHY. The opposite point of view, I understand, has some rather strong support, also.

Secretary RUSK. Well—

Senator McCARTHY. In high councils of Government.

Secretary RUSK. Yes; I have heard the other points of view, and I was just expressing my disagreement with them.

Senator McCARTHY. And you think your point of view is the one which has the greater weight in whatever decisions may be made in this area, or don't you want to answer that?

At least there is a counterweight to what you say.

Secretary RUSK. I think all of these points of view are taken into account. I would have to confess that I think my view as Secretary of State has some bearing on the problem. [Laughter.]

Senator McCARTHY. We won't ask you to put it in quantitative terms. [Laughter.]

QUESTION OF LAND OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

I would like to raise a question, pursuing a question Senator Pell just raised a little farther. He asked why it was that there was no countermove in North Vietnam by land forces either under orders or South Vietnamese who might do it on their own.

You said, well, this is escalation in a sense and you asked if he was against escalation and indicated you didn't think that was a good policy. I don't think that is a good answer.

What is the difference between that and bombing North Vietnam? Is there a diplomatic or a military reason that doesn't apply to one and does to the other?

Secretary RUSK. The South Vietnamese forces have had their hands pretty full with the task in front of them. I really feel I would rather get into this, I ought to get into this, in executive session rather than open hearing. This gets us into some difficult problems.

SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Senator McCARTHY. Senator Symington inquired about the matter of armed sales to the United Arab Republic. I didn't get your answer, did you say you wanted to talk to him in private or in executive session?

Secretary RUSK. In the executive session with the committee or privately with the Senators who wish to have it, either way. I am at the committee's disposal. I don't think it would be wise to discuss this fully in open session.

Senator McCARTHY. I know the State Department exercises consultation on sales made by the Pentagon.

Secretary RUSK. I beg your pardon, sir, I didn't—

Senator McCARTHY. You are consulted with reference to the arms sales which are being pushed by the Pentagon.

Maybe I shouldn't say pushed, but—

Secretary RUSK. No, we keep in very close touch with the Defense Department on the sales of arms. As a matter of fact, we have to approve, we must approve, those in the private field through munitions control, and in the public field through the military assistance and military sales.

Senator McCARTHY. I wonder whether you exercise control over arms control all over the world.

Secretary RUSK. We have an arms munition controls procedures by which we regulate the license of the sale of arms in pursuance of policy guidelines established. We have a regular procedure to doing that.

Senator McCARTHY. Did you clear the sales by the arms dealer in Alexandria?

Secretary RUSK. The arms—

Senator McCARTHY. The international sales that he makes. Two Sundays ago I read a story which said he was modernizing the army of one of the Latin American countries and I wondered whether he could do this on his own or if he had to get clearance from the U.S. Government.

Secretary RUSK. It would be my impression that they are under the munitions control procedure but I would have to look into that particular case to see what the case is.

Senator McCARTHY. The explanation as I heard it was that they could do the job cheaper through the Alexandria man than they could with Mr. Rusk.

DOLLARS LEAVING VIETNAM

Secretary RUSK. Well, there may be some differences in surplus equipment. I am not sure—I just don't know the circumstances.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Secretary, again in answer to a question from Senator Symington, I think you said only \$2 or \$3 million a month were going to France.

Senator PELL. Not to France, sir, to the black market.

Senator McCARTHY. To the black market.

Senator PELL. In Hong Kong, most of it.

Secretary RUSK. That is fleeing Vietnam each month.

Senator McCARTHY. Black market.

Secretary RUSK. Capital flight, if you like.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you have an estimate as to how much of the money we put into Vietnam or how much we are going to put in is likely to be handled through French banking interests and therefore likely to have a bearing upon our balance-of-payments problem with reference to France?

Mr. BELL. I would not expect, Senator, that any substantial portion would be handled through French banking interests. The way this system works, the financing of imports is what you are talking about, I believe.

Senator McCARTHY. Well, construction; \$700 million for construction.

Mr. BELL. Construction is the Defense Department's business, and they have hired certain American construction firms to do that work. Those American firms normally all deal with American bankers and so on. I am not quite sure what the precise point of your question is, I must admit.

Senator McCARTHY. Well, much of the money will be spent in Vietnam, it would be spent on labor, for example.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Some of it would be spent on materiel.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. This would be spent in Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator McCARTHY. What becomes of the dollars that are set loose in this area?

Mr. BELL. Now, I understand.

Dollars earned by the Vietnamese Government, by their central bank, as in the case you are talking about where an American construction firm will hire some Vietnamese laborers—those dollars are used by the Vietnamese Government or released for payment for imports and some of those imports will undoubtedly come from France. That is right. Those aren't our AID dollars.

Senator McCARTHY. I know they are not AID dollars. I am speaking about total expenditures of dollars, either AID or military.

Mr. BELL. Right.

CONTROLS OVER IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

Senator McCARTHY. What attempted control over the movement with these dollars is now being exercised, do you know?

Mr. BELL. Well, the Vietnamese Government and ours have a joint planning process controlling what is going to be imported to the country—the volume and the types and so on. We, as the United States, do not control the places where orders are placed, if they are financed by Vietnamese Government dollars other than by our economic aid dollars. They will be placed in general where prices and commercial considerations indicate. Some of them will undoubtedly represent purchases in Japan, some in Europe, some in the United States.

Senator McCARTHY. You don't have anyone who can make an estimate as to what amounts, in what amount these dollars do become relatively free dollars passing through French financial circles?

Mr. BELL. I don't know. Can we make an estimate of that? Let us try to put something in the record for you on that, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC EXPENDITURES IN VIETNAM WHICH PASS THROUGH FRENCH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

France has been an ineligible source for AID-financed imports since late 1960. There are, however, about six French-owned agencies or trading firms in Saigon which have represented United States manufacturers for many years.

For imports financed by the Government of Vietnam, French firms are limited to certain agricultural and industrial raw materials, capital equipment, and vehicles. French type foodstuffs and luxury items have virtually disappeared from the market.

The value of French imports financed with Vietnamese foreign exchange reached a level of \$35.0 million in 1962 or 44 percent of Government-financed imports; and fell to \$18.2 million, or 19 percent of these imports in 1964. It is believed to be even less in 1965; however, final 1965 statistics are not yet available.

USE OF SCRIP BY AMERICAN FORCES

Senator McCARTHY. The second question had to do with the amount of scrip that is used and how it is handled.

Mr. BELL. The American troops in Vietnam are now receiving any funds that they want to receive in cash—not in greenbacks but in the form of so-called military payment certificates, scrip. They

can convert that scrip. The regulations under which they work require that they convert that scrip through official channels at a rate of 118 piasters to a dollar. If they do not so convert it, but instead convert it on the black market, that is a court-martial offense. There are undoubtedly some soldiers who do that but the number is believed to be quite small, and the evidence is that the introduction of the scrip a few months ago did in fact greatly reduce the volume of dollars that were going through the black market, and greatly improved the ability of the Vietnamese Government and the United States Government to control the financial and economic circumstances in the country.

PAYMENT OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS

Senator McCARTHY. The payment of Vietnamese soldiers is made by the Vietnamese Government itself and you give the dollars to that Government.

Mr. BELL. No, sir; we don't give any free dollars to the Vietnamese Government. The import letters of credit which we give Vietnam are sold by the Vietnamese Government to their importers who pay piasters therefor, and those piasters are applied to the Vietnamese budget. So that the Vietnamese Government receives piasters. We control the dollars and pay the dollars to the exporters, in the United States, in Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and a few other less developed countries. We do not finance any imports into Vietnam from Europe.

Senator McCARTHY. The payment of their troops for military expenditures?

Mr. BELL. The Vietnamese troops are paid in piasters by the Vietnamese Government as part of their regular budget.

Senator McCARTHY. And the Vietnamese Government gets its own money how?

Mr. BELL. Well, there was an earlier question about this, Senator. But let me summarize it: the Vietnamese Government budget for 1966 is about 55 billion piasters. They will obtain of those piasters, 21 or 22 billion from their own internal taxes. About 10 billion will come from deficit-financing, credit-creation, and the other 24 roughly will come from the piasters that are made available as counterpart for our economic aid.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN A LAND WAR IN ASIA

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Secretary, I have one question, I think we accepted for 5 or 6 years the ideas expressed by General MacArthur, General Eisenhower, General Gavin, General Ridgway, and others that a land war in Asia was unthinkable.

Is that theoretical position still held or do we have among the military figures in America today a changed point of view?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, the nature of a struggle of this sort, where the initiative is not ours, where we did not start it, and where we didn't want it to begin with, and where the aggression comes from the other side is, of course, substantially determined by the other side.

At the present time the situation in South Vietnam does not take the form of armies, land armies, locked in combat with each other. It continues to be basically a guerrilla operation. The overwhelming

part of the problem is terror and sabotage. The fixed units that the other side has—battalions or regiments—occasionally engage in combat.

But the great mass of the problem is the guerrilla action by smaller groups, intimidating villages, blowing up highways or bridges, assassinations and kidnappings, and techniques of that sort.

One cannot say with complete confidence what the future will hold, but I would just point out that, at this stage in the situation, the other side is still operating chiefly on a typically guerrilla basis. They are doing so both as a matter of practice and apparently also as a matter of doctrine.

Senator McCARTHY. I know that to be the case.

Secretary RUSK. The fire power that is available to the government and allied forces out there is very large indeed, and the other side has found it very difficult to sustain battalions or regiments in action for any protracted period.

Senator McCARTHY. Well, I don't think that quite answers my question.

Secretary RUSK. I know it didn't, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

[PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. I have a couple for Mr. Bell to answer.

Are we insuring any type of private enterprise in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. There is an agreement between the Vietnamese Government and ours which authorizes the normal kind of investments guarantees for American investments. But none have been issued over the past 12 months. There were some previously.

Senator AIKEN. We have not insured any type of private investment in South Vietnam over the last 12 months?

Mr. BELL. That is my understanding.

Senator AIKEN. Is that what you say?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Has any private investment from the United States been made in the last 12 months?

Mr. BELL. I am not sure that I know of any, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. None at all?

Mr. BELL. I would be glad to check the point for the record.

(The following material was subsequently furnished for the record:)

U.S. PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM DURING 1965

During calendar year 1965, the United States issued two specific risk guarantees to Caltex for investments totaling \$722,000. In addition, there is underway an expansion of a paper and pulp manufacturing company in which Parsons & Whitmore are equity participants. The value of the equipment required for the expansion is estimated at \$2 million.

Discussions are being held between the Government of Vietnam and a number of banking institutions regarding the possible establishment of an American branch bank in Saigon.

We have no further information immediately available here as to whether other American firms operating in Vietnam are expanding their investments.

BRANCHES OF U.S. BANKING FIRMS

Senator AIKEN. You don't know of any branch banks established in the last 12 months?

Mr. BELL. When I was there early this month there were four large American banks asking for permission to open branches in Vietnam. Now, the government was considering these applications favorably, perhaps not for all four, but at least one or two but those investments have not yet been made. There are a number of American import houses which have been operating in Vietnam for some years, been operating effectively. They have not enlarged their investment so far as I know in the last year and certainly have not asked us for any guarantees. There were some American investments, Foremost Dairies has an investment there. I believe that—

Senator AIKEN. That was previous to the war?

Mr. BELL. Well, not previous to the—about 3 years ago, Senator, there was considerable conflict going on then.

Senator AIKEN. But you say there are no American branch banks in South Vietnam now?

Mr. BELL. There have not been, there are just about to be the first ones.

Senator AIKEN. There have not been any?

Mr. BELL. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. But there are four applications?

Mr. BELL. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. What banks have applied?

Mr. BELL. I don't know whether that is a commercial secret or not.

Senator AIKEN. I think it is a public matter.

Mr. BELL. First National City, Chase, the Bank of America and American Express are the four. Chase-Manhattan, First National City, Bank of America, and American Express.

U.S. BUSINESS OPERATIONS

Senator AIKEN. Are there many American service establishments in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. What do you mean, Senator, service establishments?

Senator AIKEN. Gas distribution and so forth.

Mr. BELL. Oh, yes sir. Esso operates there, Caltex.

Senator AIKEN. Laundries?

Mr. BELL. There are—

Senator AIKEN. Things like that.

Mr. BELL. There are companies in construction equipment, petroleum.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; large prominent American firms.

Senator AIKEN. Are they subject to harassment by the Vietcong?

Mr. BELL. As any business is, and to the extent that it is, the oil trucks, for example, that travel in the back country highways are frequently stopped and taxes demanded if they are to be passed along that highway just as any other traffic on the back country highway.

Senator AIKEN. You mean they pay tolls?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; that the form—

Senator AIKEN. They pay for the privilege of doing business in Vietcong territory?

Mr. BELL. That is right. Just as any other businessman is liable to have to do.

INTEREST RATES IN SAIGON

Senator AIKEN. I see. What is the going rate of interest in Saigon, for instance?

Mr. BELL. About 8 percent.

Senator AIKEN. And you mean a business person in Saigon could borrow money at 8 percent?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; has been able to.

Senator McCARTHY. It is better than he can do in the United States now.

Mr. BELL. No, the prime rate in the United States is still only 5.

Senator AIKEN. What money do they borrow?

Mr. BELL. They borrow piasters, sir. The economy of Vietnam is operating, Senator. It operates in, with some limitations, but there are the markets and the marketing systems, the stores, the transportation systems are those that you would, any of us, would recognize as normal. You run into trouble when you get out into certain areas in the countryside. The cities operate in pretty normal fashion.

Senator AIKEN. What money do the Vietcong use?

Mr. BELL. They use piasters.

Senator AIKEN. And the money is accepted freely by service establishments, stores?

Mr. BELL. Well, it is accepted freely, if the person giving it does not identify himself as a Vietcong. If a fellow comes into a shop in Saigon and buys something and pays piasters he could be a Vietcong purchasing agent or he could be an ordinary citizen.

Senator AIKEN. But you say, you are sure there is no private American money invested in the banking or lending business there?

Mr. BELL. Up to now, that is correct.

Senator AIKEN. Up to now, there are no private U.S. funds invested?

Mr. BELL. Well, I repeat, Senator, there are some U.S. funds which have been invested in previous years in import and export business, in petroleum distribution and sales, in dairy firms, I think there are probably several other enterprises, business enterprises in which Americans have invested, not enormous sums of money.

Senator AIKEN. And they do have to pay the Vietcong for the privilege of doing business.

Mr. BELL. Not in Saigon; no, sir. But insofar as they—

Senator AIKEN. If they get outside.

Mr. BELL. If they want to distribute commodities out in a rural area as the oil companies do, for example, they may on any given day encounter a roadblock and be forced to pay toll to go through. The passage from one secure area to another on the highway is often taxed by the Vietcong. This is a form of banditry; it is like holding up the stagecoach in the West in the early days.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, they rob the stage.

Mr. BELL. Exactly.

When I was there I was told of a fellow who had traveled on a bus from up in the mountains from Kontum to Pleiku and he said that the busdriver obviously got some kind of signal at a certain stage and he noticed all of a sudden everybody on the bus was taking his valuables off and taking his wristwatch off and putting it in his sock and

sure enough around the corner the bus was stopped and the Vietcong came aboard and asked for money.

Senator AIKEN. I believe it takes about 10 deputy sheriffs to cope with 1 desperado, doesn't it? [Laughter.]

CONTROL OVER DECISION TO ENGAGE IN WAR IN ASIA

Just one question, I was interested in the questions Senator McCarthy asked of the Secretary, I understood the Secretary to say that the other side would determine whether the United States becomes locked in a land war in Asia or not.

Did I hear that correctly?

Secretary RUSK. In the sense, sir, that, just as when the other side moved large numbers of organized divisions across the parallel in Korea, we had to face the question as to whether we would leave them alone, get out of the way, let them have it, or whether we would hit them.

Senator AIKEN. They will determine then whether we send 400,000 or 2 million men into southeast Asia?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, that—

Senator AIKEN. Don't you suppose they will be making other decisions for us perhaps if we agree that they have this one to make?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it is almost in the nature of aggression, Senator, that the initiative lies with the aggressor. If it would be left up to us there wouldn't be any shooting out there at all. We wouldn't have been there with troops. We want peace in the area, and we have wanted it for the entire postwar period.

Now, when somebody else starts shooting, then decisions have to be made as to what is done about that, and by whom, and what the responsibilities of the United States might be in that situation.

Senator AIKEN. That would apply to any part of the world.

Secretary RUSK. It would apply particularly to those countries with whom we have commitments. I indicated earlier this morning we don't look upon ourselves as the gendarmes of the universe and we are not trying to establish a Pax Americana right around the globe. Many others carry responsibilities and many other types of aggressions and fighting have been dealt with or resolved without the participation of the United States.

UNITED KINGDOM POSITION ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Did I hear the radio report correctly this morning which indicated that the United Kingdom says that her contributions to our trouble in Vietnam will consist of not calling on us for greater contributions to protect her resources in different parts of the world? Would that be a real contribution?

Secretary RUSK. No, I think that is a little—that misses the point by considerable.

Senator AIKEN. I got it on the air and that is why I am asking you to clarify it.

Secretary RUSK. No; Britain has had a direct responsibility in southeast Asia because of the problem between Indonesia and Malaysia, and they have had a fairly substantial part of their defense budget committed in southeast Asia. That problem is not resolved,

and there has been fighting there, in Malaysia and in Borneo, with infiltration elements.

No; I would think that radio report was rather missing the point.

Senator AIKEN. I think I have got the situation as clear as I might, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WILLIAMS. If you will yield?

Senator AIKEN. I will yield to the Senator from Delaware who has a question.

FREE WORLD SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM

Senator WILLIAMS. Speaking of the contribution Britain has made, why is it that they have not stopped their ships from sending supplies to Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. We are at the present time in closest touch with Britain about that matter, as with one or two other governments. The free world shipping has been substantially reduced. I think the average monthly rate now is about 13. Most of those are small ships operating out of Hong Kong.

About half of those that do come in, come in in ballast, take out coal to Japan, and some fresh fruits and vegetables to Hong Kong or eastern Siberia.

We do not like that free world shipping going into Haiphong, and we have been working on that with governments and have succeeded in reducing it very sharply. But we are not yet at a point with which we are satisfied, and we continue to work on it.

Senator WILLIAMS. Did Great Britain ask us for our cooperation in her efforts to blockade Rhodesia? Couldn't we have asked her to take the same prompt steps she is asking us to take?

Secretary RUSK. This was not just a bilateral matter between us and Britain. This was part of a general worldwide attitude with respect to the Rhodesian problem, and it also engaged some direct specific interests of the United States in Africa. This is relevant, but it is not the decisive point in this question of the Haiphong shipping.

Senator WILLIAMS. As I understand it, some of our other so-called allies are likewise supplying North Vietnam with shipping?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, in the first place, no strategic goods of any sort are supplied by free world shipping, and certainly none by our allies.

The shipping has been reduced now to basically the Hong Kong shipping. There are occasional ships from other states in there, but the governments of those countries have been able to deal with it to a very considerable extent. We have some hopeful prospect that this matter will be resolved.

Senator WILLIAMS. Do they furnish us with a manifest of their cargo?

Secretary RUSK. We have ways of knowing what is on board; yes, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. Is it not true that in times of war all types of supplies to a certain extent are war materials, even food?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would think that would be true in a most general sense. Certainly those ships coming in ballast to take things out would not be in that category. But some things are much more war material than others.

Senator WILLIAMS. One other question, Mr. Chairman, if I may. The CHAIRMAN. Yes; go ahead.

Senator AIKEN. I have one more.

I was going to ask, since we are aware of the nature of the cargoes transported from Hong Kong to Hanoi, have we discovered any military supplies of any kind in any of those cargoes?

Secretary RUSK. We have no information on any strategic goods going into North Vietnam on free world ships.

Senator AIKEN. Who submits the list, the shippers?

Secretary RUSK. We get this information in a variety of ways, sir, and I would prefer not to go into that in open session.

Senator AIKEN. That is all right. But you do have lists?

Secretary RUSK. We think we are quite well informed.

Senator AIKEN. Material which our friends transport from Hong Kong to Hanoi?

Secretary RUSK. I think we are quite well informed as to what goes into Haiphong in such shipping.

Senator AIKEN. And you are satisfied that very little in the way of military supplies enters Haiphong or goes to North Vietnam by water?

Secretary RUSK. By free world ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have another question?

Senator AIKEN. That is all.

FINANCING IMPORTS WITH AID FUNDS

Senator WILLIAMS. As I understand it, a substantial part of this approximately \$200 million that you are asking for will be used to buy supplies which will be imported into Vietnam, is that correct, and sold later by the merchants in that area?

Mr. BELL. We have asked for \$275 million, Senator, for Vietnam in this supplemental; \$175 million of it is for transactions of the type you have just described.

Senator WILLIAMS. My question is: Who gets the proceeds of those sales? We pay for the goods.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. And they are shipped in and they are sold by the private trade in South Vietnam. Who gets the money?

Mr. BELL. The Government of Vietnam receives the benefit of this. It is, in effect, a grant of an equivalent amount of piasters to the Government of Vietnam, and they use it as part of their budget to finance part of their budget.

Senator WILLIAMS. Now, is that counted as part of the 21 billion that you said they put up toward their budget or is it a part of our 24 billion?

Mr. BELL. No, sir; it is a part of our 24.

Senator WILLIAMS. It is a part of our 24?

Mr. BELL. It is our 24.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is what I mean. This is the 24 that you are speaking of?

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is all.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I inject one remark because there might have been some misunderstanding?

POSITION OF MILITARY ADVISERS ON A LAND WAR IN ASIA

When Senator McCarthy asked this question—and I regretted he had to leave—the point that I was reluctant to comment on was about what the shape of this matter might be in Asia. As to whether our senior commanders or military advisers are advising against what we are doing because of the problem of a land war in Asia, the answer to that question is “No,” and I will so inform Senator McCarthy. I did not want to avoid that part of his question. It was the projection into the future that I was somewhat diffident about.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the present commanders.

Secretary RUSK. And advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about the attitude of Ridgway and Gavin?

Secretary RUSK. Some are on the record with other views, but I am talking about those who are carrying the responsibilities.

CONCERN OVER POLICIES IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, as you know, I have been in the Congress quite a long time, and I do not recall any issue since I have been here where there has been so much apprehension concerning a military involvement. This is a reason why some public discussion of our policies at this time is appropriate.

I have seen in the press that our approval of these very large requests, not only the one now before this committee but the one that will come before the Senate in the military field, will be interpreted as a vote of approval of the overall policy. I think there is a great doubt about whether or not we are on the right track, and these doubts need to be cleared up.

You said there had been great discussion in depth about Vietnam. I would submit, in all honesty, that the discussion has been rather superficial. We had a relatively small commitment even as late as the time of the Bay of Tonkin affair. I personally did not feel at that time that we had undertaken a course of action that could well lead to a world war.

I certainly was rather taken aback by the statement in the morning paper by Senator Stennis who, as you know, is chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee, and has the most intimate relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which he speaks quite firmly about the possible use of nuclear weapons on Chinese “coolies,” which is not a very complimentary term, as you know.

I would consider that the situation has changed a lot, and that we are now engaged in a very serious undertaking.

I believe that one of the reasons for this concern and apprehension is a feeling on the part of some people—including very reputable scholars and others—that we inadvertently, perhaps, for irrelevant reasons, stepped into a colonial war in 1950 on the wrong side. Whether or not we did is one of the questions at issue. It seems to me that something is wrong or there would not be such great dissent, evidenced by teach-ins, articles, and speeches by various responsible people. I do not regard all of the people who have raised these questions as irresponsible.

I think it is the duty of this committee, the administration, and others to try to clarify the nature of our involvement there, what it is

likely to lead to, and whether or not the ultimate objective justifies the enormous sacrifice in lives and treasure.

I think, in all honesty, that is why there is such interest in this matter. It is very difficult to deal with. I have never encountered such a complex situation. It is not clear cut, like Korea or like the Second World War.

You state very positively this is aggression by the other side. But this is not quite as convincing under the circumstances as it was in North Korea, for example. There was definite overt aggression in Korea. It is not comparable to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. There was no doubt in those situations. I do not know of anyone who said then, "Well, that is not an engagement for an all-out commitment." Vietnam is subtle. Perhaps, as you say, this situation is different. But it needs to be understood if we are to approve of it in the sense of voting these very large sums. If we pursue this policy, and resume the bombing, then we are committed, and will have passed the Rubicon. I think that is what justifies some discussion of this.

I do not like to delay you from your work and to keep you here, but I think I am expressing not only my own feelings, but the feelings of some of my colleagues, and some of my constituents. So all I am trying to do is to clarify some questions about our policies.

I suspect sometimes that there has been a change in policy from that which we disavowed after the Spanish-American War. You deny that there is a Pax Americana, but the fact is we have troops in Europe, Korea, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic. We have military missions in half the nations of the world, probably more. I don't know what this means. It has all come about gradually and in connection with an aid program.

The aid program has been one element in this. I have supported it all these years, but I am having very grave reservations about whether that was wise.

I am perfectly willing if, I so conclude, to admit at the proper time that I made a mistake. Perhaps it is impossible for a great nation to do that, too. I do not know. But I think there have been many cases of where great nations have drawn back from commitments which they came to believe were wrong.

I am not ready to say at the moment that I am positive that our policies in Vietnam have been wrong, but I am anxious to have greater enlightenment about just what we are about and what our ultimate objective is.

This is why I asked in the beginning if you could formulate for me more clearly just what our objective is. That is why I referred to the question of the British newsman. He tried to simplify it by saying, "Well, now, let's put aside all this talk about democracy in South Vietnam. You know that is unrealistic. There are no institutions of democracy there and never have been. This is an ancient kingdom and with no established institutions. Put that line aside, and say what you are doing is"—you do not like that word, I do not either—"imperialism." That what we are doing is saving the free world from Communist encroachment, and we are going to do it everywhere.

This policy was expressed rather clearly during the time of the Truman doctrine, and we followed it in some other instances.

Is this still a commitment that in the future wherever there is a possibility or probability of an expansion of a Communist state that

we are going to meet it and stop it? Is that a correct way to describe our policy? All I am asking for is clarification of what our objective is in this struggle.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, let me comment, if I may, on the broader aspect of your very thoughtful statement.

When I said we are not embarked upon a Pax Americana, I was thinking specifically of the fact that our obligations run to 42 allies. Those are allies because of action taken by the executive branch and the Senate in combination.

All of those are allies under treaties ratified by the Senate by an overwhelming vote.

In the case of southeast Asia I think there were—what?—one or two votes in the Senate against that treaty. There was no reservation on that treaty that, of course, this does not apply if things get tough.

We do have the specific commitments which we, as a nation—

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask there, I get lost, if you don't mind—

Secretary RUSK. Yes, please, sir.

OBLIGATION UNDER SEATO TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. In the Southeast Asia Treaty, it seems to me, as I read it, the obligation is to consult with our allies in the case of these nonovert aggressions. We have no unilateral obligation to do what we are doing.

Now, you say we are entitled to do it. That is different from saying we have an obligation under this SEATO Treaty. I mean, we are entitled, I suppose, as a great power to do nearly anything we want to. We are entitled to move in the Dominican Republic, because we have the power to do it. I did not believe you had any treaty obligation to do it, but I do not want to quibble about that.

But in this case, do you maintain that we had an obligation under the Southeast Asia Treaty to come to the assistance, all-out assistance, of South Vietnam? Is that very clear?

Secretary RUSK. It seems clear to me, sir, that this was an obligation—

The CHAIRMAN. Unilateral.

Secretary RUSK. An obligation of policy. It is rooted in the policy of the treaty. I am not now saying if we had decided we would not lift a finger about southeast Asia that we could be sued in a court and be convicted of breaking a treaty. This is not the point I want to talk about.

REFERENCE TO SPEECH BY SENATOR NEUBERGER

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Neuberger brought up a question that typifies quite well some of the things that puzzle us. She said the day before yesterday in a speech that—

President Johnson and his advisers made it quite clear that in their judgment the Vietnam war is a clear and documented case of aggression by North Vietnam against South Vietnam. This policy recognizes the de facto existence of two independent sovereign nations, the capitals of which are Hanoi and Saigon. The President also said in his state of the Union message that we "stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954." The public is aware of very little of the detail of that historic agreement, but one feature they are likely to remember. The 17th parallel was provisional and was "not in any way to be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." On the basis of it the United States is saying

both that it stands on the principle that there is no political or territorial boundary separating North and South Vietnam and that we must stand and fight in South Vietnam because that nation has been attacked by its aggressor neighbor of the north. When Americans scratch their heads over this logic they are not excusing Communist aggression nor saying that the United States ought not to be in Vietnam. It is simply a puzzle over why our stated reason for being there and our stated terms for withdrawing seem to cancel out each other.

This is the type of puzzlement that afflicts us poor laymen who are not in on all of the real secrets of diplomacy. It does puzzle me.

UNIFICATION OF DIVIDED STATES

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, as to the divided states, there were original agreements in the cases of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam anticipating the unification of those states.

The CHAIRMAN. What agreements are you referring to?

Secretary RUSK. I think the 1954 agreement anticipated the prospect of a unification of North and South Vietnam.

Senator GORE. I will read you point 4, Mr. Secretary. This is the final declaration of Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954, point 6:

The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Now, in the case of Germany and Korea, as well as Vietnam, those were divided by demarcation lines, and in the background were agreements anticipating the unification of those divided countries.

In the process, time and development of events, however, East Germany has been recognized by some countries, West Germany by the overwhelming majority; North Korea has been recognized by some, South Korea by the overwhelming majority; the same with the two Vietnams.

Now, the problem is whether those issues that exist in these divided countries are to be settled by force or are to be settled by peaceful means. We believe they should be settled by peaceful means.

If there are differences and difficulties they can be brought to the conference table and talked about. But if efforts are made in any of these three divided countries to settle the question of unification by force, then I think we are in a very, very grave and dangerous situation throughout the world.

Senator CHURCH. Will the chairman yield at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

APPLICATION OF CURRENT POLICY TO CIVIL WAR

Senator CHURCH. If this is the philosophy underlying our policy, Mr. Secretary, I should have thought that it would have been difficult to have ever fought a Civil War in this country had the same doctrine applied a century ago.

At that time, I suppose the southerners felt there had been an invasion of the South from the North, and had England, which favored the South, adhered to the same principle that now seems to govern American policy, and had sent troops in the name of self-determination into the Confederacy, I think the English Government would have

been hard put to convince Abraham Lincoln that there should be an election to determine the ultimate outcome of the war.

I mean, I think—without in any way suggesting that our Civil War was an exact parallel—I think these concepts upon which we rest our policy are subject to very serious question. Now—

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir—

Senator CHURCH. Now, you can look at the war in Vietnam as a covert invasion of the south by the north, or you can look at it as some scholars do, as basically an indigenous war to which the north has given a growing measure of aid and abetment, but either way it is a war between Vietnamese to determine what the ultimate kind of government is going to be for Vietnam.

When I went to school that was a civil war. I am told these days it is not a civil war any more.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I do not follow that point at all because, whatever you call it, there is aggression from North Vietnam against South Vietnam across that demarcation line contrary to the military clauses of that 1954 commitment.

UNIFICATION ELECTIONS CALLED FOR IN 1954 AGREEMENT

Senator CHURCH. Have all the provisions of the 1954 agreement been adhered to by either side?

Secretary RUSK. No; they have not.

Senator CHURCH. Were the elections which were called for and generally anticipated at the time the agreement was made, were they held?

Secretary RUSK. Neither in North or South Vietnam.

Senator CHURCH. Right. So it cannot be said that violations of the agreement have been all one sided, and certainly our case does not rest upon that kind of reasoning.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. The case, the basic fact, is that large numbers of armed men and large quantities of arms have been sent illegally from North Vietnam into South Vietnam to try to take over South Vietnam by force.

WHY UNITED STATES DID NOT SIGN AGREEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask what is the explanation of why in 1956, contrary to the terms of the Geneva accords, elections were not held? You have stated several times that the aggression started in 1960. But the events between 1954 when the agreement was signed and 1960 were not without significance.

We backed Diem, did we not? Didn't we have much to do with putting him in power?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we supported him.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And he was, to an extent had, a certain dependence upon us, did he not?

Secretary Rusk: We were giving him very considerable aid, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am informed that in 1955, in accordance with the treaty provisions, he was requested by the north to consult about elections, and that he refused to do so. Is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Well, neither his government nor the Government of the United States signed that agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. We will come to that as a separate point. But it is correct that he refused to consult with the north on election procedure, is it not?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we will come to your point of our not signing. Why, in your opinion, didn't we sign the agreement? There were nine parties there, and seven signed it. We refused. Why didn't we sign it?

Secretary RUSK. I have tried to find in the record a full discussion of that subject. Quite frankly, I have not been able to. I think, my general impression is, that the United States was at that time not persuaded that this was the best way to settle this affair, and did not want to be responsible for all of the elements of the agreement. They did say that they would give it—that they would acknowledge it (and I believe you might want to put in the record here, Mr. Bedell Smith's exact words on it) and would consider any attempt to upset it by force as a threat to the peace.

(The document referred to follows:)

STATEMENT BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, JULY 21, 1954

As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these matters:

Declaration

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954, between (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the People's Army of Vietnam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command of the People's Army of Vietnam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the People's Army of Vietnam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows:

"In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly."

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future.

The CHAIRMAN. Not having signed it, what business was it of ours for intervening and encouraging one of the participants not to follow it, specifically Diem?

PROSPECTS FOR FREE ELECTIONS

Secretary RUSK. Well, the prospect of free elections in North and South Vietnam was very poor at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, they have always been poor, and will be for a hundred years, won't they? That was not news to you. I mean, this was a device to get around the settlement, was it not?

Secretary RUSK. No, no, Mr. Chairman. I do not believe the prospects of free elections, in South Vietnam anyhow, are all that dim.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they ever had them in 2,000 years of history?

Secretary RUSK. They have had some free elections in the provinces and municipalities in May of last year.

The CHAIRMAN. Under our control and direction.

Secretary RUSK. Not under our control and direction; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who supervised them?

Secretary RUSK. Multiple candidates, with 70 percent of the registered voters voting, and with results which indicate that people in these local communities elected the people that you would expect them to elect in terms of the natural leaders of the community.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, will you yield for a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone who wishes me to yield, please do so.

Senator AIKEN. Are the successful candidates all living?

Secretary RUSK. I beg your pardon?

Senator AIKEN. Are the successful candidates still living now?

Secretary RUSK. Well, they are as far as the Government is concerned. The Vietcong continue to kill them, assassinate, kidnap them.

Senator AIKEN. Knock them off.

Secretary RUSK. I am sure that not all those who were elected are still in office.

Senator AIKEN. That discourages candidacies.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, it does.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there are a lot of things here that discourage candidacies, too. It is not a very easy life any way you take it.

UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY UNITED STATES AT GENEVA CONFERENCE

Coming back to 1954, because the President in his state of the Union message said we stood by the Geneva accords of 1954, although we did not sign it, Bedell Smith, who was Under Secretary of State did make a unilateral declaration.

Secretary RUSK. Under Secretary of State?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what he said?

Secretary RUSK. I do not have that text here, and I did not—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the sense of it?

Secretary RUSK. Well, he said, in effect, that we would accept the settlement and consider any attempt to upset it by force as a threat to the peace.

DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING 1954

The CHAIRMAN. Aggression, as you call it, did not start until 1960. Before that the carrying out of the agreement was really abandoned by refusal to hold elections, was it not? We did not encourage them to have elections and apparently the North Vietnamese did not do anything very substantial in objection in that period, did they? I do not know. I am asking you really.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I regret that I did not, in the words of the House of Commons, have notice of this particular questioning on this particular period. I would need to review the record and be much more briefed and detailed on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I won't pursue it at this time.

Secretary RUSK. But I will be glad to return to the committee and pursue this line of questioning.

JUSTIFICATION FOR AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. I do it for this reason that I tried to state: There is some feeling that, perhaps, we have intervened, as the Senator from Idaho indicated a moment ago, in a family quarrel here, and that this intervention may not be justified on the grounds here presented. This leads me back to the point raised by the Englishman. In all frankness, that doctrine is a more understandable, more simple, and, perhaps, more justifiable reason for our involvement if you rely on the theory that this situation in Vietnam is such a great danger to the free world and to our own security because of either the probability or possibility of Chinese Communist imperialism; that is, of their expanding physically in this area. I think that is the traditional doctrine, at least it is understandable to me. If that is the ground it is more understandable. Whether it is justified or not, I do not know, but it is more understandable.

Are you unwilling to put it on that ground?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I am unwilling to cast the United States in the role of a policeman of the universe or one who is disposed to try to impose on the world a Pax Americana in every possible situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean every possible—

Secretary RUSK. Rather than honoring the specific commitments undertaken by this Government and by this Nation by action both of the executive and the legislative branches.

SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. This is what needs discussion. I do not see the specific commitment. I do not see the Southeast Asia Treaty. I think it might be worth while for you to give us, maybe in writing, something to clarify this even further, with specific reference to that part of the treaty and the provisions which require it because I am not convinced of it. I am not sure about it.

None of us are very well briefed on this area because, frankly, I did not anticipate years ago that this was a serious situation, I mean anything like it is. I thought of it primarily as another country among many to whom we were giving aid. I really never became concerned about the situation until about the time of the Bay of

Tonkin. I had paid no particular attention to it, and that is typical of why there is this unhappiness, as evidenced by—well, you saw in this morning's paper 15 of the Members, many of them newer Members of the Senate, who seem to be unhappy about the expansion of this war. I do not think that they have made up their minds that they are dead set against what your purpose is. I think they are not quite clear what the purpose is, and would like an opportunity to examine the objective further before they have to vote on commitments which are irrevocable.

Senator PELL. Will the Chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, I yield to anybody. I am just trying to pursue this to develop something that will give us some reassurance.

Senator PELL. I think the number of people involved would be more than 15 of those who signed the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am fully at the disposal of the committee and any other Senators that the committee might wish to invite here to take part in your proceedings.

I am a little concerned that formal acts of the Government over a period of years in a variety of ways would appear to catch people by surprise at the moment when things begin to get difficult.

I would hope the Senate would not ratify an alliance if it did not intend that alliance to be taken seriously.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a difference of view of what that alliance means, you see. That is what has been developed, I think.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me yield to Senator Gore—Senator Mundt wants to ask questions. He has not had a chance, and then I will yield to you.

SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF SEATO TREATY

Senator GORE. I hope, Mr. Chairman, you concur in my view that if this is to be of some value there must be an exchange of views here.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator GORE. Between the executive and the legislative.

In preparation I have looked up some of the documents. I have here the SEATO treaty to which you refer and to which, let me remind you, Mr. Secretary, South Vietnam is not a signatory.

Secretary RUSK. It is a protocol state.

Senator GORE. It is a protocol state, that is correct. But insofar as its being a specific commitment, here is the specific language:

If, in the opinion of any of the parties the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area or of any other state or territory to which the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this article from time to time apply, is threatened in any way other than by an armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area—

here is the commitment—

the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

Secretary RUSK. That is—

Senator GORE. If that is a specific commitment to wage war in southeast Asia I do not understand it.

Secretary RUSK. That is the situation other than armed attack. I am asking for a copy of the treaty.

Senator GORE. You can have this one.

APPLICATION OF PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE IV

Secretary RUSK. Paragraph 1 of article IV says:

Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate—

and that means the protocol states which they unanimously designated—

would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

I think part of the confusion here is over the question as to whether this is, in fact, an aggression by the use of arms against South Vietnam. The chairman referred to the fact that people are not as clear about this as they were in Korea where entire divisions moved openly across the line. In the case of South Vietnam they moved, in the first instance, by stealth; they moved through the jungle. But, nevertheless, they were armed men and in substantial numbers.

From November of 1964 until January of 1965 they moved the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army down to South Vietnam. There was no bombing going on at that time.

Now, this is an aggression by means of an armed attack.

Senator GORE. Was that before or after we moved forces into South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the division moved after we had put, had reinforced our own forces there. Nevertheless, we did not have our own combat personnel in South Vietnam for a period of some years during which there was steady infiltration of armed men and armed supplies from the north.

CONGRESSIONAL EVIDENCE OF APPROVAL

Senator GORE. Going back to this, if the chairman will yield further, going back to the SEATO Treaty, where are the constitutional processes with respect to the United States that we agreed to follow in SEATO?

Secretary RUSK. The processes which have been determined through consultation between the President and the leadership, and, for example, such processes as the resolution of the Congress of August 1964.

Senator GORE. Was that a constitutional process?

Secretary RUSK. I would think so, sir. That was a joint resolution of the Congress, signed by the President, which can be repealed by a concurrent resolution which would not need the signature of the President.

Senator GORE. Is a declaration of war a constitutional process?

Secretary RUSK. It would be one. It would be a constitutional process, but it is not the only constitutional process.

INTERPRETATION OF MEANING OF SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION

Senator GORE. I voted for this resolution following the attack upon our ships off Tonkin Bay. I interpreted that resolution as approving the specific and appropriate response to this attack, and the chairman of this committee, in presenting such a resolution stated to the Senate that this was his interpretation.

I certainly want to disassociate myself with any interpretation that this was a declaration of war.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. We do not consider this—

Senator GORE. Or that it authorized the administration to take any and all steps toward an all-out war. I specifically interpreted that as an attack which we had experienced and as a specific and limited response thereto.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I just read that resolution? It is very short.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. It says:

That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

There was a legislative interpretation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, and this resolution can be amended, can be repealed, by a concurrent resolution of the Congress which would not require the approval of the President, by its terms.

DEBATE IN SENATE ON RESOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. I was just reviewing what I said in that debate.

Senator Nelson on August 6, 1964, addressed a question to me. I may say, I do not remember the origin of this resolution. Did it come to the House first or to us first?

Secretary RUSK. It is a House resolution, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. As I recall it, it was acted on very quickly following a violent armed attack upon our ships, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson said:

I have a couple of additional questions. But, first, I wish to say I did not suggest that by the use of hindsight I would now conclude that the intervention in 1954 was wrong. I do not know. I understand the necessity for the United States, since it is the leader of the free world, to do all it can in furtherance of the protection of the idea of freedom and independence, and to do so we must take gambles. We shall lose some, we shall win some.

I believe the public is slow to recognize that we have vast responsibilities, and they can expect us to win every gamble that we take. I do not expect that. I do not now rise here to criticize the original decision. But I am concerned about the Congress appearing to tell the executive branch or the public that we would endorse a complete change in our mission. That would concern me.

This was addressed to me. And I responded:

I do not interpret the joint resolution that way at all. It strikes me, as I understand it, that the joint resolution is quite consistent with our existing mission and our understanding of what we have been doing in South Vietnam for the last 10 years.

Mr. NELSON. Did I correctly understand the Senator from Arkansas to say a while ago that the language of the resolution was aimed at the problem of further aggression against our ships and our Naval facilities?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is a logical way to interpret the language.

Of course, I was doing this under the belief that this really expressed the position just stated by the Senator from Tennessee.

There is a good deal more on this. I do not want to prolong this matter. I ask that the reporter include these pertinent excerpts for the record.

(The excerpts from the Congressional Record are as follows:)

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I had the opportunity to see warfare not so very far from this area, and it was very mean. I would look with great dismay on a situation involving the landing of large land armies on the continent of Asia. So my question is whether there is anything in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it that contemplates it. I agree with the Senator that that is the last thing we would want to do. However, the language of the resolution would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever the Commander in Chief feels is necessary. It does not restrain the Executive from doing it. Whether or not that should ever be done is a matter of wisdom under the circumstances that exist at the particular time it is contemplated. This kind of question should more properly be addressed to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Speaking for my own committee, everyone I have heard has said that the last thing we want to do is to become involved in a land war in Asia; that our power is sea and air and that this is what we hope will deter the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese from spreading the war. That is what is contemplated. The resolution does not prohibit that or any other kind of activity.

Mr. BREWSTER. I thank the distinguished chairman.

Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, first I say to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas that I approve the action that has been taken, and I approve this resolution. On the matter which was the subject of the colloquy between the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, can we not associate our presence in the Gulf of Tonkin to a degree with our own interpretation of our obligations under the SEATO Treaty?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. I made mention of it. That is a further responsibility that we undertook in alining ourselves with other countries in trying to bring peace and stability into this area. That was another obligation which we undertook. It fortifies our right or responsibility for being in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Mr. MORTON. I believe the action taken by the President helps to avoid any miscalculation on the part of either the North Vietnamese or the Chinese Communists. I believe the joint resolution gives that policy further strength. In my opinion, the three major wars in which we have been involved in this century have come about by miscalculation on the part of the aggressor.

I believe Congress should speak loud and clear and make it plain to any would-be aggressor that we intend to stand here. If we make that clear, we will avoid war, and not have to land vast land armies on the shores of Asia. In that connection I share the apprehension of my friend the Senator from Maryland [Mr. Brewster].

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has put it very clearly. I interpret the joint resolution in the same way. This action is limited, but very sharp. It is the best action that I can think of to deter an escalation or enlargement of the war. If we did not take such action, it might spread further. If we went further and ruthlessly bombed Hanoi and other places, we would be guilty of bad judgment, both on humanitarian grounds and on policy grounds, because then we would certainly inspire further retaliation.

This situation has been handled in the best way possible under the circumstances so as to calm the situation, and not escalate it into a major war.

* * * * *
 Mr. NELSON. I could not hear all the colloquy between the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright] and the Senator from Iowa [Mr. Miller]. I heard a part of it.

As I understand the mission of the United States in South Vietnam for the past 10 years, stating it in the negative, has not been to take over the Government of South Vietnam, and has not been to provide military forces to do battle in place of South Vietnamese forces. To state it in the positive sense, our mission has been to supply a military cadre for training personnel, and advisory military personnel as well as equipment and materiel—our objective being to help in the establishment of an independent stable regime. And, if my memory is right, we had about 1,000 troops there the first 5 or 6 years, up to 1960. There are now approximately 16,000 troops there. In addition, it is now proposed that this number be expanded to, I believe, 21,000.

Looking at sentences of the resolution, I understood it to be the position of the Senator from Iowa [Mr. Miller] that Congress is saying to the President that we would approve the use of any might necessary in order to prevent further aggression. Am I to understand that it is the sense of Congress that we are saying to the executive branch: "If it becomes necessary to prevent further aggression, we agree now, in advance, that you may land as many divisions as deemed necessary, and engage in a direct military assault on North Vietnam if it becomes the judgment of the Executive, the Commander in Chief, that this is the only way to prevent further aggression"?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. As I stated, section 1 is intended to deal primarily with aggression against our forces. "That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

This means to me that it is with regard to our own forces. I believe section 2 deals with the SEATO area, which we are committed to protect under our treaties, particularly when they ask for our assistance.

If the situation should deteriorate to such an extent that the only way to save it from going completely under to the Communists would be action such as the Senator suggests, then that would be a grave decision on the part of our country as to whether we should confine our activities to very limited personnel on land and the extensive use of naval and air power, or whether we should go further and use more manpower.

I personally feel it would be very unwise under any circumstances to put a large land army on the Asian Continent.

It has been a sort of article of faith ever since I have been in the Senate, that we should never be bogged down. We particularly stated that after Korea. We are mobile, we are powerful on the land and on the sea. But when we try to confine ourselves and say that this resolution either prohibits or authorizes such action by the Commander in Chief in defense of this country, I believe that is carrying it a little further than I would care to go.

I do not know what the limits are. I do not think this resolution can be determinative of that fact. I think it would indicate that he would take reasonable means first to prevent any further aggression, or repeal further aggression against our own forces, and that he will live up to our obligations under the SEATO Treaty and with regard to the protocol states.

I do not know how to answer the Senator's question and give him an absolute assurance that large numbers of troops would not be put ashore. I would deplore it. And I hope the conditions do not justify it now.

Mr. NELSON. We may very well not be able to nor attempt to control the discretion that is vested in the Commander in Chief. But the joint resolution is before the Senate, sent to us, I assume, at the request of the executive branch.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. NELSON. It was sent to the Congress in order to ascertain the sense of the Congress on the question. I intend to support the joint resolution. I do not think, however, that Congress should leave the impression that it consents to a radical change in our mission or objective in South Vietnam. That mission there for 10 years, as I have understood it, has been to aid in the establishment of a viable, independent regime which can manage its own affairs, so that ultimately we can withdraw from South Vietnam.

Mr. President, we have been at the task for 10 years. I am not criticizing the original decision to go into South Vietnam. I do not know how long that commitment should be kept in the event we are unable to accomplish our mission. And I would not wish to make a judgment on that question now. But I would be most concerned if the Congress should say that we intend by the joint resolution to authorize a complete change in the mission which we have had in South Vietnam for the past 10 years, and which we have repeatedly stated was not a commitment to engage in a direct land confrontation with our Army as a substitute for the South Vietnam Army or as a substantially reinforced U.S. Army to be joined with the South Vietnam Army in a war against North Vietnam and possibly China.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it seems to me that the joint resolution would be consistent with what we have been doing. We have been assisting the countries in southeast Asia in pursuance of the treaty. But in all frankness I cannot say to the Senator that I think the joint resolution would in any way be a deterrent, a prohibition, a limitation, or an expansion of the President's power to use the Armed Forces in a different way or more extensively than he is now using them. In a broad sense, the joint resolution states that we approve of the action taken with regard to the attack on our own ships, and that we also approve of our country's effort to maintain the independence of South Vietnam.

The Senator from Wisconsin prompts me to make a remark which perhaps I should not make. He has said that we might be mistaken in our action. If any mistake has been made—and I do not assert that it has been—the only questionable area is whether or not we should ever have become involved. That question goes back to the beginning of action in this area, and I do not believe it is particularly pertinent or proper to the debate, because in fact we have become involved. However, the Senator has mentioned it. As an academic matter, the question might be raised. But having gone as far as we have in 10 years, it seems to me that the question now is, How are we to control the situation in the best interest of our own security and that of our allies? I believe that what we did was appropriate. The joint resolution is appropriate, because it would fortify the strength of the Executive and the Government. It would put the Congress on record—and we are the most representative body that we have under our system—as supporting the action. If anything will deter aggression on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Chinese, I believe it would be the action taken together with the joint resolution supporting the action. That is the best I can do about justification of the resolution. In frankness, I do not believe the joint resolution would substantially alter the President's power to use whatever means seemed appropriate under the circumstances. Our recourse in Congress would be that if the action were too inappropriate, we could terminate the joint resolution by a concurrent resolution, and that would precipitate a great controversy between the Executive and the Congress. As a practical question, that could be done.

Mr. NELSON. I have a couple of additional questions. But first I wish to say that I did not suggest that by the use of hindsight I would now conclude that the intervention in 1954 was wrong. I do not know. I understand the necessity for the United States, since it is the leader of the free world, to do all it can in furtherance of the protection of the idea of freedom and independence, and that, to do so, we must take gambles. We shall lose some; we shall win some. I believe the public is slow to recognize that we have vast responsibilities, and they expect us to win every gamble that we take. I do not expect that. And I do not now rise here to criticize the original decision.

But I am concerned about the Congress appearing to tell the executive branch and the public that we would endorse a complete change in our mission. That would concern me.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not interpret the joint resolution in that way at all. It strikes me, as I understand it, that the joint resolution is quite consistent with our existing mission and our understanding of what we have been doing in South Vietnam for the last 10 years.

Mr. NELSON. Did I correctly understand the Senator from Arkansas to say a while ago that the language of the resolution is aimed at the problem of further aggression against our ships and our naval facilities?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is the logical way to interpret the language. It makes reference to the armed attack against the forces of the United States which has just taken place, and to prevention of further aggression against our forces. Then the joint resolution passes on to our obligations under the treaty, which involves other countries.

I believe also that it is implicit, if not explicit, in the next section that the intent is to prevent the continuing aggression that now exists against South Vietnam.

* * * * *
 Mr. FULBRIGHT. This provision is intended to give clearance to the President to use his discretion. We all hope and believe that the President will not use this discretion arbitrarily or irresponsibly. We know that he is accustomed to consulting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with congressional leaders. But he does not have to do that.

Mr. COOPER. I understand, and believe that the President will use this vast power with judgment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. He intends to do it, and he has done it.

Mr. COOPER. I do not wish to take more time now, because the distinguished Senator from Georgia wishes to speak, and I want to hear him.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have no doubt that the President will consult with Congress in case a major change in present policy becomes necessary.

* * * * *
 Mr. MCGOVERN. What I am getting at is, suppose the Government of South Vietnam, for whatever reason, should decide to launch a major military attack on North Vietnam, would we be obligated in any kind of arrangement we have with South Vietnam?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. We have no obligation to follow through with a situation which we believe to be unwise, stupid, or silly. We could disavow it and withdraw and have nothing to do with it. We have no treaty agreement or any other agreement that I know of that binds us to follow through with that.

* * * * *
 Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I note the presence in the Chamber of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright]. We almost exhausted him yesterday in keeping him on the floor to answer questions.

I believe that a very important question is raised by Mr. Reston's article in the New York Times of this morning in respect to our relationship with the South Vietnamese Premier, General Khanh. Mr. Reston writes of the pattern which we followed in respect to the Formosa resolution in 1954. I know the inhibitions of secrecy and the effects upon national policy in all these respects. We may assume that our Government is taking the necessary precautions so that the broad support—to use a juridical term—which we would give to the President in respect to the extended operations of a military character in this area of the world, is not an action by which our freedom of control may be taken away by actions to which the Khanh regime may commit us for practical purposes. But we would have a right to assume in voting the joint resolution that our Government is taking the necessary precautions to see that whatever commitment we undertake is our own, and that we shall not be forced into a position of broadening that commitment against our will because the country in whose interest we are working so hard will commit us beyond what we wish to be committed to as a practical matter.

In short, to be very practical, suppose we are faced with a situation in which the South Vietnamese position should be jeopardized by its own extension of the struggle beyond its own capacity to wage a successful war in North Vietnam. Then what would happen in terms of our commitment and the commitment which our President is empowered to undertake anyhow, but which we would support in the joint resolution?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. As a practical question, there is the closest cooperation between the Government of South Vietnam and our representatives, particularly our Ambassador, General Taylor. I do not believe there is any probability, or even a possibility, that they can commit us beyond what our own people believe to be in the interest of our common effort.

There is some distinction between the present situation and the declared policy of Chiang Kai-shek during the time of the Formosa resolution. As the Senator well knows, it was—and perhaps it still is—his declared intention to retake the mainland of China. That was a question of considerable concern. That government had quite a large army of its own, and perhaps had greater capabilities than presently exist in South Vietnam.

I do not believe there is any substance to the fear that the Vietnamese could involve us beyond the point where we ourselves wish to be involved. I do not think a full scale or a substantial invasion or extension of the war without our approval and assistance could be mounted. No such invasion has been mounted.

I do not know that there is any prospect of it. That is a question which I believe is in the field of tactics, on which I am not competent to comment at the moment. But on the political aspect of the question, I do not think there is any substance to the fear that the South Vietnamese may lead us down a road that we do not wish to travel. It is a question of judgment as to what is the wise road to follow, of course.

The question will remain one of great difficulty until it can be settled. I do not believe there is any reason for such a fear at the present time.

I share with the Senator, as we all do, nervousness over these resolutions. I think it is caused by nervousness about war in general. It is not because of the specific individual involved. We are all nervous about the expansion of the war. I know the President is.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield 2 additional minutes to me, so that I might finish my colloquy with the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New York.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am sure the President shares our concern. Great concern and apprehension are always created by the breaking out of violence in these areas.

Mr. JAVITS. I should like to ask the Senator whether we have a right to feel satisfied that our Government has taken or will take the necessary precautions to see that we shall not be committed beyond the extent to which we wish to be committed by the local Government of South Vietnam itself.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe we have, both in the past and presently. I do not believe that there is any probability of their going off and involving us where we do not wish to be involved. I believe we can maintain complete control over our own commitments.

* * * * *

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I have read the Record. There was some colloquy on the floor yesterday. I noticed that every Senator who spoke had his own personal interpretation of what the joint resolution means.

One Senator yesterday stated for the Record that he understands the resolution to mean that there will be no more privileged sanctuaries.

Another Senator interprets the resolution to mean that it would authorize the Chief Executive to eliminate any aggression, future and present. Some Senators interpret this language to mean aggression against South Vietnam; others interpret it to mean aggression directly against our military forces.

Another Senator interpreted the joint resolution to mean that it is the sense of Congress that no change is suggested by Congress in the present mission in South Vietnam—the mission that has been ours for 10 years, which is to supply advisers, technical advice, and materiel, for the purpose of attempting to encourage the establishment of an independent, viable regime, so that we can withdraw our forces; and that it has not been our mission in the past 10 years to substitute our military forces for the South Vietnamese forces, nor to join with them in a land war, nor to fight their battle for them, nor to substitute our Government for theirs.

This 10-year-old limited mission can be legitimately defended as a responsibility of ours to assist free and independent nations; and it can be legitimately questioned, too, because of the geographic location of that mission.

In any event, I am most disturbed to see that there is no agreement in the Senate on what the joint resolution means. I would like to see it clarified.

If we are telling the public by this resolution that it is our responsibility to use our forces to win a war in southeast Asia—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 5 minutes of the Senator from Wisconsin have expired.

Mr. NELSON. I ask the Senator from Oregon to yield me some time.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I am willing to make a deal with the Senator from Arkansas. If I yield the Senator 4 minutes, will the Senator from Arkansas yield him some time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have only 7 minutes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. All the time for the quorum calls came out of our time.

Mr. MORSE. I did not ask that it come out of the time on the other side. I did not ask for any quorum call. I am willing to enter into a unanimous-consent agreement that the time taken for the quorum calls be not counted.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Perhaps we should find out how the timekeeper can change the record.

Mr. MORSE. I specifically said I would reserve time to yield to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Is it the understanding of the Chair that the last hour was to be equally divided between the two leaders for disposition as they saw fit; and is it also correct that the time for the quorum calls was taken out of our time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, 1 hour was to be divided between the leadership. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, at the request of the Senator from Montana, the time used during the quorum calls was taken out of that 1 hour.

Mr. MORSE. I say most respectfully that quorums calls were asked for by the proponents of the bill.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What happened to my half hour?

Mr. MORSE. The proponents did not have any speakers for the resolution. That is why they suggested the absence of a quorum. Let us be frank about it. We have speakers against the resolution. I shall not deny my colleague from Alaska an opportunity to close the debate on the resolution. It is now 20 minutes to 1. Do Senators still wish to vote at 1 o'clock? How much time have I remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon has 15 minutes remaining. Very briefly let the Chair state that 1 hour was allotted to the majority leader and the minority leader. It was not understood that the time was to be divided between them.

Mr. MORSE. I will reserve 10 minutes of my time for the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Gruening]. The Senators from Arkansas and Illinois may have the rest of the time and use it as they see fit.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Out of whose time is that to come?

Mr. MORSE. I have 15 minutes. I am reserving 10 minutes for the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have 7 minutes.

Mr. MORSE. I will give the Senator 5 minutes of my time.

Mr. NELSON. I wonder if the Senator would accept an amendment.

Mr. MORSE. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin, with the understanding that the time that I have reserved for the Senator from Alaska will be protected.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NELSON. In view of the differing interpretations which have been put upon the joint resolution with respect to what the sense of Congress is, I should like to have this point clarified. I have great confidence in the President. However, my concern is that we in Congress could give the impression to the public that we are prepared at this time to change our mission and substantially expand our commitment. If that is what the sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the resolution. I therefore ask the distinguished Senator from Arkansas if he would consent to accept an amendment, a copy of which I have supplied him. I shall read it into the Record:

On page 3, line 3, after the word "That" insert "(a)".

On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

"(b) The Congress also approves and supports the efforts of the President to bring the problem of peace in southeast Asia to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the President's declaration that the United States, seeking no extension of the present military conflict, will respond to provocation in a manner that is 'limited and fitting'. Our continuing policy is to limit our role to the provision of aid, training assistance, and military advice, and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid a direct military involvement in the southeast Asian conflict."

This amendment is not an interference with the exercise of the President's constitutional rights. It is merely an expression of the sense of Congress. Would the Senator accept the amendment?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It states fairly accurately what the President has said would be our policy, and what I stated my understanding was as to our policy; also what other Senators have stated. In other words, it states that our response should be appropriate and limited to the provocation, which the Senator states as "respond to provocation in a manner that is limited and fitting," and so forth.

We do not wish any political or military bases there. We are not seeking to gain a colony. We seek to insure the capacity of these people to develop along the lines of their own desires, independent of domination by communism.

The Senator has put into his amendment a statement of policy that is unobjectionable. However, I cannot accept the amendment under the circumstances. I do not believe it is contrary to the joint resolution, but it is an enlargement. I am informed that the House is now voting on this resolution. The House joint resolution is about to be presented to us. I cannot accept the amendment and go to conference with it, and thus take responsibility for delaying matters.

I do not object to it as a statement of policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statements. That does not mean that as a practical matter I can accept the amendment. It would delay matters to do so. It would cause confusion and require a conference, and present us with all the other difficulties that are involved in this kind of legislative action. I regret that I cannot do it, even though I do not at all disagree with the amendment as a general statement of policy.

Mr. NELSON. Judging by the Record of yesterday, many Senators do not interpret the resolution in the same way.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Senators are entitled to have different views. However, most members of the committee, with one or two exceptions, interpret it the same way.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Wisconsin has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Differences of interpretation are necessarily always present. I think the Senator's statement is a fair statement.

CHANGE IN SITUATION SINCE RESOLUTION PASSED

The CHAIRMAN. The point is that I, along with most of the committee did not at that time visualize or contemplate that this was going to take the turn that it now appears about to take. I do not know whether resuming bombing will result in escalation, but such statements as in this morning's paper by the chairman of the Subcommittee on Preparedness, indicate that this could well be heading toward a nuclear war. I think that is a mission quite different from what I had in mind at that time.

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, it is entirely fair to say that the exact shape of the situation as it has developed was not known in August of 1964, and that the exact measures which might have to be taken to give effect to the policy could not then be known and completely clarified, because so much of this turns upon what the other side has been doing during this period.

But the policy of the Southeast Asia Treaty and the policy of the resolution has been long known to be the policy of the United States, as expressed both by the executive and the legislative branches.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't you agree though in light of that, that that should not be interpreted as an authorization or approval of an unlimited expansion of the war?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we are not in a position of an unlimited expansion of the war. The steps that have been taken have been taken over a period of time with considerable caution and restraint, while every possibility of peace was being explored. And, on these matters there has been frequent consultation with the various committees and the leadership of the Congress as the situation has developed.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, did you know—

Secretary RUSK. We did not lose contact with the Congress in August 1964. Both sides have been in business, and we have been discussing this matter in great detail since then.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield certainly thinks there is a prospect, a possibility, of what he calls an open-ended conflict which is a euphonious way to say all-out war, and Senator Stennis' statements certainly indicated that he is contemplating the possibility of that or he would not have made such a statement as he made yesterday.

Secretary RUSK. There are some dangers, of course, Mr. Chairman, in any such situation. That problem has been with us in each one of the principal crises we have been faced with since 1945.

NEED FOR FURTHER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, the point comes down to: Don't you think we ought to understand what we are in for, and that the Congress should give its further approval of this changed situation?

Secretary RUSK. Well, that question, as to whether the Congress would wish to take up special action beyond that of August or in connection with the proposal which is before the committee today, is one which is a matter for consideration between the executive and the legislative branches, and I would not have a —

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have any view this morning about it?

Secretary RUSK. A recommendation on that particular point this morning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I will yield to the Senator from South Dakota. Senator MUNDT. Go ahead.

APPROVAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTS AS APPROVAL OF POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to say in view of that, would the approval of this very large increase in authorization be interpreted as an approval of our policy, as indicated it may be by Senator Stennis and others?

Secretary RUSK. You mean the \$12 billion military supplement and this?

The CHAIRMAN. Is this to be taken as an approval of an unlimited expansion of the war?

Secretary RUSK. You are not being asked, Mr. Chairman, for an unlimited expansion of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you are not, but I am talking about the interpretation of it, to be put upon it. In fact, I think I saw in the newspaper an article, I do not wish to put too much credence in that, but I think it said this would be interpreted as an approval of an all-out war.

Would you think it should be interpreted that way?

Secretary RUSK. I think the Executive and Congress must at all times move together on these matters as they have in the past. I think these additional funds, both on the military and economic side —

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think that is responsive. You do not have to answer if you do not like. You can say that is not anticipated. It is not responsive. But do you or don't you think it should be interpreted that way? You do not have to answer it, but the other is not responsive. I do not wish to —

Secretary RUSK. I will have to take it under advisement.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right if you do not wish to answer it, that is quite all right at this time. I do think before we act it ought to be answered.

Senator Mundt.

POSSIBILITY OF ADMINISTRATION PROPOSING NEW RESOLUTION

Senator MUNDT. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, do you think that we have reached a juncture in this era of uncertainty and indecisiveness where, perhaps, the administration should send some statement down which we could approve or disapprove or amend?

Secretary RUSK. Well, as I say, that is a matter that has been under advisement. The Congress has before it two very important pieces of legislation which have to do with a very large supplement to the defense budget, and a very substantial increase in the aid appropriation. That is against the background and in the light of events which have developed since the August 1964 resolution was passed. I would suppose that in the course of this discussion the Congress would have a chance to discuss and to pass judgment upon the situation as we see it at the present time.

Senator MUNDT. Did the President send down a message in conjunction with this other resolution you are talking about?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; there is—

Senator MUNDT. I wonder if there is anything in that message which makes it clear whether or not this was an approval of policy.

Secretary RUSK. In the August 1964 resolution—

I would have to check that, sir. There was, as you know, a very extensive—

Senator MUNDT. Will you check it and put in the record any clarifying statement which might have been included if there was one at that time?

Secretary RUSK. There was, as you know, very full consultation.

Senator MUNDT. It seems to me there was a paragraph there that was very pertinent to this discussion this morning.

Secretary RUSK. There was a full discussion of this with the leadership before this matter was taken up here in the Congress, as you will recall.

Senator MUNDT. Yes; but that was off the record.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, yes; it is on page 122 of the book of documents here. There was a message to Congress on August 5, 1964—a rather short message.

In this message transmitting this on this occasion, the President refers to four simple propositions that he made on June 2:

First, America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

Second, the issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

Third, our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.

It seems quite clear, the way this matter was discussed at the time—it was not related solely to the attack on a ship in the Gulf of Tonkin.

ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator MUNDT. As you know, I have been concerned for a long time about the fact that we are not getting from friendly countries who, I would assume should have the same interest in trying to bring an outcome in South Vietnam which would decrease the likelihood of global war, as we have, and have been disappointed at the results. I do not know whether the results have been bad because our approaches have been wrong, or the results have been bad because of the obduracy on the part of those we have approached.

Do you share my disappointment in the results of our efforts to bring in support from countries who should have the same concern that we have in that area?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would think the committee might wish to have an up-to-date statement on the assistance being provided by other countries. It varies in type and extent. There are more than 35 of them that are giving assistance of some sort.

Senator MUNDT. It is that "some sort" that concerns me.

(The following material was subsequently furnished for the record:)

FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM AS OF JANUARY 15, 1966

FAR EAST

Australia

Australia is providing a wide and substantial range of aid to Vietnam under the Colombo plan and by direct bilateral assistance. Australia has provided approximately \$8 million in technical and economic aid. In addition:

- (1) One infantry battalion.
- (2) One hundred combat advisors (primarily specialists in jungle warfare).
- (3) A 73-man air force unit at Vung Tau with 6 Australian caribou planes which fly daily logistical transport missions in support of Vietnamese military forces.
- (4) Two surgical teams. These teams in addition to performing major operations have established a blood bank and are giving lessons in nursing.
- (5) A group of civil engineers are in Vietnam. These engineers are scheduled to work on water supply and road construction projects in Bien Hoa, and will survey the possibility of other projects such as building two canal bridges in the port of Saigon.
- (6) Three experts in dairy and crop practices and radio techniques.
- (7) Training of 110 Vietnamese in Australia.
- (8) In goods and materials: 1 million textbooks in Vietnamese for rural schools; 3,300 tons of corrugated roofing for Vietnamese military dependents housing; 6 large community windmills; 15,750 sets of handtools; 400 radio sets and 2,400 loudspeakers, 16,000 blankets and 14,000 cases of condensed milk.
- (9) A 50-kilowatt broadcasting station at Ban Me Thout (construction is well underway).

Republic of China

The Republic of China has provided:

- (1) An 80-odd-man agricultural team.
- (2) An 18-man military psychological warfare team.
- (3) An 8-man electrical power mission under the leadership of Tai power.
- (4) A 10-man surgical team.

China is also providing training for more than 200 Vietnamese in Taiwan. In the way of goods and materials, they have provided 26 aluminum prefabricated warehouses, agricultural tools, seeds and fertilizers, 500,000 copies of mathematics textbooks and electrical power substations.

Japan

Japan has provided over \$55 million worth of economic assistance to Vietnam, chiefly through reparations. Of the 90 Japanese personnel now in Vietnam, over 70 are connected with the construction of a large power dam across the Danhim River. Japan has also provided a 6-man medical team, considerable amounts of

medical goods (4,544 cases), 20,000 transistor radios, and 25 ambulances, an electrical transmission line and agreed to the construction of a bridge over the Mekong River near Vinh Long.

Korea

Korea has provided:

- (1) One combat division force.
- (2) A 130-man mobile army surgical hospital (MASH).
- (3) Ten military instructors in Korean karate for training Vietnamese military in hand-to-hand combat.
- (4) A 2,200-man task force unit composed of the following elements:
 - One army engineer battalion.
 - One headquarters group.
 - One army transportation company.
 - One marine corps engineer company.
 - One infantry battalion.
 - One LST and two LSM's.
 - One composite support unit (communications, medical supplies, etc.).

Laos

Laos has provided 1 million kip (\$4,167) for flood relief as of February 1965.

Malaysia

Since 1962 Malaysia has trained about 2,000 Vietnamese military officers. Groups of 30 to 60 are regularly sent for about a month's training in counterinsurgency with Malaysian Police Special Constabulary. Malaysia plans to continue the program in 1965. Malaysia has previously provided substantial amounts of counterinsurgency materials, primarily military and police transport such as armored vehicles.

New Zealand

New Zealand decided to send an artillery battery. It also has provided a 25-man army engineer detachment, and a 6-man surgical team and a professor in English language for the University of Saigon. They are presently training 62 Vietnamese in New Zealand and have provided £7,500 for equipment for a technical high school. They are also assisting by providing approximately \$200,000 for a science building at the University of Saigon.

Philippines

At present, the Philippines has 70 personnel in Vietnam. These consist of military and civilian medical teams and a military psychological warfare detachment.

Thailand

The Thai have a 17-man military air detachment with 7 C-47 pilots, 1 navigator, and 9 maintenance men on duty flying operational transport missions for the Vietnamese forces. In addition, they have provided cement and zinc roofing materials and provided jet training for Vietnamese pilots in Thailand.

MIDDLE EAST

Greece

Greece has contributed medical supplies.

Turkey

Turkey has provided medicines and also offered to provide a substantial amount of cement.

Iran

Iran has contributed 1,000 tons of petroleum products to Vietnam and has dispatched a medical team consisting of 22 personnel to Vietnam.

Israel

Israel made a gift of pharmaceutical supplies and has offered to train Vietnamese in Israel in various fields.

India

India has provided cloth for flood relief and has under study the creation in Vietnam of a factory for the preparation of tea and another for sugar, within the framework of a program of technical assistance and economic cooperation.

India is also considering the provision of equipment necessary for a blood transfusion center.

Pakistan

Pakistan has contributed financial relief assistance for flood victims and has also donated clothing.

EUROPE

Austria

Austria has agreed to supply medical supplies, blankets, tents, through the Austrian Red Cross.

Belgium

Belgium has provided medicines.

Canada

Canada is providing:

(1) Personnel in Vietnam: A professor of orthopedics at Saigon University section of Cho Ray Hospital, Saigon.

(2) Vietnamese in Canada: About 200 on scholarships both academic and technical, most of them for about 4 to 5 years of training, many in engineering. About 65 more students will go this year.

(3) One hundred and fifty thousand dollars worth of flour. Funds generated by sales are used for capital construction projects in Vietnam. Since 1958, Canada has provided \$850,000 worth of flour and butter for Vietnam.

(4) A new science building for the medical faculty at the University of Hue, costing VN\$17 million. Construction has passed the halfway mark, with completion expected this year.

They have agreed to construct an auditorium for the Faculty of Sciences at Hue University, scheduled to begin soon, costing VN\$7,500,000.

Denmark

Denmark has provided medical supplies and is willing to train Vietnamese nurses in Denmark.

France

Since 1956, France has contributed \$111 million in assistance to South Vietnam.

France has nearly 500 persons serving in South Vietnam. Among them are 65 experts under France's program of economic and technical assistance, including 32 physicians, professors and other medical personnel. Under its cultural programs, France sent 417 professors to teach in Vietnamese universities and schools. There are 168 Vietnamese in France, 88 under fellowships for technical training and 80 academic fellowships.

France has provided low-interest credits of Fr100 million (\$20 million) for financing imports of French equipment for Vietnamese industry, and a grant of Fr500,000 for equipment for L'Ecole Nationale d'Ingenieurs des Arts Industriels.

In 1960 France extended a low-interest credit of Fr70 million to aid construction of the major coal and chemical complex at An Hoa-Nong Son, south of Danang, which is now well underway. It also provided a low-interest, 5-year credit of Fr60 million for construction of Vietnam's largest cement-producing complex with plants at Hatien and Thu Duc. In 1964, France provided a Fr930,000 grant for the installation of a training center for electrical technicians.

Germany

Personnel in Vietnam—provided 12; agreed 14 more; total, 26.

Provided six Germans, a director and five instructors, in the German-taught vocational section at Cao Thang Technical High School in Saigon.

Agreed, in September, to transform the above section into the new Vietnamese-German Technical High School, under construction at Thu Duc near Saigon.

Provided, at Hue University, five experts: Three physicians in the medical school, a professor of music, a professor of German language.

Agreed to addition of about nine more experts for Hue Medical School.

Provided an expert in forestry at the Department of Rural Affairs, Saigon.

Agreed to two experts, in planning and in exportation.

Vietnamese in Germany—40 provided; agreed 30 more, total: 70.

Provided 40.

Agreed to 20 for 22 months' training as future instructors in the technical high school. A considerable number have previously been trained.

Agreed to 10 for technical training for the An Hoa-Nong Son coal and chemical complex south of Danang.

Goods and materials:

Provided 30 ambulances for Ministry of Health.

Provided a commodity credit of DM15 million for import of German products such as machine tools, fertilizer, etc. The piaster funds generated go to the National Office of Agricultural Credit to aid farmers, particularly with loans.

Provided a credit of DM50 million for development of the major industrial complex at An Hoa-Nong Son.

Provided a credit of DM20 million for construction of an abattoir at Saigon-Cholon, and for construction of three merchant ships.

Provided a credit of DM500,000 for construction of the Vietnamese-German Technical High School at Thu Duc.

Provided a grant with a value of DM1 million to purchase batteries for receiver-transmitter radios for the Ministry of Information and Psychological Warfare, and of gasoline pumps for the Department of Rural Affairs.

Agreed: A 3,000-ton hospital ship for duty in Vietnam.

Ireland

The Irish people have contributed £1,000 to Vietnam through their Red Cross.

Italy

The Italians have provided a nine-man surgical team and are providing science scholarships for the next several years.

Luxembourg

Luxembourg has provided plasma and blood transfusion equipment.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands. The Dutch have given antibiotics worth VN\$200,000 (November 1964). They have sent two medical/surgical teams to Vietnam. Also one dredge now in Saigon.

Spain

Spain has provided 800 pounds of medicines, medical equipment and blankets, and has agreed to send a military medical team to Vietnam.

Switzerland

The Swiss have provided microscopes for the University of Saigon.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has provided six civilians for the British Advisory Mission and a professor of English at Hue University. With 8 Vietnamese already in training in the United Kingdom, Britain has agreed to provide for 12 more this year.

In 1963-64 the United Kingdom provided the following goods and materials: Laboratory equipment for Saigon University; a typesetting machine for the government printing office; a cobalt deep-ray therapy unit for the National Cancer Institute; various equipment for the Faculties of Medicine, Science, and Pharmacy at Saigon University, the Meteorological Service and the Agricultural School at Saigon, and Atomic Research Establishment at Dalat and the Faculty of Education at Hue. The United Kingdom also agreed to provide 50,000 British pounds worth of roadbuilding equipment and £6,000 worth of diesel fishing boat engines.

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina

The Argentines have sent two observers to Vietnam to examine the possibilities for Argentine assistance and have agreed to send material to assist in refugee relief.

Brazil

Brazil has provided coffee and medical supplies.

Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic has offered cement for use in Vietnam.

Ecuador

Ecuador has sent medical supplies to Vietnam.

Guatemala

Guatemala has sent 15,000 doses of typhoid-paratyphoid serum for use in Vietnam.

Uruguay

Uruguay has promised to send foodstuffs and medicines to Vietnam.

Venezuela

Venezuela has agreed to provide 500 tons of rice for refugee relief.
(The following information was obtained from the Department of Defense.)

FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE FOR VIETNAM

There are presently 38 nations, not including the United States and France, contributing or having promised assistance to South Vietnam. Assistance from 31 countries is in place; assistance from 7 other countries has been promised. The following is a list of assistance in place except as otherwise noted:

Country	Nature of aid	Persons in South Vietnam
Argentina.....	To come: Foodstuffs.	
Australia.....	Combat infantry division with logistic support, 100 combat advisors, 6 aircraft and crews, 2 medical teams, radio station, 1,000,000 textbooks, 3,300 tons of roofing, 6 windmills, 15,750 sets of handtools, 400 radios, 16,000 blankets, 14,000 cases of milk. [Deleted.]	1,400
Austria.....	Blankets and medicines.	
Belgium.....	Medicines.	
Brazil.....	Medical supplies and coffee.	
Canada.....	Professor of orthopedics, 130 scholarships, \$850,000 worth of flour and butter, \$170,000 science building. To come: \$7,500 auditorium for Hue University.	1
China.....	80-man agricultural team, 18-man psywar team, electrical power aid, 2 surgical teams, 26 warehouses, 500,000 textbooks. [Deleted.]	160
Costa Rica.....	To come: Medical assistance.	
Denmark.....	Medical supplies.	
Dominican Republic.....	To come: Cement.	
Ecuador.....	Medical assistance.	
El Salvador.....	To come: Medical assistance.	
Germany.....	Professors, physicians, forestry expert, technical advisors, 30 ambulances, \$20,000,000 in credits, \$250,000 worth of radio batteries. To come: 3,000-ton hospital ship at cost of \$10,000,000 being outfitted; additional professors, technical experts, and credits.	23
Greece.....	Medical supplies. [Deleted.]	
Guatemala.....	15,000 doses typhoid vaccine.	
Honduras.....	To come: Medical assistance.	
India.....	Cloth for flood relief. To come: Tea and sugar factory and blood transfusion equipment under study.	
Iran.....	1,000 is tons of petroleum, oil, and lubricants, medical team.	22
Ireland.....	\$2,800 in cash.	
Israel.....	Pharmaceutical supplies.	
Italy.....	9-man surgical team, science scholarships.	9
Japan.....	\$55,000,000 in economic aid, 6-man medical team, 20,000 radios, 25 ambulances.	90
Korea.....	1 combat division, mobile army surgical hospital, combat engineers, 2 LSM's, 1 LST. [Deleted].	20,320
Laos.....	\$4,167 in cash for flood relief.	
Luxembourg.....	Plasma and blood transfusion equipment.	
Malaysia.....	Counterinsurgency training for 2,000 RVNAF officers.	
Netherlands.....	2 surgical teams, 1 dredge, \$2,000 worth of antibiotics.	10
New Zealand.....	105 millimeter howitzer battery, surgical team, \$200,000 science building.	150
Nicaragua.....	To come: Medical assistance.	
Pakistan.....	Clothing and \$10,000 in cash for flood relief.	
Philippines.....	Medical teams and psywar team. [Deleted].	70
Spain.....	Medical team, 800 pounds of medicines, blankets.	
Switzerland.....	30 microscopes.	
Thailand.....	[Deleted] cement.	
Turkey.....	Medical supplies. To come: Cement.	17
United Kingdom.....	Police instructors, professor, technical equipment, \$140,000 worth of construction equipment.	12
Uruguay.....	To come: Medical supplies.	
Venezuela.....	500 tons of rice.	

NOTE.—The French, though their policies in South Vietnam differ from ours, continue to have some 600 educators, medical and technical personnel there.

In addition to the above, negotiations are underway between the Government of Vietnam and most of the nations having already provided assistance for increased contributions.

Administration: FWA forces are jointly administered by the International Military Assistance Force Office in Saigon, which has representation from every country having FWA personnel in Republic of Vietnam. A CINCPAC policy and procedures manual has been prepared for use in negotiations and administration of FWA forces. The Department of State coordinates the U.S. Interagency FWA effort; OSD/ISA/FER is the DOD point of contact.

Prepared by: OASD/ISA/FER, Jan. 15, 1966.

Secretary RUSK. You know we have 20,000 Koreans engaged in combat there. We have the Australian-New Zealand combat team which is in combat there. There are other forces involved in various aspects of it. The bulk of it continues to be carried by the South Vietnamese.

Yes; we are disappointed that more forces from more countries are not present on the scene.

AID PROVIDED BY INDIA

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you one or two specific questions in that area. Is India included in that group of 32 nations?

Secretary RUSK. She has made some contribution but it is a relatively—India has provided cloth for flood relief. Under study is the preparation of facilities for tea and sugar, and she has considered sending equipment for the blood transfusion center.

Senator MUNDT. Some cloth and some blood. That is the limit?

Secretary RUSK. Thus far; yes, sir.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA IN 1962

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you what happened back in 1962 when India had some pretty rough going, as I recall, with the Red Chinese when they were attacking her borders. At that time we provided some direct military assistance, did we not?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; we and Britain joined to provide certain assistance to India at that time.

Senator MUNDT. Nehru was then the leader, was he not?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. Did Nehru ask the United States, through an appeal to President Kennedy at that time, for air protection?

Secretary RUSK. There was some discussion of that at that time, sir.

Senator MUNDT. That is very evasive, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. I beg your pardon?

Senator MUNDT. That was evasive. Either Nehru asked for air assistance or he did not.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we are in open session. I could go into closed session. It is not proper for me to go into communications with chiefs of government on matters of that sort in open session.

Senator MUNDT. Well, let me put it this way: Did the United States provide some air protection for India at that time?

Secretary RUSK. We provided some transport aircraft, as I recall. I would have to refresh my memory on whether there was more air support than that at that point.

We also assisted in certain air defense measures, such as radar, things of that kind.

Senator MUNDT. There are some things that have to be off the record but I cannot expect you to present in detail or remember in detail, but will you search your memory and the record and put in the record at this time whether we did provide some protection and aircraft carriers and planes at that time?

Secretary RUSK. I will, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA DURING 1962 BORDER INCIDENTS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

The United States provided U.S. Air Force transport aircraft for a short time to help India move troops and supplies, and in addition provided directly some military equipment to the Indian Government. The United States did not provide air protection, i.e., combat aircraft, but discussed air defense arrangements. In 1963, an air defense agreement with India was signed under which, later that year, planes and personnel from the Royal Air Force, the U.S. Air Force, and the Indian Air Force conducted an air defense exercise in India at the request of the Indian Government.

Senator MUNDT. Second, it is correct, is it not, that we would not have provided that kind of protection at that time without being asked by somebody in India for some assistance? We did not go around looking for a chance to spread ourselves into new areas of dissension, I hope?

Secretary RUSK. Whatever we did was with the full consent and with the—in accordance with the—wishes of the Indian Government; yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Well, I would kind of like to relate that to this discussion we are having about North Vietnam. I understand we are not just going out voluntarily pushing our way into Vietnam. We are doing that in response to a request from the Saigon government.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator MUNDT. And I would like to think that we are not in this situation in a different posture than we were in India from the standpoint of the initiation of the support. I like to think whatever we are doing is consistent with the American policy, and I am a little disappointed that you give the impression that we have to push ourselves into any kind of conflict without being asked, and if we did it in India, we maybe did it here.

Secretary RUSK. No; I did not in any way intend to leave that impression. Throughout the course of the morning I have pointed out—

Senator MUNDT. You left that with me in response to that last answer.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. We do not go about looking for business in this matter. We have specific commitments, and we follow as best we can the national interests when particular situations arise.

I just did not want to get into communications among chiefs of government in an open hearing. That was the only reluctance I had, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. Without going into the details of the specific communication—

Secretary RUSK. India asked us.

Senator MUNDT. I am a little disenchanted with all this kind of superduper secrecy about a peacetime operation. I begin to realize why we do not get any better responses from our supposed friends, why we do not get better books and occasionally go around and say, "Look, we recall in November 1962 that Mr. Nehru asked the President of the United States for air protection and we gave it." Those are the facts. And those being the facts, and those facts becoming known in India, it has to follow there is a better chance to get the great populous country of India to provide manpower and support and even men, which, as you know, has been advocated by some speakers in the Indian Parliament. If the Indian people know that is the fact, that is going

to help us. If you shroud it in all this secrecy in every instance when we responded to a request, no wonder we cannot induce the people of India and France and Britain to feel they have an obligation now as a quid pro quo to do something to assist us, because we are doing this, I am convinced, for no selfish purpose as far as the United States is concerned. This is in the interest of world peace.

But I think we should have it a little clearer in the record if we are ever going to get off of dead center, you must be as concerned as I am, and that this committee is, and the country is, to get from other countries more support in a great contest which, if it goes wrong, could be of more immediate danger to India than to us.

So they might feel they have an obligation to do something beside contribute blood to a blood bank and a little cloth.

Whatever our problems are, Mr. Secretary, in South Vietnam, they are not because of an absence of cloth or a shortage of cloth. That is not of very direct aid to winning the victory.

Secretary RUSK. Well, our effort on this is primarily working with governments in the ways in which governments usually work together. We have not attempted to take this up with a country like India through the media of public opinion. We would like to have more assistance in South Vietnam from more countries and a great many different types of assistance.

Senator MUNDT. To get that, don't we have to create a public opinion in those countries in support of our proposal?

Secretary RUSK. I think our proper procedure from the point of view of the Government is to take this matter up with other governments.

Senator MUNDT. I yield.

CONTRIBUTION OF TROOPS BY AUSTRALIA

The CHAIRMAN. Just in that connection, last fall I made a very mild remark that the Australians might consider a little larger contribution, and the very next day—I do not know whether it was you—someone in the administration, sent Prime Minister Menzies a congratulatory telegram of reassurance of how much we appreciated their wonderful contribution. It did not evidence to me any great concern about trying to get any more help. I thought I was trying to help you get a little bit more, but they took exactly the opposite view up here in Washington.

Do you remember that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; I do. I think your remark was interpreted in Australia as minimizing and deprecating what they were doing.

Senator GORE. That is what he intended.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought it was very little; 1,300 men, I believe they have. This is a very prosperous country, close to the southeast Asia area. If anybody would be interested in helping, I would think it would be the Australians for their own self-interests aside from this overall problem of freedom, protection of freedom. I have great admiration for the Australians. But I do think that they are not making a very burdensome contribution with only 1,300 men.

They challenged me. They said this was just as much relative to population as we were making. My arithmetic did not seem to work out that way, and there was a little difference in view about that.

That is all I wanted to say. I did not think we were exerting ourselves much to increase our contribution.

I am sorry, go ahead, Senator.

NEED FOR GREATER FREE WORLD PARTICIPATION

Senator MUNDT. You have the same problem in India and in France and in West Germany and in Japan and in Great Britain, Mr. Secretary, that you have here. Whenever there is uncertainty on the part of our populace or Members of the Senate or the House as to the reasons why we are doing something, there is a tendency to hold back. There is a lot of consultation by petition, by resolution and by statements now because there is a developing uncertainty in this country among the people as to what this is all about.

Well, now, one, I think we have got to get a clear-cut understanding from the people—for a long time we had pretty well in this country—which is getting confused because the leadership of the country is becoming more vague in its approach to these things. But I do not see how, unless we can help bring the world into this thing, the people of the world, in free, democratic countries like India and Britain and France, West Germany and Japan, they have got a stake in this, so that they can begin to realize that when they come to us and ask for legitimate assistance and it is provided, there is nothing wrong in the world for their leaders to provide a little assistance on our behalf.

But you say if we won't let the people in the country know—you said we should talk to the leaders.

Secretary RUSK. I beg your pardon, Senator. Our role here in the executive branch of the Government is in dealing with the heads of other countries. I hope all of these countries will listen to what you said today and think about it. But if I were to pursue this line of discussion with respect to individual countries, I would get in the way of what you and I would hope to accomplish in this direction. We cannot do this, I cannot do this, now in open session. You can, but I cannot.

Senator MUNDT. Let me give you an illustration. I have here a page from the record of the Indian Parliament where one of the Indian parliamentarians was making what I felt was a real fine, courageous plea for support of his Government for us. He said:

I wondered why such a big country as ours, India, cannot afford to set aside and maintain at our cost, say, a brigade of Indian troops for the United Nations peacekeeping force ready to go anywhere in the world, even to Vietnam, if necessary?

What happens? The Government of India denies that they ever asked any help from the United States and ever got it. Now, the facts are clear. But the people, because we failed to present the facts, are going to believe their statesmen even though it was based upon misinformation. I do not think maybe this fellow intended to misrepresent it, but it was based upon misinformation. But whether he lied deliberately or made a misstatement because he did not research the record, the effect is the same if it goes unchallenged.

Secretary RUSK. Some months ago the President of India proposed that there be organized a peacekeeping force among Afro-Asian countries, perhaps under the U.N. auspices, to keep the peace in the south Asian situation.

We thought that was a very interesting and positive proposal, and indicated a very direct interest to it.

Peiping and Hanoi just brushed it aside with vilification. They would have nothing to do with it. But there was an interesting proposal from India in that direction.

Senator MUNDT. Have we asked India directly, as you have asked, I know, many other countries, to step up its support of this free world effort in Vietnam by supplying some manpower?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I really——

Senator MUNDT. Or is that something you cannot tell us?

Secretary RUSK. I really do not think I should get into particular countries or particular types of assistance under the circumstances.

The South Vietnamese Government has asked a considerable number of countries for help in the first instance. We have strongly supported that and have talked it over a great many times with many different governments. We hope more help will be forthcoming. We hope many countries will do more than they are doing and within the limits of what they find it possible to do, both from the point of view of resources and the point of view of their own internal situations.

Many of them have extremely difficult internal situations, as do we at times. But I do not think I can pursue this on a country-by-country basis under the circumstances.

Senator MUNDT. Well, all I can say on that is if the people of the United States and the Members of the Senate cannot find out what our policy has been in that connection, it is a sure shot bet that the people of those democratic countries know nothing about it, and I think I am beginning to realize why our results have been so abysmally bad in getting the kind of support we should have.

Secretary RUSK. There is no problem about the policy.

The policy is that we and the South Vietnamese would welcome the broadest range of support from as many countries as possible and the widest range of means of assistance, including men.

Senator MUNDT. Right. But you are never going to get, Mr. Secretary, get help winking at the leaders in the dark. You have got to let the people know what is going on, I believe.

Secretary RUSK. I doubt that I can move this very far by making speeches rather than working with them in foreign offices and with their governments. The time may be when the combination of what you are saying——

Senator MUNDT. We have tried for some time, and we have come up with some cloth and some blood. We can get along without that. We ought to come up with something better, and I think we ought to use a different approach. But if you do not want to discuss it, you need not discuss it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator Church.

Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, in connection with other countries, it seems to me that you have tried very hard to enlist the support of other countries in ways that are open to you as the Secretary of State.

If other countries have not responded, I think it is not due to any mistake in tactics on your part, but because those countries, for their own reasons, either see the war differently than we do, and do not think their vital interests require them to participate, or feel that we

will take care of the war for them, and thus that they need not participate.

Whatever their reasons, I do not think it is due to any failure on your part to indicate the American interest in getting further participation in the Vietnamese war.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.

WHERE ARE POLICIES LEADING THE NATION?

Senator CHURCH. You have said, two or three times this morning, that you are distressed that our concern should be shown suddenly when the going gets tough. I simply want to say for the record that I have shown my concern about our policies for the past 2 years. I have spoken out in every way I know. I have written articles. I have made speeches in the Senate long before the going got tough, because it seemed to me that our policy was heading us into the predicament in which we now find ourselves.

That predicament, I think, has little to do with past resolutions of the Congress or the legality of the present situation in the light of American treaty commitments.

I do not think that, in the face of the actuality of war, Congress is going to repeal the war. There is very little to do but support the American boys who are committed there with such funds as may be required.

The real question, it seems to me, gets down to a closer examination of our policy and where it is leading us in the world.

From what you have said this morning, it seems to me that you draw no significant distinction between the kind of threat we faced in Korea and the kind of guerrilla war situation that now confronts us in Vietnam. In either case you have indicated that this is Communist aggression.

In the former case it is overt, in the latter case covert, but nonetheless the kind of Communist aggression that requires us to intervene with large American forces to draw the line, so to speak, in Asia as we drew it in earlier years in Europe.

Is that a fair statement of your position?

Secretary RUSK. With respect to those situations where we have a particular commitment, not as a matter of general philosophy.

But, Senator, let me make a comment on this brief question of predicament. I think one would not understand this situation at all unless one were to call it for what it is, namely, Ho Chi Minh's war. It is not McNamara's war; it is not the United States war. It is Ho Chi Minh's war. Maybe it is Mao Tse-ting's war in terms of the support that he has given to Ho Chi Minh, and the roadblocks he has thrown against any possibilities of peace.

We have made a major effort since the spring of 1961 to find a peaceful solution to this problem of southeast Asia. Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev talked about it in Vienna in June 1961. They agreed that everybody ought to leave Laos alone. That led to the Geneva Conference on Laos and the agreement on Laos.

That was a good agreement. It did not work because Hanoi did not for a day take its men out of Laos as it was supposed to, and did not for a day stop its infiltration of North Vietnamese into South Vietnam by the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos, specifically contrary to that agreement.

Nevertheless, there have literally been hundreds of discussions with other governments, including governments on the other side, in the intervening period, trying to probe the possibilities of a peaceful settlement.

During 1965 alone I myself had more than 120 discussions with the highest officers of other governments all over the world on just this point, on just this point.

During the past 35 days there has been a major new effort to enlist the assistance of other governments including Communist governments, to bring this matter to a peaceful conclusion. Those efforts have been harshly and peremptorily rejected by the other side. The infiltration continues. This is Ho Chi Minh's war.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, if I may interrupt there?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; please.

Senator CHURCH. I have never called this war McNamara's war.

Secretary RUSK. I understand, and I am not arguing with you, Senator. I just wanted to make the predicament clear.

Senator CHURCH. If it is Ho Chi Minh's war, is it not true that Ho Chi Minh was the chief architect in securing Vietnamese independence against the French?

Secretary RUSK. He was the leader of a nationalist movement that had in it many elements, and many of the elements of that nationalist movement are now in South Vietnam supporting and trying to build a system in South Vietnam that is not Communist.

Senator CHURCH. Is it not true that at the time that the war was fought and the French were driven out, that Ho Chi Minh was generally regarded as the leader of the revolutionary effort?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. So if this now is Ho Chi Minh's war, that may be one of the reasons why so many Vietnamese are willing to die in it.

Secretary RUSK. Well, they may—

POLICY TOWARD REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL CHANGES

Senator CHURCH. It seems to me that there is a difference between guerrilla war or revolution and the kind of aggression that we faced in Korea and in Europe, and, further, that the underdeveloped world is going to be beset with guerrilla wars, regardless of the outcome in Vietnam, and that we will have to live in a world afflicted with such revolutions for a long time to come.

That is why it is so important to try to determine what our basic foreign policy attitude is going to be in dealing with these revolutionary wars in many parts of the underdeveloped world in the future; and, as I have listened to your explanations this morning, I gather that wherever a revolution occurs against an established government, and that revolution, as most will doubtlessly be, is infiltrated by Communists, that the United States will intervene, if necessary, to prevent a Communist success.

This, at least, has been the policy we followed in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam. I wonder whether this is going to continue to be the policy as we face new guerrilla wars in the future?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think it is very important that the different kinds of revolutions be distinguished. We are in no sense committed against change. As a matter of fact, we are stimulating,

ourselves, very sweeping revolutions in a good many places. The whole weight and effort of the Alliance for Progress is to bring about far-reaching social, economic changes.

Senator CHURCH. That is change sought, Mr. Secretary, without violence. History shows that the most significant change has been accompanied by violence.

Do you think that with our foreign aid program we are going to be able, with our money, to avert serious uprisings in all of these destitute countries in future years?

Secretary RUSK. Not necessarily avert all of them, but I do believe there is a fundamental difference between the kind of revolution which the Communists call their wars of national liberation, and the kind of revolution which is congenial to our own experience, and fits into the aspirations of ordinary men and women right around the world.

There is nothing liberal about that revolution that they are trying to push from Peiping. This is a harsh, totalitarian regime. It has nothing in common with the great American revolutionary tradition, nothing in common with it.

Senator CHURCH. The objectives of Communist revolution are clearly very different indeed from the earlier objectives of our own. But objectives of revolutions have varied through the centuries.

The question that I think faces this country is how we can best cope with the likelihood of revolt in the underdeveloped world in the years ahead, and I have very serious doubts that American military intervention will often be the proper decision. I think too much intervention on our part may well spread communism throughout the ex-colonial world rather than thwart it.

Now, the distinction you draw between the Communist type of guerrilla war and other kinds of revolution, if I have understood it correctly, has been based upon the premise that in Vietnam the North Vietnamese have been meddling in the revolution in the south and, therefore, it is a form of aggression on the part of the north against the south.

But I cannot remember many revolutions that have been fought in splendid isolation. There were as many Frenchmen at Yorktown when Cornwallis surrendered as there were American Continentals.

Senator Pell tells me more. I accept the correction.

In any case, it seems to me that the Communists have not changed the rules of revolution by meddling in them, regardless of how much we disapprove of their goals.

When we were an infant nation we stood up for the right of revolution, and I am afraid—

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I just cannot—

Senator CHURCH. I am afraid, what I am worried about, Mr. Secretary, is this: That if we intervene too much in wars of this type, our policy may well turn out to be self-defeating.

Secretary RUSK. May turn out to be what?

Senator CHURCH. Self-defeating.

The CHAIRMAN. Self-defeating.

Senator CHURCH. I think that the most significant thing about the underdeveloped countries in recent years is the conspicuous lack of progress that the Communists have made in taking them over and where they have had success it has usually been in places where communism has been able to catch hold of nationalist aspirations, as in

Vietnam, where the Communist leader happened to be the authentic architect of Vietnamese independence.

Secretary RUSK. Senator I cannot identify—

Senator CHURCH. Just to complete my point, Mr. Secretary, I think that in these areas where the sensitivity toward Western imperialism, born of three centuries of colonialism, is so very great that Mao Tse-tung might want us to move in with a massive importation of Western troops from the opposite side of the world believing that this intervention serves the larger interests of China in Asia, and tends to spread communism by identifying communism with Asian nationalism, and our own policy with the hated old Western imperialism.

To be sure this is not how we regard our policy nor how we define our objectives. But the important thing is how Asians look at it, and in that respect Mao Tse-tung may have a better basis for judgment than do we.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I cannot for a moment find a way to identify the purposes of the Liberation Front organized in Hanoi in 1960 with the purposes of the American Revolution or the purposes of the national revolutions which we associate with decolonization.

We are prepared, and have said so over and over again publicly and privately, to let the South Vietnamese themselves decide that question. The other side is not willing to do that. They are not prepared to let the South Vietnamese choose their government.

They said as late as this morning in a Hanoi broadcast—or at least in a letter to the chiefs of the other Communist countries—that the Liberation Front must be accepted as the sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people.

Now, we know very well from our many, many contacts with the South Vietnamese people and their leaders, and not just those in government but outside, that that is exactly what the South Vietnamese people do not want. This can be tested in a free election.

The 325th Division that moved from North Vietnam to South Vietnam did not come in there to provide the South Vietnamese with a liberal, democratic revolution in keeping with the modern trend of the sort of revolutions that we should welcome—not at all.

Senator CHURCH. Couldn't this question have been tested by a free election in 1956 in South Vietnam? Aren't we all these years late?

Secretary RUSK. And in North Vietnam.

Senator CHURCH. After all the blood and treasure we have spent, aren't we coming around full circle to what we might have done then without the intervening agony?

Secretary RUSK. Well, this was not tested in North Vietnam or in South Vietnam in 1955 or 1956, and I know very well that the South Vietnamese are not going to be the first people in history free to elect a Communist regime. I do not know what the people in North Vietnam would do if they had a chance to vote and have a free election.

Senatore GORE. Would the Senator yield?

Senator CHURCH. I would be pleased to.

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I think you may observe from the number of questions this morning that there is some need to spell out in detail to the American people the validity of our position in South Vietnam.

I am willing to accept, as I indicated earlier, the fact that we are there, misguidedly or wisely.

POSITIONS OF RUSSIA AND CHINA

In this exchange of views, which I hope may result in some benefit, I would like to submit to you that Vietnam is not the big factor here. The big factor is the equation between the Big Three Powers involved there.

I was impressed that you quoted, impressed with the statement which you quoted of a minister, a foreign minister, of an Iron Curtain country which he made to you, to wit, that the biggest problem in the world today was to bring the Red Chinese to the acceptance of the principle of peaceful coexistence. I do not recall whether you quoted him as saying it was the biggest problem or one of the biggest problems.

Secretary RUSK. I think he said the biggest problem.

Senator GORE. I would agree that is one of the biggest problems. I am not sure it is not the biggest problem, viewed in the long run.

What is your reflection upon this statement of this foreign minister?

Secretary RUSK. I think that the doctrine of an unlimited world revolution by militant means is a doctrine that is so incompatible with the peace of the world and the system of international society that we are trying to build on the United Nations Charter, that it is certainly one of the largest questions, if not the largest question.

Senator GORE. I agree.

Now, if that be the case, the equation between the three big powers, the United States, Russia, and China, is the important element involved in this predicament, as Senator Church described it.

In the formulation of policy, I would urge you to urge upon the President the prime consideration of those factors rather than the loss of face or other factors that might be involved with respect to Vietnam proper.

This, it seems to me, is where the danger of a nuclear war rests. I would be most reluctant to see this country play brinksmanship with nuclear war. I would not wish to approve such a policy.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, those are matters that are taken fully and earnestly into account.

I do not think that I would agree, and I do not think you were saying, that the shape of the world should be determined by these three great powers at the expense of the interests and the rights of the other nations.

Senator GORE. No, I did not say that.

Secretary RUSK. No, you did not say that. But the issues that you mentioned are fully taken into account in all of our considerations.

Senator GORE. You recognize then that the equation between the three large powers involved here will determine whether or not there is to be a global war?

Secretary RUSK. I would not limit it to that equation. I think that the problem of general war is somewhat more complicated than that. But this is a very important part of the problem.

Senator GORE. A war between the United States and North Vietnam is not a global war. We are having that one now.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator GORE. So if it is to be escalated into a world conflagration, it is not with the power of Vietnam so to escalate it. Such an escalation would either have to come from us through an attack upon or

confrontation with or hostilities with a world power or an action on their part to engage us in hostilities.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I was not thinking specifically of Vietnam. I was just reluctant, as a general matter, to say that the problem of a general war is solely that among those three that you mentioned.

Senator GORE. Well, I thank you for that. If you will pass that along I would appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Secretary RUSK. I have an urgent appointment at 1 o'clock that I should keep if I can.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have one question? Then we will adjourn and let the Secretary go.

Senator PELL. Right.

UNITED NATIONS ROLE

In brief, what would be the reason why we have not taken this to the United Nations or if we have not, why has not some other small nation under the charter taken this situation with respect to peace to the Security Council?

Secretary RUSK. The problem of southeast Asia has been before the United Nations on occasion, and in a most formal sense in August 1964.

The matter is discussed regularly among the members of the Security Council and, particularly, the permanent members with the Secretary General. The question is whether formal consideration there, as opposed to quiet exploration, is a better way to get on with the possibilities of opening up a peaceful settlement. Thus far it has been the opinion of those in New York primarily responsible for this that a formal meeting of the Security Council on this would result in a bitter debate with no outcome and, therefore, the parties as well as the Secretary General might better be left free to explore other ways of getting at it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I understand you had an appointment, so we will excuse you.

I am going to put in the record at your request a telegram from Mr. Lodge.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator PELL. I have a question for Mr. Bell. I wonder if he could stay.

Mr. BELL. I can stay.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary, you may go, we will have just a few more things.

Senator GORE. Senator Clark would like two articles put in the record.

(The documents referred to follow:)

SIXTY PERCENT OF DELTA PEOPLE SEEN AS RED ADHERENTS

(By Ward Just, Washington Post foreign service)

(Washington Post, Sunday Jan. 23, 1966)

SONDONG, SOUTH VIETNAM, January 22.—South from Saigon, the delta country lies flat and rich with soil pushed 2,500 miles by the Mekong River. The delta, where 5 million peasants harvest three-quarters of the nation's rice, is the great prize of the war in Vietnam.

There are 13 provinces in the delta, and the most prosperous and populous of these is Kienhoa, with 620,000 people. Sixty percent of them, at a conservative estimate, give their allegiance to the Vietcong.

In Kienhoa, there are 150 villages and 854 hamlets.

One of these is Sondong.

In Sondong, 2,600 Vietnamese—mostly Buddhists—live quietly under the protection of an army outpost 2 miles away. The last time the village was hit was 2 months ago, when one Government soldier was wounded and two Vietcong were killed.

IN TWILIGHT ZONE

Sondong is one of many delta towns that live in a twilight zone. They are controlled by the Government by day and the Vietcong by night. The village chief, a 36-year-old former army officer named Do Hun Minh, admitted that at night the Vietcong often entered the village, propagandized, collected taxes (rice and coconuts), and recruited men.

By day, the Government and U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) work to crack the closed society in the Sondongs of the delta, a society whose roots are locked in religion, tradition, and the legacy of French colonialism.

There are very many points of departure. One official cites land reform, another industrialization, a third reform of the military. Richard Burnham, the USOM province representative in Kienhoa, cites education.

Minh flipped the leaves of a newly completed chart and explained through an interpreter that only four village youngsters since the year 1950 have been to high school. No youngster in the history of the village has ever attended college.

"The Vietnamese government continues to support an exclusive educational system in a revolutionary war," says Burham. "All this is the preservation of privilege. It is madness and until it is changed into an American type egalitarian educational system, most of our other efforts will be marginal."

Those other efforts, in Sondong and throughout Kienhoa Province, are considerable. USOM pumps about half a million dollars a year into Kienhoa, arranging for medical teams and technical assistance, and building dams, school-rooms, a potable water system, an orphanage, three fish markets, two electricity systems.

But knowledgeable Americans here say that the Vietcong still offer the only outlet for a bright boy from the villages. The static nature of Sondong assures that there is no legitimate route out of the rice paddy.

BARRED AS OFFICERS

The rural children cannot be officers, administrators or district chiefs. When a surgeon with 3 years of medical training at the University of Hanoi defected from the Vietcong last year, he was obliged to go to work operating a radio at USOM headquarters in Kienhoa Province.

The Saigon administration found his medical qualifications insufficient for practice, and he could not go to the University of Saigon Medical School because, like the 19th century Russian court, the language there is French and he did not speak French. This is in a province which has 5 doctors to serve 620,000 people.

There are varying estimates of the degree to which the revolution of rising expectations, as Washington puts it, has seized the people of the delta.

An American official in Saigon who has studied the delta says that youngsters are raised "to believe that the ultimate in life is to have your own land and not owe any money. Many of the people, particularly the Cochinese, are nature lovers, in the Rousseauian sense."

But many are not, and they are the ones successfully proselytized by the Vietcong.

"You ask them," says the American, "why they don't plant two crops a year instead of one. They tell you that they don't need two crops a year."

NEEDS ARE FEW

"You mention that they do not have a sewing machine, a radio, or a Lambretta.

"They tell you that they don't need these things, although you get a little weakening when you mention the Lambretta."

In Sondong, the limbo world of the war in Vietnam, the sense is of all the forces of the 20th century coming together. The neatness of the paddies and the coconut groves, from which 104,000 liters of rice and 28 metric tons of coconuts are harvested each month, belie the insistence of the struggle.

The thatched-roof huts, as carefully plotted and arranged as a Japanese Buddhist rock garden, appear the same as in old lithographs available in Saigon.

The old people, many of whom practice Confucianism, see no need to change. Many of their offspring agree, but many do not. The Government has made no gestures to change.

When the American planes came to defoliate Vietcong strongholds in the province, there were two demonstrations in the province. Defoliation is something farmers understand.

Minh, the village chief whose pay is about \$22 a month (less than a South Vietnamese army private), flips the leaves of the chart on the wall of the village office. He says that of 1,171 people over the age of 18, 414 are landowners.

MOST IN VIETCONG AREA

But most of the land is in Vietcong territory. It is simply "worked"—no one knows by whom, and it is uncertain if the land is ever reclaimed from the Vietcong who will have title to it.

Minh said that most of the Vietcong in the village territory had moved out along the canals and rivers which lace the land. But it is still a war, and as Minh explained the charts in the wet heat of midafternoon artillery fire could be heard a mile away.

What was Minh's biggest problem?

"Irrigation," he said. "The problem is irrigation. We want to rebuild the canal."

But the war? How was the war going? Who was winning? Was the Government winning the allegiance, the hearts and minds of the people?

"I have no idea about the war," Minh said with a slight smile. "I belong to a very small unit."

ONLY A FOURTH OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS UNDER CONTROL OF SAIGON REGIME

(By John T. Wheeler, Associated Press staff writer)

(Evening Star, January 25, 1966)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Three-fourths of South Vietnam is controlled by the Vietcong—or by nobody.

This is the opinion of authoritative sources who have watched the Saigon Government's grip weaken in the provinces, even after the arrival of nearly 200,000 U.S. troops. The situation throws a big shadow over hopes for a permanent cease-fire and plans to move the country toward democracy.

These sources say the Government today controls less than a quarter of the land—controls it, that is, in the sense of having Government executive channels working in all respects.

Some U.S. officials don't think this is too important. They argue that much of the area controlled by the Vietcong or the "no man's land" is jungle or mountainous territory where few if any people live. Since the Saigon regime controls the cities, more than half the population is in areas held by the Government.

ONLY TWO PROVINCES

Only 2 of Vietnam's 45 provinces are considered wholly under Government control—Gia Dinh, which surrounds Saigon, and An Giang, center of the Hoa Hao religious sect which is determinedly anti-Communist.

Even in some areas listed in the Government column, the Vietcong underground operates freely, and the chance of ambush always haunts Government and American troops. Saigon police have battled with Vietcong military units on the very outskirts of the capital. Two district capitals, roughly equivalent to county seats in the United States, have been abandoned in the last month because of overwhelming Vietcong pressure. They were within 30 miles of U.S. Marine beachheads, but that didn't save Minh Long and Hiep Duc.

Viewing their past gains and the inability so far of the allied forces to trap Vietcong or North Vietnamese forces for a major showdown fight in the field, the Communists must feel fairly confident.

It is against this background that hopes for an early peace or permanent cease-fire must be weighed.

Although harried by air strikes and American and Vietnamese operations through their base camp areas, the Vietcong still continue to strike with a fanatical spirit.

The Saigon Government is determined that there will be no peace talks that would concede Vietcong control as it stands or that would limit the Government

to the areas it now holds. Hanoi's reluctance to negotiate appears to show optimism that the Vietcong will strengthen its position.

Assessing the situation, reliable sources say that the Government and the Vietcong each control about one-quarter of the country. The other half is disputed territory.

The Government foothold in these disputed areas usually amounts to scattered outposts that protect little more than their own barbed wire. It is the Vietcong who usually are able to move into the villages at night to hammer home their propaganda. Government village chiefs and police often spend the night at the district town headquarters building behind barbed wire.

Although Government troops sweep and resweep these contested areas, the Vietcong quickly return when the Saigon soldiers go back to their barracks.

Government control is weakest in the northernmost 1st Army Corps area. In each province it is pretty much restricted to the capital plus varying sized areas of surrounding countryside. U.S. Marines hold a beachhead at Chu Lai but no large population is involved. The other Marine bases are at Da Nang and just south of the old imperial capital of Hue.

Several district towns besides Hiep Duc and Minh Long have been abandoned in the past 18 months and in others Government forces are hanging on by their teeth. There is some fear that Qung Ngad Province, controlled by the Viet Minh during the French war and with strong separatist tendencies as well, might turn from the Saigon Government. If this happened, the Vietcong might move in and use this as a governmental base camp. But the difficulties and dangers in attempting to pull off such a coup are immense for the Communists.

The 2d Army Corps area, which includes most of the highlands, is the current theater of operations for North Vietnamese regulars but they have been lying low lately. Coastal Binh Dinh and Phu Yen were former Viet Minh strongholds.

BETTER IN SOUTH

The situation in the southern part of the area is better than in the north, where some of the biggest battles of the war, including the American clash with North Vietnamese regulars in the Ia Drang Valley, took place.

In the III Corps area, the main center of Government control is shaped roughly like an arrowhead with Saigon at the base and the sea at the tip.

Much has been made for years over efforts to pacify Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces, just west and northwest of Saigon. Little or no progress has been made. In fact, the Government has lost ground in some areas.

In the IV Corps area, the delta battleground, Government control is spotty at best, outside the provinces dominated by the militant Hoa Hao.

Many Vietcong in the delta have followed guerrilla lives for 20 years. A U.S. officer once said: "There is only one way to convert a Communist of 20 years' standing. Shoot him."

American and South Vietnamese hopes are pinned on expected conventional military showdowns with the Vietcong and North Vietnamese that will brighten the present picture. At present, the showdowns continue largely to be when and where the Communists want them. Military sources say there is little prospect that the situation will change, given the nature of a guerrilla war.

TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE

The CHAIRMAN. For the record I want to say that there is a letter here dated January 27 from the Secretary of State requesting that I put a telegram in from Ambassador Lodge.

I want to call attention to the second paragraph in the telegram, and I quote:

A vote for the appropriation is thus an utterly indispensable act if one supports U.S. policy in Vietnam.

That was one of the reasons why I asked that question earlier as to how a vote on this would be interpreted. The whole telegram will go in the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, January 27, 1966.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I believe that you and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations will be interested in the enclosed telegram from Ambassador Lodge in support of the President's request for urgent authorization and appropriation of supplemental funds for Vietnam. If it is agreeable with you, I suggest that the telegram be included in the record of the hearings.

I look forward to appearing before the committee on Friday.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK.

TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE

This appropriation covers virtually all main aspects of U.S. policy in Vietnam—a policy in which civil and military activities are, and must be, braided together. Under the word "military" is included funds for the Vietnamese military, who still carry the biggest part of the combat load; and funds for supply installations essential to U.S. troops. The word "civil" is very broadly defined to include: police type protection against assassination, torture, kidnaping, and terrorism of all sorts; measures to cope with the savage economic war which is aimed to bring about starvation of the masses in the cities, lifting up living standards at the same time that terrorism is being rooted out; and caring for refugees.

A vote for the appropriation is thus an utterly indispensable act if one supports U.S. policy in Vietnam.

This policy deserves support for many reasons: on moral grounds, since we are helping the Vietnamese in an act of self-defense against aggression and in support of the principles of self-determination—which are two of the cardinal principles of the United Nations Charter.

Self-defense against aggression, however, is not only morally right; it is also wise; and, finally, it is clearly in the interests of our own national security. If aggression succeeds in Vietnam we will be face to face with the threat of world war III. We, Vietnamese and Americans, therefore, are doing in Vietnam in 1966 what the free nations did not do in 1936 when Hitler went into the Rhineland or in 1938 when Hitler went into Czechoslovakia. And it was the free world's failure to stand against aggression then that resulted in World War II.

We seek now to avoid a repetition of that mistake. We act not only in the interest of Vietnamese and Americans but also in the interest of all who would suffer if world war III were to take place.

EXCERPT CONCERNING FAILURE TO HOLD ELECTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. I also wish to put in the record as a matter of historical interest an excerpt from a book on South Vietnam "Nation Under Stress" by Robert Scigliano, page 133 and page 134.

(The document referred to follows:)

SOUTH VIETNAM: NATION UNDER STRESS

(By Robert Scigliano)

Without notable incident, French and Vietminh forces disengaged, transferred political prisoners, and moved to the provisional assembly areas assigned them as the first step toward total withdrawal from the zones allotted to the other side. The French assembly area embraced the Hanoi-Haiduong-Haiphong region, and most of the northerners who chose to go south did so by passing into this small French-controlled zone. Hanoi was handed over to Vietminh in early October 1954, to become once again the seat of the Vietminh Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the last French forces departed from Haiphong in mid-May 1955. The Vietminh, who were assigned four assembly areas in the south—in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces in central Vietnam, the Camau Peninsula, the Plain of Reeds, and the Xuyen Moc area east of Saigon—likewise withdrew their forces within the prescribed 300 days. With the completion of the regrouping operation, the movement of refugees between the two zones also, for all practical

purposes, came to an end. It is not known with any precision how many people chose to live in the Communist zone, but their number was counterbalanced by the huge flood of about 900,000 refugees who went south during the period of free movement between zones.¹ This flood was more remarkable in view of the many obstacles the northern authorities placed in the way of those who wished to leave the Communist zone. It was a great human and propaganda victory for the south, even if one accepts the charge that religious and other influences were employed and acknowledges that about 85 percent of the refugees were Catholics, many of whom moved en masse under the leadership of village priests.²

A much more serious conflict in north-south relations emerged when the time came for opening consultations on elections to reunify the country. The Vietminh had set heavy store by these elections and, on June 6, 1955, warned the south, "Whoever tries to partition Vietnam is the enemy of the Vietnamese people and will surely be defeated."³ The Ngo Dinh Diem government, with American support, refused to discuss reunification with the northern authorities. In a statement rejecting a formal Communist request for a pre-election consultative conference, the southern authorities observed that they had not signed and therefore were not bound by the Geneva agreements and, further, that the conditions for free elections must first be evidenced in the north.⁴ Inasmuch as the conditions which the southern government sought were tantamount to a dismantling of the Communist regime, it was clear that the elections would not take place. It seemed equally clear that the south feared the outcome of any elections. Even if the International Control Commission were able to maintain strict supervision over the voting, the north possessed certain decisive advantages. Its population outnumbered the south's by nearly 2 million; its leaders were much better known in both the north and the south than Ngo Dinh Diem and his entourage, with Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap enjoying the status of national heroes for their leadership of the fight against the French; and its efficient dictatorship in the north and underground apparatus throughout the south was better able to influence the election results than the new, inexperienced administration of Ngo Dinh Diem.

The first and second anniversaries of the Geneva agreements passed without any stronger reactions from the north than demonstrations against the Ngo Dinh Diem government for having reneged on reunification. But the north was not prepared to give up the goal of 8 years of war so easily. The only alternative to peaceful reunification was reunification by force, and the Ho Chi Minh government possessed the means of employing it effectively. In the first place, its influence in the south was great. According to French reports, the Vietminh at the end of February 1955, prior to their withdrawal to the north, were masters of 60 to 90 percent of the villages in the south, except for those areas under the control of the sects.⁵ Joseph Alsop was surprised to find, in a trip to a Vietminh-controlled region in the Mekong Delta about this same time, that the people were happy, the country prosperous, and support for the Vietminh strong. "I could hardly imagine," he reported, "a Communist government that was also a popular government and almost a democratic government."⁶

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Mr. Bell, as you have undoubtedly noticed from the flavor of all the questions here, which has some constitutional concern with foreign policy, there seems to be a lack of favor of the policy we are following, and we seem to differ with some of the alternatives.

Generally, as I interpret the flavor, it is more toward de-escalation, from the line of questions.

¹ Bui Van Luong, who was responsible for the southern government's refugee program, has put the number of northbound refugees at 4,358, while Bernard B. Fall says "it is generally estimated that about 120,000 Vietminh troops and dependents chose to go north. * * *" (Richard W. Lindholm, ed., "Vietnam: The First 5 Years" [East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959], pp. 50, 57.) The discrepancy between the two figures may be due in part to Fall's inclusion of military forces.

² The broad claim by a French observer in Hanoi that the refugee evacuation was "more or less forced" would seem to lack substantiation. See Gérard Tongas, *J'ai vécu dans l'enfer communiste au Nord Vietnam*. Paris: Nouvelles Editions Debresse, 1960, pp. 15-29.

³ Allan B. Cole and others, eds., "Conflict in Indochina and International Repercussions, 1945-1955." Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956, p. 209.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 227-228.

⁵ Cited by Ellen J. Hammer, "The Struggle for Indochina Continues," Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955, p. 36.

⁶ "A Reporter at Large," *New Yorker*, June 25, 1955, p. 48.

SIZE OF U.N. AID PROJECT COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES

Now, with specific reference to your area of interest, how many people in Vietnam on the AID side are there for the technical assistance program of the United Nations or from the United Nations?

Mr. BELL. May I ask Mr. Poats to comment on that, sir?

Mr. POATS. The United Nations' technical assistance program is quite small. There is a UNICEF relief operation, there are several small technical assistance projects.

Senator PELL. About how many people at this time?

Mr. POATS. I would say about a dozen or 15.

Senator PELL. All right.

How many American AID people do we have out there?

Mr. BELL. We have at the present time about 650 in our AID mission, direct hire. That figure is rising rapidly. It will go up to between 900 and 1,000 by the end of this year, this calendar year.

We have in addition another, perhaps, 200 employees of firms and other organizations with whom we have contracted. We have a substantial number of Vietnamese on our payroll, and also some people from the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand.

Senator PELL. Is it not significant to you that the United Nations' contribution, direct contribution, of personnel is about 1 percent or a little more, maybe 2 percent, of what the U.S. contribution is? I am wondering if this could not be remedied, and we could not increase the United Nations' technical program, UNICEF involvement?

Mr. BELL. Well, the United Nations' relationship with Vietnam is quite complex, as you know better than I, Senator. South Vietnam is not a member of the U.N. and, as the Secretary was saying, while the U.N. has considered this matter from time to time in various ways, I have not regarded it as very surprising that they did not have a major technical assistance effort there.

We do have, Mr. Poats reminds me, the United States has, been strongly promoting regional activity in southeast Asia, including activities concerned with the Mekong River, which, of course, runs through Vietnam, and various other regional activities with which the United Nations group in Bangkok is very much concerned.

NON-AMERICAN AID PERSONNEL

Senator PELL. How many non-American civilian AID people would you say there were in Vietnam, in other words, from other nations, Britain, Australia, West Germany?

Mr. BELL. Several hundred. There are several hundred Frenchmen alone, and a quite substantial number from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Britain; in the medical field there are surgical teams from something like eight different countries, apart from the United States, and each of these teams has 10 to 40 medical personnel in them. So that there is very substantial number of civilians from other countries than the United States working now in Vietnam.

ACTION OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

Senator PELL. Are you making any substantial use of the voluntary agencies like Medico or the American Rescue Mission?

Mr. BELL. Oh, very substantial use. CARE has a substantial mission; the Catholic Relief Service has a significant program; several of the Protestant organizations. We contract with the International Voluntary Service for substantial numbers of young people who work mostly out in the countryside. There is a new effort in the rehabilitation, physical rehabilitation, field, led by Howard Rusk in New York. I would be glad to fill this statement out for the record, Mr. Senator. It makes a very substantial and impressive account.

Senator PELL. Would you be willing to hazard a guess as to whether it is half and half, half government people and half voluntary agencies or what?

Mr. BELL. Well, in terms of numbers of persons in Vietnam I am sure that the numbers from the Government are directly hired by the Government or are on Government contract, that they would exceed substantially the number of private citizens there.

Senator PELL. Could you get those figures later and put them in the record?

Mr. BELL. Yes, I would be glad to.

Senator PELL. Thank you, that is all.

(The information referred to follows:)

AID-FUNDED AND U.S. VOLUNTARY AGENCY-FUNDED PERSONNEL WORKING IN VIETNAM

1. AID-funded U.S. and 3d country employees

Type	On board Dec. 31, 1965	Estimated on board June 30, 1966
AID direct hire (program and administration).....	624	1,050
Participating U.S. agency.....	129	194
Contract employees:		
(a) U.S. nationals.....	370	862
(b) 3d country nationals.....	(140)	(388)
	(230)	(474)
Total.....	1,123	2,106

2. U.S. voluntary agency-funded employees

There are 17 U.S. voluntary overseas relief agencies operating in Vietnam at the present time. These agencies currently employ 25 to 30 Americans, plus a much greater number of Vietnamese (the precise number of which is not available to AID). U.S. voluntary agencies are presently engaged in expanding their personnel complements in Vietnam relief programs. The Mennonite Central Committee-Church World Services-Lutheran World Relief combined program, for example, is recruiting for 45 additional U.S. personnel.

3. Other free world civilian personnel in Vietnam

Civilian personnel in Vietnam from other free world countries totaled approximately 850 as of January 15, 1966.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bell, it is so late and we are all tired, we will defer this further questioning until a later time.

Mr. BELL. Would you like, Mr. Chairman, to file for the record the statement I have?

The CHAIRMAN. Fine, I wish you would, to complete the record.

(The statement of Mr. Bell follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID E. BELL, ADMINISTRATOR, AID

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your prompt consideration of our request for a supplemental authorization of economic assistance funds for fiscal year 1966. As the President stated in his special letter to the Congress on January 19, these funds are essential to honor our commitment to South Vietnam and meet urgent requirements for assistance in other troubled areas.

We are requesting a total of \$415 million in new obligational authority for the remainder of the current fiscal year. Of this total, \$315 million is for supporting assistance and \$100 million for the contingency fund for use only if needed to support critical national interests in southeast Asia and elsewhere.

The supporting assistance request is made up of \$275 million for use in Vietnam \$25 million for the Dominican Republic, and \$15 million for Laos and Thailand.

This is an urgent request. Present supporting assistance funds are fully programmed and the small contingency fund previously provided for this year is exhausted. The special southeast Asia contingency fund added to the fiscal year 1966 appropriation is already fully programmed.

All fiscal year 1966 supporting assistance appropriations for Vietnam programs were obligated by mid-January. Indeed, in order to fund current operations in Vietnam, we have been compelled to "borrow" \$64 million from other essential programs. It will be necessary to replenish these programs from the supplemental funds that we now request.

In addition, expanded airlift and security assistance on the Laos and Thailand fronts of the southeast Asia situation cannot safely be postponed until next fiscal year.

Additional funds for the Dominican Republic are also required as a result of severe economic and political instability following the April 1965 revolution.

Our original requests for fiscal year 1966 underestimated requirements for the year. A tight budget was submitted to the Congress, and we testified that it would not be sufficient to meet major, unforeseen demands which could grow out of the southeast Asia conflict or major changes elsewhere in the international situation. The expanded scale of Communist aggression in South Vietnam and the greatly enlarged American and other free world military response have created economic problems which could not be foreseen last summer.

I have just returned from southeast Asia. I have examined in considerable detail the problems and programs upon which these additional requests are based and am satisfied that they are urgently needed.

I respectfully request that this committee give approval to our request for an additional \$415 million in economic assistance funds for fiscal year 1966.

I should like to turn now to a discussion of the request in detail and the situation in the countries affected.

Vietnam, \$275 million

Our basic objectives in Vietnam have not changed. They are to repel Communist aggression and to help the Government of Vietnam develop a society resistant to subversion and capable of independent progress.

The scale of the U.S. engagement in Vietnam has changed drastically since our assistance plans were submitted to the Congress last spring for the current fiscal year. Our military moves have responded to the large-scale and still growing invasion of South Vietnam by regular forces of North Vietnam and to the near collapse of resistance to Vietcong attacks in central Vietnam early last year. Thus, a new dimension of major military operations has been added to the older and still central struggle of government and villager against Communist guerrillas.

The situation became severe last winter, spring, and early summer as Communist military, terrorist, and propaganda action exploited Government instability and tried to bring about a decisive victory. Roads and railroads were cut. Inland towns were isolated. Coastal cities, swollen with refugees and military forces, became dependent upon ports which had never been expected to handle large volumes of cargo.

The initiation and expansion of direct U.S. military action reversed the prospect of Communist victory in central Vietnam. It may also have taken Vietcong pressure off the Mekong Delta area, permitting some progress in pacification of several delta provinces. The country's difficult situation evidently had a sobering effect on the political factions which had brought down a series of governments in Saigon; relative political stability has existed since the government of Marshall Ky was installed last June.

This improved prospect, in itself, has had major economic consequences. Increased confidence has meant that money is being used—for investment and

purchases—in Vietnam. In addition, the economic situation was altered by related events: the continuing U.S. military buildup, intensified military operations, and expansion of Vietnamese budget expenditures. More money was put into circulation, on top of a budget deficit in 1964. Vietnamese businessmen, now expecting a long war and inflation instead of the prospect of quick evacuation with liquid savings, have begun to put their piasters into goods, both local and imported. Unemployment in Saigon, a political problem in 1964, vanished as the military draft, military construction and a spurt in private spending created labor shortages. Local shortages of both goods and labor throughout the country were aggravated later in 1965 by the congestion of ports and warehousing, clogged with military support and construction cargo and increased imports. Vietcong seizure or purchase of rice threatened shortages and politically dangerous price rises in this basic staple. The shortage of manpower and production capacity and the Vietcong threat to much of the farming area and road network made it impossible for rising domestic production to keep pace with rising purchasing power. During 1965, consumer price indexes rose 40 percent in Saigon, more in central Vietnam, less in the delta. The inflation posed a new threat to continuity of government, a critical ingredient of success in the pacification campaign.

To cope with the inflationary threat, both the United States and the Government of Vietnam have expanded the financing of commercial imports. We stabilized rice prices by financing large rice imports with Public Law 480 and AID funds. AID and the U.S. military command launched crash programs of port, warehousing, and coastal shipping expansion. We bought sheet piling, barge steel, prefabricated warehouses, cement, other construction material, and large dredges for port improvement. We leased 10 coastal cargo vessels. We put port management experts to work in both Saigon and regional ports and expanded our contract for internal airlift. To deal with the projected shortage of trans-pacific U.S. shipping, we arranged to take out of the "mothball" fleet cargo vessels for AID shipments to Vietnam. To minimize the crowding of Vietnamese ports with partially loaded ships, we arranged for concentration of AID cargoes in shipload lots at a marshaling area in Clearfield, Utah.

These additional operations and import financing will produce significant improvements in market supply and logistic capability early in 1966.

But they have been expensive. Our supporting assistance obligations for Vietnam by December 31 had reached \$235 million, nearly the entire amount appropriated. By borrowing from other programs where some obligations can be deferred for a month or two, we are funding the most urgent Vietnam requirements pending congressional consideration of this supplemental request.

The inflationary pressures which imposed these demands on us in 1965 will be far more severe in 1966. The U.S. military construction rate in Vietnam is scheduled to rise sharply. U.S. troop strength and troop spending on the local market, despite measures to provide alternatives to piaster spending, will probably rise in 1966. These two elements of abnormal market demand, caused by the U.S. military buildup, will probably equal some 45 percent of South Vietnam's entire national income in 1964. At the same time, accumulated funds in the hands of Vietnamese storekeepers, importers and individual workers are expected to move into the market.

The Vietnamese Government is seriously concerned about the threat of runaway inflation. Prime Minister Ky has cut back the 1966 budget to 55 billion piasters, an actual reduction from 1965 when price rises and the expanded military and civil requirements are taken into account. The cuts, including a freeze on civilian hiring, will limit the effectiveness of some of our projects; nevertheless, we applaud Ky's tough decision.

Despite these measures, inflationary pressures will mount in 1966 unless imports are roughly doubled in piaster value over 1965 and other stabilization measures are taken. The supplemental request now before you will permit us to finance the U.S. share of the costs of the necessary rise in imports—now estimated—to approximately double (including Public Law 480) in fiscal year 1966 as compared with fiscal year 1965.

We expect to keep close watch on the situation and to examine it periodically with the Vietnamese authorities in order to devise whatever additional measures may be required to prevent inflation from undermining the war effort.

Our projects and direct operational assistance also have been expanded to meet new or enlarged needs.

I have mentioned our provision of coastal boats, barges, dredges, port-improvement construction supplies, shipping and other logistics aid. In addition, refugee assistance, a small part of our original program, became a major obligation last

summer and fall. More than 700,000 South Vietnamese sought refuge in Government-controlled territory during 1965, and about 400,000 of these were residing in crowded camps at the end of the year. We are providing about \$20 million in food, construction materials, blankets, and other relief supplies to the refugees this fiscal year—more if the number grows substantially. Vietnamese construction workers' housing at Cam Ranh Bay must be built, at AID expense. More American doctors and nurses must be assigned to Vietnam, and they must have working and housing facilities. Rising local costs have necessitated increases in funds programed for many construction jobs. More staff is needed to handle and move supplies, assist in the port and customs operations, help district and village leaders carry out rural development projects, train and advise the pacification cadre, assist the Government's "open arms" defector program, and intensify police resources control operations to deny rice, drugs, explosives, etc., to the Vietcong.

This supplemental budget request contains \$275 million to meet our increased requirements in South Vietnam: \$175 million to finance the expanded commercial import program for the last half of fiscal year 1966; \$100 million for expansion of direct AID operations in Vietnam in logistics, construction, welfare, and development projects.

In order to meet the increased administrative costs created by the enlarged program for Vietnam, we are also requesting that you authorize the use of supporting assistance funds for administrative expenses. Some of the funds originally appropriated for AID administrative expenses can be used to cover these increased costs, but we now estimate that approximately \$1.4 million of supporting assistance funds will be needed for additional administrative expenses incurred in connection with the Vietnam program.

We have undertaken the enlarged effort in Vietnam in response to inescapable war-support requirements and a recognition that security and peace cannot be achieved in Vietnam by military action alone. General Westmoreland and his staff are among the strongest advocates of a U.S. program which meshes military, paramilitary, local government administration, welfare and development measures to win the commitment and active participation of the people in the resistance to Communist takeover.

We are fully aware of the fact that we could win the major military battles but still lose the political contest in thousands of hamlets and a score of towns and cities that will decide the future of Vietnam. We are therefore coupling our large military investment in Vietnam with support for the economic, social, and political side of the effort.

Thailand and Laos, \$15 million

Nonmilitary activities contributing to the security of Laos and northeast Thailand must be intensified if we are to deter the announced Communist ambitions in those countries. Here, as in Vietnam, the best hope for security lies in a mixture of military and police measures, the improvement of Government-villager relations and acceleration of rural economic and social development.

We are requesting \$15 million in supplemental supporting assistance funds for these two countries.

The major element of the Laos requirement is support for a higher level of airlift and refugee operations in northern and central Laos than had been anticipated for fiscal year 1966. This program has made a major contribution of stabilizing Government control of contested areas of Laos. Closely related additional expenditures are required to improve airport facilities and to assist Government control in southern Laos through a rural development "village cluster" project.

The additional requirements in Thailand are to provide helicopter, radio communications, weapons, and other support for improving the effectiveness of the border patrol and provincial police; to provide additional construction equipment and training for expansion of rural development operations in threatened areas of Thailand; to accelerate the program of bringing potable water facilities to the villages of the northeast; and to improve air traffic management at up-country airfields.

Dominican Republic, \$25 million

Since the overthrow of the Dominican Republic Government last April, the United States has made large amounts of supporting assistance available to prevent a serious economic deterioration from aggravating an already unstable political situation.

Fiscal year 1966 funds for the Dominican Republic have been fully programmed. We have been supporting the efforts of the provisional government to reduce political and economic instability and move toward the installation of an elected government. In December, the United States entered into an agreement which provided \$25 million to cover the gap between tax revenues and the operating and capital budgets through calendar year 1965 and January 1966. It was recognized at that time that an additional \$25 million in supporting assistance would be required to cover this gap during the early months of calendar year 1966 until tax revenues recovered to the point necessary to support the budget.

These additional supporting assistance funds for the Dominican Republic will be used to provide essential budgetary support and to assist capital budget public works activities in community development, road maintenance, and irrigation. These latter activities will help relieve the acute unemployment now hindering Dominican progress.

Contingency fund, \$100 million

Current contingency fund availabilities for fiscal year 1966 total only \$54 million, which has been fully programmed. Over \$37 million have been earmarked for grants to the Dominican Republic to assist the provisional government.

We are now requesting supplemental funds totaling \$100 million. These additional funds will permit us to meet any new requirements which may occur before the end of this fiscal year in southeast Asia, the Dominican Republic, and other potentially volatile areas throughout the world. While exact costs cannot be estimated now, I expect that we will have to draw on the contingency fund in the coming months to increase the flow of essential goods into Zambia.

Transfer of MAP funds for Vietnam

The President's request for supplemental funds also provides for the transfer of costs for operations in Vietnam formerly funded from the military assistance program to the budget of the Department of Defense.

These costs of supporting the forces of South Vietnam and other nations allied with us in the current hostilities have been growing steadily. To continue to support these forces from regular MAP funds would distort the basic purpose of the program, as authorized by the Congress. Military assistance is designed to build forces as a deterrent to aggression; the program was not established to support forces engaged in a major, continuing conflict. The transfer of Vietnam costs to the regular defense budget is designed to maintain the character and the clarity of purpose of MAP. It is a sensible move.

I fully concur in the recommendation for transfer and urge its adoption by the Congress.

Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, I hope that this statement has been helpful to the committee.

I urge prompt approval of the full request for \$415 million in supplemental funds for the economic assistance program in fiscal year 1966.


The CHAIRMAN. We will give you a full opportunity to express yourself at a later date.

Mr. BELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 1:05 o'clock p.m. the committee adjourned, subject to call.)



SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, FISCAL YEAR 1966—VIETNAM

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 8:30 a.m. in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and Case.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The hearing this morning will continue the committee's consideration of a supplemental request for \$415 million in additional economic aid, most of it for Vietnam. The approval of this request by the Congress will bring the total for economic aid to South Vietnam since the end of the Indochina war to over \$3 billion, which amounts to about \$215 for every citizen of that country. The total effort in Vietnam this fiscal year adds up to \$1,145 for every Vietnamese citizen. Our aid has been a major factor in bringing about our present involvement.

A request for additional military assistance for Vietnam has also been submitted to the Congress. Although the request is not technically before this committee, we cannot ignore this aspect, because of the committee's responsibility over the years for authorizing military assistance funds. Military operations in Vietnam far outweigh the economic aid effort in size and scope—but not in long-range significance. We must never forget that political, economic, and social factors—not military operations—are the real keys to a permanent peace in Vietnam.

This supplemental request cannot be considered without regard to the overall situation in Vietnam and the policies on which our involvement is based. In its consideration of these policies the committee plans to hold additional hearings next week, at which time we will hear from other witnesses. The names of these witnesses will be announced as soon as final arrangements are completed.

We are very pleased to have Mr. David Bell, with whom we are well acquainted, who submitted his statement for the record at our last meeting. Mr. Bell, could you summarize it for us.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID E. BELL, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; ACCOMPANIED BY HON. RUTHERFORD M. POATS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, FAR EAST, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. BELL. I would be glad to do so, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the supporting assistance request which is before the committee, is for \$315 million, and there is also a request for \$100 million for the President's contingency fund. The supporting assistance request is made up of \$275 million for use in Vietnam, \$25 million for the Dominican Republic, and \$15 million for Laos and Thailand.

The request before the committee is an urgent one. The supporting assistance funds that were appropriated by the Congress for the present fiscal year are already fully programed, and the contingency fund which was made available last summer by the Congress is also fully programed.

Therefore, the funds which we are requesting now are needed urgently. Indeed, all of our supporting assistance appropriations for Vietnam for the present fiscal year were obligated by the middle of January, and we are in effect borrowing money now to finance our Vietnam operations from funds which were appropriated and will be needed later in the year for other purposes.

The request for Vietnam is the largest element in the request before the committee. It is quite plain that our original request for the present fiscal year underestimated the requirements that have come about.

We submitted, the President submitted, to the Congress a very tight budget, and when we supported it last spring we testified that it would not be sufficient if major unforeseen demands occurred. The expanded scale of Communist aggression in South Vietnam and the greatly enlarged American and other free world military response have, in fact, created economic problems which were not foreseen and could not have been foreseen last spring and summer.

AID RESPONSIBILITY IN VIETNAM

In Vietnam, the activity that the Agency for International Development is responsible for is essentially of two main types: first, we are supplying imports that are urgently necessary, that are required, to support the economy of that country in addition to the imports that can be financed by the Government of Vietnam's own foreign exchange receipts and, secondly, we are deeply engaged in projects and in supporting Vietnamese Government projects, primarily in the rural areas for the security and progress of the people of that country.

The request that is before this committee contains funds for both kinds of activities. First of all, it contains \$175 million for commodity imports, and this is essentially to cope with the serious inflationary threats that confront Vietnam at the present time. That inflationary threat is not uncommon in a war situation. The resources of the purchasing power which have created that inflationary threat are essentially the budget deficit of the Vietnamese Government, the spending

by American troops, and the very large military construction programs of the U.S. military forces.

In order to meet the inflationary threat that has arisen for these reasons, the Government of Vietnam has undertaken a series of actions, most important of which was to prepare for the present fiscal year in Vietnam a very severely restricted—austere budget. The American and other economists who are in Saigon have felt that this was a courageous and correct move on the part of the Vietnamese Government to have a limited and austere budget under present circumstances.

In addition, as part of the effort to contain and control the problem of inflation, both the Government of Vietnam and the Government of the United States are planning to bring into Vietnam substantially increased levels of imports to make more goods available on the local market. As I said, \$175 million of the funds which are requested before the committee now are for that purpose.

The other hundred million dollars which we are asking for Vietnam will be needed for projects—AID projects—and direct operational assistance. This includes a wide variety of activities. It includes a number of activities related to the improvement of port operations and of internal transportation within Vietnam. We are buying coastal boats, barges, dredges, sheet steel for pier construction, and other elements of an improved logistics program.

In addition we are providing substantial funds for refugee assistance. This was a small part of our original program for the present fiscal year—it has become a much larger part. More than 700,000 South Vietnamese sought refuge in Government-controlled territory during the past calendar year, and about 400,000 of these were still residing in refugee camps at the end of the year.

We are providing around \$20 million in food, housing, materials, blankets, and other relief supplies to the refugees in the present fiscal year. This is in addition to a roughly equivalent sum which the Vietnamese Government is supplying.

AID is carrying out in Vietnam a major civilian health program—which is growing steadily. More American doctors and nurses are being assigned to Vietnam. They must have working and housing facilities, and funds for this are included in the supplemental before this committee.

More staff is needed to handle and move supplies, to assist in the port customs operations, to help local officials carry out rural development projects, to assist the Government in its “open arms” program which welcomes defectors from the Vietcong ranks, to intensify the advisory program for the Vietnamese police, to help the police establish a resources control operation designed to deny rice, drugs, explosives, and so on to the Vietcong.

All of these and many more projects and activities are in support of the war effort and they are a recognition of the point the chairman was making a little earlier that security and peace cannot be achieved in Vietnam by military action alone.

General Westmoreland and his staff are among the strongest advocates of a U.S. program which meshes military, paramilitary, local government administration, welfare, and development measures to win the commitment, the active participation of the people in resisting Communist takeover. All of us are fully aware of the fact that

we could win the major military battles but still lose the political contest in the thousands of hamlets and the scores of towns and cities that will decide the future of Vietnam.

We, therefore, have in addition to our large military investment in Vietnam, this major and growing program of support for the economic, social, and political side of the effort.

ECONOMIC AID PROBLEM IN THAILAND AND LAOS

The other elements of the request that are before the committee are much smaller in size, but they are very significant. In Thailand and Laos, the U.S. economic aid program is supporting efforts to develop the rural countryside, to strengthen local government, to establish education facilities and transport facilities, and render other improvements in the lives of the people of the countryside.

In Thailand, as the committee knows, there was an announcement from Peiping a few months ago, that the same kind of attack which was launched several years ago in Vietnam, will be launched in the present year in Thailand.

We have been anticipating this for the last 2 or 3 years and the American economic assistance program has been helping the Thai Government develop a program for security and progress in the rural areas, particularly in northeast and northern Thailand. That program has made some headway.

I had the opportunity to visit there a month ago, and was well impressed. The problem is very serious; there are beginnings of the same kind of guerrilla attacks, sneak attacks, assassinations of civilian officials and policemen in northeast Thailand which have been so characteristic of the difficulties in Vietnam. So, that the problem in Thailand is an increasing one and we are helping the Thai step up their efforts to meet it.

In Laos, we have been engaged in similar activities for some years, and these programs are going well. We have rural development efforts in Laos reaching the villages—helping the village people improve their well-being—which are very impressive.

We have education efforts, agriculture efforts, transportation efforts, which are impressive and look impressive to any visitor.

REQUEST FOR DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The request contains \$25 million for the Dominican Republic. These funds are necessary to support the efforts of the provisional government in the Dominican Republic to reduce political and economic instability and move toward the installation of an elected government. We are supporting the costs, both current and capital of the Dominican Republic's budget, to the extent that their revenues have not yet recovered from the decline caused by the difficulties of last spring.

REQUEST FOR CONTINGENCY FUND

We are asking for \$100 million for the contingency fund. The present contingency fund has all been programmed, and we believe that it would be appropriate for the President to have additional funds

available to him to meet emergencies that may occur during the remainder of the present fiscal year.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make only one other comment at this time. As the committee knows, the President's request for supplemental funds provides—not in the legislation before this committee at the present time, but in other legislation—for the transfer of the costs for operations in Vietnam which were formerly funded from the military assistance program to the regular budget of the Department of Defense.

The costs of supporting the forces of South Vietnam and other nations allied with us there have been growing steadily. To continue to support these forces from military assistance funds would distort the basic purpose of that program as authorized by the Congress. Military assistance is intended to build forces as a deterrent to aggression. The program was not established to support forces engaged in a major continuing conflict.

The transfer of Vietnam military assistance costs to the regular defense budget is designed to maintain the character and clarity of purpose of military assistance. It will make for much simpler, clearer administration and accounting. It is a sensible move and I thoroughly support it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bell.

I would like to try to start off with a general approach.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for just a moment? I realize the paramount importance of taking pictures and things of that kind, which probably supersedes the importance of this committee meeting. But can't the cruel and unusual punishment of these strong lights shining in our faces be eased for just a little bit? It is just impossible, at least to me, to try to think about what is going on here with these lights in our eyes.

(Off the record.)

COST ESTIMATES OF VIETNAM WAR

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bell, as you know, we are having to meet at unusual times and we will try to move along as rapidly as we can.

I want to try to get an overall cost estimate for the war. Of course, we all realize that the most painful and tragic aspect of this whole operation is the loss of American and Vietnamese lives, both military and civilian. They are very heavy but this bill does not concern that directly.

Last year on April 26, Secretary McNamara summarized the costs as of that time. I will quote one part of his statement:

Economic aid is probably running \$300 million a year. * * * Public Law 480 contributions—these are contributions of food and agriculture products—probably running on the order of \$70 million a year. It seems likely that the military assistance program for South Vietnam for fiscal 1965, our current fiscal year, will approximate \$330 million. And very, very roughly, I would estimate the cost of the U.S. forces operating in the waters of South Vietnam and in the air, and the cost of our advisory and logistical support, is running on the order of \$800 million a year. So that we have a cost approximating a billion and a half dollars at the present time.

That was his estimate of the overall cost as of last April 26.

So, in trying to put together what the cost is presently running, it works out, according to my staff, in about this way: The base cost of our military forces around the beginning of the fiscal year would be \$800 million using Secretary McNamara's estimate; then add to that the supplemental defense appropriations for Vietnam last summer of \$1.7 billion, the \$12.3 billion request currently being considered and the economic and military aid for this fiscal year of about \$1 billion, making a total of \$15.8 billion. Is that about correct as an estimate of the cost in dollars for this current year?

Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, I am competent to testify only on part of these sums.

The economic assistance for the current fiscal year, assuming the Congress appropriates the funds we are now requesting, will be about \$600 million including Public Law 480.

The military assistance which was appropriated last fall for the present fiscal year is of the order that you were referring to.

The CHAIRMAN. Those two together make about a billion.

Mr. BELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You know the two supplemental requests total \$14 billion?

Mr. BELL. I personally am not involved in the military supplemental.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean there hasn't been a conference or conversation between you and the military as to the overall costs of the program. You don't know anything about the military?

Mr. BELL. The military budget supplemental which is before the Congress of \$12 billion, I know about—

The CHAIRMAN. \$12.3 billion and they had a \$1.7 billion supplemental last summer. This is not secret; this has all been in the press.

Mr. BELL. Exactly. But the point is some of that is for other parts of southeast Asia. You can in one sense say that is all related to Vietnam. Some of it, however, will obviously be spent not in Vietnam but in Thailand, in the Philippines, and so on. So, all I am saying is that I do not, I am not competent to testify on the exact nature of what is in that \$12.3 billion or the \$1.7 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't want the exact nature. I thought it would give us a starting point as to what our operation in Vietnam is costing us. It is in the neighborhood of \$15.8 billion according to the staff's estimate, and they try to keep up with these matters.

Mr. BELL. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me this is never brought together. We take the requests piecemeal and no one has had a very clear view of what this involvement means in money. We know or are beginning to realize what it means in lives, and in human suffering. But this particular bill involves a supplemental request.

Do you know how many Vietcong were killed last year?

Mr. BELL. I am sure we have the figures, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it about 11,243?

Mr. BELL. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

No, the figure that is given to me here is 30,000

The CHAIRMAN. Killed or casualties?

Mr. BELL. Killed. However, it is a matter of estimates which can easily be checked.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the staff says they take this from, I believe, an official statement that there were 11,243 killed which works out as a very high cost per kill, if you want to use that distasteful word.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, we ought to get the correct figure.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the staff's figure.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the answer of the witness?

Mr. BELL. I am not the authority on these matters, Senator, the figure that has been supplied to me is 31,360. It differs from the figure that was supplied to the staff. We will get the correct figure for the record.

Senator LAUSCHE. I would suggest that that be corrected so we get an accurate figure.

Mr. BELL. Of course the Senator recognizes that these are estimated figures.

As you know, the Vietcong do not always leave their dead on the battlefield in many cases.

The CHAIRMAN. Please look up that figure for the record. In any case, I only ask this to give the impression to both the committee and to the public that this is a rather substantial operation as of now, is it not?

Mr. BELL. It certainly is.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is growing.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You estimate it is going to be less next year?

Mr. BELL. No; more.

The CHAIRMAN. It is going to be more.

Have your estimates as to the rate of escalation in the past proved to have been accurate?

Mr. BELL. Are you asking me personally, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BELL. Or the executive branch?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The executive branch.

Mr. BELL. They certainly have not been—it is a wartime situation. There were optimistic expectations a couple of years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say they were a little more optimistic than facts proved them?

Mr. BELL. They certainly were.

The CHAIRMAN. For several years running. It is escalated far greater than you had expected.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; that is correct.

EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FOR SAIGON GOVERNMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Recently General Greene, the commanding general of the Marine Corps, on returning from Vietnam said this: "You could kill every Vietcong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and still lose the war." Do you think there is any evidence of growing popular support for the Saigon Government?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; there is a great deal.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you elaborate on that?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Briefly.

Mr. BELL. Perhaps the most dramatic evidence is that last spring there were elections in the towns and district communities in Viet-

nam—in the countryside. These elections to the surprise of many outside observers were not only held but some 70 percent of the eligible voters did, in fact, vote. They elected provincial representatives, they elected senior citizens of the community, men who had stood, who had offered themselves for election. There were contested elections in nearly every case. It was, by the testimony of those who were there and saw it, a vivid demonstration of participation in normal government function under very abnormal circumstances.

EXTENT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER COUNTRYSIDE

The CHAIRMAN. How much of South Vietnam is under the firm control of the Saigon Government?

Mr. BELL. There is no simple answer to that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would the chairman identify whether he is talking about area or about people?

Mr. BELL. I was going to make that distinction, Senator Lausche.

If you consider the inhabited area of the countryside, the estimates which seemed to me, when I was there, to be most persuasive were that about 25 percent of the people who live in the countryside—outside of the cities and towns—live in areas in which there is a good security day and night, and in which there are normal government operations functioning. About 50 percent of the people live in so-called contested areas in which there is a degree, sometimes a considerable degree, of security risk.

Normally, in the daytime people move around reasonably safely, including our civilian advisers that we have living out in the countryside—in the small towns. But at night, there may well be and often are Vietcong or North Vietnamese military actions. These areas are not secure, not wholly secure at night, and are areas in which there may be units of the Vietcong or North Vietnamese military forces that can stage attacks.

The remaining 25 percent of the people who live in the countryside are in areas where the Vietcong are pretty substantially in control, and where people from the Government or American AID advisers, for example, can go normally only with a military escort.

CONTRAST WITH SITUATION A YEAR AGO

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bell, would you say the situation is better now than it was a year ago?

Mr. BELL. It is about the same, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall the estimates?

Mr. BELL. Excuse me, sir, there was a period during the spring and summer when the security conditions clearly deteriorated, but over the last few months the situation has been somewhat restored and most people feel it is about the same now as it was a year ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall that for the last 4 or 5 years the testimony from administration witnesses each year has been that things were getting better or that the situation was going to be better before very long. Is that about accurate?

Mr. BELL. I don't recall—let me put it this way, Senator. My own testimony has not been of that character, and I am not here speaking for others.

It has been evident to us, to the AID people, who have been living and working in the countryside these past several years, that the problem of establishing security and economic progress in areas which are either contested or under Vietcong control is the heart of the effort to bring about a successful solution in South Vietnam, and that that effort has not made significant progress for the last 3 or 4 years.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, will you yield temporarily?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I yield.

VULNERABILITY OF SAIGON

Senator GORE. I have here a letter from Secretary McNamara to the committee, which the committee received last week, in which he says, "Saigon remains quite vulnerable."

Is Saigon included in the area which Mr. Bell describes as secure?

Mr. BELL. I was referring, Senator, to the countryside and not to the cities at all. The cities, Saigon, Nha Trang, Danang, and the other cities are in the term I was talking, about secure areas. People move about and work freely. There are terrorist attacks, which you well know, in these cities from time to time. They are occasional and not continuous.

I think what Secretary McNamara was probably referring to is that major military actions against Saigon or against these other cities is certainly conceivable.

Senator GORE. He didn't say conceivable. He said Saigon is quite vulnerable.

Mr. BELL. In the sense that there are units of regimental size, perhaps larger, in Vietnam which could make land attacks on Saigon, if they so choose. It is also obviously a vulnerable city from the standpoint of any air attacks.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(NOTE.—Mr. Bell subsequently stated that he had not seen Secretary McNamara's letter before responding to Senator Gore's question and that he unintentionally misinterpreted the letter. The full text of the letter follows:)

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, January 28, 1966.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of January 14 expressing the committee's interest in the vulnerability of the Saigon economy to attack by the Vietcong.

Mr. David Bell is better qualified than I to comment on economic warfare which might be conducted by the Vietcong. Therefore, I am taking the liberty of forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to him.

I would like to discuss with you, however, the problem of Saigon's physical security, which has a direct bearing on the economy of the Republic of Vietnam in general and on the economic life of the capital city in particular.

We do not feel that a direct attack on Saigon by any sizable Vietcong or PAVN force is likely, but we do face the continuing threat of isolated terror attacks within the city limits, and are constantly aware of the possibility of mortar attacks from outside the city's perimeter. The bombing of the U.S. Embassy last year is an example of a type of terror attack most difficult to guard against.

The great number of vehicles and people in Saigon make absolute security an impossibility, although curfews and increased U.S./GVN military and national police patrols have reduced the numbers of such attacks. As you may have seen

in recent news reports, the quick reaction of the national police force has prevented several Vietcong bombing incidents in the past several weeks.

In addition to possible terror attacks on physical installations within the city, there is also the ever-present threat of similar attacks on roads and highways leading into the city and on port facilities and river approaches servicing Saigon and the rest of the Republic of Vietnam. Attacks on any of these communication facilities do serious but temporary harm to not only the economy of Vietnam but also the military effort and the morale of the people. The Vietcong has at various times successfully interdicted roads approaching the Saigon perimeter and has been able to reduce shipment of rice and other foodstuffs to such low levels that heavy imports have been required. We have been able to prevent serious economic setbacks and food shortages in numerous areas only by use of airlift and armored convoy. In cooperation with the Government of Vietnam, we are making the most energetic efforts to reduce these problems.

The consequences of damage to Saigon port facilities is being considerably lessened by construction of protected alternate facilities such as Cam Ranh Bay, and increased river patrol activity by United States and Government of Vietnam forces has reduced the changes of Vietcong incursions along vital waterways.

Current Vietcong terrorist activity continues to be directed at psychological targets rather than against more lucrative economic and operational targets, probably in view of United States/Government of Vietnam overall capabilities. Saigon remains quite vulnerable. Terror activity could probably be intensified at any time by the Vietcong agents present in the area, since terror is the principal tool of the type of war the Communists are waging.

I hope this information is useful to you.

Sincerely,

ROBERT S. MCNAMARA.

Mr. BELL. Those are questions, sir, which are obviously beyond my immediate responsibility. The kind of security that I am describing in response to the question about the countryside is, assuming that the Vietnamese Government and American, Korean, and Australian and New Zealand troops succeed in breaking up or pushing back the major military units of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, there still would remain the problem of establishing local security and local progress.

If I understood the chairman's question correctly he was quoting General Greene as saying that we could win the major military battles but we would still have the kind of problem I have been describing in the countryside. I thoroughly agree with General Greene that that is correct.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much.

Mr. BELL. It is that kind of local security and progress that I was referring to.

QUOTATION OF CHURCHILL

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. I only want you to comment on one last statement.

In this week's Newsweek, Mr. Hughes has a column in which he quotes Churchill as having made this statement:

Going into swampy jungles to fight the Japanese is like going into the water to fight a shark.

Do you think that is appropriate to our situation in the jungles of Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. Well, Senator, I was in the Marine Corps in World War II, and we did go into the jungle to fight the Japanese and we did quite well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sparkman?

PROBLEM OF INFLATION

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Bell, one thing I wanted to ask you about was this question of inflation. You discuss it quite fully in your statement, which I have read. But isn't that a real problem already?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; it is. There was a price rise in 1965 on the order of 40 percent. It is a very serious problem, and one which has been growing in dimensions as the Vietnamese Government expenditure budget has risen, as the American troops have come into Vietnam in larger numbers, spending increasing amounts of money on the local market, and as the military construction program has become larger. These have soaked up all available skilled labor, and is bidding for labor that doesn't exist, and for materials as well. So that the local economy in Vietnam is a typical war boom economy at the present time, and the inflationary problem is a very serious one.

One measure, but only one, which is necessary to contain that inflation is to increase the volume of imports, and this is a major reason for the supplemental that is before you now.

Senator SPARKMAN. I notice you state that the Vietnamese Government has reduced its budget which should have some helpful effect, and you also bring out this point of the need of greater imports.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

PROCESS FOR IMPORTING GOODS AND MATERIALS

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, this may be a simple matter, but I am not sure that I understand. How do you get imported goods into circulation in Vietnam? Do they go to the Government or do they go to individual merchants?

Mr. BELL. For the most part they are handled through normal commercial channels—Vietnamese and some American firms which are import establishments—businesses in Saigon, and to a lesser extent in the smaller cities.

For that part of the total imports that the United States finances, we work out with the Government of Vietnam an approved list of items and amounts. So much for fertilizer, so much for iron and steel, so much for small electric motors, so much for drugs and medicines of various kinds, and so on. Then the Vietnamese Government issues import licenses to these importers—there are a substantial numbers of importers, resulting in great competition in this market—and they place orders. Items are bought mostly in the United States but for a few things we will permit orders to be placed in other less-developed countries. We do not ordinarily finance with AID funds imports from Europe or from Japan.

Orders are placed—the goods are shipped—they are delivered, and on presentation of an invoice and a bill of lading to a designated American bank the supplies are paid from our supporting assistance funds.

The goods, therefore, move through normal commercial channels.

The Vietnamese and American importers pay in piasters to the central bank of Vietnam the piaster value of the goods; the exporter, the seller, receives his dollars from the U.S. Government.

The piasters that are received for these goods by the Government of Vietnam are applied to the Government's budget in ways that are agreed between them and ourselves.

POSSIBILITY OF BLACK MARKET OPERATIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. What method do you have of insuring against black marketing? Is there much of a black market operation there now?

Mr. BELL. In the kind of goods we have just been referring to, Senator, there is no particular black market for them because these goods move in ordinary stores and shops and markets. If you or I were in Saigon we would see these goods in the business houses there.

Senator SPARKMAN. My recollection is that when we were having considerable trouble there we had a great deal of trouble with black marketing in everything.

BLACK MARKET IN CURRENCY

Mr. BELL. I was going to say that there is a black market in currency, in greenbacks.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. BELL. And a very serious one.

Senator SPARKMAN. Are any steps being taken to safeguard against that?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. Within the last few months there has been introduced in Vietnam a system which is similar to what was worked out earlier in Korea and in Germany and in other places where we have had large numbers of troops stationed; namely, the system of paying our troops not in ordinary American currency but in what are called military payment certificates or script. American troops, insofar as they wish to draw cash and, of course, they apply a lot of their pay, most of them, to family allotments, to the purchase of savings bonds, to other forms of savings back in the States—insofar as they wish to draw cash they receive that cash now in this script, and that script can be converted legally only at a certain rate, and through official disbursing offices.

If they convert on the black market, and I am sure a small amount of this does take place, it is a court-martial offense.

That was a measure which was introduced and has been of very substantial effectiveness.

There are still ways by which Americans, either in uniform or out of uniform, may seek to profit on the black market for Vietnamese currency. This has been true, as you know, in other country situations. We are applying in Vietnam all the remedies we have learned and all the protections we have learned in other cases. We are seeking to stop it to the maximum extent that can be accomplished through inspecting and auditing and policing.

Senator WILLIAMS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

POSTED EXCHANGE RATES AND BLACK MARKET

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Bell, in connection with the question of Senator Sparkman, do not the importers buy these goods at posted exchange rates and then they are free to sell them in the more or less free market and isn't there about 40-percent difference in the exchange

rates in the unit of currency between the posted rate and the normal rate value?

Mr. BELL. The importers, sir, sell on the local market for piasters. Senator WILLIAMS. That is right.

Mr. BELL. And they pay for their import licenses; that is, they pay for the goods under import licenses in piasters.

Senator WILLIAMS. But the exchange rates at which they pay for their goods are at the posted rates.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. And are they not substantially different than the regular exchange rates in the free market in Saigon?

Mr. BELL. Well, there are at least three different exchange rates at present. One is the official rate which is, which works out including taxes and so on at about 73½ piasters to the dollar.

Then, there is the special rate for personal exchange, for the soldiers and other private Americans. This is 118 piasters to the dollar.

The black market rate for Vietnamese, for the dollar in terms of Vietnamese piasters, has been running upward of 150 piasters to the dollar. The internal price level, however, piaster price level, in Vietnam is most nearly related to the 73½ rate.

So that there is no automatic profit to an importer because he pays for his imports at 73½ to the dollar. The profit, if any, that he makes depends on what he can sell his goods for in piasters inside Vietnam, and he has no way of converting back to dollars in a way that would make him a profit. Quite the contrary, if he goes onto the black market with piasters he would be losing money.

Senator WILLIAMS. If you reverse that whole process, though, he is buying imports on the basis of 73½ piasters to the dollar and he is selling in the market where he can freely obtain 140 to 150.

Mr. BELL. No, sir, he cannot freely obtain it. That is the point, nobody can, it is a black market, it is an illegal market.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is the point that I am asking. Is it illegal for him to sell these goods at an exchange rate any higher than 73½?

Mr. BELL. Well, he sells for piasters to the consumers who are buying from him in piasters. He doesn't—the importer, the shopkeeper, the merchant—

Senator WILLIAMS. But he regulates his margin of profit to take care of the difference. I realize you are dealing with the same unit.

Mr. BELL. His margin of profit will depend on, you know, the supply and demand factor in the market and he may make substantial profits but they would be in piasters.

LIMITATION ON PROFITS

Senator WILLIAMS. Are his profits limited? For instance, if he has something that costs him 73 piasters is he free to sell it at a rate of 140 or 150?

Mr. BELL. There is a markup limit, Mr. Poats advises me—I am not sure I see how it would be enforced—but the Vietnamese Government's intention is that the markup limit will be—generally 10 percent covering not just profit but all internal costs.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is the point. Will you furnish the committee with a copy of that regulation which limits that?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir, we will be glad to.

Senator WILLIAMS. Along with a report as to how it is enforced?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

(The material referred to follows:)

Vietnamese Governmental Control of Markup in Exchange Transactions

Vietnamese Government regulations limit the markup on imported commodities. AID/Washington has wired to Saigon to secure copies of the regulations. These will be transmitted to the committee upon receipt.

However, in general, the importer is permitted to add to the import cost of commodities, internal costs such as handling, transportation, storage, etc., plus a margin of profit which varies depending on the nature of the commodity. This combination of internal costs plus profit usually does not exceed 14 percent of the basic import cost.

The wholesaler sells either directly to end-users at this price, or to retailers. The latter is allowed to add a profit margin—usually limited to 3 percent over the wholesale cost.

Selling prices of both imported and domestically produced goods must be approved by the Vietnamese Government, and there are "judicial police" who are assigned the task of checking the markets to verify that sellers do not overcharge. However, these regulations cannot, under current circumstances, be enforced and the real market prices tend to respond more to supply/demand forces of the marketplace.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for using the Senator's time.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think they were very good followup questions, and I was glad to yield to the Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

TOTAL ECONOMIC AID TO VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Bell, subsequent to our assistance to the French in their struggle in Vietnam, which I think amounted to in the neighborhood of \$2 billion, about how much have we put into economic aid and supporting assistance in Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. From fiscal 1954 through fiscal 1966, including the proposal that is before the committee right now, the obligations will have run on economic assistance, quite apart from military, about \$2.7 billion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that outside of the money which we gave to assist the French, which was in the neighborhood of \$2 billion, the total, including this request which is before us, will be about \$2.7 billion. Is that correct?

Mr. BELL. \$2.7 billion since 1954. I don't have before me the figure of how much we gave the French.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we had testimony the other day that it was roughly \$2 billion but I am talking about a period after that.

Mr. BELL. It may be a little high.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have given me the answer—\$2.7 billion.

CASUALTY FIGURES

Mr. BELL. Earlier this morning the Chairman asked me about the casualty figures. They have been checked.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, the figure as to whether there were 33,000?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Who lost their lives, or 11,000? Have you checked that?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; and the Defense Department official figures, based on body count, are that in 1965 there were 35,436 Vietcong and North Vietnamese who were killed. The 11,000 figure that the Chairman was citing appears to be the figure of the number of South Vietnamese Government troops who were killed.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many American troops lost their lives in 1965?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa has the floor, if he yields.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BELL. 1,100 Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. That means there were 1,100 Americans, 35,000 Vietcong, and 11,000 South Vietnamese Government troops?

Mr. BELL. That is right; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS FROM U.S. AID

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So we put \$2.7 billion in this effort during our tenure there.

Now, in their economy and so on, are we any better off now than we were when we started?

Mr. BELL. There is no question that the Vietnamese economy in general is substantially better off than it was 10 years ago.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They were fairly well self-supporting at that time, weren't they?

Mr. BELL. No, sir; I don't believe so.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Weren't they rice exporters then?

Mr. BELL. Well, rice production doubled in the 10-year period, and various industrial investments were made, the power supply was greatly expanded. Transportation was improved.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask you this because my time is very limited? Are these so-called improvements due only to the impact of additional American money or do they represent solid growth of the South Vietnamese economy? I am trying to see if it is a false increase from the standpoint of real stability or if it is a temporary boom based on our aid and our troops being there.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. I understand.

During the last 5 or 6 years of the 1950's, there was indeed very substantial permanent improvement in the South Vietnamese economy. For the last 4 or 5 years, that improvement has been very seriously interrupted by the increased scale of the fighting. Nevertheless, there has continued to be some improvement. For example, power supply has continued to increase. The use of fertilizer for increasing agricultural production has continued to rise, but not nearly as much as would have been the case, obviously, had the fighting not risen in intensity.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have the North Vietnamese or the Chinese sent in any large amounts of aid and supporting assistance to the South Vietnamese in the nature of our contributions there?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

VIETCONG INFLUENCE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How do you account for the fact that the Vietcong seem to be quite successful in the countryside and seem to be able to at least secure the passive assistance if not the full assistance of the South Vietnamese living in the countryside if they haven't been helping them any at all, while we have been pouring all this money into that economy?

Mr. BELL. The principal reason for Vietcong and North Vietnamese influence in the countryside is simple terror. They do it with a gun, Senator, not with aid.

The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is cheaper that way; isn't it?

Mr. BELL. Sir?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is cheaper for them to do it that way, isn't it, through terror than through the furnishing of food and medicine?

Mr. BELL. I suspect in the long run that is a rather doubtful proposition.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is not very humanitarian, I will admit that.

Mr. BELL. But the simple fact is that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese have operated a very sophisticated and widespread system of force and pressure. They have assassinated, as I am sure you know, several thousand civilian officials.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think you have answered the question. I mean they really do it through terror and force.

Mr. BELL. That is the principal instrument.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And have been able to sustain themselves on that basis rather—

Mr. BELL. I should also add they have conducted a rather astute and effective propaganda campaign. There are real grievances and problems in the countryside which they have attempted to exploit.

For example, in some areas, not in all, but in some areas of South Vietnam there are serious problems of landownership and tenancy and the Vietcong have made capital of this. They have sometimes handed out pieces of paper that purport to be title to land and so on.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Haven't we been trying to do that, too?

Mr. BELL. Yes, we have; yes, sir, and one of the matters that I personally think needs to be pushed more rapidly is a stronger land reform program on the part of the Vietnamese Government.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I hope we can get at it.

My time is limited. We can go into these things, which we have done before, when we have some more time. But I want to move into one other field.

COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THAILAND

We have been putting a lot of money into Thailand, for instance.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And in increasing amounts, not only military support but other support. According to my understanding of what you said a little bit ago, Communist activity and disturbances in

Thailand are increasing. Perhaps the increase in activity is in direct proportion to the increases in our aid.

Mr. BELL. Prior to fiscal year 1965, Senator, AID assistance to Thailand had actually been declining. However, the proportion or the share of our economic assistance that has been directed to this problem has been rising. About 3 or 4 years ago it became evident that there were the beginnings of agitation and insurgency in northeast Thailand and in northern Thailand. The program of the Thai Government and our own was redirected to put emphasis on security and progress in those areas of the countryside.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I think the Thais have been very staunch friends of ours.

Mr. BELL. They have.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I think they have cooperated completely. But it seems that the more money we put into some of these countries the more the Communists step up their activities.

Mr. BELL. I think, sir, that we did not, we have not, as a nation, recognized until the last few years the seriousness, the sophistication, the expertness with which these insurgency guerrilla-type activities have been developed and managed by the Communist groups in southeast Asia and quite possibly in other parts of the world. We have begun to modify the American programs of assistance and diplomacy and information to meet those insurgency situations. I certainly do not feel, and I would not want to give the committee the impression that I feel that we have mastered this kind of effort. We have not. We are trying hard. We have learned a good deal. We have greatly improved and increased our programs but we are a long way from home in learning how to counteract insurgency movements such as we have seen in Vietnam and are seeing now in Thailand.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. My time is up now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

CORRUPTION INVOLVING AID PROGRAM

Senator MORSE. Mr. Bell, last Friday you said that corruption was not a major factor in the total effort in Vietnam. Would you please provide the committee with copies of the recent reports of the inspector general for aid concerning corruption involving AID, and would you tell the committee now of some of the typical cases which you have investigated lately that involve allegations of corruption?

Mr. BELL. I am not sure that you are quoting me correctly, Senator. I don't remember the exact comment. May I restate my own position?

Senator MORSE. I have it in quotation marks. I hope it is taken out of the transcript accurately.

Mr. BELL. May I restate the matter?

So far as the American import program into Vietnam is concerned, I do not think that corruption is a major factor. There are other aspects of the Vietnamese economy in which I think there are very serious problems. The black market in currency that Senator Williams and I were discussing earlier is certainly a serious problem.

Now, so far as our own efforts are concerned, we will be glad to provide any records that the committee would like to see.

Senator MORSE. Have you had any inspector general reports dealing with allegations of corruption in AID?

Mr. BELL. Ken Mansfield, the Inspector General of the Department of State—he is not my inspector general, as you know, sir—was in my office yesterday, he is just about to go out to Vietnam again. He has been there frequently. We talked about our program, and his. We have on the spot in Saigon today some 18 auditors with more en route—we have at least 2, and I think it is going up to 4, members of our own inspection staff who are permanently stationed in Saigon. The AID inspection staff has investigated during the past year, as I recall, about 90 cases, and closed about half of them. I had a report on this from the chief of our own internal inspection service just the other day.

Senator MORSE. The Comptroller General of the United States from time to time has filed reports with you bearing upon problems of corruption in AID.

Mr. BELL. The Comptroller General has not been in South Vietnam for 2 or 3 years. I believe he is mounting a team now that will be going out shortly.

Senator MORSE. But he has been elsewhere where you have had your AID program and has filed reports with this committee.

Mr. BELL. Oh, yes. The GAO is constantly auditing our program all around the world; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. I want to say, as you know one of my criticisms of your whole program is you haven't stamped out corruption to the degree the taxpayer is entitled to have you do it.

Mr. BELL. I can only respond that I agree with you that we should stamp it out in every way that we possibly can. We have, since I have been in the agency, stepped up and improved our auditing program, our inspection program, our end-use check program. I think the situation has been getting better, but I agree with you that there is still more diversion than I would like to see. There are still more cases of black market operations and that sort of thing than I would like to see and we are continuing to work on it.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Bell, in fairness to you and me, I read from galley 13 of the testimony in regard to this matter of corruption:

On the other side, I do not believe it is a major factor in the total effort there. We and the present Government in South Vietnam are working very hard and closely on that.

I want to say that is the testimony of Mr. Rusk according to this galley and not yours.

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator MORSE. I assume that you did not object to the statement of Mr. Rusk.

Mr. BELL. Of course not, Senator.

REFUGEE PROBLEM

Senator MORSE. In the recent issue of Look magazine Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts has an article dealing with the refugee problem in Vietnam, and in fairness to the Senator because I am going to comment on it, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have it incorporated at this point in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
(The article referred to follows:)

[From Look, Feb. 8, 1966]

A FRESH LOOK AT VIETNAM

(By Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senator from Massachusetts)

In a small village in Vietnam recently, I had the opportunity to speak with a village elder. This man had seen 30 years of continuous conflict, two sons had been lost in long-passed military engagements, and his crude farm implements lay useless behind his home. He was an exhausted man in an exhausted country. Without my asking, he related the needs of his village—but he was really speaking for Vietnam. "We just want to be free from the terror and weapons of soldiers," he said. "We want our children to read, we don't want them to be sick all their lives, and we want to grow our own food on our own land."

This simple statement of human needs, so pathetically stated, was a crushing description of Vietnam. The months of Senate hearings that I had conducted on Vietnam's refugee problems, while dramatic in airing the hurt of people caught in war, never produced such forceful testimony as did this man in the setting where we talked.

We have been involved in two conflicts in Vietnam. One has been the battle against the terror brought in the name of revolution by the Vietcong guerrillas and the forces from the North. The efforts of the South Vietnamese and of our own American forces in this conflict have been the object of American debate and attention on an almost unprecedented scale. Our Government has taken a position in this endeavor that has been clear and firm. Regardless of individual views, most people both at home and abroad are well aware of this aspect of our policy in Vietnam.

The second conflict in Vietnam—the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people themselves—has not been waged with the same ferocity. There has been no one firm humanitarian policy understood throughout our Nation or the world. The struggle in Vietnam has not been one that has produced a concern for the most important element in the Vietnam situation—the welfare of the Vietnamese people themselves.

Positive steps have been proposed by our President, who has made clear his commitment to the welfare of the Vietnamese people. In a major address last April, the President discussed the two faces of the conflict in Vietnam. He outlined a program for the economic and social betterment of all southeast Asia. Later, and more specifically, he established Project Vietnam; a program to encourage American civilian physicians to volunteer their services to Vietnam. In September of last year, he dispatched an eminent specialist on rehabilitation of the handicapped, Dr. Howard A. Rusk, to undertake a special study in that country. The President's concern has stimulated progress in this area.

Yet greater efforts must be undertaken if we are to win the support of these people, for without them and their identification with the democratic governments of the world, the lives of many Americans will have been given to no avail. In the voice of the village elder who described a nation's needs was the clear implication that he was indifferent as to who would supply those needs. Years of fear and deprivation had smothered the concern he may have had for his own personal freedoms. He wanted physical security, education, health and some form of social justice. While it can be said that we have actively sought to provide for his security, we have yet to fully meet his remaining requests. And it is significant that it is free societies that can best provide these things.

It is the war that the hopes and aspirations of the people that must be escalated in Vietnam. In this land of 16 million people:

There are only 800 Vietnamese doctors, and 500 of these are in the armed forces, leaving 300 for the entire civilian population.

Only 28 hospitals have surgical facilities, but 17 of these facilities are idle for lack of physicians.

Eighty percent of the children of Vietnam suffer from worms.

The vast majority of people are illiterate, and what school system did once exist in the countryside has been nearly destroyed by war. School-teachers have been prime targets of terrorists. In 1965 alone, over 11,000

civil servants—a high proportion of them teachers—were killed, abducted, or wounded by the Vietcong.

The nation's production of food, once sufficient to make Vietnam a rice basket for Asia, is so depleted that rice must now be imported to feed the populace.

Local government has been decimated; not one of the 16,000 villages—or their officials—has escaped assassination or terror. Clearly, whatever social institutions once existed for the benefit of the Vietnamese are now crippled or totally ruined by war.

Before I went to Vietnam, the Senate Judiciary Special Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, which I chair, took testimony in over 4 months of hearings from some 40 witnesses on the problem of Vietnam refugees. Our subcommittee was concerned with what was being done for the homeless thousands: What provisions were being made for the estimated 100,000 orphans? Were we meeting the challenge of caring for the human fallout of war—the very people that the Vietcong claimed to champion? And in a larger sense, with Vietnam almost a land of refugees, was the United States beginning to engage in this more difficult battle for popular support?

The testimony given at these hearings indicated that our efforts in this area were not sufficient. The Saigon government, assisted by our AID officials, had only the barest beginnings of a program to meet the needs of the refugees, although they had forecast the presence of 100,000 refugees by July of 1965. Even when the estimate was proven wrong, and the refugee count was greater than 600,000 people, there was still no change in planning, no adequate program set up to handle this massive influx of South Vietnamese, according to a report by the General Accounting Office. And this occurred despite prior knowledge that the escalation of military activity would, and did, lead to a vast increase in displaced civilians.

Moreover, it was discouraging to hear the testimony of representatives of our own Government imply again and again that in Vietnam the problem of refugees is just that—a problem and a burden.

By now, there are approximately 1 million such refugees in South Vietnam, or 6 percent of its population. It is as if the population of the six New England States were homeless in America. These are people whose villages have been overrun by the Vietcong, or who are fleeing to urban areas to escape the cross fire of the fighting or the effect of the bombs from our planes. For the most part, they are grouped around the major population centers on the coastline, but hundreds of smaller centers lie inland.

While in Vietnam, I saw for myself the indifference of the Saigon government to the plight of their own. Government officials assured me that the refugee situation was well in hand—yet I inspected one camp of over 600 people without a toilet. Construction was started on seven refugee camps in anticipation of my visit. Work stopped when my plans were temporarily altered. It began again when it was finally possible for me to go.

Many other aspects of my visits to these camps did not ring true. People applauded when our party entered a camp—thanks to minor officials moving through the refugee crowd as cheerleaders. Blankets were distributed in our presence, and repossessed when we left. The paint on buildings was still wet, and roads were freshly cleared and bulldozed. In essence, the behavior of these officials was more typical of people concealing a lack of effort than of men doing their best at a difficult task. To them, these refugees are a burden—but to me, they can be one of our strongest assets in Vietnam.

I recognize that historically it has always been difficult to attend to the concerns of the civilian population in the midst of war. And in Vietnam, the by-product of escalation has been a refugee flow that would tax even the most resourceful officials. It is encouraging that last August, our AID officials established their own separate refugee program for Vietnam. And we know that the many voluntary agencies in the field have patiently continued their traditional work—despite hardships and personal dangers.

But now, perhaps, the opportunity presents itself for a greater devotion of our energies to the refugee problem. Now, more can be done to focus our attention on the Vietnamese people themselves.

I would suggest that, first, the U.S. Government must express an overall humanitarian policy in Vietnam that will rival, in resolve and resources, our military effort. This expression by our Government must be so forceful that there will be no danger of the Saigon government's misreading our desires.

The basis of this policy would recognize the potential of 1 million refugees—indeed, that of all the people of Vietnam—the potential to educate, train, and employ them in useful tasks. Experiences in other refugee situations in Asia illustrate what can be done to productively employ and train idle hands. Cottage industries established through private enterprise or voluntary agencies assist the handicapped or the young and old. Cooperative farms could be organized and built by the refugees themselves, as could resettlement villages, schools or water-conservation projects.

It logically follows that this policy direction would imply the need for more adequate facilities at refugee centers. These centers should be equipped for the activity rather than the storage of people.

Second, this strong expression of Government policy should be directed to the rebirth of democratic political action among these people to enhance their future role in their village's or nation's life. And within these settlements, people who before had at least exercised free choice in the selection of village leaders could experience greater forms of representation.

Depending upon the time that we would expect people to remain in such settlements, representative government could be fostered. Each refugee camp could elect a council to serve the refugees' interests in the camp itself. And on a national level, refugee representatives could be present in Saigon to assure that the immediate needs of this growing population are met.

The meaning and experience of this kind of activity cannot be minimized in a nation where the idea of a central government responding to individual and local needs is novel.

Third, to assist in these endeavors, it would be wise to recruit men of other nations who have a unique background and experience in the problems of refugees. The men who mastered the problems of refugees following World War II, those who worked in the deserts of the Middle East and more recently in the camps of north Africa have much to offer us. They could be called for this humanitarian purpose, to advise on refugee problems and to assist as intermediaries with the Central Government and our own Armed Forces.

Our renewed humanitarian commitment to the people of Vietnam would also provide for the presence of a refugee official at the highest policymaking level in our Saigon Embassy. This man, responsible only to the Ambassador and the President, would be involved in all decisions, whether military or civilian. He would also be a coordinator of the Government and voluntary-agency efforts.

Such experts could enlighten both Government and people. Their presence could be the promise of great international efforts, not only in Vietnam, but in all of southeast Asia. For the educational and other programs needed in refugee camps are but a small measure of the needs throughout Vietnam and the neighboring states.

Finally, and most importantly, I do not believe it visionary to consider an international force to assist the developing areas of southeast Asia. The presence of men whose only concern is the health of the population, the education of children, the bringing of simple technologies to remote lands or the development of civilian administrators would be an important defense against future political instability and resultant aggression.

This force of dedicated people would be truly international. It would not be a unilateral American effort. It would enroll the citizens of every country in the free world—but especially the citizens of Asia. These volunteers would bring an emphasis on peace and stability to a part of the world that was known too much war. Their accepted presence in any Asian nation would be symbolic of that nation's desire to improve the conditions under which its people live, regardless of ideology.

Such an international effort could be internationally fostered. There are voluntary agencies established on a worldwide basis to oversee this work and assist in the effort. I recently had the opportunity to address the leaders of these agencies in Geneva about Vietnam. I was taken by their warm response to my suggestions of greater involvement by them and their nations in the civilian effort in Vietnam.

But even more appropriately, a way might be found to involve the one organization of international harmony—the United Nations. For it is this body that can best command the resources, talent, and good will among free nations for a concerted development effort.

The work of this force, involving thousands of men and women, would be available to all. Teams of health specialists attacking entire areas suffering

from recurrent outbreaks of disease, public-health specialists constructing sanitation and sewage systems, teams of agricultural specialists adapting their knowledge to the differing farm conditions, advising and constructing the necessary equipment and systems needed for efficient food production—all these efforts are within the realm of possibility. Entire school systems could be established; adequate communications with centers of safety and Government could be devised and strengthened in methods and procedures for administering to local needs.

Regardless of the conditions in Vietnam in the months ahead, such a proposal expressing our true concern for the people of southeast Asia should be aired before the nations of the world. For what cannot be fully accomplished in the military turmoil of Vietnam immediately can now be undertaken in the more secure nations in that part of the world.

We know that the developed nations in the past have displayed an amazing capability to undertake the infinitely complex tasks of war. Cannot the harnessing of equal energy for these peaceful purposes also be achieved?

To the extent that we leave Vietnam one day with more to mark our presence than destruction, we will have met our true commitment to the Vietnamese. And to the extent that we plan and act now to assure against a recurrence of a Vietnam elsewhere in southeast Asia, we will have met the challenge of the future in Asia.

Senator MORSE. I interpret that article of Senator Kennedy to imply, at least, that he did not find the South Vietnamese Government doing for the people of South Vietnam what he thought they ought to be doing. They didn't seem to indicate interest in the mass of people. He told a story, as I recall, and I paraphrase him, but I think accurately, of how blankets were distributed to the refugees while he was there, but he was advised that after he left they were all picked up again by the South Vietnamese Government.

Yet this morning you testify that you seem to think that there is a growing support of that Government.

What did you find when you were over there indicating that the Government was giving the assistance to the refugees that it ought to be giving?

Mr. BELL. Well, Senator, Senator Kennedy obviously can speak for himself. I happened to have discussed this matter with him just yesterday afternoon at some considerable length and I believe we see it very much the same way; namely, that the Government of Vietnam now, in contrast with the situation 6 months or a year ago, has indeed mounted a major program. Of their 1966 civil budget of about 20 million piasters, 1.3 billion piasters is for refugee work. This is a substantial share of the budget obviously, and is for the approximately 440,000 refugees out of the 15-16 million total population of South Vietnam. That is not a small figure.

Senator Kennedy and I are also in thorough agreement that this is not enough. This program does and will provide food and shelter, blankets, the minimum welfare arrangements, you might say, for the refugees. But it does not yet provide sufficiently for the education of the children in the refugee camps, for the vocational training of the adults, and for the resettlement of the refugees, either back to their own home villages when that becomes possible under the security situation, or in jobs in normal employment in new locations.

Senator MORSE. How many refugees are there?

Mr. BELL. There are about 400,000 in camps at the present time. There were some 700,000 in all during the last year, and the difference—nearly 300,000—have either been resettled back in the villages from which they came or have joined the urban population and found jobs and housing there.

REASON FOR INFLUX OF REFUGEES

Senator MORSE. How many of them become refugees as a result of the Vietcong terrorism and how many of them become refugees as a result of American bombings, a scorched earth policy, napalm bombing, the poisoning of rice fields and other shocking actions of conducting the war?

Mr. BELL. I am not sure we have precise figures on that, Senator, but there is no question that the vast majority of them are refugees from Vietcong terror and not from the incidental damage of our own military operations.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, at this point—

Senator MORSE. I am not yielding to the Senator from Ohio. He is going to get his turn in due course of time.

REVENUES FROM IMPORT DUTIES

Mr. Bell, what portion of the South Vietnamese budget comes from import duties?

Mr. BELL. Import duties, sir?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Mr. BELL. May I ask Mr. Poats to give you the precise figure on that?

The total budget of the Vietnamese Government is 55 billion piasters in the present year. Of that about 21 or 22 billion piasters is Vietnamese Government revenues and of that 21 or 22 billion piasters a substantial part of their revenues are import duties.

Senator MORSE. Will you supply the figures for the record in the interests of time?

Mr. BELL. Be glad to.

(The figures referred to follow:)

VIETNAM BUDGET REVENUES DERIVED FROM IMPORT DUTIES AND
AID-FINANCED IMPORTS

Budget revenues in calendar year 1966 are estimated at 49.8 billion piasters. Revenues derived from all import duties are estimated at 13.9 billion piasters, of which 8.9 is attributable to U.S.-financed imports. An additional 27.7 billion piasters is estimated to accrue as counterpart from U.S. economic aid.

Projected calendar year 1966 GVN budget

[Billions of piasters]

Expenditures.....	55.0
Revenues.....	49.8
	<hr/>
GVN domestic receipts.....	22.1
	<hr/>
Customs Duties:	
GVN program.....	5.0
U.S.-financed imports.....	8.9
Other Taxes.....	8.2
	<hr/>
AID (counterpart).....	27.7
CIP.....	22.2
	<hr/>
Public Law 480 title I.....	5.5
	<hr/>
Estimated net deficit.....	5.2

Senator MORSE. And also, unless you have it at tongue's point would you also supply the figure as to how much of this income in their budget is attributed to imports under our aid program?

Mr. BELL. Well, the counterpart, the local currency which is received by the Government of Vietnam in the form of an indirect grant under our commercial import program, is not included in the 21 or 22 billion piaster figure that I gave you. The United States is supplying that part of the Vietnamese Government budget—will amount in calendar year 1966 to about 24 billion piasters.

Senator MORSE. Do they impose import duties on our aid?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

The import duties are paid by the consumers in Vietnam, not by the U.S. Government.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

VIETCONG ATROCITIES

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask at this time there be supplied the figures showing the number of orphans and dead people that resulted from the guerrilla tortures of the Communists? So we will have both sides of the picture.

Senator MORSE. When you supply those figures, we also—will you also supply in your 35,000 figure the number of those victims that were in black pajamas.

(The information referred to follows:)

ANNEX I

DOCTRINAL BASES OF THE USE OF TERROR

Terror has played an indispensable role in the operations of the Vietcong since Viet Minh days. Truong Chinh, one of the leading North Vietnamese theorists and third ranking man in the Politburo in Hanoi, described the Viet Minh operations in his book "The August Revolution" in these terms: "The general form of struggle was the armed demonstration, another special form used at this moment was the guerrilla wherever the topography of the country was favorable and yet another, the elimination of traitors in towns and country by picked detachments."

In another book, "The Resistance To Win," he said: "Traitors to the nation, reactionaries, and enemies of the resistance must be immediately eliminated. We should punish those even in the ranks of the resistance who advocated wrong measures or committed harmful deeds."

Who is a traitor? A Vietcong document captured in 1961 cited on page 49 of "A Threat to Peace" gave the working guerrillas a clear definition: "Step up extermination activities against traitors. All those refusing to have rice collected, to pay taxes or make money contributions to the Front can be considered as reactionaries and punished like other traitors."

Hanoi continued to call for violence, especially directed against Government officials, as shown by an article entitled "The Role of Violence in the Revolution for the Liberation of the South" printed in North Vietnam's leading Communist organ, Hoc Tap, in July 1964.

"The aim of the revolution to liberate our compatriots in South Vietnam is to defeat the aggression and frustrate the warmongering policies of the U.S. imperialists and their lackey. To that end it is necessary to smash the reactionaries administrative machinery and the imperialistic mercenaries' army. This revolution can and should be settled only by the use of revolutionary acts and the force of the masses to defeat the enemy force; it absolutely cannot be settled by laws and accords."

An attack on Saigon's police headquarters, for example, was cited on August 18 by Liberation radio:

"Our troops skillfully and valiantly shot to death the sentinels guarding the gate, rushed into the Saigon police headquarters, and blew it up.

"Let us applaud the people's armed forces in the Saigon military zone for having scored this glorious achievement and for having dealt a heavy and accurate blow to the enemy.

"This bomb explosion has also provided the Saigon compatriots with one more lesson and a rich experience with regard to the ability to use violence in both the political and military fields to topple the country-selling puppet clique and to seize power and put it in the people's hands."

The bombing of the My Canh Restaurant on June 25 which caused numerous casualties among innocent Vietnamese bystanders was the subject of boasting in Communist radio broadcasts, which called it "a new glorious exploit * * *," claimed "The South Vietnamese people and our compatriots are overjoyed at this feat * * *," and celebrated "this great victory scored by the Saigon armed forces * * *."

ANNEX II

STATISTICAL DATA ON VIETCONG ATROCITIES

Vietcong acts of terrorism against civilians

	1962	1963	1964	1965 ¹
Assassinated.....	1,719	2,073	1,611	1,089
Wounded.....	6,458	8,375	2,324	1,467
Kidnaped.....	9,688	7,262	6,710	4,696
Total.....	17,865	17,710	10,645	7,252

¹ Jan. 1-June 30.

Vietcong acts of terrorism against civil government officials only

1964:				
Killed.....				436
Wounded.....				161
Kidnaped and captured.....				1,131
Total.....				1,728
Jan. 1—June 30, 1965:				
Killed.....				143
Wounded.....				73
Kidnaped and captured.....				280
Total.....				496

ANNEX III

EXAMPLES OF VIETCONG ATROCITIES

1. EXTRACTS FROM A TYPICAL DAY (MARCH 21, 1965) OF VIETCONG TERROR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Vietcong entered a hamlet in Quang Tin Province and kidnaped 10 civilians. A Vietcong squad infiltrated a hamlet in Gia Dinh Province and kidnaped four civilians.

The Vietcong entered a hamlet in Quang Tri Province and kidnaped two civilians.

The Vietcong fired mortars into the office of the Hiep Hoa village council, wounding 22 civilians.

The Vietcong entered Phuoc Thuan hamlet in Ba Xuyen Province, kidnaping the hamlet chief and wounding one civilian.

The Vietcong attacked a land development center in Darlac Province kidnaping seven and killing two civilians.

One Vietcong platoon entered a hamlet in Tuyen Duc Province and kidnaped three hamlet personnel and four civilians.

2. VIETCONG TERRORISTS STRIKE PUBLIC FACILITIES

The Vietcong bombed the My Canh Restaurant in Saigon on the evening of June 25, 1965. The result of the two explosions set off by the Vietcong was 42 persons killed, 27 of whom were Vietnamese, and 80 injured, 62 of whom were Vietnamese. A large proportion of the killed and injured were Vietnamese women and children.

On August 10, the Vietcong exploded four mines, destroying a two classroom elementary school and information room and a first aid station at Long Phy village near Soc Trang. Three civil defense members were killed and two civilians injured. During 1962, 80,000 Vietnamese children were deprived of schools because of terrorist action: 636 schools were destroyed, 250 teachers were kidnaped and 30 teachers were killed.

3. COOPERATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT PUNISHED

On August 24, U.S. troops entered a Montagnard village 15 miles east of Pleiku to discover that the Vietcong had just executed the aged village chief and the village chief's youngest son. The village chief's wife was still alive but the Vietcong had tortured her by carving flesh from her body and cutting her arms. The Vietcong had also shot the wives of two of the Montagnard soldiers from the village repeatedly in the fleshy parts of their legs trying to force the women to disclose who, among the villagers, supported the Government.

4. POPULATION CENTERS ARE FREQUENT VICTIMS OF VIETCONG ATROCITIES

In early August, an American AID provincial representative in Binh Dinh Province told of a Vietnamese Army noncommissioned officer who went berserk and attempted to kill himself following a Vietcong attack on a refugee center. Some 60 children and older people were killed and injured, among whom were relatives of the NCO.

Following the battle of Dong Xoai in June 1965, Mr. Leo Cherne of the International Rescue Committee visited the scene of the fighting. Mr. Cherne reported: "The Vietcong * * * left behind about 1,500 of a total population of 3,000 who were dead or injured or maimed or orphaned. These are simple Vietnamese peasants. I learned that the Vietcong, before they withdrew, literally entered every single home, shack, habitation of any kind, and like locusts cleaned every last kernel of rice, every piece of dried fish or any other protein and every last container of Nuoc mam and cleaned out every last plaster."

5. AMERICAN CIVILIANS ARE VIETCONG TARGETS

On March 29, 1965, Vietcong terrorists exploded a bomb at the American Embassy in Saigon. Two Americans were killed. (It is important to note that 19 Vietnamese were also killed and 131 Vietnamese were injured from the blast.)

The Vietcong have threatened to execute Mr. Gustav Hertz, an AID American employee, who was captured while on a "Sunday stroll" in 1964 as retaliation should a Vietcong terrorist who was captured while aiding in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in March be executed. It should be pointed out that Mr. Hertz, unlike the Vietcong terrorist who was engaged in an act of premeditated violence against unarmed civilians, was in Vietnam in a purely nonmilitary capacity and was engaged in work of a constructive nature for the Vietnamese people.

(Source: Department of State.)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Bell, I notice in your statement this morning you are requesting this committee and the Congress to authorize the use of supporting assistance funds for administrative expenses.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CARLSON. Would that not be an unusual request?

Mr. BELL. It would, sir, and I apologize for not highlighting that. That was in my statement, as you suggest. We are asking for that only in relation to Vietnam, and only for the special reason that we are necessarily building up our mission staff and, therefore, the administrative support for that mission staff, to a very large amount. We are not exactly sure how much we are going to need, and we are not sure how long we are going to need it and, therefore, with the Budget Bureau's concurrence, we are asking for this special and unusual arrangement, so that we can handle the administrative costs of the expanded Vietnam program to the amount of \$1,400,000, which is the present estimate, from supporting assistance funds.

That is, I think, what underlies it, Senator.

Senator CARLSON. Is this definitely tied down to Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; only for the costs in Vietnam and those in Washington to backstop the Vietnam effort directly. It is quite tightly related, thoroughly limited to that purpose.

Senator CARLSON. Your supplemental request this morning also includes the Dominican Republic and other areas.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; but this particular proposal does not. It would be limited to Vietnam.

Senator CARLSON. I will say very frankly that I would be very cautious about voting for an open-end authorization for administrative expenses, but I assume you have made a case and made a study of it.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator CARLSON. I did read in the press this morning, or within the last few days, that plans are being made to hire thousands of Vietnamese and place them on the rolls, as, I assume, good missionaries for improving the political and economic situation.

I just wondered if you had that in mind when you come up with this open-end authorization.

Mr. BELL. No, sir; the people you refer to, I assume, are the teams of persons who will be hired by, and members of, the Vietnamese Government—not the U.S. Government—who will work in the village as part of the so-called rural construction or pacification effort. There will be a number of thousands of such persons but they will be like any other members of the Vietnamese Government establishment. They will not be our employees.

Senator CARLSON. Not paid from U.S. funds?

Mr. BELL. Well, we may support their training or otherwise supply materials for them but they will not be U.S. Government employees. They will be Government of Vietnam employees, provincial government employees.

CONTINGENCY FUND

Senator CARLSON. I noticed the President in his message to the Congress on the full-year authorization requested only \$70 million in contingency funds.

Now, if we grant this authority to use regular aid funds for administrative expenses, isn't it reasonable that that could take care of an increase in contingency funds?

Mr. BELL. Well, the administrative expenses, Senator, are nowhere near the scale of these totals. Of the \$315 million of additional sup-

porting assistance that are requested—in the submission that is before you—only \$1.4 million is the estimated additional administrative costs for the Vietnam operation that we would like to pay from those supporting assistance funds, and none of them would be available for use in the Dominican Republic or anywhere else.

It is only a special and limited Vietnam authority we are asking for.

Senator CARLSON. I notice in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 Congress did vote \$54,240,000 for administrative expenses.

Mr. BELL. That is right, yes, sir. That was not an increase over the previous year or at least no substantial or significant increase. It is because of the pressure of the greatly enlarged staff that we have to hire and support in Vietnam, that our administrative costs both there and here have risen in the amount I have indicated. It is hard to predict exactly how far it will go, and it is certainly hard to tell how long we will need it. But they are identified jobs related solely to Vietnam, and we do regard this, as I am sure you would, as a very unusual arrangement and not a precedent.

Senator CARLSON. I have a very high regard for you, Mr. Bell, and while you say \$1.4 million if we authorize this, it could easily be \$2.5 million if required.

Mr. BELL. Well, this is our estimate as to what we think we will need. We were burned last summer by underestimating the costs in Vietnam and we think we have made a generous estimate here.

Furthermore, sir, as you will note in the section-by-section analysis of the draft bill that is before you, we could not use any of the supporting assistance funds for administrative purposes except under a Presidential determination.

As you know, the President in all circumstances is very tight on personnel and administrative costs. So that is a special and additional safeguard that the committee can consider.

REQUEST FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Senator CARLSON. I would like to get into the Dominican Republic for a moment. I notice you are requesting funds of \$37 million.

What are we going to use that for?

Mr. BELL. The \$37 million figure, sir, is the amount we have already committed from this year's contingency fund. We are asking for \$25 million more in this new request that is before you. The funds are being used as budget support, that is to pay part of the costs of the Dominican Government current expenses and capital expenses.

With the difficulties that arose down there last spring, the revenues of the Dominican Government dropped almost to zero. They have been recovering slowly. We have been bridging the gap between what we regard as their essential expenditures and their revenues. That gap has been becoming smaller. Last month, January, the gap is estimated at about \$31½ million. We hope that the gap will vanish altogether before too long. But over this past few months, it has been substantial, and the amount of money that has been put into the Dominican Republic has necessarily been large for this purpose.

In addition, we have a more normal AID operation in the Dominican Republic for technical cooperation, technical assistance projects, and for a few capital-type development projects—irrigation, highways, and so on—which are intended to help improve the permanent economic situation of that country.

But the bulk of the money has necessarily gone to straight budget support during this emergency period.

Senator CARLSON. Are these funds used to pay, for instance, the police department and the civilian operations of the Government in Santo Domingo?

Mr. BELL. We have made a contribution to the budget of the Dominican Government, which, in essence, is a contribution to all the things they are doing, police, teachers, public works officials, and all the rest; yes, sir.

Senator CARLSON. Is there any evidence that we may some day be relieved of that burden?

Mr. BELL. Oh, yes; the gap between the Government expenditures and receipts has been narrowing, and we expect it to be eliminated altogether. We are not sure how quickly that can be done. The Dominican Republic, as I am sure you know, sir, is a very sick economy. The legacy of 30 years of Trujillo was a very badly shattered economic situation, and it is not—it could not be under any circumstances a strong and self-supporting economy in the near future.

On top of that basic problem came the special emergency of last spring. So that I would be misleading the committee if I gave you the impression that the economic problems of the Dominican Republic will be solved quickly.

The temporary and emergency budget support we have been providing over the last several months is already declining and will be reduced very substantially in the near future. But the underlying economic problems of that country remain very serious.

Senator CARLSON. I have read—and that's all I know about this—that we spent \$200 million for military, economic, and civilian aid in the Dominican Republic in the last year. Would that be somewhere near an accurate figure?

Mr. BELL. You mean in the calendar year 1965? It could be, Senator.

Senator CARLSON. I read it and that is the reason I wondered. It is probably not your figure.

Mr. BELL. The economic assistance would be approximately \$100 million, since April 24, 1965. The military, the costs of having our military troops there I just don't know.

Senator CARLSON. If you could get that figure for the record, I would appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up, I believe, Senator Gore.

Mr. BELL. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I am advised that the economic and military costs together are closer to \$135 million than the \$200 million. Nevertheless, this is the order of magnitude.

(The figures referred to follow:)

U.S. assistance commitments to the Dominican Republic, calendar year 1965

Agency for International Development:

Development loans.....	\$6,000,000
Feasibility studies.....	1,000,000
Private investment fund.....	5,000,000
Technical cooperation grants.....	3,107,000
Fiscal year 1965 funds.....	1,303,000
Fiscal year 1966 funds.....	1,804,000
Supporting assistance grants.....	75,593,000
Supporting assistance, fiscal year 1965.....	19,350,000
Contingency fund, fiscal year 1965.....	20,343,000
Supporting assistance, fiscal year 1966.....	7,241,000
Contingency fund, fiscal year 1966.....	28,659,000
Total AID.....	84,700,000
Food for Peace.....	10,652,000
Public Law 480, title II.....	3,869,000
Public Law 480, title III.....	2,720,000
Public Law 480, title IV.....	4,063,000

Expenses of U.S. military forces in the Dominican Republic over and above the amount normally required for their maintenance..... 30,000,000

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

VIETNAMESE RICE IMPORTS

Senator GORE. Mr. Bell, it would appear from evidence presented by you and adduced during this hearing that it shows very clearly that this conflict in Vietnam is surely as much political, economic, and social as military, if not far more so.

One thing that would illustrate that is that you appear this morning making an urgent request for large amounts of money to accomplish many purposes, one of which is to import rice into Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. That is right, sir.

Senator GORE. Traditionally, Vietnam has been one of the major rice surplus producing countries in the world; is that true?

Mr. BELL. Yes—well, I don't know about the word "major." It certainly has been a rice exporter; yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Well, sometimes the Mekong Delta is referred to as the rice basket of Asia. Whether that is a correct description, I don't know. In any event, how much are you asking for to finance the importation of rice?

Mr. BELL. About \$21 million, Senator.

Senator GORE. What percentage of this rice will be consumed in Saigon?

Mr. BELL. We will import the rice for the commercial market in South Vietnam and for government distribution to the refugees. The

refugees, very few of them, are in the Saigon area. They are mostly up along the coast, in the northern and central provinces.

I don't know that I can answer the question as to where we expect it to be consumed.

Mr. POATS. The breakdown, I will have to check for the record—as I recall my memory is about 35,000 tons up country and about 20,000 tons in Saigon per month.

Mr. BELL. Regular consumption.

Mr. POATS. Regular consumption from Government stocks.

(The following figures were supplied for the record:)

DISTRIBUTION OF RICE IMPORTED UNDER AID FINANCING

Consumption in the rice deficit areas over and above that produced locally within those areas is estimated at 57,000 M/T per month or 684,000 M/T for 1966. The monthly figure can be broken down as follows:

	M/T
Saigon/Cholon.....	15,000
Central Vietnam.....	29,000
South Vietnam-East.....	8,000
ARVN forces.....	5,000
Total.....	57,000

In 1965 approximately 420,000 M/T of rice were shipped from the Mekong Delta to the market in Saigon, and from there distributed through commercial channels to the rest of the deficit provinces. It is estimated that the 1966 harvest will be of approximately the same size as the 1965 harvest.

Public Law 480 (title I) and AID-financed imports supplement rice shipments from the delta. In addition to the difference between delta surpluses and deficit area requirements, imports are being used to build up security stockpiles in Saigon and provincial capital cities.

Senator GORE. From a reading of Secretary McNamara's letter and your previous testimony, it would appear that the city of Saigon would face starvation except for our aid, is that correct?

Mr. POATS. Senator, I think the Government could obviously solve its rice problems by withholding rice from the deficit area up north and take care of Saigon. But if it is to take care of this problem in an equitable way, then Saigon would certainly be suffering if it did not have aid.

Senator GORE. I don't raise this point, Mr. Chairman, as an indication of my opposition to this request. Obviously this is a very costly operation, and a very dangerous one, but it would appear that the Vietcong have been discouragingly successful in stopping the rice of the Mekong Delta from going into the hands of the Government in Saigon.

Mr. BELL. There have been two effects of Vietcong action, Senator: One is to prevent planting or cultivation or fertilization of substantial areas, so that the rice harvest is less than it otherwise would be; and the second is the interruption of transportation routes, and the seizure of large amounts of rice directly for use by the Vietcong—the buildup of their stocks, for the use of the larger number of troops that have been brought down from North Vietnam and so on.

So that both because production has decreased in parts of the normally agricultural surplus areas because of the direct effects of the war, and because the Vietcong have seized substantial parts of the rice output, and have interrupted transportation to Saigon and other

cities, it has been impossible to export the normal amount of rice from Vietnam and has instead made it necessary to import rice.

COST OF WAR RELATIVE TO NEED FOR U.S. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Senator GORE. Well, again, I do not mean to indicate opposition to the AID request. I would like to remind you that I have steadfastly supported the AID program. But I want to put this in perspective. When the Senate Public Works Committee filed its report last year recommending a continuation of the Federal program to assist local communities in the United States in meeting their pressing problems for community facilities, hospitals, schools, water supply, sewage systems, they reported a backlog of \$37 billion of unmet local, State and community needs.

This figure was a rather shockingly large one to me, and I think to many people in the country, and yet to relate that to the cost of the Vietnam war, the estimate given us here is that our operations in Vietnam, military, economic, et cetera, will amount this year alone, to approximately one-half the cost of meeting local and community needs in our own country. The Congress and the American people can see from this that the cost of the war is assuming very large proportions.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF OTHER FREE WORLD COUNTRIES

Now, this cost being so great, it seems to me that a basic error in our policy is to go it alone. If indeed there is a problem for the free world why is it that we are not only doing all the fighting but also providing all the economic aid? What is France providing? What is Germany providing? I understand the German budget—military budget—is only about 2½ percent of their gross national product. Yet we are spending \$15 billion in Vietnam alone this year. Will you tell us what aid other countries are providing in Vietnam, if any?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. Fortunately we are not doing all the fighting. The Vietnamese are carrying the major share of the burden. There is a Korean division which is fighting there and there are Australian and New Zealand troops.

Senator GORE. While there is one Korean division there, how many divisions do we have in Korea?

Mr. POATS. Two.

Senator GORE. So we have two in Korea and Korea has one in Vietnam and we are paying for all three.

Mr. BELL. I beg your pardon. There are other troops as well as U.S. troops in South Vietnam. There are not as many other troops as I would like to see or you would like to see, Senator.

Senator GORE. I was particularly addressing my question to the participation of other free nations in the economic area.

Mr. BELL. On the economic side, I believe that we provided for the record last Friday a complete listing of the types and amounts, nature of economic aid which is going into South Vietnam from some 30 other countries. It is not in total nearly as large as I would like to see or I am sure you would like to see, Senator.

Nevertheless, it is significant. There are hundreds of people from France and Germany and Australia and other free world countries

who are in South Vietnam. There are millions of dollars worth of assistance of various kinds going in there each year. We have, as I say—I think we submitted it for the record on Friday—an eight-page summary listing each and all of these activities. To make my point clear, however, I would not argue at all that there is enough assistance from other countries. We want more, we are continually urging them to provide more.

Senator GORE. I realize, Mr. Bell, that the policies of other countries are beyond your grasp, but you are an agent of President Johnson. I raise this point to express my own concern at not only the mounting cost of this operation but, more importantly, the fact we are virtually going it alone militarily and economically in trying to save South Vietnam. I believe this must have been one of the purposes for which the President referred the issue to the United Nations. This country, with 6 percent of the world's population, must realize that there are bounds beyond which we cannot go, and still meet our own essential needs here at home. Other nations must be encouraged and persuaded to assist.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator GORE. Collective security has been violated in the case of South Vietnam. I hope we return to the practice of collective security.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Williams?

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, earlier the Senator from Alabama was gracious enough to yield to me and I used a good bit of the time and if he has questions I would like to return the favor to him now.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would be pleased for the Senator from Delaware to go right ahead.

CORRUPTION AND CURRENCY BLACK MARKET OPERATIONS

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Bell, is it not true that to a large extent the problem of corruption relates back to the black market currency?

Mr. BELL. Well, in terms of the war effort, Senator, I would say that the most serious problem is not corruption in the standard sense, either with respect to American aid, where I believe it is relatively small, or in the currency market which has nothing to do—or very little to do—with American aid. I think the most serious problem in South Vietnam in this field is preventing goods, such as drugs, medicines, explosives, chemicals from reaching the Vietcong.

Now, much of this is not a problem of corruption in the standard sense. The Vietcong has civilian agents who can go into the markets in Saigon or the coastal cities and simply buy from drugstores or other stores items that the Vietcong need. The problem for us and for the Government of Vietnam is to prevent those items from being transported to the Vietcong back in their jungle bases.

Now, this is a very significant problem from the standpoint of the effective prosecution of the war effort.

Senator WILLIAMS. I understand that, but when they go into these drugstores to buy goods, do they approach the merchant on the basis

that they are willing to pay for them in the ratio of 150 piasters to the dollar?

Mr. BELL. No, sir; they don't use dollars, not at all.

Senator WILLIAMS. I mean the prices can be higher, they offer them more money than they can get if they sell it—

Mr. BELL. No, sir; they appear as ordinary customers and they buy at ordinary prices.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Bell, would you please furnish the committee with the names of each military and civilian employee of the U.S. Government over the past 20 years who, during his employment, was found to be engaged in currency black market operations. I want this report to name their position of employment at time of black market operations, along with a record in each case of all subsequent employment as employees, consultants, advisers, or contractors of any governmental program and to list their salaries at time of their subsequent job. This report does not need to include the names of minor military personnel who blackmarketed cigarettes, and so forth, during his regular military assignment.

Mr. BELL. I would be glad to do that, Senator. I think the number will be quite small.

Senator WILLIAMS. I hope it will.

Mr. BELL. Right. I would be glad to do so.

Senator WILLIAMS. I hope you will furnish that. Because this is not a new problem just developed in South Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. That is right, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. It is one that has been troubling us for the last 10 years in many of the southeast Asia countries.

Mr. BELL. Not only in southeast countries.

Senator WILLIAMS. And in many other countries.

Mr. BELL. Some of the largest cases of this type were in Germany after World War II.

Senator WILLIAMS. In all of the countries where we have had problems dealing with related currencies. Suppose you go back and furnish a list of the employees of the government involved.

Mr. BELL. I am not speaking of the military; I am speaking of the civilian.

Senator WILLIAMS. You can put the military if you want but separate it.

(The information requested had not been received at the time this hearing went to press.)

CONTINGENCY FUND REQUEST

Now, as to the \$100 million that you are asking for the contingency fund—how much did we appropriate to the contingency fund in fiscal 1966?

Mr. BELL. \$50 million.

Senator WILLIAMS. \$50 million. And how much is asked in the 1967 budget?

Mr. BELL. \$70 million, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. Is it going to take another hundred million between now and June 30? Is this \$70 million a realistic figure or

is this a part of the plan to put in for more supplemental requests so that you can reduce the request for fiscal 1967?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. I am not objecting to the \$100 million, but I just want to know if this is a little fancy bookkeeping.

Mr. BELL. No, sir. We are asking for a generous fund for the remainder of the fiscal year, because we have run into a lot of changing circumstances this year and a lot of unanticipated requirements financed from the contingency fund. We don't know that we will use any of this additional \$100 million. I assume that there will be emergencies which will require us to use some of it. Assume that \$50 million of it is used, Senator and \$50 million is left over on June 30. At that time, under the normal timetable at which these things move, we will be testifying before either the House or the Senate Appropriations Committee on our appropriations for fiscal year 1967. It has been our practice, under my administration, to put before those committees the amounts of funds that we have remaining on June 30 in the expectation that they would be subtracted from our request or that the appropriation for fiscal year 1967 would be reduced by a corresponding amount. I don't know what part, if any, of this \$100 million will be left on June 30. But if it is—if any is left, it will be properly related to the appropriation requirements for fiscal year 1967, so they might be reduced accordingly.

Senator WILLIAMS. All right.

Now, in other words, whatever is left of this \$100 million you are recommending that we as Members of Congress reduce your request for \$70 million next year down proportionately?

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator WILLIAMS. And if you have \$70 million left, we will strike it out entirely next year; is that correct?

Mr. BELL. Yes, assuming the \$70 million were reappropriated.

Senator WILLIAMS. Getting back to what I said before, we are in effect appropriating in a supplemental bill money which would normally be requested in the 1967 budget.

Mr. BELL. No, sir; because we have indicated a need for—we think we would like to have—a \$70 million contingency fund for fiscal year 1967. If the \$100 million we are now asking for it not used in the present fiscal year, it will revert to the Treasury unless reappropriated. Suppose \$70 million of it were left on June 30; the Congress would either reappropriate this \$70 million or appropriate a new \$70 million. In either event, we would only have \$70 million in fiscal 1967 and there would be no additional funds available in fiscal 1967 because of the \$100 million we are asking for now.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINGENCY FUND REQUEST

Senator WILLIAMS. Would you tell this committee what world-shaking development that you foresee in the next 4 months would decrease your need to \$100 million whereas you will only need \$70 million in the 12 months beginning July. You must be figuring something extraordinary will be handled and disposed of by July 1.

Mr. BELL. If we had a specific proposition before us for the use of any of these moneys, we would, of course, be asking for it on the basis

of a specific justification. There are obviously explosive situations in the Dominican Republic, in Central and South Africa, and in southeast Asia—not only in Vietnam—but in other countries in that area. We underestimated our requirements when we were before the Congress last spring and summer, and we want to be sure we don't have to come back for a second supplemental in the present year. That is all there is to it, Senator.

Senator WILLIAMS. Well, I am inclined to go along with your request here because we are in a war, and we are going to have to finance it. I don't think we can measure dollars against human lives. But the point of what disturbs me is that you are proceeding on the premise the war is going to be over next July. Don't you think that it is about time that the administration recognizes that we are in a war, and we are going to have to make plans for a longer term than just a 3-month approach? Because if you are going to need, if there is any justification at all for, a hundred million in the next 3 to 4 months, I don't see how you can justify that request in relation to \$70 million in the next 12 months following.

Mr. BELL. Well, the principal area where conditions are changing for the better and should be changing for the better in the next 12 months is the Dominican Republic. That has been the major user of the contingency fund this year. I think if the provisional government there continues to gain in strength and stability it is a logical expectation that we would stand a chance of requiring a smaller contingency fund next year than this year.

So far as southeast Asia is concerned, sir, I quite agree with you there is no basis whatever for thinking that the requirements next year will be less than the present.

The actual request for supporting assistance for Vietnam for next year is \$550 million. This is not the contingency fund, this is the regular supporting assistance request—which is on the same order as the level this fiscal year, including the supplemental request that is before the committee now.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up, if you have finished your question.

Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. If Mr. Bell will answer my questions directly, I think we will be able to develop the thoughts that I have, and I would request that there be no attempt to document what you say in answer to what I ask.

COMPARISON OF NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES

First, the argument is being made that the casualties suffered by the United States are the primary ones and constitute the great bulk of sacrifices. You have already answered this question but I now want it put in the record so that it will appear in sequence. Give me the number of the fatalities of the North Vietnamese Communists and the Vietcong, the Government troops and those of the United States.

Mr. BELL. During the calendar year 1965, Senator, the Defense Department figures, based on body count, are 35,436 Vietcong and North Vietnamese killed. About 11,000 troops of the Government of Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is our ally?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. Killed, and about 1,100 U.S. troops killed.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is the inference justified upon these figures that the participation of the South Vietnamese is the predominant fighting force that is there?

Mr. BELL. There is no question about it, Senator. That is so.

Senator LAUSCHE. When Secretary Rusk appeared here a few days ago he made this statement:

The fact that we have large numbers of U.S. combat forces there causes our own press to concentrate very heavily on the activities of our forces. The truth is that the South Vietnamese continue to carry the great bulk of the struggle. On any given day there might be, say, 2, 3, or 4 U.S. battalions in operation, but 15 to 20 South Vietnamese battalions.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you concur with that thought or not?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; that is factual.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do the figures about fatalities corroborate the statement that Secretary Rusk made?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; they do.

COMMENTS BY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, this morning there was put to you the question of what Commander Gen. Wallace M. Greene of the Marine Corps said several days ago, and he was quoted to have said you could kill every Vietcong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and still lose the war.

This question was put without also including the other things that General Greene said, and I now want to quote further from Greene's statement. Are you familiar with his statement?

Mr. BELL. Not that particular statement. I have heard him speak on this subject and I have talked to him about it. We were in Vietnam about the same time about a month ago.

Senator LAUSCHE. He said:

I haven't the slightest doubt in my mind but that the military part of the problem can be solved by the United States.

Do you know whether or not that is his judgment?

Mr. BELL. It is, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. The Marine Commandant rejected a proposal by retired Army Gen. James M. Gavin that the United States limit itself to holding major coastal bases in South Vietnam. Do you know whether that is his position?

Mr. BELL. I do not know of my own knowledge, Senator. I assume that is quoting General Greene correctly—I would be very surprised if the Marine Commandant felt otherwise.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, he is of the opinion that merely holding enclaves along the shore would be a rather hazardous course for the United States to follow.

Now then he also said "They have introduced a reign of terror" and at this point, Mr. Chairman, I want to put in the record a document showing the number of assassinations in 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1965. Also the number of wounded and the number of kidnaps perpetrated

by the North Vietnamese Communists on the civilians of South Vietnam.

(The information referred to follows:)

Estimated Vietcong assassinations and kidnaping of civilians, 1962-65

	Assassination	Kidnaping
1962.....	1,719	9,688
1963.....	2,073	7,262
1964.....	¹ 1,795	² 9,554
1965.....	³ 1,895	⁴ 12,778

¹ Includes 436 officials.

² Includes 1,131 officials.

³ Includes 230 officials.

⁴ Includes 329 officials.

What do you know about the reign of terror and the number of people whose lives were taken by the Communists in their purpose to communize South Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. As I said earlier, Senator, in response to a question from Senator Hickenlooper, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese have conducted for several years a very brutal, constant reign of terror or attempt to create terror—a successful attempt in many parts of the country. Last year alone about 1,500 civilian officials, including people like schoolteachers and policemen were killed.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mayors and chiefs?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir, that is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were some of them decapitated?

Mr. BELL. That is my understanding.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were children kidnaped and killed?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. There was a recent raid on a refugee camp—just a senseless and brutal assault killing of two or three dozen people—for no conceivable reason except to establish the pervasiveness of the Vietcong terror in the countryside.

Senator LAUSCHE. The Commandant also made the statement "We own the night now." By that he meant that in the past the night was owned by the Communists but it is now owned by the allies. Do you know whether that is a fact?

Mr. BELL. I have heard General Greene talk about this particular subject, Senator. I am sure what he is referring to is that American troops—the Marines and the other American troops—are deliberating conducting a major part of their operations at night. I have forgotten but I have heard General Greene cite the number of ambushes we set upon a typical night in the area where the Marines are operating.

AREAS OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. The next question. There has been discussion before the public about who controls what in South Vietnam. The argument is made that the Communists are in control. Now, I ask you if this is not the fact.

One, the government controls all 43 of the provincial capitals.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And is in full control of all but 16 of the 240 district capitals.

Mr. BELL. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. That would mean that out of 283 capitals of districts and provinces, all but 16 are in the control of the government.

Mr. BELL. That is right.

ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, with respect to who is trying to procure peace, has our Government submitted the proposal that open, free, public elections be held in South Vietnam, and that the people of South Vietnam determine for themselves what type of government they want.

Mr. BELL. You are asking a question beyond my direct competence, Senator. I believe that the Government of Vietnam in the person of Prime Minister Ky, in a speech just a couple of weeks ago, made quite plain the intentions of the South Vietnamese Government along these lines. I have already cited the election that did take place in South Vietnam last spring for Provincial council, an election which was a free and open election and surprisingly successful as such in the middle of this guerrilla war.

PROPOSALS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Proposals have been made that we pull out of South Vietnam, and I would like to ask your view on the basis of your communications with high-echelon officials, whether that subject has been considered and whether any thought has been given to what area in the world we would retreat to. Where do we make our stand? Is it on the shores of California or Hawaii or are we going to keep it 10,000 miles away?

Mr. BELL. Well, I think you have answered the question, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator CASE.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bell, I wonder if you would turn to page 3 of your statement.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

USE OF TERM "COMMUNIST AGGRESSION"

Senator CASE. In the middle of the page you say under Vietnam, \$275 million—

And our basic objectives in Vietnam have not changed. They are to reject Communist aggression and to help the Government of Vietnam develop a society resistant to subversion, capable of independent progress.

I shouldn't be putting this question to you, perhaps, except that you raised the issue. What do you mean "repel Communist aggression"? I want you to be quite specific about this. This sounds more like a kind of an hortatory effort to arouse our emotions, and so forth, than a precise statement of our objectives.

Mr. BELL. No indeed, sir.

Senator CASE. Would you be more precise.

Mr. BELL. Communist aggression exists in South Vietnam.

Senator CASE. What do you mean by Communist aggression?

Mr. BELL. In the form of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese military units and attacks—in the form of the terror raids, assassinations, violence, explosions, bombings which have been conducted by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam for the last several years—and all of this, as you know, sir, is directed and supported from Hanoi.

STATEMENT OF OUR PURPOSE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator CASE. It does seem to me that this is not an adequate statement.

Mr. BELL. Why is that, sir?

Senator CASE. Because it takes, for example, no account of what I think our grand strategic objective is—and I think it should be, and that is to prevent China from expanding all over southeast Asia and outflanking India and the rest. I think that we are not being frank with the people unless we explain this, unless we make it quite clear, and I do object to the use of the word "Communist" instead of quite specifically defining our objective. If you are limiting our purposes to the meeting of aggression and terror (which I deplore, of course, with you) in South Vietnam, for the purposes of South Vietnam alone, then I think we should say so, but if we have a bigger objective I think we should say this too.

Mr. BELL. I see what you mean. I beg your pardon, I was not clear on the point of your question, Senator.

Senator CASE. I think you understand what I mean. When you say Communist I don't think this is a word of sufficient precision and we shouldn't talk that way.

Mr. BELL. I maintain the word is entirely accurate. The Vietcong are Communist controlled and dominated and so are the North Vietnamese. At the same time, you are entirely correct. I am not meaning to imply here that it is Chinese Communist aggression that we face in South Vietnam. I think it is quite obvious that the Chinese Communists do support this aggression with military equipment, with other kinds of aid, as well as diplomatically.

But I would be quite willing to amend the sentence, if it would make it clearer from your point of view, and to make clear that the Communist aggression we are helping to repel in South Vietnam is the Communist aggression of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese.

Senator CASE. Well, may I say this—

Mr. BELL. Is that your point, sir?

Senator CASE. I have a couple of points here. One, I think using the adjective "Communist" is a bad practice in any event because it makes it possible, among other things, for people to say we are trying to fight an ideology with military force and that that is impossible.

Secondly, I really think that any serious description of our objectives—and I say this with all kindness and affection and respect and everything else—ought to be made by the President of the United States and not be put rather casually into papers of this sort that come up here from all kinds of different departments. This is too important a matter to be dealt with that way.

Mr. BELL. Senator, may I say this was obviously no intention to make or to state American policy in any novel or different terms. I started this statement by referring to the President's special letter on January 19.

Senator CASE. I know.

Mr. BELL. And that is obviously the authoritative statement of the administration, not my statement.

Senator CASE. Of course, and I do understand, but we run into this all the time. I think the use of this kind of language tends to confuse further a very badly confused situation. This is not just Senator Case's confusion. I suggest that the country is more confused about this matter and the whole problem and what we are doing with it than it has been at any other time in my public experience.

I don't think this is an adequate statement of our objectives in the first place. If it is, then I think there is something wrong with our objectives, and I don't believe there is.

Mr. BELL. Well, Senator, I can only repeat—having been there several times, having talked to our people and to our own military and to the Vietnamese and having seen the evidence with my own eyes—I am quite prepared to defend the proposition that the aggression we are fighting in South Vietnam is Communist aggression.

Senator CASE. You and I are not going differ, I am sure about the specifics that you mentioned.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator CASE. That the Vietcong are terrorists and——

Mr. BELL. And are Communist dominated, sir.

Senator CASE. Well, dominated by North Vietnam perhaps.

Mr. BELL. And their leaders in South Vietnam.

Senator CASE. And the leaders in South Vietnam, yes. But can we not get away from the use of terms like this or at least if we are going to use them, define them further and more clearly because I do think that this word "Communist" takes in so much territory that it means nothing in the way of precise communication.

Mr. BELL. I quite agree with you.

Senator CASE. In communication with each other or with our people.

Mr. BELL. I quite agree it is helpful to spell it out—I will bear it in mind.

REPORT BY SENATOR MANSFIELD

Senator CASE. Since you have raised this matter of our basic objectives, and they are important and I shall not be satisfied until the President himself has been more specific about this, I just raise this and I only have got about 3 or 4 minutes and I will try to make my statement about it as concise as I can so that you can make any comment that you want. Senator Mansfield and Senator Aiken came back here with a report. It had a lot of useful factual information in it and it had a basic conclusion as I read it that we are faced with two alternatives only: one, to negotiate, that is to say to accept any terms that are offered, or two, to face the prospect of an indefinite expansion of the war and a general war in southeast Asia. Now this, I think, is a fair summary of their conclusions. I have heard nothing from any authoritative source in the administration commenting on this or suggesting that they are wrong.

Now we are not talking about our objectives which I think broadly are good although inadequately stated here.

Mr. BELL. I understand.

Senator CASE. We are not talking about the morality or legality of our position. We are talking about whether the means we are using are feasible and whether they are capable of accomplishing the ends we seek at all or without unacceptable cost. And we ought to know this now. And one of the questions I think that any administration spokesman up here ought to be challenged with is: "Do you accept or not the bleak alternatives of the Mansfield-Aiken report?" I wish you would comment on that.

Mr. BELL. I would be glad to, Senator. It seems to me quite possible for major military units to beat back, to destroy, to overcome the Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops; to clear steadily larger areas of South Vietnam, within which the effort of rural construction or pacification can proceed.

It seems to me quite possible. We know enough about how to do it, to widen steadily the areas within which there is very substantial security, and economic and social progress. In this sense, it is entirely feasible to see the struggle in South Vietnam as one in which there will be a gradually enlarging area of normal security and peaceful activities—protected by major military units which can meet any sizable onslaught—battalion, regiment, division—from the other side. That is, it seems to me, an appropriate and legitimate expectation, assuming that the Vietnamese, we and the other allied countries that are helping, put into it the resources that are necessary.

That is not to say, however, that this is the only possible outcome of the present course of events. It is also quite possible, as the Mansfield-Aiken report said, that the other side will not permit this process to proceed, and will escalate the conflict—broaden it across more of south-east Asia, bring air forces, air groups, and aircraft into it from the other side, bring in troops which are not now engaged from, say, China. I quite agree with the Mansfield-Aiken statement that this could happen. It doesn't have to happen, is the point I am making.

INITIATIVE FOR EXPANSION OF THE WAR

Senator CASE. It doesn't have to happen. But is the initiative with them or with us? Can we stop their action?

Mr. BELL. The initiative is with both of us. We can act within South Vietnam in the ways I have described. We are taking the initiative within South Vietnam, both in a military and in a non-military sense. That effort involves establishing zones or areas for rural construction, so-called. That means the establishing of better local security, rooting out hidden Vietcong political cells in the villages, establishing the beginnings of effective local government of progressive, economic, educational, social health measures. The Vietnamese Government, with our support and assistance, is taking the initiative in that sense.

North Vietnam, and if they choose, China, obviously could mount a military initiative to which we would have to respond.

Senator CASE. Well, in other words, in answer to my question, I am concerned now not with the expansion of our area of control and all

the measures to raise the society are enormously important, and of course we should keep working at that. But that isn't the question here. The question I wanted the answer to—I think you have answered it now—it is within the power of the enemy to raise this ante, regardless of any effort of ours to stop them, to any level they wish; is that correct?

Mr. BELL. Isn't that always true, Senator.

Senator CASE. I am asking you; is it true?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; it is true in southeast Asia, it is true in Europe, it is true in other areas of the Pacific at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have been very much interested in Senator Case's line of questioning.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS INVOLVED

One thing I think we ought to avoid in our questions, and I know Mr. Bell has certainly avoided it in his answers today, is the use of such vague and highly emotional terms. I know we all deplore the brutality of the Vietcong and we pray for the accomplishment of our objectives in Vietnam. But war is a brutal business on all sides. What concerns me is the oft quoted statement of one American veteran who returned from Vietnam, after 2 years of jungle fighting, with the observation that in a guerrilla war the best weapon is the knife and the worst is the airplane.

Mr. Bell, you have referred to Communist aggression, and certainly there is much evidence that it does exist as between North and South Vietnam. The aggression there involves a dispute between Vietnamese as to the future of Vietnam. The Chinese aren't there. Their combat troops aren't engaged as are ours; and their planes are not engaged as are ours. So it troubles me when this war is justified upon the premise that American security is at stake. Senator Lausche said we had better fight it out in Vietnam rather than at Seattle. Well, I don't think that Saigon stands guard over Seattle.

During the Second World War, we conquered the entire Pacific, which is the broadest moat on earth. We patrol it, we police it, we dominate it. So I think these arguments confuse rather than clarify. That is why I was very much interested in Senator Case's line of questioning.

It seems to me that where American security is concerned our primary interest in the world is to contain Russia and China, not because of the ideology they profess, not because of any similarity between their economic and political systems, not because the flags they fly are red, but because they represent massive concentrations of national military power which could be directed against the United States. I worry about our policy in southeast Asia because it seems to me to be directed against the wrong target. We have confused the suppression of communism in southeast Asia with the containment of China.

Now, from all the evidence, China is the most implacably opposed of all the Communist countries to a negotiated settlement that would end this war in Vietnam. That suggests to me that China feels the

war is serving her purpose. And I think there is much evidence that this may be so.

SIZE OF AID REQUEST

But, in any case, Mr. Bell, you are not here this morning to speak on the basic validity of American policy as such. Your particular expertise relates to our aid program in southeast Asia, and I would like to ask you, first of all, whether or not it is true that the Congress has thus far responded in giving the administration all the money it has requested for Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. So far as I know, sir, that is correct.

Senator CHURCH. Certainly, although I have very real difficulty with the policy in southeast Asia, I have always so voted, and I think that, with the American men committed there and with the war in progress, Congress will continue to vote whatever money the administration indicates is required.

Now, when you break down this request, there is \$275 million in economic aid for Vietnam, there is \$25 million for the Dominican Republic and \$7½ million for Laos and for Thailand. There is also a military assistance request of about \$575 million.

Mr. BELL. There is no military assistance request.

Senator CHURCH. Not in this bill.

Mr. BELL. As such.

Senator CHURCH. There is pending before the Armed Services Committee, a request for supplemental money which will be used for military assistance purposes in Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. I believe it is not that large, I guess that is the point I am making, Senator, but as you say it is not here before us today.

Senator CHURCH. Yes. You also have \$100 million of additional money requested for the President's contingency fund.

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. I would like to know how much money is left in the President's contingency fund as of now. Can you supply that figure?

Mr. BELL. None, sir. It is all committed.

Senator CHURCH. It is all committed.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Has that money been committed to Vietnam or other parts of the world?

Mr. BELL. Most of it has been used for the Dominican Republic. I think very little of it has been used for southeast Asia. There was, excuse me, perhaps to clarify that I might add, there was a special contingency fund for southeast Asia of \$89 million which was enacted by the Congress last summer and fall, and that all has been committed to southeast Asia.

Senator CHURCH. That has been committed to southeast Asia.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; right.

Senator CHURCH. Now, the President can use money in his contingency fund for any purpose anywhere in the world, isn't that correct?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; that is correct. Well, for any purpose within the scope of this legislation.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

You have already sent up another bill—the overall foreign aid bill for the coming year, have you not?

Mr. BELL. Fiscal year 1967, yes sir; that is right.

Senator CHURCH. How much are you requesting for this coming year?

Mr. BELL. \$550 million for Vietnam, and just under \$2 billion for economic assistance everywhere else in the world, the total, I believe comes to \$2,465 million for economic assistance. There is in addition a military assistance proposal.

Senator CHURCH. Just under a billion dollars.

Mr. BELL. Yes, \$917 million, I believe.

Senator CHURCH. Now the bill you have sent up excludes Vietnam, you are handling that separately, are you not?

Mr. BELL. On the economic side it includes Vietnam; on the military side, it excludes Vietnam. The military assistance activities for Vietnam—that is, the supply of equipment and training for the troops of the Government of Vietnam, of the other free world forces in Vietnam—it is proposed that all of that be consolidated with the regular Defense Department budget. But the economic assistance continues to be part of our regular legislation.

Senator CHURCH. How does this new program compare in size with the program you requested last year?

Mr. BELL. On the economic side it is only \$6 million more, including the supplemental, that we are asking for here today.

EFFECT OF WAR ON DOMESTIC PROGRAMS

Senator CHURCH. I just want to say that, although I anticipate voting for whatever funds may be required in the war situation in Vietnam, I certainly intend this year to take a very skeptical look at the amounts of money we proposed to spend in other foreign countries, not only because of the lack of support that other countries are giving us in Vietnam, but also because every department of this Government is now ordering cutbacks in many domestic programs that are, in my judgment, highly desirable, in order to finance the spiraling costs of the war in southeast Asia. If these domestic programs are going to be cut, then I think that the foreign aid program ought to be brought under the same kind of scrutiny, and that the Congress should consider cutbacks in that program as we will consider cutbacks in domestic programs.

Mr. BELL. I think, Senator, that the domestic programs are not being cut back from last year's level. Indeed they are being increased—the antipoverty program, the education program, medicare, and so on. They may be held below what would be desirable objectives under normal circumstances—budget requests were cut. The foreign aid request was held at exactly the level, apart from Vietnam, which the Congress appropriated for the present fiscal year.

There is no increase.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Mr. BELL. I agree with the Senator. Obviously all programs should be scrutinized with extreme care, recognizing the burdens which are placed on our resources by the struggle in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from South Dakota.

DIFFERENCES IN STATEMENTS OF OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Bell, I have been interested in the discussion you have had growing out of what you said on page 3 that our basic objectives in Vietnam have not changed. I would assume that to be true. But we confront a steadily changing pattern of presentation from the administration as to what these objectives are.

You have stated them this morning in such a way as to leave out what I consider to be the most important as expressed by Secretary of State Rusk. He has included the two that you have—and I accede they are important objectives—to repel Communist aggression and to help the Government of Vietnam develop a society resistant to subversion and capable of independent progress. Right?

But the American public has been told, and I think properly so—certainly Dean Rusk has said over and over again—that our main objective in Vietnam is to help bring about a settlement which will decrease the likelihood of global war.

Now, if peace has fallen out of our list of objectives this is a shocking thing, I can't find it in your manuscript.

Mr. BELL. Well, Senator, as I indicated to Senator Case, this sentence was not intended as a complete and thorough description of the purposes that we have in Vietnam but merely—

Senator MUNDT. It is part of your sales prospectus, it is there, you put it in, and you left out what I think is the most important part of it.

Mr. BELL. It was intended as a shorthand reference to what has been said many times.

I entirely agree with you that our efforts in Vietnam are part of the broad worldwide effort we are making for peace. I did not mean in any sense to minimize or to omit that reference.

Senator MUNDT. Well, I believe that is correct.

But you are talking over television, and representing the administration, and saying categorically our basic objectives in Vietnam have not changed.

Mr. BELL. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. And then you read them. And the people who hear them, if they have retentive memories, have to conclude they have either changed or your presentation has changed or the emphasis has changed. I think that the most significant reason for our operations in Vietnam is to try to create a situation, and to bring about an outcome, which is going to decrease the danger of escalation into global war with all of its possible nuclear potential. And I think that unless there has been a change on the part of the administration, you should be a little careful at that end of the line.

By omitting things that are important when you come up and ask for an amount of money which in my part of the world is considered quite a chunk of money.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

As you know, your part of the world is also my part of the world. I agree it is a lot of money.

Senator MUNDT. Right.

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

Mr. BELL. We are in Vietnam resisting Communist aggression in the interests of peace. We are in Vietnam helping the Government, trying to help the Government develop a society resistant to subversion and capable of independent progress in the interests of peace. Those are the objectives.

Senator MUNDT. It would be hard to prove, if we were put on the spot by an Eddy Williams in the legal profession, and to try to show how a Government such as the Vietnamese have, is indispensable to peace by that first point.

Mr. BELL. I said, sir, it was in the interests of peace. This has been true of our assistance programs since the end of World War II. I would think that the evidence by now is overwhelming that it works that way. Our restoration of Europe's economic strength helped them develop societies resistant to subversion and promoted independent progress. This has indeed been a major contribution to world peace since the end of World War II. So have the similar efforts in Asia.

Senator MUNDT. I hope, Mr. Administrator, and you correct me if I am wrong—we won't want to waste time—I hope you are not telling me that you are putting the argument for this supplemental amount of money for aid to Vietnam on the basis that you put all AID programs.

Mr. BELL. I am not quite sure I understand that.

Senator MUNDT. Your argument is that it worked pretty well in Europe and you have two illustrations that that worked well, in Greece and Turkey, but it seems to me you have an altogether different set of circumstances here. We are in war in this area.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. We are trying to find a solution to this war which would be beneficial to peace.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator MUNDT. And our objectives in Vietnam are certainly a great deal different from our objectives in Western Europe at the time we provided aid there, with the sole exception of Greece and Turkey, and they are surely different from what they are in the 100-and-some countries to which we are giving economic aid in peaceful areas.

Mr. BELL. There is fighting going on in Vietnam but the objectives—

Senator MUNDT. There is fighting going on, there is a war going on.

Mr. BELL. Right. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Let's not minimize the importance of this economic aid in terms of winning that war unless you wish to do it deliberately.

Mr. BELL. I have no intention to minimize it, sir. I want to support the importance of it. What I have said—or tried to say—is that what we have been doing in Europe, in Greece and Turkey, in Korea, in Japan, in Taiwan, in many places around the world after the end of World War II in providing economic and where appropriate military assistance, and on occasion as in Korea joining in the fighting where that was necessary—is all part of a strong, active American foreign policy which is intended to advance the prospects for peace. All I

meant to suggest was that in other cases, in previous years the results have in many cases been positive and effective.

NEED FOR DECLARATIVE STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE PRESIDENT

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Bell, I have heard a number of my colleagues say and I have said on occasions recently also, but your testimony convinces me of the urgency and the importance of this and I think the time has come for the President of the United States to make a declarative statement of policy. I would hope in a message to Congress, but if not in some nationally televised speech on some important occasion on which he talks to the people and to the Congress to set out what I believe to be the definitive reasons for being in Vietnam and the objectives that we have. But when a man of your stature on a bill of this importance, leaves out entirely any mention of the peace objective in terms of creating a situation in which world war is less likely to occur, you can't blame John and Joan America for writing in and saying, "We are getting a little bit confused as to why we are there."

Congress, I am sure, understands in the main the reasons. I would hope the people do, but I think the time has come now when we face a new situation in a new era with part of the discussions being carried in the United Nations, with resumption of bombing having been ordered by the Commander in Chief when the American people are taken into their confidence and told clearly what this is all about. If it is desirable I think it would be desirable to present it in the form of a resolution which Congress would debate and which I would expect the Congress would support.

Senator MORSE. Would the Senator yield?

Would the Senator have the President's message take the form of a message asking for a declaration of war?

Senator MUNDT. I said that Sunday, I didn't ask him to make a declaration of war. I am not sure to whom he would make an appeal for peace, and I don't know against whom he would make a declaration of war.

Senator MORSE. It is a strange argument that we should kill American boys without a declaration of war.

Senator MUNDT. No, sir, I think we need a declaration of policy, clear and specific, and I would think one could be worked out in terms of the facts which are obtainable for which Congress could vote and have the people understand.

I think it is a bit shameful to have testimony today which would tend to cloud the issue instead of clarify it. I would hope the results are the same.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.
Senator Clark?

MAP SHOWING AREAS OF GOVERNMENT AND VIETCONG CONTROL

Senator CLARK. Mr. Bell, I show you a map issued January 24, in U.S. News & World Report, purporting to show Communist-controlled areas and contested areas in South Vietnam, and ask you whether in your opinion the map is substantially accurate?

Mr. BELL. I think our maps, Senator, would look substantially different from this in several respects. Some of the areas, sir, that are shown here as contested, we would show as Vietcong controlled. Some that are shown as Communist controlled we would show as either contested or as government controlled. This is a broad general map and doesn't have much detail on it. I am quite sure that any official government map would be significantly different.

Senator CLARK. It is a cause of enormous frustration to me that a map prepared by the Defense Department which presumably represents what they think the situation is, continues to be classified. I can see no excuse for it. And we therefore have to use whatever we can get. That is the best thing I have been able to get.

Senator CASE. Excuse me, would you identify the map?

Senator CLARK. It was a map published in U.S. News & World Report, January 24, 1966.

Mr. BELL. Incidentally, Senator, I see in the text that accompanies this map—there is the statement with respect to the population—that the government controls about 57 percent, which consists of the people in cities, towns, and the ports and peasants in certain areas of the countryside.

Communists control about 23 percent, mostly peasants on farms, rural people, and neither side controls the remaining 20 percent.

When you take account of the people in the cities and towns this is not too different from the figures I was giving earlier today.

Senator CLARK. Is there any reason in the world why you could not provide this committee with a map which could be public property and which would show your judgment as to what areas the Communists controlled, what areas are controlled by the government, what areas are contested, and what areas are just noninhabitable because they are jungle?

Mr. BELL. I can't answer that, Senator. I am not the authority on these matters. I will be glad to take that question back and consult with the Secretary of State and see what we can do.

Senator CLARK. Let me say not to you, sir, because you know the high regard in which I hold you, both personally and as administrator, I think it is almost a fraud on this committee not to permit us to have a map of what the control situation in this country really looks like.

How do we perform our duties of advising and consenting if we can't get a map? I am not criticizing you.

Mr. BELL. Senator, this committee, the committee members, the committee staff are entitled to have any map that any of us have.

Senator CLARK. So are the American people.

Mr. BELL. And you have them.

Senator CLARK. So are the American people.

Mr. BELL. No, sir; the only question is whether they should be made public. That is a question, as in any war, of what is legitimate public information and what is necessarily restricted as being related to military operations and so on. That is never an easy question, Senator, as you know.

Senator CLARK. Don't you think that to have a well-circulated weekly news magazine publish this kind of a map and then have you testify in open session that it is not accurate just tends to completely confuse the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator let me interrupt? We had a map marked "confidential" supplied by the Defense Department.

Senator CLARK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been in our possession, but it is classified "confidential." I assume it meant we weren't to give it out to the press.

Senator CLARK. My complaint was that they didn't want us to give it out.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all right to give it to the U.S. News. It depends on who gives it.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Bell, since you are in no position to give us a map unless you ask for it, will you please mark on that map the provincial capitals which you contend are in South Vietnamese control.

Mr. BELL. Incidentally, some of them are located in areas shown here as under Communist control and that is one of the reasons why I think this is erroneous.

Senator CLARK. Yes, and my suggestion is that while we may have nominal control of the provincial capitals many are surrounded and practically under siege by the Vietcong. In any event you will get that back to us if you will at your earliest convenience.

Mr. BELL. I would be glad to.

Senator CLARK. I would like if you could blow that map up a little and I am sure you have the facilities and show the district capitals, including the 16 which are under Vietcong control, or is that classified?

Mr. BELL. I couldn't tell you about the question of the 16, Senator. I will be glad to check them.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

(The information referred to follows:)

DISTRICT CAPITALS NOW CONTROLLED BY VIETCONG

Thirteen Government of Vietnam district capitals are now under Vietcong control. They are underlined on the map. In some cases, the Government has abolished the administrative district in question and merged it with a neighboring district. In other cases, the seat of the district administration has been moved to another location within the confines of the district. In still other cases, the district administrators reside in another district town or in the province capital and continue to function as a governmental unit to the extent possible.

Senator CLARK. You know I am not going after you, Dave.

Mr. BELL. I know that.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I ask to have printed in the record two articles by Richard Critchfield, Asia correspondent of the Washington Star, which appeared in that newspaper under date of January 24, 1966, and January 25, 1966, the headlines are "Peasants Toil for the Earth Not for a Government" and "Armed Might Versus Reforms" and also when they are printed in the record, the part of those articles which I have underlined also be underlined in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection so ordered.

Mr. BELL. May I say that series of articles by Mr. Critchfield seem to me a very good series. I think there were four of them, weren't there?

Senator CLARK. I have only been handed two by the staff. If there were four I would be glad to have all four of them in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[From the Evening Star, Jan. 24, 1966]

THE PEOPLE'S WAR—PEASANTS TOIL FOR THE EARTH, NOT FOR A GOVERNMENT

(By Richard Critchfield, Asia correspondent of the Star)

TAN AN, SOUTH VIETNAM.—"This earth which formed their home and fed their bodies and made their gods * * *."

The Asian peasant's deep attachment to the soil he tills and in which his ancestors are buried, described in Pearl Buck's "The Good Earth," is strongly evident here in the Mekong Delta rice bowl of South Vietnam.

It is harvest time now. The golden fields of the great fertile plain between the Mekong, Bassac, and Saigon Rivers are dotted with men and women winnowing the precious rice against tall, curved shelters of plaited bamboo so as not to lose a grain.

In black pajamas and pointed straw hats, barefoot, bronzed by the January sun, the peasants have the sturdy look of men and women who can endure disease, natural disaster and war so long as they have some land to farm.

But very few have land of their own. In Long An, one of Vietnam's most fertile provinces, more than 85 percent of the peasant population are tenants.

This landownership pattern may help explain why, despite a tremendous cost in lives and material, the war in Long An is no closer to being won than it was several years ago.

Last year, the heaviest fighting raged in the jungles and rubber plantations north of Saigon, the rain forests and grasslands of the high plateau and in the swamps and rice paddies of the narrow central coastal plain.

But if the main theater of war lay elsewhere, the rice-rich heartland of the Saigon region and the upper Mekong Delta, linked together by Long An, remains the prize for which the war is being fought.

Here, in less than 14 Provinces, live almost two-thirds of the 15 million South Vietnamese.

In June 1964, the summer before the Vietcong began massing multibattalion forces for pitched battles, Long An was held up as the showplace of how a combined Vietnamese-American military and economic pacification effort could defeat a Communist insurrection.

Visitors went to Long An if they wanted to see how the protracted guerrilla war was going in the countryside.

But now, 18 months later, little has changed. There has been no dramatic turn in the guerrilla fighting; the Government has won some villages and lost some.

There are no signs of any serious deterioration. But there has been no real improvement either; since it is primarily a war of subversion in Long An, the creeping Communist initiative simply has crept further.

Other peasants have replaced the hundreds of Vietcong killed in battle, and American military and civilian advisers agree there are many more Vietcong than a year ago.

OPPOSING SIDES

Most important in Long An, however, the Government and the mass of peasantry still seem to be on the opposing sides of the fight.

None of the successive Saigon governments has succeeded in analyzing the peasants' grievances and then tried to right these wrongs, though there are signs Premier Nguyen Cao Ky's regime is moving in this direction.

Land is of such paramount importance here that the Vietcong allow only the landless or very poor farmers in the delta to command guerrilla units or qualify as party members.

The provincial government's social order is the exact reverse. Most of the military officers, civil servants and community leaders come from the landowning gentry.

The same is true in Saigon, where only one of the 10 generals now sharing power has any rapport with the masses. He is central Vietnam's erratic Maj. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi, who also is the only one of peasant origin.

The traditional Mandarin ruling class fell from power with Ngo Dinh Diem, but their political heirs are the nonpeasant urban middle classes and their relatives.

LODGE PUSHES REFORM

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and his top aids have made it clear that the United States regards major land redistribution as essential in successfully prosecuting the war.

Ky recently announced a land reform program that will initially convey 700,000 acres to 180,000 peasants.

Eventually, the program will be expanded to encompass over 500,000 acres of land formerly owned by the French, 660,000 acres now farmed by "squatters" and 300,000 acres where free titles will be awarded in resettlement areas.

The crux of the problem, however, has yet to be tackled. This is the redistribution from big to small owners of more than 2 million acres in the Mekong Delta.

Good delta land is worth about \$50 an acre; it is roughly estimated by the South Vietnamese generals that it would cost between \$150 and \$200 million to carry out equitable reform programs here.

Land reform under Diem left a bitter aftermath, since 2,279 dispossessed landlords were paid only 10 percent in cash as compensation and given low-interest, nontransferable, 12-year bonds for the rest. The bonds since have plummeted in value.

U.S. GENERATING MONEY

The United States could solve this problem by generating \$150 million in local currencies so that an outright compensation could be made.

It already is generating piasters to pay for the Vietnamese share in the war—to the tune of \$350 million this year—by giving the Saigon government imported commodities to sell to local merchants.

Both North Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap and the U.S. commander, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, describe the Vietnam conflict as "a people's war," and not "a war of attrition."

Since the emphasis, first, is on converting and, second, on killing, the investment of \$150 million in land reform to undermine the Vietcong's peasant support would seem like a bargain in a war that is costing \$16.5 million a week.

During the early days of the Diem regime, the United States spent \$4 million on land reform. From 1961 through 1965 nothing was spent. And \$1.1 million is budgeted for the current fiscal year.

PROBLEM NOT UNIFORM

The problem is not uniform throughout the country. With the exception of the Saigon area, the upper Mekong Delta and a thin, populated strip along the coastline, South Vietnam is mostly empty terrain. More than 85 percent of the land total is covered with jungle, swampland or dense foliage.

Along the overpopulated coastal fringe, now heavily burdened with refugees, most farms are small and owner-operated and there is real land hunger.

In the highlands, the problem could be solved simply by giving the Montagnard tribes clear title to land they have farmed for centuries.

The real problem is in the delta.

Out of 1.2 million farms, only 260,000 are owner-operated; 520,000 are rented and 330,000 more are partly rented.

There are 71 farms of more than 250 acres and 85,000 more over 12 acres (though all one peasant family can reasonably handle is 5 to 7 acres).

Some 3,000 rich Saigon families still are the big landlords.

In Long An, the pattern is even more lopsided. According to one official U.S. survey made last July, 65 rich landlords, 3,000 farmer-owners and 28,000 tenant families comprise the population.

COULD INFLUENCE ELECTION

The landownership pattern probably would significantly influence the outcome of a free election, such as envisaged in the 1954 Geneva agreements.

Lodge has observed the Communist promises of land to the tiller is "perhaps the greatest appeal the Vietcong have."

Why there is so much opposition to sweeping land reform among some Saigonese is suggested by the tremendous wealth of a delta province like Long An.

In a good year, such as 1963-64, Long An produced 320,000 tons of rice (Saigon's annual requirement is only 600,000 tons). It also sold that year 10,000 tons of pineapple, 70,000 tons of sugarcane, plus chickens, ducks, pigs, and other cash earners.

The legal land ceiling is 220 acres. Even so, a Saigon landlord who charges double the legal rental rate of 25 percent, as he can do if the land is fertile enough, stands to profit as much as \$40,000 in a single year on 220 acres.

This compares with a Vietnamese policeman's monthly wage of \$25, or the monthly cash allotment of a Vietcong guerrilla, which is 40 cents.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES AFFECTED

More important, perhaps, is how this unequal distribution of land affects the political attitudes of the Vietnamese.

What seems to be absent here is the kind of political code that Theodore H. White has described as President Johnson's "grassroots liberalism":

"You get yours and he gets his and we all share what there is to share."

In Long An, this gets no further than "you get yours" and he, the peasant, can either lump it or try to get his by joining the Vietcong.

But most of the peasants have learned by now that under the Vietcong nobody keeps his.

This has created the kind of political vacuum where many Vietnamese peasants regard the war as a pointless slaughter. They still feel they stand to be the losers no matter who wins.

CAUGHT IN VISE

Caught between bloodsucking landlords, many of whom charge double the legal rents, and pitiless Vietcong tax collectors, who shoot first and talk later, the peasants appear ready to call a plague on both sides of this indecisive struggle.

Yet there is an appeal to the Vietcong's three main propaganda themes: "Land to the tiller," "The soldier helps the peasant," and "The Government exists for the people."

These are novel and explosive ideas to a man who works knee deep in mud 14 hours a day, growing half his rice for somebody else, whose idea of government may be a venal local tax collector, and whose chickens and ducks may have disappeared when the last militia patrol passed through his village.

If his home has been destroyed or relatives killed by ill-directed bombs and shells, he might make a ready Vietcong convert without knowing what for.

U.S. MILITARY FRUSTRATED

Within the American military command in Saigon, there is widespread frustration over the failure of pacification efforts in the delta provinces like Long An.

One hears talk that the only way the Vietcong fish can be deprived of the water in which they swim is to make things so hot in Communist-held zones that the peasants will come over the the Government side as refugees.

Others argue there is no substitute for thoroughgoing land reform.

One veteran American adviser in Long An said:

"These people have country that doesn't need a government. They could go back 2,000 years and they'd be happy, fish in every pond, crabs in every paddy, bananas, coconut, and ducks. All they need is a little land of their own to be happy. Five percent of the Vietnamese in this Province are honestly pro-Government by their own personal beliefs and ideology, 5 percent are with the Vietcong for the same reason and the other 90 percent are right."

[From the Evening Star, Jan. 25, 1966]

THE PEOPLE'S WAR—ARMED MIGHT VERSUS REFORMS

(By Richard Critchfield, Asian correspondent of the Star)

TAN AN, SOUTH VIETNAM.—A respected Vietnamese journalist, when asked why Saigon's generals temporized on enacting the kind of land reform that most people agree is needed to win the war, replied:

"They're still convinced it's winnable their way, and if not, it's not worth winning."

This harsh judgment may have more than a grain of truth in it.

Here in Long An Province, in the rice-rich, heavily populated upper Mekong Delta, the Vietnamese officials and army officers seem as fiercely determined as ever to defeat the Vietcong eventually.

The Vietnamese still are fighting their own war here.

But local leaders become curt and evasive when questioned about land reform or other innovations to improve the peasant's lot.

"All the land we can distribute in secure areas, we have distributed already," said one senior Vietnamese official.

GENERALLY RESPECTED

Most of these local leaders are reserved, sensitive, French-educated men, generally respected by their American advisers as "very competent" and "fine people." All have lived amidst war and violence since 1939.

Yet most of the higher ranking ones see South Vietnam's salvation in terms of military action rather than political remedies.

A typical response on how to win the war came from a civilian administrator in his mid-thirties:

"We don't have enough troops, if the free world would go to war with China, then ok. The unique way to win is to attack North Vietnam and China. If not, the war of subversion will last another 5 years."

Asked about the fate of the 3,000 Vietcong of South Vietnamese origin in Long An in the event of a cease-fire, the official said, "They all must go back to Hanoi."

His opinion was seconded by a Vietnamese officer, "Once the fighting stops, it will take us another 2 years to pacify Long An. We must throw the Vietcong forces out and destroy the Communist infrastructure."

A year ago, the U.S. mission in Saigon agreed to finance "grievance committees" in each of Long An's six districts in an attempt to analyze and then to right the wrongs that turn the peasants into Communist guerrillas.

One Vietnamese officer explained how the committees were working out:

"Each cadre has a small room. Everybody must come in for 5 minutes so as to keep security for the man who seeks to tell something. The cadre asks, 'How is your family? How is your life?' In this way, we get information on the Vietcong political organization and make our intelligence net. The grievance committees are the eyes of the Province chief."

Other officials praised the committees as a good way of learning the peasantry's "education" needs, getting military intelligence, controlling the population's movements and detecting secret Vietcong cells.

No one mentioned the genuine grievances that the peasants presumably voiced.

ATTITUDES DIFFERENT

Going down the ladder one rung to the district officials, however, there seems to be a distinct difference in attitudes.

While most senior provincial officials are from Saigon and make no secret of their personal ambition to be transferred back there some day, the district

officials seem to identify themselves much more closely with the local peasantry.

Typical of this group is Nguyen Van Dhien, in Long An's most pacified district, Thu Thua. A goateed former Vietnamese ranger with a reputation as a tough fighter, Dhien writes poetry and has let his fingernails grow half-an-inch long to show he has risen above manual labor.

Dhien does not think that an invasion of North Vietnam would solve anything—and he is a strong advocate of land reform.

Asked what might happen if there were a free election contested by the Communists and the Saigon regime in Thu Thua, he said that if the Communists promised land reform, they might get the votes of 85 percent of the 45,000 who are landless peasants. In contrast, he said, the 8,000 refugees who have poured into Thu Thua in recent weeks from Vietcong-held territory probably would vote for Saigon since most are bitterly anti-Vietcong after experiencing Communist rule.

Twenty percent of Thu Thua's land, he said, is owned by rich absentee landlords who live in Saigon and Tan An.

Unlike the provincial leaders, Thien does not think the protracted guerrilla war will last long. "There is a big flame in the lamp just before it goes out," he said.

A third distinct Vietnamese attitude is moral indifference to the war, typically expressed by the bonze superior of Tan An's towering Nguyen Thuy Pagoda.

During a conversation marked by long silences, distant gongs, and burning incense, the bonze, a shaven-haired intelligent-looking man in his midthirties, had no opinion on land or any other concrete reform to help the peasantry.

"The Buddhist doctrine is tolerance, not violence," he said. "People move to town because they are afraid of bombing and artillery. I hope it is possible you can cease the bombing and shelling. Even where there is no engagement made with the Communist forces, the Americans still bomb, causing much harm to the people."

Most of the refugees, however, do not associate airstrikes with the Americans since they have seen few foreigners.

One refugee, Mua, a 49-year-old tenant farmer who fled to Tan An with his wife and five children a month ago, said his hamlet, An Nhut Tan, had long been under Vietcong control.

"At home I rented a hectare of riceland from a landlord who lived in Lac Tan village. The Vietcong promised to give us land; they called the village chiefs together last year to make a land reform plan, but they didn't do anything."

Asked what he thought of the Vietcong, Mua stuck his tongue out and made a face as if he had bitten into a sour pickle.

"They usually shoot artillery around my house so I must move. Too much bombing also since November."

Since he had no identity papers, he said, he could not qualify for refugee relief and instead was earning 50 cents a day as a construction laborer in Tan An. "It's easy to get work now; many rich men building houses."

Asked what he thought of Americans, he had to ask the interpreter what Americans were.

After a pause, he shrugged, "The Government used to help more with rice and money. Why doesn't Mr. Diem come back? When he was there we got bank loans."

DEFECTOR EXPLAINS

A 25-year-old Vietcong defector, who used to lead a 37-man guerrilla platoon, explained why peasants like Mua were turning against the Vietcong.

In his area, he said, the Vietcong initially redistributed land. But now they have raised taxes 300 percent.

"The more airstrikes, the more people moved away and the heavier taxes became," he said. "The National Liberation Front (the Vietcong's political arm) failed to solve anything. There was no security to work in your field. An F-105 jet got there too fast, there was no time to run for cover. Those and 250-pound bombs were most feared."

He said if he were directing the war in Saigon he would intensify air and artillery attacks on the Vietcong villages, and then would offer the peasants amnesty and safe harbor elsewhere.

He suggested the offers be broadcast via heliborne loudspeakers by people who previously had left the Vietcong-held villages.

He said he had joined the Communist Party 2 years ago.

"Everyone wants to join because it is an honor. You are known everywhere." His platoon, he said, was assigned the military mission of "destroying strategic hamlets, building roadblocks, and encircling and inflicting casualties on the enemy" and the political task of "visiting farmers to inquire about their poverty and ask about their sufferings."

He said the Vietcong's motto was "Eat together, live together, and work together," meaning the soldiers and peasantry.

[From the Evening Star, Jan. 26, 1966]

THE PEOPLE'S WAR—THE BATTLE TO WIN PEASANTS' LOYALTY

(By Richard Critchfield, Asian correspondent of the Star)

TAN AN, SOUTH VIETNAM.—"Vietcong?" said the teenage American corporal, shoving a magazine into his carbine. "Hell, half the people walking by could be Vietcong. How you gonna tell Charlie from the friendlies?"

Here in Long An Province in the densely populated Mekong Delta, as most everywhere else in Vietnam, it is impossible to tell "our side" from "their side." A grin or a wave means nothing at all.

The corporal is one of about 60 Americans who are spending a year in the Province, advising its military officers and civil servants on how to destroy Vietcong units, counter political subversion and win over the loyalty of the peasantry.

It is no easy task, since an unrecognizable minority of the people the advisers are trying to befriend are trying to kill them.

And unless they befriend and convert more people than they kill, the fighting accomplishes nothing.

This is the basic difference between the "people's war" in Vietnam and more familiar "wars of attrition" elsewhere.

AWAKENED BY MORTARS

That night the Americans at Tan An were awakened at 1:30 a.m. by incoming mortar bursts. For some minutes the night was full of whirring, shrieking explosions.

Then the Vietcong firing stopped as abruptly as it had begun.

Out along a fence where men in pajamas and underwear and others in full combat fatigues had taken their positions, everyone listened.

When the night stayed quiet, someone muttered, "Well, I'll live to see another day."

A garrison radio crackled to life and a voice reported two 30-man Vietnamese militia posts had been attached, one less than 2 miles away.

Flareships and "razorback" armed helicopters were soon circling the northern horizon; the tracer bullets looked like a man on a rooftop sprinkling firewater from a hose.

The commanding officer sent word from the province command post, telling everyone to go back to bed and get some sleep. They would need it in the days and weeks ahead.

SUSPECT BIG ASSAULT

The night mortar barrages have become a routine in Long An Province. Either Tan An or one of the six district capitals gets hit at least once a week.

And many of the American advisers, airmen, and technicians suspect a big assault on one of the district towns sometime this winter. Most are convinced such an assault can be turned back with Saigon's armed hueys, jets, flareships, and Long An's artillery.

It is rough for the five-man American advisory teams stationed in the six district towns.

One major said that everytime his garrison has been mortared, he has gone out and found the outside gate open, unlatched from inside the compound.

"If the VC ever get inside that gate there's no place to go but down. At that point, I take off my flak vest, 'cause if they're going to get me, I don't want it to be alive."

A captain in Tan Tru, Long An's hottest district since it straddles the main Vietcong supply route between the South China Sea and base camps along

the Cambodian border, says the morale of the Vietnamese militia he advises is "the damndest thing I've ever seen. I don't see how they can continue to smile and joke all the time; but they do."

He said his 2 months at Tan Tru has felt "like a lifetime; something happens every night."

He added, "We also have to keep the 12-mile road to Tan An open three times a week and it seems like every time we go to clear it we lose one man, either killed or wounded."

One major described a recent daylight operation to clear a Vietcong road-block off Highway 4. He said his driver, while waiting in the jeep, was shot between the eyes by a sniper.

HARASSMENT RISING

After nearly a year of comparative peace and quiet in Long An, the Vietcong moved a second mainforce battalion into the Province in November and the pace of ambushes, attacks, and mortar harassment has risen steadily ever since.

This climaxed at 1:30 a.m. on December 26, when the Vietcong chose to break the United States-South Vietnamese Christmas truce by firing 40 mortar shells into Tan An, while simultaneously laying down mortar barrages on all 6 district towns.

They inflicted heavy casualties and eventually overran two company-sized outposts and beheaded one Vietnamese soldier's wife.

Twenty-five militiamen were missing after the attack; an American captain speculated they "either bugged out, were carried off, or directly hit by a mortar shell and blown to bits."

Many of the ill-equipped militia, or popular forces as they are officially called, fight with only carbines and shotguns while wearing floppy hats, swimming trunks, pajamas, or a scrounged uniform.

Recently a four-man outpost held off a company-sized Vietcong attack for 6 hours; when morning came two militiamen were dead and two were wounded, but the post had not fallen and they had managed to capture six Vietcong weapons.

One hamlet of 300 people, deep within Vietcong territory, recently pacified itself by erecting fortifications and passing the hat to buy a 60-millimeter mortar to scare off the Vietcong. So far the Communist guerrillas have let the village alone.

Many of the American advisers believe the pattern of Vietcong attacks on isolated outposts and newly fortified hamlets along Saigon's defensive perimeter and Long An's northern boundary suggests that the Communists may be trying to sever Highway 4, and cut off Saigon from the rice-rich Mekong Delta.

COUNTERSTRATEGY

To counter this strategy, Long An Government forces, composed of two South Vietnamese regular army regiments and several thousand more locally recruited militiamen and police, have tried to fix the two Vietcong—battalions with ground action and destroy them with heavy artillery and airstrikes.

Long An is so short of troops, however, that most operations must be stopped at sunset so the militia and police can return to guard their homes and families.

Despite this troop shortage, both the American advisers and Vietnamese commanders oppose bringing American combat units into the delta where the war is still almost entirely a Vietnamese fight, except for U.S. air support.

The Americans seem to feel that moving more U.S. troops into the delta would lead to a put-down-tools attitude among the Vietnamese forces. Vietnamese officers emphasize that the local economy would be disrupted and that the Vietcong could exploit a "foreign invasion" propaganda campaign among the local peasantry.

American combat soldiers in Vietnam are always amazed to hear the U.S. advisory teams live in scattered groups of four and five, wholly defended by Vietnamese troops.

The advisers themselves often wouldn't have it any other way.

Says Capt. Maurice H. Krause, 31, of Wahpeton, N. Dak., Long An's pacification adviser:

"This is an extremely nice country. What happens if you get assigned to a big unit is that you're close to a conventional war environment, moving with the troops. Down here in Long An we see people getting schools and medicine,

see the spontaneous expressions of loyalty to this side and dissatisfaction with the VC."

Two enlisted men in Long An have extended their tours for a second year and one will marry a local Vietnamese girl next month.

The biggest problem for the advisory team, as the fighting intensifies in Long An, is how to avoid inflicting casualties on the civilian population.

HAVE TO GET CALLOUS

Half of the patients at Tan An's new 155-bed hospital are civilians wounded in the fighting.

"Usually you can count on receiving at least a couple a day," says an American doctor on the hospital staff. "They mostly step on grenades or mines or get shot by stray bullets. But we do get some bombing and napalm victims. You have to get callous or you'd drive yourself crazy worrying about it."

A U.S. Air Force forward observer, one of a team who flies reconnaissance and combat support missions over Long An every day and knows its terrain by heart, says, "If I go over a village and see women and kids, I flatly refuse to call in an airstrike."

Another American, after many months in Long An, says, "No one who goes to indemnification meetings where they pay war victims can be morally callous. No one can say a 2-year-old child or a 90-year-old grandmother is a VC. But I think we should and must continue the bombing."

"It's effective. It kills VC and interdicts their movements. I think care is taken. There are instances where American forward air controllers have refused to call in strikes or when the province chief has ordered helicopters back home that were ordered out."

"What you've always got to remember, though, is that the people are the key to winning the war. There's no reason to get out in the woods and kill lots of people unless it helps in pacification."

Tomorrow—"The Government exists for the people."

[From the Evening Star, Jan. 27, 1966]

THE PEOPLE'S WAR—AND NOW ANOTHER TRY AT PACIFYING LONG AN

(By Richard Critchfield, Asian correspondent of the Star)

This is the last of four articles on the Mekong Delta, South Vietnam's rice bowl. Critchfield recently completed an extensive tour there

TAN AN, SOUTH VIETNAM.—After months of reappraisal and careful preparation, South Vietnam has launched its fourth pacification plan since 1961 to win back the loyalty of the Vietnamese peasantry.

It differs hardly at all from the old plans on the two key issues involved—land reform and military versus civilian rule in the countryside.

As a result, many observers fear it will be no more successful than former President Ngo Dinh Diem's "Operation Sunrise," Gen. Nguyen Khanh's "Chien Thang" plan or Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor's "Hop Tac" plan.

Nor is anybody predicting spectacular success.

After a brief tour of Vietnam recently, David Bell, Director of the Agency for International Development, said, "We don't except large areas to be cleared, but they will be significant."

It has never been so much a question of devising a successful pacification program as applying it and redressing the genuine political grievances of the peasantry.

In essence, all the programs have been derived from the *tache d'huile* or "oil slick" or "ink blot" theory, first developed by the French Foreign Legion in Morocco in the 1920's. It was a method of securing some solidly held, key centers from which "pacification" forces could spread out in an ever-widening perimeter against rebellious natives.

PHILIPPINE SUCCESS

After being humanized and refined with civic action, most notably land reform, the method worked against Communist insurgents in the Philippines. And by added emphasis on promises of independence, police methods, strict population control, and fortified villages, the British made it work in Malaya.

Land reform or the promise of independence, however, provided the psychological impetus in both of these successful efforts.

As U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge puts it, the people "must adhere to the Government because they like it before it can win."

It was not until March 1962 that Diem, with the help of Malayan-experienced British advisers, launched the first attempt at Vietnamese pacification, Operation Sunrise.

Diem misused the program by making it an instrument of his personal rule. But even so, it was far more successful than any of the efforts that followed it.

For instance, here in Long An Province, Diem succeeded—in just a little over 1 year—in regrouping 1,000 hamlets into 220 strategic hamlets and isolating the Vietcong into the remaining 35.

Diem has three things his successors lacked—a functioning countrywide rural administrative system, an efficient, tightly controlled political apparatus, and a civilian chief in each Province whose authority was absolute and who superimposed a political judgment over military actions in his province.

DIEM AIDES PURGED

The wholesale purge of public servants and other Diem appointees, whatever their personal record or reputation, and the destruction of his Can Lao party left the Vietnamese Army as the only countrywide organization.

Colonels and captains took over the job of running South Vietnam's 43 Provinces and 240 districts.

It soon became apparent, however, that these men were not subject to Saigon's direct administrative control, rather they were responsible to the commander of the nearest Vietnamese Army division and through him to the local corps commander.

Seen in retrospect, the three successive military coups of Minh, Khanh, and the Young Turks were in large part supported by the officer corps to enable them to consolidate the administration in the countryside.

Thus, beginning with Diem's fall, government was made incidental to waging the war.

On the Provincial level, meanwhile, the army, jealous of its powers, exempted Vietnamese soldiers from the civilian penal code, even in crimes involving civilians.

Since the army lacked the judicial apparatus and military police to control its troops, the net effect was to turn loose in the countryside 550,000 young soldiers who had little reason to fear being arrested or prosecuted for crimes such as rape or petty theft.

The Vietcong leaders, meanwhile, were concentrating on getting their men to eat, live, and work with the peasants. The Vietcong helped the peasants till their ricefields and sweep their houses, while through terrorism, they were eroding law and order in Government-controlled areas.

Two months after Diem's overthrow, an American-Vietnamese factfinding team was sent to Long An Province.

The team uncovered an alarming Communist advance. By then the Vietcong had overrun and burnt down all but 6 of Diem's 220 strategic hamlets.

After interviewing 1,500 peasant families, the team concluded the war against the Vietcong "cannot ever be won" unless Saigon carried out drastic reforms at the village level.

Its conclusions were:

Land must be distributed. The local militia must be paid regularly. The use of artillery and bombs against villages must be "limited."

Force labor had to be stopped. Army extortion and food thefts must be prevented.

Corruption and bribery must be eliminated among local officials. District and provincial forces must send reinforcements when they were sought by village outposts under attack.

These conclusions were pretty basic, yet today most of the troubles remain largely unremedied.

Local militia are a little better paid and housed, but still not adequately. Force labor has been eliminated in most of the country. The introduction of more armed helicopters, flareships, highspeed jets, and more artillery has reduced the need for ground reinforcements.

But there has been no serious land reform. Bombing and shelling of villages have multiplied tenfold or twelvefold. Army extortion and food thefts are as common as ever and corruption is still endemic.

LODGE SHOCKED

When the report on Long An was originally published in early 1964, it had the impact of a bombshell in Saigon. Lodge, shocked at the seriousness of the situation, urged General Khanh to launch a crash pilot pacification program in the province. If the Communists could be turned back in Long An, Lodge argued, it would be shown they could be turned back everywhere.

Khan agreed. Economic aid was stepped up, U.S. heliborne flights deployed for stop attacks, the military advisory team was expanded and more men were assigned to district and mobile units operating in the province.

A Vietnamese airborne brigade was flown in to start operations to clear lost territory.

Maj. Gen. Richard Stilwell, now U.S. commander in Thailand, told newsmen Long An would be "pacified" and cleared of Communists within 6 months.

But the following July, 6 months later, the Government held only 25 hamlets, mostly clustered around Tan An and the six district towns Khanh's "Chien Thang" plan had been a fiasco.

Partly, this was because Khanh's heart was never in pacification. He weakened pacification efforts from the start by leaving it up to his province chiefs to proceed as best they saw fit in their own bailiwicks.

After Maxwell Taylor arrived in Saigon that summer as Ambassador and surveyed the wreckage of years of costly trial and error, he developed a pacification philosophy calling for giving the peasants military security while demonstrating to them the revolutionary idea in Vietnam, that Government exists for the people.

By then, one of the main Vietcong slogans had already become: "The Government exists for the people."

URGES CONCENTRATION

Taylor pushed for concentrating the Government's resources on a small area, the seven provinces encircling Saigon, hoping for visible results. This was the "Hop Tac" plan (which roughly means "togetherness").

Taylor also urged a return to civilian government. This was not simply to have Vietnam's leader a man in mufti instead of uniform, but because Taylor saw it was the way to restore a workable administration and law and order in the countryside.

Lodge's strong advocacy for a return to civilian rule, no matter who the man on top is, is based on the same reasoning.

Yet now, almost 18 months since Hop Tac got underway, Long An still has only 76 of its 252 hamlets anywhere near "pacified."

The cost of men and materiel has been heavy; four of the young American officers who pointed out shortcomings in the pacification effort to me on previous visits since have been killed in action.

Since June 1964, there have been four different American Province advisers and eight different American pacification advisers in Long An, although the Vietnamese Provincial officials have stayed the same.

USE OF AID TO BRING ABOUT REFORM

Senator CLARK. Mr. Bell, let me turn your mind back to the distant days of October 23, 1954, when General Eisenhower in a letter to President Diem said that our aid would be continued on the Government's undertaking needed reforms.

Do you or your assistant have the total of economic aid which has been furnished to South Vietnam since October 23, 1954?

Mr. BELL. I gave the figure earlier today, sir, of the total aid, total economic assistance from fiscal year 1954 through.

Senator CLARK. That is close enough.

Mr. BELL. To fiscal year 1966. That comes to about \$2.7 billion.

Senator CLARK. \$2.7 billion?

Mr. BELL. Including the present fiscal year.

Senator CLARK. To what extent have we used our aid as a leverage over the last 11 years in getting substantial needed reforms in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. I would be glad, if you will permit me, to supplement what I am about to say for the record because I am by no means familiar with the complete detail of all those years.

In general, however, I think it is fair to say we did use, we have used, our assistance to support—and to some extent as a bargaining tool—to accomplish significant changes.

Many changes, however, that were needed, were not made. The Diem regime, in its later years particularly, became very unpopular with many elements of the Vietnamese people. The revolution that overthrew Diem was in part and in considerable measure a popular revolution, resulting from the failure to develop a broader based, more democratic society.

Since the overthrow of Diem, the situation, as you know, has been very volatile, at times chaotic. There has been little opportunity to develop a strong positive, progressive governmental program.

The present Government has been in office now for 6 or 8 months. Prime Minister Ky's speech in January, which was roughly equivalent to a state of the Union message—which I assume the committee has before it, a very impressive speech in many ways—does indicate a positive, progressive, democratic purpose in this present Government. They are a long way from having accomplished those desirable objectives. There are improvements being made at the present time in, you might say, small measure. The opportunities for permanent improvements are obviously limited in a war situation. I think part of my answer is that, during the 1950's, some significant changes were brought about in substantial measure because of U.S. advice and influence.

During the latter years of the Diem regime this became steadily more difficult. Since his overthrow, there has been a succession of governments which did not, by their nature, permit steady development of a positive program. Things are looking better right now but I would be the last to want to indicate that we are home free.

RESULTS OF OUR AID TO VIETNAM

Senator CLARK. I suggest to you that because of the refusal of various governments in South Vietnam to make the desperately needed social and economic reforms that we have precious little to show for our \$2,700 million and I will ask you to comment on that.

Mr. BELL. No, I think that is a considerable overstatement, Senator. During the 1950's, as I indicated in answer to an earlier question this morning, there was a good deal done. There was a good deal done in the field of agriculture, for example, to bring in new and better methods, to start a credit organization which has some strength to it.

Senator CLARK. If you will excuse the interruption, how often after we make those improvements in agriculture do we go and burn the rice field with napalm?

Mr. BELL. The amount of agricultural crops that have been affected by our actions is really relatively small in terms of total area.

There was during the fifties a significant improvement in educational facilities in Vietnam.

Senator CLARK. If you will excuse the interruption, I know of at least one case where we built a little red schoolhouse and when people went out from AID and USIA to take a picture of the dedication they were under sniper fire from Vietcong located in the little red schoolhouse.

Mr. BELL. I am sure that doesn't sound improbable at all, Senator. As I said earlier, one of the things the Vietcong has done which has been extremely damaging has been to assassinate school teachers. That is a pretty rough thing to contend with in building up an educational system.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator PELL?

Senator PELL. Mr. Bell, by coincidence the last question I asked the chief administration witness last Friday, Mr. Rusk, was why this question was not taken to the United Nations. At that point he indicated why it was an unwise move to do. I am glad to see it is since being done.

LISTS PROMISED AT EARLIER HEARING

In this connection, too, in connection with last week's testimony, you have not yet submitted the list of names of people you were going to, those who were working for the Government and those who were in private agencies, you were going to supplement the record.

Mr. POATS. It is in our hands now and it will be up in a day or two.

Mr. BELL. It is in our hands—it was supposed to be up—it will be up soon.

Senator PELL. Right.

APPEAL OF VIETCONG TO POPULACE

It seems to me from the viewpoint of population, from the viewpoint of population and resources, North and South Vietnam are not too unevenly matched, and our own American extension of aid in men and money vastly exceeds that of Communist China aid and that of Russia.

How do you account, yourself—and this is the question that bothers me so much—for the excess of fervor?

Mr. BELL. For the what, sir?

Senator PELL. For the excess of fervor, of f-e-r-v-o-r, on the part of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in being able to make the inroads they do in South Vietnam—as opposed to the appeal of our view which we know is the better and the fact, too, that 1 million voted with their feet to leave the Communists.

Mr. BELL. I don't think it is an excess of fervor. I think that what has happened—or what is happening—is the natural result of the advantages that guerrilla warfare confers upon the guerrilla.

The Vietcong, and the North Vietnamese with them, live—have their bases in jungle areas, and can venture out at will over an area that is very sizable. And they have the advantage of surprise. They send out terrorist teams for assassination and bombings and so on. I think all authorities are agreed that, because of these advantages, it does

take a ratio of 5 to 10 to 1 in troops and police to stop this kind of thing.

Now, I want to add a comment I wanted to make earlier to Senator Hickenlooper. There is no question that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese do not have a positive program for constructive work in the countryside. They have no costs of that kind whatsoever. They tax the countryside, but they put nothing into it. They do not pay school teachers and doctors. They do not build roads. They do not make available better seeds and fertilizers and that sort of thing. They are solely a destructive force and, consequently—and because of the nature of the guerrilla action that they are engaged in—they can accomplish a lot of destruction at a relatively small cost.

That is what their advantage is.

Senator PELL. I thought one of the points here was that the Communists offer a distasteful, to our viewpoint, program, but it is more of a program than we offer when it comes to land reform and offers for opportunities to the landless, who are the majority.

Mr. BELL. No, sir; I don't think that is a fair statement of the matter. Only in some areas of South Vietnam is there a serious problem of ownership and tenancy. The Vietcong have used this as a propaganda instrument—but there is a lot more to land reform than talking about it. You have to help new owners learn how to use their property efficiently, to provide more credit, to enlarge production and income. The Vietcong have no programs of that kind whatsoever.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

USE OF WORD "COUNTERINSURGENCY"

Another point here that has often bothered me, is the use of this word "counterinsurgency." I think one of the reasons for this activity of ours not working is the word "insurgency" because we encouraged insurgency. We were born in insurgency. Some of us got into politics as insurgents. We believe in insurgency. I wonder when the administration continuously presents requests for counterinsurgency, the matter Senator Case commented upon, whether we are not undercutting ourselves and whether we ought to change the word.

Mr. BELL. Well, the problems of semantics in this field are great. Many countries do have honorable beginnings in wars of insurgency, wars of revolution. But, as Secretary Rusk said the other day, it is wholly erroneous to compare in the slightest either our own Civil War or our own War of the Revolution with what is going on in Vietnam today.

Senator PELL. Why can't we change the name from counterinsurgency to encouraging democratic insurgency? I think the name itself implies it is on the side of conservatism.

Mr. BELL. The phrase which the Vietnamese Government is now using, which I think is a very good one, is rural construction.

Senator PELL. Excellent. I would suggest the administration use it more. This is a little battle I am having with the Defense Department.

Mr. BELL. You will find that phrase sprinkled in my statement.

Senator PELL. But in the analysis you prepared for the committee you used the word "counterinsurgency."

Mr. BELL. We will take that to heart.

EFFECT OF CESSATION OF BOMBING OF NORTH ON SECURITY IN VILLAGES

Senator PELL. Another question: Did the bombing lull—cessation—in North Vietnam have any effect on the security of the villages? Did it have a positive or negative effect on the security of government-held areas in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. I don't—insofar as the bombing lull permitted the North Vietnamese to get more troops and more supplies down to their forces in South Vietnam, it helped the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. But it would be hard to show a precise relationship between that and any particular village.

Senator PELL. In my own view it is hard to establish that the bombing in the north had any direct military effect on the course of events in the south.

Mr. BELL. That is a question I am not competent to comment on, as you know.

Senator PELL. Right.

STATISTICS ON CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Returning to Senator Lausche's line of questioning—and I think his questions were very valid in asking for the insertion in the record of these figures of casualties—I think we should also insert in the record if you have them, the casualties of civilian noncombatants.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. Caused by us both in South Vietnam and in North Vietnam, and also to insert in the record—and I realize these figures we do not give every credence to—the equivalent figures which they put out in Hanoi.

Mr. BELL. I am sure we could supply for the record—if the committee doesn't already have it—what the North Vietnamese have said. I would agree one would be skeptical about the validity of those figures.

Senator PELL. I underline that point. But underlining the lack of credibility, I think it would be interesting as a matter of curiosity.

Mr. BELL. Right.

(The information referred to follows:)

A reliable estimate of the number of civilian casualties in South Vietnam caused by U.S. military actions is not available.

In request to the number of civilian casualties in North Vietnam caused by U.S. military actions, although North Vietnam has made occasional announcements regarding the number of deaths caused by specific U.S. bombing attacks, it has not released total estimates of civilian casualties in North Vietnam. The U.S. Government has no such estimates.

Senator PELL. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy?

COMMUNIST PRESSURES IN LAOS AND THAILAND

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Bell, I am interested in your remarks on page 10 where you say:

Nonmilitary activities contributing to the security of Laos and northeast Thailand must be intensified if we are to deter the announced Communist ambitions in those countries.

What are the announced Communist ambitions and who made the announcements?

Mr. BELL. There was an announcement—one that I recall, and there may well have been others—from Peiping. I have forgotten, whether it was by Chou en-Lai—it was by Chen Yi, by a high and responsible official—saying that 1966 was the year in which there was going to be started a “war of liberation” in Thailand of the type that has been going on in South Vietnam. That is their language. That is a clear and open notice that they are going to start guerrilla activities, terror activities, of the same kind that have occurred in Vietnam—indeed that has already begun. When I was in Thailand in the first week in January there was an attack on a police post in which some six Thai policemen were murdered by an organized gang from a jungle base, and which is organized into some sort of—what they would call, I suppose—a liberation front of the same kind that exists in South Vietnam.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you anticipate an effort comparable to that which is being made in Vietnam at the present time?

Mr. BELL. The effort is not on that scale at the present time.

Senator McCARTHY. I understand that. I asked you what you anticipated.

Mr. BELL. It is on an increasing scale. It is our judgment and Thai Government's judgment, that it is extremely important to stop it and throttle it, if we possibly can, before it gets on any major scale.

SIZE OF AID PROGRAMS IN LAOS AND THAILAND

Senator McCARTHY. Is there any reason to believe you can do that with \$15 million?

Mr. BELL. Sir?

Senator McCARTHY. Is there any reason to believe you can do that with \$15 million?

Mr. BELL. This is additional money, Senator.

Senator McCARTHY. How much has been made available?

Mr. BELL. The present program is going up to \$32 million.

Senator McCARTHY. Assuming there is an escalation of effort—

Mr. BELL. The Laos figures are somewhat larger. The present figure there is \$52 to 53 million, going up to \$63 million. And this \$7½ million for each is part of the additional funds that will be needed in both countries.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EFFORT IN VIETNAM TO SITUATION IN THAILAND

Senator McCARTHY. Isn't one of the arguments being made for strong resistance in Vietnam the argument that we couldn't possibly make a good fight in Thailand? It seems to me this is one of the charges

that has been made against the suggestion of General Gavin that we had better make a stand in Vietnam because it would be worse in Thailand.

Mr. BELL. I am certainly not competent, Senator, to get very far into a military question like that.

Senator McCARTHY. You have heard these remarks made by the people who are supposed to be the experts.

Mr. BELL. No, I have not heard that particular remark, Senator, really.

Senator McCARTHY. What is the view of the military men you talk to about fighting in Thailand?

Mr. BELL. That it would be difficult and complex, but I personally haven't heard any of them say that it would be more difficult to fight in Thailand than in Vietnam. There are base areas, ports in southern Thailand; there is the beginnings of a highway network leading inland; there are airfields up in eastern and northeastern Thailand. I repeat, I am not an expert on this subject, but I had not been aware of the view that it would be more difficult, or substantially more difficult, to fight in Thailand. I suppose the point might be made that in Vietnam there is a much longer coastline which can be reached at any point by our Navy; whereas the coastline in Thailand is shorter, and all in the south, while the potential area of military action would be largely in the northeast and the north. In that sense, I suppose the logistics problem for fighting in Thailand might be more difficult—but I repeat, I am not really a very good witness on these subjects.

APPLICATION OF THE DOMINO THEORY

Senator McCARTHY. You read this development in the light of the theory, I know it is not absolute, that if we resist in Vietnam then the other countries will not fall to communism. How does this fit in with falling dominoes?

Mr. BELL. Well, it is certainly true that if we are successful in Vietnam that does not automatically mean that there will be no problems anywhere else.

Senator McCARTHY. That is very obvious.

Mr. BELL. But the converse would be that if we—


Senator McCARTHY. Is the opposite true?

Mr. BELL. Well, certainly if—

Senator McCARTHY. Do these dominoes fall only one way or do they fall both ways? My experience with dominoes is that they can fall both ways. Your format has them falling only in one direction.

Mr. BELL. No, I do not think I mean to argue any such thing. Insofar as we are successful in helping the Thai to choke off and prevent the kind of guerrilla activities which have emerged in Vietnam, and insofar as we help the Laotian gradually to consolidate and expand the areas of security and progress in their country, that will have some beneficial effect, for example, in inhibiting the ease with which the North Vietnamese and Chinese supplies can now be taken down to South Vietnam.

I would not argue that that would make a major difference, but it is obviously beneficial.



Conversely, if the Communists were successful in taking over South Vietnam, that would give them a substantial gain in territory. It would release substantial resources which they could use westward, but most of all—if it happened in a way which involved the United States pulling out—it would undermine the credibility of the American commitment.

We have said that we are prepared to support the Thai in their desire and intention to retain their freedom. We have said the same thing to the Laotian—in an appropriate way; as you know, the Laotian governmental situation is very confused—but nevertheless there is a real commitment there to help them.

If, having said the same thing in Vietnam, we were now to back out, then plainly there would be legitimate skepticism in Thailand, Laos and other places in the world that we really meant to stay when the going got tough. That is a point you are obviously very familiar with.

Senator McCARTHY. Well, we are saying it, and obviously it has not deterred them from announcing or taking action, an announcement which we take seriously.

Mr. BELL. I do not think our statement that we are prepared to help the Thai defend themselves is in itself sufficient—nor have we presented it or ever claimed it to be sufficient—to prevent this kind of insurgent activity of—pardon me, Senator Pell—of guerrilla attack from being started in Thailand. It has been started; it will be continued. Undoubtedly their intention is to enlarge it as much as the other side can enlarge it, with the eventual purpose, if they could, of destroying the security in Thailand and taking it over.

We are helping the Thai in a very complex effort to prevent that. This involves greatly strengthening the police forces in Thailand, and greatly strengthening the rural development programs in Thailand, road building, school building, agricultural improvements, enabling the people of northeast and northern Thailand to participate more in their own government and in their own opportunities for investment, saving, progress in education, in all these things.

ADEQUACY OF PROGRAMS IN LAOS AND THAILAND

Senator McCARTHY. Do you think the \$32-million program is an adequate response against the threat in Thailand and Laos at the present time?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Well, the \$32 million is just for Thailand. The \$60 million-odd for Laos.

Senator McCARTHY. Just for Thailand?

Mr. BELL. The Thai Government has much greater economic resources than does the South Vietnamese Government. The marginal resources that we need to put in are, therefore, smaller in proportion to the total—substantially smaller than is the case in Vietnam.

The program in Thailand is being enlarged, and the investment in all kinds of equipment, in training efforts, in police equipment, the various purposes for which our money goes, those requirements are rising now, and they will continue to rise for some time to come.

But I think that considering the present availability of people in training, of school facilities, of the readiness to act, we are meeting the needs of today; yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. What is the Village Cluster project that you described?

Mr. BELL. The Village Cluster project we described in Laos—

Senator McCARTHY. Is that a fortified hamlet project in Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. There are no fortifications involved at all. This is a rural development program which is centered around transportation, schools, agricultural improvement, health clinics, that sort of thing. It is simply the name given in Laos to the same program or to a similar program which is called accelerated rural development in Thailand. It is a very good program, incidentally—very impressive. There are American advisers working in each of the provinces in Laos where this is going on and there are young American IVS volunteers—the Peace Corps does not work in Laos—but there are Peace Corps type persons recruited by the International Voluntary Service—the IVS—who are living in these villages and doing a very good job of it.

BORROWING FROM OTHER PROGRAMS

Senator McCARTHY. In the earlier part of your testimony you said that you borrowed from other essential programs. I have two questions: What are the essential programs from which you borrowed?

Mr. BELL. Some of the money has come from Korea, it has been borrowed from Korea. It will be needed in Korea later this year, and some of it, I think, from Laos.

This is simply obligations which will have to be entered into before the year is over, but did not have to be entered into in January and February and, therefore, we have used the money temporarily for Vietnam.

Senator McCARTHY. No cut down, no cutback, in the programs?

Mr. BELL. We have limited the programs in the other countries as much as we had felt it was possible to do.

Senator McCARTHY. Another question: When you put in words like "borrow" what does it mean?

Mr. BELL. Well, it is not borrowing in the sense of going to a bank or the Treasury and getting more money. It means we are temporarily using for Vietnam funds which Congress voted, and we intend to use, for other needs later in the year.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you have a glossary of the meaning of words you put in quotation marks or do you just develop them as you go along?

Mr. BELL. I did not think that I was creating a new dictionary definition in this case.

Senator McCARTHY. Well, you gave a new definition to the word "borrow" which is certainly not in the dictionary, not a traditionally accepted meaning. I think it is a rather dangerous practice for the Government or for people in or out, to take a good word—we politicians suffer from that in campaigns—they call us most anything, and put it in quotation marks, and say it means whatever the man intends it to mean.

Mr. BELL. Well, the action we are taking, I guess, does not have a standard word attached to it in the Government glossary.

Senator McCARTHY. You think there is none?

Mr. BELL. There is none that I know off.

Senator McCARTHY. The best thing you can do is to take the word "borrow" and put it in quotation marks?

Mr. BELL. That is the best I could do; yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. I think we ought to have someone work out a glossary of words used by the Government in quotation marks, and we could understand it as a simple matter, and the press would understand what it means.

Senator CASE. Is this in the exercise of authority for transfer which is now in the law?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. This is under the normal authority in the law. This is all within the supporting assistance appropriation.

Those are the funds I was talking with Senator McCarthy about.

In addition, however, we have asked the President, and he has formally transferred funds which will later in the year be needed for contributions to international organizations.

Senator CASE. How much of that will you use?

Mr. BELL. Some \$27 million when this appropriation is voted, if it is. Assuming the Congress provides us with the funds we are asking for, the President will formally, in fact his transfer action provided for this, return some of this money into the contributions to international organizations account in order to meet the obligations that will then be accruing.

Senator McCARTHY. Thank you. That is all.

USE OF TERM "COMMUNIST AGGRESSION"

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bell, I have a few questions. I was very much interested in the line of questions started by Senator Case and pursued, I believe, by Senator Church and others, although I am not at all sure this is strictly within your particular province. I only wanted to state that I am very interested in this point, and I hope additional Government witnesses, in particular, and others, will deal with that problem in some depth.

I do not particularly wish to pursue it with you, but the thought occurred to me that you and the other witnesses constantly refer to Communist aggression. I always thought communism was rather an abstraction.

You think it would be an appropriate—just for purposes of illustrating this point—that if, for reasons, and I know it is not going to happen, we should invade Brazil, wouldn't they be justified in saying this is an invasion by capitalism, or would you say it is an invasion by Americans?

Mr. BELL. Well, I do not think, sir, that communism—

The CHAIRMAN. I am getting at the semantics.

Mr. BELL. I do not think communism and capitalism are that easily related in a semantic sense. I think they are quite different notions.

The CHAIRMAN. What is a better word than capitalism? Freedom invades Brazil? This use of language confuses me.

Mr. BELL. I think part of the trouble, Mr. Chairman, is that the Communists, the Communist leaders, have developed a philosophy and an attitude of expansion based on—

The CHAIRMAN. There are lots of communisms.

Mr. BELL. Wars of liberation.

The CHAIRMAN. There are lots of Communists in other parts of the world than those who are there. There are the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs are not participating yet in any aggression that I know of. I just raised the question to clarify our understanding and to be more precise. I agree with Senator Case's point that repeating this kind of emotional word really does not lead to enlightenment. We ought to begin being more precise in the way we describe the problem.

I do not think it would make any sense if we say capitalism or democracy should—I hope we don't ever invade anybody—invade such and such a country. These are abstract terms that are proper for some philosophical dissertation, but not for describing actual combat such as that going on in Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. Well, I think whatever semantics we choose should recognize that there is a doctrinal notion built around this concept of wars of liberation which we are seeing, in effect, in Vietnam and, to some extent, in Thailand.

The CHAIRMAN. But not shared by all Communist countries.

Mr. BELL. Correct.

Senator CASE. And this is used by nations and leaders of nations, and it is that we ought to talk about, it seems to me.

The CHAIRMAN. And certain nations and certain people.

Senator CASE. That is right; and to be precise about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I think it leads to confusion. I just share Senator Case's feeling about it.

He raised this question and, as I say, I do not think this is your responsibility to clarify this. It is in a different area, and so I do not want to pursue it with you. I do wish that some of the succeeding witnesses, particularly those from the administration, will be prepared to deal with this a little more in depth.

REQUEST FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

About the Dominican Republic, which has been of considerable interest to this committee, I understood you to say that the request is for budgetary support, and that the money in this bill is not for any specific projects of improvement, either in the field of economic development or education. It is simply a contribution to the support of their ordinary government operations; is that correct?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. I said that the bulk of the money which we have been putting into the Dominican Republic, and which would be financed by this supplemental that is before the committee—the bulk of the money is for, has been and is for, budget support.

In that, however, the committee should understand that we are, of course, supporting the capital improvement and the education and health elements of the Dominican Government's budget, just as other elements of that budget, including the military and police, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. But only as they direct.

Mr. BELL. But over and above the money we are using for budget support, we are also conducting activities of a more normal economic aid variety, technical assistance projects, development projects of one kind or another, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any knowledge that you could give the committee this morning as to the prospects of the military leaders who have been requested to leave pending the bringing of elections, whether they are going to leave or not?

Mr. BELL. I have none, no.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no news about that. That also is in the political section rather than the economic.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. I follow that question with some interest, but I have no information that the committee does not already have.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

PROCEDURE OF HEARINGS

Senator MORSE. Before I proceed with my questions, and I have many, many more questions, Mr. Chairman, I want to raise a procedural matter with this committee.

I had hoped that I would find some basis for leaning over backwards and voting for this foreign aid program. But the more I listen to Mr. Bell, the more convinced I become that it would not be in the interests of my country to support this program.

I want to say that unless this hearing is going to be really a farce, we have got to continue in depth with this witness. Here is the Administrator of our aid program and, in my judgment, we ought to finish our questioning of Mr. Bell. I shall always yield to no one in this committee in protecting Mr. Bell's rights to answer in his own way. I think the witnesses before us are entitled to answer in their own way, and he is entitled to use whatever technique he wants to use in answering.

I only say, most respectfully, that in my judgment his answers consume an unnecessary amount of time if we are going to be limited to 10 minutes at a time. They are long and rambling and, in my opinion very often can be answered much more briefly. But that is his business, not mine.

But it is my business, representing the people of the State of Oregon, to urge upon this committee that we continue these hearings—we, at long last have got them out in the public where we, at least, have given this administration a chance to put the answers to questions in public, that the public is entitled to, and that includes the conversations we have already had on this map this morning and other things that I want to ask Mr. Bell about in the hearings ahead.

I have here more than 50 questions that I want to ask the Director, and I have not any doubt that his answers will create more than 50 more in my mind before we get through with the examination.

I want to know what the plan of the chairman is in the procedure for conducting these public hearings. I think we ought to have Mr. Bell back for as many sessions of this committee as are necessary for each member of this committee to complete his examination. I judge from my conversations with members of the staff that it is not contemplated that our next meeting will be a meeting with Mr. Bell.

The CHAIRMAN. No, it is not. There is no objection to our meeting today, as the Senator knows, and we can run—today until 1 o'clock if you would like. And if you wish, and Mr. Bell is available, you can resume this afternoon.

Mr. BELL. I am available this afternoon.

Senator MORSE. I think if we have lunch and have Mr. Bell back this afternoon—

SCHEDULE FOR NEXT WEEK

The CHAIRMAN. Further than that, and this is somewhat tentative, it may be firmed up this afternoon, I had originally asked Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler to come on Monday. They feel that it is not in the public interest to appear in public session. They are perfectly willing to come in executive session as long as you like.

Senator MORSE. I want to make clear, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish, and then you may comment. You asked the question.

Then it was suggested that General Taylor, who has had a dual responsibility, not only as a leading military man as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but also as Ambassador in Saigon, that he would appear. This, as I say, has not been firmed up, but he has been requested. I think there is a probability that he will appear in public session on Monday, and it is also planned to have General Gavin on Tuesday.

I understand, and this is all subject to confirmation, that we will be allowed to meet in the regular order next week, because the petition for cloture has been filed, and I very much hope that will be true because it is very inconvenient to meet at these unusual hours, and I do not like the idea of meeting at night if we can meet at the regular time.

We may be able to announce this afternoon who the witnesses will be on Wednesday and Thursday.

I conferred with the ranking Republican member in view of this understanding about a recess, about a meeting on Thursday. He has no objection. So as far as I am concerned, and if the committee is willing, we will have a meeting on Thursday, to try to follow it through as rapidly as we can. So that is the present plan.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to make one very brief point. On your announcement that some of these witnesses do not want to appear in public session—

The CHAIRMAN. The only one was the one I mentioned.

Senator MORSE. What about the representatives from the Pentagon Building?

TESTIMONY FROM SECRETARY M'NAMARA

The CHAIRMAN. I stated that I talked to Secretary McNamara personally yesterday, that they feel it would not be in the public interest, they do not wish to appear in public. He will appear and offered voluntarily to appear in executive session. He also added that it happens on Monday and Tuesday, the time for which I asked him, that he is already engaged with the House Appropriations Committee. He could not have come even though he had a different view. But he also added that he does not wish to appear in public session at any time on this subject.

Senator MORSE. I want to file my respectful dissent because I happen to think that it is the Pentagon Building as well as some people in the State Department who have taken this attitude in the past. As the chairman well knows, this has already led the American people a long way down the road toward government by secrecy in this country. No matter how much criticism it brings on my head, I am not going to support government by secrecy in this country, and the American people in this country are entitled to have the Secretary of Defense on the public record because the American people are going to die by the millions, in my judgment, if we continue in this war of ours in Asia which, I think, will lead to nuclear war.

I do not think there is any place in this Republic any more to have the Secretary of Defense or any other spokesman of this Government hide behind an alleged right to testify in secrecy, and I shall not attend any meeting that sponsors government by secrecy in this country on a matter that is as vital as the welfare of the people of this country.

Now, if this committee—and I suggest that we have an early meeting on it—wants to surrender to that request of McNamara to get behind the closed doors of the committee and thereby keep from the American people what they are entitled to know about their own foreign policy and military policy, let us have it out, because the American people, in my judgment, are going to start having it out with this administration the first chance they get to walk into those ballot booths, and that is what they had better do, because they are going to have to vote to protect their freedom.

If we are going to countenance government by secrecy by denying to the American people the opportunity to hear what these spokesmen for this administration have to say about their policy, and I register that dissent, and the committee can vote secret hearings with the Secretary if they want to, but the senior Senator from Oregon would not be a party to denying to the people of my State open hearings, and I am not going to be a party to participating in such secret hearings.

Senator CASE. Will the Senator yield?

Senator MORSE. Sure, I will yield.

Senator CASE. I just want to say that I share and concur with the Senator's view on this matter. I think the questions, some cannot be answered by anybody except the President of the United States, and he will make his statement in his own way, but I think so far as administration witnesses are concerned, I think we should ask all of them to be heard in open session.

Senator MUNDT. Will you yield?

Senator MORSE. I yield.

Senator MUNDT. I think there is much merit in what the Senator from Oregon says, provided he has in mind what I think he has in mind, and that is that the executive witness like the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State might not be able to answer some specific question in public.

Senator MORSE. I recognize that.

Senator MUNDT. In the interests of the country and it, therefore, should be reserved to make that off the record or to withhold it.

Senator MORSE. I have always respected that right before this committee.

Senator MUNDT. With that modification, I quite agree the American public should be advised.

Senator MORSE. We proposed these hearings to go into the background of the war in Vietnam, and our general justification and our record in South Vietnam should be heard not in private before this committee. Let me say this, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense need to be brought before this committee to be examined on their record, in my judgment, of violating one obligation after another that we have both under treaty and international law. You know my view on that, but we have not had the debate on it. We have not been able to go into it in depth, and we have a documentation that they ought to answer. I do not propose to keep it from the American people or be a party to keeping it from the American people.

I am ready to proceed with questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

IMPORT DUTIES ON AID-FINANCED GOODS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Bell, I had just before my time ran out in my last examination of you, asked you some questions about the South Vietnamese budget and how much came from import duties and what the import duties were imposed on, and to what extent our own foreign aid goods sent in there raised import duties.

You are welcome to make further comment on it or file a memorandum, but I think you ought to know what my fear and concern is.

I have a little difficulty in our pouring the taxpayers' money into South Vietnam with these foreign aid goods and have someone take advantage of it by way of import duties unless it is properly administered.

Mr. BELL. I am glad you brought it back to this, Senator. I wanted to say just as you were completing your last set of questions, I wanted to be sure that I had not misled you. I do not think I did.

Many of the goods which we make available under the commodity import program, are goods on which import duties are levied when they enter Vietnam. The U.S. Government does not pay those import duties. The consumer of the goods pays the duties in the price that he pays.

Now, that is completing an answer that I wanted to complete under the earlier circumstances.

So far as your present comment is concerned, we do have, as I indicated, a substantial number of auditors and inspectors on the scene in Saigon and the other ports, and we are reasonably confident that the goods we are paying for in fact get to the importers to whom they are supposed to get, and into the markets of Vietnam.

I repeat the point I made to Senator Williams: Once the goods are in the markets in Saigon and other cities, one cannot be sure they cannot be purchased or hijacked and taken by the Vietcong. We have been trying to develop a stronger system of police check points and other checks on transportation.

I do not believe we have any evidence there is major diversion of goods we pay for on the way to the markets of Vietnam.

Senator MORSE. Let me give you a hypothetical case that will clarify it for me.

Suppose we have an American or South Vietnamese contractor who is building some project in South Vietnam connected with the AID program and his supplies come in from the United States: cement and steel, and all the other equipment necessary for building a project. Does he pay an import duty on all those supplies?

Mr. BELL. No, sir; not on the project supplies as such. In the kind of project you described, the goods would go directly to the construction project without import duties being paid.

If, however, as is the case, we are financing cement going into the general market in South Vietnam and, if we hire a local contractor—paying him in local currency, to build for example, housing for medical technicians that we have in Vietnam, and the local contractor buys cement on the local market for that contract—he, of course, buys it at the price which it bears in the marketplace which includes import duty.

Senator MORSE. Suppose that General Electric enters into a contract either with the South Vietnamese Government or with your aid agency to build a powerplant.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator MORSE. And buys its generators and all of its supplies in the United States. It is to be paid for out of our aid funds.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator MORSE. Does the General Electric Co. have to pay import duties on those supplies—

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

Senator MORSE (continuing). That come in?

Mr. BELL. No, not under those conditions; no, sir.

Senator MORSE. But if a wholesale house, South Vietnamese wholesale house, or electric supply house in South Vietnam, knowing that there is going to be a rural electrification program or being advised there will be, buys electrical equipment, generators and what not for resale, does it pay import duties on those goods?

Mr. BELL. They pay them; we do not. That is right. Mr. Poats is adding an important qualification. Could he supplement it?

Senator MORSE. By all means.

Mr. POATS. We do not allow contractors working on aid-financed projects to use imported goods financed through our program without unusual consent, and I do not recall giving that consent in Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. In other words, the normal case is the General Electric-type case, where if we are financing a project then we put the imports from the United States directly into that project, and there are no import duties at all.

Senator MORSE. Have you had any adverse reports or findings at any time from either the Comptroller General or the inspector general in connection with any alleged corruption or malfeasance in connection with the collection of import duties?

Mr. BELL. I am not sure of the source—whether it came from the General Accounting Office or our own auditors, but there have been questions raised about the efficiency of the customs service in Vietnam.

Indeed, we recently had out there an official of our own, an American from the U.S. Customs Bureau for the purpose of working out arrangements under which we will send out a group of American customs advisers who will help to train and improve the Vietnamese Government's customs service.

TAX SYSTEM OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Bell, has South Vietnam instituted anything like our wartime excess profits tax system?

Mr. BELL. I do not think so.

Mr. POATS. No. The Government instituted a so-called five-sevenths tax which was basically motivated or justified as a means of raising additional revenue. This is a tax based on imports, on the use of foreign exchange.

Mr. BELL. But not on profits.

Mr. POATS. There have been a number of major increases in excise taxes, as much as 200-percent increases.

Senator MORSE. Excise taxes?

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Mr. POATS. In fact, some luxury goods carry as much as a 400-percent duty.

Mr. BELL. But these are excise taxes, but not on profits.

Senator MORSE. What are some of those, what goods are included in them?

Mr. POATS. For example, beer, I think, has a tax now in the vicinity of 100 percent. Cigarettes more than 100 percent.

Senator MORSE. What about hard liquor?

Mr. POATS. Quite high. I do not know the figure.

Senator MORSE. But are those excise taxes limited in large measure to goods of that nature that are not vital to the nutritional needs of the people?

Mr. POATS. That is right; excise taxes.

Senator MORSE. Excise taxes on nutritional foods?

Mr. POATS. There are no excise taxes on basic foodstuffs, no import duties on basic foodstuffs.

Senator MORSE. Is it pretty much the pattern we have had here from time to time, excise taxes on what we consider to be luxury goods and nonessential goods?

Mr. POATS. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Does South Vietnam have an income tax, Mr. Bell?

Mr. BELL. Yes, they do.

Mr. Poats advises me that the current total receipts are 1½ billion piasters of the tax revenues of the Vietnamese Government. It is not one of their major sources of revenue.

Senator MORSE. That was my next question. How much was collected from it the past year? Would you give me that figure again?

Mr. BELL. About 680 million piasters of total tax receipts of 14.2 billion piasters.

Senator MORSE. Is it fair to say then that it is rather low, a rather low income tax rate?

Mr. BELL. What about the rates, Mr. Poats? I would say that collections leave a lot to be desired. I do not know about the rates.

Senator MORSE. That would be my next question, but I would like to dwell for a moment on how—what the rate of this income tax is. What I am trying to find out, Mr. Poats, is whether or not it is a substantial tax or whether they have failed thus far to really have income tax rates that are really on an ability-to-pay basis.

Mr. POATS. The tax rate on business corporations and so on is roughly similar to the United States, I believe. However, the income tax on individuals is considerably lower. I do not have the figures with me.

Mr. BELL. We will be glad to put them in the record, Senator.

Senator MORSE. I have no desire to dwell unnecessarily on the point, but I do want to get it in the record.

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator MORSE. Would you, Mr. Poats, supply me with a memorandum in the record on the tax structure in Vietnam, because we ought to have it in there either to verify or answer the criticisms that we receive—

(The information referred to follows:)

TAX STRUCTURE IN VIETNAM, INTERNAL TAXES

Internal taxes are classified into four groups. The four groups, with percentages of total domestic revenue collections for 1965 are: Direct (9.4 percent); indirect (20.5 percent); excise (16.2 percent); and registration (7.7 percent). The following table shows domestic tax revenue in 1963, 1964, and 1965.

[In billions of piasters]

	1963	1964	1965
Total expenditures.....	27.0	37.5	52.0
Total domestic receipts.....	12.0	12.8	13.7
Direct taxes.....	1.2	1.2	1.1
Indirect taxes.....	1.8	2.2	2.4
Excise taxes.....	1.3	1.6	1.9
Registration.....	.6	.9	.9
Customs duties.....	4.4	4.7	5.4
Others.....	2.7	2.2	2.0

Direct taxes include (1) a tax on income and profits, (2) real estate taxes, and (3) the patent, or business tax. The direct tax structure is as follows:

1. INCOME AND PROFITS

The system of income taxation includes four different taxes:

a. Salaries and wages

Includes indemnities, emoluments, pensions, annuities, and all compensations for service whether in income or in kind. Salaries and wages are taxed at the rate of 1 to 16 percent. There are five brackets: 1 percent on net taxable annual income up to VN\$50,000; 2 percent on income from VN\$50,001 to VN\$100,000; 5 percent on income from VN\$100,001 to VN\$500,000; 10 percent on income from VN\$500,001 to VN\$1,000,000; and 16 percent on income over VN\$1,000,000. Abatements (personal exemptions) are VN\$30,000 for single persons and heads of households; VN\$15,000 additional for married persons; VN\$5,000 for each child under 21 years of age; and VN\$3,000 for each dependent parent or grandparent. A professional deduction is allowed for travel and entertainment (10 percent of gross income up to VN\$240,000 and 5 percent of gross income exceeding VN\$240,000) and exemptions for pension payments are allowable. Filing date for all income taxes is April 1 for income received in the preceding calendar year. Except for government employees, withholding tax procedures have not been developed.

b. Profits tax

Levied annually against all net profits from business operations of any kind, but excludes from its base capital gains and income from stocks and bonds. The tax is 24 percent for corporations and 16 percent for unincorporated businesses, including professions. The profit tax on individuals has the same abatements as the income tax on salaries. Deductions for firms include all ordinary and necessary expenses attributable to earning the profit.

c. General income tax

Levied on all income subject to the tax on salaries and wages, to the individual profits tax or business profits tax, and on income earned from sources outside of Vietnam. Allowable deductions are the same as for the salary and profits tax; deductions are permitted for salary, profits, and general income taxes paid in the previous year. Tax rates for the general income tax are progressive within the range of 1 to 50 percent.

d. Tax on dividends and interest paid by corporations

A withholding levy at the corporate level on dividend and interest payments. Tax rates vary between 18 and 30 percent depending on the characteristics of the corporation. For application of the tax, corporations are first divided into foreign and Vietnamese. Foreign corporations are taxed at the rate of 30 percent on all Vietnam-allocated dividends and interest payments; the allocation is construed to be the ratio of the total "turnover" resulting from operations in Vietnam and the total "turnover" of the corporation. Vietnamese corporations are subject to one of two rates: the rate of tax on dividends of a SARL (limited liability corporation) is 18 percent; a *societe anonyme* (corporation) is subject to a 24-percent dividends tax. Interest payments by both types of Vietnamese corporations are taxed at 18 percent.

2. REAL ESTATE TAXES

There are three basic characteristics of the Vietnamese system of taxing real property: (a) the tax is primarily a Central Government source of revenue, with other levels of government receiving income based on percentage surtaxes added to the Central Government tax; (b) land is taxed according to productive capacity, while urban buildings are taxed on the basis of real capital value; (c) four basic distinctions are made in the tax rates applicable to land depending on whether it is located in an urban center, used for rice production, used for mixed agricultural production or borders a rural highway or street.

a. Riceland tax

Land is classified according to productivity and taxed by hectare. There are six classes of land; the tax ranges from VN\$10 to VN\$85 per hectare.

b. Mixed cultivation land tax

There are seven classes of land; the tax ranges from VN\$15 to VN\$300 per hectare.

c. Urban land and property tax

Unimproved land is taxed by hectare following a complicated schedule based on location. There are separate rates for (1) major cities (Saigon is divided into four zones and seven categories, each with a different rate); (2) first-class cities (five zones); (3) second-class cities (four zones); (4) third-class cities (three zones); (5) land bordering national and provincial highways; and (6) land bordering auxiliary or communal roads. The rates on unimproved land range from VN\$30 per hectare (class 6 above) to VN\$10,000 in Saigon. Improved land is taxed twice: the land is taxed (there are five rates, ranging from VN\$0.05 to VN\$0.85 per square meter) and the improvements are taxed. The property tax rate may range from 1 to 5 percent of the real property value; it is fixed annually in accordance with the budgetary needs of the country. There is, in addition, a 40-percent tax on super rent properties which are rented at abnormally high prices.

3. THE PATENTE (BUSINESS LICENSE)

The patente is an annual fee levied on individuals and corporations for the privilege of engaging in a trade, profession, or industry. Exempt from the tax are teachers, farmers, those who are engaged in the extraction of natural resources and a few others.

There are two parts to the tax. The basic tax is a specific levy determined by the type of business. All businesses are listed in the fiscal code, which records 743 different types of businesses and professions and establishes minimum and maximum rates for each. For example, a tailor may be taxed within the range of VN \$60 to VN \$3,000 per annum; for a commercial bank the rate varies from VN \$3,000 to VN \$100,000; a large hotel from VN \$1,400 to VN \$25,000; an automobile agency from VN \$600 to VN \$25,000; and an import-export firm from VN \$800 to VN \$75,000. The basic rate for most large commercial enterprises is within the range of VN \$8,000 to VN \$75,000.

In addition to the basic tax, there is an ad valorem levy applied to the rental value of the business property. The tax rates on rental value are progressive in the range of 3 to 10 percent depending on the amount of the basic tax assessment. This tax rate applied to the annual rent, plus the basic tax, constitutes the total patente tax for the Central Government. Percentage increases of the Central Government patente tax are added for the benefit of local governments. There is also surtax of 2½ percent of the Central Government tax for the chamber of commerce.

Twenty-five business activities, chiefly manufacturing firms, are not subject to the patente but are taxed on the basis of turnover, volume of production or services provided or according to some other specialized schedule.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator MORSE (continuing). That we receive as Senators concerning the fact that the South Vietnamese are not making the financial payments that the American taxpayers have a right to expect them to make in view of our tax system in this country.

You made a comment, but I want to ask the question, Mr. Bell, for the record, what is the problem, to what extent is there a problem, of tax evasion in South Vietnam?

TAX COLLECTION SYSTEM

Mr. BELL. I think it is a considerable problem, Senator. They start with a continental system—the French system—which, unlike ours, does not begin with criminal penalties, advance statements and so on. It is based on assessor arrangements under which the tax assessor is supposed to find out what he can charge a man and then they argue about it.

We think this is not nearly as efficient a system of income tax administration as we have in the United States.

I think it is fair to say, and I will be glad to supplement this for the record, that there has been some improvement in the tax administration, but it is still a rather weak one.

Senator MORSE. Is there any—

Senator WILLIAMS. Would the Senator yield for a couple of questions?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

FREE WORLD SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM

Senator WILLIAMS. On another matter, Mr. Bell, the question I was trying to ask when my time ran out, was why have we not taken more affirmative steps to get some of our allies to stop transporting goods into North Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. We have taken a lot of affirmative steps, Senator. I can personally testify on this. I have seen the cables, I participated in drafting them. I have been involved in some of the conversations myself, and I think there has been considerable effect.

Senator WILLIAMS. We have been fighting a war in there for a year, and when the British decided to blockade Rhodesia, they were able to do it in a matter of 48 hours. Now, their ships are still moving in North Vietnam ports along with many of the so-called allies, and to the extent that they supply North Vietnam, does that not increase our need for supplying to counteract that in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. Secretary Rusk testified the other day there remain some ships—some from the free world—going into North Vietnam. They are far fewer than they were a year ago or 2 years ago, but we wish they were all out. We have been seeking to achieve that objective.

There are ships of very few free world countries, still in that trade. Most of them fly the British flag and are based at Hong Kong.

The Secretary testified the other day we have no evidence that any of them is carrying anything of particular significance to the Vietnamese economy.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Bell, you know as well as I do when a war is going on all material has military significance. You are testifying before this committee asking for \$275 million to step up the economic aid. That has military significance, and to the extent we fail to supply this, it would make our problem greater from the military standpoint. Now, that is the whole basis of your argument, I agree with that. But, by the same token, as our allies are supplying, whether it be food or what it may be, to the North Vietnamese, they are helping those whom we are trying to fight; is that not true?

Mr. BELL. I am not defending, sir, the ships going into North Vietnam. We have been trying to stop it, and we are continuing to try to stop it, and we have made very considerable headway in that direction. There remain some ships, and we regret that.

Senator WILLIAMS. I would suggest that, perhaps, if we would take the policy that those who are supplying our enemy would receive no aid or any loans or any assistance from our Government until they stopped, it may expedite the decision somewhat.

Mr. BELL. No, sir; because the principal country whose ships are still active is Britain and, of course, we give no aid to Britain.

Senator WILLIAMS. Well, now, wait a minute, the British pound was in trouble last fall. Who helped them? Did we not step forward with other countries?

Mr. BELL. I am sorry, you are using the term "aid" in a broader term than I was.

Senator WILLIAMS. I am speaking of aid in a broader term.

Mr. BELL. That is a legitimate question that I am not competent to answer.

Senator WILLIAMS. If the Senator does not mind, I would like to ask one more question.

Senator MORSE. Go right ahead.

FINANCING OF PUBLIC OPINION POLLS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Senator WILLIAMS. I notice in the Star of January 7 an article by Walter Pincus, and he refers to the fact that the AID program is spending \$452,000 to conduct polls in foreign countries to determine what they think of our foreign policy.

Mr. BELL. Not the AID program; no, sir. The USIA, perhaps, but not the AID program.

Senator WILLIAMS. Well, the USIA, I won't get into that. Maybe it is not yours but as far as the taxpayers are concerned it is still a part of our foreign policy or AID program. For example, you spent \$3,500 in Brazil to sample the voter behavior pattern in three Brazilian cities. Wouldn't it be equally important to survey the voter behavior pattern in Cook County?

Mr. BELL. Senator, you are asking me about a program I do not know anything about. Leonard Marks is in charge of that.

Senator WILLIAMS. You mean to say as the Director of our AID program you do not know anything about the USIA program that is running concurrently with your program?

Mr. BELL. No; I know a good deal about the USIA program. I know nothing about that particular point.

Senator WILLIAMS. What do you think about that particular point as a man on the outside who is not connected with it?

Mr. BELL. I do not know what the background is and, therefore, I have no basis for judging it.

Senator WILLIAMS. I hope we can get somebody up here to explain it because I am wondering what we are doing with this USIA money surveying the voter behavior pattern in Brazil, the voter behavior pattern in France and Germany, as well as conducting a \$450,000 poll of what the people of foreign countries think of our foreign policy.

I am wondering if it would not be a good idea to conduct a poll as to what a lot of American people think of our foreign policy, and maybe we had better spend some of it. But I would hope you would familiarize yourself with the program and give us the benefit of your wisdom.

Mr. BELL. I would be glad to consult with Mr. Marks, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS. I thank the Senator.

FLAGS OF SHIPS GOING TO NORTH VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. Will you tarry a moment before you leave because this raises a lot of thoughts on my part when you talk about ships going into North Vietnam.

Mr. Bell, and I do not want anything, as I have always said, that in any way jeopardizes our security, but I do not see how this could possibly—could you supply to this committee a list of the flags of foreign countries that go into North Vietnam with their ships and an indication of the goods that we have knowledge of their taking into North Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. In December, sir, ships of only three free world countries went into—

Senator MORSE. What was the date, December?

Mr. BELL. December 1965, the last figures I have before me, there were approximately a dozen ships, and most of them, all but two or three, were, as I indicated, flying the British flag, and virtually all of those were actually based in Hong Kong.

Senator MORSE. For that month?

Mr. BELL. Well, yes, sir. I was going to say that that pattern is not dissimilar from November, October, September, August, all

through that period. The number of ships which went into North Vietnamese ports last August through December—the monthly totals—ranged from 11 to 17, and the great bulk of them were these British ships.

Of these ships putting into North Vietnam, approximately half or at least a substantial number, went in in ballast in order to bring goods out, rather than take goods in. I do not have at my fingertips, but I will be glad to put into the record the answer to your question as to what it was they were carrying in, to the best of our knowledge.

(The following was subsequently furnished for the record:)

FREE WORLD SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM

The majority of free world ships calling at North Vietnamese ports arrive in ballast to pick up outgoing cargoes consisting primarily of anthracite, apatite, fruits, and vegetables. Those free world ships carrying goods into North Vietnam are laden with nonstrategic cargoes principally of foodstuffs, raw materials, fertilizers, and soft coal.

Senator WILLIAMS. If the Senator will yield for just one moment, that argument was used the other day. But to the extent that these ships move into Hanoi and take the exports of North Vietnamese out—

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILLIAMS (continuing). They can convert that into currency with which they can buy strategic weapons of war and bring them in some other way.

Mr. BELL. Yes. I did not mean—

Senator WILLIAMS. So it gives them an exchange, and it is just as equally important to stop that.

Mr. BELL. I do not mean to argue there is no economic benefit. You are quite right.

Senator MORSE. Are any of the ships Russian ships?

Mr. BELL. What I was looking at was the table showing free-world shipping.

In addition to the ships from the free world, I assume there are, perhaps, larger numbers of ships from Communist countries.

Senator MORSE. Do you know whether or not our intelligence service has been able to give us any indication?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. We have some data on that. I do not have it right here, but I will put it in the record, if I may.

Senator MORSE. I would appreciate that.

(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

BLOCKADE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PORTS

Senator MORSE. The reason I asked the Senator from Delaware to tarry, both he and Mr. Bell know my oft-repeated and longstanding view in regard to lack of justification of my Government fighting a war without a declaration of war. I cannot imagine our trying to prosecute a war under a declaration of war without imposing a blockade.

But it is an accurate statement of fact, my statement, and I would be justified in making it, that there would be a blockade of North Vietnam, and that raises the question of what foreign country would respect that blockade.

Her Majesty's Government has never, to my knowledge, in the history of the British Empire lowered the Union Jack to a blockade that it did not support. I do not think it takes much argument, may I say to the Senator from Delaware, to point out that if you put a blockade around North Vietnam, the Russian flag is not going to lower to it, and the first Russian ship you sink we are at war with Russia, and it won't be fought in Asia but New York City and Washington, D.C., and Chicago and Moscow and Stalingrad. That is why, Mr. Bell, to be professional about it, the senior Senator from Oregon finds himself so unhappy and concerned about his differences with his Government in connection with the prosecution of the war on the basis you are testifying today.

We have an honest professional difference of opinion. But I think your whole case, and the case of all of the people in the administration, is to support the prosecution of an illegal war.

We speak about commitments, and we will go into that in depth as the examination proceeds with you and other witnesses, but we have no legal commitment that justifies our making war.

But I wanted to give my friend from Delaware an opportunity to make any comment he wanted because he knows how concerned I am about our fighting a war and killing American boys without a war message ever having come to the Congress of the United States.

Senator WILLIAMS. I appreciate the concern of the Senator from Oregon, and I appreciate his also yielding in order that I can ask these questions, because there are a lot of people back home who are asking the question why they are still supplying them, and I get asked the question quite often to what extent the fact that our so-called friends have their ships in these North Vietnamese ports, to what extent is that determining our policy not to bomb those ports for fear we may hit some of our friends.

I think that this is a problem which should be recognized by the administration, and I wish that they would take just a little more affirmative steps to persuade some of our allies, those who should be on our side, that we should at least stop giving aid and comfort to the people who are killing American citizens.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, do you have a question?

Senator PELL. On my own time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OF THE WAR

Senator PELL. Mr. Bell, going back to the point we were touching on, casualties, a little while ago, I would like to insert in the record an article in the Washington Star a few weeks ago. It states that the head of the U.S. medical aid program in South Vietnam said the war is causing more casualties to civilians than to the military because of the nature of the fighting. And in connection with the figures you submit for the record, I hope you will develop the point as to how the civilians have been killed. It is equally unpleasant to be tortured, assassinated, or to be burned to death by napalm. But from the viewpoint of an impact in the country where, as the democratic forces are naturally horrified at the assassination of city leaders and rural leaders and our allies, I wonder if that horror might not be more than balanced

by the horror of those who are related or friends of those who are killed by napalm or killed for military reasons, and this is the figure I am groping for. I do not know the answer myself. Do you, in general terms, not specifics?

Mr. BELL. No, I do not. There are obviously civilian casualties from the military actions of both sides.

As you know, there have been very strong instructions issued to our troops designed to minimize civilian casualties. They have not been eliminated and cannot be eliminated in this kind of war.

I am surprised to hear—I take it the quotation you have given us is from General Humphreys, who is—

Senator PELL. It is a news story based on an interview with him which I would like to put in the record.

Mr. BELL. Right. General Humphreys, who is chief of the health section in our aid mission there, on leave to us from the Air Force, is a first-class man. I am nevertheless surprised at that comment. My own impression was that while there were substantial civilian casualties, they were not larger than those of the military troops. But he is a competent witness, and he may well be right. I will try to get a firmer statement if I can for insertion in the record.

Senator PELL. I must add, to make the record clear, that the paragraph I read is not in quotation marks. It is the conclusion that Mr. Lewis Gulick, the writer, drew from the interview.

[From the Evening Star, Jan. 6, 1966]

VIET MEDICAL AID TO INCREASE—U.S. GENERAL CITES CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

(By Lewis Gulick, Associated Press staff writer)

The head of the U.S. medical aid program in South Vietnam says the war is causing more casualties to civilians than to the military because of the nature of the fighting.

In outlining a large step-up in U.S. medical assistance, Maj. Gen. James W. Humphreys, Jr., said yesterday that "many thousands" of civilians are killed and wounded as the war is waged in populated areas.

He did not give the exact number of civilian casualties.

CAN'T BE SEPARATED

"Unless there is a very sharp fight the number of civilian casualties exceeds the military" when one side hits a village it believes occupied by the other, Humphreys said.

"All they (the civilian inhabitants) can do to get out from under, if they can, is to run out. You cannot separate the civilian from the military in this war," he said.

Humphreys, an Air Force surgeon, spoke at a news conference before heading back to Saigon today.

He has been going over plans here for a \$10 million program to improve medical services for the civilian population in South Vietnam. The military forces have their own doctors.

The 50-year-old general made headlines last November with the removal of a live grenade from a farmer's back.

Humphreys said there is only about one doctor in Vietnam for each 100,000 population, which he likened to the situation in the United States a century and a half ago.

He said there are far too few doctors, health services, and facilities now to deal with disease and with war casualties, which can be expected to increase if the fighting grows.

American doctors, nurses, and other health personnel in his program totaled 110 last June. This number will be increased to 4,500 by this June 30 under the expanded U.S. medical aid effort, he said.

Other free world countries were reported contributing some 500 medical personnel.

SEEK BARE MINIMUMS

Humphrey said the U.S. program is designed to put "a bare minimum of medical personnel into the South Vietnamese provinces, build up a basic minimum of drugs and facilities, establish a means of transporting medical supplies, train Vietnamese medical aids and increase the number of physicians and dentists graduated from Vietnamese medical schools."

He said that "of course" the Communist Vietcong are given medical help when they come to the South Vietnamese Government hospitals and aid stations.

"This is bound up in the philosophy of medicine," he said. "You treat the injured and the sick and the indigent regardless of who they are."

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator PELL. But I would be interested in those figures.

Would you bear with me, too, if one finds that the number of deaths, quantitative not qualitative, in quantitative terms, is larger on the civilian side as a result of our military activities than it is from the Vietcong military activities and assassinations, it would seem to me that the prosecution of the war can from a political viewpoint and in quantitative terms be hurting us.

Mr. BELL. Well, first of all, I doubt very much if that is the case.

Secondly, it is quite clear to the villager in Vietnam that there is a difference between organized campaigns of assassination and inadvertent, accidental casualties.

I agree that the person involved is equally dead in either case. But the villagers—and we have plenty of evidence on this from conversations all over the country—the villagers, are quite aware that they are in the line of fire because of Vietcong aggression. They have in many cases bitterly opposed the entry of the Vietcong into their villages, and when the Vietcong come in they frequently flee.

Many of the refugees are exactly of this kind. The Vietcong have entered their villages and the villagers have left because they know in the effort to reach and destroy the Vietcong, the village itself will be damaged.

Senator PELL. I would agree with you there is a tremendous difference. One is premeditated, it is like murder and homicide, one is premeditated—and one is not. But I am thinking more particularly of those who are bombed from the air. I am not thinking of the land portion.

Mr. BELL. Incidentally, Senator, I am advised by one of my staff who was at the conference reported by Gulick, that General Humphreys' reference was not to war casualties only but to deaths due to illness and disease as well. He referred to the general problem of health of the civilian population in a wartime situation.

Senator PELL. But this is why I think it would be of interest to the American people and the world to know how many civilians in North Vietnam have been killed by bombings, and if we could only get this from the enemy—unfortunately, they will probably exaggerate it—but we still have not seen an estimate, and I personally would like to see it if you could get it.

EXPLANATION OF LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT ITEM

On another point here, in the pamphlet or the information you sent up for us prepared by the executive branch under the heading "Counter Insurgency, Rural Construction," you have as your largest item logistics management. It is a new item, not in the previous program, and it calls for, I do not know how many zeroes go at the end, I imagine it means millions, \$20 million.

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator PELL. Could you define that a little more?

Mr. BELL. Yes. This is all sorts of things. It is barges and vessels and sheet piling for piers. It is vehicles of various kinds to transport items. It is the rental of aircraft, to transport materials either from the United States to Vietnam or within Vietnam.

It is, generally, the cost of moving goods and—to a lesser extent—of moving people to Vietnam and within Vietnam—primarily within Vietnam. Those costs are high.

Senator PELL. I do not mean this line of questioning to in any way be hostile to you personally or the economic side of the program, which I have found to be the most economical. It is the most popular in my own State of Rhode Island. But I wondered why we did not have any of these same requirements last year? Why did they suddenly crop up this year?

Mr. BELL. We did.

Senator PELL. No. It says zero current year.

Mr. POATS. Senator, may I explain that? We did not last year break out elements of this program to the same degree we have this year. But last year we did, for example, buy some dredges which would have fallen into this same categorization of funding. This year we greatly expanded our logistics support because the strain on Vietnam's facilities has increased largely by the introduction of major military forces.

Mr. BELL. What did we call it last year when we bought a barge?

Mr. POATS. It was included in the general procurement for the counterinsurgency support program; called counterinsurgency support services.

Senator PELL. You have Cam Ranh Bay zero last year.

Mr. BELL. Not for last year.

Senator PELL. Counterinsurgency, rural construction, I am reading from the paper you gave us.

Mr. BELL. Doesn't it say current programs, excluding supplemental?

Senator PELL. Yes.

Mr. BELL. Meaning for fiscal year 1966 prior to this.

Mr. POATS. Not last year.

Mr. BELL. 1965 was last year's.

Mr. POATS. The add-on to this year's program is reflected in this program.

Mr. BELL. The question is a legitimate question. I just wanted to make plain that what you are asking, I take it, is why did we have nothing in the 1966 budget as submitted for Cam Ranh Bay.

ITEMS UNDER COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM

Senator PELL. Right, and also nothing for logistics management, and yet it is the largest item in the new request which you submitted. I wonder if Mr. Poats could shed some light on this.

Mr. POATS. The main reason for this is we have broken out the items in greater detail in this program. The original presentation showed, I believe it was, \$50 million for various activities in support of the counterinsurgency program—the project program. We had detailed breakout sheets which we presented in closed testimony. We did not have a simple breakout of this form for public use, but we have now broken it out in more detail.

As for Cam Ranh Bay—this was simply not planned at the time we came in with the original presentation 1 year ago. This is for a project to create a housing village for workers at the Cam Ranh Bay military and logistics base.

Senator PELL. I should know the answer to this and do not. Could we have a further breakdown of this \$20 million if you have submitted it?

Mr. BELL. Oh, yes.

Mr. POATS. Oh, yes.

Senator PELL. Is it in our files?

Mr. POATS. I will be glad to submit it in the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

“COUNTERINSURGENCY-RURAL CONSTRUCTION” BREAKDOWN OF \$20 MILLION FOR LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT

This activity consists of the following four major items:

1. Breaking out and operating 10 vessels from the U.S. reserve fleet. Estimated costs to break out and rehabilitate the 10 vessels are about \$4 million. Operating costs for the remainder of this fiscal year are estimated at \$6 million.
2. Improving Government of Vietnam capability to handle internal logistics.
3. Assisting the Government of Vietnam in establishing integrated maintenance facilities in all provinces for all Government-owned civilian type vehicles and equipment.
4. Introducing improvements in the cargo handling systems and facilities in existing ports of Vietnam, specifically DaNang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Saigon, and to increase airlift capabilities for distribution inland.

A breakdown of fiscal year 1966 requirements by component follows:

16 AID technicians.....	\$310,000
14 participants; to the United States and Korea for 3 to 6 months....	60,000
Contract commodities; bulk of this to break out and operate 10 vessels from U.S. reserve fleet; procurement 10 helicopters.....	15,500,000
28 Filipino supply handling and warehousing technicians from the Eastern Construction Co.....	244,000
U.S. commodities; includes cargo and material handling equipment, warehouses, transportation, and maintenance equipment.....	3,992,000
Total.....	20,106,000

FRENCH CONDUCT OF BUSINESS WITH VIETCONG AND NORTH VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Then another question I have is as to the French friends. They inform me they are able to do business in both Vietcong and North Vietnamese territory in a relatively—or they have friends—who are able to conduct business in a relatively normal way. Is this a correct statement?

Mr. BELL. It is much less true today than it was a few years ago. A number of the French rubber plantations have had to close down within the last year for a number of reasons. The Vietcong—they never could operate in Vietcong areas except by paying taxes to the Vietcong. Those taxes have been getting higher and higher, and some of the French owners have concluded that it is confiscatory to pay taxes as they had to do to the Vietcong and also to the Government.

Moreover, some of them have been the scene of military action, as you know. There has been some bitter military fighting in some plantations.

Moreover, it has been difficult for them to hold labor. The Vietcong have been impressing people into the VC forces, and the Government is drafting people for the Government forces.

There are still, I believe, some, but relatively few, French enterprises continuing to operate in areas where they are exposed to Vietcong pressures.

Senator PELL. If you were a French banker with a client who had business in Vietcong territory and one who was in North Vietnam, where would he be more likely to do reasonably well?

Mr. BELL. If I were a banker of any country I would not lend money to either one.

Senator PELL. Right. But if you had to make a choice, which one?

Mr. BELL. Well, I guess I would have to answer that it would depend on the particular enterprise and the particular location.

In South Vietnam, in areas which are Government controlled or likely to become secure as part of the Government-controlled areas, the risk would not be too great.

In the areas that would be classified on Senator Clark's map as Vietcong controlled, I would think the risk very serious because in those areas it is the intention of the Government of Vietnam, with U.S. help, to change that situation—to go in and remove the Vietcong control.

In North Vietnam our bombing in the past, and at present, as you know, has been very sharply focused—or the attempt has been to focus it—very sharply on military objectives. Those military objectives have included roads and highways and port facilities, and if the hypothetical French investment you are talking about were close to or dependent on any of those facilities, then the risk would be very serious there.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the Senator would allow me to interpose a moment and suggest that we recess now until 2:30. We have been here a very long time. You have been very patient, Mr. Bell, and Senator Morse wishes to continue at 2:30 here in this room.

Mr. Reporter, I have been requested or I wish to put into the record an article here on the use of foreign polls.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Evening Star, Jan. 7, 1966]

U.S. USE OF FOREIGN POLLS IN POLICYMAKING IS GROWING

(By Walter Pincus, Star staff writer)

Last October, President Johnson's favorite domestic political pollster, Oliver Quayle, went to South Vietnam at Government expense to survey the situation in that war-torn country.

Quayle, whose domestic polls are constantly being cited by the President, said recently he was "asked to go out * * * to do political consulting" with U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and members of his staff. He denied he did any polling.

Other sources, however, say Quayle and members of his New York-based firm prepared questionnaires in Saigon that were used as the basis for a Vietnam public opinion survey.

QUESTIONNAIRES USED

Members of the U.S. mission, these sources say, were "unhappy" at Quayle's effort since they believed the nature of the people and the political situation were not favorable for gathering of any accurate information.

In fact, these sources add, several Vietnamese interviewers were captured by the Vietcong and American diplomats were fearful an incident would develop over the contents of the Quayle questionnaires.

Quayle, himself, refused to comment on his activities—other than to deny he took any polls—and referred all questions to Press Secretary Bill Moyers.

Moyers said Quayle did not go to Vietnam at the President's request, but could not furnish details on the trip.

Quayle's Saigon activities are being cited by observers both on Capitol Hill and within the administration as an example of the growing use by the Johnson administration of polls in foreign policy planning.

Critics of such practice assert that Johnson's reliance on polls in domestic situations may not be translatable to overseas areas—particularly those less developed countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America where polling techniques have not yet been perfected.

LEARNED LAST SUMMER

The new policymaking use of polls first came to the surface during last summer's Senate Foreign Relations Committee inquiry into U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.

Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann and Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Jack Hood Vaughn reportedly told the Senators a confidential U.S. sponsored poll taken in the Dominican Republic shortly before the crises justified their determination that Juan Bosch—who received just 26 percent of the popular support—did not have a large enough popular following to control the Communists who had become associated with his cause.

The increased White House interest in polls has been reflected in a stepup in U.S. Information Agency fund requests to carry surveys out overseas. Last year, for example, USIA asked for a 30-percent increase—to \$452,000—for foreign public opinion surveys.

The total amount spent on foreign polls may be much larger. The Dominican poll, for example, does not appear among those listed in the USIA budget, although Mann reportedly referred to it more than once as being conducted by that agency.

Accompanying the increased tempo of polling is a broadening of the matters under inquiry.

In 1964, USIA hired French and German pollsters—for \$6,500—to measure opinions in those two countries on various issues where American and French policies were in conflict. Thus, a French concern paid with U.S. funds was polling French citizens on whether they favored their own government's policies or those of the United States.

In Germany, the poll was so designed as to test whether the Germans favored Johnson or French President Charles De Gaulle policies where the two appeared to be in conflict.

Also in 1964, USIA ran a survey of attitudes of several Afro-Asian countries toward India.

USIA also conducted a \$3,500 study of voter behavior patterns in three Brazilian cities. This survey attempted to develop relationships between social and psychological variables and the vote for Brazil's President. The Brazil study drew some private criticism since its results referred entirely to a sensitive domestic Brazilian situation.

Another major worldwide polling effort was made by USIA in 1964 to determine student attitudes toward the United States and its policies. This type of survey—more in line with USIA's past efforts—aimed at determining how

student attitudes are formed in order to select the best approaches American propaganda should undertake.

LATIN QUESTIONS

According to information presented last year to Congress, the student polls in Latin America—which were undertaken in Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela at a cost of some \$52,000—included such questions as:

"In your opinion is the life of the average person in Cuba better off since the Castro revolution, worse off, or about the same as it was before?"

"Do you think violence will or will not be necessary to bring about the [progressive] changes you would like to see?"

"Do you think U.S. policy toward Castro during the past 2 years has been too soft, too hard, or about right?"

A variation of the student study took place in West Germany last year where United Arab Republic students in German universities were polled on their attitudes and political opinions.

Along with these new areas of inquiry, USIA has continued to poll worldwide on the general climate of foreign opinion on major domestic and foreign issues affecting the United States. These so-called prestige polls—which became the focus of political controversy during the 1960 presidential elections—take a different tone in various parts of the world.

In Britain, for example, a Gallup poll subsidiary has a continuing contract to measure British public opinion on world leadership in space. In December 1964, a special report was made on English attitudes toward space leadership following the Soviet launching of a three-man spaceship.

In Europe, the world survey deals with opinion on cold war relaxation, the image of U.S. military strength and the impact of race relation problems.

SUPPLEMENTING SURVEYS

Supplementing broad surveys were "flash" polls such as a \$2,500 survey in four Latin American countries after the 1964 Organization of American States approval of sanctions against Cuba and a similar survey in Nigeria and Kenya after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

To what use are all these polls put? No one can say, for USIA is close-mouthed about their distribution and all the polls bear some security classification for at least 2 years.

The Agency, however, makes a daily report to the President highlighting foreign reaction on events of major concern to the United States and there is little doubt the polls receive some emphasis here.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator MORSE. The hearing will come to order.

The Chair wishes to announce that Senator Fulbright will be delayed. He hopes that Senator Sparkman, after he has a conference in his office, will be able to come to preside. He has asked the Senator from Oregon to preside until he or Senator Sparkman can arrive.

I want to say that other colleagues, I have been advised, will be coming and going during the afternoon. This chairman, so long as he presides, will follow the 10-minute rule, and will proceed by asking Senator Church to ask any questions he cares to.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BELL.—

Senator MORSE. Just a moment. I understand Senator Prouty is in the audience.

Senator Prouty, will you come up and sit with us?

Senator PROUTY. I am very happy here, thank you.

Senator CHURCH. I just want to say for the record what I said to you privately before the hearing started this afternoon, that I thought that your responses this morning were very able, and that your presentation of the administration's has been a most commendable one, under some pressure. I know it sometimes must seem like an unequal contest, when you are down in the well and we are up here on the dais, but, in a way, you make up for that with your experts on either side, and with all of the data that is at your fingertips. In that connection, I would like to go back to a line of inquiry that I commenced this morning.

IMPACT OF THE WAR ON DOMESTIC PROGRAMS

You will remember that I asked you this morning about the foreign aid program, that is to say, the worldwide program that is being proposed this year as compared with last year, and you indicated that it was about the same size, very slightly larger this year than last. I then mentioned the cuts that were being proposed for many programs here at home, in the light of the spiraling costs of the war in Vietnam.

I think, Mr. Bell, you responded that actually the domestic programs were not being cut. You said it was true that the President was not asking for as much additional money as we might otherwise, owing to the costs of the war in Vietnam, but that the domestic programs were not being seriously cut.

Now I have reviewed the budget, in the little time that I have had, and I find some very drastic cuts in some domestic programs that seem to me to be very important ones.

I would like to mention a few of them for the record.

First of all, there is the school milk program. I think that this has been a very good and wholesome program. The American people have given it widespread support, and millions of our schoolchildren benefit from it.

Last year the President requested \$103 million for the school milk program. This year he requests \$21 million. That is in the neighborhood of an 80-percent cut.

In the agricultural conservation program, which is known to the farmers of the country and which has, unlike many other crop control programs, enjoyed the general support of the American farmer, last year the Congress voted \$220 million for that program. This year the President requests \$120 million, or a \$100 million cut.

Last year, for watershed projects, the President requested 80 new starts, compared with 35 new starts this year.

Last year the President requested, for land-grant colleges, \$12 million. He requests nothing this year.

In the field of education we have had, as Senator Morse will certainly bear me witness, a tremendously important Federal-aid program in impacted areas, where large Federal facilities have occasioned undue burden upon the local school districts. Last year the Congress voted \$347 million for the impacted area program. This year the President requests \$183 million, and when you take Public Law 874 and Public Law 815, which are the two sides to this impacted area program, the total cut in this year's budget exceeds \$270 million.

There are other examples that I could cite.

The CHAIRMAN. College housing?

Senator CHURCH. The chairman mentions college housing. The requests for Veterans' Administration hospitals is down from \$90 to \$52 million.

There are many other illustrations. These have just been hastily gathered. But in the contacts that my office has had with various departments of the Government, we are told that every department has been under instructions to cut, and to cut drastically, and these few examples I think bear out that point.

Now I am in full agreement that we are in a war, and that Congress must respond by voting whatever money is required to see it through. But if these programs on the homefront are to be cut this much, in order to finance the war in Vietnam, then it seems to me that we can afford to spend a good deal less in foreign-aid programs in 50 other foreign countries, particularly in view of the fact that we are obliged to conduct this war pretty much alone.

I think that this committee is going to have to take that into account. I have supported foreign aid in the past as far as I could support it, but this year I think the time has come to begin to consider where we can cut back on these programs in other foreign lands, even as we are cutting back on the school lunch program and the milk program and the educational programs here in the United States.

I wanted to put that on the record, because this morning I did not have an opportunity to cite examples of drastic cutbacks on domestic programs that I think ought to be brought to the attention of the public.

**STATEMENT OF DAVID E. BELL, ACCOMPANIED BY RUTHERFORD
M. POATS—Resumed**

Mr. BELL. Senator Church, as you will recognize, I could have commented more specifically a couple of years ago when I was Budget Director on each of those examples. I think I am correct that in spite of those specific cases, the President has included in his 1967 budget an overall and substantial increase, not a decrease, in the programs, that he generally thinks of as the Great Society programs, the anti-poverty program, the education program, the health program.

Some of those individual programs which you speak of I recall very well from the time when I was Budget Director. It has been traditional, for example, for Presidents to propose a cut of \$100 million in the agricultural conservation program, because it has been the view of the Budget Bureau staff for years that that money is somewhat less efficient than money put into other agricultural programs.

I might add that it has been traditional for the Congress to put that \$100 million back in. I doubt whether the President's proposed cut there has any significance in relation to the cost of the Vietnam situation. I suspect that there is a disagreement about that particular program.

In the impacted areas program I understood there was no difference in policy. The program was not cut back because of the demands of the Vietnamese war but because we have other education programs

which have taken over a large part of the funding which used to be handled that way.

I repeat, sir—

Senator CHURCH. I would say about that, Mr. Bell, that the educational programs, as passed by the Congress last year, were intended in no way to be a substitute for the impacted area programs. That was made very clear in the debate and in the consideration the Congress gave to the new programs. The educational acts of last year were meant to add further to Federal aid to education, and not to replace the impacted area program, which, for many years, has been of tremendous benefit, particularly to the small communities affected by large Federal facilities.

I recognize that Congress is not bound by the President's recommendations. I think it is significant, though, that these cuts have been recommended by the President. I think the Congress is going to be much less likely to add money this year, in view of the war, than it is to make still further cuts in the domestic budget.

I am merely saying that I think the same attitude ought to apply to the foreign aid program, in view of the spiraling cost of this war in Vietnam, which this year alone will exceed \$15 billion in expense to the United States.

Mr. BELL. And the only point I want to be sure is clear, Senator, is that I believe it is correct that the domestic side of the Federal budget is going up in 1967—not down—under the President's recommendations, even though the costs of the Vietnam situation are rising. They are heavy, and it is entirely legitimate, I quite agree, to consider what if anything the committee considers should be done to the rest of the foreign aid program in view of those high costs.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

RURAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just have one or two questions, Mr. Bell.

I think I read in the paper this morning that the program in Saigon is proposing a new—I think they call it a "pacification" program over there. They are going to put cadres of somewhere up to 85 Vietnamese agents with at least 1 American who will stay in the village, in each village that they select for a period of a year. Are you familiar with that program?

Mr. BELL. I am, sir.

Would you like me to say a word about it?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would, if you please. What is it about?

Mr. BELL. This is the program which the Vietnamese Government terms "rural construction." It is a program which has been worked out in recent months based on some experience in the last year or two as well as over a period of time.

The intention is to provide a method by which the villages in the contested areas can gradually be improved in their security and in their opportunity for economic and social progress.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Has this not been tried before?

Mr. BELL. Not this particular method, sir. This system which has been worked out now will, as you have indicated, be built around teams of specially trained persons—persons, incidentally, recruited and

trained from rural areas—these will not be, except in small numbers of cases, city people. They will work and live in the villages with the villagers for substantial periods of time.

Now the things they will do will be the following:

First, there will be a group which will be armed. They will be civilians, but they will be armed and will be able to defend themselves. They will go into villages to try to identify the people who are either open or hidden Vietcong, living in that village.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Will these be people who are trained in the use of arms?

Mr. BELL. You mean the team that goes into the village?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You said they will be armed?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; they will be trained—not elaborately, not as soldiers, but nevertheless yes—trained to use arms and defend themselves. Their purpose first of all, as I say, is to identify and deal with the hidden Vietcong cell that is normally found in any of the villages in contested areas.

Second, they will seek to become informed as to the specific problems of the villagers in that locality. If land reform is a serious problem there, to find out exactly what the problem is and what can be done about it. If transport or health or education is the key problem, to identify just precisely what needs to be done.

Third, their purpose will be to help establish effective local government, in which the villagers themselves participate.

Lastly, their purpose will be to help start the process of economic and social uplift or development.

Now all of this is a combined security and development program, which will take quite a while in each village. That is why the team would stay there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. After they determine what is wrong in the village or what problems are, are they equipped to attempt to correct those things themselves, or do they send for another cadre or another team to do that?

Mr. BELL. No, they are equipped and trained to go to work on the problems. Where it is beyond their particular competence—where heavy machinery, for example, might be needed—to call on their backstoppers at the district and province level to get what is necessary.

ORIGIN OF FUNDS FOR PROJECT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Where are the funds coming from for this project?

Are they in this supplemental?

Mr. BELL. Most of the funds for these teams are in the Vietnamese Government budget. As to equipment and materials and American advisers to help and work with these teams, those are in the supplemental budget. There are additional funds for those purposes in the supplemental budget.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you happen to recall offhand how much is in the supplemental budget for that purpose?

Mr. BELL. It is hard to identify, Senator, the precise element of our program that is related to this—in the sense that the health work that we do in the countryside—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If you do not have the answers, let's get on about this. I have got two or three other questions I would like to ask. If you do not have the answer there readily available, maybe you can supply them.

Mr. BELL. I would say offhand, sir, that about \$20 million anyway of the \$100 million in here for rural projects will be for this sort of thing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

If you find that that is substantially in error in any way, you may correct it as far as I am concerned.

Mr. BELL. Thank you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely wanted an approximation.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You say this is in contested areas?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And great emphasis will be laid on contested areas. What is to keep the Vietcong from coming in on Monday and clearing the place out and then going away and coming back the next Friday and destroying what has been done, this continuous assault, and fade away into the jungle situation?

Mr. BELL. Right. These teams will work in areas and on schedules which are coordinated with the work of the major military units, Vietnamese, American, and Korean—so that there will be sizable troop units of Vietnamese or Americans or Koreans who have been through this area, who have cleared out any major units that they uncovered, and who are available to protect the area from company size or larger assaults.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not hostile to the program except we have tried that for several years now, the strong point village theory, and putting cadres into these villages.

Theoretically they are protected by thorn bushes and other similar surrounding protective devices. Supposedly it is an area that has been cleared and we wake up to find that they have been taken out with great regularity.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Certainly I am not hostile to the idea of trying to do this.

IMPROVEMENTS OVER PREVIOUS PROGRAMS

Mr. BELL. I understand, sir. It is a legitimate point, and may I respond by saying that there are two or three elements of greater realism in this program than there have been in those that preceded it.

First of all, there is better coordination between the military effort and this effort, the military and civilian officers of the Vietnamese Government and our own have selected certain priority areas for work in the present calendar year, so that we would anticipate that we will be putting our effort into areas which once cleared can stay cleared.

Secondly, there is much better, much greater emphasis in the present planning on the local security elements that have to go along with this—notably the police elements—as you undoubtedly know, the police side of the effort in Vietnam was not a strong one for some time. Over the last year or two the police, with AID training and support, have

gone up to over 50,000 men, and they are on their way to 72,000 men. This should provide a greater chance that the areas, once cleared, can stay cleared.

Finally, these teams which will be working in the villages are much larger, better trained, and more experienced than any groups that have worked this way before. Over the last year and a half there have been prototypes, smaller teams of this kind that have done very good work in several places in Vietnam, so that the process has in effect been partially field tested.

Now these are all, therefore, reasons to think that there is a greater chance of success now than in the past. But I quite agree with you, it still remains an extremely difficult process, and it is still prospective. None of us would assert that we have yet demonstrated that this can be done. We have plans. We think they are good plans. They are now underway, and it will be some time before we could say definitely that we have demonstrated success.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is all.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bell, I noticed on page 6 of your prepared statement you said:

The military construction program is scheduled to rise sharply.

And on page 8 you say you are responsible, AID is, for building the housing at Cam Ranh Bay. Could you tell us how much is contemplated to be spent in the development of Cam Ranh Bay port?

Mr. BELL. I do not have the figure with me, Senator. You are referring to the total cost, military and civilian?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BELL. No, sir; I do not have that figure. I will be glad to put it in the record.

(The figures referred to follow:)

TOTAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COST OF CAM RANH BAY PORT DEVELOPMENT

Military port facilities have been installed at a cost of \$12 million and additional military facilities are in the planning stage; cost estimates are not yet available.

A housing village and related houses, sewage lines and roadways for towns of 25,000 will also be constructed to provide housing for 1,800 workers and their families who will be working for the U.S. Military Establishment on the peninsula. The cost of the housing and infrastructure is estimated at about \$7 million.

The full dimensions of a development scheme at Cam Ranh Bay will be determined in the future. The first phase will be a reconnaissance of the area including the collection of data and an initial evaluation of the area's potential; this is scheduled to start around March 1, 1966, and is to be undertaken by the Stanford Research Institute. The next phase covering more detailed studies based upon the findings of the first phase will begin as soon as the security situation permits. The cost of the first reconnaissance is estimated at \$50,000.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the civilian cost?

Mr. BELL. This particular cost is about \$7 million for the beginning of a community.

Actually, it is across the bay from the military base—where the civilian workers of the base will live.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us whether that base, the construction there, is of a permanent nature?

Mr. BELL. I cannot tell you offhand, Senator. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know anything about the military construction?

Mr. BELL. I have flown over. About a month ago I flew over at a low altitude and circled it. There is a major airfield there, which has been largely completed.

The runways are certainly of permanent construction. There are port facilities—piers and roadways and so on—being constructed, which will obviously be of a permanent nature.

The buildings that are going up on the base I assume are austere and of limited durability.

The CHAIRMAN. I am familiar with our usual bases, but you undertook to state that the program would rise sharply. I assumed you knew something about it.

How do you know construction will rise sharply if you do not know what they are building?

Mr. BELL. This is the total cost, and I know—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what is it? Do you know?

Mr. BELL. I am sorry; I thought you were asking about Cam Ranh Bay.

The total military construction—

The CHAIRMAN. Put it that way if you like.

Mr. BELL. In Vietnam is in the order of \$450 million in fiscal year 1966.

The CHAIRMAN. 1966, this year?

Mr. BELL. Fiscal; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what it is estimated to be in 1967?

Mr. BELL. I do not offhand; no, sir.

Mr. POATS. I can say, Senator, that the present intention is that the military construction will rise to a monthly rate of \$40 million a month.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought I saw a figure of \$1.2 billion.

Mr. POATS. \$1.2 billion is the total military construction supplemental budget request of the Defense Department for southeast Asia, a good part of which will be in Vietnam but not all.

The CHAIRMAN. But not all. I was handed by the staff figures furnished by the Defense Department. The total in the supplemental for South Vietnam is \$725 million. This includes Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; \$408 million for Army, \$207 million for Navy, \$110 million for Air Force. Is that about right?

Mr. POATS. That is an obligation estimate. The figure I was giving you was actual monthly expenditures.

PERMANENCY OF INSTALLATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. This information and what I read in the papers would indicate that we are building very substantial permanent installations there. This seems to be inconsistent with the reassertion by the Secretary of State and others that we don't seek permanent bases there and that we are anxious to get out. If that is true, why do we spend such enormous sums on military construction?

Mr. BELL. No; I think the inference, Mr. Chairman, would not be correct. One of the points that I went into with General Westmore-

land in Saigon a month ago was the question whether this construction program had been stripped down—to the greatest possible extent consistent with the military needs—in order to minimize the impact on the Vietnamese economy. One of the points he made in response, and supported it with considerable detail, was that not only had the number of projects been cut to a minimum—in their judgment—but also the nature of the construction was as impermanent as was consistent with the immediate military objectives. The kind of housing they are building, for example, is much flimsier than would be the case on a U.S. base here in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true of the military as well as the civilian?

Mr. BELL. I am referring to what General Westmoreland is saying about the military base areas.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. BELL. Most of the troops, for example, are housed in tents, not in barracks, in their base areas. And similar steps have been taken, so that the bases are as impermanent as is appropriate, as is possible under the circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your own conviction that we really intend to withdraw from this country at the earliest opportunity?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

DOLLARS LEAVING VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Did you testify this morning as to how much gold in dollars find their way into the banks of Switzerland and France?

Mr. BELL. No, the question wasn't asked. I would be glad to attempt to respond.

I do not have any such figures.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to say do you have any way really, any reasonable check upon this sort of thing or not?

Mr. BELL. No, we don't.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not. So, as a matter of fact, you have no idea whether it is \$1 or \$10 million?

Mr. BELL. Wait a minute. Let me make it clear that we follow the AID funds very carefully. So far as we know, none of them are being diverted to any such purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Not directly from AID?

Mr. BELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I meant from the citizens of Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Who might incidentally benefit from AID activities?

Mr. BELL. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean to leave the impression you had an account in Switzerland, Mr. Bell.

Mr. BELL. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. I was referring entirely to the others.

Mr. BELL. There is an estimate that around \$2 or \$3 million worth of capital may well be leaving Vietnam each month.

The CHAIRMAN. Each month?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. I repeat this has nothing to do with the AID program as such.

The CHAIRMAN. But indirectly the source of that might possibly be partially AID, don't you think?

Mr. BELL. Well, these would be profits—made either legitimately or illegitimately—in the form of piasters, be sold on the black market for dollars or other convertible currency—much of it in Hong Kong and so on.

Now, I don't think that the committee should place very much reliance on any such estimate, because, as you know, we have very limited evidence on which to base such a figure.

The CHAIRMAN. I could understand it would be very difficult.

Mr. BELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. To have any evidence on a matter of this kind.

Mr. BELL. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be very difficult.

Mr. BELL. Right.

BUYING AND SELLING OF IMPORT LICENSES

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard it stated that import licenses in Saigon have become a kind of commodity which one buys and sells. You can take an import license and borrow at the bank. Is this true or not?

Mr. BELL. I did not think that import licenses were exchangeable in that sense, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. This was a rumor, as I say. I am just trying to clear it up. I have been told that these are very valuable franchises, so to speak, and that if you have one, you can sell it or you can borrow on it—that the right to import is a kind of commodity.

Mr. POATS. Mr. Chairman, the import license may not be transferred legally. You may borrow from the bank against an import license to pay for a part of the cost of an import. This is now limited to 25 percent the value of the import covered by the foreign exchange license.

Mr. BELL. That would be a normal commercial transaction.

Mr. POATS. It would be normal import financing.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say legally is it rather difficult to supervise whether these transactions are legal or not?

Mr. POATS. It is always possible, in any country, to use an assumed name, to exchange documents, but it is watched closely by both the Vietnamese Government and ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. And they have a very efficient judicial system, haven't they?

Mr. POATS. They have a rather good judicial system; yes.

U.S. AID TO ZAMBIA

The CHAIRMAN. You say on page 12, Mr. Bell:

While exact costs cannot be estimated I expect that we will have to draw on the contingency fund in the coming months to increase the flow of essential goods into Zambia.

What are the essential goods that you contemplate shipping into Zambia?

Mr. BELL. We are at the moment, Mr. Chairman, as you know, paying for two 707 Boeing aircraft, which are flying petroleum, I think

it is, into Elizabethville, from which it is transferred into Zambia by road in trucks. This is, I believe, the only transport that we are now financing, and as far as I know it is all we have in sight. We have financed this for a temporary period.

If the petroleum lift has to continue for some weeks yet in the future, then we would need to have further financing and would have to draw on—

The CHAIRMAN. When you say financing, is this a grant of petroleum? Are you giving it to Zambia?

Mr. BELL. We are certainly financing the transportation. I don't think we are financing the petroleum. This is petroleum that the Zambian economy would normally receive over the rail or the pipeline through Rhodesia. That route is cut off, and we and the British are getting the petroleum in by other means.

The CHAIRMAN. I really was sort of surprised. I didn't know we had a primary responsibility in Zambia. Is this part of the Commonwealth?

Mr. BELL. We do not have a primary responsibility in Zambia.

The CHAIRMAN. What are we doing there? Why don't the British furnish petroleum?

Mr. BELL. They are, sir. They are putting much more money than we are into the Zambia situation. However, the Zambian Government and the British have asked us for help and we have responded by picking up part of the cost of keeping the flow of petroleum products going into Zambia that were cut off by the oil embargo.

The CHAIRMAN. You remember last year that I raised the question about your eagerness to inject our presence into every possible place over the globe. Do you remember that? And I think Zambia was one of the examples, wasn't it?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. Your suggestion was that we were in a hurry to put an aid program in.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. BELL. Even before the Ambassador arrived, I commented that we had one there even before Zambia was independent.

PAX AMERICANA AND AID

The CHAIRMAN. And we also, some of us, suggested that maybe you could restrict the number of countries that you operate in, but I take it you don't agree with that?

Mr. BELL. No, sir; I do. I think the question is what standard to use. As you know I have personally presided over the liquidation of AID programs in several countries, with which I am very pleased in because I think they have done their job and we can stop. I think that in the African countries generally we do have a U.S. interest which is sufficient to warrant the expenditure of some funds in most cases very limited funds. Zambia is a case in point.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is, of course, the point at issue. Some of us believe that our presence is sometimes—in that terrible bureaucratic word—counterproductive, that it doesn't necessarily promote our national interest to have a presence in every country. This is a basic difference of attitude.

Mr. BELL. I take it, Mr. Chairman—while this is obviously not the main subject of today's hearing—I take it one of the points to be considered would be if circumstances in that part of Africa got worse—if there were an explosion of some kind—would it or would it not require us to participate. If it would, then it is obviously the better part of economy to try to prevent difficulties at a lesser cost, which might otherwise cost us much more on a different basis.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up, but I will remind you the Secretary of State denied that we were trying to carry out a Pax Americana. He denied it was our duty to keep peace all over the world and every place where some controversy might arise.

Mr. BELL. That is correct, sir, and in the Zambia case it is quite clear that the main responsibility is that of the British and I think we are in agreement on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. During my first 10-minute round, Mr. Bell, I want to ask some more questions about the black market problem in South Vietnam.

ROLE OF UNITED STATES IN IMPORT PROCESS

Do we play any role at all in deciding what imports and what prices they are imported into South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. Do we play such a role, sir?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. What is our role?

Mr. BELL. Well, it is twofold. First of all, for the items that are financed with the American AID money, we have a decisive or controlling voice. We can and do indicate exactly what we are prepared to finance, what quantities, what grades and standards and all the rest.

For items which are imported by the Government of Vietnam that are paid for with their own foreign exchange, we do not have such a controlling voice—but we have an influential voice—and we do discuss with the Government of Vietnam what the complete range of imports for a given future period is going to be, to be financed either with their money or with ours.

Senator MORSE. Do you have inspection rights in regard to the imports over which we do some of the financing through AID?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. To see that it doesn't go into the black market?

Mr. BELL. We have inspection rights which we exercise.

We also make quite careful price checks. We get all the invoices. Copies come to our office. We have a staff which reviews the prices to be sure that they are reasonable and that they are not loaded—and that there was no overinvoicing which would mean that somebody had gained a dollar balance abroad. I don't mean that all of these checks are 1,000 percent perfect, but we make a strong effort on these matters.

Senator MORSE. It is conceivable, isn't it, that there could be a good many cause-and-effect relationships between economic stability in South Vietnam and inflation determined by the amount of goods, the type of goods and the prices of the goods that they import?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Through their Government?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. We have a great interest in the checking of inflation, not only from the financial standpoint but also from the standpoint of the effect of inflation, if it gets out of hand in South Vietnam, vis-a-vis the stability of their Government.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; very much so.

Senator MORSE. And that is also true if there should be a runaway black-market situation develop in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

BLACK MARKET IN CURRENCY

Senator MORSE. Now, since I questioned you this morning, I have had an interview at my office with a source I consider to be very reliable, who gave me information in regard to the black market. This gentleman told me that the American news bureaus in Vietnam are converting up to \$80,000 of American money per month on the black market, and that the situation is so open that personal checks are accepted by black market operators and no questions are asked, and there seems to be no evidence of any attempt to close those black markets.

Do you have any information that would deny or verify that report?

Mr. BELL. These are the private American newsmen and the news bureaus that are there that you are referring to, sir?

Senator MORSE. That is what he told me.

Mr. BELL. I don't think I have any information on that. Do you?

Mr. POATS. We have no information on it. I know of cases in which this has happened. Whenever you have a black market in currency, individuals who have foreign exchange seek to convert them at the more favorable rate. We have limited all U.S. official personnel to the use of scrip. The scrip has no special appeal for the black market, so that we have removed from the black market the great bulk of the potential flow of dollars into it. That is reflected by the high black-market rate that you have today. That rate demonstrates that there is very little in the way of dollars flowing through it.

Senator MORSE. I wish you would call attention to this part of the transcript and the subsequent statement I am about to make in regard to this matter to your officials and other American officials in Saigon, because at least I am satisfied it should be checked into.

I place such reliability on this source that I think you are going to find it verified.

BLACK MARKET IN GOODS

He also told me that the black market operates openly in Saigon, with no restrictions. Items that are available include every type and kind of combat clothing. The black market is like a huge department store in a permanent location. If you shop or request a certain item and they are out of stock, they will order it for you and you can pick it up the next day. It operates with full knowledge of South Vietnamese and American authorities, and it is obvious that no attempts are made to shut it down.

Do you have any information that would verify or deny that statement?

Mr. BELL. No. I am not sure I understand it very well. Because the market in Saigon, the openly legitimate market, contains a great many goods. It is like any other city. Most of the things you can buy in downtown Washington you can buy in downtown Saigon, so I am not quite sure what is meant by the black market in that context and in the comment that you made.

Senator MORSE. My conversation with him indicates that the black market is what any black market is. You can get goods there that you can't get anywhere else, if you are willing to "pay through the nose," so to speak, and they are goods that ought not to be available on any such illicit traffic basis.

Mr. BELL. I am not sure just what goods those would be in the Saigon situation.

Senator MORSE. I told you there are all sorts of combat clothing.

Mr. BELL. This would be stolen goods?

Senator MORSE. And other items that would not be available on the open market.

Mr. BELL. I would be very surprised if there was an open market in stolen military equipment. I will be glad to have that point checked.

Senator MORSE. That is all I am asking for, is to have it looked into.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator MORSE. He advised me also that in various places in Saigon there are many small booth-type businesses, all of them selling a variety of American goods at black-market prices.

Mr. BELL. I don't know what that would mean without further specification. There are lots of American goods available in Saigon, not at black-market prices but at normal prices.

Senator MORSE. He points out that these are goods that are not otherwise available.

Mr. BELL. And he didn't specify what types of goods these would be?

Senator MORSE. No, he didn't, but I will get further specifications and put it in the record.

Senator LAUSCHE. Wouldn't it be well to have that man come as a witness so that he can be cross-examined?

Senator MORSE. I shall be very glad to welcome him if you can get the Penatgon people to come in open hearing as witnesses, too, Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. This is putting testimony in through the back door. The man isn't here to be cross-examined.

Senator MORSE. I speak for the testimony.

Senator LAUSCHE. But he still isn't here.

Senator MORSE. I asked to have an investigation. It is common reports that we get from people that have been over in—

Senator LAUSCHE. I am not challenging the veracity of what has been implied by him, but I do think that if this testimony is to be considered he ought to be subjected to examination, to ascertain what his background is and what he actually knows.

Senator MORSE. I presented his testimony and asked Mr. Bell to have it looked into.

Mr. BELL. I think the key point that I am puzzled about, Senator, is that the black market in goods typically operates when goods are

barred from the market altogether, or are rationed. Now, there are very few goods that are barred and very little rationing in Vietnam at the present time.

Senator MORSE. What about the black market?

Mr. BELL. And, therefore, there are few goods which could be in the normal sense be said to be in the black market. Now, one of the things that may be referred to by the gentleman you speak of is that an American or other foreigner, who has greenbacks can normally exchange those greenbacks and get more piasters for them than the official rate. That is the black market in currency which we were talking about this morning, with Senator Williams.

Senator MORSE. That was my first question.

Mr. BELL. But that is not a black market in goods. The goods are simply there in the stores for sale for piasters, the prices of which are the same for anybody who has the piasters to buy them. This is what I am puzzled about in these comments; there may be some lack of clarity in either the way I am saying it or the comment that came to you.

Senator MORSE. I shall ask him to supply a list of the goods that he considers are sold in the black markets and have them inserted at this point in the record so that you can conduct the investigation.

Mr. BELL. Good, we will be delighted to check on it.

Senator MORSE. But as far as the black market in regard to the allegation concerning 80,000 American dollars of exchange a month, we certainly ought to be able to find out—

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE (continuing). To what extent that racket is going on.

CHINESE CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM

I have also been disturbed since I met with you this morning, before I get to the line of questioning I was on, about an article I read over the noon hour by Stanley Karnow, who I think is one of our top correspondents. The North Vietnam bombing area is cut back by the United States, and this bears out hints and rumors that we have had from time to time that intelligence sources have certain information regarding Chinese concerns over developments in Vietnam. I have been told, and I say I may be completely wrongly informed, but I have been told that this information is being withheld from the American public. Today in a press story from Saigon I have noted a sentence reading as follows: This is Karnow.

The Communist Chinese have lately shown signs of apprehension lest war in Vietnam escalate into their country.

Later on in the story there is a sentence stating that—

Senior American military officers in Saigon acknowledge that wider air action in North Vietnam might invite a Chinese response. This would delight them if it happened.

Now, I think this committee has a right to know whether or not this Government has had any indication from Red China that they are concerned about the developments in South Vietnam and North Vietnam, and also have a right to know whether any of our military officers are urging an escalation of the war in North Vietnam, have as

part of their motivation the hope that that might lead into an air attack on Red China with its awful consequences of a war between the two countries. Do you have any reason to believe that Karnow is giving us an accurate account of what the feeling is in South Vietnam among our military, and as to what the Red Chinese may be thinking?

Mr. BELL. I am just not competent to testify on that subject, Senator, I am sorry.

SHIPPING TO VIETNAM BY BRITISH-FLAG VESSELS

Senator MORSE. You and I were talking this morning about what might happen if there was a blockade of North Vietnam. I had a call this noon from New York from a friend who heard that exchange, and said that he would like to know why we are tolerating the British shipping of goods into North Vietnam when we stopped our ships to Rhodesia upon the request of Great Britain and almost immediately after they requested us to do so.

Mr. BELL. Again, this is an area that, obviously, I am not responsible for. I do know that we have discussed this matter with the British on an urgent basis. The British tradition, as you know, Senator, is a very strong one in favor of free and open use of the seas. If we had established a blockade in the North Vietnamese situation, the situations would be parallel. We have not established a formal blockade, and, therefore, I suppose there is some difference. But you are taking me into areas that I am not very familiar with.

Senator MORSE. I merely want to say that that was my argument this morning as to what I think would happen if we did establish a blockade around North Vietnam. You wouldn't get British respect of it.

Mr. BELL. Incidentally, am I not correct in thinking that the British have not established a blockade of Rhodesia? Right?

Senator MORSE. I didn't say they had. I thought that was your statement.

Mr. BELL. It may have been. If so, I would like to correct it. I think that is not correct.

Senator MORSE. All I know—

Mr. BELL. They have established an embargo.

Senator MORSE. All I know is that Great Britain asked us to stop our shipments and we did.

Mr. BELL. Exactly.

Senator MORSE. We have asked Great Britain, if I understand you correctly, and I heard it from other sources, too, urging that they stop the shipments into North Vietnam and they have not.

Mr. BELL. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. I understand my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

PAY OF VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Bell, do you know how the pay of the Vietnamese soldier compares with the pay of an American soldier of similar rank?

Mr. BELL. I am not sure I have the figures in my head. We certainly have them, and can put them in the record.

(The figures referred to follow:)

PAY RATES FOR VIETNAMESE AND U.S. SOLDIERS

Following is a list of average monthly pay and allowances for typical Vietnamese and American soldiers (officers and enlisted men) in Vietnam.

Average pay and allowances per month

[In U.S. dollars]

	Vietnamese		United States	
	Pay ¹	Allowances ¹	Pay	Allowances
Colonel.....	158	65	1,086	333
Captain.....	88	56	678	283
2d lieutenant.....	56	47	407	228
Master sergeant.....	40	51	409	209
Corporal.....	23	37	233	160
Private.....	15	22	93	87

¹ Piasters converted at rate of 73.5 to US \$1.

A direct comparison between pay of a Vietnamese soldier and his U.S. counterpart is not meaningful because of: (1) the great differences in the economies, wage and price structures, and standards of living in the two countries and (2) the difference in coverage between the Vietnamese and the U.S. allowance systems.

A somewhat more meaningful comparison may be made between the relative place in their respective country's wage structure of the Vietnamese and American military man. Pay and allowances of the U.S. military have been, by congressional authorization, made roughly comparable to the emoluments of equivalent civilian employees of the U.S. Government.

The pay and allowances of the Vietnamese soldier compare favorably with those of other Vietnamese with equal training. For instance, the starting pay of a Vietnamese private is roughly what an unskilled worker in Saigon makes.

There was a pay increase a few months ago.

I am sorry, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Do you know whether we supplement the pay of the Vietnamese soldier in any way?

Mr. BELL. We do not supplement his pay. We have in the past—I am not sure whether this is in effect now or not—we have provided some Public Law 480 foodstuffs to the families of men serving in certain parts of the Vietnamese militia rather than those in the regular army. Are we doing this today?

Mr. POATS. We are supplementing the pay of the Popular Forces—that is the paramilitary element of the armed forces—by providing some foodstuffs to their dependents.

Senator AIKEN. We do supplement the pay of the South Korean troops, however?

Mr. POATS. That is correct. We are providing some ration items from the Navy commissary to the South Korean troops in Vietnam.

ACCESS OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS TO U.S. POST EXCHANGES

Senator AIKEN. Yes; What I was going to ask, do the Vietnamese troops have access to U.S. post exchange facilities?

Mr. BELL. U.S. what facilities?

Senator AIKEN. Post exchange.

Mr. BELL. No, sir, they do not.

Senator AIKEN. So if they wish any of the goods which we normally sell at the post exchange, they have to buy them the best way they can get them?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. They could not buy them direct. They do not have access to those PX's.

Senator AIKEN. I wonder if that has led to some of the charges of black marketing over there?

Mr. BELL. I don't know, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. I suppose you could check—I don't suppose you could check on that. The armed services would do that.

Mr. BELL. I would be glad to try to find out and put something in the record on it.

COST TO MAINTAIN AID PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Now, can you tell us what is the average annual cost to maintain an AID man in Vietnam per year? That would include his salary, transportation, dependents, hardships and so forth. About what does it cost per man?

Mr. BELL. I think about \$25,000—that Senator, would probably be a good guess.

Senator AIKEN. Roughly?

Mr. BELL. All included, salary, transportation. At the moment, as you know, none of them are allowed to have their families with them.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. BELL. So we pay what is called a separation allowance, which is intended to help the family—whether the family is residing in the States or in Manila or in Bangkok, to name two other places where many of them are.

CLASSIFIED NATURE OF GAO INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS

Senator AIKEN. I have just one more question which does affect your territory. That is, Why is it that when the General Accounting Office makes a report on mismanagement of an AID program, that all the vital parts of that report are stamped secret?

Mr. BELL. I am delighted to answer that, sir, because that is not so about the economic assistance program. All of the economic assistance program reports, every one without exception so far as I am aware, is an open report and can be published.

Senator AIKEN. Would you mind having these put in the record again?

Mr. BELL. Excuse me, sir. On the military assistance program, GAO reports have been in many instances classified, and there are one or two cases where the GAO has published a report on both economic and military assistance programs in a single country, and at least in one or two cases those have been classified.

I beg your pardon, there is one exception that is 3 years old, I take it. The last GAO report on Vietnam which was about 3 years ago was, Mr. Poats tells me, classified.

Senator AIKEN. I have seven of them here, practically all of them within a year.

Mr. BELL. But, am I not right, sir, that the economic reports are not classified, and only the military assistance ones are classified?

Senator AIKEN. The whole thing is labeled classified.

Mr. BELL. Not reports on economic assistance, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Would you like me to read the title?

Mr. BELL. Please.

Senator AIKEN. "Review of the Economic Assistance Provided the Republic of the Philippines for Development Purposes."

That is confidential. That isn't secret.

Mr. BELL. Only the drafts, sir, would have been confidential. The final report would have been public. Is that a draft that you have there? Would that be the draft that you have?

Senator AIKEN. This is the report that was sent to us. I have six others. I don't know whether I ought to go into them or not. I would be glad to put the title in.

Mr. BELL. There is something not clear here, because I checked this matter very carefully, and the reports of the GAO on economic assistance programs, so far as I am aware, are all not classified.

Senator AIKEN. Here is one relating to—"Report to the Congress of the United States, Ineffective and Overly Costly Aspects of Economic and Military Assistance Provided to Thailand."

Mr. BELL. Yes. I repeat, the ones where military assistance are involved typically have been classified.

Senator AIKEN. I don't see that any of this could be made public, although some of it, yes, there is a little at the end that says unclassified, very little of it. Some of it is confidential. Most of it is secret.

Then I could go on. I have five others. There is no need of putting them in.

But I am wondering why don't they want the public to know that there has been mismanagement in these programs?

Mr. BELL. Senator, I repeat—

Senator AIKEN. And who orders, who directs them, to be classified?

Mr. BELL. I would like to follow this up. I would like, if I may, to talk to the clerk of the committee and look at those particular cases, because there is no reason that I am aware of—none that I have pushed—for classifying any of the GAO reports about the economic assistance program.

Now, the military assistance program is a different story, and the reason that the Defense Department has given, which so far has been persuasive to the GAO—

Senator AIKEN. Why shouldn't mismanagement or dishonesty in administering the economic program be, we will say, called confidential?

Mr. BELL. It should not.

Senator AIKEN. But dishonesty in administering a military program is secret?

Mr. BELL. Well, first of all—

Senator AIKEN. Why is one more honest than the other? Why shouldn't the public know if there has been dishonesty in administering military programs, too?

Mr. BELL. So far as the economic assistance programs are concerned, as I have testified, I see no reason why they should be classified.

As far as the military assistance programs are concerned, the reasons that have been given to me by the Defense Department is that there are in those reports which are classified—not all of them are—discussions of military details about force levels and other types of military facts which it has been felt should not be made public.

CLASSIFICATION OF ECONOMIC REPORTS

Senator AIKEN. Here is one that relates to economic assistance alone, "Review of Economic Assistance Provided to the Republic of the Philippines for Development Purposes" and that is labeled confidential.

Mr. BELL. That is what I don't understand, Senator, because I thought that report and others like it were and are unclassified.

Senator MORSE. Would you yield at that point?

Senator AIKEN. I yield.

I am wondering who orders these reports kept secret. Now, I am not reflecting on you or your agency, because I think some of them—somebody in Government says it isn't a good thing to let the public know that we have mismanagement or dishonesty in these programs.

Mr. BELL. Not with respect to economic assistance, sir.

Senator AIKEN. This one on the Philippines is nothing but economic and that is labeled, too.

Mr. BELL. That is what I don't understand. I thought that that report had been made public and that we had issued a public comment on it.

I would like, therefore, to check into the facts on that specific situation.

Senator AIKEN. Part of it is labeled unclassified and part confidential, most of it confidential, I would say.

Here is one relative to telephone service in Japan. That is labeled confidential.

Mr. BELL. Well, that can't refer to economic assistance, sir, because we don't have a program in Japan.

Senator AIKEN. I think you are right there. They don't need one.

Senator MORSE. Senator Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. I yield. I am through, anyway.

But I just have run across—it is a little exasperating to get a note saying we have a report of some Government agency that hasn't been doing its job right or hasn't been doing it honestly, and if you will go to a certain place you can read this report. But you must not tell anyone what you find in it.

Mr. BELL. Right. So far as my agency—

Senator AIKEN. It just rouses suspicion where in many cases a little explanation would eliminate this suspicion.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. So far as my agency is concerned, you should not encounter that view. Insofar as you have, there is something there I don't understand, and I would like to check into it.

Senator AIKEN. There are seven of them in all that have come up in the last year.

Senator MORSE. If my colleagues will permit 1 minute of explanation on the point that Senator Aiken has raised, you have been very helpful to us in what you have just said about these reports, and you

can be of much greater help, because I have lived with these reports for 3 years, and I have never been able to get a ruling that I would be permitted to walk on the floor of the Senate and quote from them. The confidential reports, these economic reports are all stamped confidential except as he said there are certain unclassified pages in them.

Last year I got a ruling that I could read their titles, and I read their titles. That was bad enough. But I wanted to have permission to use them for speech material.

If you will just get those released for me, I want to tell you the speeches will start, because I think the American people are entitled to know what is in both the confidential and the secret reports. It is their money and their losses if this isn't stopped.

Senator AIKEN. I want to make one statement, Mr. Bell. I am not blaming you.

Senator MORSE. I am not, either.

Senator AIKEN. Because I think you have done as well as anybody can do under the conditions you have had to work with and with what you have had to work with.

Mr. BELL. Thank you.

Senator MORSE. The Senator from Ohio.

IMPACT OF WAR ON U.S. DOMESTIC PROGRAMS

Senator CHURCH. Would the Senator yield to me to put just a few more budget figures in the record?

Senator LAUSCHE. I yield.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Bell, I have a few more that have come in that I think ought to go with the others.

One hundred and thirty-two million dollars of REA funds in this budget have been frozen. Of this \$60 million will be lost and the remainder will be carried into fiscal 1967 and 1968.

The Space budget has been cut \$300 million. The cost of meat inspection has been entirely eliminated. It is now to be borne by the consumer and by the packers. This is \$66 million.

The Atomic Energy Commission has postponed the national accelerator project.

The revolving fund for the Small Business Administration has been eliminated. That is \$305 million.

The total expenditure for higher education has been cut \$572 million.

The Army Engineers construction projects have been reduced from \$777 million involving 37 new starts last year to \$237 million, a cut of about \$550 million, and 25 new starts this year.

I just want that to go in the list with the other items I have mentioned, because I don't think the impression should be created that the domestic programs in this country are not being sharply reduced in the light of the spiraling costs of the war in Vietnam.

There has been much talk about guns and butter. I would like to see us take a billion dollars out of the foreign aid program and apply it to the costs of the war in Vietnam. I think that if we must have guns, we had better stop shipping so much butter overseas.

I want to thank the Senator from Ohio very much for his courtesy.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Bell?

Mr. BELL. Senator Church, if I may, with the committee's permission, since this is obviously a significant matter in the Senator's mind and those of his colleagues, could I obtain from the Budget Director a brief comment on this range of questions, and have it inserted in the record?

Senator CHURCH. I wish you would.

Senator MORSE. Permission is granted.

Mr. BELL. For example—without wanting to get into individual items, most of which I know nothing about—I recognize the question of meat inspection as an old chestnut which was up when I was Budget Director. This is an issue as to whether or not the user should bear the charge, not an issue of whether the costs of the Vietnamese war are so large as to prevent us from doing something we otherwise ought to do. I don't question at all—I agree with the suggestion that because of the size of our costs in southeast Asia we have had to hold down and cut back some things.

I repeat that my impression, and I will check this and put it in the record, my impression is that the civil side of the American budget is rising and not falling, in spite of the larger costs in Vietnam.

I will put in the record what the Budget Director says on this matter.

Senator CHURCH. I think that would be very much appreciated, to have a full statement from the Budget Bureau.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator CHURCH. I thank the Senator from Ohio.

Senator MORSE. The thrust of Senator Church's arguments, however, is that the Great Society program would have had recommended for it much, much more—

Mr. BELL. Oh, yes, that I agree with, Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE (continuing). Than the President is recommending, if it were not for the fact that we are pouring all of this money into a war in Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. That is an agreed point.

Senator CHURCH. I also want to make clear that so far as I am concerned, and I think as far as the American people are concerned, they don't expect that we can have our war and have all of our luxuries at home and even needed programs at home besides. I think that there is an expectation in this country that war does and should involve sacrifice. But I just don't think that that should be limited to needed domestic programs. I think that the sacrifice should also extend to foreign aid programs in other foreign lands.

(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

Decisions on the 1967 budget clearly had to be made in the context of the added costs of expanded operations in Vietnam. But these decisions were not based on an arbitrary hold-the-line policy for every program. Where program expansions were appropriate, increases were provided. A substantial advance in the new and vital Great Society programs is incorporated in the budget, although at a somewhat lower rate than might have been the case in less troubled times. Where there was a sound justification for savings or cutbacks, these were also proposed. Cost reductions through improved management and increased productivity were reflected in every agency's budget. But savings and program reductions were not made capriciously simply to offset the increased costs of Vietnam.

This budgetary approach—an increase in important and essential programs accompanied by reductions in lower priority programs and savings from improved efficiency—is not new this year. It is the approach which President Johnson has followed in each of his three budgets. The economic and budgetary impact of the special costs of our operations in Vietnam simply added weight to the desirability of financing program increases from savings and cost reductions.

This budgetary policy produced the following results:

First, the budget provides for expenditure increases of \$5.3 billion in domestic programs—to meet unavoidable costs and workload growth and to finance the advance of important new programs, particularly in education, health, and the war on poverty.

Second, these increases are almost fully offset by \$4.7 billion of reductions—\$1.6 billion in the Department of Defense outside of Vietnam costs; \$1.5 billion in civilian agencies; and \$1.6 billion through increased substitution of private for public credit, mainly by sales of federally owned financial assets.

Third, as a consequence total administrative budget expenditures outside of special Vietnam costs rise by \$600 million between 1966 and 1967.

While increases were provided for domestic Great Society programs in health, education, and poverty, the 1967 AID budget excluding Vietnam provides for no growth in expenditures over 1966. This result is achieved despite an increase in AID efforts in the fields of agriculture, health, and education.

With respect to the specific program reductions which the budget proposes, and which have been discussed in these hearings, detailed analysis will be presented to the Appropriations Committees of the Congress by the agencies concerned. But one important comment may be in order here.

Where program reductions are proposed, they result from a careful consideration of priorities, not from an across-the-board slash. For example, the revisions in the special milk program contemplate concentrating Federal assistance on the problems of needy children. In the school lunch program, the reimbursement rate is modestly reduced, but the program provides an increase in the number of school lunches and in the funds for assisting needy children to secure school lunches. In the case of new construction a "no new starts" policy was rejected; new construction starts are provided, but at a lower level than in 1966. The revisions in assistance for federally impacted school districts take into account both the sharp increase in other Federal aids to elementary and secondary education and suggestions resulting from a special study of the impacted area program conducted last year. The recommendation for a reduction in the agricultural conservation program and the proposal to finance meat and poultry inspections through a system of user charges have been made before and do not reflect the particularly stringent current budgetary situation.

In summary, program reductions are based on a careful analysis of priorities, and are not an automatic response to the budgetary problems caused by Vietnam. Similarly, the AID budget request is itself the result of a careful analysis of program needs and, like the rest of the budget, reflects program increases and decreases based on that analysis.

Senator MORSE. The Senator from Ohio.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Bell, the questions which I will put to you upon quick impact may seem to be rather simple and unnecessary. Nevertheless I contemplate doing so.

INTERESTS OF NATION IN STOPPING COMMUNISTS

Is this statement sound? That the President of the United States, in consultation with the members of his National Security Council, the members of the Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State has concluded that the interests of the United States require that the Communists be stopped in their purpose to advance?

Mr. BELL. In Vietnam?

Senator LAUSCHE. In Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you know who the members of the National Security Council are?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you identify them?

Mr. BELL. The President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Office of Emergency Planning, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attend NSC meetings regularly. In addition, the President has as a standing rule that his special assistants for national security affairs attend NSC meetings, and on occasion he has other officers attend when the subject matter is such that they might contribute to its solution.

I, for example, am occasionally invited to attend NSC meetings as appropriate.

SIMILARITIES OF VIETNAM AND KOREA

Senator LAUSCHE. Does the situation confronting the President of the United States with respect to South Vietnam parallel the situation that confronted President Truman in South Korea substantially?

Mr. BELL. Well, there might be some questions of interpretation here, Senator, I would say yes, sir. There is obviously a difference in the nature of the aggression. In the Korean case there was an attack across—it wasn't a frontier, it wasn't an international boundary—but across a defined line on the ground.

There was an attack of the normal military type—divisions abreast and all the rest of it.

In the Vietnamese case the attack is different. It is a guerrilla-type attack mounted from jungle bases, and consisting in significant measure of hit-and-run raids, nighttime assassination, and all that sort of thing.

In this respect two cases are obviously different. In other respects it seems to me there is a great deal of parallelism.

Senator LAUSCHE. In each situation the President of the United States together with his consultants and individuals fixed by law to be his advisers concluded that the interests of the United States required that the Communists be stopped—

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE (continuing). In their offenses and their purpose to advance communism.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; that is right.

VOTE ON SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you recall what the vote was in August of 1964, when it was proposed to give the President authority to use his discretion in the course to be followed in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. I think there were two dissenting votes in both Houses—that is to say, two in the entire Congress.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the two who dissented are my consistent friends, Senator Morse and Senator Gruening, is that right?

Senator MORSE. We are still wondering how so many of you could be wrong.

Senator LAUSCHE. You know, I have always wondered how some of my colleagues can think that their judgment is always right?

Senator MORSE. We stand on the record.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, I am trying to put questions just for the purpose of having a discussion of what we can do. I suppose one course that we could follow would be to pull out.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Another course is to stay in the way we are now.

The third would be to stay in but narrow our presence to areas along the coast as enclaves.

I have tried to search my own mind to determine whether there might be a fourth course. Can you give me any help on that?

Mr. BELL. Well, in terms of the proposals that have been made, I suppose that you could argue that a fourth course would be to launch much more direct and sizable attacks on North Vietnam than we are now doing. I am not talking about alternatives but hypotheses here. I suppose that if you are looking to try to set down all the various alternatives, that is one that should be set down.

COMMENT ON ENCLAVE THEORY

Senator LAUSCHE. I have tried to find out what course is recommended by those who are opposing the President's declaration that our security and our interests require our presence in South Vietnam on the level in which we are now occupied. The only answer I get is that we should retreat to the shore and establish enclaves. Now, analyzing that situation, how long will we be able to maintain those narrow bases along the shores without endangering ourselves to a far greater extent than do the problems which now confront us?

Mr. Bell, can you make a comment on that?

Mr. BELL. Well, I think I should restrain myself, Senator, from getting into this question, which is largely one of the military effects of such a course. I believe that the committee is going to have before it General Taylor and others who will be thoroughly competent to discuss that.

If you want my personal answer, I am wholly skeptical and do not understand how this enclave policy could possibly work, in part because the geography of South Vietnam. South of the mountain area there is a flat delta that extends over the southern 40 percent of the country which has most of the people in the country in it, and there are no natural enclaves whatever in that part of the country.

I could understand the meaning of enclaves up along the coast. Although I repeat my own opinion—which isn't worth anything because I am not a responsible officer in the military side of our Government—but as a first lieutenant I certainly do not understand how it would make any sense to retreat into such enclaves, even where it were possible geographically.

EFFECTS OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL

Senator LAUSCHE. Going one step further, let's assume that we should pull out. I repeat what I said this morning. To what base do we move? Do we go into Thailand, Burma? Where would we move to?

Mr. BELL. Obviously, sir, I am not in a position to speak for those who would advocate such a policy. It is possible that they would say we should pull out of Vietnam and rely on our bases in the Philippines and our alliance with Thailand, Taiwan, Korea, and so on. I am not trying to defend such a policy. I don't agree with it. But I assume that you are looking for hypothetical answers—that might well be what they would say.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am trying to reach the judgment that we pull out, providing we can pull out to a position that will be more formidable, and assure us with greater certainty that we will be freed from the threats of the Communists.

Now, this second thought. If we pull out of South Vietnam, what assurances are there that we will not be confronted with another challenge in Thailand, probably in South America or in Mid-America? Have you given that any thought?

Mr. BELL. Not only is there no such assurance, Senator, on the contrary, we are on notice that similar types of attack are being mounted elsewhere in the world, including Thailand, and will be mounted wherever those in the international Communist apparatus are directing these things. Wherever they can find a foothold, it is their intention—so announced—to create these guerrilla-type insurgent movements.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, we have been talking about trying to find another course.

What about the one that the President has proposed, that North Vietnam and South Vietnam and the United States agree to have free, open elections to allow the South Vietnamese to determine what type of government they want?

Mr. BELL. This would obviously be a splendid solution, Senator. But so far there is no evidence that the North Vietnamese or the Chinese, for that matter, favor it, or that the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong in South Vietnam would permit it.

Senator LAUSCHE. My time is up.

Senator MORSE. The Senator from Kansas.

CONCENTRATION OF SHIPMENTS AT FACILITY IN UTAH

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Bell, I just noted from your statement this morning that we are concentrating aid shipments at Clearfield, Utah. Now, if I know my geography that is not a port town.

Mr. BELL. No, sir; but it is a sensible place to do so because from there you can ship shipload lots, trainloads, either to San Francisco or to other west coast ports, and it is far enough back from the sea-coast ports so that you won't clog up the rail yards and warehouse facilities as you are accumulating shipload lots to go to Vietnam. That is why an inland area was chosen.

Senator CARLSON. How far is Clearfield from the coast, roughly?

Mr. BELL. 1,500 miles, perhaps.

Senator CARLSON. Are we building warehouses at Clearfield?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. We are using warehouses that already exist. That is one of the reasons it was chosen.

Senator CARLSON. Are there sufficient warehouses there to take care of the shipments that you concentrate there?

Mr. BELL. I believe so; yes. These are General Services Administration warehouses. I suspect they were built originally for military purposes.

Senator CARLSON. Do you handle AID products such as grains and concentrate them there? Do they have elevator capacities?

Mr. BELL. No. The grains move as Public Law 480 commodities normally do; that is, with the Department of Agriculture handling the shipping arrangements. These are nonagricultural goods that we are talking about.

ADDITIONAL COSTS INVOLVED

Senator CARLSON. How much does this additional handling of goods—where you concentrate them in one place and then ship them 1,500 miles, and then again reload and assemble them on a boat—add up to in additional costs?

Mr. BELL. We consider that it probably saves us money, Senator, because in the late fall of last year, we were shipping direct to ports and loading on ships in partial loadings. This meant more ships had to go into Saigon, and this contributed to the delays and the backups in the Saigon port—putting additional strain on limited unloading facilities or unloading capacity, and we were having to pay very heavy demurrage charges. On a major ship this can run, as you know, thousands of dollars a day.

If we can, through arrangements such as the Clearfield assembly area and breaking out ships out of mothballs as we are doing so that they will be available for full shiploads of AID-financed commodities, we expect that this will not only simplify the transportation and unloading in Vietnam, but will also save us money over what would otherwise be the case.

PRIVATE ORGANIZATION GIFTS FOR VIETNAMESE

Senator CARLSON. I noticed that Christmas gifts that were collected by the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce and the Young Democratic Clubs and the Young Republican National Federation totaled some 300,000 pounds, and either you or somebody else stopped them at Clearfield.

Did you have anything to do with that?

Mr. BELL. That was a question of priorities, Senator. When those gifts arrived in Clearfield, the Saigon port was so jammed up that we were allowing shipments only of the most essential commodities. Those gifts will proceed as shipping space is worked out. It will not interfere with more urgent commodities, such as rice, such as the military cargoes that have to go in.

Senator CARLSON. Have those shipments cleared now?

Mr. POATS. No, sir. They have just been inventoried. We have now asked the military command to designate the consignees of these items. These were collected for the U.S. troops to distribute—not as a part of the AID program. We have asked the military command to designate the consignees, to schedule the shipment, and they will be moving out in the next 3 months.

We understood from the outset this would be the case—on a space-available basis and as needed in Vietnam.

Senator CARLSON. You mean to say that these fine citizens of ours who contributed these gifts understood that they would not be delivered until next summer?

Mr. POATS. This was announced by the organizers, the junior chamber of commerce and the Young Republicans and Young Democrats that this would be the case.

It probably was not announced widely enough, because the press stories certainly expressed some surprise. But this was the intention right along.

Senator CARLSON. As a matter of fact, I have a press story; the heading is "Collectors Wash Their Hands of Their Gifts to Vietnam," so I am sure they weren't too happy with the situation that developed.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, that that be made a part of the record.

Senator MORSE. It is so ordered.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Evening Star, Jan. 19, 1966]

COLLECTORS WASH HANDS OF GIFTS FOR VIETNAM

(By the Associated Press)

It's up to the Government to ship an estimated 1,000 tons of supplies from Clearfield, Utah, to the people of South Vietnam, a leader of the organization that collected the gifts said today.

The supplies—tools, food, clothing, and the like—were collected in a December drive sponsored by the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce, the Young Democratic Clubs and the Young Republican National Federation.

Now the gifts, 55 boxcars full, are in a General Services Administration supply center in Clearfield.

"It's really out of our hands," said Lewis Helm, spokesman for the organization called YESACTT—for Youth Expresses Support through America's Christmas Trains and Trucks.

"It's up to the Government now to move it as they can," Helm said. He said the Government suggested that the trainload of gifts, collected in the East and Midwest, go to Clearfield, instead of directly to west coast ports.

Helm said those instructions came from the White House.

About 300,000 pounds of supplies collected on the west coast already have gone to Vietnam, in available space aboard ships leased by the Government for regular supply runs to the southeast Asian war spot, Helm said.

They left Oakland, Calif., on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. Medical supplies collected by YESACTT were flown to Da Nang, South Vietnam, for use in civilian wards of a military hospital there.

Helm said the supplies in Clearfield, in the bulk of the gifts collected in the drive, are being cataloged now, and will be shipped to South Vietnam as they are needed there.

He did not know when.

"It's really not a foulup," Helm said.

Senator MORSE. The Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Pell.

LACK OF MONOLITHIC CHARACTER IN COMMUNISM MOVEMENT

Senator PELL. Mr. Bell, a few moments ago you referred in answer to a question by Mr. Lausche to the international Communist movement or conspiracy.

I was interested in your thinking in that regard. Do you believe that there is such a single monolithic movement or conspiracy? Is this the Government's thinking?

Mr. BELL. No, I tried to avoid the word "conspiracy." I don't know just what word I used.

Senator PELL. Your phrase was, I think, international Communist—I forget the word.

Mr. BELL. Apparatus.

Senator PELL. Apparatus, I am sorry.

Mr. BELL. I quite agree with you. At the present time there is not a monolithic international Communist movement the way there was, say, 10 years ago. Nevertheless, both the Russians and the Chinese Communists have declared their strong support for the theory of so-called wars of liberation as a means of extending the domination of communism to countries in the less developed parts of the world. This is, as you know, an open and an avowed doctrine continually repeated, continually underlined at such meetings as the recent tricontinental meeting in Havana. It is continually apparent that these efforts are being made.

It is necessary, if we are to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of free countries of the world, that we help those countries that want to defend themselves against this sort of thing—to do so through our economic assistance programs and, where appropriate, through our military assistance programs.

Senator PELL. But wouldn't it be more a parallelism, a similarity of view between different Communist nations? I just wanted to take you up on this expression, the international Communist apparatus. To my mind there is no such thing. There is a variety of Communist movements all dedicated to our destruction, some of them more peacefully, some of them more violently, but I am not sure this particular apparatus—excuse the word “conspiracy”—of which you speak. And I know of your own general line of thought. The fact that this phrase is used in the Government indicates a certain backward look.

Mr. BELL. Well, I accept your point about the phrasing not being very apt. There are very important splits in the Communist world. This is from the point of view of the United States, a fortunate occurrence. Although, I must say, that in the less developed parts of the Russians and the Chinese are competing for leadership of the some disadvantageous results. It has meant that to some extent the Russians and the Chinese are competing for leadership of the Communist parties in the various developing countries, and part of that competition takes the form of seeing which can be most effective in helping to advance the Communist movement in those countries. This means that, if anything, this has contributed to a step up and a stimulation of the Communist effort in Latin America, in Africa, and in Asia, with which I must necessarily—as one of those in the U.S. Government—be concerned.

POSSIBILITY THAT SOME AID IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

Senator PELL. Another thought that concerns me is the one advanced by the chairman at the beginning of the meeting. How counterproductive is our aid and our efforts? We see what has happened in Indonesia or even in Cambodia—while we were on obviously bad terms with them, they are perhaps in better shape in many ways than the countries to which we extend our aid. My concern is shown by the situation in a country like South Vietnam

where the more we throw into it—it is open ended—the more the response would be. What would be the effect if we set a limit to the amount of military assistance and economic assistance that we put in there, and just held the line, period?

What do you think would be the final result of that policy?

Mr. BELL. In Vietnam, sir?

Senator PELL. In Vietnam.

RESPONSE OF VIETCONG TO AID EFFORT

Mr. BELL. Well, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese have been enlarging their effort. If we do not respond and enlarge our effort accordingly, presumably we would be driven out.

Senator PELL. Do you see them failing to enlarge when we reach a certain point?

Mr. BELL. It hasn't happened so far, Senator.

Senator PELL. I am talking of many years. I was wondering when you see this happening, what you see at the end?

Mr. BELL. It is likely to happen any day. As I said this morning in response to Senator Case's question, it seems to us entirely feasible to envision that behind the screen of effective military action which will prevent the major Vietcong and North Vietnamese military units from running at will through the country, there can be, through the coordinated efforts of the militia, the police, and the civil elements of the Government, in the rural construction program that I was describing to Senator Hickenlooper, there can be a steady enlargement of the area of security and progress in the Vietnamese countryside.

Now, that cannot be a fast process, but it can be done and it can be steadily enlarged. This is only one of the possible courses of development that that situation may take. It is, you might say, from our point of view, one way of succeeding in South Vietnam.

RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

Another way, and a much quicker one, would be the North Vietnamese agreeing to a resumption of the Geneva Conference or any other kind of conference which we have been advocating for so long and which they have been refusing—assuming that such a conference would reach a satisfactory outcome.

Senator PELL. To make the record straight, I don't think we have asked for resumption of the Geneva Conference.

Mr. BELL. Oh, yes, sir; for a long time we have tried to—

Senator PELL. A reconvening of it?

Mr. BELL (continuing). To get the British, as cochairman, to work with the Russians, the other cochairman, to get a resumption of the Geneva Conference. I don't know if I should say the Geneva Conference; but whatever the appropriate diplomatic description of that action would be the aim would be to reconvene the parties and to try to get a negotiated course worked out.

OTHER COURSES OF ACTION

Another possible course of action obviously is a continued escalation from the north which might eventually involve the Chinese. This is

clearly a very serious prospect—if that happened—and that has to be weighed very carefully. I gather that this is what concerns some Members of the Senate, that they think this is the likely eventuality.

So, I don't argue in the slightest that where we go from here is concrete and simple and open. I am saying that it is quite possible to envision a successful outcome of the present situation along at least two courses.

One would be through negotiations immediately or very soon, and the other would be through the steady development of a successful rural construction program coupled with appropriate military action which would in fact gradually enlarge the area of security and progress and drive the Vietcong farther and farther back into the jungle areas. This was essentially the route that was followed in the Philippines under Magsaysay and in Malaysia. It was a long slow process but it was successful in those cases. There is no reason, no fundamental reason why it could not be successful in the present case. It is enormously difficult, very costly, and under no circumstances could be speedy.

Senator PELL. I think also, just to complete the record there is a certain tactical difference between the situation in Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Because in the first three the areas we controlled from the sea and the areas of land that we controlled were greater than is the case in Vietnam.

Mr. BELL. This is one that makes it very difficult.

Senator PELL. That inhibits a solution?

Mr. BELL. Right. I personally don't regard this as properly describing that as a military solution. It is a military-economic-social solution. I don't know what the right single word would be.

Senator PELL. A mission team solution.

Mr. BELL. All right.

PORTION OF VIETNAM AID COMING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator PELL. Going to the foreign aid field, you mentioned a number of nations who participate. But I wonder from the standpoint of volume, just to keep the record very clear, what percentage of the economic aid going into South Vietnam is non-American?

Mr. BELL. Mr. Poats advises me that the latest total or summary figure we have is for calendar 1964, when the value of the economic aid from other countries going into Vietnam was about \$40 million.

In that year we put in around \$200 to \$250 million. Now, economic aid costs have been rising sharply, but to some extent the economic contributions from other countries have also been rising. I think we should be able to get an estimate for 1965, calendar 1965, which we might put into the record.

Senator PELL. Right.

(The information referred to appears on p. 63.)

But to oversimplify, in 1964 the United States put in about five times whatever other nations put in together, would that be correct?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; around five times.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

BACKGROUND OF TOP AID OFFICIALS IN VIETNAM

Now, in connection with the operation of the mission, one of the things that is of concern to me always is the relationship of the people in the field to the indigenous inhabitants, the Vietnamese. You may not have this information available. You can submit it for the record. If you could describe it the committee might be interested.

What is the background and experience of the director and deputy director and the top three men, say, of your mission there, and do they speak Vietnamese, any of them?

Mr. BELL. The mission director is Charles Mann, who has served in Vietnam earlier in the 1950's, who has since served in Cambodia and for the last 4 years as mission director in Laos. He is one of our most experienced AID employees. He does not speak Vietnamese but he does speak French fluently, which means that he can communicate with all of his opposite numbers in the Vietnamese Government, either in English or in French.

The deputy director slot is open at the present time. The No. 3 man is Roy Wirely who is assistant director for program, and he is also economic counselor in the Embassy simultaneously. He, like Mann, has extensive overseas experience, a large part of it in Laos, and is fluent in French as well as in English. As far as I know he does not speak any Vietnamese.

With respect to the speaking of Vietnamese, Senator, if you would like me to add a comment about that, we have instituted about 2 years ago a program for sustained and increased improvement in the number of our people who speak Vietnamese, and our general rule now, though we can't follow it in every case because of the exigencies of the situation, that anybody who is going to serve in the field outside of Saigon, who is going to be stationed in a provincial capital or in a district capital or work with the provincial or district governments goes through Vietnamese language training before he goes overseas.

Now, this is a slow and expensive process. As you know, it takes about 6 months before anybody can develop a minimum working knowledge of Vietnamese, but we are putting, we have put two or three dozen people through such training, and we have at least that number again in training now. The people we are recruiting—we have had a big drive up in Boston and have recruited recently in Chicago and in Los Angeles—will all go through this kind of training, if they are going to serve in this sort of job. I was very pleased to see on my last visit a month ago, as I went around in the rural areas, and I kept asking our people as I met them—the provincial representative and the assistants provincial representative and so on—if they spoke Vietnamese, and I found a number of people who had been through this kind of training. They all agree on its importance, and there were several cases in which our men were obviously fluent in Vietnamese, in discussions they were having with the Vietnamese who were accompanying them.

So, that this is coming along. It is a tough language, but we are bearing down hard and getting eventually all of our field people fluent in Vietnamese.

RELATIONSHIP OF AID WITH THE USIA

Senator PELL. What is the relationship between your agency and the U.S. Information Agency?

Mr. BELL. There is a major U.S. Information Agency mission in Saigon. As in every other place where there is an AID program, the Information Agency does the publicity work for the AID program. We do not have our own information staff overseas. The USIA assigns a man or two—or more as the situation warrants—who works up the appropriate publicity.

In Vietnam there is one difference from the normal relationship between AID missions and USIS staffs. In many countries the AID mission contains a group of people who work with the local ministries or private organizations in the field of broadcasting and other forms of information media. In Vietnam we do not have such a group. We have transferred our people to, and they are working under, the head of the USIA mission in Saigon, so that there is a single group which has responsibility for all aspects of the information media work there.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE U.N.

Senator MORSE. I would not want the record to close this afternoon with my friend from Ohio being in the dark as to what is proposed for settlement. He would leave in the record the impression that we have stated no proposal.

We have stated it over and over again but let me recapitulate it very very quickly. We think, of course, the only place it can be settled is in keeping with our treaty commitments through the United Nations Charter. I would like to say to our U.S. Ambassador that this situation is not one that involves labor negotiations behind the scenes, but out in the open courtroom, so to speak, because we ought to make very clear to the world that we are going to hold every signatory to that charter, as far as we are concerned, to their legal obligations.

The Security Council exists to enforce the peace. That is what the charter provides. And of course those of us opposing this illegal war of ours in Vietnam are urging that other nations come in to enforce the peace so that warmaking can stop. As you know, for many, many months I have proposed that the United Nations ought to seek to bring about a reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

I am glad that at long last our country has taken that position, but we have greatly weakened our position by going to New York with an olive branch in one hand and bombs in the other. That is why we are getting the criticism around the world that we are getting. We are going to get more of it. We have got to get that behind us.

So I want this record to show that those of us that are opposed to this war are simply saying we are without any legal right to be making war in Asia, and that war must stop.

I think our last chance of stopping it is for us to bring in the other nations that have the same legal obligation we have under the United Nations to keep the peace. The \$64 question is: Suppose they refuse, and suppose you have to move from the Security Council to the General Assembly, for which the charter provides?

Let's find out how many in the General Assembly will vote to join in keeping the peace in Vietnam. Apparently, more than this administration to date realizes is possible. But then let's go a step further. Suppose that they decide they do not want to stop the war. Then all I want to say is my country in my judgment has no right, in writing such a bloody chapter in history, of setting ourselves up as the policeman of the world, to check what the Senator from Ohio talks about as the threat of communism.

VIEWS OF OTHER ASIAN NATIONS

The interesting thing is, the major nations of Asia are not worried about it. I took a Senate delegation through Asia for 5 weeks this fall, and we found no support for our fear that China was about to take over. The major countries of Asia are anti-Chinese. They are not worried about China taking them over.

NEED FOR RETURN TO RULE OF LAW

I happen to think that this is a scarecrow argument, that the war-makers in this country are advancing, in an attempt to rationalize and justify the shocking killing of American troops in Asia at the very hour we sit here. I shall be no party to it, and shall continue to do what I can to get it back within the framework of the rule of law, instead of America's jungle law of military might.

That is my answer to the Senator from Ohio. That is my answer to the administration's position, which I know you are in a position where you defend it. But the other side needs to be spread on this record before we recess this meeting this afternoon. I pause for any comments you want to make.

I want to say most sincerely that I do not trade my loyalty and my love for my country with that of anyone in this administration. I want to say that it is a pretty dark hour in American history where we are talking about this kind of an appropriation, which is going to lead to an escalating of the war, and, in my judgment, put us in a position where we will become the greatest threat to the peace of the world.

That is what concerns me, and that is why in this very unhappy state of mind I have followed the course of action that I have followed for the last two and a half years, and have no intention of stopping, short of a declaration of a war. Then I will, of course, as a Senator, urge we unite behind the declaration and try to get it over with as quickly as we can, and at the same time do everything we can to try to get other nations to come in and maintain the peace.

I was interested in your comments about Korea. I see no relationship between Korea and this war at all. Do not forget that Korea became a United Nations war, and do not forget that before it became a United Nations war, our voices were beginning to be raised in the Senate in opposition to making it an American war without a declaration of war. And our position has been consistent. That is why your chairman this afternoon opposed the Formosa Doctrine. That is why I have opposed any attempts on the part of our country to set ourselves up as the enforcers and policemen of the world.

I would not have said this if my friend from Ohio, knowing him as well as I do, had not gotten his point of view into the record. I pause before I ask the next question for any comments you want to make. It is only fair to you that I do.

Mr. BELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, these matters were gone into very carefully by Secretary Rusk before this committee on Friday. They are essentially matters that are more properly in his area of responsibility than mine.

I would like to respectfully record that I agree with Secretary Rusk, and therefore differ with a number of the comments that you have made. But that is really not within my area of official responsibility to advance the administration's argument, sir, and therefore I think properly I must say that I am not really the right person to respond directly to what you have said.

Senator MORSE. I express this view to all, and as you well know, I think if we are going to have peace we have got to have a new Secretary of State.

BLACK MARKET DEALINGS

Now we were talking earlier this afternoon about the black market situation, and since our colloquy I have had the additional information handed to me that I wish you would look into when you look into the black market situation.

The New York Times magazine article for January 23, written by Anthony Cartho from London, in which he points out that the black market dealings from post exchanges in Vietnam had risen from a million and a half in January 1964, to \$7 million in October 1965. If that is true, that is quite a significant difference. In getting the evidence, I think it is very important that either you or the GAO or this committee send someone over to Vietnam to investigate these allegations about the black market situation. I think they are going to handicap you in your work if you do not get them stopped.

Mr. BELL. With respect to the comment about post exchanges, I do not know what the figures are, or if we have any such figures. I will be glad to check them.

I would point out, however, that it has been since September 1965—and partly because of the existence of problems on currency conversions—that we have put into effect—the U.S. Government has put into effect—in Vietnam a system of military payments certificates, or scrip, which I have described earlier today, and which has been very effective in limiting the kind of improper currency conversions which did exist prior to that time.

AID FOR THAILAND

Senator MORSE. I want to ask a few questions about Thailand.

You are asking in this proposal for \$7.5 million in support and assistance funds for Thailand, because of the likelihood "the insurgency threat will become more serious."

I understand that the money is to be used for such things as border and civil police operations and improved air traffic and construction of water facilities.

Why is the provision for these water facilities so essential for meeting this emergency?

Mr. BELL. Oh, the nature of the—I am trying to find another phrase for counterinsurgency—the nature of the rural security and program—

Senator PELL. Or democratic insurgency program.

Mr. BELL. The democratic insurgency in northeast and northern Thailand encompasses, as it should, both measures directly related to the security of the people of that area against these guerrillas, gangsters, et cetera, and also measures to provide for the strengthening and improvement of the local government and of the economic circumstances of the people of these villages.

Let me give you an illustration, Senator.

I visited in early January—Mr. Poats and I both visited—some of these areas, and we saw villages in northeast Thailand which had been connected for the first time by all-weather roads with the nearest towns. Now the effect of that was electric. It was much like the effect of our own county roads out in the Middle West and the Far West. This meant that the farmers who lived in these villages could obtain better markets for their crops, larger income for their families.

It meant that for the first time they could send their youngsters not just to the primary school, which was in the village, but to the secondary school, which was in the nearest town. It meant that they could reach the stores and other markets from which they could buy fertilizer, better seed, and other kinds of goods.

The government service in that part of the country could reach the villages and assist people in such things as health services. Now that is a result—or a typical result—of this rural development program. One of the elements that is part of this overall program is to improve and increase the potable water supply in these small towns and villages—all part of the effort to provide a stronger social and economic and political system in the rural areas, which have been quite neglected.

Thailand has been a country which has been very much centered and oriented toward Bangkok, and it is a very important change in the whole Thai situation that greater priority is being given to rural areas.

For example, instead of an assignment to a beat in Brooklyn, so to speak, it has become an honored assignment for a Government officer to be sent up into the northeast or into the north. It is something that a bright young, rising young civil servant wants to have on his record, rather than considering himself exiled from the bright lights of Bangkok.

So that in all these ways, the program that is underway directly involves the security. Rural development will strengthen the fabric of the society, will be designed to meet and overcome the efforts of the Communist insurgents.

Senator MORSE. What contribution is the Government of Thailand making to this program?

Mr. BELL. Very substantial, sir. Most of the money is in the Thai budget. We are providing a limited number of American advisers who work and live up in these country areas. We are providing equipment—roadbuilding equipment and pond-digging equipment and that

sort of thing. We are providing well-drilling equipment for the particular project you mentioned—but the local costs involve very high budget costs.

BUDGET AND TAX SYSTEM OF THAILAND

Senator MORSE. I can save a great deal of time along this same line of questioning that I was asking you concerning the policies of Vietnam taxwise and budgetwise if I asked you to supply at this point in the record a memorandum that will cover the Thai budget.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator MORSE. The system of taxation.

Mr. BELL. Right, I will be very glad to do so, sir.

Senator MORSE. Points in regard to the collection of taxes.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Senator MORSE. The type of taxes, the relationship between what they are paying for the effort over there and what we are contributing both by way of military aid and foreign aid.

Mr. BELL. Right.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

THAI BUDGET AND TAX SYSTEM

Below is a table showing Thai Government revenues for Thai fiscal years 1964, 1965, and 1966 (October 1–September 30), and one showing the Thai Government expenditures for the same fiscal years. The revenues are shown by principal source and the expenditures by broad categories of activity.

Central government revenues

[In millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1964	Fiscal year 1965 (esti- mated)	Fiscal year 1966 (budget)
Taxes on income and profit.....	41	47	51
Sales, turnover and excise taxes.....	135	154	168
Customs.....	207	236	258
Monopoly profits.....	16	18	19
Other taxes.....	27	31	34
Receipts from Government enterprises.....	10	11	12
Other revenue.....	28	32	35
Total.....	464	529	577

Central government expenditures

[In millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1964	Fiscal year 1965 (estimated)	Fiscal year 1966 (budget)
National security ¹	115	120	125
Economic and social.....	140	154	173
Capital.....	161	164	182
Other.....	107	141	161
Total.....	² 523	² 579	641

¹ Includes provincial and border patrol police.

² The deficits were financed by domestic and foreign borrowing and a drawdown of cash balances.

The estimated gross national product for Thailand for calendar years 1964 and 1965 was \$3.4 billion and \$3.6 billion respectively. Thus Government budget expenditures represented 15 percent of GNP in 1964 and 16 percent in

1965. (By way of comparison, U.S. Federal budget expenditures in calendar year 1965 were \$101 billion. This represented approximately 15 percent of the estimated gross national product for 1965).

The collection of Government revenues in Thailand is generally considered to be relatively effective. Since 1957 revenues have increased at an annual average of 11 percent, compared with an average growth in GNP of about 6 percent over the same period. A significant element of this impressive growth in Government revenues has been the result of improved effectiveness of tax collections. The Public Administration Service of Chicago, under contract with AID, has been working with the Ministry of Finance since 1959. The efforts of PAS have been devoted both to making recommendations for improving tax collections and for revising tax codes. Although there are still areas in which tax administration can be further improved, it is unlikely that growth of revenues due to this factor alone can continue at the high rate which has prevailed in recent years.

MILITARY BUILDUP IN THAILAND

Senator MORSE. As you know, some of us are concerned about the great military force we are building up in Thailand, both by way of bases, airports, and equipment, and the extent to which it is being openly criticized by many as an American military sanctuary in Thailand. It is alleged that we have been bombing out of Thailand.

Do you know whether or not we have been bombing out of Thailand into North Vietnam and Laos?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. That is not within my area of responsibility.

Senator MORSE. We are going to have to deal, in my judgment, when we come to executive sessions marking up this bill, with just such facts as I am asking for in regard to Thailand.

Mr. BELL. We will be glad to supply them, Senator.

I might give you one fact which will be among those that we will supply more fully.

Of the Thai budget, about 70 percent is for civil functions, and a large part of that is for investment in highways, power, schools and so on, so that the figures are much more oriented—as they should be in the Thai situation—toward economic and social developments than is the case today, for obvious reasons, in Vietnam.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN THAILAND

Senator MORSE. In 1957 the Thai Constitution was suspended and the Parliament was dissolved. What is the situation in regard to the Thai Government at the present time?

Mr. POATS. Senator Morse, the Thai Government has announced an intention to restore constitutional rule. Whether this will be done this year or next year is not certain, to my knowledge.

Senator MORSE. I am glad to have that statement, although I consider it completely unsatisfactory as far as justifying our policy in Thailand.

Since 1957 we have been pouring these millions and millions of the taxpayers' money into a police state. Let's face it. There has been no parliament. It has been a totalitarian system. We put ourselves in a very difficult posture in our image around the world when we continue to do that, and that is not the only place where we are doing it. I think that any information that you can give us in a memorandum justifying building up this kind of support for another type of police state would be helpful in clarifying our thinking.

As far as I am concerned, I am no more anxious to support a police state of the totalitarian, Fascist type than the Communist type, because human freedom is nonexistent in all these states.

COMPETITION FOR SCARCE RESOURCES

One other point. I have a great many questions, but I want to say for your benefit, Mr. Bell that the Chairman is having another meeting, and advised that they would like to have me there. I have many more questions and I am sure we will never be able to mark up this bill without your coming back to the committee at a later date to answer the unanswered questions and to discuss new questions that will arise. But I am concerned about a Wall Street Journal story which reads as follows:

But there is still a shortage of housing for Americans here. And as a result, Vietnamese and Chinese businessmen, spotting a chance for a handsome profit, are tearing down old residential buildings and throwing up new 5- and 10-story apartments designed expressly to meet U.S. needs.

While this private building boom may produce prosperity for a handful of speculators, it only aggravates the country's general economic situation. For one thing, it means that much of the Nation's limited supply of foreign exchange is being used to import construction materials. This in turn means that efforts to speed South Vietnam's industrial development are being undermined, since funds aren't available to buy machinery and other equipment abroad; it has been hoped that in building up industry South Vietnam could produce more of its own consumer goods and thus save foreign exchange.

Another drawback of the local businessmen's residential building ventures is that, in combination with the vastly larger U.S. program for construction of a string of combat bases from one end of the country to the other, they are creating intense competition for materials and manpower.

I will put the whole article in the record so you can make later comments if you care to.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 1, 1965]

THE SECOND FRONT—UNITED STATES PLANS TO INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS TO COMBAT VIETNAM'S ECONOMIC ILLS

INFLATION AND RED CLAMPDOWN ON RICE, RUBBER SHIPMENTS WORSEN; AID RISE EXPECTED—IMPACT OF MILITARY BUILDUP

(By Norman Sklarewitz, Staff Reporter of the Wall Street Journal)

SAIGON.—Like a man grappling with a marauder with one hand while fighting a fire that threatens his house with the other, the United States is struggling on two fronts here.

The marauder is the Communist force seeking to take over South Vietnam. The fire is a worsening economic situation—paradoxically stemming in large part from the American military buildup designed to meet the Red assault—that could have devastating effects unless something is done fast.

Increasingly aware of the seriousness of the Nation's economic troubles, the United States is stepping up efforts to do something about them. A big increase in American aid aimed at shoring up the economy is a certainty. But the problems that must be overcome are immense.

Inflation, triggered by vast military spending and war-caused shortages, plagues South Vietnam. The cost of living has jumped 75 percent this year in the northern city of Danang, site of big U.S. Air Force and Marine installations. In the capital city of Saigon food costs have climbed 57 percent in the past year as Communist Vietcong guerrillas have clamped down harder on shipments of farm products to market, and restaurants catering to free-spending GI's have bid against housewives for food.

Outstripping wage increases

For many South Vietnamese, wages have gone up, too, but for the great bulk of the population—and particularly for civil service workers, schoolteachers, and other salaried people—income has not kept pace with price boosts. The result is that a lot of Vietnamese can't live as well today as they did a year ago.

Nor is inflation the only burden the Vietnamese economy must bear. Red road blockades and other disruptions have played havoc with exports of rice and rubber, the country's principal foreign exchange earners. The United States must now bring rice into South Vietnam so citizens will have enough to eat. Pointing up the turmoil in the rubber-producing industry, just this past weekend government troops and Red guerrillas fought a major battle on a rubber plantation northwest of Saigon that ranks as one of the nation's largest but now lies idle, abandoned by its owners. When the firing stopped, white latex dripped to the ground from the shell-scarred rubber trees.

Further economic deterioration, it's feared, could quickly kindle widespread public discontent and bring on open opposition to the struggling government of young Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky. And officials here agree that political instability, leading to possible new crises and administrative shakeups, is every bit as dangerous to the U.S.-backed war effort as defeat in battle.

U.S. economic aid to South Vietnam was originally budgeted at \$550 million for the current fiscal year. A considerable increase in this total is in the works in Washington, however, though the size of the rise hasn't been decided. The added funds will be used to import ample supplies of rice, building materials, and other items in short supply. By flooding the country with badly needed imports, it's reasoned, price increases can be restrained and crippling inflation averted.

"We're just not going to let this inflation explode," declares one U.S. official here.

Expanding U.S. role

Even though the expansion of U.S. forces in South Vietnam has meant boom times for some Vietnamese, there's no question that the rapidly expanding American force here has been a significant factor in the country's economic difficulties. The number of U.S. troops stationed in Vietnam now stands at 166,000, nearly a tenfold increase from a year ago. By the end of 1965, another 40,000 are expected.

Since midsummer, once languid Saigon has become almost an American military garrison. Some 15,000 U.S. soldiers are bivouacked outside Bien Hoa Airbase, 12 miles from town, while 3,500 Air Force fliers and Army helicopter crewmen are stationed at the airbase itself. About 32,000 additional U.S. servicemen now live and work in greater Saigon itself.

To house the military and other American personnel in the Saigon area, the United States leases more than 1,200 villas and apartments, their French colonial charm now greatly diminished by 15-foot-high wire fences and sandbag barriers. Every hotel in town is almost completely occupied by Americans connected with the various military, diplomatic, or economic aid missions. Americans pay premium rents, sometimes a year or even more in advance.

But there is still a shortage of housing for Americans here, and as a result Vietnamese and Chinese businessmen, spotting a chance for a handsome profit, are tearing down old residential buildings, and throwing up new 5- and 10-story apartments designed expressly to meet U.S. needs.

Industrial growth hampered

While this private building boom may produce prosperity for a handful of speculators, it only aggravates the country's general economic situation. For one thing, it means that much of the nation's limited supply of foreign exchange is being used to import construction materials. This, in turn, means that efforts to speed South Vietnam's industrial development are being undermined, since funds aren't available to buy machinery and other equipment abroad; it had been hoped that by building up industry, South Vietnam could produce more of its own consumer goods and thus save foreign exchange.

Another drawback of the local businessmen's residential building ventures is that, in combination with the vastly larger U.S. program for construction of a string of combat bases from one end of the country to the other, they are creating intense competition for materials and manpower. The result is strong upward pressure on wages and prices in the building field. Wages for semi-skilled and skilled Vietnamese construction workers have increased 25 to 100 percent in recent months. Round steel bars have jumped 25 percent in price over

the past year, and cement is up 75 percent. Sand and brick have doubled in price since the all-out U.S. military buildup began.

Military contractors and Saigon apartment builders can absorb the higher costs, but that's often not the case with managers of rural improvement projects designed to demonstrate to Vietnamese peasants that loyalty to the central Government can pay off in tangible benefits. Under this program, a creation of the Agency for International Development, the United States provides funds to be spent in the countryside for new marketplaces, wells, schools, and other public facilities. Now, however, rising costs have made the original budgets for many of these undertakings inadequate to hire contractors and buy materials.

Another aspect of the war in the countryside—the choking off of rice and rubber shipments by the Reds—appears to be growing worse. Traditionally, South Vietnam earned most of its foreign exchange through exports of these commodities; in 1960, for example, the country sold \$48 million worth of rubber and \$27 million worth of rice, accounting for all but 10 percent of its foreign exchange earnings that year.

But by cutting surface transportation, pillaging and terrorizing peasants and workers, the Communists have wiped out much of this export income. By last year rubber exports had slipped to \$33 million, and this year's shipments will be down another 20 percent, or more. Only \$5 million worth of rice was exported last year, and currently there isn't even enough locally produced rice reaching market to feed the country's population. This year the United States is importing into South Vietnam some 205,000 tons of rice obtained from American stocks and from other ricegrowing nations, such as Thailand.

[In Washington this week the Agency for International Development announced plans to buy 175,000 tons of rice for distribution in South Vietnam during the first half of 1966. The announcement indicates imports of rice into South Vietnam in coming months will increase sharply over the current pace, possibly permitting the accumulation of a small reserve of rice and discouraging speculation by local rice merchants.]

Lately the Communists have been acting more forcefully than ever to stop shipments of rubber and rice. To frighten workers on one rubber plantation into quitting their jobs, Vietcong guerrillas recently forced the workers to watch while they killed a foreman and then quartered his body. The Reds capture many rice shipments headed for towns; what they can't carry off, they burn.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Senator MORSE. Have you found any evidence that the activities outlined in this article are interfering with the providing of housing necessary for Vietnamese and for the refugees that are pouring in by the thousands?

Mr. BELL. As I said in my prepared statement, Senator, the American military construction program has undoubtedly put enormous strain on the skilled labor supply in Vietnam, and the supply of materials, and has undoubtedly limited the availability of labor and materials for civil purposes of various kinds, including housing of the normal type and refugee housing.

We have managed first to get agreement on limitations in the military construction program so far as that has been feasible, and second, to meet the most serious and urgent requirements for refugee housing; for example, for provincial houses which are being expanded and rebuilt.

I am sure that some of the labor and materials are being used for housing for Americans and other foreigners. The Americans are there and they need housing and they constitute an attractive market. I doubt that very large, any significant proportion of the materials and labor supply is being used for that particular purpose. There just are not enough Americans in that category who need housing.

One of the things that has been done, for example, since the wives and children of American civilians in Saigon have been removed and are living elsewhere in other countries or back in the United States, we are

putting two or three or four employees in the same housing unit. The rule generally is a man per bedroom, so that a housing unit which a year ago held a man and his wife and two or three children may today hold two or three men who are there without their families. This has reduced, obviously, the requirement for the number of housing units.

So that while I am sure, I repeat, that there is some building of the kind described in that article, I doubt very much that it is a serious or a major cause or diversion of resources to that purpose.

Senator MORSE. One final question.

SIZE OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES

There was discussion today about the recommendation of General Gavin, and I understand some other retired military people, concerning the desirability as far as our military activities are concerned of withdrawing to certain strongholds. Of course that carries with it also the assumption that the Vietnamese Army will continue to fight its own war with the Vietcong.

Do you know how many there are in the armed forces of the Vietnamese?

Mr. BELL. Approximately 600,000, Senator.

Senator MORSE. The last figure I heard testified before the committee was 750,000, but maybe the losses have cut it down to 600,000. The figure that we have usually had is between 500,000 and 750,000, but let's suppose it is 600,000. Is it your view that if we continue to supply until negotiations, either through reconvening of the Geneva Conference or through the United Nations, can bring about an honorable peace settlement, the supplies that we have been supplying, that the Vietnamese cannot fight this war to a victory without the use of American troops?

Mr. BELL. Obviously I am not in a position to have an independent opinion on that matter, Senator. You know that that is the view, that is to say, that it is necessary to have American and Korean and other troops in there in addition to the Vietnamese Army is the view of General Westmoreland and the Defense Department, the Secretary of Defense and State and the President.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, it makes it our war and not theirs.

Mr. BELL. No; it makes it their war in which we are assisting, joining, and supporting. You can, if you wish, describe it as our joint war. We are fighting together there, but it certainly is not our war in the sense that we are doing it and they are standing on the sidelines. They are doing, as Secretary Rusk has said, much the larger part of the fighting. They are suffering by far the larger part of the casualties. It is not our war in the sense of our having taken it over and their not participating.

ABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO WIN WITHOUT U.S. COMBAT FORCES

Senator MORSE. If we should withdraw from active combat and follow the course recommended by General Gavin, you are concerned about whether or not the Vietnamese would prosecute the war to a successful end?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; I would be.

Senator MORSE. I am glad to have that on the record, because I think that is one of the great issues that the people of this country are going to have to decide in the months ahead, to instruct the Government in various ways as to what the people of this country want rather than what the Pentagon Building and others want.

I want to say as I recess the hearings this afternoon, Mr. Bell, that irrespective of the fact that you and I are poles apart on most of the issues that have come before us today, I think you also know that as far as I am concerned I have great professional respect for you. I wish it were possible for me to see my way clear to be on your side of the issue and the administration's side of the issue. But we have our individual trusts, and each one of us has to carry out its trust as he sees it.

The trust as I see it is that the U.S. Senate, under my oath under the Constitution, should not short of a declaration of war give support to this war. I think that is the best way, may I say, to give support to American soldiers too, because I do not think they ought to be there in the absence of declaration of war. So that is the difference that is the difference that exists between us.

I am instructed to advise you that the chairman plans to call you before the committee again at a later date when we can work out our schedule for further hearings on the economic aid aspects of the measure pending before the committee.

Mr. BELL. I will be very glad to appear, sir.

Senator MORSE. I know you will.

Mr. BELL. And also, if there are any questions which we could be preparing answers to, we would be glad to have them at the time so that we can be prepared to respond in the discussion.

Senator MORSE. Some of us over the noon hour made very clear to the chairman that we would not be ready to proceed with any markup of this bill until we had had an opportunity to complete our examination of you and other administration witnesses who testify in support of the bill.

I have been instructed by the chairman to announce that there will be open hearings of this committee on Monday at 10 a.m. in room 4221, and those hearings will be on the nominations of Lincoln Gordon and Jack Hood Vaughn.

I have also been asked to announce that there will be an open hearing of this committee on Tuesday at 10 a.m., when Gen. James Gavin will testify, and on Thursday at 10 a.m. when former Ambassador George Kennan will testify. Those sessions will be in this room, 4221 New Senate Office Building.

On behalf of the committee as well as myself, Mr. Bell and Mr. Poats and your associates, I thank you very much for your testimony today.

Mr. BELL. We appreciate it, sir.

(Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, February 8, 1966.)

... I should like to mention that in the early days of the Republic, the government was very much influenced by the ideas of the Founding Fathers. These men, who had fought for the cause of liberty and justice, had a deep understanding of the human mind and the needs of the people. Their wisdom and foresight were the guiding lights of the nation's development. It is a testament to their enduring legacy that the principles they established continue to shape our society today.

... The American people have always been a people of great courage and determination. From the first settlers to the present day, they have shown a remarkable ability to overcome adversity and build a better future for themselves. This spirit of resilience and innovation is one of the defining characteristics of the American character. It is this spirit that has allowed the United States to rise from a small, remote colony to a global superpower, and it is this spirit that will continue to guide us in the years ahead.

... In the face of the challenges we face today, it is more important than ever to remember the values and principles that have made our nation great. We must stand firm in our commitment to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and we must work together to address the issues that divide us. Only by unitedly pursuing the path of justice and equality can we ensure a bright and prosperous future for all Americans.

... The history of the United States is a story of hope and possibility. It is a story of a people who have dared to dream of a better world and who have worked hard to make those dreams a reality. As we look back on the achievements of our nation, we are reminded of the power of the human spirit and the potential of a free society. Let us continue to strive for a more perfect union, for a more just and equitable society, and for a more peaceful and prosperous world.

SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, FISCAL YEAR 1966—VIETNAM

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m. in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams of Delaware, Mundt, and Case.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are pleased to have as a witness this morning, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, U.S. Army, retired.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

General Gavin has had a long and illustrious career of military service to his country, beginning as a private in 1924, and ending in 1958 as Chief of Army Research and Development.

He later served with distinction as Ambassador to France.

At the time of the debate within the Eisenhower administration over possible U.S. involvement in the war in Indochina, he served under General Ridgway, then Army Chief of Staff, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations.

He is one of the leading military strategists of the postwar period.

Although he is now in private industry, he has remained a thoughtful observer and commentator on military strategy in the nuclear age.

General Gavin has served his country very well, and he has a right to enjoy his retirement from the controversies of Washington. We need his advice, for there are very few people with his experience.

GOAL OF COMMITTEE INQUIRY

I believe we are confronted with some momentous decisions in the near future, and I need not tell you, General Gavin, what the subject matter of these decisions involves. This committee is trying to explore certain aspects of our policies upon which you can throw some light. All we seek is some information and enlightenment so that our country's judgment, the judgment of our people, of this committee, may be as wise as possible.

This is not a novel or new approach. It is a traditional role which our system assigns to the Senate, and the Senate has delegated to this committee in the first instance to be reviewed by the Senate as a whole, and by the country.

We have many precedents for this inquiry. One of the most effective and distinguished leaders of the Senate that the Senate has ever had, on May 6, 1954, just before the fall of Dienbienphu, expressed himself well on this subject, and I quote:

We will insist upon clear explanations of the policies in which we are asked to cooperate. We will insist that we and the American people be treated as adults, that we have the facts without sugar coating.

General, we are very pleased to have you.

Will you proceed, sir?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES M. GAVIN (RETIRED)

General GAVIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

May I say, first of all, it is certainly a great privilege for me to appear before this distinguished committee. I look upon this as a public service which is a privilege to be given a citizen to perform.

Secondly, I particularly appreciate the opportunity to appear in an open hearing because I feel strongly these issues are of the utmost importance to our people. They should hear the differing views and out of this discourse will come, hopefully, a coalesced and consolidated national will to get on with the work at hand.

BACKGROUND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AREA

May I say, sir, at the outset, that in the background of my point of view that I have arrived at and expressed in that communication to Harper's magazine went 2 years of service with the Philippine Scouts in the late thirties, and since that time considerable interest in the affairs of southeast Asia.

At the time of the fall of Dienbienphu, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, I visited Korea, Formosa, Saigon, talked to Diem, talked to General Ely there, General Collins, General Daniels, and others about the problems; went on to Thailand and talked to Mr. Sarit.

Among other things at that time I recommended the construction of a highway from Bangkok to the Mekong, feeling that Thailand was a very sensitive spot and very likely might become a very deeply involved part of the southeast Asia—deeply involved in our own strategy and affairs.

Since then, perhaps one of the most interesting experiences I have had was with Mr. Kennedy. About a month after going to the post in Paris he asked me to return to talk about the problems of Laos. He was confronted with a very difficult situation, and I speak from memory now. We were supporting Phoumi, a rightist, and the question confronting President Kennedy was to what extent should we become involved in land warfare in Laos.

I do not know, but I would suspect if he had sought the advice of the Pentagon, we no doubt would have committed forces and ultimately more divisions and more divisions. But to Mr. Kennedy this made little sense and, indeed, the more we talked about it, the more I

agreed with him, a landlocked country, remote from the immediate application of seapower and somewhat less of airpower seemed to offer a hopeless situation to us.

He asked me, therefore, to go to Paris upon my return and enter into discussions with Souvanna Phouma to see if we could not convince that gentleman that we were interested in a "free, neutral, independent Laos." This I undertook to do.

Admittedly it was with some misgivings at the outset because Souvanna Phouma had a reputation of being then very close to the Communists, and I was not at all sure of how our negotiations would come out.

Mr. Harriman very ably conducted negotiations in Geneva in parallel with my own discussions in Paris.

After about six or eight meetings, and very fruitful and fascinating meetings they were for me, we did arrive indeed at a treaty that, hopefully guaranteed the freedom, neutrality, and independence of Laos.

I was aware then, as I am now, that what our President sought to achieve was a political settlement to what appeared to be a potentially serious military problem. He was absolutely right. He was absolutely right, and we did arrive at that solution.

INTEREST IN GLOBAL STRATEGY

Since then I have continued to devote a great deal of my time to matters of global strategy in our commitments.

Last summer I was asked, late last spring I was asked, by the New York Times to do an article on the meaning of the atomic bomb 20 years later. This was for the early August edition of the New York Times magazine. I had given a great deal of attention to the bombing in 1940, and even then came to the conclusion that urban bombing lacked credibility for a number of reasons perhaps not worthwhile going into here, and I wrote an article that I was denied publication at that time. I felt that the problems of the bomb were quite different than simply escalating World War II experience into more and more and more applied power.

As the summer of 1965 came to an end, my thinking on this matter formed into real meaning of the changes in global strategy that in my opinion have taken place in the last 20 years, and I did an article on this, and in the midst of this I was exchanging correspondence with Mr. Fisher, talking about air cavalry which was a postulation advanced in the early 1950's, considered far too radical for acceptance at the time, and now has valid and accepted battlefield application.

So I at that time and late in the summer or early fall decided that in view of our total spectrum of global commitments, and the changing nature of global strategy, we had better look hard at our Vietnamese commitment. It was becoming alarmingly out of balance and this was the basis for the letter I wrote which I will be very happy to come back to later.

I might say that all I said in that letter was let's look at (a) where we are today, what our commitments are, what it is costing and what we do; and (b) what the alternatives are, what these costs might be, and having done this, let's make up our mind what we are going to do.

BEING ESCALATED AT WILL OF OPPONENTS

My feeling was that we were being escalated at the will of opponents rather than at our own judgment, and I based this as much upon the statement of many officials who have been to that war-torn country and who returned with optimistic statements only to find they have had to change them successively thereafter, which suggested to me that in the very beginning they didn't understand what the requirements were and thus couldn't estimate accurately what the needs might be to meet those requirements.

In that letter I, too, in passing made reference to Hanoi and Peiping and the futility of bombing, pointing out that just more of this would cause more problems, create more problems than it would solve.

I referred specifically to "urban bombing." I would like to make that clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this still in 1962, General?

General GAVIN. I beg your pardon.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to place this in time. Was this in 1962?

General GAVIN. No; this was late last year.

The CHAIRMAN. Last year; I am sorry.

General GAVIN. Late last year, and Harper's came out about my thinking of the strategy which I would like to talk about briefly. At the moment I am, in passing, touching upon the letter.

POSITION ON URBAN BOMBING

I have a feeling as our bombing went on beyond what were obviously military targets such as ammunition dumps, tank cars or concentrations of trucks and military targets, to powerplants and such as that, we were slowly creeping to urban bombing. I wanted to lay this at rest for once and for all time.

Just bombing a city per se, for psychological reasons achieves little in the way of military effect and, in fact, today in the court of world opinion could be extremely damaging and we would have nothing to show for it, and I want to be sure to head that off, that in my own opinion just bombing Peiping wouldn't serve anything.

CONCEPT OF STRATEGY

Now, sir, if I may talk a little about the matter of global strategy into which I would like to fit Vietnam. Two of the most significant things that have happened in our time certainly have been the bomb and the space exploration. Both of which have tremendous military significance.

The bomb is a very interesting case in point. The first question we asked ourselves was the meaning of the bomb. Was the bomb the beginning of a new age, in which the atom would solve our military problems that we have been unable to solve in the past by other means, or was it indeed the end?

I suspected at first that it was the end, although this was a very minority opinion and now I am absolutely satisfied that it was. As man has sought to impose his will on an opponent from the beginning

of recorded history he has sought to use energy in every form that he could get it, bludgeon, metallic penetrating instruments, metallic pellets fired by chemical charges to the explosion of the fission of the atom and fusion of the atom itself. He finally has succeeded in bringing down to the earth the very explosions that take place on the surface of the sun, fission. He has brought the energy of the cosmos itself to the earth. He no longer can use it because it could destroy a major segment of the human race. He is at the end of the search for energy with which to impose his will on fellow men. He is at the end; that search has terminated. Now he must find more discreet means, more discriminating means. He must find greater mobility, rapid data transmission, he must keep these weapons under control. He must know what is going on everywhere as quickly as he can find out so as to keep under control local conflagrations and thus avoid the major catastrophe that might occur if, thoughtlessly, nuclear weapons were used.

If this is so, and it is purely a concept in which I do not ask you to share agreement but I am grateful for the opportunity of expressing it; if this is so, then for the first time in human history something very unusual is happening in warfare and I believe indeed it is.

Strategy has to do with those measures which taken short of war that makes absolute victory certain. If war occurs inadvertently you are sure to win.

It seems to me the best analysis I have been able to make—

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me, what was that, if war occurs inadvertently; I didn't understand.

General GAVIN. If a war occurs inadvertently, if your strategy is right you are going to win and I will give you an example of that, Mr. Symington.

I might say, if I may, that I have given a great deal of thought and done some writing on the subject. I taught political science at the University of California, 4 weeks in 1946 on a sabbatical, and I haven't come to these conclusions rather casually. They represent for me, at least, considerable effort and thought.

STRATEGY BASED ON PROSPERING ECONOMY

It seems to me, therefore, that our strategy today should be based upon, first of all, a dynamic and viable prospering economy, an economy that can export entrepreneurial skills, managerial techniques, dollars for acquisition, ventures abroad, to help other people. We have developed a way of life that provides an abundance of means for our people, and we should continue to export this just as aggressively as we can to help other people.

I am not talking about economic colonialism, for the enlightened businessman working abroad today is trying to help other people help themselves. People are not born equal nor indeed are nations born equal and they need help to achieve a place for their people. They need help of many kinds. We have been doing extremely well in this respect.

While I am talking in this context of strategy, it seems to me, for example, if one of these great books on decisive battles, "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," by Sir Edward S. Creasy, were to be

rewritten today it would include the demise of Mr. Khrushchev, who sought to coexist with his own totalitarian system organized on the basis of planning and not on market demand, who failed because he simply couldn't get the grain grown, he didn't have fertilizer and his economy just simply couldn't produce, and characteristically as happens in a failing strategy he sought the tactical gambit to recoup. He went to Cuba in a great adventure that, thanks to our great President, and our Secretary of Defense, he was defeated in.

I would say that his demise is one of the decisive setbacks in all history, and I think now in my personal opinion, that our efforts to work closely with the Soviet people should be rewarding, in fact I believe that in the President's state of the Union message the references to making changes in our tariff laws to encourage trade is a very good thing.

We have done a great deal exporting professors, entertainers, and scientists, now export businessmen and their techniques. I think we can go a long way together.

There was a turning point and it was the demise of Mr. Khrushchev.

STRATEGY AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Well now, I would say further that strategy today is in the realm of science and technology. Out of science and an adequate research program we are producing an abundance of new knowledge that will energize our economy and keep it moving and, very briefly, I think that in the court of world opinion, world opinion itself, we have the area that will have a very great deal to do with what we may do.

STRATEGY AND WORLD OPINION

I would draw a parallel of the use of energy and power through the many, many centuries of human existence when people were restrained by their fellow men in what they could do. They may have wanted to do many things. Even cities, States restrained what their armed forces could do, and this Nation has shrunk, this world has shrunk to the point today, this world has shrunk to the point today where we simply can't do all the things we would like to do.

I have always felt that one of our greatest captains of all time was General MacArthur and yet even he had to come to realize and learn the hard way that the use of a nuclear bomb, because we had them in our arsenal, did not permit him under his mandate from the United Nations to use it.

It was simply an intolerable thing.

I have touched on three areas of strategy that I believe are of overriding importance.

VIETNAM AND GLOBAL COMMITMENTS

My concern, therefore, for Vietnam first became aroused when I found us cutting back in our global commitments in the realm of economics, for I began to suspect that the escalation in southeast Asia would begin to hurt our world strategic position. If this has significance now it may have tremendous significance in the long run.

When we begin to turn back on what we are doing in world affairs, through our economic endeavors, to support a tactical confrontation that appears to be escalating at the will of an enemy we are in a very dangerous position in my opinion, and for this reason what we are doing there deserves looking at.

There are several areas where confrontations occur tactically. I mentioned Cuba. Europe is one today, in my opinion. Our commitments in Europe are far in excess of our needs, not only troop commitments but logistical support to back up those commitments.

To return to Asia, the Korean commitment is one we must maintain, and we are maintaining it. The support of Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan, the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu likewise. Southeast Asia is a very volatile, dynamic area of operations. Vietnam is not alone. Thailand I look upon as a very, very dangerous area and one that we should regard most seriously at this time.

WHAT CAN BE DONE IN VIETNAM?

Therefore, in looking at it, I raise some questions.

First of all, what do we have today and what can they do, and I simply stated today we have sufficient forces in South Vietnam to hold areas along the coast where sea and air power can be made fully effective, and then we can use this power as we see fit to do so, I then suggested that we might look at the alternatives very realistically.

Are we really trying to seal off Vietnam entirely, extend the 17th parallel all across, all the way across to the Mekong River? This has been considered. One could put a cordon sanitaire across there at considerable cost. It would still be open ended a bit at the end but it is possible.

One could extend the security down to the Cambodian border but to me these appear to be terribly costly in manpower and our national wealth, and I use the word "wealth" to include all necessary material resources.

So I finally came to the conclusion, and I think this is very important in view of the charges that have been made about what I have said, and I quote "We must do the best we can with the forces we have deployed in Vietnam now." Nothing more than that. I did not say "withdraw," "retreat," "go ahead," "attack," do anything else. We must do the best we can with what we have in hand, keeping in mind the true meaning of global strategy in world affairs today.

Economics, science and technology, and world opinion will, in the long run, serve our strategic interests well if we handle our national resources wisely.

On the other hand; tactical mistakes that are allowed to escalate at the initiative of an enemy could be disastrously costly. Since the advent of the space age there has been a revolution in the nature of global conflict. The confrontation in Vietnam is the first test of our understanding of such change or lack of it. The measures that we now take in southeast Asia must stem from sagacity and thoughtfulness, restraint and an awareness of the nature of strategy in this very rapidly shrinking world, and that is right from the letter that I wrote to Harper's.

Now, Mr. Chairman, perhaps at this point, I might say nothing further and I would be very pleased to have an opportunity to answer any questions that may be addressed to me.

(The letter to Harper's magazine referred to follows:)

[Reprinted from Harper's magazine, February 1966]

THE EASY CHAIR—A COMMUNICATION ON VIETNAM FROM GEN. JAMES M. GAVIN

(NOTE.—In the following letter General Gavin presents the first basic criticism of the administration's policy in Vietnam by a major military figure. As an alternative, he urges the stopping of our bombing of North Vietnam, a halt in the escalation of the ground war, withdrawal of American troops to defend a limited number of enclaves along the South Vietnam coast, and renewed efforts "to find a solution through the United Nations or a conference in Geneva.")

General Gavin argues for such a change in policy on purely military grounds. His views on the Vietnam war cannot be taken lightly, since he has established a reputation during the last 30 years as one of America's leading strategic thinkers. At the time of the French defeat in Vietnam, he was Chief of Plans and Operations for the Department of the Army, and his advice is generally believed to be largely responsible for the U.S. refusal to enter the southeast Asian conflict on a large scale at that time. He enlisted in the Army as a private in 1924 and rose to the rank of lieutenant general before his retirement in 1958; he had a distinguished combat career as a paratroop commander in World War II; and he served for a time as Chief of Research and Development for the Army. After retirement he was Ambassador to France, and is now chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Arthur D. Little, Inc., an industrial research firm in Cambridge, Mass.

He left the Pentagon because of disagreements on what was, in 1958, the basic military policy of the Eisenhower administration. His reasons for such disagreements were set forth in his book, "War and Peace in the Space Age," published by Harper & Row; as he indicates in the following letter, most of the changes he then urged have since been carried out.

The editors hope that General Gavin's communication may stimulate a searching reexamination of American military and foreign policies by other public figures who are especially qualified by experience and training to discuss them. In the coming months Harper's hopes to publish further contributions to such a reappraisal.—The Editors.)

Last November our Secretary of Defense, while in Vietnam, finally gave battlefield approval to the concept of Sky Cavalry. Harper's should take some pride in the fact that it published my article, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses," in 1954. That was the genesis of the idea for this new form of mobility for our ground forces. It was too revolutionary for acceptance in the Pentagon then, and Harper's performed a public service in helping advance the idea.

I would like to comment about the Vietnam situation further. I should emphasize at the outset that I am writing solely from a military-technical point of view. I was Chief of Plans and Operations in the Department of the Army when Dienbienphu brought the French endeavors in Vietnam to an end. The Chief of Staff, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, directed that we go into the situation quite thoroughly in case a decision should be made to send U.S. forces into the Hanoi Delta. As I recall, we were talking about the possibility of sending 8 divisions plus 35 Engineer battalions and other auxiliary units. We had one or two old China hands on the staff at the time and the more we studied the situation the more we realized that we were, in fact, considering going to war with China, since she was supplying all the arms, ammunition, medical, and other supplies to Ho Chi Minh. If we would be, in fact, fighting China, then we were fighting her in the wrong place on terms entirely to her advantage. Manchuria, with its vast industrial complex, coal, and iron ore, is the Ruhr of China and the heart of its warmaking capacity. There, rather than in southeast Asia, is where China should be engaged, if at all.

I should emphasize at the outset that there are philosophical and moral aspects of the war in southeast Asia that are understandably disturbing to every thoughtful person. My comments, however, are based entirely upon a tactical evaluation of our efforts there. At the time of the French defeat, it seemed to us military planners that if an effort were made by the United States to

secure Vietnam from Chinese military exploitation, and that if force on the scale that we were talking about were to be employed, then the Chinese would very likely reopen the fighting in Korea.

At the time, General Ridgway thought it prudent to bring this situation directly to the attention of President Eisenhower, pointing out that we should be prepared for a large-scale war if we were to make the initial large-scale commitment to the Hanoi Delta that we were thinking about. I thought at the time that it took great moral courage for General Ridgway to take this action, but he has never been a man to lack such courage. The President decided not to make the commitment and in his book, "Mandate for Change," he commented that to have gone to war under those conditions would have been "like hitting the tail of the snake rather than the head," which is a good analogy.

Today we have sufficient force in South Vietnam to hold several enclaves on the coast, where sea and air power can be made fully effective. By enclaves I suggest Camranh Bay, Danang, and similar areas where American bases are being established. However, we are stretching these resources beyond reason in our endeavors to secure the entire country of South Vietnam from the Vietcong penetration. This situation, of course, is caused by the growing Vietcong strength.

The time has come, therefore, when we simply have to make up our mind what we want to do and then provide the resources necessary to do it. If our objective is to secure all of South Vietnam, then forces should be deployed on the 17th parallel and along the Cambodian border adequate to do this. In view of the nature of the terrain, it might be necessary to extend our defenses on the 17th parallel to the Mekong River, and across part of Thailand. Such a course would take many times as much force as we now have in Vietnam.

To increase the bombing and to bomb Hanoi—or even Peiping—will add to our problems rather than detract from them, and it will not stop the penetrations of North Vietnam troops into the south. Also, if we were to quadruple, for example, our combat forces there, we should then anticipate the intervention of Chinese "volunteers" and the reopening of the Korean front. This seems to be the ultimate prospect of the course that we are now on.

On the other hand, if we should maintain enclaves on the coast, desist in our bombing attacks in North Vietnam, and seek to find a solution through the United Nations or a conference in Geneva, we could very likely do so with the forces now available. Maintaining such enclaves while an effort is being made to solve the internal situation in Vietnam, and in the face of the terroristic war that would be waged against them, poses some serious problems, and the retention of some of the enclaves may prove to be unwise; but the problems that we would then have to deal with would be far less serious than those associated with an expansion of the conflict.

I do not for a moment think that if we should withdraw from Vietnam the next stop would be Waikiki. The Kra Peninsula, Thailand, and the Philippines can all be secured, although we ultimately might have heavy fighting on the northern frontiers of Thailand. But we should be realistic about the dangers of the course that we are now on. A straightforward escalation of our land power in southeast Asia to meet every land-based challenge, while at the same time we leave China and Cambodia immune from attack, poses some very forbidding prospects. I realize that our Secretary of State was recently quoted in the press as having said that "the idea of sanctuary is out." However, the initiative is not ours and there is an abundance of evidence now that both China and Cambodia are sanctuaries for Communist military strength that is used to support the Vietcong.

To get to the heart of the problem, I doubt that world opinion would tolerate the bombing and seizure of Manchuria. If the Chinese Communists continue on their present course of aggression and, at the same time, continue to develop more devastating weapons—and I refer to nuclear weapons—the time may come when China will bring upon herself a nuclear war. But that time is not here yet. In the meantime, we must do the best we can with the forces we have deployed to Vietnam, keeping in mind the true meaning of strategy in global affairs. Economics, science and technology, and world opinion will, in the long run, serve our strategic interests well if we handle our national resources wisely. On the other hand, tactical mistakes that are allowed to escalate at the initiative of an enemy could be disastrously costly. Since the advent of the space age, there has been a revolution in the nature of war and global conflict. The confrontation in Vietnam is the first test of our understanding of such change, or our lack of it.

The measures that we now take in southeast Asia must stem from sagacity and thoughtfulness, and an awareness of the nature of strategy in this rapidly shrinking world.

Referring again to the sky cavalry concept, which we are now employing in South Vietnam, it is the kind of innovation that is generally unpopular in a conservative society, and in the military establishment of such a society. But many more innovations, both technical and in management methods, must be found if we are to continue to survive as a free people. Merely making bigger bombs or using more of them is not the answer. So I hope that Harper's will continue to support innovative methods when they are suggested, as you did when you first published the idea of sky cavalry in 1954.

When I retired in 1958, I said that I would be happy to serve as a private in the Army if it were the kind of an Army that I wanted it to be. I think it is that kind of an Army now, and I would be happy to serve in it in any grade in Vietnam or anywhere else. It is doing a splendid job in Vietnam and needs the support of all of our people.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

I think your review of the overall strategy is very useful. Speaking for myself, not being a military man, it has great appeal but I won't wish to pass judgment on it further than that.

COMPARISON TO SITUATION IN 1954

I believe, General, you had something to do with the study of Indochina in 1954 when you were working with General Ridgway.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir, I was the Chief of Plans and Development beginning in early 1954 and I stayed in that position and then in research for several years.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you participate in the study that General Ridgway ordered relative to the feasibility of at that time of entering the conflict in Indochina?

General GAVIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We considered the advisability of entering the Hanoi Delta, and as I recall, to be precise, we talked about the need for some 8 divisions, plus some 35 engineer battalions, we anticipated the supply would be very great, medical and so on, and there was some significance to Hainan Island if we were going to go into the delta and so on, we gave it quite thorough consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. In General Ridgway's book, "The Soldier," on page 276 he said this, and I would read it and see if you would comment on General Ridgway's statement:

I felt it was essential, therefore, that all who had any influence in making the decision on this grave matter should be fully aware of all the factors involved. To provide these facts, I sent out to Indochina an Army team of experts in every field; engineers, signal and communication specialists, medical officers, and experienced combat leaders who knew how to evaluate terrain in terms of battle tactics. * * * The area, they found, was practically devoid of those facilities which modern forces such as ours find essential to the waging of war. Its telecommunications, highways, railways—all the things that make possible the operation of a modern combat force on land—were almost nonexistent. Its port facilities and airfields were totally inadequate and to provide the facilities we would need would require tremendous engineering and logistical efforts.

On page 277 he writes:

We could have fought Indochina. We could have won, if we had been willing to pay the tremendous cost in men and money that such intervention would have required—a cost that in my opinion would have eventually been as great as, or greater than, that we paid in Korea. In Korea, we had learned that

air and naval power alone cannot win a war and that inadequate ground forces cannot win one either. It was incredible to me that we had forgotten the bitter lesson so soon—that we were on the verge of making that same tragic error.

That error, thank God, was not repeated. As soon as the full report was in, I lost no time in having it passed on up the chain of command. It reached President Eisenhower. To a man of his military experience its implications were immediately clear. The idea of intervention was abandoned, and it is my belief that the analysis which the Army made and presented to higher authority played a considerable, perhaps a decisive, part in persuading our Government not to embark on that tragic adventure.

General, are the conditions in Indochina any different today than they were at that time?

General GAVIN. There is one basic difference, sir. He was talking about going into the Hanoi Delta and going right to the Chinese frontier, which certainly meant the immediate intervention of Chinese opposition. Now we are considerably farther south, we are talking about the 17th parallel on down. Other than that I would say conditions are not essentially different, although the point I make is a very important one, too.

I should say, too, in the way of background there is more than just a cold piece of paper in this type of planning. We spent a lot of time worrying about it, certainly I did.

I had considerable combat experience in Europe from Africa to Berlin, and I knew that I would be responsible for planning the conduct of operations, and I devoted a great deal of talk about it with colleagues who had considerable experience in southeast Asia and China.

We finally decided when we were all through what we were talking about doing was going to war with Red China under conditions that were appallingly disadvantageous. We were talking about going to war with her thousands and thousands of miles from the heart of our warmaking capacity and it frankly made little sense to a man who had to go do the fighting. So I was more than pleased to see General Ridgway take the initiative and it took more courage to do it as he did and say "Let's take a look at this. It makes little sense to do it."

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the conditions in South Vietnam—the conditions mentioned in this book—are any more favorable to the conduct of war than in North Vietnam? Is the terrain more favorable? Are the conditions of health more favorable?

General GAVIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the terrain easier for maneuvering modern weapons?

General GAVIN. No, there is but one factor. The lines of supply, the communication lines that would come from China and the logistical support would come entirely from China would be much longer is a bit of advantage, but this is of almost minimum, not great import. Conditions are just as disagreeable, environmental conditions I know are just as costly in South Vietnam as they are in North Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. So your conclusion was that, as I say, it might probably lead to a confrontation with China, and I would take it you felt and General Ridgway felt this was not a wise thing to undertake then.

Do you see any reason why it would be any wiser to do today?

CONTROL OVER ESCALATION

General GAVIN. No, I don't. I must say though, I think the initiative is perhaps that of the Chinese. It is indeed that of the Chinese.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by that?

General GAVIN. I think that the confrontation will occur when and where they choose to make it occur.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I didn't understand it. Did the general say the initiative was with the Chinese now?

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you repeat the question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. You did say the initiative is now with the Chinese, did you not?

General GAVIN. I feel in Vietnam, yes, this is what I said a moment ago, and this is what makes me uneasy, the escalation is not occurring at our will as much as it is in response to an escalation of an opponent's who is supported by the Chinese. There may be variations of nuance to this but I feel the confrontation with the Red Chinese is a real compelling fact of life today, and for this reason, I am quite uneasy about an overresponse in Vietnam. We could get ourselves so deeply involved in Vietnam as to seriously lack the capability we should have if Korea were to reopen, in Thailand if it became very, very serious and then fitting this into the spectrum of global commitments, then I am concerned because our international strategic position is being eroded badly. So the choice is not whether we will be in Vietnam, we are there, but to use with judgment and discretion what we do there, that is what I maintain we should do.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a little subtle about the initiative being in the hands of the Chinese. If our escalation is confined, or if it doesn't take place in North Vietnam, it certainly would minimize the risk of Chinese entry. The Chinese are not now presently engaged in this war, directly.

General GAVIN. No, not directly, except through logistical support. I would be happy if the initiative were entirely ours, and we could do just what we pleased and increase our cutback just as we see fit.

The CHAIRMAN. Why can't we?

General GAVIN. Well, I think we tried to and we have successively escalated and increased our commitments for reasons that seem to be beyond our control.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand. What are the reasons that make it beyond our control?

General GAVIN. Yes. I think that our Secretary of Defense should be quite prepared to answer a question of that sort. We first sent trainees and then we felt we had to send combat advisers. This seemed to be adequate at one time. Then we had to send troops to protect our bases—

The CHAIRMAN. Why did we have to do this. You say we had to do all this. What was the force, the irresistible force, that made us do this?

General GAVIN. Yes, I take it was the judgment of our Secretary of Defense this had to be done and I am not questioning why he exercised that judgment. I just know it is a historical fact it has been done.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact it has been done doesn't necessarily mean that we had no choice in the matter.

General GAVIN. No, quite true, this is quite true.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me in several instances there was a freedom of choice. This is rather a strong country and I think we could have some control over whether we proceed or don't in this area.

General GAVIN. Yes, I would say so.

The CHAIRMAN. So this is where the question loses me—that we had to do this. There is an inevitability about it, apparently from your statement, that I have not been able to see.

General GAVIN. Yes, perhaps we didn't have to. We could have stopped at any point along the way as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understood General Ridgway's statement he said we could do this and we could win.

General GAVIN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. But that the cost was out of proportion to what we could gain by doing it.

General GAVIN. Yes, that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you agree with that?

General GAVIN. Yes, I would indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in 1954, and would you agree with it now?

General GAVIN. Of course, sure.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see any great change in the circumstances between 1954 and the present that would warrant any different conclusion from the study you made.

General GAVIN. No. As I pointed out, in the theater to a man doing the fighting there is a little difference there, but it is not of great national significance so far as our commitment goes.

The CHAIRMAN. This question of commitments is another question that perhaps I shouldn't ask you. You didn't make any commitment, did you?

General GAVIN. No, I didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Wherever it arose from, it was from other sources than you or the Army.

I have many other questions. But we have a very good attendance this morning and I shall reserve mine for later on.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.

GENERAL GAVIN'S LETTER TO HARPER AND OTHER STATEMENTS

Senator SPARKMAN. General Gavin, let me say that I certainly share with the other members of this committee my great, the great, admiration that we have for you and for your work and the respect for your views. Any questions that I ask pertaining to it should certainly not be taken as critical but as trying to get to the basic facts and reasoning in this case.

I have read the article published in Harper's.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And I have also read the newspaper stories reporting, I believe, a speech that you made—I guess it was in New York or was it a speech—in which you said that there had been a misconception of your views, that you did not advocate stopping the bombing; is that right?

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. You did advocate holding it up.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. For a time.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, I notice in the article though you used the term "desist."

General GAVIN. "Desist," that is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. "On the other hand, if we should maintain enclaves on the coast, desist in our bombing attacks in North Vietnam, and seek to find a solution through the United Nations"—Was that to be taken as meaning that you simply proposed to pause in the bombing until you had a chance to take it to the United Nations?

General GAVIN. Yes, I would point out, sir, this letter was written in late November and I have the letter accompanying it, the letter which went in on November 30 and it seemed far remote from this hearing. At that time it seemed to me first of all I wanted to head off any idea that urban bombing was the answer to our problem. That is why I made specific reference to Hanoi and Peiping.

Then I said "desist." I didn't say stop. I didn't say cease it, I didn't say give it up, I said let's slow down and take a look at this situation. This is what I meant.

Senator SPARKMAN. My thinking is that "desist" means to stop.

General GAVIN. It does.

Senator SPARKMAN. It may not mean permanently.

General GAVIN. This is what I had in mind.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is that your meaning?

General GAVIN. Yes, exactly.

Senator SPARKMAN. For the time being?

POSITION ON URBAN BOMBING

General GAVIN. I would be happy to talk about bombing and I feel this way about it. If General Westmoreland has a mission to carry out I see no reason for restricting his military targets—combat forces, combat weapons coming into the area. Our young men deserve this support.

I don't see why he has to go to anyone else to make a decision to deal with this type target. I began to be very uneasy in late November when we were bombing public utilities, powerplants, and I could see us beginning to bomb cities or women and children and noncombatants who might lose their lives in great numbers and we began slowly to creep into urban bombing. This is why I said let's desist now in our bombing and take a look at this whole situation, what our commitment is, perhaps we can find an approach through the United Nations or Geneva. I didn't know, nor does anyone else know. This is what I mean by that.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am glad to have that explanation. I think it does clear it up because I think the way it was worded, it is capable of a misunderstanding.

General GAVIN. Yes, I think it is.

I was writing something brief, not too long, for people to read.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am glad to hear your answer with reference to bombing military objectives. In fact I was going to ask you the question, Would you include the harbor of Haiphong in that.

General GAVIN. I really don't know enough about it sitting here in this hearing. I would have to know more about the actual conditions of the harbor. I would presume it could be mined or it could otherwise be blockaded. I wouldn't know enough about it.

Senator SPARKMAN. I mean action against it in any way, not necessarily from the air.

General GAVIN. Yes, I would say its utility value should just be done away with since it is a major port of entry for military supplies.

Senator SPARKMAN. That would be true of any military objective.

General GAVIN. Yes, I would say so.

Senator SPARKMAN. But avoid civilian centers?

General GAVIN. Yes, that is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to say to you I think that is a very clear statement and I think certainly it is a very good statement.

VIETNAM AND UNITED STATES GLOBAL COMMITMENTS

You do say :

In the meantime we must do the best we can with the forces we have deployed in Vietnam, keeping in mind the true meaning of strategy and global affairs.

General GAVIN. Right.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, you are advocating maintaining the force at its present level?

General GAVIN. That is exactly what I said; yes, sir.

May I elaborate on this? I was startled to find in the budget request figures for 1967, fiscal year 1967, we are going into \$10½ billion into Vietnam, and this is why as a citizen who has devoted a lifetime almost to the study of our global position and the nature of global conflict, this is what worries me quite a bit. Is Vietnam at this point worth this investment of our national resources, with all the other commitments we have worldwide? Are we not becoming too mesmerized with this? Are we not losing sight of the total global picture? So I recommend therefore that we make do with what we have. Now I was very happy to have an opportunity to go over to the Pentagon and talk to Mr. McNamara and Mr. Vance about this very thing. Could we do better with what we have, for example, and I really don't know? I don't believe he is sure at the moment either. We have many commitments in many areas along the coast and inland, and it might be possible in a purely military sense of gaining an advantage, to redeploy our resources, I don't know.

It would be certainly unwise in any combat to maintain a status quo, just sit there and do nothing. So I think we should not only do the best with what we have but look at how we might do better with what we have.

PLACE TO CONFRONT CHINA

Senator SPARKMAN. General Gavin, I remember that in the MacArthur hearings, General Bradley at one time used the expression—with reference to a land war in Asia, particularly in China—that it would be the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. You hold somewhat to that view, I take it?

General GAVIN. Well, I—may I speak for myself, sir? I think he was referring to combat in Korea and Manchuria. Unfortunately we are in, we are involved in southeast Asia, our young men are doing a splendid job there. I don't think the Armed Forces have done a better job right from the outside of the word "go" in combat. They have done a fine job and we must give them the best support we can, keeping in mind the Nation's total commitments. So I couldn't quite agree with that as General Bradley once expressed it.

Senator SPARKMAN. You do point out in your article though, if we are going to have a war with Red China it ought to be in the Manchurian area rather than in the southern area.

General GAVIN. To be very objective in a military sense about this as an adviser, if I were called upon in advice to my people, I would say if China brings upon herself a global war the place to fight her is not in southeast Asia. The place to fight her is where you can take away the real heart of her warmaking capacity, the Ruhr of China, and this is the Manchurian area.

POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR WITH CHINA

Senator SPARKMAN. There is one statement in your article that seems to me to be of considerable importance and concern and it is this:

If the Chinese Communists continue on their present course of aggression and, at the same time, continue to develop more devastating weapons—and I refer to nuclear weapons—the time may come when China will bring upon herself a nuclear war.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you believe that is—

General GAVIN. Of course, I write it for that reason.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you think it is likely?

General GAVIN. I don't know.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course you have some "if's" in there.

General GAVIN. I have hoped as we do—I know nuclear weapons well. In 1947 I attended our nuclear weapons school, went to Operation Greenhouse in the Pacific where the first nuclear trigger as well as a 50-kiloton weapon was exploded. I was later responsible for the small yield weapons and one gained tremendous respect for these weapons once you know their real capability. I think the Soviets understand it. I would hope that the Chinese would begin to understand it.

For example, they have said, and I have here in my papers the source of the quote and it wasn't from Mr. Mao, it was from one of his staff, that what does it matter if they lose a couple of hundred million people, there are still 300, 400 million more. This is very primitive thinking that is quite unreal. His problems would be catastrophic beyond belief and people would be a real liability to him. He wouldn't be better off. I hope he will learn this and Mao will learn this in time.

In the meantime judging by what they say and how they behave, they are quite aggressive in what they are doing. This may relate to their position in nonadmission to the United Nations and the way they are treated in global affairs, I don't know, but there is no doubt they are very aggressive right now.

COMPARISON WITH MALAYAN SITUATION

Senator SPARKMAN. I saw the TV program just a couple of nights ago on Malaya, showing how the situation was handled with the Communists in Malaya. It took the British 12 years to clean that out, didn't it?

General GAVIN. And they did an awfully good job on that; yes. I touched on it here and there in my service and we talked about it to them about how well they did. They had a unique position really with the Kra Peninsula really cutting it off and the control the environment. We have an entirely different problem in southeast Asia, it is a sieve at the moment.

Senator SPARKMAN. If I remember sometime back Secretary Rusk made a statement—or it may not have been him, it may have been a military man—that we were going after and not going to wait for the Vietcong to come to us; we were going after them; we had to pull them out one at a time. That was somewhat the way the British and the Malaysians did it; isn't it?

General GAVIN. I don't know. I really don't know. I think you have an entirely different thing between Vietnam and Malaya.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

FALSE INTERPRETATIONS ON GAVIN LETTER

I noticed an article here from the Evening Star of February 4 which said, "Gavin, a former Ambassador to France and a former Army planning chief, said that he now wishes he hadn't written the letter."

General GAVIN. No; I was asked in context of the problems I have had in the last 2 weeks how I felt about it and I must say it has been a burden. I don't know when in my life I have had such techniques used against me where I am charged with having said things I didn't say and then the charge having been made I am attacked for having said them. For example, I have been accused of retreating, wanting to withdraw, being a turtle, wanting to hold, all these things, and I said none of these things. I recommended none of these things. But worse than this is being charged then with these views and attacked for them.

This is a very troublesome and burdensome thing to me. In fact I almost look upon it more seriously now that I am personally involved in it now than Vietnam itself. If this is the state of affairs in the Government, where in the world are we going?

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. We sympathize with you. [Laughter.]

Senator MORSE. You are still an amateur, may I add.

Senator SPARKMAN. You still stand on the letter in what you said?

General GAVIN. Absolutely. Every idea in there I believe in and I stand behind every word in it. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. The time is up.

Senator GORE. Maybe you can become a member of a certain select group.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator from Iowa?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Gavin, with your experience and service to your country in various capacities I am sure we welcome your views, welcome the opportunity of discussing them with you, and perhaps more especially because of the confusion that has arisen about the interpretation of what you really mean and what you really said.

General GAVIN. Yes.

HOLDING WHAT WE HAVE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Time is limited and we have a vote on the floor at 11 o'clock so I will try not to take up all my time. I understand that you advocate that we hold what we have. That is a rather broad statement, but is it in essence that we hold what we have and we not attempt to extend or expand our physical control of the area in South Vietnam except by, let's say, peaceful means?

General GAVIN. Yes, sir. There is a not too subtle point involved in the use of language here. When I wrote that we were then apparently escalating at a rather steady rate. We were up around 200,000 men. Some writers were saying we may need to double this to 500,000.

There was even talk about a million men, I understand, by some military columnists. I felt that the time had come to take a reappraisal of where we were, feeling we were being escalated not at our own will and judgment but at the initiative of the opponent and, therefore, I did say let's take a look at what we now have there, what we can do with what we have and see and if we can't find another solution to this problem, because the alternative is quite clear, we can go ahead and go to half a million men or three-quarters of a million men but if we do this we must understand that these are all the implications and, therefore, I did say let's take a look at where we are today and what we can do with what we have there and let's see if we can't find another solution to the problem.

ACHIEVING U.S. OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Gavin, regardless of what your own personal desires or program would be, what do you conceive to be the objective of our country and whatever allies we have in the activities in South Vietnam today?

General GAVIN. Yes, yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is your conception? How do you understand it?

General GAVIN. Yes; this is the impression I get from reading about it, no one has told me that.

We are seeking to establish a government, that is a democratic government, a government chosen by the people of South Vietnam and that can operate freely without interference by the Vietcong, that is all. We haven't a desire for bases, we haven't a desire to stay there. We want them to have a good government of their choosing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Under the history of the last 2 or 3 years, do you believe that that would have been possible of being accomplished by holding what we have now and not attempting to escalate in any way?

General GAVIN. I am not sure.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is, in any material substantial way?

General GAVIN. I am really not sure. I was led to believe a year or two ago, that, yes, this was quite possible. We were saying that we could, by merely providing trainees and instructors. So I don't know. I have decided I had better worry a little bit more about this now. I would like to know what the alternatives are and there is much talk about well now, gee, if we can't do with what we have where are we going. I would like to know where we are going, this related to the total commitment this country has, whether it would be a sound investment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you consider this to be primarily a military operation in South Vietnam or is it basically a political operation in South Vietnam?

General GAVIN. Well, certainly, its character has become military in its entirety now. It was originally political. When we were just providing advisers, a handful, I believe it was, it was really a political problem. But the commitments of military forces on both sides have made it overwhelmingly a military problem, we seem to be trying to solve it by military means. I guess this relates to what I said about Laos and the late President Kennedy's solution to the Laotian problem.

It was in prospect a foreboding military problem. We found an adequate political solution to it. If we can solve political problems in Vietnam the military problem would disappear. It may be far too late for that now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At the present time the evidence seems to indicate that the Vietcong control more than 50 percent of the land in South Vietnam.

General GAVIN. So I understand.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know what the percentage is. We get various estimates.

General GAVIN. Neither do I.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let's say two-thirds.

EFFECT OF A HOLDING OPERATION

If we followed the policy of, let's say, to use your word, desisting on our military activities or standing fast or holding, what would keep the Vietcong from running riot over the rest of South Vietnam?

General GAVIN. Yes, Mr. Senator, I said desisting in the application of bombing. The use of the land forces in any way we can use them effectively I think should be carried out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That reverts under the circumstances mostly to jungle fighting, would it not?

General GAVIN. Yes, that is what it is today.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am interested in your comments on bombing military objectives—military targets.

General GAVIN. Yes, yes.

USEFULNESS OF BOMBING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is my understanding that one of the ultimate actions of a war on either side, if they can't win quick victory

right in the field, is wherever they can, to attack the enemy's basis of strength, his production facilities, the things that feed the war machine. This certainly I would think would include powerplants. I would think it would include canals. I would think it would include railroads, and all manner of things—factories that produce the sinews of war for his armies.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So I don't understand why powerplants should be excluded.

General GAVIN. Sir, I must say I look upon this as one of the great illusions of all time, that through air power you can really win this way. I think the results of the strategic bombing survey will show that as our bombing was increased German production went up until we overran facilities. I don't think you can hold them by bombing it nor really win by bombing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That has been pretty much of an undisputed military theory for a long, long time, that you can take ground by certain means but you can't hold it without men on the ground.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We used to say before the airplane came into such great prominence that you could take ground with artillery but you couldn't hold it unless you put men on the ground that you temporarily captured with artillery fire.

General GAVIN. Yes, the airplane to me is transportation and the use of the airplane in Vietnam today is sensationally attractive, the big helicopter, the Hercules, and the role the Air Force is playing in this respect is absolutely indispensable. But this isn't bombing, bombing is another matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't like to get into professional arguments here.

General GAVIN. That is all right.

GENERAL TAYLOR'S COMMENTS ON GENERAL GAVIN'S LETTER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But I presume you have at least read the report of Gen. Maxwell Taylor's speech in New York somewhere around the first of this month.

General GAVIN. Yes, I have, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I will just read this excerpt, I don't like to read out of context but this shortens the time.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He is quoted as saying, in effect at least, that he knew of "no officer with 'current' responsibility who shared the enclave theory." I assume that was referring to your article in the February issue of Harper's magazine, and then he comments in this speech that if we don't succeed in South Vietnam the efficacy of a war of liberation will be established and proved, and, I take it, it would follow that we could expect more attempts at wars of liberation around over the world in various places if this succeeded in South Vietnam.

And I will read this paragraph. This is allegedly a direct quote from the speech and General Taylor says:

This country cannot escape its destiny as the champion of the free world—there is no running away from it. The impulse to withdraw our troops into safe enclaves in South Vietnam has much in common with the yearning for safety beyond defenses at our coastlines and is equally illusory.

I assume you are thoroughly familiar with this speech as it was reported?

General GAVIN. I have, I guess, a copy of it in front of me, purported to be a copy in the Washington Post.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, probably the same that I have. Now regardless of how or what got us into this situation in South Vietnam, it seems to me that our presence there as the most formidable part of the free world may go far beyond the question of, let's say, winning a battle; it is an ideological struggle that we are facing at that point. Would you agree that there is an ideological factor here?

General GAVIN. Oh, sure; no question about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And if we don't win that ideological battle, then what do you think will happen to American prestige in Africa and south Asia and Indonesia and the Philippines and Formosa, Japan?

General GAVIN. Is that the question, sir?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; I said what do you think about the effect?

General GAVIN. Yes, would you include Cuba in that?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, it looks to me like Cuba has been pretty well conceded to the Communists already.

General GAVIN. Strange we go halfway around the world to worry about them so much when we leave Cuba, being 90 miles from the shore.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I agree with some criticism on that but we are not in there now. I am talking about the old Communist philosophy from Moscow that the way to Paris is by way of Peiping and the encirclement policy of capturing first south Asia, moving through south Asia, moving on into Africa or portions of it and the Mediterranean and so on—that long-range theory.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir; I assume you base your question upon the statements made by General Taylor, Senator.

And these I find deeply disturbing. I am not sure he read what I wrote but he has these things to say. He attributes to me a holding strategy, a permanent cessation of bombing, a halt to further U.S. reinforcements, a withdrawal of U.S. ground forces, which would lead to a crushing defeat, a capitulation, abandonment of many people, a retreat. He refers to it as a retreat which would be disastrous and a great defeat and so on.

I don't understand this. This to me is a technique that I found so very distressing that all these things are attributed to someone and then you are asked why you feel like this, and why did you say these things, and you find yourself defending what you didn't say. I don't think he read what I wrote. I don't understand these things.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One of the purposes of this hearing is to clarify the situation because there is a great deal of confusion.

General GAVIN. Yes; excuse me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead if you wish to make a statement.

WARS OF LIBERATION

General GAVIN. Yes, on matters of wars of liberation, the serious import of these is obvious, of course. Yet I worry that since the ini-

tiative may be that of the Chinese, let's say, we feel that we must raise to each confrontation with every national resource, and defeat this then and there with all that we have.

I have no doubt in the long run that our system will triumph of vis-a-vis that of the Chinese Communists, no question in my mind about it. What I want is to see my Nation act restrained and wisely and show restraint and act wisely and we'll win around the periphery with each confrontation. I think we are doing quite well in Vietnam. I worry about going further. Whether or not we win a so-called war of liberation vis-a-vis the Chinese doesn't worry me half as much as all the other things that could happen with us, I think we are doing quite well in total confrontation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say we are informed by the floor there will be a vote at 11:15. I think we can run for one turn. We will reconvene at 11:40 and run to 12:55 and come back at 2:30. That is the best I can give you.

Senator MORSE.

Senator MORSE. General, I want to say that not only do I think that this committee owes you a great debt for the distinguished public service that you have rendered so many times in the past and for what might be the greatest service you have rendered yet and that is your testimony this morning.

General GAVIN. Thank you, sir.

Senator MORSE. I think you have demonstrated what it means in a democracy to inform the people through public sessions, and I hope there will be those in the administration that will learn the lesson from this session this morning because there isn't a single person on this committee who has any desired intention of asking anyone, be it the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or anyone else, a question that involves the security of this Republic. And having sat in these hearings for many years, they know that all they have to say at a given time "Mr. Senator, that particular question I want to answer in executive session" and it is automatically laid aside.

But we have been talking basic policies with you this morning and the American people are entitled to have them discussed in public by anyone coming before us, including the administration witnesses, too. I want to thank you for this great service you have rendered the country.

CONSEQUENCES OF WAR WITH CHINA

My first question will deal with a concern that you have expressed throughout your testimony at various times this morning and I would put it this way. It seems to me you are concerned about where may we end up—

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator MORSE (continuing). In this war in southeast Asia vis-a-vis China. We have to face that general question of policy. We can't stick our heads in the sand and say there is no danger of a war with China. I hope they will have sense enough not to involve themselves in a nuclear war but who knows.

So my first question is, suppose they do, suppose they decide to move on the ground. Suppose we get into a war with them and we do the bombing and we knock out their cities and their nuclear installations and their industrial complex but they still carry on on the ground, what is your estimate of how many American troops we will have to send over in the early stages of that war.

General GAVIN. That is quite a complex question, Mr. Senator, and I would like to be fully responsive to it. Much would depend on the theater, much would depend on where they would have to go. I sometimes wonder what the theater slice is for Vietnam because to maintain a division must take four to five times that many people really behind the slice to keep them there. If the major confrontation were to occur as I would hope it would in northern China, in the Manchurian area, operating out of Korea we could probably do quite well with perhaps double the forces we had in Korea and when we were involved there, when General Ridgway was in command. I would like to be specific but the question does not lend itself to specific answers.

Senator MORSE. I understand. I don't see how you can be specific but I think it is important, however, in this public hearing that the question be raised.

General GAVIN. Yes; I think so.

Senator MORSE. To elicit from you—

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator MORSE (continuing). A response as to whether or not you could do it with the number of men that we now have in southeast Asia or double that or triple that.

Is it not true, judging from what other military leaders have said in the past, that it would take a good many hundreds of thousands of men to fight Red China on the ground whether you do it in Manchuria or whether you move up from South Korea to the border of China?

General GAVIN. Yes. If the commitment began with Chinese volunteers followed by some semblance of semiregular forces, I would say our commitment would escalate very rapidly to double and double again the force we have in southeast Asia just to save themselves and save their own resources and bases.

Senator MORSE. And when we got through forcing her to her knees, and I am satisfied we could, at a horrible cost but that we could, final surrender, does that end our occupation in China?

General GAVIN. No. I have a feeling that at this point, if you got that far down the road in total conflict you would involve the U.S.S.R. in some role or another, and whether they would seek to enter the vacuum in Mongolia and China I don't know but I suspect they would and there would be real problems in further confrontations in the successive stages—following the defeat of China.

Senator MORSE. I would expect one with your brilliant mind to be way ahead of me, I was coming to the Russian question in a moment but I tarry a moment on my last question. Assuming Russia doesn't come in and it is the United States versus China, after we force her to surrender, there is still going to be a China, devastated as she is, would it be possible for us to just automatically withdraw our troops and go home or would we have a policing job to do for a long time thereafter?

General GAVIN. Well, there is no doubt that there would be hundreds of millions of Chinese left who would be in dire, dire straits,

many of them very ill from the effects of the use of nuclear weapons, the whole base of food production, food availability, the economy, the agriculture would be laid flat, and I would assume we would take some responsibility for trying to get the situation straightened out. It would be a very, it would be an appalling problem to deal with, I would think.

Senator MORSE. Would that not be also an appalling drain on the economic resources as well as the manpower of our country?

General GAVIN. Yes; it would, no question about it.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

Senator MORSE. Now let's take the possibility of Red Russia getting involved. I am surprised at the number of people who seem to want to say, "Oh, Russia wouldn't want to come in." But we have a duty of giving some thought to the problem, and, if she does come in, what our position will be then. If Russia should come in on the basis of the fact that she has a security pact with China or for any other reason, do you think Russia would fight us in China or would she fight us in New York City, in Chicago and Washington as we would fight her in Moscow and Stalingrad?

General GAVIN. Well, Russia will always fight where it is to her advantage to do so. I think the policies of Stalin of aggrandizement still are present, perhaps latent, but there. And I would think if she saw clearly an opportunity to achieve greater control of greater amounts of territory she would go ahead and seek to her advantage wherever it would take her, northern China or wherever it would be. If this involved a confrontation with us, I don't know. This is another matter. I think she has great respect for our nuclear weapons.

Senator MORSE. We can't dismiss it as impossible of happening.

General GAVIN. No, no, I don't think so at all. It is a contingency we should be aware of and ever present lurking in the back of our mind.

ATTITUDE OF NON-COMBATANT COUNTRIES TOWARD A BLOCKADE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, let me ask one more question. You spoke in response to a question by Senator Hickenlooper about what we might do if we escalated the war into Hanoi and into the harbor and you said we might either mine it or blockade it or I assume both. Have you given any thought, General, as to what the position of noncombatant countries in respect to their flags would be if we blockaded the harbor.

Would you name for us the neutral or noncombatant nations that would lower their flag to that blockade, including the Union Jack.

General GAVIN. No; I think we would be in very serious trouble with our allies, very serious trouble.

Senator MORSE. And that blockade would be no better than its enforceability.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator MORSE. Do you know of any time in the history of the British Empire when that Union Jack has ever been lowered to a blockade that the British Empire was not a party to?

General GAVIN. No, I know of none and this matter has come up in the past, when this matter came up too, when we were dealing about some problems with China. I know this is a very difficult thing to deal with and probably it would be impossible to enforce.

Blockade it alone.

Senator MORSE. Do you think the Russian flag would be lowered to that blockade?

General GAVIN. I don't know. I doubt it.

Senator MORSE. When we sank the first Russian ship when it wasn't lowered to that blockade, do you think they would send us a valentine in February or send us a bomb?

General GAVIN. I suppose they would be inclined to bomb.

Senator MORSE. I much prefer valentines.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be back, General.

(Short recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Senator from Vermont is recognized.

Senator AIKEN. General Gavin, I understand from newspaper reports that you favor holding what bases we now have, whether inland or on the coast; is that correct?

General GAVIN. Again, where we stand today?

Senator AIKEN. Right where we are now, and not any ground forces.

DOES FIGHTING ON A PERIMETER CONSTITUTE A STATE OF SIEGE?

Just what is a state of siege? I am asking that question because all the fighting seems to be taking place on the perimeters of our bases, whether inland or on the coast.

General GAVIN. I beg your pardon, sir, what was the question at the beginning?

Senator AIKEN. My question was, what was a state of siege?

General GAVIN. Oh.

Senator AIKEN. I realize there are different kinds of sieges, perhaps, but all the fighting seems to be taking place on the perimeter of our bases.

General GAVIN. Yes.

First of all, I might say that I was not more specific on what we have there because I, indeed, do not know. I do not have any access to classified information, and I just know from what I read in the newspapers, and I do know we have established air and sea bases along the coasts in several areas, and also we have pushed our units into the interior in a seek-and-destroy operation. They appear at the moment to be doing quite well, and again I can only say from what I read in the press.

There was an interesting column yesterday by Mr. Alsop in which he speculated about the possible use of less force if one pursues this tactic than in holing up and digging in in some sort of a periphery around the coast, which I did not have in mind. But I do not know. I do not think that there is a state of siege at all. Far from it. They seem to be doing quite well with what they have.

TIME REQUIRED TO BRING SECURITY TO VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Assuming that we hold the bases which we now have and, perhaps, increase our force to the numbers which may be indicated by General Westmoreland, how long a job do you suppose it would be to restore a reasonable degree of security to the people of South Vietnam?

General GAVIN. I really do not know, sir. I do not know that anyone does. If we were to add another 100,000 men, I would expect that this would be matched by commitment from the Vietcong and, possibly, begin to see a commitment of Chinese support.

Senator AIKEN. You do not think it would take as long as it took in the Philippines?

General GAVIN. Oh, that went on for many, many years. The pacification was not completed until we had been in there, oh, 20 years at least. This is a very rough guess. But I would expect that we may be involved in southeast Asia for many, many, many years. Perhaps not that long, but a long time.

Senator AIKEN. There are other reports which are rather puzzling in a way. Once in a while we read that a large body of allied troops, maybe as many as 10,000 or 15,000 surround a lesser body of Vietcong troops, possibly of regimental strength, and are drawing a net on them. Then a few days later, when the net has been drawn tight, we find that there are only a few of the Vietcong caught in it. What becomes of them? Where do they go? Would you have any guess as to what becomes of them?

General GAVIN. Sir, my guess is hardly a bit better than yours. I do know from having served in the Island of Luzon and out on Bataan and spent quite a bit of time with Filipinos, the Filipinos themselves, in a military operation you deal with a language problem, and the problem of security, I think in many cases, that they are probably well informed about what we are doing, and we find difficulty knowing what they are doing. The environmental conditions are such that we probably have a difficult time adapting to them compared to the natives we are dealing with, and the sum total of all of this is that despite our courage and our equipment and the gallantry of our troops, we just have a very tough problem to handle. It is a little beyond our resources at times.

ROLE OF RUSSIA IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Yes. I noticed that you said that we might not now be in a position to determine the degree of escalation; that China might determine that for us. Where does Russia come into this picture? I had not seen any outward indications that Russia was at all displeased with our getting more seriously involved in that part of the world.

General GAVIN. Well, if one were to judge from what one reads in the press, the Russians and the Chinese have a very serious difference of view about support to Hanoi anyway. The Russians have presumably provided surface-to-air missiles, which are of a dubious performance so far. They are apparently getting these through China by rail to Hanoi.

I think Russia would like to be identified with Ho Chi Minh's mind as the real supporter and saviour of the North Vietnamese people.

On the other hand, I do not think the Chinese are going to stand for this for a moment. If there is any identification it will be the Chinese Reds. Personally, I would think that Ho Chi Minh would like to stand between the two and not be identified with either.

Senator AIKEN. He seems to have indicated that himself from time to time. I suppose Russia could not only deliver surface-to-air missiles, they could deliver most any kind of missiles to North Vietnam if they thought the occasion required it.

General GAVIN. Yes. They would be quite sensitive about the classified material of a very sophisticated nature going in there, I am sure, and for this reason they would be restrained in what they did. If they were likely to be overrun they would be very, very touchy about that because missiles and their associated guidance equipment are still quite highly classified in that type of sophisticated armor.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I think General Gavin has performed a service for us this morning in making some things clearer than they were before, particularly his own position. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

Senator GORE. General, the professional experience and knowledge which you bring to the committee is very welcome. Unquestionably many people will wonder why Members of the Senate who are without your professional training are concerning themselves with global strategy, military policy.

As inadequate as our training and experience may be, it just is, nevertheless, the responsibility of the U.S. Senate, despite its lack of military training, just as it is the members of the executive department who themselves are without military training, to exercise the responsibilities that are theirs and that are ours.

Having seen a plethora of mistakes, some of us are a little encouraged to follow the bent of our own judgment.

PLACING VIETNAM IN PERSPECTIVE

I was impressed with your effort to place Vietnam in perspective, relating it to our other commitments in the world, relating it to the problems of global strategy to preserve the freedom of this country.

I wrote down some words you used. I believe you described our preoccupation with Vietnam as "alarmingly out of balance." You also said at one place that in the view of some, Vietnam was out of proportion, and you used another word that some people were "mesmerized with Vietnam."

Now, taking these things together may very well place your statement in disproportion to your real meaning, but it is a counterbalance to those who seem to regard Vietnam as both the end and the center of the earth.

I have not thought it was either, although I have not been able to do so with the sophistication which you show this morning. Some of the viewpoints with respect to global strategy on the overall, the equation between the major powers, I have been expressing behind doors of this committee for several years.

The thing that concerned me most about your testimony was when you said that we had escalated—I am not sure whether you said we had escalated at the will of an opponent or we were escalating at the will of an opponent. In any event, if you meant to say that, you added a third matter of major concern.

No. 1 with me, the Communists have us committed in an area where we face the greatest possible disadvantages.

No. 2, in violation of the principles of collective security to which we committed ourselves in the United Nations Charter, they have us standing alone.

WHO CONTROLS U.S. ESCALATION?

And now you bring a third point which, in my word, means that we have escalated to the point that events are controlling our action rather than the United States being in control of events. It is that point to which I would ask you to address your remarks.

General GAVIN. It is at this very, very point that I became terribly uneasy, and I began to describe on a piece of paper what my concern was, and on this very point, because the experience that I had acquired from reading the reports of our Cabinet members who have gone there over recent years, had led me to believe that each estimate they were wrong in their calculations. On the next return we had to add an increment and another increment.

If I were a businessman and looking at a potential market and found such miscalculation, I would have to do something about it. I would not long survive.

I can merely surmise, and I can merely surmise that the initiative is not with us, to be escalated at the will of our opponent.

I have a very dear friend, and I wish I could say this myself, but I should attribute it to a proper source, who was a former Minister of State for Defense Affairs in the United Kingdom, and he talked to me a few months ago, and he said to me, "I must tell you I look upon that as a baited trap."

I think that is not a bad analog. It is close to what it might be. It may well be in the long run if we are willing to make the commitment in the area, such a costly drain on our resources, where we lack the ability to respond to other places where it would be a very real challenge to our very vital interests. This is why I am concerned at this point.

RUSSIAN ACTION IN EVENT OF SINO-UNITED STATES CONFLICT

Senator GORE. Well, General, in the awful event, which has been suggested here, of possible war between the United States and China, God forbid, you suggested certain possibilities, one of them being the Soviets moving into Manchuria.

Does the Soviet Union have treaty commitments with China to come to her aid in the event she is attacked by a capitalist state?

General GAVIN. Senator Gore, I think there is such a mutual defense pact, but I do not think it means a great deal. I think the Soviets would act in their own interests. They always have.

Senator GORE. I would agree with that.

If her interests indicated a move into the vacuum of Manchuria, you suggest they might do so. Is another possibility that once the United States and China were locked into an endless conflict, then Russia would rub her hands and look about and decide to work her own machinations on our own back door in Latin America?

General GAVIN. Oh, yes. I would certainly think that an outright conflict, a major conflagration between the United States and China would be to the Soviets' interests; very much so. They would make the most of that everywhere they could.

Senator GORE. We are told now that indictments are being circulated in the Soviet Union against China on the basis that she is trying to promote a war between Russia and the United States. Maybe China would like to see Russia and the United States fight.

So this question between the three major powers, it seems to me, is far more important than Vietnam, North or South, or both North and South.

General GAVIN. I certainly would agree with you. Anyway North Vietnam has been fitted into that whole complex of the problem. It is not so important itself that we can ignore the others and decide everything must be done here.

Senator GORE. It is not within the power of Vietnam to bring about a third world war; but, as I understand you, you say that we are now in position or may get into a position where unquestionably China could do so.

General GAVIN. It takes little in the way of a thought to see how this could come about.

Let us put it this way: that a Chinese intervention, volunteers, regulars, a reopening of Korea, and we would have a major affair on our hands, and where world war III could occur.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator GORE. General, I see my time is about to expire. I would like to thank you for this contribution to public information—the education of the American citizen on a question which involves every man, woman, and child in our country.

This does not mean that I agree with everything you have said or those who have watched this program will agree, but it is a contribution to public education.

General GAVIN. Thank you very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

Senator CARLSON. General Gavin, I, too, want to express my appreciation to you for your appearance here this morning because there is a great national and international interest in this problem confronting our Nation regarding Vietnam and surrounding territory.

As one who has read your statement in Harper's, and followed some of the press comments, I was particularly pleased that you have appeared here this morning and, I think, clarified some of the statements that we may have gotten the wrong impression from.

RELATIONSHIP OF VIETNAM SITUATION TO LAOS AND THAILAND

I was interested in one comment, and I do not know who responded to you on this dais or whose question it was, but I gathered from one of your statements that we might have to put troops in Thailand. Would you discuss that a little bit? Did you not make that statement?

General GAVIN. Yes, yes.

Of course, I do not have access to the actual troop dispositions or deployments there, but as I understand it from the sources I have, and mostly newspapers, the Pathet Lao are still aggressive in Laos. The Vietcong are beginning to show up in Laos. I would expect them to give Souvanna Phouma a very difficult time and be on the Mekong at no time at all, indeed if some forces are not there already.

We now have logistical deployment in Thailand in anticipation of troubles there of a very serious order of magnitude, harbors, bridges, highways, which are always the forerunner of a proper and efficient deployment of troops that will follow—they may not have to follow—but these things are taken as a matter of caution, so I would think that the Vietcong would go ahead with the urging and support of the Chinese and engage us and engage the Laotian, and then the Thais and involve ourselves.

Senator CARLSON. General, just following that same line of thinking, isn't the question going to be why should we not at least remain and prosecute the war in Vietnam with a hope that it would not expand into other areas of southeast Asia?

General GAVIN. Yes, absolutely. I think this is a very proper question, and the answer might be indeed, yes. In fact, if we were going to fight in Thailand, I am not concerned about if we fail in Vietnam, Thailand is coming; Thailand is coming anyway. I am concerned about the requirements for both. If it is \$10.5 billion in fiscal 1967 for Vietnam, what is it going to be in 1968 or 1969 for Thailand, too, because we have both. It is not either one, we have both, and it may well be to our advantage, I rather think tactically it is. Although I am not on the ground—I am speaking in a rather different environment here—I would think it would be well to hold a major area of Vietnam if we were going to get involved in Thailand, because this would put us in position of being not far from the communications of the Chinese supply forces that would have to supply down into Thailand.

Senator CARLSON. I believe you stated, in response to a question, that you were not opposed to the bombing of military objectives in North Vietnam.

General GAVIN. That is right, sir.

EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPORTANCE OF BOMBING

Senator CARLSON. That is one of the issues that is confronting our people. I receive much mail on it, and I am sure everyone in the country has, of the various different viewpoints as to whether we should bomb or should not bomb.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. I have before me a release of General Wheeler's statement which was taken before the Senate Armed Services Com-

mittee and released. I am going to quote just one paragraph. In it he discusses the three blue chips that we have when we come into negotiation, and I am quoting:

One of them is the bombing of North Vietnam; the second is the deployment of United States and third-country forces into South Vietnam; and the third is the prospective withdrawal, under appropriate circumstances, of our forces and third-country forces.

(The entire text of the statement referred to follows:)

Because of the widespread interest in the subject, the following excerpt from the joint hearings of the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations has been cleared for release before the entire record can be screened for security deletions and printed.

Senator Russell, the chairman of both groups, requested of Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his comments on an article written by Gen. James Gavin that appears in the February 1966 edition of Harper's magazine.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, did you have occasion to read an article by General Gavin, a communication from Vietnam?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir; I have.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have the Joint Chiefs mentioned this in any degree?

General WHEELER. We haven't discussed it in any official way.

Chairman RUSSELL. We are going to have a great many letters about this article, and I would like to have some statement in the record upon which to predicate a reply.

General WHEELER. I can make some comments right now.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you don't want to, you can file it for the record. Personally, I want it because I know there are a lot of letters coming in.

Senator PASTORE. We would like to hear it.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, go ahead.

General WHEELER. I would say this: Proposals such as this are really not new. Many of the things that are contained in this letter, either as individual proposals or as a totality, have been put forward before.

Chairman RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, our original plan went part of the way on this, didn't it?

General WHEELER. I would say this, Mr. Chairman. Everything that was said in the letter, I believe, was considered at a pretty high level and for one reason or another was discarded.

I picked out six points in the article which struck me as being worthy of comment.

There is an inference that the French and the United States had the same objectives in Vietnam, and, in other words, we are facing the same situation.

I would suggest that this is not so.

The issue, as I understand it, at the time of the French colonial war there, was whether or not the Vietnamese would get their freedom.

The issue today is whether or not the South Vietnamese can remain free, and this, I think, puts it in a different context.

The statement is made that we are endeavoring to secure the entire country from the Vietcong. Well, this is not so. Our objectives out there, and this is General Westmoreland's strategy, is to defeat, together with the Vietnamese forces, the main force Vietcong units and the North Vietnamese forces that have been introduced, that is the PAVN. We need to assist the Vietnamese in establishing security for the population, and I emphasize the word "assist" there because this must primarily, of course, be a Vietnamese operation. This is a police-type action primarily, even though it is quite true that as a collateral benefit from the presence of our forces there is security given to a large number of Vietnamese people.

Finally, our effort is to assist the Vietnamese in establishing conditions where they can maintain a free government.

So our objective is not, I repeat, to secure the entire country from the Vietcong.

The suggestion is made that we should stop bombing North Vietnam. This has two aspects to it that would be bothersome. We undertook air action

against North Vietnam for two main purposes: one was to reduce the availability of men and materiel which could be moved to the south. The other was to reduce by attacking the lines of communications the capability of the North Vietnamese to move men and supplies within their own country and from the North Vietnam to South Vietnam. We would be giving that up.

There was a psychological aspect to our undertaking these attacks and that was to punish the North Vietnamese for their aggression against South Vietnam.

Now, we have, from the military point of view, three blue chips when it comes to negotiations. One of them is the bombing of North Vietnam; the second is the deployment of United States and third-country forces into South Vietnam; and the third is the prospective withdrawal, under appropriate circumstances, of our forces and third-country forces.

If you stop bombing North Vietnam, in effect you throw one of your blue chips for negotiation over your shoulder.

There was a proposal made of withdrawing into a few enclaves. This has several bothersome aspects. One is that to do so would be to surrender the initiative to the enemy. In other words, the rest of the country outside of your enclaves would be his to do with as he saw fit.

I believe very firmly that under such circumstances the enemy would be able to concentrate against any chosen point. He could attack either with mortars, artillery, or any way he saw fit and inflict very substantial losses on us, with very little loss in return to his own forces.

Under such circumstances, I believe that it would only be a matter of time until we would lose the active fighting support of the South Vietnamese forces. In effect, I believe that this would be to give South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese.

The next proposal of the package, that having suspended bombing, having withdrawn to enclaves, we should seek negotiations in the U.N. or another Geneva Conference. As we all know, President Johnson has offered to negotiate anywhere, on practically any terms, and to date, so far as I know, he has had no takers. In fact, I would suggest that if you undertake the first two steps of this package, stopping the bombing and withdrawing to enclaves, there would be very little point in a negotiation.

I think the country would be going down the drain before you ever got a negotiation going. Secondly, I would say there would be no pressure on the North Vietnamese to negotiate under such circumstances, so why should they negotiate?

The suggestion is made that under these circumstances we might hold the peninsula, Kra Peninsula, Thailand, and the Philippines. The Kra Peninsula as you know is the peninsula on which Malaysia is located.

If we, in effect, with this program accomplished, turned South Vietnam over to North Vietnam, I doubt there would be any great enthusiasm on the part of the Malays, the Thailanders, or the Filipinos to have us engaged in some kind of a defensive activity on their soil with their assistance. In other words, they would say, "We had better accommodate ourselves to North Vietnam and Red China."

Another issue which I didn't pick out in this particular letter, but which I think is important, and that is that this is the first of the wars of national liberation which have been preached by the Soviets, and by Mao Tse-tung, and there is a very important stake here resting upon whether we win or we lose.

I believe that if we lose this war, which we do not have to lose, that we will have more wars of national liberation to face up to with the prospect of greater losses under less favorable circumstances.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, your statement here dealing with this Gavin article and the possibility of winning the war in South Vietnam, can the members of the committee quote you on that?

General WHEELER. It is perfectly all right with me, sir.

Senator PASTORE. Can you be quoted as having said it?

General WHEELER. Surely, it is all right with me. I would prefer not to get into a public controversy—

Senator PASTORE. I realize that.

General WHEELER (continuing). With General Gavin who happens to be a personal friend of mine of 25 years' standing, but certainly I disagree, and I can be quoted to that effect.

It was his contention if we stopped bombing North Vietnam we would lose a great advantage when we come to negotiations. I would assume you would agree with most of us that we would settle this someday by negotiation.

General GAVIN. I would hope so. I read General Wheeler's statement with a great deal of interest. I have a tremendous admiration for him. He is unquestionably the best man we have in the Armed Forces today.

I had an uneasy feeling that somehow we were not talking about the same thing. Actually, of course, the bombing is a "blue chip" that we have. I would like to make it quite clear that one thing I wanted to head off was any extrapolation of the immediate World War II—post-World War II—thinking that you can bomb cities and gain military results of any impressive sort whatsoever.

Today, with the weapons we have, taking out complete cities, will unquestionably create more problems than they will solve for us. One may go all the way back down the road where you are just giving vital bomber support to a platoon out in the middle of, well, of the highlands, let us say. It is a very difficult line to draw.

I personally cannot imagine, with my military background, having our young men out there committed to battle where their very lives depend on using every resource they have, to allow military dangers to arise in front of them, and then to ignore them, and the front may be a hundred miles away, and it may be a tank column or a flight of bombers or any such military target as that, but I would not just extrapolate this on to bombing the north, let us say. Somewhere in between you have to draw the line.

Senator CARLSON. I appreciate very much that statement because that answers some mail I have received. I get a lot of mail about this bombing—whether we should or should not—from the boys who are over there. I have had letters from them, who just cannot understand why we do not bomb. I have had letters from parents who have boys there, who do not understand why we do not bomb.

On the other side, you have what you mentioned, and I fully appreciate that. We should bomb where it is in the interests of protecting our boys.

General GAVIN. We really must. Of course, everybody knows, who has had combat experience, you have to be exceedingly discriminate in bombing. In darkness you cannot tell friends from foe; under the dense foliage you cannot, and in very bad weather you cannot bomb, and it is not the answer to all of our problems at all. The man on the ground holds the ground. Bombing won't hold the ground.

QUESTION OF BOMBING HANOI AND HAIPHONG

Senator CARLSON. Another problem that our country is concerned about is the bombing of Hanoi. I get letters and I hear it discussed whenever I visit with the people. I would like to ask you if you read this very excellent report that Senator Mansfield, Senator Aiken, and others made following their visit to not only Vietnam but other countries.

General GAVIN. I read most of it as reported in the press—all of it that I was able to read in the press.

Senator CARLSON. I read it once or twice. In my opinion, it is one of the finest documents that has been produced in this entire Vietnam problem.

General GAVIN. Yes. I would certainly say so.

Senator CARLSON. There is one sentence in view of the statement made this morning about bombing or closing the port at Haiphong.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. As I know my geography, Haiphong is the port which supplies Hanoi.

General GAVIN. It is at the foot of the delta.

Senator CARLSON. There is a paragraph in this report, and I thought of it the first time I read it, and I wanted to read it to you.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. It is found on page 4:

In Saigon, heavily defended as it is, the rattle of automatic weapons fire or the explosion of mortar shells in the outskirts of the city are not uncommon sounds by day or by night. Vietcong ability to carry out the terroristic attacks within the city itself is from time to time made evident. Indeed, it is considered by some that Saigon with its many vulnerabilities to sabotage and terrorism and Hanoi with its exposure to air attack are mutual hostages, one for the other.

As I read that paragraph it seems to say to me if we close the port of Haiphong, which we could easily do, I am sure, either by bombs or mines or bomb Hanoi, we could expect retaliation by closing the waterway to Saigon, and we would probably have 1,200,000 refugees on our hands. Do you have any comment on that?

General GAVIN. Yes, I do. I think that Saigon, from what I know about it, is very vulnerable, and from what I have read about it is very vulnerable, and certainly this is a risk that the commander on the spot must decide to take if he is going to bomb Hanoi. He must realize he is trading Saigon.

Haiphong is another matter. I think that my testimony earlier entered into an area in which I, perhaps, lack competence, and that is whether or not our allies would respect such a thing as a blockade of Haiphong, whether they would literally protest in a rather substantial way—mining—so that they are denied access to the port. I suppose these might be major problems.

But to return to your statement, I would agree Hanoi and Saigon are mutual hostages, unquestionably.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

PULLING OUT NOT ADVOCATED

General Gavin, do I understand correctly that it is your view that we should not retire completely to the coastline and establish enclaves there, but that our participation must be beyond that, and that the position ascribed to you recently is not the correct one?

General GAVIN. I did not get the last sentence, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yesterday's column said that you advocated retreating to the shore and staying there. This morning I heard you say that that is not your position.

General GAVIN. There has been many things that have been in columns, and I have been charged with these very things which have been attributed to me, which is not so.

I would like to quote from a letter I wrote as the basis of your discussion.

Senator LAUSCHE. I only have 10 minutes. Do you feel we should stay in South Vietnam in the interests of our country?

General GAVIN. Yes; I do.

Senator LAUSCHE. You believe that our security requires that we stay there, is that correct?

General GAVIN. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you are not advising the people of the United States that we should pull out?

General GAVIN. I certainly am not.

Senator LAUSCHE. And why are you advising that we should not pull out?

General GAVIN. I am saying this has reached a critical point, sir. This is what I am saying.

Let us take a look at what we have, what we can do with what we have, and then consider the alternatives open to us, and having reached this state of mind, make up our minds what we want to do in view of our total global commitments. This is what I am saying, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. You are not of the judgment that we can pull out of South Vietnam, move to Thailand or Malaysia or the Philippines and be in a more formidable position to protect the security and the interests of the United States?

General GAVIN. Not for a moment; no, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. The fact is that you believe that this latter course would be a mistake.

General GAVIN. No question about it.

Senator LAUSCHE. No question about it.

NO FURTHER ESCALATION ADVOCATED

What your concern is, is the manner in which we meet the problem while staying in South Vietnam.

General GAVIN. That is right, sir. And, may I say, to get a bracket on what I am thinking, if we are saying all right, let us put a million men in right now, then, to make a major commitment, this, I think, clearly is an error.

Senator GORE. Clearly what?

General GAVIN. An error; quadruple the forces we have, to really try to seal off the force, I think that is an error because we have many commitments right before us, and many ahead of us today engaging our resources.

Senator LAUSCHE. In other words, you would feel the strategy of putting a million men in there would not be good because we might become faced with a parallel situation some other place, and the assignment of that great number into South Vietnam would not be sound.

General GAVIN. That is a very—yes, sir; that is a very straightforward statement. I agree with it entirely. But I would refine it some to say that the drain on our total strategic position at this point would

become very serious. I would say that we would have to face up, and I am getting a bit out of my territory now, Mr. Chairman, to rationing of key materials, to tight control of our economy, that would then begin to hurt us in the world markets, and that is where we try to help other people and do other things that have done so much to advance the idea of what the United States is and can be.

It would hurt our internal programs, I think, as well. I speak of our social programs.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Do you know of any place to which we could withdraw and prevent the expansion of communism and improve the security of our country at this time? That is, could we withdraw to the shores of Hawaii or to the Philippines, if we can reach an agreement?

General GAVIN. No, no, Mr. Senator. We are talking about this in a global sense. We could save some of our resources in other parts of the globe. I think we are overcommitted in our troops in Europe, as I said earlier this morning, both in troop numbers and in logistical support, and we might well husband some of our resources there and use them better. But certainly not in southeast Asia, no.

We are there and committed there, and the confrontation is there, and we want to be awfully sure we do not get so deeply involved in one place that we lose track of everything else.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

CAN HANOI WIN WITHOUT SUPPORT?

Secretary Rusk has made this statement that Hanoi's attitude toward its program is that it believes three things will happen or one or two of the three things:

One, that Hanoi can succeed militarily in South Vietnam. What is your view of that judgment, if that is Hanoi's?

General GAVIN. Well, sir, certainly with the dispositions we now have, Hanoi cannot do it herself. She needs the support of the Chinese, in my opinion.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. But Hanoi cannot succeed there militarily.

General GAVIN. Not by herself, I do not think.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

EFFECT OF WORLD OPINION ON U.S. COMMITMENT

Then the second thing that they expect, and that is Hanoi speaking, they hope international opinion somehow would build up in such a way as to cause the United States to change its commitment to South Vietnam. Would you suggest that we change our commitment to South Vietnam at this time?

General GAVIN. Not because of world opinion. However, as I pointed out this morning, this is a very important point. The world has shrunk to the point where we cannot ignore world opinion. I travel abroad a great deal. I get awfully tired of having people hand me leaflets in Picadilly in London showing bombing casualties and women and children hurt by American bombs and so on.

They are trying to exploit every possible bit of sympathetic response out of the world, in world opinion, over the predicament that we have got them into, the Vietcong.

This is a very important thing that cannot be overlooked. I have a feeling sometimes Americans tend to live in isolation with their own problems and do not realize the importance of the opinion of other people about what we are trying to do.

Senator LAUSCHE. On this subject of world opinion, the report made by Senators Aiken, Mansfield, and the other members of the delegation was that of the 15 countries into which they went, 12 of them were hoping that we would win. Three of them on the surface expressed the contrary view, and the three were Russia, Poland, and, I believe, Rumania, and the last two in truth were on our side.

So that I would say that there is no indication at present that world opinion wants the Vietcong and the Communists to win in that area.

But here is the final view.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

EFFECT OF DOMESTIC DISCUSSION ON U.S. COMMITMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. And, thirdly, it is Hanoi's hope, they feel that internal differences among American people might cause the United States to change its course.

Now, my question is while it is good in our democracy to discuss these things, and I believe they ought to be discussed, what is your opinion as to whether we are helping our cause or hurting it by the denunciation of the position which our Government has taken and by the advocacy of the thought that we should pull out, and by the advocacy of the thought that we should not bomb and allow our boys to stay there and be cut down like open ducks on the sea surface. May I have your view on that?

General GAVIN. On all three points it is harmful to our position in world opinion.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not hear you.

General GAVIN. On all three of these points to take this position would be obviously harmful to our position in the world.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

General GAVIN. I must say, however, that we must have more discussion of this problem, certainly in the legislative branch of our Government. I think that we must take an interest in this, and once having done so, and the problem is understood, we will have more support than we have had otherwise.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think your appearance here today, General Gavin, has been most constructive.

General GAVIN. Sir, I hope so.

Senator LAUSCHE. There has been ascribed to you, at least as far as I have heard it, a position that is completely contrary to what you have spoken about here, and I think you have made clear, as one of the principal persons speaking on this subject, that you are of the view that we cannot pull out.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. That we cannot find a better place than where we are, and that ought to help the American people substantially.

I yield the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams?

Senator Mundt?

CHINA'S FUTURE COURSE

Senator MUNDT. General, you have a statement in your article in Harper's that sort of predicts a pretty dim future for the world, and I would like to have you talk about it a little bit. I quote it to you. It is on page 18 which says:

If the Chinese Communists continue on their present course of aggression and, at the same time, continue to develop more devastating weapons—and I refer to nuclear weapons—the time may come when China will bring upon herself a nuclear war. But that time is not here yet.

What can we do to avert that kind of catastrophe, because China is not going to bring upon herself a nuclear war without probably attacking us.

General GAVIN. Well, sir, let us walk right into that one.

Senator MUNDT. It is kind of a terrifying statement. I wish you would.

General GAVIN. I mean every bit of that, too.

Senator MUNDT. I know that, and we are all concerned about that.

General GAVIN. I rather suspect that basic to the Chinese problem is the problem of isolation in the affairs of the world. It seems to me sooner or later we are going to have to find a way to bring China into the councils, and I speak of the United Nations, the councils of the world. We have got to get these people into the society of people to talk about these problems.

Now, I think they will go ahead on an aggressive course, that is the course they are now on, and will develop nuclear weapons, fission weapons and fusion weapons; hopefully they will learn the appalling and shocking casualties that these weapons can inflict both directly and indirectly, and hopefully their adjustment to the problems of the world, their acceptance into the family of nations, their education as a result of their own technical developments may bring about a point of view on their part such as we can live together and coexist together and trade together. But this is not in prospect now.

The way things are now going I think they will continue on an aggressive course, they will continue to be aggressive in southeast Asia, they will continue to export their brand of totalitarian communism in Africa, in South America, and wherever they can find a foothold, pleading the cause they peculiarly plead "that it is us, the colored people against the other people, we understand your problem, and these other people do not, the Soviets or the United States or the Europeans."

I think they will continue on this course for some time, and I can foresee the possibility of them initiating a war that will end up in a nuclear holocaust, I can see this possibility happening. I hope it could be avoided.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY

Senator MUNDT. On the basis of your vast military background and knowledge and training, would you care to give us a "guesstimate" as to when you think China will have the delivery system with which to take their nuclear weapons out of their country and use them someplace else?

General GAVIN. Sir, I really do not know. This I do not have the knowledge of. It would be the worst sort of a guess.

Senator MUNDT. Can you estimate it from 5 to 10 years? I am a little concerned because the Pentagon underestimated by quite a number of years the time when they could come up with their nuclear devices. But even taking the most optimistic figure of 10 years, that is not a very long time.

General GAVIN. We underestimated the Soviets by 5 years. And I know, I have talked to a number of nuclear physicists who trained the Chinese before World War II, and they were always of the opinion that the Chinese, it was just a case of time when they would come up with weapons. I think they have some brilliant nuclear physicists, and they will come up with weapons.

Then you talk about a nuclear delivery capability, can they get delivery of vehicles from the Soviet, can they make their own, do they have missiles—these questions, I am sorry, I do not have an answer for. I would be guessing.

Senator MUNDT. Have you any suggestions to make as to specific steps in American military or diplomatic policies we might take to avert this awful calamity that you allude to?

General GAVIN. Yes, sir; I sure have, I sure have.

Senator MUNDT. I would like to hear them.

General GAVIN. I think we ought to mind our business and get on to developing a strategy that we have in recent years that is totally successful. I left the service in 1958 honestly concerned about the strategy we were then embarking upon. It was one of massive retaliation, the time and place of our choosing, and we are just beginning to suspect that at that time we needed a change. I felt it was totally wrong. I felt the problems we were going to live with were not total war but limited war all around the periphery. I was then concerned with the success of the Soviet system as I saw it, from a scientific point of view they were doing extremely well. I am satisfied that in the last 8 years we have definitely demonstrated to them that our system is far more productive, not only of material goods and comforts for our people, but of weapons as well, and they are now seeking to find some accommodations in the world of economic competition.

Senator MUNDT. I just have 10 minutes. I wish you would get on to China for us.

General GAVIN. All right. Then I believe in dealing with the Chinese problem. If we keep in mind our total global strategic commitments and take care of those and conduct ourselves well, dealing with the confrontations the Chinese give us on this very abrasive interface with ourselves and China as best we can, discreetly and with some wisdom, to overcommit ourselves in southeast Asia or anyplace else, for that matter, Thailand, could be a very serious mistake in case of our total equipment.

Senator MUNDT. Do you think success or failure, either alternative, is going to have any impact on this problem of whether the Chinese develop a system of nuclear weapons?

General GAVIN. No, no. I think they will go on with that as fast as they can.

Senator MUNDT. Do you think it will make any difference in the overall picture, whether we lose or win in Vietnam?

General GAVIN. Oh, I think—I think regardless of the outcome of the Vietnamese confrontation, and I cannot conceive of us really losing there with the resources we have, I think that they will get on with their nuclear weapons program. It is a matter of the highest priority.

THE "ENCLAVE" PROPOSAL

Senator MUNDT. Turning now to the second question which as a member of the Appropriations Committee, I heard General Wheeler, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, make. This is the statement that Senator Carlson alluded to, and I want to turn now to the second place where he had sharp differences with you, as he understood your presentation, and I read you his statement. He says:

There was a proposal made of withdrawing into a few enclaves. This has several bothersome aspects. One is that to do so would be to surrender the initiative to the enemy. In other words, the rest of the country outside of your enclaves would be his to do with as he saw fit.

Again quoting General Wheeler:

I believe very firmly that under such circumstances the enemy would be able to concentrate against any chosen point. He could attack either with mortars, artillery, or any way he saw fit and inflict very substantial losses on us, with very little loss in return to his own forces.

Under such circumstances, I believe that it would only be a matter of time until we would lose the active fighting support of South Vietnamese forces. In effect, I believe that this would be to give South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese.

I think you are entitled to your public rejoinder.

General GAVIN. We seem to be talking about two different things, General Wheeler and I.

Senator MUNDT. You mention enclaves in your article, on page 18.

General GAVIN. Well, sir, I said that:

"Today we have sufficient force in South Vietnam to hold," and I used the word "enclave" because I thought it would be understood. It could have been perimeter, air base, sea base—on the coast, where sea and air power can be made fully effective. That is the first step.

The next thing I referred to, I referred to it later, when I say in contrast to a total all-out commitment, to extend the 17th parallel as a cordon sanitaire to the Mekong.

On the other hand, if we should maintain our enclaves on the coast, in other words, our power there, and seek to find a solution, and so on, and finally, I make reference to our deployments by saying that we must do the best we can with the forces we have deployed in Vietnam.

I say never at any time withdraw, retreat, go into an enclave and dig in: no, sir; I do not.

Senator MUNDT. I think this is what the general caught, and it was what disturbed me in your article, because at the bottom of the paragraph you started to say and I quote:

"On the other hand, if we should maintain enclaves on the coast," you say, "the problems that we would then have to deal with"—meaning with the enclave approach—"the problems that we would then have to deal with would be far less serious than those associated with an expansion of the conflict." This would indicate your leaning in the direction of the enclave formula which General Wheeler criticizes from stem to stern. You have no reason to defend yourself against those criticisms if, in fact, you are not advocating enclaves.

General GAVIN. No, I am not.

Senator MUNDT. But if you are advocating enclaves, and it would appear so in the article, then I think we should have some argument from you as to why your position is sound.

General GAVIN. If General Wheeler means an enclave is something you withdraw into and hole up in, if that is his idea, it certainly is not mine.

DEFINITION OF AN ENCLAVE

Senator MUNDT. How would you define an enclave?

General GAVIN. I made quite clear—

Senator MUNDT. How would you define the enclave?

General GAVIN. I made quite clear I talk about the present deployment there, what we have, what we can do with what we have, and see if we cannot find other alternatives open to us. These are the enclaves as I talk about them.

Senator MUNDT. How would you define an enclave?

General GAVIN. As a matter of fact, the definition is quite clear. I was going to bring it along.

Senator MUNDT. It seems two leading students from West Point, you and General Wheeler, are not in agreement on "enclave."

General GAVIN. I used it because I thought civilians might understand it.

Senator MUNDT. The generals cannot agree on a definition. I will tell you that.

General GAVIN. An enclave is an area usually where you seal off a specific geographic area for a particular purpose. At one time or another, there was some intent on settling the Algerian problem to bring people into an enclave near the coast.

On the other hand, in military terms a complex of sea and air is frequently a vast defended area, such as Anzio or the lines of Napoleon when they decided to withdraw into Portugal and hole up until they had a better chance for the mainland later.

This we have in terms of airpower and seapower near the coast, out of which we seek and destroy and link up with other forces in the interior. I think these are perimeter tactics, and they should be followed. I see no problem in continuing to do so unless we find them too costly to maintain.

Senator MUNDT. I see my time is up. I would like to pursue at greater depth with you some time this enclave and these differences of opinion which you and General Wheeler seem to have about what you expressed in your article, maybe because of a difference in definition.

General GAVIN. Sir; I would like to make—

Senator MUNDT. Just to be holed up and shot at does not appear to me to fight a war.

General GAVIN. I want to say I never said that, and I never recommended any retreat in any way whatsoever. I never said that.

Senator MUNDT. I am glad to have a definition of enclave, which does not have that definition.

General GAVIN. I would like to say, I said we have sufficient force in Vietnam to hold. The word enclaves there, it could have been several areas on the coast, where sea and air power could be made fully effective. Enclaves does not add to that nor detract from it. It is what we have today.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. General Gavin, I appreciate your testimony today very much.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. I think it is a fine public service that you render the committee and the people of the country.

VITAL U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN VIETNAM

I understand that back in 1954 when, following the French defeat at Dienbienphu, the question was posed as to whether the United States should intervene militarily—

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH (continuing). In Indochina, that you and General Ridgway, who played a very prominent role in Korea—

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH (continuing). Were of the opinion that this ought not to be done; is that correct?

General GAVIN. Yes, true. I was his Chief of Plans and Operations and he was Chief of Staff.

Senator CHURCH. From a military standpoint then, you must have thought that the vital security interests of the United States did not require the deployment of American troops in Indochina, is that correct?

General GAVIN. True; that is right.

Senator CHURCH. Now, if we had not intervened in the interim since—

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH (continuing). And if we had not made the pledges that have been made to the Saigon Government, committing American presence and prestige there, in other words, if you were again faced with the same question without what has happened in the intervening period, would you still be of the opinion that the vital security interests of the United States, from a military standpoint, do not require the deployment of American troops in Indochina?

General GAVIN. Yes, sir; I would say so. "Vital" is a key word there.

Senator CHURCH. I wanted to get that on the record, General, because there has been so much discussion of withdrawal, and I do not know anyone around this table, certainly no member of the Foreign Relations Committee, who has advocated a withdrawal.

General GAVIN. Oh, I can understand that.

Senator CHURCH. Under the present circumstances—

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH (continuing). In Vietnam.

But we have to draw a clear distinction between a military assessment of our vital interests and the situation in which we now find ourselves, where we have made a very large investment of American prestige and a solemn political commitment that has to be weighed in the balance in determining now what is best to do.

General GAVIN. Yes.

COURSE IN THE EVENT OF CHINESE INTERVENTION

Senator CHURCH. Now, if the war continues to spread northward and westward toward the Chinese frontiers, and if the Chinese intervene and come down into Vietnam, as they did in Korea, in your opinion, General, could we then stop the Chinese from the air, that is to say, by relying on our naval and aerial power to stop them through bombing?

General GAVIN. No, they could not be stopped from the air. Incidentally, you could not do that in North Korea either.

Senator CHURCH. That is right. If they were to be stopped at all, they would have to be stopped on the ground.

General GAVIN. In my opinion; yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Now, with respect to China itself, should we find ourselves locked in a war with China, is it your opinion, General, that we could subdue China by an all-out bombing attack against them.

General GAVIN. Nuclear bombing.

Senator CHURCH. Well, let us say, first of all, conventional bombing.

General GAVIN. In my opinion, it would take nuclear bombs anyway, and there is no question about it, if we were to elect to use nuclear weapons the devastation would be incredible that we could inflict on any nation. Our stockpile is tremendous, and the devastation would be beyond understanding.

Senator CHURCH. Beyond imagination?

General GAVIN. Oh, yes.

Senator CHURCH. But even if we were to spread such an incredible desolation through the use of nuclear weapons, do you think it would require a physical occupation of China by American land forces to effect a conquest of China itself?

General GAVIN. If you seek conquest, yes. Certainly not of all of the real estate, but of all of the key areas.

Senator CHURCH. How many American troops, in your judgment, would that require.

General GAVIN. Gee, I do not know, sir. I am sorry, I would be guessing.

Senator CHURCH. But it would require, even according to the most conservative guess, many million, would it not?

General GAVIN. Yes. You are dealing here with something that would be an awful thing, because we have global commitments that would require us to meet NATO and SEATO and many bilaterals, and this would be an exceedingly difficult thing to do.

Senator CHURCH. At the time that General Ridgway, fresh from his Korean experience, advised strongly against intervention in Indochina, he considered, you will remember, the possibility of a war with China itself.

General GAVIN. Yes, he did.

Senator CHURCH. And I think, in that regard it might be profitable to read one paragraph that Ridgway wrote. It reads as follows:

But I challenge any thesis that destroying the military might of Red China would be in our own long-range interest. We could create there, by military means, a great power vacuum. Then we would have to go in there with hundreds of thousands of men to fill that vacuum—which would bring us face to face with Russia along a 7,000-mile frontier. If we failed to go in, then Russia herself would fill it, and the threat to our own security would not have been abated one iota.

Are you in general agreement?

General GAVIN. Yes, I am.

Senator CHURCH. Or in disagreement with that?

General GAVIN. I would be in agreement with that.

Senator CHURCH. Now, we hear it said as the prospect of war with China seems to be drawing nearer—

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. We hear it said sometimes that if war comes it is better to fight now than to wait and to fight it later when China enlarges her nuclear capacity.

I remember, General Gavin, when I used to hear that argument made with respect to the Soviet Union in the days following the Second World War. Then it was called the theory of preventive war, I think.

That counsel did not prevail, and now there seems to be much less credence given to the theory that war with the Soviet Union is inevitable.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Do you regard war with the Soviet Union as inevitable?

General GAVIN. No, I do not now. I think the competition of a different sort is certainly here, economic, scientific, and the like of that.

MUTUAL NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION AS A DETERRENT TO WAR

Senator CHURCH. If war were to come between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the nuclear arsenals on both sides were to be fully employed, would this not result in total annihilation of both countries?

General GAVIN. Oh, no question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not hear that, General.

General GAVIN. No question about it. If war were to come between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and the nuclear arsenals, I would assume most of the arsenals of both countries were used, it would result in devastation of both countries, unquestionably most other countries as well.

Senator CHURCH. Do you not think, General, that the reality of this awful prospect facing the leaders of the two countries is the chief deterrent that has thus far prevented the outbreak of such a war between the United States and the Soviet Union?

General GAVIN. Yes, I think so.

Senator CHURCH. And if then this happened with respect to the Soviet Union, isn't it also possible that the same thing could happen with respect to China, as her nuclear capacity grows and as the Chinese leaders begin to fully appreciate the totality of the destruction that will be visited upon China in the event of a nuclear war?

General GAVIN. Yes. This is my great hope, that this could come about that way.

Senator CHURCH. Then I take it you would not regard a war with China as any more inevitable than a war with the Soviet Union?

General GAVIN. Conditions are a bit different. The Soviet Union seems to be seeking an accommodation, where the Chinese talk in very aggressive terms.

Senator CHURCH. I appreciate that, but you do not think war with China is inevitable as we look ahead, given the present attitude of the Chinese Government?

General GAVIN. No, not inevitable from our point of view.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

General GAVIN. The initiative may be that of the Chinese.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

I want to thank you very much, General.

General GAVIN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, there are two kinds of people who talk to you. One kind of person wants to use you as a sounding board for his views, and the other wants to get information. I hope you will treat me in the latter group.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. I am very much concerned that we should get this if we can.

Now, you state that you and General Wheeler are talking about two different things. His criticism—his understanding—of your position is not a basis for a correct understanding of your position at that time.

General GAVIN. Yes. I cannot quite account for his testimony unless he took the editor's view of Harper's of my article. That is another matter. If one wants to talk about the editor's view that is another matter. That is not my view. My view is another matter. He said I was talking about withdrawal, which I did not; I was not.

Senator CASE. You have not talked about withdrawal, and I think I have heard you say several times that what we are doing is approximately what we should do.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir. What we should do, what we now have there, what we can do with what we have, and then let us see if we cannot find what are the alternatives, and then think from there on in.

ALTERNATIVE IN VIETNAM

Senator CASE. That is the question. Do we or do we not have in our control this matter of conflict at its present level or thereabouts? Have we the initiative in this regard, or don't we?

General GAVIN. This I am not sure about, but I suspect we do not have. Based on the experiences of the last few years, we do not appear to have.

Senator CASE. Well, it seems that way to me, and it seemed that way certainly to the authors of the Mansfield-Aiken report—

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CASE (continuing). Who presented us, as I read it, with a very bleak alternative of either capitulating completely to whatever the enemy wants to give us or accepting indefinite expansion and intensification of the war in southeast Asia. That is my understanding of what they said.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CASE. You do not agree with this as our only alternative, I take it?

General GAVIN. I would hope we could do less than a general expansion. However, since the initiative is not ours, I think we will probably end up in a fight in other areas besides Vietnam.

Senator CASE. I am sorry; would you repeat that?

General GAVIN. I think we will end up in a fight in other areas aside from Vietnam; for example, Thailand.

Senator CASE. You are talking about contiguous areas in southeast Asia?

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. And this is a part of what we face?

General GAVIN. I think it is.

Senator CASE. You do not have any suggestion as to a change in policy that we might make to avoid this prospect or this likelihood? You think, in general, that this is pretty much beyond our control; is that right?

General GAVIN. It appears to be right now; that is right, sir.

Senator CASE. Do you have an alternative to suggest by which we may regain the initiative in this regard, not in other matters but in this regard?

General GAVIN. No; not in this particular theater, I do not have. I would think I would have to be out there on the ground. I do have hopes, and this matter has not come up here this morning, that I hope that through a very aggressive research program we might find some technological things that would give us a real advantage in the theater.

This is the problem. You are in a tight theater of operations trying to do the best you can with limited resources, and we can only do the best we can with what we have there. We cannot afford to pull out. We should not escalate. We can find some advantage. The "Sky Cav" concept will give us a real advantage in mobility. I know other things that could be brought along, and we might find advantage of this.

RATIO NEEDED TO DESTROY GUERRILLA FORCES

Senator CASE. In the short time I have I wonder if I could develop this point. I thank you for that answer. We have often heard it stated that in a guerrilla war you need a ratio of friendly forces to guerrilla forces of about 10 to 1. I do not know whether this is correct or not. But let us say 5 or 10.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. We have a couple of hundred thousand troops in Vietnam now, and the Vietnamese forces have about 560,000, a total of 760,000.

According to Defense Department figures that the staff has given us, there were 236,000 North Vietnamese in there at the end of the year.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CASE. That ratio was not sufficient for what we were trying to do even now.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CASE. I understand the South Vietnamese are urging us to put in additional troops to bring the ratio up to 6 to 1. That would make something like 656,000 more American men.

General GAVIN. Yes

Senator CASE. Or about 256,000 more than the number suggested by Senator Stennis in a recent speech.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CASE. I take it you are not in favor of this kind of increase in the size of our forces in Vietnam?

General GAVIN. I certainly am as an automatic proposition—

Senator CASE. You are in favor?

General GAVIN. Yes. I am not in favor of it as an automatic proposition that we must go to a ratio of 5 to 1, 8 to 1, 7 to 1, 10 to 1, any figure whatsoever. I think you can, by the innovation of such things as Sky Cavalry—we can make one man equal to one guerrilla any time, and it is not just a matter of adding manpower.

Senator CASE. Well, have you any ideas as to the size, as to the increase, which you would approve or would disapprove?

General GAVIN. No; I do not. I do not.

Senator CASE. You do not rule out 500,000, 600,000, 700,000 men?

General GAVIN. At this point I must say that I would become quite concerned. What we would be talking about then, sir, is a budget of \$20 billion, \$25 billion. In terms of our strategic commitments worldwide, I would be very seriously concerned. I would think three-quarters of a million men, if we get that involved, the Chinese surely would open up Korea. I think we are getting onto another magnitude-type confrontation once we double and triple what we have there, and this is just an opinion, I must admit. On the ground, General Westmoreland may have different ideas entirely.

Senator CASE. What we want now is your ideas for everything, for every good that it can do us, and we appreciate it very much.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CASE. You would regard any escalation such as two or three times the number we have now as serious and undesirable?

General GAVIN. Yes; indeed I would.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, it is always a privilege to see you, sir.

INTERPRETATION OF LETTER TO HARPER'S MAGAZINE

The reason you are here is because of a letter you wrote to Harper's magazine. Did you discuss the letter with the editors at the time you sent it in?

General GAVIN. No; I did not, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will make my questions as short as possible and would appreciate your answers being as short as possible, because of the 10-minute time limit.

I would run through the letter with you, if I may.

General GAVIN. Surely.

Senator SYMINGTON. The editors say, "He urges the stopping of our bombing of North Vietnam"; is that true?

General GAVIN. No; it is not true.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then they say you want "a halt in the escalation of the ground war." Is that true?

General GAVIN. No; it is not true.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then they say you recommend "withdrawal of American troops to defend a limited number of enclaves along the South Vietnamese coast"; is that true?

General GAVIN. Not true.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wonder why the editors deceived us to what your thoughts were?

General GAVIN. I do not know. I suggest you bring the editor in here and talk to him.

Mr. SYMINGTON. That might be a good idea because, based on what the general says this statement by the editors who published this article is false, and is one of the reasons why there has been so much misunderstanding.

General GAVIN. Yes; I agree with you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, in your letter you say:

* * * I suggest Camranh Bay, Da Nang, and similar areas where Americans bases are being established.

Then you go on:

On the other hand, if we should maintain enclaves on the coast, desist in our bombing attacks in North Vietnam, and seek to find a solution through the United Nations or a conference in Geneva, we could very likely do so with the forces now available.

Perhaps that word "coast" is a bit misleading.

General GAVIN. I think it might be.

Senator SYMINGTON. What bases do we have you would give up?

General GAVIN. Well, in the first place, I do not know what bases we have there. I only know what I read in the papers of the bases that we have. I talked to Mr. McNamara about the bases, and I was not further enlightened because I think he feels I know enough to talk about it in the vein I have. I know the 1st Air Cavalry has a base in the interior, I assume, that might be worth holding. I do not know whether for an indefinite period of time. We have done something unusual here. We have put air and sea power right into the coast to support us. These, I think, we should maintain and let the forces do their job.

Senator SYMINGTON. You say:

Although we ultimately might have heavy fighting on the northern frontiers of Thailand.

THE "DOMINO THEORY"

Do you agree with the "domino theory"?

General GAVIN. No, sir; I do not.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you do not, but think we might have heavy fighting on the northern frontier of Thailand, and I know enough about your military career to know you would much less rather fight on the frontiers of Thailand than in South Vietnam, where we could have at least the advantage of seapower and perhaps a little air-power—

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON (continuing). You would rather fight in South Vietnam if you had to send American troops, wouldn't you, than the northern frontiers of Thailand?

General GAVIN. My feeling at the moment is the most decisive fight will take place in Thailand on the Mekong.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then doesn't that, at least to some extent, nullify your statement you do not believe in the "domino theory"?

General GAVIN. No. I do not think so because there is a prevailing belief in this country that if we fail there it is all the way back to Waikiki. I do not believe that for a moment.

Senator SYMINGTON. So if we go to enclaves, and give up the rest of South Vietnam to the Vietcong presumably also you know our tricky situation in Laos wouldn't we be dominoing if we ended up fighting in northern Thailand?

General GAVIN. Senator, you said going enclaves, those are your words, not mine. I did not say go into enclaves. I said do the best we can with what we have.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you do say "maintain enclaves on the coasts, desist in our bombing attacks in North Vietnam."

General GAVIN. That is right. I did not say "go to." I said maintain the forces we now have based in enclaves.

THE MILITARY AS A CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY

Senator SYMINGTON. Later on in your letter you say, "referring again to the Sky Cavalry concept which we are now employing in South Vietnam, it is the kind of innovation that is generally unpopular in a conservative society, and in the military establishment of such a society."

What do you mean by that?

General GAVIN. I will tell you exactly what I mean by that. I do not want to impose on your time. I wish we had more time so we could talk about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will go around again.

General GAVIN. A military establishment exists to fight with the means it has at hand, and it must use every physical resource to meet the battle right now. The last thing in the world the military wants to do is to go way out speculating if you had so and so and yet how are we going to win if we do not do this very thing. The shield of time and space we once enjoyed are gone, and we are on the frontline now. I do not think we did well in Korea with 142,000 casualties, and nothing to show for it, except the 38th parallel when we got through, and it was amazing what was done by our opponents in Europe.

I do think in our Military Establishment we are conservative, and we resist change, and goodness knows I have been exposed to this one. Change in that establishment is exceedingly difficult.

Senator SYMINGTON. You said in this letter:

When I retired in 1958, I said that I would be happy to serve as a private in the Army if it were the kind of an army that I wanted it to be.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. I tried in my feeble way to make it the kind of an Army that you wanted it to be.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir. You were a great help, and I think you were there when I said that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. I was.

INTENSIFYING THE BOMBING

What worries me is, to the best of my knowledge, every senior officer out there in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in South Vietnam today, without exception, felt it was important for us to intensify the attacking of military targets in North Vietnam, to at least make a greater effort to stop the heavy infiltration of troops and ammunition and guns now coming down the various Ho Chi Minh trails.

Do you agree with them?

General GAVIN. Absolutely. I think I made that clear this morning.

Senator SYMINGTON. You did not make it entirely clear to me. Would you bomb the powerplants? I was not sure how you felt about that.

General GAVIN. There I am in considerable doubt about it, and I do not think so.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about petroleum, P.O.L.?

General GAVIN. Isolated obvious sources of military direct supply; yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, you would bomb some of the petroleum but not all? Is that correct?

General GAVIN. Yes; I would say so. One must be discriminating about these things.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you mine the harbor at Haiphong as against bombing the docks?

General GAVIN. Given a choice, of course, I would mine in preference.

Senator SYMINGTON. People with as much military experience as you have, say that we are now getting ourselves in a position where we do not want to use seapower which, except for the Polaris, is, in effect, air-sea power, and do not want to use Air Force airpower because it would not be sporting. They take issue with you with respect to the conclusions of the strategic bombing survey. Incidentally, I have just reread the conclusions of the survey, for both Germany and Japan. Would you supply for the record the statements in those reports in context you think justify the position you took this morning.

General GAVIN. I shall.

(The information referred to follows:)

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., February 14, 1966.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: In the course of the hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday, February 8, 1966, I was asked by Senator Symington to submit data to which I referred, data that came from the U.S. strategic bombing survey. As I recall now, I made reference to the increased production of German armament bearing a direct relationship to the increased tonnage of bombs delivered by the Allies. I am enclosing charts, herewith, from the U.S. strategic bombing survey. Chart No. 4 shows the tonnage drop and the other three charts refer to specific industrial output.

Respectfully yours,

JAMES M. GAVIN.

Enclosures.

GERMAN AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION




CHART No. 7

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Overall Report. (European War) September 30, 1945.

PANZER PRODUCTION

INCLUDES "PANZER", TANKS, ASSAULT GUNS
AND SELF-PROPELLED GUNS




CHART No. 26

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Overall Report. (European War) September 30, 1945.

TOTAL BOMB TONNAGE DROPPED




CHART No. 4

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Overall Report. (European War) September 30, 1945.

COMBAT MUNITIONS

INCLUDES AIRCRAFT, AMMUNITION,
WEAPONS, "PANZER", AND NAVAL
CONSTRUCTION




CHART No. 15

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Overall Report. (European War) September 30, 1945.

Senator SYMINGTON. They feel some think it better to pursue hostilities primarily on the ground, because there we give the enemy a break, even Stephen; in fact, they have a little advantage, because they have the most numbers of bodies.

Do you think that is what we should do, even including full utilization of what you call sky cavalry?

General GAVIN. Oh, no. Let us understand each other, Senator. I would never give an opponent any break in combat. The best break he can get as far as I am concerned is to be dead. I would not give him a break.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then you do not agree with that?

General GAVIN. I do not believe we are doing this to give him a break. I think it is the limitations on that type of power.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, some people who believe in airpower, and I am not only talking about Air Force airpower but also naval airpower—they say, first they give us a job to do, which is to take out military installations in North Vietnam, then they give us very heavy target restrictions, restrictions against military targets.

General GAVIN. Certainly.

Senator SYMINGTON. They stopped entirely for 37 days. I am not criticizing that, but it did permit a heavy buildup in the flak potential, and the Sam sites, and the anti-aircraft guns.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now that the bombing has started again it is my understanding the target restrictions are more tight than they were when it was stopped in December.

General GAVIN. It seems to be.

Senator SYMINGTON. Therefore, our combined airpower says: "First, they put us in the ring, tell us to do a good job. Then they tie one hand behind our back. Then they criticize us for the job we have done as not being effective."

Does this follow your philosophy about airpower?

General GAVIN. Well, the Senator uses this peculiar description.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am only asking.

General GAVIN. Airpower should be used to attack military targets, period.

Senator SYMINGTON. You believe airpower should be used to attack military targets, even if it is not supporting ground troops?

General GAVIN. Well, every military target, I presume, will have some direct contribution to the effort of the ground forces. Otherwise it would not be a target.

Senator SYMINGTON. I agree wholeheartedly. Would you advocate continuing bombing military targets, but with the restrictions on power and petroleum this morning you nevertheless advocate?

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Limited bombing of limited military targets.

General GAVIN. As we have described what I would bomb I would say, yes, and that continuously is OK with me.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Gavin. We will now recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee was in recess, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The next gentleman I recognize is the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES M. GAVIN—Resumed

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I share the admiration of my colleagues for you, General, as I think you well know. Most of the questions that I had in mind asking you I think have been asked, and I think you have rendered a great service by your testimony here today. I think it has helped all of us to benefit from your views.

General GAVIN. Thank you very much.

AGGRESSION OR CIVIL WAR IN VIETNAM

Senator DODD. I have one or two questions I would like to ask. They may have been asked when I had to step out, I am not sure. From your knowledge of that part of the world, southeast Asia, and of this particular difficulty in Vietnam, do you consider that struggle there a civil war or a war of aggression?

General GAVIN. It started, I would say, as a civil war and it is certainly now a war of aggression.

Senator DODD. I didn't hear the last part.

General GAVIN. It started as a civil war. It started after the Geneva settlement of 1954 with the people in southern Vietnam trying to establish a government of their own choosing meeting an increasing difficulty with the inroads of the Vietcong, and then with the continuous growth of the Vietcong effort and the support they received from outside, it has become of a different character entirely. Underneath that the hope is always underlying it as a civil war, but now it is much more than that in my opinion. It is a war of aggression.

EFFECT OF A WITHDRAWAL

Senator DODD. Secondly, have you thought about—I am sure you have even though I ask it that way—the implications of any withdrawal? I know you don't favor a withdrawal, but any movement that might be considered as a withdrawal to what we have been calling here today the enclave?

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator DODD. Has it occurred to you that this might cause the South Vietnamese people and other people in other countries to doubt thereafter our word, our credibility, our reliability?

General GAVIN. Yes, I would.

Senator DODD. Don't you think it would discourage them if we did that?

General GAVIN. I would think a retrograde movement of any perceptive sort would absolutely have an impact, sure.

Senator DODD. That would be harmful to our best interests?

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator DODD. I don't think I have anything else. I think much that I had in mind was asked by other members. I want to say to you that I have a much better understanding of your view than I had this morning—

General GAVIN. Thank you very much.

Senator DODD (continuing). When I first came here, and I have the idea that other members do, too. That is why I said it has been a good thing for all of us, and I think it is good for the country as well.

General GAVIN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK. General, I would like to associate myself with the many nice things that have been said about you here today. I think you have shown a great deal of courage, and have made a very real contribution to this problem.

MAKING DO WITH WHAT WE HAVE IN VIETNAM

You have said several times this morning that you thought that we ought to make do with what we have. I think I took down accurately the statement "we can't afford to pull out. We should not escalate." Is that a fair statement of what you have said?

General GAVIN. Yes. As I expressed it in that article, let's stay where we are, do what we can do with what we have.

Senator CLARK. What concerns me, and a lot of the rest of us, is whether if we make do with what we have, we aren't going to get chased out. What is your view on that? My point is the other side has escalated. That great military strategist, Joseph Alsop, has written about the buildup of the North Vietnamese Army, and indicated that because they have escalated to such an extent, we must escalate too, or else we will be chased out. What is your view on that?

General GAVIN. Yes. Specifically about that article, it is a strange article.

Senator CLARK. It is indeed.

General GAVIN. I suspect what he is going to say next is we should probably double our strength there. I think this is what he is leading to.

Senator CLARK. I have no doubt. I suspect, and I have no reason to say this other than that I know Joe Alsop pretty well, he would be dropping bombs on China pretty soon. But let's get back to the main problem here.

General GAVIN. Yes, sure.

Senator CLARK. Can we afford to do with what we have got, or are we going to have to put more troops in because we can't hold what we have got with what is there now?

General GAVIN. I don't know, and of course this is very much up to the Vietcong and the Chinese backing them. To the extent they want to commit their own resources, they are tough decisions we have to face up to. But I hope that we will make the decisions ourselves, and not be forced to make them to match what the other side does. This is my point of view at the moment.

Senator CLARK. What bothers me is that we may have passed the point where we can make the decision. I assume that you would not

want to go on record as to what you think are the capabilities of our present 200,000 men there now, without knowing a lot better than I do, maybe a lot better than you do, what we are up against.

General GAVIN. I couldn't give you anything more. It would be quite improper for me to second-guess what General Westmoreland can do with what he has. I do know we have certain resources there not long ago that were looked upon as quite adequate. We are doing quite well with them today. I would hesitate to speculate beyond that. I would be loath to see us escalate indefinitely and double, and double again what we have.

Senator CLARK. In other words, you would go pretty slow on escalation in terms of both men and material?

General GAVIN. I would do what?

Senator CLARK. Go pretty slow?

General GAVIN. Oh, indeed, absolutely.

A VIETNAMESE OR AMERICAN WAR

Senator CLARK. It was in September 1963 that President Kennedy said, and I think I quote fairly accurately, that this is their war. We can help as advisers, we can help with money, but they have to either lose it or win it.

In your opinion are we beyond that point now, and unless we put substantial additional American forces into that war, are we going to be chased out?

General GAVIN. Yes, I certainly think we are beyond that point. I base this upon my conversations with Mr. McNamara about a week or so ago in the limitations now, the availability of certain Vietnamese manpower are very, very severe. They can't do much more.

Senator CLARK. Do you think the South Vietnamese—I don't want to overstate it—you don't think they can do much more?

General GAVIN. Not an awful lot more. This I believe now.

Senator CLARK. So then it is really an American war, isn't it?

General GAVIN. It is certainly becoming that.

MINIMIZING THE OFFENSIVE EFFORT

Senator CLARK. Now have you been able to make any estimate—or on the basis of your military experience is it possible to make an estimate—of the costs in terms of men and money of, (a) staying where we are, and (b) regaining substantial parts of the territory we have lost? Would not the latter be much more expensive, both in terms of casualties and money?

General GAVIN. Well, I would think so, yes. I would think so despite the opening paragraphs of Mr. Alsop's article, whereby by falling back to the areas you hold, you can reduce your casualties and do more with less troops. No, I would think the logic would be that if you were going to extend your search-and-destroy effort, you have to have more manpower.

Senator CLARK. And if you extend your search-and-destroy efforts, are you not inevitably going to run up casualties?

General GAVIN. Oh, I would think so, sure.

Senator CLARK. In your concept is it possible by holding the territory we now have, minimizing the search-and-destroy effort, which at least to a layman reading the newspapers does not seem to have very useful long-range effects, to minimize casualties?

General GAVIN. Well, are you saying just stop where we are and really cut back on any further forays?

Senator CLARK. Offensive operations. That doesn't mean a sally forth from a strong point—

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CLARK (continuing). But—as opposed to these amphibious landings on the coast well north of where the people and the rice are—

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CLARK (continuing). Could we not in your phrase make do with what we have a good deal better if we weren't engaged in offensive jungle operation with amphibious landings and similar types of offensive missions?

General GAVIN. Oh, I am not sure that I am in a position to answer that. I think we can continue to do very well with what we have for quite some period of time. We seem to be doing quite well now, using the air mobility we have, the helicopters we have, the sea mobility that we have. I think we can continue to do quite well.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Alsop's theory, which I want to emphasize I do not agree with, is that if we were to withdraw to these enclaves—and I think he misquoted you in this article—

General GAVIN. I think he did, too. I am glad you noticed that.

Senator CLARK. In terms of holding these strong points, his theory would be that unless we can continue to destroy out in the elements of the grass and the jungle, with substantial American casualties, we are in the end going to be cut off or chased out, and the costs will be even higher if we adopt the present somewhat offensive attitude of trying to dig them out of the jungle and to kill them.

General GAVIN. Yes, that is the way I understood his article.

Senator CLARK. You don't agree with that?

General GAVIN. I don't agree that by continuing to be aggressive in our explorations out of the areas we now hold, that we can hold our casualties down and reduce the forces we need by one-third, which is the figure he used. He said if we did not do this, we would have to have three times as many troops. I don't understand that calculation.

Senator CLARK. I don't either. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

All right, I will start, then.

WHAT'S MEANT BY ESCALATION?

General, I was trying to pick up a few things that you had stated before. One question that arose during the recess was, would you clarify what you mean by escalating or nonescalating the ground forces in Vietnam? Would you just very briefly state what you meant by that—your position on that?

General GAVIN. Well, there is perhaps more to the question. Escalation simply means an increase.

The CHAIRMAN. Increase in the numbers is what was in mind.

General GAVIN. Yes. In that communication I suggested that we begin where we are with what we have, and then take a look at the alternatives realistically. If the condition where we are now, let us say condition A, and where we might go to a total sealing off of South Vietnam as B, there are intermediate positions, but I would be loath to speculate about those. I am not sure how worth while they would be.

If the mission is to really secure and deny all Vietcong penetration into South Vietnam, this is a commitment of tremendous magnitude, and I would be most loath to go along with such a commitment. I think we ought to begin with where we are and realistically look at this in the light of our total global commitments, be realistic about any escalation from here on out.

AGGRESSIVENESS OF RED CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. General, I understood you to say in the course of one of the questions—I forgot who asked you—that the Chinese are quite aggressive in what they are doing. I wish you would elaborate a bit. In what respect are they very aggressive, contrasting what they are saying to what they are doing?

General GAVIN. Yes. In the first place I have been exposed to, as many Americans, to the filmed reports coming out of China of their militancy, of their training of their youth and their industrial workers and their people in the use of arms, in the military tactics and so on. There is a widespread national program I am led to believe to train their people for military operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that aggressive necessarily?

General GAVIN. Not necessarily.

The CHAIRMAN. Per se?

General GAVIN. No. I would like to go on beyond that. But this basic militancy I think exists in their society. I am well aware of the penetrations they have made into North Korea and how costly they were to us. They were certainly aggressive then.

I think that they are supplying the Vietcong with ammunition and medical aid and other logistical support, and certainly they are not passive in that tactical area.

Beyond this I don't know that there is much I can say about them, except their published statements about their lack of apprehension about a nuclear war, because of the vast manpower they have, and their charges against the Soviets really of tending to go along with us in our endeavors in Vietnam, rather than being more militant in opposing us.

The CHAIRMAN. I was trying to draw the distinction between what they actually do and what they say. I know they speak very offensively and aggressively, but do you consider their reaction to our approach to the Yalu River as an act of aggression on their part?

General GAVIN. Well, I would say their penetration all the way down to the 30th parallel was, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean that training of their troops internally is an act of aggression?

General GAVIN. Their movement of troops deep into Korea was.

The CHAIRMAN. No; now I was passing on to their internal training—that is, the training of troops within China. Is that an act of aggression?

General GAVIN. No, no. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is there any evidence that they moved troops into South Vietnam or North Vietnam?

General GAVIN. There is not at this time, although some people have been there, who have been to Vietnam, told me that there are Chinese trainers and technical people there, and the Chinese I believe themselves have alleged that volunteers would participate if necessary, and they have also been reported in the press as stating flatly that if we think that we can get away with our efforts in Vietnam without Korea being reopened, we are badly mistaken.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand they have made many threats.

General GAVIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of much graver import than that as far as threats go. I was trying to elucidate just how far they have aggressed in recent years actively and by force. Normally we use the word "aggression," I will admit, very loosely.

General GAVIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But normally it means some action.

General GAVIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As distinguished from a word or a statement or a threat, doesn't it?

General GAVIN. Yes. Mr. Chairman, if I understand what you are getting at, they haven't made any major forays out of China itself, going after other peoples.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have any troops outside of their own borders that you know of at the present time?

General GAVIN. Except perhaps those on the northeast Indian frontier. I am not sure of the state of affairs there now, but of course they were into India at one time.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the border incident you are speaking of in 1962?

General GAVIN. Yes, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You will recall—I believe I have the statement of General Taylor—he made a statement before the Appropriations Committee that the Indians precipitated that particular incident, did he not? Do you recall that?

General GAVIN. I don't recall that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask the staff to get that statement and put it in the record with regard to that specific incident.

General GAVIN. Yes.

(The information referred to follows:)

(Source: Department of Defense appropriations for 1964 hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st sess., part 2, Thursday, Feb. 14, 1963 (pp. 9-10).)

Mr. SIKES. Let me talk about Red China and the Indian operation. Did the Indians actually start this military operation?

General TAYLOR. They were edging forward in the disputed area; yes, sir.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. Is the area of the neutral zone on territory that was formerly claimed by India or claimed by China?

General TAYLOR. In most cases claimed by both.

Mr. SIKES. Where is it with relation to the generally accepted international boundary?

General TAYLOR. That is hard to say because there is no generally accepted international boundary. I am sorry to be vague about this, but I can assure you that I spent several hours trying to find out where the McMahon line is. Actually, you find the maps differ on this. The terrain is so terribly rugged, there has been no accurate mapping and no accurate boundary lines or markers placed.

(Statement off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. Is the proposed neutral zone generally within territory which was occupied prior to all of this activity by Indian or Chinese forces?

General TAYLOR. Most of it was unoccupied by anybody.

General HALL, are you an expert on this subject?

General HALL. Yes, sir. I would say in general it was occupied by neither force, but that the NEFA was occupied predominantly by Indian forces. One thing I think it is very important to point out is that the Chinese Nationalists, when they were in control of China, did not recognize this line either. So it is not a question of the fact it is a Chinese Communist line vis-a-vis an Indian line. It is an Indian line that has never been recognized by either the Chinese Communists or the Nationalists.

Mr. SIKES. Generally the neutral zone is in territory which was claimed by both?

General HALL. Claimed by both; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I recall that in testimony before the Appropriations Committee General Taylor made such a statement. I could be wrong. I think I have it somewhere in my files.

There was a very interesting article in a small provincial paper, the New York Times, on last Sunday, February 5, by Seymour Topping.

WHO IS ENCIRCLING WHOM?

The whole purport of that—this is from Hong Kong—is that the Chinese are alleging that they are being encircled. In answer to Senator Hickenlooper, he advanced I believe the thesis that if we didn't stop the Chinese here, that we would be encircled. Now who is encircling whom at the present time?

General GAVIN. I would be inclined to believe that the Chinese think that they are being pretty well hemmed in.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a fact, do you think, that relatively speaking they are more encircled today than we are?

General GAVIN. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is reasonable for them to feel that they are being encircled?

General GAVIN. I think in their position I would feel that way.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask the reporter to put this article in the record for the information of the readers. It is a right interesting one. He is, I am told, a very reputable reporter from Hong Kong.

General GAVIN. I think I saw the article.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see it?

General GAVIN. It was accompanied by a map showing submarines, et cetera?

The CHAIRMAN. And the disposition.

General GAVIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And if that map is at all accurate, it is quite clear who is encircled at the moment, isn't it?

General GAVIN. That is right. Yes, I saw that.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know how to go about this, but it strikes me sometimes that we get unduly nervous about their encircling us under present conditions. That is a long time in the future, if it is ever to come about, is it not?

General GAVIN. Sure, no question about it.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Feb. 6, 1966]

NEW PHASE OF CHINA-SOVIET RIFT CENTERS ON "U.S. ENCIRCLEMENT"

(By Seymour Topping, special to the New York Times)

HONG KONG, February 5—Peiping leaders, in a new phase of their struggle with Moscow, have been accusing the Soviet Union of collaboration with the United States in a military encirclement of Communist China.

Analysts in Hong Kong are comparing the encirclement concept, which has been emphasized repeatedly this week in the Peiping press, to the thesis of "capitalist encirclement" propounded by Stalin after the Bolshevik revolution. The Soviet dictator used encirclement warnings both to rally the population against the danger of a foreign attack and as a pretext to smash internal political opposition.

China's preoccupation with encirclement seems to be an outgrowth of a new worsening of the dispute with the Soviet Union rather than an expression of internal pressure.

Chinese Communist statements suggest that the quarrel between Peiping and Moscow has moved from primary emphasis on ideological issues to stress on national differences affecting security.

Jenmin Jih Pao, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper, said on Wednesday: "The course taken by the Soviet leaders on the Vietnam, India-Pakistan and Japan questions completely conforms with requirements of U.S. imperialism, especially with the latter's policy of encircling China."

The article was signed "Observer," a signature reserved for authoritative official pronouncements.

In another "Observer" commentary published today, Peiping attacked the foreign policy of Japan's Premier, Eisaku Sato, which it viewed as "following the United States and alining itself with the Soviet Union to oppose China."

On Jan. 29, Jenmin Jih Pao prominently displayed a map purporting to show how the United States was trying to encircle China. It appeared under the headline "You Must Realistically Face Up to the Threat of an American Imperialist War."

The map bore the caption "The Military Encirclement of China by American Imperialism." It was marked with symbols representing American troops and naval, air and missile bases as well as aircraft and nuclear submarines posted in an arc from Thailand through South Vietnam, The Philippines, the China Seas, Taiwan, Okinawa, South Korea and Japan.

The base locations do not in all instances conform with published information on U.S. military dispositions.

Hsinhua, the Chinese Communist press agency, said in a military review last Tuesday that the United States was redeploying its troops "to tighten its military encirclement of China" and that American military strategy had changed "from a U.S.-Soviet confrontation to a U.S.-China confrontation."

Peiping has not accused the Soviet Union of directly lending its armed forces to the encirclement. But Moscow is said to be pressing "a policy of appeasement in Europe" so that U.S. troops can be released for duty in South Vietnam.

Soviet leaders are also said to be encouraging India, whose troops are confronting those of Communist China in central Asia.

The analysts suggest that it is too early to determine if the concept of encirclement will be incorporated in Peiping's political dogma and become fundamental, as it was in Stalinist thinking.

FEAR OF ATTACK SEEN

According to opinion here, the Peiping pronouncements may be disclosing a sense of growing isolation and a fear of attack on several fronts. The pronouncements are also seen as a propaganda device to discredit Kremlin leaders within the international Communist movement before the 23d congress of the Soviet Communist Party, due in Moscow next month, at which the Chinese-Soviet ideological split is likely to be discussed.

There is also speculation that the Peiping party leaders are dwelling on the danger of foreign encirclement to enforce internal discipline. A nationalistic appeal of this kind might help to insure the loyalty of China's army officers, who are believed to be restive under the party's stringent political controls.

The Communist Party warned the army recently to give first priority to ideological considerations and to rid itself of "foreign dogma," a reference taken to mean Soviet military techniques and organization.

ATTACKERS NAME NAMES

Stalin used the threat of "capitalist encirclement" and foreign intervention to purge army and political leaders who were charged with having links abroad.

The new Peiping attacks on the Soviet party are also notable in that they criticize high Kremlin leaders by name. The tendency has been to avoid this practice in polemical exchanges.

Jenmin Jih Pao said that Soviet propaganda last month in connection with the Hanoi visit by Aleksandr N. Shelepin, a member of the Soviet Presidium, had "the clear import that the Vietnamese people ought to sit down at a conference table with the United States while allowing the latter to continue its occupation of South Vietnam."

Moscow was accused of trying to make the Vietnamese Communists cease fighting and to "turn Indochina into a sector of the joint United States-Soviet effort to contain China."

KOSYGIN ALSO SCORED

Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin was attacked for having brought about the Tashkent accord between India and Pakistan on Kashmir. "The loving care lavished by the Soviet leaders on Indian reactionaries is intended to make India an instrument of the joint United States-Soviet opposition to China and a flank in the encirclement of China," the article asserted.

Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party chief, was criticized in the same context for his visit to Mongolia last month.

PAST AGGRESSION BY CHINA AND AGAINST CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. You know a great deal about both military and political history. Have the Chinese as a nation over the last 100 or 200 years been especially aggressive? I use that word to mean military, overt aggression on their neighbors.

General GAVIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that true?

General GAVIN. They haven't been, to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Who aggressed against whom during the last century in regard to Western nations? Was it China attacking the Western nations or vice versa?

General GAVIN. The other way around. The Western nations attacking China.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this to a very great extent?

General GAVIN. Yes. I remember quite well reading about the moving from Tientsin in the Boxer Rebellion, and I remember not so many years ago reviewing the life of Gordon and the British occupation of major segments of China as well as that of other European nations.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, various Western nations practically occupied and humiliated and decimated China throughout almost a century, did they not?

General GAVIN. That is true absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. That also ought to be in this perspective that you give us.

General GAVIN. I would say so.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think that might not be a significant element in our present situation?

General GAVIN. Indeed, surely.

CAN THE UNITED STATES CHANGE ITS COURSE?

The CHAIRMAN. You stated, I think—I don't wish to put words in your mouth, because this has been a very interesting and a fast-moving hearing—that you had a feeling—I know you answered very specifically questions from Senator Church on certain assumptions—that, having become involved, we are on a course and we cannot now change it.

Would you elaborate a bit on that? I wonder, is it possible or is it inevitable in a big powerful country, in which we think we control our own course, that we cannot change a course even though we believe that that course may not be a profitable one, in view of our own security.

General GAVIN. Of course we can change, Senator. We can really do anything that we want to do of that sort, I would think. We could withdraw from tactical commitments where we have a confrontation. We can do it. It is a problem of what we should do.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. It is a matter of judgment as to what is in our national interests.

General GAVIN. That is exactly right.

The CHAIRMAN. Because we are committed on a course doesn't mean we cannot change it.

General GAVIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. If in our good wisdom and best judgment we think we ought to.

General GAVIN. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not mean to leave the impression, I am sure that—"Well, we are committed now and there is nothing to be done about it"?

General GAVIN. No, I don't believe that at all.

PRESTIGE AND NATIONAL INTEREST

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't think you would. I just wanted to clarify it a bit. You mentioned Khrushchev, and that his exploits into Cuba—I forget how you put it—finished him?

General GAVIN. I used the word "demise."

The CHAIRMAN. Demise, that is right. And you mean by that that he lost his position as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, did you not?

General GAVIN. Yes, I certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you also think that as a result of that exploit, that Russia's position in the world has been seriously damaged, that

her prestige has been lost, and that today she is a nonentity in a society of nations?

General GAVIN. No, no. They have come through amazingly well.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

General GAVIN. They have come through it amazingly well. They have come through the Hungarian experience very well, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't you conclude that having suffered what I believe you thought was one of the greatest, the most dramatic setbacks of a major nation, having come through in this way, that this question of prestige and face has been grossly exaggerated?

General GAVIN. Yes, I would say so. It often certainly is.

The CHAIRMAN. Even in this instance, that isn't the major consideration. It still comes back to the wisdom of whether we should pursue a particular course or not, and the face and prestige of the United States is not a major consideration, is that correct?

General GAVIN. I would say that is so.

WOULD A MAJOR CONFLICT SERVE ANYONE'S INTERESTS?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you also said at one point—and again I apologize if I don't state it right, because I made very rapid notes, and sometimes we get these things wrong, and I hope this is correct—that an outright conflict with China, and that would be a major conflict, would it not—

General GAVIN. It certainly would.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). That you thought that would be in the interests of Russia. Now I want to raise a question whether or not such a conflict on such a scale would be in the interests of anyone.

It strikes me that such a conflict would be against the interests of everybody, including us and the whole world. What do you think about that?

General GAVIN. Well, it could certainly go that way. I know we talked today a great deal about a confrontation between the United States and China as though this could occur sort of in a vacuum, or with no one else being involved.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean.

General GAVIN. I thought about it from time to time as we discussed it. I don't see how quite this could work out like this, with all the nations of the world interested in what was going on, and the United Nations certainly playing the role it should. Certainly it would involve other people. If nuclear weapons were involved, I can assure you it would involve other people very seriously.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, statements have been made recently by very responsible and important officials of our Government that if we got in a war with China, there would be no question about nuclear weapons being used.

General GAVIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have seen such statements, haven't you? I subscribe to the fact that if we do get in such a way, that I don't see how they could help but use them. I think the way this was put, that the vast numbers of Chinese would necessitate our using every weapon in our control. We couldn't possibly match them man for man; is that correct?

General GAVIN. That is correct, if we were involved with China on the mainland.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General GAVIN. The use of nuclear weapons I would suppose we would just abstain from and abstain from as long as we could, knowing the very severe fallout casualties that would occur, and it would be difficult to see how the pattern of—

The CHAIRMAN. The main point I wanted to raise is that I question whether or not Russia, while she would enjoy our embarrassment, is foolish enough to think she could avoid involvement, and I don't believe she would say that it is in her interests for us to have an all-out war with China.

General GAVIN. Perhaps not, perhaps not.

The CHAIRMAN. Or with anybody. I mean you have already said very persuasively how disastrous and catastrophic the use of nuclear weapons would be.

General GAVIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And, therefore, anything that would lead to their use in a major way it would seem to me would be catastrophic to everybody probably.

General GAVIN. Yes. On the other hand, I think that it would be possible to engage in a war with China under such terms, and non-nuclear, that Russia would not mind seeing us heavily engaged with the heavy loss of our national wealth in such an involvement, but once we got to the threshold of a nuclear involvement, this then is inimical to the interests of everyone.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; if you could be sure it wouldn't come to her, but no one can be sure of that.

General GAVIN. Sure.

HOW LONG DOES THE UNITED STATES NEED TO STAY IN VIETNAM?

The CHAIRMAN. One last question. I believe you said in answer to a question by Senator Lausche that we should stay in Vietnam. You didn't say how long. The President has said he seeks no bases, he seeks no real estate. Now how long do you visualize us staying there?

General GAVIN. I really don't know how long we would have to stay there. Much would depend upon the Chinese and the Vietcong.

If Thailand would become very serious, and if we were to become deeply involved there, we would certainly stay in Vietnam. If we could keep it in Vietnam and keep it from spreading beyond there, we might find a solution that would permit us to withdraw from there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Would the Senator yield for a question at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. My time is about up, but I will yield.

Senator LAUSCHE. You are still of the belief that the security and interests of our country require that we stay in Vietnam now?

General GAVIN. I believe, Mr. Senator, you used another word, "vital." I think you used that. Perhaps it was another member of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church used it, I know.

Senator LAUSCHE. I don't think I did.

General GAVIN. This is what I am thinking of. Certainly at this time the support of our obligations to these people requires our presence, let me put it that way.

Senator LAUSCHE. And doesn't the security of our country also require that we determine where we will make the stand?

General GAVIN. Once we become involved with whether or not the commitment is a vital one, whether or not it is essential to our survival, essential to our security, then you get gradients of the degree of the commitments that I would be hesitant to put numbers on.

It isn't vital for the future of the United States that we stay there. It isn't absolutely essential to our survival or to our future security that we stay there. We have a moral obligation at the moment to help those people get a government established. This is, I suppose, why I take the point of view that we should stop where we are and take a look, rather than just continuing to escalate.

Senator LAUSCHE. You don't propose that we pull out?

General GAVIN. No; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. I was only trying to sort of develop this. There is some confusion here, because the President has said time and again we do not wish bases there, permanent bases, although there are people who say the bases we are building there are of a very permanent nature. But that is not his intention.

Would it be precise to say that we stay there only until we can reach an honorable peace through negotiation?

General GAVIN. This is exactly my point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that what you really meant?

General GAVIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I was trying to clarify.

General GAVIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you did not mean to leave that statement just hanging there that we are going to stay there.

General GAVIN. No, no, not if we could reach a settlement.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the point.

Senator LAUSCHE. I subscribe to that, and I believe the President of the United States and every member of his Cabinet subscribes to it.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope they do. I join the Senator in wishing and hoping that this is certainly their purpose.

I would like to pursue this one further step if you will allow me. Would you care to describe what, in your view, is the legitimate objective of this whole operation of the United States? Is it a negotiable peace?

General GAVIN. The objective, as I understand it, and this is my impression, Mr. Chairman, from what I read and from conversation about it, rather than from any stated Government policy, the objective is to give the South Vietnamese people an opportunity to establish a government of their choosing, a peaceful, free, independent government of their own choosing.

The CHAIRMAN. Of their choosing, regardless of the nature of that government?

General GAVIN. Yes, I would say so. If they are happy with it, we are.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse? I am sorry I intruded.

Senator MORSE. That is perfectly all right.

QUESTION OF A DECLARATION OF WAR

General, does it concern you at all that our country has not declared war in connection with the Vietnam war? Does it concern you at all that our country has not formally declared war in connection with the South Vietnam war?

General GAVIN. Yes, it does.

Senator MORSE. I would like to say for the information of you and the others, that the committee has had the Library of Congress prepare a synopsis of statements that have been made by administration leaders over the years, and on March 10, 1954, President Eisenhower was questioned at a news conference about the danger of becoming involved in the Indo-China war, and he replied, and I quote:

I will say this. There is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is the result of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it. Now let's have that clear. And that is the answer.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator MORSE. As you know, General, a few of us, thus far very few, have felt that there ought to be a declaration of war, so that the people of the country would have their elected representatives in the Congress, under article I, section 8, face up squarely to the facts that the power to declare war is invested in them and not in the President. Do you share my view that that wouldn't be a bad idea for Congress to decide what it wants to do about it?

General GAVIN. Well, if I may take a moment to say, I share the concern of many Americans for the extensive sit-ins, teach-ins, draft-card burnings, and mass demonstrations that have taken place. It is quite unprecedented in many ways, short of the draft riots in the Civil War in New York.

I have a feeling, and I hope you will understand this is just my own point of view, I have a feeling that much of this stems from uneasiness because this has not been adequately discussed and debated and deliberated upon in Washington.

I think that the legislative branch should have played a more active role in bringing us to the state of affairs we are now in. I recently expressed this point of view on a television program on this subject. So I feel that Congress should thoroughly discuss this situation. The people will be much better off for it.

Finally, when we arrive at a point of view which is a national point of view, we will have the people with us whatever we embark on. If it is a declaration of a state of war, that is what it is.

Senator MORSE. It couldn't be anything more, and once it is formally declared, as far as I am concerned I will urge unity behind a declaration, but until it is declared, I think it has to be a matter of public discussion to find some honorable way out through an honorable peace.

QUESTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA

General, throughout our cold war containment policy of Russia, we maintained diplomatic relations and carried on normal relationships with Russia. We had discussed problems with her at the United Nations.

In fact, I think that at the time of the missile crisis in Cuba, the fact that we had this diplomatic relationship with Russia may very well have been the primary reason for the world not being thrown into a holocaust at that time.

Do you think that we have been handicapped somewhat in our contacts with Red China, that we have not had this type of diplomatic intercourse with her, either through diplomatic relations or through the channels of the United Nations?

General GAVIN. Yes. You will understand, sir, that this is just my own personal view.

Senator MORSE. I understand.

General GAVIN. I do think we have been handicapped. I think it is quite unrealistic to maintain, let us say, the pretense that this Nation of such magnitude does not exist for diplomatic contacts as far as we are concerned.

Senator MORSE. The chairman of the committee was dwelling on this matter in part, and I want to develop it a bit further. I think China has armed forces in Tibet at the present time, and as you have pointed out, she did get involved in a border dispute with India, but do you know of any Chinese troops outside of her own territorial area involved in any aggressive course of action against another country?

General GAVIN. No, I really don't know of any. No, I don't.

Senator MORSE. We have troops and bases in Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Okinawa, also in Germany, Spain, and Turkey, and many intermediate places.

MAKING OUR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES CLEAR TO ALLIES

Do you think that being the one country in the world that has extensive oversea bases and oversea troop assignments causes some concern among nations that we would like to have our friendly allies, as to what our foreign policy objectives are?

General GAVIN. Well, I do think it causes some concern. On the other hand, there may be a great deal more concern with the people we are now working with, if we didn't give them help. I think our NATO commitment is a very reasonable one. Our support of Greece during Mr. Truman's administration was a very necessary move on our part. Our willingness to support the Middle East countries, the Near East countries; such as Turkey, and so on, these bilaterals and multinational agreements we have entered into frequently serve a very useful purpose, although they may cause some apprehension in the minds of our would-be opponents.

Senator MORSE. Do you think it would be more helpful to the American image if some of our alleged allies who are parties to these various treaties would join us in multilateral assistance to keep the peace in various places of the world, such as some of the nations of the SEATO, and even some of the nations of NATO, in respect to peace-keeping functions in South Vietnam?

General GAVIN. Oh, it would help us no doubt, but they are not about to.

Senator MORSE. I might point out there isn't any hope of their doing this. As you go around the world, talking to representatives of other countries, a great deal of doubt is raised as to whether or not

we are taking it upon ourselves to set ourselves up as a self-appointed policeman.

General GAVIN. Sure.

Senator MORSE. To protect freedom all around the world.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator MORSE. And they are concerned about what our police activities may do in getting them into trouble.

General GAVIN. Exactly, yes.

FULL UTILIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER

Senator MORSE. You said earlier this afternoon that you thought the South Vietnamese were doing about all they could from the standpoint of their carrying on the war. One of the members of our press group talked to me about this problem over the noon hour, and suggested that I ask you a question about the conscription in South Vietnam.

He said that he had shortly come back from South Vietnam, and he found two things. He found a tendency on the part of many young men in South Vietnam to find ways and means of becoming excluded from the draft and, second, he found a surprising amount of desertions from the South Vietnamese side. Do you have any information on either of these points?

General GAVIN. No, sir; I do not, and on the matter of South Vietnam's manpower and its availability, I might say that in all of my testimony here today it has been entirely a matter of personal opinion and my own background and reading, and so on.

But this is one fact that I have from Mr. McNamara, that the South Vietnamese manpower simply isn't available in any significant quantities any more. He has told me they are doing just about as well as they can do.

I might say I think that Mr. McNamara has a very difficult problem on his hands, and I would like to help him with it in some way. I think it is a very tough one. He is getting all he can from South Vietnam in terms of manpower now.

Senator MORSE. Would you agree, however, that the South Vietnamese Government has an obligation to make clear to our people and to our country, who are supporting and providing increasing numbers of American troops over there, that they are using their own manpower to the maximum extent possible?

General GAVIN. No question about it.

Senator MORSE. In the armed services.

General GAVIN. Surely.

POLICING THE WORLD

Senator MORSE. General, it seems to me that what you have said today, and from what you and General Ridgway have written, that there is a fundamental difference between your attitude and that of General Taylor, for example.

General Taylor, in a recent speech, commenting on your letter in Harper's magazine—and you were examined about part of it this morning—said:

This country cannot escape its destiny as the champion of the free world. There is no running away from it.

Now this sounds to me like the doctrine that we used to call "manifest destiny." On the other hand, you have emphasized today such words as "discretion," "discrimination," and "thoughtfulness." You see a world that can very well be plagued in a whole holocaust, if this particular war isn't brought to an honorable conclusion.

Do you think that we have a duty unilaterally to set ourselves up as the protectors of freedom around the world? Do you think that whenever we judge that some nation in following a foreign policy, that we think may someday, somehow endanger the peace of the world, we should act unilaterally?

General GAVIN. No, I don't think so at all. I don't agree with that.

Senator MORSE. Because of the reference in your article to the United Nations, you hold the point of view that to the extent that we can with honor make use of every international law procedure through our treaty with the United Nations, we ought to follow that course as the President at long last has decided to do?

General GAVIN. Yes, Senator, and if I may without again imposing on your time, I would like to say that basic to my whole point of view is some years of concern about the strategic position of this great country of ours in world affairs.

Now this began before World War II. We came through World War II. I think in the euphoria following World War II, we did not realize that this man Hitler, who ran Germany, developed the first air rocket, jet rocket, rocket planes, snorkels, and when he got through he had burned 6 million people in the ovens.

We came back home feeling we had won the war, and in the euphoria we forgot all about the fact that the shield of time and circumstances that protected us had disappeared.

Next came Korea in 5 years, and I don't think we did well in Korea. I don't think our readiness was anywhere near what it should be—should have been.

Now what is the change in nature of strategy? What is our global commitment? What should we be doing? I think we have worldwide responsibilities to develop ourselves and further the way of life we have brought about, to export our managerial skills.

In the whole realm of economics we can do extremely well. This is what we should keep our eye on, as well as our science and technology programs and world opinion. Within the context of all of that, do the best we can, and at these confrontations such as Vietnam, this can't mean everything. There are far more important things than this.

Senator MORSE. The last question, General. As I listened to you, as I read your writings, I find myself in agreement with what I think is the clear implied meaning that we have to remain strong defensively and militarily for our own security, and that we have to face up to the fact that our best weapon against communism anywhere in the world is for us to export our system of economic freedom in an

endeavor to make people in the threatened areas economically free so that they can develop their own political freedom.

General GAVIN. That is right, absolutely.

Senator MORSE. Thank you.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I skipped Senator Pell. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Gavin, I much admired your article when it came out and inserted it in the Record on January 27, so that it could stand on its own merits and not just the press reports of it.

EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING

I want to ask you two questions, one of a military nature and one general. First, the military side, I was wondering what your view was of the effectiveness of the bombings, because my own thought is that in guerrilla warfare, bombing may well prove counterproductive.

We recently heard that 70 percent of the patients in the Vietnamese hospitals came from the effects of hostilities there. The administration will be giving us figures of these casualties which the committee is awaiting now. It seems to me to be counterproductive in that it creates enemies, particularly among the civilian population in the north, and that it can harden the will of the North Vietnamese.

In this connection in your article I noticed you used the phrase "to increase the bombing or to bomb Hanoi or even Peiping will add to our problems rather than detract from them, and it will not stop the penetration of North Vietnamese troops into the south."

You, I know, are familiar with the Rand report on the Malaysian experience, where it showed what happened in their campaign, where they used less bombs in 10 years than we use in 1 month. Moreover, they had a steady policy of never using napalm.

An article came out by Mr. Oberdorfer in the press yesterday that I would like to insert in the record, making some of these same points.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Charlotte (N.C.) Observer, Feb. 6, 1966]

HAS YEAR OF BOMBING HELPED?—250,000 TONS OF BOMBS FELL, STILL WAR CONTINUES

(February 7 marks the first anniversary of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. What has been accomplished by a full year of the most intensive application of American airpower since World War II? The following story analyzes the results, and sums up the pluses and minuses of this vast costly effort to win a war the airpower way.)

(By Don Oberdorfer, Observer Washington Bureau)

WASHINGTON.—In a year of intensive air warfare, the United States has dropped more than a ton of bombs for each of the bantam-weight Communists fighting in South Vietnam.

It has been an extraordinary experiment, testing the value of power in an unconventional war—a value much discussed but not yet proved.

As a result of the bombing, the Reds have been battered and harassed in both North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

The cost to them of continuing the war has increased sharply.

Beleaguered Allied outposts have been saved by airborne reinforcements and firepower.

On the other hand, the Communist battle force has grown steadily despite concerted U.S. air raids on assembly areas, supply lines, and infiltration routes.

Air attacks have failed to drive the Reds toward the bargaining table.

Moreover, U.S. officials are now saying that the war must be won on the ground—and denying they ever thought airpower alone would do the job.

This is a switch of emphasis, at least, from early hopes that "two or three months" of bombardment would bear fruit and reported statements that "we'll be at the conference table by September (1965)."

These are results of the air war in Vietnam, which began in earnest last February 7—just 1 year ago.

On that day, hidden Vietcong mortarmen attacked the U.S. compound at Pleiku, and President Johnson—acting on a prearranged plan—promptly ordered the first of a continuing series of bomber raids on North Vietnam.

Later that month American jet warplanes were first unleashed for air strikes in South Vietnam. Four months after that, giant B-52 jet bombers were first used to pound Communist jungle hideaways in South Vietnam.

Month by month, U.S. air attacks have grown in number and ferocity. During lulls in the raids on North Vietnam, planes were diverted to targets in Laos or other areas.

The United States encountered little opposition from North Vietnam's small air force of about 80 modern planes. However, 275 U.S. warplanes and 76 helicopters were lost to the enemy during 1965, mostly by ground fire.

At the end of the year, 1,600 U.S. aircraft and 1,270 helicopters were reported in action in Vietnam. Many more are on order.

To support this vast armada, four new airbases with permanent concrete runways are rising in South Vietnam, one in Thailand.

During the past year, U.S. warplanes dropped more than 250,000 tons of bombs, napalm, and rockets—over a ton for each of the 230,000 Communist insurgents in South Vietnam.

In December alone, U.S. planes delivered more than 40,000 tons of explosives, Secretary of Defense McNamara says this is twice as much as in the peak month of the Korean war.

At that rate, the average per day is almost as much as the total explosive power of the largest conventional air raid in history—the 1,700 tons rained on Tokyo March 9, 1945.

McNamara has asked Congress for money to support bomb consumption at "a much higher rate."

The air war in Vietnam is actually two wars—one in the north, and another in the south. Following is an analysis of what American airpower has meant on both these aerial fronts.

NORTH VIETNAM

More than 18,600 bomber flights pounded North Vietnamese targets in the past year. These raids and the limits placed on them and their limited results are perhaps the most controversial aspects of the Vietnam war.

For 5 days in May and for 37 days in December and January, the raids were halted to give North Vietnam a chance to transmit peace "signals." When none came, bombing was resumed.

The targets, bomb tonnages and at times number and type of aircraft, have been carefully controlled from Washington. The purpose was to achieve maximum impact with minimum risk that Red China or the Soviet Union would intervene.

A principal aim of the raids is to convince North Vietnam, by penalty or threat, to stop aiding the insurgents in the south.

Such "strategic persuasion" had long been favored by the U.S. Air Force. Shortly after retiring as chief of the Strategic Air Command in 1964, Gen. Thomas Power publicly suggested that the Air Force could win the war singlehandedly "within a few days and with minimum force" by persuasive air attacks on "a major military supply depot in North Vietnam" and other critical targets.

Power's forecast proved far too optimistic.

When North Vietnam failed to be persuaded, proposals were heard to redouble the attacks—and hit more important targets.

As stated by Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, policy is that the bombings are a "blue chip" to be used for trading purposes in the event of negotiations.

Another major purpose of the attacks was to cut down North Vietnamese troops and supplies heading south—by bombing bridges, supply lines and depots. By the end of the year, the Air Force reported 315 bridges destroyed and roads cut at 2,050 places.

Today North Vietnam forces move almost entirely at night—but they still move. Ferries, pontoons, and even rope ladders have replaced bridges. Road repairs are continuous.

According to official estimates, infiltration to the south has increased from 800 men monthly last summer to 1,500 monthly in late fall to about 4,500 monthly now—despite the bombing.

"You have to look at the other side," cautions an officer responsible for many raids. "If we hadn't been bombing, the flow might be even more."

Officials say, moreover, that "one clear result" of the air attacks has been diversion of perhaps 50,000 men and women in North Vietnam to repair work. This is considered a plus in hiking the cost of war to the Communists.

SOUTH VIETNAM

Meanwhile, in South Vietnam, allied warplanes flew more than 99,000 attack sorties (individual flights) in 1965 alone. This is about three times the number of Vietcong reported killed in that period (34,000).

Most of these flights were for close-in combat support or to soften up nearby enemy positions. "Each (allied) battalion is receiving more air protection and more air support than ground forces ever had before," say U.S. officials.

In December the United States was flying 430 sorties per day—and a further increase is in the works.

"We've got our boys out there, and the basic thing is to back them up," says an Air Force official. "Those kids can get an air strike in a matter of seconds—not minutes—from planes already in the air. We may be overkilling some targets, and as a taxpayer I may not be too happy—but as a father I'm glad of it."

In some cases quick air action has been credited with saving United States and South Vietnamese outposts from being overrun.

Some surveys for the Air Force by the Rand Corp. emphasize dangers in the application of massive firepower against a guerrilla enemy.

S. E. Warcup, the British air commander in the successful Malayan campaign, warned that a few civilian deaths from air strikes in villages "do more harm than all the good you may do * * *. You have made these people enemies for good." In 10 years of the Malayan emergency, the British dropped 33,000 tons of bombs (less than a month's supply in Vietnam).

Similar worries—about Vietnam—have been publicly voiced by retired Maj. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the chief U.S. expert on counterinsurgency, and Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

Officials of the U.S. Agency for International Development estimate that 70 percent of all the civilian hospital patients in Vietnam today are war victims.

One air effort where friendly villagers are scant worry is the pounding of Vietcong jungle hideaways by B-52 strategic bombers based in Guam. The aim of the B-52's is to deny the Reds a safe sanctuary where they can sleep, eat, and train between attacks.

The method is "pattern bombing," to spray the jungle in hopes of hitting Communist strongpoints. Officials say recent prisoner interrogations are "very clear" evidence that the effect is "substantial."

Because of the nature of the attack, some raids are cosmic failures. One raid with 229 tons of bombs killed two or three Vietcong, four water buffalo, and destroyed one corrugated roofed structure and two thatched-roof huts.

However, the B-52 raids have enabled Government forces and U.S. troops to probe jungle strongpoints held by Communists since the beginning of the Red struggle against the French in 1945. Ground troops have destroyed tunnels and assembly areas and captured rice caches.

With the Vietcong in control of many highways, air transport—particularly helicopters—also became increasingly important. "This is the place where the helicopter has come into its own," says an Army official. McNamara adds that the value of the whirly birds so exceeded expectations that he is doubling the number of helicopter companies in the army worldwide.

To date, the results of the first full year's application of American airpower to the jungles of Vietnam are mixed. There are some pluses and some minuses.

But the bombing continues, and the Pentagon has given one clear measure of

its own judgment of the value: Current requests to Congress for ammunition (largely for air war) for fiscal 1966 and 1967 total \$7.8 billion—four times the gross national product of South Vietnam.

Senator PELL. Finally, today the newspapers I noticed said in the headlines, "Bombing Cannot End War." Bearing these facts or these opinions in mind, and speaking from the military viewpoint, what is your view as to the effectiveness, from the viewpoint of containing these guerrilla aggressions, of our present bombings in North and South Vietnam?

General GAVIN. I don't think that I am in a position to give you a quantitative answer to that, Senator. Bombing is an extension of the arm of the man fighting on the ground, when he is dealing with problems immediately to his front, immediately near him to the front or the rear, depending on the circumstances, and I don't think he should be denied this immediate support.

What with artillery is extended into missiles and is extended out into fighter-bomber support, and military targets that are immediately a threat to the independence of the operation of the ground soldier must be attacked.

When we get beyond this and go to our rather speculative targets, targets that involve areas of high density civilian occupation, then I very seriously question the value of it. It does tend to harden the resistance. It is difficult to see the results. And I would be delighted to see and welcome an opportunity to see statistics on what the exact results of the bombings have been. For example, the long-range bombings by the B-52's from Guam I understand. But again to get to the end spectrum where bombing to me is undesirable, I refer to Peiping and Hanoi, just to take those cities out for psychological reasons wouldn't help a bit in solving the problems of dealing with the guerrillas in South Vietnam. I don't think so at all.

Senator PELL. In specific military terms though the present saturation bombings of areas in South Vietnam and use of napalm, not necessarily in support of troop operations but what you call area bombing, is this effective in your view or not?

General GAVIN. I don't know about specific bombing operations that they have undertaken like that. I might say in World War II we used saturation bombing with heavy bombers, carpet bombing in front of the infantry. This is a rather stabilized situation where you knew where your enemy was, knew what your objective was, and you could lay it in the right place and go after them. It was useful there. Any specific situations you have in Vietnam, I am not sure that I could comment on those because I honestly don't know.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

WHAT SHOULD WE DO?

Another more general question, from my information as to history, I was wondering where you think we should come out in the end? What should we do now?

I have listened to the questioning all morning, and I am still a little confused in my own mind as to what your recommendations would be, not the alternatives you offer but what you would do bearing in mind what General Wheeler said in commenting on your article that:

This must primarily of course be a Vietnamese operation.

If that quotation is correct, that means we can't continuously escalate our commitment of troops. Yet I see no other alternatives. What do you see?

General GAVIN. Yes. I don't know, and I don't know what is happening at Honolulu or what has happened there in the last couple of days, but I would hope that we could prevail upon the Saigon government to consider ways and means of establishing a government that would be satisfactory to them, and perhaps ultimately a relationship with the Hanoi government, but we can't just continue to escalate our manpower while this deadlock goes on and on.

I would say stop right where we are, with a minimum of any buildup beyond this. We will always have to replace casualties as long as people are there. They don't have to fight to have a high casualty list. So we will have to continue to send men there even with what we have. With what we have we should try to find some way, a political solution to the problem.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

VIEWS ON SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS

Senator CARLSON. General, I have only one or two questions. In the colloquy with the chairman you, I believe, inferred that the present policy in our operations in Vietnam, which seems to be search and destroy, was not a good policy. Did I misunderstand you?

General GAVIN. No, I didn't say that; no, sir. I think they have got to do this to really keep the initiative and keep the control of their own destiny, operating from whatever we have, bases, perimeters, enclaves, whatever they are.

Senator CARLSON. I misunderstood you then. I was interested as to what our position would be at a negotiating conference table, if we did not try to get some additional territory and control of more peoples in that area.

General GAVIN. Yes; I think we have to continue to do this. We got into a bit of discussion earlier this morning, and this afternoon, about Mr. Alsop's idea of using less troops if you search and destroy, and ultimately using a third as many troops, if you search and destroy aggressively.

I rather doubt this. But certainly we should continue cleaning up on them and going after them and doing the best with what we have, rather than just sitting there.

Senator CARLSON. You helped me clarify that to my own satisfaction. If I remember recent testimony or some figures that I read, we control less than half of the area. Out of about 2,600 towns and villages we and the South Vietnamese control only about 700. So it is my personal feeling that we are not in a very good position to negotiate even though we have probably over 50 percent of the population because we control Saigon.

I did want to get your thinking of the line that we shouldn't continue to try to expand our control there.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. General, the real final test of a policy must be whether it works.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator GORE. Is that correct?

General GAVIN. Right.

SUMMARY OF GAVIN'S VIEWS

Senator GORE. I have tried to get the principal thrust of your testimony in mind. I would like to state it, and then ask for your comment as I have interpreted it.

The principal thrust of your testimony appears to me to be that, though you do not think that America's vital interests are necessarily involved in Vietnam, you think our moral commitment is heavy you think that because of that and other reasons we cannot afford precipitate withdrawal. On the other hand you feel that we are if not already the victims of events, we are dangerously near losing the options which you think our national interests require we maintain. I am not trying to put words in your mouth, I am trying to interpret what you have said.

General GAVIN. You said it better than I did, as a matter of fact.

Senator GORE. You think that we should stop, look, and listen, and consider and undertake to keep this conflict within manageable bounds, and avoid if possible a war with China.

General GAVIN. Yes, I would agree entirely with that. If I may say so, I think you have expressed it better than I have, that we may lose the options we may have to keep this within manageable proportions. This is what concerns me. It is not so much what we are doing. What we are doing is terribly important, but I have the feeling that it is time that we stop and take a look at where we are, in terms of our total global commitments, and realize that if we are going to really do well in this confrontation in the long run, we had better be restrained and wise in what we do in South Vietnam.

VICTORY AND OTHER WAYS TO END WARS

Senator GORE. Along with this consideration very distinguished Senators, military leaders, journalists, and others express the view that we must push to a military victory, and there is press comment from Honolulu that General Westmoreland may be asking for as many as 600,000 men by the end of maybe the next year, though I am not sure.

Now in the event we press for a complete military victory, do you think this would go beyond the reasonable bounds which you recommend?

General GAVIN. You have given one parameter of 600,000 men, I believe you said, Senator. I don't know what we are talking about here, what this means by victory, total victory in Vietnam. If we are talking about three-quarters of a million men, we are absolutely beyond what I would consider reasonable.

Senator GORE. Is it not true, General, that wars rather generally end either in a political settlement or in military vanquishment of one foe?

General GAVIN. Oh, I think this is the traditional answer, but no, no. Let me say this about this.

In 1919 Clemenceau said that war is too important to leave to the generals. I think war now is too important to leave to any minister or Secretary of Defense.

This involves the total spectrum of national involvement. It involves our commerce, our trade, our position, our social fabric in structure and society at home, and our commitments must be made in terms of the total involvement in which we are engaged.

The world has shrunk to this point today. Now what is victory? And what is it going to take and what is it going to cost and what does it mean to our society as a whole? I don't know. But it goes way beyond a military problem, way beyond that now.

Senator GORE. Our goal in World War II was unconditional surrender.

General GAVIN. That was right; it was.

Senator GORE. Can we, in your view, wisely and prudently have that as a goal?

General GAVIN. No.

Senator GORE. As a goal in this war?

General GAVIN. I don't think it was wise in World War II either for that matter. It prolonged the war.

Senator GORE. Would you consider unconditional surrender of North Vietnam a prudent goal?

General GAVIN. No.

Senator GORE. For the present conflict?

General GAVIN. I do not.

Senator GORE. You think that would be beyond reasonable bounds?

General GAVIN. I would be certainly; yes, and an unwise goal.

Senator GORE. Do you think this would likely break the plate glass window that would set off the alarms in the precipitation of a war with Russia, or with China?

General GAVIN. If as a corollary to that you are saying that we have our way and we are going to occupy with U.S. forces right up to the mountains of the Chinese border, that is absolutely right.

Senator GORE. The gravity of this issue impels us to be candid.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator GORE. I think so.

General GAVIN. Yes.

NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT PREFERRED TO VICTORY

Senator GORE. And certainly what I am about to say I hope will not be interpreted as any criticism at all. As a matter of fact, in many respects I consider it a compliment.

We know that at one time President Johnson opposed negotiation. He was very much opposed to negotiation or a negotiated settlement at the time I suggested more than a year ago. I have personal reasons to say that. Fortunately at his speech at Johns Hopkins, he changed

his strategy and came to what I think was a far more realistic defensible, feasible position.

Now we hear word, though I do not have it officially, that Ho Chi Minh has asked India to initiate a peace movement for Vietnam. What would be your attitude on negotiation for a cease-fire, for settlement, in the present status of military and political affairs in Vietnam?

General GAVIN. Oh, I would think we should negotiate, without question. There is so much to be done in this world. There are so many things we have to do at home, so much we have got to get on with, and let's get this settled as quickly as we can.

Senator GORE. Then you would think if our option is to have a negotiated settlement on a reasonable, honorable basis, then you would prefer that to the all-out victory which some are advocating?

General GAVIN. Without reservation I would. I realize that someone else may interpret your words, Senator, as to what this means, reasonable and honorable and so on, but as you have expressed it to me, absolutely.

Senator GORE. When I referred to the fact that President Johnson had altered his course, this is true also of the bombing of North Vietnam. At one time you will recall the President was very much opposed to that.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator GORE. He was opposed to defoliation of the jungles.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator GORE. He was opposed to going to the United Nations. I think we have wisely gone to the United Nations.

General GAVIN. I think so, too.

Senator GORE. And in other instances the President has maintained a wise and a prudent flexibility. But this also give us warning, though I believe he endorses now the goal which you advocate, confining this conflict within reasonable bounds. I want to be sure insofar as I can bring it about, that that goal is accomplished.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General GAVIN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Gavin, I would like to explore this general thought. I do so because of a quandary in which I find myself, to determine which course to follow that would be in the best interests of the security of the United States. The subject is to what extent beyond the present control of southeast Asia by the Communists can we allow them to expand.

CAN WE AFFORD TO PULL OUT OF VIETNAM?

Trying to explore this general subject, my first question is: Can we afford at this time to pull out of South Vietnam? You have answered that but I would like to have you answer it again.

General GAVIN. The answer is "No;" we should not.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we pull out, in your opinion will that be the end of our troubles with the Communists?

General GAVIN. Oh no, no. I see troubles down the road, many of them for many years.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is if we pull out, we can expect that they will provoke trouble, challenging our security in some other place of the world?

General GAVIN. I would think so.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now thirdly, if we pull out of South Vietnam, what would be the reaction to such conduct by the people of Laos, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, Burma, and India?

General GAVIN. Well, Mr. Senator, I really don't know. What I would say with respect to Asia, I have suggested that we shouldn't pull out. If we should pull out, I would assume we would only withdraw when, as Senator Gore has explained, a reasonable settlement has been arrived at.

I think this would make clear our willingness to meet our moral obligations. But I think there may be as much apprehension about us going into a very much more escalated war with Red China as there is with resolving this thing and getting out of there, on the part of some people, such as the Indians.

Senator LAUSCHE. I agree with you that we should explore in the fullest degree the avenues that are available to procure a peaceful understanding.

General GAVIN. That is right.

DECISION THROUGH ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Since we get into that subject, I would like to read to you the proposal made by Premier Phan Van Dong about settlement. He stated last April:

The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the South Vietnam Nationals.

I find a grave weakness in that proposal. That proposal contemplates a surrender of the rights of the South Vietnamese and a recognition of the National Liberation Front as the controlling government. What is your estimate of this proposal?

General GAVIN. I am not sure that I know, Senator. I presume from the description you have given it, that the National Liberation Front—

Senator LAUSCHE. Is the Vietcong.

General GAVIN. Is the Vietcong.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, that is right.

General GAVIN. And, of course, I don't see how we could accept that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Sure not. The President of the United States has suggested that there be open and free elections in South Vietnam for the people of South Vietnam to determine at those elections what type of government they want. This morning I believe you said that they ought to have that right, and if they choose a Communist government they should be permitted to have it, is that correct?

General GAVIN. This is what I said. I said they should have a government they choose. If it is the kind of government we like, fine. If it isn't, that is their choosing.

Senator LAUSCHE. I can say to you that your opinion on this point has support from the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, in his testimony to this committee.

The North Vietnamese or the Vietcong are afraid that there will not be free and open elections, and it seems to me that that fear can be substantially eliminated by having the United Nations supervise the elections or having some international body created that will guarantee an election where the people will honestly have the right to make their choice. Will you express your opinion on that?

General GAVIN. I would agree with that absolutely, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, you are familiar with the type of elections that the Communists have held after World War II in Middle Europe?

General GAVIN. In general, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. They are not free and open elections.

General GAVIN. No, they are not at all.

Senator LAUSCHE. The suggestion has been made about the United Nations. We have gone to the United Nations. The matter has been ordered taken up by the Security Council, but now lies dormant. The President has said that he is willing to conform with the 1954 accords, and no favorable reaction has come from North Vietnam on that.

Now in trying to rationalize this, how far beyond this can we go? What can we do beyond this to bring the subject to an end with a choice being made by the people of what type of government they want? Do you see any other avenue? I am not cross-examining you, you understand.

General GAVIN. No, I understand that, sir.

I think the steps that you have outlined, and I touched upon them in my article, in my communication, bringing this to the United Nations, seeking an international supervisory body, as it is with the Geneva agreement, let us say, might work.

I would think, if I may say so, that the suggestion that we were willing to go now to the 1954 Geneva accords and to abide by those, and the Vietcong have violated them as well as we have, I think that it would not be a particular response if we pulled everything out and said now we are where we were and let us start here. So I do not think it will come out until we see a thing of that sort. But the movement you have suggested through the United Nations—

ARE THERE OTHER ALTERNATIVES?

Senator LAUSCHE. It is sound. If we cannot succeed through these two proposals, what alternative do we have left? Can we surrender?

General GAVIN. No.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am quite sure your answer is no.

General GAVIN. No, no, of course not. That is what I said.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have already described that if we pull out, that will not be the end of the problem.

Now from the standpoint of the listening public, and my own, I am trying to find some road over and above all the concessions that we have made to bring about an understanding, and I am at the end of my rope in the effort to find it. Do you have any other pathway that you think is available?

General GAVIN. No. First of all, let us dismiss the alternative of expanding the commitment there, escalating indefinitely. This I think is out. We begin where we are.

Now there may be other things we can do. I think that the State Department is much better equipped to answer these.

I, for example, do not see why we hesitate to negotiate directly with Ho Chi Minh. I think we should approach him. He is the guy shooting at us, and we should be willing to talk to him. I think that some contacts have been made. I think we might be more aggressive about this.

Other than that, other than talking to people in State, I really do not know. I am not in a position to know.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator LAUSCHE. Just one further minute if the Senator will.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator LAUSCHE. The question of bombing has been a very controversial one.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. There is a certain group which has argued that we should not bomb beyond the 17th parallel.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. I come back to what I said this morning. If we do not bomb the supply lines and the military bases, is it not advisable for us to pull out rather than have our men shot down by men and material being brought in from the north, but pulling out is unthinkable at present.

General GAVIN. If we are not going to give them fighter-bomber support and we are not going to attack military targets, I do not see how our position would be tenable in the long run. You have got to give them all the support you can while they are there.

Senator LAUSCHE. I concur fully with you, and I thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?

Senator CHURCH. General, I would like to go back, first of all, to the attention Senator Gore gave to keeping the war within manageable limits. I think that is the most crucial issue that now confronts us. The value of your testimony, as I see it, has been to help put this war in better perspective for all of us.

You have pointed out that there are places in the world where we have much more at stake than in Vietnam, and if we can avoid it, we must not let our engagement there be so enlarged that the tail, in effect, is to wag the dog.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator CHURCH. It is perspective, then, that you are helping to bring to the examination of what strategy we should follow.

Now, in Senator Lausche's line of questioning, he asked you if you thought that we would put an end to our troubles with the Communists if we were to pull out of South Vietnam.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator CHURCH. And you rightly said, "of course not." But let us just turn that question around, in order to get perspective.

General GAVIN. Surely.

EFFECT OF U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM ON COMMUNIST ACTIVITY
ELSEWHERE

Senator CHURCH. I do not think, as you have said before, anyone is advocating a pullout, and certainly a pullout is not going to be the policy of the United States.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator CHURCH. We have not been pulling ourselves out. We have been in the process of putting ourselves further and further in.

Now while we have been engaged in the war in Vietnam, and while we have been enlarging our commitments there, has that put an end to our problems with the Communists elsewhere in the world?

General GAVIN. Oh, I do not think so; no.

Senator CHURCH. No. While we have been holding the line in Vietnam and enlarging our commitments there, have not there been outbreaks, Communist uprisings, guerrilla wars breaking out elsewhere in Asia, and elsewhere in the world?

General GAVIN. Yes, going back to the beginning of our commitment; yes, the turbulence has continued around the universe.

Senator CHURCH. As a matter of fact, has there not been a very serious uprising in Indonesia?

General GAVIN. Sure.

Senator CHURCH. Which we have attributed to the Communists?

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. Has not Singapore splintered off from Malaysia behind our fighting front in Vietnam?

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. Has not the Dominican Republic undergone a guerrilla war on the opposite side of the world while we have been engaged in the fight in Vietnam?

General GAVIN. Surely.

Senator CHURCH. And has there not been testimony before this committee that there is serious evidence that a guerrilla war is even now spreading into Thailand, while we hold the line in Vietnam?

General GAVIN. Well, this has happened. I do not know. This has been the testimony?

Senator CHURCH. We have had such testimony.

General GAVIN. Yes; I agree that that is so.

Senator CHURCH. So those famous dominoes, General, even as we have held the bridge in Vietnam, have been wobbling all around us, have they not?

General GAVIN. Yes; I would say this is a characteristic rather than one toppling the other over.

Senator CHURCH. As a matter of fact, do you believe that by drawing a line in Vietnam or any other one place, that by establishing some military breastwork in a given place, we effectively deal with the problem of guerrilla wars and put an end to them elsewhere?

General GAVIN. No, no. No, no. Our whole adventure, adventure is not quite the word, but our whole undertaking must be characterized by flexibility and discrimination in dealing with each situation on its own merits.

Senator CHURCH. Do you not think, General, that it is much more accurate to characterize guerrilla wars, not as the link of a single chain

that can be broken in any one place, but rather as a kind of infection that spread on the winds of change which might break out in any country where internal conditions are such as to give root to subversion?

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. It is very hard to draw a battleline against that kind of disease; is it not?

General GAVIN. Yes; surely.

Senator CHURCH. And our strategy ought to take this into account; should it not?

General GAVIN. Oh, yes; exactly. And this is exactly the basis of my plea here before this committee that we see these affairs in the spectrum of all of our commitments and recognize each one as being the kind of operation it is, and that—

FALLACY OF DOMINO THEORY

Senator CHURCH. Now those who hold the domino theory in its most extreme form sometimes say that if we were not to hold the line in Vietnam, then we would be fighting the Communists at Waikiki or on the Mississippi. Do you agree with that?

General GAVIN. No. I must say that I am very suspect of a philosophy that says sooner or later we are going to have to fight them, let us get them now, or a philosophy that says that if we fall here, we go all the way back down the line.

This is to me a very shortsighted, intellectually sterile, lacking in responsiveness—a point of view that causes one to fundamentally take counsel from the fears rather than from the highest hopes.

Senator CHURCH. And could lead us, could it not, to be dominated utterly by our fears.

General GAVIN. Yes. You see, you are so apprehensive and so fearful that you decide to do the thing that is most unwise. We are too powerful a nation to be involved in such a false philosophy of survival.

Senator CHURCH. General, is it not true that we are so powerful we ought not to be afraid at all?

General GAVIN. That is right; yes.

Senator CHURCH. We should try to be rational in the pursuit of our goals in the world?

General GAVIN. Senator, I could not agree with you more, and I have no doubt in my own mind and in my heart about the outcome of this confrontation that we are worried about with Red China. I have no doubt whatsoever. I would caution therefore that we act wisely and well everywhere around the periphery.

Senator CHURCH. I think it is well, General, that we make clear, with all the talk about a possible war with China, that our resistance to it is not based upon fear on our part of war with China, but upon an assessment that such a war would not rationally serve the interests of the people of the United States.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. And that even in a victory, at whatever fearful cost we might have to pay, it could give rise to problems greater than those solved by the war itself.

General GAVIN. Yes; this is correct.

Senator CHURCH. Is that not so?

General GAVIN. I would agree with that.

SEMANTICS PROBLEM

Senator CHURCH. General, there is one other question I would like to ask, one or two. I think that one of the reasons there has been some confusion about your views has been due to a semantics problem. There has been the term "enclave" and the various misinterpretations given it.

It has been suggested to me that what is needed is some phrase that would capsule your views. I do not know whether that is possible. But as I have listened today and have tried to think of a term, would it be accurate to say that you would prefer us to follow in Vietnam a strategy of holding, a kind of a holding action, as opposed to a strategy that would either pull us out or seriously escalate the dimensions of the war?

General GAVIN. Yes. I would be a little concerned about what misunderstanding the word "holding" itself might conjure up in the minds of some. I would be more inclined to think of a dynamic situation of sorts. There is a conflict of words, but I am saying we will not escalate but we are going to remain dynamic and retain the initiative, if one can be retained.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. One final question, General. We are in South Vietnam, I think this has been made clear, by virtue of commitments that we ourselves have made to the Saigon government.

Those commitments are to help that government in its efforts to put down the insurrection against it. Is this not the kind of commitment that can only be kept in South Vietnam itself in the final analysis?

General GAVIN. If I understood your question correctly, yes, I would say so, the commitment to Vietnam as you specifically said can only be kept there.

Senator CHURCH. It can only be kept in South Vietnam itself.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. And so your strategy is just to conform with the commitment we have made, because it concentrates our effort in the area where that commitment must be kept; that is to say, in South Vietnam itself.

General GAVIN. That is true, and whether the South Vietnamese like it or not, the fact of the matter is in the long run it is probably the best strategy to serve their interests—and I use the word "strategy"—because our success in world affairs can only serve their interest best.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up. Senator Mundt.

DEFINITION OF "ENCLAVE"

Senator MUNDT. General, this morning when our time ran out, we were discussing the question of enclaves, and neither of us understood

the other's approach on that. You were about to give, I believe, your definition of what an enclave is, as you use the term of art.

General GAVIN. I read the expression when I used it in this communication:

"Today we have sufficient forces in South Vietnam to hold several"—and the word "enclave" is there—"on the coast where sea and air power can be made fully effective."

What I had in mind there was a word that would describe the commitments we have now made where we have brought sea and air power into Vietnam by establishing of an airbase, a sea base, putting in logistical support, and using that as a basis for searching and destroying.

Senator MUNDT. I think maybe part of the problem which has confused the public may come from what the editors of Harper's said about you use of the word "enclave."

Of course, the general public is hopefully looking for any way, as we all are, to keep the war from getting any greater, and it grasps this phrase. The editor said:

"In the following letter General Gavin presents the first basic criticism of the administration's policy in Vietnam."

Then the editor says:

"As an alternative, he urges the stopping of our bombing in North Vietnam * * *." I think you have clearly made it obvious that that is not your point, even though the editor reads that into your article—"a halt in the escalation of the ground war,"—but no definitive procedure for getting that done has been worked out—"withdrawal of American troops to defend a limited number of enclaves along the South Vietnamese coast * * *." This is what the editor says. After reading your article, the average layman is likely to read into this exactly what the editor of Harper's read.

We get a lot of letters. I get a lot of letters from friends around the world saying, "General Gavin has a very fine way of handling this thing without loss of life"—sort of an Operation Fortress, they call it, or a holding operation.

Now I take it that that is not what you meant to say.

General GAVIN. That is absolutely—

Senator MUNDT. The editor of Harper's read it wrong. Is that right?

General GAVIN. Senator, this is not what I meant whatsoever. Senator Symington asked me about these points earlier. I might say furthermore in the Sunday issue of the New York Times magazine Harper's advertised, in this current issue of their magazine, with a lead, what appeared to be an article by Gen. James M. Gavin versus Johnson's strategy in Vietnam, and I wrote to them Monday, and I have the letter in front of me, and I said:

"I was shocked to see the advertisement in yesterday's book review section of the New York Times," and I was, because it misrepresents entirely my point of view.

I do not know how one controls that, but I would suggest that you bring the editor in here.

Senator MORSE. Senator Mundt, can I ask to have that letter put in the record?

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

(The letter referred to appears in the appendix.)

MISUNDERSTANDING OVER GAVIN'S LETTER TO HARPER'S

Senator MUNDT. I was going to suggest that it would be helpful along the same line if you would write a letter to Harper's magazine, which I think they would publish, straightening out what you now say is a complete misrepresentation of your point of view. I went during the lunch hour to the dictionary to find out what enclave meant. Webster's dictionary says this:

A tract of territory enclosed within foreign territory, hence a district or region as a city inhabited by a particular race or set apart for a special purpose.

That looks like operation "fortress"—that you are going to hold a certain designated area and dare them to come after you.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. Now you get that from the dictionary. You get it from Harper's. I want it from General Gavin, because you are the author of the statement, and it has given a lot of false hopes to many people.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. And if the hopes are false, you are the best man to straighten it out.

General GAVIN. Yes, and I described it here, I believe. You might be interested in what I have had to say to the editor of Harper's about this matter already. I have a copy of the letter right here:

I was shocked to see an advertisement in yesterday's book review section of the New York Times. I am enclosing the upper part of it so there may be no question in your mind about the attitude to which I refer.

It seems to be clearly misleading and implies in your February issue that an article has been published in which I challenge Mr. Johnson's strategy.

This is exactly what the ad says. Then I go on to refer to this communication here, and our phone conversation when he asked me if he could publish it. We correspond a great deal, and he called me in Dublin, Ireland, I might say, in late November or rather in early December, and said he would like to publish this in his magazine, and I said "Well, all right, go ahead." So I have this to say:

As you may recall from our phone conversation, I thought well of my proposal which in essence recommended a thorough appraisal of where we are, what it is costing us and what the alternatives are, and then suggesting that we make up our own minds rather than leaving the initiative with the Vietcong.

I considered sending a copy of this to Mr. Valenti for the President, because I know him quite well. I thought I was being helpful. I say here:

I presume that I could be of help to him, the President. Mr. Fisher told me that he sent a copy of the article to Mr. Moyers.

Since then Harper's has, through its advertising, exploited the idea that my views are entirely in opposition to those of Mr. Johnson, which is untrue, although saying this, I am of course not sure of the detailed thinking of Mr. Johnson.

As I may imagine, this has been a matter of some embarrassment to me, and a great deal of misunderstanding, particularly in the high places of Washington has occurred, and so on.

I will appear before Senator Fulbright's committee, and by that time I hope that I may clarify the situation with the committee.

I cannot take responsibility for the advertising or the editorial views of the editor of Harper's magazine. I must stand by the article I wrote as I have everything else I published in that magazine, and I do.

Senator MUNDT. This is right, but you have to think about the public—

General GAVIN. Yes.

WHAT GENERAL GAVIN MEANS BY "ENCLAVE"

Senator MUNDT (continuing). That reads the article, reads the editor's interpretation, and reads General Wheeler's sharp criticism of your use of the word "enclave" as he interpreted it—

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator MUNDT (continuing). Which appears to be different also from the way you interpreted it or the way Webster's Dictionary describes it.

All of us have had the difficulty of trying to get exactly the right idea as to the meaning of the word as I understand it. If in fact you do not mean by use of the word "enclave" a holding operation, an operation fortress—which I described this morning as putting the Americans in the target zone to be shot at, and we will agree that you do not mean that—just what did you mean in terms of a change, by the using of the enclave strategy?

General GAVIN. Yes. The problem was of taking condition A, where we are, what we have and what we can do with what we have. How does one describe this?

I described it this way:

Today we have sufficient forces in South Vietnam to hold several enclaves on the coast where sea and air power can be made fully effective. I mean for example, Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, and so forth.

Senator SYMINGTON. General, will you talk into the microphone? It is a little hard to hear you.

General GAVIN. Yes. And then talking about the bombing of Hanoi and Peiping, I give as alternatives:

On the other hand, if we should maintain these areas we hold on the coast and desist from our bombing attacks and seek to find a solution through the United Nations—

And so on.

Then I finally make a final reference to this condition of where we are and what we have deployed there, what it is costing us, and what we are doing there. Talking about the final alternative:

In the meantime we must do the best we can with forces we have deployed in Vietnam. Keep in mind the strategy in global affairs.

Then I go on to refer to the economic, science, technology, and so on.

CHANGES IN PRESENT STRATEGY

Senator MUNDT. Maybe we should get at it this way, General. If you were making the decision in the command position for all America, what specific changes would you bring about compared with the present strategy we are employing in Vietnam?

General GAVIN. First of all, I would cease the escalation until I had a better look at what we are now doing. By this I mean—

Senator MUNDT. Do you mean cease sending in extra troops?

General GAVIN. We have to send replacements for what we have. Cease expanding the commitment there.

Senator MUNDT. You say you would cease the escalation. What do you mean by that?

General GAVIN. Stop expanding the forces we have there.

Senator MUNDT. Stop expanding it?

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. What else?

General GAVIN. Now beyond that I think we have got to have flexibility in what we are doing. I am not quite sure if the present deployments are the best deployments.

I have talked to the Secretary of Defense about this. It may be that he may, in the long run, if he does not expand his force, have to make changes. I do not know. This is a matter for him to decide.

It would be most presumptuous for me to sit here and say what he and General Westmoreland should do. But the point I want to make is that with the conditions now confronting us, we can take what we have and how we are now deployed, and see what we can do with it, or just go ahead and escalate apparently at the will of an opponent as we have in the past, and how far we will want to escalate, consider the alternative missions that might be open to us, to go ahead and try to seal off South Vietnam, seal it off by extending the 17th parallel with a cordon sanitaire all the way over to the Mekong.

This has been considered in the Pentagon as one possible solution. This would involve a tremendous number of men, and you would still have the Cambodian border open.

But if this is the ultimate, then I am trying in a rather scientific way to say we have condition A, condition B, take our choice, let us decide what we want to do, rather than drift in between, because someone says there is another raid by the Vietcong, we need another 100,000 men and another 100,000 men, and with each return of a responsible official from Vietnam, we receive optimistic statements about, "Well, at last the situation is in hand. We may not be winning, but we are not losing, either."

Now last fall I thought the time had come to say, "Let us put a stop to this. Let us see where we are. What can we do with what we have?" Having done this, I consider the alternatives and decide whether we want to undertake them. This is all it amounts to.

ADMINISTRATION JUSTIFICATION FOR VIETNAM DISPUTED

Senator MUNDT. One final question. I have listened to Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk many, many times in off-the-record discussions and in public discussions, and the President. I understand the overwhelming reason why we are continuing the war in Vietnam, and it is for two reasons, and they both have considerable appeal to me.

First is that we must avoid being defeated by the Communists in a battle confrontation, and, second, we must avoid giving them any rewards in that area for their aggression. Failure in either of those two areas is more likely to produce a global war, and if we can succeed in stopping either one of those two eventualities or both—will you agree with that general description?

General GAVIN. No, sir; I would not agree with that.

Senator MUNDT. If not, can you phrase it in your words?

General GAVIN. No, sir; I do not agree with that. If we are just simply going to set out to avoid defeat and avoid rewarding the Communists for their aggression, and we therefore decide in doing this that we have to match every commitment he makes, every man he sends, we will send manpower, and we finally get our involvement so out of balance with all of our other global commitments we are losing, we are in a very dangerous condition in our whole global commitment, and in fact we could lose seriously by doing too much in this particular confrontation, to try to achieve these very things.

Senator MUNDT. If we are not trying to achieve these two things, what are we trying to achieve?

General GAVIN. I think we are trying to set up a government for South Vietnam that is acceptable to the people, and once this is established, we are willing to pull out.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, 2 weeks ago I submitted a report on my trip to South Vietnam to you as chairman of this committee, and Senator Russell as chairman of the Armed Services Committee; and asked that it be declassified.

I had hoped to interrogate the witness against that report, but have not received it back yet. I must say I am surprised. In the MacArthur hearings we had clearance in 24 to 48 hours.

Now I have been asked to ask this question, General, by one of the members of the committee who could not stay.

REGAINING THE INITIATIVE WITHOUT REINFORCEMENTS

Since you feel that we have lost the initiative in Vietnam, yet you are opposed to reinforcements, how do you propose that we regain the initiative without introducing reinforcements?

General GAVIN. Yes. I would say by perhaps a better disposition of the resources we have there, a very aggressive research and development program to come up with some new weapons systems and new means of fighting, and a thorough analysis of what we are doing in terms of the mobility and communications network we have to try to perform better with what we have.

We have a very sophisticated type force there. We have remarkable air mobility. We have very good communications. Nevertheless we do have problems.

We have had to change footwear. We have had to change some of our weapons. There is much improvement that can be made. And I would think we could, and probably should, strive to do better with what we have right now.

ALSO'S INTERPRETATION OF GAVIN'S LETTER

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. This morning an article written by Mr. Also was mentioned by one of the members of this committee. I believe you agreed he had misquoted you. Had that to do with enclaves?

General GAVIN. Yes, Senator Symington, it certainly was my impression. I had a very nice telegram from Mr. Alsop before he published that, apologizing to me in advance of what it was going to be.

Senator PELL. He is a very civilized columnist.

General GAVIN. He refers to a strategy of holding enclaves on the coast, and then he talks about a retreat, an American retreat to my enclaves. He refers to them as mine. I do not think we are talking about the same thing. And I have great respect for Mr. Alsop, but I know his devotion to fighting this war out there too.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Alsop says "what then will be General Walt's requirements as summarized by him?"

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. He, Alsop, continues, "It can be authoritatively stated that the answer can be as follows"; therefore I presume he is quoting General Walt.

General GAVIN. I assume so. There are two marine—

Senator SYMINGTON. He says General Walt believes he will need a Danang garrison of two entire marine divisions instead of the regiments. Second, more artillery or heavy artillery, including continuous support from naval guns, and so forth. Have you every been to Danang?

General GAVIN. No, I was not.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was there recently, and spent quite a little time with General Walt. What he is trying to do, and you have forgotten more about this than I would know—

General GAVIN. No, I would not say that.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is true. They were throwing in mortars, inside, onto Walt's Danang airfield.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. With loss of life.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. And loss of helicopters and planes.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. So Walt was expanding all the time, so his outposts would get the fire fight contact first, and warn the inner circle.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. If he goes therefore back to the inner circle—

General GAVIN. Sure.

Senator SYMINGTON. He is automatically going to need more troops to defend, and take more casualties, is he not?

General GAVIN. Against the same level of opposition.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

General GAVIN. Yes, sure.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now General Walt himself lives, with great pride, on a mountaintop which only a few weeks ago was held by the Vietcong.

General GAVIN. Sure.

Senator SYMINGTON. While I was out there with him, at an old French fort where he had an outpost, they caught a Vietcong, brought him in to question. We saw them with him, brought in. The farther Walt pushes out, as he is now doing, the less casualties he has as against sitting around the airfield; is that not a fair statement?

General GAVIN. Absolutely, yes.

DIFFERENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM FROM THAT OF 1954

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Now there has been a lot of references in these hearings as to what General Ridgway thought, and also what you thought, back in 1954. Do you not think things today are a lot different than they were in 1954, or even when you left the Army in 1958, in South Vietnam and North Vietnam?

General GAVIN. Well, I think so. May I comment on the last question you raised, and which I answered affirmatively?

The farther out he goes, the less casualties he has. Apparently he is making it work now, and it is an interesting idea, and as long as he gets away with it, I am all for it.

It seems to me there comes a point in this equation when going far enough out involves some very heavy fighting with small units, and you just may have to decide to get reinforced to do this.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sure, based on the operations at Duc and Pleime, he would agree, even though those were fights not in his area.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was the 1st Cavalry. You said, in answer to questions by the Senator from South Dakota, they should look at it more, have more analysis, I know your opinion of General Westmoreland, General Kinnard, and General Lawson, General Walt of the Marines.

General GAVIN. You have never had better soldiers out there.

Senator SYMINGTON. You are not criticizing.

General GAVIN. They are the best we have.

Senator SYMINGTON. You think they are doing all right.

General GAVIN. No question about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

General GAVIN. I did not answer your last question though, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you do that?

General GAVIN. The question was are not things different than when I left the service, and things are different out there. I could not agree with you more, absolutely.

BOMBING TARGETS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. I am not quite clear from this morning, and would ask respectfully—it is getting late—that you submit to the committee a letter as to just what military targets you would bomb in South Vietnam and what military targets you would not bomb.

General GAVIN. I shall. I will be happy to.

Senator SYMINGTON. In North Vietnam.

General GAVIN. Yes, I shall.

(The information referred to follows:)

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., February 14, 1966.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: In the course of the hearing before the Committee of Foreign Relations on Tuesday, February 8, 1966, I was asked to discuss bombing in Vietnam. During the discussion that followed, I was asked to submit a letter outlining the targets that I would consider suitable for bombing.

At the outset, I believe that we must recognize that the nature of the fighting in Vietnam is quite different than, for example, that of World War II. Basic to the struggle in Vietnam is internal civil strife. Our military efforts, therefore, must be directed toward winning the good will of the people, and retaining that of those who are fighting with us. It follows that bombing attacks intended to achieve psychological impact through the killing of noncombatants is unquestionably wrong. Likewise, the attack of targets near areas highly populated by civilians, where civilians are likely to be the casualties, are also militarily as well as morally wrong. The "urban bombing" concept developed in the immediate post-World War II period is entirely inappropriate in the Vietnamese-type confrontation. Since the overall objective is to hold the land areas and the good will of the people, the use of properly equipped ground forces in adequate numbers is imperative. Ground forces can hold land areas and bombing cannot; the latter can only contribute to the efforts of our ground forces. With the foregoing as a preamble, I would like to describe the types of targets I would consider suitable for bombing.

Since organic ground forces' weapon support is limited by the range of their weapons to artillery and missiles, and the volume of fire that it is possible for those weapons to deliver, air-delivered support can be invaluable when delivered quite close to our ground forces. This usually takes the form of high explosive bombs, rockets, automatic weapons fire and napalm. Enemy forces and all other combat impedimenta, command posts, logistics support, supply facilities, etc., are all appropriate targets for this type of attack. Beyond close support, many targets of opportunity may offer themselves; for example, these might be concentrations of enemy personnel, vehicles, military command posts, ammunition dumps, POL dumps, etc. These should all be attacked by air at the request and judgment of the local commander. Beyond this range, and in the areas where targets are only uncovered by thorough reconnaissance, there may be targets of a transient nature. In this category, I would include moving troop columns, moving ammunition supply trains, gasoline and similar types of logistics support. These may be well beyond the immediate battle area. They, too, are proper and remunerative targets, and many of them may be north of the 17th parallel.

Greatly beyond this range from our own forces and deep into enemy territory, there may be what appears to be targets of questionable merit. I refer to quasi-military targets in the proximity of civilian noncombatants. In this category, for example, might be public utility plants in cities, warehouses, railroad yards, etc. In World War II these were considered strategic targets and attacked by forces on both sides from time to time. In my opinion the nature of the conflict in Vietnam makes these targets highly doubtful from the viewpoint of the military benefits to be derived from attacking them. If such attacks were accompanied by a high loss in civilian lives with questionable military results, the psychological impact on the remainder of the country and, indeed, on world opinion, may entirely offset what little military advantages are gained. I think that this may be difficult for us to accept since our past experience suggests that war must be total in nature and thus all targets, even remotely related to immediate combat, are considered suitable for attack. In Vietnam we must show restraint and recognize the limited character of the war in which we are engaged. Furthermore, attacks, deep in enemy territory directed against logistic facilities such as docks, warehouse areas, etc., must only be made after weighing carefully our own vulnerability to similar counterattack. This judgment must be entirely a military one.

In addition to the foregoing, there may, from time to time, be suitable air targets such as airfields and satellited hardstand areas, etc.; missile sites likewise may be uncovered and they should be attacked with precision. Further, naval forces and their associated logistics support facilities would be suitable targets.

I have refrained from discussing the role of heavy bombers, such as those employed in carpet bombing in a few instances in World War II. Where intelligence data gives us a certain fix on targets for which this type of attack would be appropriate, of course its usefulness should be exploited. However, due to the very high military cost of such attacks and the "area" nature of the targets attacked, their usefulness in the Vietnamese-type operation is not as great as that of more quickly responsive fighter-bombers.

Mr. Chairman, in the foregoing I have tried to do two things: outline principles that should govern our use of airpower and discuss several specific types of targets. I shall be very glad to elaborate on these points further if your com-

mittee desires. In the last analysis, all of our military power should be brought to bear to help us gain a decision in this very difficult conflict. It is different in nature, however, than anything we have been engaged in in some time and I am afraid that we must all learn the hard lesson of restraint and wisdom in using military power in this type of military engagement, unpleasant as that may be to our military people.

Respectfully,

JAMES M. GAVIN.

Senator SYMINGTON. Before the Armed Services Committee we had some testimony that greater license to attack by air military targets in North Vietnam might save sending as many as 200,000 more ground troops into South Vietnam. Do you believe there is justification for that testimony, from high military sources?

The premise was that if we get reasonable target license on military targets in North Vietnam, that would cut down heavily on what goes down the Ho Chi Minh trails. My question would in effect be divided into two questions.

Do you believe there is any justification for that thinking; and, even if you believe it wrong, what could we lose by trying it?

General GAVIN. Yes. First of all I am not sure that I can go along with that number. I would like to, but numbers have meaning to me, and 200,000 troops, this gets rather finite, and it gives an equation to a bombing effort I have never seen done before. That is a sizable number of troops that you would save by bombing, and I am skeptical about it, but I do not know.

GENERAL GAVIN'S ACQUAINTANCE WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Now you have mentioned several times talking with Secretary McNamara.

General GAVIN. Yes, I have.

Senator SYMINGTON. You were Ambassador to France not too long ago.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. And a very fine one. Have you talked to Secretary Rusk?

General GAVIN. No, I have not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you talked to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Wheeler?

General GAVIN. I have corresponded with him. He was sick the day I called on Mr. McNamara. We have had a very nice letter exchange. I would like to go on record here saying that he is a first-class fighting man and the best Chief we have ever had, in my opinion.

Senator SYMINGTON. Had you talked to any of the other Chiefs, present members?

General GAVIN. No, I have not.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have expressed your high opinion of people like General Westmoreland, Swede Larson, General Kinnard.

General GAVIN. Yes, I have.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know of any action the Secretary has taken that was contrary to the request of those generals, primarily General Westmoreland?

General GAVIN. You mean Secretary of State?

Senator SYMINGTON. Secretary McNamara.

General GAVIN. No, I do not know. I might say, Senator Symington, I make no pretense of having expertise in the Pentagon. I have not been given a classified briefing for 8 years over there.

What I have dealt with here are my opinions in terms of global strategy and our involvement in the specifics of tactical confrontation fitted into that context. I make no pretense of anything else.

Senator SYMINGTON. Especially because of my great respect for you, I regret that, and wish you had received classified information over the last 8 years.

General GAVIN. I told Mr. McNamara I would be happy to go to Vietnam and do anything I could for him in any way at all.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTION IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. You said this morning that our action is almost entirely military, as I understood it, at this time. Did you know we had trained, are training, and plan to train tens of thousands of young men from the various villages all over South Vietnam in strictly political action, not military?

General GAVIN. Well, I do not recall having said what you attributed to me a moment ago about our effort being entirely military.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wrote that down when you said it.

General GAVIN. Did you?

Senator SYMINGTON. If I am wrong, I will certainly correct the record.

General GAVIN. If I am wrong I regret it very much. I might say that when I went over there right after Dienbienphu, I made a point to talk to President Magsaysay, because my own feeling about the Asiatics and their whole difference point of view, face, loss of face, prestige and what may mean successes and what does not for them compared with our ideas about it, I was very much interested in how he dealt with the Huk problem.

I am very much interested at the moment as to what General Lansdale is doing for Ambassador Lodge. In the long run it to me is the gut approach to the problem, to get to the people and have them understand what we are trying to do in their terms, not our terms.

Senator SYMINGTON. I could not agree with you more, and think if you did talk with Mr. Lansdale and Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland you would be very pleased with their efforts.

EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING

Now we have lost scores of pilots over North Vietnam. The figure is classified. We have also lost over a half billion dollars in planes out there.

I am much impressed with what you have said today about the importance of the economy, and agree without reservation that this operation is costing a lot of money. Do you believe this bombing has been unnecessary, that the loss of these pilots has not been necessary?

General GAVIN. I do not see how I can say that. I will go further than this, though, sir, if I may.

I have watched the bombing patterns as I have seen them reported in the press. Bombing from Guam with B-52's, refueling on the way, with the loss of some aircraft certainly should result in productive

work at the far end of the bombing run to be even worth while. I hope that this has been worth while.

A cost effectiveness analysis of this would interest me very much. I do not know what this amounts to. When a young man loses his life in an effort to support the people who are fighting on the ground, this is the ultimate in tragedy, and I can only deplore this having occurred. I do not know how much he has accomplished. I really do not know how much they have accomplished with the loss of aircraft and lives so far. I do not know.

Senator SYMINGTON. What would you say about a pilot who felt because he was a Regular, willing to risk his life for his country, but didn't see why he should risk it a couple of times a week bombing targets that would not even have been looked at in Korea; bombing empty barracks or a bus, risking lives in a \$2 million airplane bombing targets, military targets of relatively little importance.

What would be your comments on that thinking?

General GAVIN. I would agree with the guy that said that absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We have two more who wish to question. I would only like to say that I hope we can be kind to the general. I think we are all getting tired, I will call next on Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. I shall be brief, Mr. Chairman.

CONCLUSION ON TESTIMONY

General, I have come to three tentative conclusions as the result of my study of this problem, aided substantially by your testimony here today. I am going to read them to you and then ask you to comment. My first conclusion is this: Viewing Vietnam in the light of our global commitments, and our national capability, the military realities there today are such that the cost in casualties and money of crushing the enemy, retaking the lost real estate, and pacifying the country are too high to be acceptable.

General GAVIN. They reached the point "of doubtful acceptability."

Senator CLARK. You would change it to "reached the point of doubtful acceptability"?

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. My second tentative conclusion is that the real problem is how to make a truce which is consistent with the military realities. Some would say that by more and bigger bombing, and by a big buildup of troops, we shall be able to change the military realities in our favor. Experience and history of this wretched war are against that hope, for the forces against us can be increased indefinitely, and the notion of a decisive military superiority over the land-powers of Asia is a dangerous fancy.

That is Walter Lippmann, incidentally, which I concur in.

General GAVIN. "Hopelessly against us" is strong language. Makes success minimal I would say. I would generally go along that "hopeless" is a pretty strong word there.

Senator CLARK. Let us take a couple of purple adjectives out and come to the same conclusion.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CLARK. That the real problem is how to make a truce consistent with military effort.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. My third point is while we are waiting for that truce, while we are working for that truce, in the meanwhile we should stay where we are with what we have got, increasing our forces and our money commitment only to the extent necessary to hold our present position.

General GAVIN. That is right, exactly. I would add, may I say, that once you have flexibility and according to your resources there, while you do not escalate the total, you retain the flexible position.

Senator CLARK. For every conceivable kind of tactic which holds any kind of success.

General GAVIN. That is right.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. General Gavin, to return for a moment to this point about bombing, as I understand your thinking, am I correct in saying that in guerrilla warfare, bombing other than direct military targets or for the purpose of direct military support, as you said earlier, that that kind of bombing is productive, but more generalized bombing is counterproductive? Would that be a correct statement?

General GAVIN. I would say that is a correct statement; yes.

THE FUTURE OF VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Thank you. And finally where you could look ahead as a historian in reverse, in the future, see us 20 years from now, at which point presumably all these ununified countries would be unified, Germany would be unified, Korea would be unified, Vietnam would be unified, what kind of solution do you see in the screen, on the side that we would be coming out with.

General GAVIN. Solution to what?

Senator PELL. Solution to the general Vietnam situation. Do you see a unified Vietnam in line with Yugoslavia, a national Communist but not expansive state? Do you see South Vietnam eventually taking over North Vietnam? Do you have any thoughts as to where we will be in 1976?

General GAVIN. Well, I must say for 20 years, my crystal ball is pretty cloudy.

Senator PELL. So are we all, but we ought to have a grand design. The thing I admire about General de Gaulle, whom you know so well, is that he had a grand design. I am not sure that we have a grand design.

General GAVIN. You raise a very interesting question that has not come up in this discussion, and that is whether or not a Tito-type government can be formed.

I have good reason to believe that Ho Chi Minh would resist the Chinese as much as he resists the Russians. And the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a colonel commanding the troops in Trieste when we were having serious trouble there. I was chief of staff at Naples at the time. We had a plane shot down. Our outposts were being attacked. The man we supported in World War II

was court-martialed and assassinated by Tito, and people were up in arms wanting to attack Tito.

I think the best thing we ever did was allow that government to come into being and demonstrate this man could bring in being an independent government of his own free of Stalin, and defying him. I am not at all satisfied that Ho Chi Minh might come to that would be a good government. No one has demonstrated to me that this is not so.

Senator PELL. I thank you for that answer very much indeed, because in the long haul it seems to me that the virulence of communism itself will recede.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator PELL. We will be faced with other totalitarian forces and other imperialistic nations, and our problem is to hold the line and contain it while it is in the acute stage.

General GAVIN. Yes. I would like to have given that answer. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much for that answer.

ATTITUDE OF CHINA

I just have one point here. Earlier today I raised this question. I believe you said that China should be taken into the United Nations, and I mentioned the Secretary General recently compared China with a man who had had a nervous breakdown. In other words, they were suffering from a trauma. I believe that is correct.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have the article, and I thought in order to make the record complete, I will ask the reporter to insert this whole article from the Washington Post, which quotes U Thant on that matter.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1966]

THANT ASKS BETTER OFFERS TO HANOI, HINTS CHINA "NERVOUS BREAKDOWN"

(By Flora Lewis, Washington Post staff writer)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., January 20.—U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, today urged the United States to take further conciliatory steps in the Vietnam crisis and said "the climate for fruitful discussions" was now markedly more favorable than last year.

He put his views carefully as hopes, rather than recommendations, but in effect he called for more concessions from the United States and Saigon on three key points:

Continuation of the halt in air raids on North Vietnam;

Acceptance of direct Vietcong participation in both peace talks and a new coalition government in South Vietnam that would result from them;

More understanding for Communist China's "strange * * * unreasonable reactions."

The Secretary General spoke at a wide-ranging press conference, his first in nearly a year. He made no effort to hide his disappointment that peacekeeping had failed to make more progress in that time. If a replacement could be found, he hinted, he would be glad to leave his post when his 5-year term expires in November. He gave himself until June to decide whether or not to run for reelection even without an agreed successor.

Speaking of China, Thant said that countries, like individuals, "have nervous breakdowns * * * and it is the duty of the community" to understand the circumstances, "to find some sort of remedy.

"When a country has been treated as an outcast, as an outlaw, and as a culprit," he said, "I think apart from other factors that particular country is apt to act in a certain strange way."

China is going through a difficult phase of development, Thant continued, and "in such a delicate stage, countries will show certain emotions, certain strong reactions, certain rigidities, and even certain arrogance."

But he repeated his conviction that Peiping must be brought into any Vietnamese peace talks and his regrets that it is not yet a member of the United Nations.

Asked specifically whether any of the barrage of messages in the current U.S. peace offensive had been sent to Peiping, Thant said he knew of no actual contacts although he supposed the Chinese must be aware of America's proposals.

Since he made a point of mentioning that the United States had kept him informed, the indication was that Washington had neither made its own informal contact with Peiping nor asked another government to relay its views. He personally had not been involved, the Secretary General said.

NO SIGN OF SIGNALS

Nor did he indicate any knowledge of concrete signs from Hanoi or Peiping showing interest in peace negotiations.

Thant's assessment of improved prospects for talks was based, he said, on the psychological climate generated by the cessation of bombing and on his view that public statements have shown an undeniable rapprochement between the positions of the parties on a series of points:

1. Acceptance of the 1954 Geneva framework for discussions—a recognition, Thant said, that any lasting settlement must have the unanimous support of all the great powers, including, naturally, China.

2. Both parts of Vietnam will not enter into military alliance or seek foreign military assistance.

3. Both parts of Vietnam will be free to decide between themselves the question of reunification.

4. The people of South Vietnam should be free to settle their own affairs without foreign intervention and in accordance with democratic principles. This was a reading of Hanoi's demand for acceptance of the National Liberation Front's political program which contrasts with Washington's view that it is the opposite of democratic.

THE NEXT STEP

Thant said the next step was to put practical questions on how to implement these principles.

He had a suggestion—that concrete proposals be made on what type of government in South Vietnam, representative, as far as possible, of all the sections of the South Vietnamese people, could take over the responsibility of organizing the exercise by the people of their right to decide their own affairs.

In the context, this appeared to be a call to Washington to say out loud that it would accept a coalition government in Saigon including the Communists as part of a negotiated settlement.

If that were done, Thant continued, I think a refusal to negotiate would be difficult to justify particularly (as) * * * discussions to bring about an end to the fighting must be held with those who are fighting there (the Vietcong).

Though he was not reticent on the Vietnam crisis, Thant said firmly that he saw no point in a Security Council debate on the subject nor any possibility for the United Nations to involve itself in the war at this stage since China is not a member of the world organization.

He was critical of the way the General Assembly has behaved of late on several points, though he called its last session one of the most productive in U.N. history.

Particularly, Thant deplored the poor response of all but a few members to his appeal for a closer look at peacekeeping operations and especially for money to keep them going.

The big success of the last Assembly in his view, was the India-Pakistan cease-fire.

QUOTATIONS FROM GENERAL EISENHOWER

The CHAIRMAN. I want to also insert—I do not wish to delay this any further, but I have certain quotes from General Eisenhower out of his book and from other places, relating to matters we discussed,

mostly in the context of what General Ridgway and you said before.

General GAVIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I will have the staff insert those quotes from General Eisenhower in the record at the proper place.

Senator MORSE. I want to take 20 seconds to say this to you, General. I feel that I am a better informed man for listening to you, and I am also a better human being for having listened to you. I want to thank you most sincerely for this great seminar that you have conducted.

General GAVIN. You are very kind, sir. Thank you.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, before we conclude this day's hearing, as a member of a minority, and one who has profited a great deal from your testimony, I want to express my personal appreciation for your appearance here today. I think you have helped the country a great deal, and I know you have helped the committee.

Senator GORE. Well, Mr. Chairman, he married a Tennessean.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I know all those who were here and those who are not here will join in my expression of appreciation for you coming down here at great inconvenience, and to give us the benefit of your vast experience in this area. It has been extremely helpful, not only to the committee but I think to the public and to the country, and we are very much in your debt.

General GAVIN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that all my colleagues join me in this.

I want to make one other announcement. Subject to his arrival—at least we have it cleared insofar as we can at the moment—General Taylor will appear on next Monday in open session. On Thursday there will be Mr. George Kennan. Tomorrow we will have Mr. Jack Vaughn. That concludes the hearings today. Thank you very much, General.

General GAVIN. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, February 9, 1966.)

(The following quotes are from President Eisenhower's autobiography, "Mandate for Change":)

(P. 337-338)

This was a time in history when France, along with other old colonial powers, did not necessarily want to continue maintaining—expensively in more than a few cases—its colonies. Initially their troops had been sent to preserve the status quo, but the cause, not the meaning of the war, was changing.

This put the French on the horns of a dilemma. Delay or equivocation in implementing complete independence could only serve to bolster the Communist claim that this was in reality a war to preserve colonialism. To American ears the first French pronouncements, soon made to the world, were a distinct step forward, but it was almost impossible to make the average Vietnamese peasant realize that the French, under whose rule his people had lived for some 80 years, were really fighting in the cause of freedom, while the Viet Minh, people of their own ethnic origins, were fighting on the side of slavery. It was generally conceded that had an election been held, Ho Chi Minh would have been elected Premier. Unhappily, the situation was exacerbated by the almost total lack of leadership displayed by the Vietnamese chief of state, Bao Dai, who, while nominally the head of that nation, chose to spend the bulk of his time in the spas of Europe rather than in his own land leading his armies against those of communism.

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(P. 345)

The ever-present, persistent, gnawing possibility was that of employing our ground forces in Indochina. The war has been going on for a long time and unless the French were successful a great many people could be swept under Communist rule. We had helped the French in the ways open to us, and they were losing ground; still, they were convinced that only they could devise successful military operations there. Nevertheless, I let it be known that I would never agree to send our ground troops as mere reinforcements for French units, to be used only as they saw fit. Part of my fundamental concept of the Presidency is that we have a constitutional government and only when there is a sudden, unforeseen emergency should the President put us into war without congressional action.

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(P. 358)

Again, the problem involved local public opinion. The enemy had much popular sympathy, and many civilians aided them by providing both shelter and information. The French still had sufficient forces to win if they could induce the regular Vietnamese soldiers to fight vigorously with them and the populace to support them. But guerrilla warfare cannot work two ways; normally only one side can enjoy reliable citizen help.

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(P. 360)

In one conversation Bidault said to Bedell Smith, possibly with justification, that Navarre should be replaced; in view of the French superiority in men and weapons something was obviously wrong when the French suffered defeat after defeat. Bedell gave a straightforward answer: he told Bidault that any second-rate general should be able to win in Indochina if there were a proper political atmosphere.

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(P. 362)

While there was misunderstanding between us and the French, I determined to make certain that none should exist among members of the administration. Therefore, I took the opportunity at a meeting on June 3 to clarify my attitude. If the United States should, by itself, and without the clear invitation of the Vietnamese people and satisfactory arrangements with the French, undertake to counter Chinese Communist aggression, I said, this would, of course, mark the collapse of the American policy of united action. Moreover, if the nations of the southeast Asian area showed a complete indifference to the fate of Indochina, it would be the signal for us to undertake a reappraisal of basic U.S. security policy. I was convinced that it was in our interest to commit U.S. Armed Forces in the event of overt Chinese aggression, but I was determined that southeast Asian nations could not disclaim responsibility for their own safety, expecting the United States alone to carry all the burdens of free world security. If I should find it necessary to go to the Congress for authority to intervene in Indochina, I wanted to say that we had allies such as Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and above all, the bulk of the Vietnamese people, ready to join with us in resisting such aggression.

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(P. 363)

My reply to Gruenther contained these pertinent paragraphs:

I was struck by a sentence in your letter in which you quote Pleven as saying, "It (the loss of the delta) would start a wave of anti-allied outbursts in France with great bitterness because the allies let us down."

Pleven knows as well as you and I do that beginning in early 1951, every kind of presentation has been made to the French Government to induce that Government to put the Indochina war on an international footing. * * * We urged further that France not only declare her intention of making Indochina independent and that she was fighting for the right of Indochina to be

independent, but that she should take steps to place the issue before the U.N. At the very least, this latter action would have had the effect of legitimizing any kind of coalition that might then have been formed to fight the war.

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(P. 372)

(4) What lessons or benefits, if any, accrued to the free world as a result?

I am convinced that the French could not win the war because the internal political situation in Vietnam, weak and confused, badly weakened their military position. I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bao Dai was a factor in the feeling prevalent among Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for. As one Frenchman said to me, "What Vietnam needs is another Syngman Rhee, regardless of all the difficulties the presence of such a personality would entail."

In the earlier stages of the conflict, the fighting was mostly conducted where rough terrain made it impossible to seek out the enemy and bring him to a pitched battle. Later, even when the battle lines became so located that the *groupes mobiles* could be effective, there still existed within the Red River Delta a condition in which the French could control even the main roads for only about 2 or 3 hours a day. The rest of the time all lines of communication were in the hands of the Viet Minh. This meant that the mass of the population supported the enemy. With such a feeling prevalent, it was inevitable that the French should find it impossible to retain the loyalty of their Vietnamese troops.

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(P. 373)

We will never know, of course, how much U.S. aid did to forestall a military disaster worse than the one which actually did occur. The French might have been pushed from the Red River Delta into the sea, with the loss of additional thousands of lives, and the rapid spread of communism in the region. Willingness to fight for freedom, no matter where the battle may be, has always been a characteristic of our people, but the conditions then prevailing in Indochina were such as to make unilateral American intervention nothing less than sheer folly.

SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, FISCAL YEAR 1966—VIETNAM

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in caucus room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams, Case, Sparkman, and Aiken.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very fortunate indeed this morning to have the Honorable George F. Kennan as our witness. Mr. Kennan at the present time is with the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. He has had an outstanding record with 30 years' observance of our foreign affairs of this country. He compiled, I think, a record unequaled or equaled by very few men during the course of that period.

I think he is one of the most distinguished career Foreign Service officers who has served as Ambassador that we have ever had.

He is one of the most thoughtful and scholarly men that I have known to occupy positions in our Government. Perhaps most important of all, since his retirement as Ambassador to Yugoslavia, he has had time to reflect upon and to contemplate and to think about the various afflictions of our world and particularly of our own country, and this is something which very few of us in Washington are able to do, so that I think with his experience together with his opportunity to consider the significance of events he is especially almost uniquely qualified to comment upon many of the troubles that confront us, so I feel we are extremely fortunate in having him here today.

He has no present connection with the Government and is, therefore, quite independent to express himself in any way he sees fit.

PROGRAM FOR DAY'S HEARING

I believe, Mr. Kennan, you have a short prepared statement which you may give the committee before we have questions.

May I say first, so that we won't catch you unaware, we are under order of the Senate to vote shortly after 11 o'clock. We will recess then for approximately 20 minutes in order for the members to go to the floor and vote, return, and take up the hearing from then. We

would hope to proceed until around 12—and if the questions have not been exhausted to resume at 2:30.

I say this in anticipation of there being considerable interest in your views and it won't be completed by noon. So that, if it is agreeable with you, will be our program.

By way of explanation, I may say that it was at the insistent request of the press that we move these hearings from the other room in the New Senate Office Building to this room. They were very dissatisfied with the acoustics as well as the lighting so we brought the hearings over here.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF MR. KENNAN

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, would you be willing to insert before Mr. Kennan proceeds, the biographic sketch?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; in order to be complete at the request of the Senator from Oregon there will be inserted in the record a more detailed account of your official experience in the Government in order for the record to be complete.

(The biographic sketch referred to follows:)

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF GEORGE KENNAN

Personal: Born February 16, 1904, in Milwaukee, Wis. Married to Annalise Sorenson, of Norway, and father of four children.

Education: Local schools in Wisconsin. St. Johns Military Academy in Delafield, Wis., graduated in 1921. Princeton University, B.A. degree in 1925.

Foreign Service career:

1925-26: Vice consul in Geneva.

1927: Vice consul in Hamburg.

1928: Vice consul in Tallinn, Estonia.

1929-31: Third secretary in American legations in Baltic States (Riga, Latvia; Kaunas, Lithuania; and Tallinn). Language officer in Berlin.

1931-33: Third secretary at Riga consulate.

1933-34: Third secretary at Embassy in Moscow (under William C. Bullitt).

1935-37: Second secretary at above post.

1937-38: Department of State, Washington.

1938-39: Second secretary of legation in Prague (until outbreak of World War II).

1939-41: Second secretary and first secretary in Berlin.

December 1941: Interned for 5 months with other U.S. officials in Berlin at Bad Nauheim, Germany.

1941-43: Counselor of legation at Lisbon.

1944-46: Minister counselor in Moscow (under Averell Harriman and Gen. Walter Bedell Smith).

1946-47: State Department's Deputy for Foreign Affairs at the National War College (concurrently with below position), lecturing on foreign affairs.

1947-49: Chairman, Policy Planning Committee (now Policy Planning Council) of the Department of State.

1952: Appointed Ambassador to Soviet Union (declared persona non grata after publicly comparing Soviet Union to Germany under the Nazis).

** In the late twenties was among a half dozen young men chosen by the State Department to receive training in Russian history and literature at the Berlin seminar for oriental languages and the University of Berlin.

1953: Resigned from the Foreign Service.

1961-63: Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

Academic career:

1950-52, 1953-61: Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J. as professor.

1963-present: Permanent professor with institute.

1957-58: Visiting professor at Oxford University (concurrently with above).

1966: Appointed university fellow in history and Slavic civilizations at Harvard University (concurrently with above also).

Publications: *Diplomacy, 1900-50* (1951); *The Realities of American Foreign Policy* (1954); *The Atom and the West* (1958); *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941* (1960); *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (1961).

The following is taken from *Current Biography 1947*; page 347:

"It is Kennan's belief, formulated during his years of experience with Russian diplomacy, that the Soviet Union cannot be approached on Western terms or through the medium of Western political concepts * * * and that, since the Russian aim is a world soviet, United States policy should be one of firm dealing and 'containment' of Russian expansion until Russia either enters into cooperation with America or experiences an internal collapse."

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE KENNAN

Mr. KENNAN. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Foreign Relations Committee, the subject on which I am invited to give my views this morning is, as I understand it, the complex of problems connected with our present involvement in Vietnam. I would like to explain, in undertaking to speak on this subject, that southeast Asia is a part of the world for which I can claim no specialized knowledge. I am not familiar with the official rationale of our policy there except as it has been revealed in the press. I cannot recall that I have ever, either during my official service in government or subsequently, been drawn by the executive branch of our Government into consultation on the problem of our policy in southeast Asia, or even been made privy to the official discussions by which that policy was decided.

I am sure that there are many data, relevant to any thoroughly founded judgment on these matters, which are not available to me; and this being the case, I have tried in recent weeks and months not to jump to final conclusions even in my own thoughts, to remain sympathetically receptive, both to our Government's explanations of the very real difficulties it has faced and to the doubts and questions of its serious critics.

I have not been anxious to press my views on the public but I gladly give them to you for whatever they are worth, claiming no particular merit for them except perhaps that they flow from an experience with Communist affairs that runs back now for some 38 years, and also from the deepest and most troubled sort of concern that we should find the proper course, the right course, at this truly crucial moment.

WISDOM OF U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

The first point I would like to make is that if we were not already involved as we are today in Vietnam, I would know of no reason why we should wish to become so involved, and I could think of several reasons why we should wish not to.

Vietnam is not a region of major military and industrial importance. It is difficult to believe that any decisive developments of the world situation would be determined in normal circumstances by what happens on that territory. If it were not for the considerations of prestige that arise precisely out of our present involvement, even a situation in which South Vietnam was controlled exclusively by the Vietcong, while regrettable, and no doubt morally unwarranted, would not, in my opinion, present dangers great enough to justify our direct military intervention.

Given the situation that exists today in the relations among the leading Communist powers, and by that I have, of course, in mind primarily the Soviet-Chinese conflict, there is every likelihood that a Communist regime in South Vietnam would follow a fairly independent course.

There is no reason to suspect that such a regime would find it either necessary or desirable in present circumstances to function simply as a passive puppet and instrument of Chinese power. And as for the danger that its establishment there would unleash similar tendencies in neighboring countries, this, I think, would depend largely on the manner in which it came into power. In the light of what has recently happened in Indonesia, and on the Indian subcontinent, the danger of the so-called domino effect, that is the effect that would be produced by a limited Communist success in South Vietnam, seems to me to be considerably less than it was when the main decisions were taken that have led to our present involvement.

Let me stress, I do not say that that danger does not exist, I say that it is less than it was a year or two ago when we got into this involvement.

From the long-term standpoint, therefore, and on principle, I think our military involvement in Vietnam has to be recognized as unfortunate, as something we would not choose deliberately, if the choice were ours to make all over again today, and by the same token, I think it should be our Government's aim to liquidate this involvement just as soon as this can be done without inordinate damage to our own prestige or to the stability of conditions in that area.

It is obvious on the other hand that this involvement is today a fact. It creates a new situation. It raises new questions, ulterior to the long-term problem, which have to be taken into account. A precipitate and disorderly withdrawal could represent in present circumstances a disservice to our own interests, and even to world peace, greater than any that might have been involved by our failure to engage ourselves there in the first place.

This is a reality which, if there is to be any peaceful resolution of this conflict, is going to have to be recognized both by the more critical of our friends and by our adversaries.

EXPANSION OF HOSTILITIES IS DANGEROUS

But at the same time, I have great misgivings about any deliberate expansion of hostilities on our part directed to the achievement of something called victory—if by the use of that term we envisage the complete disappearance of the recalcitrance with which we are now faced, the formal submission by the adversary to our will, and the complete realization of our present stated political aims.

I doubt that these things can be achieved even by the most formidable military successes.

There seems to be an impression about that if we bring sufficient military pressure to bear there will occur at some point something in the nature of a political capitulation on the other side. I think this is a most dangerous assumption. I don't say that it is absolutely impossible, but it is a dangerous assumption in the light of the experience we have had with Communist elements in the past.

The North Vietnamese and the Vietcong have between them a great deal of space and manpower to give up if they have to, and the Chinese can give them more if they need it. Fidelity to the Communist tradition would dictate that if really pressed to extremity on the military level these people should disappear entirely from the open scene and fall back exclusively on an underground political and military existence rather than to accept terms that would be openly humiliating and would represent in their eyes the betrayal of the future political prospects of the cause to which they are dedicated.

Any total rooting out of the Vietcong from the territory of South Vietnam could be achieved, if it could be achieved at all, only at the cost of a degree of damage to civilian life and of civilian suffering generally for which I would not like to see this country responsible.

And to attempt to crush North Vietnamese strength to a point where Hanoi could no longer give any support for Vietcong political activity in the South, would almost certainly, it seems to me, have the effect of bringing in Chinese forces at some point, whether formally or in the guise of volunteers, thus involving us in a military conflict with Communist China on one of the most unfavorable theaters of hostility that we could possibly choose.

EFFECT OF CONFLICT ON OTHER INTERESTS AND POLICIES

This is not the only reason why I think we should do everything possible to avoid the escalation of this conflict. There is another one which is no less weighty, and this is the effect the conflict is already having on our policies and interests further afield. This involvement seems to me to represent a grievous misplacement of emphasis in our foreign policies as a whole.

EFFECT ON CONFIDENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Not only are great and potentially more important questions of world affairs not receiving, as a consequence of our involvement in Vietnam, the attention they should be receiving, but in some instances assets we already enjoy and hopefully possibilities we should be developing are being sacrificed to this unpromising involvement in a remote and secondary theater. Our relations with the Soviet Union have suffered grievously as was to be expected, and this at a time when far more important things were involved in those relations than what is ultimately involved in Vietnam and when we had special reason, I think, to cultivate those relations. And more unfortunate still, in my opinion, is the damage being done to the feelings entertained for us by the Japanese people. The confidence and good disposition of the Japanese is the greatest asset we have had and the greatest asset we could have in east Asia. As the only major industrial complex in the entire Far East, and the only place where the sinews of modern war can be produced on a formidable scale, Japan is of vital importance to us and indeed to the prospects generally of peace and stability in east Asia. There is no success we could have in Vietnam that would conceivably warrant, in my opinion, the sacrifice by us of the confidence and good will of the Japanese people. Yet, I fear that we abuse that confidence and good will in the most

serious way when we press the military struggle in Vietnam, and particularly when we press it by means of strategic bombing, a process to which the Japanese for historical reasons are peculiarly sensitive and averse.

I mention Japan particularly because it is an outstanding example, both in importance and in the intensity of the feelings aroused, of the psychological damage that is being done in many parts of the world by the prosecution of this conflict, and that will be done in even greater measure if the hostilities become still more bloody and tragic as a result of our deliberate effort.

It is clear that however justified our action may be in our own eyes, it has failed to win either enthusiasm or confidence even among peoples normally friendly to us.

U.S. MOTIVES ARE MISINTERPRETED

Our motives are widely misinterpreted, and the spectacle emphasized and reproduced in thousands of press photographs and stories that appear in the press of the world, the spectacle of Americans inflicting grievous injury on the lives of a poor and helpless people, and particularly a people of different race and color, no matter how warranted by military necessity or by the excesses of the adversary, produces reactions among millions of people throughout the world profoundly detrimental to the image we would like them to hold of this country. I am not saying that this is just or right. I am saying that this is so, and that it is bound in the circumstances to be so. A victory purchased at the price of further such damage would be a hollow one in terms of our world interests, no matter what advantages it might hold from the standpoint of developments on the local scene.

Now, these are the reasons, gentlemen, why I hope that our Government will restrict our military operations in Vietnam to the minimum necessary to assure the security of our forces and to maintain our military presence there until we can achieve a satisfactory peaceful resolution of the conflict. And these are the reasons why I hope that we will continue to pursue vigorously, and I may say consistently, the quest for such a peaceful resolution of the conflict, even if this involves some moderation of our stated objectives, and even if the resulting settlement appears to us as something less than ideal.

AGREEMENT WITH GENERAL GAVIN'S ENCLAVE THEORY

I cannot, of course, judge the military necessities of our situation. But everything that I can learn about its political aspects suggests to me that General Gavin is on the right track in his suggestion that we should, if I understood him correctly, decide what limited areas we can safely police and defend, and restrict ourselves largely to the maintenance of our position there. I have listened with interest to the arguments that have been brought forward in opposition to his views, and I must say that I have not been much impressed with some of them. When I am told that it would be difficult to defend such enclaves it is hard for me to understand why it would be easier to defend the far greater areas to which presumably a successful escalation of our military activity would bring us.

U.S. RETREAT WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF CONFIDENCE OF FREE WORLD

I also find it difficult, for reasons that I won't take time to go into here, to believe that our allies, and particularly our Western European allies, most of whom themselves have given up great territories within recent years, and sometimes in a very statesmanlike way, I find it hard to believe that we would be subject to great reproach or loss of confidence at their hands simply because we followed a defensive rather than an offensive strategy in Vietnam at this time.

In matters such as this, it is not in my experience what you do that is mainly decisive. It is how you do it; and I would submit that there is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM BEWILDERING

And finally, when I hear it said that to adopt a defensive strategy in South Vietnam would be to rat on our commitment to the Government of that territory I am a little bewildered. I would like to know what that commitment really consists of, and how and when it was incurred. What seems to be involved here is an obligation on our part not only to defend the frontiers of a certain political entity against outside attack, but to assure the internal security of its government in circumstances where that government is unable to assure that security by its own means. Now, any such obligation is one that goes obviously considerably further in its implications than the normal obligations of a military alliance.

If we did not incur such an obligation in any formal way, then I think we should not be inventing it for ourselves and assuring ourselves that we are bound by it today.

But if we did incur it, then I do fail to understand how it was possible to enter into any such commitment otherwise than through the constitutional processes which were meant to come into play when even commitments of lesser import than this were undertaken.

HIGHEST RESPECT FOR U.S. FIGHTING QUALITIES

Now, just two concluding observations: I would like it understood that what I have said here implies nothing but the highest respect and admiration for the fighting qualities of our forces in the field. I have the greatest confidence in them, men and commanders alike. I have no doubt, in fact, that they can and will, if duty requires, produce before this thing is over military results that will surprise both our skeptical friends and our arrogant adversaries. It is not their fighting qualities. It is the purpose to which they are being employed that evokes my skepticism.

UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT SHOULDER POLITICAL BURDEN OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Secondly, I would like to say I am trying to look at this whole problem not from the moral standpoint but from the practical one.

I see in the Vietcong a band of ruthless fanatics, many of them misled, no doubt, by the propaganda that has been drummed into them, but cruel in their methods, dictatorial, and oppressive in their aims, I am not conscious of having any sympathy for them. I think their claim to represent the people of South Vietnam is unfounded. A country which fell under this exclusive power would have my deepest sympathy; and I would hope that this eventuality at any rate would be avoided by a restrained and moderate policy on our part in South Vietnam.

But our country should not be asked, and should not ask of itself, to shoulder the main burden of determining the political realities in any other country, and particularly not in one remote from our shores, from our culture, and from the experience of our people. This is not only not our business, but I don't think we can do it successfully.

TIMELY WORDS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS

In saying this, I am only paraphrasing and very poorly the words once uttered by one who had at one time been a Member of the U.S. Senate, and who, had a Foreign Relations Committee existed in his day, would unquestionably have been a member of it. This was John Quincy Adams, and I would like your permission to recall, before I close, the words of his that I have in mind. They were spoken in this city 145 years ago on the 4th of July 1921—

The CHAIRMAN. 1821.

Mr. KENNAN. 1821, thank you.

Some of you may be familiar with them but they stand repeating at this moment:

Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers. But she goes not abroad—

He went on—

in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and by the benignant sympathy of her example. She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standards of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force * * *. She might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.

Now, gentleman, I don't know exactly what John Quincy Adams had in mind when he spoke those words, but I think that without knowing it, he spoke very directly and very pertinently to us here today.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kennan.

May I say that I think you have spoken very pertinently and very wisely to this committee today also, and your statement raises a great many questions which I know members of the committee would like to pursue further.

A NEUTRAL COMMUNIST REGIME IN VIETNAM

If I may start with, on page 2, one observation which interests me particularly because of your own experience in Yugoslavia where I know you served with great distinction and where in a Communist country you were largely responsible for helping this country establish cordial relations in our own interest. I think, I believe it is on page 2 where you say—

Given a situation that exists today in the relations among the leading Communist powers there is every likelihood that a Communist regime in South Vietnam would follow a fairly independent political course.

It came to my mind when you stated that, you may have thought of Yugoslavia, a Communist country which is following an independent course of its own, but which is not inimical to our own interests. Is that what you have in mind. If we wisely, I think, approach this problem, it could be created there or could have been created, and still might be created, a situation which would not be to the detriment of our own interests.

Is that what you had in mind?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes. I meant to say with this statement that we must not always assume that any Communist faction that comes into power anywhere in the world will function simply as the spineless executor of the orders of one of the great Communist powers. It is true that in the years that I spent in Yugoslavia, while I certainly did not see eye to eye with its government, while I sometimes resented, and had bitter arguments over, statements made by its leaders concerning our foreign policies, nevertheless it was my conclusion that the present policies of that government, especially the policies it follows in its relations with its neighbors, the neutral policy that it has long followed between East and West in military matters, all this, taken in conjunction with the highly strategic position that it occupies in the Balkans, has operated to our interest, and that we might have been worse off.

Now, I simply want to point to the possibility that these considerations might apply in other cases, too. I realize that such a statement, Mr. Chairman, is easily open to misinterpretation. I would not like to convey the impression that I think it would be fine if the Communists took South Vietnam. I think it would be regrettable. I think that we should do all that we can with due regard to our own security and to our own interests in world peace to prevent it. But I think that we should also be careful not to overrate or to misinterpret the possible implications of it. It is not so that when men call themselves Communists some sort of magic transportation takes place within them which makes them wholly different from other human beings or from what they were before. Feelings of nationalism, ordinary feelings, still affect them to a large extent. I think this reality plays a part in all of Vietnam. I don't think they want domination by the Chinese. I think the fact that there is an alternative to the Chinese within the Communist world in the form of the Soviet Union, and an alternative which incidentally is in a much better position to give them the economic aid they need, I think all this represents a state of affairs which would be very, very carefully and sensitively taken into account by any South Vietnamese Communists; and I merely wished to say,

therefore, that while their domination there would not be desirable, it might not be perhaps quite as tragic or as fatal as many of us assume.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I don't think many of us are under any illusions that any settlement can be a desirable one in the sense that it is perfect and exactly like we would like it. It is going to be, if any settlement is reached, one that is only tolerable but not satisfactory. Is that not true?

Mr. KENNAN. Absolutely true.

VICTORY IN VIETNAM NOT A PRACTICAL OBJECTIVE

The CHAIRMAN. Among the other comments you made that arouse my interest on page 6, that you are not looking at this purely from a moral standpoint, but from a practical one, of what can be achieved. You call attention to the great differences in the culture and race and language and so on between this area and other areas where we have become involved.

I take it by this you mean that this is simply not a practicable objective in this country. We can't achieve it even with the best of will.

Mr. KENNAN. This is correct. I have a fear that our thinking about this whole problem is still affected by some sort of illusions about invincibility on our part, a feeling that there is no problem in the world which we, if we wanted to devote enough of our resources to it, could not solve.

I disbelieve in this most profoundly. I do not think that we can order the political realities of areas in a great many other parts of the world. So far as I can see we are not being very successful in ordering them on islands very close to our own shores, and I deeply doubt that we can enter into the affairs of people far, far away like this, and by our own efforts primarily determine what sort of political conditions are going to prevail there.

Now, this is separate from my sympathies. I have seen as much as anyone, I daresay, in this room, of people living under communism, and I think I know as well as anyone here does what that means. These people have my sympathy. But as John Quincy Adams says, there are limits to what our duties and our capabilities are, and our first duty is to ourselves, and if we get lost in the attempt to rescue or even to establish in many instances the liberties of others, and particularly of people who have never known them as we know them in this country, who don't even know what the words mean that we use, we can lose our own substance and, I think, we can have very little to show for it when it is all over.

GENERAL RIDGWAY'S STATEMENT ABOUT MILITARY VICTORY

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar, I am sure, with a statement made by General Ridgway, in his book to the effect, and I don't attempt to quote him, that we could, if we would in all of our enormous amount of military power, perhaps win a military victory, but he thought such a victory would be completely out of proportion to what could be gained by such an activity. Are you familiar with that statement?

Mr. KENNAN. No, I wasn't, but I would agree with it.

The CHAIRMAN. We have quoted him before. It occurs in his own book recounting his experiences in 1954.

We discussed this the day before yesterday with General Gavin. General Gavin as you know was associated with him on his staff when he was Chief of Staff of the Army.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand his statement it was if we wished to we could with a great deal of sacrifice of men and material, blood and money conquer this country, even China, but that it would be a great mistake if we undertook to do it. Would you agree with that?

Mr. KENNAN. Generally, yes. But when it comes to the question of "conquering this country," I am not sure about China, because I don't know what conquering it would mean. If it were an effort to occupy the country, I would go even further than General Ridgway and I would say that we probably couldn't even do that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think his statement was made primarily with regard to Vietnam but he also did go on to say that even though we could conquer China, and destroy it, it would be a great mistake. He said, "It would not be in our own interests."

Mr. KENNAN. This would check completely with my own views.

The CHAIRMAN. Your own views?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Kennan, words simply fail me in expressing the degree to which this testimony of yours has moved me this morning. I want to say that I think the scholarly, intellectual statesmanship that you have written indelibly in the history of this committee and this country by this testimony this morning is going to be referred to for generations to come. That is what I think of your testimony.

RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT DECLARED MR. KENNAN PERSONA NON GRATA

I think one of the finest parts of your credentials, may I say, to speak on communism is the fact that you were declared, as I recall, persona non grata by the Communist Russian Government as our Ambassador to Russia.

Would you briefly explain for the record why you, in my opinion, received that great honor?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I think that must remain a matter of conjecture because even in Russia nobody but Stalin himself apparently knew why this measure was taken. The Foreign Office did not like it. I had evidently irritated him.

I can only have my suspicions. Obviously the stated reasons were not the real ones.

I think they knew that I was not without sympathy for the Russian people, and I think they knew that a great many people around Moscow knew this. And it was awkward to have me there at a time of great political tension.

Besides, there had been an incident in 1945 on the day on which the Soviet Government admitted to its people that the war in Europe was over. I put it that way because it was not our D-day. They were suspicious and they waited 3 days before they admitted it was over. On that day the American Embassy in Moscow, of which I was then in charge, became the object of a sympathetic demonstration on the part of thousands and thousands of Russian people, which went

on for over 14 hours, and on that occasion, I went out and said a few appreciative words to the crowd.

I believe this was the first time that a so-called bourgeois diplomat had ever addressed a sympathetic Soviet audience, and I had been advised that this was extremely badly received in the party.

Senator MORSE. You said it in Russian?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, I did say it in Russian.

ADDITION OF WORDS BY MR. KENNAN TO HIS STATEMENT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Kennan, in prereading your statement which arrived yesterday, I note on page 4 the words "and consistently" were added in the phrase "We will continue to pursue vigorously and consistently" since you submitted your first draft. I take it that you must feel that we are not pursuing the quest for peace consistently. If not, why did you add "and consistently" to your draft since yesterday?

Mr. KENNAN. I should perhaps explain that circumstances of my own schedule, which included a lot of intensive travel and speaking engagements out West, even as late as last night, made it necessary for me to write this statement out by longhand on Sunday, and not to see it after that.

In the meantime this meeting has taken place at Honolulu, and I must say that to choose this moment, when the question of a peaceful resolution of this conflict is hanging fire in the U.N., and when consultations are taking place among members of the U.N. about a peaceful resolution, to choose this moment to emphasize the solidarity of our position with that of the authority that exists in Saigon, seemed to me to be something less than consistent behavior.

Senator MORSE. Thank you very much.

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.N. ROLE IN VIETNAM

In an article last December in the Washington Post you stated that since Vietnam became a critical issue "A pall of discouragement has been cast over those responsible for the conduct of the work of the United Nations."

Would you tell us what you mean by that language and if you foresee the United Nations as being able to play an effective role in trying to bring a negotiated settlement of this war?

Mr. KENNAN. The reference to the pall of discouragement reflected my feeling that a great many people at the United Nations saw the possibilities for peace rapidly deteriorating as this conflict in Vietnam became more intensive, and had a great sense of helplessness about it, because, after all, it was to have been the principal function of the United Nations organization: to be able to prevent precisely this sort of a deterioration of the international atmosphere.

I personally do not think that the United Nations itself could be useful in writing the terms of any compromise solution to the Vietnam conflict. But it was my hope, and I think it was the hope of many people at the United Nations headquarters in New York, that perhaps this recent initiative in enlisting the interest of the Security Council in this problem might lead either to the revival of the Geneva arrangements or to some other approach to this problem outside of the United

Nations, to which both we and the people on the other side could respond in a useful way.

PROBABLE OUTCOME OF 1956 ELECTIONS IN VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. Mr. Kennan, is it your view that if the elections had been held in South Vietnam in July 1956, as provided by the Geneva accords of 1954, the people of Vietnam would probably have voted in officials that would have established a Communist regime but would have done so under the election procedures set forth in the accords?

Mr. KENNAN. I don't claim to know a great deal about these realities there. I go largely on the statement in the book of a respected ex-President, who said that everything he could learn indicated that the election would have gone 80 percent in favor of the Communist side had it been held at that time. I cannot judge the correctness of this, but from all I could learn I think it likely that elections held at that time would have gone in favor of the Communist side.

On the other hand, I am not sure that they would have been entirely free elections.

Senator MORSE. If the people of a country decide to vote themselves a Communist regime or decide that they are willing to support a Communist regime, do you think it is a wise policy for the United States to use its great power to prevent those elections or to intervene to prevent those people from having the kind of government that they want.

Mr. KENNAN. No, Senator, I do not.

I do not think it was a wise policy. I recognize that this could create, depending on the place where it would happen, very difficult problems for our Government, but it seems to me that as people who profess to believe in the democratic process, we are in a poor position to object to the consequences of any free expression of opinion on the part of peoples elsewhere in the world.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Senator yield at this point?

Senator MORSE. I am not going to yield, I want to press my questions. The Senator from Ohio will have his turn.

IMAGE OF AMERICA AFFECTED BY ITS OVERSEA MILITARY INVESTMENT

I want to ask you, Mr. Kennan, if you think, speaking of the image that we are creating in other parts of the world, that it is very helpful for us to be practically the only nation in the world now that maintains overseas bases and overseas land forces? Great Britain still has Singapore which is not a great port, and the whole movement of the allies has been to withdraw from a military posture like that of the United States.

Do you think that is having an effect on our image abroad?

Mr. KENNAN. I think it is exploited by the Communists, and does have some effect. I would not like, however, to be understood as saying that I think that we should withdraw all our bases abroad. I don't think you can generalize about this. I think there are some that are warranted and useful. There have in the past been also ones that we would have done better never to establish.

Senator MORSE. Put it this way, Mr. Kennan. You have two types of bases. You have bases in which we are a part along with other nations in support, such as NATO. Then we have unilateral bases in which we are following a go-it-alone course.

Do you think there is greater danger of misunderstanding when we follow a unilateral military-base-abroad policy than when we go in with other countries under regional agreements?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator Morse, I think there is a greater danger of misunderstanding in these circumstances, but I can conceive it possible that there might be instances where we would have to maintain those bases even at the expense of a certain amount of misunderstanding.

WORLDWIDE FEAR OF UNITED STATES CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA

Senator MORSE. I would like to ask if you think that part of the concern you express in respect to foreign attitudes toward us and misunderstandings toward us, irrespective of what the facts are, is based somewhat upon a fear in many places of the world that we may be headed in the direction of a war with China?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, I think this is true. I think this fear exists in many quarters.

Senator MORSE. Do you know any basis at the present time that would justify our escalating the war in South Vietnam thereby increasing the danger of a unilateral war between the United States and China?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I am not absolutely sure that I understood the question.

Senator MORSE. Let me repeat it.

Do you know of any justification for an American foreign policy that would cause us to follow a policy of escalation in southeast Asia that would really increase the danger of the United States unilaterally becoming involved in a war with China?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I can see why reasons could be offered for such a policy but in my opinion these reasons are outweighed by other ones, and such a procedure, such a policy, is not warranted by the considerations that present themselves to me.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator MORSE. I will comment.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand, Mr. Kennan, we are operating under limited time particularly in the early stages so that everyone may have a chance.

Mr. KENNAN. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EFFECT OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL ON OTHER ASIAN NATIONS

Mr. Kennan, without discussing the background of how and why we got into this Vietnamese involvement at the present time, I think everyone will concede that it is a fact that we are involved, and we are very deeply involved.

Now, there are problems facing us and others. I am not quite clear what you would recommend that we do about it. How do we disengage

ourselves without losing a tremendous amount of face or position in various areas of the world?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I think precisely the question, the consideration that you have just raised is the central one that we have to think about, and it seems to me, as I have said here, that a precipitate, sudden and unilateral withdrawal would not be warranted by circumstances now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What do you think the result of a sudden precipitate withdrawal of our activities in South Vietnam would be?

Mr. KENNAN. I think it would be exploited mercilessly by the Chinese and the North Vietnamese.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Where?

Mr. KENNAN. In world public opinion, as a means of humiliating us.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think it would have a substantial effect on Indonesia and its future political attitudes?

Mr. KENNAN. No, sir; I do not. It seems to me that what has happened in Indonesia in recent weeks has been of such finality that we are not going to face much of a Communist danger there for some time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I presume only the future will tell on that?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think it would have an effect on Cambodia and Laos?

Mr. KENNAN. You know I am not sure that I am really qualified to answer that question. I should not think that it would have a great effect on Cambodia because it seems to me that the Government of that country is already so concerned to stay close to the Chinese that I don't think they could get much closer without submitting to inclusion into the Chinese state. I think that probably the most dangerous effect of this might be on Thailand, but I don't know. I agree that the effect would be unfortunate.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think there would be an ascertainable effect on the Philippines because of the enhanced Chinese influence and standing in their propaganda to the effect that they had been instrumental in supporting the defeat of the United States or its withdrawal there?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I ought to emphasize as I answer these questions that in my opinion a great deal depends on how these things are done. If we get out in a gradual way, if there is some sort of political compromise which can help to explain our departure, that is one thing. But if we simply turned tail and fled the scene, obviously we would do great damage around, and I am not advocating anything of that sort.

I personally think that even if we were to withdraw at an early date from South Vietnam, there is no reason for the Filipinos to get jittery. The Vietcong have no amphibious capacity and are not going to pursue us across the Philippine island or anything like that. It depends largely on the Filipinos themselves. They have the wherewithal to assure their own security if they want to do it. It is a question of their morale and their determination. They have done it before, and they can do it again if they have to.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Kennan, I am discussing this with you because of your vast experience with Communist mentality and

their aggressive tendencies, their programs, and their influence upon surrounding areas.

Let's say the Vietcong haven't any Navy with which to attack the Philippines. They can't transport troops over there. That isn't what I mean at all.

Mr. KENNAN. No.

ORIENTATION OF CHINESE COMMUNISM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But here sits China with 600, 700 million people. It is basically international Chinese in its orientation, I believe. Do you agree with that?

Mr. KENNAN. Of course it is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is as differentiated from purely a nationalistic communism which doesn't intend to extend its influence beyond its borders.

Mr. KENNAN. Well, the Government is certainly Communist oriented.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When I speak of China, I speak of the governing forces of China. Who set the policies?

Mr. KENNAN. May I put in a caveat there? I believe that the Chinese Communists would certainly like to have influence, dominant influence, all over the mainland of Asia, and they would certainly like to have Taiwan. I am not sure that they are anxious to launch invasions against these other countries and to take them under the Chinese sovereignty, at this stage of the game anyway.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They extended their influence in the disputed area of Tibet, did they not?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They also invaded India.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With force of arms.

Mr. KENNAN. But the areas to which they extended their power through these actions were ones for which they claimed the argument that the areas had been under Chinese sovereignty before. I don't excuse it by this. I merely say that it puts them somewhat in a different category.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think that the withdrawal of the United States from South Vietnam, again realizing that you have entered the caveat about the way it was done, would have some influence?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

PROPAGANDA VALUE OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think the rather immediate withdrawal of the U.S. forces and our activity in South Vietnam could be used effectively as a propaganda tool and weapon in the emerging nations of Africa where the Chinese have been making a great effort?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, it would be a 6-month sensation, but I dare say we would survive it in the end, and there would be another day. Things happen awfully fast on the international scene, and people's memories are very short. If we run our mind back over the crises of recent years and ask ourselves what has become of them, we can realize,

I believe, the truth of that statement. There was a time when we were all hot and bothered over the Lebanon and landing troops there. A year or two ago no one would have ever have thought that the Cyprus crisis would be as quiet as it is today. These things pass more rapidly than one might think.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the crisis didn't just take care of itself, did it?

Mr. KENNAN. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was really assured by the imposition of some rather forceful actions.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And it was a result of those forceful actions in each instance that discouraged these people who, while they had designs on these countries, at least in my view—

Mr. KENNAN. I would certainly have no objection if we had been as smart about getting both in and out in South Vietnam as we were in Lebanon.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We got into Lebanon, with sufficient force that nobody dared to do anything. Things quieted down and then we removed the troops but they haven't quieted down in Vietnam yet.

Mr. KENNAN. I am not sure, sir, of course, that these situations are comparable. I merely wanted to say we are a great nation and our world position rests in the long run on things more substantial, more important than the momentary propaganda victories of opponents. And while I think that the effects of an early and unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam would be unfortunate and unnecessary, and while I don't favor any such withdrawal, I daresay that 3 or 4 years hence the world would not look quite so different as we think.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think my time is up, Mr. Kennan, on this first round. It is 11 o'clock. I was just getting warmed up here.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a couple of more minutes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Maybe it will take a couple of minutes to ask questions and then the answer will take more time.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess, I think 20 minutes will be long enough for us to take a vote and reconvene.

There will be two votes.

(Short recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I recognize the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Gore.

EFFECT OF VIETNAM ON UNITED STATES-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Senator GORE. Ambassador, for reasons which you have stated more eloquently and with more erudition than I have been able to summon, I have long thought this was an unadvisable adventure for the United States. Behind the closed doors of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a long while ago, I asked this question of Secretary Rusk. I cannot give his reply now, but I would like to ask you the same question today:

Now to view this problem in the context of a decade hence what is your assessment of its bearing upon the possibility that the Soviet Union may or may not continue on the course of rapprochement with the Western Powers which has been underway now since the

confrontation of 1961, thus possibly reentering the European society, or conversely becoming more closely alined with Red China, not only in a push into the Pacific but alined more closely in a more aggressive international Communist thrust.

Mr. KENNAN. Senator Gore, a year ago this month in a public lecture at Princeton University, which was one of the two occasions in which I have spoken publicly, I believe, on this Vietnam problem, I tried to make the point that if we pressed our intervention in Vietnam, the Soviet Government would see no choice but to come down strongly against us and to enter into a sort of a competition with the Chinese to see who could look most critical of our policies, most dedicated and violent in their defense of the Vietcong.

I said that they would do this even if it had to proceed at the expense of Soviet-American relations.

Now, this is exactly what has happened. The effect of the Vietnamese conflict is not to restore the unity between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Things have gone too far for that. But it is to give to their rivalry a form very undesirable from the standpoint of our interests and the interests of world peace; namely, the form of a contest to see who can look the most anti-American, the most critical of our policies, who can appear to be the most violent defender of what they call the national liberation movements.

The reasons why the Soviet leaders have seen themselves compelled to move in this direction are ones for which I can take no responsibility. They don't commend themselves to my sympathies. But I can see why they exist, if you try to look at it from their point of view, and this seems to me a most unfortunate development of world affairs generally.

I think that we have more important problems than Vietnam to thrash out eventually with the Soviet Union, problems of disarmament, and problems of the halting of the proliferation of nuclear weaponry, and the still great and vital problem of Germany, which is, to my mind, the most important specific political geographic problem in the world.

All of this, as I see it, is in suspense while this Vietnam conflict proceeds, and the effect of the Vietnam conflict on the Soviet Union has been, I fear, to make it more difficult for us to discuss these things in a useful way with the Soviet leaders.

I am not saying that if the Vietnam conflict did not exist, I am sure that we could have agreements with the Soviet leaders on these points. I think this would take a long time, and a great deal of patience. But I think we should have kept the pressure on, and I think we might make progress slowly. At any rate, that was the way things looks a year or so ago.

Unfortunately, they do not look that way today. I attribute this to the operation of the logic of the situation which we have in South Vietnam.

EXTENSION OF COMMITMENT DIVERTS OUR ATTENTION FROM PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE

Senator GORE. If the war in Vietnam should be escalated or, if by some unfortunate incident, God forbid, war comes between the United States and China, would it be within the purview of pos-

sibility that Russia would again, seeing us bogged down, press her point of view in Berlin, and seek to work her machinations in Latin America and elsewhere?

Mr. KENNAN. It is certainly within the realm of possibility. One of the things that worries me most about an extension of our present commitment in Vietnam is that it might leave us very poorly prepared to face crises that might arise in other areas of the world.

I think it has already caused a diversion of our attention and our resources to a point that holds dangers for the balance of our world responsibilities elsewhere. And if we are now, as some people fear, to double the amount of the manpower and the resources we are putting into Vietnam, I am afraid that we would not be in a good position to defend our interests in other areas if they were suddenly challenged.

Senator GORE. As unwisely as you think these commitments have been made, I remind you that through three administrations we have inched or been inched into this unfortunate situation.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator GORE. Upon many occasions the Congress has been led to believe that a subsequent step would not follow a step presently being taken. This is behind us. We are now in Vietnam in the situation which you have so eloquently described.

The real issue, it seems to me, is whether this conflict in Vietnam is to be held within bounds which we think we can reasonably master, maintaining control of events.

You referred this morning to the damage to America's prestige around the world, the pictures of great damage that is wrought. Of course all of us know that war is hell, but the pictures of a great power, with big bombers, big bombs, big money, wreaking havoc upon a small nation is one which we all regret.

Is this element, plus the encroaching threat of China, a benefit to the Chinese Communist apparatus in more effectively regimenting her people and engendering hate of the United States?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, sir, in my opinion it is.

PREVENT CONFLICT FROM BECOMING WAR WITH CHINA

Senator GORE. Then, you conclude, and I conclude with you that it is in our national interests and in the interest of our national security if at all possible to prevent this conflict from further major escalation and most of all to prevent it from becoming a war between the United States and China.

Mr. KENNAN. This is precisely my position, and I think you have stated it in a way that I couldn't possibly improve upon.

Senator GORE. You have improved in many respects on my thoughts. I agree 100 percent with your presentation here.

Mr. KENNAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Carlson?

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Ambassador, first I want to express my personal appreciation for your appearance here. You have been in this field of diplomatic problems affecting our international policies for years and, therefore, I have a very high regard for your views.

I would not say I have always agreed with them, but I can assure you I have read many of your books and I have heard many of your lectures.

REFERENCE OF VIETNAM TO UNITED NATIONS

I was interested in the colloquy you had with the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Morse, this morning, and I may not have understood you properly. Did you say you had some question of referring this and the final negotiations to a conclusion by the United Nations?

Mr. KENNAN. What I meant to say, Senator Carlson, was that I did not think that the United Nations constituted, itself, the forum in which could hopefully take place renegotiations which would lead or could lead to a peaceful solution of this problem, but that I thought the United Nations might be instrumental in finding other forums, and stimulating discussion of this problem in other forums, where the discussion would be more hopeful.

REFUSAL OF RUSSIA TO RECONVENE 1954 CONFERENCE

Senator CARLSON. Then on that basis, we get, I assume, to the Geneva Conference of 1954. Can you give us any reason or any thoughts why the Soviets have refused to agree to call a reconvening of that conference?

Mr. KENNAN. I am puzzled by this myself. Perhaps the difficulties lie with Hanoi. I do feel that if the pressure were kept on in a suitable way that it would become very difficult for the Soviet Government to continue to hold to that position.

Senator CARLSON. Just following that thought, then, in a more general sense, why have the Soviets appeared to be reluctant to play any sort of peacekeeping role similar to the one that they played at Tashkent recently?

Mr. KENNAN. I believe it is because they are being pushed so hard by the Chinese. It is my observation that any Marxist detests being outflanked to the left by any other Marxist.

And they are very sensitive to criticisms that they are "aiding the imperialists," "doing the work of the imperialists." This is the sort of silly semantics that goes back and forth between them.

The Soviet Government is, I think, very apprehensive if it does not take a very strong anti-American line, if it appears to be in any way aiding us in our purposes, it will lose its authority within the world Communist movement and its appeal to other nationalist semi-Communist movements in other developing countries. This, I think, explains its rather curious conduct in this respect.

I must say I am bewildered myself at its unwillingness to see the Geneva Conference reconvened.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Senator CARLSON. Following your thoughts along that same line, if we cannot expect any help from the Soviet Union in regard to negotiations on the Geneva Conference of 1954, is it possible that, or is there a likelihood, there might be Soviet intervention in this situation we are in?

Mr. KENNAN. Military intervention?

Senator CARLSON. Military intervention.

Mr. KENNAN. I see no likelihood of that.

Senator CARLSON. I would like to ask you what you base it on in view of the fact that I think everyone must agree this must be settled through negotiations. Maybe it will be years but some day we are going to negotiate a settlement, and the Soviet Union refuses to now. Are they just going to sit idly by and let us continue to waste our manpower, and when I say waste it, it is a poor word to use, but have our young men destroyed and have the financial sacrifices. Is that their thought?

Mr. KENNAN. I think it is. I think they probably reckon we have more to lose than they do from the present situation. And they do not want to appear publicly as being in the position of pressuring Hanoi and the Vietcong to agreements with us which these two factions might themselves not wish to enter into.

Senator CARLSON. I have some question about the Soviet Union entering militarily into this conflict.

POSSIBILITIES OF CHINESE INTERVENTION IN CONFLICT

What are your thoughts on Chinese intervention?

Mr. KENNAN. I think the Chinese, too, obviously would like to stay out of it, and will unless they feel that our military operations are taking forms that become really dangerous to them, either in the straight military sense or in the sense of prestige. I think that if we bomb too freely or if we get operating too close to their borders, it will bring them in.

Now, whether it will bring them in in a formal sense, as I have already said, or whether they will do what they did in Korea and send troops in under the flimsy and shabby excuse that these are volunteers, I couldn't say. I would suspect it might be the latter.

But it doesn't matter much from the standpoint of the problem this presents for us, whether they come as volunteers or as regular Chinese troops.

Senator CARLSON. I believe we have had testimony in our committee that the Chinese, at least, have some military advisers and people in Vietnam training the Vietcong, so they are already involved in the war in a way.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. The question as I see it is how much further will they get involved and what is the danger of it, the threat?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I think the danger is that if this goes on, if our involvement increases, and their involvement increases, this can gradually work us into a situation in which we are in conflict with them, in effect, just as this occurred in Korea. But this is in my opinion, and I think in the opinion of people who know more about military matters than I do, an extremely unfortunate terrain for us to become involved in such a conflict on.

Senator CARLSON. Admitting that it is an unfortunate terrain in which to be operating militarily, would you agree with General Gavin that their intervention may be within a reasonable time and a short time we will be further involved in Thailand. This is a military matter, but it is a statement he made before this committee the other day.

MR. KENNAN. Yes. I don't think that I would be able to comment on it. I am not familiar enough with the thinking of our own people or of the situation there.

If I may return a moment to your question about the Soviet Union, and its relationship to the conflict, the Soviet Union, of course, is already giving extensive and, I think, important military aid to the North Vietnamese. I can conceive that that may be increased if the pressure is increased from our side. But I don't see any likelihood of a formal entry of the Soviet Union to the conflict. I don't see that that would serve any useful purpose from their standpoint, so I don't anticipate that they will do that.

Senator CARLSON. Well, Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate very much your appearance here this morning.

MR. KENNAN. Thank you.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

"CONTAINMENT" POLICY

Senator LAUSCHE. Ambassador Kennan, it has been said frequently that you were the designer and architect of the policy of the United States that we cannot suffer the expansion of communism, and, therefore, there must be adopted a plan of containment. Were you a participant in the design of that plan?

MR. KENNAN. Senator Lausche, I bear a certain amount of guilt for the currency this word "containment" has acquired in this country. I published an article, an anonymous article, in 1947, written actually in 1946, in which this word was used, and the article got much more publicity than I thought it would get. It is true that in this sense I am guilty of the authorship, or at least of the use, of this word with regard to our policy toward the Soviet Union.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

Isn't it a fact that when this policy was announced, it was predicated upon the belief that the security of our country required that there be a stoppage of the aggressive advancement of communism into areas of the world other than those in which it was already prevalent?

MR. KENNAN. Yes, sir. At that time—

Senator LAUSCHE. If that is so, has your view changed then?

MR. KENNAN. No, the situation has changed. There was at that time—

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, if there has been a change in the situation, has your view changed in that it would now be within, let's say, the general security of our country to permit an expansion of Communist aggression?

MR. KENNAN. It would certainly not be in our interests to encourage it. But I did not mean to convey, in the article I wrote at that time, the belief that we could necessarily stop communism at every point on the world's surface. There were things I failed to say, I must admit, in that article, which should have been said, and one of them was that certain areas of the world are more important than others; that one had to concentrate on the areas that were vital to us.

But in addition to this, I must point out that at that time there was only one center of Communist power, and it was to this that I was addressing myself.

Today there is more than one, and that makes a great deal of difference.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

There is now more than one, and with that I agree. But the nation included now is Red China, and Red China does not believe in peaceful coexistence, but urges the expansion of communism by whatever means are necessary. Do you agree with that?

Mr. KENNAN. I agree with that.

Senator LAUSCHE. The split between Red China and Russia has come about because Khrushchev believed in peaceful coexistence, thinking that by ideological combat, communism would be triumphant, but the Chinese did not subscribe to that theory. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNAN. I think this could stand as an explanation of one of the reasons for the Russian-Chinese conflict, but by no means all of them.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

If China is the real aggressor now, doesn't the policy of containment become more demandable than it was when you announced it back 20 years ago?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator Lausche, the policy of containment certainly has relevance to China, but it is a question of what and where and what lies within our resources. If we had been able, without exorbitant cost in American manpower and resources and in the attention of our Government, in the emphasis of our foreign policy, if we had been able to do better in Vietnam I would have been delighted, and I would have thought that the effort was warranted.

SHOULD WE PULL OUT?

Senator LAUSCHE. That brings us down to this plateau. Do you advocate pulling out of Vietnam?

Mr. KENNAN. If by that you mean an immediate and sudden and unilateral withdrawal without any sort of a political arrangement and simply permitting to happen what will in that area, I do not advocate it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Under present conditions, you would not advocate pulling out. Would you advocate allowing the people of South Vietnam by open, free elections—supervised either by the United Nations or by an international body so authorized to hold elections—to determine whether they want a Communist government or a government leaning to the free world?

Mr. KENNAN. I think it would be very fine if one could have such a test of opinion, but I doubt that it would be possible in the conditions that prevail today.

Senator LAUSCHE. Who stands in the way of it? Does the United States or Red China and Hanoi? Who stands in the way of it? Are not the President and the United States urging that course?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, it seems to me that the whole situation stands in the way of it. You could not have such an election in a civil war situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, if that is your answer, I ask you: Have not the U.S. Government and the people of the United States probed every avenue through which there could be discussion toward

reaching a settlement, and has there not been constant rebuttal of those efforts by China and by Hanoi?

Mr. KENNAN. It is correct that we have gotten nowhere.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. Who is to blame if that is the effect?

Senator GORE. He didn't complete his answer.

Senator LAUSCHE. But he says that it is so—that we have tried. Who is to be blamed? Is it our Government or is it the Chinese and the North Vietnamese?

Mr. KENNAN. Perhaps the reasons go deeper than a mere question of blame on either side. Obviously, it seems to me, the other side have much more blame for this than we have.

Senator LAUSCHE. Our Government has stopped bombing, it has stopped fighting. Can you point out to a single act on the part of the North Vietnamese and Hanoi, which collaborated with this policy of stopping activities—point out one act of the North Vietnamese and Red China where they have tried to help toward bringing the subject to the negotiating table?

Mr. KENNAN. They have shown to my knowledge no interest whatsoever in negotiations at this time.

I must say that I did not expect that they would, and I believe that I said in the article which was written at the end of November, before this bombing pause was announced, that I saw no interest on their side in negotiations and did not think that in the immediate future they would be interested.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

In addition to what the President has done, what would you propose that we do now to bring this to a settlement without damage to our prestige and without danger to our security. What would you propose?

KENNAN PROPOSES LIMITING AIMS AND COMMITMENT

Mr. KENNAN. I would propose that we limit our aims and our military commitment in this area, that we decide what we can safely hold in that region with due regard to the security of our forces, that we dig in, and wait and see whether possibilities for a solution do not open up. I am fully prepared to agree that I do not see the possibilities for a peaceful solution today. But I have seen too many international situations in which possibilities of this sort were not visible at one time, but in which they were visible at another time if one showed a little patience and had a reasonably strong position.

Senator LAUSCHE. There are many, many people who believe that this is exactly what our Nation is trying to do—the recommendation that you have just made.

You don't propose pulling out precipitously, then.

Mr. KENNAN. That is correct, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we do pull out—let's assume that we were determined to—would that be the end of our troubles, or would we be confronted with new troubles in Thailand and Burma and Malaysia and Indonesia and other places?

Mr. KENNAN. I think it is likely that we would certainly be confronted with new troubles because this is a very troubled part of the

world and conditions there generally are not favorable from our standpoint.

Senator LAUSCHE. In other words, the desire of the Communists would not come to an end after a surrender of South Vietnam?

Mr. KENNAN. Certainly not their desire, but I think, Senator, that when one speaks of the Communists these days, if it is to be meaningful, one really has to be specific, and state exactly which Communist regime one is talking about.

Senator LAUSCHE. I understand that. There is supposed to be the beneficent Communist Tito, and the tortuous and brutal Communists in Red China—but we are dealing now with Red China, and the question is, What do we do there? I want to advocate pulling out, but I can't bring myself to that conclusion—and you agree with me.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, I think I have indicated my position here.

Senator LAUSCHE. You did, in your paper today, point out the misdeeds of Hanoi and the Vietcong. I appreciate that very much. I think it is wrong to leave the image throughout the world that the Communists have been gentle in this matter, and that we have been the brutal perpetrators. That is not the fact. We tried with all our might to go to the point—in my judgment, practically on the border—of appeasement.

What is the alternative, if you have one, to the course which our Government is now following? I would like to explore the alternatives, and I know the people of the country would like to know.

U.S. GOVERNMENT COURSE UNCLEAR

Mr. KENNAN. I am not sure what the course is that our Government is now following. If I knew what it was, if I could see it more clearly, I could speak better perhaps to the question of an alternative to it.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. I just want to read, the President has urged that we operate under the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Hanoi has rejected that. The President has recommended that we have open free elections in South Vietnam. North Vietnam and many of us, not including myself, claim that South Vietnam would go Communist.

Well, if it is, why don't they submit to an election? If they believe that the people will vote Communist, why are they afraid to submit to an open free election?

My time is up, and I thank you very much. I want to say to you that I have implicit faith in your sincerity and your desire to reach this on a sound basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams?

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Kennan, as I listened to your statement and your answers to the questions, I gather that you think that during the past 2 or 3 years we have made several mistakes in decisions of our Government policy in Vietnam; is that correct?

Mr. KENNAN. I think the totality of our action in this situation, as it has developed over the past few years, has been unfortunate and in error. But I must say that I have great sympathy for our Government. This has not been an easy problem for it to handle, and it has not been easy to find any one place where we could have put the hand to avoid these mistakes.

Senator WILLIAMS. Of course, we all recognize that our hindsight is oftentimes better than our foresight.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator WILLIAMS. Had you been in a position of authority at the time, what decisions do you think you would have made that were any different from those that were made?

ALTERNATIVE—NOT PUTTING COMBAT UNITS ASHORE

Mr. KENNAN. No, I think probably if there was any point where we went wrong it was in putting fighting men ashore for purposes of combat. Possibly even the instructors for the South Vietnamese forces were warranted by the situation. It is difficult for me as an outsider far away to tell. But perhaps we should have thought much more carefully before we put combat units ashore.

It has been my belief for many years, and it is a belief based on the fact that I had at one time to make a very careful study of our difficulties in connection with the intervention in Russia in 1918, it has been my belief that one should be very, very careful about ever putting American forces ashore into a situation of this sort unless one can see clearly how and at what point one can get them out again, and unless the arrival at that point appears fairly plausible and immediate. Here, if at any point, is where we made our mistake.

Senator WILLIAMS. We all have the same objectives as Americans—wanting a peaceful solution to the problem—and we recognize we are at this point now, whether we arrived there because of proper decisions or because of mistakes.

Recognizing that we are at this point, that we have a couple of hundred thousand men in there, my next question is, What would you recommend that we do now?

Mr. KENNAN. I would recommend that we not expand either our own commitment of men and resources to this conflict; that we try to limit the conflict rather than to expand it; that we adopt in general a defensive strategy and put ourselves in a position where we cannot be hurried, where we cannot be panicked, where we can afford to wait, and let the logic of this situation then gradually sink in on our opponents. And I think then there is a possibility that with a little greater patience than we have shown thus far, possibilities for an acceptable resolution of the conflict may open up. By an acceptable resolution of it, I do not say that this will be one which will hold any triumphs or indeed any great satisfaction from our standpoint.

NO HAPPY SOLUTION

I think that there is no happy way out of this conflict. I think the best we can expect is that it be resolved in a manner which does not shake the stability of the area too much, and which permits us to extricate ourselves with a reasonable degree of good grace and retained prestige.

Senator WILLIAMS. When you speak of digging in and holding what we have, you never know what the other side is going to do, and they may increase in numbers.

What would you do then? Would you retreat, withdraw or add more men?

Mr. KENNAN. This involves military considerations to which I am not competent to speak. But I must say that I do find it hard to understand that our Government does not have it within its power, that our forces that we have out there today do not have it within their power, to hold some areas of this country in a secure way.

I note that the Vietcong—that is the Vietcong and their North Vietnamese helpers—having approximately, I suppose, the same number, about the same number of forces, are said to control completely 25 percent of the country. Now if they can do that with about the same number, it is hard for me to understand why there is nothing that we could hold with our present forces there.

I don't know enough about military matters to say how this should be done. Perhaps you would have to have forward sweeps occasionally. Perhaps it couldn't be just a state of siege. But it does seem to me that it should not be beyond the power of ingenuity to find a way in which the formidable forces which we now have in that country could settle down to a more or less defensive strategy for the coming period, and could create a situation in which nobody else could hope to dislodge us.

If they cannot hope to dislodge us at some point in the future they will have to talk to us because otherwise they won't get us out.

Senator WILLIAMS. Do you think that there is a possibility that such a holding action could actually become more costly—in dollars, material, and lives—than would offensive action?

Mr. KENNAN. I have heard it argued that it could—again this is a military question—but I cannot imagine that what it might cost in lives and effort could be more than what could possibly be involved if we continue to go on into what appears to be an unlimited escalation of this conflict into an unlimited area. Because this is almost infinity in its possibilities, as related to our resources.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is all Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Ambassador, I have been very much impressed by the eloquence and profundity of the testimony you are making today. I suppose, most of all, I like your courage, particularly in these days when criticism of American policy is often met with charges of appeasement or allegations of being soft on communism or sold on surrender or some such abuse.

Your own record in our diplomatic service alone should demonstrate how strongly you have opposed communism, and how great was your contribution in devising a prudent policy in Europe designed to bring and end to Russian aggression there.

My questions won't relate to Vietnam as such. I think that what has been done there cannot be readily undone. The options now open to the President are limited, and I am confident that the President is striving to keep this war confined within manageable limits. He certainly has indicated his sincere desire to bring about a political settlement that will restore peace to southeast Asia.

Rather, I would like to question you about some of the underlying premises which led us into Vietnam in the first place, and which could, if they remain unchanged, lead us into other guerrilla wars, indeed, into an endless succession of guerrilla wars in the future.

COMPARISON OF POLICIES TOWARD EUROPE AND ASIA

I think, to get this point clearly made on the record, we should compare the policies you advocated in Europe with the situation that confronts us in Asia, which has just thrown off European rule.

Now, isn't it true that in Europe, following the Second World War, we were faced with a problem of Russian aggression, with the Red army in occupation and control of much of Eastern Europe?

Mr. KENNAN. This is correct.

Senator CHURCH. And, at that time, Russian aggression and Communist aggression seemed to be synonymous, did they not?

Mr. KENNAN. Exactly.

Senator CHURCH. And isn't it true that the NATO Alliance was designed to put a stop to Russian aggression, that is to say, the Russian movement of the Iron Curtain westward across the face of Europe?

Mr. KENNAN. That is absolutely correct, and it was designed especially to protect from further Communist expansion the vitally important industrial areas of the Rhineland and contiguous regions, which are among the most important in the world.

Senator CHURCH. We felt, did we not, that if the Russian movement westward across Europe were not stopped, then the balance of power in the world would shift from our favor to the Russian favor?

Mr. KENNAN. This is absolutely correct.

Senator CHURCH. Now, the NATO defense line didn't stifle communism, that is to say, there are still Communist Parties existing behind the NATO defense line, the largest political party in Italy is Communist, and a very formidable Communist Party exists today in France, isn't that right?

Mr. KENNAN. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH. And the reason that we don't have, behind the NATO defense line, guerrilla wars in Western Europe, or so-called wars of national liberation in Western Europe, is because the economies there have revived, there is internal cohesion, there is strong majority support for democratic institutions in these countries. Isn't that the reason that communism has not come to prevail behind the NATO defense line in Western Europe?

Mr. KENNAN. Absolutely, and if I may add, also the fact that the peoples of these countries were willing to pick up and shoulder the burden of the load. They didn't look to an outside force to do the main job.

Senator CHURCH. In other words, we were able to join with them in a genuine collective defense.

Mr. KENNAN. Correct.

Senator CHURCH. Isn't it also true that when we intervened militarily in Europe, we intervened in a region where we shared with the Europeans a common culture, and a common civilization, and commonly held attitudes against communism?

Mr. KENNAN. This is absolutely right.

Senator CHURCH. Now, I think we have made no mistake so fundamental in American foreign policy than concluding that a design that was suitable for Europe would also be suitable for those regions of the world that have just thrust off European rule. We have failed

to take into account how very different the underlying situation is in Asia and in Africa, in the ex-colonial regions of the world.

Would you agree with that?

POLICY TOWARD EUROPE NOT EFFECTIVE IN ASIA

Mr. KENNAN. I couldn't be more strongly in agreement. At the time when the containment policy with relation to Europe was being thrashed out in a practical way, and that was the time when the Marshall plan was devised, we, in the policy planning staff of the Department of State, who had something to do with the Marshall plan, were pressed repeatedly, and sometimes by people here in Congress, to produce a similar plan for China, and for Asia; and we always resisted this, precisely for the reasons you have given, not because we did not want to see communism contained in Asia, but because we felt that the devices that were effective in Europe would not necessarily be effective here.

Senator CHURCH. May I suggest here that we just briefly review the basic conditions in Asia to contrast them with what we had to work with in Europe?

Isn't it true that in Asia and in Africa we have governments that are very unstable, having just been newly established, that we have popular aspirations for a better life that often outrun, by a considerable distance, the capacity of the new governments to fulfill. We have, in addition, a situation quite different with respect to popular attitudes toward communism, that is to say, would it be your judgment that, in these areas of the world, the people may be less concerned or less fearful or less opposed to communism, as such, than they are to imperialism or colonialism, which they have experienced for two centuries and which, with great sacrifice and oftentimes with great struggle, they have finally overthrown?

Mr. KENNAN. Oh, yes.

The power of these various semantic symbols is entirely different in Asia than it is in Europe. And not only that, but the Europeans have things to lose by communism, by a Communist form of rule, which the Asians are not conscious of having to lose.

ASIANS DON'T SHARE OUR SENSE OF FREEDOM

Senator CHURCH. They have freedom to lose, do they not, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. KENNAN. Precisely.

Senator CHURCH. Is there freedom, as we know freedom, in most of the countries of Asia and Africa today?

Mr. KENNAN. There is not. I recall reading only 2 days ago an article by one of our greatest authorities in this country on Chinese culture, in which he pointed out that the Chinese language has only one word which remotely resembles our word freedom, and that conveys the sense of license, of rather turbulent indiscipline.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that?

Mr. KENNAN. John Fairbanks.

Senator CHURCH. Now, in these countries which are mostly totalitarian, although we always include them in that phrase we use con-

stantly, the "Free World," isn't it true that change, if it is to come at all, will often have to come through violence, that is to say, through revolution, rather than through the process of free elections?

Mr. KENNAN. I am sure that this is inevitable in large parts of the world.

Senator CHURCH. Because most of these countries are simply not democratic enough to allow for peaceful change.

Mr. KENNAN. No.

Senator CHURCH. For a free and unviolent way to achieve change, isn't that so?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator Church, the free elections presuppose a certain state of mind in great masses of people.

We had the same problem again in the Russian intervention. Woodrow Wilson and other people hoped there might be some sort of elections in Russia; and they couldn't understand that this was a country so torn by violence, by terror, by fear, by the miserable experiences of the past, that no Russian would ever have trusted another Russian to open the ballots and read them fairly.

NEED FOR NEW POLICY IN UNDEVELOPED WORLD

Senator CHURCH. Then, Mr. Ambassador, apart from what happens in Vietnam—and you and I both hope that the best possible solution can be achieved there for our country—but apart from what happens in Vietnam, aren't we going to be facing a situation in this vast region of the undeveloped world fairly beset by revolutions for many years to come?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes. By violence of all sorts, I think.

Senator CHURCH. And don't you think, then, that we have to begin to devise a new policy for Asia and Africa?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. One not based upon the fixed concepts which were suitable for Europe, but designed to cope with the phenomena of revolution in the newly developing parts of the world?

Mr. KENNAN. I do, indeed.

Senator CHURCH. Do you think we have yet begun to develop that new policy?

Mr. KENNAN. No, I don't; and I think we find ourselves hampered in that by the slogans and the semantic symbols of the past. I wish we could drop all these things and look at these situations realistically. I think we could perhaps devise an approach to these problems, let's say, rather than a policy, which would be much more effective than the sort of talking we have been doing among ourselves in recent years.

Senator CHURCH. My time is up, Mr. Ambassador, but I just merely want to say that I agree with you. I think we are prisoners of the past, that we must break out of this old bondage if we are to fashion a policy that will effectively advance American interests in the volatile ex-colonial regions of the world.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record a speech made by Mr. Kennan at Princeton University on February 25,

1965, entitled "United States and Communist Giants." I had this speech placed in the Record on April 1, last.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The speech referred to follows:)

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMUNIST GIANTS

(By Hon. George F. Kennan, Walter E. Edge Lecture, Princeton University, Feb. 25, 1965)

When the invitation to deliver this lecture reached me, some months ago, and I was obliged, according to established custom, to select a title for a lecture I had not yet even thought about, the one selected was the one you see on the program this evening: "The United States and the Communist Giants." What I had in mind, in selecting this title, was a relatively detached and relaxed discourse on the nature of the three great powers: Russia, China, and the United States, at this historical juncture, an examination of their respective ideologies and the compulsions that most strongly affect their governments, and perhaps the hazarding of some speculative thoughts about how they all related to one another. Little did I realize that by the time the day for delivery of this lecture came around, the Vietnam situation would have brought precisely these relationships to such a state of cruciality as to make them a burning topic of the hour, and would threaten, in fact, to predetermine at any moment, perhaps even beyond the point of no return, the answers to the very questions I had thought to discuss. Things being this way, I hope you will forgive me if I dispense with all the customary academic and forensic preliminaries and proceed at once to the burden of the thesis I have to present.

I want first to ask you to note certain things about the nature and position, at this time, of our two major Communist adversaries. Let me take first the Soviet Union and recall to your minds certain features of this great political society which affect importantly its interests and reactions as a power on the world scene.

First of all, the Soviet regime is a Marxist regime which has now been in power for 47 years, and which has carried its country, during this period, to a fairly advanced, if rather uneven, state of industrial development. One of the things this means is that the weaknesses and contradictions of the Marxist doctrine have now had time to become not only visible but even embarrassingly evident in the experience of the Soviet State. Not only have they had time to become thus evident, but that relative state of industrial advancement to which the Soviet Union has now attained has made these weaknesses and contradictions all the more conspicuous; for insofar as Marxism, or even Marxism-Leninism, still has any relevance in our age, this relevance would be primarily, I should think, to the problems of societies in the same incipient stage of industrialization as was the Germany of Marx' time, or the Russia of Lenin's—societies in which the great problem was still that of the distribution of a scarce wealth among individuals, not the social employment of an abundant wealth to the benefit of an entire people. Aside from the fact that the Marxist doctrine has proved wholly inadequate as an approach to the problems of Russian agriculture, even its achievements in respect to the raising of the living standards of the so-called masses (a function which lay, after all, at the very basis of its claim to superiority as a social and political doctrine) compare unfavorably with those of the hated and despised free enterprise system of the West. All this means not only that the Soviet regime now faces very difficult decisions of domestic policy, in the effort to reconcile its Marxist principles to the demands of an advanced industrial society, but that it cannot easily refrain from looking westward both for trade and ideas. Outside the field of agriculture, where the Russians have a very specific problem partly inherited from the past, Russia's present problems and needs, economic and social, are much more similar to those of the advanced nations of the West than to those of the underdeveloped societies in which Moscow is politically so interested.

Second, Russia, looking back on these 47 years, faces a serious crisis of conscience arising out of the historic phenomenon of Stalinism and the role it played in the development of Soviet society. This is more than an academic problem; it has serious implications for policy today. The regime is in a difficult situation. It cannot fully condone the excesses of Stalinism without estranging vitally important segments of Soviet society, notably the intellectuals

and even certain echelons of the party membership, to whom the memories of Stalinism are humiliating and intolerable. But it also cannot fully condemn Stalinism, either; because to do so would be to destroy the myth of the party's infallibility and thus to provide justification for past movements of internal party opposition, as well as for present and future ones. This would mean opening up the party to a process of real democratization. But anything of this sort would involve the forfeiture of that monopolization of power in the name of an allegedly infallible party which has endured since Lenin's days; and for this, the present leaders are wholly unprepared. Out of this dilemma have come serious divisions of educated and authoritative opinion within Soviet society, notably between those who are affected by shame and doubt over the memory of Stalinism, and those who are more affected by anxiety over what would occur should the principles of Stalinism be entirely abandoned. And it is clear that the first of these attitudes—that of the people who cannot stomach the memory of Stalinism—is now associated with a general inability to tolerate the Stalinist pattern of intellectual regimentation. One has to do here with the breakthrough of a new curiosity, powerful and insistent: curiosity about the West, about Russia's own past, about all those areas of reality concerning which the regime has tried in the past to maintain artificial, rigid and often preposterous official myths. People who have this curiosity turn naturally to the West for its satisfaction. Where else could they turn? It is not that they are enthused over Western values and examples; very often they dislike these and reject them. But they want to know, nevertheless, about Western ideas and conditions; for they find them relevant to their own problems.

A similar influence, we ought to note, is brought to bear on the Soviet leaders by the Eastern European Communist regimes and the European Communist Parties in general. Not only would important elements in these regimes and parties be quite unwilling to see a complete return to Stalinism in the Soviet Union, but to them, too, it is important that intellectual, cultural, and economic contacts be furthered between the Communist countries and the West. Should the Moscow leaders go too far in the direction of a return to Stalinist internal practices, and should they, in particular, try to reimpose the Stalinist system of complete isolation from the West, they would run the risk of alienating these other regimes and parties to a degree which, particularly in the face of the existing disarray in the Communist world, could be very serious indeed.

Returning to the situation within Russia proper, we should not forget that all these divisive tendencies operate within a political system which has important constitutional defects. I cannot take time to describe these defects in detail. They lie largely in the clumsy arrangement of parallel bureaucracies of party and government, and above all in the fact that reasonable provision for the allotment and transfer of supreme personal power exists only in the constitution of the governmental apparatus, where power does not really reside, whereas the constitution of the party, where power does reside, affords no such arrangements and makes provision only for collective leadership. I assure you: these are dangerously imperfect arrangements for a great modern society. Their imperfection was concealed in earlier years only because the powerful personalities of Lenin and Stalin and, to a certain degree Khrushchev, were able to transcend them. In the absence of such personalities, they could easily lead at any time to serious troubles. Their importance is already such that the regime is unable to reconcile, on any basis other than that of delicate compromise, the deep division of outlook and opinion that now exists.

Now one more thing. The greatest results the Soviet Government has to show for all the sacrifices and sufferings it has required of the Soviet peoples over these 47 years are to be found in the industries, the cities, the physical installations it has constructed. The standard of living of the people and the power of the regime itself, are dependent on the continued existence and functioning of all this new plant and infrastructure. A nuclear war that resulted in the large-scale destruction of these things could wipe out at one blow the entire achievements of 47 years of Soviet socialism. Added to this, we have the fact that the Russian people have only the most horrible memories of past wars. Nobody in Russia wants another major war; and the regime has gone very far in assuring the people that it will not start one. All this means that not only does the Soviet regime have every conceivable selfish reason to wish to see a major war avoided, but it has committed itself seriously before its own people, much more seriously than is generally realized in our country, to do all in its power to avoid one.

For all these reasons, the Soviet leaders need both peace and reasonably good relations with Western countries, including outstandingly the United States. Not only do they need these things, but they can see, when they look westward alone, no compelling reason why it should not be possible to have them. The great outstanding problems in Russia's relations with the West are those of Germany and nuclear armaments. In both fields, the difficulties are obviously very great; but the respective positions are not logically irreconcilable, and eventual agreement seems not to be beyond the limits of possibility. Thus the attraction of better relations with the United States, as a force operating on the Soviet leadership, is not only something founded in the deeper requirements of Soviet society and in the self-interest of the regime, but is buttressed by the fact that its realization is theoretically conceivable, even in terms of the present situation.

On the other hand, Moscow is plainly faced today with Chinese pressures of the heaviest possible sort which run in precisely the opposite direction; which not only demand an immediate deterioration in Russia's relations with the West but obviously have as their concealed aim the provocation of actual hostilities between Russia and the West at the earliest possible moment. The Soviet leaders are well aware of this. They understand its dangers. They propose, I am sure, to resist these pressures to the best of their ability. But there is one area of world affairs where they are extremely vulnerable, where the Chinese have important tactical advantages, and where the Soviet leaders can be, and are being, pressed constantly into positions and actions that compromise their relations with the United States in particular. This is the area of the so-called anti-imperialist movement. What is involved here is the question of leadership among the various anti-Western and anti-American political forces now competing for ascendancy in the newer or less developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. To the extent these conflicts, these so-called anti-imperialist struggles, are highlighted before world opinion; to the extent they engage the attention of the great powers and become theaters and testing grounds of great-power rivalries; to the extent that it becomes impossible for the Soviet Union to ignore or remain aloof from them—Moscow sees no choice but to come down strongly on the anti-Western side, even at the cost of damage to its relations with leading Western countries.

One may well ask why this should be so—what importance these new countries have for Moscow that could justify so costly a reaction. I can give you only a partial answer, because I myself believe this reaction to be exaggerated, oversensitive, and not fully warranted even by the political self-interest of the Soviet regime. Nevertheless, to a certain extent one can see and understand, if not approve, its rationale.

In Europe and North America the Communist movement, as a dynamic advancing political force, is dead. If it has a future anywhere, it is in these developing areas and particularly in the new states, where firm political traditions and institutions have not yet formed; and here the possibilities, from Moscow's standpoint, lie less in the prospect of creating real Communist systems—for this, the prerequisites are lacking—than in the possibility of dominant influence being exerted from some Communist center over these inexperienced regimes, of their being developed as instruments of major Communist policy in the game of international politics. Moscow believes—Moscow is almost obliged by doctrinal conviction to believe—that these anti-Western forces, euphonically referred to as the anti-imperialist ones, are bound to be generally successful, politically, on the local scene, at least in the struggle against Western influences; and noting the fumbling, ineffective quality of our own responses, I must say I think they have some reason for this belief, insofar as it is we Americans who are primarily involved at the Western end. The great question, in their view, is: Which Communist center is to preside over these various victories and to reap the various fruits. To abandon this field of political contest, or even to neglect it, means, as they see it, to present it on a silver platter to the Chinese. For this, they are not prepared. Their foreign relations operate in three great areas: The world Communist movement, the underdeveloped and new nations, and the Western World. In the Communist movement, their position is already under heavy and effective Chinese attack. Their relations with the West, while valuable to them, cannot, at this historical juncture at any rate, be expected to carry the entire burden of their international position. A Soviet foreign policy based exclusively on relations with the West would practically undermine the rationale for the maintenance of Soviet power in Russia itself. Aside, therefore, from

the fact that they regard their governments of the new nations as their natural and traditional clients, the Soviet leaders cannot afford, for wider reasons, to stand aside from the struggle for predominance over them. Any such passivity could easily be made to look like indifference to the prospering of the Communist cause generally and would at once be exploited by the Chinese as a means of discrediting Soviet policy, and completing the destruction of Moscow's influence and leadership in the world Communist movement. And beyond that, it would risk the loss of access to this entire theater of international politics, where a continued Soviet presence could alone make the difference between effective Soviet participation in world affairs and a total and ruinous isolation.

In summary, then, we have before us, in the person of the Soviet leadership, a regime enmeshed in a veritable welter of contradictions and problems, internal and external; torn by conflicting compulsions it is unable to resolve or to contain except by the most delicate sort of political compromise; profoundly in need of peace; subject to strong compulsions toward better relations with the West; yet conscious of having an extremely sensitive flank in Asia and Africa which it can protect only at the expense of its relations with the West; walking a very narrow tightrope among these conflicting pressures; vacillating, weaving this way and that; responsive to the shifts in the world scene; its behavior, for this reason, in part the product of the way we ourselves play our hand and in this sense susceptible in some degree to our influence.

Compare this now with what we have before us when we look to the regime in Peiping. Here is a political entity still young to the experience of power. The country it controls is still in an early stage of industrial development. The directing of the Chinese economy by the regime still proceeds in an atmosphere analogous to that which existed in Russia in the early period of the so-called war communism. Primarily concerned, still, with the destruction of every form of opposition to itself, intellectual or spiritual, conscious or subconscious, the Peiping regime requires not war itself, in the physical sense, but the atmosphere of war: a state of tension and of alleged external danger, by which alone this sort of pressure can be justified. So much is the country still involved in the social upheaval occasioned by the transition to a Communist system that the contradictions of the Marxist ideology, as a blueprint for the administration of an advanced economy, have not yet had time to become fully apparent.

By the same token, Communist China has as yet no body of physical achievement comparable to that of Soviet Russia: no great fund of new industrial and urban and technological construction to be placed in jeopardy and to constitute a vulnerability in the case of nuclear war. Those interpretations which see Peiping as quite indifferent to nuclear destruction are certainly exaggerated; but the Chinese vulnerability to this kind of destruction is definitely less, and the apprehensions of its leaders presumably that much smaller, than in the case of the Soviet Union.

If there are imperfections in the constitutional setup of the Chinese Communists, which is quite possible, these are so to speak still inoperable and invisible behind the dominating personality of a single great revolutionary leader. And while Mao's regime, to be sure, yields little to that of Stalin in the rigorosity of its political and intellectual discipline, its authority has never assumed those truly pathological and nightmarish forms which characterized that of Stalin after 1934. For this and other reasons, the Peiping regime faces no such *crise de conscience* as that which racks Soviet officialdom and the Soviet intellectual world. I am sure there is plenty of curiosity among the Chinese about foreigners and about the world outside. But one sees no evidence of anything comparable to that combination of compelling doubt and curiosity—doubt about one's own revolutionary past and curiosity about the outside world which now so consumes the young people and the intellectuals of Russia. Here, national differences surely play an important part. The Russians have, traditionally, a species of love-hate complex toward the West. They feel obliged to react in many ways against the West; but it is absolutely essential to them that it be there to be reacted to. It is something to which they have to relate themselves, whether sympathetically or antagonistically. It would be hard, I think, for them to conceive of a world without it.

I see no evidence of anything quite comparable to this in China. China developed, over the centuries, as a far more self-sufficient civilization than did Russia. The decisive phase in Russia's intellectual and cultural development occurred in the 18th and 19th centuries, and it proceeded in close association with similar developments in the West. In China, this appears to be true only

in small measure; and there is abundant evidence that the shaking off of Western patterns and modes of thought, which Communist power has everywhere involved and demanded, has been far more drastic and effective in China than in the Soviet Union.

For all these reasons, we find in the case of China nothing comparable to those compulsions and interests that determine both Russia's need for peace and her need for better relations with Western countries. I do not doubt that over the long run the Chinese Communists, too, will experience a stronger sense of need for both these things. But as of today they have other and more urgent concerns.

Particularly is this true when it comes to relations with the United States. It must surely be apparent to the Chinese Communist leaders that better relations with this country would be conceivable, in present circumstances, only if they were to relinquish their demand for liquidation of the Chiang regime and for the total inclusion of Formosa into their political system. But so violent and insistent have been their pretensions in this respect that the abandonment of them would involve serious loss of prestige. Yet to them, prestige is of enormous importance, both for traditional psychological reasons and because it has to compensate for their relative military weakness: their deficiency, that is, in advanced forms of weaponry, their lack of amphibious power. Similar considerations present themselves, of course, with regard to Korea and Vietnam, not to mention Japan. In none of these places does Peiping have any idea of recognizing the legitimacy of the American presence; and the concessions it would have to make to stand any chance of real accommodation with the United States over these issues are ones quite irreconcilable, as things stand today, with that image of itself as the overriding, inspiring and organizing power of the eastern world which Peiping has so insistently cultivated and around which it has constructed the edifice of its international pretensions and ambitions.

Not only do the Chinese view accommodation with the United States as something conceivably purchasable only at an exorbitant price, but they see—I feel sure—no present necessity of paying price at all. The wickets on which they are today standing, which are those of incitement of distrust of American influence and hatred of the American presence among the populations locally affected, are not bad wickets. They are not very effective, thus far, in Japan and Formosa; but this, too, could change. Meanwhile, they are extremely effective in Vietnam; and if they yield there the success they are expected to yield, their effectiveness will certainly increase in other areas. Peiping not only sees at the moment little to be gained by accommodation with us, but sees a good deal to be gained, particularly from the standpoint of its own prestige, by the continuation of sharpest, most ruthless and unscrupulous sort of political attack against us. It may be true that this situation is partly the result of our own mistakes. There may be things we can do over the long run to alter it. There is very little we can do to alter it in the short term.

Now Communist China obviously has a compelling need for foreign capital on a vast scale, as a means to its own industrialization. Such assistance is, in fact, practically indispensable to any early realization of the dreams and plans of the regime in this respect, for the accumulation of the necessary capital from the indigenous resources would be a slow business. Theoretically, such capital could come either from the West, and outstandingly from the United States or from the Soviet Union. It would scarcely be available, however, from the Western side in adequate amounts except on terms which the Chinese leaders would view as unacceptable from the standpoint of their pride and their political independence. What the Chinese need, actually, are gifts, not loans, and very large gifts at that. Gifts in such amounts are not likely to be forthcoming from ideological adversaries. The Chinese have no choice, therefore, but to continue to center their hopes on Moscow. But transfers of capital from the Soviet Union to China on the requisite scale could take place only to the detriment of the development of the Soviet economy itself, and the Soviet leaders, as past experience has shown, can be brought to provide this kind of assistance only under compulsion; only, that is, if they are deprived of other alternatives. A tolerably good relationship with Western countries and particularly one which permits them to trade freely and extensively with the West, represents just such an alternative. So long as the Soviet leaders have this alternative, so long as they have this line to the West, they have bargaining power vis-a-vis the Chinese. In these circumstances there are limits beyond which the Chinese cannot push them, especially in the field of economic assistance, for the Russians are always in a position to turn to them and say: "Look here. Close association with you

is not the only way we can live. We have other possibilities. You may not be in a position to arrange your affairs with the West, and for this reason you may be dependent on us, but we are quite able to arrange our affairs with the West, and we are not dependent on you."

This explains, of course, the almost desperate intensity of the Chinese attack on the theory of coexistence, of the Chinese determination to disrupt Russia's relations with this country. For only if these relations can be disrupted; only if this alternative can be destroyed, can Russia be put into a position where it has no choice but to give Peiping what it wants, on Peiping's terms.

So much, then, for the Chinese position. Now let us try to take stock of these circumstances from the standpoint of U.S. interests.

We are confronted here with two great Communist powers. The attitude and behavior of the one; namely, the Chinese, with respect to ourselves is pretty well determined and predictable, at least for the immediate future. There is little we can do to influence it. The attitude and behavior of the other is still a variable, susceptible at least in part to influence by ourselves.

Two possibilities now present themselves. One is that our relationship with Moscow deteriorates; that Moscow, as a consequence, finds it necessary to hold more closely to Peiping, in order to compensate for the loss of its Western card; that Moscow then throws itself even more frantically and, having little to lose, even more recklessly and wholeheartedly, into the anti-imperialist struggle; heedless of the effect on Soviet-American relations, coming to regard as its major objective not the preservation of an effective balance between the Chinese and ourselves as factors in Russia's external situation, but rather: successful competition with the Chinese for leadership in the political struggle for our destruction. This alternative would not satisfy in all respects Chinese desiderata, for the Chinese-Soviet rivalry would continue to be operable in many forms. But it represents in general the direction in which the Chinese, as well as many neo-Stalinists in the Soviet Union would like to see Soviet policy move. It would militate for increased unity throughout the Communist bloc as well as for sharper and more uncompromising tactics toward the West. It would compound the effectiveness of the forces now marshaled against it. It is difficult to see what ultimate conclusion it could have other than a world war.

The other possibility is, of course, a continued improvement of Russia's relations with ourselves. This is one that would strengthen the hands of both powers with relation to the Chinese—the Russian hand, because the value of the Soviet alternative to the acceptance of Chinese pressures would be enhanced; our own hand, because the intensity of the forces ranged against us would be reduced and because Soviet interests might even work in many ways to reinforce our own position.

In drawing the picture of these alternatives, I should like to avoid the impression that they are absolutes. There is nothing I can conceive of, short of a world war, which could throw the Russians entirely into the Chinese camp. Conversely, any improvement in Russia's relations with the West should not be expected to go so far as to produce any total break with Peiping. What I am talking about here are tendencies rather than finalities; but they are tendencies of great importance, and the fact that neither would be likely to be carried to a point of absolute finality does not obviate the enormous significance that attaches to the choice between them.

We should recall at this point that the present unhappy state of our relations with China, hopelessly anchored as it appears to be in the circumstances of the moment, should not and must not be regarded as a final and permanent state of affairs. The Chinese are one of the world's great peoples, intelligent and industrious, endowed with enormous civilizing power and with formidable talents, cultural and otherwise. It is wholly unnatural that the relations between such a people and our own should be as they are today. Dismal as are the immediate prospects, we must look forward to the day when we come to terms in some way with the prevailing political forces on the Chinese mainland. This, however, like any other adjustment of international relations, will take bargaining and compromise; and if the final relationship is to be a sound one and to bear weight, both sides must have a reasonable bargaining power when they finally sit down to accommodate their differences. Only if the Soviet Union is kept in the running as an independent force in world affairs, enjoying and valuing a constructive relationship with the West and thus being not solely dependent on the Chinese connection and not helpless in the face of Chinese demands—only if these conditions prevail will we have a chance of working out

our long-term relationship to China on a basis reasonably satisfactory to ourselves. A well-ordered relationship with Moscow is in other words essential to the constructive and healthy adjustment of our long-term relations with China. If in place of the preservation and encouragement of Russia's independent role, we force the Russians back into a closer relation with the Chinese, or even into an intense and exclusive competition with the Chinese for leadership in the destruction of our world position, we will not only intensify the effectiveness of the forces ranged against us at this particular moment, but we will complicate greatly, and not to our own advantage, the problem of the eventual composition of our differences with both the Russians and the Chinese.

If this view be accepted, it becomes, as you see, an urgent requirement of American policy to ease in every proper and constructive way the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. This has nothing to do with fatuous one-sided concessions, designed to win gratitude on the Soviet side. As one of my Foreign Service colleagues used to say, you can't bank goodwill in Moscow; and I would be the last to advocate anything of that sort. But what you can do is to hold out to Moscow a plausible prospect of accommodation in those issues that are theoretically susceptible of solution in this way, and avoid the accenting of those that are not. This, as I see it, means serious effort on our part to provide a reasonable basis for accommodation in the great issues of Germany and of nuclear weapons control—in those issues, in other words, that affect primary the European theater and are central problems of Russia's relationship with the West; and at the same time to deemphasize wherever possible conflicts that fall under the Communist category of the anti-imperialist struggle, conflicts in the face of which Moscow, when its hand is forced, is bound to come down formally on the anti-American, if not the pro-Chinese side.

It does not appear to me that American policy of recent years stacks up very well in relation to this requirement. I have not seen the evidence that we have done all we could do to find agreement with the Soviet Union in matters of Germany and disarmament. Needless irritations, such as the captive nations resolution and various antiquated trade restrictions, are still permitted to impede the development of Soviet-American relations. And our present involvement in Vietnam is a classic example of the sort of situation we ought to avoid if we do not wish to provoke in Moscow precisely those reactions that are most adverse to our interests. It is largely as a consequence of these strategic errors that we find ourselves in the dangerous and unpromising position we occupy today.

It will be asked, of course, particularly in connection with the problem we now have on our hands in Vietnam, what else we could do than what we have done in situations of this sort. We cannot, it will be argued, simply walk away and fold our hands and watch such countries slide irrevocably into the Communist orbit.

I would be the last to generalize about such situations, or to suggest that a hands-off policy is everywhere possible and desirable. But there is one thing we might usefully bear in mind. The surest way to invite a strong and effective Communist involvement in situations of this nature is to involve ourselves heavily, particularly in a military way. Where we lay off, the road may be open, ostensibly, to Communist intrigue and penetration—it is usually open, no matter what we do—and there may well be takeovers by political forces that make a pretense of Marxist conviction and look to Moscow or Peiping for economic aid and political support. But this is not always so intolerable to our interests as we commonly suppose. The less we are in the picture, the less is there any excuse for actual military intervention on the part of the Communist powers, and the greater are the chances for rivalry between Moscow and Peiping for political predominance in the region concerned. But in the absence of a Communist military presence, and where the Chinese-Soviet rivalry exists, the local regimes, whether nominally Communist or otherwise, are almost bound to begin to act independently in many ways—to develop, in other words, Titoist tendencies. And this is not always the worst solution, from our standpoint. It is harder for either Moscow or Peiping to interfere extensively with a regime that calls itself Communist than with one that does not. And since we have not engaged our prestige extensively, the situation affords to the Communist powers no such opportunities for political gains at our expense as those the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists are now reaping in Vietnam.

I can think of nothing we need more, at this stage, than a readiness to relax, not to worry so much about these remote countries scattered across the southern crescent, to let them go their own way, not to regard their fate as our exclusive responsibility, to wait for them to come to us rather than our

fussing continually over them. The more we exert ourselves to protect them from communism, the less the exertion they are going to undertake themselves. We are not, after all, their keepers. They have in general much more to demand than they have to give. And others, even the Communists, are not apt to derive much more profit than we or former mother countries have derived in the past from the effort to keep them.

In the complexities of our international situation, the hour is late and the difficulties enormous. But it seems to me that I now detect in many quarters in this country voices inspired by an increasing awareness of the realities I have been discussing. It is still not too late to turn events in a more hopeful direction. If we will bear these overriding strategic considerations in mind—if we will be concerned to reduce to a minimum our existing conflicts with the Soviet Union and to extract ourselves at the earliest possible moment from involvements which leave that power no choice but to join Peiping in opposing us—if, in other words, we will opt for one great Communist opponent at this historical juncture rather than two, then I am hopeful that peace can be preserved; and I can see the possibility of international life beginning to move in that direction which is my own fondest dream and which I think should be a basic objective of American foreign policy, which is the eventual constructive ordering of our relations with both of these two great peoples now under Communist control, to whom we have so much to give, and from whom we have so much to receive.

Senator CLARK. I would also like to have an article published under Mr. Kennan's signature in the Washington Post on December 12, 1965, entitled "Our Push-Pull Dilemma in Vietnam."

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection so ordered.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1965]

OUR PUSH-PULL DILEMMA IN VIETNAM—AN AUTHORITY ON COMMUNISM SAYS
WE'RE LETTING THIS ONE AREA DISBALANCE WHOLE POLICY

(By George F. Kennan, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,
an authority on world communism)

There are, I am sure, many besides myself who would have preferred to remain silent in the face of a discussion so shrill and so confused as that which has resolved around the Vietnam problem in recent months. But the challenge advanced by the recent Freedom House statement "placing the onus on those who remain silent and fail to make clear the American consensus" is a fair one, and its authors can have no complaints if it is responded to, in this instance, by one whose voice not all of them always hear with sympathy.

Our adversaries in Vietnam are people for whose predilections and purposes no one in this country need have the faintest sympathy. Allowed to have their way, they would impose a ruthless dictatorship in any area under their control, and the experience of other Communist countries (leaving aside, for the moment, Yugoslavia) does not suggest that this would be followed by economic or social benefits remotely commensurate with the loss of liberty and the isolation from the world community this tyranny would involve. The young Americans who march around with Vietcong flags or profess to favor a Vietcong victory are choosing a very strange way to demonstrate an attachment to the cause of either independence or freedom, if this is indeed what they are interested in.

On the other hand, to recognize that this is so does not mean that it is necessarily the duty of the United States to set all this to rights. Understanding for democratic ideals is not widely spread among the human race. There are more instances of oppression and of the abuse of power in this world than the United States alone can ever hope to remedy, and some of them are closer to home than what transpires in Vietnam.

Nor is it clear to many of us that such Vietnamese as we might find to install in power in the unlikely event of a sweeping military success (for surely we would not wish to hold the country indefinitely under direct colonial administration) would be inclined, or even able, to rule with any markedly greater liberality.

A QUESTION OF HEGEMONY

The question we have really to ask ourselves when we think of the future of Vietnam are primarily two: first, to what extent a future Vietnamese regime would be likely to accept a status of subordination to one of the two great Communist powers and to represent an extension of its political and strategic power; and secondly, what would be the effect of the settlement on neighboring areas.

As to the first of these questions, it is unlikely, in the face of the Chinese-Soviet conflict, that even a Communist regime in any part of Vietnam would find it necessary or desirable, in normal circumstances, to subordinate itself entirely to either of the two great Communist powers. If Hanoi has today come into a one-sided and unhealthy relationship of dependence on Peiping, this is surely primarily the effect of the discipline exerted by the war itself.

In the event of a termination of hostilities, there would be neither necessity or advantage from the North Vietnamese standpoint in retaining this one-sided alinement. But for a smaller Communist country to attempt to preserve a balance in the relationship to the two great ones means, as we see from other examples, to exercise a high degree of independence in external relations generally. Thus, even in the event of a complete Vietcong victory (and I am not suggesting we settle for anything of this sort), the result would probably be something less than the automatic extension of Chinese power that many of us fear.

As to the second question, that of the reaction of other countries: this is of course a very serious consideration. Our Government is justified in citing it as a main reason why we could not contemplate any precipitate and disorderly withdrawal. But the elements of this "third country" problem have undergone important alteration as a result of recent events in Indonesia and probably in India and Pakistan as well. Our latitude of action would seem to be greater than it was when we first committed our forces in Vietnam on a serious scale.

OUR GREATER PROBLEMS

The most disturbing aspect of our involvement in Vietnam is its relationship to our interests and responsibilities in other areas of world affairs. Whatever justification this involvement might have had if Vietnam had been the only important problem, or even the outstanding problem, we faced in this world today, this not being the case, its present dimensions can only be said to represent a grievous disbalance of American policy.

For nearly a year now, we have sacrificed to this effort all serious possibility for improvement of our relations with the Soviet Union, with all this implies from the standpoint of the ultimate danger of nuclear war, and this we have done at a time when prospects for such improvement were otherwise not unfavorable. We have placed a great and deeply regrettable strain on the friendship and confidence of Japanese people.

A pall of discouragement has been cast over those responsible for the conduct of the work of the United Nations. Constructive treatment of the great problems of Germany, of nuclear disarmament, of the future of the United Nations and of China in the wider sense has everywhere been placed largely in abeyance in deference to this one remote involvement.

All of these problems are more important, for the long term, than what happens in Vietnam, and there is none of them that will be usefully met even by such further military successes as we may have in the Vietnam area—rather the contrary.

LOSS OF INITIATIVE

The effects of this unbalanced concentration of resources and attention on a single area of world affairs are unfortunate enough even as things stand today. They could be much more unfortunate if we were to be suddenly faced, as we easily could be, with a simultaneous crisis in another area where our interests are importantly engaged.

This being so, if we can now find nothing better to do than to embark upon a further open-ended increase in the level of our commitment simply because the alternatives seem humiliating and frustrating, one will have to ask whether we have not become enslaved to the dynamics of a single unmanageable situation—to the point where we have lost much of the power of initiative and control over our own policy, not just locally but on a world scale.

None of this should be taken as inferring that our Government has been guilty of obvious stupidities. At no time in the history of this whole unhappy affair have its choices been easy or obvious ones and the worst feature of the many violent demonstrations of opinion, pro and con, has been that they have been so vehemently suggested that they have been. Questions about past decisions, furthermore, are not answers to the problem we face at this particular moment.

On the other hand, it will not do for the administration simply to turn to its critics outside Government and say: "What would you suggest?" No one who is not privy to all the available information and who cannot give a larger proportion of his time to the study of public questions could make useful suggestions for specific action in a situation so vastly complicated as this.

The administration could perhaps get more help from public discussion if it could find less exalted and more meaningful terms in which to describe its own predicament. Public understanding is not aided by the demands that the North Vietnamese "cease their aggression" which fall so regularly from the lips of senior State Department officials.

We are not dealing here with established sovereign states, wholly separate and independent and accepted in the Western sense. The situation does not lend itself to classification under established concepts of international law.

Nor does it help us much to be told that our Government is determined "to live up to our commitments." Commitments to whom? To some South Vietnamese government? If so, to which one?

When and where did we assume the obligation to sacrifice to its defense the whole balance of our policy and the wider interests of world peace? And is this commitment conceived as something unrelated to its own performance, to its ability to command the confidence of its people?

BALANCE OF POWER

Or is it the people of Vietnam themselves to whom this commitment is conceived to relate? Obviously, their feelings cannot today be consulted in any orderly way. But can we be sure, on the basis of what we now know of their reactions, that to have this conflict continue to be fought out on their backs is really preferable in their eyes to the consequences of even the most unfortunate political settlement?

If, in short, what we are actually fighting over is the preservation of some balance of power in that part of the world, which is something about which we have every right to be concerned, let us then discuss the problem in those terms and not try to drape our action in legalisms and moralisms.

No one can question the thesis that a precipitate withdrawal representing the total capitulation of our entire position in that region, would be one of the worst of the alternatives before us. No one will deny that the other side is today wholly unresponsive to any and all suggestions for negotiation—particularly negotiation with us. I wonder, however, whether negotiation—particularly early negotiation between Hanoi and ourselves—is the only, or even the most promising, way out of this situation.

Prospects were never good, at any time, for agreement between the North Vietnamese and ourselves on any sort of publicly negotiated formal contract defining what political conditions should henceforth prevail in the disputed area. Hanoi cannot join us, the "imperialist," in publicly instructing the Vietcong, partially a South Vietnamese force, to be politically unsuccessful.

There would be a better chance of this situation's simmering down, through a series of reciprocal unilateral actions on the part of the main protagonists, to a point where it became somehow manageable, as so many other tense situations have done in recent years, than of its being resolved by contractual agreement between ourselves and one portion of the other side.

If we wish to develop this possibility of a simmering down (and it is, unhappily, the most promising of all the possibilities we face), then we must be prepared, it would seem, to let the talking be done for us, quite privately and without elbow joggings on our part, by our friends and others who have an interest in the termination of the conflict. And then we must be prepared, depending on such advice as we receive from them, to place limited restraints at some point on our military efforts, and to do so quietly and without published time limits or ultimatums, where we have reason to hope that such restraints will meet with adequate reciprocation from the other side.

UNLIKELIEST OUTCOME

No one can guarantee the success of even this approach, and there are many who, in the light of the pretentious terms in which our objectives have often been cast, would consider it inadequate even if successful. But it is hard to imagine anything better.

I would not know what "victory" means in these conditions. In this sort of a war, one controls what one can take and hold and police with ground forces; one does not control what one bombs. And it seems to me the most unlikely of all contingencies that anyone should come to us on his knees and inquire our terms, whatever the escalation of our effort.

If it be once accepted that in the present difficult situation the security of our own forces is the cardinal consideration, that it is better to hold smaller areas securely than to hold larger ones insecurely and that the immediate objective is not to bring the adversary to the negotiating table but to bring about a mutual lowering of the intensity of hostilities, then perhaps the advantage and disadvantages of such an approach will appear in a different light.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Kennan, are you generally familiar with that Princeton speech? I have it here.

Mr. KENNAN. I think I have it fairly well in mind although I can't always remember what I said.

Senator CLARK. Well, instead of quoting to you excerpts from it I am going to make the assumption that you remember it pretty well, and ask you to comment on this observation of mine.

GOAL OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: TO REACH DETENTE WITH SOVIET UNION

In my opinion, the major thrust of our American foreign policy today should be the most difficult task of arriving at an overall detente with the Soviet Union in the interests of world peace. I wonder if you would agree with that, and whether you would care to elaborate?

Mr. KENNAN. I agree very strongly with that, because I think that the greatest dangers to world peace still lie in the area of our relations with the Soviet Union. Not that I think that either of us wants a great war, but when you still have such unresolved problems as the continuing proliferation of nuclear weaponry, and the great outstanding difference over Germany, differences which are becoming after all potentially more explosive and dangerous from year to year as the military strength of the Western German Government increases—so long as you have those problems, I think that the most important questions we have to face lie in the field of our relations with the Soviet Union.

Senator CLARK. I take it, sir, that you would also be of the view that Russia's present problems and needs—economic and social—are not so different from our own and that such a detente would be in the realm of a very skillful diplomacy exercise over a considerable period of time.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, in the realm of a skillful but a very patient diplomacy. I don't think these successes are to be had at any early date. I think some sort of a resolution of the Vietnam conflict is a prerequisite for them. But I am not unhopeful about the long-term future of our relations with Russia.

May I just say there that I have never looked for any utopia in our relations with Russia. We are two great different nations in different situations in different parts of the globe. The relations between two such peoples are always complicated, and there always will be elements in which we do not see eye to eye. Furthermore certain tra-

ditional difference of approach to problems of international policy will always cause some difficulty.

But, when I look back on those days when the so-called containment policy was formed, it seems to me we have made a good deal of progress in our relations with Russia since that time, and that things are better than they were then. And this is a very important recognition, for if we could make that sort of progress over the past 20 years, I think there are possibilities that we could make similar progress over the next 20 years and we ought to cherish those possibilities.

Senator CLARK. You would agree, I take it, that the Soviet leaders—and, indeed, the Soviet people—need both peace and reasonably good relations with Western countries almost as much as we need the same from them.

Mr. KENNAN. They do, and I think they are conscious of that need.

COMMUNIST CHINA IN BELLIGERENT STAGE

Senator CLARK. Now, my understanding is that you feel the present situation in Communist China is somewhat different in that they are in the early stages of a revolution, a belligerent stage.

I wonder if you would state for the benefit of the committee what you think the capabilities and intentions of the Chinese Communists are with respect to the possibility of—in due course—arriving at a detente or an adjustment with us.

Mr. KENNAN. I think that at the moment the Chinese Communist leaders are in an extremely difficult and almost hysterical state of mind. They have had frustrations of one sort and another both internally and externally over the course of recent years.

I believe they are really weaker than they like to admit. They are very troubled by what does seem to them to be a sort of encirclement, and an exclusion for which admittedly they are themselves mainly to blame, from the counsels of the world.

But this puts them into a highly excitable and irritated state of mind, and I think there is very little opportunity of talking with them or dealing effectively with them today.

On the other hand, I do not feel that they have the capability to create much mischief beyond the Asian land mass. I am not really too terribly worried about the island territories of the Pacific. I think the Chinese Communists have suffered an enormous reverse in Indonesia, one of great significance, and one that does rather confine any realistic hopes they may have for the expansion of their authority confine them pretty much to the Asian landmass, most of which in east Asia they already occupy.

I think it will take a long time before we could deal with them effectively.

But meanwhile, I think that we should leave them alone. I don't think that it is necessary for us to or desirable for us to try to solve this vast problem by military means. I don't think it is susceptible to solution by military means any more than the problem of Vietnam is.

I am quite prepared to recognize that we face a great and serious problem in the cultivation by the Chinese Communists of a nuclear striking capacity. I don't wish to minimize that for a moment. But

I would prefer to see us tackle that problem, and approach it, by finding as soon as we can an acceptable ending to the conflict in Vietnam, and then pursuing with the Soviet Government, and even with the French, agreements which would permit us to bring the pressure of world opinion to bear a little more effectively on the Chinese.

Senator CLARK. With the ultimate hope that we could get into a meaningful dialog with them, as well as with the Russians?

CHANGE IN CHINA'S ATTITUDE INEVITABLE

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, with an ultimate hope that we could at least bring this terrible problem of nuclear weaponry under some measure of control. And then I think things will change in China, as they changed in Russia. They always do. A new generation of Chinese leaders will come. They could scarcely be worse in their attitude toward us than the present ones. And as I look back over the history of international affairs, it seems to me that the counsels of patience and restraint have been more effective as a general rule, than the counsels of violence and particularly the unleashing of unlimited violence.

Now, there has been great confusion sowed precisely in this respect by Hitler and the National Socialists; and no statement of this sort that you make can be without its exceptions. There are no universally valid generalizations here. There are, there can be, threats to the peace that have to be faced in the way that Hitler should have been faced. But, by and large, especially when one is dealing with conflicts which threaten to develop into great world conflicts on a scale that has never been known before in history, surely it is better to exhaust the counsels of patience and restraint before one plunges into the others.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kennan, I have long admired your thinking. I guess more than 20 years ago, as a junior departmental officer, I used to read your lucid reports—the most lucid and interesting we used to get—and afterward I followed you in middle Europe, and in a much more modest way was castigated by the Soviets, too, for my activities. I have followed your thinking all these years and I have spent most of my time in the Eastern European area when I was in the State Department, which is also the area of your specialization.

WAR WITH CHINA: GROUND WAR OR NUCLEAR WAR

Do you believe that the course of events we are following now in Vietnam—which seems inevitably to lead to a commitment of many more troops, steady escalation, the capability of erasing of Hanoi and Haiphong, and the placement of North Vietnam with the China—will lead to our fighting the Chinese on a man-to-man basis, or whether we will fight with nuclear weapons? Remembering the public response to the use of nuclear weapons at the time of Korea, do you believe the Soviet Union will feel compelled to retaliate, or will it stay out of that one?

Mr. KENNAN. If we do not resort to nuclear weapons, and merely get into a conflict on land between our forces and the Chinese Communist forces in southeast Asia, I should not think that the Soviet Union would intervene in any formal sense.

But, if nuclear weapons come to be used, I simply cannot predict the effects of world opinion, the effects on our own opinion, the cumulative quality of such a conflict. It could lead to anything. I am afraid that I can only say to you that the consequences of such a development are unpredictable. They could be anything. They could be an entrance of the Soviet Union into the war. I am afraid if it went to the bitter end we probably would create a situation in which the Soviet Union would be almost forced to come out against us in a strong military way, and whether that, again, would develop into a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and ourselves, I do not know. But this represents, all of it, a fringe of apocalyptic danger on which I should never like to see this country play, if you see what I mean. This is the edge of a precipice, of an abyss, and we ought never to get near this edge.

Senator PELL. To use another phrase, it is almost a brink.

Mr. KENNAN. It is indeed a brink, but in a terribly serious sense.

POSSIBILITY OF REUNIFICATION OF DIVIDED COUNTRIES

Senator PELL. With your experience as Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and looking ahead—as you did when you were in charge of the Policy Planning Staff and as Ambassador to Yugoslavia—if we look ahead 20 years, it would seem to me likely that all the countries that are now divided—Germany, Korea, Vietnam—one way or another—will probably be one country. On the basis of your experience in Yugoslavia, do you see any hope that there will eventually be a unified government in Vietnam?

I noticed in the testimony last week—in the questioning of General Gavin—this question came up. I was wondering if you saw this end as a possibility—looking way, way ahead when the present expansionist moves of Ho Chi Minh have died down.

Mr. KENNAN. It is an observation that ought to give us food for thought, that it was only a Communist, Tito, who succeeded really in uniting the Yugoslavs to this extent over the course of many years, and I don't know how else this could have been done. Of course in the case of Germany and of Korea, there are very complicated situations, because the interests of other great powers are extensively involved, and you don't get a fair test of what the ability of the country to unite itself would be if these outside pressures did not exist.

The tendency, of course, is toward national unification, wherever there is a sense of national identity. How much there is in Vietnam, I don't know. I am rather puzzled by the different things I read about this. I just don't know.

But I gather that these people think of themselves as something quite different from Chinese, and that there are strong nationalistic streaks in their outlook.

Senator PELL. I don't know either—and that is why I was hoping to develop this line of thought.

ARE WE PLANNING FAR ENOUGH AHEAD?

Finally, I was wondering if you felt that the Government is doing enough thinking ahead—20 or 30 years. When you started out with the Policy Planning Staff, it was designed to look ahead; you quickly got diverted to a series of crash projects.

Is there anyone in the Government today—to your knowledge, from where you sit at Princeton—any group of people who are looking at the world outside the United States as we want to see it in the year 2000? We are working hard in the Great Society domestically, but is there any group or any branch of the Government that is looking that far ahead internationally?

Mr. KENNAN. You know, I can't answer this problem. I simply am not familiar enough with what goes on in the Government these days. I am not living here.

You know, I think it is impossible to look usefully too far ahead in international affairs. It is too full of uncertainties. And my own feeling, after some years involved in the planning function there in Washington, was that perhaps the most important thing a government such as ours can have, as it faces the long-term future of international relations, is right principles rather than the gift of prophecy.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. We just have a moment.

I yield to the Senator from Minnesota before we recess.

QUESTION OF AVAILABILITY OF DATA ON VIETNAM

Senator McCARTHY. I will try to come back this afternoon, but I would like to ask this one question:

In your remarks, Mr. Kennan, you observed that there were a great deal of data available on this question which is not available to you. Do you really think in a case that is as public and as confused as this, there is really significant data which may be available to those who are closer to decision than you are or than we are—data which, if it were available, would significantly influence your position in this particular case?

Mr. KENNAN. In the strictly military field, yes, and to some extent in the political field, too.

Now, what I mean by this reply, Senator McCarthy, is that I am constantly being bewildered by reports in the press that seem to me to have contradictory implications. We are told one day that we could not possibly hold enclaves there in South Vietnam, and yet I see a statement in this morning's press to the effect that the South Vietnamese Government has decided to hold precisely such enclaves. One just doesn't know what to believe, and it is the same with political conditions.

Senator McCARTHY. Let me repeat: Do you think those closer to decision have such information or do you just hope that they have this information?

Mr. KENNAN. I hope they have, but I am not sure that there is any authoritative opinion about these questions, or correct opinion about them, even behind the scenes.

Senator McCARTHY. Passing your best judgment on this particular case, on the basis of what you know about it, and on the basis of your experience with similarly difficult and complex situations, would you conclude that there is likely to be a great gap between the data which the decisionmakers may have—those who are close to the decision—and the information which we have, or which you have?

Mr. KENNAN. Only perhaps when it comes to developments of the last 24 or 48 hours. In general, it seems to me that the public has access, if it wants to read it here, to press coverage which gives it a pretty good idea of what the situation is.

I think that anyone who wants to follow the situation attentively in the press can know most of what the Government knows which is relevant to a timespan of more than the last 24 or 48 hours. There is always the possibility of something might just have happened in the last few hours that they know about but we don't.

Senator McCARTHY. Then, if you go back beyond 48 hours as a basis for a judgment, we ought not to be frightened off by those who say if you knew what I know.

Mr. KENNAN. No, and if I put this disclaimer in to my statement here, it is because I have had friends who profess to a specialized knowledge of Vietnam, who have shouted me down very brutally and say, "You have no right to open your mouth about it. You have never been there, and you shouldn't have any ideas about it."

Senator McCARTHY. So you would only apply this limitation to about 48 hours.

Thank you very much.

Mr. KENNAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I recognize the Senator from Missouri, Mr. Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kennan, it is a great privilege to see you as always. As I understand it, unfortunately I could not be here all the time this morning, but I think I have had the benefit of listening to you, I was thinking, about 20 years.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE KENNAN—Resumed

Mr. KENNAN. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have changed your position with respect to containment, have you not?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I recognize there are things that I should have said in the article that I did not say. But I still consider that containment is better than war, both with regard to Russia and with regard to China.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Page 2 of your statement you say "it should be our Government's aim to liquidate this involvement just as soon as this can be done without inordinate damage to our own prestige or to the stability of con-

ditions in that area." Do you think we could leave that area at this time without that type and character of damage?

Mr. KENNAN. No, sir; not unilaterally, and not without some sort of a political compromise.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

MEANING OF "VICTORY" AND "WINNING"

On page 2 you talk about victory. You have, "great misgivings about any deliberate expansion of hostilities on our part directed to the achievement of something called "victory." Do you know anybody in the military, or the administration for that matter who has in their mind this question of victory as we have known it in the past, with respect to this Vietnam operation?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I have not talked to very many people down here. In fact I do not think I have talked to anyone in the administration or the military for many months. But I still see a great many references to our determination to win, and this is what I have reference to here. I do not know what the word "win" means in these circumstances, and I am not sure that whether we win or not in this sense is purely a matter of our determination. I think that it may be that we are undertaking things for which we do not have the suitable instruments and potentiality.

Senator SYMINGTON. If we had to have any determination you would rather see it be a determination of success than a determination to lose, would you not?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, Senator; if determination is what is going to define the outcome here. I naturally would. But I would like to see our determination first of all be to preserve the balance of the foreign policies of this Nation, to proceed in a prudent way with its resources and its manpower, and to show a very, very responsible attitude toward the effects of what we do on the prospects for world peace.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand. But you do not know anybody in the Government who is after a victory, as it was considered in the past, do you?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I see these words keep slipping through?

Senator SYMINGTON. From whom?

Mr. KENNAN. I would have to run the statements down, but it seems to me that repeatedly this phrase has been used—that this is a contest that we have to win.

Senator SYMINGTON. By whom?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I cannot name it now. I would be glad to look some of these things up and to give you the names afterward.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wish you would let the record show that I know of nobody in the administration who wants a victory as victory has been considered in the past. In fact I do not know of anybody who thinks we could have such a victory.

MEANING OF "STRATEGIC BOMBING"

On page 4 you say:

Yet we abuse that confidence and good will in the most serious way when we press the military struggle in Vietnam, and particularly when we press it by means of strategic bombing.

Would you define "strategic bombing"?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I had in mind here the bombing we are doing of North Vietnam with a view to interdicting the supply column, that sort of thing, as distinct from the tactical bombing that is directed toward forces opposing us on the battlefield.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you consider bombing a road strategic bombing?

Mr. KENNAN. If it is not related to the immediate tactical task, and relates to an area far away from the field of battle, I think I would.

Senator SYMINGTON. Suppose we discovered a truckload of arms and ammunition and soldiers going down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Would you consider that—if it was 150 or 200 miles away from our troops—would you consider trying to knock out those weapons and those soldiers in those trucks strategic bombing?

Mr. KENNAN. I believe I would, Senator, provided we could be pretty sure that what we were hitting was the truck and not a lot of other things.

Senator SYMINGTON. You would be opposed to that?

Mr. KENNAN. In this case not. But when it comes to bombings on such a scale that they are almost bound to bring a great deal of damage to civilian life, this is what worries me.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am not talking about what could be done, but about what is being done. Now we are bombing trucks on the Ho Chi Minh trail. Would you be opposed to that?

Mr. KENNAN. I think that if the clear relationship to our military operations can be demonstrated, it will not have as bad an effect on Japanese opinion as in other instances. This was the connotation in which I spoke of this here.

DIFFERENT CHARACTER OF BOMBINGS

Senator SYMINGTON. I spent several days in Japan last month. I must say, with great respect to you, sir, that I am not in entire agreement as to just what is our position in Japan today. But in any case what I am interested in is the type and character of air attack you think we could make; because, as I understand it, if you are opposed to this type and character of bombing, then you would want to wait until we got into hand-to-hand combat on the ground with no air attacks unless said attacks had direct connection with troops fighting in a particular locality; is that correct?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, certainly the use of air would enter into it long before we got into hand-to-hand contact, because if you admit its legitimacy with regard to tactical operations, you can carry it out over a very considerable area.

Senator SYMINGTON. Am I correct in the way I have stated your position with respect to bombing?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I realize there is no very fine and clear line that can be drawn here. My point is that the spectacle of us using enormous quantities of bombs against areas that will appear in the rest of Asia not to be very well equipped, perhaps, to defend themselves, at least the people themselves, against this sort of an attack, does a lot of damage to our reputation.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have heard, in other briefings, that it is estimated the number of American casualties in this war is about the same as the number of North Vietnamese casualties—it is estimated our bombing created in North Vietnam. Would not that figure tend to show that we have tried to be very careful not to kill or wound people in North Vietnam?

Mr. KENNAN. It would, and I have no doubt that this is the case. But unfortunately in this world, what things seem is often more important than what things are, and we stand under certain handicaps. Anything that a great big powerful white nation such as ours does is going to be interpreted to our disadvantage, if there is any way to do it. This is what I had in mind.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then, as I understand your position, even though trucks and buses are carrying soldiers and ammunition and guns to be used against our people and the South Vietnamese, and are run by oil and we could attack that oil in North Vietnam, under no circumstances would you attack the military target of petroleum?

Mr. KENNAN. I would not say under no circumstances, but I would think by and large we would be better off to avoid such bombing. I realize it is very hard to discuss such problems unless one is specific. There might be targets that were of such cruciality that military necessity would require it, but it seems to me on principle undesirable and—

Senator SYMINGTON. What oil targets would you consider we have the right to attack from the air?

Mr. KENNAN. You know, these are questions which, about which, I have never tried to define my position. I am not a military person. As I have already said, I think no one objects to the use of air with reasonable relation to the combat operations on the ground, and that can mean to a considerable degree beyond them. But when it comes to North Vietnam, I simply have my doubts; because I do not see that this type of operation has produced great results in the past, and it does seem to me that it has produced very important negative psychological effects on peoples further afield.

BOMBINGS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND NORTH KOREA COMPARED

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you see any difference in the way we are attacking from the air in South Vietnam and the way we attacked from the air in Korea?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, it seems to me that in Korea this was mostly in the category of tactical bombing but it also seems to me, looking at it from a distance and from a civilian point of view that it was extraordinarily unsuccessful.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think the bombing was comparable to the bombing in Korea?

Mr. KENNAN. A lot of it is.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you object to the bombing in Korea?

Mr. KENNAN. No; I did not, although I felt that its effects were overrated in advance. I mean the predictions that were made for it turned out to be highly exaggerated, I thought.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, those who believed in the right of air attacks against North Korea are, many of them, disturbed because

the target restrictions in North Vietnam are much more rigid than were target restrictions in Korea. That is the reason I asked you the question.

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I am not sure that the two situations are entirely comparable. We had much more of a regular confrontation of armies and a conventional military situation there in Korea. I simply point out the fact that these things are psychologically undesirable, and that if you strike a balance between the military results they might bring in and the damage they do to our reputation abroad, it seems to me from all I can read that this balance is not to our advantage when we go very far afield.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would ask one more question if I may. You say:

Our motives are widely misinterpreted; and the spectacle of Americans inflicting grievous injury on the lives of a poor and helpless people, and particularly a people of different race and color, no matter how warranted by military necessity or by the excesses of the adversary our operations may seem to us to be * * * this spectacle produces reactions among millions of people throughout the world profoundly detrimental to the image we would like them to hold of this country.

Do you not feel that there is some right to consider also the poor and helpless people of South Vietnam that the Vietcong are chopping up in the villages, 3,000 of their leaders last year.

Mr. KENNAN. I have no brief to hold for the Vietcong here, and as I have said, I do not think these judgments are even fair to us. But I think that this is the way the world is. I think a country of our strength is forgiven less than these fellows are forgiven.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kennan, it is very good to welcome a constituent to the committee.

Mr. KENNAN. I appreciate that.

Senator CASE. I may say we in New Jersey are very proud of you.

There are two lines of questioning that I would like to explore with you a little bit, and I hope you will do most of the talking.

MEANING OF "AGGRESSION"

I take it that one of our problems here is that we are facing a kind of aggression which is not so easy to recognize and not so clear perhaps—what the Communist Chinese particularly call wars of national liberation—in contrast to the kind of aggression where armies mobilize along a frontier and then cross and physically occupy foreign territory.

Now, I take it you do not disagree that the former, that is the kind we face now, is just as much aggression as the latter; is that correct?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator Case, I think the use of the word "aggression" with regard to what we are facing today in Vietnam is confusing. I think that this present conflict has so complicated a background, so long a background, so much of it does result from things that have happened within South Vietnam, and not outside of it—and not only that, but the border between North and South Vietnam is of a curious quality. It was not meant originally to be a border between states. All these things seem to me to indicate that when one uses the term "aggression" as some of the people in our own Govern-

ment have been using it, one confuses the issue. This is, of course, in part, the invasion of one country, if one wants to describe it that way, by forces of another country, although all of these things involve stretching of terms. But in any case, it is not just that. It is also a civil conflict within South Vietnam, and one of great seriousness. I do not think that we can afford to delude ourselves that the Vietcong are simply an external force or a force that would not exist if there were not external encouragement. They might not be so strong, but all accounts indicate that they were fairly strong years ago, before they had this help from the North Vietnamese.

Senator CASE. Well, this, as applied to this particular area and this particular situation, is a question basically of fact.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator CASE. You would not disagree that there can be as serious aggression by means of bribery, by means of terror, by means of other use of native dissident elements as there has been historically by crossing another country's border with your troops.

Mr. KENNAN. I would certainly agree that the effects can be no less serious and final and that this presents a great problem. But I think we ought to be careful to identify it, insofar as it is that, as a question of internal unrest and insubordination rather than a question of external attack.

Senator CASE. Well, I appreciate that distinction.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

ORIGINS OF THE VIETCONG

Senator CASE. I agree we we must attempt to define it.

I take it you disagree rather sharply with what Under Secretary of State Ball said recently in his Northwestern University speech, that North Vietnam and Hanoi systematically created the Vietcong forces in matters of their equipment, in the guerrilla war and supporting that war on a day-to-day basis, and that the National Liberation Front is purely a fictitious organization created by Hanoi to reinforce a fiction, namely that it is the legitimate spokesman for the people of South Vietnam.

You disagree basically with that.

Mr. KENNAN. This is not the impression I have. I have the impression this is something that has existed for quite a time there in the south, and probably has, regardless of the means, no doubt undemocratic means, by which it was obtained, a considerable degree of what you could call support among the population.

By "support," too, I would not wish to be misunderstood. This may not be sympathy with the political aims even; there are many reactions on the part of people that call upon them and bring them to support this sort of force. Many other things enter in there.

Senator CASE. I remember—of course you know much more about it than I do—but I remember from my rather slight touch with it after the war, in West Germany there was very great concern that Germany was going to be Communist very soon and great timidity on the part of the people there who had no interest in communism but took care not to make their Western sympathies at all obvious.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator CASE. For this very reason, so this kind of thing can happen, and it is a technique which is embraced within the term "war

of liberation," and is the kind of thing we have got to find ways of dealing with.

Mr. KENNAN. That is correct. And, Senator, I would like to say I have great sympathy on the way you have described this. On many occasions, talking with Russian Communists, I have tried to impress upon them that this type of thing—stimulating and encouraging and organizing rebellious minorities within another country and seizing power through them, could be just as much a matter of real aggression as anything else.

Senator CASE. And requires whatever resistance we can apply to it within reasonable limits.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes. But one always has to bear in mind that there is usually in these situations some ingredient of real local injustice out of which these people profit, so that it is never just a clear case of some outsider going in and doing some sort of a magic transformation, as I said this morning, in people and making Communists out of them. There is usually something on which they can work, which is an indigenous situation, and for this reason it is always confused.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I may have some minutes more, but I am being called to the floor to make a speech before the Senate adjourns, and if I may, I would like to reserve the right to come back and finish the last 2 or 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator SPARKMAN?

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Kennan, I am sorry I was not able to be here this morning and missed your testimony, in which I am sure you must have brought out many of the things going through the minds of all of us.

I want to say to you, sir, that I have always had a very high regard for your opinions. I followed them down through the years, even back in the early days of containment.

CONTAINING VIETNAM

You have referred to it here. How can we contain in Vietnam?

Mr. KENNAN. Of course the answer to that depends on whether one is talking about the long term or the short term. Our intervention there has created conditions which affect this question very vitally today, but which would not be applicable over the long term.

LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

If you are talking about the long terms, I sometimes think that we would do better at any rate than we have proven able to do in the past when it comes to situations of this sort, although there are no two of them alike of course, but we would do better if we really would show ourselves a little more relaxed and less terrified of what happens in certain of the smaller countries of Asia and Africa, and not jump around like an elephant frightened by a mouse every time these things occur.

It is my feeling that no one is going to be able to draw blood from a stone, and no one is going to make much more out of these territories than what is in them. I do not think that even the Communists, in

most instances, are going to do anything with these territories that is necessarily going to be as tragic as we think.

I think sometimes we make the problem worse than it is by the size of our own alarm and jitteriness. We are a very great power, and we could absorb probably more of this sort of thing than one thinks. Other peoples have their troubles, too; and sometimes a bit of jiu-jitsu—letting the other fellow fall on his face—might not be the worst way of dealing with certain of these problems.

A great many Americans are concerned, for example, about Castro in Cuba, and at times they have had good reason to be, and I do not for a moment underestimate the seriousness of the crisis we faced there some years ago. But it does seem to me that we must carefully stack up our advantages against our disadvantages in these situations. For the first time in a long, long time, someone else is paying the bills in Cuba, someone else is getting milked, someone else has the problems of dealing with the Cuban regime. For once we can sit by. And personally I do not think that the Russians are going to have any great satisfaction out of their involvement in Cuba over the long run. I think they will liquidate it by themselves in the course of time.

I only cite this as an example to show that very often the situation will tolerate more than we think it would, and by our interference we raise questions of prestige which need not have been raised, and which give to these events, sometimes, an unfavorable quality from our standpoint that they would not otherwise have attained.

Now, of course, what I have just said is relevant only to the long-term problems of containment in certain areas, and with relation to certain countries. It does not relate to the situation we have before us today in Vietnam, where we have created an entirely different set of considerations through our intervention.

I do not know whether this is responsive and helpful with regard to your question. It is all I can say, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me, in all frankness, that your answer relates to a time that is in the past rather than in the present, is that not true?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, but possible to a time that is in the future, too, because South Vietnam is not the only country where things of this sort could happen.

IMMEDIATE INTERESTS IN VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course right now we are confronted with a very difficult problem. I am sure you recognize that fact. We have our men in Vietnam. We are involved there. There is a situation that prevails. I do not see how we can adopt these calm attitudes and so forth at this point of the game.

So, what I had in mind was if we do adhere to the principle of containment and want to practice it, what are the things that we do at this point?

Mr. KENNAN. My answer to this would be that we try to establish in South Vietnam some position, militarily, that we can be fairly sure of holding over a long period of time, with due regard to the security of our own forces, and that having established that, we do not try to expand this conflict, but rather give things a chance to simmer down,

and let other people who are interested in the resolution of this conflict see what they can do in trying to find some sort of a compromise solution.

I do not think that we can hope in the present circumstances to negotiate any such solution ourselves. I think it will have to be done by other people, and when the proposals have been made, we will have to decide whether we can accept them or whether we cannot.

As of today, I think the chances for any such compromise solution are very poor. But I think time might change that, and my concern at the moment is that we should consolidate our existing presence in South Vietnam in some such way that we can be sure of holding it without great danger to our forces.

I believe, Senator, that we have now done something which is very important, and which perhaps had to be done at some stage, if we were ever to find our way out of this difficulty, and this is to demonstrate the seriousness of our purpose there. I think no one doubts that any more today, and this is the positive side of an effort over the past year which has had many negative sides, too. But having demonstrated that seriousness, I think we do not need at this time to go further. I would like to see us try to stabilize as much as we can the situation that exists today, to make it clear to these people that they cannot kick us out of there, and that at some point they are going to have to talk to us, if they want us to get out of there. Once they digest this lesson, I think we may be on the road toward an acceptable resolution of this whole miserable problem. This will not be a resolution which will, I am afraid, contain any triumphs for us or any great satisfactions. This is not the kind of situation it is.

ELEMENTS OF A SATISFACTORY PEACEFUL SOLUTION

Senator SPARKMAN. In your statement you refer to a satisfactory peaceful resolution of the conflict, and you have referred to it here. Could you state to us what the elements of such a settlement would be?

Mr. KENNAN. They are not entirely visible to me today, I must admit that. And I am only hoping that perhaps the future would reveal them, because I have seen other cases in the past where solutions which were not visible at one time proved to be possible at another.

But it would seem to me that eventually there must be some sort of a political compromise between the various factions involved in South Vietnam. And I am afraid that others, as I say, are going to have to work this out—and the South Vietnamese themselves. There are a number of factions there. It is not just the Vietcong and their opponents. There are Catholics, there are Buddhists, there are Montagnards, there are a lot of people who have fingers in that pie. And at some point, perhaps, they, who I must say are rarely lacking in political resourcefulness when they want to do something, may cook up compromises which today look impossible to us.

I do not think that anything of this sort can occur in the present atmosphere of sharp conflict and great nervousness on both sides, and this is why I would like to see things quiet down.

I have seen a number of other international situations which looked hopeless at one moment but looked better after one has simply halted

the violence for a few months. Things always change and pressures and impulses break through, then, which cannot break through in a highly militant and excited atmosphere.

Now this may sound like a poor suggestion, and no doubt it is in many respects. It certainly contains no great glory for us. But I am measuring it against the two alternatives, one of which would be to launch ourselves in a growing involvement of unlimited dimensions in a part of the world that is very unfavorable to us, and the other would be to get out in a disorderly and abrupt and unilateral fashion, presenting our adversaries with a gratuitous prestige victory, I do not favor either of those alternatives. This is all I can see to do.

RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. What is your conception as to the involvement of Russia in this situation? You are a longtime expert on Russia.

Mr. KENNAN. The Russians are involved primarily through their fear of the very violent and destructive criticisms that are being raised against them by the Chinese. The Russians are, after all, Communists. They are committed to an ideology which looks very out of date and very unconvincing to me but to which they are committed by the whole past history of their party. This ideology also has its own semantic symbols and fetishes. One of them is imperialism, and the Russians do not want to appear before the world public and particularly before the public of the Communist nations in any guise that can permit the Chinese to say, "You are the running dogs of American imperialism. You are doing the work of the Americans."

For this reason the Russians are very concerned to show themselves strongly against us in this conflict. And they are concerned to demonstrate that they are giving all the help they could reasonably be expected to give to the North Vietnamese. However, the Soviet Government has many irons in the fire. It has a great variety of interests. It is a world power. It has to think in terms of East and West. And it would be my judgment that it hopes that this conflict can be resolved peacefully and in the not-too-distant future.

I was asked, if I may just say this, this morning, why the Soviet Union opposed the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. This is a difficult question to answer. I can give no complete answer to it. But I think it is simply, at this point, fear of Chinese criticism if they should do it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Aiken?

"COMMITMENTS" AND "OBLIGATIONS"

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Kennan, usually when the executive branch discusses this matter with us they refer to our commitment. I notice you use the words both commitment and obligations. Do you make a distinction between an obligation and a commitment?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I don't make much of a distinction here. An obligation, I conceive as being to some other party. A commitment, of course, can be to ourselves in a way, but that should be specified.

I have used the terms interchangeably, I think, in this statement.

Senator AIKEN. Couldn't we have a moral obligation to assist oppressed people to the best of our ability, without having the obligation to make a commitment to them?

Mr. KENNAN. I am sure that this is conceivable. It is a subjective question. But I myself feel that any moral obligation that we have toward the strengthening of the liberties of other people is a very indirect one, and exists only in the degree in which it was defined by the statement from John Quincy Adams which I quoted at the end of my remarks this morning. We owe them a debt of sympathy, if what they are really after is their liberties, which is another question, because remember that practically everybody who wants our aid in the world claims that he wants it in the cause of freedom. This is not always the case. In many instances these words are taken in vain by people simply because they think they will appeal to us.

How interested the South Vietnamese regime really is in freedom in our sense is something which I do not know. I cannot speak to this, you see.

Senator AIKEN. I have felt that we had a moral obligation to help the people of South Vietnam, but that did not necessarily mean that we must enter into a commitment to do our utmost. Assuming that we do have a commitment there would you say there is any point beyond which we should not go in meeting that commitment? I think I should ask the Secretary of State or somebody else that question.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. But I think it is a very good question.

Is there a point beyond which we should not go or does it imply that our total manpower and other resources are involved in that commitment?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I cannot imagine that anyone with any degree of responsible concern for the fortunes of the people of this country could ever have given to any foreign political authority an unlimited claim on our resources and our manpower. I just do not see how this is conceivable.

There are a great many countries in the world besides Vietnam, and we have many other obligations and responsibilities, and it seems to me out of the question that we should assume any such obligation toward anyone else or feel that we had it even in a moral sense.

After all, our first duty is to ourselves and to the life of our own people here, and to their prosperity, and I would be strongly averse to, I would fight with every fiber of my own being against, the suggestion that we should ever give to any foreign political authority anything in the nature of an indefinite claim on the resources of this country.

Senator AIKEN. Our total resources.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES AND COMMITMENTS

I notice in your formal statement this morning you say, "I do fail to understand how it is possible for us to enter into any such commitment otherwise than through the constitutional processes which were meant to come into play when even commitments of lesser import than this were undertaken."

That recalls what someone has said, told me recently and I have no knowledge of whether it is true or not, that at Munich that Chamberlain failed to—that he bypassed the processes that were provided for in the British Constitution and made decisions by himself. Do you know anything about that? Of course it may not have anything to do with this at all.

Mr. KENNAN. I can't judge it from the British standpoint of British constitutional law, which is quite different from ours.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. KENNAN. But I think perhaps the same principle is involved.

What I meant to say here is that I may have missed something but it seems to me that, no doubt without deliberate intent, and probably with the most worthy of intentions, we have nevertheless involved ourselves here in a situation which, according to the consensus of the Fathers of our Constitution, would certainly have called for a great national debate and a very solemn decision in the Senate as well as in the executive branch. I am not aware that this has taken place. And for this reason I always find myself caught up short when I see the way that this struggle is often referred to today in our public debates: people talk about our living up to our "commitments," and say we must fulfill our "commitments" to these people.

Well, these commitments, as we now interpret them, go very far indeed. They go, as I pointed out here, further than the normal military alliance. To commit yourself, in any way, to assure the internal security of another government, means to commit yourself to interference in the most vital process of its own internal political life, and this seems to me a commitment of such seriousness that it should not be lightly or casually slipped into. This is what I meant to say.

Senator AIKEN. I would think that to commit ourselves without limitation—

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator AIKEN (continuing). Is certainly a pretty heavy responsibility for anyone to assume, particularly when processes are provided for for senatorial advice and consent. I think it well to remind ourselves frequently that these processes are provided for by our own Constitution and our laws, and trust that anyone carrying the responsibility will remember it.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case, I believe you have 3 or 4 minutes left of your time, if you would like to take it now.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are most kind.

U.S. RESPONSIBILITY AS A WORLD POWER

What I had in mind was your thoughts about the extent to which we have a responsibility in the world for world peace, the extent to which in the absence of world order run by law with courts and a system of enforcing court orders, this country has to act as Britain once did and other countries perhaps earlier?

Now, the other side of the coin, I suppose, would be to say we have no function, no responsibility in this matter at all. So long as our immediate security is not involved we can wash our hands of the world. Do you move in this direction in your thinking?

I wish you would try to assess our responsibility as a world power, the greatest, perhaps, certainly on the free world side, in the world today.

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, that question goes very deep, and it puts me in a sense on the defensive because I find that—

Senator CASE. It isn't intended to at all.

Mr. KENNAN. Now, that I am beyond the barrier of 60 years I find myself with more and more sympathy for the concepts of foreign policy that prevailed in this country in an earlier time; I find myself, if you will, in many respects sort of a neo-isolationist.

Senator CASE. You know, this may be catching. I am past the barrier, too. [Laughter.]

Mr. KENNAN. What I would say is simply this: I think we have an enormous responsibility with regard to world peace. We are in many important respects the most powerful nation in the world. There certainly is no nation which, if its affairs are handled prudently and well and thoughtfully, can contribute more than we can to preserving the peace of the world.

I do think, though, what we have to bear in mind here mainly is preserving the peace between the great powers, hostilities among whom might really have appalling effects for the world at large and set our entire civilization back by goodness knows how much.

I do not have any illusions that we can stop all violence everywhere in the world. I think that the slogan which Litvinov, the Soviet foreign affairs commissar, used to mouth so frequently in the 1930's—that "peace is indivisible"—is not correct; it is in fact a horrendous doctrine. Men have always fought; they are always going to. We must hope now that the great powers such as ourselves and Russia are aware of the fact that the weapons in our hands are of such terribleness that we cannot afford to fight any more. And I think we are coming to this realization, to the realization that what we have in our hands is so terrible that we cannot afford the luxury of settling affairs with each other the way people have traditionally settled them all through human history.

But there are a great many new nations, small nations, nations with inexperienced governments, nations with shallow traditions of national life dotted all around this world. Believe me, they are going to fight with each other. And it seems to me that our role here as a great power must be to try to isolate, to moderate these conflicts, to settle them as quickly and as easily as we can, not to worry too much about the issues, because there will be right and wrong on both sides, but to try to keep these local conflicts from doing great damage to world peace.

Now, the problem we face with relation to Vietnam today is how do we best serve world peace at this moment? Do we serve it best by increasing the measure of our involvement in Vietnam? By trying to root out the Vietcong by fire and sword? By increasing the intensity of this conflict in a single area, to neglect, I must say, of our world responsibilities, our responsibilities in other areas? Or do we serve it better by trying as best we can, to bring about some sort of a resolution of the fighting in Vietnam and applying ourselves then once more, imaginatively and courageously and enthusiastically, to the solution of the great, really great, and fateful problems that we still have outstanding with the Soviet Union?

There, as I see it, is the question, and my own answer would be that it is the last. I understand that people can differ about this.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Case.

Mr. Kennan, there are one or two questions I would like to pursue.

One of these is not necessarily directly on the subject of your previous testimony.

ARE THE HEARINGS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?

There has been some criticism of this committee for holding these hearings at all. It has been said that we are giving aid and comfort to our enemies. You are very familiar with the Communists, and you are very familiar with this whole scene. Do you feel these hearings, not only yourself today but with General Gavin and others, are in the public interest or not?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I am aware that no one sitting in this seat and testifying before your committee can suppose that his observations are purely detached and that they do not affect the situation to which they relate. To talk about this situation at all, even as an outside observer who doesn't live in Washington, is today a responsible act, and must affect the situation itself in some ways. I can assure you that it is not a pleasure for me to sit here and to say things which I know are going to be taken in some respects as critical or skeptical of the wisdom of our present policies. I know that there are people who are going to come up and say that "you have made the situation worse by the things you have said, and you have made it harder for us than it would have otherwise been to achieve a solution in Vietnam."

But is my conviction that the implications of this involvement, the complications to which it may lead, are of such magnitude that we should not wander into them without the widest, most serious, most responsible, and most searching sort of a public debate—a responsible debate—in the legislative branch of our Government. And while it may be undesirable in some respects that other people listen in, I think it is far more important that this debate take place, even if it has these undesirable side effects, than that we move into such realms of danger without it.

It seems to me absolutely essential to the continued successful functioning of our kind of a democracy that we talk things out in the most serious and responsible way.

Now, I have not participated in any demonstrations about Vietnam, I haven't even been in any teach-ins or anything like that. But asked to speak on such an occasion, I think that I have to give you my honest opinion, and I hope that it is useful. It is my strong impression that it is not only useful but it is essential, indispensable in fact, to the workings of our democratic system that there be this sort of a discussion, and that the people listen in and draw their own conclusions.

EFFECT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ON U.S. COMMITMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think, Mr. Kennan, if we should be able to have negotiations and reach a conclusion which is not happy or

satisfactory, but nevertheless is tolerable, that this could reasonably be considered as a betrayal of this commitment to the South Vietnamese?

This is an odd question. It grows out of these recent meetings in Honolulu, and it is perhaps an easier way—

Senator GORE. Would you restate that question?

The CHAIRMAN. It wasn't very well stated. Perhaps the best way to put it is, what do you think of the reports of the recent meeting in Honolulu? The reason they bother me is that we have further committed ourselves to a point where any kind of negotiated settlement short of what is called victory would be considered a betrayal of our commitments. This is what bothers me. I wonder if you could comment on that?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, of course, this is what you often hear and read. I read a column just a day or two ago in which even the idea of trying to defend enclaves was described as a betrayal of our South Vietnamese allies or associates.

There are a number of things to say about this. It seems to me, first of all, that the South Vietnamese have had a tremendous amount of aid from this country already, an amount which we would never be able to give in equal measure to any great number of countries abroad if they were to ask it of us, because we simply don't have resources in that magnitude.

Now, the aid we are giving them and the situation we have with relations to them today in South Vietnam is not just our doing. They asked for it. They wanted us to do this. They wanted us to come in. They wanted us to help them. They must surely have been aware that this could not constitute a blank check on all the resources and all the manpower of the United States, that there must be limits to what we could afford to give to any one situation of this sort and to any one foreign political authority. And I would say this: that I should think that even though our aid to them were to stop today, which I am not advocating, but even though it were, I think they would have had about 10 times as much from this country as anybody has any right to feel that he has a right to, if you can understand that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I do understand it.

In other words, the short answer to the first thought I had is that a settlement which is acceptable to us—and I am sure it would be a settlement with honor, could never be considered as a betrayal of our commitment—such as they are.

I must say I am very unhappy about this word "commitments." You have mentioned it; you already have discussed it so I won't go over it again. The nature of the commitment seems to me to be less than clear, and not one in which the country as a whole played a very important part and I doubt very seriously today if the country understands it.

THE HONOLULU PARLEY

In this morning's paper I read just one paragraph, reporting on the Honolulu parley. It says:

The solid support given the leaders of South Vietnam by President Johnson in their Honolulu meeting strikes many officials and diplomats here—

This is at the United Nations—

as a barrier to a negotiated settlement of the war.

This is what gave thought to this. This is an article by Drew Middleton in the New York Times. One other sentence reads:

They reason that * * * the increased involvement of the United States in the country's economic, educational, and social program, has removed any prospect of forming a more broadly based government with which North Vietnam might be willing to negotiate.

This bothers me very much because it seems we may have a further obstacle to a negotiated settlement. The article goes on:

The majority view was that the agreements solidified the United States-South Vietnam alliance and would lengthen and expand the war.

This is reporting upon the effect of the Honolulu meeting among the delegates in the United Nations.

Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. KENNAN. This checks, I must say, entirely with my own opinion. It does seem to me that if we had wanted to develop to the utmost the prospects for a peaceful solution of this conflict, the first thing we should have been concerned to do at this time was to retain the independence of our position and not to get it any more closely associated than it has to be with that of another political authority which shares only in part our interest and our aspirations.

Now, I have no doubt that the South Vietnamese in some respects deserve our sympathy, and I don't want to speak about them in an unsympathetic way. But they have their own axes to grind. These are not the same as ours. I doubt that their aspirations would check entirely with ours. And I must say that it gives me a very, very uneasy feeling to read the joint declaration to which we subscribed the other day with them there in Honolulu.

GENERAL EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS

I understand the motives that enter into it. I realize that the sentiments expressed in this declaration are very commendable ones from our point of view, and that the right words were used. But I am a historian of sorts, and I—perhaps my memory goes back too far, but it seems to me—that this is where we came in many years ago in other situations.

I can recall Secretary of State Hay getting the European powers to sign up to declarations of high virtuousness of intent in the open-door crisis in 1898, declarations which didn't affect their behavior, nor, I may say, ours, very deeply in the succeeding years.

I can remember, for example, some of our good allies during the period of the Russian intervention—

The CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Mr. KENNAN. 1918, 1919, this specific incident was, during the Peace Conference—some of our allies persuading Admiral Kolchak, the head of the anti-Communist forces in Siberia, to sign up to a declaration of high democratic principle precisely for the purpose of getting aid out of the United States. In fact, our associates wrote the document for him in terms that they thought would appeal to the idealistic American mind. But it all had no real effect. The prerequisites for this sort of thing were nonexistent in Siberia at that time. Anybody

who knew the situation could have told us that. Kolchak himself was totally swept away within a year and executed.

And I remember declarations of this sort during the recent war. I wouldn't want to say that the situations were exactly parallel, but I cannot forget declarations like the Cairo Declaration, or the declaration on liberated Europe, in which we got people who had quite different ideas, really, about political values, to sign up to documents which looked fine on American terms, promising sweetness and light and democracy and moderation and all these things, and usually—in all of these instances, in fact—we had cause to regret these things later.

I would prefer not to see us join with other people of different tongue and different cultural and political tradition in signing up to general language of this sort, because I think that it usually rises up to penalize you in the course of time.

Now, I hope that this will not be the case with the Honolulu Declaration. God grant that there is some reality in this, and some understanding on the other side for these things as we see them. But experience does not suggest that there is, and it is this that bothers me.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE HONOLULU DECLARATION

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any reason to believe that General Ky has any deep understanding of this kind of a document?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, this is precisely what seems to me to be implausible. I have no doubt that General Ky has many estimable qualities and I would not for a moment want to speak in a manner derogatory to his person, but nevertheless, he has grown up in a wholly different political atmosphere than our people have, and I am simply skeptical that he, signing such a document, could mean the same thing with these words, that we do; and if he does not, there is apt to be a day of reckoning. This is what diplomatic history shows.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned you are a historian of sorts. It is my memory that you have given good deal of thought to history.

Mr. Reporter, before I proceed with regard to that quote from Drew Middleton, I wish the whole article be put in the record so it will be complete.

(The article referred to follows:)

HONOLULU PARLEY STIRS DOUBTS AT U.N.

(By Drew Middleton, special to the New York Times)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., February 9.—The solid support given the leaders of South Vietnam by President Johnson at their Honolulu meeting strikes many officials and diplomats here as a barrier to a negotiated settlement of the war.

They reason that the President's endorsement of Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, South Vietnam's Chief of State, and of Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, the Premier, as well as the increased involvement of the United States in the country's economic, educational, and social programs, has removed any prospect of forming a more broadly based government with which North Vietnam might be willing to negotiate.

On January 20, Secretary General Thant suggested discussions leading to the formation of a government involving all elements in South Vietnam, including the Communist National Liberation Front. This is now ruled out both by the accords between Washington and Saigon and by the stated intransigence of Premier Ky toward any dealings with the Communists, the sources said.

"We are back to where we were when the bombing started," one said.

Only a minority were prepared to accept the idea that the United States might be forced to act outside the framework of the Honolulu accords if events made this necessary. The majority view was that the agreements solidified the United States-South Vietnam alliance and would lengthen and expand the war.

The shock given peace hopes here by the agreements is explained by the emphasis placed by the majority of the nonaligned delegations, including those from many African states, on the vital importance of including the National Liberation Front if there is to be successful negotiations.

Some sources now found it more difficult to accept the U.S. promises to withdraw troops and dismantle military bases in view of its economic aid commitments. Those were considered by some as a form of "neocolonialism" that would bind South Vietnam more closely to the United States and inhibit the formation of a truly independent nonaligned, united country.

The United States delegation takes the position that the South Vietnamese leaders' attitude is normal under the circumstances and that they could have said little except what they did. This referred to statements by Premier Ky and General Thieu that they would not negotiate with or recognize the Vietcong, the military arm of the National Liberation Front, and to Premier Ky's reference to the latter as the "national enslavement front."

The American mission insists that the peace effort in the United Nations continues, although that there are no signs of progress. The effort to find an effective form of United Nations intervention that would hasten peace talks is continuing despite the pessimism aroused by the Honolulu meeting.

The objective remains a United Nations declaration calling on the combatants to negotiate. This would be along the general line of the U.S. resolution placed on the Security Council agenda last Wednesday, but the declaration ostensibly would be the work of the nonaligned nations rather than the powers concerned.

Some African states that have been most active in the private discussions have questioned the wisdom of presenting a declaration before more is known about the attitude of the North Vietnamese and Chinese Governments toward peace talks.

AGGRESSIVE NATURE OF CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. Something has been said on this matter of China. I want to clarify it just a step further. The nature of the commitment to South Vietnam—and you have already described it considerably—seems to me so out of proportion to what is involved there that surely some other consideration beyond Vietnam must be involved. I can't imagine a commitment such as has been described could have been just for this rather limited purpose. I think it does involve China and I think previous questions have indicated this. There was some passing reference made this morning to the aggressive nature of China.

Now, as a historian, is it your impression that China, when she was a strong country in the past, has been inclined to military aggressiveness such as was characteristic of Germany in two instances recently and other countries from time to time?

Mr. KENNAN. No. It is my impression that the Chinese are tremendously preoccupied with what used to be called "face"—with prestige—with the outward aspects of authority and respect; and that sometimes, as in the present situation, their language can be very violent, and extreme, but that by and large they are very prudent people when it comes to military action.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps I didn't phrase my question as carefully as I should have. I was really trying to exclude the present, as you said this morning, hysterical state of the present Communist regime. I was trying to make this a historical question. We realize that they are under very different circumstances now from what they were 50 years ago or a hundred years ago or a thousand years ago. They are

suffering from what you described very well this morning as a kind of a hysterical state.

But traditionally they have not been noted as very aggressive people militarily.

Is that true or not in your view?

Mr. KENNAN. That is my impression, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. More recently, a statement was made the other day and was this morning referred to during discussion of the Indian matter and I thought I remembered a statement made by General Taylor, while he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This was made on Thursday, February 14, 1963, before the Committee on Appropriations. I think it bears upon the question.

This is page 9 of that hearing—Mr. Sikes of Florida asked him:

Let me talk about Red China and the Indian operation. Did the Indians actually start this military operation?

General TAYLOR. They were edging forward in the disputed area; yes, sir.

I would be perfectly willing to put it all in the record; I don't wish to burden the record and take the time.

On page 10 Mr. Sikes says:

Where is it with relation to the generally accepted international boundary?

They were talking about the northeast boundary that this incident referred to.

General TAYLOR. That is hard to say because there is no generally accepted international boundary. I am sorry to be vague about this, but I can assure you that I spent several hours trying to find out where the McMahon line is. Actually you find the maps differ on this. The terrain is so terribly rugged, there has been no accurate mapping and no accurate boundary lines or markers placed.

This is all available. I won't burden the record with it. But it strikes me to say or to use this as an example of an aggression is rather tenuous. And with regard to Tibet, has not the status of Tibet been a matter of considerable controversy for a long time?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, of course it has, and the Chinese did regard it as part of their area of sovereignty. I don't say this excuses what they did there. It puts it in a different category.

The CHAIRMAN. But I mean a long time ago, and not just by the Communist Chinese.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that the Nationalist Chinese regarded Tibet as a part of China, not since Mao Tse-tung came in.

Mr. KENNAN. Senator Fulbright, there have been very few of the troubles we have been having in the last few years which we would not have had with any other Chinese regime. A lot of this is national.

REASONS FOR CHINA'S BEHAVIOR

The CHAIRMAN. I don't wish to overplay this but I think when we look at specific cases and examine the circumstances surrounding them, their actions as distinguished from their words have not been unusually aggressive or even as aggressive as many of our Western countries. In view of the history of China during the last century beginning with the opium wars, running up to the Second World War, would you not

say there was considerable reason for their having some dislike to Western nations?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

I think we have to remember that we deal with the Chinese today at the end of a century in which they had very, very unhappy experiences with Western powers generally. I don't think that the blame for this was entirely on the Western powers. There was usually a good deal of connivance on the Chinese side at these relationships of imperialism.

But, by and large, these were very unhappy experiences. They were humiliating to the Chinese people, and there has accumulated a fund here of sensitivity and resentment which we are probably harvesting today. We have to bear that in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up but I would like to clarify that one point that their connivance that irritated us or provoked us. If I remember my history at all, take, for example, the opium war.

Do you see any excuse for waging a war to force a country to accept opium for the use of their people?

Mr. KENNAN. No, Senator, I don't. All I meant to convey by that was something which is also relevant to the opium war: it was that a number of highly placed Chinese also profited very well from the opium trade. This was not all so simple.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is true. They were bribed. They had a number of their people who were bribed; there is no doubt about that. This is quite true. But for a country to take advantage of another country, that was so weak—and China was very weak in the dying days of the Manchu dynasty—and to subvert its local officials and to wage a war for this reason seems to me about as outrageous as any war I can think of.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you know there was a succession of, in effect, occupations and invasions of a very weak and helpless country. Isn't that generally so?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, I think this is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they attack any other Western country during that period.

Mr. KENNAN. No, I fully agree with you here. I think that the ferociousness of Chinese policy in the past and somewhat today is often a matter of words rather than of actions. I just would say this: it seems to me that the Chinese, if you look back historically, have not been an easy country to deal with. They have had ideas of being the center of the universe—

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. KENNAN. And all that, which have presented problems for other people. My own feeling is that I think a long period in which we had perhaps as little as possible to do with them, kept our distance and tried to be reasonably restrained and polite, might be helpful in our relations with them.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't misunderstand me, I don't cite this as an excuse for their present conduct. I think it is as outrageous as you think it is, but the fact is there are these old reasons that I think affect their attitude.

Being from the South, I am not unmindful of the fact that for a considerable number of years after Reconstruction people regarded southerners as being irrational in their attitude toward Yankees; maybe this was our fault, we shouldn't have been, but it was a fact of life, wasn't it?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And still is to some extent.

I would like to pursue this longer. I wish to put in the record at this point an article by you on November 22 which bears upon this China problem. You are familiar with it, I am sure. You wrote it, it was published in the New York Times Magazine on November 22.

Mr. KENNAN. This last November?

The CHAIRMAN. 1964.

Mr. KENNAN. 1964, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It bears upon the China problem.

Mr. KENNAN. Quite right.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times magazine, Nov. 22, 1964]

A FRESH LOOK AT OUR CHINA POLICY

(By George F. Kennan)

At the heart of all our difficulties in the Far East lies a preposterous and almost incomprehensible fact. The great country of China, forming the heart of Asia, a country which for many years we befriended above all others and in defense of whose interests, in part, we fought the Pacific war, has fallen into the hands of a group of embittered fanatics; wedded to a dated and specious ideology but one which holds great attraction for masses of people throughout Asia; finding in this ideology a rationale for the most ruthless exertion of power over other people; associating this ideological prejudice with the most violent currents of traditional nationalism and xenophobia: linking their power to the arrogance and pretension traditional to governing groups in a country which long regarded itself as the center of the world; consumed with ambition to extend to further areas of Asia the dictatorial authority they now wield over the Chinese people themselves; sponsoring for this reason every territorial claim of earlier Chinese Governments for which history could show even the flimsiest evidence; and now absolutely permeated with hatred toward ourselves, not only because the ideology pictures us all as villains, but also because we, more than any other people, have had the strength and the temerity to stand in their path and to obstruct the expansion of their power.

We have had no choice but to place ourselves in that path, for to have done otherwise would have been both to run out on the commitments with which we emerged from the Pacific war and to forfeit at once all the most important fruits of our victory in the war. An Asia dominated by people so prejudiced against us, ideologically, as the Chinese Communists, so dedicated to the destruction of everything we value, would obviously have been more dangerous to the interests of our country than the limited Japanese power we fought the Pacific war to destroy. In asking us to accept their domination of Asia, the Chinese Communists were asking us, in effect, to hand over to them the fruits of our victory over Japan and to render that victory meaningless for ourselves.

And so the conflict developed: the Chinese Communists trying to bring about our physical expulsion from the Far Eastern area, to ruin our world influence, to reduce us to a position of helplessness and ignominy; we, for our part, trying primarily to prevent the further extension of their power or their dominant influence to those insular and peninsular appendages of the Asiatic continent—South Korea, Taiwan, southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and the Japanese and Philippine archipelagoes—which had managed to hold out and to continue to lead some sort of independent political existence.

And as part of this effort of containment (for that is really what it is), we have tried to see to it that Communist China was denied recognition, denied admission to the U.N., denied the advantages of normal participation in the life of the international community until such time as its leaders would moderate their ambitions, desist from their expansionist efforts, and accommodate themselves to the continued existence of truly independent governments elsewhere on the Asiatic continent.

There has, however, always been a strong body of opinion in this country which has not accepted this defensive concept of our policy in Asia and has insisted that our true objective was the destruction of communism, as a political force, in China and everywhere else—the overthrow, in other words, of the Chinese Communist government. This concept has found strong support among us: in our repugnance to communism generally, in the emotional current set up by the cold war, and in the fact of our commitment to the defense of the government on Taiwan, with its claim to be the legitimate government of China. But this is a typical case of confusion between distant hopes and practical undertakings, between what would be theoretically nice and what it is useful at the moment to try to achieve. In actuality, by the force of circumstances, our effort with regard to China has had to be confined largely, in recent years, to defensive purposes.

There are a number of misunderstandings about the nature of this effort. They are often reflected in our public discussions and sometimes even in the official statements of our Government.

First of all, this is not purely, or even primarily, a military problem, and it cannot be thought of or tackled that way. If this is really a war, as we sometimes hear it said that it is, then it is like no war we have ever been engaged in before. Military force has a part in it, and there is at least one area, the island of Taiwan, where the Chinese Communists would probably set about to achieve their objectives at once by purely military means if our Armed Forces did not stand in the way. But in most instances, Chinese armed forces are not involved; and even direct military aid from the Chinese side is probably less of a factor than we commonly think.

The weapons with which the Chinese are operating here are primarily the political reactions of the people of the threatened areas themselves: their inherited resentments, their fears, their weariness, and such error and prejudice against ourselves and their own regimes as can be artificially pumped into their minds. And we, by the same token, have to struggle for control of this same weapon. We have to look to it, in fact, as the basis of our effort. For while we have military forces in some of these countries, and while the struggle in some places assumes semimilitary forms, nowhere can this military aspect of the problem be entirely detached from the political aspect.

There is not one of these places where our own military effort cannot be frustrated, not only deprived of its political meaning but actually rendered physically unsuccessful, if we fail to find support in the temper of the inhabitants. We are working here with and through the reactions of people who are not under our power, and on whose loyalty and obedience we can lay no ultimate claim. There is not one of these areas where people cannot, if they persist in doing so, render unsuccessful even our best efforts in their own defense.

What is at stake here, therefore, is not just the level of our own resolution and determination or even the quantity of the resources we are willing to commit. We are at the mercy of the enlightenment and sense of self-interest of those we are trying to help; and while this is something we can affect by the persuasiveness of our political and psychological approach, it is always possible that there can be barriers, here and there—barriers founded in timidity or shortsightedness or long-established prejudice—which not even the strongest effort of persuasion on our part could break.

For this reason, I think we should be chary of ringing professions of determination and of brave resolutions, to ourselves and to the world, about what we propose to accomplish. Our friends among the governments of the threatened areas are liberal with demands that we reiterate our undying determination to save them. They are quicker to demand such assurances from us than they are to offer them. One cannot blame them for wishing us, rather than themselves, to bear the major responsibility for their fate. But we should be chary of responding to these demands.

In general, there has been nothing wrong, in any of these areas in recent years, with America's willingness to extend support; the problems have arisen in con-

nection with the ability of other people to make effective use of that support. This is, therefore, a struggle in which we cannot promise to be everywhere successful, even in the defensive sense; for our success depends on the collaboration of others for whom we cannot responsibly speak. The best we can say is that we are determined that none of these people shall lose their independence for lack of any support that we might reasonably be expected to give.

A second misunderstanding concerns the definition of what you might call "victory" in such a conflict. It concerns the demands we hear so often that the conflict be solved by widening the theater of operations, by carrying the "war," so called, to the enemy's camp, by making it our immediate objective to encompass the overthrow and destruction of the political center, or centers, from which our troubles emanate.

One can only have sympathy for the feelings by which these demands are inspired. If any political regime in history has ever asked for its own violent destruction, it is this group of men in Peiping, who have never ceased to reiterate that their own objective can be achieved only by means of war and violence, who have, in fact not hesitated to split the whole world Communist movement rather than to admit that the ideals of socialism could be advanced by other methods. And yet, I am profoundly convinced that the answer to our problem does not lie in that direction. It is not necessarily our business to bring to the Chinese Communist leaders, or to anyone else, retribution for all the injustices they may have perpetrated and for all the sufferings they may have brought or would like still to bring to other people.

We are not the avenging angel of all humanity. We have more modest and immediate problems of our own. We must leave something to the Almighty, whose justice must be supposed, in any case, to be superior to ours.

There are at least a half dozen overwhelming reasons why the attempt to solve our problems around the periphery of China by attempting to unseat the present mainland Government there through direct military action would not be a rational or hopeful procedure—why it could be expected to be, in fact, a self-defeating, fruitless and even disastrous undertaking.

Not only could no total success be counted on, even in the best of circumstances, for China is too vast a country to be entirely occupiable, but the ulterior consequences would be so adverse that they would more than cancel out any immediate successes we might have. We would alienate much of world opinion. We would alienate great portions of the Chinese people themselves, because the force we would have to apply would injure them no less than their rulers, and no one likes to be liberated from a native regime by foreign bayonets. We would unite a world Communist movement now grievously and fortunately divided. Worst of all, we might very well unleash a world war of unprecedented horror and destructiveness.

The fact is that to try to solve this military political contest on the periphery of China by carrying the struggle to the Chinese capital, or—even worse—to the various capitals of the world Communist movement as a whole, would make out of it an entirely different sort of a contest from that which it now is—a contest in which the objectives and possibilities of the present one would be swallowed up and lost entirely. It is the beginning of all wisdom, in our encounter with world communism generally, to recognize that, frustrating and annoying and perhaps even morally unjust as this may be, this is a problem to which there is no immediate and total solution.

To say this does not mean that we have reconciled ourselves to the existence and nature of Communist power in China, or that we have abandoned hopes for an improvement of this situation. We are merely recognizing the classical distinction, which lies at the heart of all political decision, between what is possible and practical, at the moment, and what is not. And the fact that it is obviously not our task, at this juncture of history, to dispose of communism everywhere and all at once does not mean that we need to lose all hope for the future.

The leaders of Communist China, it is true, represent, in the psychological and political sense, the most formidable problem American diplomacy has ever faced. Even Stalin, at his worst, presented in some ways less of a problem than do these men, because he was less emotional, more cynical, more realistic, less pathologically concerned with prestige and therefore more inclined to enter into realistic practical deals where this seemed to him the prudent course.

The country Stalin headed, moreover, was a country which had developed in the Judaic-Christian tradition and was more conscious of its stake in relations

with the West than is, I fear, the case with China. I do not wish, therefore, to minimize the ugliness of the problem presented by the state of mind of these men: their fanaticism, their addiction to violence as a method, their essential misanthropy, their extraordinary belief that the sort of gray, joyless hell they have drawn over the Chinese people has something to do with human progress.

But we must not make the mistake of taking any of this as absolute and unchangeable. These, too, are only men. They once had mothers and childhood and affections. They are, today, what circumstances have made of them. It is circumstances which will determine what they, or their successors, will be in 10 or 20 years' time. It is up to us to try to shape those circumstances in such a way that the fruitlessness of some of their undertakings will become apparent to them.

We have possibilities for doing this. The continued frustration of their ambitions is one. Patient, realistic, sensible argument, addressed to the people on whose collaboration they ultimately depend and through whose reactions they try to work, is another. And still another is being careful to hold open to them and their people the possibility of negotiation and accommodation if their ambitions are moderated and their methods change. Neither these men in Peiping nor the regime over which they preside are immune to the laws of change that govern all human society, if only because no single generation, anywhere, ever sees things exactly the same as the generation that went 10 years before it.

So much for the prospects of success. While we neither overrate or underrate them, we must apply the same moderation of view to the possible consequences of failure. There are certain places (outstanding among them the great industrial workshop of Japan) whose continued tenure in friendly hands is indeed quite essential to American security. Even elsewhere the consequences of failure could, of course, be very serious indeed—and we are right to do everything in our power to avoid them—but they would be more serious for the peoples concerned than they would be for us; and, here, the disasters might not be final.

A triumph of the Communists in certain of these outlying countries might be the beginning of a long night; but it would not necessarily be an endless night. History shows that people, and particularly, I think, people in Asia, are very inventive of finding ways to frustrate foreign rule and to develop bargaining power, in the end, vis-a-vis a foreign conqueror or an overshadowing neighbor. So, while we have every reason to take this encounter with the utmost seriousness and do all in our power to avoid reverses, we should be careful not to proclaim ourselves in advance defeated and undone by eventualities which, were they to mature, we would have to live with and would probably succeed in living with.

So much, then, for the direct effort to prevent the Chinese Communists from taking control of these outlying areas. What of the diplomatic effort that accompanies it—the effort to deny to the Chinese Communist leaders the fruits of normal association with the international community?

There are three sides to this aspect of our problem. They are all connected, and yet each is a problem in itself. One is the question of diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, by ourselves and by others. Another is the question of the admission of that Government to membership in the United Nations. The third is the question of the status of the island of Taiwan and of its present Government, and the relationship of both of these to the Chinese mainland.

The first two of these matters—recognition and U.N. membership—are really separate problems, although what is done about the one admittedly influences what is done about the other. There can be countries, members of the U.N., with which we do not maintain diplomatic relations. There can be, and have been, countries with which we had diplomatic relations which are not members of the U.N.

It is my view that the importance of both these questions has been somewhat exaggerated in our public debate. In the case of recognition, the whole argument has often been placed on false premises by the impression many people have that diplomatic recognition means the issuance to the other government of some sort of patent of legitimacy or good-conduct award. This is a view that has been woven in and out of American diplomatic practice for many decades, depending on the personal convictions of the respective Presidents and Secretaries of State. It has no proper foundation in international law, and I personally consider it pernicious. We have not followed it consistently even in the case of other Communist governments.

Official relations with another government, as I see it, should be regarded as a convenience—particularly in that they serve as a relatively reliable and sophisticated channel of communication and source of information. There are, of course, times when it is no less important to be able to communicate with an adversary than with a friend. Where this is the case, and where the other party is prepared to be cooperative and to extend decent facilities for diplomatic representation, there is no reason in principle for not having such representation, even though the political relationship may be one of sharp antagonism.

One may well have doubts about the propriety of accrediting a full-fledged Ambassador—a personal representative, that is, of the President of the United States—to a government whose attitude toward us is contemptuous and offensive. But the exchange of more junior representatives, on a de facto basis, does not have the same overtones; and I would know of no reason of principle why this should not be done even in the case of a politically hostile country. Whether to do it or not is simply a question of expediency.

When it comes to membership in the U.N., the situation is, of course, different. Such membership confers certain rights and duties relating to the good order and conduct of the international community. It presupposes a certain spirit of tolerance and good will. It presupposes a desire on the part of the member government to see the affairs of the community ordered on a basis of peace and mutual collaboration, not of deadly struggle. It is hard to believe that the regime in Peiping qualifies, at the present moment, under these standards; and I do not see how we could vote today in good conscience for its admission.

I am also inclined to doubt, in the light of what we read about the experiences of others, that we would have much satisfaction from an exchange of official representatives with that regime. But about both U.N. membership and diplomatic recognition there are two things it is important to remember.

First, while we may hold an adverse position, we will be unwise to try to put heavy pressure on other governments which may see things differently and may wish to act in a different manner. To do so will only irritate them; and in the end they will probably act as they please, anyway.

It is one thing for us to decline to share the responsibility for bringing Peiping into the U.N. It is another thing to conduct a campaign to keep it out—and to risk unnecessary prestige defeats for ourselves in the event the decisions eventually go against our wishes. We must remember that over the long run, after all, both diplomatic recognition and U.N. membership are the normal conditions of international life for a great nation such as China, and both must be expected to ensue, sooner or later. We will be ill-advised to place ourselves too demonstratively in the path of the inevitable.

Second, neither of these questions is of such a nature that disagreements over them in our public and private debates should be allowed to become the occasion for personal aspersions or reflection. I am, as you see, not enthusiastic either about exchanging representatives with Peiping or which, in the long run, they stand to gain no less than the islanders themselves.

It remains to mention the Chinese-Soviet conflict and its relation to the problems I have been discussing. This conflict is perfectly genuine. It is the most momentous event that has overtaken world communism since the Chinese revolution. The removal of Khrushchev may serve, for the present at least, to halt further deterioration in relations between the two great Communist powers; but the causes of the conflict are profound, and will not be overcome at any early date. Meanwhile, the conflict cannot fail to have, and already has begun to have, a profound effect on the calculations and behavior of the various Communist governments throughout the world, including that of the Chinese Communists.

It would be foolish, of course, for us to fold our hands and look to the operation of the Chinese-Soviet conflict to solve all our problems in Asia. This conflict will affect the Red Chinese regime, but there is no reason at this time to suppose that it will put an end to it. And nothing, least of all an ideological triumph of one of these powers over the other, is going to cure in any short space of time the troubled state of Asia in which our problems are rooted. On the other hand, it would be equally foolish of us to disregard the Chinese-Soviet conflict entirely and to fail to take advantage of any favorable effects it may have.

The basic fact that world communism is becoming a pluralistic rather than a monolithic phenomenon represents, unquestionably, the most hopeful thing that

has come over the world situation in the last 20 years. To ignore this circumstance, and above all to choose this particular moment, when change is in the air, to lose patience entirely and to embrace policies based on a total despair and involving risks of incalculable enormity would be the behavior of men who had lost all sense of reality.

This effort of containment has been going on now, in one way or another, for a decade and a half. Nowhere, except briefly during the Korean war, could the main burden of the effort be borne even primarily by our own forces and resources. Elsewhere, as we have already noted, the main question has been not what we ourselves could do but what we could assist and encourage others to do. We have had a great deal of loyal and effective collaboration in this effort. But we have found ourselves wedded, throughout, not just to the virtues of our associates in the threatened countries, but also to their weaknesses.

There has been more than one occasion when it has seemed that our own efforts were fruitless—that we were getting nowhere, that our interest was simply being exploited; and yet it had always to be recognized that the prospective consequences of withdrawal were worse than those of continued effort. And we have thus had no choice but to stagger along, relying at times on faith and luck and on such rewards as international life occasionally has for those who refuse to admit defeat.

Unquestionably, we have made mistakes. We have wasted a great deal of motion. We have spent stupendous sums of our substance. The effort has cost many American lives. Undoubtedly, we could have done it cheaper and more effectively had we been better set up, institutionally and by national tradition, to conduct this curious sort of military-political operation in time of peace.

We are, God knows, not out of the woods. In South Korea we have formidable problems. In southeast Asia, things have obviously come to a crucial pass. It may well happen that we suffer further reverses, or even defeats, here and there on the long periphery of this political front. No one can guarantee that this will not occur, for it is not just our own efforts that are involved.

But, by and large, we have not done too badly. Our adversary has not disappeared from the face of the globe—but neither has he gained his objectives. The Japanese archipelago, South Korea, Taiwan, and most of southeast Asia still remain outside his grasp. We are learning daily, by experience. Our efforts are plainly more serious and more realistic than they were some years ago.

In these circumstances, I think our Government, as it struggles with this unpleasant and unaccustomed task, deserves our continued good wishes and support. The judgment on which its decisions have been taken have been, in overwhelming proportion, ones based on calculations of national interest and not of domestic political advantages; and that goes for all the administrations that have borne this responsibility since the Chinese revolution.

And I think we owe it to the men who are now risking their lives in southeast Asia to place the same limitation on the standards of our criticism. It is right that the Government should be required to explain the general rationale of its actions, but it should not be asked to spell out publicly the tactical considerations that govern at any particular moment. It needs the consciousness of having behind it an inquiring and critical public opinion; but the delicacy of the tasks it has in hand just at present, particularly in Vietnam, is such that it cannot stand much juggling of the elbow.

It will not be helped by demands that it abandon the effort altogether, in what would necessarily be a panicky and ignominious withdrawal that could only present our adversaries with a gratuitous bonanza. On the other hand, it will also not be helped by demands that it lose all sense of measure and restraint and try to solve the limited problems of the moment by opening up new ones without limit.

The complex and unhappy situation we have before us in Asia is one out of which, I fear, there are no laurels to be picked, no triumphs to be won, for American statesmanship. The best we can hope is that time and change will work for us, and that it will gradually dawn on our opponents that, even from the standpoint of their own interests, there are better ways to pursue their purposes than by the methods of violence and subversion. And if the question be placed—Will this day ever come?—I can only say: I think it can come; and the prospects for its coming are still not so poor as to justify any of us in yielding to the counsels of impatience or despair.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Ambassador, before I ask you my next question I want to buttress your impression as to what our military policy in South Vietnam is when you speak about it as a policy of victory or to win.

I completely share that impression. I only want to point out we started out with 20,000 and 50,000, and 75,000, and then 100,000, 150,000, now 200,000 men in Vietnam, who haven't been sent over there to play checkers. Now we hear the Pentagon Building and this military headquarters in South Vietnam talking about 400,000 men, and we have a chairman of a Senate subcommittee talking about 600,000.

THE HONOLULU DECLARATION AND OTHER STATEMENTS

But I want to find out what the President says in what I consider to be the very unfortunate welcoming speech he made at the airport in Honolulu. He said in part and I am going to put the whole speech in the record:

If we allow the Communists to win in Vietnam, it will become easier and more appetizing for them to take over other countries in other parts of the world.

He goes on to say: "We will leave here"—Mr. Ky and Mr. Thieu there with him—"We will leave here determined not only to achieve victory over aggression, but to win victory over hunger, disease, and despair." He said later in his speech, "In all these endeavors we will give all the support possible to the energetic effort of our Vietnamese allies."

(The entire statement referred to is as follows:)

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1966]

TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S WELCOME

HONOLULU, February 6.—Here is the text of President Johnson's welcome to South Vietnam's Prime Minister, Nguyen Cao Ky, and head of state, Nguyen Van Thieu.

I welcome these two brave leaders of the Vietnamese Republic and their colleagues to American soil.

We meet in a time of testing and trial. But we will talk also of hope and harvest.

Our friends in Korea, Australia, and New Zealand have sent their own men to join with Vietnamese and Americans in a conflict to decide if aggression and terror are the way of the future—or whether freemen are to decide their own course.

It is a question of the gravest importance to all other nations, large or small, whose people seek to walk in peace and independence. For were the Communist aggressors to win in Vietnam, they would know they can accomplish through so-called wars of national liberation what they could not accomplish through naked aggression in Korea—or insurgency in the Philippines, Greece, and Malaya—or the threat of aggression in Turkey—or in a free election booth anywhere in the world.

WHY THEY FIGHT ON

During the past year more than 1,300 Americans have lost their lives from Communist action in Vietnam. But more than 11,000 of our Vietnamese brothers-in-arms died last year to protect their homeland.

Why do the Vietnamese fight on? Because they are not going to let others enslave them or rule their future. And with their soldiers are the administrators and civil officials, and the villagers themselves—to many of whom each darkness of the evening is filled with fear—and to many of whom each noise in the night may be a terrorist bomb or an assassin's grenade.

And yet they fight on.

They fight for dreams beyond the din of battle—the dream of security in their village—a teacher for their children—food for their bodies—medicine for their

sick—the right to worship in the way they choose. They fight for the essential rights of human existence—and only the callous or timid can ignore their cause.

OUR STAND IS FIRM

There are special pleaders who counsel retreat in Vietnam. They belong to a group that has always been blind to experience and deaf to hope. We cannot accept their logic that tyranny 10,000 miles away is not tyranny to concern us—or that subjugation by an armed minority in Asia is different from subjugation by an armed minority in Europe. Were we to follow their course, how many nations might fall before the aggressor? Where would our treaties be respected, our word honored, our commitment believed?

In the forties and fifties, we took our stand in Europe to protect the freedom of those threatened by aggression. If we had not then acted, what kind of Europe might there be today?

Now the center of attention has shifted to another part of the world where aggression is on the march and enslavement of freemen is its goal.

Our stand must be as firm as ever.

REALITY OUT OF HOPES

If we allow the Communists to win in Vietnam, it will become easier and more appetizing for them to take over other countries in other parts of the world. We will have to fight again someplace else—at what cost no one knows. That is why it is vitally important to every American family that we stop the Communists in South Vietnam.

To these beautiful islands and newest of our States have come the leaders of South Vietnam and the United States—to talk of our resolution to defend the peace and to build a decent society for the people of South Vietnam. Because we are here to talk especially of the works of peace, we will leave here determined not only to achieve victory over aggression, but to win victory over hunger, disease, and despair.

We are making reality out of the hopes of the common people—hope for a better life. We will talk of health and education, agriculture and economics—and those other important aspects of a vital future for the people of Vietnam. In all of these endeavors we will give all the support possible to the energetic efforts of our Vietnamese allies.

As leaders of our two nations, engaged in this struggle, it is appropriate that we should meet together in order that we may best move forward together. And so I extend today to these two friends and allies, a warm welcome to our country.

I find nothing there but the conclusion we are out to win. Then we have in today's press in a statement attributed to the President. The President said:

In South Vietnam Chief of State Thieu and Ky understand and we understand that the war we are helping them fight must be won on two fronts: one front is military and the other front is the struggle against social justice.

Then we have the communique, a most unfortunate historical document in my judgment because I think in this document the President exceeded his constitutional power. I think he flaunted constitutional processes, and I do not think that he has the constitutional right to make the commitments that he has made in this communique.

He says in it: "We must defeat the Vietcong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil"—it has become our soil now. "We are the victims of an aggression directed and supported from Hanoi. That aggression—so-called war of national liberation, is part of the Communist plan for the conquest of all southeast Asia"—on which they buttress their argument that we are going to stop communism wherever we, unilaterally, decide it ought to be stopped.

He also says, or he agreed, "it is a military war, a war for the hearts of our people. We cannot win one without winning the other."

I don't think there is any question about the fact of what our present course is, and I happen to think we ought to change that present course. We ought to follow the constitutional processes; we ought to follow the course of action such as you and General Gavin have told the American people. I think that in a democracy, if you are going to have full public disclosure of the public's business, you need just this kind of a forum; and this kind of a forum, in my judgment, backs up the boys in South Vietnam because it may lead to stopping the killing of them in the increasing numbers that they are going to suffer if we continue to escalate the war which in my judgment will go along with the Honolulu communique.

I am at a loss that my President has yet to repudiate this statement of Ky in Honolulu. The South Vietnam leaders are not going to sit down in any negotiations with the Vietcong. I want to say, as one member of this committee, that I do not propose to let Ky—and I do not share a very high opinion of Mr. Ky, being a great lover of Hitler as he said to the London Mirror he was—tell us how many boys are going to die in South Vietnam because of any refusal on their part to negotiate with the Vietcong who are a real force in South Vietnam or are part of the negotiations. If that is the position of the South Vietnamese I have no doubt what our policy should be, "Get out."

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

I come to the question of constitutional processes. You mention on page 6 of your statement this morning:

I fail to understand how it was possible to enter into any such commitment—

You were speaking about the commitment—

to bypass the processes of senatorial advice and consent which were meant to come into play when undertakings of even lesser import than this were entered into.

You have no doubt, do you, that the President admits we are at war in Vietnam?

Mr. KENNAN. It seems to me this has been said many times.

Senator MORSE. By the President.

Do you know of any declaration of war against any country in Asia that we have taken through our constitutional processes?

Mr. KENNAN. I do not, Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Are you at all disturbed or concerned about the fact that article I, section 8 of the Constitution hasn't been complied with by the President and by the Congress? The President has sent no war message, as did Woodrow Wilson on the night of April 17, 1917, to the Congress in which he said that he lacked constitutional authority—that is his language—to make war in the absence of a declaration of war, and that Franklin Roosevelt, after Pearl Harbor, sent a war message to the Congress asking for a declaration of war.

Does it concern you that we have boys dying in South Vietnam in a war which I have called an executive war without a declaration of war?

Mr. KENNAN. It has puzzled me. And the whole situation has concerned me.

JAPANESE ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. Mr. Ambassador, let me tell you something about Japan.

I took a congressional senatorial delegation to Japan and was there for a good many days. We met with all the Japanese political parties in separate sessions and I want to say in the majority party we got a little lipservice. In the other parties we got open opposition to our policy in Vietnam and most of the Japanese press and the academic world is against our policies in southeast Asia. As to the majority party, there sits behind me Dr. Marcy, head of the professional staff of this committee, and after our conference with the majority party was over, where they had pretty much one spokesman on the subject, I got back to my hotel about 4:30 in the afternoon. Dr. Marcy called me at 5 in my room, he said, "Senator, we have two members of the majority party down in my room and they said they must see you."

So I said, "What about?"

He said, "I think you ought to come."

I went down, and these two members of the majority party didn't want me to leave Japan without knowing that they were badly split in their majority party over the war in Vietnam, but that they were in a position of a parliamentary system where they had to go along with the majority leader.

There was great concern even in the majority party and I want to say their great concern is what: that we are leading the countries of Asia, into a war with China. They don't want a war with China, they can handle China, they can live with China, and they can get along with China—that is their view. They are concerned that the U.S. course of action in South Vietnam is going to escalate us into a war with China and that is why I am putting to you the question in regard to your own reference to constitutional processes.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

Don't you think it is about time we make up our mind whether or not we are going to legalize this war by going through our constitutional processes?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, Senator, I think we have a fundamental decision to make and it ought to be a conscious decision and we ought to be aware of the gravity of it when we are making it.

COMPARISON OF VIETNAM TO MUNICH

Senator MORSE. I happen to think the American people are entitled to be told whether we are going to take them into war by a declaration of war and get that debate. That will stir up the grassroots of America.

One question more very quickly.

We hear a lot of comparison of the situation in Vietnam with Munich. Those of us who—somebody sent me an umbrella the other day [laughter]—those of us who are against this escalation and this unilateral American war in Vietnam are told we are a bunch of Chamberlains.

Would you give us your view as to what the analogous relationship, if anything, might be between this war and the situation at the time of Munich or between Mao and Hitler?

Mr. KENNAN. I think they are entirely different things. I think that no episode, perhaps, in modern history has been more misleading than that of the Munich conference. It has given to many people the idea that never must one attempt to make any sort of a political accommodation in any circumstances. This is, of course, a fatally unfortunate conclusion. Hitler was, thank heaven, a unique phenomenon. Circumstances existed that did indeed make it fatuous to think that you could arrive, at that point at an agreement with high that would preserve the peace of Europe.

But these were specific circumstances; and I think the wrong conclusions can be drawn and have been drawn time and time again from this. Hitler was a man who had made up his mind that he was going to conquer Europe by force of arms according to a certain timetable. I have never seen the evidence of anything comparable to that state of mind on the part of our Communist opponents. For this reason, I have had to struggle for years against the attempt of people to apply the Munich precedent to the problem of containing Soviet power.

Senator MORSE. One more question.

WORKING THROUGH THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I want to take you to the United Nations for a moment because you made mention of it. I think it is very doubtful that the Security Council, if it should vote to take jurisdiction over the question, would probably get Hanoi and Peiping in a conference within the Security Council format, but it might very well be able to pass a recommendation or a resolution calling for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, and Great Britain and Russia might respect that.

We must not jump to the conclusion if that were the proposal that you couldn't get acceptance of it. We have had some acceptance in Security Council for peacekeeping purposes and there also is the open door then if they do reject it of calling for an extraordinary session of the General Assembly, which in turn, might even be a better format to try to bring some negotiations with Hanoi and Peiping.

Do you think there is any basis for my feeling thus?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes. I think the first alternative is the more promising one, and that if there were a strong demand from the unaligned countries, and a wide variety of countries around the world, for a reconvening of the Geneva conference, it would be harder for the Soviet Government to stand in the way of it.

I think, however, that it would be very desirable, if not absolutely necessary, that there be some sort of internal political accommodation of the various factions within Vietnam, before the attempt is made to get a peace.

Senator MORSE. There has to be?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator MORSE. Of course, you might be able at this point—if you can see the possibility of getting them to agree to a reconvening of the Geneva Conference—to get them to accept some recommendations from the Security Council for the terms of a cease-fire. I don't see

how you can get anywhere even with the reconvening of the Geneva Conference until you can first bring the killing to a halt. That is what we ought to be urging, and I want to say most respectfully although I disagree with my President—I really love him—I think he is dead wrong in the course he is following. I have a suggestion that he might counteract the Honolulu trip with a trip to New York City to ask for an extraordinary session to hear a plea from the President himself. This would demonstrate a course of action that we think we ought to follow, quite different from what is proposed in this communique, of suggesting a cease-fire with reasonable terms of a cease-fire and let them debate that.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa.

RUSSIAN AND CHINESE THEORIES OF WORLD DOMINATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Ambassador Kennan, can you give me your evaluation or your opinion on the political ambitions and orientation of China? Do you think that China follows what we have generally considered to be the international Communist theory of world dominion—extending its dominion of international communism more and more and more?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator Hickenlooper, I think that it is the conviction of the Chinese Communists, as good Stalinists-Marxists-Leninists, that communism is the future form of government for all the world, and that it is their duty to try to promote and hasten this state of affairs.

But, I feel that one has to draw a very significant distinction, when one talks about these things, between what people think would be nice and what they actually expect to achieve within their lifetime, that to which they are addressing their efforts.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is the Communist timetable limited to the lifetime of any particular people or—

Mr. KENNAN. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER (continuing). Or is it limited only by the progress which they think they will make, whether it is one lifetime or two lifetimes?

Mr. KENNAN. There is no timetable for this. The Russian revolution took place nearly 50 years ago, 50 years ago next year; and theoretically, ever since that time they have been waiting for the world revolution to occur. They know perfectly well that they are a lot further from it today, so far as Europe is concerned, and I think so far as the world is concerned, than they were then in 1917. But they still cling to this. It is a sort of a respectable tenet of religion with them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the Russians.

Mr. KENNAN. That is the Russians.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Kremlin.

How about the Chinese? They are not as far along in their social and political development as the Russians.

Mr. KENNAN. The Chinese are more sanguine. The Chinese know even less than the Russians do—and that means they know very little indeed—about Western countries, about the situation here in the West, and I have no doubt that the Chinese leaders, cut off as they are,

isolated as they are today, fanatics as they are by training, that they really believe that there are possibilities for this doctrine gaining ground and coming to dominate the world.

Whether they expect that this would mean that they would have disciplinary control over Communist parties all over the world is another thing.

I think they hope that Peiping would stand as a great inspiring center in the way that Moscow did in the early years of the 1920's and the 1930's.

I think they do entertain these ideas. Such ideas are profoundly hostile to us, and I think they put limitations on what we could expect to have in the way of friendship and good relations with anyone who seriously holds them; but I draw a distinction between these long-term aims which, after all, lie at the heart of any sort of quasi-religious militant movement (and sometimes they last for centuries) and what people actually do.

If you take the Muslims and others: they have entertained aims which have never been fully achieved, just as the Christians have, in this world.

Well, so it is with these people; and I would feel that we would do well, if we want to make headway in coping with world problems, to address ourselves primarily to what these people are doing, to what occupies them, occupies their minds from the standpoint of tomorrow and the day after, rather than to their long-term aims.

CHINESE VIEWS ON USE OF FORCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think that the Chinese abandoned the idea of international communism that force and force of arms is the ultimate weapon necessary to advance their international aims and ambitions?

Mr. KENNAN. Not at all. On the contrary, I think they are quite committed to such means. I don't doubt that the Chinese Communist leaders would love to unleash the bloodiest sort of revolutions in every country that they can think of that is not Communist.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will get down to the wars of liberation in just a moment. I am now trying to see what you think about the Chinese at the present time.

If they have that as their continuing basic philosophy, then isn't it reasonable to assume that the Chinese are, in effect, urging the North Vietnamese on—as a cat's-paw in this idea of advancing communism clear down the end of the peninsula?

Mr. KENNAN. Oh, yes, it is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A step.

Mr. KENNAN. I think it is unquestionable they are urging the North Vietnamese on. But, of course, this situation suits the Chinese book very well. They have us, locked into a conflict there with somebody else, and they want these people to bleed us as long and as profusely as possible.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean they follow the philosophy of "lets you and him fight?"

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I think the Chinese are the passionate partisans of a war between anybody else and the United States, anybody else except China.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't believe I can disagree with that.

Do you consider the North Vietnamese regime as a nation dedicated to the philosophy of international communism and under the control of the Communist philosophy and system?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, although, of course, these ideological elements are intermingled with many other impulses, nationalistic and also defensive.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Before lunch we were talking for a moment about the situation as it exists, and, I think, I based my questions on this statement—that to examine at the present time exactly what the history of this involvement is might be futile in the elements of time which we have here. We are in. We are like the fellow who is out in the water drowning; we don't necessarily stand on the bank and quarrel as to how he got in there; the job is to get him out, and it is in that context that I want to discuss this with you for just a moment.

U.S. ALTERNATIVES IN VIETNAM

What do you see, in view of the present situation in which we find ourselves there—we and everyone else that is involved there—what do you see as our alternatives there? What choices do we have?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Perhaps you have discussed this in my absence.

Mr. KENNAN. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't want to go over something—

Mr. KENNAN. I would be glad to reiterate it. I see three basic choices: One is to multiply our military effort in the hope that somehow or another we can overcome all the resistance with which we are faced in that area, and settle things according to our own ideas. This means an escalation of the war. It means from what I pick up from the press—and that is all I have to go on—at least the doubling of our forces there, and possibly more so. And it means a great deal more physical damage done within the country. It means—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you say that that particular line would, if successful, mean the military defeat of North Vietnam?

Mr. KENNAN. It would be aimed at that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean that would be its purpose.

Mr. KENNAN. That would be its purpose, I should think eventually, because we would have to stamp that source of resistance out. That is one alternative.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Go on with the others.

Mr. KENNAN. A second alternative is—probably it was better stated here by General Gavin in the military sense than I could state it—but it is to adopt basically a defensive strategy, to try to give an opportunity there for a simmering down of hostilities, to let the whole situation quiet down, to hang onto certain areas as a bargaining counter for the future, to see what gives, and to strive in every way possible for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The third alternative would be—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That would involve the enclaves?

Mr. KENNAN. That would involve the enclaves idea.

The third alternative would be just to get right out.

I would like to say one thing that I have not had occasion to say today: I favor the second of these alternatives, of course. I have made that clear. And I don't like the third one bit: the idea of a unilateral and sudden withdrawal of our people. But if these alternatives were to be narrowed down to two, only to an unlimited commitment to something called victory which I don't quite understand, or to a withdrawal, then I am not sure that I would not prefer the second.

Fortunately, they are not that today.

EFFECT ON AMERICAN POSITION OF POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we touched this morning on your view as to the results or the effect upon the American image and American position in the world if we just withdrew completely, in view of our buildup of our involvement there. What would that effect be on, let's say, Africa and the rest of south Asia?

We just touched on it before we closed for lunch.

Mr. KENNAN. I am not so disturbed about Africa. It would send a certain shock for a time through these areas, and through other areas of the world. But after all, other people have made withdrawals equally drastic within the last 20 years, from a number of places, and they have been able to pocket the momentary loss in prestige very well.

In southeast Asia, I do not know. I do not know. This would be a matter of subjective reactions of the people themselves. I think that such a withdrawal on our part, without any explanation, without any political accommodation, just simply getting out and throwing the area open to whoever wants to take it, I should think that this could very well have serious repercussions in southeast Asia. I think that we should at any rate not exclude this possibility.

The only place I see where these consequences could be very serious might be in Thailand, and I don't know enough about Thailand to predict how serious they would be.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand then that you don't completely discard the domino theory?

Mr. KENNAN. Not—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You say, in part at least, it might go into operation under those circumstances or it might not.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, particularly in the immediate area. But I think, I do think, Senator, that the dangers have been greatly diminished by what happened in Indonesia and—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Go ahead.

Mr. KENNAN. And by the present situation in India, and Pakistan.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't want to get into the background of that. I am not quite so optimistic about the finality of the Indonesian situation as your statement might indicate you are.

I think for a moment there is some ray of hope there. I think only time will say whether it can be solidified into something reliable.

THE ENCLAVE THEORY

The second choice, we will call it the "enclave theory," do you envision that as being one under which we should consolidate present.

positions around strong points and keep those secure at various places—perhaps strategic places—throughout Vietnam?

Mr. KENNAN. That is my thought.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any idea as to how many troops it now takes to secure and hold—just to secure and hold—one strong point over there at the present time?

Mr. KENNAN. No, I don't, and I am puzzled over the various statements that have been made about this. I drew attention this morning to the fact that I have seen statements in the press to the effect that the Vietcong, having forces no larger than our own or about the size of our own, hold securely 25 percent of the territory of Vietnam; and I am a little puzzled to know how it is that they, with forces of this size, can hold that, whereas we can't even hold small enclaves, at least according to the arguments of some of the people who have opposed this idea, we cannot.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All the evidence I have seen is that the Vietcong, unless it has changed within the last few days or weeks, holds more than 50 percent of the area while we may control some of the other area—some of the other cities. But this is what puzzles me about the enclave theory. It seems to me that in the enclave theory we would be holding certain strong points at certain places and in the rest of the country around there the Vietcong could run wild and organize the country and what would we be doing there. We would be merely sitting and holding and subject to periodic and frequent attacks at their convenience.

Mr. KENNAN. Of course the South Vietnamese themselves, according again to the figures that are published in the papers, have forces considerably larger numerically than do the Vietcong. I was surprised to see a day or so ago in a column in the papers written by a friend of mine, and opposing the idea of the enclaves, the statement that if we settle down to a defensive strategy there such as General Gavin proposed, we could just wipe out the entire South Vietnamese forces as a factor in the situation; that they would become overnight demoralized and nonexistent as a factor in the situation.

I can only say that if this is true, if they are so weak a reed as this, then I would very, very seriously question how much we wanted to have our fate linked to these people.

In other words, what I am saying is this: If there is any truth in the estimates of the numerical strength of the South Vietnamese forces which we read in the papers, these people have plenty of strength to defend their own position further afield in the country. It is a question of their resolve and of their political basis.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My time was up, Mr. Kennan, when I started to ask the last question, so I think I had better in deference defer.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

Senator GORE. Ambassador Kennan, I suppose that by now, you have realized that members of this committee are very interested in your own views. But we are also somewhat interested in projecting our own. I plead particularly guilty.

GOING TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

You know, millions of people, perhaps uncounted millions have been watching this hearing today. My office has been flooded with telephone calls, my staff advises me. I am sure that is true of every member. I made a statement this morning that, through three administrations, the country had been inched into this predicament and that Congress had been led to believe in one instance after another that a subsequent step, which we later took, would not follow the step presently or at that time under consideration. Some telephone calls have come in asking me to clarify it.

To begin with, I would like to say, to you and to the American people, that this committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hasn't suddenly burst forth with concern and interest. Many of the sentiments which you have expressed and which the members here have expressed on all sides of this question, have been repeatedly expressed in executive session. Unfortunately, we seem not to have made a dent. What we are seeking to do now is to go over the head of the President to the American people, and reach him by way of the people.

Now, there is nothing particularly un-American about going over the head of someone. After all, Congress has been subjected to this, by many Presidents. Indeed the state of the Union message now is no longer to Congress but in the prime hours of the evening by way of TV to the American people.

So the Congress, this committee, is trying to reach the American people. We think it is necessary.

THREE PRESIDENTS' STATEMENTS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

Just as an example of the sentiment that has been expressed to the administration in vigorous terms by this committee in executive session, I would like to read to you two sentences from views which I expressed in executive session in trying to dissuade the administration from sending combat troops to Vietnam:

"But once the battle is joined"—this is my statement—"you are either faced with staying there or being pushed off, and that reduces itself somewhat to victory in battle, does it not, or does it?"

I will later give Secretary Rusk an opportunity to give his response, but because this was in executive session, I cannot now give it.

Going ahead, "Success of the military depends and is interwoven with the political fabric in the country, political problems in the country. That political problem is made up in part by religious strife, by racial hatred, and by the civil war between factions and elements within the country."

Isn't that similar to the sentiments you have expressed here?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator GORE. Now on this question of whether or not Congress has been led to believe that we wouldn't go further than steps under consideration at particular times, I would like to take this one thing to which you referred as being the largest mistake that we made, the commitment of combat troops. I will cite the statements of three Presidents.

President Eisenhower said:

If there must be a war in Asia let it be Asians against Asians.

President Kennedy said:

They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world.

I have another quote from him, but I will not cite that.

I am sorry, that was a quote from President Johnson, I just read.

I had gotten my references, I am sorry, I got them out of order.

Here is the one that I intended to read from the late President Kennedy:

In the final analysis it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam.

Now, lest I take it entirely out of context, I would like to read again the statement of President Johnson, and cite when it was made. This was made on August 12, 1964:

They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world.

And I recall when Vice President Johnson went to Vietnam in 1961, and he returned, and briefed this committee, and he was asked specifically if he had made a commitment to send American troops to Vietnam, his answer was, "No."

The question was raised whether in the event things took a turn for the worse and we had to cut our losses and withdraw, what was the policy, and I remember distinctly, and I have refreshed my memory, he said, "This decision must remain open to us."

Now, Mr. Ambassador, it is now at this particular point that as one member of this committee, I am deeply concerned that events are about to become our master, and that the options are about to be closed for us. We have been inched into this Asiatic morass step by step, and there are not many more steps short of war which the President described with China and with the world. I yield to you to comment.

Thank you for letting me use you.

Mr. KENNAN. I am in complete agreement, and happy to be able to identify myself enthusiastically at this point with the statement of the President that you have just read. [Laughter.]

Senator GORE. Twice.

I would like to read you another statement President Johnson has made. We seem not to have located here a copy of the planeside statement that he made on landing in California. The staff has called the White House and it is being dictated, and once again, I would like to read to you:

The war we are helping them fight must be won on two fronts. One front is military.

GOAL OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

I know you have said you are not a military man, I certainly don't profess to be, but it does seem to me that this conflict there is more

political, economic, social, religious, anticolonial, racial—or certainly as much these things as it is military.

Do you think it was wise in World War II to have a goal of unconditional surrender?

Mr. KENNAN. No, I do not, and, as a historian, I have pointed out many times what I felt to be the error of this formula.

HOW CAN THE WILL OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BE EXERCISED?

Senator GORE. Well, this colloquy in which you have engaged has, I think, elucidated the issues a great deal. In our democracy of which you are such a scholar and student, how can the American people exercise their will in the present circumstances?

Mr. KENNAN. I think that these circumstances are in that respect not exceptional and that this is a question that relates to our entire political experience as a nation. It has always been my feeling that the people have to express their will primarily through those of you who sit in the legislative branch of the Government and whom they elect to these positions. You are, of course, sensitive to their feelings, and you have ways and means, which I greatly admire, for taking the test of their feelings and opinions. But they require exposure to precisely this sort of a discussion in order to have the issues clarified for them, and I see nothing more that we can do for them than this.

Senator GORE. Mr. Ambassador, you recognize, of course, that this hearing on the critical examination of policy in the midst of a war is unprecedented and it may be historic.

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I do realize that. Perhaps it is too late today. I hope not.

Senator GORE. Let's hope not.

Mr. KENNAN. But if this war had been duly declared, and that was that—if I could really have the feeling that what we were into now was the result of a truly deliberate and searching exploration of this problem in all the places where it should be searched and deliberated in our society—then I think probably I would prefer not to give my views, even though they were ones that were full of misgivings, you see. I would rather keep them to myself. But I feel that this is our last opportunity, and we ought to use it.

Senator GORE. Well, many of us have made mistakes. There are enough mistakes for all to share. I want to plead guilty to not having said the things publicly 4, 5, 6, and 7 years ago that I have been saying publicly for the last 15 months. I should have done so before. This committee should have had this hearing 3 years ago.

It is only, however, with the imminent threat of a nuclear war, that this committee has posed this serious challenge to the American people of the soundness and wisdom of the policy and the course we are following.

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, may I just comment on that with one word? I don't think any of us in this respect should be too rough on ourselves, and you, above all, here. This has been a most unusual situation, and it has been indeed very difficult to find any particular point at which the decision being taken appeared to be of such momentousness that you could identify it as the place where we ought to have a great debate.

Senator GORE. Well, I appreciate that. But having been critical of Presidents and Secretaries of State and Defense, I certainly didn't want to hold myself blameless. I, too, have shared in this mistake.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

USEFULNESS OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Ambassador, I certainly shall not keep you long. I think you have been most generous with your time. You have been most responsive to all the interrogation by members of this committee, I assure you. Personally, I appreciate very much your appearance here because I rather agree with the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Gore, that public discussion is good. On December 12, 1965, there appeared in the Washington Post an article written by you entitled, "Our Push-Pull Dilemma in Vietnam" I shall take a little bit here out of context but I shall read the whole sentence to make it correct.

"This administration could perhaps get more help from public discussion"—and I think we have had some today and we have had some previous. I trust we will continue, because I think the country demands it. I think it is wholesome and I am hopeful that it will be helpful.

To complete this sentence that I did take out of context—"The administration could perhaps get more help from public discussion if it could find less exalted and more meaningful terms in which to describe its own predicament. Public understanding is not aided by the demands that the North Vietnamese 'cease their aggression' which falls so regularly from the lips of senior State Department officials."

I will not put the entire article in the record. I am sure you are familiar with them. You have written several of them.

EFFECT OF U.S. POWER ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHERS

This morning you stated in response to a question, and this is not an exact quote but as I took it down: "We cannot order the political realities or views of other nations by our military power."

Would you want to elaborate a little on that? If we are not going to do it by the military power in this age when we are confronted with nations who seem to respect only military might, what can we do?

MR. KENNAN. I am talking about the internal affairs of other peoples here, and about our entering into these internal affairs and deciding what sort of political conditions shall prevail. And this gives me opportunity to say something that I feel very strongly about.

When it comes to helping people to resist Communist pressures of all sorts, whether you call them aggression or whatever you call them, it has been my conviction for many years that no assistance can be effective unless the people themselves have a very high degree of determination and a willingness to help themselves. The moment they begin to place the bulk of the burden on us, I think the whole situation is lost. So strongly do I feel about this, that I have often said publicly that the only people worth helping in this world are the

people who say, "We propose to survive whether you help us or not and just because you don't help us doesn't mean we are going to go under. It means that we are going to fight to the last ditch anyway but it may be a little easier if you help us."

Now, with people who take that standpoint there is something you can latch onto. But I am extremely suspicious every time I hear it said that "If you Americans don't give us more than you have given us or if you slacken your efforts on our behalf, we will become faint-hearted and then what will become of you?"

And I think there is only one answer to this, and that is "Whatever becomes of us will not be as bad as what becomes of you yourselves if you become fainthearted."

In other words, I do not believe in the possibility of helping people when it comes to problems that are partly problems of their internal political life, unless they themselves have a very high degree of determination and of internal self-discipline. If things have deteriorated so far in these countries that they can't mobilize this sort of public morale and determination, then I don't think any foreign force can put it into them. I think that in these circumstances, the entry of a foreign force into the situation confuses it, creates new confusing elements, which make it all the more difficult. I think this is what has happened in Vietnam, and I have seen it happen in other situations in history.

We intervened in Russia in 1918 amid debates and doubts very much like those of today, and the effect of our intervention was this: There, too, the problem was communism, the problem was communistic forces. We intervened partly to, at least a lot of us thought we were intervening then to, keep these forces from taking over. Now the Communists had opposition in Russia. They had a conservative opposition. They had a more liberal opposition. And the effect of our entry into this situation was to cause these two opposition groups to stop fighting the Communists and begin to fight each other, because each of them said to himself, "Ah ha, the Americans have come in, they are going to save us now from the Communists. Now, we can concentrate on sewing up our domestic position and on getting rid of our domestic rivals."

I think this happens in a number of situations. I think this occurred in China around the time of the Chinese revolution.

In other words, I think it is very, very difficult for outsiders to come into a situation like this and to do only good. I think their presence is apt to confuse the political realities, rather than to be helpful to the resolution of them.

I don't know whether this is responsive to your question.

Senator CARLSON. I appreciate it very much. I am one member of this committee, but I think everyone on the committee and in the Nation is concerned about the ever-increasing buildup militarily in the world—not just our own Nation, but we seem to be on an escalation of expenditures and increasing manpower in the military and you wonder where we are going.

I realize it is a very unpopular time to bring up the 18 nations disarmament conference but it is meeting and I assume they will reach about the same decisions they have been reaching in the past; they

have been unable to get anywhere but isn't it really something that we must be looking forward to in the future, if we are to live in a world of peace?

Mr. KENNAN. I feel very strongly that this is so, and I think that it is a pity that our attentions and our hopes and our efforts are not concentrated more on this vitally important problem of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.

Senator CARLSON. I cannot agree with you more.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?

IS U.S. POSTWAR POLICY IN EUROPE APPLICABLE TO ASIA?

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Ambassador, this morning I mentioned that I didn't think this committee could second-guess the President in the day-to-day direction of the war in Vietnam. Moreover, I don't think that the real service of these hearings has to do with the immediate situation in Vietnam so much as it has to do with examining the underpinnings of our policy. In that connection, you will remember that we discussed the situation that faced this country in Europe after the Second World War, and how different the underlying conditions are in Europe than in Asia.

Our policy in Europe was a success. It appears to me we have been so mesmerized by that success that we have tried to superimpose the same policies in Africa and in Asia, where the underlying conditions are so radically different. The same policies haven't worked there and will not work. That may account for the very serious crisis that now confronts us in Asia.

Well, you will recall, in our discussion this morning, that we talked about the lack of any common cultural tie between the United States and Asian lands, the lack of democratic institutions, the endemic instability, and the likelihood of continuing revolution in this area of the world, as we look ahead.

Let me make it clear, I would like to see the United States fashion a new policy, prudently designed to cope with this reality so that we can use our influence, as best we can, to discourage the spread of communism in Asia and Africa. With that objective I am in full accord.

But we also have another objective that may be even more important in terms of the vital interests of this country, the need to contain Russia and China, the other two great national powers in the world today, and I think we have to keep the two objectives differentiated. I see no evidence, when State Department spokesmen come before this committee, that they make any differentiation at all.

In fact, they constantly wrap the two together as though it were all one ball of wax.

ATTITUDE OF ASIANS TOWARD U.S. ACTION IN VIETNAM

Now, if we return to the question of how we can best discourage the spread of communism in the underdeveloped world, wouldn't you agree that this will depend in the long run, in considerable part, upon

the view that Asians take of us and our policies, in other words, our influence, in the long run, will rest upon the respect and the regard that Asian people have for us and for what we stand?

Mr. KENNAN. Certainly.

Senator CHURCH. Is that correct?

Mr. KENNAN. Certainly.

Senator CHURCH. So the war in Vietnam must be looked at, not simply from our point of view, but from what Asians may think of it. Is that not so?

Mr. KENNAN. Correct.

Senator CHURCH. Of course, none of us are expert on the question of Asian viewpoints. We have to rely on common sense, and upon what little personal experience each of us has had. I remember, when I was a young soldier in India, meeting with Indian rebels. I had never met revolutionaries before—it is very hard to find any in our country—but in India I met with some who were looking toward the day when the war was over, when they could drive out the British, and establish Indian independence, as we have driven out George III 150 years before. And these educated Indians made a great distinction between the United States and Great Britain. They had read Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine and they knew that our country had once stood for revolution. We had been the first colonies to rebel against the British crown. But when I went out into the countryside in India, and was thrown into contact with the peasants, I couldn't see that the Indian peasant, uninformed about the United States and its tradition, made any distinction between my American uniform and the British.

That having been my experience, I worry about the war in Vietnam. We know that our purposes there are very different from what the French purposes were. But when you get out of the intellectual centers in Saigon and venture into the countryside, among the peasantry in Vietnam, do you think that they are apt to make any distinction between an American uniform and a French, or do you think they regard us as merely other white men, and that after their long bitter war to expel the French, they may feel that this is but a repetition of the same struggle.

Mr. KENNAN. Well, of course, I don't know conditions there; but I should think it most implausible that they would make any clear and intelligent distinctions along those lines. I think they would be inclined to think this is another form of Western imperialism.

Senator CHURCH. The other day the Secretary of State was before this committee. He kept referring to the Vietnamese war as Ho Chi Minh's war, and he acknowledged that Ho Chi Minh had been the revolutionary leader who had achieved independence for all of Vietnam by driving out the French.

If he is correct in his assessments of this struggle as Ho Chi Minh's war, don't you think as Vietnamese might view it that this would tend to attract the support of the Vietnamese?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. To the Communist cause.

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I should certainly think this would make Ho Chi Minh's cause more popular than to say that it was an American war or something like that. If you identify it as his war, they will

certainly identify with him, I should think, rather than the stranger. This is true.

REACTIONS TO WESTERN INTERVENTION IN ASIA

Senator CHURCH. I worry about this. It seems to me it is possible that by transporting tremendous numbers of Westerners halfway around the globe to fight against Asians in Asia, as we have done, that we may end up by making Ho Chi Minh an Asian hero.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. And I would hate to see that because the effect of that would be to give added momentum to communism, it seems to me.

Would you agree or disagree?

Mr. KENNAN. I think that in the light of historical precedents this is a strong possibility. I can only tell you that our intervention in Russia in 1918 strengthened the Communists afterwards, gave them great prestige, and permitted them to identify with Russian nationalism, with the protection of Russia against the invading foreigner.

Senator CHURCH. This especially concerns me, Mr. Ambassador, because the Communists have not made very significant headway in their attempts to overthrow governments and establish themselves in power in most of Asia and Africa, except where they can identify communism with nationalism. If our policy is going to be that of intervening in Asian countries with large Western military forces, I am afraid, in the long run, we may work against our own interest, and that we may have the effect of spreading communism rather than thwarting it.

COST OF INTERVENTIONS

The second thing that concerns me is the cost of this to the United States. Assuming that we have to anticipate numerous revolutions in this part of the world, and assuming that each of these revolutions is going to be infiltrated, as I am sure it will, with Communists attempting to take over, and assuming that every time one of these revolutions starts to go badly, we intervene, what is the cost going to be?

In Korea the cost was over \$20 billion and 135,000 American casualties. In Vietnam it is obvious that the cost may go higher. We have already discovered that it is harder to get out of the Dominican Republic than it was to get in. If our policy is to use American military power to quench revolution, then aren't we going to cast ourselves in the role of sentinel for the status quo in the world, and won't the drain on our men and money be out of all proportion to the importance of these wars to the vital interests of the United States?

Mr. KENNAN. This is precisely my view. I can't argue with it.

Senator CHURCH. I think for this reason, to use an old Western phrase, Mr. Ambassador, it is time for the United States to ride a little looser in the saddle. I think that if we do we will have a better chance to prevail against communism. I have been in Communist lands. Communism doesn't impress me at all. I think it is a very weak, bureaucratic, regimented, and repugnant system. It is also an inefficient system, and often very incompetent. I don't think that the

world is going to turn to communism or that it is likely to inherit the world. I think our way of life has a much better chance to spread, and that freedom, if we nourish it properly, has a much better chance to prevail than does communism.

And so we must begin to develop a new policy in these regions of the world—the State Department came up with a good idea, with your help, in Europe, in 1949. I don't think the Department has had a new idea since. [Laughter.]

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, may I just make two observations with regard to what you have said?

I think that in most of these situations, in the smaller and developing countries, where there seems to be a threat of communism or of forces close to communism taking over, there are usually countervailing forces which, if we keep out, will make themselves felt. If we intervene we paralyze them. I don't say this will happen everywhere, but I think this is very often the case, and we should be very careful to bear that in mind.

INFLUENCING OTHER COUNTRIES BY OUR EXAMPLE

But, secondly, when it comes to influencing these people, I feel very strongly that something applies here which I think applies when it comes to influencing your own children; namely, that example is much greater and better than precept, and that the strongest way that we can bring our influence to bear on them is through the power of the example of our own civilization here at home. It is our first task to make this as decent, as creditable, as helpful as an example to others as it can be made. And I just invite attention again to the words that John Quincy Adams used. He says, "America will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice and by the benignant sympathy of her example." And this is where I think this sort of thing ought to stop—with the example.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Ambassador, I agree fully.

My time is up. I would only want to add that when we were an infant country, without any power, without any great armadas dominating the seas and the air, the strength of the American example as a struggling young republic, spread a wave across the Atlantic that humbled or brought down nearly all the great monarchies of Europe within a century's time.

I think that what you have just said is borne out by the history of the 19th century and that now, in this time of our greatness, when our armadas do preside over the seas and the air, we should remember that ideas still have greater force than arms, and that by our example we can lead the world.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator CASE? Or Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. No, thank you very much, Senator.

Senator CASE. Mr. Kennan, I just have one area of questioning that I would like very much to have you comment on. I don't want to keep you because you have had a long day. This is not as directly upon this particular problem as it is an effort to clarify my thinking on how this committee and the Congress can best perform its functions in this present day.

DEBATING U.S. COMMITMENT SHORT OF A DECLARATION OF WAR

There has been a suggestion that we were derelict in not insisting upon a declaration of war. Yet I am not sure that this is realistic.

In an age in which the enemy usually has the ability to cast his aggression in ambiguous form, not quite specific and harsh enough to arouse the American people the way a Pearl Harbor did or a crossing of the Belgian frontier or other things, I wonder if a certain amount of less-formal procedure doesn't have to be followed in matters of this kind, and I wonder whether you wouldn't perhaps give us a little guidance along this line from your own experience in actually being in the executive branch of the Government.

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I think there is great force in what you say. I realize that the procedures we have for defining our relationships to such conflicts are perhaps not entirely relevant to the sort of ambiguous situation that we have met here.

It isn't so much the formal declaration of war that concerns me here. It is the question of whether we have really made up our mind in an adequate way.

It seems to me that the manifestations of American public opinion that we have seen here in this last year, indicate that in this growing involvement the Government, at least, has not yet thrashed out the rationale of what it is doing, has not thrashed it out with the U.S. people in a manner that would relieve my mind as to how the people are going to relate themselves to this in the future.

Do you see what I mean? I just have a feeling here—

Senator CASE. In other words, this must be a continuous process.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator CASE. And here I couldn't agree with you more.

Mr. KENNAN. It must.

Senator CASE. I think you are so right but I didn't mean to interrupt you, I am sorry.

Mr. KENNAN. I think that you just—I have said this before—that you cannot just wander into complications of such magnitude without having it very, very clear in the minds of our people as to precisely what it is you are getting into and having a wide degree of approval—enthusiastic approval on their part.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri.

LESSENING U.S. CASUALTIES THROUGH STRATEGIC BOMBING

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Kennan, there has been mention of a figure of 600,000 American military in South Vietnam by the distinguished junior Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee. That figure did not originate with him. It came from some of the highest military authority, in a hearing before the Armed Services Committee.

Also there was testimony by some of the highest military authority that you might cut the number of young American soldiers needed in South Vietnam by several hundred thousand if you bombed strategic targets, military targets only, in North Vietnam.

Let us say if 100,000 less Americans were needed in South Vietnam as the result of our hitting such strategic targets as power and oil and the docks, would you still be opposed to such air attacks as you were this morning?

I will make my questions as short as possible, and would appreciate your answers being as short as possible, because I know it is late, and know you have been here a long time.

Mr. KENNAN. It is a terrific question, Senator, and it relates to a hypothetical situation which, so far as I know, does not exist.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, let me be sure you understand. We have had testimony, before our other committee that in the opinion of some of the people at highest military level, if we bombed military targets only, like power and oil and the docks, or mined the docks, it would reduce, let us limit the figure to be very, very conservative, at least by 100,000 the number of ground troops needed in South Vietnam. So it is not hypothetical as far as I am concerned.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes. I must say if this were really established, if you could depend on this judgment, I think that then you would have to give it very, very careful consideration. I mean there would have to be a staff study which I am not capable of replacing from this table at this moment. But one would have to take this into very serious consideration.

But I would want to be very sure that this is what you hit, that you did not hit other things, that pictures were not going to come out in the paper of pathetic women bearing their dead children in their arms, the sort of things that we have seen in the press in these recent weeks.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, I have seen a good many dead and wounded young Americans over there in the last few days also.

Mr. KENNAN. I know.

Senator SYMINGTON. And others who might as well have been dead, so I sympathize with you in your sympathy of the casualties and also the opinions of the military.

Then your opinion about the bombing in North Vietnam would be a military matter and not from a moral standpoint.

Mr. KENNAN. No, I would look at it from the political point of view, and I would be very careful what would be the political effects there and further afield.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am not sure I follow you, but I am doing my best.

WHAT CONSTITUTES SUCCESS IN VIETNAM

There has been quite a little discussion and, at least, implied, criticism of the President in this discussion of "victory." I have great respect for the President. He has many serious problems as does any head of any great nation in the world today. But I talked to a good many hundred young Americans in South Vietnam in recent days, and found they all want to be successful, are glad to be over there, no reservation, everyone, provided they could be successful. Their concept of success was that they could stay there long enough so, if they left, the Vietcong would not put hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese to the sword as they have already put tens of thousands. I would imagine the President's concept of success would be to have us leave and, at the same time, have left there opportunity for the South Vietnamese to

have a free and viable government, with free elections, in South Vietnam. Would you be for that also?

Mr. KENNAN. I would certainly not—I would not be too unsympathetic with that line of thought, although I have my doubts about whether free elections would be very feasible in this atmosphere. The only thing that bothers me a little—

Senator SYMINGTON. What kind of elections do you think we should have if we should not have free elections?

Mr. KENNAN. I think the chances would be better for a sort of accommodation between the leaders of the several political factions that do exist there in South Vietnam.

Senator SYMINGTON. And then have dictated the elections, based on what the leaders at the top think about it?

Mr. KENNAN. I cannot know what they would agree on. I cannot look that much in the future. But what worries me a little bit about what you have stated as an aim here is that it seems to leave out entirely the South Vietnamese forces which are formidable in number, and to assume they cannot do anything for themselves, that the Americans have got to do everything.

Senator SYMINGTON. For what it is worth, I believe South Vietnamese could handle the Vietcong without too much difficulty if it were not for what the latter were getting from the Red Chinese and the North Vietnamese down through the Ho Chi-Minh trail.

When were you in Vietnam?

Mr. KENNAN. I have never been there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Never have been there.

Mr. KENNAN. I am conscious of the limitations on the responses I can offer.

BRINGING ABOUT THE POLITICAL CAPITULATION OF NORTH VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. On page 3 you say:

There seems to be an impression that if we bring sufficient military pressure to bear there will occur at some point something in the nature of a political capitulation by the other side. I think this is a most dangerous assumption. * * * The North Vietnamese and the Vietcong have between them a great deal of space and manpower to give up if they have to, and the Chinese can give them more if they need it.

That is a recognition of the one place that they have equality, if not superiority; namely, in numbers of people, is that correct?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Nevertheless, even though that is where they exceed us, but we exceed them qualitatively, in sea and air power, you would not use that sea and air power in North Vietnam, is that correct?

Mr. KENNAN. We have not spoken of seapower here at all today.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, seapower today is primarily airpower except for the *Polaris*, and—

Mr. KENNAN. Well, it would depend on the purpose, Senator, for which you are doing this.

I do not entertain very optimistic feelings with regard to the purpose of trying to put an end to the Communist pressures in this part of the world by any military means.

I have a feeling that you can of course bomb these oil supplies and means of communication in North Vietnam—I must say that it seems

to me that the results of bombing of this sort, not just in this war but in others, have not been quite what we were led to expect or to hope that they would be—but let us say that they were effective. I still do not think that this would solve the problem. I think you are going to be faced with the fact that the Vietcong will go on controlling at night the villages which we control during the daytime. I do not think we get to the guts of the problem through this.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

VIEWS ON THE "ENCLAVE" THEORY

Now I will turn if I may, to page 5 of your statement. You say:

Everything I can learn about its political aspects suggests to me that General Gavin is on the right track in his suggestions that we should, if I understand him correctly, decide what limited areas we can safely police and defend, and restrict ourselves largely to the maintenance of our position there. I have listened with interest to the arguments that have been brought forward in opposition to his views, and I must say that I have not been much impressed with some of them.

Am I correct in believing that you would want to withdraw to these enclaves in South Vietnam?

Mr. KENNAN. That strikes me as the most hopeful alternative that we face.

Now again I would not wish to try to define, as a civilian sitting over here and not knowing the terrain or the circumstances—

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand, but I did not bring it up. You did, and I would like to be sure I understand what you think.

Mr. KENNAN. I will try to define in a military sense what it means. If it were necessary to carry out forward sweeps to protect the borders of such enclaves, why, that is that, and I suppose it could be done. But I do find it a little hard to understand why this should be impossible, and the explanations that I have read as to why it should be impossible, I have not found very convincing.

EFFECT OF ENCLAVE THEORY ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE

Senator SYMINGTON. There are 700,000 South Vietnamese fighting with us over there today; and their casualties are a great deal heavier than ours. If you go to the enclave theory, then you automatically give up the assistance of some 700,000 people, of whom only 5 percent are draftees, the rest volunteers.

Do you think that would be wise from the standpoint of the additional casualties we would have in American forces because they carried on without the assistance of the 700,000?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I would be very interested to know why one of those things follows from the other. Why should we give up the support of the 700,000 and some Vietnamese because we concentrated on defending enclave areas?

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, of course, the South Vietnamese hope ultimately their villages will be free. If we retire to these coastal enclaves and give up all the land their families live on, and give their families up to the Vietcong, what reason would there be for them wanting to continue to fight the war just to protect the Americans in enclaves?

Mr. KENNAN. Well after all, it is their country, and these forces that they have are, if I am correct, over three times, numerically, what the Vietcong have. If they have any extent of determination and resolve, can they not fight on their own behalf? Must they have us at their side?

Senator SYMINGTON. In the first place, I do not think they are over three times, but that is a detail.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. In any case, they would continue to be supported heavily by the Communists from the north; therefore, they would find it extremely difficult to protect their villages against terrorism.

I have been in villages where they beheaded the children of the chief first, then his wife, then the chief himself. Under that type and character of typical Communist terrorism, and the policies laid down by Mao Tse-tung, and Lin Pao in his recent speech, it would be very difficult for them to get along, regardless of numerical superiority.

Do you think it is an asset to have these people fighting for us. Secondly, morally do you think we have the right to desert them by going into the coastal enclaves?

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, if their morale is so shaky that without an offensive strategy on our part they are simply going to give up the fight, I do not think they are worth helping anyway. And, as for the question of our having a moral obligation to them, they have had enormous help from us to date. I mean, goodness, they have had help in billions and billions of dollars. How many countries are you going to give such a claim on our resources and our help? If they cannot really do the trick with this, I feel strongly that the trouble lies somewhere with them and not with us, and I am not inclined to take the exclusive blame for this whole situation on to the United States and say that everything that goes wrong there or anything that cannot be done is our fault because we have not given it enough.

It seems to me we are bearing every bit our share of the burden. They cannot expect this country to launch itself into an indefinite involvement there on their behalf, which may distort our entire foreign policy, may carry us in the direction of a large war in an area where we do not want to fight it. They cannot expect this sort of thing from us.

PRACTICAL VERSUS MORAL CONSIDERATION

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Kennan, I think I knew how you felt, because I notice you say at one point, "I am not looking at this whole problem from the moral standpoint but from the practical one." I think, practically, you would find a good many thousand young Americans in South Vietnam who, regardless of your theories of the relative importance of Europe as against Asia, or the relative importance of people in one part of the world as against another, would feel a moral obligation not to desert people who, every day, are risking the lives of themselves and their families to promote the policies of the United States, even though it is clear to me you do not think those policies are sound.

COMPARING VIETNAM TO BRITISH AND FRENCH COLONIAL WITHDRAWALS

Now, I would like to go back to another point on page 5, if I may, where you talk about France giving an impressive exhibition of statesmanship in withdrawing from north Africa; and about the British wisely and tolerantly liquidating great portions of their colonial empire.

Do you feel that the position of the United States in the world today, with our unprecedented economy and our obligations, whatever they may be, to free people, is comparable to that of the British today?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, it is sufficiently comparable so that I should doubt—and this is all that I meant to say with that statement—I should doubt that we would be receiving any bitter reproaches from the British over giving up an individual position like this, even if we were to do it, because they have been all through this, as have the French and others. And, incidentally, as far as that is concerned, this sort of loss has usually been digested somehow or another.

Senator SYMINGTON. My time is up. I would like to ask a couple of quick questions, then wait until the next round. Would you withdraw from Europe if you were the United States?

Mr. KENNAN. Just now? Just like that? I mean, you cannot answer, it seems to me, answer this question—

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you see any difference between our now withdrawing from Europe and the British withdrawing from Europe, and all the other places they once have been?

Mr. KENNAN. I think these are quite different situations. And, obviously, in the delicate situation that exists in Europe today, with a Germany divided, with the Berlin situation, any withdrawal on our part would have implications which are not at all involved in, let us say, in southeast Asia.

RELATIVE DANGER FROM RUSSIA AND CHINA

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think there is a greater danger from Soviet Russia than there is from Communist China?

Mr. KENNAN. A greater potential danger, and I would be more concerned to avoid a war—I would be more concerned to try to patch up our relations—with the Soviet Union than with Communist China.

After all, Senator, let me just say this: It is something that has lain at the heart of my own thinking about these matters ever since 1947. If you look around the world and ask yourself where military-industrial strength exists on such a scale that it can produce armed force, and particularly amphibious force, in a degree that can really be troublesome and dangerous to us, you will find that there are really only about five such areas. Our own country is one of them; England is another; the Rhine Valley in Western Europe is a third; the Soviet Union is a fourth; and Japan is a fifth. These are all in the North temperate zone of the globe. Only one of them today is in the hands of Communists. This is the Soviet Union.

Senator SYMINGTON. My time is up. But as you talk I get the impression that, despite some of the members on this committee being "scared to death" and others thinking the greatest danger is a war with China, you do not feel that is nearly as important as protecting

ourselves from the industrial complexes of Russia and others—is that correct?

Mr. KENNAN. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, and if we want to continue the dialog I will wait until my turn.

The CHAIRMAN. On my time you answer the question. Go ahead. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. KENNAN. I only want to say that the great problem of containment, to my mind, is to prevent, if we can, Communist power from getting control of one or the other of these great military industrial potentials, and this is why I attach an importance to Germany and to Japan far greater in the long-term sense than I would to South Vietnam. This was merely what I wanted to say.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I ask one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. I will yield to you my time if you like.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is kind of you; I would like to pursue this because I am not quite clear.

Then you do not feel that Red China—and I ask it with great respect—is a serious menace to the United States today; is that a fair question?

Mr. KENNAN. This is correct, except insofar as we have involved ourselves in the situation in southeast Asia where we meet it on its own land mass. But in any place outside of that land mass today, I do not think it is a serious threat to us as things stand now.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you read Lin Pao's speech of the 3d of December?

Mr. KENNAN. I do not remember. I probably read part of it in the press if it appeared there.

Senator, I do not know what the implication of that question is. But I would not want to be misunderstood. These people talk the most inflammatory language that anyone could conceive of, and I am well aware of that.

EFFECT OF CHINA'S DEVELOPING NUCLEAR CAPACITY

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, within 10 years, it is estimated, maximum, the Red Chinese will be a nuclear power. In that speech the Deputy Prime Minister, head of their military stated that the great enemy of Red China is the United States in the world today, the imperialists that they must defeat is the United States; that the test place was now, in South Vietnam, therefore, wouldn't it be better to realize this possible danger now, and to try to defend ourselves in South Vietnam if we believe that there is any truth in what he says, than a time until they become a nuclear power? I am not talking about attacking anybody. Let me emphasize that. I am talking only about continuing to defend with conventional weapons in a conventional way, the efforts of the Red Chinese who are now, many thousands of them, in North Vietnam; and defending against the North Vietnamese in the efforts of the latter to help the Vietcong, and themselves against the South Vietnamese, the Americans, the Koreans, and the Australians, and New Zealanders.

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, I would far prefer that it was we and not they, who decided what was the test place in this contest, first of all.

But beyond that, I think that there may be better ways of tackling the problem of the Chinese approach to a nuclear striking capacity than by fighting Vietnamese down there in southeast Asia.

Senator SYMINGTON. I'm sorry, would you repeat that.

Mr. KENNAN. I think there might be better ways of tackling on our part the problem created by the Chinese approach to the acquisition of a nuclear striking capacity than by trying to fight Vietnamese in southeast Asia.

Senator SYMINGTON. Surely you do not mean we should attack their nuclear developments.

Mr. KENNAN. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then would you state what you do mean?

Mr. KENNAN. I would like to see us get back to the cultivation of our world relationships and to the pursuit of this whole question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in talks with the Russians and with others, because I think that if we could develop the general agreement elsewhere in the world on this subject we might begin to bring some pressure to bear on the Chinese.

Senator SYMINGTON. I agree with you. But aren't we doing that? Isn't Mr. Foster in Geneva now trying very hard to reach some agreement with respect to proliferation?

Mr. KENNAN. I think we could do a lot better if we did not have the complication in Vietnam, with the burden that that places on our relationships with other people.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, if we would get out of South Vietnam you think that would improve our possibilities of making a proliferation treaty with the Soviet?

Mr. KENNAN. If the conflict there could be terminated, I think we could address ourselves to other problems of world affairs in a much more hopeful way. This is indeed my view.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

Now, on page 5 you say:

U.S. COMMITMENT TO VIETNAMESE PEOPLE OR GOVERNMENT

And finally, when I hear it said that to adopt a defensive strategy in South Vietnam would be to rat on our commitment to the government of that territory—

I may be wrong, but we have no commitment to any government in South Vietnam; have we? We have a commitment to the people of South Vietnam; have we not?

Mr. KENNAN. Well, if we have one, it is really a commitment to ourselves, I think, because it has certainly not achieved any formal statement anywhere. I realize that this reverts, Senator, to things you have said before about our relation to the Vietnamese people: the way some of our men in the forces feel about this over there, and so forth, and I may be at fault here, but I must say that I see our own interests in this world very greatly endangered, and it is our own country, and our ability over the long term to contribute to international life, that I am concerned with here, more than I am, I must say, with the South Vietnamese.

Furthermore, I do not think that you can regard our country as having a commitment to a people at large. We have to deal with

these people through the political authority which governs the territory in which they live; I would not say the political authority they select, because they have not even selected it in South Vietnam. This is what we have to deal with. While I have no prejudice against this authority, I have great misgivings about accepting the thesis that its ideals are the same as ours, and that we should identify with them.

Senator SYMINGTON. Whose ideals are those?

Mr. KENNAN. The ideals of the South Vietnamese regime—its leaders, put it that way.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about the people?

Mr. KENNAN. I have no idea. But I should very much doubt also that their ideals are similar to ours.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wish at some time, as long as you feel so definite about these things, that you would take a little time off and go out there and visit in South Vietnam, not with the leaders but with the people in the villages and the political action teams and the young men we are training by the thousands to try to go back and be good citizens in the villages.

I think, if I may respectfully say so, you would change your opinion some.

I do not want to prolong this. A lot of people criticize the administration, about what we are doing. They criticize our policies. But then they say, "We are not really criticizing the President and we don't want to get out. We want to stay there."

LONG- AND SHORT-TERM IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM

I do not feel that way about it. I would either like to move forward, and have the sacrifices being made by many people mean more, or move out. I think the more you talk, if I am correct, the more you are saying "Let's move out, go out. This is really not important to the future destiny of the United States." Is that a fair assumption?

Mr. KENNAN. It is a fair assumption as a long-term recognition, but not as a short-term one. I have not said that we should move out of there unilaterally and in any disorderly way. I have not said that we should abandon the field and leave everything to other people. I would like to see us maintain a presence in there until we can use it to some good effect in achieving a political settlement of this conflict.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would that be by retiring to the coast, the enclaves on the coast?

Mr. KENNAN. That sounds to me, as an outside citizen and civilian, as the alternative that makes the most sense.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where did you get the idea?

Mr. KENNAN. Actually I had it before General Gavin uttered it, and it appears in this article that was published in the Washington Post in December last.

Senator SYMINGTON. You might be interested to know that General Gavin denies ever saying that. I so placed in the record today. He said he never asserted that he wanted to retire to the enclaves on the coast and turn the people of South Vietnam over to the Vietcong.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would be glad to yield, Mr. Chairman.

COMPARISON OF KENNAN AND GAVIN VIEWS

The CHAIRMAN. Earlier in this testimony the witness stated his position almost as General Gavin did the day before yesterday. He said he did not advocate retiring or retreating. It was to hold a position that we now have. You, earlier in your testimony, said that Senator Symington said that you advocated retiring; you had not said that previously. You said to hold the position we now have with what we have. That is what General Gavin said the other day.

Mr. KENNAN. Senator, perhaps if I were to define my position I would do best by saying I would gladly identify myself with what Mr. Walter Lippmann said in the column published in the Washington paper this morning about this, namely, that we should regard this as a limited war, a war for limited objectives, and not for unlimited ones.

The CHAIRMAN. All I meant is I think you, perhaps, were responding to that question in a little different way than you did previously, and as General Gavin did, because he stated that he had been grossly misrepresented.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put Mr. Lippmann's column in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection so ordered.
(The document referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1966]

LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WAR

(By Walter Lippmann)

The declaration from Honolulu consists of a web of ringing generalities about the hopes, the good intentions, the high-minded purposes of the Johnson administration and the Ky government. What it all means concretely and in practice has to be inferred. If the inferences that are drawn are wrong, as I devoutly hope they are, the fault lies with the calculated opaqueness of the document.

I read it as a refusal by the President to put limits on our war aims and on our military commitments in Vietnam. The declaration is tantamount to the rejection of a negotiated peace between General Ky and his adversaries in the Vietcong and in North Vietnam. We are committed to win the war and to defeat and liquidate the enemy forces, and then to reconstruct the country as it is regained for the Saigon government.

The indispensable condition of a negotiated peace—that there be negotiation with the enemy in the field—was loudly rejected in a press conference at Honolulu by General Ky without any noticeable reservations by the President.

The big objective which the words of the document declare is a total victory for General Ky. To accomplish this enormous objective, very large forces will be needed. The declaration must therefore be read as a commitment of American forces limited not by considerations of policy but only by our ability to break the logistical bottlenecks which hold down the number of troops we can land and support.

If these are not the political and military decisions on which the Honolulu Conference agreed, no time should be lost in making clear to our people what in fact the commitments are.

As it happened, on the day the Honolulu Declaration was issued, General Gavin was testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. As a result of his testimony the central issue in the whole great controversy can now be seen. It is whether we are fighting a limited or an unlimited war in Vietnam.

The Gavin position, as it emerged from the questioning by the Senators, is that our strategic planning and our diplomatic objectives should be tailored to the fact that we cannot—because of our other responsibilities around the world—commit an unlimited force to the war in South Vietnam. General Gavin made

it clear enough that we cannot withdraw until after there is a political settlement and that we should not escalate much beyond the force already committed. If this is the limitation on the kind of war we can fight, it follows that our strategic purpose will have to be to hold fast in the areas we already occupy and which are within reach of our seapower.

This is not a strategical plan for winning the war. It is a strategical plan for not losing the war dishonorably and unnecessarily. Those of us who support this strategical principle are convinced that a war on the Asian mainland cannot be won by a white Western power. For 20 years this belief has been tested on the battlefields of Indochina, and there is no reason to think that we are in sight of the objectives once again reiterated in the Honolulu Declaration.

The most serious criticism that has been made of the proposed holding strategy is that the American forces are not able to hold and make secure enclaves in South Vietnam. No doubt it would be difficult to do so. But to admit that the military forces of the United States are not powerful enough to do this is a radical and spectacular admission that American military power is very feeble indeed on the Asian mainland. If what we decided to hold were an island, it could be protected as effectively as Formosa or even the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. If our Gibraltar were on a peninsula like Korea, or on an isthmus like the Kra, the stronghold could be made secure.

The serious defect of the enclave strategy is that it attempts to hold territory which is not an island, a peninsula or an isthmus but is rather on the continent of Asia. It would therefore be subject to infiltration and to siege. But the total opponents of the holding strategy are left with the alternative of fighting an unlimited land war on the continent.

These are difficult matters and nobody involved in the argument has any claim to infallibility. For myself, I agree with General Gavin that we should adopt the strategy of a strictly limited war. While it is true as the Washington Post said on Wednesday, "that there is no easy, painless, costless alternative" to our present course in southeast Asia, there may be, and it is our duty to search for, a wiser one.

The CHAIRMAN. We went into this at great length with General Gavin. He made it quite clear that he was not advocating retreating to a narrow enclave. He said he wished to hold our position. He thought we could with our present forces. He was simply not for escalating—increasing the commitment is what he really said—and I thought that is what you said earlier.

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I do not pretend to know what the definition of a defensive posture would be in South Vietnam. That is up to military people to determine. I cannot speculate on that. I only say that I feel great misgivings about a forward strategy, and feel a strong conviction that we will have no profit from an attempt to carry this military effort to its ultimate conclusions.

Senator GORE. And ultimately you think the United States should not maintain armed forces there.

Mr. KENNAN. That is correct. I look forward to the day when we will not have any there.

MORAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. So long as you understand my position, there is nobody anywhere who wants to get out of South Vietnam more than I do. I would do anything in the world that I know of to get out of it.

But, on the other hand, we defend the free world today all over the world. One of the highest people in the State Department, not in the military, said that if we walked out of South Vietnam, he thought there would be riots in Berlin. That is why I am disturbed about your statement that you do not look at this whole problem from a moral

standpoint, rather from a practical one. To me there does seem to be some morality in it, that we do have some obligations to these South Vietnamese people out there.

All over the world, we have made commitments to people as to what we will do in case they are attacked. It seems to me that it would be very difficult for us to leave South Vietnam without destroying the position we have with others; with people like the West Germans, and in other places.

I want to get out. But I do not see how we can get out, and the only way we can stay in there, in my opinion, without very heavy additional loss of American life, is to utilize where we are strong, sea air power and air power, and not fight on the ground. And yet you feel we should not use that power against North Vietnam. Rather we should take it on a one to one basis in the jungles on the ground. I think that is where we have our major difference.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is becoming very late, Mr. Kennan. You have been most patient with us. I know you are very tired, as we all are.

I cannot tell you how much we appreciate your testimony. I think you have made a great contribution to the understanding of this most difficult problem. I only regret that this committee and the Government had not consulted you more often in the last year or two. I think we all would have benefited from your advice.

I thank you very much.

The committee is adjourned until the next meeting. The meeting will be with General Taylor, according to current plans, which are subject to change at any time, on next Thursday.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I make one observation before we leave?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wanted to ask the witness in detail about his opinions as against General Taylor's opinions, militarily, of General Gavin's opinions militarily. But, as I understand it, Mr. Kennan, and you know my respect for you, sir, you do not feel you could comment on the differences between those two military men because of your lack of military experience; is that correct, sir?

Mr. KENNAN. I think it would be much better for me not to attempt to do it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kennan.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the committee recessed to resume at 10 a.m., Thursday, February 17, 1966.)

SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, FISCAL YEAR 1966—VIETNAM

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Morse, Long of Louisiana, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams of Delaware, Mundt, and Case.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Some question has been raised in the last day or so about the purpose of these hearings. The purpose of the hearings is to inform the American people, the members of the committee and the Senate as fully as possible about the implications of the war in Vietnam. Whether our country is to continue to enlarge, to continue on the present basis, or to settle this war is a very serious question affecting the lives and fortunes of every citizen of this Nation.

I know of no other forum in which this problem may be more appropriately examined than this committee. It is in truth our duty under the Constitution to inquire into matters of this kind. I hope these hearings may assist our Government in making the wisest possible decision with the security of our country for the reestablishment of peace in southeast Asia.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

We are privileged this morning to have as our witness Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, one of the ablest military leaders we have had in this country in many years. His record of distinguished service to the Nation goes back nearly 45 years. He was an outstanding combat leader in World War II, and in Korea, and went to progressively more responsible positions to become Chief of Staff of the Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Few men have played such a significant role in the developments leading to our current involvement in Vietnam.

For the last 5 years, General Taylor has been associated intimately with the making of Vietnamese policy decisions as personal military representative of President Kennedy in 1961 and 1962, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962 to 1964, and as our Ambassador to South Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. He is now Special Consultant to the President, and accompanied him to the recent conference in Honolulu.

General Taylor, we are very pleased to have you. Of course, we have had you very often before and are familiar with you. We welcome you to make whatever statements you wish.

STATEMENT OF GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR (RETIRED)

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the committee for your willingness to hear my views on the situation in South Vietnam. I am afraid that they will not be new to many of you since you have often heard me express them in the days when I was an official of the Government. I agree thoroughly with the motivating purposes of these hearings; namely, to analyze the reasons why we are involved in South Vietnam, the importance of this involvement, and the effectiveness with which we are dealing with the resultant problems. If my personal view can assist in clarifying these points, I shall be most happy to present them.

For the purpose of providing a basis for our subsequent discussion, with your permission I would like to make a continuous statement which will undertake to answer three basic questions.

First, what are we doing in South Vietnam?

Secondly, how are we doing it?

And, finally, can we improve upon what we are doing?

WHAT WE ARE DOING IN VIETNAM

A simple statement of what we are doing in South Vietnam is to say that we are engaged in a clash of purpose and interest with the militant wing of the Communist movement represented by Hanoi, the Vietcong and Peiping. Opposing these Communist forces, in the front rank stand the Government and people of South Vietnam supported primarily by the United States but assisted in varying degree by some 30 other nations.

The purpose of the Hanoi camp is perfectly clear and has been since 1954. It is to absorb the 15 million people of South Vietnam into a single Communist state under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his associates in Hanoi. In the course of accomplishing this basic purpose, the Communist leaders expect to undermine the position of the United States in Asia and to demonstrate the efficacy of the so-called war of liberation as a cheap, safe, and disavowable technique for the future expansion of militant communism.

Our purpose is equally clear and easily defined. In his Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, President Johnson did so in the following terms:

Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

This has been our basic objective since 1954. It has been pursued by three successive administrations and remains our basic objective today.

DEMONSTRATING THE DANGER OF "WAR OF LIBERATION"

Like the Communists, we have secondary objectives derived from the basic one. We intend to show that the "war of liberation," far from being cheap, safe, and disavowable is costly, dangerous, and doomed to failure. We must destroy the myth of its invincibility in order to protect the independence of many weak nations which are vulnerable targets for "subversive aggression"—to use the proper term for the "war of liberation." We cannot leave while force and violence threaten them.

IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM TO UNITED STATES

The question has been raised as to whether this clash of interests is really important to us. An easy and incomplete answer would be that it must be important to us since it is considered so important by the other side. Their leadership has made it quite clear that they regard South Vietnam as the testing ground for the "war of liberation" and that after its anticipated success there, it will be used widely about the world. Kosygin told Mr. Reston in his interview last December:

We believe that national liberation wars are just wars and they will continue as long as there is national oppression by imperialist powers.

Before him, Khrushchev, in January 1961, had the following to say:

Now a word about national liberation wars. The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people serve as the latest example of such wars. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable. Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with peoples waging liberation struggles.

General Giap, the commander in chief of the North Vietnamese forces, has made the following comment:

South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world.

The Minister of Defense of Communist China, Marshal Lin Piao, in a long statement of policy in September 1965, described in detail how Mao Tse-tung expects to utilize the "war of liberation" to expand communism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

EFFECT OF SUCCESS OF "WAR OF LIBERATION"

These testimonials show that, apart from the goal of imposing communism on 15 million South Vietnamese, the success of the "war of liberation" is in itself an important objective of the Communist leadership. On our side, we can understand the grave consequences of such a success for us. President Eisenhower in 1959 stressed the military importance of defending southeast Asia in the following terms. He said:

Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries of southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a crumbling process which could as it progresses have grave consequences for the forces of freedom.

Now, this view has often been referred to as the "domino theory." I personally do not believe in such a theory if it means belief in a law of nature which requires the collapse of each neighboring state in an inevitable sequence, following a Communist victory in South Vietnam. However, I am deeply impressed with the probable effects worldwide, not necessarily in areas contiguous to South Vietnam, if the "war of liberation" scores a significant victory there. President Kennedy commented on this danger with moving eloquence:

The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the southern half of the globe—Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East—the lands of the people who harbor the greatest hopes. The enemies of freedom think they can destroy the hopes of the newer nations and they aim to do it before the end of this decade. This is a struggle of will and determination as much as one of force and violence. It is a battle for the conquest of the minds and souls as much as for the conquest of lives and territory. In such a struggle, we cannot fail to take sides.

Gentlemen, I think a simple answer to the question, what are we doing in South Vietnam, is to say that for more than a decade we have been taking sides in a cause in which we have a vital stake.

HOW ARE WE DOING IT?

My second question was, How are we doing in the pursuit of our objectives in South Vietnam? Both sides in the struggle have over the years developed the current strategies which are now in confrontation.

During 1964 and 1965, the Hanoi leadership attempted to exploit the political turbulence which followed the fall of President Diem in November 1963. Greatly encouraged by the disorder which marked the political scene in Saigon, the Communist leadership made a massive effort to press on to victory. To meet the growing needs in military manpower, they began the infiltration of personnel of the North Vietnamese Army, first as individual replacements, later as formed tactical units. Utilizing this new strength, they intended to make the monsoon offensive of 1965 a major drive for significant military victories.

Concurrently, they increased the sabotage directed at the land communication system in South Vietnam for the purpose of hampering the distribution of commodities and thus adding to the economic stresses in the south.

Terrorism was stepped up and directed with added frequency at U.S. personnel and installations. They apparently hoped to be able to seize and hold politically important localities such as district and provincial capitals, to demoralize the Vietnamese people and Government and to demonstrate to the United States that we were backing a cause which must inevitably fail.

INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN GROUND FORCES

Faced with this growing threat, the Vietnamese Government and our American officials were obliged to develop a counter strategy to blunt and defeat the intensified efforts of our adversaries. It evolved out of the experience of the preceding months and years and assumed its full form with the critical decisions in 1965 to introduce U.S.

ground forces and to initiate the bombing campaign against military targets in the north. Both of these courses of action had been under consideration at least since November 1961, when I presented my report to President Kennedy following a visit to Saigon to appraise the growing criticality of the situation there.

We did not take either action at that time but my report contained the following comment with regard to the possible necessity of using air power against the source of the Vietcong support in North Vietnam: I quote:

While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken now, I would not suggest that it is the final word. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South Vietnam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training, and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary.

Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of the aggression after the fact that external aggression is clearly established?

By February, 1965, it became clear that we could no longer tolerate this clandestine support from the immune sanctuary in North Vietnam which served as the external base for the Vietcong insurgency.

INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GROUND FORCES

In brief, the strategy which we have been and are pursuing consists of four components. The first includes the many activities directed at increasing the effectiveness of our ground combat against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam. For this purpose, we have made the utmost efforts to increase the indigenous forces of South Vietnam, always mindful that this is a Vietnamese war in which we should do only those things which the Vietnamese cannot do for themselves or cannot do in time to avert defeat.

From July 1964 to July 1965 the armed forces and police of South Vietnam were increased by some 140,000 trained men, a very creditable effort on the part of this small country where military leadership and administrative experience are inevitably in short supply. As of today, the overall military strength in South Vietnam is approaching 700,000, the largest military force in being among all of our allies, worldwide.

Encouraging though the results have been in increasing the Vietnamese strength, during the year cited, our intelligence authorities believed that the Vietcong increased their total strength by some 60,000. In other words, we were advancing at a rate only a little better than 2 to 1 in our favor.

Since history has shown that the Government forces successfully opposing a guerrilla insurgency in the past have required a much greater preponderance of strength, 10 to 1 or 12 to 1 for example, it was quite clear the Vietnamese could not raise forces fast enough to keep pace with the growing threat of the Vietcong in time. It was this sobering conclusion that led to the decision to introduce American ground forces with their unique mobility and massive firepower to compensate for the deficiency in Vietnamese strength. With such forces available, it was felt that the ratios of required strength cited above would lose much of their validity.

IS THE REQUIREMENT FOR U.S. TROOPS ENDLESS?

I am thoroughly, Mr. Chairman, aware of the concern of this committee over the growing requirement for American troops in South Vietnam. Is this an endless requirement in an open-ended war? I do not believe that anyone can give a completely satisfactory reply to this question but I can suggest the consideration of certain limiting factors which have a bearing on the matter.

First, on our side, we are not setting as an objective for our ground forces the occupation of all South Vietnam or the hunting down of the last armed guerrilla. We are in Vietnam to safeguard the people who are the real target of the enemy. Terrain has little meaning except insofar as it supports people. Thus the extent of control and protection of population is the true measure of progress rather than control of territory. By the former indicator we are not doing too badly.

Senator Mansfield estimates, in his recent report, that the Government controls about 60 percent of the population, the Vietcong about 22 percent, leaving 18 percent contested. When I left Saigon last July, those figures were 53 percent, 25 percent, 22 percent.

The point I wish to make is that when one expresses our military objective in terms of securing a high proportion of the population, the troops requirement loses some of its impression of open-endedness. Under this concept, the prime target of our U.S. forces becomes the main-line enemy units which constitute the greatest threat to population—not the entire guerrilla force wherever found.

Another limiting factor is the logistic difficulty of the Vietcong in supporting increased numbers of troops in combat. The combination of air attacks on their lines of supply and of increasing ground attacks on their units which must then consume supplies at an increased rate places some kind of ceiling on the forces they can maintain in South Vietnam.

I wish I knew exactly where that ceiling is but our basic data on Vietcong logistics are too uncertain to permit precision. But the point is that there are factors which tend to keep our troop requirement finite and limit the capability of Hanoi to support large numbers of additional forces in the south.

AIRPOWER AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY TARGETS

The second component of our strategy relates to the use of airpower against military targets in North Vietnam. It is well to remind ourselves the reasons which impelled us to this decision. There were three which we recognized perfectly at the time of the decision and which remain valid today. The first was to give the people of South Vietnam the assurance for the first time of imposing a direct penalty on the source of the aggression. For 11 years they had suffered the depredations of the Vietcong without exacting any price from the country which provided the direction and support. The morale of the people and that of the armed forces in Vietnam received an inestimable lift from the decision to use the air forces of both our countries against military targets in the homeland of the enemy—a lift which has certainly contributed to sustaining their will to continue to fight.

The second reason for the decision was to use airpower, insofar as it could be effective, to limit and render more difficult the infiltration of the men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. It was perfectly clear from the start as it is clear today that airpower would not be able to stop infiltration. We were quite sure, however, that it could impose a ceiling on the forces which could be sustained in combat in South Vietnam. I do not believe that anyone who has reflected on the effect of the destruction of bridges, ports, railyards and similar facilities, and on the effect of the limitation of daylight movement on the roads throughout a large part of North Vietnam can avoid the conclusion that the air campaign has had an important effect in slowing down infiltration and in raising its price. A testimonial to its effectiveness was the feverish activity in North Vietnam during the bombing pause to repair bomb damage and to move transport in daylight.

The third reason for the decision to use our airpower was to provide a sobering reminder to the leaders in Hanoi that progressively they must pay a mounting price for the continuation of their support of the Vietcong insurgency.

In spite of their defiant statements of determination to endure these attacks forever, I for one know from experience that no one derives any enjoyment from receiving incoming shells and bombs day after day and I have no doubt that the warning message is getting through to the leadership of Hanoi. In a very real sense, the objective of our air campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership.

We hope that, in due course, the combination of the Vietcong failure to win victory on the ground in South Vietnam and the effect of continued air attacks will present to the Hanoi leadership a situation so disadvantageous that they will decide that it is in their interest to halt their aggression, redefine their aims, and join with us in discussing ways and means of improving the lot of all Vietnam.

NONMILITARY ACTIVITIES

The third component of our current strategy includes all of those nonmilitary activities which are so important but which receive too little public attention. It is not that our leaders have been unaware of the importance of better government, better living conditions, and the promise of a better future for the people of this country. Unfortunately, lack of insecurity and governmental instability were for a long time factors limiting the effectiveness of the many programs for development and reconstruction. But now, with the growing military effectiveness of our forces on the ground and the slowly developing maturity of the civil leadership in Saigon and in the provinces, I hope that conditions will permit much greater progress than in the past in bringing the benefits of a comparatively normal life to this war-weary people.

As you know, the recent Honolulu Conference devoted most of its time to a consideration of these nonmilitary activities. If we are to leave a country after the end of the Vietcong insurgency, it is essential that we make progress even under the conditions of war in stabilizing the government, the society, and the economy.

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

The fourth component of our strategy is that which relates to our political and diplomatic efforts to initiate the discussion of a peaceful settlement of this conflict.

The so-called peace offensive is so well known as to require no discussion at this time, as is also the discouraging lack of response from the other side.

I am obliged to feel that the Hanoi leadership is not yet convinced that it must mend its ways. Perhaps they still hope for some kind of military victory in the South. Certainly, they are not convinced that in some way the United States cannot be detached from the support of South Vietnam. They hope against hope that through international or domestic pressures our Government can be forced off course.

They have not forgotten that the Vietminh won more in Paris than in Dienbienphu and believe that the Vietcong may be as fortunate in Washington. They doubt the will of the American public to continue the conflict indefinitely. In a contest of patience, they expect to win even though North Vietnam like the South has been constantly at war for over 20 years. Until it becomes perfectly clear to them that we are going to stay on course regardless of anything they can do, I am afraid we are not likely to see them at a conference table. Or if they come unconvinced of the inevitability of the failure of their present course, we can expect them to stall, delay, and maneuver just as they did at Panmunjom in Korea for over 2 years.

In summary then, our four-point strategy consists of a complex but coherent package of measures designed to improve the effectiveness of our forces on the ground in South Vietnam, to exploit our air superiority by attacking military targets in North Vietnam, to stabilize the political, social, and economic systems in South Vietnam, and to seek an honorable negotiated settlement of the conflict.

It is limited as to objective, as to geographical scope, as to weapons and forces employed, and as to targets attacked.

All parts of it are interrelated; all parts are indispensable; we must be successful on all fronts. The key, I believe, is inexorable pressure at all points, directed at the will, the ability, and the means of the Communist aggressors.

IS THIS BEST STRATEGY TO WIN U.S. OBJECTIVES?

It is a fair question to ask whether this is the best strategy to attain our basic objectives. I am the first to concede that we can and must do better in all four categories of our efforts and, unhappily, progress toward peaceful negotiations is a bilateral affair which can progress only with some cooperation from Hanoi. As you know, thus far that cooperation has been withheld.

Having conceded the need and possibility for improvement within the components of our current strategy, I must add in honesty that I know of no new strategic proposal which would serve as a better alternative to the one which I have described; that is, provided we do not sacrifice our basic objective. There are, of course, the two old alternatives which we have always rejected and I hope will continue to reject—to withdraw and give up our basic objective or to widen the war by massive air attacks on the North Vietnamese or even on Chinese

targets. These two courses of action appear so to contravene our national and international interests that I shall not take the time of the committee to discuss them here.

HOLDING STRATEGY

The only new proposal of which I am aware is the so-called holding strategy which, in its least extreme form, calls for a cessation of U.S. reinforcements and limitation of military operations to those necessary for the security of our forces and for the maintenance of our military presence. On several occasions, I have expressed myself in opposition to such a course of action. To button up our troops in defensive positions and thus to the sacrifice of their unique attributes of mobility and firepower would constitute the abandonment of our allies on the battlefield and would assign a most inglorious mission to our troops who, for the present, have high morale and complete confidence in their ability to cope with the Vietcong in the field. The effect of such behavior on our Vietnamese allies could be disastrous. At a minimum, it would destroy all confidence in Vietnam in ultimate success and would encourage the timid and the wavering to turn to the Vietcong for protection and to the Liberation Front for political accommodation. Another serious result of such passivity would be the impossibility of obtaining honorable terms at any peace table. The Communists are tough enough to deal with when one has the upper hand. They would never give us acceptable terms if the military situation reflected weakness on our part and a readiness to withdraw. Our only alternative would be to accept dishonorable terms or to continue to sit out the war indefinitely on a supine defensive. I can hardly see the American public or this Congress long supporting such a course of action. Thus, I am obliged to conclude that the so-called holding strategy is really not an alternative way of reaching our objective of an independent South Vietnam free from attack. We could never reach it on such a course. Rather than being a true alternative, it amounts to the modification and erosion of our basic objective and hence appears to me to be unacceptable.

PRESENT STRATEGY IS BEST

In conclusion, I feel that our present strategy is the best that has been suggested and that it is important that we adhere to it, always striving to improve our performance within the confines of its general concept. Certainly, it is not without risks, but little of value in this world is accomplished without risk. It seems to me that the risks entailed are warranted by the importance of our stake in southeast Asia. Congress recognized this importance in the wording of the joint resolution of August 1964:

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

I subscribe to these words and believe that we should live by them and by the words of President Johnson when he said in regard to our commitment in South Vietnam.

We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Taylor.

BATTLE OF DIENBIENPHU

General Taylor, before I start questions there is one statement you made that puzzled me greatly. On page 12 you say:

They have not forgotten that the Vietminh won more in Paris than in Dienbienphu and believe that the Vietcong may be as fortunate in Washington.

What more did they win in Paris than they won at Dienbienphu?

General TAYLOR. It was the weakening will to continue the conflict which had been growing over the months and years and the fact that the homefront and political front had reached the conclusion that the struggle in South Vietnam was hopeless, and, hence, they must end it very rapidly.

You will recall that Mendes-France at the time of the Geneva accord arbitrarily set the date, I believe, of July 20, by which the French would get out regardless of the status of the agreement; whereas, at Dienbienphu in a military defeat in which the French lost some 25,000 or 30,000 troops represented only a serious military setback, and not a Waterloo.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't consider Dienbienphu as a decisive battle?

General TAYLOR. It was in a sense; it tilted the scale of decision, but actually the French had strong military forces which were not involved at Dienbienphu at all and could have continued the conflict.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to have that information. I had always been under the impression that Dienbienphu was a rather decisive battle, and that the Vietminh felt they had won the war at that time.

General TAYLOR. I am sure they did because it was the act of—

The CHAIRMAN. How long after the battle of Dienbienphu did the conference at Geneva begin?

General TAYLOR. I would have to check it. It is a historical record.

The CHAIRMAN. It was the next day.

General TAYLOR. It was almost concurrent, if not concurrent.

VALIDITY OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. General, not being a military man, as you know, I would not wish to argue of strategy. I am not an expert on military strategy. From my point of view, the validity of our involvement there is even more important. I think there is no question that if we wished to bring all of our power to bear we can completely annihilate this small country. As you have already pointed out, there are 15 million people and they are very important people, are they not? There is no industrialization of any consequence. They do not make planes, missiles, tanks, anything of that character, and I am sure we could completely crush them to dust and rubble if we wished to do so. I don't doubt the capacity of our military power to do this.

What does worry me as a representative of the citizens of Arkansas is whether we are justified in pursuing this to this extent. I know this:

is a very unpopular way to look at it, but on page 3 you say about national liberation wars:

The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people serve as the latest example of such wars. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable. Can such wars flare up in the future? They can.

How do you describe the war of 1776? Was that a war of national liberation, or wasn't it? What kind of a war did we fight in 1776? How would you describe it?

General Taylor. May I go back and pick up two or three of your comments previous to that one, Senator?

U.S. OBJECTIVE TO CHANGE WILL OF HANOI

First, I hope my statement has made clear it is not our objective to crush or destroy North Vietnam. We are trying to change the will of the leadership in Hanoi. I would like to quote a sentence from the Greek historian Polybius who wrote 125 years before Christ, he says, I think very wisely in its application today, "it is not the purpose of war to annihilate those who provoke it but to cause them to mend their ways."

I would make this point very strongly, Senator, we are trying to make them mend their ways, not to accept destruction.

COLONIAL DOMINATION OF FRENCH

The CHAIRMAN. What about the people of South Vietnam? We are causing much more damage to them than we are to North Vietnam. Take the whole of Vietnam, we will come back to the question of whether these are two different countries, there are some questions as to whether they are.

General TAYLOR. I would like to comment on the Algerian question. I feel there is a suggestion that they are comparable in Algeria and Vietnam. They are not. There was a resistance to a colonial rule at the time in Algeria.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

General TAYLOR. This is not resistance to a colonial rule unless one wants to call Communist aggression a form of colonial aggression. I don't think that is a fair analogy.

The CHAIRMAN. I would not want to put it that way, unless we want to say we are in the shoes of the colonial power. Some people put it that way. I don't put it that way. Is this an effort by the Vietnamese people to throw off the colonial domination of the French? Wasn't that so?

General TAYLOR. That was successful. And then the Communists tried to impose their colonial rule.

The CHAIRMAN. But wasn't it a group who succeeded in throwing out the French largely influenced, if not dominated, by Communist leadership under Ho Chi Minh?

General TAYLOR. Largely but not entirely. Many of our friends in South Vietnam to date fought against the French, and they are violently anti-Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest you let the witness answer your question because you keep making speeches while the witness is answering.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the leader—he is not the leader of this committee—would please wait his turn.

Senator LONG. I would like to have the answer to the question.

The CHAIRMAN. You will have your turn. You stated your position yesterday. You can say it today before the microphones.

Continue, General.

General TAYLOR. I was simply making the point that any analogy between the Algerian situation and that today in South Vietnam is not accurate in my judgment.

CHARACTER OF AMERICAN REVOLUTION

With regard to 1776, again I would find great difficulty in finding any similarity between the actions of the American colonists—

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you how would you characterize the Revolution in 1776?

General TAYLOR. As a civil revolution against a colonial power.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. And it was very similar as to the original revolution of the Vietnamese against the French, wasn't it?

General TAYLOR. It was, but the situation today, sir—

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, General. I was just trying to pursue the origin of this struggle. I realize that the situation has changed considerably. The struggle began as a civil revolution and some of us think it succeeded at Dienbienphu; is that not correct?

PARIS AND DIENBIENPHU

General TAYLOR. Dienbienphu, as I say, was the climactic point, but the real reason for the collapse of the French was the homefront rather than the military front in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know what evidence you have for that. It has been the general impression that Dienbienphu was quite a blow to the French and they decided the war was hopeless and they began negotiations almost immediately thereafter. They went to Geneva and agreed to a cease-fire. Is that not correct?

General TAYLOR. The first Battle of the Marne was also a great defeat of the French but at that time there was no weakness on the homefront and hence they continued and won. In other words, a battle is important largely as it relates to the home situation. In that sense Dienbienphu wasn't very critical.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think that the Marne is quite comparable. There was a genuine revolt against colonial domination and people often fight with a great deal of tenacity. The French, I think, if I read it correctly, decided it was a hopeless struggle. Many elements may have entered into it, but surely Dienbienphu was one of them. The Vietnamese had mounted a long and a very costly war. We ourselves contributed approximately \$2 billion helping the French maintain their domination of the Vietnamese between 1950 and 1954, did we not?

General TAYLOR. A considerable sum, I don't have the figure.

The CHAIRMAN. The exact amount doesn't matter—but it was a considerable sum.

It is rather odd when we revolted against the British the French helped us.

General TAYLOR. Roles do change, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Roles do change in a most peculiar manner. I don't recall in all our history where we ever assisted a colonial power to assist in the domination of its colony, do you?

General TAYLOR. Again, I would only for the record remind us all we are not talking about the situation at that time, we are talking about the Communist colonialism which is now attempting to assert itself.

CONTINUITY OF VIETNAM AS A NATION

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you, General, and I don't wish to argue about the strategy about how you wish to defeat the enemy, and they obviously have become our enemy. They were not necessarily so in 1946. But what worries a great many people is whether or not we are justified in the position we have taken here. North and South Vietnam which you now call two countries—prior to the subjugation by the French force in 1884 was one country, wasn't it?

General TAYLOR. In a very loose sense of the word.

The CHAIRMAN. It had been one country for 2,000 years, had it not?

General TAYLOR. Not, I believe, as a nation; as a state in our sense of the word.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I suppose during the Dark Ages and the feudal period no country was a nation as they are today. But it was as much a country as any of these countries.

General TAYLOR. There were three separate states, Annam, Cochin China, and Tonkin in the north.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a war between North and South Vietnam very much, I suppose, like our war between the North and South. But we still consider ourselves one country, even though we had a war, don't we? The more powerful side prevailed, didn't it?

General TAYLOR. We behave somewhat differently, sir, after the situation, than they do in southeast Asia. I am always reminded of the event that took place in the north in 1954 when tens of thousands of the North Vietnamese who opposed Ho Chi Minh were murdered. That seems to be the pattern of the Communist leadership there.

The CHAIRMAN. War has a way of killing people. There are a lot of them being killed now.

OBLIGATION TO THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM

One last question. In your statement in the U.S. News & World Report which I had the opportunity to read there was a statement about our involvement and our commitment, and I quote:

First, we have the moral stake of our commitment to the people of Vietnam. I say the people not the Government. Governments have changed but our obligation is to the people of South Vietnam.

That is the end of the quote.

How does a nation go about making an obligation to the people of a country as distinguished from its government?

General TAYLOR. Obviously for political and military purposes, diplomatic purposes, one deals with a government and I am not suggesting by that statement that we go around governments to deal directly with the people. But as I view it, and this is my personal view, our obligations are to these people. Sometimes I find gentlemen discuss the issue and try to make a legalistic question out of it, the question of the legality of these various governments of which we have seen such a large number. The point I tried to make in that article, sir, is I feel our obligation is to people and not to government.

MAJORITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMMITTED TO ANTI-COMMUNISM

The CHAIRMAN. How do you go about determining what the people of South Vietnam want? How do you know today what they want?

General TAYLOR. Well, I would like to cite a few reasons why I am convinced the people of South Vietnam are deeply committed to the anti-Communist cause. We could go back to 1954 when a choice was given to every citizen, both north and south whether to go north or stay north and be a Communist under Ho Chi Minh or stay south or move south and be in the non-Communist half of the country. You will recall that over a million people, or roughly a million people came south, bringing nothing but what they could carry in their hands to avoid being in the Communist camp.

On the other hand, only about 80,000 moved north to choose the side of Ho Chi Minh.

So I think that is a starting point of an indication of the attitude of the people of South Vietnam.

Since that time, in the course of the war, there have been large movements of population. We estimate that there have been over 700,000 refugees either fleeing from the possibility of Vietcong domination in South Vietnam or simply avoiding the hazards of war. It is very significant they always come to the Government side. We know of no movement of population to get behind the Vietcong insofar as it has a front.

We had an election last May 1965, in South Vietnam, which was very interesting, which was almost never reported or referred to here in this country. It was held in every Province of South Vietnam. The political purpose was not particularly important. It was to elect counselors, either municipal or Provincial counselors, but the result was quite interesting. Of all of those estimated eligible to vote, and clearly outside of the areas held by the Vietcong, some 70 percent registered—excuse me, some 67 percent registered and of those who registered 73 percent voted, that is a lot better than we do in our own country, and the significant fact was that the Vietcong were most anxious to sabotage that election and every man who voted was doing an act of defiance of the Vietcong and in many cases taking serious chances, because his name was being put on the reprisal list of the Vietcong who observed this. Things like this, Senator, make me convinced that the vast majority of the South Vietnamese people are deeply committed to the anti-Communist cause.

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S STATEMENT ON ELECTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Since you mentioned 1954, how do you reconcile your views with the statement in General Eisenhower's book that he thought if an election were held 80 percent of the people would vote for Ho Chi Minh?

General TAYLOR. I have not—I would have to find the context in which that statement was made. I would certainly disagree if it were under conditions such as today.

There was, of course, a fear of the elections as set up by the Geneva accords, unless they were indeed internationally supervised and it soon became apparent international supervision would be impossible.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

I don't wish to be understood that I think they would choose communism, either. They don't have that kind of choice. The alternatives are pretty bad out there.

General TAYLOR. They really are.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think many of them would. None of us would, and I doubt if very many of them would.

Senator SPARKMAN?

Senator SPARKMAN. General Taylor, I followed your statement with a great deal of interest. It seems to me it should clear up some misunderstandings that a great many people have, I believe.

DESCRIPTION OF VIETCONG

First, let me ask you an elemental question. Who are the Vietcong?

General TAYLOR. The Vietcong are, in terms of military categories, the so-called mainline units who are really the hard core, the tough professional fighters, and then they have both provincial and local units who are more paramilitary in character than strictly military.

Then they have a large cadre of political cadremen, some 40,000.


Now, insofar as racial is concerned, the majority—exactly what percentage I don't know—are South Vietnam, but a large majority are South Vietnamese. The important South Vietnamese who, particularly those in the main line units, have been taken north and trained in the north, and sent south. So that their leadership, regardless of ethnic or origin, came out of North Vietnam.

Now, since the end of 1964 in addition to the Vietcong themselves, we have the so-called PAVN units, the units of the Army of North Vietnam who were brought there as I mentioned, first as individuals then later in formed units, even in division size. So you have them as a very important reinforcement and they are all from North Vietnam.

ARE WE INTERVENING IN A CIVIL WAR?

Senator SPARKMAN. We hear a good bit from time to time about this being simply civil war within a country, and that we are in effect intervening in the internal affairs of that country. What would you say about that?

General TAYLOR. I would say that is simply not the case; that we have indeed a foreign aggression supported from Hanoi, the Vietcong simply being the military arm of North Vietnam, being utilized initially clandestinely to overthrow, to impose a Communist rule upon



the people of South Vietnam. The leadership, the direction, the important supplies, all come from North Vietnam.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, they are directed by another power, and under the Communist ideology, is that right?

General TAYLOR. That is perfectly clear, I think, now, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. Does that fit in with the declaration that President Truman made of our foreign policy at the time of our helping out in Greece and Turkey?

General TAYLOR. I think you should ask the Secretary of State to answer that. In my judgment, yes, although I am far from an expert on that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you remember the statement that he made at that time?

General TAYLOR. I do in general terms. I don't have it in front of me.

STARTING POINT OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. But you do feel that this is meeting a Communist foe under Communist direction, under the direction of a foreign government in the country of South Vietnam which we were bound by our own understanding to help?

General TAYLOR. That is my opinion, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. We were not a party to the Geneva Conference, were we?

General TAYLOR. We did not sign the—

Senator SPARKMAN. We did not sign the accord.

General TAYLOR (continuing). Sign the agreement. Neither did South Vietnam.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did we make an agreement with the South Vietnamese Government that we would help them if they needed help?

General TAYLOR. Shortly thereafter. There was an exchange of letters in which President Eisenhower agreed to assist the Government in response to the request of President Diem.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was it under that promise, that we went into South Vietnam originally at the request of the Government of South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. I think that was the basic action which initiated our aid. Again, I have not researched all the documents but that, as I recall, is the principal document which in the sense of the starting point for the programs which we have carried forward.

FIRST U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. When did we first put military assistance, when did we first give military assistance to South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. Almost at once after this agreement in 1954, we established a small mission which gradually grew. For a while the French remained in a training capacity in South Vietnam. Eventually they withdrew that formal participation and we took over the entire training task of the armed forces. At the same time there was economic aid going on.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was an advisory group, was it not?

General TAYLOR. That is correct, sir. This so-called MAAG.

Senator SPARKMAN. That increased later to advisers, even to men in the field.

General TAYLOR. It grew rather substantially, as the result of the visit of my mission in 1961. President Kennedy and his government decided to increase the numbers of advisers, not to change the quality of our support, but to increase the quantity of it, and very shortly thereafter the total number went as high as 17,000.

Senator SPARKMAN. And then it was sometime later that we put in sizable units?

General TAYLOR. Yes; that was not until 1965, because of the inability to create additional adequate South Vietnam's forces to compensate for the added infiltration from the north that we decided to put in our own combat forces in a combat role.

Senator SPARKMAN. They were increasing their military manpower but not fast enough to match the infiltration from the north; is that correct?

General TAYLOR. That is correct, sir. I think the increase has been very good. The limiting factor is not so much manpower but leadership. It is almost impossible to create a trained officer corps, and non-commissioned officer corps, quickly. So that the dearth of leadership has been the restraining factor on the increase of their forces.

But even so, as I mentioned in my prepared text, they have almost 700,000 men now in the army, the paramilitary forces or the police.

DOMINO THEORY

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, General Taylor, I notice in your statement that you do not subscribe to the so-called domino theory, but you do admit, do you not, that Communist success in South Vietnam would have a tremendous effect on other nations around there?

General TAYLOR. I certainly do. I don't like the domino phrase, because it suggests an automaticity, the neighbor goes down next.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

General TAYLOR. It may not be the neighbor. We may well have serious difficulties in Africa or Latin America, for example.

Senator SPARKMAN. In your opinion, can we win in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. Senator, I always ask, when asked that question first, I want to say what I mean by "winning." I think the word "win" tends to mean Appomatox, Yorktown, the signing of a peace on the deck of the battleship *Missouri*. That doesn't mean that to me at all in this kind of situation. To "win" means to obtain our basic objectives, the ones which I underlined in my prepared statement; namely, the ability to offer freedom and self-determination to South Vietnam. I think we could do that, yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, our is not a conquest.

General TAYLOR. Not in any sense.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is for the purpose of enabling this country, to whom we are bound by agreement, to maintain its own government and its freedom.

General TAYLOR. Or to choose its own government.

Senator SPARKMAN. Or choose its own government.

General TAYLOR. That is my opinion, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

ENCLAVE THEORY

You mentioned some of the advocacy of withdrawing to enclaves, create the holding action. Could we win, as you see it, with that kind of action?

General TAYLOR. Definitely not. I think that it inevitably, if indeed our objective is to get to a conference table, to come to a conference table from that posture means we could never get the kind of agreement which would attain the basic objective we have been discussing.

Senator SPARKMAN. You recognize that military winning alone is not sufficient.

General TAYLOR. We must be successful on the ground against the Vietcong to the point of convincing the leadership in Hanoi that the Vietcong insurgency cannot possibly win. So in that sense the military is very important.

It is also very important in creating that security behind which we can do these nation-building acts which are also very important.

I would like to stress the point, our strategy is a package and we have to do well in the military field, the political field, the economic field, and the psychological field.

U.S. PROGRESS IN NONMILITARY FIELD

Senator SPARKMAN. Are we beginning to move, do you think, in this field of pacification?

General TAYLOR. Pacification—I gather you are using the term to describe the nonmilitary.

Senator SPARKMAN. I mean this constructive work you are talking about.

General TAYLOR. The nonmilitary?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

General TAYLOR. We have always been able to move in the areas where the security was good enough. But I have often said it is very hard to plant the corn outside the stockade when the Indians are still around. We have to get the Indians farther away in many of the provinces to make good progress. But I do think that our increased military effectiveness and, of equal importance, the growing capability of the South Vietnamese Government to administer, to do all these actions, civic actions necessary to support the military program, that the increased capability in both of those fields is encouraging as we look to the future.

GROWING STABILITY IN POLITICAL SCENE

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, you were Ambassador there for quite a time.

General TAYLOR. A little over a year.

Senator SPARKMAN. A little over a year. You have followed, of course, the Government of South Vietnam.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you believe there has been some growth in the stability of the Government?

General TAYLOR. Almost anything would be an improvement over what I saw while I was Ambassador. I had to work with five Prime Ministers in the course of my 13 months. Since this present government is now, I believe, in its 8th month, clearly it has done better in terms of stability than any government since that of President Diem.

I think we have missed one reason, one explanation; namely, the fact that this is the first government which is solidly backed by the armed forces, and as long as they are behind this government in the present sense it is not going to be overturned by some noisy minority as some governments were overturned in the previous years, so I do feel there are some encouragement indicators of growing stability in the political scene.

FIGHT AGAINST VIETCONG NOT SUPPORTED IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, you hear the complaint made often that the Government of South Vietnam and the action in fighting the Vietcong is not supported, does not have popular support in South Vietnam. What is your answer to that?

General TAYLOR. In a certain sense of the word I would agree. In the sense that because of the war conditions, present leadership, the individuals are not generally known throughout the country. Saigon historically has always been an unpopular place to the peasants in the field. That is where the tax collector lives. So I don't think the commitment really is to this government, or particularly to the leaders, although Prime Minister Ky now is showing considerable political sense. He gets out among his people. He obviously has their interests at heart. But the real commitment of the people is against the Vietcong, against communism. They know that kind of life is not progress but retrogression. So they are deeply anti-Communist, although with no deep personal devotion, I would say, to the present government. They simply don't know the government.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FRANCE'S TROUBLE AT DIENBIENPHU

General Taylor, you have had, of course, quite unique experience in this particular situation in which we find ourselves in South Vietnam, but I would like to get clear in my own mind one or two things.

It appears to me at the moment—and I am suggesting this to see what your comment is—that there have been two types of procedures in South Vietnam in which we have become involved. Let us leave out the fact that we did contribute a great amount of money to the French to bolster them and whatever activities they had prior to Dienbienphu. Incidentally, I want to ask you whether my opinion, in your judgment, is sound or not, that a great deal of the failure of the French in South Vietnam came as a result of internal confusion back in France and the idea that their forces were not being supported in South Vietnam which led to the fact that they did not conscript any men in France for service in South Vietnam, used only

volunteers, and eventually they just sort of dried up on the vine so far as back home French support is concerned?

Do you think there is anything to that idea?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; I am quite sure that was a factor.

U.S. TECHNICAL AND MILITARY AID IN 1954

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then following the withdrawal of the French, we undertook to give aid, didn't we, to South Vietnam. During that period it was limited, was it not, to technical aid, and some military advisory aid?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; we had both an economic program and a military program. I might point out that the economic program in terms of dollars has always been greater than the military aid.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General TAYLOR. Up until, if we don't include the operational cost of our forces in the last year.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point I am getting at is this: We hear so much nowadays about the fact that this active militant military action in South Vietnam has been a continuing action since about 1954. Now, up until the end of the Eisenhower administration, we had only about 750 military personnel in South Vietnam, did we not?

General TAYLOR. It was very small, something like that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is within 25 or 30 of the number, either way, and they were entirely devoted to giving technical advice on training to the South Vietnamese troops.

General TAYLOR. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. To your knowledge, did we have any commitment or agreement with the South Vietnamese up to that time that we would put in active field military forces to conduct a war along with them?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. Very clearly we made no such commitment. We didn't want such a commitment. This was the last thing we had in mind.

U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM MADE IN 1965

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When was the commitment made for us to actively participate in the military operations of the war as American personnel?

General TAYLOR. We, insofar as the use of our combat ground forces are concerned, that took place, of course, only in the spring of 1965.

In the air, we had been participating more actively over 2 or 3 years.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I really want to fix this in point of time, because we hear so much about our carrying out a commitment made back in 1954 and our troops being in there as a followup on that commitment. I have not agreed with that theory.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

Now, with regard to the situation we find ourselves in now, I have asked this question before but I would like to put it to you again: In my view it seems we have three broad courses of action. They may have some ramifications, but one would be to withdraw. The other

would be to follow the idea of a strong point security in a defense limited area, and just sit there and hold that strong point and hope that they wouldn't lob mortar shells in on us, that they wouldn't get close enough. The third is to either increase or continue the active destruction of military targets of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, preventing their ability to carry on the war.

Would you say those are three general courses that are open to us?

General TAYLOR. Well, I mentioned a fourth and then immediately threw it out; namely, the unlimited use of our air in all targets in North Vietnam or even in China.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would use the fourth as a potential part of the third, perhaps.

General TAYLOR. I think it is so different, Senator, that I think you ought to make it a separate category.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, it may be. It has been my philosophy that if you get into a hassle of this kind you want to win.

NORTH VIETNAMESE AT CONFERENCE TABLE

Do you think if we—to speculate now—withdrew our forces and our support there and then said, let's come to a conference table, do you think the North Vietnamese would come?

General TAYLOR. It is hard to say. They would have won, anyway. I wouldn't think they would win anything more at a conference table. I wouldn't be sure. We would be sunk, of course.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the history of struggles between nations or peoples, do you know of any instance where a nation that believes it is at least holding its own in the struggle or perhaps winning, is willing to come to a conference table and make a lot of concessions that are against their interests as they see it?

General TAYLOR. Well, all conferences or all settlements of course simply record the assumed balance of power at the moment, so obviously no one should go to a conference table from a weak position unless he is ready to come out with a weak solution.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Unless he thinks he has to.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; that is right. He has no other choice.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does it appear to you that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese are in that state of mind at the present time?

General TAYLOR. I don't think they have been convinced yet that they are bound to lose.

DID 37-DAY BOMBING LULL HELP?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now we have had about a 30-day lull in the bombing of military targets.

General TAYLOR. Thirty-seven days, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sir?

General TAYLOR. Thirty-seven days, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thirty-seven days, I guess that is what it was. Do you think much was accomplished there except to enable the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong to rehabilitate themselves in the field and get in new supplies and repair their damage so that they could return to the fray with greater vigor?

General TAYLOR. Well, Senator, I think a great deal was accomplished. I was for the pause. I was asked my opinion and I said I think it is well worth the try. Whether it was worth 37 days or not I think is a matter of judgment, but certainly a substantial pause was clearly ample to sound out the opinion of the other side, clearly ample, when you have all the consultations which were made, I am sure was a good thing.

It is quite right as you suggest, there was some military price paid in terms of allowing the other side to recoup, to repair damage, to build up stocks.

I think all of those things, however, can be remedied if indeed our subsequent conduct from here on out shows the leadership in Hanoi that we are inevitably unalterably committed to our course of action, we are going to stay on until they mend their ways.

VIETNAMESE ENDURANCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think you said a little earlier, in response to a question of Senator Fulbright, that after all, this war is nothing new in South Vietnam. They have been fighting for 20 years over there. Well, having become acclimated to 20 years of fighting, is it going to mean so much to them to continue for another 10 or 12 years? Aren't they rather used to it now, unless they get hurt rather badly?

General TAYLOR. Well, Senator, if you were watching the start of a prize fight, would you bet on the man in his 1st round or in his 20th round?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not so sure if he were doing very well and got used to it—

General TAYLOR. I have been exposed to war situations—one never gets used to war. The first shell coming in is rather exciting and rather interesting, but the thousandth shell is very dull and unattractive.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think that is true. But they have had this existence to which they apparently have accustomed themselves, and they seem to get along. Maybe it is a subsistence existence, and unless they are hurt worse than they apparently are being hurt now—

General TAYLOR. I think the point—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wonder whether they will not say, we have endured it for this long, we can endure it for another 10 years.

General TAYLOR. Another point, while they have been at war for 20 years, either at war with the Japanese or French, and feeding the war in South Vietnam. North Vietnam has never been touched in the last 15 years, and there is something new, the bombing attacks force the homeland to pay a direct price, which was not true in the past, so this is a new factor. This is new.

U.S. CIVILIAN GOODS FINDING WAY INTO HANDS OF GUERRILLAS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was an article in one of the morning papers by a writer named Warner Berger. He says that Mel Barisic, vice president of the National Maritime Union of the United States, has been in Vietnam and makes the flat statement that 40 percent of

all cargo and about 36 percent of all PX supplies unloaded in Vietnamese ports wind up in the hands of the guerrillas.

General TAYLOR. I wouldn't know whether that is accurate or not, Senator. I just don't know. I doubt that he has access to clear information.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is a fantastic percentage, it seems to me, and I may well be forced to inquire into whether that is an extravagant statement or has a substantial measure of truth. The statement is, and I quote from his article, "Forty percent of all cargo"—he doesn't qualify his statement as to any particular type of cargo—"and about 30 percent of all PX supplies unloaded in Vietnamese ports wind up in the hands of the guerrillas."

I haven't any knowledge on this matter.

General TAYLOR. I have never seen any data which would suggest precise knowledge of that sort.

U.S. OBJECTIVE NOT WELL DEFINED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, we understand that the announced objectives of our participation is to enable the South Vietnamese, not only for their own interests but for the general political stability of the area, to have free elections, and that we are going to use enough force to convince the North that it is unprofitable to continue the war. I think right there is where the confusion arises in the minds of a great many people, because it is a nebulous—or considered by many people as a nebulous—objective that is not too well defined.

Certainly, the freedom and self-determination of South Vietnam is something. The ability for free elections and the security of the political situation in southeast Asia is something, but most of us don't know whether we are going to step this thing up to the point where it really hurts them, it really takes out their will to fight, if it really convinces them that it is a futile thing for the north to continue this adventure or not.

I think that is where we run into a lot of confusion and misinterpretation.

General TAYLOR. I don't see how there can be any doubt about our basic objective. It just seems so clear and so simple; namely, to allow these people to choose their own government and their own way of life. I quite concede, however, sir, that the discussion of ways and means and tactics and strategy can become and has become highly complex. This results in part from the nature of the war. I have often had occasion to say there is not one situation there, there are 44 situations corresponding to the 44 provinces, and a perfectly true statement about province A may be completely misleading as applied to province B.

So I think these factors have added to the difficulty in making clear just what is taking place.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you very much.

GROWING FRENCH OPPOSITION TO THEIR WAR

Senator MORSE. General, prior to Dienbienphu, were the French people growing restless and was increasing opposition developing in French public opinion to the war in Indochina?

General TAYLOR. There was a great deal of opposition developing, Senator. As you can recall the governments were changing rapidly and it became a political issue.

Senator MORSE. It was my recollection that Mendes-France really stood for office on a pledge to the French people that he would bring the war in Indochina to an end.

General TAYLOR. That Mendes-France stood for office on that platform?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

General TAYLOR. I think that is true, sir. I had not reviewed that situation.

Senator MORSE. He was elected and interpreted it as a mandate. He went to a Geneva conference following Dienbienphu and joined in negotiating an agreement carrying out what he considered to be the mandate given him by the French people. I think that is a fair observation of what happened.

General TAYLOR. I do not recall whether he had a clear majority or not. But certainly, as you say, he took office with the intent of doing this, and furthermore made the negotiation most difficult by fixing a date by which he was going to withdraw his forces. That virtually sold out any chance of getting a reasonable settlement from the point of view of the non-Communist Vietnamese.

REPUDIATION OF U.S. WAR IN VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. Now, when the people of a nation demonstrate opposition to its foreign policy, and make clear—as I think they did to Mendes-France, that they wanted the Indochina war stopped—do you interpret that as a weakness on the homefront?

General TAYLOR. The question, as I understand it, was, that if indeed Mendes-France had a clear majority of the will of the French people, whether I should call that a weakness on the homefront—

Senator MORSE. Yes.

General TAYLOR. Weakness, if one attaches importance to success in southeast Asia, it certainly is a legitimate act on the part of any people to change the policy of their government.

Senator MORSE. You know we are engaged in historic debate in this country. There are honest differences of opinion. I happen to hold to the point of view that it isn't going to be too long before the American people repudiate our war in southeast Asia.

General TAYLOR. That, of course, is good news to Hanoi, Senator.

Senator MORSE. That is the answer you militarists give to those of us who have honest differences of opinion with you. But I don't intend to get down on that level and engage in that kind of debate, General. I am simply saying that in my judgment the President of the United States is already losing the people of this country by the millions in connection with this war in southeast Asia. If the people decide that this war should be stopped in southeast Asia, are you going to take the position that is weakness on the homefront in a democracy?

General TAYLOR. I would feel that our people were badly misguided and did not understand the consequences of such a disaster.

Senator MORSE. Well, we agree on one thing, that they can be badly misguided. You and the President in my judgment have been misguided them for a long time in this war. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. It is a violation of our rules to demonstrate in these hearings, and you are guests of the committee and will please remain silent.

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S LETTER OF 1954

Senator MORSE. General, I take you to the final declaration of the Geneva conference on July 21, 1954. Before I do that, I want to point out that an article in the New York Times of August 17, 1965, states:

Although asserting strongly at a news conference that the Communists must be stopped in Vietnam, Mr. Eisenhower denied that he had ever given a unilateral military commitment to the Government of South Vietnam. His administration saw no need for such a commitment in 1954, he said, and he was offering aid, not military programs.

Later it says, "When asked about the view today," Mr. Eisenhower said—in my second round I probably won't have time to get into the Eisenhower letter, but I want to mention it in the first round—we would help that country. We were not talking about military programs, but foreign aid. So our original program was not a military program under Eisenhower but a foreign aid program."

General TAYLOR. Senator, first in 1954 we had no vision of what was going to take place. We did not realize we were about to face a clandestine aggression directed out of Hanoi; obviously there was no commitment made to cover that contingency. We didn't foresee it.

Second, I would say in 1954 the program initiated was not just aid but also had the rather limited military factor in it which Senator Hickenlooper mentioned.

DECLARATION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE

Senator MORSE. I will take you to paragraph 4 of the declaration of the Geneva conference, which reads:

The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as all kinds of arms and ammunitions.

Do you think our subsequent aid was in violation of that section of the declaration?

General TAYLOR. Do I think what, sir?

Senator MORSE. Do you think our subsequent military aid was in violation of that section of the declaration?

General TAYLOR. I would say that, one, there was never a cessation of hostilities to begin with. The North Vietnamese left behind 5,000 to 6,000 men in South Vietnam, and large caches of ammunition. They proceeded almost at once to infiltrate armed men from North Vietnam, so I would say that the whole provision was never effective.

Senator MORSE. But the signatories to the treaty thought so. They signed it.

General TAYLOR. They didn't know what was going to take place, sir. The ink was not dry on that piece of paper before North Vietnam was violating it.

Senator MORSE. You haven't heard France or the other signatories to the treaty defend America's position that a course of action in violation of these sections was justified?

General TAYLOR. What is the question, sir?

Senator MORSE. You haven't heard France or the other signatories to the treaty take the position that our course of action contrary to these sections has been justified?

General TAYLOR. Well, their objection is not being ignored, Senator; ours is.

Senator MORSE. But their treaty is being torn up by us.

General TAYLOR. It was not our treaty, nor did the Vietnamese people, and let me remind our listeners, that the South Vietnamese leaders present at the time denounced the treaty in advance, and indicated, I think with considerable perspicacity, that the other side would never adhere to the provisions which were actually signed.

Senator MORSE. I will ask some questions later about what this Government is, how it came into being and where Diem came from. But I want to discuss further the provisions of the declaration.

U.S. MILITARY BASES CONSONANT WITH DECLARATION

Paragraph 5 states:

The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or the service of an aggressive policy.

Do you think the bases we have established in South Vietnam and the military forces we have put in there are in keeping with that section of the declaration?

General TAYLOR. I would say that by the time we put in any forces and establish anything that might be called a base, the entire Geneva accord had been nullified by the action of North Vietnam.

U.S. SUPPORT OF DIEM

Senator MORSE. I respectfully dissent, and we will discuss it later. Section 6 states:

The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the discussion of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Vietnam.

Do you think our support of Diem, whose regime we had much to do in setting up in the first place, was a violation of this paragraph of the declaration?

General TAYLOR. No, sir; I do not. I think we all feel that a day may still come and would hope for the day when unification could still be possible under terms freely reached by the Vietnamese people.

It was clearly impossible after the action of Hanoi in establishing a police state in North Vietnam. Partition for a long period of time was inevitable and unhappily it is today.

OUTCOME OF 1956 ELECTIONS

Senator MORSE. Paragraph 7 in this declaration states:

The conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to insure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtained for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from July 20, 1955 onwards.

Isn't it true, General, that the United States opposed those elections and said that any elections ought to be held under the United Nations contrary to the provisions of the agreement? Didn't we join in preventing those elections as President Eisenhower himself admits in his book?

General TAYLOR. Immediately after 1954, Senator, as you well know, it became entirely clear that there would be no such thing as international supervision of an election. The International Control Commission could not circulate freely in North Vietnam, a police state had been formed by the end of 1955. It was utterly not only—it lacked realism, but it simply was impossible to contemplate elections under those conditions. They could not have been held. We did not need to do anything to prevent the election.

Furthermore, the South Vietnamese people, the other half of this agreement, never signed it and always said from the outset they would not have any part of it.

Senator MORSE. The demarcation line of the 17th parallel was a demarcation of military zones. The French forces were to repair to the south. It was contemplated there should be nothing but two zones. It was the United States and Diem that proceeded to set up the government in South Vietnam in clear violation of the agreement.

Now, we have Ky saying he is for reunification, if it is going to be under Ky's terms. It is all right if it is to be his way, but it is wrong if it is coming from the North-South.

General TAYLOR. Senator, it is your position that elections, free elections internationally supervised, could have been held in 1956?

Senator MORSE. I don't think there is any doubt about it. I think India, Canada, and Poland would have supervised those elections. The machinery was set up and we should have tried it. Then if it turned into chaos we would have had a case. But the fact is that history will record that our Government helped stop those elections from being held. This is a black mark in our history.

General TAYLOR. The fact is that tens of thousands of North Vietnamese citizens were murdered and the International Control Commission could do absolutely nothing to control the situation at the time.

Senator MORSE. There is no question that the conduct of the Communists has been despicable and shocking. But at a later time we will also discuss some of the atrocities of the South Vietnamese.

General TAYLOR. Would you force communism on the 15 million South Vietnamese who want to be free after the experience in North Vietnam?

PROTECTORATE BY MULTILATERAL NATIONS

Senator MORSE. As I have said many years since this situation has been so badly handled, I would get a protectorate by multilateral nations. We don't have the manpower or resources to police Asia for the decades we are going to be required to if we follow this administration's policies.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Aiken?

Senator LONG. I would like to have the witness answer the last question.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not a question; it was a statement.

Senator MORSE. I would like to have the response.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all right to have the witness respond.

General TAYLOR. I would have to ask, What nations would the Senator consider as a protectorate?

Senator MORSE. I would put it up to the U.N. Those are the primary peacekeeping obligations of the Security Council. I would not be behind the scenes working in New York trying to stop full debate.

General TAYLOR. As you know, the Communists—Peiping—have resolutely declined to do anything.

Senator MORSE. They don't have to. They don't have to be members. The United Nations doesn't have to apply only to members in the keeping of the peace.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken is recognized.

EFFECT ON VIETNAM OF WEAKENING WILL IN PARIS

Senator AIKEN. General Taylor, I have three or four questions, and I hope they are constructive questions and will get constructive answers. Do you think France would have won the war in Vietnam had it not been for the weakening will in Paris that you mentioned in your statement?

General TAYLOR. I doubt it, Senator. I think colonialism was doomed in Vietnam, but I think they could have lasted longer and could have had better terms.

Senator AIKEN. France, though, would have continued to fight in Vietnam, according to what some French officials told me, at the time, because they felt that if they gave in, in North Vietnam then, as they put it to me, their north African colonies would demand their independence and sure enough they did. But isn't France a stronger nation today, wielding perhaps more influence in world affairs, than she did when she was clinging tenuously to her colonial empire?

General TAYLOR. I think that is probably true. That is an argument, of course, against colonialism and not a defense of the free people in South Vietnam.

Senator AIKEN. Yes. Then is Japan a stronger nation today since she got out of the mire of trying to control much of the Asian mainland?

General TAYLOR. Actually, of course, this, again, was an aspect of the attempt to retain a colonial power which she was not able to do.

Senator AIKEN. I think it is in both those cases an example of biting off more than you can chew. Apparently each country could chew so much. The question is, where do we stop biting?

General TAYLOR. I quite agree, no country should bite off more than she can chew. I don't believe we have bitten off more than we can chew.

THE 1962 DECISION TO SEND IN U.S. TROOPS

Senator AIKEN. When did you go to Saigon, as Ambassador?

General TAYLOR. I went there a little more than a year ago July—July 1964.

Senator AIKEN. You were not there in 1962?

General TAYLOR. No, sir; I visited.

Senator AIKEN. You were Chief of Staff?

General TAYLOR. I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and I visited several times during that period.

Senator AIKEN. Yes. At that time, I believe President Kennedy had a request for 6,000 troops to be sent to South Vietnam. Was that done on your advice?

General TAYLOR. I don't recall that particular block of 6,000 troops, Senator. I went to Saigon at the head of an interdepartmental mission in October 1961 and as a result of the recommendations throughout 1962, additional advisers went into Vietnam. I don't recall a block of 6,000.

Senator AIKEN. You don't know whether that was specifically your advice or not?

General TAYLOR. I would say the increase to a level of about 17,000 American personnel resulted from the recommendations which I made.

Senator AIKEN. Yes. Was it considered at that time that this body of roughly 6,000 troops, would be followed by a request for more and more troops.

General TAYLOR. No, sir; we rather defined in our report those jobs that needed to be done in South Vietnam, largely advisory, logistic types of tasks, and we didn't know what the amount would be, and only by cut and try was the figure of 17,000 reached in 2 years.

Senator AIKEN. You don't know whether it was considered at that time equipping and recruiting more South Vietnamese troops?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Rather than sending our own in?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; throughout the period every effort was made to increase the strength in South Vietnam.

Senator AIKEN. Then the need for more troops was really not foreseen at that time?

General TAYLOR. We hoped very sincerely that we could hope to meet the threat of the Vietcong in South Vietnam without using our Air Force outside of South Vietnam or bringing in our combat forces.

Senator AIKEN. Do you think you can see further ahead now than you did then?

General TAYLOR. What?

Senator AIKEN. Do you think you can look farther ahead now than you did then?

General TAYLOR. I think we can see the metes and bounds of the problem than we did then. Obviously, we didn't have as many troops in the field.

A TRUCE CONSISTENT WITH MILITARY EFFORT

Senator AIKEN. That is not really a fair question anyway because none of us can see very far ahead. I am sure of that.

Now I noticed that—and I ought to know better than to quote one general to another—but nevertheless, General Gavin told us that he thought the problem was how to make a truce consistent with the military effort. Is this the way you appraise the problem or do you think of it in terms of what kind of settlements may be possible if the Vietcong are defeated?

General TAYLOR. And what is the question, sir?

Senator AIKEN. The question is—General Gavin told us he thought the problem was how to make a truce consistent with the military effort. I suppose that means to make the best deal we can after considering all aspects of the situation.

General TAYLOR. I frankly do not understand it. I have difficulty in replying.

Senator AIKEN. I believe you mention negotiations on page 14 of your statement and intimate that the time to negotiate is after we have defeated them.

General TAYLOR. I wouldn't say "defeat," because again I am afraid we are thinking about Appomattox or something of that sort, but I would say until it is quite clear that their course of action is a losing one and they can profit by changing the course of action.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, we have to really put them in a mood to negotiate before we attempt to negotiate with them?

General TAYLOR. This is true. I think this is applied in all military confrontations in history.

Senator AIKEN. Is that consistent with President Johnson's position that he will negotiate with anybody, anywhere, at any time? It seems to me that your position is somewhat at cross-purposes with that of the President.

General TAYLOR. No, sir; I don't detect that.

Senator AIKEN. Well, evidently he doesn't think so, either, or he wouldn't be looking to you for advice.

General TAYLOR. I might repeat my statement at the outset, Senator. My views are my personal views I am giving you today.

BLACK MARKETING IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Senator Hickenlooper touched on the story of the New York Times this morning which was to the effect that 40 percent of the civilian goods landed in South Vietnam, and I believe 33 percent of PX goods, found their way into the hands of the guerrillas.

General TAYLOR. I will read that.

Senator AIKEN. I think if you will read that column through I think you will find it exempts military supplies and applies only to

civilian goods. Do you think that situation has become better or worse in the last year?

General TAYLOR. The Viet—

Senator AIKEN. All this dealing in black marketing and racketeering.

General TAYLOR. It is very hard to measure, of course. Inevitably in a situation like this there is some black marketing. However, the increase of American observers throughout the provinces allows a much better check to be kept this year than, let's say, last year or the year before, but I wouldn't suggest it is watertight.

INCREASE IN U.S. TROOPS PREDICTED

Senator AIKEN. In view of the fact that in 1962 17,000 American troops were considered adequate to deal with the situation over there, would you venture a guess as to how many troops, exclusive of supply lines, Air Force, Navy, would be necessary to deal with the situation within the next year?

General TAYLOR. I wish I could give you an accurate estimate. I just can't. Certainly the present strength, 205,000, I believe, which includes your supply types, is not sufficient, and some increase is going to be required. How far it will go I just don't know.

Senator AIKEN. I am sure the total is not sufficient even to hold their own there, even assuming there is no escalation of the enemy forces.

General TAYLOR. Well, I think it is most important that we move aggressively on the ground against these Vietcong units in order to impose this attrition on them which increases their supply problems, and adds to the difficulties of the Hanoi leadership.

Having embarked on their course, I hope we strike them hip and thigh and be as effective as possible in order to shorten this.

HOLDING STRATEGY

Senator AIKEN. You evidently take exception to the position which some have taken that we should hold the bases which we now have, and stay there for as many years as is necessary. Of course, we stayed in the Philippines 50 years. I don't know whether we are out yet or not. But we stayed there for 50 years. We have been quite fortunate in holding those bases, haven't we, in the last few months?

General TAYLOR. No, sir; we have absolutely no chance of being overrun. Our lads are in charge of this war situation, Senator. We are not being licked. There is too much of an insinuation we have to run away and hide some place. We are looking for these people and destroying them at the greatest rate that has ever taken place in the history of the struggle.

Senator AIKEN. Aren't all our bases surrounded by the Vietcong?

General TAYLOR. Not in the way one word "surrounded" suggests. They have mortars. Six men can mount a mortar attack and get away with it. But 40,000 marines being in danger of the Vietcong, I am sure all 40,000 marines would rise in anger at the suggestion.

Senator AIKEN. I think you are right. But on the other hand, it isn't safe for American soldiers at least to venture out of the bases.

General TAYLOR. Senator, there are bases in Washington that are not safe to walk around at night.

Senator AIKEN. It is a noisy place at night.

General TAYLOR. I have lived there, I agree.

Senator AIKEN. Those are all the questions I have at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long?

GENERAL TAYLOR'S MILITARY RECORD

Senator LONG. May I say, I was just looking at your record here, General Taylor. To have done all you have done for America, you are very well preserved, a very well-preserved man. How long have you served in the uniform of the Army of the United States?

General TAYLOR. I believe it was 44 years, sir.

Senator LONG. I notice that some of the military units you commanded, some of the finest fighting units that ever wore the uniform were some with whom I had contact during the war. I was an amphibious officer in Sicily, for example, at that time when paratroopers flew over our boats, you were the Chief of Staff, I think of the 82d Airborne Division that made that paratroop landing.

General TAYLOR. Originally the Chief of Staff, later the artillery commander.

Senator LONG. That was a magnificent division, in my opinion. Is that division still in existence, the 82d Airborne?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; the 82d is at Fort Bragg.

Senator LONG. Yes, sir; and you were the commander of the 101st Airborne Division?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. What were some of the achievements of that division during World War II?

General TAYLOR. We landed in Normandy with the first parachute unit to go into Normandy.

Senator LONG. You were paratroopers who landed on D-day?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, the morning of D-day.

Senator LONG. You were some of that group we saw in the picture show about "The Longest Day" that had that interesting experience with the Germans.

General TAYLOR. I agree it was the longest day. After that we were in the Arnheim operation in Holland, in the defense of Bastogne, and subsequently went through southern Germany to Berchtesgarden.

Senator LONG. Then you were placed in charge of our troops in Berlin, I believe, and then you were the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

You were the commander of our Army in Korea. Commander of the 8th Army, and you served as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army before you retired, did you not?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

GENERAL TAYLOR'S TIME IN VIETNAM

Senator LONG. Contrary to these previous experts that were sent to advise us, you have actually been in Vietnam, have you not?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, I have been in Vietnam several times.

Senator LONG. While you were there, I believe the Communists had a price on your head, did they not?

General TAYLOR. I beg your pardon?

Senator LONG. Didn't the Communists have some incentive to kill you? Weren't you one of those people that they had some special arrangements to kill you on sight?

General TAYLOR. Well, the American Ambassador was always fair game for the Vietcong. There is always open season on the Ambassador.

Senator LONG. I read somewhere you and General Westmoreland were two of the top targets.

General TAYLOR. I am sure they also always want to knock off our leadership if they can.

SEATO TREATY

Senator LONG. I read it somewhere, I don't know whether it was you or not. The charge has been made and efforts will be made to establish this, that our Nation is an international outlaw and if we are an international criminal as the Communists suggest and as some Senator, then the Communists, I suppose would be within their rights when they capture an American by American airplane and simply take a pistol and shoot him in the temple that he is an international criminal and he is not clothed by the legality of a combatant in an armed struggle. I want to plead my Nation not guilty and I want to ask you if I am not correct in my understanding of this.

I refer to the Southeast Asia Collective Treaty, article 4. It says:

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory within the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees to act that it will meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. * * *

If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected * * *.

that this would endanger us all and we would meet action to meet the common danger.

At that time the agreement did not include Vietnam but we agreed to a protocol. This treaty was ratified by the Senate by a vote of 82 to 1, if I recall correctly, and then we add a protocol which says specifically:

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purpose of article IV of the treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

Now, that treaty was signed on behalf of the United States by John Foster Dulles, H. Alexander Smith, Mike Mansfield, and ratified by the Congress by a vote of 82 to 1.

SEATO MEMBERS' MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN VIETNAM

Other signatories were Australia. Does Australia have men fighting by our side there in honor of this treaty?

General TAYLOR. There is a very fine Australian battalion present in action.

Senator LONG. Does Korea have young men doing a fine job?

General TAYLOR. They are doing extremely well.

Senator LONG. I see the Republic of the Philippines is a signatory, are they giving us any help?

General TAYLOR. They have some small detachments in South Vietnam at the present time.

Senator LONG. They honor their commitment?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. I see the Kingdom of Thailand, does the Kingdom of Thailand recognize a commitment there?

General TAYLOR. They are giving us very important collateral assistance, yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Now, we were helping in compliance with this treaty. Let's just see if this treaty is legal.

ARTICLE 51 OF U.N. CHARTER

Here is the United Nations Charter, article 51, which says:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.

Do you regard article 51 as giving us the right to make this collective defense treaty?

General TAYLOR. I am not a lawyer and I know I am in the presence of some distinguished lawyers but as a layman I have always assumed that is the case.

U.S. TROOPS AS PRISONERS OF WAR

Senator LONG. Here is a letter signed by the 20 outstanding professors of international law and they say that their study of this matter and these include the professors of Harvard, Yale, and many of the outstanding law schools, and they say:

As teachers of international law we wish to affirm that the presence of U.S. forces in South Vietnam at the request of the Government of that country is lawful under general principles of international law and the United Nations Charter. The engagement of U.S. forces in hostilities at the request of the Government of South Vietnam is a legitimate use of force in defense of South Vietnam against aggression.

Wouldn't you say that makes out a pretty good case that our boys if they are captured should be treated as prisoners of war rather than killed as international criminals.

General TAYLOR. I think they made a very strong case, Senator.

Senator LONG. Well, I just wanted to put in the record that most people seem to know about it. But we have been engaged in hostilities on other occasions without a declaration of war.

You were the commander in Korea. Did you have a declaration of war at any time when you were in command of forces there?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator LONG. You were there because the Commander in Chief sent you there.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION

Senator LONG. Now, are you familiar with the resolution that Congress passed when our ships were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Let me just quote from that. Our ships were there and they attacked us. We were there to be helpful in one way or another to the South Vietnamese, no use kidding about that. But we weren't fighting just out there in international waters.

When they attacked us they authorized us to first strike back. There are 125 times in history at least when the Armed Forces have been employed in the absence of a declaration of war. We fight first and declare war later, that is the usual case.

Now, when they were attacked we fought back, and we passed this resolution by a vote of 400, I think, something to 2, and here is what it says:

* * * Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Then here is section 2:

The United States regards as vital to its international interests and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

It then refers to this treaty here, saying we regard this treaty as binding us to do just what we are doing there, and having done that it then says: that the President is—

* * * to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SOUTH VIETNAM IS A PROTOCOL STATE

Now, if you were President, wouldn't you regard that as a commitment and an order of our Congress to go to the aid of these countries when they are being murdered and killed by Communist aggressors?

General TAYLOR. I would, sir.

Senator LONG. Now, after that happened the Communists reacted violently and they started marching organized units into South Vietnam and we started putting our units in there to meet this, as I understand it. They're sending in organized units and so are we.

QUALITY OF OUR TROOPS

I would like to know, General, if you think the quality of the men we are sending there today is equal to those who served before.

Do you recall some of the places the 1st Marine Division served before in World War II? For example, where are some of the places they served?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. I believe you would say Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, those are the boys who put that flag on top of that mountain, they served in Saipan, and I believe, Tinian. Do you recall some of the other places that division served?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Do you think the men who serve today in the 1st Marine Division are worthy successors of those men who served in that division?

General TAYLOR. I would like to make more general reply if I may because I have seen the quality of almost all of the troops present. I have not seen the last division that has gone in but I think our men are coming extremely well prepared for this unusual kind of warfare. This reflects the intense concentration of interest on preparing for guerrilla wars which has existed in our Armed Forces since early in 1962.

They arrive in excellent condition, for General Westmoreland gives them 2 months and as a result I think we can all be proud of all of our troops.

Senator LONG. I would like a specific answer. Do you think the men serving in the 1st Marines are worthy successors of those serving in World War II?

General TAYLOR. I didn't see them in World War II, I am sure they are.

Senator LONG. Would you mention the others?

General TAYLOR. I would mention the 101.

Senator LONG. Do you think those men there today compare favorably with the men who landed today, in Normandy?

General TAYLOR. As good as their forebears in Normandy.

Senator LONG. Would you name the other divisions?

General TAYLOR. Again, I have the difficulty of not having personal observation in World War II. But I think we can sum it up by saying indeed our men are worthy of the units which they represent.

Senator LONG. Let me just ask you this.

CIVILIAN ATROCITIES BY VIETCONG

Do you know how many civilians the Vietcong have killed—innocent men, women, and children who are not combatants at all?

General TAYLOR. It doesn't have a total figure, it runs in tens and tens of thousands.

Senator LONG. The last time I looked at it the figure exceeded 50,000. In one year alone they killed 456 mayors in little villages.

General TAYLOR. Senator, I think we should mention also to appreciate a figure like that we should multiply it by 20 and then ask ourselves how we would feel if that many mayors or officials in our country had been destroyed.

Senator LONG. Let's take the South Vietnamese boys fighting for their country. The last time I looked at it those boys had suffered some very heavy losses. They had suffered roughly 40,000—35,000 of their men killed in combat against the Communists. How many would that be, just to see the weight of that loss, if you assess that against the United States? If we suffered a relative loss that heavy, fighting against the Communists, how much would that be?

General TAYLOR. 700,000.

Senator LONG. Now, that would be as though we lost 700,000.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Carlson?

SIGNIFICANCE OF AIRSTRIKES IN LAOS

Senator CARLSON. General Taylor, I regret sincerely that I was unable to be here when you read your prepared statement. I had the honor of attending the President's prayer breakfast this morning and I presided. But I read your statement since coming to the meeting and it does raise some questions. I hope my question will be like Senator Aiken's suggestion, that they add something to this discussion. I think you stated that you were not using your Air Force outside of Vietnam, is that correct?

General TAYLOR. I was commenting on the fact that in 1961 although we were perfectly aware that North Vietnam was the source of the support of the insurgency, we did not recommend the air strikes outside of the country, hoping to be able to cope with the situation within the confines of South Vietnam.

Senator CARLSON. Well, the reason I bring it up is that I have here a dispatch from Saigon dated February 15. I shall not read it. It is written by Jack Foisie, a Los Angeles Times reporter. It reads this way:

The U.S. Air Force has stepped up its attack on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos by using spray planes to destroy foliage and chemicals.

My only reason for bringing it up is I wonder if this means an extension or escalation of the war outside of the Vietnam area.

General TAYLOR. I am not aware of this operational activity, Senator. We have been flying armed reconnaissance for a long time with the agreement of the Laotian Government. Whether reference is to that kind of activity I am not sure.

Senator CARLSON. If this statement is correct, would this be an expansion or escalation of the war, even to another country?

General TAYLOR. Escalation, I believe, represents a rather dramatic change in tactics or strategy. I would say it is simply an extension of the kind of thing we are doing in the north, namely the infiltration of men and supplies.

Senator CARLSON. Isn't it a fact that much of the materiel and supplies do come from Laos in the northern area? This probably is one section of the war theater that could be helpful if we could prevent the supplies from coming in. The question gets to be again, are we going into Laos and other areas?

General TAYLOR. Certainly it would be very important if we could stop the movement of supplies into Laos.

Again, we all know the limitations of what air can do even if there are no restrictions placed upon its employment.

Senator CARLSON. I notice in your statement, I believe, on page 10, where you said, "It was perfectly clear from the start as it is clear today that air power would not be able to stop infiltration," I was wondering if this is the beginning of an expansion of the air power into those areas?

General TAYLOR. I have no knowledge of any change in decision.

SOURCES USED FOR TROOP EXPANSION

Senator CARLSON. I want to get to another sentence about the expansion of the use of our troops. You say, "I am thoroughly aware of the concern of this committee over the growing requirement for American

troops in South Vietnam." Then you ask "if this requirement is open ended." You say you don't " * * * believe that anyone can give a satisfactory reply to this question, but I can suggest the consideration of certain limiting factors which have a bearing on this matter." There is in progress, I think, of course, an increase in the number of our troop strength and I just want to ask this question: Can we triple, for instance, our troop strength in Vietnam without cutting back on our troop commitments in Europe and Korea?

General TAYLOR. That would mean raising the troop levels to around 600,000.

Senator CARLSON. Well, a substantial amount at least?

General TAYLOR. I would say we would have to call up some of our Reserves. It all depends upon the reaction at home. It could be if we raised additional forces, we could support this strength and also commitment overseas but not with our present military establishment.

Senator CARLSON. Would you be required then to call up the Reserves if we should go that far?

General TAYLOR. Only Secretary McNamara could answer that officially, but I would certainly assume so if it went up to 600,000 some selected.

MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA

Senator CARLSON. Here I go back to Senator Aiken again. You don't quote to one general the views of another, but I was interested in the comment of General Gavin. He told us, in his opinion, if we become further involved to the extent of vastly increasing our troop strength, the Chinese would surely open up in Korea.

Do you have any comment on that?

General TAYLOR. I—it is purely a matter of opinion, neither one of us can prove our case. I would not agree with that. There are so many reasons why the Red Chinese would want to avoid a military confrontation with us, and, of course, on our side we are certainly not seeking one.

Since both parties would be against a military confrontation, I would be surprised if it arose. There is always some risk, as I conceded in my statement, but when you look at the problems of China, there are enormous population food problems, their extreme vulnerability to air attack, to the fact that they can't afford to have their own strength diminished in relation to the Soviet Union, with whom they are engaged in a bitter competition, and all these factors, when they are looked at, it seems to me that the likelihood of deliberate military involvement in confrontation of the United States on the part of Peiping is unlikely.

DE GAULLE'S REPLY TO NOTE OF HO CHI MINH

Senator CARLSON. We read correspondents' reports all over the world, and I was interested to see one from Paris, February 15. This is written by Waverley Root, of the Washington Post foreign service; it is a rather lengthy article, but an interesting article in regard to a letter. Maybe I had better read just a sentence or two.

President de Gaulle has told President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam that there is no military solution to the Vietnam war and that France will act to help a peace effort when the time is ripe, which he does not think is now the case.

I assume, based on some previous answers you have made, you question whether this is the time.

General TAYLOR. I simply don't believe that the Hanoi leadership has got in a frame of mind that they are likely to bring with them to the peace table a sincere determination to seek a solution.

Senator CARLSON. Then I shall read the next paragraph.

De Gaulle's views were put forth in a letter sent to Hanoi February 8 but published here today.

This is Paris—

It was a reply to a letter from Ho of January 24.

This is a lengthy article, which I would like to put in its entirety in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the entire article may be received.

(The article referred to follows:)

DE GAULLE SEES NO VICTOR IN VIETNAM WAR

(By Waverly Root, Washington Post foreign service)

PARIS, February 15.—President de Gaulle has told President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam that there is no military solution to the Vietnam war and that France will act to help a peace effort when the time is ripe, which he does not think is now the case.

De Gaulle's views were put forth in a letter sent to Hanoi February 8, but published here today. It was a reply to a letter from Ho of January 24.

The letter, which contains an implied dig at the Saigon Government, has been the subject of two interpretations here. Some American circles feel the letter blames Hanoi-Peiping and Washington equally for interference in Vietnam—a view already at variance with official American thought.

High French circles, however, feel that this is too rosy a view of French feelings on Vietnam. They consider the American intervention less defensible than the North Vietnamese intervention and assert that the implied criticisms in the De Gaulle letter are aimed primarily at Washington.

Although subject to these differing interpretations, the letter appears to reiterate the position France has consistently maintained on the Vietnam conflict.

Those who think the letter was aimed equally at both sides point to two passages:

The first calls for a return to the principles of the Geneva accords guaranteeing Vietnam's independence "by the nonintervention of every foreign power under whatever form, and reciprocally by a policy of strict neutrality on the part of Vietnamese authorities."

The second assumes that "the engagements taken in 1954 concerning Vietnamese independence and neutrality and against the interference of anyone in Vietnamese internal affairs would be renewed and, naturally, observed—which, very obviously, is not the case in the present situation."

In these two passages, however, De Gaulle speaks of "Vietnam," which lets Hanoi out and ignores American insistence on the existence of two Vietnams. Chinese and Russian intervention fall under these terms, but not that of North Vietnam south of the 17th parallel; so does American intervention, but the "policy of strict neutrality on the part of the Vietnamese authorities" hits at Saigon as well as Hanoi.

De Gaulle took a further swipe at Saigon by saying that a political solution involves "the possibility for the population of South Vietnam of constituting a representative government without outside intervention." Outside intervention in this case, however, seems to apply to Hanoi as well as to Washington, Peiping, and Moscow.

Other passages are difficult to read as referring to any country other than the United States:

De Gaulle acknowledges that Ho wrote "on the war which is going on in Vietnam and in particular about the policy and action of the United States of America." Ho had appealed to De Gaulle to "help stop in time any new perfidi-

ous American actions in Vietnam and Indochina." De Gaulle could have suggested that he would use his influence to help stop the war without going along with the implication of predominant American responsibility, but he did not do so.

He noted that France has always respected the Geneva accords, an implied reflection on the United States, which did not sign them.

He wrote: "We think a military solution is ruled out and we do not approve of the prolongation of the combat, much less its extension, on the pretext of arriving at one." This seems an explicit condemnation of the resumption of bombing raids on North Vietnam.

De Gaulle ended by reaffirming French "affinities" to Vietnam and admitting "that better understanding between the Vietnamese and the French, following the World War, would have prevented the cruel events which are tearing your country apart * * *."

He then went on to speak of French desire "to apply her influence in the desired direction to hasten the end of the conflict and participate actively in its settlement as soon as that appears possible, which tells you also that she is disposed to maintain all contacts with your Government which can be useful to this aim."

Actually, high French sources do not appear optimistic about a settlement soon, so no immediate initiative can be expected from De Gaulle. It is too early and too late, French thinking goes. Useful negotiations might have started before the bombing of the north began a year ago, but a cooling-off period now seems necessary, which they think will require deescalation on both sides.

These ideas have been communicated to American officials, along with advice as to the chief obstacles to present negotiations:

Reluctance to accept the Vietcong as a full partner in negotiations, if not as the sole or chief negotiator. The French think Hanoi might climb down on the demand for direct or exclusive negotiations with the Vietcong if the latter were accepted at peace talks, but suspect the Vietcong might be tougher than Hanoi, just as they feel Hanoi is more amenable to compromise than Peiping.

The personality of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. The French think Ky might back down and accept talks in a large group with the Vietcong playing a minor role, but they wonder if the Vietcong will talk with Ky under any circumstances. Hence De Gaulle's reference to "a representative government" for South Vietnam, though French sources are not sure whether Ky would have to be replaced before or after negotiations.

U.S. OFFICIAL ADVISED OF LETTER

Senator CARLSON. I bring this up because it states in here that the officials of the U.S. Government have been advised of this letter and of this correspondence and with your position in the policymaking position of our Government. Are you familiar with this letter and this suggestion that he would act and on what basis he would act?

General TAYLOR. No, sir; I am not familiar with the letter.

Senator CARLSON. It is a rather interesting article, and gets into the suggestion that the leadership of our Nation has been advised of this offer in the two letters of correspondence.

I think it is important for this reason: There is, I think, a sincere hope in our Nation that we can reach negotiations. I know there is a sincere feeling in this Nation against President de Gaulle. That is a matter many of us have discussed but at the same time they are the one nation which has had great experience with the Vietnamese people. It seems to me if he has made a suggestion here with any thought of being in contact with Ho Chi Minh and being able to work out any solution, I would hope that you as one of the men in high-ranking positions of policy, along with others in the Government, would take a sincere look at it.

General TAYLOR. Well, I am quite sure the responsible officials will, sir.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

General TAYLOR. If there is such a letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. General, it is a pleasure to have you before the committee. For a man such as yourself, General Gavin, Mr. Kennan, Mr. Bell, to appear before this committee and by television before the American people is an event in which I believe many people will take pride.

I thought your prepared text was the ablest presentation of the administration's policy that I have read.

General TAYLOR. Thank you.

Senator GORE. I congratulate you.

PURPOSES OF CURRENT HEARINGS

I was pleased to note that in your first paragraph you say, "I agree thoroughly with the motivating purpose of these hearings," and then you name some of the purposes. I would like to cite them. You say, "to analyze the reasons why we are involved in South Vietnam, the importance of this involvement and the effectiveness with which we are dealing with the resultant problems."

Would you think in addition to those stated purposes that a proper motivating purpose would be an examination of those resulting problems, the additional problems which might result?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, I think those would be thoroughly legitimate additions to the statement.

Senator GORE. Would you think public enlightenment upon the question involving war and peace would also be apropos?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. And you take the view, I take it, that such an examination through our democratic processes is a proper exercise in a self-governing society?

General TAYLOR. I certainly do, sir.

Senator GORE. I would add one other purpose, General, although I would not claim that I can speak for the whole committee. It seems to me that the prime purpose of these hearings must be to contribute to the formulation of policy and objectives in this historic situation in which the American people and their Government can be advised.

Would you think that a laudable objective?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir. In my prepared talk, of course, I tried to lay out what I understood our basic objective to be.

Senator GORE. And you did quite well.

General TAYLOR. And the strategy to do it and, of course, I feel we are on the right course.

Senator GORE. And you did quite well in that effort.

DISAGREEMENT ON LIMITATIONS OF WAR

Now, in an effort to come to this central issue of the formulation of a policy and unifying the people, I would like to come to the objectives which you describe. If you would turn to page 12 of your statement, near the end of the page, you describe it as follows; your policy, the administration policy. Quoting from your statement:

It is limited as to objective, as to geographical scope, as to weapons and forces applied, and as to targets attacked.

Now, I would like to read to you three sentences from a statement which I made on the floor of the Senate yesterday, and then perhaps if we can understand what your objectives are, we can understand what the limits are; perhaps we can be moving toward some unity which is badly needed. I would like before reading this to say that I am apprehensive that as the war has been widening, the gap between the President and the Congress has been widening, and unrest among our people has risen. So this hearing may contribute wonderfully well to bringing some modification of policy or some understanding of policy on the part of the administration and an enlightenment of the people as to the policy. I would like to read this brief statement which I made and then reread the one you have just made and solicit your comment. This is the statement I made:

I advise that this war be kept within bounds which appear manageable, with limited goals and limited commitments—

Which you say we have—

that goal being a tolerable political arrangement that would permit honorable disengagement of U.S. combat forces at the earliest feasible time.

Once again I advise against a wider war, against a commitment to total victory and a major war in Asia. There, it seems to me, is the great issue now under debate.

Let me read your statement, and ask you to point out the differences, if you will. What are the limits and what are the objectives? Here in your statement you describe the policy: "It is limited as to objective, as to geographical scope, as to weapons and forces applied and as to targets attacked."

There ought to be an area of agreement here between these two statements.

Will you comment on where the divergences are and the areas of agreement?

General TAYLOR. I would think that there is indeed very little separating us, although, of course, the interpretation of certain words can be important. The meaning of my sentence is this: That our objective is the one which I have stated at the outset, using the language of the President, that it is a free and independent South Vietnam, no longer threatened by Communist aggression.

From the point of view of Hanoi, then, it is not the destruction of Hanoi, it is not an abject capitulation of Hanoi. It is not unconditional surrender, it is not giving up the Communist form of government; all of these things can be retained by Hanoi as long as they stop the aggression against the south.

As to geographical scope, we originally limited for years the use of military action within the confines of South Vietnam.

Now, we have embarked upon this very carefully controlled, very limited use of our airpower against military targets in the north, very much of a limited employment of airpower.

As to the weapons and forces employed, we have certainly limited the type of weapons to our conventional weapons, no one is talking about the use of nuclear weapons, for example. We have limited the use of our ground forces to South Vietnam and are not contemplating their use in North Vietnam and certainly the targets being attacked are very carefully chosen as military targets making a maximum effort to avoid all civilian destruction.

LIMITATION OF FORCES

Senator GORE. I would like to ask you about the limitation of forces.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator GORE. None of us can be certain as to what part the size of American expeditionary force will have upon the decision of the Red Chinese. General MacArthur, I recall, said that American forces could go to the Yalu without the Chinese coming in in Korea. You were in Korea. Did you share that estimate of General MacArthur?

General TAYLOR. I was not in Korea at the time. I was in Berlin far from this immediate problem.

Senator GORE. I withdraw the question.

You said on television last Sunday that you didn't think the Chinese would come into Vietnam. I hope you are right.

General TAYLOR. Of course, the situation is quite different, as you see.

Senator GORE. I understand.

AMERICAN TROOPS IN KOREA

Now, what was the largest number of American soldiers in Korea?

General TAYLOR. I would have to get the book out on that.

Senator GORE. I have the figures from the—

General TAYLOR. But the total strength along the front was something under a million men including the Koreans.

Senator GORE. There is a great deal less than that. I have a statement from the Defense Department that the largest number of American soldiers on the scene at any one particular time was 281,000.

General TAYLOR. Excuse me, I said the entire force on the front to include the Koreans.

Senator GORE. I misunderstood.

I asked you the number of American soldiers.

General TAYLOR. I think your figure, if that is from the Defense Department, is correct.

Senator GORE. 281,000?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

AMERICAN TROOPS IN VIETNAM

Senator GORE. Now, Senator Russell said on the floor of the Senate yesterday, that we have approximately 300,000 men involved in Vietnam now.

He included, I must point out, the naval forces that are offshore. But I believe actual number of foot soldiers in Vietnam is now something more than 200,000, is it not?

General TAYLOR. The total military population permanently in Vietnam, the last figure I saw was 205,000. It may have changed slightly.

Senator GORE. So we are already involved insofar as our forces are concerned to an extent in the order of the Korean war.

General TAYLOR. In quite a different sense, Senator. So much of this American strength is really backup to support the very large Vietnamese force of 677,000. A great deal of the logistics support, the air

support and that kind of thing is necessary because we have such a large ally with forces in being and forces in combat.

Senator GORE. Can you enlighten us as to the limits of the forces which you have in mind? You say you have careful limits as to weapons and forces.

General TAYLOR. Well, I rather suggested in my prepared text why I didn't think there was an endless requirement for American ground combat forces, making the point that because of logistic limitations, which are, to which are contributed the effects of our air, that I felt that the Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese, had a finite number of forces that could be sustained.

Then I pointed out if we take as our military objective on the ground the destruction of those mainline Vietcong battalions without taking as the objective the occupation of all of the country or pursuing every guerrilla to the most remote layer in the jungle that then the military requirement becomes something that we can cope with.

Senator GORE. I appreciate that statement. And I must point out that it is very general, and one of the causes of our trouble here, I think, General, is that we have creeping escalation. The Congress, some Members, may know what the administration plan is, but most of us have been left in the dark.

PLAN FOR TROOP COMMITMENT OF 600,000 MEN

Now, let me call your attention to the fact that a very distinguished and able Senator, Senator Stennis, made a speech recently in which he referred to the possible sending of 600,000 American troops to Vietnam.

Then last week, before this committee, or a member of this committee, the very able junior Senator from Missouri, former Secretary of the Air Force, made this statement:

There has been mention of a figure of 600,000 people in South Vietnam by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee. That figure did not originate with him. It came from the highest military authority in a hearing before the Armed Services Committee.

Are you acquainted with the plans for 600,000 referred to here?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. There is no reason why I would be. I am not suggesting there would be plans. If my old colleagues of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do as I did, you have a whole stack of plans at various cut-off points, not knowing which plans are going to be implemented.

Senator GORE. My time has expired. I want to come back if I may, Mr. Chairman, to try to delimit these objectives, what are the objectives, what are the limits? Is there to be a limited war or a global war? This is where the real issue lies.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, for the time being, I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

UNITED STATES LABELED AS EXPLOITERS BY NORTH VIETNAM

General Taylor, as a premise to my questions, which first will be directed in trying to ascertain with what country the brutality lies, I want to read to you from the book written by Truong Chinh of North Vietnam in describing what the revolutionary activities should be:

The traitors to the nation, reactionaries and enemies of the resistance, must be immediately eliminated. We should punish those even in the ranks of the resistance who advocated wrong measures or committed harmful deeds. Step up extermination activities against traitors. All those refusing to have rice collectors, to pay taxes, or make money available to the front shall be considered as reactionaries and punished as traitors. Finally, the aim of the revolution is to liberate our compatriots in South Vietnam.

Now, remember this is a North Vietnamese speaking.

The aim is to defeat the aggression and frustrate the warmongering policies of the United States imperialists and their lackeys.

Now, with that preface, I direct my questions, first, to the subject of the attempt made this morning to place the U.S. Government in the position of a colonial power wanting to exploit the economy and resources and the people of South Vietnam.

Who is the colonial power that has been referred to, if you can answer, General Taylor?

General TAYLOR. We have discussed several colonial powers; France, for one, and I have made the comment—

Senator LAUSCHE. I mean right now.

General TAYLOR (continuing). That Vietnam, the Hanoi leadership, is the new colonial power in this area.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then this effort by innuendo and adroit reasoning to imply that our Government is the exploiter, so far as I am concerned, cannot go unchallenged.

In the fight that terminated in 1954, was there or wasn't there a colonial power involved?

General TAYLOR. There was indeed; France.

Senator LAUSCHE. And wasn't it because colonialism was the issue that the fight against colonialism grew intense and was successful?

General TAYLOR. That is right. The aggressors were both Communists, the Vietminh, and also non-Communists, who are on our side today.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, you have listened to statements from North Vietnam and from the Vietcong and, may I ask, if it is not a fact that in their purpose of propaganda, they have labeled us as the imperialists and the exploiters?

General TAYLOR. Those terms are usually used.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not believe I have ever read a statement from Hanoi on policy unless it contained the epithet, such as "the imperialists of the United States."

Have we taken anything out of South Vietnam or out of any other southeast Asian countries as distinguished from what we have been giving to help them build up their society and economy?

General TAYLOR. I think the President has made clear over and over again that not only have we not taken anything out in the past, we have no intention to seek permanent bases or any permanent relationships in that part of the world.

Senator LAUSCHE. We have given definite assurances that we have no contemplation of destroying the North Vietnamese Government. We want nothing from them except that they should stop their aggression against the peaceful citizens of South Vietnam.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

VIETCONG ATROCITIES

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, to return to this policy of torture, atrocities, have they destroyed deliberately the schools of the South Vietnamese?

General TAYLOR. In many cases, in many cases.

Would you allow me to pick up your original thought, sir, because you mentioned the activity in North Vietnam. I think we ought to remind ourselves frequently of what took place in 1954. I have a quotation here from one of our magazines current at the time that described the actions of the Communists in the north:

What began simply as a gigantic muddle soon degenerated under the guidance of Truong Chinh—

whom you just mentioned—

into a veritable bloodbath. The terrible popular tribunals were set up in the villages of which the landlords were judged by the infallible people. The judgment was usually followed by summary execution. Nobody knows how many died in this way. The policy was known by the sinister name of the mobilization of the masses.

I would suggest, as you are suggesting, Senator, that if indeed the Vietcong ever had domination in the south, we would see far greater slaughters and our feelings would certainly be more harrowed than we observed during the Soviet action in Hungary a few years ago.

Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon what I read as having been written by Truong Chinh, has his advice and doctrine in their views been carried out in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. Terror is a regular tactic against the civil population, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is mayors and chiefs are destroyed and kidnaped?

General TAYLOR. Schoolteachers.

Senator LAUSCHE. Schoolteachers. Schoolhouses blown up, buses destroyed, and that is done not in the hundreds but in the thousands; am I correct in that?

General TAYLOR. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. I read to you of an event that happened in June of 1965 following the battle of Dong Hoa. The Vietcong left behind about 1,500 of a total of 3,000 population dead, injured, maimed, or orphaned. These 3,000 people were simple Vietnamese peasants. The Vietcong, before they withdrew, literally entered every single home, shack, habitation of any kind, and like locusts cleaned out every last kernel of rice, every piece of dried fish or any other protein,

and every last container of nuagmam and cleaned out every last piaster.

Are you familiar with that incident?

General TAYLOR. Not specifically, but I am sorry to say those incidents are not rare.

U.S. EFFORTS TO SPARE CIVILIAN POPULATION

Senator LAUSCHE. I listened yesterday afternoon to an argument on the floor of the Senate and, to my great pain, my colleagues were attempting to lay the blame on our people and our Government, that we are perpetrating these acts.

General Taylor, in your connection with this problem, has there come to your attention a single instance in which we have, under a policy such as that promoted by the Communists, carried into effect such atrocities?

General TAYLOR. Certainly as a matter of policy, Senator, we do everything possible to spare the civilian populations. General Westmoreland is an able and humane man, and has issued the clearest of instructions that in utilizing military force insofar as consideration of the population can be taken into account without the loss of our people in action, that he will make every effort to spare them from the horrors of war. Unhappily, they do suffer, and it is impossible to have a civil war of this type, a war in which the enemy deliberately mingles themselves with the civilian population, without civilian casualties in large numbers.

IS IT IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO WITHDRAW?

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, I come to another subject. The people of our Nation are wanting to learn what course we ought to follow. I am one who is trying to determine what course will be in the best interests and the highest security of our Nation.

Preliminary to putting my question to you, I want to read the questions that I put to General Gavin when he testified here last week:

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you feel we should stay in South Vietnam in the interest and the security of our country?

General GAVIN. Yes, I do.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you believe that our security requires that we stay there; is that correct?

General GAVIN. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you are not advising the people of the United States that we should pull out?

General GAVIN. I certainly am not.

A further question:

The fact is that you believe that this latter course of staying in Vietnam and not withdrawing to Thailand or Cambodia or the Philippines is the course that we ought to follow?

His answer was, "Yes."

I now go to the questions that I put to Mr. Kennan.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up, I am very sorry.

Senator LAUSCHE. It is a bad time for my time to be up, as far as our cause is concerned, and a good time for the cause of those who disagree with me, but I will yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The time determines this, not the chairman.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me put forth just two questions.

General TAYLOR. What is the question?

Senator LAUSCHE. Would it be in the interest of the security of our country for us to pull out?

General TAYLOR. Just the contrary, it would be disastrous.

Senator LAUSCHE. A moment ago, in answer to questions put by another Senator, you said that if we did pull out, it would be regrettable.

General TAYLOR. I hoped I used a stronger adjective.

Senator LAUSCHE. What do you think would happen if we did pull out? Would that be the end of our troubles?

General TAYLOR. I think it would just start our troubles on a world-wide basis. The repercussions would not be limited to southeast Asia but would affect every country with whom we have relations, particularly in all our alliances which would be adversely affected.

The CHAIRMAN. I will have to tell the Senator to desist.

Senator Mundt.

RELATION OF MOSCOW TO PEIPING-HANOI-VIETCONG AXIS

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Ambassador, on page 1, I think you have a statement which might need a little clarification or, perhaps, some expansion because it changes the context of the opposition we confront in Vietnam, if I understand that opposition correctly. You said that a simple statement of what we are doing in South Vietnam is to say we are engaged in a clash of purpose and interest with the militant wing of the Communist movement represented by Hanoi, the Vietcong, and Peiping.

I do not think you completed the rollcall. I think you have got to add Moscow to that to present a realistic picture, if I understand it.

General TAYLOR. Moscow is, of course, an important factor in the situation. I think their relationship is quite different from the one which links those three elements together.

Senator MUNDT. Different from what?

General TAYLOR. I think the relationship of Moscow to the problem, however, is quite different from that which links those three elements together, the three mentioned in my statement.

Senator MUNDT. Would you care to define the difference?

General TAYLOR. I beg your pardon?

Senator MUNDT. Would you care to define the difference?

General TAYLOR. I would say that it is the Peking Chinese wing of the Communist bloc which would gain primarily by success in this part of the world. Actually their success to some extent might even embarrass the Soviet Union because they have—they are known to be the conservative force tending to discourage any escalation, to use that overworked word, in this part of the world.

The Soviet Union has no national objective to gain here, and they have a great deal to lose if, in the course of events, it brought them into confrontation with the United States. So their interests are quite different, and I suspect that their role is quite different from that, say of Peking.

SOVIET UNION SHIPS SUPPLIES INTO HAIPHONG

Senator MUNDT. If that indeed is the true condition of affairs—and I am one who believes the evidence supporting that hypothesis is a little bit on the skimpy side—and we accept that hypothesis, why don't the Russians implement it by discontinuing shipping in military supplies into the harbor of Haiphong?

General TAYLOR. It is, of course, entirely possible, to stop the cargo moving into Haiphong either by bombing the facility or by mining the harbor. This capability we have had from the beginning.

Senator MUNDT. I think you misunderstood the question. If the hypothesis is correct that the Russians have no desire to see this thing move in the direction of a victory for the Chinese-Hanoi wing of the party, why don't they voluntarily discontinue shipping the supplies that make it more probable that the Chinese-Hanoi wing could succeed?

General TAYLOR. I think they are in a dilemma, as I see it, Senator; but while they have the factors which I mentioned, which incline them in one direction, on the other hand, they have to contend with Peking as the flag banner of world communism. They cannot stand by entirely inactive and not assist in South Vietnam, even though they do not enjoy doing it.

Senator MUNDT. If we accept that, we arrive at the same result, it seems to me, that they help Hanoi and Peking, whatever the motivations are. I would agree with your statement.

General TAYLOR. I think their position is quite different vis-a-vis the situation with Peking.

Senator MUNDT. It does not make too much difference from our standpoint what motivates them. If they are helping them and they are supplying every surface-to-air missile that is being used in North Vietnam to shoot down American planes, those are made in Russia, is that correct?

General TAYLOR. Let us agree it is important. I do not suggest the contrary, they are indeed important in the situation.

STATUS OF VIETNAM PROBLEM IN U.N.

Senator MUNDT. What is the present status—put on your diplomatic hat now—of the problem in Vietnam in the U.N.?

General TAYLOR. I have defined myself facetiously as an indignant taxpayer. I am now a private citizen, I am no longer in Government, I have a part-time assignment as consultant to the President.

Senator MUNDT. Indignant—

General TAYLOR. A part-time consultant to the President.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, I know that. In that connection, with your Ambassadorial background, could you give us some idea of what the status of the Vietcong problem is now in the U.N.?

General TAYLOR. The Vietcong problem at the U.N.?

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

General TAYLOR. I am sorry to say I am not close enough to that. Secretary Rusk will be in a much better position to discuss it tomorrow.

VIETCONG LOSSES INCLUDING DEFECTIONS

Senator MUNDT. Having in mind the increase of troops which you set out so clearly in your presentation where we seem to be gaining in terms of overall numbers on our side, I wonder if you have in mind the ratio of losses which, it seems to me, also must be moving favorably on our side. I am not now thinking about American losses, I am thinking of South Vietnamese losses versus the North Vietnamese losses.

General TAYLOR. The word is "losses"?

Senator MUNDT. Right.

General TAYLOR. Very hard to say except, of course, we would like to see a continuation of the heavy losses inflicted on the North Vietcong.

I saw the figures quite recently of those killed, the Vietcong killed, in action since January 1, and I quote the figures, although always with a warning that there can be a considerable factor of error in the figures. It is 5,748 since January 1 to mid-February. That is a monthly rate of 3,800.

Now, let us say we do not know how many wounded there were, but if the average is about what it is on our side, at least three wounded to one killed would be a fair assumption. If that is the case, in a month they lost over 11,000 wounded.

Now, furthermore they are defecting at the highest rate ever encountered. For the last 2 or 3 weeks the average has been around 80 a day.

Senator MUNDT. Eighty?

General TAYLOR. Eighty per day, so that I am assuming then in this month that I am checking on, perhaps 1,500 defectors might be added. Hence, the total loss that would have to be replaced by the Vietcong would be over 16,000. I do not guarantee the accuracy of this, but it is a very suggestive figure, and I would answer your question then, if we could increase, maintain or increase, this rate of loss for the next year, I would say that the Vietcong are indeed in very serious difficulties in manpower.

Senator MUNDT. Would you give us that in ratios, Mr. Ambassador, in terms of South Vietnamese losses; would it be 2 to 1, 3 to 1?

General TAYLOR. It is around 4 to 1, probably is about right. I have not checked the record recently.

Senator MUNDT. Well, the tides of battle seem to be moving in our direction.

General TAYLOR. Very much so.

PRELIMINARY TRAINING OF U.S. TROOPS

Senator MUNDT. I just got back from South Dakota yesterday, and while I was there several mothers talked to me and wanted me to tell them, and you can tell them now because they will probably be listening in on the television, if there is a minimum period of training that an American boy can depend on after the time he is brought into the service before he will be shipped over to Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. Very much so. It is one which is based upon law. He must get his basic training of at least 16 weeks. If he is a specialist

he will get more training than that. He probably will be put into a unit and get considerable unit training, depending upon how long his unit remains in the United States. There is no question in my mind about the adequacy of the military training our young men are getting.

Senator MUNDT. Would it run in the area of 6 months before he gets to Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. It is probably so. I would say in the case of a man, a recruit, he certainly will not get to Vietnam in less than 6 months. That would include his training, also travel time and various other things.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

Senator MUNDT. Taking up now where Senator Lausche left off, you have stated clearly in your presentation and in your various discussions here this morning, I believe, that the three choices confronting us in Vietnam are retreat or hold or advance in terms of increasing pressures of some kind; would that be a fair summary of your presentation?

General TAYLOR. No. I disagreed slightly with the Senator. I think there are really four courses of action. The fourth is pursue the strategy we are on, doing it better, and with greater effectiveness; and the fourth would be remove restraints in the, all restraints, in the use of our forces, particularly our air power on all targets in North Vietnam or even in China.

Senator MUNDT. You reject the idea of retreat?

General TAYLOR. I reject it; yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. You reject the idea of the so-called holding enclaves, and just see who has the most patience?

General TAYLOR. We can not sit out the war successfully, I am sure.

Senator MUNDT. We are now in what you would call an era of accelerating the pressure.

General TAYLOR. Doing better what we have been attempting to do in the past year.

Senator MUNDT. And we reject as of the moment certainly and hopefully forever, the idea of having to escalate the kind of attacks that are made to try to bring all-out victory?

General TAYLOR. Clearly we have great deterrent strength, unused deterrent strength, which puts a restraint upon the escalation of the war on the part of the other fellow. I would never give up that deterrent or ever say publicly, at least, that I would never use that deterrent.

Senator MUNDT. You cannot say you never will use it.

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Because you weaken yourself obviously in front of the enemy.

PROGRESS IN ERA OF PACIFICATION

What are we doing in this era of pacification? We hear a lot about that. Are we making any progress? Every once in a while we hear we have got it buttoned down pretty well, but then you hear about some mayor in a community we have held for several years who gets assassinated.

General TAYLOR. Of course, pacification, by that I assume you mean all the effort, in the military, political and social field.

Senator MUNDT. Economic, social.

General TAYLOR. It is not something, I am sure, you will say that we suddenly recognized the need for progress in this field. We have always recognized it, but we have been inhibited by two factors. One is the lack of security. One cannot build in this country without some level of protection.

Second is the inexperience of the Government in Saigon. Since both of those situations are improving, I think we are going to move forward better. The present situation is that the pacification goes well in about 8 or 9 provinces, does virtually nothing in about the same number and, in between the remaining provinces of the 44, uneven fluctuating progress.

U.S. FREEDOM ACADEMY NEEDED

Senator MUNDT. Some of us believe, General, we are limited by a third factor that you did not mention. You and I have discussed that before in the Foreign Relations Committee, and that is to develop in this country a recognized, competent, and thorough training facility for the kind of political, economic warfare we are having to fight and want to fight in lieu of a military fight.

We have all the training institutions we need militarily. But I think we are also lacking in a cadre of sufficiently trained people in the political, economic area to carry out this job, and that is the reason we have been trying for at least as long as we have been fighting in Vietnam to create something we call a Freedom Academy in this country to provide for our nonmilitary operations the same kind of training that the Army, the Marines do. I wish you would use your considerable influence and your capacity as a general counselor at the White House to encourage the State Department to take its foot off the brake so we can enact legislation which already once has passed the Senate to create the training facilities required to carry out this important aspect of the war.

General TAYLOR. I quite agree with you, Senator, that the training of the civilian expertise required is most important. I am very proud of the 1,200, roughly 1,200, American civilians who are scattered all through this country, working in very exposed conditions, often situations just as dangerous as those occupied by our military people. They are doing a first-class job.

But what I am concerned about, as I am sure you are, is the rotation question. They cannot stay out there indefinitely, and how to replace these people by men equally motivated, equally skilled, will be difficult.

Senator MUNDT. This is exactly right. We have failed to develop the manpower pool, man and woman power pool, for replacement of competent people over there in this very, very important function to the success of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Church.

Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PRAISE OF WITNESS

General, I have been listening to your testimony with great interest. We honor you as a native son of Missouri. We also honor you for being one of the highest decorated officers in the Army; and for being known, along with another Missourian, as the GI general, along with Omar Bradley. Also for having been Chief of Staff of the Army, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But I think, most of all, for the fact you went to South Vietnam, in 1961, when I had the privilege of being with you, along with another able public servant, Walt Rostow. President Kennedy was so impressed with your report that later he asked you to be his adviser. Then still later, even though you had coming up a well-earned retirement, you were willing to go back to that rough situation and be our Ambassador in Vietnam.

So, in my opinion, combining the military and political, you have had as much experience and therefore have as much right to speak on this as any American.

NO SOUTH VIETNAM DEFECTIONS

First, I have a question here from one of our most respected colleagues, Senator Cooper of Kentucky. He noted you gave several reasons to show that South Vietnam was anti-Communist, such as a million North Vietnamese who have moved south; and also the free elections held in South Vietnam. The Senator stated he was told when in the Far East about another proof of South Vietnamese opposition to the Vietcong and North Vietnam—namely, that there had not been a single defection of any unit in the South Vietnamese Army; even down to the platoon level, there had not been any defection to the Vietcong—is that correct, to the best of your knowledge?

General TAYLOR. I would think so. Some have disappeared under conditions we are not sure.

I would add, however, another point relating thereto. There have been no political defectors. In other words, despite all of the political arguments and debates and the very—the animosities which broke out after the fall of Diem, none of the Vietnamese politicians although they might hate each other, have ever gone over to the Liberation Front, which, I think, is an interesting point.

Senator SYMINGTON. Based on my trips out there, I am impressed by the fact that if we can stop the North Vietnamese from supporting the Vietcong with men, money, and munitions the South Vietnamese themselves could handle the Vietcong. Would that be your thought?

General TAYLOR. I would think so, Senator. I think, first, the blow to the Vietcong morale would be very, very great indeed; and, second, if indeed there was no further infiltration, the growing, the increasing, effective South Vietnamese forces should be able to cope with the situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. There is a quotation which bears on the way some of us feel about the possibility of a relationship to resisting this present Communist totalitarianism as against resistance put up in 1941

against Japanese and Nazi totalitarianism. It comes from Winston Churchill's "The Gathering Storm," and is:

The belief that security can be obtained by throwing a small state to the wolves is a fatal delusion.

Would you say that has some application here?

General TAYLOR. I would say yes.

COMMENTS ON ENCLAVE STRATEGY

Senator SYMINGTON. Why did you state, in your recent New York speech, that General Gavin's enclave strategy would more likely lead to overt Chinese Communist involvement in southeast Asia than our current strategy? That interested me.

General TAYLOR. Would you restate that?

Senator SYMINGTON. Why did you state in your recent New York speech that General Gavin's enclave strategy would more likely lead to overt Chinese Communist involvement in southeast Asia than our current strategy?

General TAYLOR. First, I do not think I referred to it as General Gavin's. I never have mentioned General Gavin in my comments on the enclave strategy because he is not the only one who has supported it. I am frankly not sure to what extent he does today.

The comment there simply indicates that the sureness of our eventual elimination from southeast Asia under the enclave strategy would encourage the other side to take greater advantage, to exploit the weakened situation on our front, and to expand through southeast Asia and elsewhere.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the enclave concept allow us to deploy fewer forces into South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. I suppose it would if we arbitrarily said we will send no more than those at the present time. I think, in the long run, we might then have to be shoved off one by one these coastal enclaves if the enemy massed against us and if we had major defections from the South Vietnamese which would be quite possible.

Senator SYMINGTON. What would be the results for the South Vietnamese and ourselves, political and military, if we adopted the enclave theory?

General TAYLOR. I think, in the first place, the South Vietnamese Government would fall. I do not see how it could subsist after the American ally had abandoned their forces on the battlefield.

I would think that the timid and the wavering would seek an accommodation of the enemy and, I think, this would probably—there would probably be defections among the armed forces, feeling that all was lost in the long run, and they had better adjust to the Vietcong and the enemy. So, in combination, I think it would be disastrous.

EFFECT OF B-52 AIRSTRIKES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. What have been the effects of the B-52 air-strikes in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. I think they have been very effective in keeping the Vietcong moving. In the good old days, as they would refer to them, I am sure, it was possible for a Vietcong battalion to get into a

fight, have a good brisk one for 2 or 3 days, then break off and go back into base areas where that battalion was relatively secure; in fact, it was completely secure. It could train, rest, recruit, and prepare for the next operation.

The B-52 strikes now have been used on a scale supported by, I think, reasonably good intelligence with the result that no battalion is ever secure. We find from the prisoners, they complain about the fatigue, of constantly moving for fear of a B-52 strike, and from that point of view, I am sure, they are very effective.

I would doubt if we would find many of the bombs hitting exactly where we would like them to go simply because of the fact this is area bombing, and, as I say, based on generalized intelligence, but the overall effect has been very helpful.

MASSIVE AIR ATTACKS ON NORTH

Senator SYMINGTON. In your statement you mentioned a couple of alternatives to which you hope we continue to object. One of those included massive air attacks on the North Vietnamese, or even on Chinese targets. By massive air attacks, you are talking about bombing Hanoi, are you not, and that kind of thing?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; removing all restraints and removing the restraints on urban bombing because of the command centers and industrial targets of various kinds.

Senator SYMINGTON. There is nothing in that statement which infers you would be against attacking military targets of any type in North Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. I would favor it and I would favor a gradually increasing scale of attack.

RISK OF WAR WITH CHINA

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the true risk we are running vis-a-vis Red China? Do you think there will be a direct confrontation?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. I said on numerous occasions one cannot write off the possibilities, but I would think when one analyzes the pros and cons from the point of view of the other side, the likelihood is quite low.

AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH MILITARY TARGETS

Senator SYMINGTON. And is the air campaign against military targets in North Vietnam integrated, a complementary to, the allied military operations in South Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. It is an essential part of the strategy which I described in my opening statement. We must not only convince Hanoi they cannot win in the south, but we must also remind them they will pay an increasing price in the north. The two go on concurrently, and we must be effective in both areas.

EXTENT OF ALLIED FORCES SEIZING OF INITIATIVE

Senator SYMINGTON. To what extent have allied forces seized the initiative from the Vietcong; that is, the North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam—since the midsummer of 1965?

General TAYLOR. We have done increasingly well more or less in proportion to the numbers of American forces engaged. Not only do our American units add their weight to the battle, but also their presence has had a stimulating effect on the Vietnamese units, so that the net result has been clearly an advantage.

"THE GATHERING STORM"

Senator SYMINGTON. I guess my time is about up. I would give this one more quotation from Mr. Churchill's "The Gathering Storm," which impressed me:

Still if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly, you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precious chance of survival. There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory.

Would you say if we do not face up to aggression at this point later on that quotation might be pertinent to our own problem?

General TAYLOR. I think it might.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CLARIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY

General, I would like to start this by making one or two points myself to use as a frame of reference. You are talking to one Senator who is not unfriendly to the administration's position, or necessarily friendly, but who wants to be persuaded very much that it is right. I think most of our colleagues feel that way.

I do not think most of us have any concern about the objectives. Like, I think, Senator Gore, whose statement about this was extremely good and very helpful.

Nor do I think most of us worry either about the legality or morality of our position. We are satisfied with it. But we do not think constant reiteration of the soundness of our objectives or of the rightness of our position is an answer to the question. Does this make sense? This is the thing, of course, that again and again and again comes back to disturb us.

There are others of us—the more romantic of us—who feel that a man has the strength of 10 because his heart is pure, and that for the United States every war it gets into is fine. But that does not really answer the question.

May I, as a further preliminary, just ask you this. As a consultant to the President and a member of his small group of advisers—thank goodness from my point of view—was your statement submitted to the White House before you made it today?

General TAYLOR. Not for any formal clearance. I informed the White House.

Senator CASE. Well, I have been advised that at least one Senator was told by the President that he ought to get up here and hear you because you really were talking not only sense but policy. Has your statement the authority of the administration?

General TAYLOR. It should not be considered an administration statement. It has not been staffed by the Government.

I would say, however, as I sit in on many of these conferences, but certainly not all of them, but I think it is consistent with the administration's position. I know of no conflict.

Senator CASE. I am sure you would, and I think you are right in your thinking that it is.

But I wish we had had this set up in the open a little more clearly. There should be an administration statement, and it ought to come from the President frankly. It ought to be clear who is talking, and I hope that it will be before we get through.

OUR INVOLVEMENT IN A CIVIL WAR

Now, there has been a lot of talk that we ought not to be in Vietnam because this is a civil war, we ought not be messing in it and interfering. I want to make perfectly clear that I believe we should be interfering because what we are talking about is "wars of liberation." These are civil wars essentially, as I understand it, between groups within a country, aided and abetted by an outside Communist power that hopes it will win and thereby become dominant in directing the affairs of that country. That is what we are talking about essentially, isn't it?

General TAYLOR. Yes. I think an important element and an essential element is the clandestine assistance from the outside of Communist sources.

Senator CASE. These things are civil wars. All wars of liberation are civil wars essentially.

General TAYLOR. In the tactical sense, but in the strategic sense I would say they are foreign wars.

Senator CASE. I agree. But when we are charged with doing wrong and getting involved in a civil war, those who make the charge are conceding to the Communists the advantage of a strategy which is theirs alone. There is no defense from the West; is that not, in substance, true?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

OPEN-ENDEDNESS OF OUR INVOLVEMENT

Senator CASE. Now, to get to the main point. This is the question of feasibility. You say "I do not believe anyone can give a completely satisfactory reply to that question."

I would like to direct you to two specific points, the number of men involved and possibly to be involved. You refer to the contention that you need 10 or 12 times as many antiguerrilla forces to be successful against guerrillas. And then you go on to say that with the addition of firepower, et cetera, et cetera, this can be cut down. How much can it be cut down, General?

General TAYLOR. I just do not know, sir. When the decision to bring in American forces was taken, the direct head count ratio between friendly strength and hostile strength was about 3½ to 1. On a battalion basis the ratio was even more unfavorable, around 2 to 1, perhaps less than that.

All I can say at that time it was not good enough. Yet I do not think we had anything like the ratios that were necessary to, say, have in Malaya, because we have available this great mobility which allows the battalion to fight in Province A, and tomorrow Province B, 200 miles away. Obviously, mobility affects the effectiveness of these forces. So somewhere between 3 to 1 and 10 to 1. Only experience will tell. It will have to be cut and dried, in my judgment, to reach the point when our advantage has been reached great enough to serve our purpose.

Senator CASE. I want to have proof that this can be done, not that it cannot be done. But I need a better idea than I have now if I am to feel that I have exercised my constitutional responsibility in this matter, which I do not think is finished by having voted for that resolution a couple of years ago, frankly.

Where are we left? If we vote for this particular authorization on the floor now, are we further committing ourselves irrevocably to a course that has no limit, 600,000, 800,000 men, a million, 2 million, 3 million? If so, then I think we ought very clearly to know that what we are doing makes sense.

Then you have stated that we control about 60 percent of the population. But Senator Mansfield's report says that all we have done is to hold our own and, in effect, we have enclaves because the bulk of this population of 60 percent is huddled together in the cities, and what we have not got is the countryside.

General TAYLOR. What I pointed out was that we had gained in the last 6 months from 53 to 60 percent, if these figures are accurate.

Senator CASE. If these figures are accurate. You have not put much stress on it, if they are accurate.

General TAYLOR. It is an honest effort. I know they are approached in every province and they get a monthly report in Saigon on the military and the civilians, the estimate of their population control, so it is an honest effort, but obviously there is room for error.

SUPPLY ROUTE THROUGH LAOS

Senator CASE. If I may just raise this other point.

The press has reported an enormous buildup of the supply route from North Vietnam and the possibility of our inability to inhibit it effectively at all and of a much greater intensification of the war in the north. This is not something that I have seen mentioned specifically in your comment.

General TAYLOR. I think the problem in Laos is one we have had with us from the beginning and which will stay with us to the end. Unless we move physically with large forces into Laos we cannot stop some infiltration there, even if we had no limitations on our air, because of the fact that the trails and the roads are covered by forests. It is almost impossible to use air effectively.

My own answer to the infiltration problem goes back to the source. It is Hanoi's leadership. There will always be some infiltration, until they decide that their aggression is not paying off.

So our effort, our target, must always be the will of the enemy which is, by the way, a sound military target in all wars.

Senator CASE. Of course. But this gets to reasoning in a circle, since the only way we can persuade the enemy that they should stop this is to prove they cannot win, and that they are not going to gain more than they are losing. The question is, Can we do this without getting involved in a general war in southeast Asia? You believe we can?

General TAYLOR. I believe we can; yes, sir.

IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT FUTURE

Senator CASE. If you have anything further to give us on the feasibility question, I think we ought to have it.

General TAYLOR. No. I certainly wish I could, Senator Case, because I have wrestled with this problem just as you have, trying to find out where we might be a year from now. But, as in all moving situations, whether military or economic, or political, one cannot see what the future is going to hold with any great degree of precision or clarity.

I simply feel we are on the right course of action, and there is no need for us to assume we will have infinite commitments.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

The committee will adjourn until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 1 p.m., to reconvene at 2:30 p.m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The next is Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Well, General, I am glad to greet you again. I join with my colleagues who have expressed their admiration and respect for you.

General TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

Senator DODD. I add that none of them excels me in this area. I think you are a great American. I am glad to say so publicly. And I think that your testimony this morning was the most lucid and the most impressive and the most authoritative that we have heard on this vexing, worrisome question of Vietnam. Thank God you are in the service of this country.

Most of the subjects that I have found interesting, I wanted to ask you about, have been covered by other Senators.

However, I am particularly interested in two or three points that I think might help us all here to better understand the discussion about our position in Vietnam.

I will hurry this. I know I only have 10 minutes. I want to get as much in as I can.

ADEQUATE U.S. HELP BECAME INSUFFICIENT IN FACE OF AGGRESSION FROM NORTH

Am I right in my understanding that in the beginning, with respect to Vietnam, we said we will help you to remain free, we will do whatever we can to help you. At that time we thought that some technical

assistance, some expertise on military matters, some economic aid, some other things, would be enough.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, I think that describes the beginning. We did not foresee the course of history. We did not know the magnitude of the effort necessary to preserve the freedom of this little country at the outset.

Senator DODD. All right. Now, am I also right in understanding that as this situation moved on, the aggression from the North Vietnamese and the Communist forces increased in intensity, in volume, and massiveness?

General TAYLOR. That is correct. From 1954 to about 1957 or 1958, the Diem government did quite well. It pulled the divided elements of the country together, the economy started to progress, and I think that was clearly recognized by the people in Hanoi, who then stepped up their efforts, and about 1959 or 1960 declared this war of liberation, so-called, against the South.

Senator DODD. So what happened really was, if I understand correctly, that what we thought would be adequate in the beginning turned out to be not sufficient because of the mounting aggression from the Communist side.

General TAYLOR. That is correct—using our jargon of today, they were constantly escalating their effort.

Senator DODD. So the escalation that we all talk about has been an escalation from the Communist side?

General TAYLOR. That is correct. And our response has always been a defensive response.

Senator DODD. It is often argued by critics of our policy that we are escalating the war. The point of my question—actually the escalation has come from the other side, and we have been required to meet it the best we can by assistance to the South Vietnamese.

General TAYLOR. That is correct.

Senator DODD. So this has been a three-phase situation. The beginning that I have described, the finding that we would have to do more, and finally the commitment of our own troops to combat.

Well, I think it is up to the American people to understand this. I have heard it argued that we have no commitment, we were in there to give them a little kind of help, and now it has spread into a big war. Am I right in understanding, General, what we committed ourselves to do is what America has committed itself to do historically, to help free people remain free?

General TAYLOR. I agree.

Senator DODD. I don't suppose—let me put it another way—let me put the question in better form.

I hope the United States never says to its friends "We will help you up to this point, but if it gets too tough, we will have to quit."

Do you agree with that?

General TAYLOR. I would hope that also, Senator.

Senator DODD. So I think all of this discussion in a way has been helpful. In a free society I suppose it is one of the drags on us that we have to do these things freely. But I am willing to pay that price, and I am sure you are, too.

FREE WORLD SHIPPING TO HAIPHONG

Now, I find my constituents asking me some questions that I would like to ask you.

They ask me particularly why do we allow some of our friends and allies to ship in supplies to Haiphong. These are some nations that we are helping. And they are supposed to be our friends.

We are in a bitter struggle. Why do we permit this? Why can't we get them to stop it?

Do you have any answer to that?

Mothers of sons who are in Vietnam ask me.

General TAYLOR. Well, I am sure that many approaches have been made by our Government to those friendly nations who are still shipping to the north. The Secretary of State would be qualified to discuss that. I really am not.

It is quite clear we could close this port by force, by using our airpower, possibly by mining. It is always on the list of those things which we could add to the program in the north.

But thus far in the judgment of those making the decision, the time is not yet ripe.

Senator DODD. Well, it seems to me—and I hope you agree—that we ought to be moving to get our friends to stop this.

RUSSIA SHIPPING SUPPLIES TO HAIPHONG

The second point I would like to raise is that the Soviet Union has boasted about its assistance. A Moscow radio broadcast in December, I think it was, boasted about the Black Sea fleet, an unending chain of shipping to Haiphong. I heard Senator Mundt ask you this morning how you reconciled this. I heard your answer, which I thought was as all your answers, intelligent and wise. But it troubles me that the Soviet Union, which one theory holds is not really interested in this war, nevertheless boasts about the fact that it is shipping in supplies with a Black Sea fleet of tankers, I think, oil tankers, that has been pouring oil into Haiphong.

I have American mothers in my State ask me about this. How do I explain this? What do I say to a mother who has a boy in Vietnam when she says to me, "Senator, I understand that Moscow or the Soviet Union is shipping oil into Haiphong to supply tanks, guns, or trucks, or whatever oil is needed for. Why don't we stop it?"

General TAYLOR. I would think that probably the boasting of the Soviets reflects that duality of motivation we were talking about before lunch—that they do like to feel obliged to boast of the aid they are giving to North Vietnam, and perhaps even exaggerate it, in order to fly the flag of the leadership of communism.

DEFECTORS TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator DODD. Well, in the couple of minutes I have left, General—I was greatly interested in your testimony this morning about the number of defectors who are coming over to our side.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. I knew that figure. I have some documentation, some classified parts of which I cannot use.

But I knew about the 1,500-odd per month.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

I have had people say to me—well, these are primitive people, what do they know about democracy, idle talk about defending their freedom? I understand at least 50 percent of their armed forces are voluntary.

Am I right about that?

General TAYLOR. Far more than that. Of the 677,000 under arms today, all are volunteers except about 5 percent.

Senator DODD. Well, I didn't know the exact figure. But it seems to me that a country that is willing to volunteer 95 percent, they may not know much about democracy, but it sure must know something about Communist tyranny.

General TAYLOR. I agree.

Senator DODD. Now, I understand, too, that the Air Force of the South Vietnamese is really pretty good. Am I right about that?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, they perform very well.

Senator DODD. They have about 1,000 crack pilots, am I right?

General TAYLOR. Of that order I would say, yes, sir.

Senator DODD. And they fly pretty good sorties?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. And they fly many more than we do, am I right about that?

General TAYLOR. I haven't seen the flying hours comparison, but they work hard at their job.

Senator DODD. So this isn't a limp country that doesn't have an interest in its own freedom, is it, General?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE KNOW SOMETHING OF FREEDOM

Senator DODD. Now, in addition, I have always understood that for all of the several hundred or maybe beyond that figure, mayors, or hamlet chieftains who have been assassinated, there has never been any difficulty in finding a replacement.

General TAYLOR. That is true, a very notable phenomenon I think, that there is always someone willing to go back into that empty chair.

Senator DODD. So the situation we find ourselves in is this, I think—and I ask you, General, if you can comment on it. We have a people who do know something about freedom, at least they want to remain free of Communist tyranny.

General TAYLOR. For 11 years they have not given up the fight, Senator, and I saw no indication they were about to give it up.

Senator DODD. And we have a people who have suffered terrible losses, who are fighting gallantly, who are willing to make great sacrifices, with a poor economy.

PLIGHT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE IF THEY LOSE

Another final question I would like to ask you.

Now, I hear all the arguments about this war. But I never hear anybody talking much about the plight of these people. What will happen to them at the time of a takeover? A terrible genocidal blood-bath that will ensue. Don't you think that will happen?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I read into the record, Senator, this morning, a description of what took place in North Vietnam, where the resistance to Ho Chi Minh was a small minority.

Now, if they ever—if the Communists ever took over the South where the anti-Communists element is a large majority, it is very hard to visualize what might be the losses in terms of lives, murders committed on the part of the Communists.

I think that Hungary would look like a very mild affair compared to what would take place.

Senator DODD. How are we going to get over to the free world in particular and our own country that basically this is what is at issue?

General TAYLOR. I hope that will be one of the outcomes of these hearings, Senator.

PRAISE OF WITNESS' STATEMENT

Senator DODD. I hope it will. And I want to say to you, General, in conclusion, what I said in the beginning. I never heard a clearer, a more lucid, a more intelligent presentation of this case.

General TAYLOR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. General Taylor, I thought you articulated as well as I have heard it ever done the administration's position. I read your paper, reread it. I found it very well thought out. You very well presented the arguments that have been presented in the past.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

May I ask the general to speak a little closer to the microphone? Some of the audience during the lunch hour said they could not hear. I thought if you bring it a little closer to you, because they want to hear what you have to say.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

I think it is much more important you be close to the microphone than we.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, I must go to the floor.

LEAPFROG DOMINO THEORY

Senator PELL. I was struck, too, with your mentioning you did not believe necessarily the domino theory, but you felt that there were effects from the loss of a free country to the Communist world. I guess we might coin a new phrase and say you more or less believe in the leapfrog domino theory. In other words, if one government falls, it would not effect the country next door necessarily, but it will have an adverse effect somewhere in the free world.

General TAYLOR. Well, the so-called domino theory? I do not believe that necessarily if South Vietnam fell the next state to fall would be, let's say, Thailand. I think Thailand would be very much threatened. But we might have the immediate confrontation in Africa, or in Latin America.

Senator PELL. That is what I mean by the leapfrog domino.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, it may occur in many parts of the developing world.

EFFECT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM CUBA

Senator PELL. Following that same theory through, when the Soviet Union withdrew from Cuba, with a great loss of face, where did the leapfrog domino fall the other way afterward?

General TAYLOR. I am afraid I don't follow the point, sir.

Senator PELL. Well, as I understand it, if either of the great protagonists suffered a loss of territory to the other side, your thought is there will be an adverse reaction somewhere else around the world.

General TAYLOR. In the Communist world, if our side were successful?

Senator PELL. No. Your point was in our side, if the Communist side were successful.

General TAYLOR. That is right. In which case we might have difficulties in any of the developing countries of the world.

Senator PELL. When the Communist world lost Azerbaijan or part of Austria, or they had to withdraw with great loss of face from Cuba, where was the resultant adverse effect in their world?

General TAYLOR. The reverse effect in the sense that—

Senator PELL. Dominoes have to fall two ways, don't they?

General TAYLOR. If we were successful, I am not suggesting the dominoes would fall necessarily on the Communist side. I think they would have—it would have a serious effect, certainly. At least it would demonstrate that the war of liberation is not indeed cheap and necessarily invincible.

Senator PELL. But basically your thought then, is the dominoes fall this way, not the other way?

General TAYLOR. No; I would say if the domino means adverse effect, an adverse wave being started, I would think it would be felt on the Communist side if our side is successful.

Senator PELL. I revert to my earlier question. Where after Cuba did it fall on the Communist side, when they withdrew?

General TAYLOR. Well, I think Cuba certainly affected the attitude of the Soviet Union to us, and continues to affect it. The missile crisis and its solution by our Government certainly has had a great impact on the Soviet attitude worldwide.

Senator PELL. I know my own objective in these hearings is to better inform myself and the people who are listening to the ideas and the responses of the witnesses, and for that reason I will try to keep my questions short, because I think most of the people watching know our own views pretty well.

FINITE LIMIT TO AMOUNT OF NORTH VIETNAM TROOPS

But the most important thing with these hearings is to know what we are doing and where we intend to go, and where we will come out in the end. In this connection, I would like to develop your point earlier that you said you felt there was a finite limit to the amount of people that the North Vietnamese could put in, if we continue to bomb in North Vietnam. Would you be more explicit as to what in your view is that finite limit?

General TAYLOR. I have been asked frequently to try to put a number on that, and I just cannot, because of the fact that the data bear-

ing on the consumption of supplies by the Vietcong, for example, are very few.

I am quite sure, however, in a qualitative sense, that a combination of continued, intense attacks on the lines of communications of the north utilizing our airpower, accompanied by increased attacks against the ground forces, so that they must consume supplies, they must take greater casualties, will lower the ceiling which probably exists today. In other words, to some degree we control where the ceiling is.

Senator PELL. In other words, if we keep going as we are, you feel we will find that they have reached their finite limit now?

General TAYLOR. Well, it is very interesting. A study of the combat rate of the Vietcong battalions reveals that a Vietcong battalion is rarely in action over 1 or 2 days a month, which almost raises a question whether they pay off, so to speak, whether or not it would be better to have fewer battalions, and make them fight 5 times a month or 10 times a month. I am sure the Communist leadership have a sensible answer to that conundrum, but I don't see it. In a certain sense you could say that even now the ceiling is preventing their utilizing fully the forces they have available.

Senator PELL. Isn't there a human limit, too, to the number of days in a month or a week that a man is willing to be in battle?

General TAYLOR. Very much so. But they are not even approaching the breaking point in terms of direct combat. I do suspect, however, as I said this morning, that the B-52 and the use of our other aircraft against their bases does take away the rest periods which has allowed them to be a very durable force in the field in the past.

WILL BOMBING BRING HANOI TO NEGOTIATIONS?

Senator PELL. General, in connection with the bombing, particularly in the north, one of the purposes, as I understand it, is to make their will flag, and make them more willing to come to the negotiation table.

Where—and this is a point that other witnesses would not agree with you—in history do we find other examples of where general bombing, or bombing has brought people to the—made people more willing to come to the negotiating table.

General TAYLOR. Since the days where we have had aircraft in quantity, so that it is a formidable weapon, we have never had a situation like this. You recall in World War II it was unconditional surrender, it was fight to the end or be destroyed, and many people preferred to be destroyed rather than to accept unconditional surrender. Here we are not doing that at all. Just the contrary. We are constantly pointing out the better life that awaits the north if they will end their aggression against the south. We are deliberately keeping a golden bridge open behind them, so they are never in the trapped position that the Germans or the Japanese found themselves in.

Senator PELL. But then would you bear with me in my view that bombing per se has not, at least in the past—I am not just thinking of World War II—but in the past tended to bring countries to the negotiating table.

General TAYLOR. Well, I think it certainly did in the sense the destruction of bombing, both in Europe and in Asia, weakened the ability of our opponents to continue the war. I don't think anyone would sug-

gest that in itself the bombing brought the enemy to the peace table, but it certainly was an important part of it.

Senator PELL. You don't feel that in some cases the bombing can be—as I think the British found in Malaya—that it can be counterproductive.

General TAYLOR. I don't know the circumstances there. But if properly used, certainly it is a great advantage to us to present to the leadership in Hanoi this very dismal picture of continued destruction of all they have been constructing in the last 10 years, and always giving them an alternative, but you don't really have to accept this indefinitely—you can stop it yourself.

Senator PELL. I appreciate your view, and I hope you are right. I just have this feeling in me that it can be in many cases, counterproductive. I think for those of us who have been campaigning in the past, we think back a year ago, when we campaigned against escalation and defoliation, and the bombing of North Vietnam, it puts us in a rather odd position, because we want to support our President, and we believe in the objectives. And witnesses like you may be able to persuade us that the premises of 1964 were incorrect.

DIFFICULT TO COUNT CASUALTIES OF SOUTH

One point in connection with the counterproductivity of bombing—I am trying to find out what the casualties are in South Vietnam from the war, because I agree with you, many people were horribly murdered and assassinated by the Vietcong, and many murdered and assassinated in North Vietnam. But for the person who is killed, for his immediate relatives, it doesn't make any difference if it is by napalm, bombing, or some other way. You are just dead. Why is it so hard to get an estimate of the casualties of the South Vietnamese from the war?

General TAYLOR. Because of the very nature of the war. Our weapons are used in the jungles and the forests, generally in areas where the population is very sparse.

There is no way to count—to visit the battlefield and count the casualties. But I would say it is significant. I know of no protest on the part of any of the leaders of South Vietnam, any newspaper in South Vietnam, over the use of our bombing. The great concern—which I respect here in the United States, as to whether or not we are needlessly destroying civilians, is not felt in South Vietnam. And any suggestions that we limit the use of our weapons I am sure would be very strongly resisted by the people and the leaders in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

CONFUSION ABOUT OUR PROGRESS IN WAR

General, I was pleased that you are optimistic, or reasonably hopeful about the progress in the last few months.

I must say that in reviewing the progress reports we have had the last 4 years, we are a little dubious about the accuracy of predictions. You recall the statements that you and Secretary McNamara have made in the past about the outlook.

General TAYLOR. I would be glad to have you repeat them, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. I know that you cannot be positive in these matters. But it is anything but certain just how this situation is proceeding—whether there are grounds for optimism.

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OR LIMITED OBJECTIVES

I want to explore the question of limited objectives that was discussed earlier this morning.

I am confused about this.

It strikes me that the way you described our objective—although not using the exact language—that it means we are going to use whatever force is necessary to make them give up. This is just another way of saying, “unconditional surrender.”

General TAYLOR. No, sir; I don't agree.

The CHAIRMAN. To me this means an unlimited objective. But I know you don't use that language. But the language you do use logically seems to result in that conclusion rather than one of being disposed to negotiate.

The administration has said that it would allow the Vietcong to be represented in negotiations. But Premier Ky, after Honolulu, said that he would never negotiate with the NLF, or, as he characterized it, as the “National Enslavement Front.” This seemed to be quite a different view from the administration's. The President's speech yesterday seems to be more in agreement with Mr. Ky's view that we are not going to negotiate until they give up—which to me means unconditional surrender.

Could you just clarify this a little bit?

General TAYLOR. First, I would hope you will address these necessities on negotiations to a gentleman who can really speak with authority, the Secretary of State.

I would only comment on this. That I think the exact status of the Liberation Front in any negotiations is going to be a very important point. And I would think it would be a great mistake for us to make too clearly our position until we find out what are the other factors to be arranged in order to conduct meaningful negotiations.

But I would certainly say most positively that the position—I have never heard any official of our Government suggest that we will not negotiate until the other fellow surrenders. I do not consider it a surrender to have a criminal surrender his future or his life if he is required to give up his felony. And all we are trying to get is to have the North Vietnam to cease the aggression against the south, and in exchange therefore I can suggest a number of advantages which they might be offered.

The CHAIRMAN. In the last World War all we were seeking was for Germany to give up its aggression and be good boys and quit.

General TAYLOR. No, sir; we went much further than that. Furthermore, it is quite clear that we were going to try and presumably execute their leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. In any case, I am very confused about it.

The idea of negotiating a compromise, which is something less than what we want, seems to me to be consistent with a limited war.

But if they must give up and come to our terms, this is what I would call unlimited commitment. This means using whatever we need to use to bring about this result.

General TAYLOR. I could think of many more—

The CHAIRMAN. I am having a semantic difficulty here.

General TAYLOR. "Unlimited" means you could add nothing to the requirement. I am sure you could think of other things we might ask North Vietnam to do in addition to stopping their aggression. We could ask them to stop being Communist. We could ask them to stop being allied to Peiping, to abjure their ideology.

The CHAIRMAN. You might ask them that at the conference table. You would not expect them to agree to that in advance.

General TAYLOR. I am just making a point that when we say, "Stop your aggression," that is far from being unlimited.

The CHAIRMAN. That seems to imply, though, that we use unlimited means, even if it means going into China or anywhere else.

General TAYLOR. We are certainly using limited means in terms of the vast resources which we have in reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. We are up to now. That is not what I meant. I meant how the objective, the ultimate, comes out. That is what I am talking about.

General TAYLOR. The ultimate objective is to get the leadership of Hanoi to stop doing what they are doing to the south. And I am quite sure they are not going to await ultimate annihilation before changing their ways.

DISCUSSION OF WAR ATROCITIES

The CHAIRMAN. General, I don't wish to dwell on this, but much has been said about atrocities. This is the nature of war, isn't it?

General TAYLOR. What, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Atrocities were mentioned at length this morning. War is inherently a rather atrocious activity, is it not?

General TAYLOR. I am sorry to say that it is.

The CHAIRMAN. If we are going to talk about such things, we are reminded about air raids on Tokyo, or Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Would you call those atrocities or not?

General TAYLOR. No. I would say that was being used against a ruthless enemy executing our prisoners, who attacked us at Pearl Harbor and various places.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it true that each country always believes the other one commits the atrocities, and that God is on their side? Isn't this typical in all wars?

General TAYLOR. No. I would say atrocity—I am thinking of a good definition—I think that carries with it the idea of intentional cruelty, does it not? And I would say nothing in our procedures has even had this intent.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know, but it seems to me a rather drastic matter to kill thousands of people with one bomb.

General TAYLOR. We are not doing that in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I am talking about the past.

General TAYLOR. We are not proposing to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that this discussion is very significant because people in warfare revert to a form of savagery. War is of that nature. I am not saying we are any better or worse than others. I am trying to say that it is a rather irrelevant argument, because when people are trying to win a war they usually resort to drastic means to eliminate the enemy. I am not sure it makes much difference whether you shoot him or decapitate him or burn him up. I would rather be shot than be burned to death. I think. It is quicker.

These references to atrocities seems to me to be designed to arouse emotions and the usual chauvinism necessary to carry on a war, regardless of the justifying factors. That has been typical of nearly every war. It is certainly not characteristic of us. I don't mean that.

ENEMY HOPES FOR CAPITULATION IN WASHINGTON

Reverting once more to a matter I raised this morning about Dienbienphu and the Vietcong, on page 12 you state:

"They hope against hope"—that is, the enemy—"that through international or domestic pressures our Government can be forced off course."

I have been told during the noon hour that certain journalists have leads for their stories saying: "Administration suggests that the war may be lost in Washington," which means again a possible reflection upon the value of these hearings.

Did you mean by that statement that the war may be lost because of these discussions?

General TAYLOR. Nobody. I simply referred to a fact which I believe is historically correct, that the situation in France, and in the French Government, really was the direct cause of the capitulation of the French effort in South Vietnam. That I had a feeling, only my personal feeling, Senator, that the leaders in Hanoi will hope that the same kind of situation will arise here. I sincerely hope that is not the case, and don't believe it will.

WAS DECISION OF MENDES-FRANCE REFLECTION OF PUBLIC WILL?

The CHAIRMAN. General, isn't it a fact that Mendes-France was elected on the promise that he would either settle the war in 30 days or increase the commitment sufficient to overcome the enemy, and that the French people chose to settle after Dienbienphu?

General TAYLOR. I have not had a chance to review that, Senator. It is an interesting point. Whether or not Mendes-France's decision to capitulate in South Vietnam really reflected the majority view of the French people I am just not sure.

The CHAIRMAN. I was informed that he was in the process of preparing two divisions to go to Vietnam and then they made a deliberate decision not to send them; that this was a decision on the part of the French Government. I would say, in retrospect, that they were very wise.

General TAYLOR. Well, the French Government and the French people, of course, may be two different things.

The CHAIRMAN. They had an election. The war was an issue in it.

SIGNIFICANCE OF EISENHOWER ELECTION IN 1952

In our own election in 1952, war or peace was considered to be a significant factor when President Eisenhower said, "I will go to Korea." The implication was that he would go and settle it. The people voted for him in overwhelming numbers, didn't they? Was that war lost in Washington?

General TAYLOR. I am not sure whether you consider a vote for Eisenhower a vote for that solution or not. I am not qualified.

The CHAIRMAN. You know that he did say that.

General TAYLOR. Oh, yes; he said it.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with that election?

General TAYLOR. Very much so.

The CHAIRMAN. I personally think, of course, that it is our duty to have these hearings in view of the great confusion about the issues that exist in the country.

INVOLVEMENT IN ASIAN LAND WAR

One other thing: Since we mentioned Eisenhower, it is my information that several—three at least—of the leading military men in our history, Generals MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Bradley, have all stated at one time or another that we should never become involved in a major land war in Asia. Is that right?

General TAYLOR. I am not sure whether it is or not.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not sure?

General TAYLOR. General Bradley would be available to answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are not sure, maybe I should not ask you. I thought that was the case.

General TAYLOR. The word "never" is very dangerous for either a military man or a civilian to use. I hope they never used that adverb.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, assuming they said that—maybe I can put it hypothetically—do you see any reason why this advice is any less valid now than it was in the days of Generals Eisenhower or MacArthur?

General TAYLOR. That all depends upon the context in which one uses this. I do not consider that we are getting involved in a major land war in Asia at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not consider this an involvement in a major land war in Asia?

General TAYLOR. In the context, where the statement you cited has normally been used, the concept has been one of a general land war with Red China, and I certainly do not consider our assistance to the very large Vietnamese force in South Vietnam, our support of this ally, constitutes the kind of war envisaged by that quotation.

The CHAIRMAN. It has already been stated here that an involvement of up to 600,000 men is contemplated by people in authority. I thought that would be considered quite an involvement.

POSSIBILITY OF WAR WITH CHINA

I think, General, in all honesty, behind the concern of many of us, is not just Vietnam. There is the possibility, or even probability, of this situation escalating into a war with China. We always hesitate to talk about these things, but that is one of my concerns.

I would regret to see us continue this war to the point where we became engaged in an all-out war with China. Many people who are wiser than I am believe that this a possibility.

General TAYLOR. As we discussed this morning, obviously one cannot rule it out. But I wonder whether our Government, or whether the Congress, would suggest complete supineness on the part of our foreign policy in the Far East because of that relatively small possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think anyone suggests supineness. But there have been several news stories in which the Chinese have stated that they are being encircled, and they are exhibiting considerable nervousness about the possibility of a war with us.

I believe you said that you did not feel nervous about a war with China, but there is a real question that the Chinese may feel very nervous about a war with us.

General TAYLOR. They should feel nervous about it. If they ever got in a war with us, it would be disaster for them. And we know we are not seeking such a confrontation.

The CHAIRMAN. You have confirmed their fears, I think. My greatest trouble is a feeling of inadequate knowledge and understanding of China and of this whole area to make very sound judgments.

I don't profess to have the kind of knowledge to make sound judgments about these issues. My judgment is more by instinct and feeling.

It would be a great disaster if we became involved in an all-out war against the Chinese on the Asian continent.

I believe my time is up.

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S STATEMENT ABOUT 1956 ELECTIONS

General TAYLOR. During the noon hour, my research was in the direction of President Eisenhower's statement about Ho Chi Minh—you recall our discussion. I would like to read the passage from his book, in which this appears.

I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held at the time of the fighting—

against the French—

possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than the Chief of State, Bao Dai.

In that context, I would certainly agree that the Vietnamese would never have supported Bao Dai in election, who was a French puppet. But I would say also that the 80-percent figure quoted would certainly not apply today in South Vietnam in regard to the election of Ho Chi Minh, the head of the Communist state in Hanoi.

The CHAIRMAN. You think they would support Ky today over Ho Chi Minh?

General TAYLOR. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your opinion they would support Ky today over Ho Chi Minh?

General TAYLOR. They would not care whether it is Ky or not. But it would be the head of a government which is offering them security in a non-Communist state.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the General—this involves our colloquy.

The date of the election was to be July 1956. Do you deny that President Eisenhower was talking about July 1956?

General TAYLOR. He was talking about an election—it is not clear here. He is talking about an election to be held between Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai—

Senator MORSE. He is talking about an election—General, may I respectfully say, he was talking about the election to be held under the Geneva accords, July 1956. Those are the elections that we joined in preventing happening. I have talked to people on the Foreign Relations Committee who were briefed at the time as to what our intelligence reports were, too. Our intelligence reports were, if the election was held it would go to Ho Chi Minh.

General TAYLOR. This is entirely a question of Ho Chi Minh versus Bao Dai.

Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bao Dai was a factor in the feeling prevalent among Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for. As one Frenchman said to me, what Vietnam needs is another Syngman Rhee, regardless of all the difficulties the presence of such a person would entail.

Senator MORSE. They were talking about the Geneva accord election.

General TAYLOR. He is talking about an election between Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai.

Senator MORSE. I don't care who it was. It was the 1956 elections that we stopped. That is our sad, sordid record in regard to our alleged support of freedom in South Vietnam.

General TAYLOR. To have had elections—they could not have been held, Senator, under the terms of the Geneva accord. There would have been no international supervision.

Senator MORSE. There would if we hadn't stopped them.

General TAYLOR. No, indeed. International supervision was not possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Bao Dai was the head of state in the beginning, before Diem ousted him; is that right?

General TAYLOR. He was the French puppet at the time—

The CHAIRMAN. And Diem was our boy. Diem put him out. Isn't that about right?

Senator SPARKMAN?

INTERNATIONAL TEAM REFUSED ADMISSION BY NORTH VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, following up about the international team, isn't it true that North Vietnam refused to let this international team come into that country?

General TAYLOR. I think they admitted them into the Hanoi area, but they were never allowed circulation throughout North Vietnam.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, the idea of supervision of elections meant more or less free circulation around.

General TAYLOR. It would have to be. And for that reason free elections as contemplated never were possible.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't know that this leads anywhere. As a matter of fact, I felt rather bad that we could not go through with the idea of holding the elections. But isn't it true that we knew ahead of time that so far as the elections were concerned, they would be for all practical purposes rigged, because North Vietnam would be controlling the elections?

General TAYLOR. We would know that certainly North Vietnam would vote 99.9 percent for Ho Chi Minh, as any other Communist state votes when they go through that motion.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it was presently futile to hold an election.

General TAYLOR. That is my opinion.

AREA OF FIGHTING A WAR WITH CHINA

Senator SPARKMAN. General, referring to this question of war with China—and I believe you have shown in your statement, and your answers to questions here, that you certainly do not want a war with China, and do not believe that this war will push into that. But General Gavin said that if we should get into war with China, it ought to be a place of our own choosing, and that southern China was not the place where it ought to be.

If we were going to have a war with China, it ought to be in the Manchuria area.

Do you agree with that reasoning?

General TAYLOR. Well, first, I don't believe there is any good place to have a war with China. But if indeed we had one, certainly we would not be confined to South Vietnam. I assume this would be general war against China. And if our strategists preferred Manchuria, they could take Manchuria.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course a war with China would probably—well, I think probably we ought not to speculate on that. I started to say it probably would involve nuclear weapons; would it not?

General TAYLOR. It is possible, but not necessarily so.

EFFORTS TO AVOID DAMAGE TO CIVILIANS

Senator SPARKMAN. General, something has been said about the damage done to villages, civilians, in some of our activities there.

I will ask you whether or not we have tried to avoid that insofar as practical to do so.

General TAYLOR. Very much so, sir. It is always in the mind of our commanders. It is a directive all through the military channels. I really don't think that is necessary. I think American soldiers in the field generally try to conduct their operations as humanely as possible. I agree with the chairman, however, there is no such thing as a peaceful—

Senator SPARKMAN. Kindly.

General TAYLOR. Conflict in which civilians do not lose heavily.

Senator SPARKMAN. But isn't it a practice of ours to warn villages if they are to be attacked or obliterated?

General TAYLOR. Well, in the north, it is usual to have pamphlets dropped which will indicate to the population to keep away from certain types of places. In the south, on the tactical battlefield, obviously that kind of warning just is not feasible—except where loud-speakers can be used on the battlefield.

MAIN ATTACK BY VIETNAMESE AGAINST VIETCONG

Senator SPARKMAN. General, I think you may have answered this question this morning, but I want to pinpoint it.

We read news stories all the time about what the American forces are doing over there. But isn't it a fact that the main attack is being carried by the Vietnamese against the Vietcong.

General TAYLOR. You are quite right—the national interest of our presence in South Vietnam focuses attention on American action, and unfortunately so, because the Vietnamese, who are indeed still carrying the main load, their deeds are not recorded in our press, and also our allies, the Koreans, for example, and the Australians, the New Zealanders. It just is unfortunate that we don't give a more balanced presentation of the participation in action.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think a great many people think that this is an American war instead of a Vietnamese war. But you say it is a Vietnamese war.

General TAYLOR. Very much so, sir. All one has to do is add up the casualties, look at the totals at the end of the month, and be reminded of the intense military activity being conducted, sometimes entirely by the Vietnamese alone, sometimes they join with us in combined operations.

Senator SPARKMAN. And we do have, even though in limited numbers, fighting forces from other friendly countries.

General TAYLOR. Yes, the Korean contribution as you know is getting quite significant. I think the total combat strength of our allies now is around 22,000.

Senator SPARKMAN. General, I was looking over something that was sent to us entitled "The Heart of the Matter in Vietnam," and included in it, the 14 points that we made. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if that has been placed in the record at any point in the hearings. It seems to me it would be a good thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be put in the record.

Would the Senator yield?

I am told this paper you wish to put in has no authentication. Where did it come from?

Senator SPARKMAN. It came from the State Department, and is somehow connected with the testimony of Mr. George Ball.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing to indicate it is a State Department document.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that.

Senator SPARKMAN. In fact, I have a letter here.

The letter was from Mr. Douglas MacArthur, Assistant Secretary of State, and we all received a copy of it.

(The document referred to follows:)

THE HEART OF THE MATTER IN VIETNAM

I. THE FACT OF AGGRESSION

The simple fact is that tens of thousands trained and armed men, including units of the North Vietnamese Regular Army, have been sent by Hanoi into South Vietnam for the purpose of imposing Hanoi's will on South Vietnam by force. It is this external aggression which is responsible for the presence of U.S. combat forces. Indeed, it was not until the early summer of 1965 that the number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam reached the number of those which have been infiltrated by Hanoi. If this aggression from the outside were removed, U.S. combat forces would not be needed.

II. THE U.S. COMMITMENT

The United States has a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Vietnam against external attack. This commitment is based upon bilateral agreements between the United States and South Vietnam, upon the SEATO Treaty (whose obligations are both joint and several), upon annual actions by the Congress in providing aid to South Vietnam, upon the policy expressed in such congressional action as the August 1964 resolution, and upon the solemn declarations of three U.S. Presidents. At stake is not just South Vietnam, nor even southeast Asia: there is also at stake the integrity of a U.S. commitment and the importance of that commitment to the peace right around the globe.

III. INITIATIVES FOR PEACE

A. We are not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past 5 years to seek peace in southeast Asia. Reports of "peace feelers" have to do with initiatives by third parties. Hanoi has denied that it has ever made any "peace feelers." We ourselves know of none. During 1965 Hanoi has consistently insisted that its four points must be accepted as the sole basis for peace in Vietnam. The third of these four points would require the imposition of the program of the liberation front upon South Vietnam, whether the South Vietnamese wanted it or not.

B. The initiatives for peace undertaken by our side, and by many other governments, would be hard to count. They began with President Kennedy's talk with Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 and have not ceased. The publicly known initiatives have been multiplied many times by private initiatives not yet disclosed. On the public record, however, are the following instances:

1. Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in June 1961;
2. Geneva Conference on Laos;
3. U.S. reference of Gulf of Tonkin matter to the U.N. Security Council in August 1964;
4. The Polish proposal to convene the two Cochairmen and the three members of the ICC (India, Canada, and Poland) to take up the question of Laos;
5. The call of 17 nonaligned nations for negotiations without preconditions;
6. Attempts by U Thant to visit Hanoi and Peiping;
7. President Johnson's call for unconditional discussions;
8. The British Commonwealth Committee on Vietnam; and
9. Attempted or actual visits by Patrick Gordon Walker, Mr. Davies (Member of Parliament), and Ghanaian delegation.

IV. U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BASKET OF PEACE

The following statements are on the public record about elements which the United States believes can go into peace in southeast Asia:

1. The Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in southeast Asia.
2. We would welcome a conference on southeast Asia or on any part thereof.
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it.
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it.

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions.

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose.

7. We want no U.S. bases in southeast Asia.

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured.

9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice.

10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision.

11. The countries of southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option.

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least \$1 billion.

13. The President has said "The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem.

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

In other words, we have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Vietnam.

COMPARISON OF VIETNAM ACTION TO OTHER U.S. INVOLVEMENTS

Senator SPARKMAN. Something has been said about our enclaves, military bases, and so forth in South Vietnam.

Can you tell us whether or not it is part of our policy to establish permanent bases in South Vietnam if and when the war is brought to an end?

General TAYLOR. We have often said, our President has often said, that we are not seeking bases in South Vietnam for any purpose beyond the immediate problem of freeing South Vietnam from the Vietcong.

Senator SPARKMAN. Are we trying to do in South Vietnam a thing that is similar to what we did in Western Europe following the war—containing communism?

General TAYLOR. It is hard to consider the analogy at all exact, I would say, because the conditions—

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, let me move to another operation. Is it akin to the operation that we entered into in Greece?

General TAYLOR. I would say very much so. It also what we entered into in Korea, although the military situation is quite different.

JUNGLE WARFARE

Senator SPARKMAN. General, your first assignment by President Kennedy was paramilitary, was it not?

General TAYLOR. It was to be—the title was military representative, which included looking at the preparations our Government was making in the paramilitary counterinsurgency field.

Senator SPARKMAN. When we first started sending advisers into Vietnam, if I remember correctly, we thought it was going to be a jungle operation, probably somewhat akin to that in Malaya.

Have we departed from that, or is it still largely that?

General TAYLOR. I think that the original military threat, after 1954, was more in conventional terms, and the training which we gave, our advisers gave, was more pointed at the possibility of a formal war across the demarcation line.

It was not until after 2 or 3 years, probably 1958 or 1959, that the extent of the guerrilla threat became apparent; and it was indeed the threat, and hence we oriented our training of the Vietnamese and our own preparations here to cope with guerrilla warfare.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do I understand that we do have an operation there of going after them almost singly, pulling them out one by one, out of the jungles?

General TAYLOR. I am not quite sure—

Senator SPARKMAN. Or is most of it on a kind of a mass operation?

General TAYLOR. We normally use our forces to strike a significant military force of the Vietcong, usually the so-called main-line units, so that we like to get large targets, battalions or larger, if it is at all possible. Unfortunately the enemy doesn't necessarily behave the way we would like to have them do. But we are most effective when we can get a significant military target. In the course of dealing with one of these battalions, let's say, we end up in very detailed operations, routing out companies and squads and platoons in the jungle.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I had seen pictures of military men going into huts, cabins, bringing the people out one by one, and sometimes dragging out a Vietcong. I just wondered if much of the operation was carried on that way.

General TAYLOR. Well, they go where the enemy are, and the enemy usually or frequently are in villages, but more frequently in fortified entrenched areas, in caves.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, they seek them out.

General TAYLOR. That is the only way to end them as a military threat.

Senator SPARKMAN. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

WIDER SIGNIFICANCE OF VIETNAM CONFRONTATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Taylor, the tenor of the discussion here this morning and this afternoon, unless it changed a little bit during my absence, has been largely on the question of the military confrontation in South Vietnam.

Do you consider that the action in South Vietnam is a confrontation wider than just a military confrontation—that is a confrontation against the advancing aggression of international communism?

General TAYLOR. I indicated in my earlier statement, Senator, that I feel that while our direct purpose, our direct objective is the liberation of 15 million people in South Vietnam, inevitably there are collateral objectives, one of which is to resist the war of liberation, prove that it is not an invincible technique, and hope then it will not be applied elsewhere.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems to me that international communism had for one of its programs leading toward the communisation

of the world, or gradual absorption of the rest of the world into the international Communist authoritarian system, a highly active system of subversion of various kind in various countries. But recently, in the last few years, emanating chiefly from Communist China, has been a discussion of the program of wars of liberation.

COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OR WARS OF LIBERATION

I want to probe that just a minute because my impression is that the Communists approach the so-called war of liberation in whatever country it may be, not by spearheading it necessarily in an overt way but through subversion and other means of aiding and stirring up a revolution, and then attempting to move in to take charge, after a revolutionary movement is started. And they classify as joining in a war of liberation, under the guise that it was already started, and then they take over and help.

Is that part of the pattern of this war of liberation movement?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, I think it is. The Communists are always very clever in exploiting internal weakness and turbulence in any weak country. And I think they look for these soft spots, hope then that they can feed the fires, and then move in, as you say, once the internal movement has gained in strength. And then they can use limited means to keep it going from a clandestine assistance from the outside.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, is there any question in your mind but what the Chinese Communists are determined if possible to aid, to encourage, or to extend the international Communist principle, first in South Vietnam, and then hopefully if they are successful there, to the neighboring areas, as opportunity presents itself?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; I am sure they look forward to following that course of action, as they get the breaks. They are going to watch this very carefully.

DOMINO THEORY AND BANDWAGON MOVEMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You said this morning that you did not adhere to the generally accepted idea of the domino theory, because it connoted knocking one over and then knocking the next one up against it.

I think I would agree with that. I think it might jump over one country and knock another one down.

But successive surrender of countries one by one to international communism, based upon the successes which they have had in the past with other countries, would encourage the conquest of other countries.

Now, what do you think about the danger in, let's say, first in south Asia and the islands in that area, of subversion and attempted further conquest among those other nations if this activity in South Vietnam that we are in now should terminate with the control by the North Vietnamese Government, through the international Communist movement as represented by the North Vietnamese Government? If the North Vietnamese win, do you think it will only be a matter of time before we are confronted with another problem, perhaps more serious, in connection with the incursion of the Communists?

General TAYLOR. I think it would be a great encouragement both to the Communist leadership in Peiping and Hanoi, and also the

Communist elements in various weak countries, and it would encourage the latter to move forward more aggressively, and it would also allow them to get adherents among the wavering in many countries.

There is always a danger of a sort of bandwagon movement, I am afraid, among these very weak countries. And if indeed they felt that the strength of the future lay in the Communist bloc, particularly that led by Peiping, I think we would be in real trouble.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I would use almost interchangeably myself the bandwagon movement and the domino theory.

General TAYLOR. They are related.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If we abandoned South Vietnam, if we just got out of there, and let the north take over, do I understand it to be your feeling, then, that it would be a great discouragement to the forces of freedom and Western ideology in that part of the world, and perhaps to other parts of the world, such as Africa and places like that?

General TAYLOR. Very much so. In these weak countries, the bandwagon movement certainly would become apparent. And even among our staunch allies, NATO, for example, the spectacle of the United States walking out on what the world accepts as our commitment, regardless of how some of us want to interpret it, that our walking out would certainly shake their confidence in our performing under NATO, under any other international agreement of which we are a part.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think perhaps that there is something to that.

ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY BY OUR ALLIES

But I wish some of our so-called allies would assume more of their responsibilities than they have been assuming heretofore.

General TAYLOR. I join you in that, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And perhaps we might be justified in losing a little confidence in some of them because of their failure to come forward sufficiently in a time of this sort.

I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

APPLICABILITY OF U.N. CHARTER TO SEATO TREATY

Senator MORSE. General Taylor, this morning I understood that you shared the view that the SEATO treaty would justify our course of action in South Vietnam.

General TAYLOR. What, sir?

Senator MORSE. That the SEATO Treaty would justify our course of action in South Vietnam. Is that a correct interpretation?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator MORSE. Article 53, General, of the United Nations Charter reads as follows:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of members against any enemy state * * *.

Those two enemy states, of course, were Germany and Japan. Those were the two states referred to in the treaty.

Do you know of any authorization of the Security Council justifying our making use of any regional arrangement under the SEATO Treaty?

General TAYLOR. I am not sure of the validity of that argument, Senator. I base my opinion on the applicability of this treaty largely because of statements made by our own officials, and by positions taken in this committee. For example, John Foster Dulles—the Foreign Relations Committee in its report on the SEATO Treaty made the following statement:

This treaty constitutes an important step in the evolution of U.S. policy to create a system of collective security in the west Pacific area. It is the latest addition to the protective network of the mutual defense treaties which have been concluded by the United States with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

And, furthermore indicated that the committee at that time was thoroughly aware of the applicability of the treaty to this situation—the committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that the acceptance of these obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

Now, I could read citations from Secretary Dulles and other officials at the time which to me, not as a lawyer, sir, as a citizen, leads me to believe that we intended the SEATO Treaty to cover this situation, and we anticipated the obligation falling due.

Senator MORSE. General, that is completely worthless from the standpoint of the language that I just read to you from the U.N. Charter. I don't care what the Secretary of State said, or anyone else said as their opinion.

QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The question is a question of law. Have we received authorization from the Security Council for our course of action under a regional treaty in South Vietnam, and the answer is "No," we never have. And until we do, we are going to continue to stand charged throughout the world in many, many places as in violation of the charter and in my judgment the misappropriation of SEATO.

General TAYLOR. How do you reconcile your position, Senator, with the overall right of self-defense, which is acknowledged in several paragraphs?

Senator MORSE. Oh—the so-called right of self-defense is specifically covered in the treaty. It makes perfectly clear that under a regional program you cannot proceed except by going through the United Nations.

Read the first section of the SEATO Treaty as to the commitment that we made.

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

We have proceeded time and time again to treat it as a scrap of paper. So the great debate that is going on among the international lawyers, may I say, is why haven't we made use of article 53 of the United Nations Charter, as well as a whole series of others that I could point out to you?

Senator LONG. General, if I might be your legal adviser, may I refer to section 51?

Senator MORSE. I do not yield to the Senator from Louisiana. I am cross-examining the witness. He can question you on his own time.

I want to say that our clear duty, General Taylor, is for us to conform to the United Nations Charter, and that we have not. I question this in regard to another violation of international law.

General TAYLOR. Senator, I am indebted to the Senator from Louisiana.

Senator MORSE. You read it when he asks the question, not on my time.

I am sorry.

General TAYLOR. I am responding to your comment.

Senator MORSE. I am not letting the Senator from Louisiana take over my witness. I am accustomed to that tactic in hearings. But you are going to answer my questions.

General TAYLOR. I doubt the equity of your position, but I yield, sir.

Senator MORSE. Of course—

Senator LONG. You mean the Senator won't yield for an answer to his own question?

Senator MORSE. I am sure you don't agree with me at all. Wait until the country gets through with you and the policy in regard to Vietnam, and you will see what the agreement is.

Senator LONG. Just a point of order.

Is the witness to be permitted to answer the Senator's question—

Senator MORSE. I am used to your filibustering tactics.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's have order. The Senator from Oregon?

ADVISE AND CONSENT ROLE OF SENATE

Senator MORSE. The Senate has a constitutional role, General, in the making of foreign policy with which I know you are familiar. In order to perform this role properly, it must be brought into the decisionmaking process in the initial stages, when major questions are under consideration concerning possible commitments to other countries which might eventually involve us in a war.

The Senate has not been called upon to advise and consent to a treaty committing this Nation in the manner that we now say we are committed to in Vietnam.

This commitment is drawn through tactical decisions within the executive branch of the Government, which when added together amount to committing us to a war. This has taken place without a solid treaty basis for involvement of a declaration of war by the Congress.

DECLARATION OF WAR

The question is, under our constitutional system, do you believe that it is proper to involve this Nation in a war without a declaration of war?

General TAYLOR. First let me respond to your previous statement. Again, my clear understanding is the SEATO Treaty does indeed cover the action which we are doing in southeast Asia.

Secondly—

Senator MORSE. I disagree. Go ahead.

General TAYLOR. We have had troops involved in military actions in many situations without a declaration of war by executive action, always with discussion with the Congress.

I certainly—the situation here has not arisen without knowledge of you gentlemen. I appeared as Ambassador at least five times, to explain the developing situation when I was Ambassador. Many of you attended. Some did not. But the result was that certainly in that period of time there was complete consultation between the Executive and this committee. I am not sure—

Senator MORSE. What was legal about it? What was legal about taking this country into war without a declaration of war?

General TAYLOR. Following the policy established by our Government as represented by the SEATO Treaty.

Senator MORSE. That is one of the strangest arguments I ever heard, that the commission of a series of wrongs makes a right.

Now, the fact is, in my judgment, this President of ours cannot justify under the Constitution sending a single American boy to his slaughter in South Vietnam without a declaration of war. And that is the issue the American people must really draw out with this President.

I happen to think that we are involved illegally in this war, without a declaration, and I think the American people are the ones who ought to decide what our foreign policy should be.

FAVORABLE MILITARY INDICATORS HAVE NOT DEVELOPED

Now, in a colloquy with Chairman Fulbright a few moments ago you said it would be all right to quote some of your previous statements in regard to Vietnam. I would like to quote one before a committee on July 13, 1963. And I quote you:

We are improving, however, and I am convinced that in the aggregate we are getting our money's worth. In many areas I see encouraging signs of the success of this program. In the bitter struggle in the Republic of Vietnam, 1962 is a critical year. For the first time in 15 years the people of Vietnam with our military assistance started winning instead of losing their fight to protect their freedom. I have just gone over last month's report from Vietnam, and all the military indicators are favorable.

I only want to say that I was one, I think, of many greatly disappointed in the subsequent developments in Vietnam, which didn't bear out this encouraging report. In fact, I remember you were back here once and testified before a committee, and I think I engage in understatement by saying you said things were getting better. In fact, I think even before you got back to Vietnam on that occasion there was another coup in South Vietnam. And so you have left some of us, at least, with the impression that the series of reports that we received from you, sir, and from Secretary McNamara, and Secretary Rusk, and other administration spokesmen, have not borne out what we had a reason to believe would be great improvements in Vietnam.

We find ourselves over there, according to your testimony, with 205,000 American boys. Dick Russell says that counting the people in the naval forces, we have 300,000 boys. That is why some of us wonder whether or not there is any possibility of our winning an honorable peace over there on any such procedures we are following.

I think in fairness to you—

General TAYLOR. Let me go back to the statement in July 1963. I was testifying as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military situation. I think if you will review the situation at the time, you will find the military indicators were indeed favorable. This was a result of the application of the programs which President Kennedy approved at the end of 1961. What happened thereafter, however, was the collapse on the political front—namely, the fall of the Diem government, after which there was a long series of unstable governments—which cause a tremendous concern to me as an American. I reported that condition to you gentlemen every time I returned—that the political economic situation in the country was highly unstable, and no one could be assured of just when it would stabilize.

Meanwhile, the military factors were not the most troublesome. They certainly were not in 1963. And even in the days of 1964, when the governments were tumbling, the military situation held together fairly well.

I would say, Senator, I have always given this committee a balanced statement. I have never been a starry-eyed optimist, nor have I been a handwringing pessimist, I hope. I have tried to present a very difficult, complex situation, which sometimes has gone up and sometimes has gone down.

But in 1963 it was definitely going up.

Senator MORSE. You have always given us a very sincere statement that represents your best judgment. My quarrel is with your judgment. I think it has been pretty bad over the years in regard to this matter.

INVOLVEMENT OF RUSSIANS IN HANOI

I would like to ask you a question in regard to Hanoi.

Do you think that there are a considerable number of Russians in Hanoi?

General TAYLOR. A number of Russians?

Senator MORSE. Russians in Hanoi?

General TAYLOR. I doubt there is any great number. Undoubtedly there are some technicians there in connection with the surface-to-air missile.

Senator MORSE. Do you think if we should mine or blockade or bomb the harbor outside of Hanoi, we would increase the danger of Russia coming into the war?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. I want to tell you about a report I gave to the President the early part of last August, when a group of us met for about 3 hours and 20 minutes one night in a rough-and-tumble exchange with the Russian Ambassador here in Washington. (We have an obligation to our President to report such information.) And during the course of that discussion, we asked him if things went from bad to worse, and our Government bombed Hanoi, what would be the posi-

tion of his Government. He didn't hesitate to say they would go to war against us, because, as he said, you cannot bomb Hanoi without bombing Russians.

General TAYLOR. I would expect him to say that, sir.

Senator MORSE. It was dismissed by the administration as Russian propaganda.

Then we asked him about the harbor; the same answer.

Then we asked him about the bombing of the nuclear installations in China, and he pointed out there that they not only would go to war, because they keep their security agreements, but he said, "It will not be fought in Asia alone."

And that was perfectly clear where it would be fought. But I judge from your statements that you are not very much concerned about either Russia or China coming into this war.

General TAYLOR. Under the present circumstances; that is correct.

Senator MORSE. And you don't think the circumstances would change—cause you to change your opinion?

General TAYLOR. I am not going to go into the future on that, because you will be quoting me here in 1977.

Senator MORSE. I expect to be here in 1977 to quote you.

General TAYLOR. I hope my judgment will be better by that time.

Senator MORSE. I hope so, too.

U.S. CHANCES OF WINNING A WAR WITH CHINA

But one more question: Do you think if we should get into a war with China, God forbid, that we could beat her by bombing, either nuclear or conventional?

General TAYLOR. I wouldn't know what "beat her" means.

Senator MORSE. Force her to surrender.

General TAYLOR. I don't know whether we would want her to surrender or not. We could make her pay a tremendous price for aggression.

Senator MORSE. She doesn't have anything to fight back with except manpower. Wouldn't we have to meet her on the ground?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. Just meet her in the air?

General TAYLOR. To a large extent. That is one way of doing it.

Senator MORSE. This is very interesting. You take the position that if we get into a war with Red China, we are not going to have to send hundreds of thousands of men on to the mainland of China?

General TAYLOR. Not necessarily so.

Senator MORSE. Tell that to Mr. McNamara, so we can get you two together on the same advice.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

DEFINITION OF COMMUNISM

Senator AIKEN. As I indicated, what we are really fighting is to defeat communism in the world, and if we don't defeat it in one place, it will pop up in one or more other places.

Do you want to give us a short definition of what you consider communism to be?

General TAYLOR. Well, Senator, in a short period of time I am afraid I could not give you an ample answer.

First I think we all know what communism is. And we also know what the aggressive emanations of communism can mean. Here is a dogma, apart from its social and political implications, that carries with it the spirit of Moslemism at the time of the great expansion; that it must grow by absorbing and imposing itself upon other countries who are not believers. We certainly see in Peiping today the same kind of messianic attitude which was in Moscow at the outset until Moscow matured to some degree.

I think that we have a special virulent form of Communist aggressive threat in the Chinese leadership. I think that can go away with time, and if we are firm, as we were in the case of the expansive efforts of Soviet communism, I am hopeful enough to believe in a decade or two that we may find a new attitude in China which removes it from the very threatening position which it now occupies.

Senator AIKEN. Communism really controls people and resources by a central self-perpetuating government.

General TAYLOR. Which then imposes a police state from which it is almost impossible to escape.

Senator AIKEN. Yes; a one-party government. And under communism, property—personal property—can be and is frequently expropriated by government.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. And income can be fixed by government, taxed by government, if it exceeds a certain amount, be confiscated by government.

Communism entails universal military service, does it not?

General TAYLOR. I beg your pardon?

Senator AIKEN. Communism entails universal military service.

General TAYLOR. National service of all kinds, both military and for labor purposes.

Senator AIKEN. Yes. And under communism, government controls and rations if necessary materials and goods, I believe, and fixes the price of those goods, a price ceiling on them.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Under communism, too, government fixes wages, working periods, conditions for working, and establishes criteria and supports programs for education and health, also. Well, all I can say is I hope we are successful in defeating communism.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long?

U.N. CHARTER AND SEATO TREATY

Senator LONG. Now, may I offer you the opportunity to answer the question my distinguished colleague asked and refused to let you answer. Would you mind reading from article 51 of the United Nations.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the

exercise of this right of self defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way effect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace or security.

Senator LONG. General, I have here our treaty—we signed the treaty, we signed the protocol agreeing to help protect these people. Here is an act of Congress. I admit two Senators voted against it—one of them is a member of this committee who has never changed his mind from that day to this.

Senator MORSE. Proud of it.

Senator LONG. Here is an act of Congress that says we regard this as falling within that SEATO treaty. We have reported the matter to the Security Council. The Congress does not want to have the first thing to do with it. And here I quote from the opinion by the most outstanding teachers of international law in America, 20 of them. They all say everything we are doing is completely legal and the way it ought to be.

We have fought the war in Korea, with you a general in charge of the whole Army over there, without a declaration of war at all. But in this case we told the Congress—we signed the treaty, we told the Congress what we were going to do. The Communists attacked us. We fought back just as the treaty obligated us to do. We reported the matter to the United Nations. We sent our troops in. And our allies who signed the treaty, many of them sent their troops in. We passed an act of Congress that says that here is the treaty, here is the act, and here is the act of aggression, and we now agree in compliance with this treaty this is what we ought to do.

Now, it may be that I cannot convince one Senator—but I would be willing to put this to any section of the American Bar Association, even though they do not specialize in this, and I have no doubt whatever that what we are doing is exactly what it ought to be.

Let me ask a question.

Do you think we are the international bad guy or the international good guy? What is your opinion about that?

General TAYLOR. I hope we are the international good guys. We certainly intend to be.

DIVISIONS FIGHTING IN VIETNAM

Senator LONG. Well—General, may I ask this. Of course, I started out this morning discussing some of the units that were fighting for this country overseas. I think in honor to those men I should not leave out these divisions. They are fighting for our country, to uphold our obligation to uphold freedom in Vietnam.

One is the 3d Marine Amphibious Force, which is composed of the 3d Marine Division, major elements of the 1st Marine Division, and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, plus supporting elements, a total of 40,000 men.

None of these units listed have ever suffered defeat in combat with enemy forces. They might have perhaps lost some men with a little patrol, but no major elements of these units has ever been defeated by the enemy in the history of the United States of America. As you know, they are a very old outfit.

General TAYLOR. That goes for the 101st Airborne.

Senator LONG. In the Army, the 1st Cavalry Air Mobile, the 1st Infantry Division, a very old outfit—the 173d Air Borne Brigade, the 1st Brigade of 101—that is your old outfit, General, the 101st Airborne Division. Certain major elements of the 25th Infantry Division. None of these units listed has ever suffered defeat in combat with enemy forces.

General TAYLOR. They are all proud historic units, Senator, and they are displaying, on the battlefield in South Vietnam, the same qualities they have in other wars.

Senator LONG. I heard—I hope before this is over we will have a chance to hear from the mouth of General Westmoreland—that this is man for man the finest Army the United States ever put into combat with anybody, and that they are the best equipped Army the United States ever put into combat.

Now, you made the statement, General, and there has been some question about it, that the Communists say that they defeated the French at Paris, not Dien Bien Phu, because when these boys were surrounded and cut off, the French Government would not draft Frenchmen to send in to save these boys.

I heard—and if it is not correct I would like to be corrected—that those courageous volunteers at Dien Bien Phu stood there and shot these Communists down until a big moat in front of them was completely filled with bodies, and those hordes of numbers kept coming at them until they just marched across the dead bodies that filled the moat, to kill and capture these courageous Frenchmen fighting there.

Now, would you like to see any one of these elements that I have mentioned, any one of these courageous divisions of American fighting men, surrounded and defeated, humiliated, killed, and made to surrender because this country would not give them the help that they needed?

General TAYLOR. Well, I hope that day will never come, Senator.

Senator LONG. Would you like to see Old Glory pulled down over the 1st Marine Division or the 101st Airborne and a white flag of surrender run up there?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator LONG. Do you think those young men over there want to be brought home on anything less than honorable terms?

General TAYLOR. They would deeply resent any settlement which nullified their gallant efforts.

EXPANSION OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

Senator LONG. Are you of the opinion, General, that if we do not resist Communist aggression here, we are going to have to resist it somewhere closer to home?

General TAYLOR. There is no question in my mind, sir.

Senator LONG. Well, that is my judgment, that these people have planned to take over everything that borders on Red China, everything that borders on the Soviet Union, then everything that borders on everything that borders on that. They are already leapfrogging into Latin American and Africa. And if we have not got the courage to stand up here, where we have got all—where we are inflicting 10

casualties on them for every 1 we are taking, and our Nation is 10 times as big as theirs—if we cannot stand fast here, are you sure we can hold Florida against Castro?

General TAYLOR. Your point is very well taken, Senator. South Vietnam, far from being a difficult place in which to apply our military strength, is relatively favorable. It has a long seacoast, which allows us to use our Navy and naval air. It is now well equipped with airfields, so we can use our land base there effectively. We can get our supplies in easily. So while it may be 8,000 miles from home, geographically, it is not an unfavorable theater.

Senator LONG. General, you have made a magnificent witness here today. I don't think I have heard a better witness testify in this room, and I would include in that General Douglas MacArthur, who was the most moving witness I ever heard testify here. When he said that he would not advocate a war on the land of China, a major land war on China, he did not advocate that. He was saying at that time that he nevertheless advocated that we fight and win in Korea, was he not?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. And you were over there at the time to know about this.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. You were one of his officers.

COMPARISON WITH U.S. MILITARY POSITION IN KOREA

Now, do you find our military position in Vietnam any more difficult than the position that General MacArthur at that time had and that you had in Korea?

General TAYLOR. No, sir; quite different. There were assets and liabilities. It was really a miracle that the ill-equipped, ill-trained divisions we threw into Korea were able to dam the invasion from the north. In South Vietnam we have excellent units, as the points you have been making. We do have a different kind of war, a more diffused war, and in some sense of the word more difficult to wage. But when they add the pros and cons together I can see little difference in the problem that we have in South Vietnam as against that in Korea, in terms of overall difficulty.

Senator LONG. General, I don't have the good fortune to have a son. I have two daughters of whom I am very, very proud. But if I had a son and he died in Vietnam, would you feel that boy died in vain?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator LONG. Do you have a son, General?

General TAYLOR. I am very proud of having a captain in the infantry, in the 101st Airborne Division. He is in action up the coast from Saigon.

Senator LONG. He is in Vietnam fighting for his country right now.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. May I insert in the record following my comments on the SEATO treaty, a lawyer's committee memorandum of law in regard to this war, including a section on SEATO—prepared by some of the outstanding international law professors in the country sustaining the position I have taken on SEATO.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The document referred to appears in the appendix to these hearings.)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

Senator CARLSON. General, I share with you and Senator Long from Louisiana praise for the excellent troops that we have over in Vietnam. We are proud in Kansas to have been the home of and the training ground for the 1st Division, the Big Red One. They are over there. They have suffered some casualties. And I know, based on the past service of that great division, that we have no fear that they will carry the enemy, and we are proud of that.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN VIETNAM

But I want to get to another phase besides the military phase of this war for a very few minutes.

We have been discussing largely the military situation, and, of course, we hope to win a military victory. But with this military victory, I think that we have to consider the political and economic victory that we must have if we are to build a stable country.

I have been a little disturbed to read what is happening from an economic standpoint over in that area. In fact, there were some articles that appeared yesterday in our papers, written by correspondents who were over there. They rather infer that the Government has done nothing about a runaway inflation, about problems that are really causing price rises that could prove disastrous unless something is done.

What are we doing as a government?

General TAYLOR. We have recognized the importance of the economic problem for years, Senator. We have had some of our best people in the economics field advising and assisting in this program. Also, we have had good cooperation from the economic experts on the Vietnamese side. And I must say they have several very competent people in this field.

As you can imagine, however, a little country like this, basically an agricultural economy, after 11 years of war its economy is indeed in very precarious condition. It is highly fragile. Only by an increasing program of commercial import have we been able to keep inflation within bounds in the past.

The very fact of the additional forces we are bringing in adds to the inflationary trend, because we compete for the limited skilled labor pool, for transportation facilities, for construction facilities, all that kind of thing.

So I would be the first to say we have a very definite economic problem. But I would add that we are thoroughly aware of it, and the best minds we have available in our Government are working constantly on anticipating the problem.

I would not agree that the Government of Vietnam has not cooperated and is not cooperating. However, I would say that we have a very sensitive segment of our whole strategy in the economic situation.

Senator CARLSON. All I can do is just quote from some of the articles that I read. Again I get back to what I said this morning to you, General. Unless we have some testimony from you and others who have been over there, all we know is what we read of the reports from correspondents.

Here is a correspondent who writes that the Vietnamese Government has done little to deal with this crisis—speaking of this seller's market that has run riot. There is no income policy, no price policy, only the bare beginnings of an import policy, and very little control.

General TAYLOR. I would say that is far too generalized a criticism. There are weak spots in most of the areas mentioned, but nothing like the damaging criticism of that article.

I would hope that you would ask Mr. David Bell some of these questions when he appears up here, because he and his associates are directly responsible for the economic situation.

PROMISES AND UNFULFILLED PLANS

Senator CARLSON. I can assure you that Mr. Bell will be asked some of these questions. That brings up another point. We are going to get into the political situation and the possibility of establishing ourselves with a stronger political front with the foreign aid program. The President was in Honolulu recently, and following his visit, and some commitments I assume the President made to President Ky, the Vice President has been over, and Secretary Freeman has been over, and the Vice President is still over in those other countries.

But they made some very definite commitments that I think should have some consideration. And here again I mention articles I read. One of the writers writes this:

By and large, however, the promise of new social and economic programs has not aroused discernible enthusiasm, largely because the history of recent years is crowded with unfulfilled plans.

Now, we have been in South Vietnam quite a long time with our foreign aid program. I am somewhat familiar with it, because this committee, of course, every year reviews the authorization. I would like to have your comments about our unfulfilled plans. Again, I know that it is Mr. Bell's problem.

General TAYLOR. As I indicated in my prepared statement, the economic and social sector is the unsung, unreported area of activity.

As Ambassador, I did everything I could to guide the press to look more at the nonmilitary activities of our Government and of the Vietnamese Government. Unfortunately it is only the military activity which receives the headlines. There have been and continue to be two serious obstacles to the economic-social program—pacification, as we sometimes say.

I mentioned them before; namely, the lack of security, without which there are definite limits on what can be done in a given problem in social reform, economic reform, and that kind of thing. And the other has been the governmental instability and inexperience, which is only now beginning to rectify itself. But I hope with the improved military performance, and the improved governmental performance, from here on out we can score greater successes. But do not think that it has all been black. Some of the provinces have done quite well, if indeed they have been relatively secure. So any fair statement of the situation in South Vietnam would require a lot of qualifications depending upon the area about which one is speaking.

Senator CARLSON. Well, as one who has tried to follow it from the political angle more than the military, I have been concerned, and

fearful that we are not making progress with the great expenditure that we do make and expect to make in that area.

General TAYLOR. I think your concern is justified. But I hope that with increased security, we can tend to show better performance than we have in the past.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to place these two articles in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The articles referred to follow :)

SAIGON BOOM CAUSES PROBLEMS—VIETNAMESE SKEPTICAL OF PLEDGES;
ECONOMIC SITUATION IS WORSENING

(By Stanley Karnow, Washington Post foreign service)

SAIGON, February 16.—President Johnson's meeting with South Vietnam's leaders in Honolulu last week, followed by visits to Saigon by Vice President Humphrey, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, and assorted other American dignitaries dramatized the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam.

Now that the fanfare has faded away, however, Vietnamese are feeling somewhat bewildered and more than a little dubious about the administration's dazzling performance. Their opinions vary, of course, according to their social backgrounds.

Predictably, the educated, articulate civil servants, lawyers, schoolteachers and other "intellectuals" here in the capital seem to take a skeptical view toward Washington's hopes of helping to build a Great Society in Vietnam.

Some of them were comforted to hear Humphrey speak of satisfying popular aspirations and rising expectations—a refreshing antidote to much of the military jargon heard here. Many others were pleased to hear through the local grapevine, that Freeman had intervened to save one of the country's leading agronomists from being drafted into the army.

By and large, however, the promise of new social and economic programs has not aroused discernible enthusiasm, largely because the history of recent years is crowded with unfulfilled plans.

"We've heard it all before," said a prominent trade union leader yesterday. "We are weary of words."

Doubts about the future are reinforced, moreover, by a fairly pervasive lack of faith in the ability of the South Vietnamese Government headed by Premier Nguyen Cao Ky.

In his speeches and statements, Ky projects an image of himself as an honest, simple soldier dedicated to promoting "social revolution." That image has reportedly captivated the White House, where Ky's statements are said to be on the required reading list.

But to Vietnamese here in Saigon—and to many American officials, too—Ky is far from the hero he is made out to be by his publicists.

The Ky government is stable largely because it is immobile, explain Vietnamese. In fact, they add, it is not really Ky's government but a junta of generals who, for the sake of their own survival, have tacitly agreed not to disagree—at least for the present.

In the view of Vietnamese here, moreover, the Saigon government hangs together because it is supported by the United States, which would not tolerate another succession of coup d'etat and uprisings such as followed the downfall of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in November 1963.

ANOTHER MEETING

Thus President Johnson's personal identification with the Saigon leaders in Honolulu last week has been seen here as primarily an American exercise in bulwarking the local government. And it is believed that another Honolulu meeting this summer, as announced by the President, will repeat that exercise.

"It's like doping horses," commented an irreverent young Vietnamese army officer the other day. "They run for awhile, and then you've got to give them another shot."

Much of this criticism reflects uneasiness with the degenerating economic situation here. Tremendous infusions of American money have simply unhinged

and disrupted the local society to the point at which a bargirl can earn in a day what a longshoreman makes in a month.

Soaring prices have especially affected fixed-income groups—civil servants, army officers, schoolteachers and other professionals—who are the intelligentsia of any underdeveloped country.

TENANT BEING EVICTED

A middle-level civil servant is being evicted from his house this week, for example, because his landlady can find an American tenant willing to pay \$600 per month rent. The landlady, incidentally, is the wife of a prominent Vietnamese general.

Economic disruption is naturally accompanied by corruption, which is regarded here as almost as great an enemy to the country as the Communists. Nearly everything, from construction contracts to the delivery of motor scooters, which are rationed by the Government, is said to require a payoff.

Import licenses are being bought and sold, and it is feared that when the U.S. commercial import program is accelerated—in order to absorb the surplus currency in circulation—the traffic in licenses will boom.

Characteristically, most of the critics of conditions here can offer little in the way of constructive suggestions for handling the situation more effectively. It can be recalled that several of those in positions of authority today were themselves last year's critics, fulminating against the regime then in office and vowing to perform honestly and efficiently if they took power.

FEAR OF ABANDONMENT

Underlying this every-man-for-himself approach, however, is perhaps the one feeling that touches nearly every Vietnamese. It is a fear of being abandoned, forgotten, sold out.

Over the past generation, Vietnamese hopes were buoyed up and then betrayed by the French, the Japanese, the Communists and by successive Saigon leaders.

Despite the gallant words stated at Honolulu, the Vietnamese—are not at all sure how much trust they can place in the United States—which in turn prompts some American here to wonder how much trust can be placed in the Vietnamese.

VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC SITUATION WORSENS

(By Ward Just, Washington Post foreign service)

SAIGON, February 16.—Saigon's economic situation, serious for the past year, is becoming critical, and diplomatic sources rate it as second only to the Vietcong as "the most important political problem we have."

According to Government figures released yesterday, prices rose 10 percent last month over December and nearly 50 percent over the year 1965. There is an acute shortage of skilled labor, imports, and consumer goods. A flourishing black market and official corruption add to the difficulties.

Overhanging all is the massive infusion of U.S. funds, estimated to total \$600 million in 1966.

The problem is shot through with paradox. Vietnam, a country at war, has a booming economy—but, informed economists say, it is an almost classic example of a sellers' market run riot.

U.S. officials have made it clear to the Government that they regard the situation with the utmost seriousness, and President Johnson himself reportedly told Premier Nguyen Cao Ky at the Honolulu Conference last week that even if the military struggle is won, the gain would go up in smoke if the economic situation deteriorates further.

The Government, preoccupied with the war and lacking the competence to deal with economic complexities, has not been quick to confront the crisis.

The black market, in money and in goods, has swollen. There is no income policy, no price policy, only the bare beginnings of an import policy, very little control over hoarding.

One key suggestion has been to increase taxes on "the winners" here—bar owners, landlords, hotelkeepers.

What the boom has done is throw the economy out of proportion, creating an economic problem first, but bringing social and political problems along with it.

This is a country where a bar girl can make more than a Cabinet minister, where a cyclo driver in Saigon can make a killing a day if he caters to the Americans, where the labor shortage is so acute that the gigantic U.S. construction company, RMK, recently pirated a Vietnamese driver employed by the U.S. Embassy.

Not all these effects are bad. The boom has tended to get money into the hands of the urban poor, where it is most needed (as well as into the hands of the Chinese businessmen, where it is not). Farm income rose by an estimated 25 percent last year.

But the pressure has been on prices: Milk, rice, and cloth have all gone up dramatically. Pork has risen, by one estimate, 200 percent in a year.

Many of the goods people want can be produced locally, but because of the war effort it is practically impossible to increase production. The United States employs 100,000 Vietnamese, for example.

MORE CONSUMER GOODS

It is understood that the United States itself will undertake to increase imports of consumer goods like radios, bikes, and television sets. But complicating that problem is an anti-import licensing law and the difficulty of moving goods into Vietnamese ports.

Officials here are frantically trying to open up the port of Saigon (where turnaround time for a vessel is frequently 2 to 3 weeks) to imports, to turn the sellers' market into a buyers' market. But the heavy importation of military hardware makes it a difficult task, despite the improvements to the harbors of Danang and Quihon and the Brobdingnagian effort at Camranh Bay.

Rippling beneath the surface is the Government's refusal—or inability—to do anything about the black money market, to which many prices are tied. The official rate is 73 piastres to the dollar. The black market rate was 135 piastres to the dollar in August and 170 last week.

Sources here say that the gigantic U.S. construction effort must also be cut back. The U.S. investment in construction is now estimated at \$400 million a year, \$100 million of which has a direct effect on the economy.

AIRPORTS BEING BUILT

The United States is building everything from airports to billets, with a resulting pressure on iron, steel, and cement. As one example of the social and political implications, 10-year-old boys are becoming construction workers.

The best that can be hoped for this year, economists say is that the inflation rate will be held to 35 or 40 percent.

Experts say that by the adroit use of a fiscal and monetary policy, a savings bond campaign, for example, and a conscious effect at belt tightening, the crisis might be averted.

But there is no enthusiasm for the war in this dazed and weary country, and the population is in no mood to accept stiff controls.

While ARVN privates die in the swamps of Haughia Province, well-off Vietnamese sun themselves at the swimming pool at the Cercle Sportif.

While Americans struggle through the rice fields of Binh Dinh, landlords refuse to sell land to the U.S. Government on which to build tent cities to relieve the acute housing shortage in Saigon.

"There is no patriotism here," said one official. "I am not being negative. I am being realistic."

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

LIMIT ON U.S. FORCES WITH RESPECT TO POLICY

Senator GORE. General Taylor, I undertook this morning, as you will recall, to draw from you a definition of the limits to which you referred in your very able statement. You say that it is limited as to forces employed. Would you be more specific and tell us just what are the limits as to the forces employed?

General TAYLOR. Well, we obviously have not put in anything like the forces we have available for commitment in that part of the world if we wanted to. We have put in only the forces which are consistent with our limited objectives, which is the persuasion of the leadership of Hanoi to stop their aggression.

Senator GORE. I was not addressing my question as to what we had done.

What are the limits on forces with respect to policy in the future?

General TAYLOR. The ultimate limit, I would say, probably the basic limit is the willingness of Hanoi to continue the aggression in spite of the mounting costs. Just at what point they will decide this is not a remunerative course of action I just do not know. But they are the ones really to decide what that limit will be.

Senator GORE. Is it fair for me to conclude from that that there are no limits on the forces to be employed until Hanoi capitulates?

General TAYLOR. I would say that the forces that can be usefully employed, employed for the purpose of bringing conviction to Hanoi in the form of continued increasing loss to the Vietcong guerrillas, so that they cannot replace their losses—there was a downward trend in their overall strength—and a clear picture created in the mind of Hanoi they cannot win a military victory in the south.

Senator GORE. Then I will submit the same interrogatory.

General TAYLOR. Sir?

Senator GORE. Do I correctly understand that the limit on forces employed to which you refer in your prepared statement will be determined by the willingness of Hanoi to capitulate?

General TAYLOR. No, I would put it more as determined by the requirement to create a military situation in South Vietnam which makes it clear to Hanoi that they cannot win a military victory in the south.

Senator GORE. Could you give us any specifics at all as to the size of forces which our policy now contemplates?

General TAYLOR. I wish I could but I just don't know. I think only the experience from month to month will indicate what is required, but it is certainly a finite number of troops in order to continue to, the present rate of loss which the Vietcong are suffering. I mentioned this morning, if we could continue the rate which has been going on in 1966, theoretically they would virtually run out of trained troops by the end of 1966, I would not like the headline to say I predict the end of the war by 1966 because the Vietcong run out of men but it is a significant fact that the rate of loss is now very high and if our forces can continue to impose this attrition on the Vietcong they are going to be in a very serious way for replacement at Hanoi.

Senator GORE. I will ask you again if it is accurate to deduce from your statement that there are no limits on forces employed insofar as our policy is concerned except to use whatever is necessary to bring about the capitulation of the Hanoi government.

OBJECTIVE TO CHANGE WILL OF HANOI

General TAYLOR. I am sorry that is not my statement. Our ultimate objective is bringing Hanoi to change its course of action. That will be in my judgment, I am speaking only for myself, in my judgment when first it is clear that there can be no military victory for the

Vietcong in the south. That does not mean that they are all eliminated, that does not mean they are all captured or rounded up, it means a highly unfavorable military situation in South Vietnam.

Second, there has to be clear evidence that our air strength in North Vietnam is going to apply continued pressure and they are going to suffer continuing loss and pain from the air in the North.

Third, they are—the picture must include also the existence of a reasonably viable, reasonably stable, reasonably efficient government in Saigon.

Fourth, there must be the picture of a determined United States back home that is not going to be forced off course. When all four conditions are met, I am convinced we will then have brought Hanoi to the point that they are willing to talk in a sincere way at a conference table.

So you see the military situation on the ground is only one-fourth of the entire problem.

Senator GORE. Then there are no limits insofar as policy is concerned except the force sufficient to achieve the objectives which you have stated in general terms?

General TAYLOR. I have stated—we are talking just about ground force requirements in the South. I gather that is what we are concerned about. I am saying we must have enough strength, Vietnamese and American, actively engaged to inflict such continuing loss on the Vietnamese forces that obviously they can't win.

I would say that is a fairly restricted objective.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ADVICE ABOUT INCREASE IN TROOP STRENGTH

Senator GORE. Well, General, I hope you will not mind my suggesting that I find it a little incongruous that this committee is advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have presented a plan to the Armed Services Committee involving a possible use of 600,000 troops and you as the President's military adviser seem not to have heard about it.

General TAYLOR. I am not the President's military adviser. I am a part-time special consultant, and they have a very qualified Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who gives military advice to the Government.

Senator GORE. Are you readily telling this committee that you haven't heard such plans discussed?

General TAYLOR. I am quite sure there are plans as I said this morning for 200,000, for 400,000, 600,000, maybe a million for all I know, it is one thing to have a plan and a convention that such a requirement exists. And I am not confident of that conviction.

U.S. POLICY STILL UNCLEAR

Senator GORE. I was hopeful from your testimony this morning that we could find a broader area of agreement with respect to policy on escalation. I hope that I am not finding discouragement in your testimony this afternoon. Just what is the policy? Is it for escalating the war or is it for limiting the war, to have a limited conflict?

General TAYLOR. I am not here as a spokesman for policy, I am here reporting on what retired General Taylor thinks about the situation in

Vietnam. I think you have to ask the administration for policy. I think what I have been saying is consistent with the views I have heard.

Senator GORE. I think you are very able. I had thought that perhaps your views more nearly reflected the views of the administration than you attribute to them.

General TAYLOR. I do not, I am not aware of any discrepancy between my views, but I am still not able to say this is the policy on a specific segment of our overall strategy.

Senator GORE. I shall not press you on that because you have been a very able witness.

General TAYLOR. Thank you.

Senator GORE. And your testimony has been very helpful.

Perhaps I took more hope from your statement about this goal and policy being for a limited war than was justified.

General TAYLOR. I don't, I am sorry if I have disappointed you, Senator, because I really am because I don't think I am indicating an objective which is out of the ceiling. I think it is a fairly reasonable one except I can't put a specific price tag or numbers tag on it.

EXTENT OF U.S. TROOP COMMITMENT

Senator GORE. I wouldn't expect you to tell me the exact number, but can you tell whether it is 200,000, 600,000, or a million?

Can you give us some order of magnitude?

General TAYLOR. I would just say with the force we have we are imposing losses on the enemy which run about, what did I say, some 17,000 per month at the present time. Now, that is a very sizable number and I would doubt that this force could continue at that rate. I think it is too narrow an experience base to try to project it. But it does suggest that no extremely large increase is necessary to impose these casualties.

AMERICANS FEAR WAR WITH CHINA

Senator GORE. Well, Senator Fulbright suggested to you, as others have, that a very deep concern on the part of certain members of this committee and a great many Americans, is whether this war in Vietnam will be escalated until a war with China becomes almost inevitable.

With respect to this particular point, some reference was made to General Bradley's views. I do not know what his views are with respect to the present situation. But I would like to read you a few sentences, and I must say they are not all together, because this is very extended, large testimony, with respect to the Korean conflict and the policy there. I recognize that it is dangerous to draw analogies. A number of people have tried to draw an analogy between the situation in Western Europe after the end of World War II and the situation in Vietnam. They are not very analogous. We did not try to exterminate the Communists in Italy or France; the largest political party in Italy is still the Communist Party.

But in South Vietnam it seems to be the policy to exterminate the Vietcong.

Is that not the case?

General TAYLOR. Not as a military objective. There are 125,000, 140,000 of them. I don't think anybody suggests literally exterminating them, but we would like to have them so beaten that they would be glad to come in and accept an amnesty.

GENERAL BRADLEY'S TESTIMONY IN 1951

Senator GORE. So would I. But to get back, with the limitations of analogy which I acknowledge, I would like to read you what General Bradley said to a joint meeting of the Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1951, involving much the same problem of whether or not the war in Korea would escalate into a war with China:

The strategic alternative enlargements of the war in Korea to include Red China would probably delight the Kremlin more than anything else we could do. It would necessarily tie down additional forces, especially our seapower and our airpower, while the Soviet Union would not be obliged to put a single plane into the conflict.

Under present circumstances we have recommended against enlarging the war. The course of action often described as a limited war with Red China would increase the risk that we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize.

Do you think that would be reasonably relevant to the danger of an enlarged escalated war in Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. I would say there would be a very great different. Let us—first, I agree with General Bradley when he made that statement or would have, I was not present at the time.

I would point out he was considering whether or not we would deliberately take on China at that time, when the Soviet Union was a great menace, we were not at all sure what they were going to do in Europe even with a minor engagement in—

Senator GORE. Couldn't she suddenly become a great menace in Berlin if we became bogged down?

U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH IN 1951

General TAYLOR. I would say the situation is now, the atmosphere is quite different. Let me continue with my reminder of the situation in 1951.

Senator GORE. Excuse me.

General TAYLOR. We had a very aggressive Soviet Union quite capable of militarily exploiting any commitment we made in the Far East. We had no nuclear weapon stockpile of any great significance at the time. We were utterly unprepared for the land war that we were engaged in, in Korea, having great difficulty putting an army together literally on the battlefield.

Today, what is the difference? Well, first, we are not considering taking on Red China. We are not seeking a confrontation and certainly I would hope they are not either. We are, however, a far better, greater military power. We have been preparing for this kind of challenge of the guerrilla war ever since 1961. We have a vast stockpile of nuclear weapons to be the ultimate deterrent of any great expansion.

So, the problem is quite different although I come out with, the same way as you, Senator, this is not the time, probably there is not the time to take on deliberately Red China in a military confrontation.

Senator GORE. Well, my time is exhausted. I will try later to find just what are the political limits in the conflict later.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General TAYLOR. I beg your pardon, Senator, I have difficulty hearing you; would you mind moving your microphone a little bit?

It is not very clear.

Senator CASE. How about this?

General TAYLOR. That is good.

Senator CASE. Is that any better?

General TAYLOR. That is fine.

Senator CASE. You know what discrimination there is down at the end of the line. [Laughter.]

VIETNAM POPULATION UNDER VIETCONG CONTROL

General, I would like to pursue a bit further the line of inquiry that we were engaged in before, and in a sense to continue the one that Senator Gore was engaged in, too.

We were talking about whether this thing is going to work or not, without indefinite escalation.

One question was whether anything had been gained in this last year in terms of the percentage of the population under the control of the South Vietnamese Government, under the control of the Vietcong and in no man's land or disputed territory. And the figure that you had mentioned in your statement was something like last July being 53 percent Government controlled, 25 percent Vietcong controlled, and 22 percent contested.

General TAYLOR. That was last summer.

Senator CASE. That was last July?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. And Senator Mansfield, you said, stated in his report that the Government controlled about 60 percent, indicating some improvement.

General TAYLOR. Modest. I would not overstate it.

Senator CASE. Modest improvement.

But now my attention has been called to a statement by Secretary McNamara in hearings in the latter part of January, in which he gives an estimate of about 53 percent of the population of South Vietnam under Government control, that is South Vietnamese control, and Vietcong about 23- and the 24-percent figure in contested territory.

That seems to be the same as your own figures of last July. But then he goes on to say that Prime Minister Ky's figure of 25 percent is probably a much more realistic appraisal of what is Government controlled than is the 53 percent. This isn't very encouraging. You give more optimistic results as due to operations this past month, January of 1966.

General TAYLOR. I am just giving the official figures.

Senator CASE. I am not trying to knock anything down. But this comes against a background of statements made to us year after year

that were overoptimistic, that were unrealistic as it turned out, and we are just trying to find out whether it is possible to do the job we are trying to do in the war or are we still in effect barking up the wrong tree?

If we are, it seems to me more dangerous than ever, because we have gotten ourselves involved in terms which to many people raise the question of whether we are not now in the grip of events rather than in control of them, and in a situation in which it will always seem necessary to escalate from this point to another.

ESCALATION OF TROOP STRENGTH TO 800,000 MEN

I know in your interview in U.S. News & World Report you say that a figure of 800,000 American ground troops is utterly fantastic. I take it you would still say so?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; I certainly would foresee no such requirement as that.

Senator CASE. That this was utterly fantastic.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. You would still feel that this is so, even if we keep on matching and then increasing the ante as we have done since about a year ago?

General TAYLOR. Well, I would say the pursuit of the objectives I have been describing with some of you gentlemen would not require any such figure as that.

Senator CASE. Well now, have we distinguished sharply enough between limited objectives—we all agree our objectives are limited—and the inevitable process in which we find ourselves caught up in attempting to get those limited objectives? This is the concern we all have of going into an unlimited war—as the Aiken-Mansfield report says, a general war in southeast Asia, which it flatly predicts—and the administration has not, through the President, said there is any alternative.

General TAYLOR. Well, I think I have made my position clear that I do not see any inevitability in the kind of escalation you refer to. Escalation, I suppose, could be compared to some extent to a poker game, and in a poker game the side wins which has the greater resources and the strongest nerves.

I would say that we certainly have the greatest resources on our side of the table and I also hope we will always have a good strong nerve.

PUBLIC NEEDS ASSURANCES ABOUT OUR INVOLVEMENT

Senator CASE. Well, the concern expressed by many people is not that the United States is going to do everything that makes sense in its own protection and in the fulfillment of its commitments. The question is of keeping its actions, it seems to me, in reasonable balance in relation to its commitments and its needs.

General Gavin comes up and says we shouldn't get too involved in Vietnam because the real trouble from a military standpoint may very well come—and perhaps we can't do much to stop it—when the Chinese decide they are going to look toward India by way of Thailand and we had better not be bogged down with hundreds of thousands and millions of men in this particular neck of the woods.

This is only one area in which American strength may be needed. This is our concern. Senator Morse blew up this morning when somebody suggested that we shouldn't raise these questions. I don't have exactly the same approach as the Senator, but I am equally concerned whether we are getting into a situation that is beyond our control, and getting into a situation in which the responsibilities of the Congress of the United States are being handed over to an executive and there is not upon our own Government the kind of check that the Founding Fathers thought would be a good idea. This is involved in the inquiry that we have got right now.

Senator MORSE. Would the Senator yield for a personal favor; what was your adjective describing it?

Senator CASE. I forget what it was. I know I was greatly impressed with the bristling that you contributed. [Laughter.] I always am, just as your mustache bristles out there, so your temperament—

Senator MORSE. I just expressed respectful righteous indignation.

Senator CASE. If I needed to have a description I would have come to you for it.

Senator MORSE. Much better than the one you used, I might say.

Senator CASE. I forget what I used, but I would accept the presumption that whatever the Senator says is always better than what I say.

Senator MORSE. It is not true.

Senator CASE. In all good spirit as the Senator would always say.

AMERICANS MUST UNDERSTAND POLICY TO SUPPORT IT

But seriously, I am troubled by any suggestion that any question raised is weakening American efforts abroad. Americans cannot support any policy that they don't believe in and they can't believe in any policy that they don't understand. And the only basis on which a democracy can demonstrate its determination is first understanding what the policy is all about, and not by being told, "Don't raise questions about this because our boys are going to be hurt."

Nobody is going to hurt our boys, consciously or unconsciously, and the only harm that we will do up here is not to pursue this to the point where everyone substantially finds himself in general agreement because things are so obviously right. All I personally want is to be assured that we are on the right track, and the experiences we have had over the last few years are not such in many cases as to make us completely easy with just a rather calm assurance to "trust us." That is why I think it is desirable to get to the bottom of the thing as far as we can now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I didn't mean to make a speech, but I had to state that I am not yet satisfied that what we are doing makes sense.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very good speech, I thought.

Senator CASE. Thank you, sir.

May I have permission to correct the record about the bristling of the Senator from Oregon?

Senator MORSE. Why take the humor out of it?

Senator GORE. May I suggest "bridling"?

Senator CASE. That is a good word.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good word. Is that all? Is that all the Senator wishes? Are you through?

Senator CASE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri.

Senator SYMINGTON. General Taylor, I have been up here from the executive branch many times. You have been up many times. I think I know about how you feel, you have been here all day. I am sorry, speaking not only as a Missourian but as an American—very sorry for some of the things that have been said here today, I am proud of you and I know millions of Americans are too.

General TAYLOR. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Everybody has a right to his own opinion. In my opinion, more Americans agree with you than don't.

DIENBIENPHU WAS LOST IN PARIS

The question of Paris came up this morning, and again this afternoon. I was in Paris in the late winter and early spring of 1954. Because I was traveling with the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee at that time, we had an opportunity to talk to the top people in Paris, including the Minister of War, who was just back from South Vietnam. There was nothing we proposed to him as a possible solution but what he said it could not be done. Everything could not be done. Finally, we said, "Well, then, you see no hope of any kind whatever, is that it?" and he said, "That is right."

We were astounded and depressed.

I read the book of the Frenchman Roy, the "Battle of Dienbienphu." I have also read the comments of Bernard Fall, in his book "Street Without Joy." Based on that conversation I had in Paris in the spring of 1954—March, to be specific—and based on what Roy says about the bitterness of the generals at the front, Navarre, Cogne, incident to their failure to get out of Paris, what they felt they needed in order to hold, I want to associate myself with your remarks. I believe Dienbienphu was lost in Paris primarily, although goodness knows, I am no military expert.

ATROCITIES BY VIETCONG

And then something came up about atrocities being sort of even on both sides.

I read, either in Bernard Fall's book or another book called "The Green Beret" about what the Vietcong did when they went into a village. They took the chief and his wife, and the four children, as I remember the number. First they disemboweled the smallest, in front of everybody, then they disemboweled the second, then the next older and the next older, then the wife in front of the chief, then the chief himself, I asked, in Nha Trang, the man who would know, "That story couldn't possibly be true; could it?" And he said, "I knew the village and I knew the chief."

You have had a lot to do with American youth. As I remember it for 3 or 4 years you were superintendent at West Point, were you not?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could you imagine, in your wildest dreams, any group of Americans pulling a stunt like that?

General TAYLOR. No, sir; I cannot.

BUILDUP OF FORCES IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. The question came up about whether we are, or are not, going to have a buildup.

Do you know, and if so, can you tell this committee this afternoon, whether there is going to be a major buildup of forces in South Vietnam.

General TAYLOR. I am sure there is going to be an increase beyond what we have now but I don't know of any final decision as to what the increment will be, the new increment.

MORE MEANINGFUL TARGETS SUCH AS POWER AND PETROLEUM

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, there has been discussion of the dangers of getting China into this war. I went in recent weeks to what might be termed "the windows of China," specifically Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong as well as Thailand and South Vietnam. I found nobody, at any level, including all intelligence as well as State and the military who felt the Chinese would come into this war regardless of the degree of air attacks on North Vietnam. I did find a difference of opinion as to what would happen if we put ground troops in North Vietnam. Inasmuch as we had testimony before the Armed Services Committee that we might be able to put a great many less ground troops in South Vietnam provided we hit more meaningful targets, military targets, let me emphasize, in North Vietnam, I would like to ask you this for your frank opinion; would you object to our going after more meaningful military targets such as power and petroleum, in North Vietnam?

General TAYLOR. No, sir; personally, I think we should on a slow progressive scale.

UNITED STATES SHOULD DEFEND ITS ALLIES

Senator SYMINGTON. There has been a lot of criticism of this administration as the result of this undertaking in South Vietnam. One of the reasons I went out there was to try to find out what it was all about. That is hard to do, as you know, because you have forgotten more about this than most Americans will ever know. Later I decided, and made a statement to that end, that if the President wanted to get out of the war, I would support him.

I know the President, as all of us in the Senate do, and am convinced that these casualties hit him just as hard as they do anybody unless it is a matter in your personal family. At the time of the resumption I wrote this out for myself:

No one wants to get out of South Vietnam more than I. But this country should not leave on other than an honorable basis, because if we do leave on any other basis in turn our leaving our South Vietnamese friends and allies to the Vietcong, all people everywhere will never again believe the United States is serious in defending its friends and allies in accordance with either treaties or agreements.

Would you agree with that?

General TAYLOR. I would, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then I wrote:

On the other hand if we cannot get out on an honorable basis, then we should do our best to be successful in these hostilities, else the billions upon billions of

dollars that have gone into this operation designed to protect freedom would have been wasted, and more important, our casualties will have been in vain.

Would you agree with that?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

FULL UTILIZATION OF NAVAL AND AIR FORCES WITH GROUND FORCES

Senator SYMINGTON. And finally:

If we plan a heavy buildup of our ground forces, without for the first time fully utilizing our superior naval and air forces on military targets then we would be undertaking a major ground war in Asia which I do not believe we can win.

Would you comment on that?

General TAYLOR. I think inevitably, in the present situation we have to have a proper balance of ground and air forces.

Your figure of a hundred thousand ground forces being unnecessary, if we use our air with greater strength, I of course could not defend that particular figure. But as I have often said, there is no question in my mind but what the proper use of our air against military targets, the communications system, does put a limit on the number of forces that can be brought forth and hence puts some limit on the number of forces we have to bring in. So there is certainly a reciprocal relationship between the two.

Senator SYMINGTON. The figure I used, and let me emphasize I said "might," is based on testimony respected. If there is the word "might" in there, the figure I used was conservative.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. In the extrapolation you referred to which I included in my report to Chairman Fulbright and Chairman Russell but which unfortunately was later classified, I set out in detail how they arrived at what they did.

But certainly the chance they could not increase the number of troops because of what is going on today in the way of their casualties would be greatly increased if, for example, you took out the oil that makes it possible for them to run their trucks down the trail; isn't that a fair analysis?

General TAYLOR. Yes; I think so.

EVIDENCE OF U.S. MILITARY EFFORT OVERRUNNING VIETCONG

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me continue, if I have more time, with the group of questions I was asking this morning.

With increasing frequency we are getting reports of United States and South Vietnamese overrunning Vietcong and North Vietnamese army camps and bases. A year ago this was very rare. As a military expert, what is the significance of this change?

General TAYLOR. This shows the higher quality of the forces engaged. Their great offensive spirit, and also the fact that our air is now allowing us to blast away into some of these redoubts which never were entered before.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, General.

Further to this point, what evidence do we have that our overall increasing military effort is beginning to cause the Vietcong problems with morale, supplies, popular support, and in other areas.

General TAYLOR. The principal source of our information comes from prisoners whom we have captured, and it has been quite clear in the recent dates that the morale is going down in some units. I think it is a mistake to generalize too quickly. The morale in a unit depends upon what has happened to that unit in the last week or so and those that have been hit hard their morale is down. Those that haven't been hit hard I am sure their morale has been unaffected.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

General TAYLOR. Also the question of the availability of manpower. We see—first we have the evidence of the increased use of North Vietnamese in South Vietnam showing that the old manpower pool which was built up in 1954 and after the war apparently has been exhausted, and also we find that recruiting in the South is becoming much more difficult, as evidenced by the youth and the physical condition of some of the Vietcong recruits. We find 15-year-old boys for example, in uniform. So there are many indicators of this sort which are not entirely conclusive but I think we just have an overall feeling that in recent months the overall situation has improved.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will continue when my time comes around again. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. I have an apology to make to you. I have come late. My day started in New York; otherwise, I would have been in attendance during the entire hearing today, and if I ask anything repetitious, this is the reason.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

DANGER OF CHINA ENTERING WAR

Senator CHURCH. I understand that it is your present feeling that the danger of the war in Vietnam escalating into a general confrontation with China is not as great as some have felt it might be. Is that correct?

General TAYLOR. I do not know how urgent the feeling of other people is, but I suspect that that would be an accurate statement. I would not rule it out, but I would not put it high on my list of concerns at this time.

Senator CHURCH. Well, I also would think that China would hesitate very long before entering the war, considering the kind of power that we have to bring to bear, should such an eventuality occur.

But I am, nonetheless, concerned about this. One of the reasons, I suppose, is because of the experience we had in Korea. In his book, "The United States in the Korean War," Larson reviews an exchange between President Truman and General MacArthur, a passage of which I would like to read to you:

In your opinion—

President Truman asked General MacArthur—

is there any chance that the Chinese might enter the war on the side of North Korea?

MacArthur shook his head.

I would say there is very little chance of that happening. They have several hundred thousand men north of the Yalu, but they haven't any air force. If they tried to cross the river, our Air Force would slaughter them. At the most, perhaps 60,000 troops would make it. Our infantry could easily contain them. I expect the actual fighting in North Korea to end by Thanksgiving. We should have our men home or at least in Japan by Christmas.

CHINA SITUATION COMPARED IN KOREA

Well, we have heard in the course of the last few years, some optimistic predictions about how soon we would have our men home from Vietnam. Is there anything in the strategic situation confronting the Chinese in Vietnam that would make it less likely for them to enter the war in that region of Asia than in Korea?

General TAYLOR. Yes, I would think so very clearly. When our armies moved to the Yalu, there was no certainty in the Chinese mind that they were not about to invade China. We, so far as I know—I do not think the record indicates there was any dialog, any conversation going on at all as to what our intention was. So in retrospect, and it is always easy to be wise in retrospect, one can see reason for very grave concern on the part of the Chinese as we came rushing forward.

Senator CHURCH. If we were to duplicate or tend to duplicate in North Vietnam what we did in North Korea, that is to say extend the perimeter of the war northward toward the Chinese frontiers, then do you think that China might respond as she did in fact respond in Korea?

General TAYLOR. Undoubtedly the danger would increase dramatically as our ground forces approached the frontier of China. Again, however, I would say that there are two or three factors in such a situation which did not exist in Korea. The first would be, I assume, we would be talking very vigorously as we are talking now and did during the pause, talk to everybody. I do not think any country ever opened its books as completely to the world as we did in the 37 days, what our intentions were, what we hoped to come out of the situation as we are explaining to the world right at this table now, and finally, the fact that now we are the great military power we are, with a nuclear arsenal of great proportions is another factor which did not exist before.

Senator CHURCH. At the time of Korea, were we not the only nuclear power in Asia?

General TAYLOR. Our arsenal was extremely limited, and we were very much worried about what Russia would do in Europe.

Finally, the Chinese are extremely vulnerable in other ways, internal because of the tremendous population-food problem. They are also vulnerable in the fact they have worked so mightily to get a limited nuclear capability which is highly vulnerable to elimination.

So all of these factors, I would think, would add up—furthermore, they have a great rivalry with the Soviet Union. They cannot afford to be weakened in their strengths in a confrontation with us and thereby fall well behind the Soviet Union when they hope to be the No. 1 Communist power.

So in combination these are all pretty potent reasons, it seems to me, to suggest that China will not come in, and then we add quickly we have no plan to put our ground forces near the front, the Chinese frontier.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, but in view of the fact that we made a miscalculation as to Chinese intentions last time, we ought not to be too confident that we can be sure about Chinese reaction this time. Would you not agree with that?

General TAYLOR. Gentlemen, a general was wrong before, and a general can be wrong again.

Senator CHURCH. Politicians are often wrong, too.

RELATIONSHIP OF KY REGIME TO UNITED STATES

General, you referred earlier, I think, to Bao Dai, and I think correctly so, as a French puppet.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Is it not true that the Ky regime in Saigon is rather completely dependent upon the massive aid we are giving them both in—

General TAYLOR. I am afraid that suggestion is the equivalent of saying he is an American puppet, and I would say he is not. We did not elect General Ky. We did not put him in.

Senator CHURCH. General, if I may frame the question, I was not going to suggest our purpose in Vietnam was anything like the French purpose.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. What I am trying to ascertain is how the Vietnamese themselves may regard the Ky regime, particularly the peasant folk in the countryside where the war is being fought and how they may regard the American presence there. Do you think that the peasantry in the countryside of Vietnam tend to draw definite distinctions between Americans and Frenchmen?

General TAYLOR. Oh, I think there is no question about it, that in the vast majority of cases our presence is welcomed. I would not suggest a village that is about to be the battleground between the two forces enjoys having either of us around. But insofar as recognizing this indispensable character of our presence, I do not think there is any question.

SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT BY COUNTRY POPULACE

Senator CHURCH. Do you think the Ky regime enjoys widespread support from the people in the countryside?

General TAYLOR. No, sir.

Senator CHURCH. You think he does not.

General TAYLOR. Let me qualify it because that sounds perhaps misleading. I made the statement this morning the government in Saigon is rarely known to the peasantry; there have been so many Saigon governments since the fall of Diem, I am quite sure that many of the peasants have never heard of the present leaders in Saigon. On the other hand, they are so completely committed to anti-communism, and they know that government forces, whether they know the leaders or not, represent safety and security. In that sense they are committed to the government.

Senator CHURCH. Are there leaders in South Vietnam today that are committed to the cause of anticommunism that are known to the

people sufficiently so that their prominence in the government would constitute a link between the government and the people?

General TAYLOR. Well, it is relatively few, simply by the circumstances of history, that the French never allowed anybody to emerge as a national name. It is quite true Ho Chi Minh is the best known Vietnamese in the world probably, and also there is considerable regard for him in South Vietnam as the nationalist leader against the French and against the Japanese but not as the head of the state at Hanoi. They distinguish very clearly between the two personalities.

PRESTIGE OF HO CHI MINH

Senator CHURCH. Would you say the prestige, the nationalist prestige that Ho Chi Minh won as the leader of the revolution in driving out the French, has been of assistance to the Communists, the Vietcong?

General TAYLOR. There is no question. They had a great flame to coalesce around although they did it at the price of—they had to slaughter thousands of their citizens to get this unanimity in the north.

Senator CHURCH. This has been, though—it has helped to give them momentum and helped to sustain them in their war effort?

General TAYLOR. It made it easier in a political sense.

EFFECT ELSEWHERE OF VIETCONG SUCCESS IN VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. This morning, in the New York Times, I noticed that the President said something close to what you said in your opening statement. He said:

If the takeover of Vietnam can be achieved by a highly organized Communist force, employing violence against the civilian population, it can be achieved in another country at another time and with even greater cost to freedom.

If that war of liberation triumphs, who will be liberated next, he asked.

I think in your statement you said:

However, I am deeply impressed with the probable effects worldwide, not necessarily in areas contiguous to South Vietnam, if the war of liberation scores a significant victory there.

I think this is the same argument as the one that the President advanced in his speech yesterday.

General TAYLOR. I think so, yes.

Senator CHURCH. In trying to determine how we should deal with the problem of guerrilla warfare, I am wondering if you feel that a successful termination, which we all hope for in South Vietnam, a suppression of the Vietcong revolt, let us say, would, in your opinion, put an end to the problem of guerrilla warfare elsewhere?

General TAYLOR. No, sir, I am quite sure it would not. I think it would diminish the threat. I think it would discourage a repetition unless the initial conditions were even more favorable than they were in South Vietnam. I think it would be important to our cause, but it would not eliminate the danger entirely.

Senator CHURCH. Is it not true that the Greeks had success in putting down a guerrilla war in Greece some years ago?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; they did.

Senator CHURCH. But that did not discourage the outbreak of many guerrilla wars since, did it?

General TAYLOR. No. It was tried also in Malaya and in the Philippines.

Senator CHURCH. And the success in the Philippines—

General TAYLOR. This has not become a dogma, however, to the same degree. I think the war of liberation dogma, I think that is the correct term, is a later development, influenced perhaps by these earlier experiences, but I have a feeling now they have a new factor to inject which invalidates the experience gained in that area.

Senator CHURCH. But as you say, General, the success the Philippines had in putting down this kind of Communist infiltrated insurrection, the success that the Burmese had, in both cases without any military intervention on the part of the United States—

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator CHURCH (continuing). Did not put an end to further attempts on the part of the Communists in such places as Vietnam and elsewhere, is that not true?

General TAYLOR. That is true, although the failure, I would say, in South Vietnam would be much more dramatic and hence I would think more far-reaching in consequences.

EFFECT OF U.S. PRESENCE ON A COMMUNIST INFILTRATED INSURGENCY

Senator CHURCH. Is it not also true that the massive American intervention in Vietnam, which has now reached about 200,000 American troops, and which will have cost us about \$20 billion by the end of this year, has not prevented the outbreak of Communist insurgency elsewhere even as we hold the bridge, so to speak, in Vietnam? For example, another such war broke out around the globe in the Dominican Republic just a few months ago, did it not?

General TAYLOR. I see your point of reasoning, and it is an interesting approach. I would point out, however, that all of these insurgencies started about the same time. They did not have the experience of what the American intervention is meeting now in this situation. The situation in South Vietnam, of course, dates back at least to 1954. So that to suggest that our action is not suppressing other areas is, I do not think, a final conclusion, because these other areas started up concurrently with South Vietnam.

Senator CHURCH. I am not trying to draw any final conclusions. I am just trying to grope for what might be a sound conclusion; take Indonesia for example.

General TAYLOR. Let me add, sir—

Senator CHURCH. Take Indonesia.

General TAYLOR. I am glad you are going to.

Senator CHURCH. This happened quite recently, after a long demonstration of American resolution in Vietnam. A revolt occurred which we have attributed to the Communists and which apparently the Indonesians also attributed to the Communists. It resulted in putting, Sukarno says 85,000, others say 200,000, Communists, to the sword in Indonesia. This has occurred, moreover, after Sukarno, in effect, asked us out. Certainly the success there in dealing with the Communists is not the result of any massive American intervention.

General TAYLOR. I know, but—

Senator CHURCH. There is hardly even an American present in Indonesia any more.

General TAYLOR. I see the argument made, however, which is a very appealing one to me, that the Indonesians would never have resisted the Chinese-backed Communist Party had we not been holding the line in southeast Asia. I think that is a pretty valid argument.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.
Senator Pell?

LACK OF ENTHUSIASM OF OUR ALLIES FOR VIETNAM CONFLICT

Senator PELL. General, one question that has bothered me is that if we are correct, as we would like to believe we are, why is it that so few of our allies are really willing to contribute fighting manpower? The present fact is that we have nine times as many fighting men as all our allies put together in Vietnam. I think Australia, New Zealand, as you pointed out, and South Koreans, with certain perhaps quid pro quo presence there. But how do you account for the lack of enthusiasm of our allies and equally free people to help us in this battle?

General TAYLOR. I would not expect to find much enthusiasm on anyone's part to get into such an unpleasant situation. Only a sense of duty will overcome a natural lack of desire to take part in this situation. I am sure Secretary Rusk tomorrow can enumerate for you the many efforts of our Government to try to induce our allies to contribute more.

Senator PELL. Excuse me. My question is not that we have not tried, because we have. I am trying to equate perhaps my own lack of enthusiasm for our course of action in Vietnam with that perhaps of some of the other free governments in the world.

General TAYLOR. We do not like being there ourselves. I do not know why we would think our friends would really enjoy being there; only unless they are impelled by a strong sense of duty are we likely to get a major contribution.

Senator PELL. Well, to carry that thought to its conclusion, you would think that we have a stronger sense of duty than the other free nations of the world then.

General TAYLOR. We do insofar as this particular problem is concerned.

Senator PELL. Incidentally, going back to article 51, just to make the record complete, article 51 of the charter which your court-appointed lawyer helped you with, I think it would be interesting for the record if you could have submitted by the administration the measures taken in the exercise of this right of self-defense which have been reported to the Security Council, because the record is incomplete as it stands.

General TAYLOR. Would you ask that of the Secretary? I think he will have a comment on that, Secretary Rusk, tomorrow.

Senator PELL. To Mr. Rusk?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

CAN UNITED STATES AFFORD ACTION IN ALL WARS OF LIBERATION?

Now, another question that goes through my mind is in the end, I am quite confident you are correct, there are enough men, anywhere from half to three-quarters of a million, with which we can undoubtedly achieve a military solution in South Vietnam. But then looking ahead, what happens. Why would they not, as General Gavin put it, hold out the baited trap a little bit in Laos or Thailand? And we look back to Korea, we won, but all these years we are still spending there, I think it is more than half a million a year and a large number of men, I believe the figure is classified.

How many of these victories can we stand, do you think?

General TAYLOR. Well, you are suggesting a point which I think is a very important one. If indeed the war of liberation is going to be a tactic frequently used should we—

Senator PELL. Excuse me for interrupting. This is what the opposition says, it will be increasingly used, it will be and is being used.

General TAYLOR. I am just raising the problem before us, if indeed there are tactics going to be used, do we have the duty and do we have the capability of intervening in all of these situations that might arise? All I can say is obviously not, that we are not the gendarme of the world and cannot be. We are going to have to use awfully good judgment as to how we accept these challenges in various parts of the world.

Our main hope, however, is in preventive action taken in time. Most of the problems of the developing world are those of backwardness, poverty, lack of resources, lack of leadership, so that all that we do in assisting the emerging countries to develop into stable societies, of course, is an indirect defense against this kind of thing.

But I do agree that selectivity in applying our resources in the future is going to be a major problem of this Government.

OUTBREAK OF WAR OF LIBERATION IN THAILAND

Senator PELL. To carry this thought one step further forward, when we have achieved, and I would like to accept the words "when we have achieved a military solution in South Vietnam"—

General TAYLOR. There is no such thing as a military solution, Senator.

Senator PELL. When we have achieved a status of pacification, if that would be a better word, in South Vietnam, why would it not immediately arise in Thailand?

General TAYLOR. Why would it not, sir?

Senator PELL. Why would not a war of liberation immediately be started in Thailand?

General TAYLOR. I think it is because the danger has been recognized by the Thai Government over the years, and with our assistance they have been preparing for the possibility of the war of liberation being moved into Thailand.

I simply hope that those advance preparations are adequate. I think for the time being they look that way, but there is a possibility that unsuccessful in South Vietnam, they might seek to compensate, so to speak, by moving their operations into Thailand, but they will

have a much tougher problem there than they ever had getting started in South Vietnam where they left a base behind them, you will recall, in 1954 upon which they could build.

Senator PELL. From a military viewpoint, would you agree with the view that we could not, probably, conduct more than two or three of these wars with our present capacity without allies or outside help?

General TAYLOR. I do not think one could answer without knowing the specific situation. Obviously we would be in—have great difficulty in having three or four brush fires going at the same time, and I would say we would have to reject involvement in one or more of them in order to deal adequately with a smaller number.

Senator PELL. One point also in clearing up the record, I am not sure we are correct in tracing the similarity to Greece, because in Greece there was no large infusion of American manpower. It was essentially Greek manpower helped by a great deal of American aid and advisers.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, all these situations have been somewhat different. There is always a common core of similarity and then many factors that are different.

LAND AND SEA TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES TO VIETNAM

Senator PELL. What percentage of supplies, roughly, come from Vietnam by sea and what come overland from China roughly?

General TAYLOR. We just do not know, Senator, but we have a strong feeling that the vast majority come by land.

Senator PELL. More than half would you say?

General TAYLOR. More than half by—I would say much more than half come by land rather than by sea. Our feeling is—although I must say it is hard to document—that the improved coastal patrols, backed by the 7th Fleet, are having a very restrictive effect upon it, any large importation of supplies by sea.

AROUSING OF FERVOR IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator PELL. Another question of tactics that I do not understand fully is why can we not arouse the same fervor in the Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, that apparently Ho Chi Minh does in the North Vietnamese? Why does it take, if the ratio is 10 to 1, to pin down guerrillas, why are there not guerrillas on the north of the line doing exactly what the Communists are doing in the south, only equaling Vietnamese?

General TAYLOR. No one thought about this in time. The reason the guerrilla war has been so reasonably successful in the south is that a strong base including caches of arms and ammunition were left in the south readily available for the guerrillas, the manpower which was later infiltrated from the north. No one had that in mind at the time of partition of North Vietnam, so by the time anyone could think of that, you had a closed police state with all the guards and fences against infiltration by anybody.

So if one wanted to pursue that course of action, it was not feasible.

Senator PELL. We also do not seem to be able to stimulate the same fervor. What is the reason for that? You were in Vietnam. You saw them and worked with them. How do you account for it?

General TAYLOR. I do not know that I would agree necessarily that the Communist fervor is higher. It is very hard to measure that because they are under such control that it is impossible for them to show a lack of enthusiasm. In a democracy such as they have in South Vietnam where there is no police state, anybody could go out on the street and carry a banner and demonstrate against the government and against the war. So one receives impressions of dissidence, if that is the word, in the south which could not possibly appear in the north.

BRAKE TO INDEFINITE ESCALATION

Senator PELL. Do you think that the course of those of us, who believe we have a logical commitment to be there, who realize it is a fact we are there, but feel that we should act as a brake to this indefinite escalation, that this course is harmful or that this view, when expressed publicly is of harm to the enemy?

General TAYLOR. What kind of—

Senator PELL. The view that we should act as a brake to this continuous buildup that is going on.

General TAYLOR. Well, I would not know in exactly what form one would make that statement. I think that if we decided to adopt an enclave policy, as I understand the enclave policy, that would be the best news in the world to Hanoi, and a great discouragement to South Vietnam.

Senator PELL. I must say I for one was very impressed by General Gavin. I would love to see a debate between the two of you. I think it would be very instructive for us and the American people because you sound very convincing here and he sounded very convincing a few days back.

IS VIETNAM VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST?

Finally, I was wondering if you felt that Vietnam was an area, because of the closeness in the world today of every part to the other, is really a matter of our vital national interest.

General TAYLOR. I believe it is. I know the Congress agreed with that in 1964. I would phrase it more in terms that the lives and liberty of 15 million people is bound to be a great stake to any country that has committed itself to the preservation of that particular segment of the world's population. I think the collateral importance which we have discussed in the course of the day, the resistance to a war of liberation, to preventing the worldwide effect of encouraging the Sino-North Vietnamese aggressors by allowing them a success, all of these together, add up to a vital interest about which I have no doubt.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, General.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

PERSONAL NATURE OF GENERAL TAYLOR'S STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. General, I think you made a very fine statement and a very persuasive one. I understood before you came that you were a military adviser to the President. When I called Secretary McNamara he recommended, or suggested, that I ask you to testify.

Do I understand from your answer to Senator Gore's question that you are not a military adviser to the President, that this is purely a personal statement? Is it not approved by the administration?

General TAYLOR. First, my position is that of a part-time special consultant to the President, with the understanding that he gives me specific tasks, and I am consulted on specific matters. That does not mean that I am in the same position as I was with President Kennedy from 1961 to 1962, in which case I was in the full stream of Government business.

Secondly, with regard to my statement, I informed the President, he had access to it, but I did not ask for clearance in Government, and from that point of view it is a personal statement.

The CHAIRMAN. And they take no responsibility for it?

General TAYLOR. No, sir; I think they would authorize me to say, I am sure, that I have not included anything in it that is contradictory to the policy of the administration, simply because I happen to agree with their policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I don't know that it is important, but I had understood that you would be speaking for the administration. You wouldn't know whether or not, in view of this explanation, Secretary McNamara might reconsider his decision about testifying in public session?

General TAYLOR. I couldn't say, sir. When I was first contacted by telephone on this I made the point clear that I was a private citizen and hence cannot speak for the administration.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you are a private citizen. General Gavin is a private citizen, too. Would you say your statements have the same authority?

General TAYLOR. I leave that to you, sir.

VIETCONG CASUALTIES

The CHAIRMAN. General, you stated several times that we are killing very large and increasing numbers of Vietcong. Is it not a fact that there are more Vietcong in South Vietnam today than there were a year ago?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that not correct?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe the official figures from the Pentagon indicate that in January of 1965 there were 103,000 Vietcong. They estimated 19,000 infiltrators in 1965 and that 35,000 Vietcong were killed during the year, and 11,000 captured. This would, I believe, leave about 76,000. Their present estimates are that there are 236,000 which would indicate that they had recruited 160,000 during the course of 1965. This would seem to be somewhat inconsistent with the theory that we are killing ever-increasing numbers, and thereby making progress. Is that true?

General TAYLOR. Did not inflict the casualties at the rate which I discussed for this year in the number you mentioned? It is quite true they have increased and that was one of the reason we decided we had to use our American ground forces to compensate for the deficiency in the Vietnamese.

WISDOM OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. General a moment ago, I think, in one of your answers you touched on the courage and the patriotism of citizens of this country. I don't really believe that is questioned by anyone on this committee. What we are questioning is the wisdom of the policy, particularly as it leads to substantial escalation of the war. I hope you understand that.

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, I do, I hope I did not give the impression of impugning the patriotism or courage of anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. No one on this committee is suggesting that we ought to turn tail and "scuttle and run," as one of our leading columnists characterizes it, because of a lack of courage. It is purely a question of judgment that we are concerned with.

METHODS OF BREAKING THE WILL OF THE OPPOSITION

There was one other question that was inspired by your reply to a question by the Senator from Missouri. Can you imagine in your wildest dreams of a Secretary of the Air Force agreeing to napalm a great city, perhaps a city like Tokyo, with millions of innocent, pure children who love their mothers, and mothers who love their children—just like you love your son—resulting in the death of thousands of people who never did us any harm? Can you imagine any Secretary of the Air Force or any President ordering the burning of these little children right before the eyes of their mothers?

General TAYLOR. I am not sure of the situation, I can't visualize the situation you are asking me about.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it a fact we did just that in Tokyo?

General TAYLOR. The fire raid?

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't we?

General TAYLOR. I am not familiar with the details.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not familiar?

General TAYLOR. But we certainly dropped fire bombs on Tokyo.

The CHAIRMAN. You hadn't heard about the bombs?

General TAYLOR. I had heard about it.

The CHAIRMAN. What difference, really, morally or any other way, do you see between burning innocent little children and disemboweling innocent citizens? Isn't it only the means you use?

General TAYLOR. I would say there is no doubt as to the objective in the latter case. In the former case, I would imagine the answer would be that it was an unhappy concomitant of the attack of the targets that happened in the bombing.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it an objective in war, we mentioned it before, about your seeking the surrender, or the breaking of the will of the opposition? This is the nature of war?

General TAYLOR. This is not a factor in the present situation in South Vietnam at all, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The only implication of this question was that we sometimes think we are the only good people, and I certainly don't think we are bad people. But I don't see any great distinction between using the weapons that we happen to have, and others don't, to kill innocent people, such as burning by napalm and disembowling with a knife because a knife is all you happen to have.

I don't think that we should claim any great superiority because we happen to have nuclear bombs and fire bombs and the other side doesn't.

General TAYLOR. But we are not deliberately attacking civilian populations in South Vietnam. On the contrary, we are making every effort to avoid their loss.

The CHAIRMAN. We deliberately drop napalm bombs on villages.

General TAYLOR. In the illustration that was deliberate.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not by accident we are doing this.

I am not questioning the nature of war, and people use what they have at their command.

General TAYLOR. I would just say that the observation does not apply to what we are trying to do in South Vietnam because this is not an unlimited war. This is, as I have often said, a limited war, with a limited objective, one of the objectives being to try to protect the civilian population which we are trying to rescue and not destroy.

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

The CHAIRMAN. I find your answer to Senator Gore is unsatisfactory. You say our objective is unlimited, but the only logical conclusion of your objective would seem to be to surrender.

General TAYLOR. No, sir. I am not asking for anyone to surrender.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see how else you can explain it. I don't understand this play on words, maybe I am much too stupid to understand what it means when you say, "We are going to do what it takes to make them come to the conference table." This to me means they are going to have to, as they used to say in the Ozarks, holler "Enough," or say "calf rope."

General TAYLOR. This is simply to make them see pursuing their present course of action is so disadvantageous it is to their interests to come to the table.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I think that to me means surrender.

General TAYLOR. No, sir; it is not surrender.

LIMITED WAR OBJECTIVE IS UNCLEAR

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make the contrary point. I would think a limited war would be where our real efforts are to seek a conference and propose a compromise, in which we don't necessarily get our way, and they don't surrender. We don't surrender, but we seek a settlement of it.

General TAYLOR. How do you compromise the freedom of 15 million South Vietnamese, Senator? I don't understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you compromise it?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir. That is the issue at stake. How do you compromise the issue? They are either free or not free.

The CHAIRMAN. You can extend that reasoning and say, "How do we compromise the freedom of 250 million Russians?" Why don't we go over there and free them?

General TAYLOR. That is not the issue for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the Yugoslavs. You have been talking about communism. The Yugoslavs are Communists, as you call them. I don't think your answer is responsive. This is a war, a most unfortu-

nate war, and I am very unhappy about it. But we are trying to develop just what our objective is. My idea of a proper objective—as I have stated it often—is that we should try to find a way to the conference table; whereas pursuing this in an unlimited way to the point of forcing North Vietnam to give in may involve us in a war with China. I also think that the Vietcong in South Vietnam as the major opponent on the field is a party which has to be dealt with.

SAVAGE TACTICS SIMILAR IN ANY WAR

I don't agree with their tactics any more than you do. I think they have been very savage. I think most people have been in war. We said the Germans were savage in World War I, at least we were told. We were given pictures of them cutting off the hands of children and doing all sorts of things to women and so on. It has been so in every war that I know of; in the last war it was the gas chambers.

Now the Germans are our bosom friends, our staunch allies, but they killed more people in gas chambers, and were most inhuman and immoral.

It seems to me that all wars have similar characteristics. We use whatever means are available at the time to kill people. They are dead anyway you do it and I can't see much moral distinction about the method used.

General TAYLOR. I think the matter of intent is important, Senator. I think the law recognizes that.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a difference. But as a national policy as a country and as a government that engages in war and uses its own weapons, I don't see any very great distinction.

I don't know that this point makes any difference. The only reason I raised it—I didn't raise it; Senator Lausche raised it first this morning—is that it is the kind of inflammatory line which discourages the utilization of what little reason we have left. That is the only reason I commented on it in the first place. I don't wish to make a great point of it. I certainly don't wish to say we are a bit worse than any other country. We use weapons at our disposal. We have burned a lot of innocent people in this war. I am not blaming you or anyone else for it. It is the nature of war. This is why I would like to find some way to stop it.

EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON OBTAINING COMPROMISE

But I can't see where the emphasis in this policy is as either you or others have described it. The emphasis should be on trying to find a way to stop the war; to work out a cease fire like they did in 1954. At least they did bring that particular phase of the war to a temporary end.

General TAYLOR. I am sure, Senator, we would like to have this settlement on the 1954 line if all the Vietcong would go home and go north and let South Vietnamese lead their own lives.

The CHAIRMAN. You are asking them to say, "Well, we are sorry we made a mistake and we beg your pardon. Now, whatever you want we will do."

General TAYLOR. I think they could have compensations. There are compensations that we could offer.

The CHAIRMAN. So could we, and I am not advocating that we just stop it out of hand. Maybe it is a matter of degree, but, in all honesty I get the impression that our policy is directed toward forcing them to surrender, and then we will parley with them, rather than seeking some basis upon which we could obtain a compromise to stop the slaughter.

VIETNAMESE ALLOWED TO MAKE OWN DECISIONS

In the long run, I think the outcome in this area will be probably the same whichever way you follow because I do not think you are or any of our Government officials are capable of creating out of whole cloth the kind of fine democratic regime in this area which some people seem to imagine they can create. I think this is impossible. They are going to have to create it for themselves, and the sooner we allow them to get at it, the better.

General TAYLOR. I quite agree with you, Senator, providing the 15 million South Vietnamese choose the kind of government, the kind of life, they want to lead.

The CHAIRMAN. The proposal I have made, and the 1954 proposal did the same, is to allow them to make their own decision. That is what was provided. It was interfered with. I would not want to recount all who interfered. We certainly played our part in our support of Diem. It seems to me that is the most we could ask. We should not assume to dictate their political solution.

I think they should be allowed to make their own decision, and that is what I have been recommending. Other members of this committee have also.

General TAYLOR. That is what our position is; that is what we are trying to do.

The CHAIRMAN. To create a condition that would allow them to settle it.

A procedure was stated in the 1954 agreement. Maybe there is a better method.

Well, I have had my say. Do you wish to comment on that? You do not have to.

General TAYLOR. I am sorry, Senator, I do not agree with much of what you have said. Certainly our objective is as you have interpreted it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am aware of that.

Senator Morse.

HIGHLY CRITICAL OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY

Senator MORSE. I have only one more subject to raise with the general, but I want to raise a matter of personal privilege comment with my friend from Missouri, Mr. Symington. There have been some conversations since the statement he made a few minutes ago. I have great respect for the views of Senator Symington in support of his convictions. He is entitled to hold them. I am going to hold to mine.

If his comments meant by innuendo that some of us should not have expressed our views as we have, I only want to say I stand on every word I have spoken today. And I am perfectly willing to state my

view, as I shall, in the great debate across this country which is going to take place from now through the election in 1968.

We are going to let the American people determine their foreign policy. I am highly critical of my administration and of the people who have been advising my administration. They are leading the American people into a war that, in my judgment, they never should have led us into. I only want my friend from Missouri to know that is my position. I am sure he will be on the other side in that debate, and we will abide by the judgment of the people.

MINING OR BLOCKADING PORT OF HAIPHONG

You know so much more about the operation of international events that lead to a war than I could possibly know.

What concerns me is the danger of our following a course of action such as General Goldwater suggested the last couple of days, in which he would welcome some incident that would give us an excuse for bombing China. He represents, I think, a point of view that thinks you have got to fight China some time, and the sooner the better.

Then I am concerned about Russia. I do not dismiss the Russian attitude as all propaganda.

So I take you to the port of Haiphong. Suppose we do either one of two things. Suppose we mine, and there are those who think we ought to mine it, to keep the ships out. I think it is terrible that they are delivering goods into the port. At the last briefing we had before this committee just the other day it was mentioned that Great Britain has not even stopped all her ships from going into that port. Suppose we mine the harbor, can we mine it without running the risk of Chinese or Russian minesweepers clearing it periodically?

General TAYLOR. I think so, sir. That is—I am not an expert in naval mining, but I am told that our mines are so that they are very difficult to sweep and can be very easily replaced.

Senator MORSE. Suppose we blockaded it. There are many advocates of blockading the port. Of course, you and I will agree that a blockade is no better than its inforceibility. Do you think the Russians would respect that blockade?

General TAYLOR. I would advise against a blockade, I think, for the reasons you suggest. It is much more difficult than mining and creates problems of this type.

Senator MORSE. What concerns me—and I think I can properly say what frightens me—is that if we follow this suggestion of blockading the port, when you sink the first Russian ship that tries to go through, how do you avoid a war with Russia then?

General TAYLOR. I would avoid the blockade.

Senator MORSE. Well, I cannot tell you how delighted I am on that observation, and I hope a good many people who are talking about a blockade will take heed.

Then I am concerned about what some of our allies would do. I said in the committee the other day I am concerned about what Her Majesty's Government would do. I know of no instance in the history of the British Empire where the Union Jack has been lowered to a blockade that the British Government was not a party to or did not indicate it would approve of. I am also concerned about the flags of some other countries.

BOMBING CHINESE NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

I am very much concerned about the danger of our escalating this war into Hanoi and into the port of Haiphong. Then the danger of some incident occurring close to the Chinese border will then get us involved with China.

I think I can state this within the privilege of my obligations as chairman of the subcommittee that took a delegation to Asia last fall: I was very much concerned about what we learned in Hong Kong. I speak only my conclusion. I think that it is recognized that if we bomb the nuclear installations in Red China—and they are pretty well defended, but we can bomb them out—that we cannot avoid China's coming into the war. She is bound to move.

General TAYLOR. I would be inclined to agree, Senator. I know no one who is proposing that sort of thing, no one in a responsible position in our Government.

Senator MORSE. All I can tell you is that I think we have quite a few people behind the scenes who are talking that kind of rot. I think it is very important that our administration be perfectly clear at all times that this is not going to be a war involving the type of escalation which will put us in a position where a war with China is unavoidable.

I want to say, General, that although you and I—as the record of today shows, and past records show—find ourselves far apart as to what our foreign policy should be, I think it is a great thing that you and I live in a democracy where two men can exchange points of view and be so far apart in our respective views on foreign policy. We both know that the whole democratic process is going to remain safe nevertheless.

In that sense, I want to thank you very much for the testimony you have given here today.

General TAYLOR. Thank you, Senator, for your remarks. I reciprocate your feeling.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Nothing more. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long.

INTERRUPTION OF GENERAL TAYLOR

Senator LONG. General Taylor, I hope that my interest in hearing your answers will not be misunderstood. I meant no discourtesy to anyone on the committee, but a number of times Senators have pressed you so hard when they were speaking and wouldn't let you answer the question.

The chairman asked you a question when you said you disagreed with him, and you did not get a chance to answer it. If you can recall the question, I would like for you to answer it on my time.

General TAYLOR. Well, I think, really it is just the feeling the chairman has that we are setting for ourselves virtually unlimited goals, the abject capitulation of the north, and really that is all the program adds up to, which I have been describing. I do not see it that way, and that was my point.

REVIEW OF WAR ATROCITIES

Senator LONG. Now, the chairman pressed you on this argument, and half the time you were not permitted to answer the question or respond to it. I am sure he is very sincere about this, but he was pressing you on this theory that the atrocities these people commit in the last analysis are not much different from things that our people have done themselves.

I do not agree with that, but that is the chairman's argument, and the logical extension of that argument would be that there is not really enough difference between our theory of government and what we believe in and what they believe in to justify our sending our boys over there to keep that nation anti-Communist.

Now, I want to go and review this. In World War II we did not start it. Adolf Hitler started this idea, that they would fight a total war, and he found that, feeling it very dangerous to try a landing on Britain, he would bomb the British people into submission. He went to work then trying to bomb Britain into submission, and a lot of sweet little children and decent women died as he tried to bomb that nation into submission. He was not trying to kill the women and children. He was trying to bomb that nation into submission.

Now, they started that, didn't they?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. And having sowed the wind, to use Winston Churchill's term, they reaped the whirlwind when the U.S. Air Force did it back to them, is that not about the size of it?

General TAYLOR. I would agree.

Senator LONG. Now, when the Japs bombed Pearl Harbor, and they went to work on us, they were not too careful whether they were killing men, women, or children, were they? They were trying to destroy our will to fight.

When we bombed Hiroshima would you be willing to agree that if we could have done it we would have liked to have spared all noncombatants, but the kind of war that was being fought was such that it was impossible to do that?

General TAYLOR. Well, I am sure we would have liked to, Senator. But, as you suggest, by that time this was total war on both fronts, and certainly we had put down any hesitancy in bombing urban targets. It was the result of the situation originally created by Hitler's decision to use air power for that purpose, and it extended around the world on all fronts.

U.S. HUMANENESS IN WAR

Senator LONG. May I say this, some of the things we did in World War II, to notify the enemy we were coming, and to get the women and children out of there, were humane to the point of being ridiculous in a war. I have talked to Air Force men who would talk about our information people telling the folks we were coming, and to get out of there, and they would lose half their airplanes, how the boys would want to turn in their uniforms.

"How can you do this? Just the whole German Air Force was there."

When we were bombing Berlin—perhaps you were there—on that last tremendous raid, we announced we were coming, and for people to get out of the way because they were just going to level the place. Now, is that not a case of being gentlemanly and honorable to the point of ridiculousness? They shot down about half those planes, General.

General TAYLOR. I am not—

Senator LONG. They knew we were coming, and the whole air force was there.

General TAYLOR. I am not too familiar with the circumstances, Senator.

Senator LONG. You know we did things like that.

General TAYLOR. But what really concerns me is that the situation we are talking about in World War II can seem to carry over into what we are doing in South Vietnam, and as you know, that is not the case. We are making every effort in South Vietnam to spare civilians in every possible way.

Senator LONG. When we killed women and children, is it not true that that happened because we were striking at a target and it was unavoidable, that those people would perish along with the target and the combatants in the area?

General TAYLOR. That is correct.

The point I tried to make also, our intent is to not hurt the civilians.

Senator LONG. And is it not also true, General, what we were doing was well within the rules of war?

General TAYLOR. Oh, yes, no question about it.

Senator LONG. It was well within the rules of war. We were playing by the rules of the game.

When someone comes in and chops and cuts a little child to pieces in front of the father and the mother, and then cuts the next child to pieces and then destroys the mother and then the father, cannot you see a difference in doing that to innocent civilians than in dropping a bomb on a target which is a military objective?

General TAYLOR. I certainly can.

Senator LONG. Would you be willing to make the unqualified statement that you just think that our people are just better and more honorable and more moral people than the Communists?

General TAYLOR. They certainly are behaving that way in South Vietnam.

Senator LONG. As a matter of fact, right now are we not, in bombing North Vietnam, insisting that we only strike at military targets and be very careful not to strike targets where there are civilians?

General TAYLOR. That is right.

Senator LONG. Are they showing us the same consideration when they send a man in with a bomb to blast a whole building down?

General TAYLOR. I might cite the famous case of the floating restaurant which was attacked by two Claymore mines just before I left, with 40 civilians killed, 80 wounded by a coldblooded planting of the mines so that they could sweep a restaurant and then the gangway with the second mine just as the people tried to escape.

Senator LONG. So they blast the restaurant down with innocent people, and then put a second line of mines to get every person who tries to get out of there after the first explosion occurred.

General TAYLOR. Yes.

UNITED STATES SHOULD FULFILL HONOR AND WORD

Senator LONG. Now, the question has been asked, How many troops would we put in there? I understand your answer. I saw it on television. I had to leave here temporarily.

General, I hope that the President will answer that question very affirmatively, in line with this resolution we gave him. I hope he will put in whatever troops are necessary to resist aggression. I hope we will tell this bunch of Communist assassins we are not going to let them get away with this, and I hope that the answer is whether it is North Vietnam or even China, we will fight these people and do whatever is necessary to fulfill our honor and our word. That is how we have done it in the past. May I say that General MacArthur sat right there where you are, and if he testified on television he would have been President of these United States. A U.S. Senator sat in this room and kept asking him questions in a way that he would hedge around trying to get the precise answer the Senator wanted.

But General MacArthur would not answer quite that way. He said, "Senator, I do not quite see what you are getting at. Are you trying to find out what I would have done if I were President of the United States when these Chinese Communists came in?"

And the Senator was forced to say, "Yes," to the question. And General MacArthur then said, General Taylor, he said:

I would have told them you have got 48 hours to get those troops out of here or you are at war with the United States of America.

GENERAL MAC ARTHUR'S TESTIMONY ABOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH
BRITISH

Now, let me tell you something we know now we did not know then. General MacArthur testified at that time and, I want to know if you know something about this, that when they came in, every time he would tell the United Nations something, the Communist always knew what it was. If he was going to try to do something, he would tell our U.N. friends he was going to move somewhere, so the entire Chinese Army was there, so he felt he could not tell them any more. Since that time we have discovered they had a couple of Englishmen at that embassy, and those Englishmen were relaying everything they could find, communicated from this Government to the British Government, to the Soviet Union, and they defected. One of them was named Burgess. I forget the other guy's name. Do you recall his name? They defected and went to the Soviet Union.

Among these things that they were looking for was the fact that we had agreed to consult with England in the event we decided to use that atom bomb, and they were in a position to get warning, and plenty of it in time to get their troops out of there in the event that we decided to put that atom bomb on those hordes of Chinese Communists.

Now, I hope, General, that you won't advise the President to give them that kind of assurance in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

COMMUNISTS TAKING HEAVY LOSSES

Senator LONG. If I have more time I would like to ask a question or two. Are not these Communists taking some very heavy losses?

General TAYLOR. I beg your pardon?

Senator LONG. Aren't these Vietcong and these North Vietnamese taking some very heavy losses?

General TAYLOR. They have; yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Would you say as a military man that unless they had some indication that we were going to give up that their struggle is beginning to look rather hopeless?

General TAYLOR. I would think it would look very grim; yes.

Senator LONG. I found some very good news from the Senator from Oregon who has been saying that we just had to get out. He said yesterday it looks to him in a few weeks the Vietcong may have to surrender. I had not been that optimistic about that matter.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator yield for a correction?

Senator LONG. I will not yield for a correction. I will put it in, what was said.

Senator MORSE. I never said we would get out at any time, and I challenge you to produce it. It just is not true. You ought to make a truthful statement if you are going to quote it.

Senator LONG. You told me that several times.

Senator MORSE. I never have, and if you say I have, you are not telling the truth. Your statement is false.

Senator LONG. I will just say that, perhaps, I misunderstood you, but that is the way I understood you, and so that is the way I understood your statement, Senator.

But, anyway, I thought you said it for the record a few times, you told it to me so many times.

VIOLATIONS OF GENEVA ACCORDS

Now, we have our finest men. They have not been defeated, they are winning. We are told here now that we have broken the Geneva accords. How many times did the Communists break it before we did? If two parties sign a contract, and the other guy won't keep his end of the contract, then you are not bound by yours. How many times did they break it before we broke the Geneva accords?

General TAYLOR. I could not tell you in terms of numbers, but they never really observed it.

Senator LONG. Don't you think it would be rather foolish to take on a Communist adversary who is bent on destroying you, and fight him by the Queensberry rules while he is fighting you by the law of nail and clawing out your eyeballs and punching you beneath the belt?

General TAYLOR. Yes. I think that consideration of the constant violation from the other side resulted in the events we have seen taking place in recent years.

Senator LONG. My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Your time has expired.

Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. General, I would like to relieve the situation a little by saying that both my grandfathers wore the gray. We learned a

long time ago when the South, both by practice and the word of General Sherman, that war is hell, and I have not seen too much kindness and generosity in a policy when people go to war.

Unfortunately, there are brutalities on both sides. This is the nature of things when men are fighting to kill each other. I am sorry that it happens.

PRESENT HEARINGS SEEN BY MILLIONS

But I would like to tell you a little conversation I had, as I returned to the hearing room, walking along with one of the working newsmen who has been sitting not far from you. He said that during the recess he had checked with his wife by telephone—I suppose to see what the prospects of her dinner were—anyway, he said she reported that, “You have an unclean house but a highly informed wife.” [Laughter.] So you have brought enlightenment to millions of people.

I saw the rating on the hearing previously, and I believe the estimate was 22 million, and with two networks carrying the hearing today, the words you have brought, the schools, the classes that have been dismissed in order to hear you, have, I believe, been enlightened.

WHAT ARE LIMITED OBJECTIVES OF WAR?

Unfortunately, there have been disagreements. I am sorry that we have not been able to reach more agreement as to just what are the limited objectives of the war, and I know you have been here all day. I am not going to press you. I am not going to ask another question, but to give you an opportunity, although you say you are speaking only for yourself. This is a disappointment to me, too. I thought you were coming here at the suggestion of Secretary McNamara to talk about military policy. But just as yourself, respected and able and fine and honored as you are, can you extend your remarks on the limitations, the limited nature of this war, as to the objectives in particular?

General TAYLOR. Very little, Senator, I am sorry to say, because really what I think you are asking me is to predict the future, what will we need a year from now.

I am sorry to say that I am unable to tell you where we will be a year from now. But I feel in my own heart that if we stay consistently on the course which we have laid out, which are described as our so-called four-component strategy, increasing our forces enough in the south so it is perfectly clear to the Hanoi leadership that they cannot win a victory in the south, something quite different from saying we will destroy every Vietcong in the south, that we will occupy every square mile in the south, if we accomplish that on the ground, at the same time utilize our air power to impose a daily price for the continuation of this struggle, if indeed we can become wiser and more capable in advising the civilian leadership in the south to get a broader vision in that government, so that they will be more effective in assisting their own people, and then finally, in combination in success in those three areas, that we can project the vision to Hanoi, that they must stop the aggression, and if so there will be compensations which will make for the benefit of their people, whereas the continuation on

their present course might be a disaster to them, if indeed we can do those things in the course of the next year, I think we will be well along to the goal I have described.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me say if I have annoyed any of my colleagues by what I have said, I regret that. The Senator from Oregon knows my affection for him. The witness before us has been my friend also for many years. One has to say what one believes.

So far as casualties are concerned, I hope no one is hurt. But if anybody must be hurt I would rather have it other people than our own people.

DEATH OF COLONEL NAM

By the way, General, I am reminded of a funeral, when you and I were in South Vietnam in 1961, of the representative of the South Vietnam Government at Geneva, a man who, many times, according to Ambassador Nolting, had voted against the Diem government. But one time he voted against the interests of the North Vietnamese. On a Sunday afternoon he went to his little garden about 4 miles outside of Saigon. He went out with his chauffeur. The chauffeur was told to beat it by a couple of men. Two weeks later they found his body in the river, terribly tortured. Do you remember that occasion?

General TAYLOR. I remember that, Colonel Nam, a well-known officer in Saigon.

Senator SYMINGTON. The things they did to him were almost unbelievable.

So I would join you and my colleague from Louisiana, I cannot see that type and character of torture as comparable to dropping something on a military target from an airplane. After all, if we do get in a fight, and we hear time and again the great apprehension as to a war with China, surely there has to be some recognition of our technological quality as against taking them on one for one in the jungle, as some of our men are forced to do now in South Vietnam.

I have quite a few questions, Mr. Chairman, and know it is getting late, so would ask your permission and that of the committee to file them in the record for answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The questions referred to and answers subsequently submitted for the record follow:)

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SYMINGTON

1. Question. We hear a good deal about Vietcong forces "living off the land," using local recruits and employing captured weapons and ammunition in their fight to seize control of South Vietnam. On the other hand, there is apparently a constant flow of North Vietnamese soldiers and war material into South Vietnam. In your judgment, how important is the support being provided by North Vietnam in the form of men, equipment, and other materials of war?

Answer. The support being provided the Vietcong by North Vietnam in the form of men, equipment and other materials of war is indispensable to the guerrillas for the conduct of the war in its present form. All of the important military supplies come over that route as do the trained replacements for the losses in the mainline Vietcong units. Also, during the past year, this external

assistance has included the deployment of formed units of the North Vietnamese Army into South Vietnam.

2. Question. What, do you feel, would be the effect if all external material support of Communist forces in South Vietnam was terminated?

Answer. The cessation of all external material support of the Communist forces would be a severe blow to the morale of the Vietcong guerrillas and would progressively slow down the tempo of their military operations and would eventually make it impossible for them to stand and fight against United States and South Vietnamese regular forces. Once their reserve of supplies had been depleted, I would feel that the South Vietnamese forces alone would probably be able to cope with the military threat represented by the Vietcong.

3. Question. Would this appreciably shorten the duration of the conflict in South Vietnam, and thus save American lives?

Answer. It would certainly shorten the duration of the conflict in South Vietnam and thus save American lives.

4. Question. As an adviser to the administration, I would expect that you support the strategy of conducting air strikes against military targets in North Vietnam; is this so? What, exactly, as you see it, are the objectives of the air campaign against North Vietnam's military forces?

Answer. The air campaign against the north has three objectives: (a) To raise the morale of the South Vietnamese by giving them a chance to strike at the source of all their troubles; (b) to utilize air power to the extent possible to slow down and limit the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam; (c) to remind the Communist leadership in Hanoi that they will have to pay a steadily increasing price for the continuation of the aggression against South Vietnam.

5. Question. How is this campaign being carried out; that is, what targets are being attacked, what kinds of weapons are being employed by the Air Force and Navy in carrying out these strikes, and how extensive is this air campaign?

Answer. The air campaign against the north is characterized by a slow, steady increase of pressure through attacks on military targets, particularly those associated with the support of infiltration. The targets include such things as roads, bridges, ferries, port and airfield facilities, and anti-aircraft missile sites. A limited amount of POL storage and electric power sources has been included. The targets are pretty well distributed over about two-thirds of the surface of North Vietnam. As you know, we have always kept out of the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

6. Question. Now I have a question about the effectiveness of the air campaign against North Vietnam's military machine, in terms of its effect on the infiltration of men and equipment into South Vietnam. Have the air strikes served to appreciably reduce the capacity of North Vietnam to move men and supporting supplies and equipment into South Vietnam?

Answer. The air attacks have had a limiting effect upon the ability of North Vietnam to move men and supplies into South Vietnam. It has not stopped infiltration; indeed, we never expected that it would. During the bombing pause, there was a tremendous effort in North Vietnam to take advantage of the lull to repair bomb damage and to move transport by daylight. I think this fact suggests a rather high degree of effectiveness of the bombing attacks when they were conducted at the tempo which just preceded the bombing pause.

7. Question. Would you say that the air strikes against North Vietnam's military lines of communication leading to South Vietnam have had the effect of raising the cost to North Vietnam of providing support to the insurgents and regular Communist forces in the south? (It is estimated that 50,000 persons in North Vietnam have been diverted from other pursuits to work on roadway and railway reconstruction and on other facilities associated with their badly-damaged lines of communication.)

Answer. The air attacks definitely have increased the cost to North Vietnam of providing support to the insurgents in the south. It has been estimated that from 100,000 to 150,000 men are engaged in air defense, repair of bomb damage and other activities growing out of our air campaign. Although dollar estimates of the cost of repairing bomb damage vary widely, the smallest figure, about \$30 million, is still large in a country whose gross national product is only about \$1.6 billion.

8. Question. You would say then, that the air campaign against North Vietnam's lines of communication and other military targets is hurting North Vietnam?

Answer. I would say that the air attacks have hurt North Vietnam and can be made to hurt more if we increase the number of our sorties and the targets attacked.

9. Question. To realize full effectiveness from the air campaign against North Vietnam's military lines of communication, is it not vital that air strikes be carried out systematically, without respite against lines of communication, since the enemy will make every effort to overcome the effects of such air attacks, as indeed he must, if he is to continue to support his forces in the south?

Answer. I agree with your statement of the requirements for full effectiveness in the air campaign.

10. Question. General, would you say that the air campaign against North Vietnam's military lines of communication complements our military efforts in South Vietnam?

Answer. Yes, the air campaign is an indispensable adjunct to the military efforts in South Vietnam. We must be successful on both fronts, in the north and in the south.

11. Question. Turning now to the military campaign in South Vietnam, as I understand the tactics being employed there. Because of the limits on ground movement imposed by the terrain, there is heavy reliance on our Air Force, in close coordination with ground forces, to provide much of the firepower required to strike the Communist force there; also, we are relying primarily on aerial reconnaissance to locate the enemy forces. Are these tactics—I am referring to the coordinated Air Force-Army operations—working well in South Vietnam? Do you have an estimate of the relative number of casualties imposed by the Air Force and by Army forces?

Answer: I would say that the Air Force-Army operations in South Vietnam are extremely well coordinated. This coordination becomes better as time goes on and additional experience is acquired. I am sorry to say that I have never seen an estimate of the relative number of casualties imposed by the Air Force and by Army forces.

12. Question. Would you say that the Army and Air Force have worked well together in Vietnam?

Answer. Yes, I would say that the Army and Air Force have worked and do work extremely well together in Vietnam.

13. Question. There has been a good deal of discussion concerning the attacks carried out in South Vietnam by our B-52 aircraft against what had for many years been jungle sanctuary areas for the Vietcong forces. In your judgment, have these attacks been effective? What purpose do you believe they have served?

Answer. The effectiveness of the strikes by B-52 aircraft depends largely on the quality of the intelligence which has been received on the target area. This intelligence is often far from complete so that it is comparatively rare to expect to hit pinpoint targets with the bombing. In my judgment, most of the benefit comes from area bombing which has the primary purpose of keeping the Vietcong moving and preventing them from resting and retraining in safe base areas. Prisoners report that the B-52's have been very successful in keeping the Vietcong on the move and thereby reducing their combat readiness and overall morale.

14. Question. Do you think that expansion of our air interdiction efforts in North Vietnam—to include targets which affect the supply of materiel directly supporting the Communist efforts in the south—would contribute significantly to our objectives there?

Answer. I would favor a continuation of the slow increase in pressure on the military target system in the north. I think this impression of the inexorability of greater discomfort is an important part of our effort to convince the Hanoi leadership of the inevitability of defeat.

15. Question. If we are really serious about curtailing the flow of war materiel from North Vietnam to the south, would it not be to our interests to neutralize the port of Haiphong?

Answer. There have always been pros and cons to the use of our airpower to neutralize the port of Haiphong. The question of proper timing is always involved in the discussion of this matter. I am inclined to believe that the time has been reached when we should mine this harbor and cut off the shipping which normally uses it.

16. Question. Some concern has been voiced about the possibility of Red Chinese intervention in Vietnam or of a diversionary move by the Chi-coms into

Thailand or South Korea. What, in your view, deters the Chinese from such courses of action?

Answer. Although I am always reluctant to express a view on the elusive subject of Chinese motivation, I can think of a number of good reasons which would seem adequate to deter the Chinese from a deliberate intervention in South Vietnam or any other action in deliberate extension of the war. In the first place, the Chinese are not likely to be invited by the North Vietnamese to come in force into North Vietnam. China is the distrusted, traditional enemy of all Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh would be loath, I am sure, to see Chinese armies on North Vietnamese soil.

From the point of view of China, the leadership in Peiping must enjoy this war by proxy and fighting the Americans and South Vietnamese to the last North Vietnamese. Apart from the cheapness of their participation in this way, they are aware of the unlimited loss which they might suffer in a military confrontation with us. They are highly vulnerable to air attack, including the nuclear plants which have been erected as such a cost to the nation.

Finally, they have to think about the Soviet Union with whom they are engaged in ruthless competition for hegemony in the Communist world. They cannot afford the attrition of their relative strength to the Soviet Union through involvement in a risky military adventure.

17. Question. Some of us are concerned about the accuracy and precision of air operations, particularly the bombing. We all know that no one deliberately makes mistakes and that our forces do take precautions. But how effective are these? While you were in Vietnam, to what extent did you feel our bombing was controlled and accurate? Were there effective controls to keep from attacking innocent people?

Answer. I would say that everything is being done which one can conceive of to assure the accuracy of our bombing and to avoid civilian casualties. Of course, any bombing mistake immediately makes headlines in our papers. We never hear of the thousands of missions flown without incident.

18. Question. Have we really begun to attack the underlying problem of security in the countryside?

Answer. The underlying problem of security in the countryside is, first, the elimination of the main line Vietcong units, followed by protective action to prevent their return to the countryside. The added military strength resulting from the presence of our U.S. combat forces has given added effectiveness to activities in both categories.

19. Question. To what extent are the Vietnamese Government and people really interested in continuing the fight?

Answer. Although the Vietnamese people are war weary after 11 years of struggle against the Vietcong, I never perceived any inclination to give up and accept Communist domination. They know too well the consequences, having observed the fate of many of their compatriots subjected to Vietcong occupation.

20. Question. How do our objectives in Vietnam relate to the overall U.S. objectives in southeast Asia?

Answer. Success or failure in South Vietnam will have a great impact on the overall objectives of the United States in southeast Asia. This area is a political, economic, and military entity of which no part can be treated in isolation.

21. Question. When will the United States be able to withdraw from Vietnam?

Answer. When the threat of a Communist takeover is removed, all or most of our military forces could be withdrawn. I would expect the outcome to resemble somewhat the situation as Korea following the armistice, although there should be no requirement for so large a military presence remaining in South Vietnam. I am sure we will need to give continued economic support and I would hope that there will be a strong corps of American civilian advisers to assist in dealing with the political, social, and economic problems.

22. Question. To what extent is the war today still a Vietnamese war fought by them against the Vietcong without our support?

Answer. In spite of the dramatic increase in American assistance during 1965, we are still the minority partner in this enterprise. As you know, there are nearly 700,000 men in the armed forces and police of South Vietnam whereas at the present time our U.S. military strength is slightly over 200,000. We are still operating by the principle enunciated by President Kennedy in 1961, namely, that we assist the Vietnamese only in doing those things they cannot do for themselves or cannot do in time to avert defeat.

23. Question. General, I am informed that the United States and GVN forces go to great lengths to protect innocent women and children from harm in our combat operations. Would you describe our practices in this regard?

Answer. Our United States and GVN commanders do everything possible to protect civilians in the course of combat operations. To the extent possible, civilian communities are warned in advance that combat is imminent and that they should stay away from possible bombing targets. In village fighting, there is the increased use of tear gas to avoid the casualties which would result from the use of firearms when the Vietcong are intermingled with the civilian population. Bombing targets are normally not attacked unless the permission of the local civilian authority is obtained and assurance given that the target is under Vietcong control. These precautions I have cited are only illustrative and are nothing like a total list.

24. Question. How would you compare and evaluate our position and our objectives in Vietnam today with that of the French in the post-World War II period?

Answer. The French were trying to regain a lost colony against the will of the vast majority of the inhabitants. We are in South Vietnam to assist the vast majority of the inhabitants to resist absorption into the Communist state of North Vietnam.

25. Question. Describe the efforts the United States has made to bring peace to Vietnam?

Answer. Our efforts have been so numerous that I could not tabulate them without a review of the State Department record. It seems to me that everything that can be done has been done to initiate unconditional discussions of a peaceful solution.

26. Question. What are the elements which the United States believes can go into peace in southeast Asia?

Answer. Our Government has stated clearly the elements for an honorable peace as we see it. They are summarized in the so-called 14 points which have been incorporated in a record of these hearings.

PROPAGANDA ATTEMPTS TO WRECK OUR MILITARY EFFORT

Senator SYMINGTON. There is one more subject I would like to bring up at this time. When going from An Khe, General Kinnard's headquarters, to Pleiku, and on out to Duc Co and Plei Me, where we lost 240 killed—Captain Moore, of Connecticut, was still running Plei Me and Colonel Metaxis took us out from Pleiku—we were shown from the air how we would have in turn destroyed them, except they escaped through Cambodia. Then in going back Colonel Metaxis told us of something that has been worrying me a great deal: that some group had gotten hold of the names of various men of his in these outposts. As you know, we have 12 men in each outpost: a captain, a first lieutenant, and 10 sergeants, all expendable. It is just a case of whether the enemy wants to make enough effort. Each team has 400 to 600 Montagnards under them. He said each of these outposts in his command were getting these letters, letters cleverly written, well written, asking, for example, why they were such stooges as to fight for Wall Street. He said apparently it was a campaign.

Metaxis continued, "We don't know how they got these addresses." Going back in the armed helicopter to Pleiku, I asked, "How many have you? You say you have got quite a few." He said, "I have at least 40 and they are still coming in."

This I put in my report.

Metaxis said most of his men were not affected by such propaganda, but now and then one might be, and that one person might be the one to let down his guard at a crucial moment to the point where the whole unit could be lost.

Is there any way you know of that we can put a stop to that type and character of effort to wreck our military effort over there?

Regardless of what we think over here, those young men out there have nothing to do with the fact that they are there.

General TAYLOR. No, sir. I was not aware of this kind of thing. You gentlemen who know the law far better than I. I would have to examine if we have any statutory recourse in a case like this. I just do not know. We have no censorship, of course, so it is impossible to stop mail from coming in.

Senator SYMINGTON. I put it in my report, which has been declassified. The notes were taken by Colonel Peter with me, of the Army. It impressed me as a most unfortunate business.

General TAYLOR. I agree.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have no further questions or comments. May I respectfully, at 10 minutes of 6, congratulate you for being a very tolerant, a very articulate, very constructive witness, and a very fine American.

General TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

General, you have been very patient and very responsive.

STATEMENT BY GENERAL RIDGWAY

I wish to insert in the record a news story of a statement made by General Ridgway pertaining to General Gavin's statement before the committee.

(The statement referred to follows:)

ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS STORY OF A STATEMENT BY GENERAL RIDGWAY ON GENERAL GAVIN'S TESTIMONY

PITTSBURGH, February 10.—Retired Army Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway today added his support to the "enclave" strategy for Vietnam proposed by Gen. James M. Gavin. Ridgway declined to elaborate on his views but said, "I agree basically with everything that General Gavin said."

Ridgway reported he has been asked to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the war but "respectfully declined."

"I didn't think I had anything to add. I thought the thing had been very thoroughly covered."

Ridgway made his remarks at an interview in his home at suburban Fox Chapel. The former Army Chief of Staff called General Gavin's remarks "magnificently presented." He said Gavin's testimony before the committee had served to clear up confusion on the enclave strategy. "It's hard to see how people could go as far afield as they did in misinterpreting his views," said General Ridgway.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

Do you have anything else you would like to say?

General TAYLOR. No, sir. I want to thank the committee. I have enjoyed this discussion and I feel very heavily the responsibilities of talking before the audience.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know how you could have enjoyed it, but it was very informative.

(Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., on Friday, February 18, 1966.)

SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, FISCAL YEAR 1966—VIETNAM

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1966

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Morse, Long of Louisiana, Gore, Church, Symington, Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams of Delaware, Mundt, and Case.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased to have this morning our distinguished Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. He is one of the most dedicated and hard-working public servants that I have ever known. I am always personally pleased to have you, Mr. Secretary, even though on occasions we have had differences of views about public affairs.

As everyone knows, you appeared in public session about 2 weeks ago. I was hopeful that we might have the cooperation of the administration and have at least two official witnesses who might help us develop for the American people and the Congress the facts about our policies in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese war has now become a rather major affair. And the Secretary of Defense has declined to appear in public session. According to the *Washington Post*, which is sometimes reliable, the Vice President has declined to appear, or says he will not appear.

ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN

I would like to ask you, before you open your statement, is it the firm decision of this administration that you are to be the only official spokesman in these hearings?

Secretary RUSK. The Administrator of AID, Mr. Bell, and I have both appeared, and I, of course, am here today.

No, if the committee wishes to continue these hearings and have other spokesmen for the administration, I am sure there would be others who could appear. Certainly my Department, and I think that the committee is familiar with the issues raised by the matter of certain military information in open session, but I am not in any sense saying I am the only witness available to the committee today.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to clear that up. I requested Secretary Ball to appear last week and he informed me he was told not to appear.

I assumed from that you were the only spokesman they wished to appear for the administration.

Secretary RUSK. As you know, I was away at the time, and I wish to make the first and major presentation for the administration of the Department of State on these larger aspects of the southeast Asia question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the committee has not taken a decision and it will meet on Monday, I believe, to discuss what other official witnesses from the executive might be available.

Secretary RUSK. That is my understanding, Mr. Chairman. But we will have a chance, I presume, to discuss that with you and the members of the committee in due course.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE LAST APPEARANCE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, since our last meeting, which I believe was 3 weeks ago—when you gave us a very thorough fill-in on the Vietnamese situation—there have been three developments to which I hope you will address yourself in your opening remarks. First, we would like very much to know how far our commitments to General Ky in Honolulu went; how firm we are to back him in his determination never to negotiate with the National Liberation Front; how many troops we have promised and how much money.

Two, I would like to know what commitments the administration authorized the Vice President to make in his extended trip to some 10 nations, especially whether in return for the \$100 million loan to India, the Indians will be required to send troops to Vietnam, and the same with regard to the other countries to which he is apparently authorized to extend loans.

Three, I would like to know what General de Gaulle really said in his letter to our Government about the war in Vietnam, as reported again in the Washington Post this morning. Or to be more specific, I would like to know if General de Gaulle actually said this Vietnamese war is leading nowhere and that it is absurd. This was stated in the Washington Post.

It seems to me that we and the public are entitled to know if that is true; apparently, somebody leaked and gave it to the press. While I understand from the press that it is a private letter, nevertheless it appeared in public print that this is what he said. Insofar as you can, I hope that you will enlighten the committee in your opening remarks about these matters which have developed since you briefed us thoroughly 2 weeks ago.

With that introduction, Mr. Secretary, will you proceed?

Do you have a prepared statement?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to summarize it, or read it?

Secretary RUSK. I should like to make my statement now, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.

Secretary RUSK. I may come to one or two of the questions you have raised after I have finished my prepared statement, because I did not cover those in what I planned to say in the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. I mentioned them because they are the only things that happened since you last testified.

Secretary RUSK. I think there has been a good deal of discussion in this committee since I last testified, Mr. Chairman, and other issues have been raised on which I wish to comment.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are any, I would be pleased to have your comments on any other new issues. I was only trying to suggest we needn't cover the same testimony because the other hearing was also in public.

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, the immediate occasion for these hearings is a request by the President for a supplemental appropriation to the AID administration of \$415 million, of which \$275 million are intended for South Vietnam. Mr. David Bell, the Administrator of AID, and I have both already testified on this particular request. These hearings, as the chairman has pointed out, have also entered into the largest and most far-reaching aspects of our interests and involvements in southeast Asia. So, for my part, I welcome this opportunity to appear again before the committee to discuss with you these larger issues.

Since World War II, which projected the United States into the role of major world power, we Americans have had to face a series of difficult tasks and trials. On the whole, we have faced them very well. Today we are facing another ordeal in southeast Asia which again is costing us both lives and treasure.

South Vietnam is a long way from the United States and the issues posed may seem remote from our daily experience and our immediate interests. It is essential, therefore, that we clearly understand—and so far as possible agree—on our mission and purpose in that faraway land.

WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM?

Why are we in Vietnam? Certainly we are not there merely because we have power and like to use it. We do not regard ourselves as the policeman of the universe. We do not go around the world looking for quarrels in which we can intervene. Quite the contrary. We have recognized that, just as we are not gendarmes of the universe, neither are we the magistrate of the universe. If other governments, other institutions, or other regional organizations can find solutions to the quarrels which disturb this present scene, we are anxious to have this occur. But we are in Vietnam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live. The situation we face in southeast Asia is obviously complex but, in my view, the underlying issues are relatively simple and are utterly fundamental. I am confident that Americans, who have a deep and mature understanding of world responsibility, are fully capable of cutting through the underbrush of complexity and finding the simple issues which involve our largest interests and deepest purposes. I regard it, therefore, as a privilege to be able to discuss these problems with the committee this morning—

to consult with you—and at the same time to try to clarify for the American people the issues we must squarely face.

I do not approach this task on the assumption that anyone, anywhere, has all the answers or that all wisdom belongs to the executive branch of the government, or even to the Government itself.

The questions at issue affect the well-being of all Americans and I am confident that all Americans will make up their own minds in the tradition of a free and independent people. Yet those of us who have special responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign policy have had to think hard and deeply about these problems for a very long time.

The President, his Cabinet colleagues, and the Congress, who share the weightiest responsibilities under our constitutional system, have come to certain conclusions that form the basis for the policies we are now pursuing. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that those who are officially responsible for the conduct of our public affairs must make decisions—and must make decisions among existing alternatives. None of us in the executive or the legislative branch has fulfilled our responsibilities merely by formulating an opinion—we are required to decide what this Nation shall do and shall not do and are required to accept the consequences of our determination.

What are our world security interests involved in the struggle in Vietnam?

PREVENTING THE EXPANSION OF COMMUNIST DOMINATION

They cannot be seen clearly in terms of southeast Asia only or merely in terms of the events of the past few months. We must view the problem in perspective. We must recognize that what we are seeking to achieve in South Vietnam is part of a process that has continued for a long time—a process of preventing the expansion and extension of Communist domination by the use of force against the weaker nations on the perimeter of Communist power.

This is the problem as it looks to us. Nor do the Communists themselves see the problem in isolation. They see the struggle in South Vietnam as part of a larger design for the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat.

I have observed in the course of your hearings that some objection has been raised to the use of the term “Communist aggression.” It seems to me that we should not confuse ourselves or our people by turning our eyes away from what that phrase means. The underlying crisis of this postwar period turns about a major struggle over the very nature of the political structure of the world.

Before the guns were silent in World War II, many governments sat down and thought long and hard about the structure of international life, the kind of world which we ought to try to build, and wrote those ideas into the United Nations Charter. That Charter establishes an international society of independent states, large and small, entitled to their own national existence, entitled to be free from aggression, cooperating freely across national frontiers in their common interests, and resolving their disputes by peaceful means. But the Communist world has returned to its demand for what it calls a world revolution, a world of coercion in direct contradiction to the Charter of the United Nations.

There may be differences within the Communist world about methods, and techniques, and leadership within the Communist world itself, but they share a common attachment to their "world revolution" and to its support through what they call wars of liberation.

So what we face in Vietnam is what we have faced on many occasions before—the need to check the extension of Communist power in order to maintain a reasonable stability in a precarious world.

That stability was achieved in the years after the war by the valor of free nations in defending the integrity of postwar territorial arrangements. And we have achieved a certain stability for the last decade and a half. It must not be overthrown now.

EFFECT OF WORLD WARS ON EXISTING POWER STRUCTURES

Like so many of our problems today the struggle in South Vietnam stems from the disruption of two World Wars. The Second World War completed a process begun by the first. It ripped apart a structure of power that had existed for 100 years. It set in train new forces and energies that have remade the map of the world. Not only did it weaken nations actively engaged in the fighting, but it had far-reaching secondary effects. It undermined the foundations of the colonial structures through which a handful of powers controlled one-third of the world's population. And the winds of change and progress that have blown fiercely during the last 20 years have toppled those structures almost completely.

Meanwhile, the Communist nations have exploited the turmoil of the time of transition in an effort to extend Communist control into other areas of the world.

CHECKING COMMUNIST AMBITIONS IN EUROPE

The United States first faced the menace of Communist ambition in Europe when one after another of the nations on the boundaries of the Soviet Union fell under the dominion of Moscow through the presence of the Red army.

To check this tidal wave the United States provided the Marshall plan to strengthen the nations of Western Europe and then moved to organize with those nations a collective security system through NATO.

As a result, the advance of Soviet Communist power was stopped and the Soviet Union gradually adjusted its policies to this situation.

But within a year after the establishment of NATO, the Communists took over China. This posed a new and serious threat, particularly to those weak new nations of the Far East that had been formed out of colonial empires. The problems in Asia were, of course, different from those in Europe. But the result was much the same—instability, uncertainty, and vulnerability to both the bully and the aggressor.

Western Europe, with its established governmental and traditional social institutions recovered quickly. But certain of the new nations of Asia—particularly those that had not known self-government for a century or more—continued to face a far more formidable problem which they still face.

KOREA—THE FIRST TEST IN ASIA

The first test in Asia came in Korea when the United Nations Forces—predominantly American—stopped the drive of Communist North Korea supported by material aid from the Soviet Union.

It stopped the Chinese Army that followed. It brought to a halt the Communist effort to push out the line that had been drawn and to establish Communist control over the Korean Peninsula.

We fought the Korean war—which like the struggle in Vietnam occurred in a remote area thousands of miles away—to sustain a principle vital to the freedom and security of America—the principle that the Communist world should not be permitted to expand by overrunning one after another of the arrangements built during and since the war to mark the outer limits of Communist expansion by force.

SECURITY TREATIES TO SETTLE ASIAN SITUATION

Before the Korean war had ended, the United States, under President Truman, moved to settle and consolidate the situation in the Pacific through a peace treaty with Japan and through bilateral security treaties with Japan and the Philippines, and through the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and New Zealand. Hardly had the Korean war been finished when France, which had been fighting a protracted struggle in Indochina, decided to relinquish its political presence in southeast Asia. After a brief negotiation it came to terms with the Communist forces that had captured the nationalist movement. The result was the division of Indochina into four parts: a Kingdom of Cambodia, a Kingdom of Laos, and Vietnam divided at the 17th parallel between the Communist forces in the North and a non-Communist Vietnamese Government in the South.

Recognizing that the Communists had not abandoned their ambitions, the U.S. Government under President Eisenhower, took steps to secure the situation by further alliances. Bilateral treaties were concluded with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Formosa. In the Middle East the so-called northern tier of countries lying to the south of the Soviet Union entered into the Baghdad pact which established what is now known as CENTO—the Central Treaty Organization.

The United States did not become a formal member of this alliance which is composed of Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. But we are closely associated with CENTO and have bilateral military assistance agreements with its regional members, concluded by the Eisenhower administration.

CREATION OF SEATO

In order to give support to the nations of southeast Asia, the United States took the lead in the creation of an alliance embodied in a treaty and reinforced by a collective security system known as SEATO—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. In this alliance, the United States joined with Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines to guarantee the security not only of the member nations but also to come to the aid of certain protocol states and territories if they are requested.

South Vietnam was included in this protocol. The United States had not been a party to the agreements made in Geneva in 1954, which France had concluded with the Communist Vietnamese forces known as the Vietminh. But the Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, stated under instructions that the United States would not disturb the agreements and—

would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the * * * agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

Under Secretary Smith's statement was only a unilateral declaration, but in joining SEATO the United States took a solemn treaty engagement of far-reaching effect. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides that—

each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack * * * would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

SEATO OBLIGATIONS

It is this fundamental SEATO obligation that has from the outset guided our actions in South Vietnam.

The language of this treaty is worth careful attention. The obligation it imposes is not only joint but several. That is not only collective but individual. The finding that an armed attack has occurred does not have to be made by a collective determination before the obligation of each member becomes operative. Nor does the treaty require a collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. If the United States determines that an armed attack has occurred against any nation to whom the protection of the treaty applies, then it is obligated "to act to meet the common danger" without regard to the views or actions of any other treaty member.

The far-reaching implications of this commitment were well understood by this committee when it recommended, with only the late Senator Langer dissenting, that the Senate consent to the ratification of the treaty. The committee's report states, in its conclusion, that—

The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards—

the committee's conclusions stated—

in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

Following this committee's recommendation, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1, the late Senator Langer voting against. All members of this distinguished committee who were then Senators voted for that treaty.

BILATERAL COMMITMENTS TO VIETNAM

Our multilateral engagement under the SEATO Treaty had been reinforced and amplified by a series of bilateral commitments and assurances directly to the Government of South Vietnam.

On October 1, 1954, President Eisenhower wrote to President Diem offering, and I quote—

to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means.

In 1957, President Eisenhower and President Diem issued a joint statement which called attention to—

the large buildup of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Vietnam—and stated, and I quote :

Noting that the Republic of Vietnam is covered by article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endangering peace and stability.

On August 2, 1961, President Kennedy declared that—

the United States is determined that the Republic of Vietnam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States can render.

On December 14, 1961, President Kennedy wrote to President Diem, recalling the U.S. declaration made at the end of the Geneva Conference in 1954. The President once again stated that the United States was "prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence." This commitment has been reaffirmed many times since.

VIETNAM A VICTIM OF AGGRESSION BY MEANS OF AN ARMED ATTACK

These then are the commitments we have taken to protect South Vietnam as a part of protecting our own peace and security. We have sent American forces to fight in the jungles of that beleaguered country because South Vietnam has, under the language of the SEATO Treaty, been the victim of aggression by means of armed attack.

There can be no serious question as to the existence and nature of this aggression. The war is clearly an armed attack, cynically and systematically mounted by the Hanoi regime against the people of South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese regime has sought deliberately to confuse the issue by seeking to make its aggression appear as an indigenous revolt. But we should not be deceived by this subterfuge. It is a familiar Communist practice. Impeded in their efforts to extend their power by the use of classical forms of force such as the invasion of Korea, the Communists have, over many years, developed an elaborate doctrine for so-called wars of national liberation to cloak their aggression in ambiguity.

A war of national liberation, in the Communist lexicon, depends on the tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion. It has a particular utility for them since it gives an advantage to a disciplined and ruthless minority, particularly in countries where the physical terrain makes clandestine infiltration from the outside relatively easy.

At the same time the Communists have a more subtle reason for favoring this type of aggression. It creates in any situation a sense of ambiguity that they can exploit to their own advantage.

NATURE OF CONFLICT IN VIETNAM

Yet, in spite of Communist efforts to confuse the issue, the nature of the conflict in South Vietnam is very clear.

Let me review briefly the facts.

With the benefit of hindsight no one can doubt that, in agreeing to the 1954 accords, the regime in Hanoi fully expected that within a relatively short period the South Vietnamese would fall under their control. The south seemed overburdened with troubles. Its formidable economic problems were complicated by the need to absorb almost 1 million North Vietnamese, who—having seen the true face of communism—fled south after the 1954 accords. The north moreover had concealed resources in the south. At the time of the accords in 1954, many Communists fighting with the Vietminh had been directed by the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi to stay in the south, to hide their arms, and to devote their efforts to undermining the South Vietnamese Government. These efforts of subversion were in the initial years quite unsuccessful. Much to the dismay of the Hanoi regime, South Vietnam made substantial progress in spite of the extraordinary problems it faced, while North Vietnam lagged far behind. As a consequence the Communist leaders in North Vietnam were forced to conclude that more active measures were necessary if the subversion of South Vietnam were to succeed.

During the 5 years following the Geneva Conference the Hanoi regime developed a secret political-military organization in South Vietnam based on the cadres who had been ordered to stay in the south. Many of the activities of this organization were directed toward the assassination of selected South Vietnamese civilians. More than 1,000 civilians were murdered or kidnaped from 1957 to 1959. In 1960 alone, terrorists assassinated 1,400 local government officials and kidnaped some 700 others, while armed guerrillas killed 2,200 military and security personnel.

In September 1960, the Lao Dong Party—the Communist Party in North Vietnam—held its third party congress in Hanoi. That congress called for the creation of a front organization to undertake the subversion of South Vietnam. Three months thereafter, the National Liberation Front was established to provide a political facade for the conduct of an active guerrilla war. Beginning in the late 1950's the Hanoi regime began to infiltrate into South Vietnam the disciplined adherents whom the party had ordered north at the time of the settlement. In the intervening period since 1954, these men had been trained in the arts of sabotage and subversion. Now they were ordered to conscript young men from the villages by force or persuasion and to form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built.

All of this was documented by the Legal Committee of the International Commission for Supervision and Control. That body, established to supervise the performance of the Vietnam cease-fire, is composed of Indian, Polish, and Canadian members. The Legal Committee, with Poland objecting, reported in 1962:

There is evidence to show that arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the north to the zone in the south with the objective of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, against the armed forces and administration of the zone in the south.

There is evidence that the PAVN (i.e., the North Vietnamese Army) has allowed the zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the south, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the south.

That is the end of the quotation.

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961, the North Vietnam regime infiltrated 10,000 men into the south. In 1962, 13,000 additional personnel were infiltrated. And by the end of 1964, North Vietnam may well have moved over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into South Vietnam.

But beginning over a year ago, the Communists apparently exhausted their reservoir of southerners who had gone north. Since then the greater number of men infiltrated into the south have been native-born North Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate elements of the North Vietnamese Regular Army in increasingly larger numbers. Today, there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in the South.

SYSTEMATIC AGGRESSION BY HANOI

I have reviewed these facts, Mr. Chairman, which are familiar enough to most of you, because it seems to me they demonstrate beyond question that the war in Vietnam is as much an act of outside aggression as though the Hanoi regime had sent an army across the 17th parallel rather than infiltrating armed forces by stealth. This point is important since it goes to the heart of our own involvement. Much of the confusion about the struggle in South Vietnam has arisen over a failure to understand this aspect of the conflict.

For if the war in South Vietnam were—as the Communists try to make it appear—merely an indigenous revolt, then the United States would not have its own combat troops in South Vietnam. But the evidence is overwhelming that it is, in fact, something quite different—a systematic aggression by Hanoi against the people of South Vietnam. It is one further effort by a Communist regime in one-half of a divided country to take over the people of the other half at the point of a gun and against their will.

Up to this point I have tried to describe the nature of our commitments in South Vietnam and why we have made them. I have sought to put those commitments within the framework of our larger effort to prevent the Communists from upsetting the arrangements which have been the basis for our security. These policies have sometimes been attacked as static and sterile. It has been argued that they do not take account of the vast changes which have occurred in the world and indeed are still in train.

MORE INVOLVED THAN DEFENSE OF THE STATUS QUO

These contentions seem to miss the point. The line of policy we are following involves far more than a defense of the status quo. It seeks rather to insure that degree of security which is necessary if change and progress are to take place through consent and not through coercion. Certainly—as has been frequently pointed out—the world of the midtwentieth century is not standing still. Movement is oc-

curing on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Communism today is no longer monolithic; it no longer wears one face but many, and the deep schism between the two great power centers of the Communist world—Moscow and Peiping—is clearly one of the major political facts of our time.

There has been substantial change and movement within the Soviet Union as well—and perhaps even more among the countries of Eastern Europe. These changes have not been inhibited because of our efforts to maintain our postwar arrangements by organizing the Western Alliance. They have taken place because of internal developments as well as because the Communist regime of Moscow has recognized that the Western Alliance cannot permit it to extend its dominion by force.

Over time the same process hopefully will work in the Far East. Peiping, and the Communist states living under its shadow, must learn that they cannot redraw the boundaries of the world by force.

What we are pursuing, therefore, is not a static concept.

BELIEF IN SOCIAL REVOLUTION

For unlike the Communists we really do believe in social revolution and not merely in power cloaked as revolution. We believe in constructive change and encourage it. That was the meaning of President Johnson's initiatives at the Honolulu Conference—to encourage the efforts of the South Vietnamese Government to transform the country in a way that will correct ancient injustices and bring about a better life for all the people.

LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

In meeting our commitments in South Vietnam we are using substantial military forces. At the same time, we are making it quite clear to North Vietnam and to the world that our forces are being employed for a limited and well-defined objective.

What we seek in South Vietnam is to bring about a restoration of the conditions contemplated by the accords of 1954. We seek, in other words, to restore the integrity of the settlement made between the French Government and the Communist forces under Ho Chi Minh—a settlement which was joined in by the United Kingdom, Communist China, the Soviet Union, Laos, and Cambodia. This settlement forms a part of the structure of arrangements that are the key to stability in the present-day world.

Unfortunately, the limited nature of our purpose is foreign to the philosophy of the Communist world.

It may be hard, therefore, for them to realize that the United States seeks no territorial aggrandizement in South Vietnam or anywhere in southeast Asia. We do not wish to maintain our troops in that area any longer than is necessary to secure the freedom of the South Vietnamese people. We want no permanent military bases, no trade advantages. We are not asking that the Government of South Vietnam ally itself with us or be in any way beholden to us. We wish only that the people of South Vietnam should have the right and opportunity to determine their future in freedom without coercion or threat from the outside.

EFFORTS AT A POLITICAL SOLUTION

For months now we have done everything possible to make clear to the regime in Hanoi that a political solution is the proper course. If that regime were prepared to call off the aggression in the south, peace would come in almost a matter of hours. When that occurred the people of North Vietnam could safely go about their business. For we do not seek to destroy the Hanoi regime or to force the people of North Vietnam to accept any other form of government. And—under conditions of peace—we would be quite prepared for the North Vietnamese people to share with the other peoples of southeast Asia in the economic and technical help that we and other nations are extending on a regional basis to that area.

This is the simple message that we have tried to convey to Hanoi through many channels. We have sought in every way to impress upon the Communist world the ease with which peace could be attained if only Hanoi were willing.

We have used every resource of diplomacy. I know of no occasion in history where so much effort has been devoted, not only on the part of the United States but of many other nations, in an effort to bring about a political solution to a costly and dangerous war. I know you and the members of this committee are generally familiar with the record.

But to this point the sounds from the other side have been harsh and negative. The regime in Hanoi has been unwilling to accept any of the possibilities open to it for discussion. All we have heard is the constant insistence that they will not negotiate unless we accept in advance their four points. Yet, the effect of those four points, as propounded by Hanoi, would be to give away the very purposes for which we are fighting and to deliver the people of South Vietnam against their will to the domination of a Communist regime.

To understand the situation realistically, we should not underestimate the harshness of the Communist side or overestimate the ease of a political solution.

From time to time we have heard it suggested that we should seek a Geneva Conference or enlist the good offices of the Conference Co-chairmen or take the problem to the United Nations or invite the mediation efforts of neutral nations.

Well, we have done all of these things, and in most cases we have done them repeatedly—with no result.

We have heard it suggested also, by governments and individuals on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that no peace was possible so long as American planes were flying bombing missions over North Vietnam, but that negotiations might be possible if the bombing were discontinued.

We did that also—not once but twice. The last pause, as this committee will recall, lasted more than 37 days. And again with no response.

Certainly, we shall do everything consistent with our national objectives to seek a solution through diplomacy. There is no doubt as to the elements for an honorable peace as we see it.

THE 14 POINTS

We have made them clear again and again. Most recently we have summarized them in the form of 14 points:

1. The Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U.S. bases in southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
11. The countries of southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option;
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least \$1 billion;
13. The President has said, "The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think," he said, "that would be an insurmountable problem."
14. We have said publicly and privately, and since this particular point was put through there were 37 days of action, that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

These 14 points are on the public record. Our Government has made quite clear what kind of peace we are prepared to accept—a peace that will guarantee the security of South Vietnam, a peace that will stop armed aggression in violation of international agreements and international law.

POSITION OF HANOI REGIME—THE FOUR POINTS

This is the position that we have made known to the other side both directly and through intermediaries. How does this compare with the position of the Hanoi regime?

Both Hanoi and Peiping have repeatedly rejected our proposal for unconditional discussions. They have insisted instead that before any discussions can take place our side must agree in advance to the four points of Hanoi's program. The words that they have used have

differed from formulation to formulation. Sometimes they have said their points are the "sole basis" for negotiations, sometimes "the most correct basis." But the effect is the same. What they are insisting upon is that we accept in advance their substantive position and then discuss only the ways in which it shall be given effect. The technique of demanding such substantive agreement in advance is a familiar Communist negotiating tactic. It does not mean that the basic points are open for discussion or that they can be loosely interpreted. It means just what it says.

We have subjected these four points to the most careful scrutiny. What do they reveal?

The first point calls for "recognition of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people: sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity." This point also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, dismantling of our military bases, and abolition of our military alliance with the Government of South Vietnam, "in strict conformity with the Geneva agreements."

The United States has made clear that we, too, are prepared to support a restoration of the provisions of the Geneva agreements and that we are prepared to withdraw our troops and dismantle military bases once there is compliance with the accords by all parties. We have said also that we would not expect or require a military alliance with a free South Vietnam.

The second point relates to the military clauses of the Geneva agreements, and these, too, we could agree to under the conditions I have indicated.

The fourth point provides that the issue of peaceful reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese people without foreign intervention. This also we could accept if it be clearly understood that conditions must first be created both in the North and South that will make it possible for truly free elections to be held.

CHARACTER OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

It is in the third point that the core of the Communist position is disclosed. That point provides that the internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front.

To understand the significance of this point, it is necessary not only to examine what is meant by the "program of the National Liberation Front" but to explore somewhat further the character of the front itself and the purposes it serves in the tactics of the North Vietnamese regime.

Let us turn first to the front itself. Both Hanoi and Peiping have made clear again and again—and they have been joined in this by other Communist powers—that negotiations will be possible only when the United States recognizes the National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people."

What are the implications of this proposal and why are the Communists urging it so insistently?

The evidence is overwhelming that the National Liberation Front is exactly what its name implies—a Communist front organization intended to give support to the deliberate fiction that the war in Vietnam is an indigenous revolt. The front is, as the facts make clear, an

invention of the Communist Party of North Vietnam, to serve as a political cloak for its activities in the South.

As I have noted earlier, the front was created by the North Vietnamese Communist Party—the Lao Dong Party—in 1960, soon after North Vietnam's military leader, General Giap, announced:

The north is the revolutionary base for the whole country.

The individuals proclaimed as leaders of the front are not personalities widely known to the Vietnamese people, either in the north or in the south. To suggest that they represent the aspirations of the Vietnamese people is absurd. The significant fact is that at no time has any single individual of political significance in South Vietnam adhered to the front or to its policies.

While some Vietnamese leaders and groups may differ among themselves on how the country is to be led, none of them differs on the fact that the front does not speak for them.

In 1961 Hanoi sought to strengthen the fiction of the front's indigenous origins by creating a seemingly independent Communist Party as the principal element of the front. It therefore established the People's Revolutionary Party. A secret Lao Dong circular dated December 7, 1961, advised party members that—

The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence. Actually our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam unified from north to south under the central executive committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho * * * during these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret—

they said:

especially in South Vietnam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose.

The People's Revolutionary Party has not concealed its role at the front. It has frankly stated that it is the dominant element. On February 15, 1961, the Vietcong committee for the south went even farther, stating that in time the Communist Party would "act overtly to lead the revolution in South Vietnam." In other words, the Communists have told their followers that, at the proper moment, they would emerge from cover and cast off the disguise of the National Liberation Front.

And so the Communists have a clear purpose in insisting that we recognize the National Liberation Front as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people. For them this is not a procedural question but a major question of substance. They insist on our recognition of the front as the sole spokesman for the people of South Vietnam since our acceptance of the front in that capacity would in effect mean our acceptance of the Communist position as to the indigenous nature of the conflict and thus our acceptance of a settlement on Hanoi's terms—which would mean delivering South Vietnam into the control of the Communist north.

U.S. POSITION ON NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

In spite of these clear realities, we have not asserted nor do we assert an unreasoning attitude with regard to the front. The President said in his state of the Union message, you will recall, that "we will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points,

or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group”—and that, of course, includes the front along with other groups.

To the extent then that the front has any validity as a representative of a group, the views of that group can be heard and the issue of the Liberation Front should, as the President has said, not prove “an insurmountable problem.”

It remains a problem only because Hanoi insists on using it to establish its own substantive position—that the front represents the hopes and aspirations of the South Vietnamese people—and hence should control them.

PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF)

The significance of this issue is clearly seen when one examines the so-called program of the National Liberation Front, as it was announced from Hanoi on January 29, 1961, and revised and amplified in a second publication on February 11 that same year. The first point of this program discloses the full Communist intention. It calls for the overthrow of the South Vietnamese Government in Saigon and the establishment of a coalition government from which the Government in Saigon would be totally excluded.

In other words the Hanoi regime is demanding the following preconditions to which the United States must agree before the Communists will even condescend to negotiate:

First, that the South Vietnamese Government be overthrown;

Second, that the Liberation Front, the creature and agent of Hanoi, be accepted as the sole bargaining representative for the South Vietnamese people;

Third, that South Vietnam be put under the control of a coalition government formed by the Communists and from which the South Vietnamese Government would be excluded.

SUMMARY OF U.S. POSITION

May I conclude, therefore, Mr. Chairman, with certain simple points which are at the heart of the problem and at the heart of U.S. policy in South Vietnam.

1. The elementary fact is that there is an aggression in the form of an armed attack by North Vietnam against South Vietnam.

2. The United States has commitments to assist South Vietnam to repel this aggression.

3. Our commitments to South Vietnam were not taken in isolation but are part of a systematic effort in the postwar period to assure a stable peace.

4. The issue in southeast Asia becomes worldwide because we must make clear that the United States keeps its word wherever it is pledged.

5. No nation is more interested in peace in southeast Asia or elsewhere than is the United States. If the armed attack against South Vietnam is brought to an end, peace can come very quickly. Every channel or forum for contact, discussion, or negotiation will remain active in order that no possibility for peace may be overlooked.

Mr. Chairman, you asked me to comment on certain questions. I would be glad to turn to those if you would be good enough to repeat them, sir.

GENERAL KY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NLF

The CHAIRMAN. One point I thought you might comment on is with regard to the announced attitude—I believe I have quotes, they were in the paper—of General Ky toward negotiating with the NLF. That was one question, you will recall.

How do you reconcile that with the statements you have made of our willingness to negotiate with them?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, that particular statement was made as a result of several attempts by a newsman to force him to a categorical answer to that question.

Now, at Honolulu, Prime Minister Ky was freshly aware of the fact that Ho Chi Minh, in a letter to the heads of Communist governments, declared that the recognition of the front as the sole representative of the people of South Vietnam was a prerequisite to any political solution.

Prime Minister Ky is leading a nation at war. All of his people are in the front line. The villagers, as well as the soldiers, the local officials, as well as high officials in Saigon, are subject to terror and intimidation or assassination.

He has the problem of war leadership among a people to whom he cannot promise the prospect of peace next week or next month, and so he felt, and I think we can understand it, that he could not indicate to his own people that he felt that there was a prospect for an early peace through negotiation on the basis of the experience that he and we had during this period of a "pause."

Now, what we ourselves have said on this has been discussed thoroughly with him and his Government. The President's offer of unconditional discussions back in April was discussed in advance with the South Vietnamese Government. I do not believe, myself, that this is a difference of substance if Hanoi shows it is capable of stopping its aggression and shows some interest in peace.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand that General Ky's attitude that he would under no circumstances negotiate with the National Liberation Front is not accepted by our Government?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have said what our view on that would be. But I think we ought to note that, although this is what Prime Minister Ky said when he was pressed on this exact same question six times, and he was trying to point out that the Liberation Front was misnamed, that it was not a Liberation Front but what he called an "Enslavement Front"—when he was pressed on it, he gave that categorical answer.

Now, the circumstances would be drastically changed if Hanoi indicated an interest in peace. I have no doubt that those circumstances would be reviewed by everybody concerned if they developed in that direction, and we could see where we go on that point.

HOW TO GET THE MATTER TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE?

The CHAIRMAN. How can you expect any development in any direction when we pursue or appear to have taken such an adamant attitude? I don't see how any development can come about.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Mr. Chairman, an adamant attitude has to do with one particular and specific and limited point. We are not

asking anything from Hanoi except to stop shooting their neighbors in Laos and South Vietnam. We are not asking them to give up an acre of territory. We are not asking them to surrender a single individual, nor to change their form of government.

All we are asking them to do is to stop sending armed men and arms, contrary to specific agreements and contrary to international law, into South Vietnam for the purpose of shooting somebody.

Now, I have seen in certain columns the remark that to ask them to stop shooting is to ask them to surrender unconditionally. We are not asking them to surrender a thing except their appetite to take over South Vietnam by force.

Now, on that I would suggest somebody had better be adamant. We have a series of alliances which have been—

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe I don't make myself clear. I don't wish to interrupt you.

Secretary RUSK. No, please.

The CHAIRMAN. But the purpose of some of us is to try to get this matter to a conference table.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, and that is our purpose, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. How do we go about it?

Secretary RUSK. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. We certainly haven't made much progress. How do we go about doing it if there is a sticking point about whether or not they should be admitted to the conference? Everything we have had in testimony is that the Vietcong constitute the major fighting force in South Vietnam. You recognize that, I think.

Secretary RUSK. The combined Vietcong-North Vietnam forces, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. A force, it is admitted by the Pentagon, of 236,000 troops. The only thing we are interested in is seeing if this can be brought to some kind of negotiating table. If this is a sticking point, the statement made by Mr. Ky—and the papers leave the impression that it was made with our approval—would seem to be one obstacle. It may not be the only one; I wouldn't minimize the difficulty of getting over this obstacle. And that is why I wished to get it clarified whether or not we have changed our position with regard to being willing to sit at a conference table with the representatives of the Vietcong.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. What the President said last July indicated that this problem of the Vietcong and its views should not present an insuperable obstacle.

The CHAIRMAN. Obstacle?

Secretary RUSK. For us to negotiate the details of that point, even here in this room, or with the press, or with other governments who have no capability of stopping the shooting, is somewhat beside the point.

If Hanoi would come to the conference table, that is the kind of thing that could be discussed, among other things.

Now, we see a double standard pretty widespread in the world which affects this problem of the effort being made to bring this matter to a political solution. The United States has exhausted almost every procedure, every idea. We have traveled all over the world. We

have tried to get the assistance of the 17 neutral nations, the Secretary General of the U.N., the British Commonwealth, the President of India, the President of Ghana. We have made unilateral declarations about discussions. We have had private contacts with Hanoi. In other words, what we have been saying is: "Why don't you come to the table and let's see if there is a basis for peace?"

And when they say: "No, not unless you recognize the Liberation Front as the sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people," we can't do that—that is what the shooting is all about.

The CHAIRMAN. I never had understood they said "sole" spokesman. Are you quite certain they have said that, if we have a negotiation, it will only be with representatives of the National Liberation Front? Is that your position?

Secretary RUSK. In the Ho Chi Minh letter to the leaders of Communist governments, they call for the recognition of the Vietcong as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people.

The CHAIRMAN. And they would talk with no one else at the conference table?

Secretary RUSK. These things have been explored in many ways through private channels and I can assure you we have had nothing else from the other side except that idea.

THE DE GAULLE LETTER

The CHAIRMAN. One of the other two points is if you could tell us about the de Gaulle letter. It was in the paper this morning. What can you tell us about it?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure. I think that dispatch was from Paris. I don't think that was—

The CHAIRMAN. I read it in the morning Post.

Secretary RUSK. I think that dispatch was from Paris. That tends to suggest it was not we, for a change, that did the leaking—if there was any leaking. That dispatch used some adjectives that I did not recognize in recognizing the communication. It would not be, I think, for me to disclose the specific contents of the communication, but the attitude of France in this situation is pretty well known. They think there ought to be a settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords. So do we. They think that these problems ought to be solved by political means. We certainly would prefer that. They do not believe that the time is ripe at the present time for such political discussions, or at least they do not see any particular steps which they themselves can take at this particular moment to bring this matter to the conference table.

But I did not find anything in the letter that justified this word "absurd" that I believe was used—

The CHAIRMAN. The paper uses the word if my memory serves me right. It says the war is leading nowhere and it says the war is absurd. The French are really the culprit in this—they were the colonial power at the time of our original involvement. We came in in response to their request that we support them in maintaining their colonial domination of this area. That is the origin of it.

You testified before that you were in the Department at the time this took place, isn't that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you know all about that. The French, if anyone, should be qualified to make some judgment about the character of these people. They had an intimate relationship with them, as their colonial masters, for about what—80 years, wasn't it? Seventy-five or eighty years.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is how the article reads:

Government circles in Washington—

Fontaine wrote—

can compare the friendly public text of (De Gaulle's) answer to Ho Chi Minh with that of his reply to Mr. Johnson.

Fontaine said De Gaulle apparently reproached Mr. Johnson—

not only for having ordered the resumption of the raids against the north, but also for persisting in an intervention from which there is nothing to be hoped, the Vietnamese alone being qualified to find a solution for their problem.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, that story is highly inaccurate.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to know.

Secretary RUSK. It is not my privilege to prove my statement by putting President de Gaulle's letter in the public record here. It simply does not bear, that story does not bear, any resemblance to the letter that I have seen.

The CHAIRMAN. In the last paragraph it says:

To an American visitor, De Gaulle confided, in substance, a short time ago: "My analysis is different from that of your leaders. This war is absurd. It is leading to nothing. But I know the responsibilities of anyone at the head of a great state. I can imagine and I can understand President Johnson's problems of conscience."

All I wanted to know is it inaccurate and untrue.

Secretary RUSK. It is inaccurate and untrue, Mr. Chairman.

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY'S AID ANNOUNCEMENTS TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to know whether or not it was true.

What about Vice President Humphrey, who is traveling to a number of countries? The paper this morning says that he has authorized a loan, I believe of \$100 million—I am not sure whether it is a grant or a loan—to India. This seems to me rather out of normal channels for such actions. It is not the usual responsibility of the President of the Senate—the Vice President of the United States—to go about making such commitments. Would you explain that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Mr. Chairman, the two loans to India and Pakistan, which were announced on the occasion of the Vice President's visit, were development loan fund allotments made from the funds provided for this fiscal year.

As you know, certain activities in the economic assistance field began to mark time at the time of the India-Pakistan fighting. Since then there has been the Tashkent agreement between those two countries, and the steps taken by the two to carry out in important ways that Tashkent agreement.

We have been in touch with both India and Pakistan, and the negotiations on these particular loans will continue in the usual chan-

nels. They are loans aimed primarily at facilitating the import of certain spare parts and other goods to get the industrial sector of the economies going full speed again.

The Vice President did not undertake these negotiations, and would not do that. The release of these funds was announced while he was there.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any conditions that are not public with regard to these loans?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. The loans are of the type with which your committee is fully familiar under the development loan program.

EFFECT OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF AID PROGRAM COMPONENT FOR VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. In your last appearance before this committee, Mr. Secretary, you said that one of the components in the commitment to Vietnam was approval by Congress each year of the AID program. You repeated this in a speech in Las Vegas on Wednesday. We have, of course, before us the supplemental request for authorization.

Do you consider that we are making similar commitments to all 53 countries to which we provide military aid?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I do not. The commitments, as far as Vietnam is concerned, center on the SEATO Treaty, which I discussed in my opening statement.

The CHAIRMAN. You did state that though, with regard to the AID program.

Secretary RUSK. No, but the commitment was there when President Eisenhower began, in 1954 and 1955, to provide assistance to South Vietnam, to assist it in building a viable state secure from internal subversion or outside aggression.

Now, that bilateral aid was in reinforcements of the purposes of the SEATO Treaty, and the general attitude of the country and of the Government has been consistent throughout this period. The most recent formal affirmation of that same policy was, of course, the resolution of the Congress of August 1964. And I would think that the economic and military assistance which we have given to South Vietnam over the years has been consistent with the purposes stated both in the preamble of that resolution and in the resolution itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, in case I do not approve of the policies being followed in Vietnam, I am forced to vote against this authorization, if I accept that as a proper interpretation, wouldn't I? I don't wish to do that.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, you and others would want to consider very seriously the declaration of policy which the Congress itself, by a vote of 504 to 2, made in August 1964. Section II of that resolution says:

That the United States regards as vital to its national interests and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

And that declaration stated that—

the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Now, that declaration of policy passed in 1964 is entirely consistent with the Southeast Asia Treaty on the same subject, which was passed, was ratified, by an overwhelming vote in the Senate in 1955. The policy lines are very simple, and they have been repeatedly reaffirmed by Presidents and by the Congress. So I would hope that you would take into full account the continuity of policy, and the problem of turning aside from that policy under present conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I wish these things appeared as simple to me as they do to you. I am sure it is due to my own obtuseness but we will pursue this later.

The Senator from Alabama?

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, first I want to commend you for a very fine statement you have made. I think it is the clearest statement I have seen made during the whole course of the discussion of this Vietnam situation.

I think it is good for the American people to have this statement. By the way, do you believe that these hearings have a useful purpose to serve in acquainting the American people with the facts?

Secretary RUSK. I am always glad to be with this committee. I have met with it frequently, and I think that this discussion can clarify a good many issues here.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think you have done that this morning by your statement.

NATURE OF THE VIETCONG

You have made certain specific points that I want to emphasize. One is the nature of the Vietcong. I think you have given us the fullest explanation we have had yet of the connection of the Vietcong with North Vietnam, and the direction under which they are operating. We are hearing more and more about this being simply civil war, and that we have been intervening in it. It clearly is not a civil war, is it?

Secretary RUSK. It certainly is not, Senator; and may I say that, had it not been for the infiltration of large numbers of men and large quantities of arms from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, I do not believe that there would be any American combat forces in South Vietnam today.

Senator SPARKMAN. The buildup has been rather constant and consistent, hasn't it?

Secretary RUSK. Beginning with the several thousand hard core trained agents left behind rather than regrouped to the North as the agreements called for in 1954.

GETTING THE MATTER TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE

Senator SPARKMAN. I think you also have certainly emphasized and elaborated on the willingness of our country to negotiate.

We hear a great many people talking about this matter—saying we ought to negotiate; we ought to settle this thing; we ought to get to the conference table. Haven't we tried just about every way that you can think of to get to that conference table?

Secretary RUSK. We have, Senator.

We are continuing to try. None of the channels has been closed. Other governments as well as we are continually active in this. The members of the Security Council are now consulting on what might be done in this direction.

The problem of negotiation probably turns on a very key point: and that is whether or not Hanoi is prepared to draw back from its desire to take over South Vietnam by force.

Now, if it decides that it is prepared to draw back it might do so either in fact, simply stop doing what it is doing, or come to a conference table. But I see relatively little chance that they are going to come to the conference table until they do decide that they will draw back from trying to take over South Vietnam by force.

REFERENCE OF PROBLEM TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. We hear from time to time that this matter ought to be referred to the United Nations. Have we tried that channel?

Secretary RUSK. The matter is before the United Nations at the present time.

Senator SPARKMAN. It was there once before, too, wasn't it?

Secretary RUSK. There have been a number of other occasions in which the question was before the U.N. In May 1954 the Soviet Union vetoed a Thailand resolution in the Security Council which requested the Peace Observation Commission to investigate the threat posed to the Governments of Laos and Cambodia by the presence of Vietminh troops in those countries.

This came again before the Security Council in September 1959. The Security Council dispatched an investigating mission, but the Security Council took no further action.

At the 18th Assembly in 1963 Afro-Asian members requested a similar consideration of violations of human rights in South Vietnam. Now, that was investigated. That was investigated because our friends and our people cooperate when this sort of a thing comes about.

Cambodia complained to the Security Council in May 1964, but the Security Council took no action when Cambodia rejected the report.

In August 1964, we ourselves took it to the Security Council, and, at that time, you will recall that the Soviet representative moved that representatives of Hanoi, as well as of Saigon, be invited to come to the table. We supported that invitation, Hanoi refused to come.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was Communist China invited, too, under the Russian proposal?

Secretary RUSK. I don't think they were, sir. I don't think they were.

Then, in February 1965, we reported to the Security Council with respect to the air attacks that were launched in that month on North Vietnam.

Then again, on February 27 of last year, we transmitted our white paper for all members of the United Nations.

On April 7, the President at Baltimore invited the Secretary General to coordinate regional economic and social development programs in southeast Asia, and we transmitted the text of that address.

Throughout the summer of 1965 we tried to engage the interests of U.N. members collectively and individually to find ways to restore

peace and to bring the situation from the battlefield to the conference table.

On January 4 of this year Ambassador Goldberg again put the matter to the Security Council, and gave them a summary of the peace offensive. And it is there now in an effort to find out whether the Security Council can be of some assistance in moving this away from violence to negotiation and discussion.

RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

Senator SPARKMAN. It has also been suggested that the Geneva Conference be reconvened.

Secretary RUSK. That suggestion has been made many times, chiefly from our side. The other side has been unwilling to come to such a conference. We have indicated—it was one of our 14 points—that we would welcome a conference on southeast Asia or any part of it, and we thought some 9 months ago there was a slight nibble in this direction on the other side. Hanoi sent a delegation to Moscow and, in their joint communique, they seemed to refer with approval to the possibility of a conference on Cambodia and then, perhaps, on Laos. We were ready for such a conference. But something happened to that after that meeting broke up in Moscow. Perhaps Peiping moved to interrupt it—but those conferences were not held.

We would be glad to see a conference on Vietnam or on Laos or on Cambodia, or all three together.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you know of any other channel that you can follow for bringing about a negotiation or a conference?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, let me say very simply that the problem here is not that of technique or channel or contact or the ability to be in touch with the other side. The problem is that, with contact, we see no basis for peace because the other side apparently is not prepared to hold its hand from its attempt to take over in South Vietnam by force.

OBSTACLE TO NEGOTIATIONS—HANOI'S APPETITE

The problem is not contact or procedure. The problem is substance. The problem is the appetite of Hanoi.

Senator SPARKMAN. And that appetite is to devour South Vietnam so far as the Ky government is concerned?

Secretary RUSK. We have heard nothing that suggests anything else, and the actions being taken by Hanoi indicate that they are still persisting with their effort to take over South Vietnam by force.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is our support of South Vietnam both military and economic in accord, as you see it, with the spirit of the Geneva Conference, which more or less set up the guardianship of the Indochina states?

Secretary RUSK. The attempt by one part of Vietnam to take over the other part by sending armed men and arms across the demarcation line is a major and elementary infraction of those Geneva accords.

Now, we could go back from the first day of those accords to look at the chain of circumstances—about who did what that was not in compliance with those accords. But the principal thing is that we

believe those accords do provide an adequate basis for peace in southeast Asia, that we are prepared to come to the conference table and talk about that proposition, and the other side is not.

Now, there is a long history of charge and countercharge about those accords. We say they are an adequate basis for peace, that where there are differences they should be settled at the conference table through discussion and not on the battleground.

Now, this is the way we had better handle most of these problems around the world if we are not going to have great violence. If there is argument about an agreement of that sort, come to the conference table and talk about it, and do not simply go out and try to settle it by force.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Secretary Rusk, I think the testimony which you have given here today in your prepared paper, while admittedly somewhat lengthy, is a most comprehensive and informative review of the circumstances involved in the situation in which we find ourselves today.

If I have any criticism of your paper, I would say that I had hoped that you might discuss a little more extensively the domino theory—the effect of our defeat in South Vietnam or our complete abandonment of South Vietnam on the other nations and areas in that part of the world.

I will ask you a question about that a little later.

Secretary RUSK. All right.

VIOLATION OF GENEVA ACCORDS BEGINNING IN 1954

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But with regard to peace and the establishment of peace, is it fair for me to assume from all the evidence we have heard—the testimony that we have heard—that, in effect, the Geneva accords of 1954 were violated practically from their inception through the subversive activities increasing all the time by the North Vietnamese—subversion and the furnishing of supplies to the so-called Vietcong from the north?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator. I think in point of time the first serious violation was the failure of the Communist side to regroup to the north, as the expression then was, all of their elements that were supposed to regroup.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think you pointed that out in your testimony.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. They left behind several thousand of them in the south.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I gather the impression from your testimony that the failure of the North Vietnamese to regroup, to withdraw their forces, and to make any attempt whatsoever to carry out the spirit of the Geneva Accords, made it practically impossible to implement the 1954 accord, because of the presence of their armed forces and the secret cadres.

Secretary RUSK. That was a major part of the problem, Senator. I think there has been a good deal of evidence since then that at that

time the authorities who are now in Hanoi were extremely reluctant to sign the agreement. They did so, however, apparently in prospect of their being able to accomplish their real purpose, which was to have the entire country—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That began to unfold shortly after the accords were signed.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do I understand that you are saying to us that the Vietcong in South Vietnam are sustained and bolstered and encouraged and prodded, if you please, by not only logistical help from the north but also military directional help—in fact, by strong units of the North Vietnamese Army, so that the Vietcong in South Vietnam really are completely dependent upon North Vietnam for continuing this struggle.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

HANOI'S ROLE IN CONFLICT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, if we get down to the point of a conference—if we and the South Vietnamese did have a conference with the Vietcong, whatever they are in South Vietnam—would any agreement with the guerrilla fighters be worth anything at all? In fact, would it not be completely unreliable unless Hanoi were one of the sustaining parties to that agreement on a reliable basis?

In other words, the Vietcong might agree to something; but if Hanoi did not agree, while there might be a temporary lull, Hanoi probably would return to the fray with increased vigor in a very short time; is there anything to that theory?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this is a very important point, because we have said privately to a good many governments that, as far as the United States is concerned, the key issue of peace is with Hanoi.

I said this morning that, had that infiltration of men and arms not occurred, we would not have had combat forces in South Vietnam. So, as far as the United States is concerned, Hanoi is the problem.

Now, unless Hanoi stops doing what it is doing by way of launching an armed attack against the south, then we have not solved our problem. If they do stop, then I think these other problems will fall into place very quickly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But it should go beyond a mere stopping temporarily, should it not?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The settlement would have to be based upon a realization by Hanoi that its adventures are unprofitable and, in fact, disastrous to them if they continue them.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

And, Senator, I would hope—I do not want to emphasize this point because I undoubtedly will be charged, in some quarters, with raising a new precondition of some sort for discussion—I would hope that the assurances which would come out of any such agreement would be far stronger than those that we had in Laos, for example, where we had categorical agreements that were not worth anything because they were never complied with by the other side, and the machinery that was supposed to provide the assurance was not permitted to operate.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

THE DOMINO THEORY

Now, before my time expires, could you give us a short outline of the possible nature of the expansion of communism in southeast Asia if the United States should abandon South Vietnam by getting out. I do not think we are going to, but then that is a hypothetical. But if we should leave South Vietnam to its own devices, its own fate, without our presence and assistance, could you give us an outline as to what we might reasonably expect from wars of liberation in other areas—the increased subversion, the expansion of Communist power into other countries—and the encouragement or discouragement that they would have from our action?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, this problem has sometimes been referred to as the domino theory. I myself have not used that expression and feel that it is somewhat misleading, because we are not dealing here with little blocks of wood with dots on them.

The theory is the theory of a militant world revolution put forward by Peiping and by Hanoi, and by other elements in the Communist world. That is the theory. You do not have to go to dominoes. They have proclaimed it, they have proclaimed it.

Now, how does it work in action? When Vietnam was divided in 1954, and North Vietnam was organized as a Communist country, immediately infiltration of men and arms and subversion and pressures started against their two closest neighbors, Laos, South Vietnam.

Now, they have refused to give Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia—Hanoi has refused to give Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia a solid commitment with respect to the territorial integrity of Cambodia. They have announced that Thailand is next on the program. This past year they announced the formation of a Thailand liberation front, and agents are already stepping up activities in northeast Thailand.

Now, one does not have to speculate just in theory about whether dominoes have to fall or they fall in both directions and that sort of thing.

The reality is Peiping saying with a harshness that has caused great problems even within the Communist world that they must get on with their world revolution, and by militant means.

Now, when Chen Yi gets to the continent of Africa and announces that Africa is ripe for revolution, the African leaders understood that he was not talking about decolonialization. He was talking about knocking over most of the present governments of Africa; and two or three of them expelled some Chinese Communists this past year because of some of their activities. So we have here a difference within the Communist world, perhaps.

On the subject of the militancy with which they press the Communist world revolution and the real meaning of what, in the western part of the Communist world they call peaceful coexistence, I have no doubt myself, sir, that these primitive Marxists, the veterans of the long march in Peiping, have a very militant view of these matters, and that, if they convince themselves that their view is the successful view, we are in for great dangers in the future.

If they can discover that their militancy has no future, and they must reconsider, it may be then that they would turn more toward what some people call peaceful coexistence.

Now, I have had a very distinguished representative of the Communist world tell me that the No. 1 problem in the world today is turning Peiping toward peaceful coexistence.

Now, if I had said that, I suppose I would have been accused of capitalist propaganda. But there is a very serious problem here, and what happens here in southeast Asia is not only important in terms of what the peoples of southeast Asia will have for a future: it is of the greatest possible importance in terms of the decisions made in Peiping about the future course of their policy. So that is one side of it.

Now, looking at it from our own point of view, because of pressures applied at various parts of the world since 1945, we ourselves have engaged in a series of alliances. None of these alliances were made in the abstract or because someone had a theoretical desire to encircle somebody. They were made in direct response to pressures.

Now, the effect of these alliances has been stabilizing on the whole. Once in awhile you will get a particular pressure at a particular point. I am very much concerned, Senator Hickenlooper, that if we as a nation decide that one of our alliances is not very important, this will have a fundamental effect upon the strength and the solidarity and the usefulness of other alliances.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thank you.

My time is up.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am finished at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I am always glad when opposing counsel files his pleadings because that draws the issues very clearly and now we have the pleadings filed on both sides.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS

Senator MORSE. You speak about the need for political settlement in southeast Asia. I agree with you. Unless we have a political settlement in southeast Asia, I would hope along the format of our institutions of international law, there is also going to have to be a political settlement in the United States. I think that is the issue that you are helping draw this morning. In my opinion now, the American people are going to have to decide this issue, and we will take the case to them.

DISAGREEMENT WITH CONCLUSIONS

You rely heavily upon the SEATO Treaty this morning, as did Under Secretary Ball in his Northwestern University speech some time ago.

I only want to say that I completely disagree with the conclusions you have reached in regard to the SEATO Treaty. I do not think that we can possibly justify our course of action on the very terms of the SEATO Treaty. And I shall answer your position point by point in a major speech that I shall give early next week in the Senate.

EXTENT OF UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

Some of the top international lawyers of this country take quite the opposite point of view, as international lawyers on your side take the position that you take. I think we are going to have to draw that issue, too.

Mr. Secretary, with reference to your answer to Senator Sparkman's questions about the course of action that we have followed in the United Nations, is it not true that when we took an issue, back in 1964 I believe it was, to the United Nations, we circumscribed the presentation on the basis of the alleged violations of our rights in the Tonkin Bay incident?

Secretary RUSK. That was the immediate issue on which the matter was taken to the Security Council, but we were prepared for a full discussion of the entire problem.

Senator MORSE. We may have been prepared for it. But did we file an official resolution at any time before the United Nations—prior to the resolution now pending before the Security Council, the one that raised the issue of the threat to the peace of the world in southeast Asia—to be taken under Security Council jurisdiction?

Secretary RUSK. We have invited them on repeated occasions to consider what they could do on that, Senator. As you know, we have had considerable discussion of this matter over the years, and the presence of a Soviet veto in the Security Council, the role of the Soviet Union as a cochairman of the Geneva Conference, and the hopes that expectations of members of the Security Council that somehow procedures could be worked out for convening a conference on this matter, has tended to limit the frontal confrontation of this issue by the Security Council.

Senator MORSE. As you know, Mr. Secretary, you and I have had friendly discussions of this matter from time to time. We have disagreed as to what our procedure and course of action should be, and you have told us for quite some time about the veto point you have now made.

But it has been the position of the senior Senator from Oregon that we have had an obligation under the charter to file a formal resolution before the Security Council calling for a Security Council takeover of this threat to the peace in southeast Asia. I know of no resolution that we have filed that has met that obligation save the last resolution that we filed. These conversations of which you speak are, after all, conversations and are not carrying out what I think is our clear pledge under the charter.

I am hoping that we can get consideration in the Security Council, but if we can't—as I have said to you many times, and in hearings before this committee—then we ought to proceed under the form of procedure of the rest of the charter for an extraordinary session of the General Assembly. I think our only hope is to try to get this controversy under the canopy of the United Nations for action, and then, as you point out this morning, show our willingness to engage in a reconvening of the Geneva Conference. That represents another point

of view in regard to this matter. I say most respectfully—and I am very kind as far as my motivations are concerned—until our recent steps I do not think we have ever fulfilled what has been our clear obligation to test this matter in the United Nations.

I don't think it is too late. There are those who are pessimists who think that we can't succeed now because we have waited too long. I don't think you can ever wait too long if you want to demonstrate to the world that we want a peaceful solution. I want to say that I hope we press for the debate in the Security Council, and if we can't get it, that we press for action in the General Assembly.

RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON SEATO AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

But, Mr. Secretary, although it has been mentioned before, this great emphasis of recent date on SEATO interests me, because for a long time we were talking about the commitments of past Presidents. President Johnson only a few months ago was laying great emphasis on the President Eisenhower letter to Diem.

Subsequently, President Eisenhower—I have the paper here that purports to report his comments and I think accurately—pointed out that his agreement or commitment with Diem was for economic aid and not military aid.

Is that your understanding?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the commitments that were made bilaterally in terms of the assistance at that time were indeed in terms of economic and military aid.

Senator MORSE. And military, too?

Secretary RUSK. I beg your pardon.

Senator MORSE. Did you say—

Secretary RUSK. And military assistance—you know, the ordinary military assistance type of program, with training and arms and things of that sort.

The commitment of the treaty existed at that time. But the problem then was not: What steps are necessary to give effect to the treaty if the treaty itself is brought into play by the action of the other side? Back in 1955-56, along in there, I think that it would not have been the view that North Vietnam was at that point engaging in an armed attack against South Vietnam.

Now, that armed attack is in process at the present time. So I think that the measures to be taken with respect to a policy will vary as the circumstances vary—and specifically will vary with the steps taken by the other side to upset such arrangements as the 1954 agreements or to challenge the SEATO Treaty.

Senator MORSE. Would you agree, then—unless he is inaccurately reported—that President Eisenhower was mistaken if he voiced the point of view that this alleged commitment to Diem did not involve commitment of military forces?

Secretary RUSK. I think his bilateral commitments to President Diem were of the sort that he described. But I am pointing out that in the background and in the contingency of such things as an armed attack, the treaty which he recommended to the Senate and which the Senate approved by a vote of 82 to 1 did contain a commitment with respect to an armed attack.

SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION

Senator MORSE. Do you think, Mr. Secretary, speaking about the Tonkin Bay resolution, that the vote would have been the same if my colleagues in the Senate had contemplated that it might lead to 200,000 or 400,000 or 600,000 American troops in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Well, that is a matter that I, myself, cannot speculate on.

My impression, from consulting and being present in the consultations with the leadership and in discussing this matter with committees of the Congress, was that the Congress felt, as it stated in that resolution, that "The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of peace and security in southeast Asia," and, as stated in the SEATO Treaty, that an armed attack here, "would endanger its own peace and safety," our own peace and safety.

Now, those were not passing views. Those have been matters of discussion over the years. And so I would doubt very much, Senator—although this is something for the Congress to decide, I doubt very much—that the vote would be substantially different.

Senator MORSE. We will give him a chance next week to find out.

Secretary RUSK. All right.

Senator MORSE. Because don't forget that that resolution also contains a rescission clause. I think the American people are entitled to have a vote on the rescission resolution. I intend to offer it as an amendment to the pending business in the Senate. Even a vote to lay it on the table will be a vote on its rescission.

Secretary RUSK. Yes; it is quite true that that resolution can be changed by a concurrent resolution which does not call for the President's signature and does not involve a possible Presidential veto.

PLANS FOR POSSIBLE ESCALATION

Senator MORSE. I think the people are entitled to that vote. I am disturbed with respect to the pending bill, Mr. Secretary, by the testimony of Secretary McNamara a few days ago before the Armed Services Committee, and I quote:

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, are there any plans to escalate and step up the offensive in Vietnam?

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, there are preparations being made, and they are reflected in this fiscal 1966 supplement, for substantially increasing our deployments to South Vietnam and raising the rate of activity of our air units there. Whether or not we will carry out such higher rates of activity and actually deploy all of those additional forces is a decision that only the President can make, and no such decision has been made. His instruction to us is to be prepared to meet such higher deployments and such higher rates of activity, should the need for them arise.

Senator SMITH. If there aren't any ammunition shortages in the Vietnam fighting and if there aren't any plans to escalate and step up the fighting in Vietnam, then why have you recently opened a half dozen of more ammunition plants directed to start operations on increased ammunitions?

Secretary McNAMARA. To be prepared to support higher deployments and higher rates of activities. We have laid out over the period of the next 18 months—through June 1967—possible levels of deployment, and possible rates of activity which are higher than present levels of deployment and rates of activity, and in order to be prepared to support them we are requesting funds to procure the ammunition for such higher deployments and higher rates of activities.

Certain other testimony of the Secretary was eliminated for security reasons and should have been, but nevertheless that concerns me. And it concerns me in regard to the pending business, Mr. Secretary. If you vote for this, you are voting for a pig in the poke, in my judgment, as far as our plans for future escalation is concerned. Maybe, as the chairman brought out yesterday, there are plans for 400,000 to 600,000 men.

All I am saying is the American people are entitled to know that before we vote. For they and their boys are the ones who are going to do the dying. And so I do not accept the position of the chairman of this committee that, if you vote for this, you are not in any way voting upon the policy issue that is involved here; to wit, are we going to continue and continue to escalate this war if the North Vietnamese and the others follow their course of action? That is what we have to get behind us. That is what the political issue is.

IS VOTE FOR FUNDS A VOTE FOR ESCALATION?

I want to ask you, if I vote for this bill—and I don't intend at the present time to vote for it, because it does involve an approval of the policy of this administration in South Vietnam, and I think that that policy must be repudiated—but if I were to vote for it, would I not be voting really for whatever program of escalation is included—as I interpret Secretary McNamara—for the future of this war through the funds that are provided for therein?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, may I make two comments on your question?

First, on this matter of escalation: This has been discussed recently as though escalation is a policy of the United States, and depends upon decisions made by the United States. Now, there wouldn't be a single American combat soldier in South Vietnam had Hanoi not launched this aggression against South Vietnam. We don't want any more troops than are required to do what is necessary to carry out the Southeast Asia Treaty, and to give effect to what the Congress called, in its August 1964 resolution, "to prevent further aggression."

Now, unless someone can tell us exactly what the other side is going to do, it is not possible for us to say at a given moment whether there will be more or fewer or what the situation will be as far as men are concerned.

Now, I would suppose, Senator, that a vote for this appropriation would be voting for a support of policy to resist, to prevent, aggression in southeast Asia. That policy was declared as recently as August 1964 by 504 Members of the Congress, you, sir, dissenting, and it was made clear in the Southeast Asia Treaty. So that is the policy.

I am sure you understand me, sir, when I say that that is the law of the land as far as the Secretary of State is concerned. The President is carrying out the most formally stated and declared policy of the United States, involving both the executive and the legislative branches of the Government.

Senator MORSE. If you will permit this one comment.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. I think you have stated your position with complete accuracy. That is your position and your duty. We have, fortunately,

in a democracy the right to dissent, to disagree, and to change an administration policy if the majority will go along. As I interpret your remarks, not only are we going to continue this policy, but a vote on this pending piece of business in the Senate really is a vote as to whether or not we are going to continue to support this program, because the only check, one of the best checks we have, is to say we are not going to finance it. If the President can't get the finances, then he has to change his policy. And that is why at the present I intend to vote against the pending business.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

HANOI'S CONTROL OVER VIETCONG POLICY

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, in your colloquy with the chairman a short time ago, I understood you to say that if North Vietnam would stop the aggression in the south it would smooth the way toward peace in southeast Asia. That, in effect, is what you said; isn't it?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. Is there any doubt in your mind that North Vietnam can stop the aggression in South Vietnam if they so desire?

Secretary RUSK. I believe, sir, that Hanoi has some independence to stop sending men and arms into South Vietnam if they chose to do so, and that the practical problems that anyone else would face in forcing them to continue against their will would be very great.

Now, I think that Hanoi could stop if they decided to do so, although there is great influence there on the part of Peiping.

Senator AIKEN. You think that they are the guiding force as far as the Vietcong are concerned?

Secretary RUSK. I think they play the decisive role in that respect; yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. But if they were unable to stop the aggression in South Vietnam, then your position that it is an external war would be considerably weakened; would it not?

Secretary RUSK. You mean if they could not themselves stop the Vietcong?

Senator AIKEN. If they were unable to stop the Vietcong.

Secretary RUSK. Well, if all those that are clearly under the discipline of Hanoi were to go home, and no more were to come down there, and if all of the supplies from Hanoi were to dry up, and if all of the directions given to operations and all of the propaganda were to stop, then I think that the problem in the south would be quite a different problem than it is now. I think the guerrilla war would become quite a different problem in scale and character, and I think the result would be—

Senator AIKEN. Probably the situation would be greatly changed?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. I think we are all aware of that.

ARE THERE CIVIL WAR ASPECTS TO CONFLICT?

However, according to the Department of Defense statistics, there have been a total of 63,300 infiltrators from North Vietnam since 1960, and during that period, again according to the Department

of Defense we have killed 112,000 Vietcong. The year-end strength of the Vietcong was 225,000 excluding the North Vietnamese troops. It makes a total of 337,000 Vietcong including those killed in action.

If you subtract from that the total of 63,300 infiltrators from the north, that still leaves 273,000 Vietcong recruited and trained in the south, according to the Department of Defense statements.

Does this indicate that there are civil war aspects to this struggle, and that the appeal of the Vietcong to his fellow countrymen in South Vietnam is quite strong?

Secretary RUSK. There are elements of civil war in this situation, but the heart of the problem of peace is the external aggression.

On the matter of the extent of Vietcong influence among the South Vietnamese, we could debate that or listen to other people debate it at some length. The north claims that the Vietcong are the sole spokesmen and ought to be treated as such. We can't find any significant political leader or significant groups in South Vietnam, outside the ranks that you have just described, who want the Vietcong's answer.

But in any event, Senator, we are prepared to see that matter tested at the polls in a free election. We are prepared to let the people of South Vietnam make that judgment.

Now, the Liberation Front is not and Hanoi is not. They say: "We have got to have another government. We have got ourselves to be in charge here before there are any elections."

They are asking an international conference presumably to impose the Liberation Front upon the people of South Vietnam in some sort of combination. So, whatever the speculation might be—and all our evidence is that the Vietnamese people as a whole simply do not want the Liberation Front—we are prepared to have that matter tested at the polls, and the other side is not.

Senator AIKEN. But do you think there were elements of internal rebellion present before the Communists moved in; or did the Communists move in first and organize the elements of rebellion?

Secretary RUSK. Well, at the time of the split between North and South Vietnam, it was agreed that there would be a regroupment of the two sides. The Communist elements were supposed to go north and, as you know, 1 million northerners came south to get away from what was to come in the north.

Several thousands of those who were supposed to be regrouped to the north stayed behind.

Now, I can't say, Senator, those were the only group that resisted at one time or another the Government of the day. Certain of the sects were in rebellion for the time, but they worked out a certain modus vivendi. And there are times when a Montagnard group will be disturbed. But the great problem of international peace is the infiltration. The great problem of internal peace is this resulting fight, and the great obstacle to a constitutional choice on the part of the South Vietnamese is the violence that is going on there for which the north must take the heaviest responsibility.

Senator AIKEN. But there were some justifications, perhaps, for discontent in the south before the cruelties began?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, I think that there were reasons for discontent in the south, and many, many reasons for discontent in the north.

At about that same time—and this bears upon the problem of elections—General Giap made a speech October 1956; and this is about the period that we are talking about now, Senator.

He said:

We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front and seeing enemies everywhere resorted to terror which became far too widespread.

This is the Hanoi commander.

Whilst carrying out our land reform program we failed to respect the principles of freedom of faith and worship in many areas. In regions inhabited by minority tribes we have attacked tribal chiefs too strongly, thus injuring instead of respecting local customs and manners. When reorganizing the party, we paid too much importance to the notion of social class instead of adhering firmly to political qualifications alone. Instead of recognizing education to be the first essential, we resorted exclusively to organizational measures such as disciplinary punishments, expulsion from the party, executions, dissolution of party branches and cells.

Worse still—

He concluded—

torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganization.

So that throughout the country, there was a residue of violence and turmoil, and then you had that system in the north that imposed terror in the fashion that General Giap discussed.

VIETNAM AS PART OF WORLDWIDE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION

Senator AIKEN. I think there is no question that terrorism did exist and that Hanoi gave it as much encouragement as it could. But do you regard the Vietnam struggle now going on as a complete war by itself, or is it part of a worldwide war between communism and the foes of communism?

Secretary RUSK. I think it is a part of a Communist doctrine of world revolution. That does not mean that every Communist state participates in the same way in that world revolution, or, in the case of certain ones, say like Yugoslavia, that would even support it. But here we have at least a group of countries in southeast Asia where the Communist pressures are on: Laos despite the agreement of 1962; South Vietnam where armed attack is underway; Thailand where the beginnings of their "war of national liberation" can already be seen. I think this is a much larger problem than just the problem of what happens to the two halves of Vietnam.

Senator AIKEN. And are we bound to fight communism wherever it exists?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, no, sir, we are not, we are not. We are not talking about fighting communism for the purpose of destroying communism as such as a social or political organization, if that is what people want. But what we are talking about, I believe, Senator, is that where Communist countries undertake to commit aggression against those to whom the United States has undertaken a clear commitment in an alliance, that there we have a duty to assist our allies to meet that aggression.

Senator AIKEN. That would include what, about 80 or 90 countries in the world?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. This would include just over 40 countries.

Senator AIKEN. Only 40?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. But we have had AID programs in about 80 or 90.

Secretary RUSK. I spoke of alliances. I mean those countries to whom we have taken formal alliance commitments. You see, even there, Senator, I might just comment very briefly if I may, that even among allies, many of them deal with these problems in their own way without having to call upon us for direct involvement or assistance, say, with our own forces.

In Latin America some of them have dealt with it at the ballot box and some of them with their own local forces, and in Western Europe they made an enormous contribution by working out their own internal arrangements on a constitutional basis that helped to protect them against further pressures from the Communist side.

But nevertheless, when the chips are down and the aggression is there, and our help is needed and our commitment is there, I feel we have to meet it.

EXTENT OF COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. You hold that we are in Vietnam today because of a commitment?

Secretary RUSK. I do, sir, but also because that commitment, important as it is, has beneath it an underlying policy which is of great importance to the prospects for the future peace of the world. I don't want to take time unduly, Senator, but it was said here the other day that Hitler was a unique phenomenon. Well, there were some unique aspects. An airdale and a great dane are different but they are both dogs.

Now, we have this phenomenon of aggression.

Senator AIKEN. They bite you in different places.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. We have the phenomenon of aggression. Hitler could see that the Japanese militarists in Manchuria were not stopped. He saw that Mussolini was not stopped in Ethiopia. This encouraged him.

Now, what happens here in southeast Asia, if Peiping discovers that Hanoi can move without risk or can move with success? What further decisions are they going to make? What difference will that make in Moscow about what would happen to our commitments elsewhere, whether they should make choices as between peaceful co-existence and a more militant policy of world revolution?

All of these things tie together into some very far-reaching decisions made on the other side as well as on our own side, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. I realize that my time is about up. I would like to complete this line of questions with one more.

What is the extent of our commitment in South Vietnam? Is there any point beyond which we would not go in meeting that commitment?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, the commitment is as contained—I think it is best expressed, contained, in the language of the SEATO Treaty where it says:

Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will, in that event, act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Senator AIKEN. That doesn't give any limit.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir, and under the NATO Treaty, where it was stated somewhat more simply and directly that an attack on one is an attack on all, no limit was provided there.

I think, sir, that it is not easy for me in an open session to talk about the idea of limits, because we don't want a war of any sort out there. We don't want a larger war. We don't want a war as large as the one we have. But here is one of the problems that a democracy faces in avoiding a miscalculation or a misunderstanding on the part of a totalitarian regime.

Senator AIKEN. Would you say there is a limit?

Secretary RUSK. I am not going to say that this country has accepted in advance a certain point beyond which it will not go in meeting its commitments, because that is subject to the greatest misunderstanding. And when we say in this country, as we do, because it is true, that we don't want a larger war, it is just possible that there are those on the other side who are saying, "Ah, that means that we can have a larger war without an increase in risks."

Now, how do we insure that the other side faces up to the recklessness and the danger of the decisions that they may be making, if they want to make this into a larger war?

Senator AIKEN. I think this is the most important question I have asked, but I realize my time is up, our time is up.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Long?

HOW FAR SHOULD WE GO?

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, I am glad you raised that question about just how far we should go. A Communist backward power of 16 million, just by the ordinary standards of what a nation can do in warfare, could put about 10 percent of its population in a fight if it had to. Judging from prior wars that is about what we were able to do. I think we could put about 20 percent of our population in and the Communists would be badly outnumbered in the fighting line.

But about 10 percent, going by the rule of thumb, would be what I would regard as a full effort.

That means that if North Vietnam wants to they could put about 1,600,000 men in.

I want to compliment you for not saying that we are through just by these boys being sent because we have a potential of putting 16 million in by the same standards. We have better weapons and better equipment. If I do say it, I wasn't advised about sending those boys. I know if you had asked me 12 years ago, should we send troops over there prior to signing that SEATO Treaty, I would say I just prefer to keep the boys here. But we signed that treaty. We made that agreement. We helped those people. We were attacked in a moment of national pride and we struck back at the aggressor. We voted by a vote of—what was that—504 to 2 a resolution encouraging the President to do whatever is necessary.

I regard whatever is necessary being whatever it takes to defeat that little backward force over there, and I wouldn't think that whatever is necessary is just to send a few boys and have them cut off.

SUPPORT OF AMERICAN FORCES IN VIETNAM

I would just like to ask you, do you plan to send those boys over there without giving them whatever it takes for them to fight and defend themselves and to win?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we are going to support our men who are carrying the load with such gallantry and professional skill. I have no doubt of it whatever. I have no doubt that that is what the Congress would want us to do and expect us to do. But I wonder if I could also comment that people, some people, are concerned about the possibilities of a great land war in Asia.

I would like to comment that this is not the shape of that war at the present time, and we would hope that it would not become the shape of it, because the other side ought to realize how reckless and dangerous such a decision would be.

The problem in South Vietnam is still typically the guerrilla problem. The problem is how to find the other fellow. This is a problem that we have dealt with in other situations, we and others. I think there must come a time—because I think there is some rationality on the other side, there will come a time—when the other side will decide that it is too costly, that it doesn't make sense for them to persist in trying to do what they are now trying to do. When that time comes, then we may have some peace in this world.

But we haven't come to that moment yet, we haven't come to that moment yet.

Senator LONG. I don't know this for a certainty, Mr. Secretary—I only get this by rumor and I don't want to make any suggestions that what these people are trying to do is anything improper—but a number of Members of Congress went down and visited that Soviet Ambassador. He suggested that if we wouldn't let our boys shoot back for a while that maybe that would lead to peace.

Then they went down and talked to him and he suggested that if we quit bombing those Communists, maybe that would bring them to the peace table. And so we did that for about 37 days.

Just possibly the message wasn't getting through. He sent a message to the President again to get one of the top White House advisers to go down and talk to them. If you are going to send these boys, Mr. Secretary, let them fight. Don't send them over there with their hands tied behind them. I am convinced, just as General Taylor said yesterday, we are not going to lose that fight over there. If the 1st Division has to pull Old Glory down a flagpole it is going to be because somebody over here made a mistake not somebody over there. When you send those men, Mr. Secretary, can you give us the assurance that you are going to give them whatever help it takes to see that they are not cut off and surrounded and decimated as those people were at Dienbienphu?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I can give you complete assurance that this country is going to back those men over there and do everything that it can to assure them the maximum safety and the maximum effect for the effort that they are putting in. I don't myself believe that there can be or will be anything like the Dienbienphu situation.

There is just too much power immediately available in the area to allow that to happen.

Senator LONG. We have the power if we will use it. That is what I am talking about and that is what I would like to hear you say. If we passed a resolution and only two Members voted against it, and it said the President should do whatever is necessary, then I would like for you to assure us that you are not going to leave those boys over there to fight without the help they need when they fight.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think anyone who knows our Commander in Chief as well as you do would not need that assurance from the Secretary of State.

Senator LONG. I think the people would like to know it.

Secretary RUSK. The Commander in Chief is going to take care of that problem.

VETERANS' SUPPORT FOR ADMINISTRATION POSITION

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, a rather surprising thing happened a short time ago. You spoke to the American Legion. It is sort of unusual for the American Legion to invite the Secretary of State to be their spokesman at all; isn't that correct?

Secretary RUSK. I haven't looked at the precedents on it.

Senator LONG. I mean you spoke; I just ask you that.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I did speak.

Senator LONG. They tell me that those men stood there and applauded so long that people wondered if you were ever going to get a chance to make the speech at all. In fact I think it took about the whole hierarchy from the commander on down finally to get those fellows to quit standing up and cheering.

Secretary RUSK. Well, it would not be for me to describe that occasion.

Senator LONG. Have you ever in your whole lifetime found a much warmer reception anywhere?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. On occasion I have found the other kind of reception.

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, don't you think this is somewhat significant that the men who have fought for their country in years gone by were proud to see a Secretary of State speaking for the President of the United States who is not the kind of fellow who believes in rolling over and playing a dead dog when the Communists take him on?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, my duty, under the direction of the President, is to carry out the great stated policies of the United States. And I find them among other places in treaties and in the resolutions of the Congress. I believe these policies in the postwar period have been well grounded. I believe that we must do everything that we can to organize a peace, not just to hope for it, but to organize a peace so that those who threaten the peace will know that there is no future going down that path: because in the most literal sense, it is just too late in history to play around with the idea of allowing aggression to develop a momentum, because, if we go down that trail, I don't believe that the human race can survive.

Senator LONG. Mr. Secretary, I hope that inasmuch as this committee saw fit to listen to two former employees of your Department who had never or not in years been to Vietnam, that it will show me the courtesy of letting me call a couple of witnesses.

For example, I am going to ask that we send for men who have been to Vietnam, one of whom is the commander of the Disabled American Veterans. Those boys know what it is to fight for the country and get hurt, and most of them don't regret it for a moment. They are proud that they served their country, even though they lost arms and legs and got shot to pieces. They are proud that they served their country in its hour of danger.

Then I hope that this committee would show me the courtesy of letting me call the commander of the American Legion. Then I would like to call the commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

I have a paper here that shows in these so-called peace demonstrations we have been having—not in the front of them but always in the crowd—there is a bunch of Communists. They are the guys who lead the applause and start the cheering going for the speakers and sometimes they are the speakers themselves.

I will make this available to the committee.

If those Communists want to come testify, I will be perfectly content to hear them, but those are the people we have been hearing so much about.

Do you have any objections as a man who speaks for the President of the United States to hear these men, who represent the many millions of boys who fought for this country, come and express their views to this committee?

Secretary RUSK. I would have none if the committee wishes to hear them.

LEGAL BASIS FOR U.S. ACTIONS

Senator LONG. I have been told that we are an international outlaw, that this war is illegal.

Have you considered the legal aspects and been advised by your lawyers whether we are an international outlaw or whether we are a bad guy or a good guy?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, we are filing with the committee a legal brief. I am one of seven Secretaries of State who have not been lawyers, and I think the law officers of the Government ought to be permitted to file a legal brief on these questions.

Nevertheless, I have been exposed to a good deal of law in my day. Now, article 51 of the United Nations Charter—

Senator LONG. Senator Vanderberg was responsible for that article, wasn't he?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct, sir.

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter says:

Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The inherent right of individual and collective self-defense was not limited or restricted by the charter.

If the Security Council can move to restore the peace, then presumably that right is adequately taken care of.

Senator, I think the best way to test your question on that is to observe who it is that is standing in the way of a peace, who it is that won't even come to the table to start talking, who won't engage in a

discussion to find out what the issues are, who it is that is saying "You must take our position or we won't talk."

We have said to them, "Look, we will talk about your four points at a conference table. We will talk about them. But you can't gag us and refuse to let us talk about the points that are of interest to us."

Now, it seems to us that is a perfectly reasonable position to take.

But they won't come to the conference table. They won't stop *de facto* so that we can "de-escalate" this, as the word is. They are not cutting back in a way that is of any political significance. So the way to test who is the good guy and who the bad guy is, is to say who is prepared to do something about a peace here. The United States has made dozens and dozens of efforts to probe the possibility of peace, and we get nothing but polemics and vilification from the other side. Even neutrals who try to take some action of this sort are condemned in the most violent terms by the other side—for even trying to find a peace.

Senator LONG. We are told that we are in violation of the so-called Geneva accord. As I understand it, under the Geneva accord these Communist assassins were supposed to take their crowd north and the people who didn't want to be Communists were supposed to move south. Then we were supposed to move and let the people make a free decision.

Now, we didn't sign the accord to begin with. Would you mind giving me your reaction to the Geneva accords?

Secretary RUSK. Well, as to the Geneva accords, it is true that the United States did not sign those accords. We were not an active party in the fighting at that time. There were various reasons, and I am not sure that I personally am familiar with all of them, for our actually not signing the accords.

The Government of South Vietnam did not sign those accords.

Nevertheless, Under Secretary Bedell Smith said that we would not take any action to upset those accords, and that any attempt to upset them by force would be looked upon as a threat to international peace and security.

Now, again, Senator, one way to test a question of that sort is to ask the question: Who is prepared to do what today?

Who is prepared to do what today? We have said that the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in southeast Asia and that we are prepared to come to a conference table and talk about that result. But where is the other side? Where is the other side?

So there have been violations of those Geneva accords in various respects.

Senator LONG. Didn't they violate it from the day they signed it?

The CHAIRMAN. Your time is up.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct; that is correct, and the same thing with the Laos agreement, the same thing with the Laos agreement in 1962.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate very much your statement this morning, particularly the approximately 20 pages, in which you discuss the growth of aggression on the part of communism in this world. I noticed that you state that our "first menace of Com-

munist ambition was in Europe," when we had some difficulties there, and you go on through page after page, step after step of where we have had to meet this problem.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALLIES IN VIETNAM

I had a call yesterday afternoon, during the hearings, from a lady in Kansas City. She asked a question that I think the country would like to have some discussion on. She asked this question. She said:

If we are really fighting a Communist aggression, why are not our allies and friends assisting us in this? Why don't we have some support from these folks, whom we have helped in the past when they were having difficulties with the Communist aggression?

Secretary RUSK. First, Senator, let me say that we do not have at the present time the amount of assistance that we would like to have, and we do believe that there are a number of countries who could do more than they have been doing, in their own interests as well as in the total interests of the free world.

It is true also that certain of the countries most immediately involved in the threat are assisting very substantially. The Republic of Korea, who knows what this issue is, and who suffered through this type of issue, has a substantial force in South Vietnam. Australia and New Zealand, whose security interests are immediate, are there, and I have discussed in closed session some assistance that is available elsewhere.

I would emphasize that the South Vietnamese continue to carry a very large part of this load. The involvement of American forces has tended to divert the interests of our news media to our own forces and to ignore to a considerable extent what the South Vietnamese are doing.

I believe yesterday, for example, there were some 25 operations of a battalion size or larger, on the part of our side. Twenty of those were South Vietnamese. The others were United States and combined allies. Twenty out of twenty-five were all South Vietnamese. They are carrying it.

Now, I would have to say that we are discussing this matter of additional assistance for South Vietnam with other governments. We would like to have more. It is not easy for me to get into specific instances of these discussions in an open session, because we want the results rather than the discussion.

But I would agree with the import of the lady's question, that we do need more help. We would welcome more help, and we would hope that additional help would be forthcoming.

Senator CARLSON. It just seems to me, and I think it does to the country, too, that we not only will want their help, we could expect their help.

SEATO MEMBERS CONTRIBUTIONS

I noticed on your chart the SEATO agreement. There are several members, including the United States, who signed the SEATO agreement. We don't have any help from Pakistan, do we?

Secretary RUSK. There is no military help there from Pakistan. I think there may have been some economic help.

Senator CARLSON. They are a signatory to that treaty.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CARLSON. Do we get anything from France?

Secretary RUSK. France has been involved in South Vietnam with various forms of assistance. I think that they have not provided assistance specifically within the framework of the current action there, or perhaps within the framework of the SEATO Treaty, but they have provided substantial assistance over the years to South Vietnam.

Senator CARLSON. I have a statement that the Defense Department issued on January 15, that is the latest figure I have, in regard to the help that we have received in numbers of people.

For instance—this sounds a little ridiculous—from the United Kingdom 12 persons, 12 people.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, the United Kingdom has a very substantial part of its defense forces in southeast Asia engaged in another critical area, where there has been fighting, the Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia. I think that is one of the reasons why they have not taken up the question of further activity in South Vietnam.

Senator CARLSON. The Philippines are signatories according to this treaty.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. If my figures are accurate, and they are from the Defense Department on January 15, they had furnished 70 people.

Secretary RUSK. That question is now being discussed by the new President of the Philippines with the leadership of his own congress, and that matter is coming to a decision, I think, in the near future.

Senator CARLSON. According to this same list that I have, New Zealand has furnished 150.

Secretary RUSK. They have a battery of artillery with the Australian battalion.

Senator CARLSON. Australia is listed here as having furnished 1,400.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator CARLSON. And I think that is very commendable on their part.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator CARLSON. I really do. But we do get to that problem. After all, it occurs to me and, I think, the country that we should not be the only ones concerned about carrying on a campaign against the destruction or, at least, expansion of the Communist aggression in this world.

As you stated, they have control of about one-third of the territory.

ALLIED TRADE WITH HANOI AND PEIPING

Is it also not a fact that our allies not only are not assisting us substantially—let's use that word—in Vietnam, but are in fact supporting Hanoi and Peiping in carrying on trade in strategic and nonstrategic material at a time we are at war?

Secretary RUSK. We have made representations to those free world countries who have had ships in trade with Haiphong. The number has declined sharply in the last year or two. Some 13 or 14 a month

are still coming in there. Some of them, most of them, are rather small coastal freighter types operating out of Hong Kong. We are working on that problem very hard at the present time. We have not gotten the final answer yet, but we hope very much to be able to reduce the number further.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you for working on it, and I hope that it can bear some fruit.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.

Senator CARLSON. I have been advised that many of our allies' ships are going to Hong Kong in ballast, unloading the ballast, and then, of course, hauling out goods made in Red China, which is really assisting them in expanding not only their economy, but, if they are a part of the aggression in that area through Hanoi, that, too, helps.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have no information that any strategic goods of any sort are going into Haiphong through free world ships, and indeed it has been estimated about half of those ships that do go in, go in in ballast to pick up coal from Haiphong to take up to Japan, fresh fruits, and vegetables perhaps, to take up to the east Siberian ports.

Now, I am not suggesting that this is an excuse for the trade. I am saying that this is not a major military problem from the point of view of strategic goods.

Senator CARLSON. Is it your thought that we are not sending military supplies through our allies carried by their merchant marine into Hong Kong?

Secretary RUSK. Military supplies?

No, sir; I am quite convinced of that. I think we have very accurate information on that.

Senator CARLSON. I see.

Again, I want to say I commend you for working on this. I think this is one place they certainly could cooperate with us. I would hope they would help us as copartners in this great struggle against communism and do more than they are doing in Vietnam.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, upon what date, assuming your continued service, will you have served as long as Secretary Cordell Hull?

Secretary RUSK. Well, he served nearly three presidential terms. I think he served nearly 12 years. Please don't ask me to try to—

Senator GORE. Well, I know that a little humor may be entirely out of place here. I ask you this in a facetious way to illustrate to those who listen that they have had the pleasure of hearing from a man who I believe has served the second longest term as Secretary of State in the history of our country, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I got a little testimonial or something the other day that reminded me that there were eight Secretaries of State who served longer than I have.

Senator GORE. I am off base again. At least I was trying to pin some roses on you.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you. I appreciate that, Senator.

Senator GORE. You have pinned them on yourself, however, with your testimony today, though I find myself in disagreement with some of your conclusions. Through these hearings, Mr. Secretary, I have striven to come to the crucial issue and the crucial questions at each session. I want to do that this morning. But in view of some statements that have been made, I would like to make one thing emphatically clear. There is no question at all involved in these hearings about support or nonsupport of American forces in Vietnam. They are there, not upon their choice but upon the orders of their Government, their Commander in Chief. They will be supported, they must be supported. I shall vote for every bill to provide all materiel, every piece of ammunition, all weapons and supplies of any sort that they need to execute their mission with the maximum safety to themselves.

So let's settle this. That is not involved here at all.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator GORE. Involved here is the question of prudence and wisdom of policy, the strength of that policy, and the dangers and risks involved therein. Would you agree with that?

Secretary RUSK. I have not seen any inclination to fail to support our men in South Vietnam.

EXTENT OF U.S. COMMITMENTS UNDER SEATO

Senator GORE. Thank you. I won't belabor that one. Now I do not wish to engage in an argument with you or an extended colloquy with you about whether the SEATO treaty binds the United States to do what we are doing in Vietnam, and what may be contemplated. I think that I can present an argument equally as strong as the one you have presented that it does not. But suffice it to say if this treaty did in fact bind us, as you now describe it, I wonder why President Eisenhower, who signed it, did not interpret it as binding us to send combat forces to Vietnam. And if indeed it is as binding as you today interpret it, why was it that President Kennedy, under whom you served as Secretary of State, gave assurance to the American people that combat forces would not be sent to Vietnam; and indeed if that treaty is so binding, and if this resolution—your interpretation of which I also disagree with—so binding and so specific, why was it that 2 days after this resolution was approved, President Johnson himself, in a speech to the American people, spoke as follows. The President was speaking, to paraphrase, he was speaking of the two extremes as I understand the political tactic, and then he said, after he had referred to those who said we should withdraw, then the next paragraph he said:

Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us—

This may have been Senator Goldwater—

to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world.

I simply don't understand how three Presidents could take this limited view of our commitment under SEATO and then one President with respect to the resolution, and now you, interpret it as being a binding commitment to do what we are doing in Vietnam. I will not

ask questions but I will certainly yield in fairness for you to respond to that.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.

HISTORY OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Senator GORE. I want to come to what I think is more important. We are there. Our forces are there. They must be supported, and the question is what do we do from now. But since so much has been made of the history of our commitment and the nature of our commitment. I did want to make my views in that respect plain.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Senator. The difficulty is that we are not playing this as a hand of solitaire: We need to keep our eyes on what the other side is doing during all this period. President Eisenhower did not have to face the question as to whether he should make a finding that there was in being an armed attack by North Vietnam against South Vietnam under the SEATO treaty.

When President Kennedy became President, we had about 800 U.S. military there under a U.S. aid mission, and that was within the level provided in the Geneva agreements of 1954.

It was President Kennedy who went to Vienna, in June 1961, to talk to Mr. Khrushchev about southeast Asia. He found that Mr. Khrushchev agreed in principle that we ought to get out of Laos and leave that alone, but he also found that Mr. Khrushchev and he could not agree on Vietnam. So, when he came back—and you remember this was during a period also when there was a pretty sizable Berlin crisis underway—President Kennedy sent men out to South Vietnam to take a very special look at that situation, because he knew that the other side—as far as anything he could learn from Mr. Khrushchev was concerned, he knew that the other side was going after it.

So by the end of 1961 we had 3,000 men there. By the end of 1962 President Kennedy had authorized up to 11,000 men in South Vietnam. Now, they were advisers but they were also advising combat people in the field and were themselves engaged in combat during that period as advisers and were getting killed. I am informed that our first military casualty in South Vietnam occurred in December 1961.

The policy has been the same policy. The actions required to meet the steps taken by the other side have had to be different.

Now you mentioned the statement of President Johnson on August 12, 1964. At no stage have we ourselves wanted to escalate this war, as the expression goes. At no stage have we wanted a larger war. But it was in November, December, January, over the turn of the year 1964-65, that North Vietnam moved the 325th Division of the regular North Vietnamese Army from North Vietnam to South Vietnam to up the ante. That was before the bombing started. That wasn't in response to an escalation by the United States. It seemed to be the result of a decision on their part that, well the United States says it doesn't want a big war. Maybe we can have a big one without undue risk.

But in any event the steps that have to be taken in this situation have to be taken against the background of, and in the face of, action by the other side to carry out a result which we are committed to prevent; namely, the armed seizure of South Vietnam by North Vietnam.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I shall not dwell upon that. I merely wanted to indicate that I did not accept the thesis that we are legally bound to do what we are doing in Vietnam, or what I am apprehensive is contemplated.

POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT WITH CHINA

Let us come to what I think is a more important and a more current problem. I notice with some concern that in no place in your prepared text did you refer to the possibility that has aroused such deep concern in this committee and the country, to wit, the possibility that this war may be escalated into a conflict or war with China.

Will you first indicate why you made no reference to this, and then will you please, sir, address your remarks to the subject as ably as I know you may.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, this is a grave question for a person sitting in my particular chair to discuss completely in an open session. I will do my best.

Senator GORE. I shall not press you.

Secretary RUSK. I understand, sir.

Senator GORE. You need not make any comment whatsoever which you think might involve the security of the country.

You do recognize this possibility, as you describe it, as a grave matter. I wondered why you made no reference to it as being so grave in your testimony, in your prepared statement.

Senator MORSE. I think the Secretary ought to have assurance in the matters that he wants to talk to us about in regard to the China issue in executive session, that he will be given that opportunity at his leisure and convenience and as soon as he wants it.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator GORE. Indeed, Mr. Secretary, if you prefer, I will withdraw the question; I would be glad to do that.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, perhaps I might comment on it, at least briefly, because, as you know, we have spent considerable time in the committee on this problem. The question of how far a crisis can go is of course the final question at the end of the day in handling any crisis.

In all of these postwar crises a possibility of a larger war has always been present: whether it is the Greek guerrillas or the Berlin blockade or the Korean war or the Cuban missile crisis, now here in southeast Asia. This is also a problem for the other side.

USING FIRMNESS AND PRUDENCE

Now we have had to deal with a number of crises in this postwar period with firmness. We have taken 160,000 casualties, 165,000 casualties now, in different parts of the world since 1945, to try to stabilize the peace, literally to try to stabilize the peace. But in dealing with each of these successive crises, we have also had to take care to deal with them with a prudence and a caution, so that issues which

in the 19th century could have thrown the entire world into the explosion of a general war, can somehow be handled in a way that permits the human race to survive in the presence of modern weapons.

So we did not throw mass divisions in to relieve the Berlin blockade. We used an airlift to probe for a peaceful settlement.

There were some who, in the Cuban missile crisis, wanted to go in with full bombing weight just as soon as the missiles were discovered. But President Kennedy decided that, although it was necessary to make it very clear to the other side that the missiles must go, it was important to provide an opportunity for them to go by peaceful means.

We did not open up a nuclear war because of Korea.

We have tried to show restraint and we have found on occasion, that the other side—that at least some on the other side understand the importance of restraint.

Now I suppose, Senator, if I could illustrate the point with a rather extreme illustration: no one, I think, believes that a nuclear exchange is a rational act of policy. But if two sides came to a table, each utterly convinced that under no circumstances would the other fight a nuclear war, then that could create a very dangerous situation.

We are not talking about the nuclear business in South Vietnam at all—not at all. It has not come up. We have not considered this matter. This is certainly not in the picture.

What I am saying is that, if one side only worries about escalation, then you can have a big war. The other side must also think about this question. The other side must realize that this is a dangerous and reckless thing for them to contemplate. The other side must understand, just as we, that if they know their own interests, they don't want a larger war any more than we do.

Of course, we are concerned about where this will go. Of course. And the other side is concerned, and we would hope that, as has happened in other crises in this postwar period, there will come a point when these concerns will lead to peace, where the cost of what they are trying to accomplish is too much for them. Maybe they were somewhat surprised that we were willing and able to do as much as we have done to stand in their way.

Now, when they discover that they are not going to have an easy military victory in the south, and when they discover that the South Vietnamese are not going to just disintegrate and lie down in front of them, when they discover that international opinion is not going to build up in such a way as to force the United States to change its policy, and when they discover that internal differences in the United States are not going to pull us out of South Vietnam and let them have the country, then perhaps they will start looking toward the conference table and start giving us some peace.

Senator GORE. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. This is a very grave question.

You also referred in your discussion to nuclear warfare. Though I will not identify the officials, I have heard very high officials express the opinion that a war with China would in fact be a nuclear war. It is the imminence of this threat that, in my opinion, has bestirred this committee to bring the issues that are involved in this hearing

before the American people. I will want to explore this further with you when we return.

Secretary RUSK. I shall be glad to, Senator; thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

EVOLVING GREATER NATIONAL AND CONGRESSIONAL UNITY ON VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, earlier in your presentation to this committee, which I consider to be an excellent presentation, you said it is essential that we clearly understand and, so far as possible, agree on our mission and purpose in that faraway land, referring of course to Vietnam.

You followed from that that you believe it would be in our national interest if, from these hearings or from any other source, there could evolve a greater degree of national unity concerning our purposes and programs in Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. I do, Senator. I think in our society free discussion, free debate, dissent are a fundamental part of our system.

In terms of moving this matter to a peaceful solution, I think that one thing that would help us move it to a peaceful solution is the full understanding on the part of Hanoi that we are, in fact, going to see this commitment through and that they must not count upon divisions among us to give them what they want in South Vietnam.

Senator MUNDT. Would it follow that you feel that it is equally, and perhaps even more, desirable to have a greater unity of support in the national Congress for our position and policy in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it is a little hard to expect a score of larger than 504 to 2, Senator. I think the resolution of August 1964 made these basic issues very clear. I would hope that that degree of consensus would not be seriously changed in the course of our present discussions.

Senator MUNDT. You hope it would be greater, not less?

Secretary RUSK. That would be pointing very high, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. That is correct.

VALUE OF PUBLIC HEARINGS

May I say that I think your statement here this morning, Secretary Rusk, standing by itself—had we not had other valuable testimony, which I think we have had—justifies completely the decision of the committee in having these hearings, and in having them public, and perhaps justifies the decision of the networks to carry the deliberations live to the people of America.

I think, in my own view, it deserves to be, and should be printed as a white paper and circulated widely both at home and abroad. It has cleared up some misunderstandings on the part of a great many people.

The morning paper reports that President Johnson is watching these hearings. I don't know whether that is true or not. I hope it is true.

Secretary RUSK. I will soon find out, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. You will find out, touché. But I think it is good because it might bring the administration and the Congress into a

closer unity and to closer agreement in support of policies which are certainly vital to the whole national interest.

REDEFINING THE 1964 SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION

I happen to believe, and have said for some time, that I think we might move toward this greater unity in Congress and the country, that you have said is desirable and which I think is desirable, if in some form there could come to Congress a statement from the President which would redefine and update what was said in the resolution of 1964.

What was said in that resolution, to me, I think was very clear. I don't have the problems some of my colleagues seem to have in feeling that it is too obtuse or that they were trapped into a vote that might not really reflect the situation. I think it was pretty clear but there is no denying the fact that some confusion has developed since then. I would like to see a reclassification and clarification of our policy.

The Senator from Oregon says that that is right. He is going to introduce an amendment to rescind that resolution.

I think that is the wrong approach, speaking for myself, because if you rescind the resolution—and certainly I would vote against such a rescission—you leave our armies abroad with no policy at home supporting them. That just leaves the slate clear and blank.

I believe that a statement prepared along the line of the one that you have so carefully and constructively presented this morning would have a great affirmation to the country and an affirmation, a reaffirmation, if you please, in Congress. We have had it said and it has been said over and over again—but I think better than saying some of it in the rose garden and some of it on the roof garden someplace, it is better that it be said in Congress and debated on a positive approach.

Do I overemphasize in my mind the fact that a serious debate and a substantial vote for rescission of that resolution would be a very upsetting situation as far as the impression on the Communist world is concerned, and enhance their reluctance to come to a peace table, and increase their determination to fight on?

Secretary RUSK. I have no doubt, sir, that a major change by the Congress on a matter of such far-reaching importance as this would bring about a major change in the world situation. I think it would mean a major change in the world situation.

Senator MUNDT. To our disadvantage?

Secretary RUSK. To our disadvantage.

Senator MUNDT. You said one thing I know a lot of Americans are going to be pleased to hear—you said that we are not committed to fight Communist countries every place that they emerge. We are limited to 40 or about 40.


I think it would be good to have you place in the printed record the list of those 40 countries.

Secretary RUSK. I will be glad to.

Senator MUNDT. I am sure that is a public piece of information that ought to be in the record at that point.

(The information referred to follows:)

UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (15 NATIONS)
A treaty signed April 4, 1949, by which the United States joined with 14 other nations to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The purpose of the treaty is to maintain peace and security in the North Atlantic area. The treaty is bilateral with the United States and the other 14 nations.

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EFFECT OF SUCCESS IN VIETNAM ON FUTURE WARS

Senator MUNDT. I was pleased also by the emphasis that you placed, on pages 5, 6, and 7 of your statement, on the importance of the proper resolution of this Vietnam war in terms of future peace. Now, it is true that there are commitments which have been made. It is true that people have disagreed about the particular extent of this or that commitment.

But I am pleased that you emphasized the fact that you believe this to be a part of this whole global conflict in which we have been engaged for a long time—the worldwide development of communism and its tendencies to pick off countries along the periphery.

I wish you would elaborate upon the important reasons why we have a duty to perform in Vietnam. Does it decrease the likelihood of a world war or a greater war if we can resolve it satisfactorily, as compared to an unsatisfactory result in Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, we experienced ourselves directly before World War I and in World War II, the problem of deterring or diverting courses of aggression before they gathered momentum and engulf the world in violence.

Now, these are different kinds of people, but the phenomena of aggression is very much the same. We have, from our own side, the problem of assuring that the pledged word of the United States means something to the opposition. Again, it is not easy, in public session, to underline that in all its seriousness but, when Chairman Khrushchev presented President Eisenhower with an ultimatum on Berlin in the late 1950's, and when Chairman Khrushchev said to President Kennedy what he said in June 1961 about Berlin, and about the consequences if President Kennedy did not yield, I cannot tell you how important it was to the peace of the world that the President of the United States, whether it was President Eisenhower or President Kennedy, or now President Johnson, be believed when they say to the other side: "Gentlemen, this you must not do." Because, if we ever get to a point where that simple statement is not believed, then I don't know where the future and the safety of this country is, or that the possibilities of general peace would exist.

But I don't want to rest this just on the point that we have a commitment and pledge. I think our commitment was correct and that it was made on the basis—

Senator MUNDT. Excuse me. May I interrupt just a minute? I am not disputing that.

Secretary RUSK. I understand that, sir.

Senator MUNDT. I doubt that we would retain effective leadership if we were placed before the world as a country which deliberately violates its pledge, breaks its word, and destroys its commitment. I think that is important. But it seems to me that this other question that we have been discussing is of vital importance.

I want to ask you this hypothetical question.

WHAT WOULD THE UNITED STATES DO IF IT HAD NO COMMITMENT?

Suppose we did not have these commitments. Suppose we faced the situation which we now confront without commitments. Would you consider the necessity of preventing an outbreak of new aggression on

the part of the Communist's world of sufficient importance to the overall peace of the world and of our country to justify what we are doing there now?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, we had that problem at the outbreak of the Korean war, because we did not at that time have a specific commitment to Korea in terms of an alliance. Nevertheless, for reasons very vital to the security of our own country, we took part in that defense. It was partly because of the experience with the Korean war that we felt we ought to be quite sure that the other side knows in advance. So that is why we formed some of these alliances in the Pacific as well as in Europe—because, as the committee's report on the SEATO Treaty said:

There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

Now, I suppose the greatest of all hazards would be for him to find out that we didn't have any intentions to start with. He must understand that when we make an arrangement of this sort, we intend to carry it out. Then I think there is a chance to build a peace. Then I think there is a chance to build a peace, little by little and gradually—because when he realizes that militancy and pressing the world revolution are not winning, and that the idea of peaceful coexistence can work out, we can take up some of the points of difference, one by one, small and large, and try to find agreement on them.

But I do not know how we can organize the peace in the world if we have in front of us examples of successful aggression, and, particularly, successful aggression in the very teeth of the commitment of the power of the United States.

Senator MUNDT. You mentioned on page 27: "Communism today is no longer monolithic."

I wonder if you should not have put the word "world" ahead of "communism" to make it read "World communism"?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. I think that is right.

Senator MUNDT. I did not want to convey to the public the idea that our great Secretary of State had changed his opinion about the structure of communism within a country.

Secretary RUSK. That is a useful clarification. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. Yes. I do appreciate the emphasis that you have placed on the importance of what we are doing in Vietnam in terms of overall peace. It follows logically, it seems to me, that when you say that if we accept defeat and if we reward aggression now, we increase the likelihood of war, because success thrives upon success, and the appetite gets bigger as the bites get larger.

You say, as you have, if I understood you correctly—with this I will conclude because my time is up—that if we did not have the commitments and just faced the situation in the world like we did in Korea, you would feel that in the interests of avoiding a global war, and maintaining an orderly world, it is important that we do what we are doing in Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. I think that the commitments rest upon policy and strategic and geopolitical considerations that are of the utmost importance.

Senator MUNDT. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The committee will stand adjourned until 2:30.

(Whereupon, the committee recessed at 1 p.m., to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I recognize the Senator from Idaho, Mr. Church.

Senator CHURCH. Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Senator.

Senator CHURCH. Let me say first of all, as one who witnessed your presentation this morning, that I think that, as always, you have made a very firm and lucid statement of the administration case and I want to commend you for it.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Secondly, Mr. Secretary, let me say that I agree with what Senator Gore said this morning, that the purpose of these hearings is to give no suggestion of disunity, or lack of congressional resolve when it comes to supporting American forces in the field.

Secretary RUSK. I understand that, sir.

Senator CHURCH. I think the Congress, judged by its past record, will doubtlessly give American troops whatever support may be required, wherever they are called upon to do their duty, whether it is in Vietnam or any other place.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator CHURCH. Now, it seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that the service of these hearings may not relate to what we do next in Vietnam. Our options there have narrowed and there aren't any magical cures.

The President is doing everything he can to keep the war confined within manageable limits, and to seek out diplomatic doors that may lead to the conference table, and in this he has my wholehearted support.

INQUIRING BEYOND VIETNAM

Rather, I think that the purpose of these hearings is to inquire both behind and beyond Vietnam, to try to determine where we are, how we got there, and where we are going.

In that connection, you said this morning, Mr. Secretary, that we do not want U.S. bases in southeast Asia, that we do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam. I am completely in agreement with this, and I think it is very important that it be emphasized. But, in a way, Mr. Secretary, it has a certain familiar ring that does disturb me.

I have here a copy of a 1951 committee print of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee compiled from notes kept by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley who was at that time Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The notes relate to the conference at Wake Island between President Truman and General MacArthur.

Secretary RUSK. I was myself at Wake Island, Senator.

Senator CHURCH. Fine. I remember that you were there. That is why I bring up the committee print of the conversations that took place there.

On page 1 of the print, referring to conversations between President Truman and General MacArthur, I read the following which purports to be the position taken by General MacArthur:

I hope the United Nations will hold elections by the first of the year. Nothing is to be gained by military occupation. All occupations are failures.

The President nodded agreement. Then it goes on, MacArthur continuing:

After elections are held, 10 divisions with our equipment supplemented by a small but competent air force and also by a small but competent navy. If we do that it will not only secure Korea but it will be a tremendous deterrent to the Chinese Communists moving south.

Again I emphasize the fact that the military should get out the minute the guns stop shooting and the civilians take over.

U.S. BASES CONTINUING IN KOREA

Now, here it is 1966. As I recall your testimony 2 weeks ago, Communist China withdrew Chinese troops from North Korea about 10 years ago, and there has not been a guerrilla war in South Korea. We have, in the meantime, built up a very modern and effective Korean defense force. Yet 55,000 American troops appear to be permanently stationed in South Korea.

In the face of this, it seems to me we didn't follow General MacArthur's advice, is that not true?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. But I will comment on that when you have finished your—

Senator CHURCH. Fine.

Is it not also true that China is now developing a nuclear capacity; that is, she has already detonated two atomic bombs?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Is it your surmise that China is engaged upon a serious effort to develop a nuclear capability of her own?

Secretary RUSK. Yes; it is.

Senator CHURCH. And a modern delivery system of her own?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Would you say, then, looking ahead perhaps 10 years, that China may build a formidable nuclear arsenal and perhaps a modern delivery system, including intercontinental ballistic missiles?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is entirely possible.

POSSIBLE FUTURE CHINESE DEMAND FOR U.S. BASE WITHDRAWALS

Senator CHURCH. Then, isn't it also possible that, at such a time, China may turn to us, assuming that we still retain military bases in South Korea, and say "Get out. We don't think you belong here on the mainland of Asia with military bases so close to China."

Remember that we said to Khrushchev, when he attempted to establish Russian military bases in Cuba, "Get out, you don't belong here so close to the boundaries of the United States and we will not permit it."

I am trying, Mr. Secretary, to look ahead. Vivid is the memory of that crisis in 1962 which took the world to the brink of nuclear war.

I thought then that the American position was absolutely valid. But I am wondering how the Chinese may view American military bases so close to China once they have developed a nuclear capacity that would give them a semblance of power commensurate with that of the United States.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, it is true that we have retained 55,000 men in the Republic of Korea. This is our principal ground force in northeast Asia, directly relevant not only to our interest in the security of Korea, but also in the security of Japan, and indeed, the total strategic situation in the northern Pacific. I do not believe that this is a guideline for southeast Asia. Indeed, we have already demonstrated in the case of Laos that, if there is a peaceful situation, we are prepared to withdraw our forces and would expect others to withdraw their forces.

At the time of the agreement on Laos in 1962, we had several hundred military men in Laos. We took them out; we took them out. So as far as southeast Asia is concerned, what I would say to the other side is: "If you don't believe us, come and test it, come to the conference table. Work out these agreements. We will tell you that if peace is assured, American military forces will depart from southeast Asia."

Senator CHURCH. I, Mr. Secretary, am in full accord with that.

Secretary RUSK. We will write that into it. In other words there is no need for the other side to say, "Well, they still have them in Korea, so they will have them in South Vietnam." Let them come and test us so far as southeast Asia is concerned.

PEIPING'S ATTITUDE TOWARD COEXISTENCE

Now, as to the other question, on what might happen 10 years from now, a great deal depends upon Peiping's attitude toward peace and toward the right of smaller nations to live next door to them without being molested, and what use Peiping might expect to make of the power which they may at that time have.

Senator CHURCH. May I just interject at that point, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Because, in that connection, it was stressed this morning that Peiping is presently regarded, even by some Communist governments, as the principal threat to world peace, since it has not embraced the doctrine of coexistence.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator CHURCH. I think you emphasized that.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; that is correct.

HANOI'S RELATIONSHIP TO PEIPING

Senator CHURCH. That raised in my mind some questions relative to Vietnam. I think there is a tendency in our discussion of Vietnam to intermingle China and North Vietnam, as though there were no real distinction between them.

Do you feel that what we face in Vietnam is a case of Chinese aggression or is it a case of North Vietnamese aggression? Is there a distinction between the two, and does it matter?

Secretary RUSK. The instrument of aggression, that is the active agency of the aggression, is Hanoi. The doctrine which is used to support this aggression is from Peiping, and there is indication that Peiping, even more than Hanoi, has blocked the path toward a conference table.

Senator CHURCH. Do you regard Ho Chi Minh, then, as the mere agent of Mao Tse-tung?

Secretary RUSK. Not entirely, not entirely. I think there are elements of freedom of action, and we would hope that a situation could be found in which he could exercise that freedom of action and come to the conference table even though Peiping might object.

Senator CHURCH. So you do feel, after all, that North Vietnam has sufficient independence to come to a conference table even though China might object?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the sufficiency of that independence is still under test. As I indicated this morning, some 9 months ago there was a joint communique by Hanoi and Moscow, expressing approval of the idea of a conference on Cambodia and Laos. We were interested in such a conference and approved it. Our information is that Peiping then moved in on Hanoi and possibly on Cambodia to block the prospects for such a conference. So the question of where the decisive influence exists on that particular point cannot be stated categorically at this point.

Senator CHURCH. But from the military standpoint, even though the extent of the political independence of North Vietnam might be somewhat ambiguous, Chinese combat troops have not become involved in the fighting in Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. So that we are not faced here, as we were in Korea, with an actual Chinese invasion of Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. That is not the present position, that is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Do you regard the much-talked-about treatise of Chinese Marshal Lin Piao as a kind of Asian "Mein Kampf," describing a blueprint for the Chinese conquest of Asia, or do you regard it as a do-it-yourself kit, outlining the Chinese revolutionary experience and advocating similar methods for Communist revolutionaries in other Asian lands?

Secretary RUSK. In practical terms thus far it takes on the shape of a do-it-yourself kit. Indeed in the Communist world, the general rumor going around is that Peiping is prepared to fight to the last North Vietnamese. That does not necessarily provide a guarantee for the future.

Senator CHURCH. No, no; I am trying to diagnose the present because it is upon the diagnosis of the present that we must project the future.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator CHURCH. And the present situation in Asia, as I understand it, is quite different from the threat posed by Hitler in Europe before the Second World War.

Secretary RUSK. There are differences but there are also enormous similarities, Senator.

Senator CHURCH. Well, I was trying to get at the differences in this series of questions and answers.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, all right.

Senator CHURCH. My time is up, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for your responses.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MEANING OF 1964 RESOLUTION

Mr. Secretary, may I just give you a second to rest while I make a very brief statement about my conception of what the Tonkin Gulf resolution of 1964 meant or did not mean.

I don't regard my vote for that resolution or for the SEATO treaty or any of the agreements I have voted for in this connection as involving an abdication of my responsibility as a Senator. I think it would be unfortunate if the administration took the position that this large vote in 1964 meant that the Senate and Congress are out of the picture now and that the President has a completely free rein.

There are many reasons why a vote on any such matter as that is almost unanimous and I think we are all familiar with it and I don't think it should be taken for more than an expression of confidence in the President in the immediate situation, and not a power of attorney irrevocably delegating all of the congressional authority to the President for whatever period the President may see fit, and I think this ought to be understood and acted upon. Among other things it means constant consultation, it seems to me. I don't suggest you haven't been before us many times, Mr. Secretary, but I think that this should be clearly understood. We are trying to find an effective substitute for the "declaration of war" provision in the Constitution, and it seems to me the only real substitute is the practical one of working together continuously and certainly when matters begin to change or turn or assume a different posture.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CASE. If you have any disagreement with that general approach I would like to have your comments on it.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, obviously when the Congress passed that resolution of August 1964 it did not go out of business, and the executive and the key congressional committees and the leadership have kept in, if I may say so, very close touch in the development of this situation since.

I know of no situation in my memory where there has been more frequent and more intensive discussion between the executive branch and the Congress and its key committees and leadership than has been true on this subject of Vietnam.

You were good enough to indicate that I had come frequently on this committee. I have been here more than 50 times, and in most of those discussions the Vietnam issue was discussed.

CONSULTATIONS AT TIME OF 1964 RESOLUTION

Congress has a continuing responsibility here, Senator. And, if I may take a moment, I would just like to say something about the consultations that occurred at the time of the August 1964 resolution.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, if this is in order, I would like to ask this be done on the general time because I would like to hear it but I have a few questions that I would like to put.

Secretary RUSK. I have sympathy with the problem the committee faces but I have plenty of time and these issues are rather extensive.

Senator CASE. Go ahead. I want to hear this even on my own time, if necessary.

Secretary RUSK. I recall that the President, in August 1964, told us in private discussions—the Secretary of Defense and myself—he remembered that when he was a junior Senator and the Korean question had come up, that Senator Taft said at that time that he supported what President Truman did in Korea but he did not support the way in which it was done; that he felt he should have come to the Congress for a resolution.

The President recalled that in the fifties, President Eisenhower discussed with him when he was majority leader certain other situations in which, although there were perhaps existing commitments, it was important that the Congress register its view.

So President Johnson asked the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to be in touch with certain of the leaders of the Congress on this matter; and there was indication that they felt that a resolution would be important in order that the Congress might be a part of, and be included with the President on, the great issues of policy which were at stake.

So, the President, as some of you will recall, had a meeting with the leadership, and there was full discussion at that meeting of the problems involved and the seriousness of the situation, not only with the civilian but with the military leadership, and it was agreed that the President should ask the Congress for a resolution.

The President sent up a message and the Congress passed that resolution of August 1964.

Now, there is no inclination, Senator, to take the view that the Congress, therefore, at that point abdicated its responsibility. The President and the Secretary of State and indeed our military men in the field, want to proceed on the basis of a national policy in which the Congress participates fully.

Now, there are issues before the Congress at the present time in connection with the particular bills that are in front of you. When that resolution was passed, I believe it was Senator Russell who referred to the constitutional issue and said, "Well, a resolution of this sort really ties the hands of the Congress because it is subject to Presidential veto."

And so it was agreed that that resolution of August 1964 would contain on its face a provision that the Congress, acting alone by concurrent resolution, could rescind it.

In other words, here was a situation where the President and the Congress in partnership acted together, or the course of the United States would be quite different, would be quite different.

VOTE ON RESOLUTION IN 1966

Now, the situation has developed further. There has been consultation with some of the leadership about whether a new resolution is required. There has been, I think, some divided counsel on that matter, but nevertheless the issue is in front of you in the votes to be taken in the Senate, in the Congress, in connection with these supplemental appropriations requests.

Now, although I would not myself recommend that that resolution be rescinded, if there is doubt in the Congress about this major policy, let us vote, let us find out, let's have that decision considered in 1966.

But if I may say so, Senator—and I am not now pointing a finger at you at all—if I may say so, I would hope that, before the votes are taken, the Members of the Congress, of the House and the Senate, would go into a quiet corner and think very long and deeply about what we have been through for the last three decades, four decades, and on what basis we have any chance whatever to organize the peace in the world—on what basis can we build a peace—and then decide which vote is a vote for war and which vote is a vote for peace.

I recall, Senator—if I may, Mr. Chairman. I hesitate to intrude. I am sorry I am not allotted a little time myself.

Senator CASE. Go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. You had plenty of time this morning, and we will give you more time any time you want to.

Secretary RUSK. I was an undergraduate at Oxford Union on the night in 1933 of the great debate on the motion "that this house will not fight for king and country." That motion was moved by the philosopher, C. E. M. Joad, with great brilliance and humor. The motion passed. That motion was quoted by Hitler as an indication that Britain wouldn't fight and therefore his hands were free to pursue his ambitions.

But just a few years after that debate C. E. M. Joad issued a statement saying to the young men who were in the Union that night, "Sorry, lads, but this fellow Hitler is different. Now get out there and fight."

And a battalion of the Black Watch charged Nazi Panzers at Dunkirk with naked bayonets in order to help a few of their comrades get off the beach.

We had a few of those people in this country who said this was not our war up to as late as October and November of 1941, who objected to the extension of the draft, and a company of which I took command in a division which was supposed to be ready for combat had wooden tubes instead of 60 millimeter mortars.

Now, we older people have got to learn what it is we have got to forget. But surely we have got to remember some of the things that are enduring.

How do we organize a peace? Do we do it by saying to those who would like to commit aggression, "No, it won't work. You have got to live in peace"? Or do we say "Well, maybe the next bite will be satisfying and he will be quiet"? Maybe we will say, "If we will get out of his way, maybe he won't be too rude and too mad."

I must say, I think these issues are very far reaching, but I do hope that the Congress will review them and vote—and vote and help us make this decision. It is a joint responsibility.

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary, I thank you for your statement very much. There are a couple of things that are still left open. What I am talking about now is whether by this vote on the 1964 resolution the Congress abdicated its power and turned it over to the President. I think it did not. I take it you think it did not, either.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Senator CASE. And it is appropriate to have these hearings, for example, it is appropriate for Congress to review any matter at any time, not just because there was a right reserved in the resolution for Congress to repeal the resolution but just in the nature of the structure of our Government and its division of authority.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CASE. I appreciate that.

Now, Mr. Chairman, what is the situation with regard to my time?

The CHAIRMAN. Your time has elapsed. As a matter of fact, you had 12 minutes.

GETTING TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE

Senator CASE. There is one other point I would like to make. Our chairman, Senator Fulbright, in questioning you this morning, said something to the effect, and he will correct me if I am wrong, that our objective here is to get the matter to the conference table. I don't believe that we misunderstand each other, that this is not my view of our objective. I hope we do get to the conference table but our objective, it seems to me, is much greater than that. We want to get to the conference table and have the matter settled in such fashion that it will be an enduring peace and we shall have enduring stability in this area of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. You are quite right. I didn't mean to imply—

Senator CASE. I appreciate that very much because that bothered me just a little bit and I wanted to get cleared up on the matter.

HOW FAR CAN WE GO?

Now, Mr. Secretary, I have shared with Senator Gore and others of my colleagues this question of how far do we go. It is not a question of our objectives or the importance of somebody doing this job or the rightness of our position in the war—there are many things done by both sides that are shocking and horrible—but the question of how far we go.

How far can we go in escalating the number of American troops without turning this into an American war as opposed to a war of the Vietnamese?

Secretary RUSK. We are rather a long way from that point at the present time, Senator. I indicated this morning that out of 25 battalions on larger scale operations in progress yesterday, 20 of those were South Vietnamese. There are also 700,000 South Vietnamese under arms in all categories, military and paramilitary. They are carrying the bulk of the fighting, they are taking the bulk of the casualties, and many aspects of this struggle are peculiarly for them rather than for us, particularly the flushing of guerrilla cadres out of villages, and things of that sort in which, almost in the nature of the situation, they are the experts and we are not.

I think we are at a considerable distance of this becoming our war in any sense exclusive of the South Vietnamese or in which they would be ultimately the junior partner.

They are the major partner here in the fighting, and, for the foreseeable future, as far as I can see in the months ahead of us, that, I think, will remain the situation.

Senator CASE. Do you agree with General Taylor's statement in U.S. News & World Report, the current issue, that anything like 800,000 American troops would be fantastic?

Secretary RUSK. I have not heard any serious discussion of figures in that order of magnitude.

Senator CASE. Do you agree with his statement that this is a fantastic figure?

Secretary RUSK. I don't see that—you see, our principal problem in South Vietnam with the enemy is to find him; is to find him. The typical pattern of operations is not that of vast divisions locked with each other in combat, but a guerrilla situation. And so I don't see that kind of situation in front of us, unless there were major decisions by great powers on the other side to change fundamentally the nature of this operation.

Senator CASE. No; I am talking within the framework of the present situation in regard to that particular aspect of the problem.

Secretary RUSK. Right. Well, the 800,000 figure is far beyond any figure I have ever discussed in any serious way.

Senator CASE. You wouldn't regard voting for the current authorization bill as an authorization that would be thrown in our teeth for escalation on our part to 800,000?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I wouldn't wish to fix a number. I would say, just as I said earlier, that whatever you do now on these bills that are in front of you, the Congress doesn't go out of business, and the consultation and the communications between the Executive and the Congress will continue as intensively and as intimately as they have all along.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

My time is up. I have some more questions which I will ask later.

EXCHANGE BETWEEN SENATORS FULBRIGHT AND NELSON ON 1964
RESOLUTION

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the record at this point the exchange or colloquy between Senator Fulbright and Senator Nelson, together with a copy of President Johnson's speech to the American people on August 4, which appears on page 18459 of the Congressional Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[From the Congressional Record, Aug. 7, 1964]

Mr. NELSON. In view of the differing interpretations which have been put upon the joint resolution with respect to what the sense of Congress is, I should like to have this point clarified. I have great confidence in the President. However, my concern is that we in Congress could give the impression to the public that we are prepared at this time to change our mission and substantially expand our commitment. If that is what the sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the resolution. I therefore, ask the distinguished Senator from Arkansas if he would consent to accept an amendment, a copy of which I have supplied him. I shall read it into the record:

"On page 2, line 3, after the word 'That' insert '(a)'.

"On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

"(b) The Congress also approves and supports the efforts of the President to bring the problem of peace in southeast Asia to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the President's declaration that the United States, seeking

no extension of the present military conflict, will respond to provocation in a manner that is "limited and fitting". Our continuing policy is to limit our role to the provision of aid, training assistance, and military advice, and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid a direct military involvement in the south-east Asian conflict."

This amendment is not an interference with the exercise of the President's constitutional rights. It is merely an expression of the sense of Congress. Would the Senator accept the amendment?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It states fairly accurately what the President has said would be our policy, and what I stated my understanding was as to our policy; also what other Senators have stated. In other words, it states that our response should be appropriate and limited to the provocation, which the Senator states as "respond to provocation in a manner that is limited and fitting," and so forth. We do not wish any political or military bases there. We are not seeking to gain a colony. We seek to insure the capacity of these people to develop along the lines of their own desires, independent of domination by communism.

The Senator has put into his amendment a statement of policy that is unobjectionable. However, I cannot accept the amendment under the circumstances. I do not believe it is contrary to the joint resolution, but it is an enlargement. I am informed that the House is now voting on this resolution. The House joint resolution is about to be presented to us. I cannot accept the amendment and go to conference with it, and thus take responsibility for delaying matters.

I do not object to it as a statement of policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statements. That does not mean that as a practical matter I can accept the amendment. It would delay matters to do so. It would cause confusion and require a conference, and present us with all the other difficulties that are involved in this kind of legislative action. I regret that I cannot do it, even though I do not at all disagree with the amendment as a general statement of policy.

Mr. NELSON. Judging by the Record of yesterday, many Senators do not interpret the resolution in the same way.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Senators are entitled to have different views. However, most members of the committee, with one or two exceptions, interpret it the same way.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Wisconsin has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Differences of interpretation are necessarily always present. I think the Senator's statement is a fair statement.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 4, 1964]

THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

My fellow Americans, as President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against U.S. ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer *Maddox* on August 2 was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes.

The destroyers and supporting aircraft acted at once on the orders I gave after the initial act of aggression.

We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the U.S. Navy.

But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense but with positive reply.

ACTION NOW IN EXECUTION

That reply is being given, as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations.

In the larger sense, this new act of aggression aimed directly at our own forces again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in southeast Asia.

Aggression by terror against the peaceful villages of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America.

The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the Government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response for the present will be limited and fitting.

We Americans know—although others appear to forget—the risk of spreading conflict.

We still seek no wider war. I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries and, indeed, to all.

I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations.

CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION ASKED

Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in southeast Asia.

I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders of both parties that such a resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed with overwhelming support.

And just a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater and I am glad to say that he has expressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight.

It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States of America.

But it is my considered conviction, shared throughout your Government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace.

That firmness will always be measured. Its mission is peace.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri.

SECRETARY RUSK'S MILITARY BACKGROUND

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, there has been so much military discussion, at times I wish this was a joint hearing with the Armed Services Committee.

Yesterday we had a military man with considerable diplomatic experience; today we have a statesman with considerable military experience. When did you first join the Army?

Secretary RUSK. I began my ROTC training at the age of 12 in high school. I became a Reserve officer when I graduated from college in 1931, and was called to active duty in 1940, for the duration of World War II.

Senator SYMINGTON. Was your voice down by the time you were 12? [Laughter.]

When did you go into the service in World War II?

Secretary RUSK. I was called to duty in December 1940, which was a year before Pearl Harbor.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you outline for us your service in the Army, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I was first a company commander in the 30th Infantry of the 3d Division. Then I came to G-2 in Washington for a period of a little over a year. Then I went to the China-Burma-India theater as an operations officer and became chief of war plans and operations in the China-Burma-India theater. Then in

1945 I came back to the Pentagon as a member of the War Plans Division of the General Staff, and then was called by Secretary Marshall to serve in the State Department.

Senator SYMINGTON. I brought this up because not only do you have the right to talk on matters of diplomacy, but also on military matters, based on your great experience.

NEED TO SUPPORT FORCES IN THE FIELD

I would refer you to the Record of Wednesday, February 16. On page 3009 I asked the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee:

After noticing the heavy buildup which resulted from the decision to move our troops in force there during 1964 some logistical shortages were noted—as there always will be in peace, in industry, and in war; and I found at least one case in which shortages resulted in additional casualties, something which was frankly recognized and every effort was made by the Department of Defense to correct the situation.

Would not the able chairman agree, however, that if we do not supply the funds he is requesting in support of this bill—

talking about the pending legislation—

and which is supported so convincingly by the senior Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Saltonstall, additional casualties over a period of time are bound to occur in the fighting zones because of shortages?

Senator Russell replied:

Of course, if a hopeless impasse were to result between the Commander in Chief who ordered these men into Vietnam, and Congress, if it refused to provide for them there, it would mean that all of them would perish eventually, either through sickness, or from the bullets of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. In a short while, they would be perfectly helpless. They would have no medical facilities, no food, ammunition, no shells, and no fuel for the airplanes and helicopters now in that area.

I cannot conceive of the Senate's tolerating such a condition for a moment, without regard to the views of any Senator on the wisdom of the policy which put our boys in South Vietnam.

Would you agree with the distinguished Senator from Georgia?

Secretary RUSK. Sir, I have no doubt that we have an elementary obligation—and this has been brought out this morning in the course of our discussions—to give our men in the field every possible support in terms of supply and care that they can possibly use. And I must say I was very encouraged by my recent discussion with General Westmoreland on these matters in Honolulu. He pointed out, for example, that in the medical field a wounded man in South Vietnam in most cases is in the hands of a professional qualified doctor within an hour after his wound. This is because of the helicopters; and there were very few cases where he would not be in the hands of such a person, say, in 3 hours. This means that our losses among the wounded is a fraction of what it was in earlier wars, and that our men are sustained by the best medical care that any American Army in the field has ever received. I was also encouraged by what he said about the supply situation: that despite all of the rapid buildup and the known logistic difficulties, supply had not affected the actual operations or the welfare of the troops in the field.

VIEWS ON AMENDMENTS TO FREE DRAFTEES FROM SERVING IN VIETNAM
UNLESS THEY ARE VOLUNTEERS

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, recently a resolution was introduced which would require that any additional drafted men would not have to go to South Vietnam unless they volunteered or unless the Congress so stipulated.

There are 33,000 drafted men today in South Vietnam, roughly, and some 25 percent of our Army of around a million men are draftees.

From the standpoint of morale and justice, what would you think of that amendment, based on your military career and your knowledge of troops?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would not wish to speak for the Secretary of Defense on this particular point. I perhaps have a certain prejudice as an ex-infantryman. I believe that the responsibility for performing military duty is a general responsibility of citizenship, and that we must be rather careful about drawing too many classifications which protect some groups of citizens from the dangers involved and expose other groups of citizens to the dangers involved.

I would think that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces ought to have flexibility to use the men in uniform of the U.S. Armed Forces in whatever way the safety and security and the best interests of the Nation require.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

WHAT FURTHER STEPS AT THE U.N. ARE POSSIBLE?

There has been a suggestion in recent weeks and months about taking the matter of South Vietnam to the United Nations, which we have done. Have you any knowledge or suggestion as to how this matter can be pursued in the United Nations in a way that is not being pursued now?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that the immediate and operational parliamentary problem in the Security Council is the presence of a veto. But I think it is somewhat broader than that. It is not very likely that the United Nations will throw itself into a situation involving combat where one of the parties says, "This is none of your business; anything the United Nations decides to do is null and void."

Senator SYMINGTON. What party is that?

Secretary RUSK. That is Hanoi and Peiping: both have said that.

The Korean situation was literally unique because at that time the Soviet Union had walked out of the Security Council and was not present and its representative did not come back to the Security Council to cast its veto.

I think that we would run across, therefore, a very strong desire on the part of the United Nations membership not to take strong sides and organize a war but to explore every possibility of bringing the parties to a peaceful settlement. Now, that is what is happening at the present time in the Security Council. The nonpermanent members under the chairmanship of the distinguished Japanese representative, who is President of the Council this month, have been trying to explore it. You see when the other side said, "This is not the business of the United Nations" they also said, "This is for the Geneva machinery."

Whereupon we said, "Well, that is all right, let's have the Geneva machinery."

Then the other side said, "Well, no Geneva machinery either."

So, what the nonpermanent Security Council members at the present time are trying to do is to find out whether it is possible to get some machinery going to take up this matter and get some talk started. Thus far there has been no response from the other side that is very encouraging.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, what you say is that you are doing your best to get it before the United Nations, but you are stuck.

Secretary RUSK. We are doing our best to get the United Nations to take some action which will contribute toward peace in this situation. Their activities have been frustrated by the veto. Also, the Secretary General was denied a chance to visit Hanoi and Peiping last year. So that what the United Nations can do is, and what they probably would want to try to do, would be somewhat limited at the present time.

QUESTION OF SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, there is much criticism of your policies, policies of the administration by a certain group who, in my opinion, are predominantly interested in the problems of Europe. They talk a good deal about spheres of influence. In a world which man can now go around in 80 minutes, and considering the new development of missiles launched from submarines or surface, or Polaris, nearly every town in the world will only have a warning, at best, under 10 minutes. Do you think that spheres of influence are to a point now where any particular part of the world is a great deal more important than any other particular part, when it comes to facing up to totalitarian aggression?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think there are perhaps two separate questions there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Please reply in any way you want.

Secretary RUSK. There is the general question of spheres of influence; and the other question is whether some areas are more important than others.

I do believe that those who say that southeast Asia or Korea are in a natural sphere of influence of Peiping have an obligation to develop that in some detail as a concept for the organization of the political structure of the world.

They should determine, they should advise us, who in their judgment are supposed to be these master races. Who are the great powers who are supposed to have these dominant spheres of influence? How many of them are there? The United States, Peiping, Soviet Union, anybody else?

If so, we ought to identify who these people are.

They ought to make clear what they have in mind, then, is that everybody else is subject to such a sphere of influence, not with the independence of Mexico and Canada, our own nearest neighbors, but somehow subject to the domination of these nearby great powers. Then they ought to address themselves to the further question as to what happens if these identified great powers—three, four, five, whoever they are—then engage in a struggle among themselves for spheres of

influence. There is where the great danger lies, there is where the great danger lies.

It seems to me when we were thinking long and hard about these questions at the end of World War II, we did in fact come up with the wisest answer: that large and small nations have a right to live without being molested by their neighbors, and that a small nation has a right to live in peace and without domination by somebody else if—even if—it is within the reach of some great power.

So I must say I am very much concerned about substituting the idea of spheres of influence among a few great powers for the structure of international life laid out in the United Nations Charter.

IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT AREAS IN THE WORLD

Now, on the matter of whether some areas are more important than others: It is true that on some basic criteria of strategic position or industrial power or the qualities of population—in terms of education, and so forth—there are certain areas that are of the most vital importance. Western Europe, for example, and the great Japanese industrial structure are of the greatest possible importance from the point of view of the United States.

But even those areas, Senator, can only be secure if the commitment of the United States is considered to be valid. Therefore, when we turn ourselves to the question, can we afford to be negligent about our pledge in this area because we do not think that area is very important—although I happen to think southeast Asia is very important—we have to consider that if we are negligent about that, this bounces back into an undermining of the validity of our pledges to those areas which are of transcendent importance. So I am fearful that, if these solemn alliances which we have undertaken are not supported, we would be faced with a situation where no one would be sure about any of our alliances.

How could we persuade somebody else by saying, "Now we were not very strong over there, but, don't worry, we will be all right if you get in trouble?" How are we going to persuade them to rely upon that, and, more particularly, how are we going to persuade the Communist capitals that, although we might have appeared not to have meant business here, we will in fact mean business over there?

That is very dangerous business, that is very dangerous business.

So I would think that we need to think about the structure of the peace, for the support of which we went into these alliances, and to consider the effect upon the possibility of peace if it should prove that our commitments are not reliable.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

PRESENT POLICY IN VIETNAM A STEP TO PEACE

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, in line with that same thought, do I understand that you feel our policy of firmness in South Vietnam is really a step toward peace rather than a policy of retreat which would more or less invite war?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it is indeed. And I think this really is, if I may say so, the underlying issue in much of the public discussion not only here but in other countries in the last very few years.

It has been said of me that I am a hard liner—I would like to comment very briefly on that—and that I should come up with new ideas. Now one new idea that I am supposed to come up with apparently is that we can go back to the pre-World War II period and pick up those old ideas and pretend that they have validity in the 1960's: the idea that maybe this is only the last bite, maybe the fellow will be satisfied, maybe we do not have to be concerned about it, maybe we are not on a course to war if the aggressor begins to succeed.

Now, this is not the kind of world in which it is comfortable to be a foreign minister. It is difficult and complicated and dangerous for everybody in this room. But there are moments when, Senator, toughness is absolutely essential for peace.

I mentioned earlier this morning that when Chairman Khrushchev presented President Eisenhower with an ultimatum on Berlin, and when Chairman Khrushchev tried to intimidate President Kennedy about Berlin in Vienna in June 1961—he threatened us with war on those occasions—we would have been in the gravest danger had we not said, "Mr. Chairman, this won't do. If that is what you want, you can have it, but we had better start looking for some alternative." If, on those occasions, we do not make it quite clear where we are and where we are going to make our stand, then the prospects for peace disappear, disappear. And so the central issue here is how you organize a world peace, and whether we have learned anything over the last four decades about what is a threat to world peace.

Now, I must say I believe that if we want to be polite to the other side, if we want to avoid being rude to the other side, and we say, "Well, we don't want much trouble. You can just have South Vietnam," that is a step toward war; that is a step toward war.

Senator WILLIAMS. Thank you for answering. The reason I raised this question I wanted your views on that. The suggestion is made that this may be described as an American war, which we all hate to see. But at the same time our withdrawal under present circumstances would be described as American defeat, would it not?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

DOES SEARCH FOR PEACE ENCOURAGE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION?

Senator WILLIAMS. And I have one question; my time is limited. I want to say first, I think quite properly the President is continuing his search both through the United Nations and other sources for a peaceful solution to the conflict in Vietnam. We are all hoping for the best of success. But the question that gets raised occasionally, is it not possible that the North Vietnamese may interpret these international gestures as a sign of weakness on our part, and thereby encourage them actually to step up the war rather than to hold back. What is your comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. That, Senator, quite frankly was a part of the calculated risk that we took into account, part of the calculated risk. And it was something of a risk because there are signs that the people in Hanoi are not very sophisticated about the United States and about the outside world. For example, if we heard that 20,000 demonstrators were circling around the headquarters in Hanoi calling for peace, we would be inclined to think that the war was over. Whether they are sophisticated enough to know that 20,000 demonstrators

circling around the White House does not mean that the war is over so far as we are concerned, one does not know.

I think that some of the Communist countries—in Moscow, for example—know enough about us to not make that mistake. But we have to take that into account. I think, sir, on balance that Hanoi understands that the desire to bring this matter to a conference table was not a demonstration of weakness, partly because they see American strength right in their own back yard—they see the amount of strength that is present.

Senator WILLIAMS. And in line with the question of Senator Church about Chinese reaction to our establishment of bases in southeast Asia, have we not repeatedly stated that we have no such intentions of establishing permanent basis in southeast Asia and that if there is a peaceful solution that we would withdraw at that time?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. All they need to do is to test that, to test that by coming and making some peace and finding out.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Dodd?

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator DODD. Mr. Secretary, I shall not detain you long because a good part of the questions I asked you this morning. I have heard you many times before this committee and other places, and I can only say to you again what I have said I guess to a tiresome degree, I think you are one of the great statesmen of the world.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

Senator DODD. And I think you have presented the case for the people of the United States and the administration as brilliantly as it can be done.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

Senator DODD. I have never heard a more intelligent presentation and a more accurate historical one.

Mr. Secretary, I am troubled, and have been for some time, about the tendency on the part of many people to equate the position of the United States with that of the forces of aggressive communism. Senator Williams touched on it, and it is of interest to me and I would like to have your comment on it.

PURPOSE OF U.S. BASES IS NOT AGGRESSION

I have heard it said all the time, "Well, after all, we forced Khrushchev to take his missiles out of Cuba. We have our Polaris and other submarines, all kinds of bases around the world, we are really in the same posture."

I think this is a basic error. I think it is a false premise. I think it would help our people very much if you took a minute or two to state your view about it. I may add this, it seems so clear in logic and in historical fact that we are not an aggressive power, that every action we have taken has been a defensive one, a reaction to an aggressive act. Every base we have, every submarine under the sea, every aircraft in the sky, every soldier at arms is in that posture today because of aggressive threat or act from the forces of aggressive communism.

Am I right about that?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, just after, at the close of World War II, we demobilized at a rate and at a depth which meant that in early 1946 we did not have a single division ready for combat nor a single air group ready for combat.

We moved, as you will recall, in the Baruch proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons for everybody, including ourselves. And we began to concentrate on binding up the wounds of war and getting on with the civilian business of man.

Since 1947 the United States has spent \$800 billion on its defense budgets. The story of that increase of defense effort is a story of specific steps of aggression launched by the other side, most of which appear on the agenda of the Security Council of the United Nations.

These alliances of which we are a part would lose their significance if the other side would live at peace. No one is building these alliances just for the fun of it. We could get on with disarmament if we could accompany disarmament measures with political settlements and an assurance that the peace in fact would be observed.

I realize this is a presumptuous statement for any American to make, but I am deeply convinced that there is no people in the world who are more deeply peace loving than are the American people, and that, if we be given a chance to demonstrate it, everyone would see what we are all about and what we would really prefer to do with those \$800 billion of our resources.

So—nevertheless—we have faced a series of tough problems initiated by the other side: a blockade of Berlin, guerrillas in Greece, all the rest of it, which has made it necessary for us to exert ourselves to deal with the issue of aggression as it has come from different quarters.

It is tragic that this should be so in the 1960's after all that we have been through in the last four decades.

I would hope that we could reach a point where it would be recognized on the other side that aggression is simply out as an instrument of policy, that if there are differences, we ought to get at them around the conference table, that if there are ideological differences, let the peoples themselves decide in what has been called peaceful competition or some have called peaceful coexistence—let the peoples decide these things and not have them decided on the battlefield.

DOUBLE STANDARDS

We do, Senator, get into a bit of a problem with a double standard; with a double standard.

I have seen a good many petitions lately calling upon us to do X, Y, or Z for peace in southeast Asia. But very few of those petitions ask Hanoi to do anything. I saw a full page ad in the paper the other day calling on us to do four or five things. It didn't ask Hanoi to do anything.

We can't have peace on that basis. We can have peace on a reciprocal basis, and we have done everything that we can to show to the other side that on the basis of reciprocity, we can have peace very quickly.

So, we have that problem of double standards. But I do believe that there is broad understanding throughout the world that this almost unbelievable power of the United States has not really corrupted the purposes of the American people, and that we would be the first

to lead the way toward peace if there were others who would join us and say, "We are not going to commit aggression against our neighbors."

Senator DODD. Well, I am most grateful for your answer and I think it will help the American people to better understand the posture we are in and what we are up against.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to have inserted into the record, if it is permissible at this time, an article from the New York times—I don't have the date of it but I will supply it—written by Mr. Felix Belair, Jr., in which he relates that conversation in which President Eisenhower endorsed the decision of President Johnson with respect to the resumption of bombings. I think this is significant because I think these hearings have been watched by vast numbers of people. I think the world ought to know that our country isn't really torn apart, and that we are not in such great disunion as may appear.

Here is a former President of the opposition party who says that he thinks the President is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be inserted.
(The article referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Feb. 1, 1966]

EISENHOWER CALLS JOHNSON UNQUESTIONABLY RIGHT—INDEFINITE LULL IN RAIDS WOULD ONLY AID ENEMY, HE SAYS—HANOI DENOUNCED BY GENERAL FOR "ESCALATING" CONFLICT

(By Felix Belair, Jr.)

WASHINGTON, January 31.—Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower said today that President Johnson "unquestionably has made the correct decision" in ordering a resumption of bombing in North Vietnam.

To have done otherwise, General Eisenhower said, would have "given sanctuary to those responsible for sending guerrilla forces and supplies into South Vietnam" for the purpose of imposing their will on the government and people of that country.

The general expressed his views on the President's decision in a telephone conversation from his winter residence in Desert City, Calif. His response to a request for comment was immediate and extemporaneous.

"BRINKMANSHIP" DENIED

In addition to providing safe passage from the north for the guerrilla forces and supplies infiltrating into South Vietnam through Laos, he asserted, an indefinite suspension of bombing would "only make certain that he would have to face the Communist aggressor on other battlefields elsewhere in southeast Asia."

"We are in South Vietnam at the invitation of that Government," he said, "and I'm for winning the battle here and not in some more remote place not of our own choosing."

He had no sympathy at all, General Eisenhower said, with some Members of the Senate, and others who maintained that a bombing resumption in the north would be escalating the war and playing at "brinkmanship with a nuclear world war III."

He contended that it was Hanoi, working through the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the political affiliate of the Vietcong, that had done the escalating. In addition to a completely negative response to President Johnson's peace overtures, he said, North Vietnam's Communist regime had used the period of suspended bombing to strengthen their forces in the south and send more equipment.

The Vietcong forces had expanded their attacks on U.S. military installations and barracks while continuing their bombing of nonmilitary civilian targets such as buses and other public facilities, the former President said.

All this required that American forces react, and the bombing of North Vietnamese targets was part of that reaction, he said. He added that "in the circumstances there was nothing the President could do but order a resumption of the bombing."

General Eisenhower's voice was strong and he was at no loss for words to express his views on the President's decision. He said he was feeling fine again and today had played nine holes of golf for the first time since his heart attack in November.

Gavin view rejected

Although General Eisenhower did not say so, his views on any U.S. military involvement always are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are sometimes solicited by President Johnson.

Without going into the question of limited warfare as opposed to an expansion of hostilities in Vietnam. General Eisenhower rejected the recent proposal by Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin (retired) that the U.S. forces withdraw into several coastal enclaves in South Vietnam so as to limit the war while pursuing peace efforts.

The general raised the question of what the Vietcong would be doing throughout the rest of South Vietnam while U.S. forces sat securely in their enclaves.

The general said that such a course would only postpone an inevitable decision to meet force with force.

Senator DODD. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I won't detain you very long. I am so much pleased about you and everything you do that I couldn't add any more.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Mr. Secretary, I want to follow up your mention to Senator Dodd about reciprocity and revert also to one of the questions of Senator Aiken, where, as I understood it, you said that what we were really concerned with in South Vietnam is the external aggression that has come in from North Vietnam. If this were truly a civil war we would let them handle it so. You said we were not the gendarmes of the world.

WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE NORTH VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL?

Now I am just probing, as we all are, for ways—not necessarily at the conference table because we may never get there—but just ways to achieve a diminution of hostilities. Would it be your position that, if the North Vietnamese withdrew their regular troops, their infiltrators, we would get out of South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. I think that, if they were to show the slightest interest in withdrawing their regular armed forces and infiltrators, we could move to peace very quickly and the United States could withdraw its forces. That would be a major change in the situation.

Senator PELL. I wonder if this message, though this hearing will do it in a small way, is being sufficiently telegraphed to the enemy because I am not sure that the American people, even in my own State of Rhode Island, much less the people in the world, are aware of the fact our troops would get out if the North Vietnamese would get out of South Vietnam. Do you feel we have adequately conveyed this message or are we conveying it now?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have stated it over and over again publicly for the information of our own people. I think it is entirely possible that some of them don't understand that. But, what is more important, we have indicated these matters privately and responsibly and in the greatest seriousness to the other side through many channels.

Senator PELL. I don't mean to press this point too hard, but when we talk about withdrawal of the North Vietnamese infiltrators from South Vietnam, would you differentiate between those who are South Vietnamese Communists who have gone north, been trained and come back as opposed to those who are born in North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese, who have been infiltrated south? Or would you consider them all together?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, if there were a representative from Hanoi sitting on the other side of this table I could at least have a colloquy with him on that subject. Actually these people are participating in the aggression. The aggression ought to be lifted. This would be a difficult point, but a lot of these people—these southerners who went north and then came back—a good many of them are coming over these days as defectors who have had enough of the National Liberation Front.

This is a rather complicated question, but it is one that can be addressed in the course of negotiations if we ever get anybody to negotiate with.

MEASURES REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator PELL. I would like to revert to article 51, which you cited earlier, and ask, with respect to the second portion which reads "measures taken by members in the exercise of their self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council" and ask what actions we have taken in the past to report these measures to the Security Council. You cited 1964 and then a week or so ago—

Secretary RUSK. We have. I will be glad to furnish for the record a detailed statement of the communications to the U.N. We have made periodic reports. In August 1964 we reported that action to the Security Council; and when we started the bombing in February 1965 we reported that to the Security Council; and when we resumed the bombing we took the matter to the Security Council.

(The statement referred to follows:)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., February 25, 1966.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee on February 18, the Secretary said he would submit for the record a list of all communications which the U.S. Government has addressed to the United Nations concerning Vietnam.

I am pleased to transmit this list to you, together with a copy of each document concerned. The list includes communications from the United States which have been circulated by the United Nations in its document series as official communications from a member state, or which have otherwise been made public.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

PUBLIC U.S. COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. August 5, 1964.—Letter from Ambassador Stevenson requesting a Security Council meeting on the Tonkin Gulf incidents (S/5849).

2. September 9, 1964.—Ambassador Stevenson informed the Security Council President of U.S. views on the report of the Security Council Mission to Cambodia and Vietnam dated July 27, 1964. In particular, he commended the report's suggestions looking toward the establishment of a group of U.N. observers

and the resumption of political relations between Cambodia and Vietnam. He concluded that implementation of the report's recommendations represented "practical, although limited, steps by which the U.N. can exercise its peace-keeping responsibilities and contribute to a reduction of tension in southeast Asia" (S/5955).

3. *February 7, 1965.*—Letter from Ambassador Stevenson informing the Council members, in accordance with article 51 of the U.N. Charter, of the air attacks against military installations in North Vietnam which were undertaken by the United States and Government of Vietnam in response to increasing infiltration from the north and expanded attacks by Vietcong forces in the south (S/6174).

4. *February 27, 1965.*—Ambassador Stevenson's letter to the Security Council President forwarding for the information of all U.N. members the text of the Department's paper entitled "Aggression from the North" (S/6206).

5. *April 2, 1965.*—In a letter to the Security Council President, Ambassador Stevenson rejected a Soviet charge that U.S. forces were using "poisonous gases" in Vietnam. The U.S. letter attached excerpts from Secretary Rusk's March 25, 1965, press conference on this subject (S/6270).

6. *April 9, 1965.*—The text of President Johnson's April 7 address at Johns Hopkins University was transmitted to the Security Council President for the information of all U.N. members.

7. *July 28, 1965.*—President Johnson wrote Secretary-General U Thant expressing the hope that all the resources of the United Nations could be used to bring about peace in Vietnam.

8. *July 30, 1965.*—Ambassador Goldberg wrote the Security Council President informing U.N. members of U.S. efforts to find a peaceful solution in Vietnam and inviting the members of the Security Council to collaborate with the United States in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security in southeast Asia. (S/6575).

9. *January 4, 1966.*—Ambassador Goldberg informed the Secretary General of the purposes and content of the U.S. "peace offensive" and again urged members of the Security Council to give even more earnest thought to what they might do to achieve peace in Vietnam (S/7067).

10. *January 31, 1966.*—Ambassador Goldberg requested the Security Council President to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in Vietnam (S/7105).

LETTER DATED AUGUST 4, 1964, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the United States, I request that you convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the serious situation created by deliberate attacks of the Hanoi regime on U.S. naval vessels in international waters.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 9, 1964, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the report of the Security Council mission to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam which was submitted to the President of the Security Council on July 27, 1964 (S/5832).

After studying the report with great care and interest, my Government has come to the conclusion that the recommendations made in part VI—particularly those looking toward the establishment of a group of United Nations observers and the resumption of political relations between Cambodia and Vietnam—offer genuine promise of reducing the incidents which have occurred along the common border between Cambodia and Vietnam and, at the same time, other sources of recent tension between these two countries. My Government believes that the members of the Security Council mission should be commended for the wisdom they demonstrated in making recommendations which have two great merits: not only do they point in the direction of an improved future, but also they point to practical, albeit modest, ways in which the United Nations can again exercise its fundamental and indispensable peace-keeping responsibilities. My Government has noted with satisfaction that the Republic of Vietnam, one of the two prin-

cial parties concerned, has exhibited a forthcoming attitude toward the recommendations of the Security Council mission.

These recommendations stem from the Security Council resolution of June 4, 1964 (S/5741)—a resolution which was passed in response to a complaint brought before the Council on an urgent basis by the Royal Government of Cambodia. It has been, therefore, a source of both surprise and regret to my Government to note the attitude of the Royal Cambodian Government toward the report of the Security Council mission. In addition to casting aspersions upon the independence, objectivity, and impartiality of the members of the Security Council mission, the Royal Cambodian Government has adopted an attitude towards the report which argues, on the one hand, that the mission's recommendations are not responsive to the Cambodian complaint and, on the other hand, that the United Nations is not competent to judge what steps can be taken to ameliorate a situation brought to the Security Council by the Cambodian Government itself. Faced with this incongruous attitude of the Royal Cambodian Government, my Government has been perplexed in its efforts to discern the motive behind the Cambodian complaint to the Security Council.

My Government has been surprised by a further element of incongruity; namely, despite its contention that United Nations organs are not competent to suggest remedial measures for the unfortunate friction along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, the Royal Cambodian Government has continued to bring to the attention of the Security Council charges of alleged violations of Cambodian territory or air space by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States. One of these charges constitutes a very serious accusation to be leveled against any country. I am referring, of course, to the Cambodian charge that the Republic of Vietnam and my Government have recently engaged in chemical warfare against the civilian population of Cambodia. This charge was made in a cable to the Security Council President from the Cambodian Foreign Minister (S/5839) and has been repeated elsewhere, often with differing details.

My Government has repeatedly and categorically denied this Cambodian charge, as has the Republic of Vietnam. Further, both my Government and the Republic of Vietnam have proposed an impartial international investigation of the Cambodian charge. The Royal Cambodian Government has been unwilling to agree to such an impartial investigation. A letter of August 30 to the Security Council President from Foreign Minister Sambath, while reasserting the charge, suggests that the request for an impartial inquiry has come "too late" and is "unacceptable under present circumstances" (S/5940). An earlier official Cambodian statement, a communique from the Ministry of Information on August 16, stated *inter alia* that the assistance of "foreign bureaucrats" was not necessary in counting the number of victims of the chemical warfare allegedly undertaken by the Republic of Vietnam and my Government. This, of course, was not what had been proposed. The proposal was, rather, that a qualified international body be permitted to conduct an impartial inquiry into completely unsubstantiated charges that many Cambodians died as a result of poisonous chemicals spread over Cambodian territory by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States.

Although the reasons for the Cambodian attitude may not be clear, it is apparent that the Royal Cambodian Government is unwilling to subject its charges to the scrutiny of impartial investigation. In this connection, it is worth particular note that two of the occasions on which it is charged that South Vietnamese aircraft dispersed poisonous chemicals over Cambodian territory allegedly took place well before the Security Council mission had arrived in Cambodia; another occasion allegedly took place while the mission was visiting the Republic of Vietnam. It is difficult to understand why the Royal Cambodian Government did not bring these alleged incidents to the attention of the Security Council mission while it was in the area.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to reiterate my Government's belief that the recommendations in the report of the Security Council mission—assuming arrangements can be agreed on for their implementation—represent practical, although limited, steps by which the United Nations can exercise its peacekeeping responsibilities and contribute to a reduction of tension in southeast Asia. My Government can only regret that the Royal Cambodian Government does not look upon these recommendations—which stemmed from its own urgent appeal to the Security Council—in a similar light.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1965, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honor to inform you of the following acts which have further disturbed the peace in Vietnam.

In the early morning of February 7, Vietnamese time, Vietcong forces carried out coordinated attacks on South Vietnamese airbases in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa, on two barracks installations in the Pleiku area, and on a number of villages in the area of Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. Numerous casualties were inflicted, and at least one village was burned.

These attacks by the Vietcong, which operate under the military orders of North Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi, were a concerted and politically timed effort to sharpen and intensify the aggression at a moment designed for broader effect in the field of international politics, and to test the will of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States to resist that aggression.

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the United States immediately consulted and agreed that it was necessary to take prompt defensive action. Accordingly, on the afternoon of February 7, Vietnamese time, United States and South Vietnamese air elements were directed to take joint action against certain military facilities in the southern area of North Vietnam. An attack was carried through against Dong Hoi, which is a military installation and one of the major staging areas for the infiltration of armed cadres of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam in violation of international law and of the Geneva accords of 1954.

The Vietcong attacks of February 7 related directly to the central problem in Vietnam. That central problem is not one of a struggle by one element of the population in South Vietnam against the Government. There is, rather, a pattern of military operations directed, staffed, and supplied in crucial respects from outside the country. Up to 34,000 armed and trained soldiers have infiltrated into South Vietnam from the north since 1959. In addition, key items of equipment, such as mortars of the type employed in the attacks of February 7, have come from North Vietnam. During 1964, the infiltration of men and equipment has increased sharply, and virtually all of those now coming in are natives of North Vietnam.

Infiltration in such numbers can hardly be labeled "indirect aggression"—though that form of aggression is illegal too. What we are witnessing in Vietnam today is a sustained attack for more than 6 years across a frontier set by international agreement.

Members of the Security Council will recall that we discussed in the Council, in August 1964, aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United States in the Gulf of Tonkin. At that time we described these attacks as part of a pattern which includes the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against legitimate Government of South Vietnam, the arming of terrorist gangs in South Vietnam, the assassination of local officials as an instrument of policy, the continued fighting in Laos in violation of the Geneva agreements—a pattern, in short, of deliberate systematic and flagrant violations of international agreements by the regime in Hanoi which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law, and civilized practice, is bound by their provisions.

The Republic of Vietnam, and at its request the Government of the United States and other governments, are resisting this systematic and continuing aggression. Since reinforcement of the Vietcong by infiltrators from North Vietnam is essential to this continuing aggression, countermeasures to arrest such reinforcement from the outside are a justified measure of self-defense.

Mr. President, my Government is reporting the measures which we have taken in accordance with our public commitment to assist the Republic of Vietnam against aggression from the north.

We deeply regret that the Hanoi regime, in its statement of August 8, 1964, which was circulated in Security Council document S/5888, explicitly denied the right of the Security Council to examine this problem. The disrespect of the Hanoi regime for the United Nations adds to the concern which any United Nations member state must feel about Hanoi's violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Nevertheless, I would remind you, and through you other members of the Security Council and of the United Nations, that our mission in southeast Asia is peace and that our purpose is to insure respect for the peaceful settlement to which all concerned are committed.

We therefore reserve the right to bring this matter to the Security Council if the situation warrants it.

In a statement issued this morning on behalf of President Johnson, the U.S. Government once again emphasized that "we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors. The key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from North Vietnam and the clear indication by the Hanoi regime that it is prepared to cease aggression against its neighbors."

Our objective is a peaceful settlement. This would require both the self-restraint of the regime to the north and the presence of effective international peacekeeping machinery to make sure that promises are kept.

This is our purpose. But we will not permit the situation to be changed by terror and violence and this is the meaning of our action this weekend.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1965, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

For the information of the members of the Security Council, I am transmitting a special report entitled "Aggression From the North, the Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam" which my Government is making public today. It presents evidence from which the following conclusions are inescapable:

First, the subjugation by force of the Republic of Vietnam by the regime in North Vietnam is the formal, official policy of that regime; this has been stated and confirmed publicly over the past 5 years.

Second, the war in Vietnam is directed by the central committee of the Lao Dong Party (Communist) which controls the government in northern Vietnam.

Third, the so-called People's Revolutionary Party in the Republic of Vietnam is an integral part of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam.

Fourth, the so-called Liberation Front for South Vietnam is a subordinate unit of the central office for South Vietnam, an integral part of the governmental machinery in Hanoi.

Fifth, the key leadership of the Vietcong—officers, specialists, technicians, intelligence agents, political organizers, and propagandists—has been trained, equipped, and supplied in the north and sent into the Republic of Vietnam under Hanoi's military orders.

Sixth, most of the weapons, including new types recently introduced, and most of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Vietcong, have been sent from North to South Vietnam.

Seventh, the scale of infiltration of men and arms, including regular units of the armed forces of North Vietnam, has increased appreciably in recent months.

Eighth, this entire pattern of activity by the regime in Hanoi is in violation of general principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and is in direct violation of the Geneva accords of 1954. Such a pattern of violation of the treaty obligations undertaken at Geneva was confirmed by a special report of the International Control Commission in 1962 and it has been greatly intensified since then.

These facts about the situation in Vietnam make it unmistakably clear that the character of that conflict is an aggressive war of conquest waged against a neighbor—and make nonsense of the cynical allegation that this is simply an indigenous insurrection.

I request that you circulate copies of the report, together with copies of this letter, to the delegations of all member states as a Security Council document.

In making this information available to the Security Council, my Government wishes to say once more that peace can be restored quickly to Vietnam by a prompt and assured cessation of aggression by Hanoi against the Republic of Vietnam. In that event, my Government—as it has said many times before—would be happy to withdraw its military forces from the Republic of Vietnam and turn promptly to an international effort to assist the economic and social development of southeast Asia.

In the meantime, my Government awaits the first indication of any intent by the government in Hanoi to return to the ways of peace and peaceful resolution of this international conflict.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

LETTER DATED APRIL 2, 1965, FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on March 27, 1965, the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union asked that there be circulated as a Security Council document what he described as "a note of March 26 from the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States" (S/6260).

In actual fact, the communication to which the Soviet representative referred was rejected by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The reason was simple: the Soviet communication was based on the completely false allegation that poisonous gases are being used in South Vietnam in connection with resistance to the aggressive campaign of conquest being waged by North Vietnam against the Republic of Vietnam.

Poisonous gases, the use of which would rightfully concern the conscience of humanity, have not been used in Vietnam, nor is there any intention of employing them. The materials which were employed in Vietnam are commonly used by police forces in riot control in many parts of the world and are commonly accepted as appropriate for such purposes. They are nontoxic and of course are not prohibited by the Geneva Convention of 1925, nor by any other understandings on the subject. These facts were of course entirely familiar to the Soviet Union when it drafted the tendentious and willfully misleading communication referred to above.

The United States is, of course, assisting—and will continue to assist—the Republic of Vietnam in repelling subversion, terrorism, and infiltration. At the same time, there is nothing the United States desires more than to have peace restored to that country as quickly as possible.

The position of the U.S. Government on the matter raised in the Soviet communication was made incontrovertibly clear by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in a statement on March 24, the substance of which is attached.

I would be grateful if you would have this letter and its attachment circulated as a Security Council document.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

PORTIONS OF STATEMENT MADE BY THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE
ON MARCH 24, 1965

"Now, we understand the concern around the world and in this country about the specter of gas warfare. These memories go back to World War I, when tens of thousands were killed or maimed by what might be called 'military gases.'

"This is not involved here.

"We are talking about a gas which has been commonly adopted by the police forces of the world as riot control agents—gases that are available commercially, and have been used on many occasions, some in this country; and on many occasions in other countries.

"Now, why is tear gas a part of the equipment of police forces?

"It is because police forces would like to be able to use the minimum force that is required for the maintenance of law and order. It is a minimum instrument. And my information is that certain situations arose in South Vietnam where this problem presented itself.

"On one occasion, for example, the Vietcong had seized a village, was holding the villagers in hostage, and was firing through these villagers at mixed crowds outside the village.

"The decision was made to employ tear gas to try to deal with that situation as a riot control type of problem, in order to avoid the problem of whether to use artillery or aerial bombs that would inflict great damage upon innocent people.

"There is no question here about gas warfare, nor gas in contravention of established conventions * * *.

"* * * We are not engaged in gas warfare. It is against our policy to do so, as it is against the policies of most other governments that I know about.

"But we are reminded, when something of this sort comes up, of the nature of the war in South Vietnam. It isn't a comfortable and easy war * * *. It is a mean, dirty struggle carried out without regard to ordinary norms of conduct by the Vietcong.

"Those who are concerned about tear gas, I would hope would be concerned about the fact that during 1964 over 400 civilian officials were killed, and over

a thousand were kidnaped in South Vietnam—village chiefs, schoolteachers, public health officers. Among other civilians, 1,300 were killed, over 8,000 were kidnaped, entire village populations have been kidnaped and their villages burned to the ground, and families of those who were in the armed forces were held as hostages.

"There is nothing more urgent, from the point of view of the United States, than that peace be restored to that country as quickly as possible. And peace can be restored if Hanoi will stop infiltrating militarily trained personnel into South Vietnam, stop the sending of arms into South Vietnam, and stop directing these operations aimed at taking over South Vietnam against the wishes of the people of that country."

LETTER DATED APRIL 9, 1965, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In view of the legitimate interests of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security in southeast Asia, as well as the closely related problems of economic and social development in that area, I request that you have circulated as a Security Council document for the information of all members of the United Nations the important statement of U.S. policy delivered by President Johnson on April 7, a copy of which is attached.

My Government is confident that those countries sincerely interested in peace and prosperity in southeast Asia will give this statement their most sympathetic and careful consideration.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT AT SHRIVER HALL AUDITORIUM, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, BALTIMORE, MD.

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some 2 dozen countries having an interest in southeast Asia. We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world.

I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change.

This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is a principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Vietnam.

Vietnam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Vietnam's steaming soil.

Why must we take this painful road?

Why must this Nation hazard its case, its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason and the waste of war, the works of peace.

We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place.

The first reality is that North Vietnam has attacked the independent nation of South Vietnam. Its object is total conquest.

Of course, some of the people of South Vietnam are participating in attack on their own Government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from north to south.

This support is the heartbeat of the war.

And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnaping. Women and children are strangled in the night

because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Vietnam?

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Vietnam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence.

And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe from Berlin to Thailand are people whose well-being rests in part on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must stay in southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

We will do everything necessary to reach that objective and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Vietnam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression.

We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact:

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery—the will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is futile—our resources

are equal to any challenge—because we fight for values and we fight for principle, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement.

Such peace demands an independent South Vietnam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference, tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the Governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again 50 times and more to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready with this purpose for unconditional discussions.

And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle—Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Vietnam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.

But we will use it.

This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Vietnam want? They want what their neighbors also desire—food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to learn, progress for their country, and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle.

These countries of southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrestle existence from the soil. They are often wracked by diseases, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.

Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won though by arms alone. It also requires the works of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

The first step is for the countries of southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Vietnam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.

The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area, and as far back as 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Vietnam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway.

And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror with progress.

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA.

The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care.

Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the process of development.

And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not

allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and rice and cotton.

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding, patriotic, and distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank.

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, and elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change—as we see in our own country—does not always come without conflict.

We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful, or because we have made some mistakes, or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power, and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

The ordinary men and women of North Vietnam and South Vietnam—of China and India—of Russia and America—are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love, and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge—always before denied—to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

A dam built across a great river is impressive.

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchen warmed, and the home heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside—yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive.

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive.

These—not mighty arms—are the achievements which the American nation believes to be impressive.

And—if we are steadfast—the time may come when all other nations will also find it so.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can to unite this country? Have I done everything I can do to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Ask yourselves that question in your homes—and in this hall tonight—Have we, each of us, all done all we can do? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or understand.

We can do all these things on a scale that has never been dreamed of before.

Well, we will choose life. And so doing we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.

[From the Office of the White House Press Secretary]

TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO HIS EXCELLENCY U THANT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 28, 1965.

HIS EXCELLENCY U THANT,
Secretary-General of the United Nations
United Nations, New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL: I want you to know from me directly of the very great personal confidence which I place in Ambassador Goldberg. His appointment as permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations—and his acceptance of this responsibility in the circumstances—is, I hope, strong evidence that this Government places the very highest importance on the work of the United Nations and will continue to give it our utmost support.

I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg especially to maintain close contact with you on the situation in Vietnam. Your efforts in the past to find some way to remove that dispute from the battlefield to the negotiating table are much appreciated and highly valued by my Government. I trust they will be continued.

Meanwhile, as I stated publicly last April, the Government of the United States is prepared to enter into negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions. That remains our policy.

And as I stated in San Francisco last month, we hope that the members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, will use their influence to bring to the negotiating table all governments involved in an attempt to halt all aggression and evolve a peaceful solution. I continue to hope that the United Nations can, in fact, be effective in this regard.

I hope that you will communicate to us, through Ambassador Goldberg, any helpful suggestions that may occur to you that can strengthen our common search for the road to peace in southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

LETTER DATED JULY 30, 1965, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The President of the United States announced on July 28, 1965, certain steps being taken by my Government to lend further assistance to the Republic of Vietnam in resisting armed aggression.

At the same time the President reaffirmed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the willingness of the United States to enter into negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions, and again invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about discussions in a negotiating forum. On July 29, the Secretary-General immediately sent a most welcome and appreciated reply, stating his determination to pursue his efforts to remove the dispute over Vietnam from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

The Security Council, which has a legitimate interest in the peace of southeast Asia, has been kept informed of the policy of my Government with respect to the dangerous course of events in that part of the world. For example, my late predecessor, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, told the Council more than a year ago, on May 21, 1964:

“* * * the United States has no—repeat no—national military objective anywhere in southeast Asia. U.S. policy for southeast Asia is very simple. It is the restoration of peace so that the peoples of that area can go about their own independent business in whatever associations they may freely choose for themselves without interferences from the outside.”

Members of the Council also are aware of the prolonged and repeated efforts of the U.S. Government to open a path to peaceful solution of the disputes of southeast Asia, beginning with our acceptance of the terms of the Geneva accords of 1954. These efforts have included:

Various approaches to Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow.

Support of peaceful overtures by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Favorable reactions to proposals made by 17 nonaligned nations, and later by the Government of India.

Approval of efforts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to initiate peace talks.

Endorsement of a larger role for the United Nations in southeast Asia, including a United Nations mission of observers along the frontier between Vietnam and Cambodia; a United Nations mission to investigate alleged suppression of minority rights in Vietnam; and a United Nations invitation to Hanoi to participate in Security Council discussions of the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Major participation, directly and through the United Nations, in economic and social development projects in southeast Asia.

A direct appeal by the President of the United States to the members of the United Nations to use their influence in bringing all parties to the peace table.

Repeated assertions on the highest authority that the United States is prepared to engage in negotiations or discussions of any character with no prior conditions whatever.

On at least 15 occasions in the past 4½ years, the United States has initiated or supported efforts to resolve the issues in southeast Asia by peaceful negotiations.

I am sure that the other members of the Security Council share the deep regrets of my Government in the fact that none of these initiatives has met with any favorable response whatever. It is especially unfortunate that the regime in Hanoi, which along with the Republic of Vietnam, is most directly involved in the conflict, has denied the competence of the United Nations to concern itself with this dispute in any manner and has even refused to participate in the discussions in the Council.

Nonetheless, our commitments under the Charter of the United Nations require us to persist in the search for a negotiated end to the cruel and futile violence that ravages the Republic of Vietnam. This responsibility—to persist in the search for peace—weighs especially upon the members of the Security Council, the primary organ of the United Nations for peace and security affairs.

The purpose of this communication therefore is to reemphasize to the members of the Council the following points:

First, that the United States will continue to provide, in whatever measure and for whatever period is necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Vietnam in defending their independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.

Second, the United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of southeast Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin.

Third, the United States will continue to explore independently and in conjunction with others, all possible routes to an honorable and durable peace in southeast Asia.

Fourth, the United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world.

It is the hope of my Government that the members of the Security Council will somehow find the means to respond effectively to the challenge raised by the present state of affairs in southeast Asia.

I respectfully request that this communication be circulated to the members of the United Nations as a Security Council document.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

LETTER DATED JANUARY 4, 1966, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

My Government has during the past 2 weeks been taking a number of steps in pursuit of peace which flow in part from our obligations under the United Nations Charter, of which we are most mindful, and in part from the appeals which His Holiness the Pope and you addressed just before Christmas to us and to others. I believe it would be of interest to you, in addition to what we have already communicated to you privately, and to all states members of the United Nations to know more precisely what we have done, and what we have in mind.

You will observe that we have already responded in terms which go somewhat beyond the appeals earlier addressed to us. President Johnson dispatched messages, and in several cases personal representatives, to His Holiness the Pope, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to a considerable number of chiefs of state or heads of government, reaffirming our desire promptly to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam and to do all in our power to move that conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. In this connection, our bombing of North Vietnam has not been resumed since the Christmas truce.

Among the points made in our messages conveyed to a number of governments are the following: that the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

I should appreciate it if this letter could be communicated to all members of the United Nations as a Security Council document. I should urge them in examining it to recall President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General in which the President invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about unconditional discussions, and my letter of July 30, 1965 (document S/6575) to the President of the Security Council in which I said, *inter alia*, that the United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world. I should hope that on the present occasion also organs of the United Nations and all States would give even more earnest thought to what they might do to help to achieve these ends.

(Signed) ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

LETTER DATED JANUARY 31, 1966, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honor to request that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam.

As you know, the U.S. Government has, time and time again, patiently and tirelessly sought a peaceful settlement of this conflict on the basis of unconditional negotiations and the Geneva accords of 1954. We have done so both inside and outside the United Nations.

In President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General, in my letter of July 30, 1965, to the President of the Security Council, and in my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General, we appealed for whatever help in ending the conflict the Security Council and its members or any other organ of the United Nations might be able to give. We have also been in constant touch with the Secretary General in order to keep him fully informed and to seek his counsel and assistance. A great number of United Nations members, acting jointly or separately, have with our earnest encouragement sought to find a means of moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

As you are also aware, because my Government was advised by many others that a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam might contribute to the acceptance

by its Government of our offer of unconditional negotiations, we did suspend bombing on December 24, and continued that suspension for some 37 days. At the same time, President Johnson dispatched several high-ranking representatives to explain to His Holiness the Pope and to the chiefs of state or heads of government of a number of states our most earnest desire to end the conflict peacefully and promptly. Our views were set forth in 14 points which were communicated to a very large number of governments and later published and which were summarized in the third paragraph of my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General. I should like to repeat that summary to you as follows:

"That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples."

Subsequently, the President in his state of the Union address on January 12 reiterated once again our willingness to consider at a conference or in other negotiations any proposals which might be put forward by others. I am authorized to inform the Council that these views were transmitted both directly and indirectly to the Government of North Vietnam and were received by that Government.

Unhappily, there has been no affirmative response whatsoever from Hanoi to our efforts to bring the conflict to the negotiating table, to which so many governments lent their sympathy and assistance. Instead, there have been from Hanoi, and, of course, from Peiping as well, merely the familiar charges that our peace offensive, despite the prolonged bombing pause, was merely a "fraud" and a "swindle" deserving no serious consideration. The most recent response seemed to be that set forth in President Ho Chi Minh's letter to certain heads of state which was broadcast from Hanoi on January 28. In this letter President Ho Chi Minh made quite clear his unwillingness at this time to proceed with unconditional negotiations; on the contrary, he insisted on a number of preconditions which would in effect require the United States to accept Hanoi's solution before negotiations had even begun. This is obviously unacceptable.

Therefore, Mr. President, my Government has concluded that it should now bring this problem with all its implications for peace formally before the Security Council. We are mindful of the discussions over the past months among the members of the Council as to whether a formal meeting could usefully be held in the context of other efforts then in train. We are also aware that it may not be easy for the Council itself, in view of all the obstacles, to take constructive action on this question. We are firmly convinced, however, that in light of its obligations under the charter to maintain international peace and security and the failure so far of all efforts outside the United Nations to restore peace, the Council should address itself urgently and positively to this situation and exert its most vigorous endeavors and its immense prestige to finding a prompt solution to it.

We hope that the members of the Security Council will agree that our common dedication to peace and our common responsibility for the future of mankind require no less. In this connection, we are mindful of the renewed appeal of His Holiness the Pope only 2 days ago in which he suggested that "an arbitration of the United Nations confided to neutral nations might tomorrow—we would like to hope even today—resolve this terrible question."

Accept, etc.

(Signed) ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

Senator PELL. I can't help but observe the last time we were talking here, I think, being low man on the totem pole, the last question I asked was that I hoped you would take it to the U.N. I am delighted you have since gone.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Why is it so difficult for us to get an estimate of the number of civilian casualties in the war? We have a real problem here.

Secretary RUSK. I don't know, Senator. You asked that of Mr. Bell and they are working on it.

Senator PELL. He told us they could not furnish it.

Secretary RUSK. I didn't hear the answer. The question is: Did we have any information or any meaningful information on that subject? A great effort is being made to avoid civilian casualties wherever possible, and, I just don't know, I have not myself seen any such figures. I can assure you that it is not a case of withholding figures. I just don't believe we have reliable or approximate figures on that.

Senator PELL. I think it would be of some interest to this committee—I don't mean to speak for the chairman—but it would be of some interest to me if some effort could be made, perhaps by the U.S. mission in Saigon, to come up with some kind of estimate based on the rolls and the people in hospitals, of the number of civilian casualties.

Secretary RUSK. May I look further into that, Senator?

Senator PELL. I wish you would and I would hope that you would pursue that, if you could.

NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS

Finally, it would seem to me that in connection with these hearings they have established sort of a negative consensus because most of us on the Senate side, this side of the table, and all the witnesses, nearly all of us actually, on both sides, have come to negative conclusions. Nobody is advocating, as one very civilized columnist put it, that we should scuttle and run; on the other hand, nobody has said we should knock the chips off the Chinese shoulders. But it is this area in between where we have disagreement and some of us would like to think we could hold the commitment as it is because we feel that time is on our side. The Communists first injected time as a fourth dimension in warfare. But we can use it too. If enough time goes by, if we keep our presence in South Vietnam the time will come when it will be to their interest to get us out through negotiations.

On the other hand, if we feel we must achieve a quick solution, and go up another 200,000 men this year and the same next year, it would indicate to us that we feel time is almost against us. It is for this reason that I, for one, would like to see us act as a brake on the administration to avoid the indefinite commitment of our young men abroad. I was wondering where your particular criticism of this policy would be.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the President has indicated all along that it is necessary to do what has to be done but that he is trying to act with prudence and care in light of all the circumstances.

You see, up until the end of 1961, we had in South Vietnam only those that were authorized, the numbers that were authorized, by

the Geneva agreement, despite the substantial infiltration that had already begun.

There were over 5 years of infiltration, stepped up infiltration, before there was any bombing of North Vietnam. That infiltration had included a division of the regular North Vietnamese Army before there was any bombing of North Vietnam. The bombing has been rather carefully circumscribed in character and purpose. We have tried throughout that 5-year period to bring this matter to negotiations, to the conference table. I think you can assume that there is no indication on the part of the administration, certainly not on the part of the Commander in Chief, to be reckless, to try to move this to a much higher level of violence, on the basis that one wearies of the effort. But, on the other hand, one has to face the fact that the other side, too, is making decisions, and that, if they build up the effort, then one decides whether to meet it or whether to let them have their way.

Now, I am rather encouraged by what has been going on in the last several months out there in terms of the initiative of the South Vietnamese and allied forces. I think the other side does realize the fact that this is a much more serious matter than they perhaps anticipated. The losses to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in 1965 were equivalent to the losses and killed by our own forces throughout the entire Korean war. So they are up against some real problems, and I think they have to face the fact they are not going to have a military success in the south. We would hope that they would draw some conclusions from that—sooner rather than later—and move this matter toward a peaceful solution.

KNOWLEDGE OF CHINESE INTENTIONS

Senator PELL. You don't feel, Mr. Secretary, that the Chinese will feel impelled to stiffen their spines and fill the vacuum when they find this flagging on the part of the North Vietnamese?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I am sure that the Chinese are considering these matters, but I think there are a lot of other things the Chinese will have to think about at the same time. I rather doubt that the Chinese want a bigger war. I think they realize that that would be a reckless and dangerous matter for them to precipitate. We certainly have no desire on our side to precipitate that kind of larger war. So, let's see where we come out.

Senator PELL. One final question. I was rather struck with a Reston newspaper column the other day that mentioned the strength of our intellectual resources when it came to examining the Kremlin's intentions and foreign policy, and I am also struck by the fact that at the time of the McCarthy years we pretty well swept out most of our China specialists. Where in the Government do we draw our analyses of Chinese intentions?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have our own research group of analysts in the Department of State, and of course the intelligence community has a good many people working on it. There is, I think, a steadily growing body of analysis in the university field. There was a lag for a period after China went Communist, but there is much more stimu-

lating and effective work at the universities than, say, 15 years ago, on China.

Senator PELL. But, for instance, when you come to the conclusion that the Chinese will not necessarily stiffen the North Vietnamese spines or that they will not intervene, are you reaching into this university community at all for these recommendations?

Secretary RUSK. Well, their views and their estimates and their ideas on that subject are taken fully into account. But let me say that one does not come to a conclusion on that subject, because it may well be that Peiping doesn't know the answer. Therefore, how could anyone else?

One doesn't come to a conclusion on that, and then base policy upon it. But that is one of the possibilities that has to be taken fully into account in deciding what we do in a given situation.

Senator PELL. Because I am sure, going back to Korea, one of the reasons for our misjudgment of the Chinese intentions was the fact that we had tossed out so many of the Chinese specialists in the Department, and that is why in our estimates now I was wondering if we made use of the fellows from outside at the universities.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we try to get ideas on things like that, not only from some very competent men inside Government: we also keep in touch with people outside of the Government on subjects of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that finishes the first round.

Mr. Secretary, I want to join my colleagues in saying that you are an extremely capable advocate of the administration's position as you have demonstrated this morning and this afternoon.

FAILURE OF SEATO FORCES

This morning Senator Carlson raised the question about the failure of our SEATO allies to support us. It prompted me to make a few observations of my own. I think the failure of the SEATO nations to furnish forces is very significant. There are now about 1,600 men from these countries in Vietnam, consisting primarily of Australians, plus about 150 New Zealanders. The forces of other SEATO members are quite small, as he mentioned.

As I understand it, there are none, or practically none, from Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and France. There are none from India, Indonesia, and Japan, which are the nearest major countries.

It seems to me that this fact is explained by their not sharing your view as to the nature of this war, which, as I understand your position, is that this is a clear case of international Communist aggression. I think they believe rather that it is more in the nature of a civil war in which outside parties have become involved. I can see no other logical reason why these countries which are either members of SEATO, or would be subject to attack much more quickly—and are more exposed than we are—would not give support if this were truly an example of international Communist aggression. In short, I do not think that they believe their security is at stake or that the SEATO treaty requires their participation in the war. We have discussed at length whether the treaty requires action or simply entitles us to act. I don't wish to pursue that aspect of it.

But even if the nations in the area do feel that their security is at stake, as in the case of New Zealand and Australia, they have sent only token forces. I suppose they believe that the United States will carry the whole load, and that our men will do the dying and that we will pay the bill. Otherwise, I am unable to understand why they do not send more than a token force.

In the case of Europe and NATO, we have collective security in which all members have shared. You asked just a moment ago how do we organize peace. I have always thought that, as a general proposition at least, we should use the United Nations, and collective security insofar as possible, and that our policy generally was not to arrogate to ourselves the role of a world policeman.

DAMAGING CHARACTER OF VIETNAM WAR

The Senator from Oregon in particular has insisted for a long time on this approach to finding a solution to the Vietnam problem.

A review of the development of this war shows, in my opinion, that it clearly began as a war of liberation from French colonial rule. It goes back to the time when indigenous Vietnamese nationalists who most unfortunately, from our point of view, were led by Communists; notably Ho Chi Minh. These nationalistic Communists were twice betrayed, once by the French in 1946 after they thought they had made an agreement for independence, and later in 1956 by President Diem who, with the support of the Americans, refused to hold unification elections. After 1956, the struggle became a civil war between the Diem government and the Vietcong, the nationalistic Communists remaining in South Vietnam, who believed they were cheated by the Diem government in 1956.

I think this background is important and does explain the apathy, or the indifference, of these friends and allies, that is, allies under certain treaties and friends in other respects.

Until 1960 the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the North Vietnam participation was slight, except for large amounts of aid to Diem by the United States. I believe that is a fair statement of your own testimony. After 1960, the character of the war changed, with increased participation by the North Vietnamese and by the United States, and apparently each time one has increased its support the other has responded by a similar increase, to where both sides are now there in very large numbers.

In short, I think it is an oversimplification merely to say that this is a clear-cut case of aggression by North Vietnam Communists against a free, independent neighboring nation. If that were so, I believe many of these nations I mentioned would be participating in a more positive way. I can see no other reason why they will not provide more help. It is this point that I believe is responsible primarily, if not entirely, for the lack of support from our friends. And also, I may say, for a good deal of the concern in this committee.

REASONS OF TROUBLE IN EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE

As to our efforts to negotiate, the real trouble, it seems to me, is uncertainty as to our terms for peace, not merely the procedure for negotiation. We have had a lot of very involved and complicated talk

about 4 points and about 14 points and about the significance of the third point and where parties to a conference will meet and who will be there. But I do not recall that we have ever made it crystal clear that we will support an election supervised by an appropriate international body, and that we will accept the results of that election, regardless of how it turns out.

It is also not clear that we are willing to allow any participation of the National Liberation Front either in a provisional government or at any time, and, therefore, there is no alternative for them but surrender or annihilation. If this is true, there can be nothing to negotiate about, with such a prospect. It seems to me that this is one of the reasons that they will not negotiate, unless we assume that they are utterly without reason and have no desire even to live. Because in my opinion there is no question but that we can kill them all if we wish to put enough troops over there. There must be some reason to explain their attitude.

There is the further point about our intentions regarding leaving Vietnam. You have repeated time and again that we are willing to leave and have no desire for permanent bases. But I think few people in Vietnam, and I believe in other places, can quite understand why we are building such extensive, costly, and large permanent-type bases—harbors, airfields, military housing and so on—if we have any intention of leaving in the foreseeable future. I don't think they believe us when we say we will get out. As has already been stated, we haven't gotten out of Korea and the Dominican Republic—I don't mean these are analogous in any way—but we do happen to have more troops spread around the world in bases than any other country today.

Finally, in spite of statements to the contrary, the policy objectives seems to be unconditional surrender of the National Liberation Front. Or to put it in another way, that this is not really a limited war, but that we intend to pursue it to victory even though that may result in bringing in the Chinese, and possibly even the Russians, which would force World War III.

FUTURE COMMITMENTS ASKED TO BE PLACED IN FORMAL TREATIES

Frankly, Mr. Secretary, we are very much more deeply involved in Vietnam, far more than I ever imagined possible and I am very worried about future commitments, as for example to Thailand, made without full discussion and consultation, and, I hope, approval by this Congress. I have already stated that I regret that I did not discharge what, in my opinion, I now believe to have been my duty to have full discussion of the 1964 resolution. I think I made a mistake, at least as one Senator and chairman of this committee, in not accepting the amendment offered on the floor by Mr. Nelson.

The discussion in the Senate about that amendment has just been put in the record by the Senator from Tennessee. I hope that any future commitments that might bring this country into a war will not be made by unilateral declarations or agreements between ministers, but will be made by treaties submitted to and ratified by the Senate.

This apprehension on my part has been greatly increased by our unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic last year, which, in my opinion, was a clear violation of our solemn treaty obligations.

I have tried to sum up here why I think there is this seemingly uncompromising attitude on the part of our enemies, who I assume are people capable of reason, and why there are also doubts in this committee.

I wish to insert in the record at this point three articles: One by Mr. Frankel of the New York Times in today's paper; one by Mr. Lippmann on the 15th of February; and an article on Vietnam by a Frenchman, Jean Lacouture, which I think bears on these points. One relates to the history of this engagement and the other one particularly to the immediate problem discussed here today.

(The articles referred to follow:)

[From the New York Times, Feb. 18, 1966]

NEW LIGHT ON U.S. POLICY—GENERAL TAYLOR SAYS AIM IS TO COMPEL
ACCEPTANCE OF A FREE SOUTH VIETNAM

(By Max Frankel)

WASHINGTON, February 17.—Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor brought out in public today what other high officials here have made increasingly plain in private—namely that the U.S. terms for peace in Vietnam are much stiffer than the offer of unconditional negotiations has implied. Though caught up in a debate with some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about whether the administration's goals were limited or unlimited, General Taylor left little doubt about what those goals are. He said the United States could, should, and would achieve military and political successes of sufficient magnitude to force the Communists to accept an independent and non-Communist South Vietnam.

The Johnson administration has never wavered in the pursuit of that objective. Nor has it said anything to contradict the retired general's assertion that his personal testimony was wholly consistent with official policy.

Many observers and diplomats here and abroad, however, have misinterpreted the administration's offer to negotiate as an offer to compromise with the Vietcong in South Vietnam. General Taylor's testimony should have made it clear that such a compromise is not anticipated here.

That clarification was explicitly recognized at the end of the long hearing today by Senator J. M. Fulbright, the committee chairman. The Arkansas Democrat said it seemed to him, in the language of the Ozarks, that the United States intended to apply the pressure until the Communists "holler enough."

THE BASIC QUESTION

He said he wished instead that the administration was ready to deal with its principal adversary, the Vietcong, to seek a compromise to stop the slaughter and to give up the policy of waging a war that can end only if all the Vietcong would go home and go north.

General Taylor did not dispute this summation of the essence of the argument between the administration and its critics. If the Vietcong would in fact go home and stop trying to take over South Vietnam, he said, they could at least obtain "compensation"—presumably in economic aid to North Vietnam. But his basic reply was a question: "How do you compromise the freedom of 15 million South Vietnamese people?"

Compromise has had no appeal here because the administration concluded long ago that the non-Communist forces of South Vietnam could not long survive in a Saigon coalition with Communists. It is for that reason—and not because of an excessively rigid sense of protocol—that Washington has steadfastly refused to deal with the Vietcong or to recognize them as an independent political force.

It has offered to consider the Vietcong's views in negotiations and even to let the Vietcong sit in the delegation of North Vietnam, whose agents it says they are. Washington's purpose at such negotiations would be to ratify the end of the Communist threat to South Vietnam and not to compromise on the basis of the existing military balance.

As General Taylor reiterated, the administration believes the Communists have not been hurt sufficiently on the battlefield to enter into the kind of negotiations that have been offered. Privately, officials here agree with this presumed Communist assessment. They believe the Communists would now negotiate or give up only if they were prepared to honor the potential force that the United States can bring to bear.

As General Taylor also made clear, even the potential American military might is not enough to assure success. Force on the ground must be used to put the Communists into a highly unfavorable situation in South Vietnam, he said, while force in the air is used to inflict increasing loss and pain in North Vietnam.

NEED FOR VIABLE REGIME

In addition, he emphasized, the United States must construct a reasonably viable and stable government in South Vietnam and demonstrate a determination at home to see the struggle through.

The general said he was convinced that when all four conditions were met, North Vietnam would have been brought to the point where it was willing to talk. The purpose of the talks, he stressed, would be to "free South Vietnam from the Vietcong," and the essential ingredient is to "have them so beaten they'd be glad to come in and accept an amnesty."

These goals are not only limited but realistic, the general contended, although he would not be pinned down on the number of American troops that might have to become involved. The present 205,000 are not enough, he said, and 800,000 would be fantastic and unnecessary.

It is the realism of this assessment that troubled most of the administration's critics on the committee. They fear that no limits to the American involvement are in sight and that it could lead to an even more costly war with Communist China. Some seek more precise estimates of the ultimate cost, while others would prefer a reduction of the objectives—in other words, a compromise on the basis of present military and political strength.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 15, 1966]

TODAY AND TOMORROW—CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA

(By Walter Lippmann)

The televised hearings, at which General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have done an inestimable service to our people. For they broke through the official screen and made visible the nature of the war and where our present policy is leading us. On the rule that if you cannot beat them, join them, which in its modern form is that if you cannot debate with them, say you agree with them, the President takes the position that there is not much difference between the Gavin-Kennan thesis and the Rusk-McNamara policy.

There is in fact a radical difference, the difference between a limited and an unlimited war. The President may not want to fight an unlimited war. I have no doubt myself that he does not want to do so. But the promises he made in Honolulu which the Vice President is now broadcasting so lavishly in Saigon and Bangkok, are—if they are to be taken seriously—an unlimited commitment of American soldiers and American money. It is this unlimited commitment which those of us who belong to the Gavin-Kennan school oppose. For we see that as the numbers of our troops and the range of our bombing are escalated, and as the theater of the war becomes widened, it is highly probable, indeed it is well nigh inevitable that the United States will find itself confronting China in a land war on the mainland of Asia.

Last week's hearings made visible that this is where the course we are taking leads. Congress and the people would be frivolous if they did not examine with the utmost seriousness how real, how valid, how significant is the hypothesis that the kind of war the Johnson administration is conducting is leading to a confrontation with China.

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who since 1961 has played a leading part in our military intervention in South Vietnam, has recognized that the prospect of a land war with China is today our greatest worry. In an interview published in the current issue of U.S. News & World Report, General Taylor is asked about the danger

of "a military confrontation with Communist China." He replies that "one can never rule out the possibility. But I would list the probability quite low in terms of percentage."

This has an ominous resemblance to the colloquy in 1950 between President Truman and General MacArthur. (Cf. Lawson, "The United States in the Korean War," p. 79.)

"In your opinion," President Truman asked General MacArthur, "is there any chance that the Chinese might enter the war on the side of North Korea?"

MacArthur shook his head. "I'd say there's very little chance of that happening. They have several hundred thousand men north of the Yalu, but they haven't any air force. If they tried to cross the river our Air Force would slaughter them. At the most perhaps 60,000 troops would make it. Our infantry could easily contain them. I expect the actual fighting in North Korea to end by Thanksgiving. We should have our men home, or at least in Japan, by Christmas."

At the very moment that President Truman and General MacArthur were talking there were already more than a hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in North Korea, and another 200,000 were ready to cross the Yalu. By mid-November at least 300,000 Chinese would be poised to strike—and the ROK, the American and other U.N. forces would not even be aware of their presence. Before the war was over the Chinese Communist armies in Korea would reach a peak strength of more than a million men.

On the question of the need to contain the military expansion of Red China, there is virtually universal agreement in this country. The containment of Red China today, like the containment of Stalinist Russia after the World War, is necessary to the peace of the world and is a vital interest of the United States. What is debatable is the diplomatic policy we are pursuing in order to contain Red China. If we compare what Mr. Rusk and Mr. William Bundy are doing with the diplomatic policy by which some 15 years ago Stalin was contained, the differences are very striking.

The cardinal difference is that our Chinese containment policy is a unilateral American policy whereas our Stalinist containment policy was shared with and participated in by all the Western Allies. It is often said officially that in the Far East today we are repeating what was done so successfully in Europe. If this were what we are doing, there would be an alliance to contain China in which Japan, Russia, India, Pakistan, the United States, Great Britain, and France were allied in a Far Eastern Marshall plan and NATO. Instead, owing to the miscalculations and blundering of the Vietnamese war, we have alienated and indeed neutralized all the great powers of the Asian mainland.

The difference between the two containment policies in Europe and in the Far East is the difference between realism and verbalism, between professionalism and amateurism. Our present policy is as if we had set out to contain Stalinist Russia by ignoring the British, the French, the Italians, and the Germans, and had decided to make our stand against communism by the defense of—let us say—Bucharest.

[From the New York Review, Mar. 3, 1966]

VIETNAM: THE LESSONS OF WAR

(By Jean Lacouture)

"On the long thin coast of Vietnam," wrote John K. Fairbank in the last issue of this paper, "we are sleeping in the same bed the French slept in even though we dream different dreams."

The dreams of course are very different but so are the beds and the dreamers themselves. Let us compare them and see when the end of the night may come.

Nothing could be more valuable for American leaders at the moment than a close examination of the disastrous errors made by the French in Indochina from 1945 to 1956. To know the faults of a friend may not cure one's own, but from France's experience American might well learn something of what has gone so dreadfully wrong in Vietnam today.

The French had three great dreams for Indochina and each led them into a different and more ugly phase of the war. At first, in 1946, they clung briefly to the dream of reestablishing their prewar empire in Indochina. Indeed, for

one hopeful moment they seemed to be on the verge of a promising new colonial policy: General Leclerc, sent out to "reconquer" the territory, decided instead to negotiate with the Vietnam revolutionary leader, Ho Chi Minh. Leclerc recognized Ho's Vietnam as a "free state," connected with France, but controlling its own diplomacy, army, and finances. This was the first agreement made between a European colonial power and the Asian revolution—and one of the shortest lived and saddest in retrospect. For within weeks the intrigues of colonialists in Saigon and Paris and extremists among the Vietminh and its nationalist allies succeeded in scrapping it. The way was now open for France to plunge into full-scale colonial war. But it soon became clear to everybody that this would have been a hopeless venture, doomed from the start by the half-ruined state of France, the lack of an air force and navy, and the disapproval of the Russians and Americans.

At this point the French conceived their second Indochina dream which led them into a second war, lasting from 1948 to 1951. Now they would transform their colonial struggle into a civil war. Against Ho's Vietminh they would set in opposition the "independent" Emperor Bao Dai, encouraging him to cultivate his own anti-Communist but nationalist leadership—a policy described by the distinguished scholar Paul Mus as "nationalist counterfire."

Perhaps it might have succeeded if the nationalists had been given a chance to make it work. But their power and prestige and autonomy were always limited. While Vietnamese and French troops died courageously, Bao Dai preoccupied himself with tiger hunting, his ministers with profiteering. The Vietminh methodically liquidated Bao Dai's officials, dominated the countryside, and organized its soldiers into divisions soon after the Chinese Communists arrived on the northern frontier in 1950.

After this decisive event and the outbreak of the Korean war, France dreamed once again of transforming the nature of the war in Vietnam, this time into an international conflict with communism. In September 1951 General de Latre arrived in Washington to argue that France, faced with Vietminh subversion supported by Communist China, now needed and deserved to have its risks shared. He was given both credits and weapons. But later, in 1954, on the eve of Dienbienphu, the French Government demanded far more: It requested that several hundred American bombers be ordered to attack the enemy from Manila. To these requests Washington finally responded that "Indochina does not fall within the perimeter of the area vital to the defense of the United States."

We can now admire the wisdom which led President Eisenhower to reject both the agitated appeals of the French and the advice of Admiral Radford and Vice President Nixon, both of whom recommended intervention. But we may well ask why a country not considered of "vital importance" to American interests in 1954 became so in 1965. The Communist camp, after all, is no longer a monolithic force able to exert unified global pressures as had been the case in 1954. In Korea, moreover, Chinese had recently been fighting American soldiers, something they have since refrained from doing; and missile strategy has meanwhile diminished the importance of local airforce bases. One can only conclude that the diplomatic views of American leaders have hardened during these years. In the light of Mr. Rusk's performance the diplomacy of John Foster Dulles must be reconsidered and credited with an admirable flexibility.

Thus France launched three wars in Indochina and lost them all. Its allies having refused to provoke a brutal extension of the war in order to avoid a local defeat, France's dream of an international anti-Communist "crusade" collapsed at Dienbienphu in the spring of 1954. General Giap destroyed France's main combat force; the Vietminh controlled two-thirds of Vietnam; and neither Hanoi nor Saigon were protected from attack.

Ho Chi Minh had offered negotiations 6 months before this debacle and had been ignored. Now Moscow and Peiping were agreeable to an international detente and Washington seemed prepared to accept the consequences of its failure to intervene. Thus at the Geneva conference table in 1954 the Western powers benefited from a certain complicity on the part of Molotov and Chou En-lai: The West succeeded in wresting from the victors half of the territory and the larger part of the material wealth of Vietnam. Ho agreed to fall back to the north in exchange for a promise that elections preparing the way for unification would be held in 1956—elections that he had no doubt of winning.

A great deal of confusion surrounds this Geneva settlement. It must be emphasized that the only texts signed at Geneva were the armistice agreements between the French and the Vietminh. No one at all signed the "final declaration"

of the conference—both the United States and South Vietnam had reservations about it—and it carried only the force of suggestion. But apart from the North Vietnamese, the French were the only nation that formally guaranteed to carry out the Geneva accords that provided both for partition at the 17th parallel and for elections.

And now France committed a new error (its last?), dreaming this time that it might finally leave Vietnam and forget it altogether. Diem, now installed a dictator in the south, wanted the French to quit his country as soon as possible. This was not only because certain French interests were intriguing against him—something that helped strengthen his position as a nationalist leader—but also because the French Army was the only force that could compel him to hold elections in 1956. In the event, the French quickly yielded and the last of their Army departed in April 1956.

The consequences of this final French error were, and remain, enormous. Diem was now free to declare himself free of the Geneva obligations and soon did so with American encouragement. The south could now be reorganized as an anti-Communist bastion, from which a reconquest of the North could eventually be launched. The Diem government in fact soon created a Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam, which beginning in 1958, parachuted agents into the north, notably into areas such as Vinh, where Ho's agrarian reform had provoked violent peasant uprisings. But meanwhile the north, considering itself cheated by Saigon and Washington (with France's cooperation), began preparation to exploit the political and social discontent in the south to establish a base for subversive operations. And Hanoi was to show itself far more adept at this political game than Saigon.

Could the French have resolved this Vietnam problem? In fact, they were confronted by two immensely volatile forces whose demands would have shaken any Western government, as they are shaking the United States today. First, the demands of a people thirsting to overthrow colonialism and to recover their national identity, their freedom of maneuver, and their unity. But also the demands of a revolutionary group, supported by one of the great power blocs, which claims the right to impose its authority on the entire nation in the name of a Communist doctrine highly suspect to the majority: a group, nonetheless, whose heroism, discipline, and ruthlessly effective methods seem to assure its success.

It is the deep and constant intermingling of these two forces which have made the Vietnam problem seem so hopeless and defeating to the West. How can a Western government successfully sponsor an independent "nationalist counterfire" when the strongest feelings of many Vietnamese have been invested for many years in the local civil war; and when one finds among those who have rallied to the Vietminh, and then the Lao Dong and the NLF, a great many patriots, drawn to the organization because they believe it to be the hope of Vietnamese nationalism, capable of defeating colonialism and Western domination.

Perhaps it might have been possible for the French to disassociate the nationalist inspiration in Vietnam from the Communist organization. But to do this would have been very difficult. For to gain the confidence of the nationalists I believe that French aid to Vietnam would have had to meet three extremely demanding conditions: that the donor of the aid would have no right to intervene directly in the Government; and the aid would be given to the most worthy leaders; and that it would not lead to the creation of oligarchies of profiteers and a climate of corruption.

By all these standards the French failed. If they ever had a chance to survive the Asian revolution, they lost it, basically, because they were unwilling to alter their patronizing colonialist attitudes and deal with Asians with some sense of mutual respect or cooperation. For the most part they preferred instead to appoint and then control the manageable, the incompetent, and the operators, many of whom made fortunes out of the corrupt French aid program.

Opposed in Vietnam, then, were a coherent, principled, and implacable revolutionary movement of militants organized in the villages—the country's fundamental social and economic unit—inspired by an evident nationalism and posing defenders of stern justice and equality; on the other hand, a regime obviously supported and controlled by foreign powers, partly composed of former colonial officials, disdainful of peasant claims, tolerant of a social order where the influential and successful were frantically engaged in profiteering—preparing for the arrival of the inevitable catastrophe. The only possible result was a catastrophe on the scale of Dienbienphu.

How relevant is the French experience to Vietnam today? Certainly the American situation is different in important respects, but really how different? For example, the United States has no colonial past in Vietnam, no strictly imperialist drive for economic gain. But its objectives are, curiously, both more altruistic and more imperious than those of its predecessor. After all, a country seeking colonial profits is quite capable of making a compromise to preserve at least some of its endangered wealth. But what of a country that supposes itself to be defending a selfless principle? In fact, the United States does seem to have several fairly concrete motives: e.g., to prove to certain nations that it is faithful to its alliances; to show the underdeveloped peoples of the Southern Hemisphere how costly it can be to choose "Marxism-Leninism." There would seem to be sufficient elements of calculated self-interest here to make realistic bargaining possible—on the basis of spheres of influence, for example.

A second difference concerns the size and power of the forces involved. General Westmoreland not only commands a good many more troops than General Navarre (750,000 as compared with 500,000) but he is also relatively free from the financial, logistical, and transport problems that plagued the French. A far greater advantage, however, lies in America's enormous firepower as well as its Air Force and complete mastery of the sea. It is no exaggeration to say that the United States and South Vietnamese forces are now 20 times more powerful than the army of General Navarre (which had no more than 80 combat planes at its disposal during the battle of Dienbienphu). The small size of the present theater of operations in South Vietnam thus becomes a favorable factor of great importance: The French forces were charged with the defense of all Indochina, a territory four times the present size of South Vietnam.

But given these advantages can it be said that the United States is now succeeding where France was forced to retreat? Of course, one answer must be yes, in the limited sense that it is impossible to imagine the United States suffering a major defeat in the present circumstances. During the past year President Johnson has been able to dispatch enough American troops to Vietnam to avoid another Dienbienphu, but beyond this the situation is less than hopeful. The arrival of over 100,000 troops has done no more than stabilize a deteriorating military situation; it did not result in a sharp swing of military advantage to the Western side, as certain observers had expected. The military map published on January 30 in the New York Times showing four-fifths of the south "under Vietcong influence" must be regarded as accurate, notwithstanding contrary claims by officials. (Incidentally, this map recalls the military charts the French press did not dare to publish 12 years ago. The American public has recently been getting far more information on the Vietnam question from the press, television, Senate hearings, etc., than was ever available in France.)

The fact is that American policy in Vietnam, although originally inspired by very different intentions, now resembles all too closely the disastrous policy of the French. The United States has also failed to solve the problem of providing support to genuine local leaders without excessive intervention in the country itself. Indeed, it can be said that the French—perhaps hypocritically—did nevertheless succeed in transferring some responsibilities to the Vietnamese: These were quite feeble ones in military matters, rather more important in politics, and nearly total in such administrative work as tax collecting. By contrast, we are now seeing the progressive Americanization of both the war and the country itself: The influence of the local military headquarters grows weaker; the efficiency of the Government in Saigon continues to decay; American experts have taken over a great many local functions. Of course one understands the concern for efficiency, but the psychological effects are hardly calculated to encourage the emergence of authentic nationalist leaders at the present time, as Roger Hilsman forcefully pointed out in his recent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Certainly the Americans have done no better than the French in finding worthy non-Communist leadership. There is no need to reexamine now the tragic liquidation of Diemism, an event made inevitable by the sectarian religious isolation and the oligarchic obstinacy of the Ngo family. But since then, what decadence. Sad mandarins from certain conservative milieux in Saigon—courageous and outdated men—are followed in office by juntas composed of young generals of fortune who add a new star to their shoulders after each defeat in battle.

As for the moral climate in Saigon, one can only say that the corruption which dominated the life of the city's elite in 1953 has now been democratized. Shady dealings having to do with aid and military programs are no longer confined to

people in high places, but seem to involve every kind of business. Testifying before the Senate on February 4, Mr. David Bell, the Director of Foreign Aid, said that he knew of no black market in Saigon—which only shows that a brilliant and hard-working official has had no time to stroll along the streets of a town where someone begs you to break the law at every step.

It would be wrong to predict a priori that President Johnson's new "counter-insurgency" and "pacification" programs, based on plans for economic and social development in the southern villages, will fail as totally as did the quite similar plans sponsored by the French and later by the Diem regime. Can they produce a qualitative change in Vietnamese attitudes toward the present Government and the United States? What can be said is that any efforts by political and army leaders in the south, however doubtful their results, will surely be more effective than the current bombing of the north. I will not take up the moral aspects of these attacks. It should be sufficient to examine their diplomatic and military results thus far. According to predictions made in January 1965, several weeks of daily raids would bring the north to its knees and thence to the negotiating table. In fact, Messrs. Ho and Dong have since toughened their demands, passing from the relatively flexible "four points" of March 8 to the recent letter of January 31, which refers to the NLF as the "only representative of South Vietnam"; until then, Ho had mentioned only the NLF "program."

As for military results, we must realize that the bombing of the north has no overwhelming impact on a people who only recently emerged from a resistance movement and are now being trained to return to one; for the most part their lives are not greatly affected by the destruction of a bridge or a truck depot. On the other hand, in January 1965 there were two northern regiments in the south, while now in February 1966 there are eight. Furthermore, the combat reserves forces in the north are numerous enough to permit the dispatch of more northern troops to General Giap in the south every time the United States escalates the bombing. The American public has been told that the north is being bombed to save American lives. But, on the contrary, it seems clear that the bombing in the north only increases the pressure on General Westmoreland's troops: The American foot soldier must pay for the destruction caused by the American Air Force. And if Hanoi itself is bombed, we may be sure that the Vietcong forces have well-laid plans to take atrocious vengeance on Saigon, a city they have both infiltrated and surrounded. The adversaries have now sunk their claws into each other and so long as the ground fighting continues, we may expect that each blow will be followed by damaging reprisals.

Thus a political solution becomes all the more urgent—although unlike the settlement of 1954, it will not be preceded by a military disaster. But here American diplomacy is the victim of its own myths. Because the U.S. Government has decreed from the first that the war in the south was originally provoked by invasion from the north, it has insisted that a solution must be negotiated with Hanoi, and only Hanoi.

A false historical analysis has led to a political impasse. For a careful study of the history of South Vietnam over the last 10 years will show that from 1956 onward, strong resistance groups, the surviving members of political-religious sects crushed by Diem, were in active opposition to the regime in the south; they were in fact already called "Vietcong" by the Diem regime at that time. Furthermore, this essentially nationalist dissident movement gained added support as a result of the rural discontent which led Diem to suppress the elected municipal councils in 1957; it spread further after the promulgation of the terrible law of 1959 which prescribed the death penalty for all "accomplices of Communists"—and communism comes cheap in South Vietnam. At this time the resistance was composed of nothing more than southern groups organized in self-defense against Diem. Hanoi had made no connection with them. The North Vietnamese did not begin to exploit this situation and infiltrate agents until 1959; and it was only after pressure from a southern congress of "former Vietminh resisters" in March of 1960 that they prepared to intervene. At the northern Communist Party congress in September of the same year the Hanoi Government gave direct encouragement to the revolutionary activities in the south. Still, it was not until November 11, 1960, following an attempted military putsch against Diem, that the Vietcong—feeling the pressure of competition from military nationalists—gave itself formal identity and established a political headquarters by creating the National Liberation Front.

Today it is clear that the NLF leaders are closely linked to Hanoi, on which they depend for much of their supplies and arms. But anyone concerned with a

peaceful settlement in Vietnam should be aware of both the local origins of the front and its strong persisting regionalism—its attachments to the milieux, traditions, economy, and countryside of the south which give it a fundamental autonomy.

And yet, notwithstanding the fact that the southern origins of the Vietcong insurrection have been carefully confirmed, no element of the Vietnam problem has been so neglected, especially in American official circles. We may be astonished, for example, that the immense, spectacular, and probably sincere efforts of recent American diplomacy to persuade Hanoi to negotiate finally produced, after 30 days of pause in bombing, a single defiant letter. Yet America is dealing here with a small and poorly armed country; its allies are reluctant to give it aid too openly, fearing a crushing American response. Certainly it is a Communist government, but one presided over by a man who in 1946 and 1954 was able to prove to the French his willingness to accept compromise. And of the four points posed as conditions by Hanoi last year, Washington now accepts three. Why then doesn't Ho play Lyndon Johnson's game? In a conference the North Vietnamese would hold so many trumps that their present position is hard to understand.

But perhaps they were not in a position to negotiate at all. If we look back over the history of the NLF we find support for the view that Hanoi is not able to speak for the front. First for psychological reasons: The published program of the NLF expressly mentions the possibility of an independent South Vietnam; and it looks forward to forming an alliance with Laos and Cambodia only. Thus it seems most unlikely that the front would consider itself adequately represented by the northern government. Finally, there may be a purely practical reason. Combat conditions in the south are such that it is by no means certain that a decision or an agreement even if approved by the NLF would be supported by all the fighters in the field.

If we are to undertake a serious and credible search for peace in Vietnam, we must take account of this diversity of the southern resistance; we must recognize that it is in fact a federation of maquis of different ages and differing inspiration, and that it is not as yet completely unified.

There is not as much geographic and psychological distance between the typical southern military chief and Ho Chi Minh as there is between Ho Chi Minh and Mr. Kosygin. But to be effective now in Vietnam diplomacy must certainly take account of the maquisard and his part in the war. It must also attempt to understand the role of the Central Committee of the NLF, where Maoist influence is strong but where all tendencies coexist; of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi, with its pro-Chinese and pro-Russia factions; and the Political Bureau in Peiping, with its cast of performers, both civilian and military. And finally we must comprehend the very complex position of the Soviet Union, which is quite unwilling to sacrifice either its policy of peaceful coexistence or its commanding position as leader of the Communist world. If the diversity of governmental levels, alliances, and forces involved in the war presents difficulties, it also offers many more chances for an alert diplomacy than were available during the monolithic conflict of the cold war.

It is true that American leaders now argue that to recognize the Vietcong is to admit defeat. A curious intellectual position indeed—to refuse to recognize your adversary for what he is. Perhaps it is worth recalling that in December 1953, after Ho Chi Minh had first announced himself ready to negotiate, the French Socialist, Alain Savary, suggested to Georges Bidault (then Foreign Minister, now living in Brazil) that he seek Ho out for talks. "You only make them bigger by talking to them," said Bidault—who did finally talk with Ho's delegate at Geneva, but after the fall of Dienbienphu.

"Recognizing" the Vietcong certainly will not solve the problem of peacemaking in Vietnam at a stroke. It would nevertheless be an extremely constructive idea to focus diplomatic attention firmly on the south at the present time—without meanwhile ceasing efforts both to make contact with Hanoi and to assess Communist Chinese intentions.

But to bring about peace it will not suffice simply to recognize the existence of a powerful revolutionary organization supported by the north and already in control of the largest part of the national territory. More important is the task of reestablishing the constitutional legitimacy which Diem embodied for a brief period—reactionary as he was—and which has since vanished. The NLF is an essential element of this legitimacy because it is the heir to the revolt against Diem's totalitarianism as well as the principal force of resistance to foreign intervention. But there are others who make up the social and political society

as well—the Buddhists, the Catholics, and also the Army, a bourgeoisie in uniform.

An effective policy to bring about a peaceful settlement should begin by making it possible for each of these groups to return to an active political role. While General Ky, after having won his sole victory of the war at Honolulu, occupies the stage, we may be sure that the other groups are ready in the wings, waiting for the protection and encouragement the United States could still supply. And from such a revived political life we could expect an authoritative leadership to emerge whose lot it would be to debate with the NLF on the future of the south and to establish a coalition government to represent South Vietnam in future peace conferences. While the NLF is the largest force in the south it recognizes that it is obviously not the only force, reserving a large fraction of the seats on its Central Committee for groups who do not belong to the NLF. The democratization of power in South Vietnam is not a fantasy. The destruction of the small democratic movements struggling to survive under Diem was among the factors that led to the civil war.

French colonial policy was only too familiar with these very diverse political factions and brilliantly played them off, one against the other. But to divide and rule became a pathetic policy as France's control became more feeble. An American policy which seeks a peaceful settlement must take account of both the sociopolitical pluralism of South Vietnam and its extraordinary capacity for finding original—and local—solutions to its problems. Surely it is time for American leaders at last to confront the people with whom they have become so inextricably involved.

HOW TO BRING HANOI TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE

The CHAIRMAN. I am frank to say it puzzles me, when I listen to you, why people are not more reasonable, more rational under these circumstances. There must be some explanation, unless we just assume that the world has gone completely mad.

I have taken up most of my time. You do not have to answer unless you care to. There is 1 minute of my time left.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I think that I spent almost an hour this morning answering the observations you have just made.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that you did and they were based upon your observations. I am trying to put forth my point of view.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might ask you to amplify your statement in one respect. What do you want Hanoi to do in these circumstances?

The CHAIRMAN. What I want them to do, both Hanoi and the Vietcong, is to come to a conference with you and the Russians and the Chinese—everyone who has a legitimate interest—roughly the same people who participated either in the 1954 Geneva or 1962 Laos Conferences. I do not care whether it is the Geneva Conference on Indochina or the one on Laos. They are the people with the primary reasons—historical or geographical—for having a conference.

I do not think you can have a conference out of thin air, unless you or someone representing this Government go to the parties who are involved and give them some assurance that we mean what we say in public. I am not saying that you are trying to deceive anybody, but our actions, which I know you do not control, in my view are not consistent with our words and I do not blame you for that. You do not build the bases. You do not control the military activities and many other things. You make the best case you can, and it is very ably made.

But I think there is great doubt on the part of these other people certainly. I have no other way to explain why such people as the

Japanese and the Indians will not come and sacrifice their men in this struggle. Therefore, I do not believe they accept your thesis. That is why I want to go to a conference.

I think you would have to assure them as to what kind of a settlement you will accept. I get the impression, not from your statement as much as General Taylor's, that we are in an unlimited war and the only kind of settlement is unconditional surrender. Therefore, there is nothing to negotiate about.

Secretary RUSK. Unconditional surrender of what, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. But you deny this and I think so did the general.

Secretary RUSK. But unconditional surrender of what?

The CHAIRMAN. That they give up and they come to the conference at your mercy and we have total victory.

I see no occasion of any disposition to compromise. Now we are the strongest nation in the world. We can probably impose our will. I am saying that this is not wise in the long run even though we do have that power. I know we have the power. But I think this is not the lasting way to do it.

This is the way great empires have done it in the past, and it has usually not been very lasting. It has not brought about a stable peace.

I am just saying that I am thinking about a compromise in which you assure them in some way that is persuasive to them this time—because once before we did not go through with a settlement—that, if an election is held in Vietnam, we will abide by it regardless of the outcome. I do not think that has ever been said in any convincing way by this administration, and I do not know whether you are prepared to say it.

Secretary RUSK. The only convincing way in which you could say that to the other side apparently is to let them have, to start with, the government that would conduct the elections.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not believe that is the only way at all.

Secretary RUSK. I am saying what they themselves are saying.

HAS THE U.S. POSITION BEEN CLEAR?

The CHAIRMAN. They have not said it in any way that I know of. This is our disadvantage. They may have said this to you. It has not been my impression that they have said, "You have to turn everything over to us and therefore we are going to run it completely without any interference at all." As you say, I have never had the impression that they require of us that we get out and turn the country over to them without an election or any further ado about it.

It is not clear to me, and I do not think that there is any good evidence to that effect.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, do you have any doubts about the good faith and the credibility of the other side here in this situation?

The CHAIRMAN. I have no doubts that they are a very cruel, ruthless, and mean people, as has been expressed here often. They have engaged in all kinds of terrorism. What they say in public is very often, and I think generally, propaganda designed for public consumption. I do not know what they say in private. We have had these insinuations, or even statements, that you or others have been approached

through U Thant and so on. There has been great mystery about most of these.

I am not aware of what has gone on in the orthodox diplomatic circles. What is said on these great expeditions of sending people all over the world and making statements that we are for peace, I do not think is relevant to what I am trying to get at. To say we like peace, we are peace-loving people, does not seem to me to mean much. It is what you say privately to the people concerned, and how persuasive you are as to what you are willing to agree to in case you had a negotiation, that I am not aware of.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, may I just illustrate the problem? On the matter of persuading the other side, back in 1961 Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Kennedy agreed that everybody ought to leave Laos alone, get their forces out, let these people look after their own affairs. We went to the Laotian conference in Geneva—Ambassador Harriman first, and then I came over for the closing stages. I was there also at the opening. Those were long and complicated negotiations.

We accepted the Communist nominee to be Prime Minister of Laos, the present Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma. When the agreements were signed we took our military people out of Laos. They left several thousand, Hanoi did—several thousand of their armed forces—in Laos, specifically contrary to the agreement. Not for a day did they stop using Laos as a route of infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, specifically contrary to agreement. And they used a veto to paralyze the ability of the International Control Commission to go anywhere in Laos to look at the possibilities of infringements.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I believe all that. Are you not still glad that you had that—even with all its defects, with all the difficulties you have cited—rather than a world war, or even a major war in that area?

You settled it in a way that was unsatisfactory.

Secretary RUSK. No, but it is not settled, Mr. Chairman; it is not settled.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not settled, but it is not escalating into a war of major proportions.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the major North Vietnamese effort is channeling south into South Vietnam. We have no present reason to believe that they have accepted the basic agreement in 1962 as a permanent structure for Laos.

They are not permitting the Government to function on that basis. They are not permitting the ICC to visit around the country. They are putting more people into Laos.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it is influenced to a great extent by the Vietnamese problem?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I have no doubt, from the point of view of the other side, that they violated the Laotian agreement because it was convenient to them in order to pursue their enterprise against South Vietnam. But that is no defense. That is no defense.

The CHAIRMAN. It is no defense and of course we are doing the same. We are building bases—

Secretary RUSK. There was no provision in the Laos accord, that “of course you can go ahead and use Laos if you really are going after

South Vietnam—just use it for infiltration.” They were supposed to stop it.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you.

Secretary RUSK. This was supposed to be one of the significant steps toward peace in southeast Asia. The Vietnam problem would be a quite different problem if Laos were not open to this infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

TESTING GOOD FAITH ON BOTH SIDES

Now we tested there the matter of good faith on both sides in southeast Asia. I must say I am not at all—well, let me say this, Mr. Chairman: I suppose that the other side may have some doubts, if they wish to entertain them, that we will draw our troops out of there. All they have got to do is to come and test it, come and test it.

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot test that. I mean, if you do not do it, how do you test it?

Secretary RUSK. Because arrangements can be made under which our troops will come out—arrangements at the table, the nature of the settlement, the provisions for the withdrawal of forces on both sides.

The arrangements can be made.

There is no need for us to be obscure about that point. I would be a little disturbed if, say, members of this committee were to express doubt about our intentions in that respect merely because we are building some facilities to take care of the forces that we have there in South Vietnam. We have built and abandoned many facilities in the course of the last 30, 40 years, in many places. This has nothing to do with good faith. This is a matter of meeting our present military requirements, which we will be prepared to abandon if the other side makes peace. These things can be easily tested.

I find it hard to get the other side to come in with anything that would show their interest in peace or their good faith with respect to the 1954 and 1962 agreements. And so I find it difficult to be patient with people who keep on saying, “Oh, but you have not convinced them. You have got to give them something else.”

We have given them practically everything but South Vietnam, in terms of trying to find a basis for peace in southeast Asia. Now, I cannot believe that we are expected to give them South Vietnam.

In terms of elections, sure.

Senator GORE. What do you mean by that?

Secretary RUSK. Elections as you and I would mean them.

FREE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator GORE. Are you saying now if a free election was held, the U.S. Government would stand by and accept it?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator GORE. That is a great step.

Secretary RUSK. But, Senator, it is a step we took a year ago. That is not a new step.

Senator MORSE. You did not say it in 1956.

Secretary RUSK. Well, in 1956 the problem there was elections throughout Vietnam on the issue of unification. I read you this morning the description which General Giap, the North Vietnamese general

gave of the mistakes they were making in 1955 and 1956. The situation developed in such a way that it was quite clear that North Vietnam was not going to have free elections. They will not have them today. They will not have them today. The other side has said, "North Vietnam is a member of the Socialist World. So you can forget it. We are not going to be talking about North Vietnam. What we are going to be talking about is South Vietnam."

Now, they made it very clear that there are going to be no free elections up there. So that they, with some 17 million people up there, with 17 million votes in their pockets, they want some elections in the south, so that the combined numbers would clearly mean that they then would take over South Vietnam through that process.

Now, there were violations of various sorts in those days, including the terrorists that were left behind to make those elections more difficult, and to insure their effect in the south. But what we are saying, Senator, is that if that is the issue, let us have the elections. If that is the issue, let us have the elections. Let the South Vietnamese decide.

Now, we have not qualified that, Mr. Chairman. What I have said is that I do not myself believe that the South Vietnamese people in genuinely free elections would be the first people in history voluntarily to elect a Communist regime to power.

I have said that—and that is, in turn, interpreted by some as, "Oh well, then you do not mean elections."

Well, of course we mean elections: let the South Vietnamese decide these questions for themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not wish to impose on the time, but has it not been quite clear that you have coupled this with the idea that, no matter what happens, there is no possibility of any participation by the National Liberation Front. Therefore they have no alternative but to fight on? Has that not been pretty clear from what you and others in the administration have said?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, it has not been said in those terms, but they do have an alternative.

The CHAIRMAN. To give up.

Secretary RUSK. They do have an alternative. They are the front of Hanoi. They do have an alternative of quitting, of stopping being an agent of Hanoi and receiving men and arms from the north for the purpose of taking over South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. That particular question is disputed by some people who know much more about it than I do—that while the Vietcong are allies with and supported by Hanoi, they have an identity of their own. They have representatives abroad of their own. They treat with people; that is, they have representatives in various countries, not this one. I do not profess this, but I have read a great many articles—this piece I put in by a Frenchman who I am told is one of the better authorities on conditions in South Vietnam—and many of these statements of fact are that this or that is so. I am not capable now of disputing you.

I have my doubts, if I may say, about our knowledge generally of this whole area, as well as China and South Vietnam, as to what the actual facts are—the actual relations between the National Liberation Front and the people. I do not really know. I doubt that anybody knows very well except the people within their own organization.

IS VIETNAM WORTH A CONFRONTATION?

But all I am really trying to say is I do not think that this dispute is worthy of an escalation that would result in a confrontation with China in a world war. I do not believe that there is much evidence that this is the kind of a test in which it would follow that, if we should make a compromise, then all the world will collapse because we have been defeated.

This country is much too strong, in my opinion, that it would suffer any great setback. We are much stronger than the Russians were when they withdrew from Cuba. For a week maybe people said they had had a rebuff and within a month everyone was complimenting them for having contributed to the maintenance of peace.

We are certainly strong enough and decent enough and good enough in every respect to withstand any kind of a compromise that is at all reasonable.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I do not understand though, Mr. Chairman, just what the substance of the compromise would be.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it strikes me that the essence—

Secretary RUSK. I mean some of the things you said suggested that we should abandon the effort in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I am not suggesting that we should abandon it, but that we should have a conference. I do not think you will get it until you propose reasonable terms that would allow the Vietnamese, even the liberation front, to have an opportunity to participate in an election.

After all, Vietnam is their country. It is not our country. We do not even have the right that the French did. We have no historical right. We are obviously intruders from their point of view. We represent the old Western imperialism in their eyes. I am not questioning our motives. I think our motives are very good, as has been testified on numerous occasions.

But I still think from their point of view it is their country, however bad the people have acted. Other countries have had civil wars; we had one. In my part of the country we resented it for a long time. So did yours. You can remember the feelings that were there.

These are very unfortunate controversies. But what bothers me and, I know, a number here, is that this is in one sense a relatively minor matter. In another sense it seems to be the trigger that may result in a world war, and I do not want that to happen. That is what we are really concerned with.

Secretary RUSK. And none of us want it to happen, Mr. Chairman. But when you say this is their country—

The CHAIRMAN. It is their country, with all its difficulties. If they want to be Communists just like the Yugoslavs, I do not know why we should object to it.

Secretary RUSK. We are making a distinction, though; that is that South Vietnam is not Hanoi's country.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not our country. It used to be one country.

Secretary RUSK. But there was a settlement, Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the 17th parallel. There were some differences about various aspects of that.

THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of settlement was it? I think it would be fine if you would describe it very precisely. Did it divide it into two separate nations?

Secretary RUSK. It did not establish it as two separate nations, but it provided some procedures by which this could occur if that is what the people wanted. And then it worked out so that North Vietnam was not interested at all in holding anything like genuinely free elections. It was perfectly clear that North Vietnam was marking time for the time when it could seize South Vietnam regardless of the views of the South Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no doubt they expected to win that election. They thought they had won the war at Dienbienphu, didn't they?

Secretary RUSK. I suppose they did.

The CHAIRMAN. And didn't the Vietminh occupy a great deal of what is now South Vietnam and withdraw in response to that settlement or cease-fire?

Secretary RUSK. They withdrew in part. They left substantial numbers behind.

The CHAIRMAN. Many South Vietnamese thought they had been cheated by the Geneva Accords, didn't they?

Secretary RUSK. You mean the North Vietnamese?

The CHAIRMAN. The South Vietnamese did, too. They thought they had been sold out by the north because they did have to withdraw. But they were persuaded by the Russians and, I think, us and the French that there had better be a cease-fire—this was leading to a terrible situation—so they agreed to a cease-fire anyway. Isn't that about true?

Secretary RUSK. I think the people in Hanoi undoubtedly felt that they had been let down by the agreements in 1954, and they immediately rolled up their sleeves to go after it again.

The CHAIRMAN. And the only reason they accepted it, the best that I can read, is that they thought there would be an election and undoubtedly they thought they were going to win. General Eisenhower, I think, thought they would, too. He indicated that in his book.

Secretary RUSK. He indicated that in terms of that period of the fighting, not in terms of the period of the—

The CHAIRMAN. He referred to it.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. One of our proteges, of course, threw out Bao Dai, shortly thereafter. It was really the French's responsibility to guarantee the elections, wasn't it? They signed the cease-fire. The only people who signed the Geneva agreement were the Vietminh and the French.

Secretary RUSK. That point was a little confusing because the French were not in a position to hold elections.

The CHAIRMAN. They retired.

Secretary RUSK. The responsibility was turned over to the South Vietnamese, and the South Vietnamese Government did not sign the agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. No. There wasn't any South Vietnamese Government at that time. That was constituted subsequently. It was only the Vietminh who were the Communist national——

Secretary RUSK. The French military command signed the agreement with the Vietminh.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

There were only two signatures on the cease-fire. Nobody signed these other so-called declarations. They just accepted them.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. As a kind of a procedure?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. The French responsibility was to see that it was carried out. But the French retired and gave up their responsibility to hold the election. We didn't sign. I will grant it wasn't ours. Our participation was by proxy through Diem. I apologize. I don't wish to take all the time.

OBSTACLE TO ELECTIONS

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would comment that that is not, or need not be, the obstacle today, because there can be elections in which the South Vietnamese people can make their own decisions about these matters. But the Liberation Front, or at least Ho Chi Minh in his message to the heads of government, particularly to President Radhakrishnan recently, says: "If we really want a peaceful settlement we must accept the four point stand of the North Vietnamese Government and prove this by actual deeds; we must end, unconditionally and for good, all bombing raids and other acts against the DRV," with no reference whatever to any of the acts of war that they are committing; and that "We must recognize the Liberation Front as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam and engage in negotiations with it."

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I know they have said that. This morning, I think, I gathered that our statements at Honolulu, or part of them, were for public consumption and to try to bolster their morale. This is what I call a form of propaganda. I think you can find both sides have said things that are designed to help morale. I don't think they are final at all. The National Liberation Front itself has said on numerous times that they call for free elections. I don't think this can be settled in public declarations by one propaganda agency or another. I am suggesting that it has to be done in the old-fashioned way of going to these people privately and trying to assure them, if you can make them believe, that we would agree to the kind of program of genuine free elections that I mentioned.

I think it would be a major undertaking to convince them that we would live up to that, in view of their past experience with us and particularly the French in 1956. I am not saying you or this country is responsible for all that. I don't think we are. But there have been some very, very difficult historical facts that are hard to overcome and make people believe and have any confidence in a conference. All I am pleading with you for and have been very awkwardly, I think—is that this isn't the kind of conflict that warrants a vast escalation, a vast expenditure of money and many thousands of deaths. I think it is not

that kind of a vital interest, as I can cite in other instances. I also think that the great countries, especially this country, is quite strong enough to engage in a compromise without losing its standing in the world and without losing its prestige as a great nation.

On the contrary, I think it would be one of the greatest victories for us in our prestige if we could be ingenious enough and magnanimous enough to bring about some kind of a settlement of this particular struggle.

That is all I am trying to get at. I don't want you to give up or do anything disgraceful.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, we wouldn't have much of a debate between us on the question of compromising and a settlement, but we can't get anybody into the discussions for the purpose of talking about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there is something wrong with our approach. Let's assume that these people are utter idiots. There must be something wrong with our diplomacy.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, is it just possible that there is something wrong with them?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, there is a lot wrong with them. They are very primitive, difficult, poor people who have been fighting for 20 years and I don't understand myself why they can continue to fight, but they do.

Secretary RUSK. And they want to take over South Vietnam by force.

The CHAIRMAN. It is said the liberation front would like to take it over by election. That is what they say.

Secretary RUSK. They are requiring us to accept the liberation front as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam.

Now, that is what we have heard privately. We are not hearing a lot of things privately that you don't get publicly.

The CHAIRMAN. Normally in the old days that is the way it used to be done—not on the front pages in every capital in the world. It used to be done in a different way. I confess I am at a disadvantage to know what they have done or what we have done privately.

I yield to the Senator from Oregon. I have said too much already.

SUPPORT FOR CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

Senator MORSE. Before asking the questions that I am going to ask, on which I want to have the Secretary comment, I want to say to you, Senator Fulbright, in my judgment I consider your statements on this record the most eloquent and the most penetrating analysis of the problem that confronts us in southeast Asia by anybody at any time who has come before this committee. I seriously do not doubt, if all in this room and in this country could have heard you, that they would fully appreciate the significance of what you say.

You have presented a case that I pray my Government is going to give some heed to. I speak with a sad heart and I am sure the Secretary knows from my standpoint over the years that I am very unhappy to find myself in such complete disagreement with him for the past several months and still tonight. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I think our difficulty goes back to 1954 and 1955. Our

Government doesn't want to face up to the very unfortunate record of the United States made in southeast Asia in 1954, 1955 and 1956. That is when we made our horrendous mistake.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION FINDINGS OF GENEVA ACCORD VIOLATIONS

The Secretary reads, on page 23 of his statement this morning, the findings of the International Control Commission about the violations of North Vietnam in respect to the Geneva accords. They have violated them and violated them and violated them. And so did South Vietnam and so did the United States.

I would like to put in the record the reports of the International Control Commission, Mr. Chairman, that show the violations of others besides the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. (The reports mentioned appear in the appendix.) That is where a lot of this mess really started. Don't forget the Geneva Accords called for the starting of conferences in July 1955 in the preparation for these elections. The Secretary said the North Vietnamese won't have anything to do with the election. I want to say most respectfully I think he is dead wrong. I want to say we stopped the elections beginning as early as 1955. We took a course of action of supporting this man Diem whom we supported from the very beginning. He refused to sign the accords or be a party to them and he had the encouragement of John Foster Dulles not to sign them. We started at that time to scuttle the Geneva accords, although we gave lipservice to them under the statement of the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, and the President.

Our record in 1954, 1955, and 1956 paved the way for the shocking catastrophe that is taking place in South Vietnam today.

BILATERAL SETTLEMENT NOW HOPELESS

I happen to think, Mr. Chairman, that we have reached the point where this can never be settled bilaterally between the United States, the Vietcong, and the North Vietnamese. I think a bilateral settlement of this is hopeless. I think even if you force them to a surrender, the settlement is still hopeless. I think you are going to have to have other parties come in and do the settling for us. That is why I have been pleading that we get other nations of the world to realize their stake in this. I think their stake is so great. I agree completely with an observation that the Secretary of State made over in Paris some weeks ago when, as I recall, he went before NATO and tried to get them to see their stake. They have a stake. And I think their stake is such an important one that they ought to recognize it, move the United States out of the negotiating position, step in at the head of the table in the interests of the peace, and work for a negotiated settlement. I don't think we are going to lose any face by that. I am about through but I wanted to express after these remarks of yours, Mr. Chairman, what my great fear is. I think we are going to continue to stumble along here into world war III. I think we are going to say, "all you have to do is lay down your arms; all you have to do is stop aggressing; all you have to do is move out of South Vietnam and we will have peace." We have reached the point where that is not any longer for us to determine.

I wish it were. I think it is for the rest of the world to determine what all sides including the United States shall be expected to do to stop this war. I think we have an obligation to stop it along with the Vietcong and the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese and Red China.

STUMBLING INTO A WAR WITH CHINA

But my last point, Mr. Chairman, is this fear that wakes me up in the night time and time again. I think we are following a stumble approach here in regard to this matter, until we will finally stumble into a war with Red China. If I ask the Secretary a question it would be only this. If we stumble into that war, are you of the opinion, Mr. Secretary, that we can ever fight that war successfully by so-called conventional war, or will we have to fight it as a nuclear war?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I don't believe that it is for me to try to predict that situation. I think that Peiping and we both do not want to stumble into that war. I think that we have had that situation in front of us many times before. I think these are questions which cannot be resolved on the basis of the worst case that could occur at the end of the trail, but should be weighed on the basis of what makes reasonably good sense in the present circumstances in which we find ourselves in such crises.

PARTICIPATION OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN PEACE SEARCH

But, in terms of participation with other governments, I agree with you, Senator, that this is not a matter just for bilateral handling between the United States and Hanoi, or the United States and the Vietcong. Many other governments have projected themselves into this situation. Seventeen nonaligned nations tried to set up negotiations without preconditions. The British Commonwealth set up a committee to try to visit the capitals concerned to see if they could find a basis for peace in this situation. The Secretary General of the U.N. has tried to be in touch with all the governments concerned to see if he could find a peace. He was not permitted to visit Hanoi and Peiping. The British, as cochairman of the Geneva Conferences, which would be the most logical and natural way to proceed on this, have worked indefatigably trying to revive and stimulate and make use of the Geneva Conferences. There are many governments who have, on their own, tried to be in touch with the parties privately to see if they could contribute.

The ICC governments have made their effect to do so; that is, the Control Commission.

In other words, many governments are doing this, and there are also many who are expressing their views on the merits of the matters by giving aid of one sort or another to South Vietnam—some 35 or more of them.

Senator MORSE. But that keeps the war going. That is not what I am pleading for at all.

I am pleading for us to use our great influence among these nations to say, "All right, the time has come for you to select the divisions of men and whatever number of divisions of men are necessary to send over there and separate the parties. Go in between the United States

and the South Vietnamese on the one hand and the North Vietnamese on the other. You have to go there and enforce the peace." In my judgment if you continue this bilateral approach, Mr. Secretary—and I know you don't share my view—I think you are going to end up in a war with China. I think you know that can't be fought on a conventional basis but will have to be fought on a nuclear basis. That is what I think we are stumbling into. I think we are stumbling, and I think we ought to say to the other nations of the world, "You have to come in and separate us."

It is a case now where somebody has to go on to the playground, so-called, and pull the fighting boys apart.

Secretary Rusk. President Radhakrishnan of India proposed that Afro-Asian forces be intruded in this situation. We thought that was a good idea and that we ought to explore it thoroughly.

The other side rejected it with considerable abuse of President Radhakrishnan. I think most of these noninvolved countries, that is these nonaligned countries, would themselves put their forces in there to try to suppress a side that is unwilling to accept a peaceful settlement.

This would be their taking on the war. They are not prepared to do that. What they are prepared to do is to try to facilitate every machinery, every forum, every channel for discussion in order to find out if there can be found a basis for peace, and that itself is an important effort on their part, but there has to be some interest in peace on the part of Hanoi here, if anyone is to make any moves in that. And this is not the case of simply going to them and persuading them that we are acting in good faith. It could be a case of going to them and offering them more and more and more and more until they are satisfied, and at the present time that more appears to be South Vietnam.

Senator MORSE. I don't want to do that. I want a period of time, 5, 6, 10 years for a protectorate over there or a trusteeship. You can't go to an election immediately. Everybody knows that. But it would make a lot of difference between having only the United States and a few nations that are giving us token support over there fighting now, or between having 80 or 85 nations that have really faced up to this and said: "Listen, we are going to stop this war. That is what our obligations under the charter call for and we are going to send over whatever number of divisions is necessary to move in between the fighting forces."

That is what we ought to be pleading for, it seems to me. They talk about getting more support from other nations to go over and help fight a war. We have to keep a peace, stop making war. Our motives are of the best—I don't question my country's motives—I simply say the policy we are following is not the best, because it is making war, and you can't make war in 1966 and not endanger mankind in a nuclear war not too far away.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I have been here all day, and as they say out in the farm country, I think this field has been plowed lengthwise and crosswise repeatedly. Every question has been asked, and I think the answers have been given with great repetition.

COMMENT ON THE SITUATION

It occurs to me that we know what the objectives are; that is, peace, a reliable peace in South Vietnam, and I am not certain that this hearing will settle the situation. As far as I am concerned, I have had all the answers to the questions that are in my mind. The only thing that I want to comment on is the apparent connotation that we are all wrong. I do not believe we are. I believe the stimulating or the motivating force involved in this situation perhaps does go back a good many years to the fact that the Communist nations have never in good faith kept any major agreements which they have made along the line of peace. Oh, they may have paid their bills if they buy something someplace. If they have to pay in 6 months, they may do that. And I think countless mistakes were made by this Government of ours at the end especially of World War II. I think some mistakes were made in the Korean war. I think we failed to do some things that we should have done which would have brought a happier solution to the war. But we find ourselves up against a situation here.

We are in that situation, and to me either we have to bring this to a successful and reliable conclusion, to lay the basis for peace, or we have to get out, acknowledge our defeat, and leave southeast Asia. Now to me it is just about that simple. And I do not want to see our country follow the line of defeat, inasmuch as we are involved.

I think it is perhaps like a person who gets in some quicksand, and he is looking for a way out. He would have a lot of trouble if a fellow stand on the bank and argues how he got into that. The job is to get a solution, get out of the difficulty that we are in. Unless it is brought to a conclusion where a reliable peace can result there, then it would seem to me that the Communist world would enjoy a great victory. We would only postpone the day when we really had to meet this in an all-out struggle either in southeast Asia or someplace else, if freedom is to survive as the dominant factor in this world, and if international Communist tyranny is not to take over eventually, according to the well-known plans that they have had for so many years.

I am not going to ask any more questions because, as I say, the ground has been plowed quite a bit, and the questions have been asked and answered repeatedly. But I think we are up against a serious situation, and I think it has to be pretty satisfactorily resolved.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

COMMUNICATING BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, it may be that I misjudge the situation. I hope not. I believe we have made substantial progress. The Secretary has been a candid, a frank, and forthright witness. Such a great issue as is pending of necessity must be thrashed out. Men must be communicating with each other with great responsibility and sincerity and candor and frankness. This has occurred, particularly here for the last 30 or 40 minutes. I think we have made much progress. To begin with, some members on this committee had the feeling, Mr. Secretary, that we had passed the point of no return in

communicating our concern to you and to the President. I do not say this facetiously. I say it, I think, in truth. We have reached the President by this hearing. I understand he has been listening today and yesterday. And yesterday General Taylor came in and talked to us about limited objectives, limitation of forces. I was unable to get a definition, but I can understand why. And now you come today, and you speak of "the limited nature of our purpose there." I have the feeling that this hearing—Mr. Chairman, I would like to address this to you, maybe I should wait for executive session to say so, but I will say so now, and I will ask no further questions though I have several—I have the feeling that this is the climax of this public hearing. We should have our sessions with the Secretary and with the President behind closed doors for awhile. This has reached, I hope, a fruitful point from which some unity can be achieved in the country.

Thank you very much. I will terminate.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, this year we will spend about as much for military purposes in Vietnam as we spent for the entire Korean war. Do you feel that this expenditure is justified?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I do indeed.

Senator AIKEN. And that the force is necessary?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I do.

Senator AIKEN. Last April I believe you felt that the force in the Dominican Republic was necessary.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM IN CUBA

Senator AIKEN. And not long ago you felt that the use of force in Cuba was inadvisable. Now what virtue does communism have in Cuba that makes it less dangerous to the United States than communism in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic, assuming that there was a degree of communism in the Dominican Republic, which some claim?

Secretary RUSK. In the case of Cuba, Senator, that country became Communist for all practical purposes by the summer of 1960. My first engagement with the problem had to do with the problem of cure rather than the problem of prevention. We discussed that matter in the hemisphere, and, in January 1962, with the very important assistance of Senator Morse and Senator Hickenlooper at the Punta del Este Conference, we got the hemisphere to recognize really for the first time in a broad and comprehensive way the nature of the Communist threat. But it did not seem desirable to use military forces directly against Cuba under the then existing circumstances. The casualties inflicted upon the Cuban people, the attitudes among the hemisphere and the scars that would be left in the hemisphere on that matter, and the general world situation in which there were some other very dangerous questions, suggested that it would not be appropriate to use armed force as a solution of that problem—although any action by Cuba against its neighbors might very well precipitate the use of force.

In the summer of 1964 the hemisphere applied against Cuba all of the peaceful remedies that exist under the OAS Charter. Therefore the Cuban Government could create a very dangerous situation if it now proceeded to give effect in actual practice to some of the threats that were made recently in the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana, which threatened other members of the hemisphere, some of them by name, with a militant policy of subversion and intervention through force.

Now the hemisphere has already warned Cuba that any further actions of the sort which it used against Venezuela, could bring down upon it the penalties, the remaining penalties, of the Rio Pact.

We would hope they would have the good sense not to let themselves get into that position.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SITUATION

In the case of the Dominican Republic; the situation was somewhat different there because, regardless of what has been said elsewhere, the specific occasion for, and the motive for, the introduction of the U.S. Armed Forces was to prevent the loss of life, and particularly the loss of American lives, in a situation where those who had such authority as existed could not themselves take such responsibility, and where they themselves asked us to come in to accept that responsibility. After we got onto the island, the situation in the city developed very rapidly, and a great deal more information became available as to what the situation was.

Meanwhile, the Organization of American States, rather than repudiating the action taken by the President, or rather than rebuking us for having done it, elected to build upon that action, to organize an Inter-American force, to establish a commission of the OAS to help the Dominican people work their way into the middle path between the two extremes which the hemisphere had already rejected.

In the autumn of 1960, under the Eisenhower administration, the hemisphere said that Trujillo was not the right answer here, and they applied sanctions on Trujillo because of some actions he took against Venezuela. In January 1962, as I indicated, the hemisphere said that the Castro-type answer is not appropriate to this hemisphere. So there were the two guideposts on the soft shoulders of the road, on either side, about the hemisphere's policies about how to deal with a situation such as that that was created in the Dominican Republic. So the OAS committee has been there for the purpose of working with the Dominicans—to help them form a constitutional government by the choice of the Dominican people, which would give them a political system in between the two extremes already rejected by the hemisphere. Those are comments on those two problems in the use of force.

COMPARISON OF CUBAN AND VIETNAMESE SITUATIONS

I think here in southeast Asia the problem is that of an armed attack against a small country to whom we have a commitment under treaty, and we are called upon to use force to repel that aggression, as indicated in the resolution of August 1964.

Senator AIKEN. Wasn't the fact that Russia was involved in Cuba a factor in our decision not to use stronger forces against Cuba? We did approve the Bay of Pigs invasion, which was abortive. But then it was in the fall of 1962 that we told Russia to take their missiles and go home.

Have we told them to do the same thing in North Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. The missiles are not the same type missiles.

Senator AIKEN. Are you sure of that? I am speaking of conventional missiles. I expect Cuba and North Vietnam are both plastered with Russian conventional missiles, and I wouldn't rule out the other type of missile, but we don't know about that.

RUSSIAN ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

But what is Russia doing to try to bring about peace in southeast Asia? Is she encouraging continuation of our difficulties there? Is she making any effort to get peace established? What is your opinion on it? That is the only question I have.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, the authorities in Peiping have leveled some very bitter criticism at Moscow on the grounds that somehow Moscow is in collusion with us—

Senator AIKEN. Do you believe that?

Secretary RUSK (continuing). In southeast Asia. I would have to say that I am not aware of any such collusion.

Senator AIKEN. I don't believe it.

Secretary RUSK. The Soviet Union is the cochairman of the Geneva Conferences. We would hope very much that they would fully exercise that responsibility and do their best publicly and privately to make good on the agreements of 1954 and 1962. Now if they have been acting behind the scenes to try to find some solution to this situation, quite frankly we have not been informed.

Senator AIKEN. There is no indication that Russia is doing anything to prevent the spread of the war, is there?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think perhaps I had better leave the comment where it is, Senator, in an open session. We perhaps could pursue it a little bit further in closed session.

Senator AIKEN. All right. I haven't seen any such indications. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, my definite impression, after spending time in South Vietnam, was that if the North Vietnamese stopped supplying the Vietcong with ammunition, men, and guns, the South Vietnamese could work things out favorably in a fairly short time, then obtain free elections to ascertain who is in the majority, under democratic principles. Would you agree with that?

Secretary RUSK. I would think that is very much the case, sir.

FEAR OF CHINA

Senator SYMINGTON. There has been a great deal of apprehension about China. I worry about China, like every American must. Perhaps, based on my background, I worry a little more about the Soviets, based on what they now have; but our relations with the latter are im-

proved. Do you think that our country should be afraid of Red China to the point where that fear should be the primary consideration incident to decision in the matter of our foreign policy?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think that anyone in a responsible position must keep this element very much in mind and must take it fully into account. And I think this is also a matter which the other side must take very much into account.

I do not believe that we can organize a peace, or even maintain the security of our own Nation, if in successive crises we turn aside from what has to be done on the basis that at the end of the day or the end of the road it could move into something else. I mean that would have been the case with the Berlin blockade. It would have been the case with the Cuban missiles or with any of these other matters.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me repeat. Do you believe that the fear of Red China reacting to some action we took in protecting our interests under treaties and agreements in South Vietnam should be decisive with respect to decisions made about our foreign policy around the world?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, because if we do not meet those responsibilities, we shall find a Red China much more voracious and much more dangerous if they should discover that this technique of aggression is successful.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you believe the President is doing everything he can to obtain a just peace with honor?

Secretary RUSK. Everything that we can possibly think of. And he spends an enormous amount of time analyzing the situation and trying to find out whether there are others who might do more or whether we could do more in this direction, to probe for the possibilities of peace.

Senator SYMINGTON. He is spending more time on this than anything else, is he not?

Secretary RUSK. I would think this is the overriding problem. There are many other matters around the world to which he has to give attention, but this is a matter which naturally engages his deepest interest in the maintenance of peace, and so he spends a great deal of time on it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand we have about 40 treaties with other countries, and that we base the peace of the world upon these agreements.

Is that right?

Secretary RUSK. These are the alliances that we have involving just over 40 countries.

EFFECT OF RECOGNITION OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

Senator SYMINGTON. Perhaps the best person high in Government best able to comment on this told me that if we recognize the National Liberation Front, any Saigon government would promptly fall. In addition, he said, in his opinion, that within a relatively short time there would be riots in West Berlin.

Would you comment?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is possible. I do very much have the impression that, if we were to recognize the Liberation Front as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people, and try to impose

them on the South Vietnamese people in the way that the front wants us to, we would have to turn our soldiers around in order to impose them on the South Vietnamese people, because I am absolutely convinced that the South Vietnamese people don't want any part of them, and that, if we have any respect at all for what these people in South Vietnam want, we cannot recognize the Vietcong as their spokesman.

CREDIBILITY OF U.S. COMMITMENTS

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, there was some discussion this morning of a letter the President of France wrote; that it was firm, perhaps tough, even insulting, to the President of the United States. I have never seen the letter and I don't know if it exists. But isn't it true that it is common knowledge President de Gaulle, in his efforts to achieve a cleavage between this country and its allies, is constantly saying that we would not, in the clutch, defend Europe against attack?

Secretary RUSK. That letter—by the way, apparently there has been an additional comment from Paris to the press during the day. I believe Paris has denied some of the things said earlier this morning about that letter. So, they seem to reaffirm what I said this morning myself.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am glad to hear that. But the thrust of my question—isn't the problem we now face around the world the fact that many people who, putting it mildly, haven't the best interests of the United States at heart, are assuring our allies, or attempting to persuade them, that we will not honor our commitments if they, our allies, are attacked?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, there are those who are trying to make that point.

Senator SYMINGTON. Wouldn't it be a serious situation if people with whom we have built defensive alliances, for example, West Germany, began to believe that we would not live up to our treaty agreements?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think it is a point that is serious insofar as it creates differences among our allies. But where it becomes deadly serious is that, if some of these people persuade the Communist world that these commitments of ours are not serious, then that becomes extremely dangerous, and not just a matter of disagreement and dissension.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would hope the American people would listen carefully to what you have just said.

From what I gather in these hearings, nearly everybody thinks you are doing good but not doing good enough.

AVENUES TOWARD PEACE EXPLORED

What else is it you can do—I am sure you have thought of everything you might do. I am sure you want peace, but I am also sure you want to see a peace without sacrificing the honor of the United States. What else can we do in our effort to counteract the heavy criticism you are getting from some Members of the Congress, the Senate?

What else can you do to achieve a peace, a viable peace, a peace with honor, so we don't go around with our heads down?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do not believe that there are procedures or forums or diplomatic channels that are available, or that could be created, that have not been used. I do not think that we are in a situation where a procedural invention is going to deal with the situation. I think that, while we keep all these channels open, and we keep the discussions going among governments and across the curtains with governments in the Communist world, we have got to meet the central four points on which Hanoi seems to have been living:

First, their hope for military victory in the south. It must be made clear that they are not going to get that.

Second, that there will be an internal collapse in the south. I do not believe they are going to get that, and their hopes for that must be disappointed, and I think are being steadily disappointed.

Senator SYMINGTON. Unless we run out on the South Vietnamese?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Third, that international opinion might build up to force us to change our commitments. That is not going to happen, but Hanoi must be persuaded.

And fourth, that internal divisions in this country might cause us to change our commitment—and they must be persuaded that that is not going to happen.

Then I think they will be ready to realize that they are off on a futile track, and that it would be well for them to start exploring the possibilities of peace on a more serious basis.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much.

May I say I have full confidence in you as a Secretary of State, and believe you are an outstanding public servant?

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, it is now after 5 o'clock. You have been most generous with your time and most responsive to questions all day. I think someone has remarked that we have thrashed over every phase of this problem. I remarked to Senator Aiken a short time ago that I just could not understand why anyone wanted to be Secretary of State, because it does have some problems. We do appreciate your being in this position.

EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

Personally, I have great confidence in your efforts and in your ability. I shall not ask any questions. I notice in your statement this morning you have mentioned, I believe, 14 points in regard to the provisions that are acceptable by us as a part of the peace program. I notice that No. 12 deals with resources for the economic reconstruction of that country.

I think that should be an appealing thing to these people who are suffering so. I would like to get into that problem of funds for re-

construction. We have spent billions of dollars over there and we will be voting more. But I shall do that with Mr. Bell and others possibly when they come back, not this evening.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

WITNESSES' POINTS OF SIMILARITY

Senator PELL. Mr. Secretary, having sat here now for 4 days in these hearings, listening to two witnesses with somewhat different views than yours, and you and General Taylor presenting the administration's view, I am struck by the fact when you dig into what each of you have said, the points of similarity are much stronger than the points of difference.

It seemed to me that there is a great area of agreement which is that we must keep the military presence there as long as is necessary.

DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE A GRAND DESIGN?

The question really boils down to the question whether we should increase that presence or not, and I am wondering if you would bear with me that what we have most to keep in mind is a sure knowledge of what our eventual objective may be. The only leader in the world today that I know of who seems to have a truly grand design is President de Gaulle. He has his design. We do not have to agree with it, but I think he has a picture of the kind of globe he would like to see.

I am wondering if we could visualize the globe that we would like to see, would it not basically be a world where nuclear weapons are under international control? And also, do we not accept the fact that with the passage of time the militancy, the drive and the virulence of communism, which is an utterly antinatural and cruel and impractical system, will wear itself out?

What we need, looking for the long goal, is to achieve the passage of time without plunging into a general war.

Would that be a correct statement?

Secretary RUSK. I think we need the passage of time. I think this country does have some great designs of its own in terms of the general structure of the world community. I think you would be one of the best witnesses to describe the world community that we saw in the United Nations Charter at the end of World War II. Those general propositions in the charter represent a pretty good statement of the long-term policies of the American people toward the rest of the world.

So, I think we have some good ideas about the structure of the world community.

President Johnson has been trying to support that structure in every way possible in the economic and social, educational, and health fields as well as in these security matters that are so troublesome.

Senator, the question of time is important. We do not know, for example, what the next generation of Chinese leaders will look like. We have some impressions of, shall we say, the second generation of leaders in the Soviet Union. But we do not have much of an im-

pression of the next group in Peiping. But I do not think that we—we cannot buy time at the expense of a successful aggression against smaller countries. And this is the problem.

THE FACTOR OF TIME

We need to stabilize that postwar settlement. We need to stabilize that international community as sketched out in the U.N. Charter, and then let time try to heal some of the memories, and let time give us a chance to deal with some of the specific questions that need solution.

In our own dealings with Peiping—we have had 128 discussions with them now in the last 10 years—everything turns on Formosa. We try to talk about disarmament, we try to talk about southeast Asia, we try to talk about the exchange of newsmen or the exchange of doctors. They always keep coming back to the point "Well, are you going to surrender Formosa?" because they say that if we do not do that, there is nothing to talk about.

Well, maybe time will get over that. As you know, the Eisenhower administration attempted to get agreements from Peiping to renounce force in the Formosa Straits. Well, they have never been willing to do that.

So, gentlemen, time may help, but we cannot let time get away from us by having it used by the other side to develop a momentum and an appetite and a danger that will be increasingly difficult to bring under control.

HOLDING DOWN OUR COMMITMENTS

Senator PELL. I guess the differences between some of us, as I see our role, and my role, is that of trying to hold the Vietnam war down and work for time. I think there are others, yourself and others, who would believe that we could achieve these goals perhaps more quickly. This is what has come through in these 4 days of hearings.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, let me say that, as far as South Vietnam is concerned, the United States has not been rushing into this matter in order to achieve a quick solution regardless of cost. The time factors and the rate of escalation have been determined really by the action of the other side.

Senator PELL. I realize that, but the thing that concerns me, and concerns the people in my own State is the thought that the present planning is for an expansion in the order of another 200,000 by the end of this calendar year, and a further commitment of the same number next year.

In my own view, if our present commitment could be held down to last over a 5-year period if necessary, we would be better off.

I gather your view is we ought to move up.

Secretary RUSK. I think the planning has to be on the basis of leaving it to the Commander in Chief, as he consults with others who are constitutionally responsible, such as the Congress and the congressional leadership—to give him the chance to have choices when the necessity for choices occur.

Now, if we did not have those bases, for example, in process of construction, and it became necessary some time later to use them, you couldn't do it if they were not there.

But, on the other hand, if Hanoi were to start moving toward peace, say by the 1st of March, then that would turn the situation around.

In other words, we are not on a track here where everything is frozen on both sides. We don't know what the other side is going to do in this situation. We do know that they must face the fact that they are not going to have a military success in the south, and we hope that will mean then that they will start moving toward peace and we move down these commitments—and that is where deescalation can come.

CHOOSING BETWEEN REAL ALTERNATIVES

But I do believe, Senator Pell, that there is more agreement than some of the conversations these past few weeks would indicate, particularly when one takes into consideration the necessity for choosing among real alternatives.

Now, there is the major alternative of abandoning South Vietnam. There seems to be very little interest and support for that point of view.

There is another major alternative: of rushing into a general war or a larger war, to get it over with as quickly as possible, regardless of cost, without a sense of the prudence and care that one must use in these matters in the modern world. I think that there is relatively little to support generally from that point of view.

Now, that leaves the center position. That leaves the position of firmness coupled with prudence and some care in the way this matter is handled. That has about it certain dissatisfactions. It has about it certain concerns, because we can't know for certain exactly what the future will hold. But I think that it is always useful, in thinking of these matters, to try to put the question to oneself, whether a private citizen or official, in terms of what would I do about this if I were in fact the President of the United States—to try to reach toward the point of view which is nailed with responsibility rather than simply to discuss it—and I am not suggesting we have been doing that—simply to discuss it in terms of opinion or in terms of not having to live with the results. For, it is the President who must guide us in choosing among the real alternatives.

I think myself, without any doubt, that the country understands that he has approached this matter with the greatest solemnity, that he has tried to act with the firmness necessary to organize the peace, but to act also with the prudence which is necessary to prevent events from moving out of control, and that, as we move ahead here, every chance to bring this to a peaceful settlement will be explored.

But that, we make it clear to the other side that they will not succeed, there is no avenue to a peaceful settlement that has any chance of producing the peace that we are after.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

LIMITED OBJECTIVES AND UNLIMITED COMMITMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary, Senator Fulbright said earlier he had concluded that this was not a limited war, because in fact our objective was not a limited objective. We wanted victory. You disagreed. But it seem to me that in one sense you and he would be in agreement.

It is an unlimited commitment of our resources. There is no limit that either you or General Taylor or anyone else has put on it.

Perhaps I am wrong, but I begin to think that there is no such thing as a limited war in the sense that you go into it with any reservation as to the degree of your resources you are going to put into it.

I just want to know whether this, in your judgment, is a correct understanding or analysis of the situation, a war with limited objectives but no limit on the resources and the extent to which our resources may become involved.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I don't want to conjure up the picture of a major conflagration in the answer that I give.

Senator CASE. No; I don't want you to.

Secretary RUSK. Because, as you pointed out, we have a most limited objective here in terms of denying to the other side its attempt to seize Vietnam by force. Therefore, the scale of the action, in a rather specific sense, turns to a considerable extent on how much of an effort the other side is going to use to try to take over South Vietnam by force.

Now, we have tried to make it very clear—and we hope very much the other side will be under no misapprehension on this—that we consider that our commitment is such that they cannot be permitted to take over South Vietnam by force.

What that means no one can surely say. We hope, as it has meant in other situations, that that will mean that they will come to the conference table and make peace.

Senator CASE. I understand.

Now, I promised to take only a couple of minutes.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

WINNING BY DESTROYING VIETNAM

Senator CASE. Perhaps you saw the Times story this morning which suggested that the only way this can be won is by destroying Vietnam. This is not something we should look forward to. Do you have any comment on that statement, because it keeps coming up again and again?

Secretary RUSK. Well, still the principal problem is to find the enemy—it is not the mass destruction of massed divisions in its present situation. Defections from the Vietcong are multiplying rapidly. They are having very considerable difficulties on their side. I don't know what is meant by winning by destroying Vietnam. We are not trying to win anything except—

Senator CASE. In order to prove they can't win.

Secretary RUSK (continuing). The rejection of aggression, that is what we are after.

When we say victory over aggression, we mean by that that we repel this aggression, and that we prevent it.

Senator CASE. Our objective is limited to that?

Secretary RUSK. As stated in the congressional resolution.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams?

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, you have been down here all day. We have been holding these hearings for the past 3 weeks. If I could think of any additional question that I could ask or that you could answer or any comment that you could make that would bring us 1 day closer to the solution to this problem, I am sure both you and I would be glad to stay here all night. But I have no such words of wisdom so rather than ask a question I am merely going to wish you Godspeed. I hope that we can all of us achieve the objective that this committee and the country and all of us are working for and that is a solution to this dilemma. I wish I could give it to you, but I can't.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator Williams.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just want to say, because apparently this testimony is coming to a close, that while it is possible and probable that you and I haven't always agreed on every point in the past several years, Mr. Secretary, I have agreed with you on a great many. I know of no man with greater fortitude or physical strength to do the job which you are doing under all pressures from all of the world—and under the stirrings and restlessness that is occurring in the world today—who has a greater grasp of the basic facts and the incidents, the situations which are moving in the world today.

I frankly say I don't know how you stand it physically. I think we are fortunate in having a man whose physical endurance is such as yours. I think, as public servants go—this is aside from the fact whether anybody agrees always or disagrees—I think you bring to the Government and to your responsibilities the highest degree of devotion—at least as high a degree as any man could bring to the intelligent discharge of his duties in the interest of his country and his responsibilities.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I also wish to say that I appreciate your patience here, and I admire your vitality and vigor, as I have for a long time. I think you have done an extraordinary job in defending a position and explaining it. I know the committee, and I am sure the country, have benefited a great deal by your testimony today. I agree with Senator Gore. I think this has been a very fine meeting to end up these hearings. I hope we end them up, and that we can proceed in executive session and consider this matter.

I appreciate very much the devotion that you have given to us today and the time that you have given as you have in the past.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The committee is recessed.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

APPENDIX

FEBRUARY 7, 1966.

Mr. JOHN FISCHER,
Editor, *Harper's Magazine*,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR JOHN: I was shocked to see the advertisement in yesterday's book review section of the New York Times. I am enclosing the upper part of it so there may be no question in your mind about the ad to which I refer. It seems to me to be clearly misleading and implies that your February issue has an article in which I challenge Mr. Johnson's strategy.

As you may recall from our phone conversation, I thought so well of my proposal, which in essence recommended a thorough appraisal of where we are, what it is costing us, and what the alternatives are, and then making up our own minds rather than leaving the initiative with the Vietcong, that I considered sending a copy of it to Jack Valenti for the President. I presumed that I could be of help to him. You told me that you sent a copy of the article to Bill Moyers. Since then, Harper's has, through its advertising, exploited the idea that my views are entirely in opposition to those of Mr. Johnson, which isn't true. Although in saying this, of course, I am not sure of the detailed thinking of Mr. Johnson. As you may imagine, this has been a matter of some embarrassment to me and a great deal of misunderstanding, particularly in the highest places in Washington. I will appear before Senator Fulbright's committee tomorrow morning and at that time I hope I may clarify the entire situation. However, your ads continue to be read by people and I am afraid that the harm cannot be undone.

You now have a review of four books about De Gaulle. It seemed to me, when I completed it, to be a good review without any unusual implications vis-a-vis national policy. I would be grateful if you would handle this in a straightforward manner, simply as a book review.

Sincerely,

JAMES M. GAVIN.

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AMERICAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM

IN LIGHT OF OUR CONSTITUTION, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER,
THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS, AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIA
COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Prepared by

LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM

HON. ROBERT W. KENNY, *Honorary Chairman*

Executive Committee

WILLIAM L. STANDARD, *Chairman*
CAREY McWILLIAMS, *Vice-Chairman*
JOSEPH H. CROWN, *Secretary*

LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN
POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM*
38 Park Row
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* (In formation)

AMERICAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM

The justification of American involvement* in Vietnam has troubled lawyers in the light of the literal language of our Constitution and the United Nations Charter. Though the United States initially entered South Vietnam only to "advise", American troops—now numbering 125,000¹—have moved from a passive to an active combat role. American forces have mounted repeated air strikes against targets in North Vietnam. Is such action, raising the threat of large-scale war, consonant with our Constitution, our obligations under the United Nations Charter, the provisions of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty?

Observance of the rule of law is a basic tenet of American democracy. Hence it is fitting that American lawyers examine the action pursued by our Government to determine whether our Government's conduct is justified under the rule of law mandated by the United Nations Charter—a Charter adopted to banish from the earth the "scourge of war".

We shall explore and assess the grounds advanced to justify the course of conduct pursued by our Government vis-a-vis Vietnam. In Section I, we examine American policy in the light of the United Nations; in Section II, in the light of the Geneva Accords and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty; and in Sections III-IV in the light of our Constitution. Mindful of the grave importance of the issues, we have exercised the maximum diligence in the preparation of this Memorandum which is fully documented.

I

The United States in Vietnam: The United Nations Charter

The Charter of the United Nations was signed on behalf of the United States on June 26, 1945 by the President of the United States, and was ratified on July 28, 1945, by the Senate.² Thus, the United States became a signatory to the Charter, along with 55 other nations (there are now 114), obligating itself to outlaw war, to refrain from the unilateral use of force against other nations, and

* For an historical background, see "Robert Scheer, *How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam*" (A Report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California 93103); sample copy free.

1. President Johnson, in his news conference of July 29, 1965 stated:

"I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested." (Presidential Documents, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 15, August 2, 1965.)

2. See Historical Note under Title 22, United States Code, Section 287. By the Act of December 20, 1945, c. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (22 U. S. C. 287-287e), Congress enacted "The United Nations Participation Act of 1945," empowering the President to appoint representatives to the United Nations and to render various forms of assistance to the United Nations and the Security Council under specified terms and conditions.

to abide by the procedures embodied in the Charter for the settlement of differences between States. In essence, the obligations assumed by member nations under the United Nations Charter represent the principles of international law which govern the conduct of members of the United Nations and their legal relations.

The Charter of the United Nations is a presently effective treaty binding upon the Government of the United States because it is the "Supreme Law of the Land."³ Indeed, the Charter constitutes the cornerstone of a world system of nations which recognize that peaceful relations, devoid of any use of force or threats of force, are the fundamental legal relations between nations. The following provisions of the Charter are relevant:

(a) "*All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations*" (Chapter I, Article II(4)) (emphasis added).

(b) "*The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations or shall decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security.*" (Chapter VII, 39) (Italics ours throughout the Memorandum)

It is thus plain that signatory members of the United Nations Charter are barred from resorting to force unilaterally and that only the Security Council is authorized to determine the measures to be taken to maintain or restore international peace (apart from the question as to whether or not the General Assembly has any residual authority by virtue of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution for this purpose when the Security Council is unable to meet its responsibilities⁴).

It may be recalled that in 1956, Israel justified its attack on the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula "as security measures to eliminate the Egyptian Fedayeen 'Commando' bases in the Sinai Peninsula from which raids had been launched across the Israeli frontier."

3. The treaties to which the United States is a signatory are a part of the fundamental law, binding upon all officials and all governmental institutions. Article I, Section 2, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution confers power upon the President to make treaties with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate. Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides that treaties so made, together with the Constitution and the laws of the United States made pursuant thereto, are "the Supreme Law of the Land". *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U. S. 416, 432-434; *Hines v. Davidowitz*, 312 U. S. 52, 62-63; *United States v. Pink*, 315 U. S. 203, 230-231; *Clark v. Allen*, 331 U. S. 503-508.

4. The constitutional validity of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution adopted in 1950, is disputed.

Starke, "Introduction to International Law", 4th ed., London, 1958, at p. 83 *et seq.*

When Great Britain and France introduced their troops into the Sinai Peninsula, under claim of a threat to their vital interests, the "preponderant reaction of the rest of the world was to condemn this action as *inter alia*, a breach of the United Nations Charter." Starke, "Introduction to International Law", 4th ed., London, 1958, at pp. 85-88.

When the Soviet Union suggested a Joint Military Operation with the United States to restore the peace in the Middle East, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rejected this proposal as "unthinkable" (New York Times, November 6, 1956). Dulles declared:

"... Any intervention by the United States and/or Russia, or any other action, except by a duly constituted United Nations peace force would be counter to everything the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations were charged by the Charter to do in order to secure a United Nations Police Cease Fire."

At a news conference on November 8, 1956, President Eisenhower, answering an announcement of the Soviet Union at that time, declared that the United States would oppose the dispatch of Russian "volunteers" to aid Egypt, saying that it would be the duty of all United Nations Members, including the United States, under the clear mandate of the United Nations Charter to counter any Soviet military intervention in the Middle East. The President said:

"The United Nations is *alone* charged with the responsibility of securing the peace in the Middle East and throughout the world." *United Nations Action in the Suez Crisis*. Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. IV entitled "International Law in the Middle East Crisis."

To the fundamental, substantive and procedural requirements and conditions vesting sole authority in the United Nations to authorize utilization of force, there are only two exceptions set forth in the Charter. The first exception is found in Article 51 of Chapter 7:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense *if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations*, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security."

Article 51 of the Charter marked a serious restriction on the traditional right of self-defense. As was stated by Professor Philip C. Jessup in his work, "A Modern Law of Nations", published in 1947 (at pp. 165-166):

"Article 51 of the Charter suggests a further limitation on the right of self-defense: it may be exercised only 'if an armed attack occurs' This restriction in Article 51 very definitely narrows the freedom of action which states had under traditional law. A case could be made out for self-defense under the traditional law where the injury was threatened but no attack had yet taken place. Under the Charter, alarming military preparations by a neighboring state would justify a resort to the Security Council, but would not justify resort to anticipatory force by the state which believed itself threatened."⁵

The traditional right of self-defense, even prior to the adoption of the United Nations Charter, was limited. As stated by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Caroline Case,⁶ and as adopted in the Nuremberg Judgment in 1945, any resort to armed force in self-defense must be confined to cases in which "the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation".⁷

In expressly limiting independent military action to instances of *armed attack*, the founding nations explicitly and implicitly rejected the right to the use of force based on the familiar claim of "anticipatory self-defense", or "intervention by subversion", or "pre-emptive armed attack to forestall threatened aggression", and similar rationale. Such concepts were well known to the founding nations if only because most of the wars of history had been fought under banners carrying or suggesting these slogans. More importantly for our purposes here, however, the United States was aware of these precepts *before* the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter, and consciously acquiesced in their rejection as a basis for independent armed intervention.⁸

It has been authoritatively said that the exceptional circumstances stipulated in Article 51 are "clear, objective, easy to prove

5. In support of his views, Professor Jessup noted:

"The documentary record of the discussions at San Francisco does not afford conclusive evidence that the suggested interpretation of the words 'armed attack' in Article 51 is correct, but the general tenor of the discussions, as well as the careful choice of words throughout Chapters VI and VII of the Charter relative to various stages of aggravation of dangers to the peace, support the view stated." (Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations*, p. 166.)

6. See, Louis Henkin (Professor of Law and International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia University), 57 *American Society of International Law Proceedings*, 1963, at p. 152, Moore's *Digest of International Law*, Vol. II, p. 412.

7. Henkin, *ibid.*

8. Hearings on U. N. Charter, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong. 1st Sess., July 9-13, 1945 at p. 210.

and difficult to misinterpret or to fabricate".⁹ The wording was deliberately and carefully chosen.¹⁰⁻¹¹

Hence Article 51 can under no circumstances afford a justification for U. S. intervention in Vietnam, since the Saigon regime is indisputably not a member of the United Nations and, indeed, under the Geneva Accords of 1954, South Vietnam is merely a temporary zone not even qualifying politically as a state (See Section II *infra*), even if it be assumed that an "armed attack", within the meaning of Article 51, has occurred against South Vietnam. For, as has been shown, Article 51 is operative only in the event of "an armed attack *against a member of the United Nations*". Hence, neither the right of *individual* self-defense nor the right of *collective*¹¹ self-defense can become operative.

It has been claimed that United States intervention in Vietnam is sanctioned under Article 51 on the ground (1) that South Vietnam is an independent state; (2) that South Vietnam had been the victim of an armed attack from North Vietnam and (3) that the United States, with the consent of South Vietnam was engaging in "collective self-defense" of that country, as claimed by the United States in a communication to the United Nations Security Council in March, 1965 (U. N. Chronicle, Vol. 2, p. 22). To sustain this claim, *all* three elements must be satisfied.

This claim is untenable, however, on several grounds. First, South Vietnam was not recognized as an independent state at the 1954 Geneva Conference (See Section II, *infra*). Even if it had become a *de facto* state in the course of events since 1954, the infiltrations from North Vietnam cannot be deemed to constitute an "armed attack" within the purview of Article 51.

Since the Geneva Accords recognized all of Vietnam as a *single* state, the conflict whether of the Vietcong or Ho Chi Minh against South Vietnam is "civil strife" and foreign intervention is forbidden, because civil strife is a domestic question—a position insisted upon by the United States in its civil war of 1861. Ho Chi Minh can compare his position in demanding union of Vietnam with that of Lincoln, when Britain and France were threatening to intervene to assure the independence of the Confederacy (and with the added point that the national elections mandated for 1956 in the Geneva Accords were frustrated by South Vietnam with apparent support of the United States; see Section II, *infra*). Nor should it be overlooked that Lincoln had very little support from the people of the

9. Henkin, *ibid.*

10-11. "... at the Conference itself, every word, every sentence, every paragraph of the Charter's text was examined and reconsidered by the representatives of 50 nations and much of it reworked." (Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference [by the Chairman of the U. S. Delegation, *i.e.*, the Secretary of State, June 26, 1945], Hearings on U. N. Charter, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong. 1st Sess., at p. 41.)

South, who generally supported the Confederacy, while Ho Chi Minh has a great deal of support from the people in South Vietnam organized in the National Liberation Front whose military arm is the Vietcong. There is, therefore, a basic issue whether the hostilities in Vietnam constitute external aggression (by North Vietnam) or "civil strife". Here it should be noted that the United Nations is authorized to intervene where civil strife threatens international peace, as the United Nations did in the Congo, in accord with Article 39 of the Charter—but individual states are not permitted to intervene unilaterally.

The third element requisite for the invocation of the right of *collective* self-defense under Article 51 presupposes that the nations invoking such right are properly members of a regional collective system within the purview of the United Nations Charter. The point here involved is: Can the United States validly be a genuine member of a regional system covering South East Asia. Article 51 and Article 53, dealing with regional systems, were interrelated amendatory provisions intended primarily to integrate the inter-American system with the United Nations organization (see fn. 8, 13, 15). The concept that the United States—a country separated by oceans and thousands of miles from South East Asia and bereft of any historical or ethnic connection with the peoples of Southeast Asia—could validly be considered a member of a regional system implanted in Southeast Asia is utterly alien to the regional systems envisaged in the Charter. The "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty"—connecting the United States with Southeast Asia, architected by Secretary of State Dulles, is a legalistic artificial formulation to circumvent the fundamental limitations placed by the United Nations Charter on unilateral actions by individual members. However ingenious—or disingenuous—the Dulles approach, SEATO is a caricature of the genuine regional systems envisaged by the U.N. Charter. A buffalo cannot be transformed into a giraffe however elongated its neck may be stretched. The Dulles approach to collective defense treaties employed legal artifice to circumvent the exclusive authority vested in the United Nations to deal with breaches in the peace. Articles 51 and 53 were intended to make a bona fide integration of regional systems of cooperation with the world system of international security—but these envisaged regional systems which historically and geographically developed into a regional community—not contemplating a regional system which fused a region like Southeast Asia with a country on the North American Continent. SEATO is not a regional agency within the letter or spirit of the U. N. Charter as to authorize the United States to claim the right of collective self-defense even if there had been an armed attack on a member of the United Nations geographically located in Southeast Asia. If artifices like SEATO

were sanctioned, the path would be open for the emasculation of the United Nations organization and the world system of international security assiduously developed to prevent the scourge of war.

Hence Article 51 cannot be properly invoked for (1) South Vietnam does not have the political status of a state; (2) even if South Vietnam were deemed a *de facto* state, the infiltrations do not constitute an "armed attack" within the purview of Article 51; and (3) the United States cannot claim the right of "collective self-defense" in respect of a regional system involving Southeast Asia.

Apart from Article 51 (inapplicable to the situation here), the only other exception to the renunciation of the "threat or use of force" by member states is found in Chapter VIII of the Charter dealing with regional arrangements. Article 53 of said Chapter contains two paragraphs of particular significance:

(a) "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. *But no enforcement action shall be taken* under regional arrangements or by regional agencies *without the authorization of the Security Council*, with the exception of measures against an enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article." (Ch. VIII, Art. 53(1)).

Paragraph two of that article provides:

(b) "The term enemy state as used in paragraph one of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter."

With respect to regional arrangements therefore, it is clear that no enforcement action may be undertaken without the authorization of the Security Council of the United Nations, save and except in only one instance: against any state which, during World War II, was an enemy of any signatory of the Charter,¹² to wit, Germany, Italy and Japan. Since Vietnam was manifestly not an "enemy state" within the purview of Article 53(b), enforcement action under SEATO is unauthorized and cannot be justified in view of the express restrictions set out under Article 53(a) of the United Nations Charter.

In summary, the United Nations Charter obligates all of its signatory members to refrain from the threat or use of force, and

12. The reason for this exception appears clear. When the Charter was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, peace treaties had not yet been finally signed by the allied nations with each of the enemy states. Reparations, sanctions, territorial changes, had not then been finalized. And so, in order to permit necessary flexibility in these respects, this sharply limited exception, permitting action against an enemy state in World War II by an allied government, was spelled out.

only the Security Council (apart from the residual authority [see fn. 4] granted the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution) is authorized to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and to determine the measures to be taken to maintain or restore international peace. To these salient provisions, there are only two exceptions: the first, the right to self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations; and, the second, the right of nations to enter into appropriate "regional arrangements", subject, however, to the provision that no enforcement action shall be taken under such arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council, the only exception to the latter requirement being with respect to measures against an enemy state, as defined in the Charter.

We have shown that none of the aforesaid exceptions can be invoked by the United States Government with respect to its conduct in Vietnam. It follows therefore that the fundamental requirements of the United Nations Charter with respect to the renunciation of force and the threat of force are directly applicable to the actions of the United States.

One other noteworthy Charter provision is Article 103 which subordinates all regional and treaty compacts to the United Nations Charter.

"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other International Agreement, *their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.*" (Ch. XVI, Art. 103)

This Supremacy clause was drafted to meet the predictable reassertion of dominance by the great powers within their respective geographic zones or hemispheres. Because of the unhappy history of a world fragmented by such "spheres of influence", the Supremacy clause and the restrictions on the use of force under regional agreements emerge as limitations upon the super powers even within their own geographic zones. It is significant that the United States not only accepted these limitations, but actively supported their incorporation within the Charter.¹³

13. Hearings on U. N. Charter, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong. 1st Sess., *supra*, n. 6, at p. 306.

On May 15, 1945, Secretary of State Stettinus issued a statement at the San Francisco Conference regarding the Act of Chapultepec vis-a-vis the United Nations organization which declared (so far as here pertinent); *Hearings on U. N. Charter, op. cit.* p. 306:

"As a result of discussions with a number of interested delegations, proposals will be made to clarify in the Charter the relationship of regional agencies and collective arrangements to the world organization.

These proposals will—

1. *Recognize the paramount authority of the world organization in all enforcement action.*

Article 103 makes clear that the obligations of the United Nations Charter prevail vis-a-vis the obligations of the SEATO Treaty. Indeed, Article VI of the SEATO expressly recognizes the supremacy of the United Nations Charter (see Section II, *infra*). Moreover the frequent citation by President Johnson of the pledges given by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and himself to aid South Vietnam afford no justification for U. S. intervention in Vietnam.¹⁴ In the first place, these pledges or commitments do not even have the status of treaties, for these Presidential pledges have not been ratified by the Senate. And even if these Presidential pledges had been solemnly ratified by the Senate, any obligations thereunder must yield to the obligations imposed under the United Nations Charter by virtue of the Supremacy clause embodied in Article 103. Nor

2. Recognize that the inherent right of self-defense, either individual or collective, remains unimpaired *in case* the Security Council does not maintain international peace and security and an armed attack against a member state occurs. Any measures of self-defense shall immediately be reported to the Security Council and shall in no way affect the authority and responsibility of the Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

3. Make more clear that regional agencies will be looked to as an important way of settling local disputes by peaceful means.

The first point is already dealt with by the provision of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals (ch. VIII, sec. C, par. 2) which provides that no enforcement action will be taken by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. It is not proposed to change this language.

The second point will be dealt with by an addition to chapter VIII of a new section substantially as follows:

"Nothing in this Chapter impairs the inherent right of self-defense, either individual or collective, *in the event that* the Security Council does not maintain international peace and security and an armed attack against a member state occurs. Measures taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The third point would be dealt with by inclusion of a specific reference to regional agencies or arrangements in chapter VIII, section A, paragraph 3, describing the methods whereby parties to a dispute should, first of all, seek a peaceful solution by means of their own choice.

The United States delegation believes that proposals as above outlined if adopted by the Conference would, with the other relevant provisions of the projected Charter, make possible a useful and effective integration of regional systems of cooperation with the world system of international security.

This applies with particular significance to the long established inter-American system. * * *

14. President Johnson, in his news conference of July 28, 1965, declared:

"Moreover, we are in Viet-Nam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation." (Presidential Documents, Vol. 1, No. I, p. 15), President Eisenhower has stated that his Administration had made no commitment to South Vietnam "in terms of military support on programs whatsoever." *The New York Times*, August 18, 1965, p. 1.

would the illegality of U. S. intervention in Vietnam be altered by the circumstance that the Saigon regime may have invited the United States to assume its role in the Vietnam conflict. The supremacy clause of the Charter manifestly prevails and cannot be annulled by mutual agreement of third parties.

It is by virtue of the Supremacy clause that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has called the world's attention to the emasculation of the authority of the United Nations resulting from actions taken by regional agencies without reference to the Security Council.

We believe that any fair study of the United Nations Charter will affirm the observations of Professor Lewis Henkin, of Columbia University, when he speaks "of the law of the Charter":

"So far as it purports to prescribe for the conduct of nations, it consists, basically, of one principle: Except in self-defense against armed attack, Members must refrain from the threat or use of force against other states . . . the rule of the Charter against unilateral force in international relations is the essence of any meaningful concept of law between nations and the foundation on which rests all other attempts to regulate international behavior. It is a rule which all nations have accepted and which all have a common interest essential to law."¹⁵

It appears difficult to escape the conclusion therefore, in the light of the aforesaid, that the action of the United States Government in Vietnam contravenes essential provisions of the United Nations Charter. The United States Government has decided for itself to use armed forces in South Vietnam and to bomb North Vietnam without authorization of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations. The failure of the United States to honor its obligations under the United Nations Charter is a regrettable but inescapable conclusion which we as lawyers have been compelled to reach. We, as lawyers, urge our President to accept the obligations for international behavior placed upon us by our signature on the United Nations Charter.

15. Henkin, in *57 American Society of International Law Proceedings*, 1963, *supra*, n. 6, at p. 148. See also in further explication of Professor Henkin's succinct conclusion: Statements of Honorable Edward R. Stettinus, Jr., Secretary of State, the testimony of Senator Millikin, and the testimony of Mr. Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organization and Security Affairs, in Hearings on U.N. Charter, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., *supra*, n. 8, at pp. 34-147, 210, 95-100 and 304-307; Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations* (1947); Proclamation of Athens and Declaration of General Principles for a World Rule of Law, adopted by the First World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Athens, Greece, July 6, 1963; Francis T. P. Plimpton, United States Representative to the United Nations, State Department Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No. 1278, December 23, 1963, pp. 978-979.

II

The United States in Vietnam:

The 1954 Geneva Accords and the SEATO Treaty

Officials of the United States Government have nevertheless asserted, on different occasions, that the actions of the United States in Vietnam are consistent with the United States' duties and obligations under the United Nations Charter and sanctioned by the treaty creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The conduct of the United States Government has been justified as support of a legitimate government defending itself against insurrection from within and aggression from without. We have demonstrated above that even if this latter position were accepted on its face, unilateral conclusions and actions taken by the Government of the United States upon the basis of such conclusions are violative of the United States' firm obligations under the United Nations Charter. However, we do not let the matter rest with this assertion, but proceed to an examination of the validity of the claims made by the United States Government in support of its conduct in Vietnam.

The Geneva Agreement, under which the war between Vietnam and the French was terminated, effected the division of Vietnam into North and South, at the 17th Parallel. The said "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam," entered into in Geneva on July 20, 1954, provided that the division of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel was only "a provisional military demarcation line," on either side of which the opposing forces could be "re-grouped"—"the forces of the Peoples Army of Vietnam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south" (Ch. I, Art. 1).¹⁷

The Geneva Agreement makes plain that the division of the 17th Parallel was to be temporary and a step in the preparation for a general election to elect a government for a unified nation. Pending such election, "civil administration in each re-grouping zone [was to] be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be re-grouped there" [Art. 14(a)].

16. Geneva Conf. Doc. No. IC/42/Rev. 2, in 1 *American Foreign Policy*; 1950-1955 Basic Documents 750; *New York Times*, July 24, 1954, p. 4.

17. It is relevant to note that at the time this provision was agreed upon, the Viet Minh occupied all but a few "islands" of territory to the north of the 17th Parallel as well as approximately two-thirds of the territory south of that line. See map showing areas of South Vietnam under Vietminh control at end of May 1953 in Henri Navarre, *Agonie de l'Indo-Chine* (1953-54) (Paris, 1956) p. 37. Thus, by the cease-fire agreement the Viet Minh gave up substantial areas of territory in what is now called South Viet-Nam.

An article in the *New Republic*, May 22, 1965, p. 29, by the Honorable Henry W. Edgerton, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, brilliantly delineates the provisional character of the "Government" of South Viet-Nam and casts doubt on the juridical claim to the existence of that government.

The day after the aforesaid cease-fire agreement was entered into, representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Vietminh), Laos, France, the Peoples Republic of China, the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom affirmed The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problems of Restoring Peace in Indo-China, July 21, 1954.¹⁸ The Declaration emphasized that the North-South division was solely a means of ending the military conflict and not the creation of any political or territorial boundary. Article 6 of the Declaration stated:

"The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that *the military demarcation line is provisional and shall not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.*"

This constitutes a recognition of the historical fact that Vietnam is a single nation, divided into two zones only temporarily for administrative purposes, pending an election. This being so the action of the North Vietnamese in aiding the South Vietnamese, to the extent that it has taken place, neither affects the character of the war as a civil war nor constitutes foreign intervention. It cannot be considered an armed attack by one nation on another.

The United States is in fact a foreign nation viz-a-viz Vietnam; North Vietnam is not. The latter by the Geneva Agreement was to participate in an election not to determine whether North and South Vietnam should be united but, to select a government of the nation of Vietnam, constituting all of Vietnam—north, south, east and west. It was the refusal on the part of the Diem regime and the subsequent "governments" of the South, supported by the United States, to participate in such elections that opened the door to the present conflict.

It was also stated in the Declaration that the clear objective of settling political problems and unifying the nation was to be by means of free general elections. Article 7 of the Declaration provided:

"The Conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, *unity* and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic

18. See *Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, June 16-July 21, 1954* (London) (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmd 9239), 1954 (referred to as "Geneva Accords"). The French-sponsored Bao Dai regime, which was not endowed as yet with any real political substance, did not sign the Geneva Accord: not until 1956 did France relinquish control over South Vietnam; the Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed on October 26, 1955, but French troops were not completely evacuated from the country until Nov. 1, 1956.

institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, *national elections shall be held in July, 1956, under the supervision of an International Commission . . .*"¹⁹

The reference to "national elections" reinforces the evidence of the historical status of Vietnam as a single nation. To present the picture, as the United States repeatedly has done, as though North Vietnam were an interloper having no organic relationship to South Vietnam is to ignore both the applicable legal principles and treaties and the facts of history.

Although the United States participated in the discussion leading up to the Geneva Accords, it did not sign the Final Declaration. Instead, the United States Government, through its Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, made its own unilateral declaration²⁰ on July 21, 1954. In this declaration, the United States took note of the Geneva Agreements and declared that the United States would "refrain from threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force . . ."

Referring to free elections in Vietnam, the United States' declaration stated:

"In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly."²¹

Thus the United States recognized the fact that Vietnam was a single nation. Nevertheless the justification of United States policy today ignores this admitted fact. The United States persists in its denial that it is intervening in a civil war. It seeks to justify the bombing of North Vietnam by the United States on the basis that North Vietnam is a foreign aggressor in South Vietnam.

19. Note that Article 7 stipulates that the elections were to be antecedent to and a necessary condition for the "fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions" and that the elections were to be held "in order to ensure . . . that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will." This particular portion of the Geneva Accord has frequently been quoted out of context, with the key phrases in reverse order, in order to justify the refusal to hold elections on the grounds that the necessary conditions did not exist.

20. See "Extracts from Verbatim Records of Eighth Plenary Session", Geneva Accords.

21. Nowhere in its own declaration did the U.S. recognize the political partition of Vietnam; insofar as it referred to the country, it designated it as "Vietnam", not "South Vietnam" and "North Vietnam".

Nor is this all. The United States further pledged "that it will not join in any arrangement which will hinder" the reunification of Vietnam, and concluded with the hope that:

"The agreement will permit Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of the area to determine their own future."

No election was ever held pursuant to the Geneva Accords, although both the International Control Commission (composed of India, Poland and Canada) and the United Nations announced readiness to supervise such elections. South Vietnam announced that it did not regard itself obliged to take part in the elections because the participation of North Vietnam would render such elections not free, a position apparently supported by the State Department.²² In 1955, following the Geneva Accords, then Prime Minister of State Diem repudiated the Geneva Agreements and refused to hold the elections. Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his *Memoirs*, suggests a further reason for Diem's refusal to hold elections pursuant to the Geneva Accords:

"I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indo Chinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held at the time of the fighting possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai."²³

The consequences of the repudiation of the Geneva Accords were delineated by Senator Ernest Gruening in a speech to the Senate on April 9, 1965:

22. See, Question No. 7, "Questions and Answers on Viet-Nam", Department of State Publication No. 7724, August, 1964, p. 8. See also Footnote 19, George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis, professors of government at Cornell University, in their article, "The United States in Vietnam", which appeared in the June 1965 issue of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, note (op. cit. p. 31):

"When on July 16, 1955, the Diem government announced, with American backing, that it would defy the provision calling for national elections, it violated a central condition which had made the Geneva Accords acceptable to the Vietminh. Regardless of what sophistry has been employed to demonstrate otherwise, in encouraging this move the U.S. departed from the position taken in its own unilateral declaration. And France in acquiescing abandoned the responsibility which she had unequivocally accepted a year earlier."

(Citing—Allan B. Cole, ed., *Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions*; A Documentary History, 1945-1955 (Ithaca, N. Y.) 1956, pp. 226-228; and Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indo-China* (Oxford, 1961), pp. 370-372.

23. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956* (London, 1963), p. 372.

"That civil war began—let me repeat, because this is crucial to the issue—when the Diem regime—at our urging—refused to carry out the provision contained in the Geneva Agreement of 1954 to hold elections for the reunification of Vietnam. That was one of the underlying conditions of the Geneva Agreement. The civil war began and has continued, with intensified fury ever since For over 800 years, before its conquest by France, Vietnam was a united country. After defeating the French in 1954, the Vietnamese went to the conference table at Geneva agreeing to a settlement only on condition that reunification elections be held. Yet, nowhere in President Johnson's speech of April 7, 1965 at John Hopkins University is there held out a hope of ultimate reunification of Vietnam. He conditioned the ultimate peace 'upon an independent South Vietnam instead.'"

In view of all of the aforesaid, the assumptions and justifications for our governmental policy in Vietnam do not appear to have support, either in law or in fact. The conduct of the United States Government in Vietnam appears plainly to violate the terms of the Geneva Accords and to repudiate solemn pledges to "refrain from the threat or the use of force" to disturb the Geneva Accords.

Moreover, nothing in the provisions of the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty would appear to justify the conduct of the United States Government in Vietnam. The SEATO Treaty was signed in Manila some seven weeks after the signing of the Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. The SEATO Treaty became effective in February, 1955, following the Treaty ratification by eight member states—the United States, France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippine Islands.

By the Preamble and by Article I of the SEATO Treaty, the parties acceded to the principles and Supremacy of the United Nations Charter in accordance with Article 103 thereof, which it will be recalled, provides as follows:

"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other International Agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."

The Supremacy of this provision was expressly reiterated by the eight SEATO nations under Article VI of said Treaty, in which each solemnly agreed that the SEATO Treaty:

". . . does not affect the rights and obligations of any of the parties under the charter of the United Nations, or

the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security."

The key provisions of the SEATO Treaty are to be found in Article IV. Paragraph 1 thereof permits the use of force by one or more member states only in the event of "aggression by means of armed attack." But where the integrity or inviolability of any territory covered by the Treaty is threatened "by other than armed attack" or "by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area," then, paragraph 2 of Article IV requires, *as a prerequisite to intervention*, that "the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures to be taken . . ."

The consent of all eight SEATO nations was originally required before any military action under Article IV could be undertaken by any of them (New York Times, May 28, 1962). Later, this rule was modified so that action could be undertaken if there was no dissenting vote—*i. e.*, an abstention would not count as a veto (New York Times, April 19, 1964). At the last two annual meetings of the Ministerial Council of SEATO, France has refused to support a communique pledging SEATO backing for South Vietnam against the Vietcong (New York Times, April 15-16, 1964; May 3-6, 1965; see also, Los Angeles Times, May 3-4, 1965). It would appear that with the threat of a French veto a formal SEATO commitment in Vietnam has not been sought by the United States. However, even if there had been unanimity among the SEATO nations, the provisions of Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter would still prevail:

"But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council . . ."

Manifestly, no such authorization has ever been conferred, either by the Security Council of the United Nations, or by the General Assembly, from which it follows that American action in Vietnam clearly cannot be supported by reference to SEATO.

So long as the United States remains a member of the United Nations, our right to intervene is circumscribed by the provisions of the United Nations Charter. As members of SEATO, our right to intervene is limited, both by the requirement for unanimity among all of the eight Treaty nations and, in addition, by the superseding requirement of Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, prohibiting any enforcement action under a regional arrangement without the authority of the Security Council. Our justification for acting contrary to our solemn obligations under the United Nations Charter appears tenuous and insubstantial. The fact of the matter is that the United States Government has simply acted as its own judge of its own interests in patent disregard of the fundamental law embodied in the United Nations Charter.

III

Constitutional Aspects of United States

Intervention in Vietnam

This disregard of the rules of the Charter, inherent in U. S. intervention in Vietnam, is compounded by the fact that such intervention is also violative of our own Constitution. Whatever doubts may have existed prior to the President's "Report to the Nation Following a Review of U. S. Policy in Vietnam"²⁴ (set out at his news conference on July 28, 1965), as to whether U. S. action in Vietnam constituted the conduct of a war, the President in that report made it explicitly clear that "this is really war," noting that "our fighting strength" was being raised from 75,000 to 125,000 "almost immediately" and that "additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested." Can the President's conduct be squared with our Constitution (apart from the obligations imposed upon member states by the United Nations Charter)?

It is the genius of our Constitutional system that ours is a government of checks and balances. A dangerous concentration of power is avoided by the separation—in Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution—of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The doctrine of "separation of powers" is fundamental to, and is one of the "great structural principles of the American constitutional system."²⁵ The Supreme Court has recently characterized this "separation of powers" as "a bulwark against tyranny." *United States v. Brown*, — U. S. —, 33 Law Week 4603 (June 7, 1965). The Supreme Court had earlier said:

"The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate powers. Each includes all authority essential to its due exercise. *But neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the property authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the President.*" *Ex parte Milligan*, 4 Wall 2, 139 (1866).

Classically stated by Blackstone²⁶ and derived from Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Locke, and Montesquieu,²⁷ this constitutional separation of powers was deliberately carried over by the Framers into the conduct of foreign affairs.

24. Presidential Documents, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Aug. 2, 1965), pp. 15-19. See also State Department Bulletin, April 26, 1965, p. 606; State Department Bulletin, May 24, 1965, *passim*; State Department Bulletin, May 31, 1965, p. 838, Krock, *By Any Other Name, It's Still War*, New York Times, June 10, 1965.

25. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York, 1957), p. 9.

26. Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Law of England*, 146 (7th ed. 1775).

27. Cf., Sharp, *The Classical American Doctrine of "Separation of Powers"*, 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 385 (1935).

For, contrary to widely held assumptions, the power to make and conduct foreign policy is not vested exclusively in the President, but is divided between him and Congress, with each endowed with complementary, but separate²⁸ powers and responsibilities.²⁹

Thus, in making and carrying out general foreign policy, Article II, Section 2 requires the President to have the "Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." And the President also requires the advice and consent of the Senate to "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls."

When statecraft fails and the question becomes the ultimate one of war or peace, the Constitution imposes a tight rein upon the President. His participation ends at the threshold of the decision whether or not to declare war. Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, that power is confided *exclusively* to the Congress.³⁰ There is no mention of the President in connection with the power to "declare war." Under the Constitution, Congress alone must make this decision. The Clause does not read "on recommendation of the President," nor that the "President with advice and consent of Congress may declare war." As former Assistant Secretary of State James Grafton Rogers has observed: "The omission is significant. There was to be no war unless Congress took the initiative." Rogers, *World Policing And The Constitution*, p. 21 (Boston, 1945).

"Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of war is entrusted only to Congress." *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer*, 343 U. S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J.).

That the President lacks constitutional power to make war is underscored by the historic statement made by President Woodrow Wilson on the night of April 2, 1917 when he addressed the Congress in a joint session:

"I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to

28. "One of the most striking facts in the institutional philosophic history of the United States (is) that the legislative-executive quarrels during the colonial period convinced the colonists of the desirability of a separation of powers rather than a union of powers." Wright, *Consensus and Continuity*, p. 17 (Boston, 1958).

"The doctrine of separated powers is implemented by a number of Constitutional provisions, some of which entrust certain jobs exclusively to certain branches, while others say that a given task is *not* to be performed by a given branch." *United States v. Brown*, *supra*, — U. S. at p. —, 33 Law Week, at p. 4605.

29. Story, *Commentaries on the Constitution* (Boston, 1833), *passim*; Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn., 1950); Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative* (Ill., 1962).

30. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution reads:

"The Congress shall have the power:

* * *

"11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water."

be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor Constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making."³¹

President Franklin Roosevelt also heeded his Constitutional responsibilities and was also mindful and sensitive of the Constitutional limitations applicable to the President when, before a joint session of the Congress on December 7, 1941, he requested the Congress for a declaration of war following Pearl Harbor.

The decision to place the responsibility for declaring war exclusively in Congress as the direct representative of the people, and not even to provide for the President's participation in that decision, was a most deliberate one by the Framers.

The Constitutional Convention had been urged to rest the power to declare war, the "last resort of sovereigns, *ultima ratio regum*," in the executive, or, alternatively, in the Senate. 3 Story, *Commentaries on the Constitution*, para. 1166. The arguments were made that "large bodies necessarily move slowly" and "despatch, secrecy, and vigour are often indispensable, and always useful towards success." Story, *ibid*.

When the issue was debated at the Convention, Mr. Gerry stated that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war." Madison and Gerry "moved to insert 'declare,' striking out 'make' war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." The motion carried. Farrand, ed., *Records of the Federal Convention* (New Haven, 1911), II, pp. 318-319.³²

31. President Wilson went on to say:

"With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war."

32. The Framers concluded and provided "that the power of declaring war is not only the highest sovereign prerogative; but that it is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous, that it requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all the councils of the nation. War, in its best estate, never fails to impose upon the people the most burthensome taxes, and personal sufferings. It is always injurious and sometimes subversive of the great commercial, manufacturing, and agricultural interests. Nay, it always involves the prosperity, and not infrequently the existence of a nation. It is sometimes fatal to public liberty itself, by introducing a spirit of military glory, which is ready to follow, wherever a successive commander will lead; and in a republic, whose institutions are essentially founded on the basis of peace, there is infinite danger that war will find it both imbecile in defense, and eager for contest. Indeed, the history of republics has but too fatally proved, that they are too ambitious of military fame and conquest, and too easily devoted to the views of demagogues, who flatter their pride and betray their interests. It should therefore be difficult in a republic to declare war; but not to make peace." Story, *op. cit.*, § 1166.

Nowhere in the debates is there support for the view that the President can wage a war or "commit" our nation to the waging of a war. On the contrary, war-making was to be a purely legislative prerogative. The *only* use of force without a declaration of war that was contemplated as the debates clearly show, was "to repel sudden attacks."³³

These Constitutional provisions that only Congress shall have the power to declare war and that Congress has the sole responsibility to raise and support the armies, to provide for a navy, and to impose the taxes to provide the funds to carry on a war, reflected a profound distrust of executive authority and a corresponding reliance upon the legislature as the instrument for the decision-making in this vital area. Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (New York, 1935), pp. 29-35.

These provisions reflected things painfully learned during the early colonial period, when every major European war had its counterpart on the American frontiers. The colonies were therefore determined to end the imperial authority to decide for them what wars they should enter and what the outcome of those wars should be. Savelle, "The American Balance of Power and the European Diplomacy 1713-778," in Morris ed., *The Era of the American Revolution* (New York, 1939), pp. 140-169.

The Convention was not only determined to deny war-making power to the President, but was also unwilling to entrust it to the Senate alone. To assure the fullest consideration, the Framers therefore provided that the House of Representatives, larger and more representative than the Senate, should also be brought in to decide this vital question. The action and decision of the whole Congress were therefore constitutionally made necessary to this fateful undertaking.

"The Constitution says, therefore, in effect, 'Our country shall not be committed formally to a trial of force with another nation, our people generally summoned to the effort and all the legal consequences to people, rights and property incurred until the House, Senate and the President agree.'" Rogers, *World Policing and the Constitution* (Boston, 1945), p. 35.

Concededly there have been many instances when the President has sent United States armed forces abroad without a declaration of war by Congress.³⁴ These have ranged from engagements between

33. Manifestly the residuary power left to the President—"to repel sudden attack" contemplated attacks on the country's geographical territory—not "sudden attacks" in far-off lands, such as in South East Asia. Cf. Tonkin Bay Joint Resolution of August 6-7, 1964, discussed in Section IV, *infra*.

34. See United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing, Situation in Cuba*, 87th Congress, 2d Sess., September 17, 1962 (Washington, G. P. O., 1962), pp. 82-87; Rogers, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 93-123.

pirates and American ships on the high seas to the dispatch of our armed forces to Latin-American countries.

These precedents cannot justify the present actions without bringing to mind Swift's comment on "precedents" in *Gulliver's Travels*:

"It is a Maxim among these Lawyers, that whatever hath been done before, may legally be done again; And therefore they take special Care to record all the Decisions formerly made against common Justice and the General Reason of Mankind. These, under the Name of Precedents, they produce as Authorities to justify the most iniquitous Opinions; and the Judges never fail to directing accordingly."

Here it is important to distinguish our country's involvement in the Korean war. For there the United States fought under the aegis of the United Nations pursuant to a definitive resolution of the Security Council authorizing and directing the employment of armed forces of member states, so that the United States was thus performing its solemn obligations undertaken in becoming a signatory of the United Nations Charter, a treaty which is the "Supreme Law of the Land." But in the Vietnamese situation, there has been no authorization by the Security Council; indeed the Security Council has not even been seized of the matter, has not been requested to entertain jurisdiction of the present conflict.

It is therefore unfortunately vitally necessary, although trite, to recall that "the government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men." *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cr. 137, (1803). Under a government of laws, the President is not free from the checks of the Constitution of the United States; the President is not free to assume the powers entrusted solely to the Congress. Ours is not a government of executive supremacy.³⁵

Here it is fitting to recall that on May 6, 1954, at a time when the fall of Dien Bien Phu was imminent, then Senator Lyndon Johnson, as Democratic leader of the Senate, at a Jefferson-Jackson Dinner, criticized the Eisenhower Administration in these terms:

"We will insist upon clear explanations of the policies in which we are asked to cooperate. We will insist that we and the American people be treated as adults—that we have the facts without sugar coating . . .

35. "With all its defects, delays, and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the Law, and that the Law be made by *parliamentary deliberations*." Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer*, *supra*, 343 U.S. at 655 (1952). (Emphasis supplied.)

"The function of Congress is not simply to appropriate money and leave the problem of national security at that."³⁶

A New York Times survey (June 14, 1965) reports widespread "uneasiness" over the President's foreign policies: that the American academic world "is intellectually and emotionally alienated from the President, to whom it gave such strong support in the election"; that there is "increasing—and mutual—hostility between the President and many segments of the press"; that many Democratic members of Congress are "restive and unhappy . . . over what they regard as [the President's] high-handed manner of making and carrying out decisions in foreign affairs"; that many friendly governments abroad "are apprehensive about Mr. Johnson's use of national power"; that among these views are expressions of "dismay," the unreliability of C.I.A. and F.B.I. reports which the President accepted, the lack of clear policy, the disregard of "principles, support or advice."

It is therefore imperative that Congress guard zealously against any executive usurpation of its exclusive power to declare, or to decline to declare, war.

President Johnson has not been unmindful of the damaging consequences inherent in the violation of the separation of powers. As recently as August 21, 1965 the President vetoed a \$1.7 billion military construction bill, calling it "repugnant to the Constitution." In a stern message to Congress, the President described certain sections of the bill as clear violations of the "separation of powers"; warned Congress to stop meddling in the prerogatives of the executive branch (New York Times, August 21, 1965, p. 1). Yet the President has not hesitated to intrude upon the exclusive power vested in Congress to declare war.

IV

Congress Has Not Declared War in Vietnam; Its Joint Resolutions Are Neither a Substitute for a Declaration of War Nor Do They Make President Johnson's War-Making Constitutional

Congress has not declared war in Vietnam and the President does not claim that any declaration of war supports his actions in Vietnam. In fact, the President is reported to be extremely reluctant to ask Congress directly to declare war.³⁷ Instead, the President is reported (New York Times, June 19, 1965, p. 10) to believe that authority for his actions may be inferred or extracted from the Tonkin Bay Joint Resolution of August 6-7, 1964 (H.J. Res. 1145;

36. Jackson, *Role and Problems of Congress with Reference to Atomic War*, May 17, 1954, Publication No. L 54-135, Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

37. Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1965, *The U.S. May Become More Candid on Rising Land-War Involvement*, pp. 1, 16.

Public Law 88-408, 78 Stat. 384, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess.) and the Joint Resolution of May 7, 1965 (H.J. Res. 447; Public Law 89-18; 79 Stat. 109, 89th Congress, 1st Session) making a supplemental appropriation to the Defense Department for the Vietnam operations.

The Tonkin Bay resolution is not a declaration of war. At most, it is an ultimatum—if that. It

“approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.”

It goes on to express the view that “the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia ‘is vital’ to the national interests of the United States” and declares the readiness of the United States to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed forces, to assist any member or protocol SEATO state to defend its freedom. The Resolution, however, provides that all such steps shall be

“Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.”

It is clear that Congressmen who voted for the Tonkin Bay Joint Resolution were not voting a declaration of war in Vietnam. The Resolution does not mention North Vietnam nor China; indeed it does not even mention Vietnam. It was “passed in the fever of indignation that followed reported attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against United States fleet units in Tonkin Bay.” Cong. Record, June 9, 1965, p. 12528. There is no evidence that Congress thought or understood that it was declaring war. It took no contemporaneous action which would have implemented a declaration of war. And the remarks of several members of the House and Senate during and since the debate on the Resolution reinforce the conclusion that the Tonkin Bay Resolution was not regarded as a declaration of war. Congress manifestly cannot delegate to the President its exclusive power to declare war; and even under the specific terms of the Tonkin Bay Resolution, the President’s actions neither conform nor are consonant with the Constitution—and, as we have seen in the earlier analysis, the President’s actions are not consonant with the Charter of the United Nations, nor with the SEATO Treaty.

In passing the May 7, 1965 Resolution, authorizing a supplemental appropriation for the Vietnam operations, Congress was confronted with a *fait accompli* which severely circumscribed its action. Its constitutional check on the will or errors of the Executive was by the President’s message, reduced to its power of the purse. Such

a circumscription will not necessarily prevent unwise or unpopular decisions or allow for the exercise of the full discretion which the Constitution intended Congress to have, and for it alone to exercise. Nevertheless, a resolution authorizing an appropriation does not constitute a declaration of war, nor can it constitutionally authorize the President to wage an undeclared war.

The Presidential assumption of powers vested exclusively in the Congress concern arrogations of power which convert republican institutions, framed for the purpose of guarding and securing the liberties of the citizen, into a government of executive supremacy. If the Constitution has such elastic, evanescent character the provisions for its amendment are entirely useless; presidentially-determined expediency would become then the standard of constitutional construction.

Under the rule of law, compliance with the forms and procedures of the law are as imperative as compliance with the substance of the law. A lynching is a totally inadequate substitute for a trial, regardless of the guilt of the victim. What Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote in another context is equally applicable here: "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards." *McNabb v. United States*, 318 U. S. 332, 347 (1947).

Under our system, constitutional powers must be exercised in a constitutional manner by constitutionally established institutions. Disregard of fundamentals in an area concerning the highest sovereign prerogative affecting the very lives and fortunes of its citizens in the interest of a short term expediency undermines " 'constitutional morality' to such an extent that the maintenance of the order itself is endangered." Friedrich, *The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective*, p. 216 (Chicago, 1963).

Finally, it cannot be over emphasized that even a declaration of war by the Congress would not negate the violations of our obligations assumed under the United Nations Charter or negate the violations of international law inherent in United States intervention in Vietnam.

CONCLUSION

A learned authority in international affairs has stated:

"Bluntly, all the rules about intervention are meaningless if every nation can decide for itself which governments are legitimate and how to characterize particular limited conflict. Unless we are prepared to continue a situation in which the legality of intervention will often depend upon which side of the fence you are on, and in which, therefore, our policy becomes one of countering force with force, we must be willing to refer questions of recognition (*i. e.*, legitimacy of

the government involved) and characterization of a disorder (*i. e.*, whether an armed attack from abroad or a civil war) to some authority other than ourselves. The United Nations is the most likely candidate for the role."³⁸

The United States has not observed the letter or spirit of its treaty obligations with respect to the action taken in Vietnam. World order and peace depend on the willingness of nations to respect international law and the rights of other nations. The United Nations is a symbol of the rejection of fatal policies which led to World War II, and an acceptance by the Peoples of the World of the principles of collective security, and the avoidance of war and the use of armed forces in the settlement of differences between nations. The United Nations was intended to ensure the preservation of international peace, security and justice, through rules of law, binding upon all member nations. The fundamental condition for the effective functioning of the United Nations is the observance on the part of all signatory nations of the obligations assumed under the Charter. Only in this way can the awesome potential of a Third World War be prevented.

We have concluded that the United States Government is in violation of its Treaty obligations under the United Nations Charter. We urge upon the Government that all steps be immediately taken to undo this illegality by an immediate return to an observance of the letter and spirit of the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

This is a solemn hour in history. We have a moral obligation to history to return to the high Purposes and Principles of the United Nations—to honor the pledges we solemnly assumed—to settle international disputes by peaceful means—to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force.

At this fateful hour, we do well to recall the prophetic dream of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the architect of the United Nations, who upon his return from the Yalta conference in his last address to the Congress in March, 1945, said:

"The Crimea Conference . . . ought to spell *the end of the system of unilateral action*, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join."

38. Roger Fisher, Professor of Law at Harvard University, "Intervention: Three Problems of Policy and Law" found in *Essays on Intervention*, a publication of the Marshon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University Press, pp. 19-20.

Should we not, twenty years after President Roosevelt's hopeful dream—twenty years after the advent of the nuclear age with the awesome potentiality of incineration of our planet and the annihilation of our civilization and the culture of millenia—should we not “spell the end of the system of unilateral action . . . that has been tried for centuries—and has always failed”?

SPEECH BY SENATOR JOHN STENNIS TO JOINT SESSION OF MISSISSIPPI STATE LEGISLATURE, JANUARY 27, 1966

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, members of the Mississippi State Legislature, and other friends, you honored me greatly by your invitation which I accepted with warm and deep appreciation. I visit with you today in the State—and at a spot—we all love. Thirty-eight years ago this week, in this chamber and on this rostrum, I took my first oath of office—as a member of the house of representatives from Kemper County. To serve here was a privilege that I cherish and shall always consider as one of my very highest honors.

You invited me to speak, primarily, on the war in South Vietnam. As I speak to you, I speak also to the people of our beloved State. It is a grim set of facts that I relate, disappointing conclusions that I reach, severe recommendations that I make.

Our situation in Vietnam is not hopeless but it is certainly not good. We face immediate and grave decisions that will affect the lives of every Mississippian and every American; decisions which could determine the future of America.

We are now at war. This is no police action. We are carrying a major part of the fighting in a bloody war and have been for many months. We also are furnishing much of the security for the local government; we are furnishing virtually all of the military supplies, materiel, and ammunition for the South Vietnamese Army. We are supplying a large part of the food and supplies necessary to support the civilian economy there.

A few illustrations emphasize how what was called a dirty little war has become a dirty big war. Last week the Secretary of Defense appeared before our committee and asked for an additional sum of \$12.3 billion. As he testified, I recall that last August I estimated that in January of this year the stepped-up cost of the war in Vietnam would be \$12 to \$14 billion. This was hotly denied and I was chided some by portions of the national press. But I knew then certain developing facts that have now matured. I thought then that many of the rosy reports being given us were not justified by the realities. We are now confronted by the realities that our Preparedness Subcommittee has been pointing out for more than a year.

Many questions about this war puzzle our American citizens. For instance, how did we get there?

Looking back, it is clear that by small and sometimes imperceptible steps, one after the other, we became committed to an extent that now makes it impossible for us to withdraw.

Even though we did not sign the Geneva Accords of 1954, South Vietnam was promised by that agreement a chance to operate as a free nation, and elections were promised later as to the form of their government. Soon thereafter, and contrary to the agreement, South Vietnam was being infiltrated with Communists by the Government of North Vietnam. They, therefore, requested help from us in their effort to survive. Throughout the years, these requests became larger and more frequent. We first sent about 200 Air Force mechanics, merely to keep South Vietnam planes flying. I vigorously protested this in three speeches on the Senate floor during 1954 and pointed out that we were thereby committing members of our Armed Forces and thus committing our flag and our country in a mission that could develop into a shooting war on the mainland of Asia; moreover, I was concerned about this point—we were going in alone and if war came we would have to fight without substantial allies to share the burden. One step followed another, quite slowly, but things went from bad to worse; by 1962 we sent in our military men in larger and larger numbers and the Red guerrilla warfare increased. The South Vietnam Government weakened and by 1964 it was clear that we could not leave. In 1965 we built up to almost 200,000 men on the mainland, plus over 35,000 Air Force and Navy men who are rendering highly important service beyond the shoreline.

However, I do not now argue the question as to how we got there. We are already there in large numbers. We are already committed. By responding to their calls for help, we have put our country in issue; many of our men have fought there and have died there; our honor is at stake. The real question is: How can we win?

There are, of course, other questions. One is, with our great power, why have we not won a decisive and relatively quick military victory against a small and underdeveloped country like North Vietnam and the guerrillas in South Vietnam?

The difficulties we confront are many. First, we are fighting in a distant land—exactly halfway around the globe. This presents problems in transporta-

tion and supply. These problems are compounded by the fact that South Vietnam is an undeveloped country, has meager ports and other facilities which a modern Army absolutely requires.

Another serious problem is the physical and climatic conditions. Dense jungles, steaming rice paddies, torrential rains, high humidity, and grinding sand all handicap our military operations. Some jungles that we have dealt with are so dense that a 1,000 yards in a day is a good march for an infantry unit.

There is an excellent highway system in South Vietnam but it is now largely controlled by the Vietcong. This forces us to travel and transport supplies and food by air. The Communist Vietcong occupy at least 60 percent and possibly as much as 80 percent of the land area of this 600-mile-long country. They even have their own mail delivery system. They have a duplicate government of their own in many areas and collect taxes from the same persons from whom taxes are collected by the South Vietnamese Government.

Further, there is the instability of the local government of South Vietnam. In a period of 21 months the heads of the Government changed 9 times.

Another problem which confronts us is the nature of the war itself. The Vietcong and their North Vietnamese allies usually fight a guerrilla-type warfare. There are no fixed or defined battlelines. You cannot get a battle, as the term is ordinarily used. We must search them out in order to engage them. Largely, they fight when and where they choose. They hide or run away. In guerrilla warfare you have to have superior numbers of 4 or 5 to 1; some say 10 to 1.

One of the major reasons for our lack of progress in the war is that, because of diplomatic or political considerations, we have thus far only been permitted to fight what amounts to a holding action in South Vietnam itself. We are not permitted to bomb the port of Haiphong or the petroleum storage facilities and powerplants in North Vietnam. Many of our actions and many of the restrictions placed upon our fighting people stem from our concern that Red China may intervene with massive forces. Red China has 1 million men she is willing to commit and lose in this test war. We cannot win with the current limited objectives and restrictions on the permissible scope of operations.

Further, we have not as yet committed a sufficient number of troops to actually reverse the tide of the war and achieve a decisive military victory. We have enough troops in Vietnam to halt the military tide which was running against us until last April, but not enough to destroy the enemy.

It is clear at this point that, while we have stopped losing the war, we are not yet winning it. If we are to win the war decisively, I believe we must commit substantial numbers of additional American fighting men. I believe this will be done in time. By the end of 1966 there may very well be 350,000 to 400,000 American troops in Vietnam. While I am not a military strategist I would not be surprised if we were ultimately required to commit 600,000 men to the battle, but so far as I know there are no such plans now. By comparison, the maximum number committed in Korea at one time was 473,000.

Another problem is that our so-called allies have not rallied to our support. We now have more than 190,000 troops in Vietnam. The rollback of other nations which have sent combat troops to South Vietnam is pitifully small. Only the Republic of Korea has furnished a significant combat force—about 21,000. Australia has sent about 1,500 troops and New Zealand about 100. The Philippines has sent only 72 noncombat men. Aside from these, we and our South Vietnamese allies shoulder the entire military burden. Thus, in time of need, and at a time when our only purpose is to try to check the spread of Asiatic communism, we turn in vain to those nations around the world to whom we have poured billions and billions of dollars out of our Treasury to rebuild their economies and create their military might. I am particularly concerned by the fact that West Germany, where for 20 years we have maintained an Army and now have more than 250,000 troops stationed in defense of Western Europe, has not as yet contributed a single man to our support in the fight in Vietnam.

If our Western and Asiatic allies cannot or will not help us out with combat troops, they should be able to help us with strong and vigorous moral, political and diplomatic support. Even this type of assistance has been weak; otherwise, our peace offensive would have had a better chance of success.

I believe that the President should inform our NATO allies, in blunt and unmistakable terms, that we can no longer bear the major part of the burden of defending Western Europe if they are unwilling or unable to come to our assistance when we are so heavily committed in another part of the world.

It should be clear to all, and to us, that the United States—with only 6 percent of the world's population and 7 percent of the earth's land mass—cannot alone protect the free world against Communist expansion indefinitely.

Now what of the future?

I supported the bombing lull and efforts to open the door to a solution to the Vietnamese problem by negotiation, but had little hope. At least, doubtful people and doubtful nations were convinced of our continued good intentions and that we actually wanted peace. However, I believe that the hard fact is that we have not yet exerted enough military pressure to force the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese to the conference table. I believe they are convinced at this time that their interests will best be served by continuation of the war. I think the Communist nations of Asia have decided to make the war in Vietnam a test of both our military power and our national purpose to win. This is the basis of much of my thinking. They believe that a long, bitter, and grinding war on the ground, with its attendant blood and sacrifice, will drain our will and capability to the point that we will either withdraw or consent to peace on their terms.

Winning of this war, and stopping the bloodshed, either through a military victory or through an honorable diplomatic settlement, is the first order of business with me, and it should be the first order of business throughout Washington.

This means that those Great Society programs with the billions that they are gulping down, should be relegated to the rear—far to the rear, I think. Certainly they should be secondary to this war.

Regardless of whether we agree with the wisdom of our initial commitment to Vietnam, we must fight this thing through either to a military victory or an honorable diplomatic settlement. We have put the American flag in issue. We have put American troops in the field. Both our flag and our troops have been fired upon. More than 1,800 American lives have already been lost in actual combat. Our commitment is such that we cannot now withdraw without dishonor to our national purpose and our national image. Moreover, to do so would lay the groundwork for almost certain and perhaps even more serious challenges to us and our commitments elsewhere in Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

There are a number of things we must do if we are to win this war. First and foremost, we must make a national decision that it is our purpose to win. If we cannot do this then we must either get out or resign ourselves to the prospect of a long and unhappy stalemate which will be costly both in money and in lives.

Assuming that our decision is to win—and I think it is—we must increase our combat troops to the extent that we can take the war effectively to the Vietcong and their allies from North Vietnam and drive them from the country.

As a part of the same movement, we must resume and conduct an air war against North Vietnam in an intensified effort to stop the flow of men and supplies from the north to the south. This means, in my judgment, the removal of the restrictions which have prevented us from waging a hard-hitting and all-out air attack in North Vietnam.

The targets for these air attacks could include powerplants, petroleum facilities and ports, and other facilities and installations. Once the President, as Commander in Chief, decides the policy, our professional military men are the ones to select the targets.

In short, I believe that we must be prepared to hit the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese as hard, as often and wherever necessary to make them realize that our purpose is to win and not just maintain a holding operation in the south. If we do less than this, we may well be faced with a long, drawn-out and bloody war of possibly 10 or 15 years.

Stepped-up operations against North Vietnam may well raise a very serious question as to whether we will provoke Red China to full intervention in the war. This is an exposed nerve and it is a question which has controlled and influenced many of our actions. However, in view of our commitments, I believe that we must face and accept the risk involved and be prepared to meet Red Chinese military aggression, if it should come, with the requisite military might.

I have no illusions about this thing. For my part, I would never put our boys in mortal conflict against the hordes of Red Chinese coolies without being free to use every weapon we have, when and if necessary.

The position of Russia in this war is not entirely clear but certainly must be reckoned with. They, of course, support North Vietnam but I feel that they are not convinced that this is the time or place to press for a showdown. However, their struggle with Red China for leadership of the Communist world may force them to adopt a strong and unyielding position.

There is another risk we face in pressing for victory in Vietnam. Until recently we were fighting that war on a peacetime budget and under peacetime procedures. As a result, much of the equipment, supplies, material, and other resources sent to Vietnam had to be taken out of the hides of other active military forces as well as from the Reserves and National Guard. The drain was substantial and, as a result, many of our active forces on guard against communism around the world and those at home, including the National Guard and Reserves, are pinched for equipment, repair parts, and supplies. Substantial reduction in our combat readiness has resulted.

My concern about this matter stems from a comprehensive and continuing investigation into worldwide Army combat readiness by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, of which I am privileged to be chairman. This inquiry already has raised many serious questions about the adequacy of our present and past military procurement and personnel programs brought about by the heavy and unanticipated demands imposed by Vietnam.

We cannot ignore this. It must have immediate attention. We must have military forces ready and capable of putting down any brush fire wars or threat of such wars if we are to prevent Communist aggression from prowling unchecked throughout the parts of the world we must in good judgment protect.

Our forces, both active and reserve, must be provided the best and most modern arms, equipment and weapons and in plentiful supply.

The war and the demands associated with it will directly affect the people of Mississippi in many ways.

With the increase in military forces will come a further and added increase in draft calls. This will take many additional Mississippi sons and brothers from their homes.

In my opinion, at least a partial callup of National Guardsmen and Reservists is probable at some date, particularly of units with specialized skills. With a substantial escalation of our strength in Vietnam, a callup of major combat units is possible. So far as I know, there are no present intentions of a callup. If this should occur I am certain that our citizen soldiers will answer the call to arms with the same patriotism and valor they have shown in the many crises of the past.

Increased taxes, if this war continues, are certain.

We may be forced to a choice between guns and butter, which might entail economic controls and rationing of goods and materials with at least a partial disruption of normal business operations. Many major domestic programs may have to be curtailed.

The toll of casualties will go even higher and additional thousands of American fighting men may be called upon to pay the greatest and final sacrifice in defense of their country.

I wish I could end this on an optimistic note, but the realities of the situation are hard and must be faced by all Americans. Let me briefly summarize. There are several alternatives or possibilities which confront us. First, we can withdraw. This is unthinkable. Secondly, without adequate military strength we could be driven out. This, of course, must not happen. Thirdly, the war can develop into a stalemate and a costly and grinding war of attrition. This could last for 10 to 15 years and would be the most costly in blood, money, and tears. Fourthly, we can bring to bear sufficient military might to force our Communist enemies to the conference table or, failing that, to defeat them on the field of battle. Only the last alternative, in my judgment, offers us the chance of peace with honor. Further, I believe that the sooner we undertake this mission, the less will be the cost in time and life.

I cannot close this without paying a special tribute to our brave men who fight and sometimes die in Vietnam. They have done a tremendous job under very difficult circumstances. They fight for the cause of freedom with the same high morale, courage, valor, and skill which have distinguished the American soldier, sailor, airman, and marine in all past battles and wars. They prove once again that a properly motivated American is the finest fighting man the world has ever known.

They deserve the gratitude and the unstinting support of all Americans and freedom-loving people everywhere. We must also give the gratitude of our support to our fine members of the Reserve forces of the National Guard who kept their talents and their training up. And, who, when they are called on, if they are, will use that tremendous reservoir of trained strength and readiness to fulfill their mission.

Now, let's remember we are a powerful nation. We have brave reserves of moral and spiritual strength. We've got to see this thing through and I predict that a strong offense will change this entire picture. Let us stand our ground.

I like the spirit of that dying soldier on the battlefield in World War I, lying there mortally wounded—and he knew it himself—when the medics reached him and kneeled down and asked what they could do to help him, he said, "You can't help me. I'm already too far gone. Move forward, move forward on the field of battle and help those who still have a chance for life. As for me, I thank God that he matched me with this fine hour."

So, as benefactors of a great heritage, wonderful spirit of liberty and freedom that we have been able to maintain and keep alive—it is alive yet—as benefactors of all these things, let us face whatever the future holds and thank God that he matched us with this hour even though it is an hour of peril.

May God sustain us and help us as we go. I thank you.

EXCERPTS FROM THE REPORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

EXCERPTS FROM THE FIRST AND SECOND INTERIM REPORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

August 11, 1954 to December 10, 1954, and December 11, 1954 to February 10, 1955

(Source for these excerpts were official reports to Parliament of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom)

FOREWORD

The Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were signed at Geneva on July 20, 1954, and published in "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)," Cmd. 9239. Provision was made in these Agreements for the establishment in each of the three countries of an International Commission, consisting of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, to control and supervise the application of the Agreements.

On January 28, 1955, the Government of India, acting on behalf of the Indian Chairman of the International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam, transmitted to the two co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China (Sir Anthony Eden and M. Molotov) copies of the First Interim Report of the International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam. Her Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government agreed that this report should be published simultaneously in all capitals concerned once copies had been received by all members of the Geneva Conference. It was also agreed that the same procedure should be adopted for the Commission's Second Interim Report, of which copies were received at the Foreign Office on March 8, 1955. The present White Paper contains the text of the first report and its appendices as received from the Government of India together with the text of the second report and certain of its appendices.

Although Her Majesty's Government are naturally in no way responsible for the contents of these reports, there is one factual error to which they wish to draw attention, as this concerns a matter for which the Commission are not directly responsible. Paragraph 29 of the First Interim Report states that "In accordance with Article 26 of the Agreement, the costs involved in the operations of the International Commission are to be shared equally between the two parties." In fact, as the House of Commons was informed by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, on December 20, 1954, it was agreed at the final meeting of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China (page 8 of "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)," Cmd. 9239) that Sir Anthony Eden and M. Molotov, as the two Chairmen, should submit to the Conference proposals for meeting the costs of the three International Supervisory Commissions in Indo-China. After consultations among the interested Powers, Her Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government have agreed to recommend to the members of the Geneva Conference a scheme elaborated by the Government of India on behalf of the Three Powers providing the members of the Supervisory Commission: India, Canada and Poland. This scheme provides that a proportion of the costs should be financed by the Supervisory Powers themselves and the remainder from a "common pool" to be established by the members of the Conference. This scheme is now being considered by the members of the Conference, who will also have to agree on their respective contributions to the common pool.

CHAPTER I. ESTABLISHMENT AND MACHINERY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

Chapter VI of the Geneva Agreement, and, in particular, Articles 29, 34 and 36 provide for the establishment of an International Commission composed of representatives of Canada, India and Poland to ensure the control and super-

vision of the execution of this Agreement by the two signatory parties. The functions and duties of the Commission have been specified under Article 36 and include the tasks of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and, in particular:

- (a) The control of the movement of the Armed Forces of the two parties effected within the framework of the regroupment plan;
- (b) The supervision of the demarcation lines between the regroupment areas and also the demilitarized zones;
- (c) The control of the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees; and
- (d) The supervision at ports and airfields as well as along the frontiers of Vietnam of the execution of the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions and war material.

2. In accordance with the above Articles, and in accordance with Article 44 of the Agreement, which provides that the Commission shall be set up at the time of the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China, the Commission was established in Hanoi on the 11th of August, 1954. The Commission consists of three Members who have the personal rank of Ambassador. The composition of the Commission is as follows:

Chairman: Ambassador M. J. Desai, India.

Members: Ambassador Sherwood Lett, Canada; Ambassador P. Ogrodzinski, Poland.

Alternates: Major-General K. P. Dhargalkar, India; Mr. Marcel Cadieux, Canada; M. M. Bibrowski, Poland.

The representative of India presides over the Commission. For the due fulfillment of its functions of supervision and control, the International Commission has established the following machinery:

NATIONAL DELEGATIONS

3. Each Member of the Commission is assisted by a Delegation from his own country. It consists of an Alternate Delegate and Military and Political Advisers. The National Delegations, besides providing Political and Military Advisers to the Ambassadors also furnish the personnel for manning various Committees and inspection teams of the International Commission.

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

4. The International Commission is serviced by a Secretariat General. The main functions of this Secretariat, which works under the control of Secretary-General, are:

- (a) To arrange and organise meetings and to keep the records of the International Commission;
- (b) To follow up the decisions of the Commission;
- (c) To maintain liaison between the Commission and other bodies which are responsible for implementation of the Agreement;
- (d) To assist the Commission in controlling the operations of the Fixed and Mobile Teams;
- (e) To examine petitions and complaints; and
- (f) To give due publicity to the activities of the Commission.

5. The Indian Member, who is the Chairman of the Commission, is also *ex officio* Secretary-General, in pursuance of a decision to this effect taken by the three countries constituting the International Commission. He has thus a dual capacity. As Chairman, he presides over the meetings of the Commission, and, as Secretary-General, he controls the executive machinery of the International Secretariat and is the chief executive of the Commission. The advantage of combining these posts in the hands of one person is to maintain a closer link between the making of decisions and their implementation.

6. There are three main Branches in the International Secretariat, each in charge of a Deputy Secretary-General.

7. The Administration Branch deals with all administrative problems—personnel, logistics, &c. It also maintains liaison with the French and the Democratic Republic authorities.

8. The Operations Branch plans and assists the Commission in controlling the work of the Fixed and Mobile Teams and executing the decisions of the Commission regarding the conduct of special investigations.

9. The Petitions Branch receives from individuals and organisations by post, through petition boxes and through the Teams, petitions relating to various Articles of the Geneva Agreement. These petitions after examination are forwarded to the appropriate parties for investigation and report.

10. In addition, there is a Public Relations Section under a Public Relations Officer which gives publicity to the activities of the Commission through Press Communiqués and maintains contacts with the Press.

11. The Commission held 5 Press Conferences—2 in Hanoi and 3 in Saigon. In addition, the Commission has issued a number of Press Releases focusing the attention of the world Press on various decisions taken by the Commission.

12. Soon after the Commission was set up in Hanoi, it realised the difficult conditions of travel and communication between various parts of Vietnam. It decided to have a system of accreditation of Press correspondents and 78 foreign and local correspondents have so far been accredited to the Commission. While contacts with the Press are not as easy and smooth as they should be due to difficulties of travel and communication, the Commission has, within the limits of the regulations for Press correspondents in both zones, endeavoured to give the Press maximum facilities possible.

COMMITTEES

13. The Commission has formed the following Committees to assist it in the more detailed phases of its work:

(1) The Operations Committee composed of Military Advisers from the three Delegations to co-ordinate the work of the Operations Branch and to advise the Commission on the military and logistic problems relating to the operation of the teams in the field.

(2) The Freedoms Committee composed of Political Advisers from the three Delegations to co-ordinate the work of the Petitions Branch and to advise the Commission on the implementation by the parties of the Geneva Agreement relating to democratic freedoms and freedom of movement.

(3) The Administration Committee to co-ordinate the work of the Administration Branch and to assist in the processing of the administrative problems of the Commission.

The Commission, from time to time, appoints *Ad Hoc* Committees to deal with specific problems.

FIXED AND MOBILE TEAMS

14. *Fixed teams*.—In accordance with Article 35 of the Agreement, Fixed Teams, composed of an equal number of officers of each Delegation have been installed at the following places on the following dates:

North of the demarcation line:

Lang Son	Sept. 11, 1954.
Lao Kay	Sept. 17, 1954.
Dong Hoi	Sept. 20, 1954.
Haiphong	Oct. 7, 1954.
Tien Yen	Oct. 14, 1954.
Vinh	Oct. 14, 1954.
Muong Sen	(to be installed on Dec. 13, 1954).

South of the demarcation line:

Saigon	Sept. 11, 1954.
Cap St. Jacques	Sept. 17, 1954.
Tourane	Sept. 20, 1954.
Qui Nhon	Oct. 7, 1954.
Ba Ngoi	Oct. 14, 1954.
Nha Trang	Oct. 14, 1954.
Tan Chau	(to be installed on Dec. 13, 1954).

15. The Fixed Teams have been set up to assist the Commission in the proper execution of its responsibilities and, in particular, for purposes of control, investigation, inspection and observation. The Teams are responsible for ensuring the implementation of Articles 16, 17, and 18, and, for this purpose, have been

established at important "Points of Entry" into Vietnam, as indicated in Article 20 of the Agreement. The Teams also receive and forward petitions to the Commission. The Teams send in regular Reports of their activities to the Commission and are, in fact, the "eyes and ears of the International Commission." To assist the Fixed Teams, the parties have provided local Liaison Officers.

16. The Commission is frequently required to make use of the Fixed Teams for the conduct of enquiries and investigations which are in the neighbourhood of their fixed points. In such circumstances, the Fixed Teams work as Mobile Teams. Moreover, each Fixed Team has a Mobile Team component within itself and the Commission has, therefore, suggested to the two parties that they define the zones of action of the Fixed Teams and spheres of action for all the mobile team elements within the 14 Fixed Teams. In the light of the discussions with the parties, the Commission is formulating a set of detailed instructions for its Fixed Teams.

17. *Mobile Teams.*—In addition to the Teams mentioned above, the International Commission has, in accordance with Article 35 of the Agreement, made use of Mobile Teams composed of an equal number of officers of each Delegation for the conduct of special enquiries and investigations, and for the supervision over operations to be executed by the two parties under the Agreement. The Commission has employed to date 28 such Mobile Teams which have undertaken, among others, the following tasks:

18. Investigation of alleged incidents, supervision of exchange of prisoners of war, supervision of transfer of authority under the regroupment plan and supervision of the movement of evacuees from the North under Article 14(d). Details of these activities are given in specific Chapters in this Report. The Commission has under consideration the question of setting up Mobile Teams to supervise the provisional demarcation line and demilitarised zone described in Chapter I of the Agreement.

19. After discussion with the two parties, the Commission has decided that each of its Mobile Teams entrusted with investigation should be accompanied by one Liaison Officer and one Interpreter from each side. The presence of these representatives of the two parties assists the Teams in their work by:

- (1) Providing liaison with the respective High Commands;
- (2) Making suggestions in the matter of collecting available evidence; and
- (3) Avoiding misinterpretation of the evidence given in the local language.

20. These Liaison Officers have, however, nothing to do with the assessment of the evidence and the preparation of the Report to the Commission which are the responsibility of the Teams.

HEADQUARTERS AND SAIGON OFFICE

21. Under the Cease-Fire Agreements of Laos and Cambodia, the International Commission established in those States have been specifically located at Vientiane and Phnom Penh, respectively. Under the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, however, no specific location has been defined for the Headquarters of the International Commission. The International Commission provisionally located its Headquarters in Hanoi and has paid periodic visits to Saigon.

22. The Commission has given consideration to the question of its Headquarters in Vietnam. It felt that for proper performance of its task, it had to be in the closest possible contact with both the High Commands. The Commission decided, therefore, to establish its second Headquarters in Saigon. This was started in a small way from the 6th of December, 1954, consisting of political and military representatives from each Delegation. Two Mobile Teams have been placed at the disposal of the Saigon Headquarters. While the Headquarters remain at Hanoi, the Commission periodically visits Saigon. The Commission has decided to remain at Hanoi until the beginning of August 1955, when it will transfer its Headquarters to Saigon. After its move, it will maintain a second Headquarters organisation at Hanoi on the pattern of the one now being developed at Saigon. The Commission has communicated this decision to the two parties to enable them to make necessary arrangements.

JOINT COMMISSION AND THE LIAISON MISSIONS

23. Under Article 28 of the Agreement, the responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities rests with the parties, and to carry out this responsibility, in respect of joint actions by the two parties, a Joint Commission has been set up under the provisions of Article 30. In accord-

ance with Articles 31 and 32, the Joint Commission is composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commanders of the two parties. The President of the French Delegation is Brigadier-General de Brebisson⁽²⁾ and the President of the Delegation of the People's Army of Vietnam is General Van Tien Dung.

24. The Joint Commission which formerly had its headquarters at Phu Lo, is now installed outside Haiduong. There are three Joint Sub-Commissions at Quynh Khe in North Vietnam, Quang Tri in Central Vietnam and Phung Hiep in South Vietnam.

25. While the International Commission has been charged under Article 36 of the Agreement with the supervision of the implementation of the Agreement by the two parties, the responsibility for the execution of the Agreement rests with the two parties under Article 28. The Commission has, therefore, stressed the necessity for co-operation by the two High Commands and has endeavoured to retain the co-operation of both parties when controversial matters were under discussion. Apart from discussion with the Liaison Mission and the Chiefs of Delegations at the Joint Commission, informal approaches have been made whenever necessary to members of the two High Commands with a view to seeking solutions of problems without making formal recommendations.

26. The day-to-day contact, between the International Commission and the parties, is maintained, however, through the Liaison Missions in Hanoi appointed by the two High Commands.

IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES, INSIGNIA, &C.

27. A draft protocol was prepared defining the immunities and privileges which the Commission desired should be made available to its personnel. This protocol has been accepted by the High Command of the People's Army of Vietnam, but is still under the consideration of the French High Command.

28. In this connexion, the Commission has issued identity cards and arm bands to all its personnel. The Commission's vehicles have been painted white and have special numbers. The Commission flies its own flag on its buildings and cars.

BUDGETARY AND LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS

29. In accordance with Article 26 of the Agreement, the costs involved in the operations of the International Commission are to be shared equally between the two parties. The International Secretariat is preparing a budget of expenditure to be shared ultimately between the two parties and this will be submitted for the approval of the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. It has been agreed that the expenditure of the National Delegations will be borne by the Member countries except boarding, lodging and necessary logistic support which will be shared by the two parties.

30. Indian Army Signals have established a wireless net covering the three countries of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, to provide communications among the three Commissions and the Teams.

31. The French High Command has arranged an air courier service between Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane and Hanoi thrice a week for carrying personnel and mail of the three Commissions. Arrangements for road transport have also been made by the parties at both Commission Headquarters, Hanoi and Saigon and for the Fixed and Mobile Teams.

CO-ORDINATION OF THE THREE SECRETARIATS-GENERAL

32. Article 45 of the Geneva Agreement provides that the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos. It further provides that the Secretariats-General of the three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them. In pursuance of this provision, the first co-ordination meeting was held in Hanoi from the 11th of November, 1954, to 15th of November, 1954. Most of the problems discussed were administrative and included technical questions regarding Conference procedure, financial and accounting arrangements, publicity work, disposal of petitions and complaints and Secretariat organisation. It was

⁽²⁾ General de Brebisson took over from General Deiteil in the third week of October, 1954.

decided that these Conferences of the Secretariats-General of the three Commissions should be held periodically.

33. The Commissioners wish to record their appreciation of the co-operation and assistance which they have received from the staff of the Secretariat-General; of the good work of the Fixed and Mobile Teams, often performed under rigorous and unusual circumstances; and of the valuable help afforded by the staff of the three National Delegations.

PROGRESS REPORT

34. Action required to be taken under the various Articles of the Agreement and the progress so far are indicated in the statement (Appendix I) attached to this Report.

CHAPTER II. CEASE-FIRE, PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARISED ZONE

CEASE-FIRE

35. The Structure of the "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam" is based upon the cease-fire throughout the country and upon the regroupment of Forces on the two sides of the provisional demarcation line.

36. Articles 10 and 11 of the Agreement provide for specific dates and times at which cease-fire shall be effected. As Article 44 of the Agreement provides for the setting up of an International Commission at the time of the Cessation of Hostilities, the International Commission was not required and was not able to supervise the operations of cease-fire.

37. Since the cease-fire became effective, the Commission has received no reports of renewal of hostilities in any part of Vietnam. * * *

(References are to Articles of Agreement)

CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSION, FIRST INTERIM REPORT

21. By its very structure, the Agreement, which is a balanced document, attempts to reconcile the interests and the sovereignty of the authorities in control of the two zones and, while it puts on the two parties the responsibility for the execution of the Agreement (Article 28), it gives the Commission the task of supervision over the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the Agreement. Effective implementation of the Agreement requires close co-operation between the parties to the Agreement and this has, in various ways, been lacking during the period under report. Each party is more keen to get the Commission to denounce the other than to take reasonable measures to get the Agreement implemented. The Commission's findings, as in the Ba Lang case, show how, in many cases, the narrow or hostile attitude of local authorities of both parties is responsible for delay or difficulties in the effective implementation of the Agreement.

22. The Commission has been insisting on the co-operation of the two High Commands promised under Article 25 and taking every possible occasion to correct the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. While the French High Command has been trying hard to carry out its obligations under the Agreement, there have been cases, as in the case of the civilian internees at Poulo Condore, where they have not been able to implement the Commission's decision in view of the independent attitude taken by the Government of South Vietnam, which has not signed the Agreement. There has, however, been no case so far where either of the High Commands has refused to put into effect a recommendation made by the Commission.

23. There have been cases of intransigence on the part of local civil or military authorities and the Commission's teams have, on occasions, not got the facilities they are entitled to receive in the fulfilment of their task under Article 35. The Commission has informed both the High Commands that they will, in future, ask for specific action under Article 22 against local civil or military authorities who do not give the necessary facilities to the Commission's teams or in any way obstruct the teams in the fulfilment of their task.

CONCLUSION, SECOND INTERIM REPORT

117. The foregoing review is a summary of the activities of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam during the first four months of its existence.

118. Despite difficulties of communication, frayed tempers due to eight years of strife and differences in the degrees of effectiveness of administration in various parts of Vietnam, the provisions of the Agreement which are of a military or semi-military nature have on the whole been carried out according to the time-schedules and directions given in the Agreement. These are detailed in Chapters II and III. As regards prisoners of war and civilian internees dealt with under Chapter IV, by and large, the parties have and are carrying out the directions under Article 21, and the bulk of the exchanges have been completed, though the time schedule has not been maintained mainly due to administrative difficulties.

119. The two parties in the Joint Commission have on occasions been unable to arrive at mutually satisfactory arrangements to execute the Agreement. On such occasions, the International Commission has been approached for intervention. The International Commission has consistently appealed to the parties to approach problems arising out of the agreement in a practical spirit and not in a narrow formalistic manner. The Commission feels that a practical approach would be in the long run the most effective way of ensuring that the provisions of the Agreement are properly carried out and it is only in this spirit that the two parties can jointly fulfil the obligations which they have accepted at Geneva.

120. It is obvious from the review that there is room for improvement in the implementation by both parties of the Articles of the Agreement dealing with democratic freedoms—Chapters V and VII of the Report. The Commission realises that in a climate of suspicion and fear engendered by eight years of strife and with administrative difficulties of some magnitude which the parties have had to face, effective implementation of the provisions of the Agreement dealing with democratic freedoms is bound to be a difficult matter, but the Commission feels that, while difficulties exist, both sides have been sadly lacking in a sense of purpose and urgency in dealing with these matters.

121. The failure of the French High Command to ensure that effective and civil military administration was established in areas taken over by them in Central and South Vietnam and the practical denial of democratic freedoms involved in the number of incidents resulting in injury to life and property of the civil population which have occurred and still continue to occur show that not enough has been accomplished as yet to establish a stable administration which alone can guarantee effectively the exercise of democratic freedoms under Article 14(c).

122. Similarly, the High Command of the People's Army of Vietnam, while they did co-operate with the Commission and took measures to secure freedom of movement in the case of about 8,000 Phat Diem refugees, have so far done little to develop adequate administrative arrangements, with the result that complaints continue to pour in. Restrictions on internal movements from province to province and a cumbersome system of permits can hardly assist in the effective exercise of the right of freedom of movement under Article 14(d).

123. Apart from informal recommendations and suggestions made already from time to time in the past, the Commission is keeping both these questions under constant review to assist the parties in the effective implementation of the Agreement.

124. Both sides have been generous in their assistance as regards logistic support to the Commission and its Fixed and Mobile Teams, concerning matters dealt with under Chapter VI. However, both sides have preferred narrow legalistic interpretation of the Articles of the Agreement regarding the tasks and the spheres of movement of the Commission's teams. The Commission is taking up the matter with both sides on the basis of experience of the last few months, but it must be stated that our Fixed and Mobile Teams have displayed considerable patience and perseverance in the face of restrictions and obstacles they have met in the form of inefficiency of local administration, the narrowness of local officials or general misunderstanding regarding their tasks.

125. In the control of import of war materials and rotation of personnel, the Commission has, as stated in Chapter VI, placed its Inspection Teams at fixed points laid down in the Agreement. Difficulties encountered have been discussed with the parties concerned and spot checks of the entry of equipment and material are from time to time carried out at these points even though no notifications have so far been received under Article 17(e). The frequency of control at these fixed points and the adequacy of these for purposes of carrying out the Commission's responsibility for supervision under Article 36 are being kept under review in the light of experience.

126. The Commission is satisfied that, on the whole, the specific points noted in the Final Declaration of the Geneva Powers dated the 21st of July, 1954, have been borne in mind by both sides and that they have made and continue to make efforts to implement the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam signed on the 20th of July, 1954.

M. J. DESAI,
Chairman, India.
SHERWOOD LETT,
Member, Canada.
P. OGRODZINSKI,
Member, Poland.

EXCERPTS FROM THE THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

February 11, 1955 to April 10, 1955

CHAPTER VIII, CONCLUSIONS

16. Reference was made in paragraphs 21 to 23 of the Second Interim Report to the want of co-operation between the parties to the Agreement, to the failure by the parties to carry out their obligations under the Agreement due to intransigence of local civil or/and military authorities and the general warning given by the Commission to both High Commands regarding need for specific action under Article 22 where required. During the period under report, the Commission has had several occasions to recommend to the High Commands that specific action be taken by them under Article 22 against particular local authorities concerned for violation of the provisions of Article 35 regarding grant of all

facilities required by the team from local civil and military authorities. Four cases of this type in the Vinh region have been referred to the High Command of the P.A.V.N. and two in the Nha Trang region to the High Command of the French Union Forces during the period under report.

17. While the Commission has, in view of the complicated administrative and other problems which the parties have had to face, shown a great deal of patience, the action of some local civil authorities in the North in dealing with matters relating to implementation of Article 14(d) and some in the South in dealing with matters relating to Article 14(c) have retarded the implementation of the democratic freedoms under these Articles in various areas. It must be added that there are substantial areas in Vietnam where there have been no investigations by the Commission's teams and the extent of implementation of these articles in those areas can only be inferred from the extent of implementation ascertained in specific areas which were the subject of investigation by the Commission's teams.

18. The provisions on Article 35 which require the concurrence of the High Command for Mobile Team investigations except along the frontiers and the dependence of the Commission's teams on local civil and military authorities for logistic and security arrangements have led to delays and even obstruction in some cases which have retarded the implementation of various Articles of the Agreement. The Commission has, in addition to bringing specific cases of delays or obstruction by the local authorities to the notice of the High Command told both High Commands that they must assume responsibility for the actions of the subordinate officials.

19. The delay in the implementation of Article 14(d), which has a specific time-limit within which the implementation must be completed, has been a matter of serious concern to the Commission so far as the zone under the control of the P.A.V.N. High Command is concerned (*vide* paragraph 11). In addition, there have been, in recent investigations, cases where one group of people demonstrated against another group and, though non-violent in its attitude to the Commission's team, caused obstruction to the team's investigation. The implementation of Article 21 and the delays in investigation in this connexion in the zone of the French High Command have been the cause of some anxiety to the Commission, particularly as the reasons therefor mentioned in paragraph 22 of the Second Interim Report still continue despite the provisions of Article 27. There has, in addition, been another undesirable development, *viz.*, demonstrations involving violence, against the Commission's teams and the personnel working with them as referred to in paragraph 16.

20. The Commission hopes that the High Commands of both parties will take all measures necessary to ensure full co-operation and assistance both from the High Commands as stipulated in Article 25 and from the local civil and military authorities as stipulated in Article 35 and secure effective implementation of all provisions of the Agreement throughout Vietnam.

EXCERPTS FROM THE FOURTH INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

April 11, 1955, to August 10, 1955

FOREWORD

The first three interim Reports of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, covering the period from August 11, 1954, to April 10, 1955, were published as "Vietnam No. 1 (1955)," Cmd. 9461 (containing the first two Reports) and "Vietnam No. 2 (1955)," Cmd. 9499. The present White Paper contains the text of the Fourth Report. This was received at the Foreign Office on October 21, 1955, and, in accordance with the procedure described in the Foreword to Command Paper 9461, is now published after the distribution of copies to all members of the Geneva Conference.

2. The passages in the Commission's Fourth Interim Report, particularly the Canadian Commissioner's amendment to paragraphs 24 to 34 of Chapter V, dealing with the implementation of Articles XIV(c) and XIV(d) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam (see "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)," Cmd. 9239, page 27 et seq.) and the inadequate co-operation received by the Commission from the competent civil and military authorities in both zones

of Vietnam, have caused Her Majesty's Government considerable concern. They accordingly proposed to the Soviet Government that Her Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, as representing the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954, should send a message about this Report to members of the Conference and to the three Supervisory Powers.

3. In this connexion, and in view of numerous public references to the rôle of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. Her Majesty's Government consider it desirable to place on record their view of the position. There is no reference in the Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam or in the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 ("Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)," Cmd. 9239) to the Co-Chairmen as such or to any special responsibilities devolving upon Her Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government by virtue of the fact that Sir Anthony Eden and M. Molotov had acted as Chairmen at alternate sessions of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. In the view of Her Majesty's Government their obligations and responsibilities and those of the Soviet Government are neither more nor less than those of the other Powers adhering to the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference. For reasons of practical convenience, however, it has become customary for Her Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government to act as a channel of communication between the International Supervisory Commissions and the Geneva Powers, to co-ordinate arrangements for the distribution and publication of the Commissions' reports and to initiate proposals for financing the work of the Commissions. On occasions, of which this is one, Her Majesty's Government, the Soviet Government or other Powers have also employed this channel as a convenient means of bringing their views on matters concerning the implementation of the Geneva Agreements to the attention of members of the Geneva Conference as a whole. The existence of these informal arrangements does not, of course, in any way affect the position and obligations under the Geneva Agreements of Her Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government or derogate in any way from the responsibilities of members of the Geneva Conference as a whole in regard to the Geneva Agreements, under Article 13 of the Final Declaration of the Conference.

EXCERPTS FROM THE FIFTH INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

August 11, 1955, to December 10, 1955. Hanoi, January 8, 1956

CHAPTER VII, CONCLUSIONS

50. Appendix I of the Fourth Interim Report gave the latest position in a statement form of the action taken till August 10, 1955, and that to be taken in future under various Articles of the Agreement. The action still to be taken remains the same.

51. Further political developments involving the transfer of authority in the zone of the French High Command have made it increasingly difficult for it to carry out by itself its obligations under the Agreement in respect of the Commission's activities in that zone. As a result of these developments, the French High Command, which is the signatory of the Agreement, in most cases can only take action to fulfil its obligations with the specific concurrence of the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam, which did not sign the Agreement and do not consider themselves bound by it, and in cases where they decline to act, the French High Command can only transmit their views to the Commission.

52. In paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Fourth Interim Report, the Commission, with the Canadian Delegation submitting a minority report, drew the attention of the co-Chairmen to the transfer of authority by the French High Command to the Republic of Vietnam, which did not subscribe to the Geneva Agreement. This had created uncertainties about the sanction for its operations in the zone south of the demarcation line and had faced the Commission with the prospect of continuing its activities indefinitely. The majority asked the co-Chairmen and the Geneva Powers to resolve these difficulties at an early date.

53. The review of the four month's activities presented in this Report, in the view of the majority of the Commission, shows a further deterioration of the situation in Vietnam, causes serious concern about the implementation of the Geneva Agreement particularly in view of the continued non-acceptance of the Geneva Agreement and the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference by the

Republic of Vietnam, and also confirms the fear expressed by the majority of the Commission in the Fourth Interim Report that the Commission cannot work with any effectiveness unless the difficulties mentioned in these paragraphs are resolved by the co-Chairmen and the Geneva Powers without further delay.

54. The Canadian Delegation considers that the position set forth in the Canadian Minority Note in the Fourth Interim Report has not substantially changed during the period covered by the present Report. Despite certain difficulties, in the view of the Canadian Delegation, there have been indications of an increased measure of practical co-operation with the Commission on the part of the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam, which was not a signatory of the Agreement. At the same time the Canadian Delegation restates its view that the present arrangement is unsatisfactory under which the Commission must in fact depend more and more on the protection, assistance and co-operation of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, although it can only claim this support through the agency of the French High Command. The Canadian Delegation reaffirms the hope expressed in its minority report that the parties directly concerned would be able to work out a more durable and dependable arrangement which will place the Commission in a more favourable position to carry out its functions, while the Commission continued to supervise and control the execution by the parties of the Agreement throughout Vietnam, to the extent made possible by the co-operation of the French High Command and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam on the one hand and the High Command of the P.A.V.N. on the other.

55. The Commission notes that the views of its members expressed in the Fourth Interim Report are now under consideration by the co-Chairmen in consultation with the members of the Geneva Conference.

56. From this review of the activities presented in this report, it is clear that until these difficulties are settled, the Commission cannot function as satisfactorily as it should in carrying out its tasks in regard to the Agreement for the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

G. PARTHASARATHI,
India.
D. M. JOHNSON,
Canada.
J. MICHALOWSKI,
Poland.

EXCERPTS FROM THE SIXTH INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

December 11, 1955, to July 31, 1956, Hanoi, September 9, 1956

CHAPTER VII, CONCLUSIONS

85. The previous Chapters of this Report, and in particular Chapter VI, have outlined the progress made in the implementation of the Cease-Fire Agreement in Vietnam, the degree of co-operation received from the two parties and the difficulties which the International Commission is experiencing in carrying out its tasks of supervision and control.

86. Apart from these difficulties, developments of a serious nature have taken place in South Vietnam. The Commission had already pointed out in previous Reports that the transfer of power from the French authorities in the South to the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam had created difficulties in the implementation of the Agreement in South Vietnam, particularly in view of the fact that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam did not consider itself as bound by the Geneva Agreement, stating that it was not a signatory to that Agreement. On April 5, 1956, the Commission received a letter from the High Commissioner for France in Saigon dated April 3, 1956, giving notice that the French High Command would withdraw completely from South Vietnam on April 28, 1956. The Commission thereupon decided to inform the Co-Chairmen of this serious development and ask for directions as to the future working of the Commission. In their reply dated April 19, 1956, the Co-Chairmen informed the Commission that they were considering the situation in Vietnam and that pending their final decision the Commission should continue in existence and carry on its normal activities.

87. The Commission interpreted the Co-Chairmen's directive to mean that, pending a final solution of the problem, it should continue to deal with the French authorities in Saigon as hitherto, and that the entire machinery for the proper implementation of the Cease-Fire Agreement would be maintained. As a result of the talks held with the French authorities regarding the interim arrangements, the Commission decided that the attention of the Co-Chairmen should be drawn to the nature of these arrangements and to the fact that after April 28, 1956, the Joint Commission machinery would not be functioning due to the withdrawal of the French High Command. Accordingly, a special message was sent to the Co-Chairmen on May 2, 1956, with a separate note by the Canadian Member, and instructions were sought as to the future working of the Commission. In this communication the Commission also informed the Co-Chairmen that it would remain in being and subject to the difficulties mentioned by it, maintain its machinery for supervision and control. It requested the Co-Chairmen to take steps to resolve the difficulties to enable the Commission to carry on normal activities.

88. The Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference discussed the matter during their talks in London and on May 8, 1956, issued messages to the International Commission, to the Government of the French Republic and a joint message to the Governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam. They strongly urged both the Governments in Vietnam to make every effort to implement the Geneva Agreements to prevent any future violation of the military provisions of the Agreement and to ensure the implementation of the political provisions and principles of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference. They further asked the parties to give the International Commission all possible assistance and co-operation in future in the exercise of its functions. So far as the political settlement is concerned, the Co-Chairmen requested the two Governments to transmit their views about the time required for the opening of consultations on the organisation of elections and the time required for holding of elections to unify Vietnam. They recognized that the dissolution of the French Union High Command had increased the difficulties of the International Supervisory Commission in Vietnam in carrying out the functions specified in the Geneva Agreements which are the basis for the Commission's activities and that these difficulties must be overcome. In their message to the French Government, the Co-Chairmen invited the French authorities to discuss the question with the South Vietnam authorities in order to reach an arrangement to facilitate the work of the International Commission and the Joint Commission in Vietnam. Until these new arrangements were put into effect, the French Government was requested to preserve the *status quo*. In their message to the International Commission, the Co-Chairmen appealed to the Commission to persevere in its efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in Vietnam on the basis of the fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements with a view to the reunification of the country through the holding of elections under the supervision of an International Commission.

89. The Commission examined very carefully the three messages which the Co-Chairmen had sent and on May 27, 1956, communicated to the Co-Chairmen its response to the appeal addressed to it. The Commission will, as stated in its message of May 27, 1956, persevere in its efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in Vietnam on the basis of the fulfillment of the Geneva Agreement. It will continue to deal with the parties concerned on the basis of the *status quo* until arrangements that will facilitate the work of the International Supervisory Commission and of the Joint Commission in Vietnam envisaged in the Co-Chairmen's message to the French Government "are put into effect." Discussions between the High Commissioner for France and the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam on the question of the future working of the Cease-Fire Agreement and the relationship of the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam with the International Commission have just been concluded in Saigon.

90. In spite of the difficulties which it is experiencing, the Commission will, as directed by the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, persevere in its efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in Vietnam on the basis of the fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam with a view to the reunification of the country through the holding of free nation-wide elections in Vietnam under the supervision of an International Commission.

G. PARTHASARATHI,
India.
B. M. WILLIAMS,
Canada.
J. GOLDBLAT,
Poland.

EXCERPTS FROM THE SEVENTH INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

August 1, 1956, to April 30, 1957. Saigon, July 12, 1957

CHAPTER VII, CONCLUSIONS

65. In paragraph 86 of the Sixth Interim Report and in its message, dated September 14, 1956, to the Co-Chairmen (Appendix A), the Commission had referred to the situation which arose as a consequence of the withdrawal of the French High Command from Vietnam. As was mentioned in the Commission's message, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam had stated that it was prepared to offer effective co-operation to the Commission but that it was not prepared to assume responsibility for the implementation of the Geneva Agreements in Vietnam. While this major development had its origin during the period of the Sixth Interim Report, it was during the period under review that its effects on the work of the Commission were felt fully.

The Joint Commission, which is an important part of the machinery for the implementation of the Geneva Agreements, has not resumed its activities since May, 1956.

The Commission had requested the Co-Chairmen to give urgent consideration to the situation mentioned in its letter of September 14, 1956. There has been no progress towards a solution of those difficulties. In fact they have further increased.

66. A major difficulty facing the Commission arises from the failure to hold consultations between the two parties and free nation-wide elections with a view to reunification of Vietnam. The Co-Chairmen in their message of May 8, 1956, to the parties had asked them to indicate the time required for the opening of these consultations and, in their message of the same date to the Commission, had informed it that they attached great importance to the maintenance of the cease-fire under the continued supervision of the International Commission for Vietnam. There has been no progress in the matter of the consultations and the elections to the knowledge of the Commission. The Commission is naturally anxious about the duration of its stay in Vietnam which is conditioned by the political settlement in this country, as envisaged in the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.

67. In the Sixth Interim Report the Commission expressed great concern over cases where the parties gave their own interpretations, which differed from those of the Commission, on the provision of the Agreement. The Commission notes with regret that this tendency continued during the period under report. The Commission must point out that for its effective functioning, it is essential that all the provisions of the Agreement should be strictly applied by the parties.

68. In spite of the difficulties described in previous Chapters, the Commission, as directed by the Co-Chairmen, have persevered and will continue to persevere in its efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in Vietnam on the basis of the fulfilment of the Geneva Agreements with a view to reunification of the country through the holding of free nationwide elections in Vietnam. The Commission is glad to report that there has been no resumption of hostilities in Vietnam. The Commission would, however, request the Co-Chairmen, and through them the Members of the Geneva Conference, to give their early consideration to the difficulties mentioned in this Report and take such measures as they may consider appropriate in order to facilitate the effective fulfilment of the Geneva Agreements.

T. N. KAUL,
India.
T. LE M. CARTER,
Canada.
J. GOLDBLAT,
Poland.

EXCERPTS FROM THE EIGHTH INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

May 1, 1957 to April 30, 1958. Saigon, June 5, 1958

CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSIONS

40. It is a matter of concern to the Commission that the Joint Commission has not resumed functioning and discharging its responsibilities under the Geneva Agreements. As mentioned in paragraph 10, the practical working arrangements recommended by the Co-Chairmen in their messages dated May 8, 1956, to the Government of the Republic of France and the Parties, have not materialised in respect of the functioning of the Joint Commission, and thus a lacuna has been created in the implementation machinery of the Geneva Agreements in Vietnam.

41. Although there was no major incident in the Demilitarised Zone, the Commission is concerned about the maintenance of the status and statute of the Demilitarised Zone. The Commission hopes that in the absence of the Joint Commission which is responsible for enforcing the provisions of Articles 7 and 8 requiring joint action there will be no violation of these Articles in the Demilitarised Zone. As mentioned in paragraph 9 there have been allegations of acts of provocation, which, though minor in themselves, might have set off a major incident. The absence of the Joint Commission and the consequent lack of arrangements for the resumption of its activities and the discharge of its functions, specially in the Demilitarised Zone, hampers the implementation of the Geneva Agreement in this important area. The Commission is making efforts to resolve this difficulty and seeking the co-operation of the two Parties in this regard. Should, however, the efforts of the Commission prove unsuccessful, the Commission will bring the matter to the notice of the Co-Chairmen for such action as they may consider necessary.

The minority view of the Polish Delegation is to add to the above paragraph: "The Commission's efforts in this regard did not bring yet any results as the Government of the Republic of Vietnam had refused to take part in the Joint Commission." The Indian and Canadian Delegations would like to state that the views of the two Parties on this question are still under the consideration of the Commission.

42. While the Commission appreciates the measure of co-operation received from each Party, it feels concerned about the tendency of the Parties to refuse to accept and comply with the decisions of the Commission and their persistence in maintaining their stands in certain cases. This tendency, if allowed to continue, will seriously affect the supervisory and control duties of the Commission and the Commission will not be able to discharge these duties to its full satisfaction. It is, therefore, hoped that the Parties, realising as they do, the importance of maintaining peace in Vietnam, will give the Commission their full co-operation and assistance in controlling and supervising the implementation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreements. In spite, however, of the difficulties experienced by the Commission, the Commission has made, and will continue to make, all possible efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in Vietnam in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Agreements.

43. The Commission notes that there has been no consultation between the two Parties with a view to holding free nation-wide elections for the reunification of the country, and to resolving the political problems and thus facilitating an early termination of the activities of the Commission and the fulfilment of its tasks. The Commission is confident that this important problem is engaging the attention of the Co-Chairmen and the Members of the Geneva Conference.

T. N. KAUL,

India.

T. LE M. CARTER,

Canada.

WLADYSLAW GORALSKI,

Poland.

EXCERPTS FROM THE NINTH INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

May 1, 1958 to January 31, 1959. Saigon, March 10, 1959

CHAPTER VII, CONCLUSIONS

43. In their message dated 8th May, 1956 to the Government of the Republic of France, the Co-Chairmen invited the French authorities to discuss with the authorities of South Vietnam with a view to reaching an arrangement to facilitate the work of the International Commission and the Joint Commission in Vietnam and requested the French Government to preserve the *status quo* until these new arrangements were "put into effect." In its message dated 14th September, 1956 the Commission informed the Co-Chairmen of the situation which arose as a consequence of the withdrawal of the French High Command from Vietnam and which placed the Commission in a difficult position.

In view of the situation revealed in paragraph 7 the Joint Commission cannot now be revived to resume its activities as long as the Government of the Republic of Vietnam maintains its attitude. An important machinery which was set up under Articles 30 and 32 of the Geneva Agreement for the execution of the provisions of the Cease-Fire Agreement requiring joint action by the two Parties and specifically charged under Article 33 to ensure observance of the Demarcation Line between the regrouping zones and of the demilitarized sectors, ceased to exist. The Commission is faced with this major difficulty which it cannot resolve on the spot and requests the Co-Chairmen to give it their urgent consideration for such action as they may consider necessary.

44. The situation in the Demilitarized Zone has shown no improvement since the Eighth Interim Report; if anything, the difficulties have further increased. Both Parties have continued to approach the Commission with complaints alleging acts of provocation and violation of the status of the Demilitarized Zone by the other. Although there was no major incident in the Demilitarized Zone and there was no outbreak of hostilities from either side, without any arrangements for the discharge of the functions of the Joint Commission to solve disputes in the Demilitarized Zone and settle complaints by prompt joint action by the Parties, effective preservation of the demilitarized character of the Demilitarized Zone created with the express intention of acting as a buffer zone and avoiding any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities may be jeopardized. The Commission hopes that the Parties will scrupulously maintain the status of the Demilitarized Zone and will avoid doing anything that may endanger peace in Vietnam. The Commission, as directed by the Co-Chairmen, has persevered, and will continue to persevere in its efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in Vietnam in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Agreement and is continuing to seek the co-operation of both Parties in this regard.

45. There has been no progress in the field of political settlement as envisaged in the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference. There has been no consultation between the two Parties with a view to holding freed nation-wide elections for the reunification of Vietnam. This has maintained the prospect of an indefinite continuance of the Commission and its activities. The Commission hopes that this important problem is engaging the attention of the Co-Chairmen and the Geneva Powers and that they will take effective measures to resolve this problem as envisaged in the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.

46. The Parties persisted in giving their own interpretations which differ from those of the Commission on some of the provisions of the Agreement and continued to refuse to accept and comply with some of the decisions of the Commission, maintaining their respective stands. In fact, these difficulties have further increased. The Commission cannot discharge with any effectiveness its functions specified in the Geneva Agreement which are the basis for the Commission's activities unless the Commission's interpretations and decisions are accepted as final by the Parties and unless all the provisions of the Agreement are strictly observed by them. However, despite its effectiveness to discharge its responsibilities under the Agreement being seriously affected, the Commission has continued and will continue to supervise and control the execution by the Parties of the Articles of the Agreement throughout Vietnam to the extent permitted by the Parties. The Commission hopes that both the Parties will give the Commission their full co-operation and assistance in controlling and supervising the implementation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement and enable the Com-

mission to discharge its functions effectively and to its full satisfaction. The Commission requests the Co-Chairmen and through them the Members of the Geneva Conference to take such measures as they may consider appropriate to resolve the difficulties which hinder the Commission's activities in order to enable the Commission to discharge its duties in accordance with the Geneva Agreements.

S. S. ANSARI,

India.

J. P. ERICHSEN-BROWN,

Canada.

WLADYSLAW GORALSKI,

Poland.

EXCERPTS FROM THE 10TH INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

February 1, 1959 to January 31, 1960. Saigon, April 6, 1960

CHAPTER VII, CONCLUSIONS

65. There has been no improvement, during the period under report, in regard to the situation in the Demilitarized Zone. The Commission continued to receive complaints from the Parties alleging acts of provocation and violation of the status of the Zone.

No major incident occurred in the Demilitarized Zone and there was no outbreak of hostilities from either side. However, in the absence of any arrangements for the discharge of the functions of the Joint Commission in relation to the resolution of disputes in the Demilitarized Zone and settlement of complaints by prompt joint action by the Parties, effective preservation of the demilitarized character of the zone may be jeopardized. The Commission reiterates the hope that the Parties will scrupulously maintain the status of the Demilitarized Zone and will refrain from any action which may endanger peace in Vietnam. As directed by the Co-Chairmen, the Commission will persevere in its efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in Vietnam in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Agreement and will continue, as hitherto, to seek the co-operation of both Parties in this regard.

66. The Commission has referred in some of its earlier Interim Reports to the lacuna created in the machinery for implementation of the Geneva Agreement as a result of the withdrawal of the French High Command and the consequent non-functioning of the Joint Commission, an important agency established under Articles 30 and 32 of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam for the execution of the provisions of the Agreement requiring joint action by the two Parties and specifically charged, under Article 33, with ensuring the observance of the Demarcation Line between the two regrouping zones and the Demilitarized Sectors. In view of the situation described in paragraph 6 of this Report, there is no possibility of the Joint Commission being revived to resume its activities so long as the Government of the Republic of Vietnam maintains its attitude. The efforts made by the Commission to find a practical solution to this difficulty with the co-operation of the two Parties have not, so far, been successful. The Commission has already informed the Co-Chairmen that it is faced with a major difficulty which it cannot resolve on the spot and has urged them to give it their urgent consideration for such action as they may consider necessary.

67. The tendency of the Parties to differ from the Commission's interpretation of some of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement and to refuse to accept and implement the Commission's recommendations and decisions, maintaining their respective stands, has continued during the period under report. The Commission feels concerned since the effectiveness of the Commission in carrying out its tasks of supervision and control under the Geneva Agreement requires that the Parties accept its interpretation as final and comply with its recommendations and decisions in all cases. The Commission hopes that, in view of the importance of maintaining peace in Vietnam, the Parties will give the Commission all possible assistance and co-operation to which it is entitled under Article 25 of the Geneva Agreement.

68. During the period under report, there has been no progress in regard to the political settlement envisaged in the Final Declaration. The Parties have not held consultations with a view to holding free nation-wide elections leading to the reunification of Vietnam and thereby facilitating early fulfilment of the tasks assigned to this Commission and the termination of its activities. The Commission is confident that this important problem is engaging the attention of the Co-Chairmen and the Geneva Powers and that they will take whatever measures they deem necessary to resolve it.

S. S. ANSARI,
India.
J. P. ERICHSEN-BROWN,
Canada.
TADEUSZ WISNIEWSKI,
Poland.

EXCERPTS FROM THE 11TH INTERIM REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

February 1, 1960 to February 28, 1961. Saigon, September 18, 1961

CHAPTER VIII, CONCLUSIONS

82. During the period under report the stresses and strains, in Vietnam and in the area as a whole, have slowly mounted, calling for more vigilance from the Commission and greater support from the Parties in the execution of the salient provisions of the Geneva Agreement. Despite this and certain difficulties mentioned in Chapter VII on "Co-operation of the Parties," and the lurking dangers in Vietnam, the active presence of the Commission and its work have helped in preserving peace. The Commission has tried to play the role of a catalyst and has provided a forum and link for both Parties. There has been criticism from the Parties of some of the Commission's decisions, but at the same time they have expressed their loyalty to the Commission. However, this expression of loyalty has not always been reflected in the degree of co-operation given to the Commission.

83. Although restricted in their movements, as mentioned in paragraph 73 of this Report, the Commission's Teams, which are its eyes and ears, have made every effort to carry out their difficult and strenuous task.

84. There has been some deterioration during the period under report in regard to the situation in the Demilitarized Zone. The mounting allegations from both sides of intrusion of military personnel into and other violations of the Demilitarized Zone is a matter of increasing concern. As mentioned in paragraphs 7 and 10 of this Report, the Commission was faced with serious difficulties in carrying out its duties of supervision in the Demilitarized Zone. Before June 1956, a helicopter was used for reconnoitring this terrain of the Western Sector. Without suitable means of transport, co-operation of both the Parties and the Joint Commission as provided for in Articles 30, 32 and 33 of the Geneva Agreement, the Commission has not been able to supervise this Zone as a whole.

85. The Commission has not been able to make any headway on the problem of reconstituting the Joint Commission which is a matter of concern. The re-establishment of the Joint Commission or in its absence the setting up of an effective *modus vivendi* acceptable to both the Parties is, therefore, necessary. The execution of Articles 30, 32 and 33 requires first of all joint action by both the Parties. The Commission while continuing to pursue its efforts to resolve these difficulties would urge on the Co-Chairmen the importance of giving their early attention to this problem.

86. The condition of the road transport of the Commission is seriously interfering with its normal work. The number of breakdowns has been growing and is sufficiently large to give concern. Both the North and the South have reported that a large number of these vehicles will require replacement, as they have out-lived their life. The Commission has been examining this question and will be shortly addressing the Co-Chairmen on this important subject.

87. The Co-Chairmen's attention has been invited to the deteriorating financial position of the Commission due to lack of adequate funds.

88. Once again, during the period under report there has been no progress in regard to the political settlement envisaged in the Final Declaration of the

Geneva Conference. No consultations have been held by the Parties with a view to holding free nation-wide elections leading to the reunification of the country and thereby facilitating fulfilment of the tasks assigned to this Commission and the termination of its activities. The Commission trusts that this important problem is receiving the attention of the Co-Chairmen and the Geneva Powers.

89. The Commission can discharge its responsibilities only to the extent the Parties respect, honour and promote the execution of the provisions of the Agreement. The fuller the co-operation given by the Parties, the greater the effectiveness of the Commission and the chances of achieving the purposes of the Geneva Agreement. It is the hope of the Commission that the parties will rally to its support and make the Commission an effective instrument for maintaining peace and promoting solidarity.

N. GOPALA MENON,
India.
C. J. WOODSWORTH,
Canada.
J. TWOROG,
Poland.

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM—SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINA

(Saigon, June 2, 1962)

(Excerpts)

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam presents its compliments to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and has the honour to refer to paragraph 2 of their message of 8th May, 1956, in which the Co-Chairmen asked the Commission to inform them in case the Commission encountered any difficulties in its activities which could not be resolved on the spot and simultaneously had urged both the Parties in Viet-Nam to extend to the Commission all possible co-operation and assistance. The International Commission has assured the Co-Chairmen in its message of 27th May, 1956, that it would continue to persevere in its efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in Viet-Nam and affirmed its determination to perform its duties within the framework of the Geneva Agreement.¹

2. The International Commission has, from time to time, submitted to the Co-Chairmen Interim Reports giving a resumé of its activities as well as a brief review of the progress made by the two Parties in the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement. In these reports, apart from other things, the Commission had pointed out its difficulties, particularly with regard to the tendency of the Parties to refuse to accept and implement the Commission's recommendations and decisions and their persistence in maintaining their own stand in certain cases. The Co-Chairmen were also informed about the difficulties which the Commission's Fixed Teams were experiencing with regard to the performance of their mandatory tasks of control and inspection in terms of their responsibilities under Articles 35 and 36 (*d*) of the Agreement.

3. In its 11th Interim Report, which covered the period from 1st February, 1960, to 28th February, 1961, the Commission had mentioned that, in spite of certain difficulties and the lurking dangers in Viet-Nam, the active presence of the Commission and its work had helped in preserving peace.

4. Since the presentation of the 11th Interim Report, the situation in Viet-Nam has shown signs of rapid deterioration. The Commission is obliged to make this Special Report to the Co-Chairmen with regard to the serious allegations of aggression and subversion on the part of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam against the Republic of Viet-Nam and the serious charges of violation of Articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreement by the Republic of Viet-Nam, in receiving military aid from the United States of America.

The Polish Delegation dissents from the views expressed in this Special Report. The statement of the Polish Delegation is forwarded herewith.

¹ "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)", Cmd. 9239.

5. Reference is invited to paragraph 24 of the 10th Interim Report and paragraph 32 of the 11th Interim Report, in which mention was made of the concern which the Republic of Viet-Nam has been expressing over the problem of subversion in South Viet-Nam. Mention was also made in paragraph 61 of the 11th Interim Report to the complaints, which the Commission had received from the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, accusing the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam of aggression in the Kontum and Pleiku provinces during October, 1960. Complaints of this nature continued to increase during 1961. In June, 1961, the Commission made known its stand regarding its competence to entertain and examine complaints of this nature in terms of specific Articles of the Geneva Agreement.

6. The Commission also received several complaints from the High Command of the People's Army of Viet-Nam (PAVN) making serious allegations with regard to the increased introduction of U.S. military personnel into South Viet-Nam, along with substantial quantities of war material, in controversion of Articles 16 and 17. All these allegations were forwarded to the South Vietnamese Mission for comments. The Party in most cases denied these allegations. But the Commission was not in a position to make a precise assessment as to the correctness or otherwise of these allegations, as the Commission's Teams at most points of entry have not been able to carry out effective inspections and controls. However, the South Vietnamese Mission did state in July, 1961, that whatever American aid its Government was receiving was meant to fight Communist subversion in South Viet-Nam, and in support of this contention it had also referred to the text of the communiqué published after the visit of the U.S. Vice-President Johnson to Saigon, in May, 1961.

7. While the Commission continued to function in this difficult atmosphere, a communication was received on 9th September, 1961, from the Liaison Mission of the Republic of Viet-Nam, alleging that the PAVN forces had launched another action in the Kontum region on 1st September, 1961. The letter containing these allegations was forwarded to the Liaison Mission of the PAVN High Command for its comments. In its reply under its letter No. 492/CT/I/B dated 11th December, 1961, the Mission stated that "the PAVN High Command will resolutely reject all decisions taken by the International Commission relating to the so-called 'subversive activities' in South Viet-Nam, a question which has no relevance to the Geneva Agreement". It further informed the Commission that "henceforth the Mission would find itself constrained to resolutely reject all possible requests for comments of this kind".

8. In the meanwhile, in early October, 1961, the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam alleged that Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam, the Chief of the Vietnamese Mission in charge of relations with the International Commission, had been kidnapped. Later, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the Commission of the murder of Colonel Nam. The complicity of the authorities in the North in the kidnapping and murder of Colonel Nam was alleged. Reference is invited to the Commission's message No. IC/ADM/V-5/61/4097 dated 9th November, 1961, in this regard. Since the allegations were of a serious nature, the Commission requested the South Vietnamese Mission to furnish prima facie evidence to support their charge of the complicity of the Northern Party in this incident. The Commission received detailed communications from the Mission on documents and photographs, in support of their contention. The Mission also stated that the "Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is confident that the case of Colonel Hoang Thuy Nam should be taken, not as an isolated case, but as part of the extensive plan of subversion and terrorism deliberately decided by the Hanoi authorities, a plan which, with this assassination enters a new phase of execution and is designed for seizing power in South Viet-Nam". In November, 1961, the Commission considered these letters containing numerous allegations, and referred them to its Legal Committee for examination "with a view to determining whether the allegations and evidence therein prima facie attract any provisions of the Geneva Agreement".

9. The Legal Committee has made a careful examination of the various allegations and the evidence produced to support them, in the form of documents and other material evidence, and has made the following report, with the Polish Member dissenting:

"We have studied the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, the South Vietnamese Mission's letter No. 4660/PDVN/CT/TD/2 dated the 24th October, 1961, and No. 5078/PDVN/CT/TD/2 dated the 16th November, 1961, and related references from the Commission together with the

evidentiary material made available by the South Vietnamese Mission in connection therewith, and reached the following conclusions:

(1) The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam proceeds on the principle of the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam, respect by either Party of the Zone assigned to the other, and the inescapable responsibility of the Parties for the fulfilment of the obligations resulting therefrom.

Article 10 of the Agreement states expressly the obligation of the two Parties to order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam.

Article 19 of the Agreement casts the obligation on the two Parties to ensure that the Zones assigned to them are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

Article 24 of the Agreement proceeds on the principle of the inviolability of the Demilitarized Zone and the territories assigned to the two Parties and states expressly that the armed forces of each Party shall respect the territory under the military control of the other Party and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other Party.

Article 27 of the Agreement affirms expressly the responsibility of the Commanders of the Forces of the two Parties of ensuring full compliance with all the provisions of the Agreement by all elements and military personnel under their Command.

It follows that the using of one Zone for the organisation or the carrying out of any hostile activities in the other Zone, violations by members of the Armed Forces of one Party of the territory of the other Party, or the commission by any element under the control of one Party of any act directed against the Agreement which enjoin mutual respect for the territories assigned to the two Parties.

(2) Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam.

(3) In examining the complaints and the supporting material, in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the further conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. The use of the Zone in the North for such activities is in violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam.

(4) The Committee considers that further investigation is necessary to reach a final conclusion as to whether the kidnapping and murder of Colonel Nam, late Chief of the South Vietnamese Mission, was a part of the activities referred to in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) above and prohibited under Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement. The South Vietnamese Mission has furnished prima facie evidence to warrant such a full investigation of the case by the Commission.

2. We shall submit in due course a full report setting out in detail the complaints made by the South Vietnamese Mission, the evidence forwarded in relation to these complaints, and our specific observations thereon."

10. The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 in specific instances. The Polish Delegation dissents from these conclusions. On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case.

11. Concurrently with the developments referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, and subsequently, the Commission received communications from the PAVN High Command and its Liaison Mission alleging direct military intervention in South Viet-Nam by the Government of the United States of America, and ever-increasing import of war material and introduction of military personnel

in violation of the Geneva Agreement. The allegations, amongst others, were:

(a) the conclusion of a bilateral military Agreement between President Ngo Dinh Diem and United States Ambassador Nolting;

(b) the gradual introduction of about 5,000 United States military personnel into South Viet-Nam, "which will soon be increased to 8,000";

(c) the arrival of 4 aircraft carriers—*Core*, *Brenton*, *Princeton* and *Croaton*—on different occasions, bringing in helicopters, other aircraft, military equipment and military personnel;

(d) the introduction by the United States of America of approximately four companies of helicopters, many jet fighters, fighters/fighter bombers and transport planes, along with military vehicles and other stores;

(e) the visits of a large number of high United States military experts and dignitaries to Saigon for inspection and guidance, particularly those of General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral H. Felt and General Lemnitzer;

(f) the establishment of a United States Military Assistance Command, with a four-star General, Paul D. Harkins, as its Chief.

12. Since December, 1961, the Commission's Teams in South Viet-Nam have been persistently denied the right to control and inspect, which are part of their mandatory tasks. Thus, these Teams, though they were able to observe the steady and continuous arrival of war material, including aircraft carriers with helicopters on board, were unable, in view of the denial of controls, to determine precisely the quantum and nature of war material unloaded and introduced into South Viet-Nam.

13. On the other hand, the Commission received a communication from Liaison Mission of the Republic of Viet-Nam dated 9th December, 1961, stating that: "In the face of the aggression, directed by the so-called 'Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam' against the Republic of Viet-Nam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has requested the Government of the United States of America to intensify the aid in personnel and material which the latter was already granting to Viet-Nam. The right of 'self-defence' being a legitimate and inherent attribute of sovereignty, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam found itself constrained to exercise this right and request for increased aid, since North Viet-Nam continues to violate the Geneva Agreement and to do injury to life and property of the free people of Viet-Nam.

"These measures can end as soon as the North Viet-Nam authorities will have ceased the acts of aggression and will have begun to respect the Geneva Agreement."

14. The Commission considered this communication from the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and drew the attention of the South Vietnamese Mission to the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement and the procedures laid down thereunder by the International Commission for the import of war material and the introduction of military personnel, and to the obligations resulting therefrom. The Commission also informed the Mission that its complaints regarding allegations of subversion and aggression by the North were under active examination of the Commission separately.

15. In the light of the stand of the Commission as stated in paragraph 14 above, the numerous allegations received from the PAVN High Command have been receiving the attention of the Commission with a view to the strict implementation of Articles 16 and 17 of the Agreement and the procedures laid down thereunder.

16. A summary of the allegations made by the PAVN High Command, from December, 1961, up to 5th May, 1962, would place the number of military personnel and the quantum of important war materials introduced into South Viet-Nam at approximately 5,000 personnel ("which are likely to increase to 8,000 shortly"), 157 helicopters, 10 reconnaissance aircraft, 34 jet aircraft, 34 fighters/fighter bombers, 21 transport aircraft, 35 unspecified aircraft, 40 armoured and 20 scout cars, "numerous" armoured boats and amphibious craft, 3,000 tons and 1,350 cases of war material, and 7 warships (exclusive of 5 destroyers of the United States Seventh Fleet alleged to have come for training). Most of the letter containing the allegations, referred to in this paragraph and paragraph 11 above, were sent to the Liaison Mission of the Republic of Viet-Nam for its early comments; but no satisfactory replies have been received. Also, in some cases the Southern Party has been asked to state reasons, if any, why violations of Article 17(e) relating to prior notification, as well as violations of Articles 16 and 17 governing the introduction of military personnel and war material themselves, should not be recorded against it.

17. As the Commission has been denied mandatory controls, as pointed out earlier in paragraph 12 above, it has not been able to make a precise assessment of the number of military personnel and the quantum of war material brought in. However, from 3rd December, 1961, up to 5th May, 1962, the Commission's Teams have controlled the entry of 72 military personnel, and observed but not controlled 173 military personnel, 62 helicopters, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, 5 jet aircraft, 57 fighters/fighter bombers, 25 transport aircraft, 26 unspecified types of aircraft, 102 jeeps, 8 tractors, 8 105-mm. howitzers, 3 armoured carriers (tracked), 29 armoured fighting vehicle trailers, 404 other trailers, and radar equipment and crates, 5 warships, 9 LSTs (including 4 visiting LSTs), 3 LSTs, 5 visiting aircraft carriers and spares of various kinds. In respect of some of the instances of import of war materials between 3rd December, 1961, and 16th January, 1962, violations under Article 17(e) as well as violation of Article 25, have been recorded against the Republic of Viet-Nam for its failure to notify arrivals and imports as required by the Geneva Agreement, and for not affording all possible assistance to the Commission's Teams in the performance of their tasks.

18. In regard to claims for credits made by the Southern Party in justification of certain imports, the Commission wishes to point out that in so far as major items of war material are concerned, except in a limited number of cases, there is no established credit in favour of the Republic of Viet-Nam. On the other hand, for some of these items, there is already a debit against it. In this context, it must be borne in mind that, even where credit exists, according to Article 17(b) of the Agreement, the Party can only import war material "piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics". However, controls not having been permitted, the Commission is not in a position to satisfy itself whether this essential requirement has in fact been fulfilled even in cases where credit exists.

19. As regards the allegation of the PAVN High Command that a U.S. Military Assistance Command has been set up in South Viet-Nam in violation of Article 19, the Commission requested the Party to furnish the following information:

- (i) Whether such a U.S. Command has been set up;
- (ii) The basis on which it has been established;
- (iii) The purpose for which it has been constituted;
- (iv) Its strength;
- (v) The scope of its activities.

The South Vietnamese Mission in its letter dated 15th March, 1962, has not furnished the necessary information required by the Commission, other than stating that this Military Assistance Command is not a military command in the usual sense of the term, and that its only function is to supervise and manage the utilisation of American personnel and equipment. The Mission stated further that there was no military alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam as no treaty of this nature had been ratified by either Government.

20. Taking all the facts into consideration, and basing itself on its own observations and authorised statements made in the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Commission concludes that the Republic of Viet-Nam has violated Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement in receiving the increased military aid from the United States of America in the absence of any established credit in its favour. The Commission is also of the view that, though there may not be any formal military alliance between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam, the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance Command in South Viet-Nam, as well as the introduction of a large number of U.S. military personnel beyond the stated strength of the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group), amounts to a factual military alliance, which is prohibited under Article 19 of the Geneva Agreement.

21. The Commission would also like to bring to the notice of the Co-Chairmen a recent and deliberate tendency on the part of both the Parties to deny or refuse controls to the Commission's Teams, thereby completely immobilising their activities and hindering the Commission in the proper discharge of its obligations to supervise the implementation of Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement. During the last few months, there has been a near-complete breakdown so far as this important function of the Commission is concerned. The Commission considered the situation and addressed detailed communications to the two Parties recommending the resumption of normal controls immediately. (Copies of the letters sent to the two Parties are attached as Annexure I to this Report.)

The Commission, however, regrets to inform the Co-Chairmen that there has been no improvement in this regard.

22. The International Commission wishes to draw the serious and earnest attention of the Co-Chairman to the gravity of the situation that has developed in Viet-Nam in the last few months. Fundamental provisions of the Geneva Agreement have been violated by both Parties, resulting in ever-increasing tension and threat of resumption of open hostilities. In this situation, the role of the Commission for the maintenance of peace in Viet-Nam is being greatly hampered because of denial of co-operation by both the Parties. The Commission, therefore, earnestly recommends to the Co-Chairmen that, with a view to reducing tension and preserving peace in Viet-Nam, remedial action be taken, in the light of this Report, so as to ensure that the Parties—

- (a) respect the Zone assigned to the other Party;
- (b) observe strictly the provisions of Articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreement in respect of the import of war material and the introduction of military personnel;
- (c) commit no act and undertake no operation of a hostile nature against the other Party;
- (d) do not allow the Zones assigned to them to adhere to any military alliance and to be used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy;
- (e) co-operate with the International Commission in the fulfillment of its tasks of supervision and control of the implementation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement.

23. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam takes this opportunity to renew the assurances of its highest consideration to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China.

G. PARTHASARATHI,
India.

F. G. HOOTON,
Canada.

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM—SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINA

(Saigon, February 13, 1965)

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam presents its compliments to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and wishes to draw their immediate and earnest attention to the following situation.

(While in full agreement that a report should be made to the co-Chairmen, the Canadian Delegation dissents from the terms of this majority Report and has expressed its views in the attached Statement).

On February 7, 1965, a joint communique was issued by the Acting Premier of the Republic of Vietnam (R.V.N.), acting under the authority of the National Security Council, and the Ambassador of the United States, acting under the authority of his Government. This communique announced that military action had been taken against military installations in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN). A copy of this communique is at annexure 'A'.

On the same day, the Liaison Mission of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) transmitted the text of a communique which was issued by the Ministry of Defence of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam referring to the bombing and strafing of the DRVN; subsequently the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam issued on February 8, 1965 a communique on these events, which was communicated by the PAVN Liaison Mission in their letter to the International Commission. The Liaison Mission of the PAVN brought to the notice of the International Commission that again on February 8, 1965, bombing and strafing of a number of places had taken place and requested the International Commission "to consider and condemn without delay these violations of utmost gravity and report them to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China". These documents are at annexure 'B'.

On February 8, 1965 it was officially announced that further military action on the territory of the DRVN had been undertaken by RVN and US aircraft. This is at Annexure 'C'.

These documents point to the seriousness of the situation and indicate violations of the Geneva Agreement.¹

The International Commission is examining and investigating these and connected complaints still being received by it concerning similar serious events and grave developments, and will transmit a report to the co-Chairmen as soon as possible.

In the meanwhile, this Special Report is submitted for the earnest and serious attention of the co-Chairmen in view of the gravity of the situation. The International Commission requests the co-Chairmen to consider the desirability of issuing an immediate appeal to all concerned with a view to reducing tension and preserving peace in Vietnam and taking whatever measures are necessary in order to stem the deteriorating situation.

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam takes this opportunity to renew to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China the assurances of its highest consideration.

M. A. RAHMAN,

Representative of India on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

R. B. STAWICKI,

Acting Representative of the Polish People's Republic on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM—SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINA

(Saigon, February 27, 1965)

(Excerpts)

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam presents its compliments to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China 1954, and has the honour to state that on the 12th February, 1965, at 1715 hours the Chief of the Liaison Mission of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) asked the Chairman of the International Commission Bureau at Hanoi "to convey to the Commission the request of the PAVN High Command to take steps urgently to withdraw all the Fixed Teams in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN). This is because of the tension and the gravity of the situation and only taking into consideration the security of the teams".

(While in full agreement that the Co-Chairmen should be informed about the withdrawal of the teams situated in the DRVN, the Polish Delegation considered the terms of this Special Report to be inadequate and expressed its views in the attached Statement).

2. The International Commission immediately on the 13th February, 1965 sent instructions to the Chairman, International Commission Bureau, Hanoi, to request that "if PAVN Liaison Mission maintain decision" they should "present it in writing", and to point out to the PAVN Liaison Mission the "far-reaching implications".

3. On the 13th February, 1965 a telegram from Colonel Ha Van Lau, Chief of the PAVN Liaison Mission, was received (which is at Appendix 'A'). After drawing attention to recent air attacks against the territory of the DRVN, this telegram formally requested the withdrawal of the ICSC Fixed Teams in North Vietnam on security grounds.

4. The request was considered by the International Commission and on 19th February, 1965 a telegram was sent (which is at Appendix 'B') outlining the far-reaching implications of the request affecting the work of the ICSC under the Geneva Agreement, the fact that all controls by these Fixed Teams had been stopped, that the International Commission was prepared to take reasonable risks, but that if the PAVN felt obliged to maintain their decision, the International Commission would have no alternative but to withdraw its Fixed Teams

¹ "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)", Cmd. 9239.

with great reluctance. (The Statement of the Polish Delegation on this telegram is at Appendix 'D').

5. A reply to International Commission's telegram was received on the 20th February, 1965 from the PAVN Liaison Mission (which is at Appendix 'C') which reiterated their demand. This was further corroborated orally at 1500 hours on the 20th February, 1965 by a representative of the PAVN Liaison Mission to the Chairman of the International Commission Bureau, Hanoi.

6. The Fixed Teams were withdrawn from Dong Dang, Hai Phong and Vinh on the night of 20/21st February, after being informed by the local authorities that immediate evacuation must take place for security reasons; and from Lao Kay and Dong Hoi on the following day. Thus, by the 22nd February, 1965, all the five Fixed Teams of the ICSC had been withdrawn to Hanoi from their locations in the DRVN.

7. As the attached exchange of correspondence will indicate, the International Commission had no alternative but to order with great reluctance the withdrawal of its Fixed Teams from their sites on DRVN territory. The International Commission has informed the PAVN Liaison Mission that it is willing to take reasonable risks in discharging its duties and has indicated to the Liaison Mission that it considers the withdrawal to be a temporary measure. The International Commission intends to discuss with the PAVN authorities the functioning of Mobile Teams and the possibility of controls by the teams temporarily withdrawn from team sites. It will keep the question of the status and functions of its teams in North Vietnam under continuing review in the light of subsequent developments.

8. The International Commission takes this opportunity to request the Co-Chairmen to use their good offices with the members of the Geneva Conference so as to ensure that the implementation of the Geneva Agreement is not impeded, that mobile controls and other operations of the ICSC in North Vietnam continue without interruption, and in particular that appropriate conditions for the return of the Fixed Teams are rapidly created.


The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam takes this opportunity to renew to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China the assurances of its highest consideration.

J. B. SEABORN,

Representative of the Government of Canada on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

M. A. RAHMAN,

Representative of India on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.



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