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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY—1963-65

GOVERNMENT

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE


ADMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACTS AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PART 9

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



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STATE DEPARTMENT - SECURITY - 1963-62

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
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¹ Succeeded Olin D. Johnston, deceased.



FOREWORD

This is part 9 of an extensive series of hearings held during 1963, 1964, and part of 1965 on "State Department Security." The subject matter of these hearings included various subtopics, necessarily intertwined. There are a number of clearly defined areas of testimony which can be presented separately, and other instances in which testimony covering two or more subjects can be combined with satisfactory coherency. Because of the great volume of this hearing record, covering nearly 2½ years, it has been decided to organize the testimony for release by subjects or areas.


All the testimony will be released, except for a very few instances of deletions for security reasons. (Any such deletions will be indicated in the printed record.) But, where a witness testified on several subjects or in several areas (as was frequently the case), the testimony may be printed in two or more different volumes. So far as possible, all the testimony on a particular subject will be printed in a single volume.


Subsequent parts of the current series will include testimony on other phases of the investigation, subject by subject. These volumes will be released successively, as rapidly as possible.


This volume contains two exchanges of correspondence. The first consists of a letter from Senator Thomas J. Dodd, vice chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee, to the Secretary of State; the Secretary's reply, discussing the Department's position on State Department security, and asking that his letter be published as part of the current series on the 1963-65 hearings on State Department security; and Senator Dodd's acknowledgment.

The second is correspondence between Senator Roman L. Hruska and the State Department with reference to the security case of William Wieland.

Because of Secretary Rusk's request, this volume has been issued without waiting for completion of the series of hearings dealing with the Otepka case, which will be resumed with the next volume released.







STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY—1963-65

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1965

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The following correspondence was ordered into the record :

AUGUST 6, 1965.

HON. DEAN RUSK,
*Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: At or near the conclusion of the Internal Security Subcommittee hearings on security in the Department of State, you indicated that you might wish to come before the committee again to discuss some of the testimony developed, or points raised, in these hearings. Although you have not followed up on this, it is understood that with the many pressures on your time, it might be difficult for you to find a convenient time to appear before the committee.

Senator Eastland and I both feel that we should reassure you that whenever you do want to come before us, the committee will make every effort to meet your convenience in the matter. We also want to make it clear that a further appearance by you, if you choose to make it, is not in any way foreclosed by the fact that the committee has begun the publication and release of the testimony taken in these hearings.

We want to assure you further that if you do choose to come before the committee again, whatever you say will be made part of the hearing record, and will be given the same publicity as other testimony, which might have been adverse to the Department.

With best personal regards and all good wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

THOMAS J. DODD,
Vice Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, September 6, 1965.

HON. THOMAS J. DODD,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR DODD: In reference to your letter of August 6, 1965, I would like to assure both you and Senator Eastland that I am always available to appear before your subcommittee at any time you feel my

presence is necessary. I take this means of conveying to you some of my thoughts about the Department's security program and the work of the Senate Subcommittee for Internal Security.

The tactics and strategy of Communist aggression continue to require our intensive attention. While this force manifests itself most patently in areas abroad, such as Vietnam, we are very aware that it also assumes another form by attempting penetration of the Department and its overseas offices. Those powers which desire to overthrow our Government and, indeed, our democratic way of life would hope to break through our physical security barriers and to compromise our personnel and, in so doing, to obtain information vital to our interests. Our national security depends not only on powerful military defenses and forceful, prudent, and successful diplomacy, but also on our ability to withstand this kind of penetration.

My responsibilities as Secretary of State for planning, initiating, and implementing foreign policy require that I act with, and depend upon, a large number of officers of my Department. The selection of these employees in the first instance is rigorous and competitive; we seek to obtain this country's finest talent. The loyalty and integrity of these employees is my personal and very important responsibility; and this responsibility receives my constant attention.

I am determined that our system and procedures relating to both physical and personnel security shall be the best, and if weaknesses exist, we shall continue by constant and thorough scrutiny to identify and eliminate them.

I am also determined that our procedures insuring integrity and loyalty of employees will at the same time fully protect the rights of the individual. I am convinced that there need be no conflict between an excellent security operation and according individual rights to those persons functioning under it.

During the past year, your subcommittee has indicated a particular interest in certain aspects of our security operation. I would like to tell you about the status of those subjects as well as other new projects of mutual interest and concern.

The updating of the security files of all employees, including Presidential appointees and other senior personnel has received renewed emphasis during the past year. It is our intention to update every employee's security investigation on a 5-year cycle. The updating program encompasses a field reinvestigation of the employees and security clearances are continued in effect only after all information is carefully reevaluated. This program is well underway, and a special branch in the Office of Security has been established to insure continuity of the program.

A Special Assignments Staff has been organized in the Office of Security to fulfill the counterintelligence function of meeting the threat of subversion of the Department's personnel by foreign intelligence services. As I pointed out in my remarks before the Internal Security Subcommittee on October 21, 1963, the Special Assignments Branch is responsible for the direction and coordination of investigations of all attempts at personnel penetration and of all situations which might make penetration attempts likely. I would like to reiterate that the achievements of this branch in terms of results have played an important part in the concept of total security.

The discovery of audiosurveillance systems in the Embassies in Moscow and Warsaw has led to a reassessment of the Department's technical security program. New countermeasure equipment has been developed, and additional acoustic secure rooms have been procured for installation at our larger and more sensitive missions. The recent placement of the audiosurveillance countermeasure committee under the U.S. Intelligence Board has resulted in increased coordination among the participating agencies. For example, the resources of all sensitive agencies of the Government are now being utilized to solve the unique problems behind the Iron Curtain. Our capability in this field has also been greatly enhanced by the latest development whereby Navy Seabees are being assigned abroad. The Seabees search out technical penetrations of our buildings abroad by demolition methods and renovate the buildings where necessary. This eliminates the obvious security weakness of employing indigenous personnel, particularly behind the Iron Curtain.

Special emphasis has been given to the security of the Department's operations in Washington. With the additional funds provided in the fiscal year 1965 supplemental and fiscal year 1966 budgets, the Department has expanded and assumed operational control of the GSA guard force. The building is now operated as a "controlled" security installation. Personnel are admitted to the building on the basis of an authorized credential or visitor pass. Patrolling guards are now conducting security inspections 24 hours per day. We plan to implement additional procedures in our effort to improve the security of the State Department building.

The Office of Security convened an interagency ad hoc committee to study the terrorism problem and particularly the isolated attacks against American installations and personnel in Latin America. The results of this study—a comprehensive guidance document—have been distributed to chiefs of missions in Latin America with instructions to establish a security watch committee to cope with this problem. Special protective equipment is also being provided and consequently, the posts in Latin America are better prepared for this type of emergency than heretofore. The terrorism problem is now being assessed worldwide, and similar departmental support will be afforded other threatened areas. Associated with this program is a special research and development project to determine what can be done to replace ordinary glass with a secure, shatterproof glass or glass substitute.

The Department continues to be represented as a participating agency on a number of interagency and ad hoc committees dealing with intelligence and security matters.

New State/AID/USIA physical procedural security regulations are being issued which introduce improved procedures concerning the control, processing, and recording of classified documents. Personnel are currently being indoctrinated with respect to the new regulations which become effective, worldwide, on September 1, 1965.

Particular emphasis has been placed upon the controls for using and safeguarding intelligence materials. Procedures have been established which insure the prompt dissemination of intelligence to the appropriate agencies and offices of the Department of State.

Protective security for visiting chiefs of state, heads of government, and other distinguished foreign dignitaries has been assisted by the

passage of Public Law 493 by the 88th Congress in 1964. As your subcommittee knows this law makes it a Federal crime to assault or injure chiefs of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers or to assault a Department security officer while on a protective assignment. In addition, this law extends arrest authority, without warrant, to these security officers.

The Office of Security was reorganized in May 1964 and the domestic field office structure, providing for 7 field offices and 20 resident agents in principal cities, was reorganized in September 1964. In addition, the overseas staffing pattern for regional security officers and for technical security officers has been realigned. These changes are resulting in improved management, supervision, coverage, and efficiency.

We are giving a new emphasis on training of security personnel. In line with the Department's concept of a total security program we are continuing to implement an interchange of security officers to permit them to profit from both departmental and field experience as well as to assure their placement on assignments best suited to their experience and ability. We have held conferences for special agents in charge, a conference on constitutional rights, and have instituted in-service courses for special agents. The security education and training program has been redesigned to reach all the employees of the Department, and has been expanded to include security orientation for wives of officers assigned to overseas duty.

Another phase of our security program which has shown positive results has been in the preventive security field. The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration has been most aggressive in establishing procedures with our posts abroad to insure that all cases which have a security or suitability ramification are expeditiously reported. This has had the effect of making our personnel, particularly overseas, more security conscious. It has also allowed the Department to take timely action on cases which could prove embarrassing to the United States. Another facet of our preventive security program is the briefing of all personnel going abroad on their conduct and decorum while serving abroad. They receive a security briefing pointing out their responsibilities as representatives of the United States.

In the field of preventive security, the Department has established a Personnel Review Board to screen all questionable applicants for employment to insure that the Department does not inherit suitability problems. I feel that the field of suitability is so closely alined to security that one has to think of both in the concept of the total security. Homosexuality is a problem in both the security and suitability fields. The Office of Security in its investigations of applicants and in-service personnel utilizes tested interview techniques which are necessary in order to bring to light homosexuals or a potential homosexual to insure that no such person is employed by the Department.

I am sure you and the subcommittee appreciate why my main interest with regard to total security is in the time frame of today. Investigations of historical security problems of years ago are important only to assure that previous mistakes are corrected and indicated improvements are instituted. I feel that the changes in reorganization and the present security concepts in the Department now approach total security. This has been brought about by injecting new blood

into the security structure of the Department, by aggressive positive leadership, and by a modern sophisticated security appreciation. Security is a 24-hour-a-day job, domestic as well as foreign, and I feel the Department is taking a hard realistic approach which emphasizes the fact that security is an ever-continuing problem. The protection of the United States from its enemies both foreign and domestic is a part of the oath taken by every man who serves his country. In order to fulfill this obligation, the national security must be paramount and above petty jealousies and ambitions.

The common goal of the subcommittee and the Department to achieve utmost protection of our national security requires an exceedingly close working relationship and the utmost in understanding of mutual problems. Our meetings and your constructive suggestions on all the subjects related to security have been very helpful. The Department's ongoing reevaluation of security continues to benefit from the study and work of your subcommittee. I want to assure you of my personal desire to afford you every assistance possible in that work.

I would appreciate it if you would make arrangements to have this letter published as a part of the current publication of hearings held before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee entitled "State Department Security—1963-65."

If you or members of the subcommittee have any questions with regard to any points I have mentioned in this letter, please do not hesitate to ask me for clarification.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1965.

HON. DEAN RUSK,
*Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wish to thank you for your letter of September 6, in which you set forth, in a remarkably cogent manner, some of your thoughts about the Department's security program and the work of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security.

In accordance with your request, I have asked that your letter be published as a part of the current publication of hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee dealing with State Department security. My own thinking is that the letter is important enough to warrant publication as a separate document, and I have so advised the committee.

The subcommittee and the Department have had important differences on certain aspects of State Department security. This is both natural and proper. On the other hand, I am pleased to note that you feel that the committee's study and my own personal suggestion have been helpful to the Department's ongoing reevaluation of security procedures.

For my own part, I want to assure you again that the members of the Subcommittee on Internal Security have never considered themselves to be in an adversary posture to the Department of State, and that it is our essential desire, through the investigative process, to

assist the Department constructively, and to cooperate with it in the improvement of security procedures.

With every best wish.

Sincerely,

THOMAS J. DODD.

AUGUST 19, 1965.

HON. WILLIAM J. CROCKETT,
*Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CROCKETT: Your letter of February 10, 1964, to Civil Service Commission Chairman John W. Macy, Jr., stated that, as of that time, "accurate records are being and will be maintained which reflect the dates clearances are granted, waivers approved, and other basic actions taken" in personnel security cases.

Please let me know what these records show with respect to the following:

1. The date the security case of William Wieland was reopened, following the clearance reported to the Civil Service Commission under date of January 24, 1962.

2. The date when, following adjudication of this reopened security case, Mr. Wieland's clearance was reaffirmed.

3. The name of the responsible official who "signed off" on this reaffirmation of clearance.

4. The date when this reaffirmation of clearance was reported to the Civil Service Commission.

5. The name of the individual who signed this report to the Civil Service Commission.

Thanks in advance for your courtesy in responding promptly to this request.

Sincerely,

ROMAN L. HRUSKA,
U.S. Senator, Nebraska.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 4, 1965.

HON. ROMAN L. HRUSKA,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR HRUSKA: Reference is made to your letter dated August 19, 1965, to Deputy Under Secretary William J. Crockett of this Department in which you asked certain questions pertaining to the William Arthur Wieland matter.

Question No. 1 in your letter was as follows: The date the security case of William Wieland was reopened, following the clearance reported to the Civil Service Commission under date of January 24, 1962.

Answer: The files of the Office of Security Department of State contain form DS-1066 captioned "Case Action Record" bearing the date May 1, 1963, in the Wieland case indicating it was then being reconsidered under Executive Order 10450.

Question No. 2 was as follows: The date when, following adjudication of this reopened security case, Mr. Wieland's clearance was reaffirmed.

Answer: January 25, 1965. (See question No. 3.)

Question No. 3: The name of the responsible official who "signed off" on this reaffirmation of clearance.

Answer: On March 19, 1964, the Personnel Advisory Review Board made the following recommendation with regard to Wieland:

"The Board unanimously recommends that the Subject (Wieland) be restored to full status as an active, senior Foreign Service Officer. The Board believes that a grave injustice would be done to the Subject were its recommendations to be otherwise. In arriving at its recommendation, the Board is of the opinion that the Subject has honestly exercised his judgment over the years, including the period of the difficult and highly complex Cuban situation.

"The Board further recommends that, due to the unfortunate publicity this case has received, Subject not be assigned to any Latin American post or other assignment dealing primarily with Latin American problems. The Board suggest that Subject, in view of his recent language study, be given an opportunity to widen his experience at a German-speaking post."

On January 25, 1965, the Personnel Review Panel concurred in the findings and recommendations of the Personnel Advisory Review Board as set out above.

Question No. 4: The date when this reaffirmation of clearance was reported to the Civil Service Commission.

Answer: March 8, 1965. (See question 5.)

Question No. 5: The name of the individual who signed this report to the Civil Service Commission.

Answer: The records of the Office of Security reveal that standard civil service form 73 was forwarded on March 8, 1965, to the Civil Service Commission reporting a favorable determination in the Wieland matter. The name of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security was typed on form 73, but not signed, in accordance with procedures which have been in effect for several years.

It is hoped the above information will be helpful to you.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

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