UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

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FIRST SESSION

ON

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UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1965

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (presiding), Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Case.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The committee is meeting this morning to receive testimony on two amendments to the United Nations Charter. These are the first amendments adopted by the General Assembly since the charter was approved almost 20 years ago.

The main purpose of the amendments is to increase the number of nations represented on the Security Council from 11 to 15, with an increase in the voting majority from 7 to 9 members, and to increase the membership of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27. The amendments also make certain changes in the election procedures to be followed after the increase in membership of the two Councils.

(The President's message follows:)

[Ex. A, 89th Cong., 1 sess.]

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING TWO AMENDMENTS TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

APRIL 6, 1965.—Amendments were read the first time and, together with the message and accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and was ordered to be printed for use of the Senate

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 6, 1965.

To the Senate of the United States:

I request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of two amendments to the Charter of the United Nations which are transmitted herewith along with a report to me from the Secretary of State. They are the first amendments adopted by the General Assembly since the founding of the United Nations.

These amendments will strengthen the ability of the United Nations to act as a force for peace and the progress of mankind.

They enlarge the membership of both the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to bring those bodies into balance with the enlarged membership of the United Nations itself.

HISTORY OF THE AMENDMENTS

Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations must first be adopted by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, and then ratified by two-thirds of the member states, including all the permanent members, according to their constitutional procedure.

In late 1963, the General Assembly considered resolutions proposing the two amendments in question. These resolutions focused on three points:

First, that the text of the United Nations Charter be changed to increase the size of the Security Council from 11 to 15, to increase the voting majority of the Security Council from 7 to 9, and to increase the size of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27. In the Security Council, neither the seats nor the right of veto of the permanent members would be affected.

Second, the resolutions provided that members of the two Councils be elected on the basis of geographic distribution.

In the Security Council, the 10 nonpermanent members would include five from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, and two from Western Europe and other areas; the five permanent members would remain the same. The present nonpermanent membership of the Security Council includes two members from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America, one from Western Europe, and one seat split between Asia and Eastern Europe.

In the Economic and Social Council, there would be the United States, 12 African and Asian states, five Latin American states, 3 Eastern European states (including the Soviet Union), and 6 states from Western Europe and other areas. The present composition of the Economic and Social Council, in addition to the United States, is five African and Asian states, four Latin American states, three Eastern European states (including the Soviet Union), and five states from Western Europe and other areas.

Third, the resolutions proposed that member states ratify the amendments by September 1, 1965.

On December 17, 1963, the resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly. On the enlargement of the Security Council, the vote was 97 to 11, with 4 abstentions; on the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council, it was 96 to 11, with 5 abstentions.

In those votes, the United States abstained, not because it doubted the principle of enlargement, but to maintain complete freedom of action while giving deliberate study to the effects of the specific proposals. The Soviet Union and France voted negatively. China voted for enlargement of the Security Council but abstained on enlargement of the Economic and Social Council. The United Kingdom abstained on both resolutions.

Since that time, 63 nations out of the required 76 have ratified the amendments. Other governments are now considering them. Of the permanent members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union has been the first to approve the amendments.

REASONS FOR RATIFICATION

The United States should now move to ratify the charter amendments to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

First, the amendments are realistic.

The membership of the United Nations has grown from 51 in 1945 to 114 in 1965. Almost all of the newer members are nations which have gained their independence from the peaceful dismantling of empires—a process which brought nationhood to one-third of all the peoples of the world and which is here to stay.

We welcome this growth.

The peoples of the world are more directly represented in the General Assembly of the United Nations today than they were 20 years ago.

We want to work together and cooperate with these new countries, within the United Nations.

If there are differences among us, we want them to be aired and examined within the United Nations.

This is the way to a peaceful and cooperative world.

But just as we welcome the growth of the United Nations, we must also recognize that the present Security Council and the present Economic and Social Council do not now realistically reflect it.

An increase in the representations on both Councils is now clearly necessary to restore the balance which existed between the Councils and the General Assembly when the charter came into force. An expansion of 50 percent in the case of the Economic and Social Council and less in the Security Council is a reasonable way to adjust to a membership which has more than doubled. At the same time, the expansion is not such as to make the Councils unwieldy.

Second, the amendments are equitable.

When the charter was signed in 1945, the member states from Africa and Asia numbered 13 out of a total of 51—less than a third. Today, the member states from these great continents number 61 out of a total of 114—more than a half. The General Assembly resolutions, necessarily and rightly, take this new arithmetic into account.

Moreover, the explicit allocation of the new seats to geographic areas, as provided by Assembly resolution, is wise. It is designed to eliminate the contentious problem of sharing an inadequate number of seats—which has led to pressures against existing seats, to disputes over the definition of geographic areas, and to split terms on the Security Council to meet competing claims for representation.

Third, the amendments fully protect the basic interests of the permanent members. While we have seen that the work of the Security Council can be hampered seriously by the abuse of the veto provision, it nevertheless remains a wise and realistic feature of the United Nations Charter. The veto provision is maintained.

Fourth, because the amendments are at once realistic and equitable, they will strengthen the United Nations.

They will increase the vitality of these Councils and to the United Nations itself by permitting more of the newer members to take part in the consideration of major world problems.

The amendments, which will insure that the Councils represent the whole Organization they are intended to serve, will thereby also insure that the Councils continue to earn the confidence and support of the membership at large. Without this confidence and support, the Councils cannot be fully effective.

The Organization as a whole will benefit from fuller participation in the work of the Councils by the new members who have much to contribute—as they will benefit from the exercise of shared responsibility.

Fifth and finally, the amendments are a reflection and a demonstration of both the stability and the adaptability of the United Nations Charter.

We Americans have always had a healthy respect for the stability of our institutions and a wariness of change for the sake of change. Our American Constitution, which has been amended only 14 times since the Bill of Rights of 1791, has clearly met the test of stability. The fact that the United Nations Charter has remained as it was written 20 years ago is ample evidence of its stability.

At the same time, we Americans have always recognized the forces of change, and have always known instinctively that the ability of an institution to adapt to changed conditions is a reliable measure of its capacity for survival and growth. Our American Constitution, as evidenced by its amendments, has clearly met this test of adaptability.

Now with its 20th birthday approaching, the United Nations is seeking the first two amendments to its basic charter. And this is welcome evidence of the inherent flexibility of another great institution.

THE STATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

As we consider these first amendments to the United Nations Charter, it is fitting to review briefly the state of the United Nations itself.

The limitations of the United Nations are apparent. It has not been able to prevent aggression in southeast Asia; it has not been able to rid the world of poverty.

Nor has the United Nations been able to solve all of its internal problems. At the present time a serious financial problem threatens the capacity of the General Assembly to perform its share of peacekeeping.

And if the limitations are clear, the basic reason is plain. The United Nations is not a world government; it is an organization of governments participating by consent. It can move only in the direction and at the pace that its members want it to move.

And yet the United Nations has served well the cause of world peace and progress—and, therefore, the national interest and the personal interest of every American.

KEEPING THE PEACE

Through the United Nations, the members have acted to avert wars on at least a dozen occasions—local wars which could have spread.

In Kashmir, the United Nations obtained and still polices a cease-fire line running through a bitterly contested area.

In Suez, the United Nations deployed an Emergency Force which enabled the respective national military forces to withdraw.

In the Congo, the United Nations provided 20,000 troops, assisted a new nation to survive its birth, and forestalled an East-West confrontation in the heart of Africa.

In Cyprus, the United Nations has stationed a force of 6,000 to strengthen that nation's security.

The Office of the Secretary General has evolved into a sensitive listening post—an ever-ready channel of communication, a potential conciliation service open at all times to the international community of states.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

At the same time, the day-to-day work of the United Nations is directed overwhelmingly toward building conditions which make the peace worth keeping.

United Nations experts are now at work in 130 countries or territories—bringing modern knowledge and technology to bear on the universal struggle to liberate man from the slavery of poverty.

The United Nations is in partnership with 89 nations and territories in cooperative preinvestment projects—surveying resources or training men and women in modern skills.

The development lending institutions affiliated with the United Nations have been investing some $1 billion annually in world development.

All in all, the level of development assistance flowing through the United Nations system of agencies now has reached some $1.3 billion a year.

TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

Meanwhile, United Nations agencies are performing the vital task of establishing cooperative ground rules which are required in the age of rapid international transport and instant international communication.

Agencies affiliated with the United Nations have developed standards for international air traffic—and for the safety of life at sea.

They have arranged for orderly use of the airwaves by allocating available radio frequencies among nations and users.

They have promoted international weather forecasting and are pioneering in the development of a World Weather Watch of incalculable benefit to peoples of all nations.

They have developed and maintained uniform international quarantine regulations against the spread of communicable diseases—and liberated 800 million people from the threat of the greatest killer of all time: malaria.

In these and other ways—through peacekeeping, through nation building, and through international technical services—the United Nations serves it members. In doing so, the Organization serves the national interest of the Untied States. It helps us do things we could not do so well alone and encourages other nations to share the burdens.

CONCLUSION

In one sense, the smallest members are in greatest need of the United Nations.

In another sense, the United Nations is of greatest service to the largest nations—for without the United Nations, the nations with the greatest resources would have to shoulder most of these tasks alone.

And in a combined sense, the United Nations serves simultaneously the large *and* the small, the rich *and* the poor—for the peace of one area is but part of world peace, and the prosperity of one country is but an element of the world's well-being.

This is why consistent and effective support for the United Nations has been near the heart of U.S. foreign policy for two decades.

This is why the Congress and the public, regardless of policies or party, have been ready to stick with the United Nations through thick and thin.

The Organization has reached a point where the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council need to be enlarged to take account of the great growth of the Organization in recent years.

The proposed amendments offer responsible and equitable plans for meeting this problem.

Because the United Nations will continue to be deeply needed by nations which seek peace, by all nations which seek to raise the levels of human welfare, by all nations which seek to cooperate in putting the achievements of modern tech-

nology to work for all mankind, it is in the national interest of the United States to ratify these steps toward making more effective the principal Councils of the Organization.

I therefore request the consent of the Senate to ratification by the United States of these amendments to the Charter of the United Nations.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 12, 1965.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House:

I have the honor to transmit to you, with a view to their submission to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, the texts of amendments to the Charter of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 17, 1963. A copy of General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII), which contains the texts of the amendments, is enclosed. Resolution 1991 (XVIII) also contains certain other provisions on which comment is made below.

The amendments, were they to come into force, would enlarge the size of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, and would increase the majority required for adoption of Security Council decisions.

Article 23, which now provides that the Security Council shall consist of 11 members of the United Nations, would henceforth provide that it shall consist of 15 members, 10 of which would be nonpermament members elected by the General Assembly. Article 23 would further provide that, in the first election of nonpermanent members after the increase in the Council's membership, two of the additional members shall be chosen for a term of 1 year (members otherwise being elected for 2 years). Article 27, which now provides that decisions of the Security Council shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, would henceforth provide that decisions of the Security Council shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.

Article 61, which now provides that the Economic and Social Council shall consist of 18 members of the United Nations, would henceforth provide that it shall consist of 27 members, all of which would be elected (as at present) by the General Assembly. Nine, rather than six, members would be elected annually for a term of 3 years. At the first election, after the increase in the Council's membership, three of the additional members would be elected for a 1-year term, three for a 2-year term, and three for a 3-year term.

Resolution 1991 (XVIII) further provides for geographic distribution of the elective seats on the Councils. In respect of the Security Council, the resolution specifies that the 10 nonpermanent members shall be elected according to the following pattern:

(*a*) Five from African and Asian states;
(*b*) One from Eastern European states;
(*c*) Two from Latin American states;
(*d*) Two from Western European and other states.

In respect of the Economic and Social Council, the resolution specifies that, without prejudice to the present distribution of seats in the Economic and Social Council, the nine additional members shall be elected according to the following pattern:

(*a*) Seven from African and Asian states;
(*b*) One from Latin American states;
(*c*) One from Western European and other states.

The present distribution of seats in the Economic and Social Council is:

(*a*) Five from African and Asian states;
(*b*) Four from Latin American states;
(*c*) Three from Eastern European states (including the U.S.S.R.);
(*d*) Five from Western European and other states (including the United Kingdom and France);
(*e*) The United States.

The patterns of geographic distribution decided upon by the General Assembly in Resolution 1991 (XVIII) would not be incorporated in the charter as amendments to it. Rather, these decisions would have the force of a General Assembly resolution, and, as such, would govern the General Assembly's electoral processes. In view of the importance of considerations of geographical distribution to the membership, and the precision with which those considerations are treated in

the resolution which adopts the amendments, it is anticipated that the General Assembly will be guided by the specified criteria in electing members of the Councils. By the terms of article 18, paragraph 2, of the charter, such elections require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

Resolution 1991 (XVIII) further calls upon the member states to ratify the amendments, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, by September 1, 1965.

Article 108 of the charter provides:

"Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent Members of the Security Council."

I recommend that you transmit the foregoing amendments to articles 23, 27, and 61 of the charter to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification for the following reasons:

1. The membership of the United Nations has more than doubled since the formation of the Organization, while the size of the Councils has remained static. The proportional representation of the membership on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council has accordingly decreased by more than 50 percent. The coming into force of the amendments would go far toward restoring the balance which existed between the Councils and the General Assembly when the charter came into force. It would enable the membership to be represented on the Councils in a measure approximating the increased membership of the United Nations.

2. Such increased representation should enhance the vitality of the Councils and the confidence which the membership as a whole places in them. It should obviate pressures for a geographical reallocation of seats within the Councils as presently composed.

3. The enlargement of the Councils provided for by the amendments is not so great as to make either Council unwieldy or unmanageable.

4. The proposed voting majority in the Councils is workable and equitable. The Economic and Social Council would, as at present, take decisions by a majority of the members present and voting. The required Security Council majority would be increased from 7 to 9, an increase which is consonant with the increase in the Council's membership to 15. The veto provision of article 27, paragraph 3, is unaffected by the amendments.

5. The pattern of geographical distribution provided for by Resolution 1991 (XVIII) is equitable in the light of the composition of the membership of the United Nations and compatible with the national interests of the United States.

Resolution 1991A was adopted by a vote of 97 to 11, with 4 abstentions; Resolution 1991B by a vote of 96 to 11, with 5 abstentions. In those votes, the U.S.S.R. and France voted negatively; China voted for part A of the resolution concerning the Security Council, and abstained in the vote on part B, concerning the Economic and Social Council; and the United States and the United Kingdom abstained on the whole of the resolution. The United States abstained not because it doubted the desirability in principle of enlargement but because agreement on the size of the enlargement of the Councils was reached so late and so suddenly that adequate consideration and consultation were precluded. However, the most careful consideration has been given to the amendments since their adoption in the light of the established sympathy of the United States for an enlargement of the Councils and of the precise terms of the amendments in question. It is on the basis of this consideration that I recommended that you transmit the amendments to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

A list of the members of the United Nations which have ratified the amendments as of this date is attached.

Respectfully submitted.

DEAN RUSK.

(Enclosures: (1) Copy of General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII); (2) list of U.N. members who have ratified amendments; and (3) present texts of articles 23, 27, and 61 of the Charter of the United Nations.)

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the Special Political Committee (A/5675)]

1991 (XVIII). Question of Equitable Representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council

A

The General Assembly,

Considering that the present composition of the Security Council is inequitable and unbalanced,

Recognizing that the increase in the membership of the United Nations makes it necessary to enlarge the membership of the Security Council, thus providing for a more adequate geographical representation of non-permanent members and making it a more effective organ for carrying out its functions under the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter,[1]

1. *Decides* to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations the following amendments to the Charter and to submit them for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations:

(a) In Article 23, paragraph 1, the word "eleven" in the first sentence shall be replaced by the word "fifteen", and the word "six" in the third sentence by the word "ten";

(b) In Article 23, pargaraph 2, the second sentence shall then be reworded as follows:

"In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year.";

(c) In Article 27, pargaraph 2, the word "seven" shall be replaced by the word "nine";

(d) In Article 27, paragraph 3, the word "seven" shall be replaced by the word "nine";

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to ratify the above amendments in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by 1 September 1965;

3. *Further decides* that the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern:

(a) Five from African and Asian States;

(b) One from Eastern European States;

(c) Two from Latin American States;

(d) Two from Western European and other States.

1285th plenary meeting,
17 December 1963.

B

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the increase in the membership of the United Nations makes it necessary to enlarge the membership of the Economic and Social Council, with a view to providing for a more adequate geographical representation therein, and making it a more effective organ for carrying out its function under Chapters IX and X of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolutions 974 B and C (XXXVI) of 22 July 1963,

Bearing in mind the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter,[2]

1. *Decides* to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations, the following amendment to the Charter and to submit it for ratification by the Member States of the United Nations:

"Article 61

"1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of twenty-seven Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

"2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, nine members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate reelection.

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[1] A/5487, para. 9.
[2] A/5487, para. 9.

"3. At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven members in addition to the members elected in place of the six members whose term of office expires at the end of that year, nine additional members shall be elected. Of these nine additional members, the term of office of three members so elected shall expire at the end of one year, and of three other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

"4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative."

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to ratify the above amendment in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by 1 September 1965;

3. *Further decides* that, without prejudice to the present distribution of seats in the Economic and Social Council, the nine additional members shall be elected according to the following pattern:

(a) Seven from African and Asian States;
(b) One from Latin American States;
(c) One from Western European and other States.

1285th plenary meeting,
17 December 1963.

CHARTER AMENDMENT RATIFICATION

Afghanistan	Hungary	Nigeria
Albania	Iceland	Norway
Algeria	India	Outer Mongolia
Austria	Iran	Pakistan
Brazil	Iraq	Philippines
Bulgaria	Ireland	Poland
Cameroon	Ivory Coast	Rumania
Canada	Jamaica	Rwanda
Central African Republic	Jordan	Sierra Leone
Ceylon	Kenya	Sweden
Chad	Kuwait	Syria
Costa Rica	Liberia	Tanzania
Cuba	Libya	Thailand
Czechoslovakia	Madagascar	Togo
Denmark	Mali	Trinidad-Tobago
El Salvador	Mauritania	Tunisia
Ethiopia	Morocco	Uganda
Finland	Nepal	U.S.S.R.
Gabon	Netherlands	United Arab Republic
Ghana	New Zealand	Upper Volta
Guinea	Niger	Yugoslavia

PRESENT TEXTS OF ARTICLES 23, 27, AND 61 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ARTICLE 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent Members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

ARTICLE 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.[1]

ARTICLE 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of eighteen Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, six members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.
3. At the first election, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be chosen. The term of office of six members so chosen shall expire at the end of one year, and of six other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.
4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

The CHAIRMAN. Our witness this morning is Mr. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State. Tomorrow, at the request of the administration, the committee will receive testimony on this subject from Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, and Mr. Harlan Cleveland, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

Mr. Secretary, you have a prepared statement, I believe?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am very glad to be accompanied this morning by Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland who is in charge of our work in the United Nations in that department and Assistant Secretary of State Douglas MacArthur on my right.

I am here today, Mr. Chairman, to urge this committee to recommend that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the two amendments to the charter of the United Nations which were transmitted to the Senate by the President on April 6.

These are the first two proposed amendments to the charter which the members have been asked to ratify—and this is enough by itself to endow the event with a note of considerable significance.

I, therefore, have no doubt you will want to consider this matter against the background of the current state of affairs at the United Nations. Ambassador Stevenson, as you have indicated, will be here tomorrow, to give you some firsthand impressions as seen from New York.

I assume, as well, that you will want to weigh this request within the general context of our foreign policy. I, therefore, thought it

[1] Chapter VI contains Articles 33–38 relating to Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Paragraph 3 of Article 52, relating to Regional Arrangements, reads:
"3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council."

would be appropriate for me to begin these hearings with a few comments on how the United Nations and its future development fits into our national objective of helping to create a more reasonable world order. With your permission, I shall address myself to this point in something of a summary fashion.

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, the first function of the United Nations is to help keep the peace and to help restore the peace if it should be breached.

Fifteen years of United Nations experience with peacekeeping problems have shown that the United Nations has been useful in minimizing the dangers of a great power collision, in smothering brushfire conflicts, and in supervising truces while negotiated settlements are being worked out.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Experience over the past decade and a half also demonstrates how diverse the requirements for peacekeeping machinery turn out to be in practice. Peacekeeping missions have been performed—

By a handful of observers to report on compliance with ceasefires in Indonesia and Kashmir;

By a small band of military observers to supervise the truce on the Arab-Israel armistice lines;

By an observer corps to help expose and prevent illegal infiltration in Greece and Lebanon;

By a security reserve for the United Nations temporary administration of West New Guinea;

By an emergency 5,000-man buffer force in Gaza and Suez;

By more than 20,000 troops from 28 countries to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo;

By a 7,000-man force to restore order and keep the peace in Cyprus; and

By a unified combat command from 16 nations under U.S. leadership in Korea.

There can be no doubt that in performing these peacekeeping tasks the United Nations has served the vital interests of the United States—for we have no greater national interest than in preventing armed conflict and seeing to it that the great tides of change are kept within peaceful channels.

Expansion of available callup forces and improvement in procedures for financing and managing versatile peacekeeping machinery in the service of the United Nations would manifestly serve our interests in the future.

U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS

Our national interests are similarly and deeply engaged in the economic and social programs of the United Nations agencies. These are directed at things that make the peace worth keeping—and therefore can be thought of as preventive peacekeeping.

In point of fact, the peace and security matters which so preempt our time and thoughts and energies are but a small fraction of the United Nations work. Almost 17 of every 20 United Nations employees and nearly ninety-three cents of every United Nations dollar are engaged in economic, social, and technical enterprises.

We have a direct national interest in the success of the United Nations work with communicable diseases, with milk and malnutrition, with illiteracy and education, with overpopulation and underproduction, with the mechanics of trade and development.

All the agencies of the United Nations family are dealing with one or another aspect of human security—the kind that comes from safety standards for the operation of steamships, aircraft, and atomic reactors; or the kind of security that is reinforced by decent standards of nutrition and education.

There is neither need nor time to delve more deeply into these interesting and useful functions, except to say that these activities go on unabated because they are needed—and undebated because almost everyone knows they are needed. And I doubt if any thoughtful person would quarrel with the conclusion that the economic, social, and technical services of the United Nations also serve our own national interests.

We believe this will be so in the future as it has been in the past.

LIMITATIONS ON U.N. CAPACITY TO ACT

Nor is it necessary to deal at any length before this committee with the limitations which the United Nations has demonstrated in action. So, I shall confine myself to brief comments on four general but central points on this score.

First, the scope of international organization, at this stage in history is limited by the stubborn persistence of a strong spirit of nationalism—and not only in the newly independent areas. Most of the peoples of this world appear to be ready to share their traditional sovereignty in cooperative enterprise only when the task at hand cannot be done at all on a national basis or when the technical advantages of international cooperation are overwhelmingly clear.

The political traditions centering around the conception of unrestricted national sovereignty place a strict and not altogether undesirable governor on the art of institution building in the international community.

Second, the job of keeping the peace of the world turns out, in practice, to be beyond the capacities of any one nation or any one institution. Any workable system of world order for the foreseeable future will be a pluralistic system in which the United Nations, regional organizations, bilateral diplomacy, and national defense forces play their several and sometimes mutually reinforcing parts.

The problem is to avoid the use of the most dangerous and costly form of power—which is national armed force—whenever it is possible to persuade others to share the tasks and responsibility of peace keeping.

Third, while the United Nations has been conspicuously successful in damping down conflicts that might easily have spread to world war, it has been less successful in resolving the underlying disputes. This suggests, not so surprisingly, that even a very efficient police force is not enough—that perhaps the United Nations should somehow move in the direction of a more systematic, sustained effort to sponsor conciliation of the political disputes that underlie tests of armed strength.

It would not be difficult to devise an agenda of, say, territorial disputes which have festered too long for safety.

Fourth, we live in times of such pervasive change—such deep transformation—that any viable international institution has to be endowed with inherent flexibility to adapt to changing needs and conditions. In fact, the United Nations has shown just such a capacity. But if it is going to prosper in the years ahead, it must never be caught for long in a procedural or constitutional straitjacket.

We are involved in just such a problem today.

These are, indeed, substantial limitations on the capacity of the United Nations to live up to the great vision of the charter.

But despite nationalism, the international community must continue to grow as science and technology continue to internationalize human affairs—and the United Nations is the principal foundation of world community.

Despite the need for pluralistic peacekeeping systems, the United Nations is an important—and perhaps indispensable—alternative for peacekeeping services in a security crisis.

Despite the fact that the United Nations has been better at damping down fires than in removing the sources of dispute, where else should we turn for more effective techniques of international conciliation?

And despite the fact that adjustments are needed to take account of changing conditions over the past decade, the organization has proved remarkably flexible in the past and there is no inherent reason why it should not be in the future.

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

This brings me to the two charter amendments now being proposed—for they are concerned with one of the essential adaptations which the United Nations must make to meet changed conditions.

Whatever else has to be done—and whatever may be said about the complexity of the larger political environment—the justification for these amendments is simple and overwhelming: the membership of the United Nations has more than doubled while representation on its two major Councils has remained fixed in the pattern of 1945.

To redress this patent case of obsolete apportionment, the first of these amendments would enlarge the membership of the Security Council from 11 countries to 15 and raise the requisite majority from 7 to 9 members. The other amendment would increase the size of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 members.

The amendments were adopted by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly in 1963 and require ratification by two-thirds of the membership, including all the permanent members, before entering into effect. Approval by the United States therefore is essential to give effect to the proposed amendments.

The General Assembly resolution requested all members to act by September of this year. Sixty-five of the required 76 members have already ratified, including the Soviet Union, which initially voted against these amendments. Another permanent member, the United Kingdom, has announced its intention to ratify.

Neither amendment would affect this country's membership on these two Councils or alter our veto rights in the Security Council as established by the charter.

ADVANTAGES OF AMENDMENTS

Mr. Chairman, the advantages of these amendments are quite clear and straightforward and the argument for them stands on its own feet.

First, they would modernize the current obsolete apportionment of seats on the two Councils in line with the present membership.

Second, they would add to the prestige of the Councils and to the confidence of the membership at large that they are fairly represented in these principal organs which are charged with serving the interests of all members.

Third, they would alleviate the present severe pressures on the original allocation of seats which has led to bickering and to such unsatisfactory practices as split terms on the Security Council.

Fourth, the proposed distribution of seats in the enlarged Councils, which is included in the Assembly resolution, should help minimize contentious rivalries for seats on the Councils and help to assure that a greater number of countries over the years will have opportunity to participate in the affairs of the Councils.

The proposed enlargements are reasonable and equitable without expanding the Councils to unwieldy sizes.

The proposed voting majorities are fair and workable—and in our judgment would not materially change the voting alinement from the present situation.

These, it seems to me, are persuasive arguments for U.S. ratification of the charter amendments.

But let me also say, in a more general vein, that the United States welcomes the entrance of the new members into the open society of the United Nations.

They have gained their full independence in the greatest sweep of national liberation in all history.

They have knocked on the door of the world community and have been invited in to speak their pieces and make their contributions and take on whatever share of responsibility they are able and willing to shoulder.

And our world is a better and a more democratic world because they have taken their rightful places in the councils of our times.

I am sure this committee agrees with me when I say that this is the last nation on the face of the earth to shun diversity, or to reject the open forum, or to fear the growth of democratic practices.

Expansion of the two Councils of the United Nations to take account of this welcome expansion of the United Nations is not only within the strict national interests of this country but is consistent with our longer range purposes.

I have no reservations, Mr. Chairman, in urging the committee to recommend the consent of the Senate to ratification of the first two amendments to be proposed to the Charter of the United Nations.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

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SOVIET AND FRENCH POSITIONS ON AMENDMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

You said the Soviet Union had ratified these amendments.

What about the French, have they ratified them?

Secretary RUSK. We have not had a final and official view of the French Government expressed on this, Mr. Chairman, but we feel that in the case of France and China that it would be very likely that they would join with the rest of the membership in ratification.

The CHAIRMAN. Which nations initiated this move to enlarge the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council?

Secretary RUSK. The principal impetus came from, of course, the Afro-Asian group which has felt for some time that they were badly underrepresented on the Security Council and Economic Council, and that the original distribution of seats did not take into account the interests of the new members, but it was also supported by those who benefited from that original distribution because they had found that the desire of the some 50 new members to get adequate representation put enormous pressure on the seats which they looked upon as their seats under the original distribution.

So I would say, Mr. Chairman, that there was very broad interest in this throughout the Assembly.

POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE ADJUSTMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you anticipate that, for the foreseeable future, any further adjustments will be necessary because of increased size in the membership of the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. This particular amendment comes about through the more than doubling of the United Nations since 1945. Now, we anticipate there will be some more additional members in the U.N.

The CHAIRMAN. How many more?

Secretary RUSK. I should think perhaps at least 10 or 12 along the way, that kind of thing. I am a little hesitant about giving figures on that because when the United Nations instructed the architect to design the plans for the present headquarters of the United Nations, he was instructed to prepare the building for 60 members with the possibility of expansion to 75. We now have 114 members in the latest count of the members of the U.N. But I would not suppose, Mr. Chairman, that there is much likelihood of a sufficient increase in members to require the early reconsideration of the distribution of seats in these two Councils.

The CHAIRMAN. I note you say the Soviet Union voted against this originally when it was proposed and then ratified it.

What happened, do you know?

Secretary RUSK. We have not had an explanation from them on this point. I think that undoubtedly this was related to their view of the Afro-Asian group. You will remember, Mr. Chairman, that they have taken a position for some time that there could be no charter amendment until the question of China was disposed of, but in this particular case they apparently decided to go ahead with this particular amendment without insisting upon that point.

I might add that we ourselves at the time this was voted upon abstained and one of the principal reasons for our abstention was that there had not been opportunity for full consultation with the Senate at the time the vote was cast.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is unusual deference to the Senate. I never heard of that before.

Secretary RUSK. I thought the committee would appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is news to me. I don't know of any other instance for that. Where is the precedence for that?

Senator Aiken, do you have any questions?

ATTITUDE ON ARTICLE 19 ISSUE

Senator AIKEN. Just one or two.

Mr. Secretary, I don't see any particular risk in approving these two amendments but I am just wondering, Are you intending to insist on a decisive vote on the enforcement of article 19?

Secretary RUSK. That matter, Senator, as you know, led the General Assembly into an impasse at its last session and it is now being discussed in a committee of 33 which is meeting regularly in New York, meeting this week, for example, and there are also quiet conversations going on on that subject behind the scenes.

Ambassador Stevenson will be here tomorrow and I would hope that he would have a chance to go over the discussions on that with the committee in executive session.

But our attitude on the article 19 question has been stated and affirmed. We do not yet see a complete solution to that problem but it is the subject of quiet discussion in New York.

Senator AIKEN. I think there is a solution to it, probably only one.

QUESTION OF PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN VIETNAM

I notice that you set forth eight instances in which peacekeeping missions have been performed. Why has it not been possible for the United Nations to have a peacekeeping mission in Vietnam, for instance? There are at least eight other places where these have been performed, why haven't they been able to do it in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. I think there have been several reasons for that, sir. The Vietnamese question has been before the Security Council from time to time. The latest instance was at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin affair. At the time of the Gulf of Tonkin affair when we put this matter before the Security Council, you will recall that the Soviet representative recommended that the representative of Hanoi be invited to the Council. We supported that recommendation. Hanoi turned down the invitation. Both Hanoi and Peiping have made it clear in their public statements in recent weeks and months that they do not consider that the United Nations has any role to play in South Vietnam. They have not welcomed the possibility of a visit by the Secretary General, for example.

Now, they are very crucially involved in this situation and it is not clear to see how the United Nations might move in respect to it if two of the principal parties involved there reject the idea.

If we went into the Security Council there would be a veto, almost certainly, on the situation if an attempt were made to pass a resolution to take specific decisions about it.

There are two other aspects of it, however, Senator, that remain open. The Secretary General has considerable authority and responsibility under article 99. He is following this situation very carefully and has made it clear to all parties that he is prepared to be of any help that he can be in his role of Secretary General. It is entirely possible, although one cannot anticipate the future development of this point, it is entirely possible that if the matter moves toward a settlement the United Nations might be able to play something of a peacekeeping and peacewatching role as it has done in other situations and other places.

So, we have neither excluded the United Nations nor expected it to take definitive action until there begins to be some indication that the matter can move toward a settlement.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, the United Nations could not move effectively in any country that was not a member of the United Nations if there were objection?

Secretary RUSK. If there were objection.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And even only where there are members involved if there were strong objections.

You see, sir, I think the Korean war was something of a special case because, as you will recall, at the crucial vote there the Soviet Union was not present in the Security Council.

I think it is rather unlikely that the United Nations will inject itself into a situation where major fighting is involved. They have a somewhat different role to play.

Now, at the present time there is large-scale fighting, and it is unlikely that an international police force could do anything about that until there is agreement among all the parties and that means a first big step would have been taken toward peace.

Senator AIKEN. That is right.

The United Nation's potential could not come into play until there had been negotiations between the warring parties.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct.

Senator AIKEN. I think there is no argument about that.

QUESTION OF PEACE FORCE IN PANAMA

Just one other thing, getting back to article 19 and its complications, would you, as a representative of the United States, be willing to pay 30 percent of the costs of a General Assembly peace force in the event that the General Assembly is willing to maintain one between the Canal Zone and Panama?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, that is a question which is shared both by you gentlemen up there and by me.

Senator AIKEN. It is a good question, it is a very important question.

Secretary RUSK. That question is one of such difficulty that it will be my purpose to do everything we can to avoid that contingency arising and I think it is unlikely that we will be in that contingency for a long time to come.

But nevertheless, I would say quite sincerely, Senator, that is a question on which there is some identity of interest between ourselves and the Soviet Union, and the other permanent members of the Security Council.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. We don't underestimate the importance of that question, and particularly in the case of the Congo, I think it is worth bearing in mind that of the five resolutions on the Congo that proved to be the important resolutions, the Soviet Union voted for three of those resolutions, vetoed the fourth, and abstained on the fifth one, so we did not have the early registration there of the deep resistance of one of the permanent members.

We would like to see this matter discussed in some detail to see whether some understandings cannot be reached about how this question is handled in the future, perhaps to emphasize the importance of the role of the Security Council on the one side, and the gravity of an eventual decision by the General Assembly if it should move contrary to the strong objections of a permanent member of the Security Council.

Senator AIKEN. Well, then, any future potential of the United Nations as a peacekeeping agency is pretty much dependent on reaching an agreement as to article 19?

Secretary RUSK. I think so, sir, as well as on the articles of the charter having to do with the character of the responsibility of the Security Council.

The charter at the present time uses the expression "primary responsibility"; the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining the peace.

We feel that the General Assembly has a residual role to play if the Security Council is unable to act. I think it is fair to say that the Soviet Union rather takes the view that the Security Council has the sole responsibility, and they have been pressing in that direction because there they would cast, of course, a decisive influence through the veto.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK (presiding). Senator Carlson?

ARTICLE 19 ISSUE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.N.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, just following along the same thought as the Senator from Vermont, can there really be any hope of substantial peacekeeping help in the United Nations unless we somehow solve the article 19 issue?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that the problem on article 19 forces a clarification of the issues involved in peacekeeping and in the financing of peacekeeping. I think that breaks up into two important stages: One, what do we do about the situation up to this point and the present financial plight of the United Nations; second, whether we can work out an understanding on the matter of authority and on the matter of financing with respect to the future, which would represent a stronger consensus within the United Nations about how these matters could be handled.

We feel, for example, that we ought to take into account the fact that 5 percent of the contributions to the United Nations can exercise two-thirds of the vote in the General Assembly.

Now, the principal contributors, as I say the 25 or 30 principal contributors, do in fact carry the major financial responsibility for the decisions of the U.N., and we have felt that some way ought to be found to see that their views are taken most seriously into account by the Assembly when the Assembly makes decisions in this field. But I do think that it is important for everyone to understand just how we do proceed: that we not have double standards, that we not have assessments that are compulsory for some and voluntary for others; and that when votes are cast for operations that involve costs, that those who cast votes for them recognize that they have to be paid for and that they do involve the responsibilities and burdens of costs.

But these are matters which Mr. Stevenson is working on very hard day by day in New York. Tomorrow he will be with the committee—I would hope part of the time in executive session—to bring you up to date on how those discussions are proceeding.

Senator CARLSON. I appreciate very much, Mr. Secretary, that Ambassador Stevenson will be here tomorrow, and this is no time to get into all of the problems of the United Nations. But after all Congress is going to act upon these amendments—and personally I have no objection to them—and the question confronting me is the future effectiveness of the United Nations with or without these amendments.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator CARLSON. And it concerns me greatly. Tomorrow I assume we will discuss the percentage we contribute to the United Nations, as well as the number of nations that are not paying their share, and I shall not burden you with those questions. But I think it is important for this committee and the Congress to have a full picture of the future of the United Nations which we all hope will, as you say in your opening statement, help to create a more reasonable world order.

We are all for that.

But when you look around at Vietnam, at India and Pakistan, and Yemen, and one little problem that I noticed we had up at the United Nations in a dispute between Israel and Jordan, and now we have a little problem down in the Dominican Republic, we sometimes get concerned that we have a very great, but ineffective, agency and it bothers some of us. We would like to be of help.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator. I would like to emphasize that the very turbulence of this world scene to which you referred, does emphasize the importance of an institution which can apply some poultices to the fevers.

If you look back over the agenda of the Security Council since 1945, I think you can see there a record of a very important role played by the Security Council in talking things out, in holding things in some sort of manageable proportions while the processes of peace or of time take effect, to prevent some of these conflicts from growing into larger conflicts.

Senator CARLSON. Personally, I am one who feels we must have some organization where nations can gather and discuss their problems, and I would hope we can have one where we can reach some solutions

to them rather than just a debating society or a meeting of a board of governors or something without effectiveness.

I thank you very much.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.

Senator CLARK. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in connection with this proposed increase in the members of the Security Council, and as I understand it in the Economic and Social Council, greater emphasis is apparently given to the Communist bloc countries and to Asia and a reduced emphasis comparatively, at least, to Latin America.

Do you think that will have a material effect upon the decisions and activities of these two bodies?

Secretary RUSK. I don't think so, Senator.

As you know, the change in the Security Council would move the majority from seven to nine. We believe that we can expect the additional members of the Afro-Asian nonpermanent membership of five at any given time to be a well-distributed membership in general orientation and attitude. It is our judgment, based upon an examination of past voting trends, as well as the attitudes of the Afro-Asian countries on major issues before the U.N., that that would not change the relative political weighting of the Security Council as compared with the present.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, at least superficially it would seem to me that it would substantially change the weighted voting or the actual voting on determining issues.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think I might comment a little further on that point because it is a point of some importance. Of course, we could expect if the membership of the Security Council is not changed, that the Afro-Asian group would move in rapidly on the existing distribution of seats.

In other words, Africa and Asia membership in the United Nations has increased by 5 times from 12 to 60 between 1945 and 1965, and they will simply not accept the so-called gentlemen's agreement distribution of 20 years ago.

Now, we believe that on some of the key issues between the free world and the Communist world, for example, that as long as we have the West Europeans and the Latin Americans with us on a Council issue, thinking of it solely from a U.S. point of view, we would need only one African-Asian vote in order to make up the majority of nine required for the Security Council to take action. No Asian-African vote will be needed to prevent the Council from taking action, that is to reach the "blocking" number, if we have the West Europeans and at least one Latin American with us.

In other words, we don't believe that the voting pattern in the Security Council moves adversely to our interests by this enlargement procedure.

I think that it is becoming more clear in recent weeks even than it was before, that in a real sense there is no such thing as an African-Asian bloc except perhaps on strictly colonial issues, because there is great diversity. This was brought out even in the recent celebration

of the 10th anniversary of Bandung in Jakarta. It was brought out in such meetings as the recent meetings of the Organization of African Unity in Nairobi. We think that, if anything, there will be less bloc voting among the so-called Africans and Asians than most people generally suppose. It is not our judgment that this expansion changes the political situation with respect to the Security Council. But, in any event, if there is a political problem we would have it with increasing insistence even if we did not make these changes because the new members would move in on the seats of those who obtained seats under the original allocation. I would have to say, sir, that the two Latin American seats would be the subject of very great pressure. The Afro-Asians would be inclined to press very hard for one of those seats because the Latin American membership in the U.N. has moved from 20 to 22 while the Afro-Asians membership has moved from 12 to 60.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I have no position of opposition to this proposal. I am still concerned with it as to what the overall results will be, especially in the Economic and Social Council, where so much of the money for its operations comes from the United States.

Of course, that same thing applies to the United Nations generally, but I do have a concern as to the net result of this. I tend to agree that we have got to do something along this line in order to sustain a little more equality of voting and representation, and I can understand the restlessness of some of these countries in this field.

I don't think I have any other questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, sir; Senator Case?

Senator CASE. I have no questions.

Senator CLARK. Gentlemen, I am aware of the 10-minute rule. I have some questioning of the Secretary which might take as much as half an hour or 45 minutes. I hope if any of you gentlemen desire to break in you will exercise your seniority privileges and do so.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to state for myself that I don't have any doubt at all about the desirability of these amendments to the charter, and I shall certainly support them both in committee and on the floor. I do, however, share Senator Carlson's view that it is about time—and I think the Secretary has indicated to me informally that he shares it, too—that we have a good serious discussion in the Senate about the United Nations, where it is going, what its limitations are, and what its possibilities are.

With respect to the matter immediately under consideration which has to do really with United Nations procedures and charter amendments, I would like, with my colleagues permission, to enter into the record what I consider to be an extremely able address by Secretary Cleveland's assistant, Mr. Richard N. Gardner, "United Nations Procedures and Power Realities: The International Apportionment Problem."

I think, Mr. Secretary, you were present when he gave that address.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CLARK. And I believe you gave it your implicit blessing.

Secretary RUSK. Very able statement.

Senator CLARK. So I will ask it be made a part of the record.

(The address referred to follows:)

UNITED NATIONS PROCEDURES AND POWER REALITIES: THE INTERNATIONAL APPORTIONMENT PROBLEM

(Address by Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, at the annual banquet of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., Apr. 23, 1965.)

I have always looked forward to annual meetings of this society with anticipation—but never more so than this year. One reason, of course, is the very great honor of participating in this evening's program together with the Secretary of State. The other reason is the particularly timely and important theme to which you are devoting these annual meetings—"The Development of International Law by International Organizations."

Some people, to be sure, may have reservations about the decision to devote all of your meetings this year to this particular subject:

On one side, there are those who may feel that the problems of international organizations are not sufficiently legal to sustain the interest of practicing lawyers and law teachers.

On the other side, there are those who may feel that law and lawyers already have too much to do with foreign policy, in the field of international organizations and elsewhere, and that this program of yours is hardly designed to keep them in their place.

Those who hold this latter view would probably agree with the judgment of Sir Harold Nicolson, the famous British writer on diplomacy, that "the worst kind of diplomatists are missionaries, fanatics, and lawyers."

Fortunately, Sir Harold Nicolson's view on this subject has not prevailed in the United States. Since 1789, 45 out of 52 of our Secretaries of State have been members of the bar. One member of that small band of seven who have not been lawyers—the Secretary of State we honor here tonight—does not conceal the fact that he was studying law when the war intervened. It cut off what undoubtedly would have been a brilliant career at the bar—and it no doubt made him Secretary of State several years sooner.

My views on this subject are undoubtedly self-serving. I am a great believer in the deep involvement of lawyers in foreign policy, particularly in the field of international organization. Those laymen who complain about the lawyer's role in this area tend to think of law as the mechanical application of principles found in cases and textbooks. Few lawyers today would accept so restrictive a definition of their function. Most of us like to think of our selves as practicing what a colleague on the Harvard law faculty has described as "Eunomics—the science of good arrangements."

It is not surprising that in the Department of State today there are many more lawyers outside than inside the Legal Adviser's Office. Several, like myself, are in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, trying to apply "the science of good arrangements" to the major tasks of peacekeeping and nationbuilding which our country is undertaking on a multilateral basis.

Together with our colleagues in the Office of the Legal Adviser, we have been applying the lawyer's skills in problem solving to some of the exciting enterprises undertaken during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations—to developing the institutional components for partial and general disarmament; to negotiating ground rules for U.N. peacekeeping forces; to drafting principles for the peaceful uses of outer space; to establishing interim arrangements for global satellite communications; to inaugurating a United Nations-Food and Agriculture Organization world food program; to creating a world weather watch under the World Meteorological Organization; to launching new United Nations trade machinery; and to analysis of the possible functions of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

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Of all our preoccupations these last 4 years in the field of international organization the one which best illustrates the relevance of law and legal skills has been our effort to adapt the decisionmaking procedures of the United Nations and its family of agencies to take adequate account of world power realities.

The Secretary of State himself called special attention to this problem in his Hammarskjold lecture at Columbia University on January 10, 1964. He pointed out that a two-thirds vote could now be put together in the General Assembly, at least in theory, by members representing only 10 percent of the population of U.N. members and 5 percent of contributions to the regular budget. He noted that the rapid and radical expansion of the Organization may require some adaptation of procedures if the U.N. is to remain relevant to the real world and therefore effective in that world.

The reason for our preoccupation with this subject is obvious. The United Nations has grown from 51 to 114 members in the last 20 years. A parallel increase has taken place in the membership of the specialized and affiliated agencies. U.N. membership may reach a total of 125 to 130 before it finally levels off.

What makes this extraordinary increase in membership particularly significant from a constitutional point of view is the simultaneous increase in the U.N.'s capacity to act. The United States has played a leading role in the strengthening of the action responsibilities of the United Nations system in both peacekeeping and development. We want to continue to play this role in the years ahead.

It is obvious that, as the U.N. develops an increasing capacity to act, there will be increasing concern with the procedures by which this capacity is exercised. The manifest disproportion between voting power and real power is now a central preoccupation of persons concerned with the future of the world organization. Unless we can find ways to allay the anxieties felt on this subject in the United States and in other countries, it will be increasingly difficult to use the U.N in the years ahead for important tasks of peacekeeping and development.

To be sure, it it important not to overstate the problem which is inherent in the present constitutional situation. As Dag Hammarskjold reminded us some years ago in an annual report to the General Assembly, the members of the United Nations may have equal votes, but they are far from having equal influence:

"The criticism of 'one nation, one vote,' irrespective of size or strength, as constituting an obstacle to arriving at just and representative solutions, tends to exaggerate the problem. The General Assembly is not a parliament of elected individual members; it is a diplomatic meeting in which the delegates of member states represent governmental policies, and these policies are subject to all the influences that would prevail in international life in any case."

Anyone who believes that U.S. influence in the United Nations is measured by the fact that it has less than one-hundredth of the votes in the General Assembly fails completely to understand the realities of power as they are reflected in the world organization. These realities include the fact that the United States is the principal contributor to the U.N.'s regular budget, is by far the largest supporter of the U.N.'s peacekeeping and development programs, and is making by far the largest individual contribution to the defense and development of the non-Communist world. On U.N. decisions of vital importance to the United States, the voting of other countries has been considerably influenced by U.S. views.

Nevertheless, after these and other qualifications are made, it remains true that the present procedures do need to be improved in the light both of the growth of U.N. membership and the growth of U.N. responsibilities. The last UNESCO Conference, for example, voted a budget by a large majority of votes which represented less than 30 percent of the funds that had to be raised to make the budget a reality. And at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva last spring there was a disturbing tendency of the 75 (now 77) less developed countries to use their automatic two-thirds majority to vote recommendations for action in trade and development over the opposition of the very minority of developed countries to whom the recommendations were addressed.

On the whole, the majority of small countries have not behaved as irresponsibly as the pessimists have predicted. We hope in the years ahead that the "revolution of rising expectations" will be matched by an "evolution of rising responsibility." But we cannot base our participation in the U.N. on hope alone. Sound procedural adaptations can help make this hope a reality.

The constitutional problem here involved is not unique to the U.N. We have sometimes referred to these difficulties in the U.N. as the "international apportionment problem"—because the word apportionment has a very poignant meaning in our domestic political life through the recent actions of our Supreme Court and State legislatures.

Indeed, we are dealing here with problems in the management of power reminiscent of those which confronted our own Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia nearly 200 years ago. In Philadelphia then, as in the United Nations system today, the problem was how to reconcile the sovereign equality of States with the fact that some States are very small and other States are very large.

The sovereign equality of states is one of the fundamental principles of international law. In the words of a famous case decided many years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court: "Russia and Geneva have equal rights." Article 2, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter declares that the United Nations is based on the principle of sovereign equality.

The sovereign equality of states, however, has never meant the equal right to participate in the decisionmaking process of international organizations. The composition of the Security Council and other councils, the veto provision, the amendment process—these and other provisions of the charter all accord special privileges to certain members. So the structure of the United Nations from the very beginning recognized the need to reconcile the principle of sovereign equality with the uneven disposition of real power and real responsibility for implementing U.N. decisions. Appropriate means of balancing these considerations were also incorporated in the constitutions of the specialized agencies.

Quite apart from charter provisions, procedures have been developed over the years to adapt decisionmaking procedures to power realities. In the last several years this central problem has occasioned a vast amount of staff work in our own and other governments—and a considerable amount of discussion and negotiation in the U.N. system.

We have explored with other nations many different procedures for rationalizing the decisionmaking process. We recognize that no one procedure is appropriate for all cases:

> Certain procedures may be appropriate for the voting of General Assembly resolutions which merely manifest the views of members and have no binding legal effect.
>
> Other procedures may be appropriate when the General Assembly is exercising its mandatory power to assess.
>
> Still other procedures may be appropriate in specialized agencies lending substantial sums of money for exchange stabilization or economic development.

So our search for adequate procedures has been undertaken on a case-by-case basis with special regard for the peculiarities of each case.

Before turning to a discussion of possible procedures, it may be useful to identify one solution to the problem which we have not considered. We have rejected the notion that most or all important U.N. operations should be subject to the "principle of unanimity."

Specifically, we have rejected the 20-year-old Soviet demand that all peacekeeping operations of the U.N. should be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council and thus subject to great-power veto. While recognizing that the Security Council has the exclusive right to initiate mandatory peacekeeping actions that impose binding obligations on states, we have consistently recognized the residual authority of the General Assembly to launch voluntary peacekeeping operations. We have defended the charter power of the Assembly to assess the membership for such operations—while recognizing that in practice many peacekeeping operations can be more appropriately financed by methods other than by every-member assessment.

Some Americans, I know, feel strongly that we must not expose the vital interests of the United States to the possibility that the Assembly would lay mandatory obligations on us against our will. Fears have been expressed that the United Nations would send a force into some area against our political opposition—and make us pay for such ventures besides. It has been suggested that in the arrears issue we are trying to enforce on the U.S.S.R. and France a principle that we would never allow to be enforced against ourselves.

There are several important points to be considered in connection with this assertion. The Congo and Middle East operations were launched with the aquiescence of the Soviet Union and France. The General Assembly has never recommended any peacekeeping operation against the negative vote of a big power. Indeed, the Assembly has only recommended a peacekeeping operation once, the United Nations Emergency Force, and this was with the consent of the territorial sovereign.

The Assembly cannot, in any case, initiate binding enforcement action requiring members to contribute men and logistical support to military operations. It has never attempted to do this—and there is no reason to suppose it ever will. Moreover, the Assembly, indeed the U.N. is estopped by article 2, paragraph 7 of the charter from unlawful intervention in matters within a member's domestic jurisdiction.

Finally, in the light of article 19 experience, it is clear that the Assembly will be very cautious in the future in exercising its right to initiate and assess for voluntary peacekeeping operations. These considerations are usually overlooked by those who claim that the principle for which the United States has been contending in the article 19 crisis is incompatible with our national interests.

The argument that, if we were like the Soviet Union, we would not want to pay for peacekeeping operations we oppose, is unpersuasive for another reason: The policies we pursue do not lead the United Nations to undertake peacekeeping actions directed against what we see as our vital interests. If the United States were engaged in promoting the overthrow of foreign governments and institutions, it would have reason to fear the effective implementation of United Nations principles.

But, in view of what in fact American principles and purposes are, we have every reason to uphold the authority of the United Nations. We have every reason to uphold the law, as the International Court of Justice has found it to be. We have every reason to favor impartially applying the law of the charter, for we have no reason to fear impartial application of that law. If we seek a world ruled by law rather than force, we naturally must seek to apply and defend the law we now have.

In short, the United States has been prepared to take whatever risks are inherent in the principle that voluntary peacekeeping operations may be initiated and financed by the General Assembly free from great-power veto because we recognize a long-term interest in developing this means of containing violence in the nuclear age. We want to minimize these risks, of course, but not at the cost of crippling the capacity of the United Nations to act for peace and security.

To put it another way, we are persuaded of the need to protect the interests of ourselves and other large and middle powers in the United Nations vehicle. But we do not want to do this by draining all the gasoline out of the motor. We prefer to keep the gasoline in—and to keep the vehicle on the road through the introduction of "power steering."

II

How can "power steering" be built into the United Nations vehicle? Diplomats and scholars have explored six main approaches to this problem:

1. Weighted voting

Most public discussion of the "international apportionment question" has focussed on proposals to introduce weighted voting in the General Assembly and in the conferences of the major U.N. agencies.

Weighted voting exists, of course, in the four financial agencies of the United Nations system—the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association. In each of these, voting power is roughly proportionate to financial contribution. Weighted voting is also employed in the main international commodity arrangements, where it is related to the size of participating countries' trade in the particular commodity. Except for these financial and trade arrangements, it is not otherwise employed in the United Nations system.

But most U.N. members, while willing to employ weighted voting for decisions on the disbursement of loans or the administration of commodity agreements, are not prepared to introduce this system across the board to cover recommendations of the General Assembly and other bodies.

The obvious practical impediment to the introduction of weighted voting in the General Assembly is that it would require amendment of the U.N. Charter—and therefore the approval not only of the Soviet Union, France and other members of the Security Council, but also of two-thirds of the membership of the General Assembly. In the present state of international relations, it is hard to imagine the permanent members of the Council and two-thirds of the Assembly agreeing on any formula which would assign different weights to their share in the decisionmaking process.

The most likely consequence of pressing for a charter review conference to consider weighted voting, as some have urged, would be to provide a golden opportunity for the Communist countries and other to press for amendments diminishing the powers that the U.N. has developed under the charter during the last 20 years and that have generally promoted the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

Even if it were possible to amend the charter to provide for weighted voting, it is not at all certain that our national interest would be served by the result. No system of weighted voting could conceivably be negotiated which did not weigh population as a major factor. It is questionable whether such an arrangement would suit a country like ours, which has only 6 percent of the world's population and which, together with its NATO allies, has only 16 percent. If population were a primary criterion, India with its 450 million people and China with its 700 million people might well end up with more votes than the United States.

Of course, it is always possible to construct hypothetical systems of weighted voting congenial to our interests based mainly on such factors as literacy, per capita income, and military power. But such systems are simply not negotiable, at least not in the foreseeable future.

The Department of State in 1962 conducted a study of various weighted voting formulas based on population and contributions to the U.N. budget. When these formulas were applied to 178 key votes that took place in the General Assembly between 1954 and 1961, it was found that, while they would have somewhat reduced the number of resolutions passed over U.S. opposition, they would have reduced much more the number of resolutions supported by the United States and passed over Communist opposition. The same conclusion was reached in projecting these formulas to 1970, having regard to further increases in membership.

The results of this study reflect the fact that the desire for political independence and economic progress has put most U.N. members on the same side as the United States on most important matters—particularly where action is involved as well as talk.

We have, therefore, concluded that any system of weighted voting taking population substantially into account—and, I repeat, no weighted voting system would be negotiable that failed to do this—would help Communist countries more than ourselves, by making it easier for them to achieve a blocking one-third vote on U.N. actions for peace and welfare that are in the interest of the United States and other nations of the non-Communist world.

2. Dual voting

Dual voting—or a system of double majorities—has recently been advanced by some commentators as a possible answer. Benjamin Cohen, for example, has proposed that General Assembly decisions on substantive matters should be made in the future by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting, provided that the majority includes two-thirds of the members of the Security Council.

Dual voting has two great advantages as compared with weighted voting:

It does not offend directly the one-nation, one-vote principle.

It does not require a complicated negotiation involving national prestige in which different weights have to be assigned to different members.

But most members of the United Nations would probably feel that the introduction of dual voting on all substantive matters would require charter amendment. It is doubtful that a sufficient consensus on the desirability of dual voting presently exists for such an amendment to be approved.

It is always possible, of course, that dual voting might be introduced in selected areas of U.N. decisionmaking. At the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva last year the non-Communist industrial countries, in the closing weeks of the Conference, proposed a system of dual voting for the new U.N. trade machinery. Under this proposal, decisions on certain important matters in the periodic Trade and Development Conference were to be taken by a two-thirds majority, including a majority of developed countries and a majority of less-developed countries; in the Trade and Development Board such decisions would be taken by a plain majority, including a majority of developed countries and a majority of less-developed countries.

This proposal found some support not only among developed countries but also among less-developed countries, some of whom recognized the futility of voting self-serving resolutions without the concurrence of at least a majority of those countries to whom the recommendations were addressed.

But the idea involved too great a change in existing procedures to gain approval at Geneva. And some of the Western industrial countries even developed second thoughts on the proposal—on the grounds that special voting procedures of this kind might cause greater significance to be attached to U.N. recommendations than they were prepared to accept.

3. Bicameralism

Bicameralism in one form or other is an approach to the international apportionment problem offering greater possibilities in the short run than either weighted or dual voting.

In its extreme form, bicameralism would mean treating the Security Council and the General Assembly as an "upper House" and a "lower House" and requiring that decisions on some or all matters would have to be passed by both of them. For example, the veto could continue to apply to enforcement action; but voluntary peacekeeping operations and perhaps recommendations in other areas could be adopted by two-thirds of the General Assembly and by 7 of the 11 members of the Security Council (9 members of the enlarged Council of 15).

Here again, this kind of proposal would probably require charter amendment. It is, therefore, not a practical possibility in the foreseeable future. But more tentative and informal steps in the direction of bicameralism may be possible.

In September 1964, the United States submitted to the Working Group of 21 a proposal covering arrangements for initiating and financing U.N. peacekeeping operations involving the use of military forces. We proposed that all proposals to initiate such peacekeeping operations should be considered first in the Security Council. The General Assembly would not authorize or assume control of such operations unless the Council had demonstrated that it was unable to take action.

This proposal would work a change in present procedures. While under the charter, the Security Council would normally be expected to consider a threat to peace and security in the first instance, there is no requirement that the Security Council should first consider a particular peacekeeping operation. In the Suez crisis, for example, the Security Council met before the General Assembly convened in emergency special session, but it did not consider the proposal for the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. This proposal was initiated in the Assembly itself.

A new arrangement by which proposals for the establishment of peacekeeping forces would first be submitted to the Council would be a step in the direction of strengthening the primary responsibility of the Council in the peacekeeping field. It should commend itself not only to those members who are seeking to strengthen the Council's role but to all members who want to work out a rational distribution of powers between the Council and the Assembly.

The UNEF, Congo, and Cyprus operations illustrated the importance of getting U.N. troops to world trouble spots without undue delay. Therefore, any proposal requiring prior resort to the Council should contain safeguards—perhaps a fixed time limit—to avoid jeopardizing the ability of the Assembly to take timely action under its residual powers.

Enlargement of the Security Council could also aid our efforts to deal with the international apportionment problem through measures of modified bicameralism. If the Security Council is to discharge more effectively its primary responsibility in the field of peace and security, it must be sufficiently representative of the U.N. membership as a whole to have the confidence of the membership. This is not possible without enlargement.

The General Assembly has approved the first charter amendments in the history of the United Nations—amendments enlarging the Security Council from 11 to 15 members and the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 members. The President of the United States recently sent a message to the Senate asking for advice and consent to the ratification of these amendments. Hearings will shortly commence upon them in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Affirmative action upon these amendments is clearly desirable.

The enlargement of the Security Council is designed to eliminate the contentious problem of sharing an inadequate number of seats. The new understanding for the distribution of the elective seats embodied in the Assembly resolution proposing the amendment is realistic and equitable. It allocates two seats to Western European countries and others, two to Latin America, one to Eastern Europe, and five to Africa and Asia. Enlargement should reduce the tendency to split terms in Security Council elections and should relieve mounting pressures against seats now held by Western European and Latin American countries.

4. Committees with selective representation

Probably the most promising method yet devised for building greater responsibility into United Nations decisionmaking is that of committees with selective representation.

The basic concept was provided in the charter provision for a Security Council with 11 members, including the five permanent members which bear the principal responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The same concept is embodied in the charter of a number of the specialized agencies; for example, in the governing body of the International Labor Organization, the 10 members of chief industrial importance have permanent seats.

Even where no specific provision is made for permanent seats for a certain category of members, elections to the executive boards of U.N. agencies have normally taken account of the special responsibilities of members in the particular functional area of cooperation; whether it be telecommunications, weather forecasting, or medical research. Presumably this will continue to be true in the future as well.

In the case of the Security Council, the charter itself declares that due regard should be especially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organization as well as to equitable geographic distribution. This provision has not received the attention it deserves. It would enhance the effectiveness of an enlarged Council if this consideration could be adequately reflected in Council elections in the years ahead.

The members of the United Nations have found committees with selective representation particularly useful in the financial field. The General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Questions bears responsibility for examining and reporting on the Secretary General's U.N. budget estimates. The United States has supported the effective operation of this small 12-man body, which is not merely representative of the major geographic groups in the United Nations, but also reflects comparative contributions to the U.N. budget. We have sought to strengthen the authority of similar groups in the specialized agencies, and we believe members might usefully consider the possibility of creating such groups in agencies which do not have them.

We also favor use of a committee with selective representation in the peacekeeping field. Our working paper to the Committee of 21 last September proposed that the General Assembly establish a standing Special Finance Committee. The composition of this committee would be similar to that of the present Working Group of 21—it would include the permanent members of the Security Council and a relatively high percentage of those member states in each geographic area that are large financial contributors to the United Nations. The General Assembly, in apportioning expenses for peacekeeping operations, would act only on a recommendation from the committee passed by a two-thirds majority of the committee's membership.

One great advantage of the committee approach is that it does not require amendment of the U.N. Charter or the constitutions of the various specialized agencies. The proposed Special Finance Committee for peacekeeping operations, for example, could be constituted under and governed by firm rules of procedure by the General Assembly. In effect, the Assembly would be adopting a self-denying ordinance to act only upon proposals first adopted in this new suborgan.

5. Informal relations with international secretariats

Informal relations with the international secretariats may also provide a useful approach. Obviously, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the heads of the specialized and affiliated agencies engage in a continuous process of consultation with the membership. In these consultations they naturally take account of the differing responsibilities which the members have for supporting the work of their organizations.

During the United Nations operation in the Congo, for example, the Secretariat systematically consulted an advisory committee of countries that contributed military personnel. More informally, consultation was carried on with key contributors of services and money. For example, the United States and other major contributors were in frequent touch with the Secretary-General and his staff in New York and with the chief of the U.N. Congo operation in Leopoldville. This was a truly international undertaking. At the same time, its conduct reflected the views of the major supporters of the operation.

So far the heads of U.N. agencies have generally paid close attention to the views of the countries with special financial and other responsibilities. The problem has mainly been the inability of these countries to organize themselves effectively for the timely transmission of their viewpoints to the agency heads.

In the recent months, the U.S. Government has made special efforts to deal with this problem. We have sought to take a longer range view of international organization activities and to develop our own position on programs and budgets far enough in advance so that the executive heads of the agencies can take these views into account at the time the program and budget is being formulated.

Our objective here is to put the executive heads of the agencies in a position to take into account the views of their major contributors early in the budget cycle before their proposals to the executive boards and conferences are frozen. This is immeasurably better than having them formulate their programs and budgets in the dark, only to be met suddenly at the general Conference with the opposition of major contributors.

During the past year, the United States has begun a systematic series of consultations with some of the other major contributors in an effort to develop common positions on the programs and budgets of the international agencies. We have found this process of consultation very useful. As governmental positions emerge on various issues facing the specialized agencies, they are presented informally to the Directors-General.

We believe that, in the long run, this exchange of views among governments and with secretariats will make for more effective participation by the larger contributors in the international organizations, and consequently for more realistic program proposals in the agencies.

6. Conciliation

The most recent—and perhaps the most original—procedural innovation in U.N. decisionmaking is the conciliation procedure established by the last General Assembly for the new U.N. machinery in the field of trade and development.

The need for the conciliation procedure became apparent during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva. In the closing days of UNCTAD, at which I served as vice chairman of the U.S. delegation, there was an encouraging disposition to reach a consensus on some subjects. But there were also instances when the voting bloc of less-developed countries passed resolutions over the opposition of the minority of industrial countries on matters involving important economic interests.

Some delegates argued that this was no cause for concern, since the resolutions were recommendations only—and any resolutions of the new trade machinery would be recommendations only. But the United States and other countries pointed out that the currency of such recommendations would be hopelessly debased if they failed to reflect a substantial consensus among all countries, including particularly the countries bearing the principal responsibility for implementing them.

Trade questions have traditionally been dealt with among nations by negotiation—not legislation. Undoubtedly, there is a constructive role for institutions whose primary purpose is to articulate through recommendations the measures which should be undertaken by both developed and less developed countries to deal with the trade problems of the latter. But such institutions can only operate through a process of persuasion.

Persuasion is assisted when delegates seek a consensus through conciliation and express that consensus in resolutions. If it is not assisted, it may even be set back by the passage of self-serving resolutions by automatic majorities. Public opinion in the industrial countries is likely to react adversely to recommendations that are passed over the opposition of the industrial countries but call for concessions by them.

What is wanted, in the last analysis, is not voting, but results. Because this was recognized by most delegations, a last-minute agreement was reached at Geneva that the new UNCTAD machinery should contain procedures "designed to establish a process of conciliation to take place before voting and to provide an adequate basis for the adoption of recommendations with regard to proposals of a specific nature for action substantially affecting economic or financial interests of particular countries."

The task of working out these procedures was left to a special committee appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations. I had the privilege of serving as the U.S. expert on this committee. The conciliation procedure which the committee devised will operate in the periodic Conference, in the Trade and Development Board, and in its committees.

Under this procedure, conciliation can be initiated and voting suspended on any resolution, upon the motion of a very small number of countries (10 in the Conference, 5 in the Board and 3 in committees), or upon the motion of the President of the Conference or Chairman of the Board.

The initiation of conciliation is automatic. However, guidelines are provided defining the kind of resolutions which are appropriate for the conciliation procedure.

Following a motion for conciliation, a conciliation group is appointed with adequate representation of countries interested in the subject matter. If the conciliation group cannot reach agreement at the same session of the Conference or Board, it reports to the next session of the Conference or Board, whichever comes first.

If the conciliation group has reached agreement, the agreed resolution can be voted. If it has not, a decision can be taken continuing conciliation for a further period, or the original proposal, or some variant thereof, can be voted in the normal way.

In the event that a vote is taken after unsuccessful conciliation, the resolution will cite the report of the conciliation group (which may contain minority as well as majority views), and the records of the United Nations will show how the members voted on the resolution.

These procedures offer important benefits to all U.N. members:

For the minority of developed countries, they provide some safeguard against the voting of unacceptable resolutions by automatic majorities, and a "cooling-off" period of 6 months or more during which efforts at compromise can be sought through quiet diplomacy.

For the majority of less-developed countries, they afford a means of engaging the developed countries in a sustained debate during which the developed countries explain the reasons for their opposition to proposals of the majority.

It is too early to see just how the conciliation procedure will work in practice, but we may hazard one prediction: The main value of the new procedures may be less in their actual use than in the subtle way in which their mere existence influences member governments in the direction of compromise rather than voting on disagreed proposals.

III

This catalog of procedures for coping with the "international apportionment problems" should serve to indicate four things:

First, that the United States and other countries are very much aware of the need to adapt U.N. procedures to take account of power realities.

Second, that a wide variety of alternative procedures can be developed to come to grips with the problem.

Third, that the most practical of these procedures can be put into effect without amendment of the U.N. Charter or of the constitutions of other U.N. agencies.

Fourth, that a great process of procedural adaptation and innovation is already underway throughout the U.N. system.

Of course, procedures in and of themselves are only part of the problem. What is really required is widespread recognition of the common interest in basing U.N. decisions on an adequate consensus, a consensus which includes the support of most of the countries bearing the principal responsibilities for action.

Will such a recognition be forthcoming? The cynic may ask why the majority of small countries should accept any restraint on the use of their voting power. The answer is clear enough.

If United Nations procedures cannot be adapted to take account of power realities, the large and middle powers will increasingly pursue their national interests outside the U.N. system.

If, on the other hand, the necessary procedural adjustments can be carried out, the United Nations and its agencies will be able to assume increasing responsibilities for action in both peacekeeping and development.

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This is the fundamental reason why the important procedural adjustments now underway in the United Nations serve the enlightened long-term interests of all its members.

Senator CARLSON. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Senator CLARK. I would be happy to yield.

Senator CARLSON. You mentioned this address by Secretary Gardner. He wrote a book on the United Nations that I have read and I think it is a book that might well be read by people in the educational field and in the schools.

Senator CLARK. And members of the Foreign Relations Committee

Senator CARLSON. I have read it.

Senator CLARK. I have read it, too; if it were not for my constant concern for the taxpayer I would put it in the record also.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I will try to make that book available to members of the committee without burden upon the taxpayer.

Senator CLARK. I think it would be very nice if the Secretary would autograph it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who was it that said, "Oh, that mine adversary had written a book."

Senator CLARK. I am just beginning to find that out.

Senator CASE. I was just calling attention to it.

Senator CLARK. You came pretty close to writing one yourself.

As the Secretary knows, for a good many years I have been active in sponsoring various concurrent resolutions usually designated "planning for peace" resolutions.

I have had at least some mild encouragement from the Department, although never quite official, in presenting those resolutions. The latest one is Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 which is cosponsored by more than one-quarter of the Senate, 26 Members, and the Secretary, at least, gave me some encouragement in connection with exploring matters which are in that resolution and I, therefore, would ask, with my colleagues' permission, that a copy of the resolution may be put in the record at this point.

(The resolution referred to follows:)

[S. Con. Res. 32, 89th Cong., 1 sess.]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas it is the policy of the United States, as stated by President Johnson in his communication to the Congress on arms control on January 15, 1965, to be "vigilant for opportunities for improving the hopes for peace"; and

Whereas the steps taken toward peace in the past four years, including the adoption of the limited nuclear test ban treaty, the hot line agreement, the United Nations resolution against weapons in space, and the pursuit of a policy of mutual example in reducing excessive defense expenditures, have contributed to the relaxation of international tensions; and

Whereas these developments have enhanced the prospect for the negotiation of further international agreements based upon mutual interest and calculated to advance the cause of world peace; and

Whereas the basic purpose of United States foreign policy is the achievement of a just and lasting peace, which can best be attained through the development of the rule of law in the international community; and

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly, at its fourteenth session, unanimously adopted "the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control", and called upon governments "to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem"; and

Whereas President Eisenhower stated on September 22, 1960, to the Fifteenth General Assembly, "Thus, we see as our goal, not a superstate above nations, but a world community embracing them all, rooted in law and justice and enhancing the potentialities and common purposes of all peoples"; and

Whereas President Kennedy stated on September 25, 1961, that we must create "worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and weapons", and stated further on June 10, 1963, that "our primary long-range interest" is "general and complete disarmament—designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms"; and

Whereas the United States program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, introduced of the sixteenth session of the United Nation General Assembly, defined the objective of the United States as "A world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" and the "institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations" and called for the creation of an International Disarmament Organization to insure compliance with disarmament obligations, a United States Peace Force to keep the peace during the period of disarmament and thereafter; and improved processes for the peaceful settlement of international disputes; and

Whereas President Kennedy, in addressing the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 20, 1963, called for the revision of the Charter of the United Nations to permit the development of that body into "a genuine world security system", and declared that the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations must be strengthened by the adoption of sound financial arrangements and the maintenance of standby peace force contingents by member nations and that resort to special missions for the conciliation and adjudication of international disputes be increased; and

Whereas the realization of these goals through international negotiations, United Nations Charter revision, or otherwise, is a matter of urgency because (1) technological and political developments have given rise to new perils to peace through the increasing spread of nuclear weapons, as evidenced by the successful detonation of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists, the continued development of an independent nuclear deterrent by France, and the possibility that several other nations, which have the capacity to make nuclear weapons, will follow a similar course; and (2) the increasing cost of the arms race is preventing human needs from being met in all the countries of the world; and

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly, during recent sessions, has resolved to keep in being the Committee on Arrangements for the purpose of reviewing the charter, and has further resolved to ask the Committee to submit periodic reports, with recommendations, to future sessions of the General Assembly; and

Whereas the achievement of an international accord for general and complete disarmament under effective controls and the development of international peacekeeping machinery require not only the support of the Congress, but also an informed public opinion in the United States: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President should be supported in his efforts to achieve peace and disarmament under legally effective controls and to develop international institutions capable of permanently keeping the peace.

SEC. 2. The President is hereby requested to formulate as speedily as possible specific and detailed proposals for the implementation of the foreign policy objectives of the United States regarding the establishment of an international authority to keep the peace under conditions of general and complete disarmament effectively guaranteed by adequate inspection and controls. In formulating such proposals, the President is requested to consider whether the development of effective international machinery for the supervision of disarmament and the maintenance of peace, including (1) an International Disarmament Organization; (2) a permanent World Peace Force; (3) world tribunals for the peaceful settlement of all international disputes not settled by negotiations; (4) other international institutions necessary for the enforcement of world peace under the rule of law; and (5) appropriate and reliable financial arrangements for the support of such peacekeeping machinery, may best be achieved by revision of the Charter of the United Nations, by a new treaty, or by a combination of the two.

SEC. 3. The President should make such proposals available to the Congress and to the public generally.

SEC. 4. The President is requested to transmit copies of this resolution to the heads of government of all of the nations of the world and to urge them to initiate within their governments studies of matters germane to this resolution and to formulate and make generally available recommendations based upon such studies.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you to turn to page 4 of your prepared statement under the heading IV. Let me say, I find myself in rather complete accord with the four points you make in that subparagraph.

You suggest, first, that the scope of international organization is limited by the stubborn persistence of a strong spirit of nationalism, and that the political traditions centering around the conception of unrestricted national sovereignty place a strict—and then you say, and these are the words I question:

Not altogether undesirable governor on the rate of institution building in the international community.

Why do you think it is not entirely undesirable, as I do?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I think that the point there is that we must be careful that a gap not develop between the theory, as it might be devised, of voting in an international meeting such as the General Assembly, on the one hand and the readiness and the reality of states in giving such resolutions their attachment and their support, in fact.

Now, we are every day, in one sense, accepting limitations upon our complete freedom of action. If one wants to call that sovereignty one can do so. I am a little wary myself of debating this word "sovereignty" too much.

We have more than 4,200 treaties and international agreements, two-thirds of which have been entered into in the past 25 years.

Senator CLARK. Each one of which limits to some extent our sovereignty, does it not?

Secretary RUSK. Each one of which at least limits our freedom of action. We exercise our sovereignty in going into these agreements.

Senator CLARK. There are two schools of thought about this word "sovereignty." One is it is such a faulty word we don't ever dare mention it because immediately people wrap the American Flag around themselves and resort to that form of patriotism which Samuel Johnson once had referred to as "the last refuge of the scoundrel" and, therefore, we try to achieve the same result by using a different word—and maybe this is good tactics at the moment—but the fact of the matter is, is it not, that unless we can find some method, such as the method which the Thirteen Colonies devised when they moved from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution of the United States, for limiting the complete freedom of action of the Nation States, we are going to be in quite serious trouble as we move ahead, are we not?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is so, Senator, if I might make a moment's comment on this.

Surely we have learned in our own internal processes in our own society, that law is a process by which we increase our range of freedom.

Senator CLARK. But the law has to be enforceable, doesn't it?

Secretary RUSK. It has to be complied with.

Senator CLARK. Therefore, when it is broken it must be enforceable to perform that function.

Secretary RUSK. All of us, for example, from the time we wake up until the time we go to sleep pass through literally hundreds of legal relationships in the course of the day. Most of those remain latent but many of them can be stirred up by our own action or by the action of somebody else.

Senator CLARK. We take most of them for granted.

Secretary RUSK. But this is the point: we are able to predict generally what others are going to do. So it is on the international scene. We are constantly making arrangements——

Senator CLARK. You are quite sure what the North Vietnamese are going to do?

Secretary RUSK. Well, there are exceptions, of course, just as there are here in our own society at times.

But we are constantly enlarging our own freedom by being able to predict what others are going to do, particularly in those fields in which there are not high political controversies but where cooperation itself is necessary or contributes to accomplishing the objective.

There are no such things as sovereignty with respect to epidemic diseases, for example, because disease does not recognize political borders.

So, we get at that on an international basis with far-reaching measures for cooperating across national frontiers.

Now, this is the direction in which we have been moving very rapidly and it is very seldom that we ourselves, as a Nation, find that these regulations or rules which we have entered into, in fact, limit us or bar us from moving in directions in which we would like to go in our own interest.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, sir.

I see now that our chairman has returned.

The CHAIRMAN. Please continue.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would the Senator yield?

Senator CLARK. Yes.

THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the discussion in the last minute or two is quite interesting on the theory that if laws are on the books they should be obeyed. I certainly agree with that. But it seems to run afoul of certain policies we see in the United States now where if people decide they don't like a law they can violate other laws in protest. That isn't quite compatible with the idea that laws ought to be obeyed.

I agree with the theory that laws ought to be obeyed but we seem to be tolerating disobedience of law all over the country under the guise of free speech or something else.

Senator CLARK. I guess, Senator Hickenlooper, there would be no difference between you and me in our general theory that we have to live under a rule of law and it had better be enforceable. I suggest this is the requirement, and primary requirement, in international

affairs today. We haven't got there yet. I don't know whether you or Mr. Cleveland would like to comment on it, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. On the international side I made a reference the other day to a phrase used by Mr. Jenks who is the chief counsel of the International Labor Organization who referred to the common law of mankind. In the opening chapter of a book by that title, he showed how the human race has been moving steadily, and in recent years more rapidly, to build up expected standards of conduct and instruments of cooperation. These are bringing a great deal of order in international affairs, even in the face of some of these most violent ideological problems, and security problems, that we are all aware of. There has been a rapid buildup of that unseen development in the international community through a development of what he called a common law of mankind.

It is represented most dramatically in the economic, social, and technical work of the United Nations to which I alluded in my remarks.

Our problem, Senator Clark, is that that movement is not moving rapidly enough to take hold of these great crisis situations, to bring them under the rule of law and the concept of peaceful settlement of disputes.

But I have no doubt at all it is having a steady influence and is moving in that direction.

Senator CLARK. I quite agree with you.

It occurs to me, however, that the difference between us is the question of speed. My criticism, as you know, has been that our Government is not moving nearly rapidly enough, is not taking nearly enough initiative to bring forward that movement, that we have been too content to let it be a government of development by consensus, a development by unanimity, and there are problems. I am so happy to see the four comments which you made on page 4 of your statement, because I think this indicates an understanding on your part, and that of your associates, of the need to move forward somewhat more rapidly in this.

Now, perhaps you want to make a comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, let me say just not as an alibi but as a reflection——

Senator CLARK. You have been rather busy.

Secretary RUSK. ——of the environment in which we are having to operate, these are not matters which we ourselves can solve alone. We have taken up, for example, in the disarmament discussions, some very key and fundamental issues in this field that we must approach on a broad front.

One is that we must improve the processes for the political settlement of disputes and try to get some of the most dangerous disputes that are on the agenda out of the way by peaceful settlement, such things as a divided Germany and the problem of Berlin.

Second, we must proceed as rapidly as we can with disarmament and at the same time, in parallel, strengthen the ability of the international community to keep the peace.

DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

Senator CLARK. In other words, you would agree with me in principle, I take it, that disarmament is really going to be quite ineffective, and so is arms control, if we have to take the intermediate step, unless we get some type of international institution which can enforce the disarmament process and hopefully in the long run find a method of settling political disputes by mediation, conciliation, equity procedures, whatever you have, instead of throwing them over in the long run to the rule of force.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir, and we have made these points very insistently in the Geneva disarmament discussions.

Senator CLARK. One thing that concerns me, Mr. Secretary, is that there has been a backsliding in the Johnson administration since the assassination of President Kennedy. We all know those three great speeches which he made, two at the United Nations and one at American University; we all know that he caused to be tabled—and you or Mr. Cleveland played a major part in drafting it—our treaty of general and complete disarmament at Geneva which met the Russian proposal; we all know the wide gap between the Soviet position and our own, but since President Johnson went into the White House I have never heard the words general and complete disarmament uttered from his lips, your lips, or from anybody else, and my question is, Have we retreated from the position which President Kennedy placed us in?

Secretary RUSK. We have not at all, sir, and the President is very much interested in it and concerned with the entire field of disarmament. We have, in fact, taken certain steps in connection with the reduction of the production of materials for weapons.

Senator CLARK. All on fringes of arms control but we have never gone back——

Secretary RUSK. Oh, yes.

Senator CLARK. ——to general and complete disarmament so far as I know at Geneva since President Kennedy was removed from the White House.

Secretary RUSK. We have not gone——

Senator CLARK. My understanding is, and you tell me if I am wrong: Since the death of President Kennedy the whole steam has gone out of bringing the Russians back and attempting to get together with them and, possibly, to see if we can't bridge the gap between their plans for general and complete disarmament and our own.

This seems to have been a casualty from the Kennedy, as distinguished from the Johnson, administration. I hope I am wrong.

Secretary RUSK. You are very wrong on that, Senator.

Senator CLARK. Three cheers.

Secretary RUSK. This is not the point.

We ourselves have been pressing to get the Geneva discussions going again. It was the Soviet Union that elected to call for this present meeting of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations which is made up, as you know, of all the members, and constitutes a forum in which hard and serious negotiation is not likely to occur.

Senator CLARK. You are aware, I am sure, that the Russian position has been given to some of our people as being that we were not seriously interested in a nonproliferation agreement, because if we

were, we would forget about the multilateral force. This has been a deterrent to getting back to Geneva, and I take it you are telling me now, and I am delighted if it is true, that you would like to urge our people to get back to Geneva and see if we can't come to at least some peripheral agreements with the Russians which will make it possible to get back to the track we were on in September 1961.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, as recently as last December, which was the last time I had a chance to meet with Mr. Gromyko, we had about five meetings during the month while he was at the United Nations and we spent a great deal of time at those meetings trying to find some way in which we can proceed on further steps in disarmament.

But I will have to say, sir, that there are some major obstacles still rooted in the questions of assurance, inspection, and verification. Even on the subject of budgetary reductions on both sides we have not been able to talk seriously about such possibilities. And one of the reasons is that we have never been able to engage them in a discussion of what goes into a defense budget in our respective societies.

How comparable are defense budgets, what do they represent?

We have suggested over and over again that our comptrollers of our defense departments get together and examine it because it doesn't do very much good to have one side say, "Well, we are reducing our defense budget by $300 million," and indicating an increase in their research and development budget of $300 million if both of those items are in our own defense budget in this country.

Senator CLARK. I quite understand.

Secretary RUSK. So, there are problems of that sort.

MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE AND NATO

Senator CLARK. I know and they are very serious problems and I certainly appreciate, having been twice at Geneva myself and once to Russia, how very difficult and how mean and how discourteous the Russians can be and what tough antagonists they are.

My concern is, are we trying hard enough and isn't it one of the real deterrents to getting back at the table in talking of it that we haven't been able to come up with a satisfactory solution to the German problem and the one reason is because we have got them scared to death about the multilateral force.

In my book, as you know, and I have told you this before, I think if we would only get the multilateral force idea out of our head we might find ourselves in a position to make some progress on these other far more important matters.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, on the multilateral force I think I should state for the record here now, that the multilateral force is a false issue with respect to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Senator CLARK. That is our position, but with a little sense of empathy I think I can understand, and I think you can, where the Russians don't agree with it.

Secretary RUSK. The Russians don't agree with it for a variety of reasons. They don't like NATO, they don't wish anything to tie NATO countries together.

Senator CLARK. Which do you think is more important, coming to a comprehensive talk with Russia or shoring up a NATO organization which shows every sign of distintegrating?

Secretary RUSK. I don't believe there is a possibility of a detente with the Soviet Union unless there is a strong NATO. We didn't come to a detente—if one wants to call even the present situation a mild form of detente—we didn't come to that by a general agreement with the Soviet Union. We came to it over a period of time because the West made it clear that the alternative to a detente was not acceptable and could cause very, very severe damage for everyone.

Senator CLARK. I quite agree.

We need to negotiate from strength; we need our European allies to help us negotiate from strength. But it occurs to me that we are far more worried about a Russian movement west into Europe than any of our European allies who would be among the first to go there.

Even General de Gaulle, whom I know we don't agree with on many matters, thinks that this is really a rather obsolete complex and I believe this is true of the British and many of our other NATO allies. Perhaps, you would comment on why we are so scared when they are not.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I think that we must bear in mind since 1947 the total defense budgets of the NATO alliance have been on the order of a trillion dollars. I think it would be a great disaster if we in the West should assume that somehow a new day has dawned and, therefore, we need not worry about the practical aspects of security if people on the other side change their minds.

Senator CLARK. Let me interrupt to say I quite agree with you and I certainly am not a unilateral disarmer.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator CLARK. My only view is if the State Department and the Defense Department put as much effort in trying to figure out ways in which we could persuade the Russians to let down their guard as we do to try to persuade the West Germans to put up their guard we might get ahead faster.

DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I will be glad to review with you at some stage the long, very long, discussions I have had in the last 4 years with Mr. Gromyko, hour after hour, week after week, month after month, trying to explore the possibilities of resolving some of these important differences, particularly after the nuclear test ban treaty, trying to find new points on which agreement can be found.

(See p. 131 for chronological list of U.S. activities in the field of arms control and disarmament.)

Secretary RUSK. As you know, your committee is looking into the question of trade. In the disarmament field they have put forward approximately 11 points; in the general field of partial measures, we put forward about the same number. Unfortunately, still we are somewhat in the position of occupying each other's rear. We have not yet found additional points where we can engage each other directly as we did in the case of the nuclear test ban treaty.

In the case of a comprehensive test ban, for example, their view is there can be no onsite inspections, and they put this on political grounds, quite apart from what might be the technical or the scientific requirements.

Senator CLARK. Aren't they still talking espionage?

Secretary RUSK. Undoubtedly.

Senator CLARK. This is a pretty obsolete concept in view of our methods of intelligence, isn't it?

Secretary RUSK. Well, this is not espionage, because in connection with the test ban treaty it could be worked out in such a way that no question of espionage could arise.

But you see in this whole field of inspection and verification, in one sense we are asking them for unilateral concessions because when they look at us, an open society, with a little persistent inquiry around the country, one might call it espionage, they can get pretty complete assurances about what we are doing. We can't do the same on their side. This is far more difficult, and unless we can devise some means for giving assurance, providing assurance, and there are improved technical means for putting that capability in the hands of international bodies.

Senator CLARK. Or even into the hands of national bodies.

Secretary RUSK. Within some limits it does require, even so, a good deal of international cooperation, but until we can find some way to move with assurance, then these problems are going to be extremely difficult to work out.

We have made some progress on some points, and I hope that when we get back to Geneva we can make some additional progress.

Senator CLARK. Do you think we will get back to Geneva?

Secretary RUSK. It is our hope that we can. I may be wrong on this, but I think it is probable that at the end of this present discussion in New York that there will be some further discussions at Geneva. I can't say that with assurance because we don't have any agreement of those who would be needed to take part. We would be glad to be there.

Senator CLARK. Let me say that I sympathize with you very fully. I realize the frustrations in dealing with those very difficult people. I understand that it has been impossible to make a break. But I want to suggest to you that you and some of your colleagues may be a little bit unduly concerned, and I hope Senator Hickenlooper won't contradict me on this, in your almost phobia against Congress being unwilling to go along with any really peaceful measures, and I know that under our system of government you constantly have to be recognizing the hot breath of the Congress on your neck.

But I would hope that you would be a little bit more bold in the future, and that some of us who have been coming along a little more recently will give you a little courage to move toward peace, because I am convinced we should be taking the initiative there.

I don't say this in sort of a flabby way of having no definite plan.

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

Senator CLARK. You know pretty well we have a very definite plan in this Resolution 32 and perhaps you might want to comment on that.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, let me say, I don't believe that at the present time our problem is here at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Our problem is with the other great states involved.

Senator CLARK. Really one, isn't it, Russia, and then in the background, China.

Secretary RUSK. In the case of——

Senator CLARK. And De Gaulle, too.

Secretary RUSK. In the case of nuclear testing there is a problem of France.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And as you know France has not taken its seat at Geneva.

Senator CLARK. I understand.

Secretary RUSK. The seat has been vacant throughout this period. If in our discussions with the Soviet Union and others and in NATO, we saw some opportunities for a major step in the disarmament field I can assure you we would be down here indicating we think this is possible and consult the Congress about the possibility.

In other words, I don't think it is Congress that is a drag on progress in this field at the present time.

Senator CLARK. You think it is the Russians?

Secretary RUSK. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

QUESTION OF GENERAL CHARTER REVIEW

Senator PELL. Secretary Rusk, I find myself in complete support of the general line of thought and views expressed by my colleague, Senator Clark.

But to return to the subject of the hearing today, which is the amendments to the Charter of the U.N., my recollection, and having participated at San Francisco, as you have, was that when we were doing this, we were working with a rather imperfect instrument with the idea we would definitely have it reviewed within 10 years.

This period of time elapsed and we didn't. Now we are changing it by bits and pieces.

I wonder whether any thought has been given to the idea of a constitutional convention, as we call it in the individual States of the United States, or to a general discussion of what changes were needed, and then instead of having one or two changes, go into it perhaps more comprehensively.

I am thinking of the fact that, as you know from Dumbarton Oaks, we rather supported the veto, and then we changed in San Francisco to opposing it.

At San Francisco we were all for the Security Council, and this we changed after Korea to the General Assembly where the general changes in thrust of our own national interests would seem to be answered by general discussion.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think that we ourselves ought to have a continuing procedure within our own Government to examine how the United Nations is working and what changes might be effected. It is true that we modified our view, as you remember personally, sir, on the veto. We felt that we should retain it under chapter 7 of the charter with respect to compulsory action of a military character. We, however, were prepared to remove the veto under the Vandenberg and other leadership, on the peaceful procedure sections of the

charter, chapter 6, and also on the question of new members, but the Soviet Union indicated it would not accept such changes.

Now, I think it would be unlikely that there would be serious interest in major revisions of the charter among the general membership. One can imagine, for example, that some would like to see the charter amended to take account of the imbalance now between the very large number of small countries in relation to those who are carrying the major responsibilities, say in the financial field.

But I don't think that the Assembly will ever agree to change the situation by which 5 percent of the contributions or 10 percent of the population of the world can cast two-thirds of the vote in the General Assembly. That would be like changing the arrangements, say, in the U.S. Senate with the size and population of States. I don't think that is a viable proposition.

Senator PELL. I must interpolate here, from the Federal viewpoint, we are doing it unilaterally with the States at this point.

Secretary RUSK. That is beyond my present ken, Senator—"ken" perhaps is not the word.

But now, on general charter review, there have been committee efforts from time to time in the U.N. to take a look at this, but it has been made quite clear by those whose votes would be required, particularly the Soviet Union, that a fundamental charter change is not in the cards.

I think I should report to you there also have been some indications that we had better hold pretty closely to the charter that we have now, because if we were negotiating a charter today we couldn't get agreement even on this charter.

So, I don't myself agree that the political prospects for major changes in the charter are very good, although we ourselves would consider and accept a considerable number of changes that we think would improve the United Nations.

Senator PELL. Thank you, sir.

OUTLOOK ON ARTICLE 19 ISSUE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, perhaps while I had to go out to testify for a few minutes, you discussed article 19.

Are you optimistic about the U.N. surviving this crisis?

Secretary RUSK. Diplomacy has to move on the basis of optimism, Mr. Chairman, so that I am professionally committed to optimism. I do believe there is a serious desire on the part of all of the members to find some solution.

Now, this is easy to say, and easy for everybody to say, and it still doesn't produce a solution. The Committee of 33 is at work as I reported to the committee while you were out. There also are private discussions among some of the key delegations.

Mr. Stevenson will be here this week and I would hope that he would have a chance for a few minutes with the committee in executive session to bring you up to date on the feel of those discussions that are going on in New York.

I think it is important and necessary for the United Nations to resolve this problem. I think it will be resolved, but we are a long way from it at the moment. We don't see the blue sky immediately ahead of us.

USE OF VETO IN SECURITY COUNCIL

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to the veto, you said in your initial statement that this in no way disturbs our right of veto in the Security Council.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But haven't we by long practice sort of prided ourselves in not having used it to the point where we are almost committed not to use it?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, this is perhaps a little indiscreet, but——

The CHAIRMAN. We would like for you to be indiscreet.

Secretary RUSK. But the United States does feel very strongly that particularly in those matters involving the peaceful settlement of disputes we should not inject the veto.

You remember the resolution proposed by this committee at one stage suggesting we change the charter to eliminate the veto from chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter, in effect, and from the question of membership. But I think it is fair to say that we have never been confronted with a situation that was vital enough to our interests to require the veto—where we needed to use our veto to block the action that was being proposed.

In other words, the voting situation in the Security Council did not really require consideration of the use of the veto.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think that we have created a situation in which we would be very embarrassed to use it in case the need arose?

Secretary RUSK. I think if we used the veto this would be looked upon as a major development but I would tell you that under the law and the charter, I would not myself hesitate to recommend it if the situation required it in the national interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything further?

I wonder if Mr. Cleveland wishes to carry on this morning? He is due to come tomorrow, but we have 40 minutes before noon, if you want to continue this morning. We could release the Secretary, if you are through with everything you wish to say.

Does any member of the committee wish to ask the Secretary anything further?

If not, we can go ahead with Mr. Cleveland and it will shorten tomorrow's meeting.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, if I could make one remark along Senator Clark's comment? We are now in the 20th anniversary year of the United Nations and although these particular amendments are fairly simple as far as the issues are concerned and quite straightforward as to their effect, I do hope that this will be the occasion for the Senate to give some thoughtful discussion to the United Nations, its role, and its future. If there are ideas about the way in which the United Nations might be improved or ideas about the way in which future charter amendments might be considered, we, on our side, would be glad to have those become a part of the discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will certainly be glad to do that.

My own private opinion is that the organization is not so bad. The difficulty arises from the wisdom of those who try to make it operate.

It is not the machinery that falls down every now and then. It is the people who operate it.

Secretary RUSK. That frequently happens in human affairs, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am afraid it does.

Mr. Cleveland, is it all right for you to continue this morning?

Mr. CLEVELAND. I would be glad to.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone want to ask the Secretary anything?

Well, you can go back and solve the Vietnamese crisis.

I sure wish you would do something about that. We are giving you 30 minutes extra.

I want to announce that the Secretary will be meeting with the committee in executive session on Friday morning for a discussion on matters other than the one we had this morning.

Mr. Cleveland, we are very fortunate in having you here. I see no reason why we shouldn't proceed, if it is agreeable with you.

STATEMENT OF HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Chairman, I have no independent testimony or prepared statements beyond those that the Secretary has given this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it there is no difference between you and the Secretary about the wisdom of these amendments?

Mr. CLEVELAND. I agree with him thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. This time there is agreement within the administration.

Mr. CLEVELAND. I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, it might be useful to have in the record the three charts which we have up here on the easel, and perhaps I can say just a word about them.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

(The charts referred to follow:)

CHART I

EFFECT OF AMENDMENT OF THE U.N. CHARTER ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF NON PERMANENT SEATS ON THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL



CHART II

GEOGRAPHICAL ALLOCATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL SEATS

ALLOCATION	NUMBER OF MEMBERS 1945	NUMBER OF MEMBERS 1965	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	PRESENT AVER. DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS	FUTURE DISTRIBUTION WITH ENLARGEMENT
PERMANENT MEMBERS U.S. U.K. FRANCE CHINA USSR	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
REGIONAL ALLOCATION										
WESTERN EUROPE AND "OTHERS"	10	18	ITALY		IRELAND (SPLIT TERM)	NORWAY	NORWAY	NETHERLANDS	1	2
LATIN AMERICA	20	22	ARGENTINA ECUADOR	CHILE ECUADOR	CHILE VENEZUELA	BRAZIL VENEZUELA	BRAZIL BOLIVIA	URUGUAY BOLIVIA	2	2
AFRICA AND ASIA	12	60	CEYLON TUNISIA	CEYLON U.A.R. LIBERIA (SPLIT TERM) TURKEY (SPLIT TERM)	GHANA U.A.R.	GHANA MOROCCO PHILIPPINES (SPLIT TERM)	IVORY COAST MOROCCO	IVORY COAST JORDAN MALAYSIA (SPLIT TERM)	2½	5
EASTERN EUROPE	4	9	POLAND (SPLIT TERM)		RUMANIA (SPLIT TERM)		CZECHOSLOVAKIA (SPLIT TERM)		½	1
	51	114							11	15

CHART III

GEOGRAPHICAL ALLOCATION OF ECOSOC SEATS

ALLOCATION	NUMBER OF MEMBERS 1945	NUMBER OF MEMBERS 1965	1965	PRESENT AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS	FUTURE DISTRIBUTION WITH ENLARGEMENT
U.S.	1	1	U.S.	1	1
LATIN AMERICA	20	22	ARGENTINA CHILE ECUADOR PERU	4	5
WESTERN EUROPE AND "OTHERS" (INCLUDING U.K. AND FRANCE)	12	20	U.K. FRANCE AUSTRIA LUXEMBOURG CANADA	5	6
AFRICA AND ASIA	13	61	JAPAN ALGERIA IRAQ PAKISTAN GABON	5	12
EASTERN EUROPE (INCLUDING USSR)	5	10	USSR CZECHOSLOVAKIA RUMANIA	3	3
	51	114		18	27

DISTRIBUTION OF NONPERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL SEATS

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Chairman, this first one at first glance is a little complicated but I think it tells an interesting story.

This is an analysis of the original, and then the proposed, distribution of nonpermanent members of the Security Council. This analysis excludes the five permanent members to see how the rest of the percentage would come out.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. CLEVELAND. The original membership of the U.N. excluding the 5 permanent members shows that Latin America accounted for 43 percent; 9 percent was Eastern Europe; 22 percent West European; and 26 percent Afro-Asian, the 12 Afro-Asians that the Secretary referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all of Africa and all of Asia?

Mr. CLEVELAND. All of Africa and all of Asia. There were only at that time two African States, the Ethiopians and Liberians who were independent states.

The CHAIRMAN. This is when, 1946?

Mr. CLEVELAND. This is the original membership which signed the charter in 1945.

The present membership of the U.N., still excluding the 5 permanent members, shows more than half of the total as Afro-Asians, 55 percent, with only 22 Latin American States, just 2 more—Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago—than there were before; 9 Eastern European States, 8 percent, and 18 Western European States and others.

This is a new form of words adopted in the resolutions on these charter amendments to cover in effect the old commonwealth; that is Australia, New Zealand, Canada, thrown into the pot with Western Europe, rather than with the Western Hemisphere in the case of Canada, and with Asia in the case of Australia and New Zealand.

Now, the average distribution in the last 5 years of these nonpermanent seats has worked out to the Afro-Asians having 42 percent of the seats as against their 55 percent in the General Assembly, the Latin Americans being in this sense overrepresented in 33 percent of the seats with 20 percent of the membership, and the Western Europeans and Eastern Europeans being roughly about right in terms of the membership distribution.

The future distribution, as you will see, still underrepresents the Afro-Asian States by 5 percent; that is, they would have half of the nonpermanent seats in the Security Council, whereas they have 55 percent of the comparable seats in the General Assembly.

The Latin American States would be brought to 20 percent, which is just their percentage of the total membership.

Eastern European States would have 10 percent and the Western European and others would have 20 percent of the nonpermanent seats.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this amendment make it rigid with regard to geography?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes; there is in effect a written gentlemen's agreement now passed in the resolution by which the charter amendments were put——

The CHAIRMAN. Heretofore there was no such requirement on geography. Just a gentlemen's agreement?

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Mr. CLEVELAND. It was a gentlemen's agreement but also on a geographical basis.

Senator PELL. To interpolate, didn't we violate the gentlemen's agreement once?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, ever since the gentlemen's agreement was arrived at the gentlemen have been arguing about it.

The Eastern Europeans, for example, claim the gentlemen's agreement reserved one seat for them but in practice they have only had a seat about half the time and the rest of the time the growing Asian group has managed to have the seat in the alternate years. This has resulted in these split terms that have become quite familiar.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Cleveland a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is it true, Mr. Secretary, that two-thirds of the members of the U.N., that is in numbers, represent only 10 percent of the world's population and pay only 5 percent of the U.N. budget?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes, sir.

Rather a little less than 5 percent of the budget. And this is the center of the apportionment problem. The political effect of the charter amendments here, of the enlargement of the councils, is to prevent a situation in which the general membership, the small countries in particular, lose their sense of participation in these smaller and more effective councils to such an extent that their cooperation with these smaller organs of the United Nations tends to fall off.

The other political effect is that since the distribution of seats is arrived at by an election held in the General Assembly without any veto applying, the General Assembly majority does in fact have the votes to raid seats previously allocated under the gentlemen's agreement to Latin America and Western Europe if enough room isn't created in these councils for the very large number of new states.

This chart here shows the increase in number of members by these geographical categories in which the present gentlemen's agreement is described.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the increase in Eastern Europe from four to nine; who are the new ones?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, some of the Eastern Europeans weren't in in the beginning, you remember; Hungary.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. They have been in sometime, though.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Many of them were occupied at the time and were not really independent countries at that moment in history.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

So, your increase is primarily in Africa and Asia?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Africa and Asia, it is the decolonization process, of course, that has created it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL SEATS

Mr. CLEVELAND. The third chart is simply the same story for the Economic and Social Council where you don't have a veto, of course, and where you operate not by two-thirds but by majority vote.

Here, again, are the number of members by geographical area. In this case the analysis includes the permanent members of the Security

Council because they don't have any special status in the Economic and Social Council except they are always elected to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Always members?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, except the Chinese. In recent years the Chinese Nationalists have not been elected to the Economic and Social Council. They are very resentful of this, and indeed abstained on this charter amendment on that ground. They agreed to the Security Council one but abstained on the Economic and Social Council one. We don't know what effect that may have at the ratification stage.

This is the present average distribution of seats making up the 18 in the Economic and Social Council.

The American delegation has always had one seat, Latin Americans four, Western Europe five, Africa and Asia five, and Eastern Europe including the USSR three. The Communists would stay the same; Africa and Asia, of course, would get the big boost, 12; Western Europe and others—6 to take care of the Commonwealth group; Latin America—5 as against 4; and, of course, the American seat representing the new total of 27.

That is all the direct testimony that I think I need to add to what the Secretary has said and what Ambassador Stevenson will be saying tomorrow morning.

ARTICLE 19 CONTROVERSY

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything to say about this article 19 controversy, in addition to what the Secretary had to say?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that the important thing about it is to make a pretty clear distinction between what we would call the authorization stage and what we would call the appropriation stage of the U.N. peacekeeping.

As far as the authorization stage is concerned as to who can authorize a U.N. peacekeeping operation, I think we would have to say that the present situation is about right. That is, the Security Council is the first port of call in a peace and security matter. There is the escape hatch of the uniting for peace resolution into the General Assembly.

The General Assembly does in fact have, and the Soviets can't remove, the residual power to act by recommendation as it did, for example, in the only example in history, in the case of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East in 1956.

Of the 12 peacekeeping operations, that is operations using military personnel, in the U.N.'s history, only one has been authorized by the General Assembly.

When you come to the financial stage all large peacekeeping operations have had some element of voluntary contribution, some of them have been partly or mostly financed by assessments in the General Assembly. Essentially the issue is how far will the General Assembly be willing to use and enforce its power to tax, if that requires some enforcement against a major power? That, essentially, has been the political difficulty right along in the General Assembly, and this is something that only the General Assembly can decide.

We can't, of course, decide that all by ourselves.

The negotiations will be continuing. The deadline for some kind of resolution of this problem is the 1st of September when the 19th General Assembly reconvenes, a couple of weeks before the 20th General Assembly gets underway later that same month.

The CHAIRMAN. They are now negotiating about a possibility of some solution?

Mr. CLEVELAND. They are. Now, I think it would be fair to say that there are desultory conversations about a solution, focused particularly on the problem of how to get the U.N. back to reasonable solvency, and what kind of a fund or what kind of contributions might be made by the Soviets and others to assist in doing that.

But we frankly don't know whether the Soviets are going to be willing to pay something on their past debts or not, or to pay something on any basis.

But, regardless of what happens on that side, with respect to the past, it does seem to us to be important to preserve and enlarge, if we can, the capacity of the organization to build and pay for peace forces, because it looks as if there is going to be no lack of need for sitting on the lid in local and regional disputes here and there around the world as we go along.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

ADVISORY OPINION OF INTERNATIONAL COURT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Cleveland, what can you tell us about the authority of an advisory opinion of the International Court, such as was given at the request of the General Assembly on the payment of peacekeeping assessments.

The charter, I believe, says that the General Assembly can ask for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, and in another provision it says that certain disputes shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice.

Now, what is the difference? It seems pretty clear that under certain circumstances they have already agreed to submit certain things to the International Court, and in other circumstances it seems that the General Assembly may ask for an advisory opinion from the International Court.

What is the attitude of the General Assembly on the sanctity of that advisory opinion or its authority?

Do they recognize it, or do they say, "That is only an advisory opinion. It dosn't mean anything. It is subject to acceptance or refusal of our various countries as they see fit."

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, of course, it is subject to acceptance by the General Assembly which asked for the opinion.

In the financing case, the General Assembly asked for the opinion and the opinion was given. The General Assembly then accepted that by an overwhelming vote.

In other words, the General Assembly took the Court's advisory opinion on the law and said this would be the policy for the General Assembly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On the question of acceptance, did they say that sometimes there is a dispute as to what the word "acceptance" means? Did they take it in the context of, "Well, we will receive the opinion and file it, or we will receive the opinion and abide by it as a governing rule of the General Assembly?"

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, it was understood that they were accepting it, and that this implied that the General Assembly would be guided by it.

Now, there are two problems which have come up since then. One is the reluctance of the small country majority of the General Assembly to uphold that law and that policy when it came to a specific case in which article 19 would have to be applied to a major power, a permanent member of the Security Council.

And secondly, the Soviets and the French also have taken the line, in effect, that the advisory opinion was advisory, the acceptance by the General Assembly which can only make recommendations was a recommendation to governments, and they, for their part, don't accept the recommendation from the General Assembly. Therefore, neither the advisory opinion nor its acceptance by the General Assembly, against which they voted, is binding on the Soviets in their legal view.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; I understand that is their view, but do I also understand that the General Assembly has not officially taken the position that the advisory opinion of the International Court is binding on the General Assembly so far as assessments are concerned?

Mr. CLEVELAND. An advisory opinion is an authoritative statement of the law, but is not binding on governments in the way, for example, that a decision of the Court in a contentious case might be binding and enforceable since there are no contending parties in an advisory case on which the decision is binding.

It is advisory to an organ of the U.N., and it is up to that organ to decide what to do with that authoritative advice.

In this case, that organ, the General Assembly, took the advice, accepted it, and those of us who voted for that acceptance, I think, have a right to believe that the General Assembly would consider itself bound by that law, even if individual governments who voted against it did not. The Secretary General has recently considered himself to be bound by the Assembly's acceptance of the Court's opinion.

But so far, at least, the General Assembly has not been willing to carry that law into practice in the particular case even though the particular case seems to us to be constitutionally and legally quite clear.

Mr. Schwebel, of the Legal Adviser's Office is present; perhaps he should join me in this legal discussion.

NATIONS IN ARREARS ON PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many members of the United Nations are in default in their assessments for peacekeeping operations?

Mr. CLEVELAND. There are 12 that are behind by in excess of the 2-year rule in article 19. There are, of course, a great many more than that who are not fully paid up at any particular moment in history.

As a matter of fact, we, of course, have not in most years, we don't pay our general budget assessment until the latter part of the year, so that——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That comes from the appropriation process in this country. We have to wait until the authorization and the appropriation goes through Congress.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes, exactly.

Perhaps the way to look at it is what countries have paid nothing on the Congo and the U.N. emergency force which are the two contentious items here.

At the present time there are 18 countries that have never paid anything on the United Nations emergency force since it was set up in 1956, and 29 countries that have not paid anything on the Congo force. These figures are, of course, dramatically different, much lower than the number of countries that had never paid anything at the time that we were discussing the bond issue, the U.N. loan up here 3 years ago when as many as half of the total membership of the U.N. had not paid a dime on the Congo.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Most of these countries still want the benefits, if any, of the U.N., but they want the United States and a few others to pay the bills, is that correct?

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO U.N. BUDGET

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, I think that there is that tendency in this club. By and large, I think that the amounts that we pay in the U.N. are quite fair and reasonable if you take the proportion that our production bears to the aggregate national products of all the U.N. countries. We come out at somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 percent or a little more, we have more than 40 percent of the total gross national product of all U.N. members.

And our normal budget scale is 32 percent, a little less than 32 this year.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When you say 40 percent you are considering the special agencies and various others in addition to the normal assessments, aren't you?

Mr. CLEVELAND. What I am saying is, if you take our total production and compare it with the total production of all of the other U.N. members we are about 40 percent of the economic strength of the U.N. membership.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But if you take our contributions to all of the agencies, the whole ball of wax, not a loan, but the specific assessments to the semi-independent agencies or those that we contribute to, doesn't our contribution rise up above 40 percent of total?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Oh, no, it would work out probably around 37 percent, somewhere in that area. Because we have placed a ceiling on nearly all of our voluntary contributions at 40 percent of the total and none of the assessed scales places us above our U.N. percentage, which is 32 percent, approximately, and in many of the specialized agencies we pay a good deal less, our percentage averages out at about 37 percent.

ILO we pay 25 percent, the Universal Postal Union we pay 4½ percent.

SALE OF U.N. BONDS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How are we doing on the sale of U.N. bonds?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, the period of the sale for the U.N. bonds has now run out, and the total that has actually been purchased is $169,910,000. (See p. 137 for information on U.N. bonds.)

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What was the total authorized issue?

Mr. CLEVELAND. $200 million. And of that we have bought $76.2 million. We are not quite up to the 50-percent matching that was authorized. The formal position is that we would still be in a position to—this was an open ended appropriation, we would still be in a position to match up to the total amounts purchased by other nations, depending, however, on how these constitutional and financial questions work out and whether that seems to be advisable in the future or not.

We have been repaid on our bonds as have all the other bond holders, right on time and in full, for principal and interest.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do they contemplate another bond issue at the moment?

Mr. CLEVELAND. No; there is no talk of another bond issue at all.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How are they going to pay their bills?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Most of the talk up there in the course of these negotiations has been in terms of voluntary contributions to a fund to put the U.N. back in full solvency. Whether such an arrangement can be worked out, of course, depends on whether the Soviets are going to be prepared to pay anything that is usable for past debts in any form, which, so far, they have not been willing to do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Case?

Senator CASE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cleveland. I guess that is all this morning.

The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, April 29, 1965.)

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 1965

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Church, Clark, McCarthy, and Carlson.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee is meeting this morning to receive additional testimony on two amendments to the United Nations Charter which provide for an increase in the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

Our witness today is Mr. Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

We will also hear from public witnesses whose formal presentation will be limited to 10 minutes. Lengthier statements may of course be submitted and introduced in the record of the committee's printed hearings.

Mr. Stevenson, we are very pleased to have you this morning. Do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. ADLAI E. STEVENSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS; ACCOMPANIED BY HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Ambassador STEVENSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in his statement before this committee yesterday, the Secretary of State pointed out to you the very important part the United Nations plays in the conduct of our affairs and the way in which it helps to serve our national interests.

I would like to discuss with you today in somewhat more detail the proposed charter amendments and how they would affect the work of the organization.

Before doing so, I feel it is necessary, however, to clear up one misapprehension that has had too much currency: That is, due to the adjournment of the General Assembly this winter, due to unhappy circumstances following its postponement, that the United Nations is

a dead or dying institution. The fact is that while the General Assembly has been inactive for some months, the United Nations is in full operation, in some respects on a scale greater than ever before. One might say simply that its parliamentary arm is temporarily disabled.

The United Nations and its subbodies continue to debate matters of moment, to administer aid and technical assistance programs which are of benefit to millions of people, to mediate disputes, to maintain peacekeeping operations and to carry out a multitude of continuing responsibilities conferred upon it by past General Assemblies.

HISTORY OF CHARTER AMENDMENTS

Allow me now to review with you briefly some of the history behind the charter amendments which you are now called upon to approve for ratification.

When the charter was adopted in 1945, there were 51 members of the United Nations. The charter provided for a Security Council of 11 members, the 5 permanent members, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Soviet Union; each with a veto, and 6 nonpermanent members, 3 elected each year for a 2-year term. It further provided for an Economic and Social Council of 18 members, 6 elected each year for a term of 3 years.

In the Security Council, a 1945 "Gentlemen's Agreement," which I negotiated in London, governed the first election of the six nonpermanent members. This agreement allocated two seats to Latin America (then the largest single group of members) and one seat each to Western Europe, the British Commonwealth, the Middle East and Africa, and Eastern Europe. This allocation was subsequently followed in most other elections, although with the growth of African and Asian membership and with the hostile attitude long shown toward the United Nations by the countries of Eastern Europe, Asian and African countries often filled the seat originally allocated to Eastern Europe.

In 1946, there was only one Asian member (the Philippines) besides China and India (which was eligible for the Commonwealth seat), seven Middle Eastern members and two African members (Ethiopia and Liberia) in addition to South Africa, which was then eligible for the Commonwealth seat.

Since 1945, however, the membership of the United Nations has more than doubled to 114. Now the Africans and Asians, including those from the Middle East, constitute well over one-half (61) of the total membership, and the size of the councils has remained precisely the same.

As the membership has grown, there have been constantly increasing pressures for enlargement of the two councils. The first proposal for enlargement came from the Latin American countries after 16 new members were admitted in 1955. Over the years, the United States has consistently supported a reasonable increase in the membership

of the councils, but until 1964 any increase was always blocked by the Soviet Union, which contended that there could be no increase unless and until Communist China was seated in the United Nations.

As early as 1956, you may be interested to know, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, then a Senator and a member of our delegation to the 11th General Assembly, said in plenary session that, and I quote:

> The United States was already well disposed to an enlargement of the Security Council when so many new members were admitted.
>
> We feel—

he went on—

> that it is proper and just, in the interests of the maintenance of international peace and security that such an increase should take place. We hope the General Assembly will approve the increase now.

As it turned out, however, the enlargement resolution called for at the 11th General Assembly was not pressed to a vote because of Soviet opposition, and because members could not agree on the size of the enlargement or on the distribution of seats on an enlarged Council.

When enlargement amendments came to a vote in the 18th General Assembly in December 1963, the United States and the United Kingdom abstained while the Soviet Union and France voted against. Our abstention in 1963 was not, however, due to opposition to the substance of the resolutions, but rather because they were adopted at the end of the Assembly session. Last minute changes were made in the proposed size of the enlargements and, in the fast-moving parliamentary situation, we had insufficient time for renewed consultations with Members of the Congress and our United Nations allies. Hence we abstained.

ADVANTAGES OF SECURITY COUNCIL ENLARGEMENT

Allow me now to review briefly for you the specific advantages which we believe enlargement of the Security Council would bring and to set them in the context of the new voting alinements they would create.

The Security Council is the body primarily responsible for peace and security problems. If the enlargement amendments were to be ratified, the new geographic distribution of seats, written into resolutions adopted by the Assembly, would go into effect. That new distribution would be, in addition to the permanent members, five from African and Asian states, one from Eastern European states, two from Latin America and two from what is called the "Western European and others" category which includes the old Commonwealth members; that is to say, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

We consider this to represent a fair allocation to important geographic areas, and from the debate which took place in 1963, we believe it both meets the demands of those groups whose membership has grown so quickly since the founding of the United Nations, and protects the proper participation of others in the Council.

Allow me to point out also that in the absence of an increase in the number of seats on the Security Council, the areas which now consider themselves underrepresented can be expected to seek to increase their participation by putting up candidates for seats now held by other areas. The Council has already seen cases in which such conflicting regional pressures have resulted in "split" seats in which one area shares one-half of a 2-year term with another. This has occurred in the following instances: 1956–57, Yugoslavia-Philippines; 1960–61, Poland-Turkey; 1961–62, Liberia-Ireland; 1962–63, Rumania-Philippines; 1964–65, Czechoslovakia-Malaysia.

As a permanent member, our seat is of course in no danger, but seats belonging to Latin America, Western Europe, and other firm supporters of the United Nations might be taken away in such an unpredictable situation, unless there was an increase in the membership.

VOTING ALINEMENT ON SECURITY COUNCIL

As for voting alinements, we face, as one does in any parliamentary situation, two contingencies: one, where we desire to have approved a resolution which we consider to be in the interests of international peace and security, and the opposite, where we wish to prevent passage of a resolution of which we do not approve. In both these situations, it is our considered judgment that the voting alinements under the new allocation, with a majority requirement of 9, would not differ materially from the present one, the situation of 11 members and a majority of 7.

Why, one might well ask, is the voting majority of a 15-member council as low as 9?

We believe, as do a majority of United Nations members, that the Council's ability to act in a positive way is enhanced by the 9-vote majority which was, during the negotiations on the resolutions, cut down from an earlier proposal for a 10-vote majority.

We have always played a major role in supporting the ability of the Council to act in a positive way; we have continually supported its authority; the United States has helped to make the Council work. And we believe that under the proposed new voting balance we will be just as able as under the old arrangement to promote our national aims, and those of world peace through the Security Council.

The nine-vote majority will be a great aid to us and to other like-minded nations who wish the Council to act expeditiously in the cause of world peace.

There are, of course, resolutions introduced from time to time which we do not wish to see passed, resolutions which we believe to be contrary to the development of orderly international relations. The veto is still available to us in order to defend our own national interests. But we expect that, as in the past, our policies would be in harmony with those of a majority of Council members and we would not, as a

result of Security Council enlargement, be more likely to have to cast a veto than now. If we wish to impede passage of a resolution without use of the veto, the voting proportions to defeat a proposal in the enlarged Council would be substantially the same as they have been in the present one.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Since the Economic and Social council is a somewhat less prominent United Nations body, I will describe to you briefly its areas of responsibility. Under the direction of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council operates in the fields of technical assistance, of the practical application of science and technology, and of the promotion and protection of human rights throughout the world. It initiates studies, recommendations, and conferences in these areas and coordinates the activities of all United Nations specialized agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it deal with population control?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Has it done anything about it?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Well, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council have adopted several resolutions, some initiated by the Population Commission—which has made important, significant, and, I think, major contributions to an understanding of the problem of population. The Commission is a highly qualified commission of demographic experts.

BACKGROUND ON ENLARGEMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

With the expansion of United Nations membership, an Economic and Social Council made up of only 18 members has become less than sufficiently representative to carry out these tasks. It has been losing touch with some nations or groups of nations, and it has been losing support and not accomplishing all that the United Nations and we could wish in the broad area of economic and social development.

This problem was recognized by the members of ECOSOC as early as 1958. Again in 1963, as a culmination of this growing recognition, the Council considered a resolution of the Economic Commission for Africa regarding African representation in the Council and urged the General Assembly to increase the membership of the Council "in order that it can remain the effective and representative organ envisaged in chapters IX and X of the charter."

The following December, at the same time it adopted the charter amendments, the General Assembly invited the Council to enlarge the membership of its sessional committees: The Economic Committee, the Social Committee, and the Coordination Committee. This the Council did at its resumed session only a few days later, increasing the membership in each committee from 18 to 27.

As a result, during the 37th session of the Economic and Social Council in the summer of 1964, the three sessional committees consisted of 27 members, although the Council itself still had only 18. The nine countries which were members of the committees but not of the Council itself were accorded observer status at Council meetings. The nine additional countries played their full role in the work of the committees, and in addition they participated fully in Council debates but without the right to vote.

As a result of these interim arrangements, our delegation was able to judge the future of an enlarged council against the practical yardstick of the experience in the session last summer. Our experience at that time confirmed our earlier view.

We are convinced that the increased membership of the ECOSOC sessional committees increased the effectiveness of their work. We believe that a similar increase in the membership of the Council itself would improve the Council's ability to reflect the opinions of all areas of the world in its recommendations and actions on the important issues with which it deals.

Finally, there is a general reason why the United States should ratify both these amendments with enthusiasm. We seek a world of order and peace. We have everything to gain from international councils which also seek these ends and which truly represent the nations of the world. The United States is a nation which seeks only to strengthen the causes of justice and peace throughout the world, and has everything to gain from international councils which also seek these ends.

Hence, I join with the President and the Secretary of State in earnestly seeking your consent to these amendments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. It is a very clear and succinct statement.

Senator Church, do you have any questions?

NUMBER OF NATIONS WHICH HAVE RATIFIED AMENDMENTS

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Ambassador, how many members of the United Nations have thus far ratified these proposed amendments?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Sixty-five.

May I add that 76 are required to ratify, in order to bring the amendments into effect.

Senator CHURCH. Do you anticipate that that number will be secured by the time the General Assembly next meets?

Ambassador STEVENSON. I do anticipate it. I cannot, of course, guarantee it. The Soviet Union has already ratified. The United Kingdom will ratify I think almost concurrently with our ratification, if we do. And I would assume that the constitutional processes of a good many other countries during this spring, in the sessions of their parliamentary bodies, would take like action, and we would

have enough ratifications by the time the Assembly convenes in the middle of September.

Senator CHURCH. Has France ratified?

Ambassador STEVENSON. France has not ratified.

Senator CHURCH. What is the French position? Do you know?

Ambassador STEVENSON. All I know about it is that they have not interposed any serious objection to either of these enlargements.

DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES OF ENLARGED SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator CHURCH. Do you see any possible disadvantage to the United States that could result from the enlarged membership?

Ambassador STEVENSON. No; as I have pointed out, I think on the contrary, there are more advantages than disadvantages.

We have made very, very careful calculations over a period of many months as to the effect of the voting majorities, taking as illustrative a number of major issues over a period, say, of 5 years, and tried to figure out what the consequences would be as the result of the enlargement from 11 to 15, and the increase in the majority from 7 to 9.

As I said in this prepared statement, the conclusion is that it would have no perceptible difference on the experience of the past.

And, sir, may I add, Senator, there is this real hazard that we have now without enlargement—as long as the membership has increased from 51 to 114—that inevitably, the African-Asians will start to raid the seats of other countries, and one could hardly blame them, feeling they are so grossly underrepresented, having more than half the membership, and not more than one or two members on the Council. So this imperils, of course, especially the seats of the Latin Americans.

BLOC VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator CHURCH. There has been a frequent expression of concern in recent months over the growth of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations.

Has there been a great deal of bloc voting, monolithic bloc voting, up to the time that the General Assembly stopped meeting this year, to bear out this apprehension?

Ambassador STEVENSON. No. One has to be cautious in making any predictions. But on the basis of our experience to date, there is a good deal of misconception about the Afro-Asian voting. While they have a majority in the General Assembly now, actually the historical record is not one of solid bloc voting at all, and we have found in the Security Council, for example, that the African members who have sat there from time to time, the Afro-Asians, over the past, say 5 or 6 years, have in most cases, actually supported the position that the United States took. This contradicts, I think, what most people think. In some cases they have abstained.

I have statistics, by the way, on that, which might be of interest to the committee.

I have a review, for example, of 24 close votes on procedural and substantive issues in the Security Council since 1960, where the resolutions were not vetoed, which suggests that there probably would have been in virtually no case a change in the outcome of the vote on those issues had the Security Council been of the size and composition envisioned by these amendments, which I think is interesting.

There are certain cases, of course, as you well know, on what we call the colonial issues, where special interests are involved, especially the Africans, and where they vote with a solidarity that is not standard practice in other issues.

Senator CHURCH. I think, Mr. Ambassador, whatever studies the Department may have made on voting patterns since the Afro-Asian members have come to a majority in the General Assembly would be helpful to this committee in passing judgment on these amendments. If that information could be supplied, we would appreciate it.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes, sir; we would be very happy—if we cannot present it this morning, we can present it very shortly, and leave it with the clerk to be inserted in the record.

(The material referred to follows:)

VOTING RECORDS OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. The Afro-Asians numbered one-half of the membership in 1961. At that time there were 52 Afro-Asian States members of the United Nations out of a total membership of 105. In 1962, there were 58 Afro-Asian members of the United Nation out of a total membership of 110. In 1963, the figures were 61 and 113; in 1964, 62 and 115; in 1965, 61 and 114.

2. Attached are voting charts which record the positions of United Nations members on the most important and representative issues brought to a rollcall at the 16th, 17th, and 18th General Assemblies. The charts do not purport to show a country's position in detail. There are a large number of hand votes on which there is no official record. In addition, a simple tabulation of votes fails to reflect the role particular countries may play in pressing for key language changes before a draft resolution reaches the floor of the Assembly. Nevertheless, the charts are useful in correcting a common misconception that Afro-Asians vote as a bloc or that they generally oppose positions supported by the United States and its allies.

3. The Afro-Asian bloc includes states of differing political tendencies. Some of these are close allies of the United States and others like Outer Mongolia are either allied to the Soviet Union or highly sympathetic to its positions. Many adopt a posture of neutrality between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Because of these differences, the Afro-Asian countries seldom vote as a bloc. At the 16th, 17th, and 18th General Assemblies, for instance, the votes of nearly half of the Afro-Asians coincided as often or more often with the vote of the United States than with the vote of the Soviet Union. (One should note, however, that the final outcome on these key issues was much more favorable to the United States than to the Soviet Union. The reason is that even though the votes of the Afro-Asians were divided, the votes of the Latin Americans and West European States on these key issues generally coincided with those cast by the United States.)

4. The area in which a large number of Afro-Asian States do tend to vote alike is colonialism. But on colonial items as on other matters, it is necessary to examine the voting record of countries qualitatively in order to avoid misleading impressions. For example, the voting charts show that a high proportion of the votes of Afro-Asian States on colonial issues coincide with the Soviet Union's vote. However, this is not a case of Afro-Asian support for Soviet positions, but rather a demonstration of the fact that the Soviet Union has found it politically expedient to support some Afro-Asian positions on colonialism which the United

States, for one reason or another, could not support. Although the Soviet Union undoubtedly hoped that, in return, the Afro-Asians would give the Soviet Union greater support on issues on which it felt strongly, the charts would suggest that the Soviets have not been successful in this tactic.

5. Fears about the Afro-Asian bloc are also misplaced from the theoretical standpoint. Article 18(2) of the United Nations Charter requires that decisions of the General Assembly on important questions receive the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the members present and voting. It is unlikely that on an issue of vital importance to this country, the United States could not rally a blocking third in the Assembly. Our friends in Latin America and Western Europe alone constitute more than one-third of the membership; we could expect to receive strong support not only from them but from other nations in Africa and Asia as well.

47-378 O—65——5

VOTING RECORDS AT THE 18TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1963)

Explanation and Additional Items

1. The attached voting charts record the vote of each United Nations member on 23 of the most important and representative issues brought to a roll call vote at the 18th General Assembly. Each year hundreds of votes are taken at the General Assembly in connection with the various items of the agenda. Most of these matters, however, are dealt with by a show of hands or by a voice vote. Consequently, official United Nations documents record only the totals and do not indicate the votes of individual countries. These charts, therefore, do not purport to give a complete picture of each country's position at the 18th General Assembly.

2. An analysis of the selected issues shows that the majority view at the 18th General Assembly generally coincided with the United States position on most of the important questions before the session. The principal exceptions were the colonial issues. (Five of the eight issues on which the position of the United States did not coincide with the majority dealt almost exclusively with colonial questions in Africa.) The majority of the Assembly agreed with the United States on such East-West issues as the Korean Question and Chinese Representation. Also, the United States was in the majority on important peacekeeping issues like the continuation of UNEF and the extension of UNOC until June 30, 1964. The resolutions on these East-West issues were approved with the entire Soviet Bloc in opposition. Measured statistically, the position of the majority at the 18th General Assembly coincided with that of the United States 65% of the time or on 15 of the 23 issues selected.

3. The voting record of any country should be analyzed qualitatively in relation to the issues in order to avoid misleading impressions. For example, the voting record of most Afro-Asian nations on colonial items reveals a high proportion of votes which coincide with the USSR vote. This is not an indication of Afro-Asian support for the Soviet position, but rather a demonstration of the fact that the Soviet bloc finds it expedient to support some of the Afro-Asian positions on colonialism which the United States, for one reason or another, could not support.

4. The sponsorship of a resolution is sometimes a more meaningful indication of a nation's interest in an issue than a vote in favor of the resolution. For example, of the 4 resolutions listed in the attached voting charts on which both the vote of the United States and of the USSR coincided, only one was sponsored by the US and none by the Soviet Union.

5. Vote number 10, concerning the Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, requires additional explanation. The United States abstained on the final roll call vote taken on this issue in Committee 3, listed as vote number 10. But after a minor adjustment in text, the United States voted for the Declaration in Plenary with the reservation that in the event of a conflict between the provisions of one paragraph of the Declaration and the principle of free speech guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the latter would always prevail in the United States. The resolution in Plenary was not brought to a roll call vote and therefore could not be included in the charts.

6. Attention is specifically drawn to the preface to the charts where a number of extremely important resolutions are listed. These resolutions, while adopted by the 18th General Assembly, were not brought to a roll call vote and could not therefore be included among the selected issues.

LIST OF IMPORTANT RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY 18TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BUT NOT BROUGHT TO ROLL CALL VOTE

The 18th General Assembly adopted 113 resolutions; 66 were adopted by a unanimous vote, by acclamation or without objection, a large number of others by overwhelming majorities. Some of the major resolutions passed by the 18th General Assembly, especially in the field of disarmament and space, were never brought to a roll call vote. Significant resolutions at the 18th General Assembly that were adopted unanimously, by acclamation, or by large majorities and that, moreover, had the full support of the United States included the following:

1. Question of General and Complete Disarmament (Bombs in Orbit resolution) - by acclamation.
2. Question of General and Complete Disarmament (Approving work of 18 Nation Committee on Disarmament) - unanimous.
3. Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Tests (Calling on all states to become parties to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) - 104-1-3.
4. Draft Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space - unanimous.
5. International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - unanimous.
6. Report of the Commissioner-General of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East - 82-1-14.
7. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development - unanimous.
8. Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources Released by Disarmament - unanimous.
9. United Nations Training and Research Institute - 78-1-11
10. Special Training Program for Territories under Portuguese Administration - 102-2-1.
11. Budget for the Financial Year 1964: its three parts - 96-10-3; 109-0-0; 97-11-1.
12. International Cooperation Year - unanimous.
13. Question of Malta - unanimous.
14. Question of Northern Rhodesia - unanimous.
15. Question of Nyasaland - unanimous.
16. International Cooperation in the Application of Science and Technology to Economic and Social Development - unanimous.
17. Participation of Women in National, Social and Economic Development - unanimous.
18. Terms and Conditions Governing the Issue of United Nations Bonds 88 12-5.

LIST 1

VOTING PATTERN FOR 18TH REGULAR SESSION
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SEQ	RESL	DOCUMENT #	VOTE		VOTE DATE	FINAL VOTE	TITLE
01	1911	A5618	P		11-27-63	091 000 015	DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA: RES EXPRESSING HOPE LA STATES WILL INITIATE STUDIES LEADING TO LA DENUCLEARIZED ZONE
02		AL427	P		10-21-63	041 057 012	CHINESE REPRESENTATION: ALBANIAN RESOLUTION CALLING FOR REMOVAL OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK REPS AND INVITING PRC REPS TO OCCUPY CHINA'S PLACE IN UN
03	1964	AC1L333	C	1	12-09-63	073 010 015	KOREA: OPER PARA 2 OF US RES INVITING ROK REP TO TAKE PART IN DISCUSSION OF KOREAN QUESTION
04		AC1L334	C	1	12-09-63	025 054 020	KOREA: MONGOLIAN RES INVITING NORTH KOREAN REPS TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSION OF KOREAN QUESTION
05	1964	A5666	P		12-13-63	065 011 024	KOREA: 14-POWER RES CALLING UPON NORTH KOREANS TO ACCEPT UN OBJECTIVES AND REQUESTING CONTINUATION OF UNCURK
06	1912	A5624	P		12-03-63	079 001 018	PALESTINE REFUGEES: OP PARA 4 OF US RES CALLING ON PCC TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA 11 OF RES 194 (III)
07	1991	A5675	P		12-17-63	097 011 004	ENLARGEMENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL: RES CALLING FOR INCREASE FROM 11 TO 15 MEMBERS
08	1991	A5675	P		12-17-63	096 011 005	ENLARGEMENT OF ECOSOC: RES CALLING FOR INCREASE FROM 18 TO 27 MEMBERS
09	1992	A5653A1	P		12-17-63	096 000 011	ENLARGEMENT OF COMMITTEES OF ECOSOC: RES INVITING ECOSOC ENLARGE COMMITTEES
10	1904	AC3L1148	C	3	10-28-63	089 000 017	DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: DRAFT DECLARATION AS A WHOLE
11	1983	A5680	P		12-17-63	061 011 034	UNEF: OP PARA 3 (SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS) OF RES PROVIDING FINANCING FOR 1964
12	1983	A5680	P		12-17-63	077 011 020	UNEF: RES PROVIDING FOR FINANCING FOR 1964.
13	1885	A5567	P		10-18-63	076 011 020	UNOC: FINANCING FOR FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1964
14	1928	AC5L810R1	C	5	11-29-63	069 008 003	GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF OF SECRETARIAT: 16-POWER RES ASKING SYG TO TAKE MEASURES TO ACHIEVE "EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION" OF POSTS
15	1956	AL443	P		12-11-63	095 000 006	RES CONTINUING COMMITTEE OF 24 AND APPROVING ITS REPORT
16	1881	A5565	P		10-11-63	106 001 000	THE POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA: RES CONDEMNING SA AND REQUESTING RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS
17	1978	A5565A1	P		12-16-63	099 002 000	POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF GOVT OF SAFRICA: RES ASKING ASSISTANCE FOR FAMILIES OF PERSONS PERSECUTED BY GOVT OF SAFRICA
18	1899	A5605	P		11-13-63	084 006 017	SWAFRICA: RES AFFIRMING RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, CONDEMNING GOVT OF SAFRICA, CALLING FOR ARMS AND OIL EMBARGO
19	1979	A5605A1	P		12-17-63	089 002 003	SWAFRICA: RES FINDING SITUATION IN SWAFRICA IS SERIOUSLY DISTURBING INTERNATIONAL PEACE & REQUESTING SC CONSIDERATION
20	1913	A5629	P		12-03-63	091 002 011	PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES: RES NOTING REFUSAL OF PORTUGAL TO IMPLEMENT PRIOR UN RESOLUTIONS AND REQUESTING IMMEDIATE SC CONSIDERATION
21	1883	A5564	P		10-14-63	090 002 013	SOUTHERN RHODESIA: 44-POWER RESOLUTION INVITING UK NOT TO TRANSFER POWER TO PRESENT GOVT
22	1889	A5564A1	P		11-06-63	073 002 015	SOUTHERN RHODESIA: RES URGING MEMBERS TO USE INFLUENCE WITH UK & CALLING ON UK NOT TO GRANT INDEP
23	1967	A5671	P		12-16-63	065 015 027	FRIENDLY RELATIONS: NETHERLANDS RES REQUESTING STUDY OF DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL BODY FOR FACT-FINDING

LIST 2

VOTING PATTERN FOR 18TH REGULAR SESSION
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A F - AFRICA

SUBJ NO	1	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	COINCIDE WITH US	USSR	NEITHER	BOTH
ALGERIA	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	3	9	7	4
BURUNDI	A	Y	Y	Y	A	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	AB	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	AB	A	3	8	10	2
CAMEROON	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	A	10	6	5	2
CENTRAL AF	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	5	5	3
CHAD	Y	N	Y	N	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	6	4	3
CONGO BRAZ	Y	N	Y	A	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	AB	A	Y	Y	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	7	4	9	3
CONGO LEOP	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	6	5	2
DAHOMEY	Y	N	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	A	8	5	7	3
ETHIOPIA	Y	AB	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	N	5	8	7	3
GABON	Y	N	Y	N	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	AB	Y	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	AB	Y	7	4	10	2
GHANA	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	6	8	5	4
GUINEA	Y	Y	AB	AB	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	4	7	8	4
IVORY COAS	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	A	10	5	5	3
KENYA	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Y	Y		AB	AB	-	-	-	-	AB	-	Y	-	-	-	-	1		5	1
LIBERIA	Y	N	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	6	5	2
LIBYA	Y	N	AB	AB	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	6	6	7	4
MALAGASY R	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	9	6	5	3
MALI	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	2	9	8	4
MAURITANIA	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	9	5	5	4
MOROCCO	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	8	7	4
NIGER	Y	N	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	6	5	2
NIGERIA	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	6	6	8	3
RWANDA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	AB	Y	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	10	5	7	1
SENEGAL	Y	N	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	7	5	7	4
SIERRA LEO	Y	A	Y	A	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	7	5	8	3
SOMALIA	Y	Y	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	AB	Y	A	5	6	9	3
SOUTH AFRI	Y	N	Y	N	AB	AB	A	A	AB	AB	A	A	AB	Y	A	N	N	N	N	AB	N	N	AB	9		14	
SUDAN	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	A	5	8	7	3
TANGANYIKA	Y	Y	AB	AB	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	5	7	8	3
TOGO	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	A	10	4	6	3
TUNISIA	A	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	7	8	4	4
UGANDA	AB	Y	AB	AB	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	3	7	10	3
UPPER VOLT	Y	N	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	AB	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	AB	AB	6	5	10	2
ZANZIBAR	-	-	-	-	-	-	AB	AB	AB		A	A	-	-	-	-	AB	-	AB	-	-	-	-			7	
UNITED STA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	N	Y	A	A	A	Y				
U S S R	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N				
AREA TOTALS:																								224	193	239	94

VOTING KEY:
Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTAIN
AB - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO MEMBERSHIP

1 - DISARMAMENT/TESTING
2-5 - EAST WEST ISSUES
6 - OTHER POLITICAL QUESTIONS
7-9 - UN ORGANIZATION
10 - ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
11-14 - UN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE
15-22 - COLONIAL AND RACIAL ISSUES
23 - LEGAL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

LIST.2

VOTING PATTERN FOR 18TH REGULAR SESSION
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A R A - AMERICAN HEMISPHERE

SUBJ NO	1	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	COINCIDE WITH US	USSR	NEITHER	BOTH
ARGENTINA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	6	3	4
BOLIVIA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	9	6	6	2
BRAZIL	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	9	5	5	4
CHILE	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	11	6	2	4
COLOMBIA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	8	6	5	4
COSTA RICA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	11	6	2	4
CUBA	A	Y	AB	AB	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N		17	2	4
DOMINICAN	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	AB	AB	AB	Y	10	3	8	2
ECUADOR	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	10	5	4	4
EL SALVADO	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	AB	Y	AB	AB	Y	AB	AB	AB	Y	10	1	9	3
GUATEMALA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	11	5	4	3
HAITI	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	AB	AB	A	AB	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	AB	Y	8	3	10	2
HONDURAS	AB	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	AB	AB	AB	AB	Y	AB	AB	Y	10	1	12	
JAMAICA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	6	3	4
MEXICO	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	11	6	2	4
NICARAGUA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	AB	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	AB	AB	Y	AB	AB	AB	Y	9	2	10	2
PANAMA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	8	6	5	4
PARAGUAY	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	AB	Y	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	8	5	8	2
PERU	Y	N	Y	N	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	8	5	7	3
TRINIDAD T	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	6	3	4
URUGUAY	Y	N	AB	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	9	6	4	4
VENEZUELA	A	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	7	2	4
UNITED STA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	N	Y	A	A	A	Y				
U S S R	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N				
ALL TOTALS:																								200	119	116	71

VOTING KEY:
Y - YES
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NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO MEMBERSHIP

1 - DISARMAMENT/TESTING
2-5 - EAST WEST ISSUES
6 - OTHER POLITICAL QUESTIONS
7-9 - UN ORGANIZATION
10 - ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
11-14 - UN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE
15-22 - COLONIAL AND RACIAL ISSUES
23 - LEGAL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

LIST 2

VOTING PATTERN FOR 18TH REGULAR SESSION
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

E U R - EUROPE

SUBJ NO	1	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	US	COINCIDE WITH USSR	NEITHER	BOTH
ALBANIA	AB	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	N	N	N	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N		14	5	4
AUSTRIA	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	10	4	5	4
BELGIUM	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	16		3	4
BULGARIA	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N		19		4
BYELORUSSI	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N		19		4
CANADA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	15	1	3	4
CZECHOSLOV	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N		19		4
DENMARK	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	12	4	3	4
FINLAND	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	9	4	6	4
FRANCE	A	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	N	A	A	A	A	Y	12	4	4	3
HUNGARY	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N		18	1	4
ICELAND	Y	A	Y	N	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	10	3	6	4
IRELAND	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	12	3	4	4
ITALY	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	15	1	3	4
LUXEMBOURG	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	14	1	4	4
NETHERLAND	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	14	1	4	4
NORWAY	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	12	4	3	4
POLAND	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N		19		4
PORTUGAL	Y	A	AB	AB	AB	A	A	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	AB	AB	N	N	N	N	N	N	AB	7	1	15	
RUMANIA	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	1	17	1	4
SPAIN	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	AB	Y	N	A	N	A	A	Y	12	1	8	2
SWEDEN	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y		Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	11	4	3	4
UKRAINIAN	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N		19		4
UNITED KIN	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	N	A	A	NP	NP	Y	16	1	3	3
YUGOSLAVIA	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	5	9	5	4
UNITED STA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	N	Y	A	A	A	Y				
U S S R	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N				
AREA TOTALS:																								203	190	89	92

VOTING KEY:
Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTAIN
AB - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO MEMBERSHIP

1 - DISARMAMENT/TESTING
2-5 - EAST WEST ISSUES
6 - OTHER POLITICAL QUESTIONS
7-9 - UN ORGANIZATION
10 - ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
11-14 - UN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE
15-22 - COLONIAL AND RACIAL ISSUES
23 - LEGAL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

LIST 2

VOTING PATTERN FOR 18TH REGULAR SESSION
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

N E A - NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

SUBJ NO	1	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	COINCIDE WITH US	USSR	NEITHER	BOTH
AFGHANISTA	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	6	8	5	4
CEYLON	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	~	A	6	8	5	4
CYPRUS	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	11	6	2	4
GREECE	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	15	1	3	4
INDIA	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	8	8	3	4
IRAN	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	6	3	4
IRAQ	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	A	3	7	10	3
ISRAEL	Y	A	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	9	6	5	3
JORDAN	AB	N	A	A	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	3	6	10	4
KUWAIT	Y	A	AB	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	A	3	5	12	3
LEBANON	Y	A	AB	AB	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	7	6	6	4
NEPAL	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	6	7	8	2
PAKISTAN	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	8	7	5	3
SAUDI ARAB	Y	A	AB	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	AB	AB	Y	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	2	4	14	3
SYRIA	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	4	7	8	4
TURKEY	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	14	2	3	4
UNITED ARA	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	3	8	8	4
YEMEN	Y	Y	AB	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	A	A	A	AB	Y	Y	AB	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	AB	1	7	13	2
UNITED STA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	N	Y	A	A	A	Y				
U S S R	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N				
AREA TOTALS:																								119	109	123	63

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LIST 2

VOTING PATTERN FOR 18TH REGULAR SESSION
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

F E - FAR EAST

SUBJ NO	1	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	COINCIDE WITH US	USSR	NEITHER	BOTH
AUSTRALIA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	Y	14	2	3	4
BURMA	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	4	8	8	3
CAMBODIA	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	4	8	7	4
CHINA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	12	6	1	4
INDONESIA	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	6	9	4	4
JAPAN	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	Y	13	3	3	4
LAOS	AB	Y	AB	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	3	7	9	4
MALAYSIA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	11	6	2	4
MONGOLIA	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N		19		4
NEW ZEALAN	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	Y	12	2	5	4
PHILIPPINE	Y	N	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	10	6	4	3
THAILAND	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	AB	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	11	6	3	3
UNITED STA	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	N	Y	A	A	A	Y				
U S S R	A	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N				
AREA TOTALS:																								100	82	49	45

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VOTING PATTERN FOR SIXTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PAGE I)

AFRICA

KEY: Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
\- VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

	FRENCH AFRICAN GROUP	CAMEROUN	CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.	CHAD	CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)	DAHOMEY	GABON	IVORY COAST	MALAGASY	MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL	UPPER VOLTA	CASABLANCA POWERS	GHANA	GUINEA	MALI	MOROCCO	U.A.R.	EMPAIROBE AFRICA	CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)	ETHIOPIA	LIBERIA	LIBYA	NIGERIA	SIERRA LEONE	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	REP. OF SOUTH AFRICA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (YES - NO - ABSTENTIONS)
DISARMAMENT/NUCLEAR TESTING RADIATION ITEMS																																			
25-STATE RESOLUTION ON ATOMIC RADIATION COMMITTEE REPORT: IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF USSR TESTING, 10/20/61 (RESOLUTION 1629)(SPC)		Y	Y	Y	a	a	a	Y	a	-	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	75-0-17
CZECH RESOLUTION MERELY NOTING ATOMIC RADIATION COMMITTEE REPORT, 10/20/61 (SPC)		N	A	Y	a	a	a	Y	a	-	Y	A	A		A	?	Y	Y	Y		Y	A	A	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	-	A	A	A	A	Y	33-22-37
RESOLUTION APPEALING TO USSR NOT TO EXPLODE 50-MEGATON BOMB, 10/27/61 (RESOLUTION 1632)		Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	A	a	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	87-11-1
INDIAN RESOLUTION CALLING FOR URGENT, UNCONTROLLED MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING, 11/6/61 (RESOLUTION 1648)		Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	a	Y	Y	a	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	N	N	N	71-20-8
US-UK RESOLUTION CALLING FOR NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY WITH EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, 11/8/61 (RESOLUTION 1649)		Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a		A	A	A	A	A		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	71-11-15
AFRICAN RESOLUTION ON CREATION OF AFRICAN DENUCLEARIZED ZONE, 11/24/61 (RESOLUTION 1652)		A	A	A	A	a	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	A	A	Y	55-0-44
AFRO-ASIAN RESOLUTION ON BANNING USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 11/24/61(RESOLUTION 1653)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	N	N	Y	55-20-26
SWEDISH RESOLUTION ON AGREEMENT BY NON-NUCLEAR POWERS NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ALLOW THEM TO BE STATIONED ON THEIR TERRITORY, 11/30/61 COMMITTEE I (RESOLUTION 1664)		A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	a	Y	a		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	A	N	Y	57-12-32
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																																			
CENSURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER LOUW FOR GENERAL DEBATE SPEECH, 10/11/61		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	N	NP	Y	67-1-20

RESOLUTION ASKING FRANCE TO RECOGNIZE IMPRISONED ALGERIANS AS POLITICAL PRISONERS, 11/15/61 (RESOLUTION 1650)	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	A	A	Y	62-0-31
INDIAN RESOLUTION ON WEST NEW GUINEA CALLING FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN DUTCH AND INDONESIANS, 11/27/61	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	A	Y	A	Y	-	A	Y	N	N	Y	41-40-21
FRENCH-AFRICAN RESOLUTION ON WEST NEW GUINEA STRESSING SELF-DETERMINATION AND ESTABLISHING UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION, 11/27/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	-	Y	N	A	Y	N	53-41-9
38-STATE RESOLUTION ON COLONIALISM ESTABLISHING UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON GRANTING INDEPENDENCE, 11/27/61 (RESOLUTION 1654)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	97-0-4
SOVIET AMENDMENT TO 38-STATE RESOLUTION ON COLONIALISM, SETTING 1962 AS YEAR OF ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM, 11/27/61	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	-	A	N	N	N	Y	19-46-36
SANCTIONS AND EXPULSION PARAGRAPHS OF AFRICAN RESOLUTION ON APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA, 11/28/61	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	A	Y	N	N	Y	48-31-22
INDIAN RESOLUTION ON APARTHEID, CONDEMNING SOUTH AFRICA BUT WITHOUT CALL FOR SANCTIONS OR EXPULSION, 11/28/61 (RESOLUTION 1663)	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	97-2-1
RESOLUTION ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA PROCLAIMING RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INDEPENDENCE, 12/13/61 (RES.1702)CMTE IV	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	86-1-4
NON-COMPLIANCE OF PORTUGAL WITH GA RESOLUTION 1542(XV) REGARDING REPORTING TO UN ON ITS OVERSEAS TERRITORIES, 12/19/61 (RESOLUTION 1699)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	a	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	90-3-2
ALGERIA - RESOLUTION CALLING FOR RENEWAL OF NEGOTIATIONS; WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO FGAR, 12/20/61 (RESOLUTION 1724)	A	A	A	a	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	62-0-38

N.B. 1) All votes are roll call votes and were held in Plenary Session (2/3 majority required) unless otherwise indicated. Committee votes require only simple majority.

2) Resolution numbers are indicated for those resolutions formally adopted by GA. No numbers are indicated for procedural motions or where resolutions failed of passage.

3) Soviet bloc consists of ten members: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Ukrainian S.S.R., USSR. Bloc voted together on all issues.

4) Absences are not included in comparative totals listed at bottom of PAGE II.

VOTING PATTERN FOR SIXTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PAGE II)

AFRICA

Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
\- VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

	FRENCH AFRICAN GROUP	CAMEROUN	CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.	CHAD	CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)	DAHOMEY	GABON	IVORY COAST	MALAGASY	MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL	UPPER VOLTA	CASABLANCA POWERS	GHANA	GUINEA	MALI	MOROCCO	U.A.R.	BRAZZAVILLE AFRICA	CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)	ETHIOPIA	LIBERIA	LIBYA	NIGERIA	SIERRA LEONE	SOMALIA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	T-J	TUNISIA	REP. OF SOUTH AFRICA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (YES-NO ABSTENTIONS)
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																																			
ANGOLA - BULGARIA-POLAND RES CALLING FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST PORTUGAL, 1/30/62		Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	a	Y	A		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	N	N	Y	26-43-32
ANGOLA - AFRO-ASIAN RES CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION OF ANGOLA, 1/30/62 (RES. 1742)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	99-2-1
RES CALLING ON UN CMTE OF 17 TO CONSIDER WHETHER SOUTHERN RHODESIA IS FULLY SELF-GOVERNING, 2/23/62 (RES.1745)		Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	57-21-24
RES ON RUANDA-URUNDI ENVISAGING TERMINATION OF UN TRUSTEESHIP ON 7/1/62 AND ALLOWING FOR POSSIBLE CONTINUED BELGIAN PRESENCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE, 2/23/62 (RES.1743) CMTE IV		Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	A	87-0-11
EAST WEST ITEMS																																			
INSCRIPTION OF ITEM ON TIBET, 9/25/61		Y	A	A	Y	a	A	A	A	-	Y	A	Y		A	N	N	A	A		A	A	Y	A	A	-	A	A	-	A	A	A	Y	N	48-14-35
INSCRIPTION OF ITEM ON HUNGARY, 9/25/61		A	A	A	A	a	A	A	A	-	A	A	A		A	N	N	A	A		A	A	Y	A	A	-	A	A	-	A	A	Y	Y	N	51-15-30
MONGOLIAN MOTION ON SEATING 2 KOREANS AS AMENDED, 12/13/61 CMTE I		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		A	N	N	A	A		Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	-	Y	A	Y	Y	N	63-18-19
UNITED STATES MOTION NOT TO SEAT NORTH KOREA, 12/19/61 CMTE I		Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y		N	a	N	A	A		a	a	Y	A	A	A	A	A	a	A	A	Y	Y	N	54-17-22
KOREA - REAFFIRMING EARLIER UN RES AND EXTENDING UN CMTE FOR UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION, 12/20/61 (RES. 1740)		Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y		A	A	A	A	A		a	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	a	A	A	Y	Y	N	60-11-27
RECOGNITION OF RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR TIBET, 12/20/61 (RES. 1723)		Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		A	A	A	A	A		Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	a	A	A	A	Y	N	56-11-29
RES DEPLORING USSR AND HUNGARIAN LACK OF COOPERATION WITH UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON HUNGARY, 12/20/61 (RES. 1741)		A	A	a	a	Y	a	A	A	A	A	A	A		A	N	N	A	A		A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	a	A	a	Y	Y	N	49-17-32

CHINESE REPRESENTATION: IMPORTANT QUESTION RES, 12/15/61 (RES. 1668)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		N	N	N	N	N		Y	N	Y	Y	A	A	A	N	A	a	N	Y	Y	N	61-34-7
CHINESE REPRESENTATION: SOVIET RES TO SEAT CHINESE COMMUNISTS, 12/15/61	N	A	A	A	A	N	A	N	N	A	N	A		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		A	Y	N	N	A	Y	Y	Y	N	A	A	N	N	Y	37-48-19
CUBAN CHARGES vs US - CZECH-RUMANIAN RES - OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH URGING US TO STOP INTERFERENCE IN CUBA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 2/15/62 CMTE I	A	A	a	A	a	A	A	N	A	a	A	A		A	A	A	A	A		A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	N	Y	11-50-39
CUBAN CHARGES vs US - MONGOLIAN RES STRESSING PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION, 2/20/62	A	A	a	A	a	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	N	N	Y	37-45-18
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS																																		
ADMISSION OF MAURITANIA, 10/27/61 (RES. 1631)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y		A	N	N	N	N		A	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	68-13-20
US RES ON UNRWA ENDORSING PCC EFFORTS WITHOUT ARAB AMENDMENTS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1725)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y		Y	A	A	A	A		Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	a	A	A	a	Y	A	62-0-37
UNRWA: ARAB AMENDMENT RE PROPERTY RIGHTS, 12/20/61	N	N	A	a	A	a	N	N	Y	N	Y	N		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		N	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	a	A	Y	a	N	Y	40-37-21
16-POWER RES URGING DIRECT ARAB-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS, 12/19/61 (SPC)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	N	Y	A	Y		N	N	N	N	N		A	A	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	a	A	N	a	N	N	34-44-20
ARAB LEAGUE RES CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN OMAN AND WITHDRAWAL OF UK TROOPS, 12/14/61	a	a	a	a	a	a	A	A	a	a	A	A		A	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	A	A	Y	A	A	A	a	Y	-	a	Y	N	N	Y	33-21-37
RES AUTHORIZING ONUC FINANCING, FROM 11/1/61-6/30/62, 12/20/61 (RES. 1732)	A	A	a	a	Y	a	Y	N	A	a	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	A		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	a	Y	Y	A	Y	N	67-13-15
RES AUTHORIZING UNEF FINANCING, FROM 1/1/62-6/30/62, 12/20/61 (RES. 1733)	A	A	A	a	a	a	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	A		Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	a	Y	Y	A	Y	N	61-11-24
RES REQUESTING ICJ OPINION RE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF ONUC AND UNEF PAYMENTS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1731)	A	A	A	a	Y	a	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y		A	A	A	A	A		A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	a	A	Y	A	Y	N	52-11-32
RES APPROVING 200 MILLION UN BOND ISSUE FOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1739)	Y	A	Y	a	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	A		A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	a	A	Y	A	Y	N	58-13-24
													sub						sub														TOTAL
COINCIDE UNITED STATES	19	16	14	10	15	11	19	18	13	17	16	19	187	8	6	5	5	3	27	11	9	19	9	11	10	6	4	2	10	11	23			339
COINCIDE USSR	6	4	5	4	5	5	6	6	6	6	11	7	71	18	23	24	19	19	103	14	15	8	15	10	11	14	18	3	8	15	0			305
COINCIDE NEITHER	12	15	11	9	6	7	10	12	10	8	10	10	120	11	8	8	12	15	54	11	13	11	13	16	13	13	15	2	20	10	14			325
COINCIDE BOTH	5	5	5	4	4	3	5	5	4	4	5	4	53	6	5	6	6	6	29	5	5	5	6	6	5	6	6	2	5	6	1			140

VOTING PATTERN FOR SIXTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PAGE II)

Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
\- VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

	ARAB LEAGUE	IRAQ	JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	MOROCCO	SAUDI ARABIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TUNISIA	U.A.R.	YEMEN	MIDDLE AND FAR EAST	AFGHANISTAN	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA	CYPRUS	FED. OF MALAYA	GREECE	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	ISRAEL	JAPAN	LAOS	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PHILLIPINES	THAILAND	TURKEY	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (Yes - no - abstentions)
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																																			
ANGOLA - BULGARIA-POLAND RES CALLING FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST PORTUGAL, 1/30/62		Y	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A		A	A	A	A	N	A	A	N	Y	Y	N	A	N	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	Y	26-43-32
ANGOLA - AFRO-ASIAN RES CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION OF ANGOLA, 1/30/62 (RES. 1742)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	99-2-1
RES CALLING ON UN CMTE OF 17 TO CONSIDER WHETHER SOUTHERN RHODESIA IS FULLY SELF-GOVERNING, 2/23/62 (RES. 1745)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	N	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A	N	N	Y	57-21-24
RES ON RUANDA-URUNDI ENVISAGING TERMINATION OF UN TRUSTEESHIP ON 7/1/62 AND ALLOWING FOR POSSIBLE CONTINUED BELGIAN PRESENCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE, 2/23/62 (RES. 1743) CMTE IV		A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	87-0-11
EAST WEST ITEMS																																			
INSCRIPTION OF ITEM ON TIBET, 9/25/61		A	A	A	A	A	A	A	-	A	A	A		A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	48-14-35
INSCRIPTION OF ITEM ON HUNGARY, 9/25/61		A	a	A	A	A	A	A	-	A	A	A		A	Y	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	51-15-30
MONGOLIAN MOTION ON SEATING 2 KOREANS AS AMENDED, 12/31/61 CMTE I		N	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y		N	A	a	A	N	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	63-18-19
UNITED STATES MOTION NOT TO SEAT NORTH KOREA, 12/19/61 CMTE I		N	A	A	A	A	a	A	A	A	A	A		N	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	54-17-22
KOREA - REAFFIRMING EARLIER UN RES AND EXTENDING UN CMTE FOR UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION, 12/20/61 (RES. 1740)		A	Y	A	A	A	a	A	A	A	A	A		A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	60-11-27
RECOGNITION OF RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR TIBET, 12/20/61 (RES. 1723)		A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	56-11-29
RES DEPLORING USSR AND HUNGARIAN LACK OF COOPERATION WITH UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON HUNGARY, 12/20/61 (RES. 1741)		N	A	A	A	A	a	A	A	A	A	A		A	A	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	49-17-32

CHINESE REPRESENTATION: IMPORTANT QUESTION RES, 12/19/61 (RES. 1668)	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	A	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	61-34-7
CHINESE REPRESENTATION: SOVIET RES TO SEAT CHINESE COMMUNISTS, 12/15/61	Y	N	A	N	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A	N	N	Y	Y	N	A	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	37-48-19
CUBAN CHARGES vs US - CZECH-RUMANIAN RES - OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH URGING US TO STOP INTERFERENCE IN CUBA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 2/15/62 CMTE I	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	A	A	N	N	N	a	A	N	N	N	N	N	Y	11-50-39
CUBAN CHARGES vs US - MONGOLIAN RES STRESSING PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION, 2/20/62	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	A	Y	A	N	N	Y	N	Y	37-45-18
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS																																		
ADMISSION OF MAURITANIA, 10/27/61 (RES. 1631)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	A	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	68-13-20
US RES ON UNRWA ENDORSING PCC EFFORTS WITHOUT ARAB AMENDMENTS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1725)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	A	62-0-37
UNRWA: ARAB AMENDMENT RE PROPERTY RIGHTS, 12/20/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	A	A	A	Y	A	A	N	N	Y	40-37-21
16-POWER RES URGING DIRECT ARAB-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS, 12/19/61 (SPC)	N	N	N	N	N	N	a	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	Y	Y	a	A	N	A	A	N	N	N	34-44-20
ARAB LEAGUE RES CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN OMAN AND WITHDRAWAL OF UK TROOPS, 12/14/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	N	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	Y	33-21-37
RES AUTHORIZING ONUC FINANCING, FROM 11/1/61-6/30/62, 12/20/61 (RES. 1732)	A	A	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	67-13-15
RES AUTHORIZING UNEF FINANCING, FROM 1/1/62-6/30/62, 12/20/61 (RES. 1733)	A	A	A	A	Y	a	A	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	61-11-24
RES REQUESTING ICJ OPINION RE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF ONUC AND UNEF PAYMENTS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1731)	A	A	A	Y	A	a	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	a	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	52-11-32
RES APPROVING 200 MILLION UN BOND ISSUE FOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1739)	A	A	Y	A	Y	a	A	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	58-13-24

N.B. 1) All votes are roll call votes and were held in Plenary Session (2/3 majority required) unless otherwise indicated. Committee votes require only simple majority.

2) Resolution numbers are indicated for those resolutions formally adopted by GA. No numbers are indicated for procedural motions or where resolutions failed of passage.

3) Soviet bloc consists of ten members: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Ukrainian S.S.R., USSR. Bloc voted together on all issues.

4) Absences are not included in comparative totals listed at bottom of PAGE I.

VOTING PATTERN FOR SIXTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PAGE I)

MIDDLE AND FAR EAST

KEY:
Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
\- VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

DISARMAMENT/NUCLEAR TESTING RADIATION ITEMS	ARAB LEAGUE	IRAQ	JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	MOROCCO	SAUDI ARABIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TUNISIA	U.A.R.	YEMEN	MIDDLE AND FAR EAST	AFGHANISTAN	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA	CYPRUS	FED. OF MALAYA	GREECE	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	ISRAEL	JAPAN	LAOS	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	THAILAND	TURKEY	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (Yes - no - abstentions)
25-STATE RES ON ATOMIC RADIATION CMTE REPORT: IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF USSR TESTING, 10/20/61 (RES. 1629) (SPC)		A	a	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	75-0-17
CZECH RES MERELY NOTING ATOMIC RADIATION CMTE REPORT, 10/20/61 (SPC)		Y	a	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y		Y	Y	A	Y	N	Y	A	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A	N	A	A	A	A	Y	33-22-37
RES APPEALING TO USSR NOT TO EXPLODE 50-MEGATON BOMB, 10/27/61 (RES. 1632)		Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	87-11-1
INDIAN RES CALLING FOR URGENT, UNCONTROLLED MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING, 11/6/61 (RES. 1648)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		A	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	N	71-20-8
US-UK RES CALLING FOR NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY WITH EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, 11/8/61 (RES. 1649)		A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A		A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	71-11-15
AFRICAN RES ON CREATION OF AFRICAN DENUCLEARIZED ZONE, 11/24/61 (RES. 1652)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	55-0-44
AFRO-ASIAN RES ON BANNING USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 11/24/61 (RES. 1653)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	A	N	Y	Y	A	A	Y	-	Y	A	A	A	N	N	Y	55-20-26
SWEDISH RES ON AGREEMENT BY NON-NUCLEAR POWERS NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ALLOW THEM TO BE STATIONED ON THEIR TERRITORY, 11/30/61 CMTE I (RES. 1664)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	N	N	Y	57-12-32

COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																																				
CENSURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER LOUW FOR GENERAL DEBATE SPEECH, 10/11/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	NP	Y	67-1-20
RES ASKING FRANCE TO RECOGNIZE IMPRISONED ALGERIANS AS POLITICAL PRISONERS, 11/15/61 (RES. 1650)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	62-0-31
INDIAN RES ON WEST NEW GUINEA CALLING FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN DUTCH AND INDONESIANS, 11/27/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	A	N	A	A	Y	Y	N	Y	A	N	Y	41-40-21
FRENCH-AFRICAN RES ON WEST NEW GUINEA STRESSING SELF-DETERMINATION AND ESTABLISHING UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION, 11/27/61	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	A	Y	A	A	N	N	Y	N	A	Y	N	53-41-9
38-STATE RES ON COLONIALISM ESTABLISHING UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL CMTE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON GRANTING INDEPENDENCE, 11/27/61 (RES. 1654)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	97-0-4
SOVIET AMENDMENT TO 38-STATE RES ON COLONIALISM, SETTING 1962 AS YEAR OF ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM, 11/27/61	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	N	Y	A	A	A	A	A	N	A	N	N	A	A	N	N	N	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	Y	19-46-36
SANCTIONS AND EXPULSION PARAGRAPHS OF AFRICAN RES ON APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA, 11/28/61	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	N	A	A	N	A	Y	A	Y	N	A	A	Y	A	A	N	N	Y	48-31-22
INDIAN RES ON APARTHEID, CONDEMNING SOUTH AFRICA BUT WITHOUT CALL FOR SANCTIONS OR EXPULSION, 11/28/61 (RES.1663)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	97-2-1
RES ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA PROCLAIMING RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INDEPENDENCE,12/13/61(RES.1702) IV	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	86-1-4
NON-COMPLIANCE OF PORTUGAL WITH GA RES 1542(XV) REGARDING REPORTING TO UN ON ITS OVERSEAS TERRITORIES, 12/19/61 (RES. 1699)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90-3-2
ALGERIA - RES CALLING FOR RENEWAL OF NEGOTIATIONS; WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO FGAR, 12/20/61 (RES. 1724)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	62-0-38
												SUB																					TOTAL
COINCIDE UNITED STATES	1	8	8	9	5	5	4	4	11	3	4	62	3	9	5	8	25	17	23	32	6	5	24	27	27	20	8	16	23	23	29		392
COINCIDE USSR	23	14	13	15	19	14	18	16	14	19	17	182	19	15	15	17	1	10	8	0	18	24	7	3	3	4	14	11	5	7	4		367
COINCIDE NEITHER	13	12	16	13	12	11	15	14	12	15	16	149	15	14	15	11	10	9	6	4	13	8	6	8	8	10	16	10	10	8	4		334
COINCIDE BOTH	6	5	6	6	6	5	5	6	6	6	6	63	6	5	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	4	5	6	5	5	6		170

VOTING PATTERN FOR SIXTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PAGE I)

LATIN AMERICA

KEY: Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
\- VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (Yes - no - abstentions)
DISARMAMENT/NUCLEAR TESTING RADIATION ITEMS																							
25-STATE RES ON ATOMIC RADIATION CMTE REPORT: IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF USSR TESTING, 10/20/61 (RES. 1629) (SPC)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	75-0-17
CZECH RES MERELY NOTING ATOMIC RADIATION CMTE REPORT, 10/20/61 (SPC)	N	A	N	N	N	N	Y	N	A	N	N	a	N	A	a	N	N	A	N	A	A	Y	33-22-37
RES APPEALING TO USSR NOT TO EXPLODE 50-MEGATON BOMB, 10/27/61 (RES. 1632)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	87-11-1
INDIAN RES CALLING FOR URGENT, UNCONTROLLED MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING, 11/6/61 (RES. 1648)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	71-20-8
US-UK RES CALLING FOR NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY WITH EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, 11/8/61 (RES. 1649)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	71-11-15
AFRICAN RES ON CREATION OF AFRICAN DENUCLEARIZED ZONE, 11/24/61 (RES. 1652)	A	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	a	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	55-0-44
AFRO-ASIAN RES ON BANNING USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 11/24/61 (RES. 1653)	A	A	A	A	A	N	Y	a	A	A	N	A	A	Y	N	A	A	A	A	A	N	Y	55-20-26
SWEDISH RES ON AGREEMENT BY NON-NUCLEAR POWERS NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ALLOW THEM TO BE STATIONED ON THEIR TERRITORY, 11/30/61 CMTE I (RES. 1664)	A	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	N	A	A	A	A	A	N	Y	57-12-32
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																							
CENSURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER LOUW FOR GENERAL DEBATE SPEECH, 10/11/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	NP	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	67-1-20

RES ASKING FRANCE TO RECOGNIZE IMPRISONED ALGERIANS AS POLITICAL PRISONERS, 11/15/61 (RES. 1650)	A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	A	a	A	A	a	a	A	a	A	a	A	A	A	A	Y	62-0-31
INDIAN RES ON WEST NEW GUINEA CALLING FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN DUTCH AND INDONESIANS, 11/27/61	N	Y	A	N	N	N	Y	A	A	A	A	A	N	A	N	A	N	N	A	A	N	Y	41-40-21
FRENCH-AFRICAN RES ON WEST NEW GUINEA STRESSING SELF-DETERMINATION AND ESTABLISHING UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION, 11/27/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	53-41-9
38-STATE RES ON COLONIALISM ESTABLISHING UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL CMTE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON GRANTING INDEPENDENCE, 11/27/61 (RES. 1654)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	97-0-4
SOVIET AMENDMENT TO 38-STATE RES ON COLONIALISM, SETTING 1962 AS YEAR OF ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM, 11/27/61	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	a	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	19-46-36
SANCTIONS AND EXPLUSION PARAGRAPHS OF AFRICAN RES ON APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA, 11/28/61	N	A	N	N	N	a	Y	N	A	A	A	Y	A	A	N	N	A	A	A	A	N	Y	48-31-22
INDIAN RES ON APARTHEID, CONDEMNING SOUTH AFRICA BUT WITHOUT CALL FOR SANCTIONS OR EXPULSION, 11/28/61 (RES. 1663)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	97-2-1
RES ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA PROCLAIMING RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INDEPENDENCE, 12/13/61 (RES. 1702) CMTE IV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	86-1-4
NON-COMPLIANCE OF PORTUGAL WITH GA RES 1542 (XV) REGARDING REPORTING TO UN ON ITS OVERSEAS TERRITORIES, 12/19/61 (RES.1699)	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90-3-2
ALGERIA - RES CALLING FOR RENEWAL OF NEGOTIATIONS; WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PGAR, 12/20/61 (RES. 1724)	A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	a	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	62-0-38

N.B. 1) All votes are roll call votes and were held in Plenary Session (2/3 majority required) unless otherwise indicated. Committee votes require only simple majority.

2) Resolution numbers are indicated for those resolutions formally adopted by GA. No numbers are indicated for procedural motions or where resolutions failed of passage.

3) Soviet bloc consists of ten members: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Ukrainian S.S.R., USSR. Bloc voted together on all issues.

4) Absences are not included in comparative totals listed at bottom of PAGE II.

VOTING PATTERN FOR SIXTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PAGE II)

LATIN AMERICA

KEY: Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
\- VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (Yes - no - abstentions)
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																							
ANGOLA - BULGARIA-POLAND RES CALLING FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST PORTUGAL, 1/30/62	N	A	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	26-43-32
ANGOLA - AFRO-ASIAN RES CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION OF ANGOLA, 1/30/62 (RES. 1742)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	99-2-1
RES CALLING ON UN CMTE OF 17 TO CONSIDER WHETHER SOUTHERN RHODESIA IS FULLY SELF-GOVERNING, 2/23/62 (RES. 1745)	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	a	A	A	A	A	A	N	Y	57-21-24
RES ON RUANDA-URUNDI ENVISAGING TERMINATION OF UN TRUSTEESHIP ON 7/1/62 AND ALLOWING FOR POSSIBLE CONTINUED BELGIAN PRESENCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE, 2/23/62 (RES. 1743) CMTE IV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	87-0-11
EAST WEST ITEMS																							
INSCRIPTION OF ITEM ON TIBET, 9/25/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	a	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	48-14-35
INSCRIPTION OF ITEM ON HUNGARY, 9/25/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	51-15-30
MONGOLIAN MOTION ON SEATING 2 KOREANS AS AMENDED, 12/31/61 CMTE I	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	63-18-19
UNITED STATES MOTION NOT TO SEAT NORTH KOREA, 12/19/61 CMTE I	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	54-17-22
KOREA - REAFFIRMING EARLIER UN RES AND EXTENDING UN CMTE FOR UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION, 12/20/61 (RES. 1740)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	60-11-27
RECOGNITION OF RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR TIBET, 12/20/61 (RES. 1723)	Y	Y	Y	Y	/	Y	N	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	56-11-29
RES DEPLORING USSR AND HUNGARIAN LACK OF COOPERATION WITH UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON HUNGARY, 12/20/61 (RES. 1741)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	49-17-32

CHINESE REPRESENTATION: IMPORTANT QUESTION RES, 12/15/61 (RES. 1668)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	61-34-7
CHINESE REPRESENTATION: SOVIET RES TO SEAT CHINESE COMMUNISTS, 12/15/61	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	37-48-19
CUBAN CHARGES vs US - CZECH-RUMANIAN RES - OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH URGING US TO STOP INTERFERENCE IN CUBA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 2/15/62 CMTE I	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	11-50-39
CUBAN CHARGES vs US - MONGOLIAN RES STRESSING PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION, 2/20/62	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	37-45-18
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS																							
ADMISSION OF MAURITANIA, 10/27/61 (RES. 1631)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	68-13-20
US RES ON UNRWA ENDORSING POC EFFORTS WITHOUT ARAB AMENDMENTS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1725)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	62-0-37
UNRWA: ARAB AMENDMENT RE PROPERTY RIGHTS, 12/20/61	Y	N	A	N	N	A	Y	N	A	N	N	N	a	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	Y	40-37-21
16-POWER RES URGING DIRECT ARAB-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS, 12/19/61 (SPC)	A	A	Y	Y	A	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	N	N	34-44-20
ARAB LEAGUE RES CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN OMAN AND WITHDRAWAL OF UK TROOPS, 12/14/61	A	A	A	N	A	a	Y	N	A	A	A	A	a	A	N	A	A	A	A	A	N	Y	33-21-37
RES AUTHORIZING ONUC FINANCING, FROM 11/1/61-6/30/62, 12/20/61 (RES. 1732)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	67-13-15
RES AUTHORIZING UNEF FINANCING, FROM 1/1/62-6/30/62, 12/20/61 (RES. 1733)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	N	A	Y	Y	Y	A	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	61-11-24
RES REQUESTING ICJ OPINION RE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF ONUC AND UNEF PAYMENTS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1731)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	52-11-32
RES APPROVING 200 MILLION UN BOND ISSUE FOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1739)	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	a	N	A	A	A	Y	A	a	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	N	58-13-24
																					TOTAL		
COINCIDE UNITED STATES	29	27	26	31	30	27	1	25	22	25	26	21	17	26	28	29	28	30	27	27	502		
COINCIDE USSR	2	3	3	1	0	0	32	0	2	0	1	4	1	3	0	1	0	1	1	3	58		
COINCIDE NEITHER	7	9	9	6	8	7	4	10	11	10	11	8	6	8	3	8	8	8	9	9	159		
COINCIDE BOTH	5	4	5	5	5	2	6	5	5	4	5	5	2	4	3	5	4	4	5	4	87		

KEY: Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
\- VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

VOTING PATTERN FOR SIXTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PAGE I)

WEST EUROPE AND OLD COMMONWEALTH

	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWEDEN	UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA	UNITED KINGDOM	YUGOSLAVIA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (Yes - no - abstentions)
DISARMAMENT/NUCLEAR TESTING RADIATION ITEMS																							
25-STATE RES ON ATOMIC RADIATION CMTE REPORT: IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF USSR TESTING, 10/20/61 (RES. 1629) (SPC)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	75-0-17
CZECH RES MERELY NOTING ATOMIC RADIATION CMTE REPORT, 10/20/61 (SPC)	A	A	A	N	N	A	A	N	N	A	a	A	N	A	A	N	N	A	A	Y	A	Y	33-22-37
RES APPEALING TO USSR NOT TO EXPLODE 50-MEGATON BOMB, 10/27/61 (RES. 1632)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	87-11-1
INDIAN RES CALLING FOR URGENT, UNCONTROLLED MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING, 11/6/61 (RES. 1648)	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	A	A	Y	N	A	Y	N	A	Y	N	N	71-20-8
US-UK RES CALLING FOR NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY WITH EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, 11/8/61 (RES. 1649)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	N	71-11-15
AFRICAN RES ON CREATION OF AFRICAN DENUCLEARIZED ZONE, 11/24/61 (RES. 1652)	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	55-0-44
AFRO-ASIAN RES ON BANNING USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 11/24/61 (RES. 1653)	N	A	N	N	A	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	N	A	N	N	Y	N	Y	55-20-26
SWEDISH RES ON AGREEMENT BY NON-NUCLEAR POWERS NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ALLOW THEM TO BE STATIONED ON THEIR TERRITORY, 11/30/61 CMTE I (RES. 1664)	A	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	A	Y	N	N	Y	A	N	Y	N	Y	57-12-32
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																							
CENSURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER LOUW FOR GENERAL DEBATE SPEECH, 10/11/61	A	A	NP	A	NP	A	NP	NP	A	A	a	Y	A	NP	A	A	NP	N	NP	Y	NP	Y	67-1-20

RES ASKING FRANCE TO RECOGNIZE IMPRISONED ALGERIANS AS POLITICAL PRISONERS, 11/15/61 (RES. 1650)	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	a	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	62-0-31
INDIAN RES ON WEST NEW GUINEA CALLING FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN DUTCH AND INDONESIANS, 11/27/61	N	Y	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	41-40-21
FRENCH-AFRICAN RES ON WEST NEW GUINEA STRESSING SELF-DETERMINATION AND ESTABLISHING UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION, 11/27/61	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	N	Y	N	53-41-9
38-STATE RES ON COLONIALISM ESTABLISHING UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL CMTE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON GRANTING INDEPENDENCE, 11/27/61 (RES. 1654)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	97-0-4
SOVIET AMENDMENT TO 38-STATE RES ON COLONIALISM, SETTING 1962 AS YEAR OF ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM, 11/27/61	N	A	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	a	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	19-46-36
SANCTIONS AND EXPULSION PARAGRAPHS OF AFRICAN RES ON APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA, 11/28/61	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	48-31-22
INDIAN RES ON APARTHEID, CONDEMNING SOUTH AFRICA BUT WITHOUT CALL FOR SANCTIONS OR EXPULSION, 11/28/61 (RES. 1663)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	97-2-1
RES ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA PROCLAIMING RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INDEPENDENCE, 12/13/61 (RES. 1702) CMTE IV	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	N	A	Y	NP	A	Y	Y	Y	86-1-4
NON-COMPLIANCE OF PORTUGAL WITH GA RES 1542 (XV) REGARDING REPORTING TO UN ON ITS OVERSEAS TERRITORIES, 12/19/61 (RES. 1699)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	90-3-2
ALGERIA - RES CALLING FOR RENEWAL OF NEGOTIATIONS; WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO FGAR, 12/20/61 (RES. 1724)	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	a	A	Y	A	Y	62-0-38

N.B. 1) All votes are roll call votes and were held in Plenary Session (2/3 majority required) unless otherwise indicated. Committee votes require only simple majority.

2) Resolution numbers are indicated for those resolutions formally adopted by GA. No numbers are indicated for procedural motions or where resolutions failed of passage.

3) Soviet bloc consists of ten members: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Ukrainian S.S.R., USSR. Bloc voted together on all issues.

4) Absences are not included in comparative totals listed at bottom of PAGE II.

KEY: Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
\- VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

VOTING PATTERN FOR SIXTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PAGE II)

WEST EUROPE AND OLD COMMONWEALTH

	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWEDEN	UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA	UNITED KINGDOM	YUGOSLAVIA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (yes - no - abstentions)
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																							
ANGOLA - BULGARIA-POLAND RES CALLING FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST PORTUGAL, 1/30/62	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	a	N	N	N	N	N	N	a	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	26-43-32
ANGOLA - AFRO-ASIAN RES CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION OF ANGOLA, 1/30/62 (RES. 1742)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	99-2-1
RES CALLING ON UN CMTE OF 17 TO CONSIDER WHETHER SOUTHERN RHODESIA IS FULLY SELF-GOVERNING, 2/23/62 (RES. 1745)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	57-21-24
RES ON RUANDA-URUNDI ENVISAGING TERMINATION OF UN TRUSTEESHIP ON 7/1/62 AND ALLOWING FOR POSSIBLE CONTINUED BELGIAN PRESENCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE, 2/23/62 (RES. 1743) CMTE IV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	A	87-0-11
EAST WEST ITEMS																							
INSCRIPTION OF ITEM ON TIBET, 9/25/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	N	Y	N	48-14-35
INSCRIPTION OF ITEM ON HUNGARY, 9/25/61	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	51-15-30
MONGOLIAN MOTION ON SEATING 2 KOREANS AS AMENDED, 12/31/61 CMTE I	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	A	Y	Y	N	Y	N	63-18-19
UNITED STATES MOTION NOT TO SEAT NORTH KOREA, 12/19/61 CMTE I	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	A	Y	Y	N	Y	N	54-17-22

KOREA - REAFFIRMING EARLIER UN RES AND EXTENDING UN CMTE FOR UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION, 12/20/61 (RES. 1740)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	N	60-11-27
RECOGNITION OF RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR TIBET, 12/20/61 (RES. 1723)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	A	Y	A	Y	N	56-11-29
RES DEPLORING USSR AND HUNGARIAN LACK OF COOPERATION WITH UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON HUNGARY, 12/20/61 (RES. 1741)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	49-17-32
CHINESE REPRESENTATION: IMPORTANT QUESTION RES, 12/15/61 (RES. 1668)	Y	A	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	61-34-7
CHINESE REPRESENTATION: SOVIET RES TO SEAT CHINESE COMMUNISTS, 12/15/61	N	A	N	N	Y	Y	N	A	N	N	N	A	N	Y	A	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	37-48-19
CUBAN CHARGES vs US - CZECH-RUMANIAN RES - OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH URGING US TO STOP INTERFERENCE IN CUBA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 2/15/62 CMTE I	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	Y	11-50-39
CUBAN CHARGES vs US - MONGOLIAN RES STRESSING PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION, 2/20/62	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	a	N	A	N	N	Y	N	Y	37-45-18
<u>MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS</u>																							
ADMISSION OF MAURITANIA, 10/27/61 (RES. 1631)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	68-13-20
US RES ON UNRWA ENDORSING PCC EFFORTS WITHOUT ARAB AMENDMENTS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1725)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	a	Y	A	Y	A	62-0-37
UNRWA: ARAB AMENDMENT RE PROPERTY RIGHTS, 12/20/61	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	a	Y	N	a	N	Y	N	Y	40-37-21
16-POWER RES URGING DIRECT ARAB-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS, 12/19/61 (SPC)	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	N	Y	Y	Y	A	a	N	A	a	N	N	N	N	34-44-20
ARAB LEAGUE RES CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN OMAN AND WITHDRAWAL OF UK TROOPS, 12/14/61	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	A	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	33-21-37
RES AUTHORIZING ONUC FINANCING, FROM 11/1/61-6/30/62, 12/20/61 (RES. 1732)	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	67-13-15
RES AUTHORIZING UNEF FINANCING, FROM 1/1/62-6/30/62, 12/20/61(RES. 1733)	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	61-11-24

KEY: Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
\- VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

VOTING PATTERN FOR SIXTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PAGE II)

WEST EUROPE AND OLD COMMONWEALTH

	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PORTUGAL	SPAIN	SWEDEN	UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA	UNITED KINGDOM	YUGOSLAVIA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (Yes - no - abstentions)
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS																							
RES REQUESTING ICJ OPINION RE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF ONUC AND UNEF PAYMENTS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1731)	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	N	52-11-32
RES APPROVING 200 MILLION UN BOND ISSUE FOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS, 12/20/61 (RES. 1739)	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	58-13-24
																					TOTAL		
COINCIDE UNITED STATES	34	22	32	33	29	16	27	27	30	35	33	34	33	31	17	28	25	23	36	6	551		
COINCIDE USSR		5	2	1	5	6	3	4	3			1		4		2	5			25	66		
COINCIDE NEITHER	3	11	5	5	4	17	8	5	5	2		3	5	3	8	10	8	14	3	6	125		
COINCIDE BOTH	6	5	4	4	5	4	2	3	5	6	6	5	5	5	1	2	5	1	4	6	84		

VOTING RECORDS AT THE 17th UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1962)

Explanation and Additional Items

1. The items listed on the voting charts include the principal issues which were brought to a roll call vote at the 17th Assembly. Twenty-nine votes are listed from among the hundreds of votes taken on nearly 100 agenda items. The items were selected on a basis of their importance and on the availability of voting records on a country-by-country basis. The great majority of votes taken in the GA are not recorded by country but only by totals since the voting is often by a show of hands. Consequently, these statistics do not purport to show a complete picture of each country's position, or of the total results.

2. In general, the outcome of the 17th GA was successful from the US point of view. On a large majority of the issues (22 out of the 29 listed and many others not listed) the position of the majority in the GA coincided with that of the US. The Soviet Union, however, was in a minority position in 16 of the 29 votes tabulated. The total UNGA results recorded in the lower right-hand corner of each chart show that, on those issues where the US and USSR voted differently, the total votes which coincided with the position of the US were 1,037 while those coinciding with the USSR were 496 or about 2 to 1 in favor of the US. On East-West issues, despite a relatively high number of abstentions, the American position was adopted in all cases at this GA.

3. The voting record of any country should be analyzed qualitatively in relation to the issues in order to avoid misleading impressions. For example, the voting record of most Afro-Asian nations on colonial items reveals a high proportion of votes which coincide with the USSR vote. This is not an indication of Afro-Asian support for the Russian position, but rather a demonstration of the fact that the Soviet bloc finds it expedient to support some of the Afro- Asian positions on colonialism which the United States for one reason or another, could not support.

4. The sponsorship of resolutions is also significant because it throws light on the source of primary interest in certain items. For example, of the 7 resolutions listed in the attached voting charts on which both the US and the USSR voted affirmatively, 4 were sponsored by Afro-Asians, 1 by the US (UNRWA), 1 by Indonesia and the Netherlands (on West New Guinea) and 1 by the non-permanent members of the Security Council (election of U Thant). The Soviet Union sponsored none of these. The end result in each case was satisfactory to the US.

5. Additional Items: The United States supported a number of important resolutions which were adopted by large majorities but on which there were no roll call votes and therefore could not be included in the voting charts. These resolutions include:

(1) General and complete disarmament (84-0-1)
(2) Financing of UN Congo operation (75-12-13)
(3) Financing UNEF (Gaza strip) operation (76-11-8)
(4) Plans for UN Institute (85-0-6)
(5) UN Conference on Trade (91-0-1)
(6) Population growth and economic development (69-0-27)
(7) UN Marriage Convention (92-0-27)
(8) Increase in UN Working Capital Fund (91-11-3)
(9) International Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Unanimous)
(10) Economic Consequences of Disarmament (Unanimous)
(11) FAO World Food Program (Unanimous)

KEY: Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

EXPLANATION OF VOTING CHARTS AND ADDITIONAL ITEMS - see P. 1

VOTING PATTERN FOR SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

AFRICA

	BAM STATES	CAMEROON	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	CHAD	CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)	DAHOMEY	GABON	IVORY COAST	MALAGASY	MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL	UPPER VOLTA	CASABLANCA POWERS	ALGERIA	GHANA	GUINEA	MALI	MOROCCO	U.A.R.	BRAZZAVILLE AFRICA	BURUNDI	CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)	ETHIOPIA	LIBERIA	LIBYA	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SIERRA LEONE	SOMALIA	SOUTH AFRICA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (YES-NO-ABSTENTIONS)
NUCLEAR TESTING, RADIATION ITEMS																																							
1. Thirty-seven power Res calling for cessation Nuclear Testing by January 1, 1963, based on eight-nation memorandum to Disarmament Cmte 11/5/62 (Res. 1762 A)		Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	A	A	81-0-25
2. US-UK Res calling for Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with Effective International Control 11/6/62 (Res 1762 B)		A	a	A	a	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		A	A	A	NP	A	A		A	a	A	Y	A	A	a	a	A	Y	A	A	A	A	a	Y	N	51-10-40
3. Res on Atomic Radiation Cmte Report: noting dangers nuclear testing and asking WMO to devise scheme for monitoring radioactivity 11/20/62 (Res 1764)		Y	Y	Y	a	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	86-0-11
EAST-WEST ITEMS																																							
4. Inscription of Item on Hungary 9/24/62		N	N	a	A	N	a	N	N	N	N	N	N		-	N	NP	N	A	N		a	NP	N	A	A	A	a	Y	N	Y	A	N	A	A	-	Y	N	43-34-19

5. Korea: USSR Motion on Seating both North and South Korean Reps 12/11/62 Cmte I	N	N	N	a	N	N	N	N	A	N	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A	Y	A	a	A	N	Y	Y	N	A	Y	a	Y	a	N	Y	29-56-14
6. Korea: U.S. Motion to seat South Korea Rep only 12/11/62 Cmte I	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	A	Y	a	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	a	A	a	Y	N	65-9-26
7. Korea: Res reaffirming earlier UN Reses and extending UN Cmte for Unification and Rehabilitation (Res 1855)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	a	A	A	a	A	Y	a	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	a	A	A	a	Y	N	65-11-26
8. Hungary: US Res Giving STG responsibility for Hungarian question and reaffirming objectives earlier UN Reses 12/20/62 (Res 1857)	A	A	A	A	A	a	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	NP	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y	N	50-13-43
9. Chinese Representation: USSR Res to seat Chinese Communists and Expel Chinese Nationalists 10/30/62	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	A	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	N	Y	42-56-12
OTHER POLITICAL ITEMS																																				
10. U.S. Res on UNRWA: Operative para 2 thanking Palestine Conciliation Comm. for efforts solve refugee problems etc. 12/20/62 (Res 1856 Rev. 1)	a	A	Y	A	a	Y	Y	A	A	Y	a	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	a	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	a	A	a	A	A	Y	A	a	Y	A	58-0-41
11. U.S. Res. on UNRWA: Final Resolution (Res 1856) requesting Palestine Conciliation Comm. to continue its endeavors and continuing UNRWA until June 30, 1965. 12/20/62	A	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	100-0-2
12. Arab League Res calling for self-determination in Oman and withdrawal UK troops 11/28/62 SPC (failed get 2/3 in GA)	a	A	Y	A	A	a	a	a	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	A	A	Y	A	a	A	Y	N	Y	Y	A	Y	a	N	Y	41-18-36
UN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING ITEMS																																				
13. Res accepting ICJ opinion on financing UN Peace-Keeping operations 12/19/62	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	a	a	Y	a	Y	Y	a	A	Y	a	a	a	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	N	76-17-8
14. Res establishing 21-Mbr Cmte to recommend special financing methods for future peace-keeping operations 12/19/62 Cmte V	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	A	A	A	A	a	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	N	78-14-12
15. Election of U Thant as Secretary General of UN. 11/30/62 (Res 1771)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	109-0-0
16. Six power Res on equitable geographical distribution Secretariat stressing Charter Article 101 (3) and recommending guidelines for improved distribution 11/28/63 Cmte V	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	a	Y	N	84-10-2

KEY: Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTAIN
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

Explanation of Voting Charts and Additional Items - see p. 1

VOTING PATTERN FOR SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

AFRICA

	AFR STATES	CAMEROON	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	CHAD	CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)	DAHOMEY	GABON	IVORY COAST	MALAGASY	MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL	UPPER VOLTA	CASABLANCA POWERS	ALGERIA	GHANA	GUINEA	MALI	MOROCCO	U.A.R.	REPUBLIC AFRICA	BURUNDI	CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)	ETHIOPIA	LIBERIA	LIBYA	NIGERIA	RWANDA	SIERRA LEONE	SOMALIA	SOUTH AFRICA	SUDAN	TANGANYIKA	TOGO	TUNISIA	UGANDA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (YES-NO-ABSTENTIONS)
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ITEMS																																							
17. Res requesting all possible aid for Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong 12/7/62 (Res 1784)		Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	A	A	A	A		N	N	N	N	N	N		a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	N	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y	N	53-22-26
18. Res on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 12/14/62 (Res 1803)		Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	N	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	87-2-12
19. Res on Technical and Financial Assistance to Rwanda and Burundi Cmte II 12/14/62		Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	a	a		Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	A	60-0-13
20. Res noting with appreciation "Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries" Cmte II 11/8/62		A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	84-0-15
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																																							
21. Res taking note of Dutch-Indo agreement on West New Guinea and authorizing UN role in agreement 9/21/62 (Res 1752)		A	A	A	a	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A		-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	A	Y	-	Y	Y	89-0-14
22. Apartheid in South Africa: Res recommending sanctions and possible SC action 11/6/62 (Res 1761)		Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	67-16-23

23. Res on Colonialism Enlarging to 24 Mbrs UN Special Cmte on Granting Independence: Vote on Res as whole without target date para 12/17/62	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	101-0-4
24. So. Rhodesia: Res calling for Lifting of Ban on ZAPU Political Party and release of ZAPU President 10/12/62 (Res 1755)	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	a	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	83-2-11
25. So. Rhodesia: Res Requesting UK to bring about new constitution for Territory and extend voting rights to whole population; requesting "good offices" of SYG 10/31/62 (Res 1760)	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	61-2-19
26. South West Africa: Res requesting Cmte 24 to take up question SWAF and requesting SYG establish "effective UN presence" in Territory 11/19/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	96-0-1
27. Portuguese Territories: Res approving report of Special Cmte and requesting cessation sale and supply of arms to Portugal 12/14/62 (Res 1807)	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	82-7-13
28. Portuguese Territories: Res establishing UN educational program for students of territories and inviting UN Mbrs to provide scholarships 12/12/62 (Res 1808)	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	a	[illegible]	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	86-2-1
29. Angola: Res supporting immediate independence and requesting SC action, including sanctions	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	a	B	Y	Y	a	Y	a	N	Y	57-14-18
																																		ARFA TOTAL		GRAND* TOTAL
COINCIDE UNITED STATES (BUT NOT USSR)	11	11	9	6	10	7	11	10	8	10	6	8	4	5	4	3	3	4	6	9	8	12	6	7	11	6	3	14	3	4	7	5	2	233		3627
COINCIDE USSR (BUT NOT USA)	5	6	5	5	5	2	5	7	8	7	6	6	10	11	10	11	9	11	6	6	8	4	5	5	3	7	10	2	7	10	4	9	3	216		456
COINCIDE NEITHER	8	7	10	15	10	15	8	8	8	7	13	12	8	6	8	8	10	7	11	7	6	6	12	11	13	9	10	11	12	9	12	8	16	321		734
COINCIDE BOTH	5	5	5	3	4	5	5	4	5	5	4	3	5	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	6	6	2	7	6	2	7	6	6	7	6	181		596
																																		953		2965

*THE GRAND TOTAL DOES NOT EQUAL THE SUM OF THE AREA TOTALS ON THE FOUR GROUPS BECAUSE THOSE NATIONS (SUCH AS [illegible]) WHO HAVE BEEN LISTED ON THE [illegible] ARE ALSO DOUBLE COUNTED [illegible] THE GRAND TOTAL.

KEY: Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTENTION
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

EXPLANATION OF VOTING CHARTS AND ADDITIONAL ITEMS - see P. 1

VOTING PATTERN FOR SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

WESTERN EUROPE AND OLD COMMONWEALTH

	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PORTUGAL	SOUTH AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	UNITED KINGDOM	YUGOSLAVIA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS
NUCLEAR TESTING, RADIATION ITEMS																							
1. Thirty-seven powe Res calling for cessation Nuclear Testing by Jan. 1, 1963, based on eight-nation memorandum to Disarmament Cmte 11/5/62 (Res. 1762 A)	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	a	A	8[illegible]-0-[illegible]
2. US-UK Res calling for Nuclear Testing Ban Treaty with Effective International Control 11/6/62 (Res. 1762 B)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	[illegible]	51-10-40
3. Res on Atomic Radiation Cmte Report: noting dangers nuclear testing and asking WMO to devise scheme for monitoring radio-activity. 11/20/62 (Res. 1764)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	86-0-11
EAST-WEST ITEMS																							
4. Inscription of Item on Hungary 9/24/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	[illegible]	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	43-34-19

5. Korea: USSR Motion on Seating both North and South Korean Reps. 12/11/62 Cmte I	N	A	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	Y	N	Y	29-56-14
6. Korea: U.S. Motion to seat South Korea Rep only 12/11/62 Cmte I	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	N	65-0-26
7. Korea: Res reaffirming earlier UN Reses and extending UN Cmte for Unification and Rehabilitation (Res 1855)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	N	65-11-26
8. Hungary: US Res Giving SYG responsibility for Hungarian question and reaffirming objectives earlier UN Reses. 12/20/62 (Res 1857)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	50-13-43
9. Chinese Representation: USSR Res to seat Chinese Communists and Expel Chinese Nationalists 10/30/62	N	A	N	N	Y	Y	N	A	N	N	N	A	N	Y	A	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	42-56-12
OTHER POLITICAL ITEMS																							
10. U.S. Res on UNRWA: operative para 2 thanking Palestine Conciliation Conv. for efforts solve refugee problems 12/20/62 (Res 1856 Rev. 1)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	a	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A	58-0-41
11. U.S. Res on UNRWA: Final Resolution (Res 1856) requesting Palestine Conciliation Comm. to continue its endeavors and continuing UNRWA until June 30, 1965. 12/20/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	100-0-2
12. Arab League Res calling for self-determination in Oman and withdrawal UK troops 11/28/62 SPC (Failed get 2/3 in GA)	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	A	A	A	Y	N	Y	41-38-36
UN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING ITEMS																							
13. Res accepting ICJ opinion on financing UN Peace-Keeping operations 12/19/62	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	A	Y	Y	A	Y	N	76-17-8
14. Res establishing 21-Member Cmte to recommend special financing methods for future peace-keeping operations 12/19/62 Cmte V	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	N	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	N	73-24-32
15. Election of U Thant as Secretary General of UN 11/30/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	109-0-0
16. Six power Res on equitable geographical distribution for Secretariat stressing Charter Article 101 (3) and recommending guidelines for improved distribution Cmte V 11/28/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	84-10-2

47-378 O—65——7

KEY : Y - YES
N - NO
A - ABSTAIN
a - ABSENT
NP - NOT PARTICIPATING
- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO GA MEMBERSHIP

EXPLANATION OF VOTING CHARTS AND ADDITIONAL ITEMS - see P. 1

VOTING PATTERN FOR SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

WESTERN EUROPE AND OLD COMMONWEALTH

	AUSTRALIA	AUSTRIA	BELGIUM	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	ICELAND	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBOURG	NETHERLANDS	NEW ZEALAND	NORWAY	PORTUGAL	SOUTH AFRICA	SPAIN	SWEDEN	UNITED KINGDOM	YUGOSLAVIA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ITEMS																							
17. Res requesting all possible aid of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong 12/7/62 (Res 1784)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	N	Y	N	53-20-26
18. Res on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 12/14/62 (Res 1803)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	87-2-12
19. Res on Technical and Financial Assistance to Rwanda and Burundi Cmte II 12/14/62	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	a	Y	A	Y	a	a	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	60-0-13
20. Res noting with appreciation "Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries" Cmte II 11/8/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	84-0-15
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																							
21. Res taking note of Dutch-Indo agreement on West New Guinea and authorizing UN role in agreement 9/21/62 (Res 1752)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	89-0-14
22. Apartheid in South Africa: Res recommending sanctions and possible SC action 11/6/62 (Res 1761)	N	A	N	N	A	A	N	A	N	A	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	A	N	Y	N	Y	67-16-23

23. Res on Colonialism Enlarging to 24 Mbrs UN Special Cmte on Granting Independence; Vote on Res as whole without target date para 12/17/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	101-0-4
24. So. Rhodesia: Res calling for Lifting of Ban on Zapu Political Party and release of ZAPU President 10/12/62 (Res 1755)	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	N	N	A	Y	NP	Y	A	Y	83-2-11
25. So. Rhodesia: Res Requesting UK to bring about new constitution for Territory and extend voting rights to whole population; requesting "good offices" of SYG 10/31/62 (Res 1760)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	N	N	A	A	NP	Y	A	Y	81-2-19
26. South West Africa: Res requesting Cmte 24 to take up question SWAF and requesting SYG establish "Effective UN presence" in Territory 11/19/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	A	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	96-0-1
27. Portuguese Territories: Res approving report of Special Cmte and requesting cessation sale and supply of arms to Portugal 12/14/62 (Res 1807)	A	A	N	A	A	Y	N	A	Y	A	a	A	A	A	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	82-7-13
28. Portuguese Territories: Res establishing UN educational program for students of territories and inviting UN Mbrs to provide scholarships 12/12/62 (Res 1808)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	86-2-1
29. Angola: Res supporting immediate independence and requesting SC action, including sanctions	N	A	N	N	A	A	N	a	A	N	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	A	N	Y	N	Y	57-14-18
																					AREA TOTal	GRAND TOTal	
COINCIDE UNITED STATES (BUT NOT USSR)	19	13	19	20	16	9	17	15	17	18	17	19	18	15	9	14	18	13	17	4	307	1037	
COINCIDE USSR (BUT NOT USA)	1	1	0	0	2	3	2	1	3	1	0	0	2	3	2	2	1	3	2	12	41	[illegible]	
COINCIDE NEITHER	1	8	2	2	4	10	5	8	3	2	6	3	2	4	17	11	4	6	3	6	107	734	
COINCIDE BOTH	8	7	8	7	7	7	5	5	6	8	6	7	7	7	1	2	6	7	7	7	125	558	
																					580	2356	

*THE GRAND TOTAL DOES NOT EQUAL THE SUM OF THE AREA TOTALS ON THE FOUR CHARTS BECAUSE THOSE NATIONS (SUCH AS THE UAR) WHICH HAVE BEEN LISTED ON TWO AREA CHARTS HAVE BEEN COUNTED ONLY ONCE FOR THE GRAND TOTAL.

KEY:- Y - YES
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EXPLANATION OF VOTING CHARTS AND ADDITIONAL ITEMS - see P. 1

VOTING PATTERN FOR SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

LATIN AMERICA

	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	TRINIDAD & TOBAGO	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (YES-NO-ABSTENTION)
NUCLEAR TESTING, RADIATION ITEMS																									
1. Thirty-seven power Res calling for cessation Nuclear Testing by Jan. 1, 1963, based on eight-nation memorandum to Disarmament Cmte 11/5/62 (Res. 1762 A)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	81-0-25
2. US-UK Res calling for Nuclear Testing Ban Treaty with Effective International Control 11/6/62 (Res. 1762 B)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	51-10-40
3. Res on Atomic Radiation Cmte Report: noting dangers nuclear testing and asking WHO to devise scheme for monitoring radio-activity. 11/20/62 (Res 1764)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	86-0-11
EAST-WEST ITEMS																									
4. Inscription of Item on Hungary 9/24/62	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	N	43-34-19

5. Korea: USSR Motion on Seating both North and South Korean Reps 12/11/62 Cmte I	N	N	N	N	N	N	a	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	a	N	N	N	Y	29-56-14
6. Korea: U.S. Motion to seat South Korea Rep only 12/11/62 Cmte I	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	N	65-9-26
7. Korea: Res reaffirming earlier UN Reses and extending UN Cmte for Unification and Rehabilitation (Res 1866)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	65-11-26
8. Hungary: US Res Giving SYG responsibility for Hungarian question and reaffirming objectives earlier UN Reses. 12/20/62 (Res 1857)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	50-13-43
9. Chinese Representation: USSR Res to seat Chinese Communists and Expel Chinese Nationalists 10/30/62	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	Y	42-56-12
10. U.S. Res on UNRWA: operative para 2 thanking Palestine Conciliation Conv. for efforts solve refugee problems 12/20/62 (Res 1856 Rev. 1)	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	A	58-0-41
11. U.S. Res on UNRWA: Final Resolution (Res 1856) requesting Palestine Conciliation Comm to continue its endeavors and continuing UNRWA until June 30, 1965. 12/20/62	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	100-0-2
12. Arab League Res calling for self-determination on Oman and withdrawal UK troops 11/28/62 SPC (failed get 2/3 in GA)	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	a	Y	a	a	a	A	a	A	a	A	a	A	A	N	Y	41-18-36
UN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING ITEMS																									
13. Res accepting ICJ opinion on financing UN Peace-keeping operations 12/19/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	76-17-8
14. Res establishing 21-Member Cmte to recommend special financing methods for future peace-keeping operations 12/19/62 Cmte V	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	78-14-12
15. Election of U Thant as Secretary General of UN 11/30/62 (Res 1771)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	109-0-0
16. Six power Res on equitable geographical distribution for Secretariat stressing Charter Article 101 (3) and recommending guidelines for improved distribution Cmte V 11/28/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	N	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	a	Y	Y	N	84-10-2

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EXPLANATION OF VOTING CHARTS AND ADDITIONAL ITEMS - see P. 1

VOTING PATTERN FOR SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

LATIN AMERICA

	ARGENTINA	BOLIVIA	BRAZIL	CHILE	COLOMBIA	COSTA RICA	CUBA	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	ECUADOR	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HAITI	HONDURAS	JAMAICA	MEXICO	NICARAGUA	PANAMA	PARAGUAY	PERU	TRINIDAD & TOBAGO	URUGUAY	VENEZUELA	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (YES-NO-ABSTENTIONS)
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ITEMS																									
17. Res requesting all possible aid of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong 12/7/62 (Res 1784)	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	:	58-22-26
18. Res on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 12/14/62 (Res 1803)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	87-2-12
19. Res on Technical and Financial Assistance to Rwanda and Burundi Cmte II 12/14/62	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	Y	a	a	a	a	Y	Y	A	60-0-13
20. Res noting with appreciation "Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries" Cmte II 11/8/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	84-0-15
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																									
21. Res taking note of Dutch-Indo agreement on West New Guinea and authorizing UN role in agreement 9/21/62 (Res 1752)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	89-0-14
22. Apartheid in South Africa: Res recommending sanctions and possible SC action 11/6/62 (Res 1761)	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	a	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	a	A	Y	A	A	N	Y	67-16-23

23. Res on Colonialism Enlarging to 24 Mbrs UN Special Cmte on Granting Independence: Vote on Res as whole without target date para 12/17/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	101-0-4
24. So. Rhodesia: Res calling for Lifting of Ban on ZAPU Political Party and release of ZAPU President 10/12/62 (Res 1755)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	83-2-11
25. So. Rhodesia: Res calling for UK to bring about new constitution for Territory and extend voting rights to whole population; requesting "good offices" of SYG 10/31/62 (Res 1760)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	81-2-19
26. South West Africa: Res requesting Cmte 24 to take up question SWAF and requesting SYG establish "Effective UN presence" in Territory 11/19/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	96-[illegible]
27. Portuguese Territories: Res approving report of Special Cmte and requesting cessation sale and supply of arms to Portugal 12/14/62 (Res 1807)	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	[illegible]	Y	82-7-13
28. Portuguese Territories: Res establishing UN educational program for students of territories and inviting UN Mbrs to provide scholarships 12/12/62 (Res 1808)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	a	A	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	36-2-1
29. Angola: Res supporting immediate independence and requesting SC action, including sanctions	A	Y	A	A	a	a	a	A	a	a	a	Y	A	a	A	a	Y	a	A	Y	a	Y	[illegible]	Y	57-14-18
																							AREA TOTAL	"GRAND" TOTAL	
COINCIDE UNITED STATES (BUT NOT USSR)	14	11	14	14	15	13	1	15	13	15	13	13	14	10	14	12	14	12	14	8	13	13	275	1037	
COINCIDE USSR (BUT NOT USA)	3	4	3	3	3	3	16	0	2	1	4	5	3	4	4	1	4	2	1	5	3	4	78	456	
COINCIDE NEITHER	5	8	6	5	4	7	4	11	7	9	5	6	8	8	4	12	5	11	9	10	6	5	155	734	
COINCIDE BOTH	7	6	6	7	7	6	8	3	7	4	7	5	4	6	7	4	6	4	5	5	7	7	128	598	
																							636	2865	

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EXPLANATION OF VOTING CHARTS AND ADDITIONAL ITEMS - see P. 1

VOTING PATTERN FOR SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

MIDDLE AND FAR EAST

	ARAB LEAGUE	ALGERIA	IRAQ	JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	MOROCCO	SAUDI ARABIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TUNISIA	U.A.R.	YEMEN	OTHER MIDDLE AND FAR EAST	AFGHANISTAN	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA	CYPRUS	GREECE	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	ISRAEL	JAPAN	LAOS	MALAYA	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	THAILAND	TURKEY	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (YES-NO-ABSTENTIONS)
NUCLEAR TESTING, RADIATION ITEMS																																				
1. Thirty-seven power Res calling for cessation Nuclear Testing by Jan. 1, 1963, based on eight-nation memorandum to Disarmament Cmte 11/5/62 (Res. 1762 A)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a		Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	81-0-25
2. US-UK Res calling for Nuclear Testing Ban Treaty with Effective International Control 11/6/62 (Res. 1762 B)		A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		A	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	53-10-40
3. Res on Atomic Radiation Cmte Report: noting dangers nuclear testing and asking WMO to devise scheme for monitoring radioactivity. 11/20/62 (Res. 1764)		Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	86-0-11
EAST-WEST ITEMS																																				
4. Inscription of Item on Hungary 9/24/62		-	N	A	A	A	A	N	A	N	A	N	A		A	A	N	N	Y	A	A	NP	N	A	A	Y	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	43-34-19

5. Korea: USSR Motion on Seating both North and South Korean Reps. 12/11/62 Cmte I	Y	Y	A	a	a	Y	a	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A	N	A	Y	N	A	N	a	N	Y	a	N	N	N	N	Y	29-56-14
6. Korea: U.S. Motion to seat South Korea Rep only 12/11/62 Cmte I	A	A	Y	a	a	A	a	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	A	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	65-9-26
7. Korea: Res reaffirming earlier UN Reses and extending UN Cmte for Unification and Rehabilitation (Res 1855)	A	A	Y	a	a	a	a	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	65-11-26
8. Hungary: US Res Giving SY G responsibility for Hungarian question and reaffirming objectives earlier UN Reses. 12/20/62 (Res 1857)	A	A	A	A	A	A	a	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	50-13-43
9. Chinese Representation: USSR Res to seat Chinese Communists and Expel Chinese Nationalists. 10/30/62	Y	Y	N	A	N	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A	N	Y	Y	N	A	N	Y	A	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	42-56-12
OTHER POLITICAL ITEMS																																		
10. U.S. Res on UNRWA: operative para 2 thanking Palestine Conciliation Conv. for efforts solve refugee problems 12/20/62 (Res 1856 Rev. 1)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	58-0-41
11. U.S. Res. on UNRWA: Final Resolution (Res 1856) requesting Palestine Conciliation Comm. to continue its endeavors and continuing UNRWA until June 30, 1965. 12/20/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	100-0-2
12. Arab League Res calling for self-determination in Oman and withdrawal UK troops 11/28/62 SPC (failed get 2/3 in GA)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	N	A	a	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	N	Y	41-18-36
UN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING ITEMS																																		
13. Res accepting ICJ opinion on financing UN Peace-Keeping operations 12/19/62	A	A	N	Y	Y	a	N	A	a	Y	A	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	76-17-8
14. Res establishing 21-Member Cmte to recommend special financing methods for future peace-keeping operations 12/19/62 Cmte V	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	a	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	78-14-12
15. Election of U Thant as Secretary General of UN. 11/30/62 (Res 1771)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	109-0-0
16. Six power Res on equitable geographical distribution for Secretariat stressing Charter Article 101 (3) and recommending guidelines for improved distribution Cmte V 11/28/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	84-10-2

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EXPLANATION OF VOTING CHARTS AND ADDITIONAL ITEMS - see P. 1

VOTING PATTERN FOR SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

MIDDLE AND FAR EAST

	ARAB LEAGUE	ALGERIA	IRAQ	JORDAN	LEBANON	LIBYA	MOROCCO	SAUDI ARABIA	SUDAN	SYRIA	TUNISIA	U.A.R.	YEMEN	OTHER MIDDLE AND FAR EAST	AFGHANISTAN	BURMA	CAMBODIA	CEYLON	CHINA	CYPRUS	GREECE	INDIA	INDONESIA	IRAN	ISRAEL	JAPAN	LAOS	MALAYA	NEPAL	PAKISTAN	PHILIPPINES	THAILAND	TURKEY	UNITED STATES	SOVIET BLOC	TOTALS (YES-NO-ABSTENTIONS)
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ITEMS																																				
17. Res requesting all possible aid of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong 12/7/62 (Res 1784)		N	A	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	A	N	A	N	Y		A	'A	N	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	N	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	58-22-26
18. Res on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 12/14/62 (Res 1803)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	87-2-12
19. Res on Technical and Financial Assistance to Rwanda and Burundi Cmte II 12/14/62		Y	a	a	a	a	Y	a	Y	A	a	Y	a		Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	60-0-13
20. Res noting with appreciation "Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries" Cmte II 11/8/62		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	84-0-15
COLONIALISM/AFRICAN ITEMS																																				
21. Res taking note of Dutch-Indo agreement on West New Guinea and authorising UN role in agreement 9/21/62 (Res 1752)		-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	89-0-14
22. Apartheid in South Africa: Res recommending sanctions and possible SC action 11/6/62 (Res 1761)		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	N	Y	67-16-23

23. Res on Colonialism Enlarging to 24 Mbrs UN Special Cmte on Granting Independence: Vote on Res as whole without target date para 12/17/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	101-0-4
24. So. Rhodesia: Res calling for lifting of Ban on ZAPU Political Party and release of ZAPU President 10/12/62 (Res 1755)	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	83-2-11
25. So. Rhodesia: Res Requesting UK to bring about new constitution for Territory and extend voting rights to whole population; requesting "good offices" of SYG 10/31/62 (Res 1760)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	81-2-19
26. South West Africa: Res requesting Cmte 24 to take up question SWAF and requesting SYG establish "Effective UN presence" in Territory 11/19/62	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	96-0-1
27. Portuguese Territories: Res approving report of Special Cmte and requesting cessation sale and supply of arms to Portugal 12/14/62 (Res 1807)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y	82-7-13
28. Portuguese Territories: Res establishing UN edicational program for students of territories and inviting UN Mbrs to provide scholarships 12/12/62 (Res 1808)	a	Y	a	Y	a	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	86-2-1
29. Angola: Res supporting immediate independence and requesting SC action, including sanctions	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	a	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	a	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	N	Y	57-14-18
																																AREA TOTAL	GRAND* TOTAL
COINCIDE UNITED STATES (BUT NOT USSR)	4	4	8	5	6	3	4	3	3	5	4	6	6	6	6	7	13	10	17	12	6	14	11	17	4	12	6	10	15	15	19	261	1037
COINCIDE USSR (BUT NOT USA)	10	10	8	7	5	9	7	7	12	9	11	4	9	8	11	8	5	5	0	6	10	6	6	2	6	6	9	8	5	3	0	212	496
COINCIDE NEITHER	8	8	7	10	12	10	13	12	7	8	7	15	7	8	5	7	3	7	4	4	6	2	7	3	15	4	8	4	2	4	2	219	734
COINCIDE BOTH	5	7	6	7	6	7	5	7	7	7	7	4	7	7	7	7	8	7	8	7	7	7	5	7	4	7	6	7	7	7	8	205	598
																																897	2865

*THE GRAND TOTAL DOES NOT EQUAL THE SUM OF THE AREA TOTALS ON THE FOUR CHARTS BECAUSE THOSE NATIONS (SUCH AS UAR) WHICH HAVE BEEN LISTED ON TWO AREA CHARTS HAVE BEEN COUNTED ONLY ONCE FOR THE GRAND TOTAL.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carlson.

ANY DISADVANTAGES TO ENLARGED SECURITY COUNCIL?

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Ambassador, I notice in your statement you spent considerable time mentioning the advantages to the United States of this enlarged council.

Now, what are the disadvantages?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Well, to be very homely about it, Senator, the disadvantages are the unknown, as against the known, and the tried experience of the past.

I think in anything that is experimental like this, one has some misgivings that something may arise, that you may not have made every calculation that you can, or taken every precaution that you can.

But beyond that, I must confess, with respect to the Security Council, I see nothing but advantages, because I would be almost certain that if things went on as they are now, and there was insufficient representation of the Afro-Asian majority, very soon some of our friends would lose their seats.

Senator CARLSON. Yesterday it was suggested that the Latin Americans might feel they would be disadvantaged in the new arrangement. Would that be a possibility?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Well, of course, Latin America now has a disproportionate representation, I must confess, with 20 percent of the membership, including Cuba. It has about 33 percent of the membership of the nonpermanent members. So it is disproportionately represented. And I think it would be disadvantaged if we did not enlarge, because it would probably lose one of those seats through raiding by the Afro-Asian nations.

Senator CARLSON. As I understand your statement, the Afro-Asian bloc has enough votes to change this, whether we want a change or not.

Ambassador STEVENSON. I think that is about it.

UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION

Senator CARLSON. I realize you are appearing here this morning in behalf of the two amendments that are proposed, and I want to say that personally I have no problem with the amendments. My problem, of course, is with the future of the United Nations and its success in the peacekeeping operations.

If I remember correctly, the United States was one of the sponsors of the Uniting for Peace resolution passed in 1950, which enabled the General Assembly to assume some jurisdiction over the financing and control of peacekeeping operations formerly reserved for the Security Council.

Now, in view of this increased membership in the United Nations, are we beginning to have second thoughts about the wisdom of this move? After all, at the present time, if I am not mistaken, a majority of the members of the United Nations is made up of what we might sincerely and honestly say are have-not nations.

Ambassador STEVENSON. I do not share that apprehension about the Uniting for Peace resolution, Senator, myself.

After all, our interpretation of the charter—and I think it is shared by the overwhelming majority of the members—is that the General Assembly has residual authority to authorize peacekeeping operations; that is, to recommend them. Their recommendations are only recommendations—they are not mandatory or obligatory, as in the case of enforcement actions in the Security Council.

This power exists in the General Assembly, that is indispensable to the United Nations as a peacekeeping agency, which could be paralyzed by a veto in the Security Council—and all the Uniting for Peace resolution does is to provide that, in the event the Security Council is unable to act because of a veto, the General Assembly shall consider the issue and make a recommendation.

It does not seem to me that this is harmful, because that power exists anyway in the General Assembly.

May I revert for one moment, sir, to one question you asked me?

One of my advisers here reminds me, the fact of the matter is that the Latin Americans enthusiastically supported the enlargement of the Council for the very reason I told you. I think they were apprehensive about the future of their seats.

U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS

Senator CARLSON. What percentage does the United States contribute to the cost of the operations of the United Nations?

Ambassador STEVENSON. We contribute 32 percent, approximately, of the general budget of the United Nations. In the case of peacekeeping operations, if you lump all of them, from the beginning to the present, our percentage was around 39 to 40 percent.

Senator CARLSON. Well, is there not beginning to develop some feeling among the larger contributors to the United Nations that in view of their substantial contributions there ought to be a change in the voting in the United Nations?

I am sure you have heard weighted voting discussed.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes, we have had many discussions of weighted voting over the years. There has, I think, been a feeling shared more by the lay public than by the professionals within the organization that something should be done about it.

Actually, very careful studies that we have done, taking various possibilities, various formulas for weighted voting, do not reveal that

the results would be better from our point of view than they have been actually in the past.

There are a good many reasons why we have been loath to embrace any proposal for weighted voting.

It is politically unrealistic to expect that the preponderance of the small states which now enjoy the same vote as the great powers would voluntarily vote themselves out of this position of equality. And of course their vote would be required.

Weighted voting could only be instituted through charter amendment, and it seems to me unlikely that a two-thirds vote of all the members would be available for adoption of such amendments.

So much for the practical aspect of getting it done, even if we wanted to.

It is not clear that any scheme of weighted voting, I repeat, would, in fact, produce greater support for positions advocated by our country.

We have, in fact, fared very well in the United Nations on matters of vital concern to us, owing primarily to the support of our position by the smaller states.

The population of the majority of members is small. Their national income is low, as is their assessed share of the United Nations budget.

Senatorl CARLSON. Mr. Ambassador, is it not a fact that about three-fifths of these nations contribute a very small percentage to the cost of the operations?

Ambassador STEVENSON. That is correct.

Senator CARLSON. Would you be willing to submit for the record a statement on the contributions? I think it might be interesting and helpful.

Ambassador STEVENSON. That is the percentages assessed against——

Senator CARLSON. Percentages expressed in dollars, if you would, please.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Very happy to do that. That is published by the Secretariat.

(The document referred to follows:)

Estimated scale of United Nations assessments for the calendar year 1965

Members (112) [1]	Percent	Amount	Members (112) [1]	Percent	Amount
Afghanistan	0.05	$51,500	Kuwait	.06	$61,800
Albania	.04	41,200	Laos	.04	41,200
Algeria	.10	103,000	Lebanon	.05	51,500
Argentina	.92	947,600	Liberia	.04	41,200
Australia	1.58	1,627,400	Libya	.04	41,200
Austria	.53	545,900	Luxembourg	.05	51,500
Belgium	1.15	1,184,500	Madagascar	.04	41,200
Bolivia	.04	41,200	Malaysia	.15	154,500
Brazil	.95	978,500	Mali	.04	41,200
Bulgaria	.17	175,100	Mauritania	.04	41,200
Burma	.06	61,800	Mexico	.81	834,300
Burundi	.04	41,200	Mongolia	.04	41,200
Byelorussian S.S.R	.52	535,600	Morocco	.11	113,300
Cambodia	.04	41,200	Nepal	.04	41,200
Cameroon	.04	41,200	Netherlands	1.11	1,143,300
Canada	3.17	3,265,100	New Zealand	.38	391,400
Central African Republic	.04	41,200	Nicaragua	.04	41,200
Ceylon	.08	82,400	Niger	.04	41,200
Chad	.04	41,200	Nigeria	.17	175,100
Chile	.27	278,100	Norway	.44	453,200
China	4.25	4,377,500	Pakistan	.37	381,100
Colombia	.23	236,900	Panama	.04	41,200
Congo (Brazzaville)	.04	41,200	Paraguay	.04	41,200
Congo (Léopoldville)	.05	51,500	Peru	.09	92,700
Costa Rica	.04	41,200	Philippines	.35	360,500
Cuba	.20	206,000	Poland	1.45	1,493,500
Cyprus	.04	41,200	Portugal	.15	154,500
Czechoslovakia	1.11	1,143,300	Rumania	.35	360,500
Dahomey	.04	41,200	Rwanda	.04	41,200
Denmark	.62	638,600	Saudi Arabia	.07	72,100
Dominican Republic	.04	41,200	Senegal	.04	41,200
Ecuador	.05	51,500	Sierra Leone	.04	41,200
El Salvador	.04	41,200	Somalia	.04	41,200
Ethiopia	.04	41,200	South Africa	.52	535,600
Finland	.43	442,900	Spain	.73	751,900
France	6.09	6,272,700	Sudan	.06	61,800
Gabon	.04	41,200	Sweden	1.26	1,297,800
Ghana	.08	82,400	Syria	.05	51,500
Greece	.25	257,500	Tanganyika and Zanzibar	.04	41,200
Guatemala	.04	41,200	Thailand	.14	144,200
Guinea	.04	41,200	Togo	.04	41,200
Haiti	.04	41,200	Trinidad and Tobago	.04	41,200
Honduras	.04	41,200	Tunisia	.05	51,500
Hungary	.56	576,800	Turkey	.35	360,500
Iceland	.04	41,200	Uganda	.04	41,200
India	1.85	1,905,500	Ukraine	1.97	2,029,100
Indonesia [2]	.39	401,700	U.S.S.R	14.92	15,367,600
Iran	.20	206,000	United Arab Republic	.23	236,900
Iraq	.08	82,400	United Kingdom	7.21	7,426,300
Ireland	.16	164,800	United States	31.91	[3] 32,867,300
Israel	.17	175,100	Upper Volta	.04	41,200
Italy	2.54	2,616,200	Uruguay	.10	103,000
Ivory Coast	.04	41,200	Venezuela	.50	515,000
Jamaica	.05	51,500	Yemen	.04	41,200
Japan	2.77	2,853,100	Yugoslavia	.36	370,800
Jordan	.04	41,200			
Kenya	.04	41,200	Total	100.00	103,000,000

[1] Does not include Malta, Malawi, and Zambia (admitted to the U.N. in December 1964).
[2] Indonesia has withdrawn from the U.N.
[3] In addition, the 19th General Assembly is expected to authorize expenditures of $17,300,000 for United Nations Emergency Force for the period January 1–December 31, 1965. The U.S. assessed share of this 1965 United Nations Emergency Force expenditure would be $5,485,000. The United States is also entitled to a credit of $3,873,300 as the 3d repayment on its loan to the United Nations. Thus, the net contribution for the United States amounts to $34,479,000.

Source: OIA: December 1964.

PRESENT STATUS OF U.N. FINANCES

Senator CARLSON. What is the present status of the United Nations finances?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Well, the present status is that the United Nations needs about $108 million. This is comprised of roughly—I will have to take these figures out of my head—roughly $50 million of indebtedness for the payment of unpaid peacekeeping obligations, about $40 million to replenish the working capital fund, and the balance for miscellaneous other obligations.

So the position, of course, is very bad.

As to what to do about it, as you well know, that is a matter of current discussion in New York in the Committee of 33 and in direct negotiations between the principals and the Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly.

Senator CARLSON. May I ask this question?

At the present time, are the operations of the General Assembly being financed by funds borrowed from other agencies or organizations in the United Nations.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Not at the moment. This has been true in the past, in that they have borrowed some money from the Special Fund, but it has been repaid. But the Working Capital Fund has been almost entirely depleted, from $40 million to a couple of hundred thousand dollars balance remaining now—which has been used to finance these peacekeeping operations.

Currently the Cyprus operation, for example, is supported by the participating states on a voluntary basis. It is no burden on the regular United Nations budget. And the current operations are being paid for by the members in the usual way, out of contributions on the basis of 80 percent of their assessments for 1964, which they are currently paying.

We hope when the next Assembly convenes, and we can begin to vote again, and adopt the budget for 1965, that additional money will then be available from that source.

Meanwhile, the great hope for restoring the financial health and solvency of the organization is of course voluntary contributions by the members.

Senator CARLSON. Are voluntary contributions being made at the present time, in addition to the assessments?

Ambassador STEVENSON. No. One of the problems that the Committee of 33 is considering at this time is how that will be done and when. Certainly the Secretary General has in mind that there will be a pledging conference called sometime in the course of the summer, perhaps before August.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I have a good many questions I would like to discuss with the Governor. Therefore, I would be happy to defer to you and the other members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to take 10 minutes now? We have three public witnesses we want to hear, and then if the committee wishes, we can have an executive session with Mr. Stevenson.

Senator CLARK. Whatever the chairman desires.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Senator McCarthy. Just one question.

Could you accept voluntary contributions from the nations to meet the expenses of the peacekeeping operations in Africa—that is, solicit voluntary contributions to pay off the Russian and French obligations?

Ambassador Stevenson. Mr. Senator, would you be good enough to repeat that?

Senator McCarthy. Could you accept voluntary contributions from other nations to meet the unpaid obligations of the French and Russians for the Congo operation?

Ambassador Stevenson. Oh, yes.

Senator McCarthy. Technically you could. Would this be acceptable to the Russians?

Ambassador Stevenson. Sir, I am sure the Russians do not care what is done with the money. Our problem is whether we get some voluntary contributions from the Russians.

Senator McCarthy. Thank you.

Senator Clark. Perhaps I could take just a couple of minutes, Mr. Chairman. I will be quite brief.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Clark. Governor, I have no doubt in my own mind about the desirability of these amendments to the charter. I shall certainly support them. My concern is that they do not go far enough to remedy what to me at least seems to be an unsatisfactory condition with respect to the potential of the United Nations to achieve those peacekeeping functions which you, as one of the originators of the San Francisco Conference, have done so very much to promote.

I am concerned that the U.N., as a major peacekeeping institution, is so handicapped by the one vote-one country rule in the General Assembly, particularly since the arrival of all the new African and Asian nations; the veto in the Security Council; the fact that there is no automatic international method of providing the United Nations with funds to keep it going, so that we have these constant financial crises and the U.N. is not developing its peacekeeping functions the way one could hope.

I appreciate fully the difficulty in dealing with the Russians, and to some extent the French; the limitations imposed by the fact that Communist China is not a member; and the constant outbreakings of confrontations all over the world, which make this very difficult.

DISCUSSION OF SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 32

You are familiar, I think, with Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, cosponsored by 26 Senators, the largest number we have ever had, including four members of this committee—Senators Church, McCarthy, Morse, and myself. I think you are generally familiar with the preamble of that concurrent resolution.

My concern is whether the policy of the United States, with respect to general and complete disarmament and with respect to peacekeeping activities, has changed since the days of the Kennedy administration.

47-378 O—65——8

I raised this question with Secretary Rusk yesterday, and he, I thought, was of the view that our policy had not changed.

I would just like to ask you this sort of general question, and give you an opportunity to comment.

The preamble of the resolution—and shortly we shall have full hearings, within the next month or so—refers to the 14th General Assembly which unanimously adopted a resolution calling for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and calling upon governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem. And then President Kennedy, on September 25, 1961, in his famous speech before the United Nations, said that we must create worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and war weapons:

> Our primary long-range interest is general and complete disarmament, designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build institutions of peace which would take the place of arms.

I will not extend my comments by reading the other statements of fact in the preamble to Senate Concurrent Resolution 32.

I am, however, acutely aware of the fact that since the United States tabled its Treaty of General and Complete Disarmament at Geneva in 1962, and since the last speech of President Kennedy in this regard, on September 20, 1963, before the United Nations, in which he called for the revision of the charter to permit the development of that body into a general worldwide security system, we have had precious little from either the State Department or the White House indicating that that is still the fixed policy of the Government of the United States.

I wonder if you would comment on that.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Senator Clark, I take it your question is my comment on what you have said generally about the problem of peacekeeping and disarmament.

Senator CLARK. I wanted to give you the widest possible latitude to respond to my observations.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Well, I appreciate that.

I might say that I am not unfamiliar with the speeches of President Kennedy at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Senator CLARK. It might even be assumed you played some part in drafting them.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Certainly, speaking for myself, I agree emphatically with the broad objective of Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, and continue to support, and indeed pray for, the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

I think that we have a national purpose in this regard that has been expressed most effectively by President Kennedy, and also by, subsequently, President Johnson.

That we have not made more progress in this direction is discouraging to me, after the breakthrough with the test ban treaty.

I must say also that I am not optimistic about the present situation after having been present at the meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York on Monday, where the Soviet delegate and I both spoke.

Senator CLARK. My understanding is that that was one of the most disagreeable confrontations in your whole conduct of our affairs within the United Nations. Is that correct?

Ambassador STEVENSON. It was very distressing—the resumption of what seemed to me the language of the cold war and the temper of the cold war.

I think there is an inextricable relationship between disarmament and the development of effective peacekeeping machinery.

Our outline of a treaty for general and complete disarmament I believe is a helpful framework at least for consideration of steps in that direction.

I do feel that it is quite apparent, and has been for some time, that general and complete disarmament is something you can obtain only a step at a time. You cannot arrive at that conclusion until you have passed through the intermediate steps. Emphasis, therefore, has to be placed, as we have, I believe, going back for quite some years, on initial, collateral arms control measures which can be implemented.

NEW CLIMATE NEEDED FOR DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS

Senator CLARK. Actually, Governor, what we need is to create a new climate, is it not, not only with respect to the Russians, but perhaps with respect to our own aspirations and our own zeal in forwarding the very fine objectives which President Kennedy so eloquently stated?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Yes. Certainly you cannot make any progress in disarmament without a better political climate than exists presently with the Russians.

I say this with some qualifications.

Regardless of the extent of existing tension, it is possible to make steps in the field of disarmament where mutual interest is obvious. There have been illustrations of this before. It is only after the maximum tension of the Cuban crisis that we made any advances in a nuclear breakthrough.

Senator CLARK. And the Berlin wall is another example of how, just when things look blackest, suddenly we come up with an advance.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Before you can arrive at a state of total, general, and complete disarmament, really there have to be a lot of political settlements that have to precede it.

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you whether you think the present intransigence of the Russians is influenced substantially by the situations in both Vietnam and Germany?

Ambassador STEVENSON. It is not for me to say what influences Russian decisions. Many people will say to you that it is competition with the Chinese more than anything else, and is unrelated to other things, and that they exploit other situations in order to advance their main objective. But I cannot speculate very intelligently on this subject.

I have made an amateur sport of being a Kremlinologist for a good many years, but I still consider myself an amateur.

Senator CLARK. Perhaps it would be better to discuss this in executive session.

Ambassador STEVENSON. I want also to say, if I could, in response to Senator Clark's question, Mr. Chairman, that I think that there is no distinction that I have ever detected between the Johnson administration and the Kennedy administration—if there was any suggestion of a distinction—in the field of arms control.

Senator CLARK. As far as I know, Governor, the words "general and complete disarmament" have never passed the lips of the President of the United States, and they certainly did with his predecessor. And may I say for the record I recall the difficulties I had as a member of the platform committee of the Democratic National Committee in getting some of President Kennedy's words into the platform.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Well, I must say that this administration—at least it seems from where I sit—has very strongly supported the disarmament effort. In fact, I believe that the first law that President Johnson signed after taking office provided for authorization for the Disarmament Agency for 2 years.

He has talked to me about it on frequent occasions. Specifically, he has taken a personal interest and strongly supported efforts in the 18-nation Disarmament Commission to reach some concrete agreements. In his statement at the reconvening of the conference in January 1964 he proposed, as you well know, five major types of potential agreement. And during the talks last year our delegation to the Disarmament Commission set forth these proposals in great detail.

He has proposed urgently needed steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, measures to cease the production of fissionable materials, plans to decrease the danger of war, by accident, by surprise attack, and so on.

Much of the time has been devoted to a discussion of general and complete disarmament. I reaffirmed that. I have my speech here of only yesterday—Monday—in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York.

Following the Russian speech I said:

> We are determined to work for general and complete disarmament, as part of our common long-term effort to achieve a better and safer world through the application of the principles of the charter and the steady development of international law and effective peacekeeping arrangements. The outlined Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament which the United States has submitted and discussed in Geneva would in our view provide a sound framework for this common effort.

Senator CLARK. Who are you quoting from?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Myself.

This speech, of course, was approved by the President before I gave it.

Senator CLARK. I assume it was cleared by Mr. Cleveland and others.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Let me conclude this, because I think it is relevant to what you said, sir.

> If we are to achieve this goal, we must first halt the progress of the arms race, and particularly the nuclear race, and turn it back. We must begin with those areas of arms control and reductions where agreement seems possible, and we must begin now. We must avoid the lure of easy slogans and deceptive generalities, and face the fact that agreements in this area involve complex matters of military balance, scientific technology, and, where necessary, verification.

This approach was reflected in the program of action which the United States placed before the 18-nation conference in Geneva. Our proposals were outlined in President Johnson's message of January 21, 1964, to the conference. As our President stated in the opening words of his message, there is only one item on the agenda of this conference, it is the leading item on the agenda of mankind, and that one item is peace. In that spirit President Johnson outlined five major types of agreement for study and negotiation.

Well, sir, I repeat this only because this has been the heart, if I can put it that way, of our approach to the whole problem of general and complete disarmament—that it must be attained, and the way to attain it is step by step.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, should these U.N. Charter amendments be approved without reservations, understandings, or interpretations?

In other words, if they are amended by the Senate, by reservation or other change, would this entail a renegotiation or not?

Ambassador STEVENSON. Well, if the reservation goes to the heart of the matter, then all of the members of the United Nations would have to accept it. If it does not go to the heart of the matter, it is probably not worth making. So I would think my answer is "Yes," without reservations.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you would mind stepping aside. We will have an executive session, if you have time to wait until we hear the public witnesses.

Ambassador STEVENSON. Delighted; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The first public witness is Mr. George V. Allen, of Washington, D.C., on behalf of the United World Federalists.

Mr. Allen, we are very pleased to have you. We have welcomed you to this committee many times in the past.

Do you wish to read your statement, or to insert it in the record and comment on it?

Mr. ALLEN. I would like to read it more or less, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.

Mr. ALLEN. I would welcome interruption at any time.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE V. ALLEN, WASHINGTON, D.C., ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS

Mr. ALLEN. In order to explain my position here, I would like to say to you and members of the committee, my name is George V. Allen, Washington, D.C., and am appearing on behalf of United World Federalists as Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee and Vice Chairman of the National Advisory Board. I have devoted most of my life to the Foreign Service of my country, serving as Ambassador to Iran, Yugoslavia, India, and Greece and twice as an Assistant Secretary of State. I participated in the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in 1943, the Roosevelt-Churchill Conference in Cairo in 1943, the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, and the Potsdam Conference in 1945. I served three times as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to UNESCO Conferences and was Chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO during 1962 and 1963.

United World Federalists, Inc., is a nonpartisan, nonprofit membership organization incorporated under the laws of the State of New York. Our membership of 20,000 Americans is drawn from every State in the Union and we have 120 organized chapters.

From its inception in Asheville, N.C., in 1947, when five predecessor organizations joined to form United World Federalists, this organization has been primarily concerned with the development of the United Nations into an effective instrument for law and order in the world community. We have long sought to strengthen the United Nations as a keeper of the peace.

We have urged changes in the Charter of the United Nations through the amendment processes of articles 108 and 109 which, in our opinion, would make the United Nations better able to fulfill the high purposes set forth in the preamble of its charter.

REASONS FOR SUPPORT OF CHARTER AMENDMENTS

We appear today in support of the first two amendments to the United Nations Charter during its history of almost 20 years. We believe that these amendments, increasing the membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15 nations, and of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 nations, are equitable, realistic, and sound. We believe that adoption of these two amendments is in the best interests of the United States and the United Nations for the following reasons:

(1) These amendments will make the United Nations stronger and more effective because they will provide more realistic and equital representation of the member states. Since 1945, the United Nations has more than doubled in membership growing from 51 to 114 members. By far the largest part of the increased membership is made up of African and Asian states which were not in existence when the charter was drafted and accordingly, had no opportunity to contribute to its drafting.

The consideration given to enlarging these two bodies by the 18th United Nations General Assembly in 1963 showed clearly the high importance attached to equitable representation by the member states from Africa and Asia. It also showed that a mere reallocation of seats in the 11-nation Security Council would not meet the need felt by almost all members for an equitable voice on the Security Council. Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand urged expansion of these councils and not merely redistribution of seats. The United States took the same position.

The enlargement of the Security Council from 11 to 15 will maintain intact the seats of the present 5 permanent members; double the seats for Western Europe from 1 seat to 2; increase the seats for Africa and Asia from 2 to 5, with the understanding that 3 shall be filled by African nations and 2 by Asian nations; give 1 seat to Eastern Europe in place of the often disputed seat which is present split between Asia and Eastern Europe, and Maintain the present 2 seats for Latin America.

(2) As the United States will probably prefer, on most occasions, to have the Security Council exercise its primary responsibility for peacekeeping, despite potential obstruction by the veto and without prejudice to the residual rights of the General Asembly in this area,

it is important that the Security Council represent as a equitable a cross section of the views of the members of the United Nations as feasible.

(3) Since the cooperation of the newer nations has been essential to the proper constitution of the United Nations peace forces, it is just and prudent that they should have equitable representation on the Security Council which has primary responsibility for peacekeeping.

(4) Enlargement of the Security Council may facilitate the kind of solution of United Nations peacekeeping financing which has been sought by the United States. It will indicate, as the charter provides, that the United States regards the Security Council as having "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Some accommodation with the clear desire of substantial majority of United Nations members for the enlargement of this Council is essential to the solution of future financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

(5) These amendments will demonstrate the ability of the United Nations and the charter to adapt to changing circumstances in the light of new realities. It is important to establish the United Nations capacity to adapt to change as this is the measure of any organization's ability to survive and to grow. As the U.S. Constitution has met the test of adaptability, so must the United Nations Charter.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, we believe it is in the best interests of the United States and consonant with our own belief in democracy to recognize and support the keen interest of an overwhelming majority of the member states of the United Nations in enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

BACKGROUND ON NEED FOR CHARTER REVIEW

While we support these two first amendments to the United Nations Charter, Mr. Chairman, we do not believe that these changes alone will provide answers to some of the problems which have become increasingly apparent over the years since the charter was adopted at San Francisco on June 26, 1945.

During the present year, from June 24 to 26, the United Nations will again meet in San Francisco to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the signing of the charter. It will, however, be a very different United Nations and a very different world from that historic meeting in 1945 when the guns of war were still heard around the world and the atomic age was yet around the corner.

We have now lived 20 years under what the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was wont to call a preatomic charter. I would suggest that now, in this International Cooperation Year and as the United Nations begins its third decade—now is the time to begin a full evaluation of the United Nations in the light of both the hopes invested in it in 1945 and the requirements of international organization for the protection of national security and the maintenace of peace in 1965.

I am quite aware, Mr. Chairman, and members of this distinguished committee, of the problems inherent in political creation. I am aware that changes, no matter how desirable, do not come overnight. I am equally aware, however, and utterly convinced, that desirable changes

in international institutions will not occur as readily or be as much to our liking unless we determine in a realistic and hardheaded manner what we want the United Nations to be, what is needed to make it thus, and then advocate our proposals with the same determination and the same tenacity with which other permanent members of the Security Council advocate their proposals.

Over the past 20 years, many prominent Americans, including many members of this distinguished committee, have voiced their concern with one aspect or another of the operation of the United Nations. While the United States has lived with the present charter and has supported a liberal interpretation of that charter, we have recently witnessed a United Nations constitutional crisis with respect to the financing of peacekeeping operations. This crisis points to the fact that changes will have to be constitutional, not alone interpretive, in the future. A constantly growing number of world leaders, including the Secretary General of the United Nations, are suggesting the need for revision of the charter.

I suggest that it would be highly desirable for your Committee on Foreign Relations to undertake a full review of the United Nations Charter, after 20 years of operation, similar to the Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter which conducted extensive studies and hearings in 1954 and 1955 as authorized by Senate Resolution 126 on July 28, 1953.

In this regard, we welcome the recent introduction of Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 and its sponsorship by more than one-quarter of the Members of the Senate. We believe that this resolution is directed to the most important unanswered question facing U.S. foreign policy today, namely a thorough and specific determination of the kind of international authority that the United States deems necessary and is ready to advocate in order to implement our stated goal of—

> a world which is free from the scourge of war and the danger and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. (Title I, sec. 2. Public Law 87-297, 87th Cong.)

We hope very much, Mr. Chairman, that your committee or an appropriate subcommittee thereof will hold hearings on this important resolution.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you and express the views of the United World Federalists in support of these first amendments to the United Nations Charter.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Allen. I can assure you the committee will hold hearings on the resolution in the near future.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark, any questions?

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Allen, for the plug for Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, which actually I think will give us an opportunity to look into these matters.

I was very happy to have the chairman make this statement. Secretary Rusk has also given his blessing to some consideration of these matters by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I think your testimony has been most helpful.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Allen.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mrs. Robert J. Wiener, of Portland, Oreg., on behalf of the American Association of University Women.

STATEMENT OF MRS. ROBERT J. WIENER, PORTLAND, OREG., ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN

Mrs. WIENER. Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Mrs. Robert J. Wiener and I am here on behalf of the American Association of University Women, an organization with a membership of over 166,000 organized into 1,560 branches in the 50 States, Guam, and the District of Columbia.

The association has maintained an intense interest in international problems ever since the period of World War I, and an equally keen interest in means of achieving a more peaceful world. AAUW was vigorous in its support of the proposed League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice. It had a representative, an appointment made by President Hoover, in Geneva in 1932 at the World Disarmament Conference, just as it had official representatives in San Francisco in 1945, and a member on the U.S. delegation to the Bretton Woods Monetary and Financial Conference in July 1946. A former AAUW president is Vice Chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, and our executive director was appointed by President Johnson to serve on the Advisory Committee on Educational and Cultural Affairs to the State Department.

As recently as February 1962 the association presented a witness before this committee in support of the United Nations bond issue.

Within our membership there are study groups in a large proportion of our branches working to broaden understanding of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. AAUW members have consistently supported United Nations Day and Week in their communities, and currently are supporting International Cooperation Year.

We firmly believe that an international forum for the presentation and the working out of solutions to international problems and conflicts is imperative if any degree of peace in the world is to be maintained. It seems to us that economic and social development, the resolving of political problems, and the development of effective international peacekeeping machinery are key responsibilities of the United Nations.

REASONS FOR URGING RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS

We are all acutely aware of the changes which have occurred in the world since the United Nations came into being 20 years ago, and therefore urge acceptance of the two amendments to the Charter of the United Nations which are under consideration by this committee—amendments which have been ratified by 65 of the 76 member naions required for adoption.

The membership of the United Nations has more than doubled since 1945, but no change in these 20 years has been made in the Charter of the United Nations to reflect this difference. An increase in the size of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council would insure that these bodies come closer to representing the whole membership of the United Nations and would alleviate the pressures and the conflicts of recent years which have resulted from the efforts of new members to secure seats on the Councils.

The adoption of these amendments would act to restore the balance which was envisioned in 1945 between the Councils and the General Assembly by providing for additional representation. This is a matter of obvious justice, as well as political wisdom. We believe the opportunity of serving on the Councils will prove to be a "school for diplomacy" for representatives of nations which have not had access to seats on the Councils in the past. We believe the work of the Councils will be more effective if they are enlarged as proposed.

In our opinion, the general United Nations membership will have greater confidence and an added sense of participation which should lead to greater support by the total United Nations membership for United Nations activities.

In the eyes of the association, the very fact that this is the first time the United Nations Charter has been amended is a tribute both to its stability and its flexibility. We have noted that these amendments do not affect the basic interests or the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

We have also noted that there is no reason that the proposed geographic distribution of seats outlined in the resolution adopted in December 1963 by the General Assembly should affect adversely the interests of the United States.

We urge ratification of these amendments as a means of strengthening the United Nations, an organization for which we see no substitute, and which we believe has a unique role to play in building a world community whose common interests are served through international cooperation on matters ranging from labor and trade, through space and atomic energy control, to feeding the undernourished, peacekeeping, and promoting economic and social development.

A distinguished member and former president of the AAUW, Dean Virginia Gildersleeve, served on the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945. We are proud to say that Dean Gildersleeve, as a member of one of the drafting committees, was the primary author of the initial phrase in the preamble to the United Nations Charter, "We the peoples of the United Nations * * *." We urge ratification of the two amendments under consideration by this committee in the spirit of this eloquent phrase.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Wiener. That is a very fine statement. I appreciate your taking the trouble to testify before the committee.

I think you have already sensed that the committee is very sympathetic to your position. Thank you very much.

The next public witness is Mr. Robert Cory, of New York, on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

Mr. Cory, we are happy to have you. Do you wish to proceed?

STATEMENT OF ROBERT CORY, NEW YORK, ON BEHALF OF THE FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Mr. CORY. I would like to file my statment for the record and make some comments on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be fine. The basic information has already been presented to the committee in several different ways. The whole statement will be put in the record, and then you may comment on it.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Cory follows:)

STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. CORY ON BEHALF OF THE FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

My name is Robert H. Cory, of Scarsdale, N.Y. I am program associate of the Quaker United Nations program where I have had the opportunity for the past 4 years to observe first hand the operations of the United Nations. I am appearing today on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation. This Quaker committee has on its policymaking general committee, Friends appointed from many Friends bodies, but it does not claim to speak for all Friends. The Religious Society of Friends is a very democratic organization, and Friends cherish the right to their individual opinions.

But it is clear that the United Nations commands broad support among most Friends and is regarded as the chief political institution in helping to build a peaceful world of law and order.

I appear today to support Senate approval of the pending amendments to the U.N. Charter which would enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 and the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27.

At the annual meeting of the general committee of the Friends Committee on National Legislation, held March 19–21, 1965, a statement of legislative policy was adopted on "supporting and improving the United Nations" which begins as follows:

"Increasingly, the maintenance of world peace depends upon the United Nations. The U.N. needs even greater support by the nations of the world to develop into a more effective instrument for the establishment of world peace and justice under law.

"In recent years, the United States has given increased moral and financial support to the United Nations. But all countries of the world, including the United States, need to make the United Nations the cornerstone of their foreign policy and seek to improve it as the major instrument of international justice.

"Although the U.N. is not yet capable of handling all world problems, it has been frequently able to exert a moderating influence in situations of tension and crisis. In particular, the establishment of U.N. peacekeeping operations and observer groups in the Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus has helped keep local conflicts from spreading and has reduced the danger of major war while allowing time for basic solutions to be sought through negotiation or other peaceful means. The good offices and personal diplomacy of the Secretary General have been used constructively on many occasions. * * *

"The United States can help the U.N. gain experience and function more successfully by * * * approving the amendment to the U.N. Charter agreed to at the U.N. which would enlarge the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to reflect the expanded membership of the U.N."

We view Senate approval of the pending amendments to the U.N. Charter as one of the important next steps which the United States can take to help the U.N. function more successfully.

The membership of the U.N. in the past 20 years has grown from 51 to 114 and may increase slightly in the near future. This increase in membership has come primarily from Africa and Asia, for in 1946 only Liberia, Ethiopia, India, and the Philippines were members; whereas now there are 30 African States and 14 Asian States in the U.N.

Much of the work of the U.N. is done by organs on which members serve on a principle of equitable geographic distribution. Adjustments have already been made in those organs of the U.N. whose membership is not numerically determined by the charter. However, any adjustment in the membership of the Secu-

rity Council and the Economic and Social Council can only be achieved through charter amendment. Amendments for these changes were adopted by the General Assembly, December 17, 1963, with the recommendation that all members of the United Nations ratify "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by September 1, 1965." As of April 2, 65 nations have ratified, but of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council whose consent is obligatory, only the U.S.S.R. has ratified.

DISCUSSION OF AMENDMENTS

Of these amendments, the most important one is that which expands the membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15. One of the distinguished scholars of U.N. affairs, Sydney D. Bailey, in his book, "The General Assembly of the United Nations," concludes that "the position now is that it's impossible to distribute the six seats to be filled by election in such a way that all main groups are continuously represented." Mr. Bailey points out that a considerable amount of time of the General Assembly has been absorbed in contests for these six seats, with resulting bitterness and tension. The amendment would be supplemented by a resolution indicating that the 10 nonpermanent members of the Security Council should be elected according to the following pattern: 5 from African and Asian States, 1 from East European States, 2 from Latin American States, and 2 from Western European and other states. The veto power of the 5 permanent members would, of course, not be altered, but on procedural matters 9 members in 15 rather than 7 in 11 could decide.

The second amendment would increase the size of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27, and in so doing, allocate 7 of the additional seats to African and Asian States. The Economic and Social Council has increasingly tended to become a procedural body concerned with review and coordination of programs of work within the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Though it can serve as an initiator of new means of consultation and cooperation on economic and social questions, the authority to recommend lies with the General Assembly. Since 1962 the 18 seats have been distributed so that the Afro-Asians and the Latin Americans together had half the total. Though it is impossible to predict exactly the application of the new amendment, the Afro-Asians and Latin Americans together would unquestionably have a clear majority. On the other hand, influence is not measured by votes and the industrially developed countries have had and will continue to have a dominant influence because of their financial power.

It appears then that these two procedural amendments are needed to reflect the basic change in the U.N. over the last 20 years: the expansion of Afro-Asian membership. That process cannot be reversed, though a failure of these amendments at this time could inject disappointment and some bitterness. In any general review of the place of the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy, the total implications of this trend should be realistically assessed. In that assessment, it is important to realize the important advantages of increased membership and the relatively minor disadvantages.

I feel that increased membership has enabled the U.N. to contribute to the nation-building process through aid in public administration as well as through technical assistance. It has widened the world view on the new nations, facing them with a global agenda. Though the General Assembly has become a somewhat procedurally unwieldly body, it has also become a more adequate means of expressing the needs and feelings of the developing nations. I would hope that small nations, particularly in Africa, are finding common interests through such U.N. bodies as the Economic Commission for Africa—interests which may lead to the ultimate formation of larger, more viable political units. Meantime, U.N. research and data collection agencies now can piece together a more adequate, more statistically valuable picture of world problems.

VALUE OF REPRESENTATION AT U.N.

Representation at the United Nations is valuable to new states as a means of training diplomats in the issues and procedures of a global agenda. Delegates coming to the United Nations both for the permanent missions and for the General Assembly return to their foreign offices and to important ambassadorial posts with the valuable experience of having worked with fellow delegates from all parts of the world and with having wrestled with the intricate and often baffling problems of a world undergoing rapid change. While they are in New York,

they have an opportunity to observe and report on American society and to come in close contact with U.S. officials. Since many of these nations have only rudimentary facilities for training of foreign service officers, access to U.N. bodies and to posts in the Secretariat can contribute to the quality of the new diplomacy. This is particularly true in the work of the Security Council, for here nations are forced to deal with some of the most difficult and intractable issues of international politics.

In my opinion, it is a mistake to conclude that there is a generally observable difference in judgment, maturity, and wisdom between the big powers and the small powers or between the original members and the new members of the U.N. A dispassionate examination of the record will, in my view, indicate that the new members have played as responsible a role in U.N. diplomacy as have the original members. Therefore, increasing their participation in the Security Council and in the Economic and Social Council should strengthen the U.N.

As a nongovernmental observer at the U.N., it is not within my competence to make any clear judgment on the performance of governmental missions at the U.N. However, it is my personal opinion that there have been many specific instances in which some of the newer nations have made unusual contributions. I have great admiration for the work of Chief Adebo, of Nigeria, as Chairman of the Committee of 21 on U.N. peacekeeping. I have known of the work of Mr. Malhotra on the Special Committee on Apartheid, whose careful research has won the respect of his colleagues. While everyone is aware of the skill of Mr. Quaison-Sackey, the President of the General Assembly, the high quality of some of the Ghanian diplomats is less known; Mr. Johnson Appiah, of Ghana, for instance, did outstanding work in the planning for the Trade Conference. I have been impressed by the objectivity and skill of Ambassador Usher of the Ivory Coast as a representative of his country on the Security Council.

In all these cases, it is often the respected and experienced delegate from one of the smaller nations who is chosen for the difficult job of drawing up resolutions which bridge conflicting points of view and achieve the maximum consensus. Though there may indeed be specific exceptions, the nations of Africa and Asia, in my judgment, have given a high priority to the quality of representation at the U.N. Most of these diplomats are well aware that it would be futile to pass resolutions, no matter how great the majority, which would become inoperative for lack of support from the major nations.

I think it is also important to realize that Afro-Asian States have contributed some of the most qualified persons for the work of the international Secretariat. Not only do we have the present Secretary General as an example, but also a number of his chief executive officers. The diversity of nationality in the Secretariat creates some obvious difficulties but in the long run strengthens the sense of objectivity and of confidence which enables the U.N. to serve all its members.

Afro-Asian States have, by and large, policies of nonalinement. Therefore, they are often in the position of trying to arrange some compromise resolution when there is a deadlock between great powers in the Security Council. Since the United States retains a veto and since the United States may on a number of issues wish to find a middle ground, the participation of more Afro-Asians can have very real advantages for the United States. In the Economic and Social Council the Afro-Asians could be expected to use their slightly increased influence to push for cooperative ways of meeting the growing gap between the have and have-not nations. Here it seems to the great advantage of the United States to have open discussion of methods of peaceful change and to support governments seeking evolutionary rather than revolutionary answers.

This brief assessment of a change which has already occurred—the increased membership of the Afro-Asian States—puts, in my opinion, the question of these two amendments in perspective. The United States will, in my opinion, gain in diplomatic influence by ratifying these amendments.

To be a truly effective instrument for world peace and order the U.N. must reflect the world as it is. These charter amendments help to make these two vital U.N. bodies more representative. We strongly urge this committee and the Senate to ratify these amendments to the U.N. Charter.

Mr. CORY. My name is Robert Cory. I am from Scarsdale, N.Y., and I am a member of the Scarsdale meeting of the Religious Society of Friends.

I have the privilege of being an accredited observer at the United Nations for an organization with consultation status with the Economic and Social Council.

I am here today on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation to support these two amendments.

I think perhaps the contribution I can make, if any indeed, is on the question of the quality of participation of the Afro-Asian States and of the value in these amendments in furthering that participation.

If I could read briefly from my statement—I think the failure of these amendments at this time would not reverse the process of wider representation, but could inject disappointment, bitterness, and procedural difficulties.

ADVANTAGES OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE U.N.

In any general review of the place of the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy, the total implications of this trend should be realistically assessed. In that assessment, it is important to realize the important advantages of increased membership and the relatively minor disadvantages.

I feel that increased membership has enabled the United Nations to contribute to the nation-building process through aid in public administration as well as through technical assistance. It has widened the world view of the new nations, facing them with a global agenda. Though the General Assembly has become a somewhat procedurally unwieldy body, it has also become a more adequate means of expressing the needs and feelings of the developing nations.

I would hope that small nations, particularly in Africa, are finding common interests through such United Nations bodies as the Economic Commission for Africa—interests which may lead to the ultimate formation of larger, more viable political units. Meantime, United Nations research and data collection agencies now can piece together a more adequate, more statistically valuable picture of world problems.

VALUE OF U.N. TO NEW NATIONS

Representation at the United Nations is valuable to new states as a means of training diplomats in the issues and procedures of a global agency. Delegates coming to the United Nations both for the permanent missions and for the General Assembly return to their foreign offices and to important ambassadorial posts with the valuable experience of having worked with fellow delegates from all parts of the world and with having wrestled with the intricate and often baffling problems of a world undergoing rapid change. While they are in New York, they have an opportunity to observe and report on American society and to come in close contact with U.S. officials.

Since many of these nations have only rudimentary facilities for training of foreign service officers, access to United Nations bodies and to posts in Secretariat can contribute to the quality of the new diplomacy. This is particularly true in the work of the Security Council, for here nations are forced to deal with some of the most difficult and intractable issues of international politics.

CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY NEWER NATIONS

In my opinion, it is a mistake to conclude that there is a generally observable difference in judgment, maturity, and wisdom between the big powers and the small powers or between the original members and the new members of the United Nations. A dispassionate examination of the record will, in my view, indicate that the new members have played as responsible a role in the United Nations diplomacy as have the original members. Therefore, increasing their participation in the Security Council and in the Economic and Social Council should strengthen the United Nations.

As a nongovernmental observer at the United Nations, it is not within my competence to make any clear judgment on the performance of governmental missions at the United Nations. However, it is my personal opinion that there have been many specific instances in which some of the newer nations have made unusual contributions.

In all these cases, it is often the respected and experienced delegate from one of the smaller nations who is chosen for the difficult job of drawing up resolutions which bridge conflicting points of view and achieve the maximum consensus. Though there may indeed be specific exceptions, the nations of Africa and Asia, in my judgment, have given a high priority to the quality of representation at the United Nations. Most of these diplomats are well aware that it would be futile to pass resolutions, no matter how great the majority, which would become inoperative for lack of support from the major nations.

I think it is also important to realize that Afro-Asian states have contributed some of the most qualified persons for the work of the international Secretariat. Not only do we have the present Secretary-General as an example, but also a number of his chief executive officers. The diversity of nationality in the Secretariat creates some obvious difficulties but in the long run strengthens the sense of objectivity and of confidence which enables the United Nations to serve all its members.

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In the Economic and Social Council the Afro-Asians could be expected to use their slightly increased influence to push for cooperative ways of meeting the growing gap between the have and have-not nations. Here it seems to the great advantage of the United States to have open discussion of methods of peaceful change and to support governments seeking evolutionary rather than revolutionary answers.

This brief assessment of a change which has already occurred—the increased membership of the Afro-Asian states—puts, in my opinion, the question of these two amendments in perspective. The United States will, in my opinion, gain in diplomatic influence by ratifying these amendments.

To be a truly effective instrument for world peace and order the United Nations must reflect the world as it is. These charter amend-

ments help to make these two vital United Nations bodies more representative.

We strongly urge this committee and the Senate to ratify these amendments to the United Nations Charter.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cory, for a very perceptive statement. I appreciate your taking the trouble to testify before the committee.

The committee will now adjourn to the anteroom for an executive session.

(Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee proceeded to executive session.)

(The following statement was subsequently received for the record:)

STATEMENT OF MRS. CATHERINE MANNO FOR THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, U.S. SECTION, WASHINGTON, D.C., IN SUPPORT OF SENATE CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE U.N. CHARTER

The U.S. section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom urges the Senate to approve ratification of the proposed amendments to the U.N. Charter, for four reasons:

1. Enlargement of the two principal Councils will adapt the U.N. structure to the fact that membership has more than doubled since the charter was drafted. The specific geographic allocation of elective seats should facilitate elections and leave members better satisfied with the fairness of the results.

2. Even though these amendments will accomplish only a minor reform, ratification by the United States will indicate this country's faith in, and desire to strengthen, the United Nations.

3. It will also show our respect for the opinions of the rest of the world, since the amendments were voted by an overwhelming majority of countries and it appears likely that the required approval of the other four permanent Security Council members will be given.

4. It would ill become the United States to hesitate to allow other U.N. members a few more seats on the two Councils when we have been privileged to be permanent members of both (by law in the Security Council and by practice in the Economic and Social Council). The continued pre-eminence of the permanent members in the Security Council is evident: they retain the veto right while not even a concurring majority of the votes of the nonpermanent members is needed for substantive actions supported by the Big Five. (Only 4 of the 10 elective members' votes would be needed under the proposed voting majority requiring a total of 9 affirmative votes for such actions.)

The women's International League for Peace and Freedom has no illusions that this small structural reform will substantially alleviate the crisis in which the U.N. now founders. Other steps toward strengthening the organization are urgently needed. They require the joint efforts of many nations, but the United States could assist such a progressive development in several ways:

1. By continuing our financial commitment to the U.N.

2. By withdrawing our opposition to the seating of the Peoples Republic of China, within the context of a settlement of the Chinese representation question that protects the interests of the people living under the government of the Republic of China.

3. By removing the reservations we have placed on the jurisdiction of the principal legal organ of the United Nations—the International Court of Justice. (The reciprocity principle prevents others from profiting from our fuller acceptance of international law unless they accept equal obligations.)

4. By displaying a greater willingness to use, or at least try to use, U.N. agencies and good offices in the settlement of disputes, and by encouraging others to do the same.

5. By a greater willingness to compromise those differences that can be compromised, recognizing that we cannot have every decision wholly our way, that others too must have an incentive to loyal participation, if the

United Nations is to grow in authority and resources. The Women's International League believes that this includes the issue of U.N. arrears, which should be solved by a compromise that preserves the universality principle and as much as possible of the collective-responsibility principle.

In conclusion, the league believes that the great task of our generation, if it is not to be the last generation, is to find methods other than war and threats of war for resolving differences between nations. The United Nations is an indispensable institution within whose framework such methods can evolve. The prompt ratification of these amendments would be a signal to the world that the United States intends to give its support to such an evolution.

47-378—65——9

APPENDIX

U.S. Position Papers on Article 19 Issue

The U.S. position in these negotiations was stated as recently as April 22 by Ambassador Yost before the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (Committee of 33). In summary, that position is:

1. That the Charter specifically gives the Security Council "primary" responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
2. That the Charter specifically does *not* give the Security Council "exclusive" responsibility for dealing with peace and security issues. The General Assembly under the Charter has always had authority to make recommendations with respect to the maintenance of peace and security, including recommendations for the establishment of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
3. That it would be in the interest of the Organization to maintain the principle of collective financial responsibility for the operations of the Organization.
4. That the General Assembly under the Charter has exclusive authority to apportion and pass assessments to cover the expenses of the Organization.
5. That the United States is prepared to consider procedural modifications, preserving the basic principle of collective financial responsibility, if the members think it desirable to take into account any strong political objections to peacekeeping operations on the part of a Permanent Member of the Security Council.
6. That the United States is prepared to consider and negotiate any proposals consistent with these principles.

[U.S. Mission to the United Nations, press release No. 4531, Apr. 22, 1965])

Statement by Ambassador Charles W. Yost, Deputy U.S. Representative, in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, April 22, 1965

The U.S. delegation has so often made clear that it shares the views of the vast majority of member states concerning the charter arrangements which govern United Nations peacekeeping operations that we had not intended to speak on this subject today. However, in light of the statements made this morning and in order that there should be no ambiguity about our position, I would like to state once more very briefly the principles which the United States will continue to support with respect to the initiation and financing of United Nations peacekeeping activities.

First, the charter specifically gives the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The authority of the Security Council should indeed be primary in this field and the Security Council should be looked to as the principal organ of the United Nations for this purpose. We should make renewed efforts to assure that it works well in carrying out this responsibility.

Second, the charter specifically does not give the Security Council exclusive responsibility over peace and security, nor do we believe it should do so. The exclusive power given the Security Council by the charter in this field is to decide on measures—commonly called enforcement actions—for the maintenance of international peace and security, decisions which are binding on member states. This is the action which article 11(3) of the charter reserves to the Security Council, as the International Court of Justice determined.

The General Assembly under the charter otherwise has always had, and should continue to have, full authority to make recommendations with respect to the maintenance of peace and security including recommendations for the initiation of United Nations peacekeeping operations. We see no reason at all why this power, granted to the Assembly by the charter, should be abandoned and a situation created whereby any nation, no matter how powerful, could unilaterally and

totally prevent the organization from functioning in the most vital area of its responsibility. Such an abdication would certainly not be in the long-run interest of the majority of members of the dignity and authority of our organization.

Third, we believe that, in the interests of the organization, the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations should be the collective financial responsibility of the entire membership. It is on the basis of this principle, we believe, that the long-run financial, and hence practical, health of United Nations peacekeeping can best be assured. Our efforts in this committee will be directed to preserving this principle, not to finding ways in which to abandon or sidetrack it.

Fourth and finally, only the General Assembly has under the charter the power to apportion the expenses of peacekeeping operations among member states.

These are the basic principles which we believe must be applied.

While we feel the present practices for implementing these principles are satisfactory, we will be flexible in considering new ideas consistent with them, although we do not wish at this stage in our deliberations to commit ourselves to any details at this point.

One new idea in the field of finance has already been put forward—the suggestion that when the General Assembly in the future apportions the expenses of major peacekeeping operations, it should take into account any strong political objections to such operations which had been voiced by a permanent member of the Security Council. Let me be clear on this point. We would prefer to have full collective financial responsibility applied to all member states and we believe the principle of full collective financial responsibility should continue to be the presumptive one for United Nations peacekeeping operations. But if others feel a modification of this sort is necessary for the preservation of the basic principle of collective financial responsibility for United Nations peacekeeping, we would be willing to consider it. We certainly do not believe that it is in the interests of the organization to take the position that the only alternative to full collective financial responsibility is to abandon the principle altogether.

Mr. Chairman, on September 14, 1964, the U.S. delegation submitted to the Working Group of 21 a paper (A/AC.113/30) on the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations. This paper sets forth in more detail our views on future arrangements for initiating and financing United Nations peacekeeping operations. That paper and the proposals it contains—such as that for a special finance committee—remain valid today and I would like that paper to be distributed as a document of this committee. However, we are prepared to consider and attempt to reach agreement on any proposals for future peacekeeping arrangements which reflect the general principles I have mentioned earlier.

In conclusion, I may emphasize that we share the desire of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for a genuine negotiation in mutual respect on these vital matters. In that spirit we will examine with particular care the ideas and suggestions which have been put forward by the speakers today.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS,
22 April 1965.

FINANCING OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Working paper submitted by the delegation of the United States of America[1]

The United States delegation has the honor to present to the Working Group of Twenty-One the attached Working Paper containing suggestions for changes in the arrangements and methods for initiating and financing United Nations peace-keeping operations involving the use of military forces.

In March 1964, as members of the Working Group are aware, the United States and United Kingdom delegations indicated that they were prepared to explore with other members of the United Nations, in the first instance those represented in the Working Group of Twenty-One, ways to reinforce the capacity of the United Nations to undertake and finance such peace-keeping operations in the future. Accordingly the United States and United Kingdom delegations at that

[1] Previously issued as a document, on September 14, 1964, of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations (A/AC.113/30).

time suggested certain ideas for discussion, and explored those ideas, informally and in broad outline, with various members of the Working Group, including the Soviet delegation.

The attached Working Paper embodies the main lines of these ideas and the salient features of the suggestions then made, as modified by subsequent discussions. It is now submitted by the United States for consideration and discussion in the Working Group.

These suggestions presuppose settlement in some manner of arrears for past peace-keeping operations. Such payments may take any number of possible forms so long as they conform to the United Nations Charter and Financial Regulations.

Arrangements and methods for initiating and financing United Nations peace-keeping operations involving the use of military forces

A. To preserve and reinforce the peace-keeping capacity of the United Nations, it is in the interest of the entire membership of the Organization that there be established, within the framework prescribed by the Charter, generally acceptable new procedures and methods for the future initiation of United Nations peace-keeping operations involving the use of military forces and the obtaining of necessary financing for such operations.

These procedures and methods must safeguard the capacity of the United Nations to undertake and carry on successfully such future peace-keeping operations. Within the scope of this objective, they should also take account of the interests and capacities of all Member States and the special status under the Charter of certain of them.

B. In establishing such procedures and methods, particular consideration should be given to the following principles:

1. Any new arrangements should make it possible to take due account of the interests and capacities of all Member States, but must not permit any State to obstruct the United Nations in the discharge of its peace-keeping responsibilities.

2. The Security Council has primary responsibility under the Charter for the initiation of peace-keeping operations involving the use of military forces.

3. The General Assembly may recommend such peace-keeping operations, in the event that the Security Council is unable to act.

4. All Member States have a responsibility under the Charter to contribute to expenses of such United Nations peace-keeping operations when assessed by the General Assembly under Article 17.

5. In apportioning expenses, account should be taken of any excessive burden which the cost of expensive operations might impose on the economies of developing countries.

6. United Nations procedures should be adapted to take into account the interests of those Members, including Permanent Members of the Security Council, that bear special responsibilities. Member States making large financial contributions for such peace-keeping operations should have an appropriate voice in the determination of methods of financing such operations.

C. Arrangements for embodying these considerations in the initiation and financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations involving the use of military forces would include the following interdependent elements:

1. All proposals to initiate such peacekeeping operations would be considered first in the Security Council. The General Assembly would not authorize or assume control of such peacekeeping operations unless the Council had demonstrated that it was unable to take action.

2. The General Assembly would establish a standing special finance committee. The composition of this committee should be similar to that of the present Working Group of Twenty-One: that is, it would include the Permanent Members of the Security Council and a relatively high percentage of those Member States in each geographical area that are large financial contributors to the United Nations. It would be constituted under and governed by firm rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

3. In apportioning expenses for such peacekeeping operations, the General Assembly would act only on a recommendation from the committee passed by a two-thirds majority of the committee's membership.

4. In making recommendations, the committee would consider various alternative methods of financing, including direct financing by countries involved in a dispute, voluntary contributions, and assessed contributions. In the event that the Assembly did not accept a particular recommendation, the committee would resume consideration of the matter with a view to recommending an acceptable alternative.

5. One of the available methods of assessment for peacekeeping operations involving the use of military forces would be a special scale of assessments in which, over a specified amount, States having greater ability to pay would be allocated higher percentages, and States having less ability to pay would be allocated smaller percentages than in the regular scale of assessments.

6. Pending action by the General Assembly on financial arrangements for such a peacekeeping operation initiated by the Security Council or General Assembly, the Secretary General would continue to be authorized under the provisions of the annual resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary expenditures, to commit up to $2 million (and with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions up to $10 million) to finance the initial stage of an operation. Commitments and expenditures above this initial amount could be made by the Secretary General only after the General Assembly had adopted a financing resolution on the basis of a recommendation of the special finance committee.

[U.S. Mission to the United Nations, press release No. 4537, Apr. 29, 1965]

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR CHARLES W. YOST, DEPUTY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

My delegation would like to make a few very brief comments on the draft resolution submitted on April 23 by the distinguished representative of Ethiopia and circulated as document L.1.

While the text of this resolution is by no means identical with what my own delegation would have drafted, we do believe that Ambassador Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy has performed a valuable service by bringing to the fore the urgent need for a solution of the financial difficulties of the organization. As his draft resolution indicates, there is indeed a consensus that this solution should be found as quickly as possible; that members should put aside their differences in the interests of the organization; and that the organization should be brought to solvency by voluntary contributions. Such ideas had their origin in the suggestions first presented informally by the Ambassadors of Afghanistan, Nigeria, Norway, and Venezuela in November of last year. Subsequently they were further developed in a proposal which you, Mr. President, made informally and which appeared to have the support of virtually all the members of the organization. In fact, shortly before Christmas it appeared that there would be unanimous support for your proposal. Unfortunately, the Soviet delegation felt obliged to reject it.

We have one preliminary comment to make on the draft presented by the distinguished representative of Ethiopia. Paragraph 1 refers to the applicability of article 19 of the Charter of the United Nations. One member of the Committee has even suggested that there should be further references to that article. But in our view the applicability of article 19 is a matter for the Assembly itself and not for this Committee to determine.

The problems this Committee faces is essentially twofold: (1) to restore solvency to the organization, and (2) to discuss procedures for future peacekeeping. We have already stated our position with respect to the future and are prepared to enter into negotiations aimed at reaching a consensus. With respect to the solvency, we believe that our efforts should be directed toward what all agree is the desired goal; that is, the restoration of solvency through voluntary contributions.

The distinguished representative of Ethiopia pointed out that we are now working in a different context from that which faced us during December, January, and February. For that reason we should not seek to reproduce the exact language of one version or another of the various proposals which had been previously considered. That approach will, I fear, only take us back to difficulties which previously plagued us. Rather our efforts should be directed

toward seeking a solution of the financial crisis through voluntary contributions to restore the United Nations solvency. I would therefore venture to suggest that far from adding further paragraphs on article 19 to the draft resolution before us, the best course would be to delete the reference to article 19 in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. I would also venture to hope that we could before very long receive such voluntary contributions that the United Nations would, in fact, be restored to solvency.

Let us put aside unfounded fears and unnecessary controversy. Let us instead concentrate on achieving solvency through cooperative effort and on reaching a reasonable understanding about future obligations of the organization relating to peacekeeping. If we can do that—and I think we can—then we can all look forward to a constructive Assembly session this fall and to an increasingly effective United Nations organization.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, April 28, 1965.

ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

The first law signed by President Johnson after he took office was Public Law 88–186 providing authorization for an additional 2-year period for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

On December 5, 1963, President Johnson addressed the principal officers of the Department of State, USIA, AID, ACDA, and the Peace Corps. At that meeting he expressed his support for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and stated, "I strongly supported the limited test ban treaty, and I want Bill Foster to know that I look on his work as part of national security just as much as the work of Secretary Bob McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

On the weekend of December 14–15 of 1963 President Johnson convened in the White House a meeting of the top officials in the U.S. Government who dealt with the subject of arms control and disarmament. This included not only the ranking officers of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency but also officials of the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, AEC, the President's Adviser on National Security Affairs, and the President's Adviser on Science and Technology. This group held a weekend meeting in preparing for the opening of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. President Johnson met with this group and counseled with them as to the work they were doing in preparation for the opening of the conference. A chronology of the actions taken in the year 1964 and so far in 1965 follows:

January 8, 1964: In his state of the Union message, President Johnson announced that U.S. production of enriched uranium will be reduced by 25 percent and that the Atomic Energy Commission will close down 4 of its 14 reactors producing plutonium for weapons. He calls on the Soviet Union to take similar steps.

January 18, 1964: President Johnson, in his reply to Premier Khrushchev's letter of December 31, 1963, urging the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, calls for a deemphasis of East-West differences and appeals to the Soviet Union to support concrete steps to strengthen peace, namely: (1) prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, (2) cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons uses, (3) the transfer of large amounts of fissionable materials to peaceful uses, (4) the prohibition of all nuclear tests, (5) limitations on nuclear weapons systems, (6) reduction of the risk of war by accident or design, and (7) progress toward general disarmament.

Commenting on Khrushchev's proposal regarding the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, the President emphasized that the principle of peaceful settlement should apply to all wars and proposes the following guidelines: (1) All governments should abstain from the direct or indirect threat or use of force to change international boundaries, other territorial or demarcation lines established by international agreement or practice, the dispositions of truce or military armistice agreements, or arrangements or procedures concerning access or passage across certain areas. Nor should any government attempt to enlarge its territory by overthrowing established authorities. (2) These limitations should apply regardless of the direct or indirect form that a threat or use of force might assume, including the clandestine supply of arms. (3) The parties to any dispute should seek a peaceful solution by peaceful means—ne-

gotiation, mediation, judicial settlement, action by an appropriate regional or U.N. organ, or other peaceful means of their own choice. (4) These obligations should be generally observed, and the inherent right of self-defense that is recognized in the UN Charter would remain fully operative.

January 21, 1964: The 18 Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) reconvenes in Geneva. In a message to the Conference, President Johnson proposes five collateral measures:

(1) Prohibition of the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly—whether by aggression, subversion, or the clandestine supply of arms—to change boundaries or demarcation lines, interfere with access to territory, or extend control over territory by displacing established authorities (2) a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; (3) a verified agreement on the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons uses; (4) creation of a system of observation posts to further reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack; and (5) in order to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, agreements that: (*a*) nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of states that do not now control them, (*b*) all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful uses take place under effective international safeguards, (*c*) the major nuclear powers accept increasingly for their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other states, and (*d*) all nuclear weapons tests be banned under effective verification and control.

In his budget message to the Congress, President Johnson announces that U.S. defense expenditures for fiscal year 1965 ($51.2 billion) will be $1.1 billion less than those for fiscal year 1964.

February 6, 1964: At the ENDC, ACDA Director Foster says that the United States will have private discussions with the Soviet Union in an effort to reach agreement on a nondissemination agreement based on the Irish resolution. He says that it is the declared policy of the United States not to take any action inconsistent with that resolution.

March 5, 1964: Deputy ACDA Director Fisher tells the ENDC that the United States favors application of IAEA safeguards to all international nuclear transfers for peaceful uses. He announces that the large Yankee power reactor at Rowe, Mass., will be inspected by the IAEA in order to assist the IAEA in developing effective safeguards and to set an example for other nuclear powers to invite the application of IAEA safeguards to their reactor facilities.

March 19, 1964: At the ENDC, Deputy ACDA Director Fisher proposed destruction of 480 U.S. B–47's and 480 Soviet TU–16's drawn from each side's "operational inventory" at the rate of 20 each per month over a 2-year period. He says that the United States would also be willing to destroy an agreed number of the same type of aircraft now "stored and preserved for emergency mobilization." He believes that this measure would insure that the bombers could not be transferred to other nations and would thus inhibit nuclear proliferation.

March 26, 1964: At the ENDC, the United Kingdom submits a working paper outlining a plan for the establishment of a system of observation posts to guard against war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise ataack. The posts would monitor military movements by raid, road, air, and sea and would be manned on an "adversary basis", i.e., posts in the West would be manned by Warsaw Pact representatives, and posts in the East would be manned by NATO representatives. International observers would not be excluded.

Deputy ACDA Director Fisher supports the United Kingdom plan on observa tion posts and states that Soviet efforts to link establishment of such posts with foreign troop withdrawals and German denuclearization have prevented the holding of fruitful discussions on the question.

April 16, 1964: In the ENDC, Deputy ACDA Director Fisher elaborates the U.S. proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The freeze would cover five categories of missiles, bombers, and antimissile missile systems. Production of these vehicles would be stopped, except as required for maintenance and replacement of missiles expended in allowed confidence and training firings. The freeze would be verified by continuing inspection of declared production facilities, an annual quota of inspections to check undeclared locations for possible violations, observation of space launching and allowed missile firings, and observation of the destruction of vehicles and launchers being replaced. Vertification would be less extensive than that required for general and complete disarmament and would not involve a check on existing levels.

April 20, 1964: President Johnson announces that he has ordered "a further substantial reduction" in the production of enriched uranium. Combined with the reduction announced last January, the overall reduction in the production of enriched uranium will be 40 percent over a 4-year period.

Premier Khrushchev announces that construction of two new big atomic reactors will be discontinued, the production of uranium^{235} in the next several years will be substantially reduced, and more fissionable materials will be allocated to peaceful uses.

April 21, 1964: Prime Minister Douglas Home announces that United Kingdom production of military plutonium will gradually be terminated.

April 28, 1964: The ENDC recesses.

June 9, 1964: The ENDC reconvenes.

June 11, 1964: The IAEA Board of Governors approves an agreement between the United States and the Agency whereby four U.S. reactors will be placed under Agency safeguards against diversion to nonpeaceful ends. The largest of these reactors in the Yankee power reactor at Rowe, Mass. It is the first powerplant with a thermal capacity of over 100 megawatts to be placed under the expanded IAEA safeguards system, approved by the Board on February 26.

June 16, 1964: At the ENDC, ACDA Director Foster says that the United States cannot accept the Gromyko "nuclear umbrella" proposal as the basis for setting up a working group on the problem of nulear delivery vehicles. That proposal, he points out, would require elimination of about 97 to 99 percent of all nuclear delivery vehicles in 18 months and rapidly alter the present military balance in favor of the Soviet Union. The United States cannot accept such unbalanced reductions. particulalry without adequate verification procedures or institutions capable of keeping the peace and preventing the use of force in the resolution of disputes.

The United States agrees that a technical working group should be established to deal with the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles, but it maintains that the terms of reference for this group should be consistent with the agreed procedure for work on general and complete disarmament and that all relevant proposals and matters should be open for discussion.

June 25, 1964: At the ENDC, the United States presents a plan to provide vertification for a cutoff in the production of fissionable materials for weapons. The plan provides for inspection of installations but not of stockpiles, mines, or refineries, and it does not require disclosure of information on the storage and deployment of nuclear weapons. For inspection of some production installations, access to the interior of the facilities would not be necessary.

July 7, 1964: The ENDC Cochairman (the United States and Soviet representatives) announce they will hold bilateral talks in an effort to agree on a basis for an ENDC working group to consider the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the context of a general disarmament agreement.

July 16, 1965: U.S. Ambassador Timberlake proposes procedures for verifying the destruction of equal numbers of United States B–47's and Soviet TU–16 bombers. The host country would supervise and pay for the destruction of its planes at a designated airfield. Destruction would be comprehensive enough to insure that each bomber could no longer be restored to flyable condition and its engines were no longer usable for propulsion. Before destruction, the host country could remove from the bombers whatever equipment and instruments it wished to retain. Inspectors from the other country would have the right to keep designated bombers under visual observation, witness their destruction, and make records. They would not have the right to examine any bomber before it was destroyed or any of the equipment or instruments removed. They would enjoy the same privileges and immunities accorded by the host country to diplomatic envoys. Observers designated by the nonalined members of the ENDC and by the U.N. Secretary General might also participate.

August 27, 1964: In the ENDC, U.S. Ambassador Timberlake elaborates the verification that would be required for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. There would be continuing inspection of declared production facilities, an annual quota of inspections to check undeclared locations for possible violations, observation of space launchings and allowed missile firings, and observation of the destruction of vehicles and launchers being replaced. These procedures, however, would not involve a check on existing levels, would not disturb the security of sensitive installations, and would be less intrusive than those required for general and complete disarmament.

September 17, 1964: In a message to the ENDC, President Johnson points to the cutbacks in production of fissionable materials for weapons that were an-

nounced by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom in 1964. He says that more concrete proposals for safeguarded and realistic disarmament were made in 1964 than in any other year since before World War II.

September 17, 1964: The ENDC adjourns under an arrangement under which it is to resume its meetings in Geneva as soon as possible after completion of the disarmament debate at the 19th General Assembly, on a date to be decided by the Cochairmen (United States and Soviet Union) after consultation with other ENDC members.

General and complete disarmament: In addition to the above chronology, the United States submitted its views on the question of general and complete disarmament throughout the 1964 session of the ENDC. This discussion occupied approximately one-half of the time of the conference during 1964, in accordance with the agreed agenda. In accordance with that agenda, most of the discussion centered on seeking agreement on the measures for stage I; however, much of the discussion also dealt with the question of the relationship between development of international peacekeeping arrangements and progress in disarmament. In connection with these latter discussions the United States delegation pointed out the deficiencies of the Soviet plan in this regard and emphasized the need for development of international peacekeeping machinery to accompany progress in disarmament. The United States delegation pointed out that as nations reduced their own military establishments there would be increased need for security to be provided by international institutions. During the course of the discussions on general and complete disarmament the United States agreed to join in an experts working group to study the question of reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles in a disarmament program.

November 1, 1964: The White House announces that President Johnson has appointed former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric to head a special panel to study new policies to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

December 1964: In several talks with Mr. Gromyko, in early December 1964, the Secretary of State reiterated our position on several arms control and disarmament issues. In particular, he stated:

(*a*) The United States is ready to meet with Soviet experts to review our respective military budgetary practices; this is a necessary preliminary to discussion of any disarmament agreements concerning reduction of military budgets.

(*b*) The United States continues to seek a nuclear nonproliferation agreement, and urges the U.S.S.R. to reconsider its position.

(*c*) The United States is not opposed to, and indeed favors, nuclear free zones in regions where nuclear weapons are not part of the necessary security arrangements, for example in Latin America.

January 31, 1965: The members of the Gilpatric panel on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons met with the President to advise him of their views.

When it became clear that the General Assembly would not be able to hold discussions on disarmament at its current session, Mr. Foster, in his capacity as an ENDC Cochairman, urged, in private conversation with the Soviet representative, agreement on reconvening of the ENDC at an early date. The Soviet Union, however, subsequently informed Mr. Foster of Soviet preference for a meeting at the present time of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

March 31, 1965: The Soviet representative at the United Nations asked the Secretary General to convene the U.N. Disarmament Commission in the first half of April.

The U.S. representative at the United Nations, Ambassador Stevenson, said that although the United States would prefer to reconvene the ENDC, which in the U.S. view was a better form for negotiating concrete disarmament proposals, it had no objection to the proposed meeting and to giving all U.N. members an opportunity to express their views. He stated that if a majority supported such a meeting, the United States would participate constructively and hope for the emergence of useful and constructive ideas that could then be considered in detail in the ENDC.

April 26, 1965: In a speech at the Disarmament Commission, Ambassador Stevenson stresses the need for early agreement on the basis of the Irish resolution, to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. He says that the United States is determined to work for general and complete disarmament and that the U.S. treaty outline would provide a sound basis for this. To achieve the goal, however, the arms race must be halted and turned back, as President Johnson pro-

posed to do in his message of January 21, 1964, to the ENDC. Ambassador Stevenson discussed the proposals contained in the President's January 21, 1964, message, as well as subsequent additional proposals submitted in the ENDC by the U.S. delegation. Ambassador Stevenson urges an early resumption of the ENDC negotiations.

Analysis of the United Nations Financial Position as of December 31, 1964

(Prepared by the U.N. Office of the Controller)

As used herein, the term "unpaid obligations" means the sum represented by the unliquidated obligations entered on the United Nations books of account, plus the amounts that should be in various surplus accounts, plus the amounts borrowed from the Working Capital Fund and other special or trust funds and accounts in the custody of the Secretary General. It excludes, however, the unpaid balances of United Nations bonds, the United Nations Headquarters loan, and credits due member states in respect to the transfer of League of Nations assets.

The position as of December 31, 1964, is estimated as follows:

	Million
Unpaid obligations	$123.4
Net cash resources	17.1
Deficit	106.3

A breakdown of the figures for unpaid obligations as between (*a*) the United Nations General and Working Capital Fund, (*b*) UNEF, and (*c*) UNOC, in millions of U.S. dollars, is as follows:

Dec. 31, 1964	U.N.	UNEF	UNOC	Total
Due to working capital fund	21.3	18.5		39.8
Surplus (deficit) accounts	4.0	1.1	31.8	36.9
Accounts payable	5.4	12.8	28.5	[1] 46.7
Total	30.7	32.4	60.3	123.4

[1] Includes $5,233,000 owed to the United States; $4,634,000 for services rendered UNOC and $599,000 services rendered UNEF.

The breakdown of net cash resources and deficit, in millions of U.S. dollars, is as follows:

Dec. 31, 1964	U.N.	UNEF	UNOC	Total
Net cash resources	5.5	1.1	10.5	17.1
Deficit	25.2	31.3	49.8	106.3

Analysis of UNEF and ONUC recorded obligations as of Dec. 31, 1964

[In thousands of U.S. dollars]

Payee	Rotation of contingents	Operation of aircraft	Rations	Operational supplies and services	Transport and miscellaneous equipment	Purchase of aircraft	Reimbursement of extra costs		Other accounts	Total
							Pay and allowances	Contingent-owned equipment		
ONUC										
I. Owed to governments:										
United States	2,196	2,033		171	6				228	4,634
Other governments	578	1,711	333	610	515		6,640	7,122	1,360	18,869
Total, all governments	2,774	3,744	333	781	521		6,640	7,122	1,588	23,503
II. Owed to other payees	42	1,145	19	142	28				[1] 3,632	5,008
III. Total recorded obligations	2,816	4,889	352	923	549		6,640	7,122	5,220	28,511
UNEF										
I. Owed to governments:										
United States			108	189	91				211	599
Other governments	855	704	5	130	26		8,302	1,534	82	11,638
Total, all governments	855	704	113	319	117		8,302	1,534	293	12,237
II. Owed to other payees	9		24	205	2				[2] 287	527
III. Total recorded obligations	864	704	137	524	119		8,302	1,534	580	12,764

[1] Includes $2,375,000 undistributed outstanding obligations in ONUC field accounts.

[2] Includes $219,000 undistributed outstanding obligations in UNEF field accounts.

United Nations bond purchases and pledges, Dec. 31, 1964

ACTUAL PURCHASES

Afghanistan	$25,000	Malaysia	$340,000
Australia	4,000,000	Mali	20,000
Austria	900,000	Mauritania	4,082
Belgium	1,200,000	Morocco	400,000
Burma	100,000	Netherlands	2,020,000
Cambodia	5,000	New Zealand	1,000,000
Cameroon	9,569	Nigeria	1,000,000
Canada	6,240,000	Norway	5,700,000
Ceylon	25,000	Pakistan	500,000
China	500,000	Philippines	750,000
Cyprus	26,175	Saudi Arabia	20,000
Denmark	5,850,000	Sierra Leone	28,000
Ethiopia	200,000	Sudan	50,000
Finland	1,480,000	Sweden	14,470,000
Germany	12,000,000	Switzerland	1,900,000
Ghana	100,000	Tanzania	2,800
Greece	10,000	Thailand	160,000
Honduras	10,000	Togo	10,000
Iceland	80,000	Trinidad and Tobago	8,750
India	2,000,000	Tunisia	485,000
Indonesia	200,000	Turkey	100,000
Iran	500,000	Uganda	10,000
Iraq	100,000	United Arab Republic	250,000
Ireland	300,000	United Kingdom	12,000,000
Israel	200,000	Venezuela	300,000
Italy	8,960,000	Viet-Nam	10,000
Ivory Coast	60,000	Yugoslavia	200,000
Jamaica	20,000		
Japan	5,000,000	Subtotal (for 63 nations)	93,647,647
Jordan	75,000	United States (for 1 nation)	76,263,276
Korea	400,000	Subtotal (for 64 nations)	169,910,923
Kuwait	1,000,000		
Lebanon	8,271		
Liberia	200,000		
Libya	25,000		
Luxembourg	100,000		

PLEDGE

United States: To match actual purchases by others	$17,384,371
Total of announced purchases and pledges (for 64 nations[1])	187,295,294

[1] Includes four nonmembers (Germany, Korea, Switzerland and Vietnam).

Summary information on U.S. purchases and pledges

Total authorized	$100,000,000
Actual purchases:	
Bond No. 33, Nov. 2, 1962	44,103,000
Bond No. 43, Dec. 18, 1962	15,569,840
Bond No. 53, Mar. 7, 1963	5,543,000
Bond No. 64, June 25, 1963	6,854,082
Bond No. 82, Dec. 31, 1963	3,423,975
Bond No. 88, June 19, 1964	769,379
Subtotal	76,263,276
Pending (to match actual purchases by others not yet matched)	17,384,371
Subtotal	93,647,647
Balance of authorization not used	6,352,353

Repayments on U.N. bonds

	Principal	Interest	Total
Jan. 15, 1963:			
United States	$1,849,858.04	$199,621.95	$2,049,479.99
Other governments	1,902,831.65	528,443.26	2,431,274.91
Total	3,752,689.69	728,065.21	4,480,754.90
Jan. 15, 1964:			
United States	2,399,983.65	1,324,157.40	3,724,141.05
Other governments	2,415,905.70	1,383,945.31	3,799,851.01
Total	4,815,889.35	2,708,102.71	7,523,992.06
Jan. 15, 1965:			
United States	2,439,655.45	1,433,686.23	3,873,341.68
Other governments	2,942,666.38	1,536,505.75	4,479,172.13
Total	5,382,321.83	2,970,191.98	8,352,513.81

Face value purchased

	As of Jan. 15, 1964	Purchased, Jan. 16, 1964 through Dec. 31, 1964	Total
United States	$75,493,897	$769,379	$76,263,276
Others	75,957,647	17,690,000	93,647,647
Total	151,451,544	18,459,379	169,910,923

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