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TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION



MONDAY, MARCH 11, 1963

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CONTENTS

	Page
Statement of Rusk, Hon. Dean, Secretary of State; accompanied by Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.....	2
Memorandum on Presidential authority to disarm and commit U.S. Armed Forces.....	29
Summary index.....	49

TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

MONDAY, MARCH 11, 1963

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (chairman), Humphrey, Morse, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Senator HUMPHREY. On behalf of Senator Fulbright, I will call the meeting to order.

Mr. Secretary, this is a meeting called by Senator Fulbright and represents a meeting of the full committee and not of a subcommittee.

PURPOSE OF MEETING

The committee is meeting this morning to discuss with the Secretary of State the foreign policy implications of the nuclear test ban treaty negotiations which resumed at Geneva on February 12.

In recent days there has been a considerable amount of discussion and speculation in the press and in the Congress about the position the United States has been taking in these test ban negotiations. Questions raised go to the basic issue of the soundness of this Nation's test ban proposals from the standpoint of our national security.

I would like to digress for a moment to say that Mr. Foster, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, will be completing his testimony, as I understand it, this afternoon before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and, therefore, is not with us this morning. Since Senator Pastore had requested that the Director be with him this afternoon, I saw no reason to duplicate today the testimony of such a fine witness. But we are very pleased to have Mr. Fisher, the Deputy Director, here with us.

I know all the members of this committee, indeed all Americans, would welcome the day when safe and sure progress could be made toward arms control and disarmament in order that this country might be able to divert more of its resources now spent on military pursuits to economic and social pursuits. Of course, any arms control or disarmament measures to which the United States subscribes must assuredly promote and not risk the security of this Nation.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased that you have been willing to give us of your time to come here to this committee this morning.

The subject matter that you are to discuss with us has been a matter of great concern, as expressed in the public press. I am pleased

that Mr. Fisher, who has done an admirable job of stating the position of the administration, is here.

I want the record to be clear since there was some discussion about this hearing at our last meeting in executive session. If I have anything to do with these hearings, the witnesses who will appear will represent every possible point of view, so that we run the full gamut of expressions of attitude and opinion on arms control and disarmament.

There will be no attempt made under any circumstances to present just a one-sided picture. There are differences of opinion among the Senators on this committee.

We are very pleased to have the administration represented by the Secretary of State and the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I think I should forewarn you gentlemen that there will be those who may not exactly subscribe to every statement which is put forth by the administration.

Having said that as a friend of the administration's point of view, why don't you proceed, Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I am very glad to have this opportunity to talk with the committee today about a most important aspect of our foreign policy, our long-continued effort to achieve agreement on a safeguarded nuclear test ban treaty.

Let me emphasize this word "treaty" because there is no doubt whatsoever that an agreement with respect to the banning of nuclear tests would be a treaty and would be submitted to the Senate for consideration as a treaty.

SAFEGUARDED CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST

Since the summer of 1958, the U.S. Government has consistently adhered to the view that a safeguarded cessation of nuclear weapons testing would be in our national interest. Periodic policy reviews in the light of shifting patterns of foreign policy, of changes in the negotiating situation, and of technical developments have always produced the same answer: that an effective test ban treaty is in our national interest.

Indeed, it is worth recalling that in 1945-46, at the very birth of the nuclear age, it was clearly perceived that a nuclear arms race would create the greatest dangers for all mankind. Consequently, President Truman directed the most serious and diligent effort to prevent such a race by bringing atomic energy under international control. Unhappily, the Baruch proposals did not succeed.

Today, I would like to discuss a nuclear test ban with you from the standpoint of our relations with the Soviet bloc and with countries outside the bloc, including our allies. I would also like to discuss what I believe to be the basic requirements for a nuclear test ban treaty to be effective. For it is clear that an illusory set of obligations on this sensitive subject ought never to be entered into by the United States.

ADVANTAGES TO UNITED STATES OF EFFECTIVE TEST BAN TREATY—FIRST,
SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD SLACKENING PACE OF ARMS RACE

In my judgment, the conclusion of an effective nuclear test ban treaty would have three advantages of primary importance in our relations with the Soviet Union.

First, a nuclear test ban treaty would constitute a significant step in the direction of slackening the pace of the arms race. Once this step had been taken with satisfactory results, new opportunities for further steps toward turning the arms race downward might well be more within the realm of reality than at present.

For the past 16 years during which the cold war has been waged we have experienced the effect of an almost unlimited arms race on our national security and on our position in relation to the Soviet Union in the world arena. Although our position has been preserved and Communist aggression has been effectively deterred to a large extent by the buildup and deployment of our military forces, our security in that position has not necessarily been improved. Indeed, our military position might well be more secure today if we had successfully achieved agreement on a test ban treaty several years ago, earlier in the negotiations.

Because of the extensive history of past negotiations on this particular question, the narrowing of the issues that has resulted from these negotiations and the worldwide interest, I believe that this problem may be more ripe for solution than perhaps any other first step in the arms control and disarmament field. It is clear that unless at some point we are able to step off in a new direction, the upward spiral of the arms race will continue unabated. The prospects of such a future for both ourselves and the Soviet Union are not attractive.

SECOND ADVANTAGE—A MILITARY ONE

Second, an effective nuclear test ban treaty would be to the military advantage of the United States. At the present time we feel confident in our nuclear capabilities. We have today a stockpile of nuclear weapons which ranges from a few tens of tons of TNT equivalent to many megatons. These weapons are useful for a variety of strategic and tactical uses. The Soviet Union has a stockpile of its own.

In certain areas of the spectrum of explosive power, namely the extremely large yields, the Soviets have developed weapons for which I am informed we do not have a present military requirement. In other areas, namely in the development of intermediate and lower yield weapons, we believe that we have a more varied arsenal than the Soviet Union.

The President and his chief national security advisers, including myself and the Secretary of Defense, believe it doubtful that either side would, through further testing, achieve major advances in any significant area which could be translated into a military advantage without the other side making either a similar or offsetting gain.

There is one proposition which we must keep in mind despite confidence and understandable national pride: nature does not yield up its secrets with political favoritism. The list of Nobel Prize winners in the sciences over the past half century shows that major breakthroughs in knowledge come from many directions and have little to do with national frontiers. If our present assessment of the military situation is correct, and I believe it is, now would be an opportune time from our point of view for the conclusion of a treaty to halt further nuclear weapon testing.

THIRD ADVANTAGE—A POLITICAL ONE

The third primary advantage of an effective nuclear test ban treaty to the United States in relation to the Soviet bloc is a political one. I have repeatedly emphasized in my public statements in the United States and at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and in previous statements before this committee, my conviction that disarmament and secrecy are incompatible.

The Soviet Union has reasons of its own for its penchant for secrecy. Regardless of the merits of their case, however, it is clear that a closed society breeds suspicion and distrust on the part of other nations. Such an atmosphere is not conducive to taking steps to treat the symptoms of international tensions or to come to grips with the causes of these tensions.

A nuclear test ban treaty would obviously not lift the veil of secrecy from the Soviet Union. It would not even result in any substantial opening up of Soviet society. It could, however, have a very important impact on the Soviet attitude toward secrecy, especially as it relates to problems of arms control and disarmament. The carrying out of onsite inspections on Soviet territory would provide the United States with not only the necessary assurance that unidentified seismic signals were not underground nuclear explosions but also additional advantage.

If a test ban treaty can operate effectively and in ways which demonstrate that the inspection connected with it does not jeopardize Soviet security or result in any particular embarrassments to the Soviet Union and its people, then the Soviet leadership may be more inclined to enter into other similar agreements. The first step seems to be the most difficult. If it can be made successfully then further steps in the same direction might be taken with less difficulty than the first.

Therefore, in our relations with the Soviet Union I believe that a nuclear test ban treaty would have both political and military advantages. In addition, an effective nuclear test ban would have advantages in our relations with countries outside the Soviet bloc.

DANGERS OF CONTINUED TESTING

Among the dangers to the United States from continued testing by both sides I would consider the danger of the further spread of nuclear weapons to other countries of perhaps primary importance. Unlimited testing by both the United States and the Soviet Union would substantially increase the likelihood that more and more nations would seek the dubious, but what some might consider prestigious, distinction of membership in the nuclear club. The risks to the security of the free world from nuclear capabilities coming within the grasp of governments substantially less stable than either the United States or the Soviet Union are grave indeed.

A test ban would not of itself solve the problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons. It should be recognized that at least one present nuclear power and one power apparently bent on developing nuclear weapons might not be persuaded to subscribe to the test ban treaty from the outset. However, many potential nuclear powers might at this stage be induced to accede to the treaty.

Moreover, a nuclear test ban could lead to further steps which would deal more directly with the proliferation problem. I am referring here to the possibility of an agreement on the one hand by the nuclear powers not to transfer control of weapons or to give assistance in weapons development to countries not already possessing them, and on the other, by the nonnuclear powers not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons of their own.

Another possibility would be an agreement to halt further production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons and to transfer agreed quantities of such materials to peaceful uses. What should be emphasized here is that while a nuclear test ban by no means offers a total solution, it would be a necessary first step.

What I have just said is, I believe, applicable both to the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons outside the North Atlantic Alliance and to the problem of the development of additional national nuclear capabilities by NATO members. I believe that a nuclear test ban would be fully consistent with the possibilities for increased participation in the multilateral control of nuclear forces dedicated to NATO by our partners in the Alliance.

IMPORTANCE OF PROBLEM OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT

Of secondary, but nevertheless significant importance is the problem of radioactive fallout. In large part because of real or assumed dangers from fallout, nuclear testing has become a key political issue in a great many countries around the world. Our relations with those countries are sometimes adversely affected when our tests produce fallout outside our own borders. On the other hand, our initiatives in seeking a test ban agreement have been well received by not only our allies but by the uncommitted countries.

ADVANTAGES TO SOVIET UNION OF TEST BAN TREATY

I have pointed out what I believe to be the primary advantages to the United States in an effective nuclear test ban treaty in terms of our relations with the Soviet Union and with other countries around

the world. However, I would like to make it clear that I believe there may also be advantages to the Soviet Union in a nuclear test ban.

A certain degree of mutuality of interest is an obvious prerequisite for any agreement.

I have stated that an effective nuclear test ban would be to the military advantage of the United States. This should not exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union could at the same time have valid military reasons for entering into a nuclear test ban treaty with the intention of carrying it out. The United States and the Soviet Union have to date apparently pursued somewhat different objectives in their testing programs.

This difference in emphasis appears attributable to different strategic concepts, as well as technological considerations. Therefore, while we may be assured that our own retaliatory capability in the event of nuclear attack is sufficient to deter such an attack, the Soviet Union could at the same time believe that it has a sufficient nuclear capability for its own security requirements without the need of further testing.

Similarly, the possibility of the further spread of nuclear weapons is a legitimate concern not only to ourselves, but to the Soviet Union as well.

ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE TEST BAN TREATY

I have thus far attempted to demonstrate why and how an effective nuclear test ban treaty would serve the foreign policy interests of the United States. I would now like to address the question of what makes a nuclear test ban treaty effective.

Three requirements are, in my judgment, basic to an effective nuclear test ban treaty.

First, the verification arrangements must provide an adequate deterrent to violation on the part of the Soviet Union. However, no verification system, no matter how elaborate or intrusive, could be completely foolproof.

Therefore, the second requirement of an effective treaty is that the scope of any violation which might escape detection must not be so extensive that it would substantially affect the military balance.

Finally, a nuclear test ban treaty will be adhered to only so long as a mutuality of interest in the agreement persists. If the Soviet Union were ever to conclude that a test ban were no longer in its interests, we can be sure that the Soviet leadership would not hesitate to abrogate the treaty and resume testing. Therefore, an effective test ban treaty must not leave the United States in a state of unpreparedness in the event of a Soviet change of attitude.

In my opinion, our present test ban proposals meet these three requirements for an effective treaty.

EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN FIELD OF DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

Last week the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held a series of illuminating hearings on developments in the field of detection and identification of nuclear explosions and their relationship to the nuclear test ban negotiations. These hearings explored in considerable depth the scientific and technical basis for the present U.S. position with respect to a nuclear test ban.

The efficacy of the technical underpinning for our test ban proposals is certainly an important factor in determining the overall effectiveness of a treaty based on these proposals. However, the effectiveness of the verification arrangements associated with a test ban does not depend entirely upon numbers or locations of detection stations. Nor is any particular number of on-site inspections the key to effectiveness. The verification arrangements must be considered as a totality. The effectiveness of the total system should be judged in the light of the entire geographic, technical, military, political, and economic environment in which it would operate.

The increase in our technical ability to detect seismic events at long distances permits us to rely upon seismic stations outside the Soviet Union to detect underground nuclear explosions inside the Soviet Union.

Moreover, a decrease by a factor of $2\frac{1}{2}$ in a previous estimate of the number of earthquakes of a given seismic magnitude occurring annually in the Soviet Union has enabled us to reduce the number of on-site inspections on Soviet territory to seven.

But perhaps more important than a particular number of on-site inspections in determining its effectiveness as a deterrent to cheating is the manner in which an on-site inspection would be carried out. Our present position with respect to the number of on-site inspections which would be acceptable to us has, therefore, been very clearly stated by Mr. Foster in discussions with the Soviet representatives to be conditional upon further agreement on such important matters as the method of selecting particular earth tremors for inspection, the size and composition of inspection teams, the area and duration of search, and logistical arrangements.

Finally, an effort has been made to increase the effectiveness of our present proposals over previous positions by vesting control over the installation and operation of the detection network, and control over the carrying out of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, more completely in the hands of the United States and United Kingdom.

This has resulted in a proposal for a simpler and more economical system. It would also permit us to evaluate a greater range of factors in determining whether the Soviet Union was honoring its treaty obligations than would be the case under a treaty providing for more complete international operation and control of the verification system.

I will leave to officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the discussion of the details of this proposal. But it is the conclusion of the President and his chief advisers in the national security area that clandestine testing which might escape detection, in spite of the verification system, would not result in developments which would significantly alter the military balance.

Finally, an announced national policy of maintaining our readiness to test will minimize the risks to the United States stemming from the possibility of Soviet abrogation of the treaty and an open resumption of testing. Indeed, such a policy would be a deterrent to abrogation and would reinforce the effectiveness of the treaty itself.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I believe that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests would advance the interests of the foreign policy of the United States, and that the present proposals of the United States for a nuclear test ban provide a sound basis for negotiation of an effective treaty. In reaching this conclusion I am aware of the risks involved in an undetected Soviet violation of the treaty or its surprise abrogation.

I am also aware, however, of the graver risks to our security and the security of the free world implicit in a future without any multilateral restraint on the development of nuclear weapons. In addition to the risks with and without a test ban which must be carefully weighed against each other, we should also consider the opportunities created by taking a step in the direction of controlling the arms race. I believe that if these new opportunities are placed in the scale, it will be tipped decisively in favor of our present proposals for a ban on the further testing of nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your statement.

I have some questions that I want to pose to you. I am sure my colleagues on the committee will want to interrogate you with reference to some of the statements you have made and the policy that has been advanced at the Geneva discussions.

WORK OF MR. FOSTER AND MR. KUZNETSOV

First, I want to place in this record the fact that, as one of the Senators privileged to be an observer at Geneva in recent weeks, I was much impressed with the work of Mr. Foster—the meticulous care of his preparation for the negotiations, and the manner in which he conducted those negotiations.

I believe that most Americans are unaware of some of the difficulties that our diplomats face in these negotiations and they also are unaware of the competence of the Soviet negotiators.

The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, is not exactly an amateur in these matters. He was well prepared to state the case of the Soviet Union, and to do whatever he could to deflect any attention to the subject matter that was before the conference; namely, the nuclear test ban.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S SUPPORT OF TEST BAN PROPOSALS

Mr. Secretary, so that we may make clear the relationship between the Arms Control Agency and the Department of State, does the Department of State fully concur in the positions that this Government has taken, as represented by Mr. Foster in the test ban negotiations of recent months?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports to the President through the Secretary of State. I sit with the Committee of Principals advising the President on these matters, and I am present for all the discussions when the final policies are determined and I have fully supported these proposals.

COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

Senator HUMPHREY. You speak of the Committee of Principals, Mr. Secretary. Would you outline for the record what the Committee of Principals is and who serves on it?

Secretary RUSK. The Committee of Principals is made up of Cabinet level officials and heads of departments: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Disarmament Agency itself, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Director of the CIA.

We also have the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, who sits with that Committee as well as the President's Scientific Adviser, Dr. Wiesner.

Senator HUMPHREY. Does the Committee of Principals present a majority report to the President of the United States?

Secretary RUSK. We sit with the President for a full discussion, and we go to considerable pains to be sure that if there are any differences of view they are fully disclosed to the President. With so many different points coming up it is true there are different views that are discussed with the President but I think the record shows that in most instances we are unanimous.

Senator HUMPHREY. In the instance of the proposals that are now being advanced at Geneva, including the seven on-site inspections, Mr. Secretary, were these proposals and was that particular item approved by you?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Were they approved by the Secretary of Defense?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I think that the answer would be yes, but I would hope we would not pursue this to the point of putting on the record the advice given by officers of Government to the President on a matter of this sort.

Senator HUMPHREY. May I ask, was it a majority view of the Committee of Principals?

Secretary RUSK. The President and his advisers were all in favor of these proposals.

Senator HUMPHREY. Including the reduction to seven on-site inspections?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, in the event that in further discussions with the Soviets on a comprehensive test ban treaty, it becomes obvious that they are determined to stick to their position of two or three inspections—which is what they have been offering—do you think it might be fruitful for this Government to forget about a comprehensive treaty and instead attempt to negotiate a treaty covering atmosphere, underground, and outer space tests?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator Humphrey, we proposed some time ago that in the absence of an agreement on a comprehensive test, we move promptly for a separate agreement on testing in the atmosphere,

under water and in outer space or at high altitudes. We feel this would go a long way toward meeting not only the security interests of our own country but meeting the concern of people in many parts of the world about the type of testing that results directly in fallout.

Thus far the Soviet Union has not been willing to address itself to that kind of an agreement. They are insistent that an arrangement should be comprehensive. Now, that may be because they have not developed underground testing as much as we have, and therefore, would look upon this as disadvantageous to them. But as far as the United States is concerned we would be prepared to move immediately into such an arrangement and have been disappointed thus far the Soviet Union has not been willing to do so while we discuss further and negotiate further about an agreement on underground testing.

RELATIONSHIP OF INSPECTION ISSUE TO SOVIET SINCERITY IN
NEGOTIATIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, it has been very difficult for some of us to understand the apparent reluctance and the stubbornness of the Soviet Union on this figure of two or three on-site inspections. As you may recall, for about a year, the Soviet Union refused to discuss any on-site inspections.

Over a year ago, the Soviet Union had accepted the principle of on-site inspections. As I recollect, the figure of two to three came into the public print by an exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and the President of the United States; is that correct? Secretary RUSK. That is correct, beginning in December of last year.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you believe that the Soviet Union in that exchange of letters was indicating any sincere desire for effective negotiations on a test ban treaty?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, looking at the objective interest which the Soviet Union itself undoubtedly has in trying to put some ceiling on the arms race, if possible, that it is entirely possible that they did make those proposals in December expecting or hoping that this would open the way for an agreement. You see, since they abandoned in 1960, I believe, the idea of on-site inspections, the West, as well as the uncommitted countries throughout the world, pressed them very hard on accepting the principle of on-site inspection.

SOVIET VIEW OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AS CONTRASTED TO U.S. VIEW

It may well be that the Soviet Union thought that all that was required was the acceptance of the principle. But I think there is another element that enters into this. The Soviet Union has made the point repeatedly that national detection systems are adequate for the job. Well, on this the argument may be somewhat uneven, if I may say so, because looking at their problem in determining what is happening in our country, they may well be right on that. That is here they are looking at an open society, where it would be extremely difficult, at best, to conduct testing of any sort secretly, and where they have relatively easy means of reinforcing the normal kind of public flow of information with, shall we say, a degree of espionage in an

open society like ours. Therefore, they may judge that they can assure themselves that we are not testing. But when you look at it the other way around and see the problem that we are confronted with, a closed society, occupying this vast land mass in Eurasia, much of it sparsely populated, we do not have the same opportunity that they have to check these matters.

Therefore, to us it is not just a principle, it is not just a political principle. We need arrangements which permit us to get reasonable assurance that any treaty on this subject is not being violated. In the process our capacity for developing such assurance has been improved in many different directions, not just in the matter of instrumentation. But nevertheless the problem remains, and from the Soviet point of view they may consider that the concession of on-site inspections is somewhat, from their point of view, unilateral because they don't need it to inspect us, given the nature of our society.

We do need it with respect to them, and this runs into their historical attitude toward secrecy. I think there is the problem.

SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS TOTALITY OF TREATY ARRANGEMENTS

I think in December that the Soviet Union then perhaps hoped that this would open the way to a test ban treaty. Why they have not been willing to pursue the matter more seriously since then, I am frank to say, I don't completely know.

We have been disappointed, for example, that they have stuck tightly on their two or three inspections and have not put that number aside to sit down and talk about the entire arrangements under a treaty, because to do that we are not talking about a number of anything in particular. It is important for us to know the number of what—all of the arrangements that determine whether any number is realistic. You can have a hundred inspections and if they were not properly arranged and set out with all the fine print that would make them adequate inspections you would get no assurance out of such arrangements. But so far the Soviet Union has not been willing to sit down and talk about the rest of the treaty. I think that to me has been the principal sign that at the present time they are not trying very hard.

COMPLAINTS OF CONCESSIONS MADE BY THE UNITED STATES

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, the emphasis that you placed upon the totality of the inspection quotient of the treaty, I think, is very, very important. This has not been properly understood or emphasized in the public discussion. It has been said, Mr. Secretary, that the Government of the United States in recent months has made a number of concessions to the Soviet Union which—and I believe I accurately state the complaint—threaten the security of the United States.

What concessions do you feel have been made, and do you feel that any of those tends to threaten or weaken our security.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, we get this coming at us from both directions.

On the one side, it has been said by some people that we have made concessions in Geneva, whereas the Russians say to us, "You have been taking substantial steps backward in some of the other things you are talking about."

For example, when we moved from international teams to do the inspecting to teams that are comprised primarily of United States or dominantly United States-United Kingdom specialists this was a movement toward a more rigorous inspection procedure.

Now, what we are talking about here is a total system, and the total system has in it many components, and the number of inspections is not by any means the only element that is of importance.

So that we believe that the discussions of the system itself do not reflect any weaker position in terms of a total verification and detection system, but I think an increasing realistic approach to that problem.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it not true that up until about a year and a half ago, we had a proposal before the Soviet Union—and one which was being respected by both sides as sort of an unofficial agreement, that there was no inspection to be provided on explosions of less than 18 to 20 kilotons. Was that our position up until about 1961?

Secretary RUSK. It was at that time the idea that since it would be difficult to detect explosions at that order of magnitude, the smallest end of the spectrum, that a treaty ought not to apply to those explosions.

We believe that there is advantage in applying the treaty all the way down.

Senator HUMPHREY. Does the present proposal apply the principles of the treaty to all explosions regardless of magnitude?

Secretary RUSK. All explosions above a level that is normal in a laboratory with the very lowest energy release.

Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, 1 kiloton and up and even less.

Secretary RUSK. Down to the peaceful kinds of experimentation.

Senator HUMPHREY. In this instance, therefore, the present proposals are more demanding, and are more restricting, than the earlier proposals; is that true?

Secretary RUSK. This, I think, has been made possible by the improvement in the types of information which can expose that lower yield testing to discovery.

ABILITY TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY EXPLOSIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, is there any real difficulty in identifying or detecting explosions above the magnitude of 4.75, which is about a 20- to 21-kiloton explosion?

Secretary RUSK. We have a high degree of confidence in our ability to detect such explosions. There is some variation, as you know, in the type of soil, type of formations in which explosions occur, but we have a high degree of confidence in the ability of the system to detect those above that magnitude.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, you speak of a national system of detection. You are now speaking primarily of seismic instrumentation, are you not?

Senator RUSK. Not entirely, Senator. That would be one of the very important elements in it. I could not go into too much detail here except in executive session, but—

Senator HUMPHREY. This is the problem, Mr. Secretary. How can the public know about the system of detection that we have if every time we get to it we have to make it hush-hush?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I realize that is a problem. We are studying that very carefully in the executive branch to see what more can be said without injuring our national security interests in the effectiveness of existing means of detection right across the board. I am not able, unfortunately today, to discuss that with the committee but it is a serious question, because we do believe that the detection capabilities are better than can be fully clarified at this point publicly.

Senator HUMPHREY. I surely want to emphasize—

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON DETECTION

Secretary RUSK. I don't want to sound, if I may say so, too spooky on this point, because one of the reasons is that anything that is called a national detection system does involve a good deal of international cooperation.

Senator HUMPHREY. Exactly.

Secretary RUSK. It involves help, assistance, combined effort on the part of many countries and you will have observed that in connection with previous tests that reports came in from countries who are in no way aligned with us in any security sense.

Senator HUMPHREY. Such as Sweden.

Secretary RUSK. Such as Sweden, and, therefore, it is rather delicate for us to talk about how this works together except in the framework of internationally agreed arrangements in which everyone can participate without embarrassment.

NEED FOR PUBLIC TO BE INFORMED ON U.S. DETECTION CAPABILITIES

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, I do hope that the executive branch will give this its most serious consideration. I hope it will give some weight to the fact that the longer there is uncertainty as to the scope of our mechanism for detection and identification, the more will be the uncertainty and the confusion about the treaty proposals.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HUMPHREY. Somewhere along the line this has to be balanced off, because I am quite sure the Russians know a great deal about our detection system. From my conversations I am quite sure they know an awful lot about it. I think it is only fair that the American people should be confided in as to what we have as a system of detection and identification, far beyond just what we call the seismic instrumentation or with our own national laboratories or national units. We have several new ones which have been established in recent years; isn't that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

EXPENDITURES ON SEISMIC RESEARCH

Senator HUMPHREY. How much money have we spent on seismic research in the last few years?

Secretary RUSK. In the neighborhood of \$90 or \$100 million.

Senator HUMPHREY. This year we are contemplating \$41 million?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. These are some of the results of the recommendations of the Berkner report; is that not right?

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator HUMPHREY. This is a matter of the greatest importance.

I want to ask just two more questions because I know my colleagues want to question you.

CHANGE IN U.S. POSITION ON TREATY

Mr. Secretary, do you think we have weakened our position in any substantial measure, or do you think we have strengthened it at the discussions in Geneva? By that I mean are we presenting as of this moment a treaty proposal which is more exacting in its requirements in terms of compliance, in terms of identification and detection of tests, or are we presenting one which is less rigid?

Secretary RUSK. I am convinced that the one we are proposing now is more rigorous than it was, say, a year ago, and I also have been reinforced by the reaction of the Soviet Union to these additional details in which we have put new ideas to them. I mentioned some of these earlier today.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I was there on the day the seven figure was announced. I was there when it was first proposed in a private discussion between Mr. Foster and Mr. Kuznetsov, even before our allies knew about it or before the nonaligned knew about it.

What was printed in the public press was that we had dropped from 8 to 10 to 7 on-site inspections. What else was included in that proposal, Mr. Secretary? Maybe you need the cooperation here of Mr. Fisher, since there was a good deal of technical data involved when we made that adjournment from 8 to 10 down to 7. Was there anything else included in the proposal?

Secretary RUSK. I think, in order to make it as complete as possible I will turn to Mr. Fisher on the details of those proposals.

Mr. FISHER. I think, Mr. Chairman, the primary other part was an increased emphasis upon U.S. control as opposed to international institutional control of the inspection mechanism.

This would include reliance, primarily, on our nationally manned and operated seismic detection stations.

Then when something indicated that there was a suspicious event, you decided whether to present that through the Commission to the Russians indicating the United States did believe that it met the treaty criteria for onsite inspection.

There was increased emphasis upon a U.S. selection of a seismic event for inspection if it wasn't satisfied with any explanation, and also the United States designated the key members of the inspection team.

Basically, it was a tidier proposal in terms of working all around. Now, I think, in terms of your question as to how this compares to how we stood, say, 16 months ago, and I use that term advisedly to avoid any indications that a change in administration made any difference on this because the position that the previous administration had on the old Geneva type treaty we also advanced.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand.

Mr. FISHER. The reason I would feel safer under the present proposal than that one, notwithstanding the difference in the number of onsite inspections, is that because under that proposal we had only a moratorium banning the tests from 4.75 down. The moratorium lasted only 3 years, it was true, but no one had much confidence that once we got started on a moratorium in a treaty context we would ever get out of it without the whole treaty structure falling down.

The treaty provisions covering onsite inspections did not apply to the events below 4.75.

MEASURING SIGNIFICANCE OF SUSPICIOUS EVENTS

Now, in order to indicate the significance of that problem, I recently took an average year of the suspicious events that had occurred in the Soviet Union, and in a sense went through, I couldn't use the term "war game," but use the term "peace game" within our own staff to determine which one of those events we would find most suspicious.

We started about with about 170 total events and you begin to sort of peel off the ones that you really wouldn't want to have an onsite inspection of. One reason might be it is located in water 10 miles east of Kurile Islands. You would peel that one off fairly quickly. For others you have seismic indications that the events were probably deep, deeper than it would be if it were an explosion, or also indications that some might have what they call rarefactive first motion, nearing the earth went inward. An explosion, on the other hand, gives an indication of outward movement.

When you got down to the group of seismic events you were really most concerned about, it was a group between 30 and 40 in the average year and it turned out that only about 10 of those produced a seismic magnitude of 4.75 and above.

So here were 30 events eligible for inspection under the present proposal, which would have been excluded under the prior proposal, and which yet were on the A-plus list so far as the degree of suspicion is concerned.

I am not suggesting that in the context of a treaty that we would exclude all of these others from the point of view of a possible candidate for onsite inspection. We would reserve the right ourselves, if it met certain criteria of location and was not clearly established as a very deep earthquake, 60 kilometers or below. We would have a right to pick any one of the 170 and that right is a real deterrent because the fellow doesn't know which one you are going to pick.

Of the 30 or 40 which were the most suspicious, 10 on the average, 10 or 15, satisfied this 4.75 criteria. This is said being in no sense or in no spirit critical of anybody else. But I just think this is a better proposal and I think you really can say we have taken into account not

only seismic improvement in detection and identification, but some more clear evaluation of the practical problems involved in making a control system effective, and an assessment of really what it was we are worried about.

We have been looking at earthquakes at the Soviet Union for 4 years now and have spent a good deal of money on it. The program started in the last administration. It is not surprising that something has paid off.

RATIO OF NUMBER OF SUSPICIOUS SEISMIC EVENTS TO NUMBER OF ONSITE INSPECTIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, or Mr. Fisher, is it true that our estimate of the number of seismic events 16 months ago, for instance, inside the Soviet Union of an earthquake nature was substantially larger than it is today?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct, sir.

We thought that instead of the 170 that I have talked about as the average number of events, that it was about $2\frac{1}{2}$ times bigger.

Senator HUMPHREY. At that time, when you thought the number of seismic events within the Soviet Union was about $2\frac{1}{2}$ times larger, how many onsite inspections did your treaty proposal include, over and about the threshold?

Mr. FISHER. The treaty proposal included 20.

Senator HUMPHREY. Excuse me; let's go back. The treaty proposal included 20 onsite inspections.

Mr. FISHER. That was our position 2 years ago.

Senator HUMPHREY. That was your position when you thought the number of seismic events in the Soviet Union was about $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as large as it is now calculated to be?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. All right.

At the present time your treaty proposal is seven onsite inspections; right?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Therefore, if you proposed 20, when you had $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as many seismic events, have you strengthened or weakened your position on onsite inspection, in light of the more accurate scientific information that you have on seismic events inside the Soviet Union?

Mr. FISHER. Well, I believe, Senator, it is strengthened not just as a result of any proportionate factor.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let's be very simple for us country folks. Just take a look at the arithmetic of this. It really gets down to something like this when you are talking to the public, because it takes too much time to go into the matter of concepts and magnitude.

NUMBER OF SEISMIC EVENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Were you right or wrong 16 months ago, Mr. Fisher, about the number of seismic events in the Soviet Union?

Mr. FISHER. Wrong.

Senator HUMPHREY. You were wrong. What reason do you have to believe that you may be right now since you were wrong before?

Mr. FISHER. There are a couple of things that have happened. The problem wasn't the total number of events in the Soviet Union because we have been looking at that for some period of time. It was relating those to the sort of magnitude that you would get out of a test. And the original estimates were made on very little data. The revised estimates were made on considerable data including a substantial series of U.S. underground tests.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you make those revised estimates, Mr. Fisher, or did you have some scientists working on them?

Mr. FISHER. The Department of Defense. They were initially made available to us through a group called AFTAC, Air Force Technical Applications Center, and were the subject of some rather extensive discussion last summer. We have ourselves evaluated the estimates, not I myself because I am not a seismologist, I am a lawyer. But we have a trained scientific staff which includes people who are physicists and are aware of this business and seismic consultants. We have satisfied ourselves as well that the present estimate is a realistic and an accurate one.

I think when you compare percentages, Senator, in order to be completely fair—where we stand now with reference to where we stood 2 years ago—the present number of 20 would have been applied not to the full 420 since all of those would not have been above the 4.75 threshold. In the neighborhood of 70 or 80 would have, but on the other hand those others below 4.75 would still be happening. The seismic events beneath the threshold that were still happening and which could have been covered by a moratorium would still be happening whether we saw them or not. They would still be a concern to me, being interested in the national security of the United States, whether I had the right to inspect them or not. In fact, as we have proceeded through this selection process it appeared to us there would be more concern about those events that were below the threshold just for the reason that if someone was engaged in a clandestine program what more logical way to do it than at a level of magnitude where by the terms of the treaty itself you had no right to inspect.

MAGNITUDE AT WHICH DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM MOST EFFICIENT

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Fisher, so we may just get this right down to even simpler terms, is it not a fact that above a magnitude of 4.75 the national detection and identification system is much more effective than below?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct, sir. I wouldn't say that now 4.75 represents the real benchmark. The benchmark they are thinking of about now is about 4, and I want to avoid giving the impression that this was a black-and-white line.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand.

Mr. FISHER. It is a spectrum. You are sure above the threshold. When you get below the threshold you aren't sure. He isn't sure, though, that you don't detect it. It is a spectrum of increased probability of detection. Where you begin to notice the shade changing, if I may mix a metaphor, is in the neighborhood of the present capability of 4.75.

Senator HUMPHREY. The greatest degree of uncertainty is in the neighborhood between 4 and 5; is that correct?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Let's say above 5 there is more certainty of detection and identification; correct?

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Was it not true that the proposal we had 16 months ago provided no inspection below 4.75?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is now true that the present proposal provides for inspection below 4.75?

Mr. FISHER. The present proposal provides—

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes or no.

Mr. FISHER. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. OK. Now, go ahead.

Mr. FISHER. It provides for inspection of any event that you detect and locate according to certain criteria.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. FISHER. That is, the reason for my qualification, Senator, was you have to pick it up on a seismograph under the present program before you can inspect.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand. There are also the differences, of course, relating to underground tests in alluvium.

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir.

MAJOR PROBLEM AREA

Senator HUMPHREY. There are many technical aspects of this. However, the problem area we have been wrestling with for several years is below the magnitude of 4.75 in underground testing, is it not?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that problem covered by onsite inspection procedures in the proposals?

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Was that problem covered 16 months ago under the previous proposal?

Mr. FISHER. No, sir; it was not.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you feel, therefore, that under the present proposal you have a more restrictive and a more inclusive treaty or a less restrictive treaty?

Mr. FISHER. I think it is a more restrictive treaty as far as a potential evader is concerned than the previous proposals.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you. I think it is time to yield to somebody else.

IMPORTANCE OF NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS

Senator AIKEN. Do you feel, Mr. Secretary, whether a test ban agreement is reached or not depends upon reaching an agreement as to the number of inspections?

Secretary RUSK. I think that would be one important element in it. From our point of view, we have to have a number that would

give us good assurance that systematic cheating is not occurring. But this is only one of a good many items on which we would have to have agreement. Agreements simply on the number standing alone, Senator, could involve some dangers because if there were an agreement in principle without an agreement on all of the arrangements that would be necessary to give effect to any such number, we might find ourselves in a position where we have almost an uninspected moratorium in terms of the political pressures that would be pouring in on all sides.

So we want to get this fine print worked out before we agree to any number because we are not talking about a number of what.

Senator AIKEN. How many inspections did Russia offer, we will say, 3 years ago?

Secretary RUSK. Two to three.

Senator AIKEN. And what do they offer now?

Secretary RUSK. Two to three.

Senator AIKEN. What did we ask 2 to 3 years ago?

Secretary RUSK. Three years ago. It was 20.

Senator AIKEN. What do we offer now?

Secretary RUSK. Seven.

Senator AIKEN. Seven?

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator AIKEN. Do you think if we accepted the Russians' offer for three inspections that you would get an agreement?

Secretary RUSK. You are not asking this particular question, but I don't see how we could agree to two or three. But in any event we would not know until we got all this fine print worked out how can you assure the inspectors they are in fact going to the area which they want to inspect under the arrangements, whether the Russians agree to the personnel that ought to be on the inspection team, and whether they agree to the conduct of the inspectors with respect to such information, whether they agree to the site.

All of these things have to be worked out.

EFFECT OF REDUCTION OF U.S. INSPECTION DEMANDS

Senator AIKEN. Do you think reducing our demand from 20 inspections to 7 indicates to the rest of the world that the United States perhaps thought it wrong to demand so many inspections?

Secretary RUSK. We have told the rest of the world we think there have been improvements in detection and verification capabilities. This is one of the effects of progress in this field. I think also as far as the rest of the world is concerned it does indicate that we believe that it is in the interests of ours and the Soviet Union and everybody else to get a test ban treaty that is workable if possible.

PRESENT PROSPECT FOR A TEST BAN TREATY

Senator AIKEN. Are you anticipating an early agreement?

Secretary RUSK. The present prospect is not at all encouraging, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. Isn't this discussion rather academic?

Secretary RUSK. If I were to answer that question yes or no today I would say "Yes" today.

Senator AIKEN. Have you observed in the discussion over getting a test ban agreement, almost a direct conflict between ideology and technology? There are so many people thinking we should go as far as necessary in order to get an agreement, but I happen to be on the Atomic Energy Committee, too, and you have testified before us.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. I don't hear any optimism that we hear exuded in some meetings and in some of the reports we get. I don't get the optimism that we have airtight methods of detecting explosions and determining what caused them. Do you think we can?

Secretary RUSK. I am convinced, Senator, the proposals we have made at Geneva would give us a high degree of assurance that the kind of testing is not being carried on that would affect our basic security interests; that the deterrent effect of the system on the Soviet Union would be very strong and that the Soviet Union would have to think very hard about the choice between getting caught in a test on the one side and simply doing the more forthright thing and abrogating the treaty on the other, if they decide to resume testing.

QUESTION OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN A TEST BAN TREATY

Senator AIKEN. Would an effective test ban require the cooperation of Communist China?

Secretary RUSK. The probability that Communist China would sign a test ban treaty is at the present time not high. I would say that it is very low. But on the other hand, I think that authorities in Peking would have to consider very hard whether they would go ahead if the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States did in fact sign a test ban treaty.

If they tested it would be open to us to abrogate the treaty if we determined our security were affected. The treaty itself has that provision in it.

LACK OF HOPE FOR EARLY TEST BAN AGREEMENT

Senator AIKEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HUMPHREY. Senator Fulbright.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I don't know that I have much to say. If I understood you correctly, Mr. Secretary, you say that this is largely an academic discussion—you have very little hope of any agreement in any case?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would comment on that. Perhaps I was a little too categorical. I think at the present time there is no prospect. There is no indication of any serious progress on these discussions.

On the other hand, I think that we ourselves ought not to drop interest in it. I think we ourselves ought to be prepared to move ahead if the other side changes its view as expressed in Geneva in recent weeks.

PRINCIPAL INTEREST IN ACHIEVING A TEST BAN TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, is your principal interest in this treaty that it would slow down or prevent the contamination of the atmosphere, or that it would contribute to peace?

Secretary RUSK. I think the principal interest is, and I think there would be disagreement in other parts of the world, perhaps, but to me the principal interest is taking a first step which would begin to put a ceiling on the arms race.

When we look ahead at the prospects of the arms race, the billions upon billions of resources that will have to be poured into it, and the increasing chanciness of that arms race, the increasing unpredictability of its course, the increasing dangers in the mounting piles of sophisticated and terrible weapons, I would think if we could find some way to begin to turn that down, this would be one of the most important things we could do at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it is economics rather than peace or contamination that interests you mostly.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, I don't think it is just economics.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, which is it? I asked you a simple question and I am not clear that I got an answer.

Could you make it a little clearer for me. I am a little slow on Monday morning.

Secretary RUSK. Let me enumerate the elements for you.

The CHAIRMAN. I said, is it contamination or is it peace? You said it wasn't either. You said it was limitation of arms, and I took it these were expensive and they ought to be limited.

Secretary RUSK. I would say it is peace, it is economics, and it is contamination. I think all three are there.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have any priority among those three for purposes of discussion?

Secretary RUSK. I think I named them in my priority so far as I am personally concerned, peace, economics, and contamination.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you really think a test ban treaty would contribute to peace if you got one?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, I think this would be an important contribution.

The CHAIRMAN. Did our experience after World War I with disarmament contribute to peace? We did have a disarmament conference, didn't we?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, we did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And we did set a limitation at that time on what were considered important arms in the nature of ships, didn't we?

Secretary RUSK. But, Senator, at about the time of that disarmament conference I first began to wear the uniform at the age of 12. It wasn't just that disarmament conference that got in the way of organizing the peace in the postwar period. We really disarmed unilaterally regardless of these disarmament treaties. We starved our Armed Forces between World Wars I and II and we were unwilling to play the kind of role we were going to play internationally if we were going to organize a peace.

PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING DISARMAMENT

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted you to clarify this a bit. This whole subject is rapidly becoming involved in our domestic political situation, is it not? If you are for inspections above a certain number, you are a good patriot; if you are for inspections below a certain number, you are soft on communism. Isn't that the way it is becoming now?

Secretary RUSK. I am a little confused, Senator. I don't want to point to specific remarks, but I am a little confused about the discussion on the one side which seems not to want any disarmament, and others want us to make deep slashes in our defense budget. It seems to me we have got to do the job in our defense budget that is required and at the same time work for disarmament that will help turn this thing down so that our defense budgets can be more manageable.

The CHAIRMAN. You will admit there is room for difference of opinion as to whether or not this treaty really contributes to peace, won't you? There are a lot of people who don't think it has any particular relevance to the promotion of peace; is that not correct?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I have no doubt at all in my own mind on that one. I acknowledge there are differences of view but if you look at the prospect lying out ahead of an unlimited, qualitative arms race in the nuclear field, that arms race certainly contributes to war, and therefore, I would think if we could find a way to put some ceiling on it that would be a contribution to peace.

OBJECT OF INTEREST IN PEACE

The CHAIRMAN. Well, these are questions. I am not sure whether it is the weapons involved that contribute to war. Maybe it is the people who make the weapons who are the primary object of our interest in whether or not we have peace.

I wonder if we are not really preoccupied with the symptoms rather than the cause of our troubles.

Secretary RUSK. It is true, sir, that weapons are only fired when people fire them and that the policies and attitude of the people are a determining factor. But the weapons confrontation itself taxes the ingenuity, the patience, the intelligence of men who are having to make the decisions of war and peace, and the more sophisticated, the more instantaneous, the more complex, the more all-pervasive these weapons systems become the more difficult it is for frail human beings to keep control of the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I will yield.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEUTRON BOMB

Senator AIKEN. In consideration of a test ban treaty have you given full thought to the development of the neutron bomb?

Secretary RUSK. That is one of the elements that has to be taken into account when you determine whether or not it is in our interest to stop testing where it is. It has been our judgment since 1958, forgetting for the moment the whole Baruch experience, that it is in the interests of the United States, if possible, to stop testing where it is.

Senator AIKEN. In that case, you would be too late now, would you not? Is not the theory of the neutron bomb pretty well known to different countries?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think the theory of it is known, but a ban on testing would impose very severe limits upon the development of such weapons.

Senator AIKEN. In the event of trouble, would not the neutron bomb be likely to supplant the atomic bomb as we now know it, to a great extent?

Secretary RUSK. I am not at all sure that would be the case. I think there has been some discussion of that, but I would think that it would not be a substitute, but an addition.

Senator AIKEN. I am not sure, but I think it has to be taken into consideration because the atomic bomb, as we know it now, is undoubtedly just a step toward the ultimate means of destruction.

INVOLVEMENT OF POLITICS IN TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to labor it, and I do not wish to take up the time of these experts on the committee who know so much about how many black boxes we have to have. I really do not know, I confess. I do not know whether it ought to be 3, 10, or 100.

I do know that it looks as if this matter is becoming involved in politics, which I think would make it a rather useless exercise, because it destroys any rational and objective examination of it.

WISDOM OF TEST BAN NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES QUESTIONED

Frankly, I rather disagree with the whole procedure you are following—that you try to get agreements of this kind in the open. I think they do not lend themselves to fruitful discussions, if everything the negotiators say has to be addressed to the local constituency back home, rather than to the people participating in the meeting. I think it is a very poor procedure that you have adopted, but that is a gratuitous bit of advice.

You are already in it, and I do not know how you can disengage, except that I think it will come to an end in the near future.

Senator HUMPHREY. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I will yield.

Senator HUMPHREY. I just want to add this. It was my privilege to be around when this sort of development took place, where the chief negotiator of the United States at Geneva was attempting to state the American Government position, only to read in the European edition of the New York Times or the Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune a new proposal that was supposedly going to be advanced—even though it never was advanced—and the negotiator having to spend most of his time telling our allies and the nonaligned nations that the news story just was not true.

Then, when the "seven" figure came up, long before anybody else in Geneva had heard about it officially or unofficially, it had appeared in print in Washington, D.C.

I knew that my little mission at Geneva was to go around from one delegation to another to explain carefully that there was no substance

to this at all, only to find out a little later, of course, that there was substance to it.

I do not know how in the world anybody can conduct negotiations under those kinds of circumstances. Frankly, it made us look almost like comedians, or at least a part of some sort of a vaudeville act. I thought it was ridiculous, and I certainly want to concur in what the Senator from Arkansas has just said: If you are going to negotiate, we ought to negotiate as quietly and as carefully as possible, and possibly not have to go through all these exercises like we are going through here today.

I could not help but think how much of this subject is being discussed in the Soviet Union at this particular hour. They must feel very happy.

Senator AIKEN. Will the Senator yield?

I think what the chairman is trying to say is that you ought to be as quiet about your plans as the Internal Revenue department is about its.

Senator HUMPHREY. And as effective.

Secretary RUSK. I think no Secretary of State would fail to appreciate the remarks pointing to the difficulties between linking of public debate and an effective international negotiation concurrently. This is a difficulty, and it is not a new problem, and I am sure this will not be the last time that we will have this problem, but it is difficult.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is almost impossible. You are very generous, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. There was an exchange, as you know, in December and January between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy on this matter. That, hopefully, had opened up the possibility of some serious negotiations that would lead to an agreement. But apparently that has not been the case. There was a case where a private communication did enter into the public discussion, the public negotiations, and since that time there has been no real headway made.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one other thing to mention in this connection. Senator Humphrey, in his usual and inimitable way, made the point much better than I could possibly make it. I do not see why you necessarily must look forward to a continuation of this procedure in this and other cases. It seems to me you ought to be able to arrange for negotiations to be private, of course making whatever you conclude public. These are quite different matters.

POSSIBLE PROPOSAL CONCERNING DESTRUCTION OF BOMBERS

As to this question that I believe is again in the morning paper about the destruction of bombers, is there any relation between it and this disarmament business?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it has no direct relation with the nuclear test ban discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it relate to the general question of disarmament?

Secretary RUSK. I think that story was incorrect, Senator. There has been discussion in the Disarmament Agency of a great many possible steps in the disarmament field.

The CHAIRMAN. At the moment, I am not particularly interested in the substance of one or the other of those matters under discussion. As I say, this whole thing is becoming political in its nature.

I do not care whether you destroy these obsolete bombers or not. However, it seems to me that it ought to be possible to be quite clear as to whether they are being destroyed or not, without there being implications of deception or untruths about the matter.

We destroyed thousands, or at least hundreds, of bombers in my State after World War II that were old fashioned. We are beginning to decommission these B-47's now, I understand. I have heard that with respect to one of the bases in my State. I believe they are substituting B-52's.

In any case, I see it in the paper as a matter of controversy. Can this not be cleared up or can you clear it up this morning?

Secretary RUSK. This is a point that has been discussed inside the Disarmament Agency and with the departments as one possible step which might at some stage be seriously considered. There has been no proposal made on this to other governments or to the Soviet Union on such a step.

Now, one of the elements in this sort of an idea, that you mutually destroy certain of your obsolescent weapons, in order to limit the extent to which highly sophisticated weapons become obsolete, as between the Soviet Union and the NATO powers, is that they do not spread all over the world and become a part of the other arms races that are going on in different parts of the world; and that they do not feed out into a lot of countries which would find them a burden and would stimulate the dangers elsewhere.

But here, again, is a problem. We are concerned with a lot of things in the Disarmament Agency, looking at them as possibilities. We reject a lot of them; we put others up for further study. But, with reference to your earlier remark about negotiations, Senator, it is very difficult to have these things prematurely out for public debate before one even knows whether it will be well to negotiate them.

So that clarification on a point of this sort is not simple. The idea is being studied. The idea is being considered. But no proposals have been made.

The CHAIRMAN. I personally do not think much of the idea one way or the other. However, I do not like to see these controversies develop which have political overtones, because, regardless of our difficulties in getting along with Russia, we do not need to tear ourselves apart internally as between the two parties over something of this kind, which, I am frank to say, I do not think is particularly significant.

QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT PREOCCUPATION WITH DISARMAMENT

Lastly, I will end by saying that my real suspicion about disarmament is that this is diverting your attention and the attention of the whole Government from those areas which might lend themselves to improving our relations with our present enemies. I doubt if this contributes very much. You have created a whole Agency for this particular activity. Nobody is very optimistic about getting anywhere. A lot doubt that you would achieve very much even if you

made an agreement. You neglect the other areas of relationships that are connected with definite human relations which are fundamental, rather than with the symptom, by fixing your attention so strongly upon this aspect of our problem.

For whatever it is worth, there are some people who feel this very strongly.

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that public attention has been drawn very strongly to the nuclear test ban discussion and to the whole disarmament problem. But I do not think that means the other problems are being neglected inside Government, to that extent.

I think, also, it is fair to say—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, for example, you are very concerned about this, but, at the same time, last year this Government took away the most-favored-nation clause for two countries which are important in this area.

So, with one hand, you say we are very concerned about this because of its peace overtones. On the other hand, we go out of our way to create worse relations with the people who are involved. We seem very inconsistent.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, my views on the most-favored-nation clause with respect to Poland and Yugoslavia have been stated repeatedly to the Congress. I was, myself, very regretful to have that action occur. I think it has not been in our public interest to have it occur.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it did occur, anyway.

Secretary RUSK. But I think on the disarmament point, sir, here is a place where there could be a genuine common interest between ourselves and the Soviet Union to try to move ahead, if we can.

As late as this so-called electoral speech about a week or 10 days ago, Mr. Khrushchev pointed once more to the great burden that this arms race imposes upon the Soviet Government in the allocation of its resources as between arms, on the one side, and consumer and other goods on the other.

Now, leaving aside ideological considerations, for the moment, I think an outsider would say that here is one field in which there is some basis of continuing common interest between these two groups of nations. They both have great unfinished business which calls for resources, and the arms race makes it more difficult for them to turn to that unfinished business. So that we have felt, as one of the points at which we might engage a genuine interest, that the disarmament idea, the disarmament possibility, was one that ought to be thoroughly explored.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean to disengage completely. What I meant is that I think the disarmament effort is overemphasized. I think it is given more attention than it really deserves. I think it ought to be continued, and, if there is anything to it, take advantage of it. However, you certainly ought not to get the idea that this is the one and only way you can make progress toward peace.

That is all, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Senator Carlson?

POSSIBLE PROPOSAL CONCERNING DESTRUCTION OF BOMBERS

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I just want to follow along with what our chairman, Mr. Fulbright, mentioned in regard to this article that appeared in the paper this morning. I want to be sure that I understand you correctly. This article states that:

U.S. disarmament officials denied yesterday that any plan had been shaped for the reciprocal burning of bombers by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Do I understand your answer to our chairman was that you had been considering this?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. And it was part of your program?

Secretary RUSK. But I believe the reported denial itself was a misunderstanding of what the Disarmament Agency official has said.

Senator CARLSON. I am glad to get that clarification, because, as the chairman has well stated, that is one of the problems that we have up here on the Hill.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator yield for a clarification?

Senator CARLSON. I certainly will.

Senator MORSE. I do not think the record is clear now at all, since the last response of the Secretary. I understood the Secretary to say, and he can check me, that there had been no negotiations with the Soviets or anyone else in regard to the destruction of any bombers, but that there had been discussions within our own Government as to possible programs for the demolishing of obsolete equipment, including bombers. Now, if that is the statement, the record ought to show it.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator MORSE. Is that your position?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator CARLSON. I wanted to clear it up because the quote in the paper this morning says that there had been no discussion about reciprocal burning. Now, the Secretary says there has at least been discussion within the Agency here in Washington in regard to this; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

And I added the point that I think the reporter misunderstood what the official in the Agency said, because the official did not deny that there had been discussion.

Senator CARLSON. I wanted the record to be clear on this, because I want to state categorically that in this connection there have been representatives of the Disarmament Agency up on the Hill.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. This has been discussed with leaders of the Congress as one of the possible steps that we might want to take.

Senator CARLSON. That clears that up, I hope.

POSSIBLE PROHIBITION ON SALE OF OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT

Senator AIKEN. Does that mean that we will agree to destroy our antiquated equipment rather than selling it to the so-called developing nations? Would that not be a good agreement for Russia and the United States to make?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I mentioned this earlier because one of the curious things about the disarmament discussions has been that it tends to concentrate on the arms as between the Soviet Union and the United States without regard to the other arms races going on in other parts of the world.

At the time the General Assembly was voting for disarmament, 70 nations were asking for military assistance.

Senator AIKEN. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. We do not want to see burdensome weapons of this sort move out into general supply in competition around the world, because they are expensive, burdensome, and in many situations, could increase the dangers.

Senator AIKEN. I think that would be a profitable subject for discussion, and one which, perhaps, might prove more fruitful than the test ban treaty—and more immediate, perhaps.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, I have just one or two more questions.

Senator HUMPHREY. Go right ahead, Senator.

INTERPRETATION OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT (PUBLIC LAW 87-297)

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I receive a great deal of mail from citizens in my State—and I assume other Members do from their States—who are concerned that the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Public Law 87-297, gives the President the power to turn over the defense of the United States to the United Nations. I wish you would discuss that a little bit.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do not see any basis whatever for that interpretation of the act. Let me repeat again what I have said about any nuclear test ban agreement. Such an agreement would be a treaty. The treaty would be negotiated in consultation with the leadership of the Congress and the appropriate committees.

If negotiated to a conclusion, it would be submitted to the Senate as a treaty, at which point the Senate can pass its own complete judgment on the matter. It is just as simple and categorical as that.

An agreement on such an important matter as this is intended to be a treaty. The rest of the world knows it; the Soviet Union knows it; that we are talking about a treaty, with all that means in terms of Senate consideration.

Now, insofar as other matters are concerned, the President is not in this disarmament field going to move out with arrangements affecting the security of the United States without full collaboration with the Congress.

The Congress has its own great constitutional responsibilities in this field. The President has his, and both, together, are responsible for the security of the United States. I believe that those fears or misgivings just have no basis in fact or intention or capability.

Senator CARLSON. Does the United Nations Charter contain any provision that could be interpreted as authorizing the President to turn over the defense of the United States to the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. Not as a charter. I mean the United Nations Charter has strongly registered at our own insistence that the regulation of armaments be a major objective of the United Nations, but the arrangements would still have to be negotiated out with the members, and nothing could occur there without our full consent, and the Congress would be fully involved in any such consent.

PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY REGARDING U.S. ARMED FORCES

Senator CARLSON. I can assure you that there is great concern among some people in our Nation that the Congress would not be the final authority on approving a treaty. There is concern that the President does have this authority through the Disarmament Act and also the United Nations, and I am glad for your statement this morning.

I would like to submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, a staff memorandum on this subject that was helpful to me, and I would like to have it made a part of the record.

Senator HUMPHREY. It will be made a part of the record.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

STAFF MEMORANDUM ON PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO DISARM AND COMMIT U.S. ARMED FORCES

Section 33 of Public Law 87-297 provides in part:

"That no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, *except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.*" [Emphasis added.]

This section makes it quite clear that the President cannot enter into a disarmament agreement or obligate the United States to disarm, except as authorized by a subsequent law or treaty.

The United Nations Charter does not contain any provisions which could be interpreted as authorizing the President to turn over the defense of the United States to the United Nations. Article 43 of the Charter provides:

"1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. 3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." [Emphasis supplied.]

The United Nations Participation Act of December 20, 1945, implements these provisions as follows:

"The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the Security Council *which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution*, [emphasis supplied] providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in

accordance with article 43 of said Charter. The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the armed forces, facilities, or assistance provided for therein: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in such special agreement or agreements."

The foregoing provisions give the Congress adequate control over the President's authority to enter into agreements to commit U.S. forces pursuant to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. In addition, Congress has enormous power (including control over the purse strings), the support of which is indispensable to any foreign policy. For example, the Congress is the body which lays and collects taxes for the common defense, and creates armies and maintains navies, although it does not direct them. It also has the power to pledge the public credit, declare war, define offenses against the law of nations, regulate foreign commerce; and it has the further power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for carrying into execution not only its own powers but all the powers "of the Government of the United States and of any department or officer thereof." Moreover, its laws made "in pursuance" of these powers are the "supreme law of the land" and the President is bound constitutionally to "take care that" they "be faithfully executed."

EFFECT ON U.S. MILITARY FORCES OF PUBLIC LAW 87-297

Secretary RUSK. I might just comment, Senator, a brief historical note:

That back in 1945 and 1946 we were negotiating with the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations the arrangements that were contemplated under chapter 7 of the Charter, Military Staff Committee, United Nations Forces, questions of that sort.

Had that move followed—those provisions, for all practical purposes, died in 1946—there might have been a United Nations command of military forces that would have played roles that might have engaged some of these questions. But that is not in front of us any more at the present time.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HUMPHREY. Just to clarify this record again, Mr. Secretary, I am very familiar with the provisions of the Arms Control Act. Do you find anything within that act which bestows power upon the President of the United States to demobilize the forces of the United States without the consent of the Congress?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; I do not.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you find anything in the Arms Control Act which would place jurisdiction over the command of the U.S. Armed Forces in the hands of the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you find anything in the Arms Control Act which would in any way dilute the authority of the President of the United States to be Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Or do you find anything that would dilute the constitutional authority of the Congress of the United States on treaty-making powers insofar as the Senate is concerned?

Secretary RUSK. I do not, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. And you do not find anything that would dilute the appropriation powers of the Congress of the United States?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that pretty well ties down the response to this kind of emotional appeal that is spread across the land.

Senator Morse?

NEED FOR DISARMAMENT EFFORTS AND DISCUSSION

Senator MORSE. In laying the foundation for my questions, Mr. Secretary, I want the record to show that the senior Senator from Oregon is not an expert in this field, and does not claim to be one. In fact, I do not know of a disarmament expert on this committee. If there is one, I would like to be introduced to him sometime. The man who, in my opinion, knows more about it than anyone else on the committee, in my personal view, is the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Humphrey. He has never claimed to be an expert, but a student in the field, which is what all of us should try to be. I am not an expert, but I am not a cynic, either. I feel that I ought to thank you, in behalf of by grandchildren and everyone else's grandchildren, for the statesmanship that your reasoned discourse portrayed this morning. I thank you for not being a cynic, for trying to be somewhat of a student of history.

I am not going to escape the fact that material things condition people; that is an elementary psychological law of conditioning. And, not being a cynic, I am not going to ignore what history has taught: that with other material weapons of the past where mankind in various eras of history has failed to limit their use, they have produced war.

There has been talk here, even by you, about this being an academic discussion. I am glad there has, because I want to point out also that mankind has made its great progress toward peace on foundations of earlier academic discussions, out of which developed great ideals that were eventually implemented into patterns of human behavior. I am for as much public discussion of this subject as we can have everywhere in the world.

I wish the Russian officials were as concerned about their grandchildren as I am of mine. I offer no apology for holding the point of view that in our time we are either successful in leading mankind to disarmament, so far as nuclear weapons are concerned, or we are not going to leave any system of freedom to our grandchildren. This just happens to be a belief of mine.

So long as I hold this trust, all the politics, all the partisanship, all the waving of the flag into tatters, are not going to divert me from doing what I can to help along the cause of working out a system of enforceable peace. However, you are not going to have an enforceable peace trying to put into perpetuity the matter of nuclear containment.

I wanted to say that as a foundation for these questions which I am going to ask you now.

I have supported the program of nuclear containment, and I will continue my support for the time being, until we can get the time I

think it is going to take to implement what is really foundation material in this kind of discussion this morning. If you do not have the American people thinking about it, in my judgment, there is no hope of our adopting a sound national policy.

I do not care what administration it is, the present one or a future one. Your national policy is going to come from the people themselves. It is one thing to talk to me about secrecy in negotiations at Geneva. It is quite a different thing to try to sell me on secrecy in discussion of American policy on the domestic scene. I am for all the public discussion of it that you can possibly have.

Academic as this is, it is a great seminar, and we need many of them. Yet, I am very much concerned about a seeming rise in acceptability on the part of increasing numbers of Americans that maybe we had better have a nuclear war and be through with it. We will sure be through with it, if we have one.

Therefore, I think, rather than show a sensitivity about political barbs—a sensitivity that some people in our constituency are displaying that maybe we should not be discussing these matters—our answer to them ought to be more discussion, not less. The interesting thing is, when you get the facts out to the American people, such as you are bringing out here this morning, you do not have to worry about their final judgment. But you get these waves of emotionalism because so many people are ignorant of the facts, and secrecy breeds ignorance, emotional, popular reaction.

We have gone through it in smaller spheres of foreign policy in recent months, and I know how those barbs feel. I do not intend to change my course of action just because somebody is going to assume that we are not protecting the flag because we are not waving it into tatters.

The American flag is being harmed more by the so-called super patriots and their partisan waving of it. Before I ask you three or four questions, I just wanted this record to show that this is the philosophical approach the senior Senator from Oregon makes to this.

RELATIONSHIP OF NATO NUCLEAR FORCE TO TEST BAN

Mr. Secretary, you said that a test ban would be fully consistent with the possibilities for a NATO system of multilateral control of nuclear forces.

Is it not possible that the Russians would regard a NATO multilateral Polaris force as a proliferation of nuclear weapons?

Secretary RUSK. It is possible that they would oppose any multilateral arrangement within NATO, but I think the point that they are most concerned about would be the addition of further, independent, national, nuclear capabilities.

The multilateral force idea is a way in which to engage the joint responsibility of our present NATO allies in a nuclear force and in its arrangements without adding to the capabilities of any single government to make decisions for the employment of such weapons.

I think this is the point to which the Soviet Union would be very sensitive.

Senator MORSE. In that answer you have also answered my next question. I am going to ask it, though, because I want to emphasize it and point it up a bit.

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

Senator MORSE. Judging from what you said, if we should ever amend the McMahon Act to permit nuclear assistance to our European allies, is it not at least likely, or possible, that the Russians would denounce any test ban treaty with the United States or the United Kingdom, if we entered into such a treaty prior to the amendment of the McMahon Act to permit us, for example, to help France build up a nationalistic nuclear program?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that at the present time the Soviet Union recognizes that France does have, and will have, a national nuclear capability, but I think they would be very much concerned if this number should increase. I think it is no secret that the Soviets are very much concerned about a German national nuclear capability, for example. But, I think, if other countries in NATO were to begin testing or were to develop national nuclear weapons, a nuclear test ban treaty would become unimportant.

I think they would undoubtedly abrogate it.

Senator MORSE. The fact that the Russians recognize that France will undoubtedly develop its own nuclear force would not change the fact, would it, that if we bilaterally proceeded to assist her in developing a national nuclear force, Russia would look askance at any proposal on our part or on the part of the United Kingdom for the development of a nuclear test ban treaty?

Secretary RUSK. I think, undoubtedly, that action on our part of that sort would create reactions on the part of the Soviet Union, that is, political reactions. But I think, also, that the Soviet Union might be interested in a nontransfer of nuclear weapons agreement at some stage, by which those that have them would agree not to give them to other national governments on a national basis, and those who do not have them would agree not to receive them or manufacture them.

Senator MORSE. If there is to be any hope for the development of an enforceable, effective nuclear test ban treaty, would you agree with me that that hope would be increased if we maintained our present position in regard to assisting in a NATO nuclear force development, and not assisting in an individual nation-by-nation nuclear force development?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct, sir; there is no question of it.

EFFECT OF TEST BAN TREATY ON WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, what is the administration assessment of the effect a test ban treaty would have on the development by the United States of low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons and an effective antimissile, or the so-called neutron bomb?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, the effect of a test ban treaty on such steps would be to prevent field testing or weapons testing which would be necessary for the development of those additional weapons.

In other words, one of the purposes would be to stop testing, and that would include testing necessary for those directions.

I might just add parenthetically, Senator, that there are steps in the anti-ICBM field, the antimissile field, which could be taken without nuclear testing, as such.

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. In terms of carriers and things of that sort.

Senator MORSE. I understand that. I was only discussing it in its relationship to the test ban.

Secretary RUSK. Right, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIETS HAVING SATELLITE NATIONS CONDUCT TESTS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, in the event a test ban treaty were concluded, do you see any likelihood that the Soviets might evade the intent of such a treaty by having their satellites conduct tests?

Secretary RUSK. I think any testing anywhere else would, of course, bring the treaty down. It would make it possible for any signatory to the treaty to relieve himself of any obligations under it.

I doubt very much that the Soviet Union would agree to a test ban treaty and then evade it through testing in its, say, Eastern European satellites. I think that there are problems involving the interests of the Soviet Union itself. I do not think they will sign such a treaty unless they think it basically is in their own interests, and I think the hazards of being caught in that kind of an arrangement would be very great.

Senator MORSE. The criticism implied by my question—which is made by those who seem to be against any test ban treaty—would be answered, would it not, by pointing out that our negotiators certainly would not be sitting mute in Geneva, or anywhere else where such negotiations were conducted, without bringing into the discussion full compliance on the part of Russia, including agreement not to evade by seeking to make use of Communist satellites?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

STATE DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION NO. 7277 RELATING TO DISARMAMENT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, my last question was really covered in part by Senator Carlson, although I think it needs to be pointed up and made clear in the record. Some people seem to have the impression that the mere existence of the administration's disarmament proposals set forth in State Department Publication 7277 amounts to surrender of all U.S. military forces and U.S. sovereignty to the United Nations. I wonder if you would clarify for the record what the nature and purpose of these U.S. proposals are.

Secretary RUSK. If we may just identify the bulletin. The document to which you refer, Senator, was a comprehensive outline of a disarmament program which would look to graduated disarmament as the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations and of the world community of nations became increasingly effective.

Now, these steps would be taken only by the United States on the basis of decisions made by the Government of the United States, including the Congress of the United States, and we do not contemplate that the security of the United States would be turned over, without our consent and participation, to somebody else outside the United States.

Senator MORSE. That is a statement I wanted to get into this record. As Senator Carlson pointed out, we have been receiving a

considerable amount of mail, and, in my judgment, it grows out of this document, and a misunderstanding on the part of many of the critics as to the procedures that would have to be followed if this outline of disarmament should eventually be effectuated.

It calls for following all the constitutional processes of our form of government: checks of the Congress that are in no way attempted to be circumvented or undermined. This is a general outline of an overall, comprehensive disarmament program that is envisioned as at least a hope for the world, if the leaders of the countries of the world come to their senses and finally work out this kind of an enforceable disarmament program.

WORKING TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE WORLD OF LAW

You see, Mr. Secretary, so many of these critics just forget about that word "enforceable" which is always used by those in positions of responsibility who are seeking to prevent a nuclear holocaust by substitution of reason for force. We are not overnighters, but we recognize that, academic as it may be at the present time, we have got to continue to work for implementing those ideals, if we are, in my judgment, going to accomplish the only hope that mankind has for survival.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I feel that what you have said this morning about working toward an effective world of law is so important that I would like to have the record show that, when I acceded to this word "academic," I was talking about the immediate negotiating situation in its most shortrun term, that at the moment there is no progress visible on this subject. But I would not wish to apply that word to the total effort here of nuclear test ban or disarmament, because I think we have got to stay with that and make some headway with it, if we can.

Senator MORSE. I understood that. Knowing you as I do, I took that for granted.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Senator Hickenlooper?

BASIC PURPOSE OF THE SOVIETS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, has your general observation over the years been that the basic purpose of the Kremlin has been to attain economic and military superiority over the rest of the world?

Secretary RUSK. I think their objective, as Marxists and Leninists, has been to put themselves in a position of domination. They have been pursuing their idea of a world revolution. I think there have been times when they have been restricted in means by actions taken by others and by their own capabilities.

I think that the great problem for the future is whether they will elevate that doctrine to the realm of doctrine only, or whether they continue to support it in action by every means at their disposal.

I think they have made their own purposes and their own predictions about the future of the world very clear over the last—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have you noticed any diminution of their action so far as their pursuit of world superiority is concerned? In other words, have they continued to develop physically with speed within their capabilities for that dominion or for the purpose of strength?

Secretary RUSK. I think they have made a major effort in building up their military power and keeping it strong. I think I could not say that they have committed all of the resources that it were possible for them to commit to a military effort, nor in particular situations in different parts of the world have they used their military resources to the extent that military resources might have been used by them.

Now, on the one side, I think there is no question about their objectives. But, on the other hand, they, too, have some problems to think about in terms of the safety of their own country, in terms of the tolerability of their own people to what might be asked of them. I think that they are capable of, on occasion, making Soviet judgments in their interests, and that some of these may be also in the interest of other countries.

QUESTION OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO IN WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Considering the rather consistent and characteristic conduct of the Russians since World War II, and then assuming, at least for the sake of argument—which, I think, is a proper assumption myself—that we do have in mass and power and probably in ultimate deliverability a substantial atomic superiority over the Russians, do you think it is compatible with Russia's past conduct and announced purposes that she will voluntarily reduce or stop her atomic development, which will inevitably keep her in a secondary position in the atomic field in the future, under present circumstances and present attitudes?

Secretary RUSK. This turns on some judgments which they have to make about their own situation, taking into account several elements. I think they do have to be concerned about the extent of the resources that will be required in an unlimited arms race.

I believe, also, they have no reason to suppose, if they wish to continue the race, that they will ever catch up on that relative position between ourselves and them, because I think that the free world has the capability, the resources, and, if necessary, the will to maintain its position in that regard.

I also think we have to take into account that the Soviet Union has at the present time a very large and powerful nuclear delivery system. Who knows what their judgment will be about what is enough for their purposes in terms of deterring or possibly preventing a nuclear exchange on the initiation, say, of the West some day.

I do not think one can rule out that they will come to the determination that a real test ban treaty would be in their interests, looking ahead.

SOVIET POLICY OF WORLD CONQUEST

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Considering the repeated statements that have been made by Khrushchev, and the other statements from official agencies in Russia, all along the line that they are determined to bury us economically or otherwise—and I do not know that they have retracted any of those statements; they seem to reiterate them on various public occasions—

Secretary RUSK. They have been repeated fairly recently.

Senator HICKENLOOPER (continuing). Is there any reliable reason to believe that they have changed that policy of the ultimate conquest of us and the rest of the world economically and otherwise? Have they really receded from that position any?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that in terms of their theory, there has not been much change in doctrine. There have been some changes inside the Soviet Union that, in terms of the freeing up of certain of their scientists, technicians and managers, show some change, as compared with, say, 10 years ago.

But, on the other hand, they, too, are humans, who have to consider the dangers, the burdens, the risks in relation to how and when they try to get on with their program.

WORLD OPINION OF U.S. POSITION ON A TEST BAN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With reference to the discussion which we have had here about the impression which many people in this country may have had, rightly or wrongly, about what concessions we are making or what power may be abandoned by the Congress or otherwise, I assume that this impression being gained by the American people with quite a prolific and diversified press, could well be gained by other people in the world, could it not?

Secretary RUSK. I think, thus far, the attitude of the Soviets, for example, has been that we have been very harsh and unyielding and insistent in trying to work at this nuclear test business. I just saw some stories the other day, referring to my own comments at the last press conference, that tried to make the point in Moscow that I clearly demonstrated that we had not the slightest interest in a nuclear test ban proposal or a treaty.

I think, as far as many people in the rest of the world are concerned, they do not carry the same responsibilities as we carry in the United States. I think they would like to see nuclear testing end on almost any basis whatever on which the Soviets, the United States, and the United Kingdom would end it. They are not so much interested in the details as basically the ending of the tests, although I am quite sure most of them would not want us to do so, if, in our judgment, it was contrary to the basic security interests of the United States.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point I am trying to make is that if our own people get the idea that perhaps the United States is not interested in really stopping this headlong rush by the Russians to world supremacy, is it not entirely possible that other nations in the world which have a great concern about Russian objectives and the ultimate Russian program might also gain the same idea from the same

general sources? And those nations may get a little bit discouraged about this, might they not?

Secretary RUSK. To the extent that that is possible, I think it is all the more important that we, ourselves, here, in the course of our domestic discussion, do not misinterpret or misread what, in fact, we are saying in these nuclear test ban negotiations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is very important.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not read the same thing into them that many people do.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But in many ways I have come to live with this thing for a good many years, and I hope I understand basically what our position is. I am aware, though, that there is an image created from time to time in the minds of many people, regardless of the reasons and regardless of the sources.

QUESTION OF SOVIET TERMS FOR A TEST BAN TREATY

Now, do you think the Russians really want a binding treaty on any terms except their own, and upon terms which will not in any way weaken their position vis-a-vis the United States and other nations in the world?

Secretary RUSK. I think it is clear that they will not want a treaty except on terms that they feel they can accept, but I think that it is also entirely possible that they, too, have some stake in this arms race and putting some limitation on it.

The problem would be to find out whether there is a sufficient degree of common interest to support a treaty which has the necessary degree of assurance in it against violations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have some stake in it, without doubt, just as every nation has a stake in it. Do you not, however, think there is quite a conflict in the Kremlin management between the philosophy of internationalism, which is pointed toward world dominion, on the one hand, and some possible responsibility for internal betterment within the country?

Secretary RUSK. I think there is a very important discussion and debate going on and some very difficult decisions being made in the Soviet Union about the allocation of resources, say, as between its military establishment, on the one side, and its capital plant and agricultural investments, on the other.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there any real evidence that Russian internal development has materially benefited at the expense of Russian military expansion power?

Secretary RUSK. I would suppose, Senator, particularly in view of Mr. Khrushchev's remarks during the election the other day, that those doubts, at least for the present, have been resolved in favor of supporting the military requirements.

SOVIET OPPOSITION TO INSPECTION DATING FROM BARUCH PLAN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I recall, as I know you do, very actively the fact that at least at the beginning of 1947 the United States had a complete monopoly on atomic weapons. No other country could

make them or had them. We had the weapon and the know-how, the plant capacity, the production potential to wipe any other nation practically off the face of the earth, if we got into a rumpus with it. Yet we offered through the Baruch plan to give that all up and turn over all atomic materials, all weapons, all uranium, and get clear out of the business and turn it over to an international agency, providing other countries would do the same, in order to preserve the world against the development by any nation of this weapon and the danger which we thought we saw at that time and which we have increasingly seen as it has developed.

Is it your recollection—it certainly is mine—that Russia adamantly refused to join in this kind of an arrangement, and it foundered on the rocks of inspection? Russia would not let anybody into their country then to see whether they were going forward with this or not. However, we were willing to have inspection, and most of the other major countries expressed a willingness to have inspection.

As far as I know, the other major countries, with the exception of China which was not very well organized at that time, expressed a willingness to stand for all reasonable international inspection, and the assumption of responsibility by an international agency.

Now, I do not see any particular evidence that Russia has moved away from that adamant position. In other words, they said at that time they were going to have atomic weapons. It was not the peace that was involved; it was a question of Kremlin equality first and then superiority. I do not see that they have changed in that fundamental pattern.

Now, I am not opposed to talks. As many people have said heretofore, when you are talking, you are not necessarily fighting. I am not opposed to talks. I am not opposed to exploratory activities.

However, I do not think we ought to follow the 50-50 concession, one horse and one rabbit, where we give the horse and the other fellow gives the rabbit. I have not seen much evidence of even the rabbit coming out in these years that we have talked about it. I do not see that Russia has moved any distance at all in any matter that tends to weaken or to lessen its chances of its general movement toward world supremacy.

I just do not see that they have made any concession on any basic fundamental at all. They talk about the theory of inspection being accepted and all this, but when we get right down to talking the details, they stop. Insofar as 2 or 3 inspections are concerned, there is nothing at all new about that.

I was in Geneva 6 or 7 years ago when the Russians were willing to talk about 2 or 3 inspections. They have not increased their inspection numbers at all in the last 5 or 6 years, so there is nothing novel about that. I have not seen a single thing advanced by the Russians that would in any way tend to cut down or to reduce their drive toward superiority. But I still think we ought to go ahead and talk and explore this as much as we can. At the same time we must be awfully careful about how much we give away.

Secretary Rusk. It was, Senator, I think, a very great tragedy for, perhaps, the human race that the Baruch proposals did not succeed and that the Soviet Union refused, as you properly pointed out, to have anything to do with them. I suppose at that time one thing that

was on Mr. Stalin's mind was that if we had succeeded in bringing this energy under international control, that that would have left the United States in a position of having a know-how which the Soviet Union had not developed, and that for the future the Soviet Union was unwilling to accept that position.

Now, that particular issue is not involved in a nuclear test ban at the present time, and I think there is enough in it—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I beg your pardon, I have great respect for your opinion, but I am not so sure that I can go along with you on that last statement that that is not involved. I have a feeling that there are certain areas of superiority which we believe we have that the Russians will not be satisfied until they reach. I think it all goes to raise the question whether or not they will ever discuss anything of this kind when they feel that they are in any way in an inferior position.

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I should say it is not necessarily involved. If your surmise is correct, sir—and I have no way of knowing how the Russians look at it at the moment—then I think we are not likely to have a nuclear test ban.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HUMPHREY. Senator Church?

POLITICS AND A TEST BAN TREATY

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, early this morning Senator Fulbright expressed his anxiety that this whole question of a nuclear test ban seems to be entering more and more into the arena of partisan politics.

I think that if rising partisanship would make the successful solution of the dilemma that faces us in Cuba more difficult, then partisanship will make any progress toward disarmament well nigh impossible.

It seems to me that "war" has been our constant companion, now, for nearly 22 years. We have grown accustomed to its face, and any loosening of this tuning can only be achieved, if it can be achieved, through a genuine bipartisan effort.

RELATIONSHIP OF A TREATY TO NATIONAL INTERESTS

I think you have said several times that you are very skeptical that the Russians are now serious about a test ban treaty. If we are serious about a test ban treaty, it is because, in our assessment, such a treaty advances the genuine interests—including the security interests—of the United States; is that not correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Then, if you are correct in your assessment that the Russians may not want such a treaty, is it not equally because in their assessment such a test ban treaty would not advance the general interests, including the security interests, of the Soviet Union?

Secretary RUSK. I think we have to assume that is their judgment about the treaty, unless we see some indications, more than any we have had recently, that they would like to go ahead on the basis of this kind of treaty.

EFFECT OF A TEST BAN TREATY ON OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND ARMED FORCES

Senator CHURCH. I think that there is some feeling in this country—generated by the way this question has been presented in the press—that a nuclear test ban would constitute some kind of giant stride toward disarmament. My own feeling has been that it could hardly be more than a toe in the door, even if we were to achieve it. I wonder if you would answer these questions in order to bring this consideration into better perspective.

Suppose we were to achieve a nuclear test ban on the terms that we are now proposing. Would that treaty in any way reduce our nuclear arsenal?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. It would not effect the reduction of our nuclear arsenal within the terms of the treaty.

Senator CHURCH. Would it stop our production of nuclear warheads?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Would it stop our scheduled or projected manufacture of missiles—either intercontinental missiles or medium-range missiles?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; it would not.

Senator CHURCH. Would it affect our scheduled production of Polaris submarines?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Would it reduce by one man the number of members of our Armed Forces in the Army, in the Navy, and in the Air Force?

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps a few of them who might be associated with testing, but otherwise not.

Senator CHURCH. Would it affect any appreciable or significant reduction in our Armed Forces?

Secretary RUSK. Not in itself; no, sir.

Senator CHURCH. Would it then effect any immediate disarmament in terms of reducing the present level of the Armed Forces of the United States or the manufacture of the weapons with which we equip the Armed Forces of the United States?

Secretary RUSK. It would not have the effect of reduction, Senator. It might have the effect of preventing further necessary increases if the testing were to go on, on both sides.

GENERAL EFFECTS OF A TEST BAN TREATY

Senator CHURCH. Is it an accurate appraisal, Mr. Secretary, to say that if we were to achieve such a treaty, its immediate and direct effect would be to prevent further testing of nuclear devices; that is to say, the advancement of the art and the further sophistication of nuclear weapons, with respect to those countries that are members of the treaty—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. And the second effect would be to establish an inspection system which might at a later date lead to enforceable means to achieve more significant progress toward disarmament? Is that the other hope or expectation of the State Department?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we do believe that it is very important, somehow, to break through this veil of secrecy that is so deeply entrenched in Soviet doctrine, because we believe that their fear of espionage in connection with international arrangements for inspecting disarmament is a groundless fear, for many reasons. We think that inspection can be accomplished which does not involve espionage, and, further, we certainly know enough about each other these days to inflict frightful destruction in the event of war, so that old-fashioned espionage is not quite as relevant as it might have been a long time ago.

Now, if the Soviets discover that inspection arrangements for a test ban can be accomplished with respect to that purpose without involving the kinds of information about the Soviet Union that are generally not involved in that purpose, then I think this might open up the possibility of other measures about surprise attack and questions of that sort in which we could go ahead, where, now, this problem of secrecy is the bar.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, if we are to make any progress at all toward reducing the terrible dangers of a nuclear balance of terror, if we are to move at all in the direction of enforceable arms control, is it not an essential prerequisite that we pierce this veil of secrecy that now surrounds the Soviet Union?

Secretary RUSK. It is very important to do so, Senator, and to do so on a basis which makes it clear that these matters do not and cannot turn upon blind trust.

What we need are arrangements on which confidence can be built as a matter wholly separate from the question of whether the Russians will trust us or we can trust the Russians, because the very arrangements, themselves, provide a basis for growing confidence.

I think this is one of the potentially important aspects about a genuinely enforceable test ban.

Senator CHURCH. Would it not seem that in the whole spectrum of disarmament possibilities the nuclear test ban presents at the moment the best opportunity for establishing such a pioneer inspection system?

Secretary RUSK. I would think, sir, that because of the nature of the weapons themselves, because of the nature of the detection and verification, instrumentation and other means, that this would be one of the simpler ways to get at that question.

Senator CHURCH. This is one of the reasons why the administration—the State Department and all others who are interested—has focused so on the test ban, would you not say?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is one of them, sir. The other is the prospects ahead if the nuclear arms race goes on unchecked in any way, and the very deep interest that people have in all parts of the world about the effect on them of an unlimited nuclear testing program.

DIFFERENCES FROM EARLIER DISARMAMENT TREATIES

Senator CHURCH. In earlier questions, Mr. Secretary, some reference has been made to earlier disarmament treaties and the fact that in due course they were broken.

I think the one that was mentioned was the Naval Disarmament Treaty of the 1920's. There have, of course, been others. Does not this test ban treaty we hope to achieve include provisions for inspection and enforcement that are quite different in character from any enforcement provisions that any previous disarmament treaty has contained?

Secretary RUSK. It provides, in the first instance, a system of detection and verification which not only requires the signatories to admit inspection on their territory, but enlists the cooperative action of a good many other governments throughout the world in making such a system effectively operational.

I think, to that extent, it is quite different.

I think, perhaps, in terms of violation, the principal enforcement sanction is the resumption of the nuclear arms race by the signatories. That, I think, is not an unimportant sanction, because the magnitude of problems involved in looking down the trail to the future is such that it will be no simple thing for a government to decide that it is going to take that path again.

RISKS IN FAILURE TO HALT ARMS RACE

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on your testimony and on your splendid statement, which I have read, although I did not have an opportunity this morning to hear it.

I am not optimistic that much progress is going to be made at this time, but that is not as discouraging to me as the difficulty of presenting the case to the American people. The debate on this question has almost been entirely occupied with an assessment of what the risk will be of cheating in the event that a treaty is agreed to. Here opinions vary as to whether or not the Russians could get by with one or two or three overt tests, how large the detonations would have to be, and how big the hole would have to be.

Yet practically no attention is given at all—which would permit the people of the United States to put this question in perspective—to the risks that we are taking and continue to take if, somehow, we do not begin to turn this nuclear arms race down.

I do not know how we are going to solve this question. As I said at the beginning, we are so used to the necessity for the uniform, which, indeed, existing circumstances in the world make essential. I supported the armament program and voted for every enlargement of it that has been proposed by this administration, but unless, somehow, we can bring into focus the terrible dangers that face us if we cannot find another route, the political possibilities of making progress in the direction of meaningful arms control are very remote.

ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT REQUIRES PATIENCE

We are like passengers on a train that is headed toward a terrible precipice, and we know the bridge is out, and yet, we are arguing with one another as to what the dangers are in jumping off the train without taking into account what the inevitable end result will be if we continue on the tracks. Are we going to slip, scratch ourselves or break our necks?

This is the most discouraging aspect of the whole question to me, and, I must say, I see little progress being made in the presentation of this issue to the American people, either through the Government, in the halls of Congress, or through the press, that gives me much grounds for encouragement.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, may I comment very briefly on that.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. That very important statement, because I do not think there is any subject requiring more patience, doggedness, and, perhaps, even courage, than to stay at this disarmament possibility year after year after year.

I indicated earlier that I had, myself, taken part in the discussions in 1945 and 1946 in the United Nations. It would be relatively easy to say in complete honesty that so many attempts have failed, that prospects are not good. But we dare not say that, Senator. This is the point.

I think that a good many of our citizens around the country who do see the need for disarmament, who are interested in it, have that occasional sense of discouragement, so that their attitude, their approach, and their sense is not, itself, as strong a part of the national discussion as it ought to be and as, at times, in the past it has been.

I think that those who see these dangers ahead, who would like to see some steps in disarmament achieved, themselves, have to gird themselves and realize that this is tough. It requires patience, understanding. We must not take these month-by-month and year-by-year disappointments as the end of the trail, because we cannot let the trail end there.

We have got to keep going, because the alternative to the trail is something that no one wants, even those who are now most opposed to any steps in the disarmament field.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HUMPHREY. Senator Church, I want particularly to compliment you on your interrogation. Mr. Secretary, I want to conclude this hearing with a very few summary questions.

Secretary RUSK. All right, sir.

EFFECT OF A TEST BAN TREATY ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you believe that a test ban treaty, if it were to be concluded, might mark the beginning of more hopeful progress in our relations with the Soviet Union on such matters as cultural exchange agreements, Berlin and overall disarmament discussions?

Secretary RUSK. I do, sir, because we do have indications that this subject of a nuclear test ban is one that is high on their priorities,

and they might look on this as a test of the possibilities ahead, just as we might, and I think this would be a very constructive step forward in the sense in which you put it in your question.

QUESTION OF SOVIET INTEREST IN A TEST BAN TREATY

Senator HUMPHREY. In view of your recent experience at Geneva and in all of your many contacts with the Soviets, what reasons are there for believing that they might be seriously interested in concluding a test ban treaty? I believe you have answered that pretty much

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think that they are still serious in these discussions?

Secretary RUSK. I am not sure that they are at this moment interested in view of the line of discussion that we have been having for the last several weeks in Geneva. But I find it very difficult to believe that they have come to a conclusion that this is something now which we will just put aside and forget, not only because of what they have said repeatedly in terms of their own needs and their own interests on this point, but, looking at it objectively, they have some reasons why they need to bring this arms race to some sort of a halt and turn their attention to other problems.

NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator HUMPHREY. I hope that point can be emphasized, because it seems to make considerable sense. Is it true that the conclusion of a test ban treaty now would leave the United States in a position of nuclear superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?

Senator RUSK. That is correct, sir, it is true.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it equally true that, as time goes on, our degree of supremacy may well diminish?

Secretary RUSK. If testing goes on, there will be a tendency for the scientific capabilities of the two sides and the variety of weapons and capabilities to move toward equality, not necessarily in magnitude, but in quality.

BUILDING AN ALTERNATIVE TO TRUST

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. Mr. Secretary, when you were speaking of this lack of trust and this sense of suspicion that permeates the area of international relations—and particularly our relationships with the Soviet Union—I am reminded of a statement by Admiral Radford in reference to the nuclear test ban discussions at another time when he said that what we were attempting to do was to build a mechanism that was an alternative to trust. In other words, what was in mind was the building in of a system that would compensate for what we might call the inadequacy of the human factor. Is that a way of stating your view?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; I would accept that, because I think this is basically the way that institutions of law and order have developed.

SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARD FURTHER TESTING

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have any reasons to believe that the Soviets are stalling now because they may want to initiate another series of tests this summer or fall?

Secretary RUSK. I have no way of knowing that, sir. I did notice a ticker report this morning of possibly a test, but I have no confirmation on that. We have had no word from the Soviets on this point at all.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEUTRON BOMB

Senator HUMPHREY. In light of our tremendous investment in nuclear weapons, the atomic and the hydrogen weapons, and our tremendous stockpile of these weapons and our high degree of sophistication of both strategical and tactical weapons, is it to our advantage to continue testing that might develop a neutron bomb?

Secretary RUSK. If the race continues, we will, of course, do that and other things. But in terms of the capacity to kill and destroy at the present time, it does not appear to me to be an overriding desire to find a weapon that only kills people.

Senator HUMPHREY. And does not destroy property.

Secretary RUSK. And does not destroy the property. That, to me, is not an impelling consideration, somehow.

Senator HUMPHREY. I have been told that the development of the neutron bomb, at least based upon what theoretical knowledge we have today, would be cheaper in cost. I also understand that once the theory is proved out in terms of practicality, the technology of it would be available to many nations.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. It might very well leave us with a tremendous investment in obsolete weapons of the atomic and hydrogen nature. Therefore, the conclusion drawn by some is that since we already have enough weapons to destroy practically all that God has created, once or twice, it would be in our advantage to attempt to stop the testing that might result in the development of a neutron bomb which a nation of lesser resources and less investment in existing stockpiles could develop.

Secretary RUSK. This has been one of the factors taken into account, and has been a part of the general judgment that a nuclear test ban now would be in the interest of the United States.

This also relates to such things as the antimissile development and the missile which gets around antimissiles, and so forth ad infinitum.

But our judgment is that it is in our interest to stop this matter now.

POSSIBLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF ANTIMISSILE MISSILE

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of talk about the antimissile missile. Does this Government have any solid information that indicates that the Soviet Union has developed what is called an antimissile missile—one that we do not have?

Secretary RUSK. We know that they are, of course, working on that. I think the judgment on that is one that I would prefer to get from the Defense Department, because it is a matter of some detail in

terms of the capability of the particular weapons. I do not believe that they are ahead of us in this field.

Senator HUMPHREY. We are working on it, too?

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. I mention this because one of the main arguments against the test ban treaty is that a halting in the tests will place us at the mercy of the Soviet Union insofar as the antimissile missile is concerned.

You are a member of the Committee of Principals, Mr. Secretary, and I, of course, would not ask you to violate any rule of executive privilege. However, I will ask, have you heard that the Soviet Union has an effective antimissile missile—one more effective than we have—and, therefore, to halt testing would be to our disadvantage?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir, that is not my information.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have been rather close in on these meetings?

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. You are there, yourself, are you not, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, I attend personally.

Senator HUMPHREY. You attend personally.

I want to thank you very much for the time that you have given. I know that you have another appointment. It has been very reassuring. May I commend both you and Mr. Fisher upon your testimony this morning.

We will have other witnesses later on, and they will go into some of the scientific aspects of this. I hope and pray that there can be some reassurance to the American people that the proposals which have been advanced have been proposals which have been well thought out, and that men of unquestioned patriotism and loyalty to this country are of the mind that these proposals advance the security of the United States.

Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

The first part of the book is devoted to a general history of the United States from its discovery by Columbus in 1492 to the present time. It covers the early years of settlement, the struggle for independence, the formation of the Constitution, and the growth of the nation to its present position. The second part of the book is devoted to a detailed history of the United States from 1789 to the present time. It covers the early years of the Republic, the struggle for the abolition of slavery, the Civil War, and the Reconstruction period. The third part of the book is devoted to a detailed history of the United States from 1865 to the present time. It covers the Reconstruction period, the Gilded Age, the Progressive Era, and the modern period.

The book is written in a clear and concise style, and is suitable for use in schools and colleges. It is a valuable source of information for anyone interested in the history of the United States. The book is divided into three parts, each of which covers a different period of American history. The first part covers the early years of settlement and the struggle for independence. The second part covers the early years of the Republic and the struggle for the abolition of slavery. The third part covers the Reconstruction period and the modern period. The book is written in a clear and concise style, and is suitable for use in schools and colleges. It is a valuable source of information for anyone interested in the history of the United States.

SUMMARY INDEX

	Page
Ability to detect and identify explosions.....	12
Achieving disarmament requires patience.....	44
Advantages to United States of effective test ban treaty :	
Military.....	3
Political.....	4
Significant step toward slackening pace of arms race.....	3
Aiken, Senator George D., examination of witness, Rusk, Hon. Dean.....	18-20, 22-23, 28
Anti-missile-missile, possible Soviet development of.....	46
Arms Control and Disarmament Act (Public Law 87-297), interpretation of.....	28
Basic purpose of the Soviets.....	35
Carlson, Senator Frank, examination of witness, Rusk, Hon. Dean.....	27-29
Change in U.S. position on treaty.....	14
Church, Senator Frank, examination of witness, Rusk, Hon. Dean.....	40-44
Committee of Principals.....	9
Communist China's participation in a test ban treaty, question of.....	20
Concessions made by the United States, complaints of.....	11
Dangers of continued testing.....	5
Department of State's support of test ban proposals.....	8
Destruction of bombers, possible proposal concerning.....	24, 27
Detection and identification, effect of developments in field of.....	6
Detection, international cooperation on.....	13
Differences from earlier disarmament treaties.....	43
Disarmament efforts and discussion, need for.....	31
Effect of a test ban treaty on our nuclear arsenal and Armed Forces.....	41
Effect of reduction of U.S. inspection demands.....	19
Effect on U.S. Military Forces of Public Law 87-297.....	30
Elements of an effective test ban treaty.....	6
Fulbright, Senator J. W., examination of witness, Rusk, Hon. Dean.....	20-23, 24-26
General effects of a treaty.....	41
Government preoccupation with disarmament, question of.....	25
Hickenlooper, Senator Bourke B., examination of witness, Rusk, Hon. Dean.....	35-40
Humphrey, Senator Hubert H., examination of witnesses :	
Fisher, Adrian S.....	14-18
Rusk, Hon. Dean.....	8-14, 23-24, 30-31, 44-47
Importance of number of inspections.....	18
Inspection issue, relationship of, to Soviet sincerity in negotiations.....	10
Involvement of politics in test ban negotiations.....	23
Lack of hope for early test ban agreement.....	20
Limited test ban treaty, possibility of.....	9
Magnitude at which detection and identification most efficient.....	17
Measuring significance of suspicious events.....	15
Morse, Senator Wayne, examination of witness, Rusk, Hon. Dean.....	27, 31-35
National interest, safeguarded cessation of nuclear weapons testing in our.....	2, 40
NATO nuclear force, relationship of, to test ban.....	32
Need for public to be informed on U.S. detection capabilities.....	13
Neutron bomb, development of the.....	22, 46
Nuclear superiority of the United States.....	45
Obsolete equipment, possible prohibition on sale of.....	28
Overall relations with Russia, effect of a test ban treaty on our.....	44

	Page
Politics and a test ban treaty.....	40
Possibility of Soviets having satellite nations conduct tests.....	34
Presidential authority to disarm and commit U.S. Armed Forces.....	29
Present prospect for a test ban treaty.....	19
Principal interest in achieving a test ban treaty.....	21
Public opinion regarding disarmament.....	22
Purpose of hearing.....	1
Radioactive fallout, importance of problem of.....	5
Ratio of number of suspicious seismic events to number of onsite inspections.....	16
Risks in failure to halt arms race.....	43
Seismic events, number of, in the Soviet Union.....	16
Seismic research, expenditures on.....	14
Soviet Union:	
Advantages to, of test ban treaty.....	5
Intentions toward further testing.....	46
Interest in a test ban treaty, question of.....	45
Opposition to inspection dating from Baruch plan.....	38
Policy of world conquest.....	37
Reluctance to discuss totality of treaty arrangements.....	11
Terms for a test ban treaty.....	38
View of on-site inspection as contrasted to U.S. view.....	10
Willingness to maintain status quo in weapons development, question of.....	36
Test ban vis-a-vis our relations with other countries.....	3
Weapons development, effect of test ban treaty on.....	33
Wisdom of test ban negotiating procedures questioned.....	23
Work of Mr. Foster and Mr. Kuznetsov.....	8
World of law, working toward an effective.....	35
World opinion of U.S. position on a test ban.....	37





