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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1967

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GOVERNMENT

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ADDITIONAL HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION


SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS

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F-111B AIRCRAFT PROGRAM


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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS,
1967**

TUESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1966.

F-111B AIRCRAFT PROGRAM

WITNESSES

HON. P. H. NITZE, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ADM. H. RIVERO, U.S. NAVY, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
**REAR ADM. W. I. MARTIN, U.S. NAVY, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS (AIR)**
**REAR ADM. W. E. SWEENEY, U.S. NAVY, PROJECT MANAGER, F-111B
PROJECT**
REAR ADM. F. H. MICHAELIS, U.S. NAVY, OFFICE OF THE DCNO (D)
**CAPT. K. C. CHILDERS, U.S. NAVY, DEPUTY PROJECT MANAGER,
F-111B PROJECT**

MR. MAHON. The committee will be in order.

We expect to go to conference with the Senate this afternoon on the Defense appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1967. There are a number of items on which there is disagreement.

We need the help and guidance of the Navy in regard to the following language on page 17 of the bill as passed by the Senate:

Provided, That no part of the funds provided in this Act shall be available for the procurement of F-111B aircraft.

We realize that you have had problems with the F-111B. I have doubted all along that the Navy was very enthusiastic for the TFX idea, but that is water under the bridge. We cannot worry about that at this stage. We are aware of the misgivings which have been expressed to us in the past, but we are not so much concerned about what has been said before. We are anxious to know what you are going to say today. We want to know what your present thinking is. We want to know if you can reasonably live with this language. If not, we want a very clear exposition of why you cannot live with it.

I would say that the members of this committee do not believe that you are ready now to go into the production of operational F-111B aircraft. You are still more or less in the development stage.

I can visualize that the language of the amendment may upset the contractors and the subcontractors working on the aircraft, and that this language might mean that the engineers and employees of the contractors and subcontractors might be concerned that this project is on the way out and as a result some of these people might be looking for another job. Morale, of course, is an important thing in these matters.

Another thing that concerns me is that there is a shortage of engineers and highly technical people, and if you do not want this air-

plane, I would think the engineers and scientific people who are working on it could not care less, because they can get other jobs. They are advertising all over the Nation, begging engineers to come and work for them rather than for the companies involved in the F-111B.

Having set that stage, and you realizing our problem here, Mr. Secretary, will you please enlighten us on what course you think we should take, and why?

STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Secretary NITZE. Mr. Chairman, I am here to urge this committee to eliminate the McClellan amendment to the fiscal year 1967 Defense appropriation bill. I urge you to do this because it is unnecessary to the attainment of the amendment's objectives, as I understand them, and its retention in the bill will, as you suggest, have a harmful psychological effect upon the industrial team upon which the Navy depends for the accomplishment of this challenging development. Already we have had indications that industry believes that the amendment means that a judgment has been made against the production of F-111B's. Also, the amendment restricts the management flexibility needed in any undertaking of this magnitude.

When we first considered the impact of the amendment, we envisaged that it would cause a delay in our program of some 9 to 12 months. This estimate was based upon the assumption that we would not be able to contract for any airborne missile control systems (AMCS's) with fiscal year 1967 funds, since a portion ——— of the planned procurement ——— were to be installed in aircraft to be procured with fiscal year 1968 funds. We now believe that we can protect our schedule by contracting for only ——— of the required ——— AMCS's—those ——— AMCS's to be used in the test program only—with an option to buy the additional ——— AMCS's, exercisable only when fiscal year 1968 funds are made available for this purpose. Further, to protect our schedule, we would have to assume that the amendment would not preclude the timely procurement of training equipment on which the leadtime is estimated at not less than 30 months.

You will note that we have earmarked \$7.8 million for advanced procurement in the fiscal year 1967 PAMN appropriation. This is a relatively small amount of the total, but I fear that inability to protect against the loss of long leadtime for a variety of small items will have adverse effect on our schedule. Of this amount only a fraction would be unrecoverable in the event fiscal year 1968 procurement were not authorized.

As you know, the language included in the House report already requires notification before we reprogram for hard tooling. This would, I believe, provide adequate control to the Congress regarding any transfer of additional funds into the program. However, a legislative prohibition, as provided in the amendment, would restrict flexibility to the point where unforeseen, but required, program changes could not be financed short of new legislation. In a program as complex as the F-111B/PHOENIX, such a restriction could delay the program.

In summary, the Navy needs the capabilities that we hope and believe the F-111B/PHOENIX will provide. Slippage from the projected schedule could have serious effects on the security of the fleet.

We do not propose to risk any substantial sums to protect that schedule prior to action by the Congress on next year's appropriation. We do not, therefore, think the amendment necessary or desirable. If the amendment were nevertheless to be included, I recommend that it be clarified by inserting the word "complete" before "F-111B."

Mr. Chairman, I would like to go on to answer one of the specific points you made in your introductory remarks, and that is whether the Navy really wants this plane.

The Navy really does want this plane. The reason we want the plane is that it is really comprised of three different elements. One of them is the PHOENIX missile. One of them is the AMCS fire control system. The other is the plane itself, the platform that carries these two.

I do not think it is fully understood how important the AMCS part of this is. The AMCS gives one the capability to detect planes out to in excess of _____ miles, and this capability has already been proven. We have already had experience in detecting targets out to _____ miles. If you can detect out to that range, the system is designed to _____. The range at which this missile can intercept is about _____ miles. We haven't got any other kind of fire control and missile system that can do anything like that.

The advanced SPARROW would be able to fire at only _____. It would not have this _____ capability, and it would not have the _____ mile range.

So, for the protection of the fleet against high capability, long-range systems, we do not see how we can get this in any other way. We think that the F-111 airplane and engine will give us the platform from which we can use this system, and we think it does affect the security of the fleet and, therefore, we want to go forward with this thing.

We have had bugs. We are making progress in working out the bugs. But we darned well want this plane.

I should like to suggest that Admiral Rivero give his view of the same problem.

Mr. MAHON. All right, Admiral, will you give your views, and will you, Admiral Sweeney, give us your views? Then we will ask some questions.

Admiral RIVERO. I think the Secretary expressed it very well, sir, when he said the Navy needs and wants the capabilities that we hope and believe the F-111B/PHOENIX system will provide. We look at it as a system—the airplane, the missile, and the fire control system capability. This is needed for air superiority in defense of the fleet against a high level of threat.

Mr. MAHON. Admiral Sweeney, I called you yesterday, as you know. You were in the Secretary's Office. I asked you to come down here for a brief visit with us about this matter because we wanted the best guidance we could get on what we should do about the language of the Senate amendment.

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir. I can verify that this missile control system is the most advanced in the world, and the airplane in which it is installed has at this time better performance capability in the air and longer time on station, even as it is, than anything else we have. It already has performance that we could use very well in the fleet, and we are hoping, as you know, to improve this program as it is developed.

Mr. SIKES. Have you tested performance on-and-off carriers?

Admiral SWEENEY. We have not tested the on-and-off carriers yet, but the wind requirements are much lower than our present fighters. In other words, it has the promise of superior performance.

Mr. MAHON. Have there been any developments of any significance with respect to the F-111B since you were before us earlier in the year?

Admiral SWEENEY. We have had the airplane up to Mach _____. That is the full speed of the airplane in the "A" version, which is exactly the same as the "B" version in this respect. We also have enlarged our operating envelope in the air. We have made several performance improvements and have measured them, and they are applicable to installation in Navy No. 5.

Secretary NITZE. We also have tested the AMCS, which has now been put into airplane No. 3. Is that not correct, Admiral Sweeney?

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes. It was checked out last week.

Secretary NITZE. It was checked out and it did produce things on the scope that it was supposed to.

Mr. MAHON. I confuse the AMCS with the PHOENIX missile. Are there two different things?

Secretary NITZE. The AMCS is the fire control system for the missile. The missile is the thing that flies. The AMCS—

Mr. MAHON. You do not want the plane, I assume, if you cannot have the AMCS, and if you cannot have the PHOENIX missile.

Secretary NITZE. Our concept is that we need all three.

Mr. MAHON. In other words, the plane without the missile system is no good to you, obviously.

Secretary NITZE. We have made progress particularly on the missile system since we last testified before you.

Mr. MAHON. You have made progress on the missile system. Is that being developed by Hughes?

Secretary NITZE. That is being done by Hughes.

Mr. MAHON. Where do they do that work?

Secretary NITZE. Culver City.

Captain CHILDERS. Culver City, Calif.

Admiral SWEENEY. That is the main plant of the Hughes aircraft factory.

Mr. MAHON. I know there has been uncertainty and pessimism as to whether or not this system could be made to work. The concept is excellent. Have you increased hope, or not, that the missile system will work?

Admiral SWEENEY. I think the targets that we have met to date have been on the schedule that we have prescribed. The fact that this system knocked down a target on its first guided firing we felt was remarkable, at a range exceeding anything we have had before.

Mr. MAHON. Personally, I have no hesitancy in abandoning the F-111B, even though we have expended considerable money on it, if that is the proper thing to do, if it is in the best interest of the defense of the country. I realize that you have development troubles with all types of planes and missile systems, but I do not think this committee is wedded to the F-111B if you people feel that the chance for success is so remote that it is hardly worth pursuing further. What is your reaction to that?

Admiral SWEENEY. The chances for success of the whole system I think are excellent. We may not get all the performance parameters

that we are aiming at, but we will get enough of them to meet Navy requirements to a great degree. I am thinking of primarily time on station.

Mr. MAHON. I do not know whether or not there will be unanimous consent to this language. We, of course, are not in favor of going ahead with the production of the F-111B aircraft until we know whether the missile system will work. So at least I am not opposed to what appears to be the spirit of this proposal.

Secretary NITZE. Neither are we. All we are trying to do is to protect the production schedule that we have outlined so if the decision is made to go forward with production and if we get the authorization and appropriation for production aircraft, we will be able to meet our schedule.

Mr. MAHON. Do you mean that you might have to have during fiscal 1967, the current fiscal year, the right to go ahead with the production of the aircraft if you are to maintain the schedule?

Secretary NITZE. Not with the production of the aircraft, but the procurement of some long-lead-time items, particularly the \$7.8 million. It is a small amount.

Mr. MAHON. There is nobody opposed to that, is there?

Secretary NITZE. I believe we would not be entitled to procure the small items, which might delay the schedule, with that \$7.8 million if the amendment stays the way it is. This is why I said if the amendment were to remain in, we would hope it would be clarified to say "complete aircraft" so we could go forward with the \$7.8 million.

Mr. MAHON. Yes. I do not believe the Senate or the House would want to prohibit your going forward as best you can on the development of the aircraft if you want to go ahead.

I have before me from the transcript of our earlier hearings, page 4313, from which I quote the following insert supplied by the Navy for the record:

INSERT FOR THE RECORD, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE, MARCH 28, 1966, PAGE 4313, FOLLOWING LINE 2

The information requested follows:

The Navy plans to buy the following items with the \$71.7 million requested in the fiscal year 1967 budget:

(1) ——— AWG-9 units are requested (airborne missile control systems) including production engineering, publications, special support equipment (SSE), and training support. ——— of these systems will be for production aircraft, ——— as spare units, and one will be provided to Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. (the airframe contractor) for aircraft/missile systems integration. \$56.7 million is included in the budget request for these ——— AWG-9 systems.

(2) One naval air maintenance trainer (NAMT), trainer support, and F-111B aircraft publications and special support equipment (SSE). These items are estimated to cost \$15 million.

You have taken out for security reasons certain figures in the quotation.

In your statement today you say: "This estimate was based upon the assumption that we would not be able to contract for any airborne missile control systems with fiscal year 1967 funds since a portion ——— of the planned procurement ——— were to be installed in aircraft procured with fiscal year 1968 funds."

Is what you have said in the statement today inconsistent with what you said last March?

Secretary NITZE. It is inconsistent, and the reason therefor is that subsequent to last March we revised the AMCS procurement in order better to fit the new schedule which we have worked out. I think Admiral Sweeney can explain that.

Admiral SWEENEY. We also are planning to use those production airplanes, the four that you mentioned there, in our test program. They are procured under earlier funding, under 1966 funding.

Secretary NITZE. Preproduction. They should have been called preproduction, airplanes Nos. 6 to 9.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Lipscomb.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Secretary, what is the amount of funds under procurement in the bill as passed by the House that would be affected by the amendment?

Secretary NITZE. On the assumption that the intent of the amendment is not to prevent our acquiring trainers—the amendment says “aircraft,” and we read that not to include trainers—the trainers have a 30 months’ leadtime, and it is important that we get that work started. On that assumption and on the assumption that we can handle the fire control system the way I outlined in my statement, \$7.8 million is the amount of money affected by the amendment.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In procurement?

Secretary NITZE. That is right.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Would the amendment affect any R.D.T. & E. funds?

Secretary NITZE. We believe not. It would, however, have this psychological effect to which both the chairman and I referred.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You mean by your proposed change, adding the word “complete,” that the only amount of money this would affect and the only part of the program would be the \$7.8 million?

Secretary NITZE. That is correct. With the word “complete” in it, we could spend the \$7.8 million because this would be advance procurement in bits and pieces.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. How much of the \$7.8 million is recoverable if the F-111B does not go into production?

Secretary NITZE. We believe a major share thereof, because as far as we can see today, much of it would go for bits and pieces for the engine which would also be required by the Air Force and, therefore, could be recovered through that route. On some of the electronics equipment—we could use the same electronics in other planes. So, we think that the unrecoverable liability would be small in the event the F-111B does not go into production.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You are sure this amendment as presently written in the bill will only affect, so far as you know, \$7.8 million?

Secretary NITZE. I made two points. One of them was on the assumption that we can negotiate for the AMCS so we get an option instead of committing money with respect to ——— AMCS’s, and on the second assumption that the amendment is not intended to cover trainers. Trainers are not aircraft, in our opinion. Then it would affect only \$7.8 million, most of which we think would be recoverable.

Mr. SIKES. Is there anything else, Mr. Lipscomb?

Secretary NITZE. You understand the trainers are all ground devices. These would not go into the air. This is to help train personnel.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If the F-111B was canceled, those trainers could be used for something else?

Secretary NITZE. No. We would then have to terminate the contract on the trainers. We would not run into the full liability, but we would have spent some money on the trainers which would not then be recoverable if we did not go forward with the F-111B.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You have no idea what the Senate thought, when they passed the amendment, with regard to the trainers?

Secretary NITZE. Let me ask counsel.

(Conferring.)

Secretary NITZE. I am not sure that we have a clear understanding of that.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I think it very important as to how you came to that assumption.

Secretary NITZE. We were hoping the conference committee could clarify that point.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. This \$7.8 million is all associated with engines?

Secretary NITZE. No, some of it is electronics.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If a good portion of the \$7.8 million is associated with the engine and it is common with the Air Force engine, why could not the Air Force pick up the tab?

Secretary NITZE. It is in our budget. It is a funding liability for us.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If you have changed your proposed and projected schedule since you appeared before the committee last, is the amount of money appropriated by the House in excess of what you need?

Secretary NITZE. No. What we did was to move forward in the schedule some of the 1968 planes and move back some of the 1966 planes in order to even the schedule so there would not be a gap in the schedule. We obtain one every other month instead of having a gap.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That is all I have.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Secretary, do you foresee any possibility from the Navy's standpoint of the cancellation of this aircraft or its weapons system because of the fact that it has not measured up to the initial expectations?

Secretary NITZE. We would hope that that contingency does not arise. We cannot be sure until we run all the tests.

Mr. SIKES. When will that be?

Secretary NITZE. Our present program calls for April of next spring.

Mr. SIKES. You said in your statement that you first anticipated a delay of 9 to 12 months. Is that the delay you are now anticipating as a result of the McClellan language?

Secretary NITZE. We cannot be sure of that because we are not quite clear what the effect would be of the bits and pieces for the engine.

Mr. SIKES. What is your present estimate of the delay that the language would cause?

Secretary NITZE. I would rather ask Admiral Sweeney, who is the project manager.

Admiral SWEENEY. The \$7.8 million that we were talking about should be obligated or committed by about December of this year to meet our schedule. If we were delayed until next July, there would be a slippage of that amount just for engines alone.

Mr. SIKES. That means approximately 6 months' slippage? Is that what you are saying?

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir; on that item alone. It would be more if any other items were affected.

Mr. SIKES. Would the McClellan language delay the aircraft itself, or the missile system, or both, in the overall picture?

Admiral SWEENEY. It would delay the initial aircraft in the production program of 1968, and it could delay the equipment that goes in those aircraft.

Mr. SIKES. What about the missile system?

Admiral SWEENEY. That is involved also.

Mr. SIKES. It would delay the missile system, also?

Admiral SWEENEY. Possibly, the last ——— of the ——— we are talking about.

Mr. SIKES. Let us talk about the word "complete" which you want added to the McClellan amendment. Does that in a sense negate the McClellan amendment? Would you be buying the complete aircraft anyway with these funds?

Admiral SWEENEY. No, sir; we are not buying any aircraft with the 1967 funds.

Mr. SIKES. Then the adoption of the word "complete" would simply negate the McClellan amendment, would it not?

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. The Senate will not be very happy about that. What other language could we use which would permit you to have planning and long leadtime funds? I think there would be considerable reluctance on the part of most of us to shut off planning and long leadtime items that are necessary to keep this program moving. What other language could be used to accomplish this?

Admiral RIVERO. I think the trainers are the thing we want to be sure are available, because there will be delay in fleet introduction if the trainers are not available in proper schedule. We want to protect that.

Mr. SIKES. I am seeking other language that could be offered as an alternative to insertion of the word "complete."

Secretary NITZE. May I make a suggestion?

Mr. SIKES. That is what I am asking for.

Secretary NITZE. Suppose one added, "Provided further, That this proviso shall not apply to the advanced procurement of equipment associated with the F-111B airframe in future programs if such procurement with funds in this act is necessary to meet present approved schedules."

Mr. SIKES. I think that would be preferable language.

Would you abide by the House report on this subject regarding advance approval if the Senate language were abandoned?

Secretary NITZE. We would.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. It is my understanding that the intent of the Senator in offering the amendment was to preclude the procurement of complete aircraft through financing which otherwise could legally be done; that is, by transfer through the emergency fund or by reprogramming, and that he recognizes there is not money in the procurement appropriation estimate for the procurement of complete aircraft. Is that a correct interpretation?

Secretary NITZE. I think that is correct.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Whitten?

Mr. WHITTEN. It is unusual to see such a strict construction of language such as you adopt here. You are afraid this language means this, that, and the other, but so far you have not talked to the fellow who wrote it to find out whether he would let you have the degree of latitude that you need. It strikes me that you just do not want the language and do not want anybody meddling with it.

Your statement refers to the effect it might have on the maneuverability of management and the effect on morale. I have heard that story until I am tired of it. What was the name of the other plane the Navy built some years ago and it would not fly because it did not have enough power, and you had to carry it around over the country and use it on Armed Services Day? Do you recall whether it was made by the same company?

Secretary NITZE. The F-3H1.

Mr. WHITTEN. This is not the same company?

Secretary NITZE. No.

Mr. WHITTEN. Were any of the same engineers or procurement officers in on that?

Secretary NITZE. I believe it was the McDonnell Aircraft Co., which subsequently produced the very successful Phantom aircraft.

Mr. WHITTEN. You used the first one to carry around on Armed Services Day so you could get some use out of it. What was the defect in that plane?

Secretary NITZE. My recollection is that it was underpowered.

Mr. WHITTEN. Is there any similarity between that and your problems here? Why it is that you have not asked the author of the amendment, or the committee, whether this language would permit you to do what you claim you really need to do?

Secretary NITZE. As I understand it, our counsel was in touch with the staff of the Senate committee and were told it was the Senate's intention that we not be authorized to use the \$7.8 million.

Mr. WHITTEN. So, you are up against that.

Secretary NITZE. Yes.

Mr. WHITTEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Secretary, you stated that the Navy wants and needs this plane. That is not the question, as I see it. The question is whether or not the contractor can produce and deliver to you a plane that meets the contract specifications.

As I understand it, the major problem with reference to the F-111B all along, or up until now, has been weight. This is a plane that you need and want, to be used on the decks of carriers, and weight is a very important factor.

When Admiral Sweeney was before the committee on March 28, I asked him a few questions. He stated you did have a weight problem. On page 151 Admiral Sweeney said:

In the F-111B contract, we have a fixed price, plus incentives and defaults, and weight is one of those we fully expect he will default on.

Then on page 150 I asked this question:

That would still give you an overweight plane of approximately 5,000 pounds? Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir.

Then you told us what you expected it to weigh in May when you weighed it. You left these weights out as confidential. I asked you

what was the specification for weight, and then what was the last weight of the plane. I believe that was 5,000 overweight.

Secretary NITZE. A little bit more than that. _____ pounds was the empty weight at that time, but we have since weighed plane No. 4—

Mr. ANDREWS. You stated here, Admiral Sweeney, that you expected to have another test on the weight in May of this year. Was that test made?

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What did it show?

Admiral SWEENEY. It showed that we were overweight something under 5,000 pounds.

Secretary NITZE. It showed the weight was _____ pounds, which is exactly what we thought it would be.

Admiral SWEENEY. _____.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is what the plane weighed in May?

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. That is the weight empty.

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand that. That is what we are talking about. That is what your specifications provide. What were the specifications with reference to the empty plane?

Admiral SWEENEY. _____ pounds.

Mr. ANDREWS. So you are still about _____ pounds overweight empty.

Admiral SWEENEY. That is what we predicted; yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is not what the contractor agreed to deliver. He agreed to deliver a plane that would weigh, empty, _____ pounds. Is that right?

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir.

Secretary NITZE. There is one further point that should be made. Of the increase in weight, approximately _____ pounds is due to Government-directed changes which increased the capability.

Mr. ANDREWS. Was that _____ pounds of the _____?

Secretary NITZE. Yes, sir. That is the way it was reduced.

Mr. ANDREWS. _____ plus _____. Then those were your changes in specifications, and you are looking to the contractor to deliver to you a plane that would weigh, empty, _____ pounds?

Admiral SWEENEY. No, sir. _____ pounds. We are adding _____ pounds to _____ which would be _____, if my arithmetic is correct.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.

The last weigh-in was about _____ pounds over.

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Can you live with that and use that plane on a carrier?

Secretary NITZE. We believe we can, in part because of the high lift devices in the wings and in part because of the fact that we are supposed to use the P-12 engine which has more thrust than the engine originally contemplated.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think the contractor could reduce that latest weight of _____ pounds?

Secretary NITZE. We do not believe he can.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are you willing to accept that weight plane when your specifications call for one weighing _____ pounds less?

Secretary NITZE. Our problem is that we see no way in which to meet the requirements of the fleet to have the PHOENIX-AMCS system with any other platform that is currently foreseeable except the F-111B. Therefore, our real problem is whether or not it will be carrier-suitable and can have adequate loiter time, and things of that kind, in order to support the PHOENIX system.

There are two problems involved. One is whether we get compensation from the contractor for the fact that he did not meet the specifications, and the other is the question of what else we can do which does the best for the fleet itself than the F-111B plus the AMCS and the PHOENIX system.

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral Sweeney stated, "I am sure the Navy will hold the contractor to the full penalty of the excess weight."

Secretary NITZE. He is referring to the first part of that.

Mr. ANDREWS. I ask, "But hold him to the penalty?"

"Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir."

I hate to see you be made to take something that is as far away from the specifications as the weight of this plane will be from the specifications that the contractor bid on. I know nothing about it, but I am wondering whether or not you will be able to use this plane weighing in excess of _____ pounds over what you contracted for, on the decks of your carriers.

Secretary NITZE. We think we can with the high lift devices and the P-12 engine. We are going to test it out. We have not yet had an opportunity to test either No. 4 or No. 5. The P-12 engine will not be available for some time, and therefore will not be installed in No. 4 and No. 5.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, now, as I understand it, there is no procurement money in the 1967 bill for the F-111B.

Secretary NITZE. That is correct.

Mr. ANDREWS. You do have \$7.8 million for long leadtime items?

Secretary NITZE. That is correct.

Mr. ANDREWS. If the so-called McClellan amendment remains in the bill, you will not be able to use that \$7.8 million for long-term procurement items unless the word "complete" is inserted?

Secretary NITZE. Or unless some other formula is found which would permit us to have some flexibility with respect to items of that character.

Mr. ANDREWS. You don't have any hope that the contractor can get the weight down below what the empty plane weighed in May of this year?

Secretary NITZE. We don't believe so.

Mr. ANDREWS. All right; that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MAHON. All right. Thank you very much.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a couple of questions, please.

Mr. MAHON. I thought you were through; excuse me.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Minshall.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Secretary, if the language that was put into the bill by the Senate, restricting funds that should be available for the

procurement of F-111B aircraft, if that prevails, what is the position of the Navy going to be if we should pass this bill with that provision in there? What are you going to do next?

Secretary NITZE. We would continue to go forward as best we could. We would try to avoid these slippages in any way we could, but we think we would run into trouble.

Mr. MINSHALL. Taking out the procurement funds, what is that going to do to you as far as going ahead with the research and development on this?

Secretary NITZE. We would go right ahead with the research and development.

Mr. MINSHALL. Would it restrict you in any way?

Secretary NITZE. It would not in the research and development, but it would restrict us from taking those timely actions which may affect our procurement schedule in the event that the Congress, next year, authorizes and appropriates funds for the procurement of—

Mr. MINSHALL. What are those timely actions that you just referred to?

Secretary NITZE. What we would like to do is to, right now, in a few months, in December, authorize Pratt & Whitney to procure some of the long leadtime bits and pieces for the P-12 engines which would be necessary for the engines to go into the 1968 planes if authorized and appropriated so that we wouldn't have the slippage in the schedule. There are—

Mr. MINSHALL. You would go ahead with the procurement of the engines even though this is a—

Secretary NITZE. If we weren't allowed to, we wouldn't go forward with the procurement of the engines; we couldn't.

Mr. MINSHALL. I know. If this language is excluded from the bill, then this December you would go ahead and go into your engine procurement; is that it?

Secretary NITZE. We would buy bits and pieces of the most long-lead-time bits and pieces which otherwise would delay the schedule.

Mr. MINSHALL. How much money would be involved in that procurement of bits and pieces?

Secretary NITZE. I think \$7 million of the \$7.8 million would be for the bits and pieces of the engines. Some of the rest may be necessary for electronics.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is the status, Mr. Secretary, of this aircraft as far as its tests are concerned, compared to the last testimony we had before this subcommittee last April?

Secretary NITZE. I think Admiral Sweeney can—

Mr. MINSHALL. Admiral, could you respond to that question, please? What have you done to improve this aircraft over last April?

Admiral SWEENEY. We have measured several improvements to the drag of the airplane.

Mr. MINSHALL. Will you give us some more detail on this? What do you mean by that?

Admiral SWEENEY. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINSHALL. Yes.

Mr. SIKES. If I understood you correctly, you said \$7 million of this \$7.8 million would be for the engine; is that right?

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes.

Mr. MINSHALL. Bits and pieces, as he said.

Mr. SIKES. The Air Force can pick that up; isn't that true?

Admiral SWEENEY. It is not in their budget.

Secretary NITZE. It is not in their budget. I mean, it would mean that we would be getting around what we assumed to be the intent of the language. If the intent of the language is that we shouldn't buy, or if DOD shouldn't be buying things which are really designed to protect our schedule, then we shouldn't be doing it.

Mr. MAHON. You shouldn't do through the back door what you couldn't do through the front door?

Secretary NITZE. That is right.

Mr. SIKES. I am thinking if Air Force could procure this, you are only talking about \$800,000. Why don't you explore that?

Mr. MINSHALL. You go ahead.

Secretary NITZE. If this was clearly understood by the conferees, that the Air Force could use their money to protect our schedule and we were not, thereby going behind the back of the Congress, why, that will—

Mr. SIKES. Will the Air Force be able to use this engine if the Navy does not?

Secretary NITZE. We think that the B-111 will use the identical P-12 engine but that decision hasn't been firmly made by the Air Force yet.

Mr. SIKES. So that the Air Force would have an interest in going ahead with this program and could go ahead with it, and, in that event, we would only be talking about \$800,000?

Secretary NITZE. That is correct. But we would want it clearly understood that that was what we are proposing to do.

Mr. MAHON. I don't think we will have an trouble working this matter out in conference.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I am still not real clear just what they have done to improve this aircraft, if anything, since last April.

Mr. MAHON. Whether they have or haven't is not really the issue before us now. I believe, Admiral Sweeney, in response to my question, you told me about some of the improvements that you had made and why you felt a little better about some phases of the plane. You did not indicate that you were out of the woods on it, that all the bugs are out, or that it is going to be an outstanding success—you don't know that yet—you haven't had the experience of flying the plane.

Admiral SWEENEY. That is right.

Mr. MINSHALL. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, the main deficiency is the fact that this plane weighs too much.

Mr. MAHON. If that is the whole problem, what does it signify?

Mr. MINSHALL. They haven't brought the weight down. If they can't bring the weight down there is no use in going ahead with the aircraft.

Secretary NITZE. That isn't true; that isn't true.

If we can fully compensate for the weight by improved lift-to-drag ratio and greater thrust in the engine it would still be a far better plane for our purposes than any alteratives which we currently see.

Mr. MINSHALL. But you are going to get a class C airplane instead of the class A airplane which you originally contracted the specifications for.

Secretary NITZE. It wouldn't be quite as good, but it would be better than anything else we can foresee, and we need this for the defense of the fleet.

Mr. MINSHALL. How can you go ahead with the weight of this airplane without some alteration to the elevators, without improving the carriers to accept the additional weight?

Secretary NITZE. I think this is a mistake; the Barrons article is quite wrong on that point, for instance. I can give you the figures as to what the elevators of the carriers will accommodate. Admiral Sweeney will give you the figures as to the elevator capacities.

Admiral SWEENEY. Our nine largest carriers will have a capacity of _____ pounds.

Mr. MINSHALL. You won't have to make any modifications on the carriers with this heavy aircraft if you bring it into the fleet; is that correct?

Admiral SWEENEY. Not for this particular airplane; but we are always making improvements to our carriers every time we have an overhaul period. And in this case there is a change from the testimony in March. Our carriers' elevators will be strengthened 10,000 pounds, from _____ pounds.

Mr. MINSHALL. This is just what I am asking for.

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir; but this is a normal improvement.

Mr. MINSHALL. Why would it be a normal improvement, unless you were bringing this aircraft into the inventory, or anticipate it, you wouldn't normally go ahead—

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL (continuing). And increase the weight when you didn't need the weight, did you?

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. Why?

Admiral SWEENEY. Well, we do that for general operational capability. We are always improving the equipment aboard the carriers, the towing gear, and so forth, and this is part of that program.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is the heaviest aircraft that normally operates off of a carrier now, fully loaded? The A-4, for example?

Admiral RIVERO. RA-5, isn't it?

Secretary NITZE. The RA-5C, _____ pounds. Is that correct?

Admiral MARTIN. Yes.

Admiral MICHAELIS. That is an overload condition.

Mr. MINSHALL. That is a what?

Admiral MICHAELIS. An overload condition.

Mr. MINSHALL. That is an overload condition; I mean, normally?

Admiral MICHAELIS. The maximum allup weight for the RA-5C is about _____ pounds.

Mr. MINSHALL. How much will this F-111B weigh, fully loaded, according to your latest tests?

Admiral SWEENEY. It will weigh about _____ pounds, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. That is _____ pounds, nearly _____ tons over the initial specifications. It was _____ originally. Now you are up to _____.

Admiral SWEENEY. I don't believe—

Mr. MINSHALL. That is ——— tons over the original fully loaded contract specification weight.

Admiral SWEENEY. I don't believe that ——— is a specification item, sir. I think that this is a calculated weight based on a specification airplane with a certain amount of fuel, ——— pounds of fuel—rather than the full-up fuel of about ——— pounds that we now use in our calculations.

Mr. MINSHALL. Well, I have a chart here in front of me that was given me by a staff member and the initial specification showed ——— pounds, and then aircraft currently being evaluated, they show ——— pounds, but they have told me the lowest they can get that down to is ——— pounds which you have just told us.

Admiral SWEENEY. Yes; but there is a difference of fuel that is involved.

Mr. MINSHALL. This is a Navy sheet here.

Secretary NITZE. There is a difference of ——— pounds in fuel.

Mr. MINSHALL. What happened to Admiral Bowen? He was here before. Where is he now?

Admiral RIVERO. Admiral Michaelis is representing him. Where is he?

Mr. MINSHALL. Don't stand up, Admiral.

Admiral Bowen gave us considerable testimony last spring about this. Where is he now?

Admiral MICHAELIS. He is in the same job, sir, at the Pentagon.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is his job now?

Admiral MICHAELIS. His job is Director of Development, DCNO Development.

Mr. MINSHALL. He is in charge of this program, pretty much, then, is he, along with Admiral Sweeney and you?

Admiral MICHAELIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. Why isn't he here this morning?

Admiral MICHAELIS. I am representing him, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. When you were here a year ago, last spring, you remember I asked you some questions about this program.

Admiral MICHAELIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. Have you altered your opinion at all since that time?

Admiral MICHAELIS. I think not, certainly basically my opinion at that time was that we needed to look at aircraft Nos. 4 and 5.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is your official job? What is your title, Admiral, in connection with this program?

Admiral MICHAELIS. I am Director, Air Systems, Surface Systems, and Electronic Warfare Development.

Mr. MINSHALL. And you work with Admiral Sweeney?

Admiral MICHAELIS. I work for Admiral Bowen.

Mr. MINSHALL. Admiral Bowen?

Admiral MICHAELIS. Yes. Admiral Sweeney is the program—

Mr. MINSHALL. Program manager?

Admiral MICHAELIS. Program Office; yes.

Mr. MINSHALL. Well, I think it is only fair to point out to the committee that last April you said, in response to a query by me when I

asked "What is your opinion as of today," referring to the F-111B aircraft:

With the 4 and 5 aircraft I think it is very hard to make judgment or even a tentative judgment without looking at those first aircraft that are supposed to be representative of the production aircraft. I would say based on what we have gotten out of the first couple of airplanes and without the improved engine it is a very questionable aircraft for carrying out the Navy mission. This is a personal opinion only.

Admiral MICHAELIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. Do you wish to change that in any way, since—

Admiral MICHAELIS. No; only to say that some weight improvement has been shown in weighing the No. 4 airplane, supporting my previously stated opinion that weight growth had been arrested. In this regard, I would like to note an inaccuracy in previous testimony. On page 335, line 15 (pt. 5), the word "drag" appears where "weight" should have been used. The sentence should read "extreme efforts are paying off in arresting weight growth." Since April there also have been some tests to improve drag. Improved weight and drag, plus going ahead with the P-12 engine—all of these are compensating, and we won't really know what the total aggregate effect will be until such time as we run the tests on the other—

Mr. MINSHALL. Do you still feel, Admiral, it is a questionable aircraft as far as the Navy is concerned, in your own personal opinion?

Admiral MICHAELIS. So far as what we have seen of the first three, not necessarily of what we will see in the follow-on aircraft.

Mr. MINSHALL. As of today, as of August 23, 1966, how do you feel about it?

Admiral MICHAELIS. I feel exactly the same way, sir, that we are not going to be able to really predict accurately the outcome until we test the airplanes that are more representative of what the production airplane will be.

Mr. MINSHALL. When do you plan to conduct the tests on 4 and 5?

Admiral MICHAELIS. The tests on 4 are commencing, are they not, next month?

Mr. MINSHALL. I couldn't hear you, sir.

Admiral MICHAELIS. The tests are commencing on No. 4 next month. Is this correct?

Admiral SWEENEY. That is right; September.

Admiral MICHAELIS. And the fifth airplane will be delivered in October.

Admiral SWEENEY. October 5.

Admiral MICHAELIS. And the NPE will commence in—

Admiral SWEENEY. December.

Admiral MICHAELIS. In December.

Secretary NITZE. And we do intend to put the improved engine on the planes after No. 5.

Mr. MINSHALL. When do you think you will be able to come up with a firm opinion on this aircraft, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary NITZE. Around next April, is our present plan.

Admiral RIVERO. The tests would not be completed until March.

Mr. MINSHALL. That will extend your slippage, then, won't it? You have 18 months' slippage on the Phoenix program already.

Secretary NITZE. No, we do not think it will extend our slippage.

Mr. MINSHALL. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MAHON. Are there any further questions?

Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to ask one question.

How many planes will you have next March or April, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary NITZE. We will have five.

Mr. ANDREWS. Five. You don't plan any more?

Secretary NITZE. We plan four more preproduction models which were financed with 1966 funds.

Mr. ANDREWS. So, by next April you will have a pretty good idea as to whether or not you will want to go forward?

Secretary NITZE. We won't have gotten six, seven, eight, or nine yet, but we will have four and five which will be more representative.

Mr. ANDREWS. You will have a pretty good idea next April whether or not you will want to proceed?

Secretary NITZE. On the preproduction ones we will also have the P-12 engine.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, if I may.

Can you go ahead with the next four preproduction planes under this language?

Secretary NITZE. Yes, we can.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If we add the word "complete" there, that will still permit you to go ahead?

Secretary NITZE. Yes, because those were already appropriated in 1966 funds.

Mr. MAHON. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much for your appearance here today and for the helpful comments which you have made for the committee. We will see you next year.

Secretary NITZE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

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Secretary Nixon: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
 We will see you next year.
 and for the helpful comments which you have made for the committee.
 Mr. Mahon: Thank you very much for your appearance here today.
 (Discussion of the record.)
 Mr. Mahon: Of the record.
 1000 funds.
 Secretary Nixon: Yes, because these were already reported in
 point you to be ready.
 Mr. Mahon: If we add the word "complete" there, that will still
 Secretary Nixon: Yes, we can.
 Mr. Mahon: I am (halfhearted) I think
 1000 funds.
 Secretary Nixon: On the present in committee we will do it, but the
 and you will want to proceed.
 Mr. Mahon: You will have a pretty good idea in a year or two, but
 but we will have your advice which will be more constructive.
 Secretary Nixon: We don't have gotten six seven eight nine ten
 to do that because you will want to go forward.
 Mr. Mahon: For by next April you will have a pretty good idea
 was handled with 1000 funds.
 Secretary Nixon: He explain four more preparation in this which
 Secretary Nixon: It is on don't plan any more.
 Secretary Nixon: He will last five.
 Secretary Nixon: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
 Mr. Mahon: Are there any further questions?
 Mr. Mahon: I would like to ask one question.
 How many phases will you have next March or April, Mr.

