

1037

88Y4
G74/C
N21/se/pl 9

ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

GOVERNMENT

Storage

Y4
. G 74/b
N 21 se / 15/
PT. 9

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

STAFFING AND OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 25, 1964

PART 9

KSU LIBRARIES



681629 929189
A 111900 00611A

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1964

AY
9/17/51
12/20/51
P.T.9

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas, *Chairman*

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington	KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina	CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota	JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska	JACK MILLER, Iowa
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine	JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island	
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire	
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut	
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland	

WALTER L. REYNOLDS, *Chief Clerk and Staff Director*

ARTHUR A. SHARP, *Staff Editor*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, *Chairman*

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota	KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine	JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island	JACK MILLER, Iowa
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut	
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland	

DOROTHY FOSDICK, *Staff Director*

ROBERT W. TUFTS, *Chief Consultant*

RICHARD S. PAGE, *Research Assistant*

JUDITH J. SPAHR, *Chief Clerk*

LAUREL A. ENGBERG, *Minority Consultant*

CONTENTS

JUNE 25, 1964

	Page
Opening statement, Senator Henry M. Jackson.....	537
Testimony of Colonel George A. Lincoln.....	542

APPENDIX

Exhibit I. Address by the Honorable Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense, at United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, May 2, 1964, Upon the Receipt of the Sylvanus Thayer Award.....	585
Exhibit II. Letter of Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze to Admiral Charles D. Griffin, President of the FY 1965 Flag Selection Board, May 18, 1964.....	589
Exhibit III. Extract from Speech by Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Education) at United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, April 24, 1964.....	591
Exhibit IV. Graduation Address by Wilfred J. McNeil, former Comptroller of the Defense Department, to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., June 9, 1964.....	593
Exhibit V. Letters from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on Status and Evaluation of the State-Defense Officer Exchange Program.....	597

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1877

ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 1964

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

[This hearing was held in executive session and subsequently ordered made public by the chairman of the committee.]

The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3112, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Pell, Brewster, Javits, and Miller.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W. Tufts, chief consultant; Richard S. Page, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.

Also present: Major John W. Seigle, Assistant Professor, National Security Problems, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The subcommittee will be in order.

As part of its review of the administration of national security in Washington and in the field, our subcommittee has been asking a number of diplomatic and military authorities to come before us and talk about issues we are studying.

This morning we are privileged to have as our witness Colonel George A. Lincoln, Professor of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, West Point. With his special knowledge and experience, we have asked Colonel Lincoln to discuss with us changes in the military profession, in particular the problem of the modern military officer in preserving the values of his profession with its special duties, disciplines, and skills while opening it up to the challenge of new ideas and to the competition of men from other disciplines involved in the policy-making process.

Colonel George A. Lincoln is one of the distinguished teachers of our time. Appointed Professor of Social Sciences at West Point in 1947, he has been head of the Department of Social Sciences since 1954. Choosing to make his contribution chiefly in the role of teacher, Colonel Lincoln has inspired and directed hundreds of able young people—both students in his classes and junior officers who have worked with him over the years as faculty colleagues.

Colonel Lincoln is no cloistered academician. His experience includes service with the General Staff, War Department, 1943-47; military adviser to the Secretary of State, Paris Peace Conference, 1946; deputy to the Under Secretary of the Army, 1948-49; Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1951-53; member of the U.S. Delegation to NATO, 1951-52; and member of the Gaither Committee in 1957.

He has received the Distinguished Service Medal and the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster (U.S.).

When Brigadier General George A. Lincoln decided to make his career as professor at West Point he reverted to the permanent grade of Colonel. He will, however, return to the grade of Brigadier General when he retires from the military service. Like his respected predecessor at West Point, Herman Beukema, Colonel Lincoln will have done at least as much for his country as most generals who retire with five stars.

Before calling on our witness today, I should like, with the permission of the other members, to place in the record at this point the text of an address I made this month, which indicates some of the issues we are interested in.

If there is no objection, we will include the text at this point.

EXECUTIVES, EXPERTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Senator Henry M. Jackson

(Commencement Address to the Foreign Service Institute Senior Seminar, Department of State, June 11, 1964)

I am highly honored to join in this graduation ceremony and to address this select gathering.

You are professionals, or experts—diplomatic, military, economic—and what I am primarily interested in this afternoon is the relationship between you as professionals and the executives for whom you work.

In policy-making we start with the facts. The situation is what it is. If it is good, we hope to keep it that way. If it is bad, we hope to change it for the better. Facts are facts, and pigs is pigs, but the facts are not immutable and bacon may be the destiny of a pig.

If it were otherwise, to make policy would be to pound one's head against the wall. Although that description sometimes seems all too accurate, the mutability of facts lies at the heart of policy-making.

It is worth underscoring this bit of wisdom. There are some people who speak of facts as something we ought to adjust to, not as something we ought to adjust. Some people think of policy as a mere response to facts, not as a line of conduct to influence the facts. Some of them are even getting headlines as the "New Realists."

Now, as you well know, a good deal of time in government is spent in trying to decide *what* the facts are, *why* they are what they are, and what may be the consequences of choosing one course of action or another.

Here, then, is where the executive needs the expert's help. Unfortunately, the experts often disagree, and it seems to be a rule that the more important the issue, the more likely they are to disagree. If every event had a Pearl Harbor clarity, policy-making would be a lot easier than it is. But, as the citizens of Troy discovered, appearances may be deceiving.

When the experts disagree, how do we proceed? A Hitler tried intuition. But the only sound way we have discovered is to grant the experts a full hearing within the councils of government. The experts who make the most convincing case may be right, or they may be wrong; the process is not guaranteed to produce the correct results, but it is the best process we have been able to devise.

All this underlines the importance of a certain amount of contention in the system. We need more than one intelligence office, more than one hierarchy

of experts, if we are to get all the issues out on the table, where they can be recognized. "Streamlining" and "unifying" can be carried to costly lengths. The life and death issues of national security are too important to sacrifice a healthy competition in the name of efficiency.

The executive has to weigh the competing views before making his choice. He has to function as a generalist—a generalist being a specialist on the sum total—for at the point of decision, he must make a net calculation of advantage and disadvantage. Like the business executive, he is trying to maximize—to make the choice which, all things considered, will maximize the difference between the credits and the debits. The task of the businessman is far easier in making the profit-maximizing choice—because the variables are fewer and more predictable—than the problem of the policy-maker in maximizing the net national interest. But even businessmen have been known to make mistakes.

One reason, I think, why men who have distinguished themselves in the law or in investment banking have often distinguished themselves in government is that success in their private careers is closely correlated with their skill and shrewdness in judging the competence of experts—in sensing when to have confidence in expert testimony and when not to. It is a skill that comes from dealing with people rather than with numbers or things or production lines.

If I were to stop here, however, I would have left the most important things unsaid. As always, these are the hardest to say. They concern the quality and nature of the relationship between political authorities and professional authorities and do not, therefore, lend themselves to precise statement.

First: Let me say that in my judgment the question of civilian, or political, control is not a real issue. The key decisions in national security affairs have been and will be made by the political authorities.

We have in this country a healthy distrust of the concentration of power. I say "healthy" because it is so easy for a man to confuse his possession of power with the possession of wisdom. The tendency is difficult to resist, as every parent knows. The American people wisely suspect claims to omniscience.

One of the great advantages of civilian supremacy is that truly democratic politics rests on that old principle known as "throwing the rascals out." If power must be concentrated—and it must—we want to concentrate it in the hands of men who can be turned out of office at the next election.

And not being wholly confident even of the efficacy of this principle, we have also built into our system a division of political authority, of what we call "checks and balances." Within the Executive Branch one department debates with and checks another; the Legislative Branch checks and balances the Executive; and an independent Judiciary Branch is alert to the abuse of power by the other two.

If some of you think this system sometimes functions less than perfectly, you might ponder Winston Churchill's observation that democracy is the worst form of government ever devised by man—except for all the others.

Second: The new developments in science and technology mean that a greater centralization of authority is possible now than ever before. In particular, systems for storing and retrieving information and for testing *quantifiable* hypotheses are giving the political authorities, especially the chiefs of the great executive departments, means of central control that differ in kind, not just in degree, from those of an earlier day.

These changes are long-term and largely irreversible. We find them in business, in education, and in government. They profoundly affect the relation of the executive to his advisers. The executive can know more details than he used to; he can ask more questions and get more answers before making his decisions. And although specialties are becoming more specialized, it is also true that advice is no longer so neatly compartmented into diplomatic, economic, military, and scientific pigeon-holes as it once was. The closed societies of experts are being opened up and exposed to competition. This is true in all fields. The physicist has something to say about biology. The sociologist has a lot to say about economic development. The diplomat and the scientist and of course the economist have contributions to make in an area that the military once thought was its almost exclusive preserve.

On the whole this intermingling is desirable. It should make possible a better understanding of our problems and a better integration, a better coordination of the factors bearing on a decision.

Particularly in the cases of the professional military officer and the professional diplomat, these developments present a difficult dilemma. The military officer serves in an old profession concerned with the "management of violence";

the diplomat's calling, equally ancient, might be described as the "management of national interests" in a world in which such interests are often in conflict. Because of the nature of their responsibilities, discipline, honor, a sense of duty have been, and remain, of major importance.

The dilemma of the diplomat, as for the soldier, is to preserve and conserve the values of his profession with its special duties and disciplines and skills, while opening it up to new influences, to the challenge of fresh ideas, to the competition of men from other disciplines. The adjustment is not made easier by the fact that, as is so often true in life, the newcomers are inclined to be a bit brash, a bit disrespectful of established ways, a bit overconfident in their approaches, a bit skeptical of the lessons of experience.

No one really has a *right* to be the "trusted adviser." It is a privilege that must be earned by showing that one's views merit attention. Of course, it is also true that those who are in positions of authority have an obligation to seek advice. And they will. A President or a Secretary of State or a Secretary of Defense will turn to the people who they think can help them. They will seek where they can find—or hope that they can find.

In all frankness, I think some career men have been a little too inclined to complain that they are not being listened to—instead of buckling down to the job of competing with experts from other fields, learning enough about other disciplines to enrich the advice they have to give, while introducing valuable insights derived from their own professional experience.

I am confident that the future of the diplomatic profession—and the military—lies with those young men and women—young in spirit, that is, not necessarily young in years—who are receptive to new ideas and prepared to learn and appropriate good ideas from a variety of sources while remaining respectful of those qualities and faithful to those values which have distinguished their professions and which ought to be preserved.

Third: Science and technology, as I have said, have contributed to a centralization of authority, and herein lies a danger—the old, familiar danger of excessive concentration of power. Centralization yields dividends, and therefore we will centralize. But there is a corollary danger: the possibility that power can be misused or abused is an increasing function of the concentration of power.

What can usefully be said about this ancient subject? Perhaps not much that is new. The more concentrated power is, the more restraint, the more humility, should be shown by the holders of power. In his own interest, the executive needs to show respect for his advisers, or he will find that the advice they give him will be corrupted. It is difficult in the best of circumstances for the powerful to escape the *Yes-Man hazard*. One of an executive's major tasks is to create a climate in which dissent is encouraged and welcomed, even though the recommendation of the dissenter is rejected. The clear-eyed executive will understand that he should be concerned about the possibility that he may, with the best of intentions, misuse his power—through some lack of sophistication, some mistake in judgment, or some shading of the truth to protect his personal reputation—and that the right of his advisers to differ is a healthy check on his exercise of the powers entrusted to him.

An executive should, therefore, scrupulously avoid retaliatory or vindictive measures against those who disagree with him. He should be loyal to his subordinates if he expects loyalty of them.

More than that, in our system of divided political authority, he should accept and even champion their right to give their *honest advice* when they appear, in accordance with our constitutional processes, before Congressional committees. For the ability of the Congress to avail itself of honest testimony is a necessary requirement for sound legislation and for dependable appraisal of national problems. Furthermore, it is the only insurance the Congress has that it will get enough information to meet its constitutional responsibility to exercise financial control of the federal budget—including the defense budget.

It is no secret that executive authorities may destroy a good idea whose time has really come. The merit of a new idea can never be absolutely established in advance. No idea is so good that it cannot be killed by *over-analysis*—or stunted by compromise in the process of winning acceptance.

For example, have we been imaginative in applying new doctrine and new technology to the waging of counter-insurgency actions? Have we substituted a hasty review of foreign aid—aimed at passing a particular appropriation bill—for a basic look at the role of economic assistance as a tool of American foreign policy? Are we really exploring the possible lines along which satisfactory understandings might be found with our NATO allies—understandings reflect

ing the growing power of Western European countries and reconciling the members' divergent conceptions of their national needs?

Indeed, the diplomatic or military bureaucracy itself—like any big bureaucracy—actually stultifies much creative effort. In this regard, the need is for more top career officers who measure up to the high standard set by General George C. Marshall. As Robert Lovett has described him for us, General Marshall recognized that:

* * * change is, indeed, one of the primary laws of life. His receptiveness to new ideas * * * for example, in the use of airpower and in the Marshall plan, was made easier by this philosophy, for he was not burdened with the attitude of mind which regards any change as a threat to the established order—or vested rights, if you choose—which must, therefore, be automatically, even blindly resisted.

One of this country's great economists spoke of capitalism as a process of "Creative Destruction." This was, as he saw it, the basis of the extraordinary economic progress made by capitalist systems. It was possible because free enterprise permitted the good new idea to destroy the obsolete idea. The vested interest could not block the upstart.

We need to find the equivalent of this process of "Creative Destruction" in government. In particular, our career services must become more hospitable to new concepts. I would like you to think about the possibility of developing what might be called a "Venture Capital Philosophy" for the career services, in terms of which the creative and talented mind is not discouraged—but is positively encouraged.

Fourth: With the increased concentration of power in the heads of our great executive departments and the President, Congress has an enhanced responsibility to play its checking and balancing role—that is, to subject to *its* tests the judgment of those in position of authority in the Executive Branch.

Under our Constitution, Congress is the creator of executive departments, the source of their statutory mandates, and the monitor of their operations; it authorizes programs and it appropriates funds. In our system, the Secretaries of State and Defense and other department chiefs are not only responsible to the President, but they are also accountable to the Congress for the discharge of their constitutional responsibilities—for the excellent reason that we do not place unlimited trust or power in any one man.

At the very heart of the American system of government—in contrast to dictatorship—is the principle and practice of Congressional review—the duty of the legislature to *cross-examine the powerful*.

And let me add that if the Congress is to be effective in its vital function of review of executive activities there is no satisfactory substitute for members of Congress, particularly those on the key committees, personally involving themselves in the day-in-and-day-out pick and shovel work.

No doubt Congress can and should improve its procedures. For one thing, we are now much too easy on executive branch officials who come up to the Hill and say "if you will just give us the money, we can do it"—and then they don't do it. But, back they come, the next year, singing the same kind of song and making the same kind of rosy promises. We need to find better ways to get across to Executive Branch officials that if they don't bestir themselves and implement the assurances they give us, their presence for future false assurances will not be welcomed. We also need to strengthen our means to audit, through the appropriate Congressional committees, the actual accomplishments of executive programs.

One of the major purposes of Congressional consideration is an educational one. So long as we rely on the democratic system, the ultimate test of a policy is its acceptance by the people. In the final analysis, the people must be persuaded of the wisdom of the policies and programs they are asked to support—and to pay for. Congressional study and debate can be a vital element in this educational process.

My last point is this: With the greater and graver responsibilities of today's government officials, our system of free elections takes on added importance.

An illustration of how things can go from bad to worse in the absence of free elections is provided by Hitler's Germany—where the people lost the means to call the tyrant and his retainers to account and to retire them from office as their program unfolded.

This year I and one-third of my colleagues are standing for election, as Senators do every six years; every Member of the House must stand for election every two years; and every four years the people choose their President. This series of elections is essentially an *audit of performance*—the method by which the American people inspect the record of their legislators and their executive authorities, and then render a judgment.

As career officers you do not have to meet the test of election—or re-election. But you can understand that those of us who do stand for election have a lively interest in the kind of job you do to serve the national interest. After all, I am going to have to defend it as best I can—or to criticize it when I cannot honestly defend it. It used to be said that the Supreme Court reads the election returns. Well, I am sure you do, also. And it is by that process that the people, whom we serve, seek to preserve their security and their liberty.

Senator JACKSON. We are deeply privileged to have you with us today, Colonel Lincoln. I believe you have a prepared statement, and if there is no objection, we shall include it at this point in the record.

STATEMENT OF COL. GEORGE A. LINCOLN, PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY

Colonel LINCOLN. I am here in response to the Chairman's request to discuss some aspects of modern military professionalism. Some have suggested that the military officer is perhaps in a dilemma as he faces the need to retain the traditional values of his profession while, on the other hand, responding to the new influences and fresh ideas of our rapidly changing world and society. I prefer to think of this situation not as a dilemma, but as a challenging problem of transition which we must solve. I elect to be optimistic, though with reservations, and to think that the military profession is solving the problem with not more than the normal frustrations, frictions, honest differences of view, and lags in adjustment that can be expected to accompany a process of rapid change. Some dedicated officers, and some areas of the profession, may be alleged to be still lagging a lap behind. But others surge with the van of changing needs. While not a subject for me to discuss here, I suggest that we are not dealing here with a one-way street. Other components of U.S. society and of government operations need to make coordinate shifts.

I speak entirely as an individual and certainly not as representing the view of my own educational institution, the U.S. Military Academy, or of any other agency of the Department of Defense. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, there is no formal doctrinal position in the Department of Defense on this subject of military professionalism.

No part of this statement is meant to imply a personal expertise which encompasses all parts of the problem, or even any part of the problem to its complete depth. But, during most of my 35 years as an officer, including the last 17 as a military professor, I have been interested in the problem of modern military professionalism and have had a particularly fortunate position for observation and study.

Until recently, few observers, even among members of the military profession, were concerned with the study or examination of that profession. It was small, comparatively inexpensive, and, except in war, of little significance in the American scene. In the past decade this disinterest has been replaced by a quickened interest. There have been differing views within the military profession, among civilians in government and among the few scholars who have tackled this problem as to what should constitute modern military professionalism.

There are also differing views as to how the professional military man should mesh into the machinery of government operations. I believe these views have increasingly tended toward a consensus on what military professionalism should be to best further the security interests of the United States.

With these introductory remarks I divide the remainder of my opening statement under five headings:

(1) who are the military professionals; (2) the traditional concept of the military professional, which is the baseline from which many step off; (3) the new challenges to the profession which cause these gloomy references to dilemmas; (4) some ways the profession is moving to adjust to these challenges; and (5) some closing comments on continuing and future problems.

I. *Who are the military professionals?*

Using approximate figures, there are about 336,000 officers on active duty today. Nearly one-half are regulars. The remainder are reservists. Many of these reservists, committed to 20 years of service, must be considered as professional as the regular officer corps, so the active military profession probably numbers about 200,000 officers (we are not here considering professional enlisted men). With this strength the profession is slightly smaller, but of the same order of magnitude, as the medical profession (256,000 in 1960) and the legal profession (248,000 in 1960). Some military professionals are specialists—chaplains, Judge Advocates, missilemen, etc. Some are generalists. Some are generalists with one or more specialties. Some of these officers come from the service academies, but most of the regulars in the Air Force, and even the Army, come from ROTC's and officer candidate schools. Not all yet have college degrees, but a bachelor's degree is now generally considered a needed qualification (about 85 percent of Army regular officers have one) and there is an increasing feeling that a graduate degree is needed for many. Over 24 percent of Army regulars have graduate degrees.

I could go on at length citing characteristics of this officer group, but I leave the subject with two comments:

(a) Great leaders such as Marshall and MacArthur and Eisenhower and Arnold and King are the usual references. Such leaders continue to be vital. But their leadership is effective only when supported by tens of thousands of other efficient, committed professionals, from lieutenant to general and admiral.

(b) As a second comment, the military profession cannot be adequately described by describing each characteristic and adding these descriptions. Nor can any great traditional institution be so described. The profession has its pride, its sense of prestige, its sense of belonging, its tacit "union card", its professional ethos.

Some years ago Dr. Frank Bowles, then the President of the College Entrance Examination Board, wrote an article entitled *The Three Great Callings*. He listed the clergy, the teaching profession and the military profession. Strange bedfellows you may say, but he found these professions had much in common from the standpoint of why men chose them. (They also all have their uniforms and traditions.) He concluded that the future of our society much depended on the successful adjustment of each of these professions to the current era of change. This mention of *The Three Great Callings*

brings me to the next and related topic, the baseline from which we step off.

II. *The traditional concept of the military professional*

The first, and controversial, aspect of the problem is the question: What is military professionalism anyhow? According to Professor Huntington, who has written thoughtfully on this subject, a professional is someone who couples a special skill with a commitment. Those skills differ. The commitment is the same—a common denominator of the profession. Commitment is, to my mind, all important. Most military skills we can teach or acquire from experience; commitment is a matter of the “soldier’s soul”. The professors argue about the unique skills which distinguish our profession and have described these in various terms such as “the management of violence”. The definition of a British officer (Lt. Gen. Hackett), recently used by Robert Lovett, seems more appropriate to today’s problem. “The function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force to the resolution of a social problem”. The word “force” should to my mind be interpreted as “military resources” in this day and age. Those resources can be used for deterring and peace-keeping as well as for violence.

The sometimes over-simplified model of the “professional manager of violence” is of a non-intellectual type who combines courage, physical stamina, and personal leadership with expertise that is limited to a narrow military area, and is generally oblivious to political, economic and social nuances, in short, a “military mind”—whatever that is. This rough sketch includes the presumption that the “manager of violence”, given the physical objective to be achieved by violence, then proceeds to achieve it (often insisting on strict adherence to doctrine) unhampered by pondering as to the reasons why or the most desirable orchestration with other relevant factors of the power he commanded.

Some of the aspects of this traditional picture were appropriate in the past and, I contend, are still needed, e.g., courage, stamina and personal leadership. Nor do you want all your professionals to be Mahans, Clausewitz’s, Billy Mitchells, Lucius Clays and MacArthurs. True, all have to be skilled; more must be very broadly capable generalists. But the traditional picture itself is a distorted picture of an officer group that, in fact, never conformed to such a stereotype. One can quickly produce a list of officers from General George Washington to a large number of young professionals of the present day who have taken the broader view. My predecessor at West Point, Herman Beukema, was certainly one of these. But, prior to our current generation, there was no clearly pressing need for other than the stereotype. Whatever our military profession once was (about 25,000 officers in 1929 compared to 8–10 times that number today), perhaps it approximately fitted the American society and the requirements of the times.

III. *The new challenges to the profession*

What then are the new challenges to which the profession must adjust? I will not pretend to list them all or to discuss any one thoroughly.

(a) There has been a quantum jump in military technology. This jump has brought a requirement for greatly increased expertise, some

of it professionally military and some not unique to military tasks and needs. Parenthetically, there is no guarantee that this military technological change will continue to affect the military establishment at the recent geometric rate. One of the requirements for adjustment ("dilemmas") has been the need to devise ways to provide professional officers having various modern specialties, some similar to civilian specialties, from nuclear and legal experts to the generalist generals and admirals.

(b) There has been a vast change in the security situation of the United States. A generation ago we operated on a low preparedness, low readiness standard. We had few forces and few active interests overseas. Now, opposite conditions prevail. We must have military professionals capable of handling these opposite conditions. These conditions include a complicated array of political, economic and social factors intermixed with the presence and management of vast military resources—a subject stressed in Mr. Robert Lovett's address in accepting West Point's Thayer Award and in almost every address I have heard since World War II by our country's leaders.

Increased complexities extend far beyond the skills for managing the modern instruments of violence in orthodox military action. The spectrum of the uses of military power extends from massive nuclear war through variations called limited war or sub-limited war to cold war and "civic action." The management of military resources now requires both business acumen and expertise in government bureaucracy. Military activities often have to be attuned to considerations much broader than military matters. There are, said General Maxwell Taylor, "no longer any purely military matters." Here is another need for adjustment—the need for a heightened awareness in dealing with situations in which it is necessary that the warp of military resources be woven to a woof of these political and other factors.

In this milieu it seems pertinent to recall a remark of Secretary of the Army Brucker who, while specifically recognizing the realities just mentioned, cautioned the 1956 graduating class of USMA ". . . you must guard with jealous care your most priceless possession—your soldier's soul. You are a fighting man." Some military professionals may view the current trends in the profession with alarm and interpret Mr. Brucker's caution as a reminder of the sense of Hamlet's soliloquy.

Thus conscience does make cowards of us all; and thus
the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale
cast of thought; and enterprises of great pith and moment
with this regard their currents turn awry, and lose the
name of action.

(c) There has been a vast increase in our defense establishment. The cost is over 50 times that of a generation ago. This increase has created management problems more complex than the sum total facing the ten greatest corporations in our country. Parenthetically, let's face a reality perhaps obscured by the happy pounce of some people on the phrase "military-industrial complex." If the United States is to be secure today there must be a relationship marked by efficiency, understanding and integrity between private industry and the military establishment—and professional officers must participate in the operations of the military-industrial complex. So, one of the areas of

adjustment for the professional officer—one of his dilemmas if you will—is the managerial problem. This problem includes new patterns of control, including new patterns of civilian control. Most sensible citizens are not worried about the military taking over the United States; they should rightly worry about control and direction giving maximum security for the high costs in money and service.

(d) The society of the United States has changed significantly in a generation. The officer is a member of that society. President Johnson stressed this point to the members of the West Point graduating class of 1961 when he enjoined them to a concern for the welfare of that society. The officer is a citizen first; he comes from being a civilian, and if he survives the service of his country, he returns to being a civilian in his early fifties or earlier unless he is one of the very small proportion chosen for general or flag rank. Some 10,000 officers now retire every year. The officer holds substantially the same values as civilian society in such matters as an adequate standard of living, family life, children, and (increasingly a problem) education of children. He also is sometimes sensitive about the prestige of his profession and about the level of his achievement measured by standards of civilian contemporaries.

(e) The military profession needs to recruit, maintain effectiveness and morale, and retain an adequate officer corps for a uniformed force in excess of 2½ million in this U.S. society. In addition to reserves, the requirement is on the order of 8–10,000 regulars a year—a number you may wish to compare with the several hundred yearly input into the Foreign Service. The solution to this problem, to my mind, is one more for civilian than for military leadership—a serious problem of the Executive Branch, the Congress and the U.S. society for which the military profession “provide(s) for the common defense”.

IV. *Adjustment to these challenges*

The fourth heading in these outline remarks concerns ways our profession is adjusting to the changing times.

I want to stress that there is far less than unanimity on the adjustments required or the rate at which they should be made—whether with all deliberate speed or in a series of quantum jumps. To me it appears that our military profession has pressed the skills to complement the new technology with great vigor, has moved more slowly in achieving a professional consensus in strategic thought; and has had most trouble in adjustment to the new managerial arrangements pressed on us and to the complexities of operating in an interdisciplinary milieu where our government deliberately attempts to integrate all kinds of factors—using military resources as one of the instruments. Some ambassadors may have similar frustrations as they strive to implement the non-traditional country team concept.

The types of military skills are now vast in number. The tasks, equipment and operational areas of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines have made vast transitions since World War II, and the problems of adjustment to keep pace with change have been massive. The Air Force is undergoing transition from primary dependence on manned strategic bombers to a heavy dependence on missiles; the Army has moved from almost complete focus on conventional and perhaps nuclear violence to involved, counterinsurgency problems.

All services have had to adjust to new management requirements in the Department of Defense and to such changes as the increasing emphasis on country team coordination in foreign countries.

When we shift from analysis of needed skills (tactics and techniques) to the larger view of the military profession there has been a range of thought. Few will quarrel with West Point's motto—*Duty, Honor, Country*—as expressing the basic values of the profession. But how do we today implement the old values? There are statements of distinguished and knowledgeable individuals on the subject. That of Mr. Lovett accepting the Thayer Award for his life of distinguished service has been cited earlier.

I have also collected and attached to this paper some statements of civilian and military leaders who have observed the troublesome present problems of the military profession, to include President Johnson, President Kennedy, President Eisenhower, General Taylor, the most recent Board of Visitors of the Military Academy chaired by General J. Lawton Collins, and others. These distinguished citizens, with very great consistency, have stressed the increasing complexity of the military profession, and show a considerable consensus in defining the complexities and ways of dealing with them. The corollary is that the leadership of the military profession, including the U.S. Congress, recognize the nature of these new complexities and adjust to handle them well in the national interest.

One of the major instruments of adjustment is the march of time. The longer officers live in the new milieu, the more most of them adjust. Old dogs may not easily learn new tricks. But the old order retires and a new order mans the leadership positions. To illustrate from personal experience, I entered an Army in which many regular officers thought it was unmilitary to vote (some did not know their state of residence); now we have a vigorous program to encourage voting by members of the armed forces and everyone has to record his state of residence.

A related method of adjustment is the rising confidence of the officer corps that it can handle the problems of the changed situation without sacrificing that which is worth preserving. This increased expertise and understanding comes in part by duress and evolutionary drift, but at least equally from conscious action. For instance, the modern military profession, while retaining strong faith in "military judgment", is increasingly a planning and programming profession while continuing to emphasize decision and action.

Progressively, the military profession is implementing carefully designed programs of command and staff organization and relationships, of schooling and of policy guidance from both civilian and military leadership—all designed to achieve the transition levered by recent change. The curricula of the war colleges (that of the Army War College shown on the accompanying chart is an example), exchange of staff officers between Defense and State, and the tenor of Mr. Nitze's guidance on selection of admirals are examples of detailed actions.

Certainly, systems analysis and related approaches have been a new and jarring note. But, along with asking for some trade-off between quantitative analysis and military judgment, you can bet that the military services are screening their ranks for bright professional

officers who will make good systems analysts. Even a couple of years ago there were 61 different courses called logistics, management, etc., included in the military schooling program. The best of middle rank officers are selected for the war colleges; 38 percent of next year's Army War College class will have civilian graduate degrees. Mr. Nitze, in his letter to the selection board of the Navy, seems to be asking even for some Admirals who can communicate persuasively with the best of the so-called defense intellectuals, civilian type. I really do not know whether these people have occasioned as much of a professional "dilemma" as the civilian bureaucracy expanding in step with the military expansion. There is greatly increased emphasis on the value of a power of communication as a trait of officership. "Communication" means "knowing your stuff", as the primary requirement, as well as being able to talk and write clearly and persuasively.

My final point on ways of adjustment to the changing times is one of emphasis on the vast schooling system of the military profession—from Academy, ROTC and OCS; through service schools, technical schools, language schools, war colleges and a large civilian graduate schooling program. The statistic of 12 percent is usually given as the portion of his career spent in school by an officer. The statistic may be low. The school of experience is often not available to our profession until too late, or if available it is an expedient unduly costly in resources, effectiveness, and lives, in comparison to doing the best we can in schooling. I do not want to pretend that there are not differences of view as to what and how much should be taught and how it should be taught. But the schooling system is the arterial system for the flow of adjustment. Its capabilities are strikingly illustrated by the quickness with which the comprehension of "counterinsurgency" or "internal defense" was pressed throughout the armed forces, triggered by President Kennedy.

V. Continuing and future problems.

My fifth and closing topic heading concerns continuing and future problems. As a first point, the reference post for these thoughts is the mission which Senator Jackson gave me: To provide my "comments and reflections on a basic dilemma of the modern military officer—as well as the diplomat—to preserve and conserve the values of his profession with its special duties, disciplines and skills, while opening it up to new influences, to the challenge of fresh ideas, and to the competition of men from other disciplines."

I have not, thus far, commented specifically on the Foreign Service although many of their problems are similar to ours—one being that we and they have to devise ways to work more closely together. They also have to adjust to higher authority continually looking over the professional's shoulder by means of electronic communication and the airplane. The advance of technology is not an unmixed blessing.

The new problems and requirements of today's military and foreign service professionals have instructive points of symmetry and overlap. Both need unique skills. The diplomat now has increasingly to comprehend operational matters and managerial techniques. The military man, who was more accustomed to such factors and techniques must now become more policy conscious. Both groups must be more cooperative and comprehending. Aloofness and single factor emphasis, undoubtedly thought of once by some professionals as a superior form of feasible isolation, are no longer practical. Both need to

recognize and weigh newly important disciplinary fields, the military, the political, various aspects of technology, economics and others—the impact of our balance of payment on both military operations and day to day diplomacy being an example. In meeting the current needs, the State Department has used schooling somewhat less than the military services. But schools require officer time and the diplomatic personnel problem is very pressing with the expansion of number of sovereign states, the spawning of international meetings, and the vast expansion of our scope and categories of operations abroad. In this new milieu, the Foreign Service has also the problem of continuing from the old ways those values which should endure. This committee's most recent report has commented on the increasing centralization and supervision. The situation seems unlikely to be reversed. The only clearly useful guideline in my mind is that leadership should consciously swim against the tide of this trend.

I still know of no better summary statement of the basic values of our military profession than *Duty, Honor, Country*, West Point's motto which was engraved in even greater depth by General MacArthur's last great address two years ago. The *Duty, Honor, Country* guidepost has been stated in other ways, e.g., that the individuals should "esteem the performance of public duties as their highest aim". The officer who is fit for the world's fight of today in support of our country's security has to have knowledge and skills combined with the traditional traits of character—and must keep moving intellectually to keep up with the changing times.

These values now have to be applied to many complicated tasks and sometimes to confusing situations. The ultimate mission of the professional officer is, as General MacArthur stressed, "to win our wars". Viewed in the context of our national security policy, the necessary military foundation for any effective deterrent and/or sublimated or cold war program is a posture of resolution and capability to prevail if war must come.

I have no programs to suggest to you gentlemen nor would it be appropriate for me to suggest any. I do, as a final note, list certain problem areas which will require continual attention and which are unlikely ever to be completely solved. At best they will be eroded by time and effort—or replaced by new and more current ones. They are:

(a) Recruiting talent in the competitive personnel market place of our society.

(b) Retaining, with high morale, a strong professional officer corps. This problem includes considerations of postretirement careers, and continual retraining and updating of officers in active service—a subproblem similar to that posed by automation in industry.

(c) Orchestrating military policy and power with the other policies and elements of power which serve our society.

(d) Providing effective command and managerial arrangements which optimize the return we receive from our budgeted expenditures without forfeiting the "soldier's soul".

I do not list schooling as a problem area. The military profession is, at least as much as any profession, on the Dean's List in this area of effort—though certainly not always up with the times. Nor do I list the "defense intellectuals", whoever they are. There are many good professional officers who can talk their language, and who also have

the skills to do the most professional jobs of managing instruments of violence.

It is usual for military professionals to refer to principles of war, which are very important truisms although not universally applicable. Nowadays, we also have to seek for principles of peace-keeping because such is part of the military task. I will close by referring to Clausewitz's definition of the requirements for a professional officer. They are, in my opinion, unchanged today if interpreted in today's context. They are "intelligence" (which includes skills, knowledge, preparation and integrity), "and the courage to take responsibility" (which clearly implies a needed comprehension of what to do and how to do it). Put another way, the professional officer must still have the courage to "march to the sound of the guns"; to go courageously where the problems are and do his professional best to solve them in his country's interest.

INDEX TO SELECTED QUOTATIONS CONCERNING ASPECTS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

1. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson—Address to Graduating Class, USMA, June 1961.
2. President John F. Kennedy—Address to Graduating Class, USMA, June 1962.
3. President John F. Kennedy—Address to Graduating Class, USAFA, June 1963.
4. President Dwight D. Eisenhower—Address to Graduating Class, USMA, June 1955.
5. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (written 1911) quoted in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings LXXXVIII* No. 9. Article by George D. Patterson, III.
6. John J. McCloy—Address of Acceptance of The Sylvanus Thayer Award, USMA, May 1963.
7. Robert A. Lovett—Address of Acceptance of The Sylvanus Thayer Award, USMA, May 1964.
8. Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze—Letter to Admiral C. D. Griffin, President of The Navy Flag Board, May 1964.
9. Louis Johnson, Asst. Secretary of War—Memorandum to President Roosevelt, 1937.
10. General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff—Address to the American Bar Association, Chicago, February 1964.
11. General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, United States Army—Address to Graduating Class, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, June 1963.
12. Extract from Report of the Board of Visitors to USMA (Chairman: General J. Lawton Collins, Ret.), April 1964.
13. Major General William F. Train, Commandant, Army War College, in a yet unpublished speech, June 1964.
14. General Earle G. Wheeler, Extract from Remarks made to Army War College, 1963.
15. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Education), from speech USMA, April 1964.

SELECTED QUOTATIONS CONCERNING ASPECTS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

(Collected by Col. George A. Lincoln)

1. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson in an address to the Graduating Class, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, June 1961.

* * * * *

. . . . So when you leave this campus you must leave not only with the great military training that you have, but you must leave with a social consciousness, with a sense of social justice, with an administrative capability of helping to carry the message of America to all corners of the globe just as your predeces-

sors have carried Old Glory around the world and brought it back without a stain on it. You are going to have to learn and to lead others to learn, to live harmoniously with our allies, and to establish real communication with them. You are going to have to be able to understand their economic and military needs, and do everything you can to fulfill them. You are going to have to help lead all people who genuinely love freedom and know what responsibilities we have . . . I have not the slightest doubt that you will go forward and not only protect the security and the national interests of what that flag represents, but you will also see that your wisdom is applied to helping find food for the hungry, and clothes for the naked, and a roof for the unsheltered, and learning for the ignorant, because that's what the masses are hungry for. And while we protect our security from military invasion, let's also insure our future by teaching the ignorant to read and by helping the hungry to obtain food and clothing and a roof over their head; and then the time will come when freedom will dominate the earth. . . .

2. President John F. Kennedy in an address to the Graduating Class, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, June 1962.

* * * * *

. . . the demands that will be made upon you in the service of your country in the coming months and years will be really more pressing and in many ways more burdensome as well as more challenging than ever before in our history.

* * * * *

Your strictly military responsibilities, therefore, will require a versatility and an adaptability never before required in either war or in peace. They may involve the command and control of modern nuclear weapons and modern delivery systems, so complex that only a few scientists can understand their operation, so devastating that their inadvertent use would be of world-wide concern, but so new that their employment and their effects have never been tested in combat conditions.

On the other hand, your responsibilities may involve the command of more traditional forces but in less traditional roles: men risking their lives not as combatants but as instructors, or advisers, or as symbols of our nation's commitments. The fact that the United States is not directly at war in these areas in no way diminishes the skill and the courage that will be required, the service to our country which is rendered, or the pain of the casualties which are suffered.

* * * * *

You will need to understand the importance of military power and also the limits of military power—to decide what arms should be used to fight and when they should be used to prevent a fight—to determine what represents our vital interests and what interests are only marginal. Above all, you will have a responsibility to deter war as well as to fight it.

For the basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible of a final military solution. While we will long require the services and admire the dedication and commitment of the fighting men of this country, neither our strategy nor our psychology as a nation—and certainly not our economy—must become permanently dependent upon an ever-increasing military establishment.

Our forces, therefore, must fulfill a broader role—as a complement to our diplomacy—as an arm of our diplomacy—as a deterrent to our adversaries and as a symbol to our allies of our determination to support them.

That is why this academy has seen its curriculum grow and expand in dimension, in substance and in difficulty. That is why you cannot possibly have crowded into these four busy years all of the knowledge and all of the range of experience which you must bring to these subtle and delicate tasks which I have described and that is why you will go to school year after year so you can serve this country to the best of your abilities and your talents.

3. President John F. Kennedy in an address to the Graduating Class, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, June 1963.

* * * * *

We live in a world, in short, where the principal problems that we face are not susceptible to military solutions alone. The role of our military power, in essence, is, therefore, to free ourselves and our allies to pursue the goals of freedom without the danger of enemy attack. But we do not have a separate

military policy, and a separate diplomatic policy, and a separate disarmament policy, and a separate foreign aid policy—all unrelated to each other. They are all bound up together in the policy of the United States.

4. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in an address to the Graduating Class, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, June 1955.

* * * * *

In this, no mastery of command can substitute for an intelligent comprehension of the economic goals, the political impulses, the spiritual aspirations that move tens of millions of people. But your greatest opportunity for enduring contribution to America may well be the council table, far removed from war.

5. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (written in 1911) quoted in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings LXXXVIII* No. 9 (September 1962) in article by George D. Patterson, III.

* * * * *

I cannot too entirely repudiate any casual word of mine reflecting the tone which was once so traditional in the navy that it might be called professional—that “political questions belong rather to the statesman than to the military man.” I find these words in my old lectures, but I very soon learned better, from my best military friend, Jomini; and I believe that no printed book of mine endorses the opinion that external politics are of no professional concern to military men.

6. John J. McCloy, in an address of acceptance of The Sylvanus Thayer Award, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, May 1963.

* * * * *

Many implications of these new developments remain obscure, but one thing seems certain, and that is, that the character of military service, the type of leadership, the skills and even the forms of courage which the nation will require, will differ in many aspects from the requirements of the past. With the threat of a war in which civilian casualties might run into scores of millions and the incapacitation of millions more, with the attendant upheavals of the nation's life, it is certain that something much more than that which was demanded of the cavalry leaders of the 19th century or the tank commanders of the 20th, will be exacted from you and those with whom you become associated in your Army careers.

7. Robert A. Lovett in an address of acceptance of The Sylvanus Thayer Award, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, May 1964.

* * * * *

You serve in an ancient profession with special disciplines because, as Lieutenant General Sir John Hackett has said, “the function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force to the resolution of a social problem.”

* * * * *

Military advice is only one—although, on occasion, the most necessary—type of guidance needed today and the decision-making process involves a system of checks and balances in the Executive Branch deliberately designed to keep any one economic or social group or any one governmental department from becoming dominant. Therefore, every judgment made at the decisive level requires a weighing of several often-conflicting and competing factors.

For these reasons, the ability of the military expert to give wise advice—and to get it listened to by policy-making officials—depends in great measure on his possessing knowledge in key non-military fields and in seeing issues in broad perspective.

8. Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze in a letter to Admiral C. D. Griffin, President of The Navy Flag Board, May 1964.

* * * * *

I believe that it continues to be most important for the Navy to select officers of flag rank who will be superb leaders in sea-going commands. This does not mean, however, that we need to place so much emphasis upon competence in sea-going billets that we fail to give substantial emphasis to competence to provide leadership in critical positions involving technical and management responsibilities. I believe that it should be possible to identify those officers whose performance at sea has given evidence that they will be brilliant leaders of task forces and fleets, but who have demonstrated those additional characteristics of leadership that qualify them for positions of greater responsibility ashore.

* * * * *

After giving careful consideration to qualification for sea command and required specializations, I believe the selection board should place great stress on seeking evidence, in the past performance of prospective flag officers, of the qualities of flexibility of mind, analytical thought processes, creativity and imagination which will best qualify them to compete with the increasingly professional and intellectual civilian leadership within an increasingly integrated Defense Department. I think that the evidence of such qualifications can be found in many categories of billets. However, I can think of none where the naval officer is put to a greater test of ability to rise above his background and possible prejudices than by demonstrated outstanding performance in Joint and International Staffs and Agencies. It is here that the common dogma of any one service must give way to the give and take of analysis from differing perspectives. It is here that he must rely less on the lessons of past experience and more on his basic qualities of intellect and thoughtfulness.

9. Mr. Louis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of War, in a Memorandum to President Roosevelt, 1937.

* * * * *

I find that this action of the State Department, in ignoring military advice, has been characteristic of its attitude for many years past. My investigation discloses that this is an attitude not assumed by the foreign office of any other nation. On the contrary, none embarks upon foreign policy having any military implications without giving the fullest consideration to the advice of the responsible military authorities. May I respectfully ask that you consider directing the Secretary of State to afford an opportunity to the War Department to express its views upon all matters having a military implication, immediate or remote.

10. General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an address to the American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 1964.

* * * * *

If we are not carrying the day in all the arguments, it is more likely that our cause may not always be right or that our persuasiveness may not always be effective, rather than that there is a deliberate desire to disregard the military facts of national life.

* * * * *

President Kennedy solved any doubt in the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to his views on the subject when in June 1961 he wrote to them as follows: "While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the over-all context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern."

* * * * *

The Military are entitled by law and right to a seat at the national table—there to advise, not to dominate or command. The longer one serves in Washington the more one becomes aware of the many elements which go to make up a successful national strategy. Of these, the military element is but one, but an important one, requiring the voice of professional spokesmen. In presenting their case before the bar of civilian leadership they are entitled to receive the same kind of attentive hearing accorded the lawyer when he presents his case before equally stern judges.

11. General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, United States Army in an address delivered to the Graduating Class of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, June 1963.

* * * * *

On a lower scale, we have developed in the Army a very effective front line radar to pick up enemy activity under all conditions of visibility, or lack of it. But radar is subject to breakdown and if the soldier becomes dependent upon it for surveillance of his front, can he revert—if the need arises—to the traditional methods of scouting and patrolling? Or will he be inclined to sit and wait for the repairman? The same problem applies to the use of the computer as an instrument for reaching command decisions.

My point is that military leadership today—and more so in the future—deals with the age-old problems of human fallibility, compounded by the frailty of the machines and instruments that are developed to minimize error and multiply strength.

12. Extract from Report of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York (Chairman: General J. Lawton Collins, Ret.), April 1964.

* * * * *

It was pointed out that a major part of the U.S. Army today is serving abroad and that many young graduates of West Point early in their careers are assigned to training missions in such areas as Viet Nam and Korea where perforce they must deal not only with men of different cultural and political backgrounds, but cannot escape becoming involved in local economic, health, and educational problems. This requires a broad understanding of subjects usually comprehended under the term "social sciences" as well as proficiency in the traditional "military science."

13. Major General William F. Train, Commandant, Army War College, in a yet unpublished speech, June 1964.

* * * * *

In the past, the professional soldier has traditionally oriented his thinking primarily on determining how military force should be employed once the decision to fight has been made. We have, as a result, developed a wealth of professional military doctrine founded on what we call the "principles of war." But, now that the prospects of a decision to fight with the full arsenal of available weaponry have become so sobering, perhaps a reorientation is needed. This new direction in which thinking on the use of military force must be channeled, not to the exclusion of the traditional direction, however, is toward the discernment of "principles of peace"; that is, toward the determination of how best to employ military power in order to preserve peace.

The highest form of the strategic art should be thought of as that which results in the achievement of national objectives and the absence of open war without sacrificing our principles or essential national interests.

14. General Earle G. Wheeler, Extract from Remarks made to Army War College, 1963.

* * * * *

In other terms, the military must be able to convince judges who are not aware of or impressed by military scriptures of the past as guidelines to the future. This is so because of the present dynamism in national security requirements themselves. In truth, these requirements can be met only by forging new and effective balances in political, economic and military national power.

My theme has been balance. The Army's purely military response to our security needs is balance in hardware, training, organization and planning. But beyond this purely military sense, the Army is after a political, economic, *and* military balance. Perhaps more important than these, we recognize our responsibility to make ourselves *heard* and *understood* in governmental forums dealing with national security affairs.

To be understood by others implies that we *understand* the problem. This, gentlemen, is our job in achieving balance—to *understand* and make ourselves *understood*.


15. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Education), from speech USMA, April 1964.

* * * * *

... The military mind, of course, really isn't unlike other professional minds. It deals with intellectual problems in basically the same way that an academic mind or a medical mind or an engineering mind or a legal mind attack their respective problems. It deals with very real, intellectual problems concerning the profession of arms . . .

There is no profession which is more intellectual than this one, and that is why I suggest that the military mind really doesn't have very much time on its brain cells, so to speak, to be worrying about taking over the government or starting world wars. It is really much more concerned with meeting the ever-increasing demands and responsibilities thrust upon this nation.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CURRICULUM AND THE CURRICULAR THEME



Senator JACKSON. I believe at this time you may wish to touch on some of the high points of your formal statement. You may proceed in your own way.

Colonel LINCOLN. Gentlemen, if I may, I will follow the outline of the statement commenting on points in it which seem to me particularly important. It may be that you will want to ask questions or make comments, either as I go along or at the end.

My first point is my position that I prefer to think of the current situation, not as a dilemma but as a challenging problem of transition which we of the military profession and of the body politic, the U.S. people as a whole, must solve. If we don't solve it, our security will be impaired. In this paper I have elected to be optimistic, although with some reservations. I feel that we are solving the problems and we are going to solve them.

I do suggest strongly that the process of solution is not a one-way street. The solution is not something that is to be accomplished entirely by us of the military profession. Other components of the U.S. society and of Government operations need to realize the revolutionary change that has taken place in the profession and need to make coordinate shifts to help out the military profession in the changes that need to be made.

Now, just to provide a quantitative feel of the problem that the country and the Government is dealing with here, I have provided some figures. Quantitative analysis as everyone here knows is very popular nowadays in the Department of Defense.

Looking at the numbers involved, there are about 200,000 officers on active duty who might be called professionals. Just to provide a comparison, there are about 250,000 doctors in the medical profession. About 250,000 lawyers is one estimate of the individuals in the legal profession.

These numbers, of course, are not precise. There can be debate over them. But the order of magnitude of the military profession is that of the medical profession and of the legal profession. I will add that the turnover in the military profession is much faster, as you know. Once a man becomes a doctor he tends to go on practicing into his 60's or later. The soldier retires, by Act of Congress, at around age 52, unless he becomes a General or a Flag Officer. Very few of us become Generals or Flag Officers.

I want to underline the point that we need the great leaders like Marshall and MacArthur, and Arnold, and King, and Eisenhower—all individuals whom I have been privileged to know personally. But, and the "but" is underlined, such leadership can be effective only when supported by tens of thousands of other efficient, committed and dedicated professionals from lieutenant to full general.

As a further comment, I stress the point that the military profession simply cannot be adequately described by describing each characteristic and adding these descriptions. Nor can any other great traditional institution be so described. You can't adequately describe the human being by describing the hands and the legs and the head and the eyebrows, and then adding these descriptions all up.

Neither can you so describe the military or any other profession. The profession has a pride, it has a sense of prestige, it has a sense of belonging, it has a tacit union card, it has characteristics which equal what some people call "professional ethos."

Looking for short definitions, Professor Huntington, who has written thoughtfully on this subject, defined a professional as someone who couples a special skill with a commitment.

In the military profession, as in other professions, the skills differ, but the commitment is the same throughout the profession. Commitment is to my mind all important.

There have been various definitions of the military profession and of the special skill required. I particularly like the one that was used by the Honorable Robert Lovett, talking at West Point a couple of months ago, when accepting the Thayer Award. He used a definition by a British officer which reads that "the function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force to the resolution of a social problem."

I do think that Mr. Lovett's whole talk at West Point, which was a short one, is a very useful guide to the problem of the military profession today.

Senator JACKSON. It was an outstanding talk. I suggest we include the complete text of Mr. Lovett's address in the record of these proceedings. I think we might also include the whole text of Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze's letter to the Flag Selection Board of May 18, 1964, and the fullest extract that is available from the speech at West Point on April 24, 1964, by Edward Katzenbach, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Education).

Colonel LINCOLN. Thank you.

Senator JACKSON. I believe it will also be useful to place in the record the text of a graduation address by Wilfred J. McNeil to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces here in Washington on June 9 this year.

(The addresses and letter referred to appear in the appendix beginning on p. 585.)

Colonel LINCOLN. Commenting on this definition that "the function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force to the resolution of a social problem," in the modern day I would interpret the word "force" as meaning military resources of all types. I am a military resource and so also is Major Seigle here. The function is the resolution of national security problems of our country rather than only of social problems.

My point here is that we shouldn't consider that military resources are available to be used only for blowing things down. They can and have been used for building them up. As we all know, probably the best historical example in our American experience is the work of the Corps of Engineers throughout over a century.

I have in my statement and in the selected quotations, stressed the broadening of the responsibilities of people in the military profession. But I think it is wise to caution, and it is wise to consider as a caution, the statement of General MacArthur that the job of the military profession, after all, the basic job, is to win American wars.

As far as the individual is concerned, I have always thought that the statement of Secretary of the Army Brucker, in a graduation address at West Point, was very pertinent. After recognizing the expansion of responsibility, he cautioned that class in these words: "You must guard with jealous care your most priceless possession—your soldier's soul. You are a fighting man." This will and capability must be continually kept in mind.

I looked up some figures looking toward making comparisons between today and the military profession when I entered it as a commissioned officer, which was 35 years ago. Among the things that startled me was that the cost today to the U.S. Government and to the society measured in dollars is well over 50 times. In fact, today, the cost is 50 times what it was only 25 years ago. I think that this great increase in cost is one of the reasons most sensible citizens who worry about the military component of our society are thinking about the huge cost and the efficient management thereof.

The intellectual approach to the profession has been a theoretical approach, because we did not have a profession large enough to affect our society. So people argued intellectually about "militarism". Now we have a large operation at huge cost, so being pragmatists, most sensible people think first of efficiency.

Their concern is to worry about having a controlled direction which gives maximum security for the high costs in money and service that is now required. The increase in size of our Armed Forces, since I was commissioned, is about eight times, certainly the officer corps has expanded about eight times.

This means, from the standpoint of attracting an input into the professional officer corps, that we have to recruit each year somewhere between 8,000 and 10,000 new regulars, good leadership, people out of the top level of good leadership in the United States. You might wish to compare that number with the problem of the Foreign Service which, I think, is recruiting only a few hundred each year.

I have presented to the Committee a selection of quotations from distinguished citizens and soldiers. I was impressed after assembling those quotations with the consistency with which these individuals stressed the increasing complexity of the military profession, and also with the considerable consensus in these quotations in defining the complexity and the ways of dealing with the complexities.

As a corollary to these judgments, I think the leadership of the military profession, which certainly includes the United States Congress, needs to recognize the nature of these complexities. The military profession is, I think, already shifting to adjust to these complexities. And as detailed examples of shifts to meet the complexities, I mention such items as the exchange of staff officers between the Defense Department and the State Department right now, the tenor of Mr. Nitze's guidance on selection of admirals which you are including in the record, and the curricula of the War Colleges.

I have brought along a chart showing the curriculum of the Army War College which, to me, is very interesting. This is what the Army leadership thinks the officer, about age 40, or about age 38 to 45, should be studying.

All of those people attending the War College are not going to be generals. But it is very rare that an individual is selected to be a general officer who has not attended one of the war colleges. That is one of the steps considered almost essential for wearing stars.

The Army, and I see now Mr. Nitze, has recently greatly increased the emphasis on the value of the power of communication as a trait of officership. I underline that this word "communication" in our profession means knowing your stuff, about what you are talking about, as a primary requirement, as well as being able to talk and write clearly about the "stuff" that you know. The word "communication"

is too often interpreted to mean that you have a good debating technique. You also need to know about that which you are debating and it is better to be trying to persuade than argue the case.

On the point of the values of the profession raised in the Chairman's letter to me, I still know no better summary statement of these basic values than Duty, Honor, Country, which is West Point's motto, and which was engraved in greater depth in General MacArthur's last great address two years ago which, as I recall, is already in the Congressional Record.

This same guidepost has been stated in other ways such as that we want individuals who esteem the goal of public service as their highest aim. But—Duty, Honor, Country—that is the best summary I know.

Now, I have listed some problem areas for the future. There is the problem of recruiting talent, 8,000 to 10,000 regulars a year. The problem of retaining a high morale which is one of the elements of retention. There is a problem of continual re-training and up-dating of officers in the rapidly changing profession, which is one of the reasons why we have such a massive school system. There is a problem of orchestrating military power and policy with other powers and other policies. This is a topic that is widely and continuously discussed.

There is a problem of effective command and managerial arrangements in this huge defense operation in which we are engaged and which seems likely to continue.

I underline that I do not think that schooling in the military services is a critical problem area. The military profession is, at least as much as any profession, I think, on the Dean's list in the area of schooling. I don't mean to create the impression that we are always up with the times in every school or in every area that people need to be schooled. But we are trying to be up with the times.

It is usual for military professionals to refer to principles of war. These are important truisms, nine of them. In a battle you may follow three, violate two, and four will not apply. Such a pattern has oftentimes occurred. But nowadays, we also have to seek for principles of peace-keeping because that is a part of our military task.

I have closed my formal presentation by referring to Clausewitz, which is not unusual for a military officer. He said that the requirements for a professional officer were intelligence and courage to take responsibility. In the modern day and age, the word "intelligence" applies to skills, knowledge, preparation and integrity. The courage to take responsibility clearly implies a comprehension of what to do and how to do it.

The professional officer in this day, even as in Napoleon's day, must still, I think, have in his heart the instinct to march to the sound of the guns, to go where the problem is, and to do his professional best to solve that problem.

Among the quotations that were put together and included with my statement, there are two that in the light of recent newspaper headlines (designation of General Taylor as new Ambassador to Vietnam and General Wheeler as his successor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) seem to me to be of particular interest. If I may, I will read the quotation from General Maxwell D. Taylor.

He says this: "If we are not carrying the day"—and General Taylor is talking about the professional officer—"in all the arguments, it is

more likely that our cause may not always be right or that our persuasiveness may not always be effective, rather than that there is a deliberate desire to disregard the military facts of national life.

"President Kennedy solved any doubt in the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to his views on the subject when in June 1961, he wrote to them as follows: 'While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.'

"The military are entitled by law and right to a seat at the national table—there to advise, not to dominate or command."

General Bradley put this very briefly, when he said that "The military voice should be a quiet voice, but it should be heard."

Senator MILLER. Is this still a quote from Taylor?

Colonel LINCOLN. I have interpolated a comment from General Bradley. If I may continue now to read from General Taylor: "The longer one serves in Washington the more one becomes aware of the many elements which go to make up a successful national strategy. Of these, the military element is but one, but an important one, requiring the voice of professional spokesmen."

General Wheeler, who has just been made Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made a statement a year ago at the Army War College, which impressed me a great deal. I asked him if I might use it. Here it is, in three brief paragraphs:

He said, "In other terms, the military must be able to convince judges who are not aware of or impressed by military scriptures of the past as guidelines to the future. This is so because of the present dynamism in national security requirements themselves. In truth, these requirements can be met only by forging new and effective balances in political, economic and military national power.

"My theme has been balance. The Army's purely military response to our security needs is balance in hardware, training, organization and planning. But beyond this purely military sense, the Army is after a political, economic *and* military balance. Perhaps more important than these, we recognize our responsibility to make ourselves *heard* and *understood* in Governmental forums dealing with national security affairs.

"To be understood by others implies that we *understand* the problem. This, gentlemen, is our job in achieving balance—to *understand* and make ourselves *understood*."

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Colonel Lincoln, for your very fine and very helpful statement and comments. Before turning to my colleagues, I want to ask two or three questions.

You mention at the end of the first paragraph of your formal statement, ". . . I suggest that we are not dealing here with a one-way street. Other components of U.S. society and of government operations need to make coordinate shifts."

Could you expand on this point a little bit?

Colonel LINCOLN. First, I should say that I have not prepared the essay on that that I should. But I think that we should recognize that the military profession has not traditionally been a popular profession in U.S. society.

It has been suspect for various reasons, some of them traditional. The more that components of U.S. society which have been traditionally critical of the profession shift toward at least a neutral position, the better the climate we will have in the United States for getting the job done that needs to be done by the military forces.

One of my great concerns in this area is adequate recruiting, of men in the ranks as well as of professional officers and also of Reserve officers. We need a great many Reserve officers to man the components of the Armed Forces that are manned in part or in whole by Reserve officers.

Under the heading of "Government Operations," I think an important, and perhaps the most important, segment of the Government operations in Washington is the Congress of the United States.

I pass no judgment on this. I only make a comment that it does seem to me that the Congress of the United States has shifted and is shifting very rapidly to understand this increasing complexity of the military profession.

Perhaps the fact that you are holding this hearing here illustrates the recognition of the problem and the desirable shift.

Senator JACKSON. I might just underline that there is one component of Government operations that needs to change its fundamental attitude toward the military profession—and I mean some of the present top civilian leadership of the Defense Department. I am reminded of what Adm. George W. Anderson, now our Ambassador to Portugal, said in September 1963: "I am gravely concerned that within the Department of Defense there is not the degree of confidence and trust between the civilian and military echelons that the importance of their common objective requires. This two-way responsibility requires wisdom, respect, and understanding from both sides."

How do you get to the American public the story of the new soldier? For example, the soldier that I saw in Vietnam in December of 1962 impressed me with his knowledge of not just his military assignment but the social and economic problems in the country that are a part and parcel of the threat.

There is in fact the new soldier, and this is the soldier with a graduate degree, and this is a soldier like yourself who is a scholar, and this is the soldier that is the physicist in the laboratory. This is the soldier that is over in the State Department working side by side with the civilian professionals in the Department.

I find that so many people just are not fully aware of this new breed.

Colonel LINCOLN. One of the difficulties, as we all know, is that if it is news, it is usually considered that it has to be critical or dramatic. I fear that what you are talking about, sir, is certainly not critical and it is not very dramatic.

So, the first inclination of the fourth estate is probably not to write about it.

I frankly do not have a formula for this problem and I feel that it is something that someone other than the military profession has to solve in great part. The releases from the information services of the Pentagon can only go so far and are, perhaps, not the best way to do it. There is another problem in this, by the way, that anything that is stressed officially by the military establishment may be taken as criticism of some members or some components of it if those particular

members don't happen at the time to have the skills being stressed in the publicity.

Let me illustrate by the graduate schooling point. One can stress graduate schooling only so far, because a high proportion of officers, after all, are not adapted to it or can't get it. Too much stress on such schooling begins to imply that if you do not have it, you are a second-class citizen.

Such is not, in fact, true. Hence, I come back to my point of someone else than the military needing to do this information job.

While we are talking about the education point, by the way, we should keep in mind the men in the enlisted ranks because the up-grading of skills and of education in the enlisted ranks may be proportionately even more than in the officer ranks.

Some figures running through my mind are something like this: That in World War I, the soldier averaged a fifth grade education, and I would guess that the company that I commanded in the early thirties, which was an engineer company, averaged about an eighth grade education. That guess excludes a couple of college graduates. That time was in the middle of the depression and they had enlisted to get something to eat. I would think that the average enlisted man now has close to a high school education.

May I turn to someone who has commanded a company 20 or 30 years later than I, and ask him his impression.

Major SEIGLE. Well, I was very fortunate in commanding a company which I trained from the day that the men had entered the Army until I took them to Germany and joined the Seventh Army, in one of the gyroscope moves of several years back, in which 25 percent of the enlisted men were college graduates. These were mostly draftees, and men who had volunteered for, in this case, the Third Armored Division. They enlisted in lieu of being drafted, and losing the option of choosing their unit. Consequently this was not a typical company.

This situation creates some problems, as you can quickly see, in the Army, in terms of the educational levels, not only of the officers but of the professional noncommissioned officer corps.

The Army has taken steps to insure that each career, noncommissioned officer attains at least a high school equivalent in his formal education, and I am sure wishes to proceed beyond that whenever it becomes possible to do so.

At the same time, they have now established a policy that all commissioned officers should be college graduates.

I would feel myself, so long as we have large numbers of young American men, many of whom are being drafted after they have completed their college education, although certainly not all of them are college graduates entering our Armed Services, we will have a continuing need for a relatively high educational level on the part of the people who will be assigned to lead them during their required service.

Senator JACKSON. It has been said by some people that the military profession spends too much of its time on the study of nonmilitary subjects—that is the study of the nonmilitary aspects of the cold war, the political, the economic, and the social and so on. They say soldiers ought to confine themselves to the military elements of the problem. Would you like to comment on that?

Colonel LINCOLN. This is a traditional approach of some soldiers: that the military man should be given a clearly defined military job

involving the use of force and then turned loose until he executes his mission; he then turns the job back to—let us use not uncommon phraseology—he turns the situation back to the State Department until they mess it up once more, and then the soldier is called in again.

This, of course, if it was ever true, is complete nonsense now. I would almost close this point off by repeating General Taylor's comment, which I put in my prepared statement, that there are no longer any purely military problems. The components of modern security problems are woven together, as I have said, like the warp and woof of a rug.

Senator JACKSON. Let me be a devil's advocate again for a moment. This is not necessarily my view, but it has been said that we face in Vietnam a special military situation, namely, guerilla-type warfare, that takes us back to the French and Indian War, and the Wars in the West with the Indians. The point is made that, for some reason or another, we do not have an effective military plan to cope with this situation, that we are concentrating too much on other subjects, and that we have missed the big problem that we are up against in this instance.

Colonel LINCOLN. First, let me say that I don't think the comparison with the Indian Wars in the West is a good one. Whatever the Indians had, they didn't have an ideology. An ideology is a skein running through this problem in Vietnam.

Senator JACKSON. Your point is that this is more than just a French and Indian War—it is a political war?

Colonel LINCOLN. This is more than a battle situation. This is what is called by some people, sublimated war. That is, in the spectrum of war from general nuclear war to civic action, it falls on the side toward civic action. I hope we keep it there.

The United States is in a position right now where we have to work from the outside. We are coming in from the outside to give assistance to a Government. Just what are the effective things that you can do to assist that Government?

Thus far, we have stuck to assistance. We are trying to promote what is called counter-insurgency. I don't like the term "counter-insurgency." We are trying to promote what is better called "internal defense".

There is an implication in the statement you have made that we should jump this effort to another level and assume the responsibility, or primary responsibility, ourselves for creating order in Vietnam.

This opens up a whole other book to write and to discuss which, frankly, I don't feel very competent to do.

Senator JACKSON. I think that that is well said. You have stated very well the story of the new soldier, the fact that the new soldier has to be acquainted with more than one discipline. If this is to be done effectively, and if he is to maximize his talents, what can be done to improve the opportunities for dissent within the profession?

In other words, our soldiers today are called upon to deal with non-military areas. They are called upon to do important work in the social sciences, and in problems that lie between State and Defense. They are called upon to do important research work, and all of this involves creative thinking. By the very nature of the operation, it requires an environment in which the soldier can properly give his views, disagree and so on.

Can this be done in the context of the tradition of heavy emphasis on discipline that has been the soldier's way of life in the past?

Colonel LINCOLN. Well, first, as a preliminary comment, if one reads the record, the history of our Armed Forces, and particularly of the U.S. Army, what is happening now is not new. The problem is only expanded as to the proportion of individuals who do think and need to think in this way.

If you looked back at the history of the officer corps, you will find that since George Washington's Army, there have been individuals who were broadly grounded and thinking very broadly. After all, Alexander Hamilton was a professional officer, and a pretty good one. That is just to cite an example.

In looking over the early history of the Military Academy, on which we have just had a dissertation written, at times as I read through the pages I wondered whether these early superintendents and military professors were spending more of their time teaching cadets or politicking with Congress. I am glad we have changed that.

But moving into this century, one can mention men such as Tasker Bliss, who was the founder of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and General Embick, who may not be known to any of you, but who worked with the State Department over many, many years on negotiations in Latin America. There have been Naval officers, Admiral Sims is one, who have been very adept and very useful in these areas.

What we have really come to is an expansion throughout a larger portion of the framework of the professional officers corps, of this need. Furthermore, the military operations have become so critical that the lieutenant out there with a platoon on the border of Germany may find himself in a politically significant predicament an hour from now.

Now, on the opportunity for dissent, that is a tough one. My first reaction was to give a personal one, looking back on 35 years now of wearing the uniform.

More correctly, it is over 39 years. In the first four years, when I was a cadet at the Military Academy, I recall times when I didn't have an opportunity for dissent, particularly during the first year there as a plebe.

But I don't recall any time since then when, in the end, I didn't have an opportunity for dissent if I felt my cause was just and it was important enough. This was particularly true, by the way, during the time I was General Marshall's planner. If you had reason to believe the developing plan was not the best, and didn't dissent, you got fired.

Senator JACKSON. Does it depend a lot on the individual, and how he goes about dissenting within the profession?

Colonel LINCOLN. There is an element of the political in this, yes.

Senator JACKSON. It gets down to judgment?

Colonel LINCOLN. It gets down to an element of judgment and also you need to be professionally competent in knowing how to put in the dissent. Dissent is a hard word. Perhaps more often than not, you are raising a question or asking that another view be considered.

Senator JACKSON. In your formal statement, you say "Communication' means 'knowing your stuff', as the primary requirement. . ." In other words, a person or an officer who really knows his business—

Colonel LINCOLN. I think you have answered your own question.

Senator JACKSON. —he can dissent effectively.

Colonel LINCOLN. Your answer is better than I have answered. If you know your stuff and you can communicate, and you can speak and you can write, you will have plenty of opportunity to dissent.

Senator JACKSON. In all professions, there are those who can dissent and get away with it and they will have the respect of their superiors, and others who try to do the same thing get into trouble.

Colonel LINCOLN. That is right. And this is one of the difficulties that we have been facing, I think, recently. We, of the military profession, certainly have a strong respect for professional military judgment. I have a strong respect for it. But it is probably true that some proportion of our individuals with the best judgment over the recent years have not been very articulate. In that case, the individual should hire a good staff officer.

Senator JACKSON. I would like to carry this same line of questioning over to the civilian side of the Government—to the relationship between the civilian and the military. Do you feel that the officer that is articulate, and who knows his stuff, and who can properly communicate all of this, can get along, for the most part, quite well with his superior civilian heads?

Colonel LINCOLN. Very definitely so, with a comment. Let me see if I can phrase this comment clearly. This comment comes back to my point on the two-way street. The civilian head or the civilian associate needs to have, as a starting point, some respect for the profession and for the professionalism of the officers involved. Otherwise it may be so difficult to get through the barriers to communication with, say a new civilian secretary, that even the highly competent, persuasive officer may not make it. And you should forgive him for not making it.

Senator JACKSON. In his West Point speech, Robert Lovett mentioned the importance of "mutual confidence and respect between civilian officials and military officers which have proved to be essential to real progress under our system of government."

For an able soldier-officer to get along, is it not essential that the other party, the civilian head in this case, have a respect and understanding of the professional soldier's role and his responsibility.

Colonel LINCOLN. It is my impression, yes.

Senator JACKSON. And, likewise, the military officer should have a full understanding of the civilian's role, and have the ability to communicate with him in a knowledgeable way.

Colonel LINCOLN. This is a very good analysis, I think, sir. If I may cite as an example, I think a survey of the Army staff relationships with their secretaries today will show a very healthy, mutual respect and a very ready communication.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Brewster has to leave shortly to go to another committee meeting. I would like to yield to him now.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Colonel, the Major testified that in his company 25 percent of the men were college graduates. The policy of our draft is to allow young men to complete their education prior to being drafted and it is also to select the abler and better young men that the country produces, and the trend certainly is for a greater percentage of our young men to obtain a university education.

This tendency will certainly increase as years go by. It is almost self-evident that men with a college degree will not make a professional career for their lives as enlisted men in the lower grades. With this background, do you see the possibility of establishing a professional career for our enlisted men in the lower ranks? I have long been concerned about the tremendous cost of training these men, and then only being able to utilize their services for a very short period of time. Are we just stuck with the situation that we are going to have our privates and corporals for four years and spend half of our time training them? Could you address yourself generally to that situation?

Colonel LINCOLN. As a first comment, I think Major Seigle's company was a rather special case. Many of the enlistees were probably impelled by the draft. By enlisting, they could get their choice.

As to officers, there is a point, if you are an ROTC graduate, to taking a regular commission rather than a Reserve commission. You are going to have to do two years anyhow with the Reserve commission. But, with a regular commission, you get more of a choice of branch and station.

You have cited a problem on which I really have no answer and only a comment. This is a problem on which I have very little expertise. It is a topic on which the personnel people in the services will have thought a great deal. They are the people to ask or refer to for expertise.

I think there is a definite gain to our U.S. society that some people may not recognize, even though we train these people and then they go on out to civilian life in four years or even eight years. They have acquired some additional skills, and they have acquired some discipline. They have been urged, by the way, to learn to use a toothbrush, which some of them don't know about when they come in, despite all of the advertisements. These items are assets that should be listed. There is just a question in my mind that you could do more than improve by a proportion, improve by a sort of percentage, say 25 percent, or 30 or 40 percent measured money-wise from the current situation, by providing for reenlistments from these individuals.

Over the long run, these individuals will want to go out and get a job that makes more money. There are only so many sergeants' jobs, even as there are only so many colonels' jobs.

I know more about the officer's aspect of this. One of the great problems of the armed services is that there is not enough room at the top. We are losing highly professional officers just because there are not enough slots for generals, and not enough slots for colonels. After they are passed over a couple of times as lieutenant colonel, they will retire and go out and do something in civilian life. It is a predicament. It is a predicament for which I don't have an answer.

Senator BREWSTER. You have addressed yourself to my second question, but to elaborate on it, do your cadets recognize and accept that, though they are professionally competent after 20 or 30 years' service, they will be pushed out and will not many of them or most of them, have a chance to become Flag Officers?

Colonel LINCOLN. Well, first, a high proportion of these people think that they carry a general's baton in their pocket, and I think that that is all right at that age. It is an incentive. Don't you think that I am right in that?

Major SEIGLE. Yes, sir, they are like the platoon that was told, going on its very dangerous mission, that only one would return. Each would look around and say, "Well, I am sure going to miss the other fellows."

They are told the expectancy on a percentage basis, which is very low, but each, perhaps, as Colonel Lincoln indicated, tends to consider himself in that fortunate few at this time.

Senator JACKSON. Which is a wonderful thing.

Colonel LINCOLN. The only figure I have ever seen on this is one given by General Porter in testimony to a committee of Congress, when he was head of personnel of the Army. He said, as I recall and my memory is certainly fallible, of 100 Second Lieutenants being commissioned, four will be made General Officers of which two will be made permanent General Officers.

Senator PELL. To interpolate here for a moment, I would imagine the statistics are almost the same in the Foreign Service for the number of newly commissioned FSO's who will become Ambassadors, and I wish they had the same peace of mind about not making ambassadorial rank.

Senator BREWSTER. Colonel, you would say that at West Point, then, this situation does not have a serious morale effect upon our cadets?

Colonel LINCOLN. No, and furthermore, these people—you shouldn't stereotype cadets any more than you stereotype officers—but some of these individuals have, for instance, quite deep technical-scientific interests. They, for instance, are looking forward to going in the Corps of Engineers. They think of this as a military life and also a useful life in the profession. They know that at a reasonable time they can get a job and an interesting job in civilian life.

I perhaps should at this point, before I go on to talk about second careers, make a comment that I had for Senator Pell. It just crossed my mind that maybe the Foreign Service has been encouraging the increase in the number of countries in the world so there will be more jobs for Ambassadors. The Foreign Service has been doing pretty well on ambassadorial posts since World War II.

One of the revolutionary changes in the military profession since World War II has been the increasing acceptance of a second career. This was not thought of by most Regular officers, I do not think, prior to World War II. Those, like myself, who were commissioned prior to World War II were not thinking in terms of a second career. They were thinking in terms of the old retirement law which I think was age 64. Then we passed a new personnel bill, and officers are out at an average age of 52 (assuming commissioned at 22), unless you have become a permanent General or permanent Admiral. This is today one of the major problems of the military profession.

On the other hand, the increasing requirement for skills in the military profession is making it easier for these individuals to move to a second career; such aspects as civilian-type skills, that is, managerial skills, and the fact that everybody now really needs at least a baccalaureate degree. In increasing proportion, our military requirements necessitate a graduate degree. In addition, a large number of officers are going on their own and getting a graduate degree because they think it will help professionally, or as insurance against the requirement for a second career. This career aspect I am discussing may or may not be parallel to the Foreign Service.

I do know some Foreign Service officers who are teaching, and military officers seem to turn to that second profession. I can give you a statistic on the teaching business, by the way. My West Point class certainly started out without a concern about a second career. There were 299 of them graduating, and only 21 left the service of their own volition, that is resigned. Today, with not more than 15 of us still in uniform, of those who have been retired, approximately 45 are teaching. In other words, out of about 220 professionals still living, approximately 45 are teaching and 15 still in uniform.

I might add this point: officers, accustomed to an active existence, are often not happy with reading and golf on retirement at age 50 to 60. Hence, in addition to the money aspect, they look for something to do that utilizes their considerable inventory of energy and interest. One might note that many more choose teaching than politics.

Senator BREWSTER. I have one final question on the subject. Would you say that the frustration and bitterness that I know did exist among field grade officers who were pushed out, at what they considered the peak of their productivity, is now on the downgrade by virtue of the training they have had and the possibilities of a real second career?

Colonel LINCOLN. You refer to the situation in the late 40's when we went through Korea, and many were kept on?

Senator JACKSON. I think the early 50's, after Korea.

Colonel LINCOLN. Broadly, I would say yes to your question, because this situation is now more accepted and officers are thinking about and planning for this second career. They accept it as a way of life.

Now, as a comment on that, when an individual is passed over for General Officer (and he well recognizes that only a small proportion can be selected) and he sees that he is not going to be a General Officer, he is liable to retire earlier than the 30 years if he sees a good opportunity to go on in a second career. This tendency may at times decrease the efficiency—under certain circumstances—of the officer corps because the individual may be concentrating his attention more on looking for the second career in his last year of service than on his job.

There was a suggestion made to me recently by a friend of mine, a Lieutenant General who was looking at what one of his chief assistants had been doing for the last few months. He said that he had come to the conclusion that maybe when an individual served 30 or 35 years and didn't have a job lined up afterwards, the thing to do was to give him the last year off at Government expense to go to graduate school or look for a job. This approach might add to the overall efficiency of our operations.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Senator Brewster.

Colonel LINCOLN. I don't make that last as a proposal to enact into law, but you might wish to think about it.

Senator MILLER. Well, first, Colonel Lincoln, let me tell you how much I appreciate this splendid statement that you have given us. I do believe you have touched on the problems and some of the underlying requirements of professionalism. I particularly like the fact that you brought out such concepts as "the soldier's soul," and "the commitment," and "the will," and "policy consciousness."

Personally, I have arrived at about the same conclusions except that I have expressed them in terms of saying that the professional soldier has to be a philosopher and a good one, and more so nowadays than ever before. But without seeking to embarrass you, I would like to just say a couple of things and I don't wish any response at this point.

I believe that you have touched on, if not the most important factor, certainly a major factor in this problem of professionals. That is the two-way street between the civilian and the military. I am not one who is opposed to civilian control over the military, but I do believe that as long as there is this civilian control power, there is a corollary responsibility that the civilians in control understand what the military side of the picture is. I am quite confident that this responsibility has not been carried out as much as it should be.

Now, I do not say that what I am about to say is necessarily directed at the top civilian controllers, although I think it is in part applicable to them. But there are still too many people in the civilian controlling spots, in the civilian recommending spots, top civilian staff people, to whom the Secretaries or the Assistant Secretaries have to look for guidance, who do not have the awareness of the problems of the military that they should. Many of them have never had the privilege of wearing a uniform, but many of them have the feeling that they have the omnipotent knowledge of how to run things. It seems to me that these people, perhaps by direction of the President, ought to be put through some kind of a refresher or quick course, maybe in the evenings, which would bring them up to date on just exactly what is going on in the military side of the picture. I don't think we could afford to turn them loose on a two- or three-month special course over at the National War College. But, on the other hand, I think that we can't afford to have them persist in their ignorance because it just means that much longer periods of time are needed by the military people with whom they are working, to try to explain and to try to instruct them, so that at least they have the other side of the picture.

I think to some extent what I have said could apply to Members of Congress. There are still too many Members of Congress who are voting on things military who haven't the remotest appreciation of what they are voting on. By and large, the members of the Armed Services and Military Affairs committees have this knowledge, although this is not universally true, either. I think that it would be well if the leaders in the Senate and the House would somehow or other see to it that at least new Members of Congress receive some kind of a briefing from the Pentagon. I am sure the Pentagon would be more than happy to comply with such a request.

In other words, this two-way street exists, but I sympathize with the military in that I do not think that the civilian side has been going down that two-way street like it should.

Now, I am also aware of the fact that the military is not entirely blameless on this. There are some rather stupid things that have occurred—for example, the recruitment program, the radio announcements, "Join the military services and retire before you are 40 years of age." This kind of business is not helping the standing of the military either, and it is not providing the proper motivation for those who join and seek to make a career of the military.

Now, getting back to what I was saying, specifically some of the things brought out during the investigation of the so-called muzzling

of the military indicated that there are some defects which can have, and undoubtedly have had, a serious impact on the soul of the military.

For example, the shunning of the phrase "Cold War," the allegations that we don't have a "win" policy, allegations which were not properly rebutted and still aren't being properly rebutted. I must say that my heart goes out to those men and their families, too, who are out in the field being subjected to the hot lead who wonder whether or not the civilian side of the picture knows what is going on, and appreciates what is going on, and has indeed got a "win" policy.

I don't think that the civilian side has done a fair job on this. I hope that it will improve, and that it will improve fast, because unless it does, these problems that you set forth here are not going to be solved, and they could get worse.

Let me ask you just two questions: I was a little disturbed by the implication of your statement that in your opinion the military profession has moved slowly in strategic thought, because it has been my personal observation that they have moved just as fast in strategic thought as they have in adapting to the technological developments. The curricula of our schools, such as the one that you have shown us here, the increase and highly competent staffing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff working committees—these indicate to me that we have moved rapidly in strategic thought.

I am not saying that we have achieved the optimum, but I would appreciate it if you would elaborate on what caused you to conclude that we have moved slowly in strategic thought.

Colonel LINCOLN. Senator, my point is that we professionals were deadlocked too long among the Services over just what our strategy should be, an inter-service controversy. Thereby we relinquished some of our rightful responsibility in the business of strategy.

Senator MILLER. Well, Colonel, that clears that up for me very well. About the only comment I would have on that is that that would not necessarily be a criticism of the military, in my judgment; it would be a criticism more on the side of the civilian.

Colonel LINCOLN. We weren't helped too much sometimes.

Senator MILLER. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. Would the Senator yield at that point for an observation? It occurs to me that some of this same problem that we have on the civilian side occurs also on the military side. For example, it took the Navy a long time, as some of us are personally aware, to be interested in the use of nuclear submarines as a strategic weapons device. It took the Navy a long time—in fact, it took World War II—to cause them to accept carriers.

The military profession, I would say, has been somewhat neglectful in the area of subversion or guerrilla or counter-insurgency type warfare.

I will turn to the Air Force for a moment; here we are with billions of dollars that we have spent for airplanes for close-in support, and we now find after all of the money spent, and all of the interest in research and development, that the best close-in support weapons system available is a 1945 trainer called the T-28.

I just want to point out that there is some hesitancy, some slowness within the military profession, as well as among the civilians. That is my observation.

Senator MILLER. May I just respond to that?

Senator JACKSON. I could cite other illustrations, of course.

Senator MILLER. I might say, or suggest, however, that this gets you into the political realm. How are you going to fight these wars? This is a matter of political rather than military decision, I think.

Senator JACKSON. When the battleship admirals opposed the carrier people, there was an unwillingness to try new ideas.

Colonel LINCOLN. It was also a decision of agreeing to a change of concept which tended to be agreeing that you were out of a job, or out of being promoted to Admiral. These things are tough, you know. I was the unfortunate individual at the end of World War II who had the staff section charged with the administrative action for disbanding the Cavalry formally, and also the Coast Artillery Corps. This was tough going. One needed some help from civilian leadership in doing these things.

There were hundreds of officers who had gone into these corps as their life career and it was tough to formalize the fact that the world had marched on.

Senator MILLER. In turn, you had some of the old grads in the civilians who were keeping in close contact with the old units, or the old thinking that they had, and I venture to say that you didn't get too much help from them either.

I do want to emphasize that I am not saying that we have reached the optimum in strategic thought, and I do agree that we have moved more slowly in agreement in strategic thought. But I do believe that I can say this, whereas, perhaps you should not: that the civilian side must share the blame, if not most of the blame, in my judgment, because, after all, it is their responsibility, it is their power, and that power has an accompanying responsibility, and that responsibility has not kept pace with the need either.

I recognize that there are areas of blame on both sides of this thing.

Now, I would like to ask just one more question. There has long been an underlying struggle between the Defense Department and the State Department, particularly the military side of the Defense Department; that is, the military personnel side of the Defense Department versus the State Department. I don't detect that this has improved very much. Perhaps with respect to the top people like the Joint Chiefs it has, but I am thinking in terms of the colonels and the lieutenant colonels and the pick and shovel staff people over in the Pentagon who are still quite frustrated about what is going on over in State.

I haven't had the experience, but I suppose that there may be a similar feeling on the part of some State Department pick and shovel staff people. How can we get more cross-fertilization between these staff people of the two departments so that there will be a better understanding, and perhaps an improved approach to these problems of joint responsibility?

Can we have joint staff seminars in schools between these key people, or should we have more people in uniform go over to State, and work in an office once in a while, and vice versa, have more State people come over and work with the DOD? We certainly do this among the services, and maybe we might do it on a larger scale between the departments. Have you given any thought to this?

Colonel LINCOLN. Let me say as a summary judgment that I think we have gone through a cycle here in relationships. During World War II and the year or two afterwards, the relationships were not highly institutionalized between the military and the State Department, but were, I think, quite good.

I say that from a parochial viewpoint because from about '44 to '47 I was personally responsible on the Pentagon side for staff work on a high proportion of these relationships. In part of that period I had such young officers working for me as Colonel Dean Rusk, by the way. The relationships were generally informal, they were quite good, and they were not institutionalized.

We went through a downswing in some period afterwards, perhaps because the relationships became more institutionalized. Also, it was very hard to do anything about relationships when Mr. Acheson and Mr. Johnson were not working closely. I have heard that Mr. Johnson once directed that no one, other than himself, would speak to the State Department. Probably this report is exaggerated.

I would suggest that today this matter is being tackled sensibly and is moving along very well. The actions needed are really now more a matter of detail, and, if I may, I will cite some details.

We know that the National War College is about a quarter State Department. There are State Department people, I believe, attending all other war colleges. I know at the Army War College that I saw four or five on a recent visit to the Strategic Seminar a few weeks ago. There is a Foreign Service Officer on the staff, I believe, of every war college, in a high position. There are military officers attending the Foreign Service Institute.

The present Secretary of State has authorized Foreign Service Officers for each of the Service Academies, by the way. There is no charge to our personnel manning for this help, so we will probably take them with double happiness. The Air Force Academy already has one on board. He is so useful that they have made him an Assistant Professor, which is a creditable title at one of the Service Academies. Annapolis will have a Foreign Service Officer next year. As you know, the senior commanders have their political advisers.

There is a swap now between the Pentagon and the State Department of, I think, 10 officers. Again I don't have the detailed knowledge of this arrangement, but I think it is 10 officers.

Senator JACKSON. I might at this point note that the State-Defense Officer Exchange Program was initiated in a hearing of our Subcommittee. It was outlined first before our Subcommittee by the then Secretary of State Herter—in June 1960. My recollection is that about 50 State Department and Pentagon officers are either now on exchange assignments under the program or have completed such assignments.

Colonel LINCOLN. Well, for instance, Dr. Rostow has two officers, uniformed officers, in the Policy Planning Council of the State Department.

Senator MILLER. On this point, do we have in the Defense Department, as you said, in exchange, the same number of State people working over there?

Colonel LINCOLN. Approximately the same, and there are some in the Joint Staff.

Senator JACKSON. We will have supplied for the record just what the situation is, and I think it will be useful to have such an up-to-date evaluation of the program.

Senator MILLER. I think it would be useful to have that, and perhaps a comment from somebody regarding the adequacy of this program, whether or not there ought to be more officers included in it.

Senator JACKSON. The quality of the officers exchanged is, of course, the critical factor in the success of the program.

Senator MILLER. I imagine they are well selected for that purpose.

Colonel LINCOLN. The heart of this problem is even more than numbers, I think; it is understanding and confidence, and a feeling that these people are in the same business we are, which is the security and interests of the United States, that they are professionals, as we are, and that they are dedicated to a career of service to the country.

Furthermore, there is the problem that they must be hard-headed thinkers. My intent is to underline both the "hard-headed" and the "thinker".

Let me say quite bluntly that the military tend to think, or have tended to think, that the Foreign Service Officers are not being sufficiently "hard-headed" and the Foreign Service Officer has tended to think that the military are not being sufficiently "thinkers". So we have to get these two groups and two characteristics together.

Major Seigle just noted to me that, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Army where I have put him for a month to rub off some of his Harvard education and face some of the hard realities, there are two Foreign Service Officers.

You have put your finger on the problem by the questions. People are working on it and perhaps they should work some more on it. The basic concept behind the questions, I think, is the concept behind the proposal that came to Congress as the National Academy of Foreign Affairs, a plan which really was generated as much by General Taylor as anyone else. But he was thinking of primarily, I think, a high-level institution that would be small and deal with problems of what we now call the "country team." The concept is that these people should be educated together and should have opportunities to thresh out their common problems together in an educational media.

As a final point, I might comment that my deputy, and there are only two professors of social sciences at West Point—Colonel Jordan, is just now coming home from spending a year as "Special Political Adviser" to Chester Bowles in India. That is how he spent his sabbatical year which he had coming to him. There was a letter from Ambassador Bowles to the Secretary of the Army recently that was very laudatory on the progress made and the help he has given in dealing with some of the embassy's problems, including trying to make some sense out of the relationship between the defense expenditures of India and their balance of payments—really a very technical economic job.

Senator MILLER. Thank you.

I wonder if I could ask the chairman if it would be feasible for us to not only have included in the hearing the record of this State-Defense Officer Exchange Program, but perhaps secure a comment from both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State regarding their evaluation of the program and any recommendations.

Senator JACKSON. We will request any comments they care to make as to the future of the program.

(The materials referred to appear in the Appendix beginning on page 597.)

Colonel LINCOLN. On education, as you gather, we have in the military a strong belief in education. Not only do the War College curriculums reflect this problem, the problem is reflected to some extent in service academy curriculums.

It is my view that it is too late, at the level of the War Colleges, to begin—and I underline “begin”—to put across that type of education. It is sort of like starting to learn to play golf after 40, which I did. I fear I am never going to have a good swing.

I would just add that the Air Force Academy has gone so far in this that they have an international relations major in their curriculum. We have a certain amount of this formal instruction at the Military Academy. We do have an international relations course, and Major Seigle here teaches the National Security Problems course, which is an elective which gets into this sort of problem.

So we are working away on the problem on the bottom level. You will see the recognition of it in the furnished quotations which include an extract from West Point's last Board of Visitors report, in which the Board implied in a polite way that maybe our service academy should do a little more about this matter we are discussing.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. I am not going to ask a question now, but I want to welcome Colonel Lincoln, whom I have known over 20 years, and who was in the War Department planning, G-5 as I recall it, when I was in the Chemical Corps, and I want to express my admiration for this remarkable paper which I have read with deepest interest, and for the fine understanding that he has of the place of the military in today's society in performing its mission. I am delighted to see you here.

Colonel LINCOLN. Thank you very much, sir. I should say that Senator Javits has, on short notice a couple of times, helped us out with our student conference at West Point.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I think the record should show that I do not agree with Senator Miller in the need for increased consciousness of the military viewpoint on the part of the civilian. I think the thing can go two ways. Sometimes it would be very good if the professional military were given the same rub-off treatment on the civilian's viewpoint, and to my mind the mix is about right now.

I have admired your career, and I think at some point you have been in the national and naval and strategic seminar short courses. I have heard you lecture, at least once and maybe twice, and I am delighted to meet you here under these circumstances.

In the War College short courses, I have been struck by the fact that, when it comes to the willingness to make use of war as a means to obtain objectives, those who would be usually more belligerent would be civilians, and the next most belligerent would be the Reserve Officers in a two-week course, and the least belligerent and those who know the most about it would be the officers. I congratulate the military services on that.

I noticed earlier you mentioned the statistics as to those who would make General or Flag rank. To refresh my memory, was it one or two percent of the Second Lieutenants?

Colonel LINCOLN. I think, sir, this is a matter of interest that we should actually ask the services for. The only testimony I know was the figure that I gave, of four percent out of 100 lieutenants coming to active duty becoming Brigadier Generals, and two percent becoming permanent, which allows you to go beyond 30 years.

Now, this was several years ago that this testimony was given, and I do not know whether the 100 Second Lieutenants meant both Reserve and Regular, or Regular.

Senator PELL. I think it is even less than that among Annapolis graduates.

Colonel LINCOLN. I would think the Foreign Service Officers rise to FSO-1 and perhaps even to Ambassador at a higher percentage rate than do Regular officers.

Senator PELL. We might get the comparative statistics inserted in the record of the new Second Lieutenants and Ensigns, and the new Foreign Service Officers. As a matter of fairness, I guess we ought to include in the new Foreign Service Officers those who were amalgamated in at the lower ranks.

Colonel LINCOLN. May I ask when you do that that you get the present forecast and not look at the people of my vintage, because I came out of an Army with 12,000 Regular officers. Because of the expansion since that time, if you lived and were reasonably good, you probably became a General officer. I think about 70 out of my class of 299 made General officers. General Harkins, who received the Distinguished Service Medal from the President yesterday, is a classmate of mine.

Senator JACKSON. We shall ask the military services and the Department of State for the statements suggested by Senator Pell.

(The statements referred to follow:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Approximately 2 to 3 percent of the career Army lieutenants can expect to be promoted to general officer grade. It is emphasized that the above percentages are estimates. Many factors must be taken into consideration, such as, the number of lieutenants entering the Army with the intent on Army career, general officer authorizations, selection for promotion to intermediate grades and the number of times considered for promotion to general officer grade.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Approximately 0.4 percent of the Navy's unrestricted line ensigns and lieutenants junior grade now serving in their first through third years of service can expect to be promoted to flag officer rank. This estimate is based on current grade ceilings, projected promotion opportunities and past attrition experience. However a determination of this nature is no more reliable than the assumptions on which it is based and it is to be expected that this estimate of opportunity will change somewhat over the intervening 25 years before these officers will compete for flag rank.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Approximately 1 percent of career Air Force lieutenants can expect to be promoted to general officer grade. This percentage opportunity is based on the following facts and assumptions:

(a) The annual average number of promotions during the past five years to brigadier general (AF) has been 45.

(b) The annual average career officer input during the past five years has been approximately 4,500.

(c) For the purpose of this estimate, no change in currently authorized officer strengths and grades is assumed.

The accuracy of this estimated percentage opportunity would be affected by the following factors:

(a) Change in active duty officer strength authorizations.

(b) Regular/Reserve force mix.

(c) Regular officer strength and grade authorizations.

(d) Variance in annual procurement.

(e) Changes in promotion policy.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 27, 1964.

HON. HENRY M. JACKSON,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you for your letter of June 30, 1964, concerning Senator Pell's interest in the percentage of Foreign Service Officers who can look forward to becoming FSO-1's or Ambassadors.

During a nine year period ranging from FY 1955 to FY 1963, an average of 1.19% of all FSO's have reached the FSO-1 level. In FY 1958, for instance, 1.62% of the total group of FSO's were promoted to the O-1 level, while only 0.84% of the FY 1959 FSO complement were promoted to the senior level. (See Chart 2) For this same period the percentage range for all FSO's to reach the CA, CM, and FSO-1 level ranged from a low of 6.44% to a high of 11.34%.

These figures indicate that one out of every hundred officers are promoted to the O-1 level each year. This rate of promotion appears to maintain a group of senior career officers averaging 7.86% of the total FSO strength over a nine year period.

As of June 30th, 1964, all six Career Ambassadors entered the Foreign Service at or near the bottom of the career ladder. Forty-seven of the 60 Career Ministers (78.33%) entered the service in the junior ranks. With a total FSO-1 strength of 259 officers, it was found that 107 or 41.31% began their career as junior officers.

Forty-nine (48.3%) of the Career Ministers are serving as Ambassadors. Fourteen (5.4%) of the FSO-1's have attained the rank of Ambassador. Of the total group (325) of officers, 15.07% are currently serving as Ambassadors. In essence then, fifteen out of every 100 FSO's currently serving as senior officers are holding the rank of Ambassador.

The FSO-1 figures reflect only those officers that entered the Foreign Service at the junior grades. They do not reflect lateral entries of career civilian employees, professionals and specialists who were commissioned under The Manpower Act of 1946 or the Wriston Act. It is evident that many FSO-1's are lateral entries.

If we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT E. LEE,
Acting Assistant Secretary For Congressional Relations.

Foreign Service officers of career ambassadors, career ministers, and FSO-1 level by fiscal year

	Fiscal year 1955	Fiscal year 1956	Fiscal year 1957	Fiscal year 1958	Fiscal year 1959	Fiscal year 1960	Fiscal year 1961	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Career ambassadors.....			4	2	2	2	9	7	7
Career ministers.....	45	44	53	55	65	73	65	66	48
FSO-1's.....	103	110	122	155	186	192	222	232	226
Total CA, CM, O-1.....	148	154	179	212	253	267	296	305	281
Total Foreign Service officers for fiscal year.....	1,305	1,965	2,750	3,289	3,439	3,563	3,664	3,750	3,710
Percent of total Foreign Service officers to reach CA, CM, FSO-1 level.....	11.34	7.83	6.48	6.44	7.35	7.49	8.07	8.13	7.57

Percent of Foreign Service officers to be promoted to FSO-1 level¹

	Fiscal year 1955	Fiscal year 1956	Fiscal year 1957	Fiscal year 1958	Fiscal year 1959	Fiscal year 1960	Fiscal year 1961	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963
Number of FSO-2's to be promoted to FSO-1's.....	15	20	40	50	27	39	44	31	32
Total number of FSO-2's for fiscal year.....	141	220	305	340	373	394	412	429	406
Percent of FSO-2's to be promoted to FSO-1.....	10.63	9.09	13.11	14.70	7.23	9.89	10.67	7.22	7.88
Percent of all Foreign Service officers up to and including FSO-2 to be promoted to FSO-1 in fiscal year.....	1.29	1.10	1.55	1.62	.84	1.18	1.30	.89	.93

¹ For statistical purposes the number of Foreign Service officers used in this report do not include CA, CM, and FSO-1's.

Career ambassadors, career ministers, and Foreign Service officers, class 1, who entered the Foreign Service in the junior grades (FSO-8, 7, 6 or comparable) as of June 30, 1964

	Total	Entered as junior officers	Percent who have advanced from junior to senior level
Career ambassadors.....	6	6	100.00
Career ministers.....	60	47	78.33
FSO-1's.....	259	107	41.31
Total.....	325	160	49.23

	Number who have become ambassadors	Percent of the total group who have become ambassadors
Career ambassadors.....	6	100.0
Career ministers.....	29	48.3
FSO-1's.....	14	5.4
Total.....	49	

Senator PELL. I was also struck by your reference to the three great callings—the clergy, the teaching profession and the military profession. I once considered the one, and I tried the other two, and I thought politics might be added because it combines elements of all three. I am not sure that is a valid point.

I was wondering what your reaction was to the rather trite comment by Von Moltke who said in substance that if an officer was energetic and intelligent, he should go on the staff; if he was intelligent and unenergetic, he was suited for high command; if he was not too intelligent nor too energetic, he was suited for normal command; and if he was stupid and energetic he should be quickly fired.

Colonel LINCOLN. There is folklore about the latter category that General Patton commented that you should just shoot him and push him in the ditch before he gets you in trouble.

Senator PELL. Two minor points: Speaking to you as an intellectual at the academy, why do you use the word “counter-insurgency”? To my mind that is a very dangerous word, indeed, because actually we encourage some kinds of insurgency. Most of us would not be here if we had not been insurgents in politics, and I thought we ought to get away from this phrase because it looks as if we want to discourage insurgency. That is not true for a nation born in revolution.

I have tried with the Joint Chiefs and with the Secretaries to get this thought across. We ought to leave that word behind us—omit it from our arsenal of words—and use some other word.

Colonel LINCOLN. I couldn't agree with you more. The difficulty is that it has become so imbedded in the vernacular that it is the word you use when you want to create a particular image nowadays of a type of problem and a type of operation. It was given great status, I believe, at the start by being used in a speech or press conference by President Kennedy, and it has now permeated all down through the schooling system.

I am aware that the intellectuals in the State Department and the Government structure generally, and some people in the Pentagon, would like to find another term. I believe we are now trying to use “internal defense.” I would be much happier using “internal defense”, but I am using, in effect, the vernacular, which I didn't need to in this distinguished gathering, to express a thought that was the same as yours.

A full description of “counter-insurgency” is: “Helping new nations through the modernization barrier while preserving internal defense.” The “new nations” are, implicitly, less developed—sometimes “traditional societies”; the “internal defense” is at the minimum insurance against communist takeover. If the Senator can find one dramatic, acceptable term for all that—many will be grateful.

We deal with a rate of transition that is revolutionary, a transition which is a mixture of matters political, economic and social. The movement is to a new *order*. Such a transition inevitably involves exercise of power and struggles for power. Such struggles often develop to use of force, a form of power. Hence military resources are always the backdrop against which the transition takes place and sometimes move onto the stage.

Senator PELL. May I have inserted in the record at this point a statement on the subject of counter-insurgency?

Senator JACKSON. Certainly.

(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT BY SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE,
AUGUST 8, 1963

Mr. President: I should like to call the attention of the Senate to a semantic skirmish in the battle of words and labels which is such an important part of the Cold War. It is a skirmish, too, which we are completely losing.

I speak of our choice of the phrase "counter insurgency" whereby we damage our own cause and unwittingly aid our enemies.

Our policy is not to *counter* insurgency, but to *support* democratic insurgency.

In many parts of the world today, we are encouraging and conducting so-called "counter insurgency" operations. Here in Washington we speak of "counter insurgency" measures and "counter insurgency" planning, and we refer to "counter insurgency" as a desirable and necessary form of activity.

We all realize that this form of activity, the combating by unorthodox means of various Communist regimes and Communist-sponsored guerrilla activity, is both a necessary and a desirable policy. However, when we use the phrase "counter insurgency" to describe these operations, I believe we damage the image the world should have of our Nation and our purpose. By our very use of this phrase, our Nation indicates our opposition to "insurgency" or "insurgent activities." Surely this is not the image we wish to project in the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Actually, when the objectives of insurgents in any part of the world are freedom, liberty, or independence our policy cannot be described as one of "counter insurgency." Rather, it is just the opposite—we support this type of "democratic insurgency."

To be more personal for a moment, let us elected politicians look at ourselves. Many of us won our first election as "insurgents"! Almost every free nation was originally born in insurgency, and our United States was no exception.

In our current battle for the minds of men, it seems to me that such distinctions are truly important. We must take care to tell the world clearly and concisely just what we stand for and just what we are trying to do. In this instance, I believe that we are being careless and unclear in our choice of words. In fact, we are saying just the opposite of what we mean. By doing this, our motives can easily be distorted in the minds of people who should be our friends. It seems to me, therefore, that it's time for a semantic shift. Our cause will be stronger for it.

Accordingly, I urge that steps be taken within the Executive branch of the Government to substitute for the negative and inappropriate phrase "counter insurgency" a positive term more genuinely descriptive of our actions and attitudes. Such a positive term would be "democratic insurgency." Or, we could speak of "internal defense" or the encouraging of "counter guerrilla" or "freedom fighting" activities.

Senator PELL. I was interested in your views with regard to academy appointments, because we have the responsibility for appointing young men. I know the system that I and my colleague have evolved is one of going on the basis of straight marks. I think it is highly unsatisfactory. We do not take into account motivation, and yet in order to keep the thing perhaps as uncontroversial as possible, we do it on this basis.

It seems to me we on the Hill would be well out of the academy appointments role, and I was wondering what your view was of that.

Colonel LINCOLN. I have a rather definite view on that.

Senator PELL. I am a Coast Guard officer myself, and I rather like the appointment system we have.

Colonel LINCOLN. I believe in the geographical appointment system, if only from the practical political standpoint, that we need the country behind us and the Congress behind us at these academies. But

I believe firmly in Congressmen making nominations, but nominating without designation, and let the academies pick the man out of six, I guess the law now reads.

Senator MILLER. Four for West Point.

Colonel LINCOLN. I think we are going in the new law to five. Certainly the Air Force Academy and West Point have very professional entrance programs now. I can't comment on the Naval Academy because I don't know them at all, but I know well both the Air Force Academy and the Military Academy.

We have very professional entrance systems, professional registrars and professional registrar staffs. We have the closest collaboration with civilian colleges who are studying how to do this thing.

So I think you could well put the faith in our system to pick the best man out of the five. I could go into detail for an hour.

Senator JAVIRS. Colonel Lincoln, I have one question which interests me greatly.

I am interested in one line in your statement, which you and I have discussed before. It is where you say: "Nor do I list the 'defense intellectuals', whoever they are."

As a staff officer myself, and in my relation to professional officers, of whom you are an extraordinarily brilliant example, I have been troubled by how you did bring the brilliant civilian mind to the highest level of your own decision. Now, when I was there, and I think the practice has been pursued since, there was a tremendously laborious process of trying to drag in good civilian thinking and it very rarely, in my judgment, had the impact that it should. It only percolated through to the top where the decision was made through a lot of people who may have disagreed with it or may not have thought too much of it, or were kind of more or less inclined to dismiss it. I think that the military forces only really get the brilliant civilian thinking from contractors where you have a specific thing that you are trying to accomplish, or from the occasional enlightenment of a particular commander in calling in high-level people, because they are all available to him.

For myself, I have always been troubled by the fact that we have some brilliant thinking in this country, and how does it get brought into the decisionmaking process at the top in our military establishment? What are the techniques for that, if any? What thinking has been done about it?

Colonel LINCOLN. I have two comments. The first one is very firm. I don't like this term "defense intellectuals," and I guess it is a little unpopular in the Pentagon, but it is being used rather widely, and for what it is worth, I consider that it should be applied equally to some people in civilian clothes and to a very large number of individuals in uniform.

After all, General Taylor is a Defense intellectual, taking the precise meaning of the words, and General Goodpaster, and General Wheeler are Defense intellectuals. There are a large and increasing number of younger officers who are able to think and talk and debate with the best individuals in civilian clothes on these terrible, difficult problems we face in national security.

Now, as to the procedures in bringing people in, one can select an individual, or individuals, and put him in a position of formal re-

sponsibility and perhaps the best example is the arrival of Mr. Hitch, supported by Dr. Enthoven whom this committee might like to talk to sometime.

Senator JACKSON. I have talked with him. By the way, he comes from my home area, Seattle, Washington.

Colonel LINCOLN. You will find Dr. Enthoven has some very interesting ideas on the topic that we are here discussing. I think that he would support most of the things that have been said here. This method of placing outside thinkers in positions of authority is one way to do it. This method causes strains, which have been reported in the press. The method, however, at times may be the least worse way to handle the matter.

You, of course, are not often going to get these people full-time and you are not going to keep them very long.

Another way is the consultant or board of consultants. If military leadership wants to use these individuals, the board can be a very powerful consulting, reporting organization, or very useful in pushing forward ideas, in analyzing proposals, and in requiring that the broader view be taken.

Senator JAVITS. I would hope that our staff, in preparing what will result from these hearings, would give consideration to the actual state of the utilization of civilian brains by our whole defense establishment, and make comparisons with the NIH in its war on disease and so on.

Other agencies of Government have rather elaborate set-ups for advice of that kind, including the National Security Council—let us see if we should make some recommendation for a formalization of a really high-level consultative body to deal with our armed forces, and endeavor to bring the impact of the best national thinking that we have on their problems.

Senator JACKSON. Just as a point, in the area of science we do have a lot of advisory committees made up of extremely competent, professional people. We have the Science Advisory Committee to the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Army, as well as one in the Defense Department. The Armed Services have many ad hoc groups that are brought in from time to time—there is a long list of such committees and groups. But we will check on that.

Senator JAVITS. I think it is well worth looking into, as well as the contract arrangements with universities and so on.

Senator JACKSON. There is of course the Rand Corporation, and similar groups.

Senator JAVITS. I think that there is some remarkably good thinking in the country. I have always worried about whether in this indispensable, critical area, we were really delivering to the point of contact everything that we have available back in the zone of the interior.

Colonel LINCOLN. Could I make another comment to this, sir? I think a most desirable way for the introduction of this resource comes through easy interplay between military people and the minds that we are speaking about here.

That comes about as the individuals know each other, or the categories know each other. Now, the officer who has been personally acquainted with this type of individual, maybe not the specific in-

dividual, but this type of individual, is not reluctant to ring him up on the telephone and say, "What do you think", or if the Congress, in its wisdom, has provided the funds, call him up and say, "How about coming down to Washington for three days and working on this problem with us."

I have worked in this way. I can cite individuals who have done this a great deal. One was General Norstad. He made a practice of calling on the best civilian minds on problems for which he was responsible.

Another such individual was General Gavin, when he was a staff officer in the Pentagon. This way of operation is a very desirable way of operation, but it presumes, again, that the two-way street is open.

Now, I will go on and say that with the increasing number of officers coming to top-level positions, who have had graduate school, they tend to take the type of action that I am talking about with greater ease.

Senator JAVITS. You have put your finger exactly on what I have in mind, because what you have just described is the traditional practice, and it is not satisfactory because it gives the military people the final say as to what goes into the process and what doesn't. It does not get the benefit of what we have here, which is debate. If you fellows might not like some of the thinking that these fellows you call up give you—then you can reject it, and as a matter of fact, the man who is giving you the thinking knows you can reject it and it may never be heard of again.

I don't think that that is right. I think that you ought to have to justify in the national domain on some major question your attitude as against the best civilian thinking attitude. It shouldn't be confined to the officials of the Defense Department.

For example, I am a Senator and I have to vote on whether to continue to spend billions of dollars on manned bombers. Now, Barry Goldwater tells me that the missiles are unreliable and that we need a lot of manned bombers. He is a patriotic American. A lot of other people tell me, including the Secretary of Defense, that that is all wet and we had better spend our billions on missiles, and that the manned bomber on the whole is already obsolescent and why waste your time and money on that.

Now, I don't know who is right. I rather suspect the missile fellows are right, but that is only my instinct, because I am inclined to look ahead instead of backward. But I only mention that although it may not be germane, as a kind of a problem which should be cast in the national debate with both sides having equally substantial and reputable backing—if there are two sides. If there aren't, so much the better, then we would stop wasting our time about a debate which isn't a debate. I only give you that as an example because you point up exactly what I hope the staff will look into.

Sure, there is this cross-reference of ideas, and communications, and there always was, and there is more now because as you say, more officers have graduate degrees and feel at home in the intellectual community and that is great. Nobody could be more pleased than I at that development but I don't think that that is entirely the point. I think that the point is that the whole enterprise is now so big, and so

vital, and so much beyond the strictly military equation that I think we really need to have some better way than we have of bringing to bear the whole weight of the national capacity for thinking, if possible—and it may not be possible to do this, you know—without hurting morale. But I would hope our staff would have a look at it. I think your testimony on that has been tremendously helpful.

Colonel LINCOLN. I think, sir, that I failed to communicate completely. First, I recognize your problem, but there is a second point to what I have been talking about. That is, that this consultation can and should happen at any level. The specific problem that you raise is a White House level problem in the end, rather than the sort of problem I was thinking about, for example, that of a colonel heading a staff division who has to send an officer out to Rwanda—and wants to know what language they speak there. Maybe G-2 can tell him. Perhaps he would like to chat with a professor of Columbia who has been there.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

Senator JACKSON. On behalf of the Committee, as you can gather from the questions and comments, we are extremely appreciative of your fine statement and the responses that you have given to the many questions.

I know that you have made a very valuable contribution.

Colonel LINCOLN. I feel very privileged and complimented to be asked to appear before the Committee.

Senator JACKSON. We will hold this hearing record open for a number of items which are being submitted at our request as additions to the testimony. Also, in connection with issues touched on today, we are requesting from present and former government officials certain memoranda which will not be available in the immediate future. I suggest that when we receive these papers they be printed as a sequel to this hearing. The subcommittee will now be in recess.

(Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT I

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE ROBERT A. LOVETT, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
AT UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT, N.Y., MAY 2, 1964, UPON
THE RECEIPT OF THE SYLVANUS THAYER AWARD

General Lampert, General Groves, Graduates of West Point, gentlemen of the Corps of Cadets, ladies and gentlemen :

Few events in my life have given me as great pleasure and certainly none is more deeply appreciated than the Award of the Sylvanus Thayer Medal. I thank you most sincerely for it. I am keenly aware of the honor thus done me by the Association of Graduates. I am most grateful to all of you for your generous thought of me, and I am profoundly touched by today's events and your heart-warming courtesies.

I must confess my enjoyment is heightened by knowing the honor comes from a group with whom I have been closely associated in my several periods of government service. My first experience with West Point graduates occurred some 47 years ago in France in World War I. Since then I have observed graduates of this Academy as they met the crucial tests of three wars. I have seen them in battle, worked with them in the field and at the conference table, and I have sat with them as participants in the councils of peace. Against such a background, measurements can be made with some assurance, and I must say to you that I have never met a group of men more dedicated to the service of their country, more dependable and faithful to their trust, or more competent and capable of discharging the responsibilities vested in them. And to these characteristics, I must add generosity of spirit—a quality of which I am the fortunate beneficiary today as I have been in other circumstances in the past.

In three tours of duty in Washington, I came to know many of these fine officers in a manner made possible only by shared problems and frustrations, heavy responsibilities and endless hours of working together. I acquired for the code and discipline which molded them a feeling of esteem and respect and, for the men themselves, a trust and friendship for which I will be grateful until the day I die. For these very personal reasons I am especially moved by today's ceremonies.

In this center of military education which, under Sylvanus Thayer, became the fountainhead of American technology, I would like to take note of the increasing tempo of the revolution now taking place in military professionalism and, with your indulgence, make a few observations on it.

I will be as brief as possible, partly because I recognize that boring you excessively would be a poor return for your kindnesses to me; and partly because every time I get ready to sound off about something, a few lines of a light-hearted prayer by an unknown author pop into my head. The prayer is entitled, with chilling aptness, "Prayer for those growing old;" and the lines are "Keep me from the fatal habit of thinking I must say something on every subject. Release me from craving to straighten out everyone's affairs. With my vast store of wisdom and experience, it seems a pity not to use it all, but thou knowest, Lord, that I want a few friends at the end."

I have been trying for years to think of some nice and uncritical things to say about growing older. I can only think of three: First, is the judgment attributed to Maurice Chevalier who, when asked on his seventieth birthday, how it felt to be that old, replied with Gallic realism, "it is better than the alternative." Secondly, and seriously, there is the advantage of seeing matters in better perspective. Many things a younger generation takes for granted actually represent major achievements frequently running contrary to previously accepted doctrine. For example, it seemed unlikely that an army could be ready at one and the same time for nuclear war, as well as conventional war of all types—yet, this is ex-

actly what Army units are being trained for. I would have predicted that the lengthy assignment of U.S. troops to stations in foreign countries would create more problems than it would resolve—and I would have been wrong. I compare your current curriculum with mine in college and wonder whether I ever would have graduated in these days. In short, the sense of values grows more acute with time, and I conclude from a clearer perspective, that the current achievements of the Army and of yours should be a matter of pride to everyone—and not taken for granted.

And thirdly, with the accumulation of experience over the years, it is easier both to identify and to evaluate change. The thoughtless person is apt automatically to identify change with progress. Yet, we all know that what is new or different is not always for the better. Change—and relatively rapid change at that—is inevitable. Since it is the first law of nature, we must reckon with it but in doing so it is essential that we see not only the gains to be made but also the price to be paid. If we do that, we frequently reduce the price by preserving more of the things that are worth preserving. High among the latter, I put the great traditions of West Point. And I include in the list, mutual confidence and respect between civilian officials and military officers which have proved to be essential to real progress under our system of government.

The military profession is currently experiencing so rapid a change it can fairly be called a revolution—particularly since it has some internecine characteristics. Some unsung modern Thayers have seen the wider horizons which must now concern the professional military officer with the result that the Army curriculum already reflects increased emphasis on non-military areas of study and on post-graduate work. This is, of course, a response to the dilemma which confronts all professional men; namely, that there is "much too much they need to know and too little time in which to learn it." Dr. Vannevar Bush, of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says "the doctor, the architect, or the chemist cannot possibly know all he needs to know for his professional work. Hence, he needs to know how he can find out. More important, he needs to be able—genuinely, honestly and generously—to collaborate with those who know more than he on diverse aspects of problems as they arise."

In the difficult professional career on which you have already embarked, you will never be finished with learning. Indeed, it seems clear that demands on you in the future will be more varied, responsibilities heavier and the need for breadth of training and experience greater because decision-making today involves the use of a wider diversity of special skills and knowledge than ever before. Much of the decision-making is in fields where there is no tested, actual experience. Much of it is a question of assessing economic, social, political and ideological considerations.

In the Cold War, the devising of proper action depends on the contribution of many types of experts—not just one. The military professional is a most important contributor to the discussions of our problems for a reason not always recognized by the government and the public he serves. The professional career officer, owing to his skills and his commitments, accepts a higher degree of responsibility than other citizens and voluntarily gives up certain of the privileges of a private citizen. You serve in an ancient profession with special disciplines because, as Lieutenant General Sir John Hackett has said, "the function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force to the resolution of a social problem."

This fact places you in a unique category of public servants and in a most select rank of profession. Because of the nature of your duties and responsibilities, you are, in effect, trustees and custodians of the armed power of the American people. You are, therefore, in a fiduciary relationship by reason of having this awesome power entrusted to you. No greater evidence of confidence and faith could be reposed in you. No greater compliment could be paid you.

Military advice is only one—although, on occasion, the most necessary—type of guidance needed today and the decision-making process involves a system of checks and balances in the Executive Branch deliberately designed to keep any one economic or social group or any one governmental department from becoming dominant. Therefore, every judgment made at the decisive level requires a weighing of several often-conflicting and competing factors.

For these reasons, the ability of the military expert to give wise advice—and to get it listened to by policy-making officials—depends in great measure on his possessing knowledge in key nonmilitary fields and in seeing issues in broad perspective. For example, the military expert should be able to spot instantly

the phony or slanted economic theory or financial policy advanced in arguments. He must, of course, be adequately prepared to look askance at any exaggerated claims—whether for a weapon or a course of action—even when made in the exalted name of “scientific methods.” It might, in such cases, be useful to remember the rather sly question, attributed to some doubting disciples, as to whether scientific methods applied to horse breeding to improve transportation could ever have produced the modern automobile engine. After all, human will, creativeness and talent must be given credit for something by somebody.

Furthermore, the military officer should be ready to identify and evaluate the impact of the swings in politico-social emotions and fashions which are so frequently the affliction of our national security and foreign policy. It is these factors which so largely influence us and produce those weird reversals and grotesque lurches that give us a policy often referred to as “crisis oriented” but which can, I think, be more accurately described as the “Yo-yo system”—that is, you throw it away one minute and snatch it back the next.

In short, the military career officer must be highly skilled in his own profession, but he cannot afford to become trapped in narrow professionalism. Nor, indeed, can his country permit him to do so.

General Eisenhower—a most distinguished predecessor in the Thayer Award—in his farewell message as President made a statement strangely overlooked by most commentators—who pounced so eagerly on his reference to the dangers of a “military-industrial complex”—yet neglected advice of equal or greater weight. He wisely—and also pointedly—said “in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.”

The noted British writer, C. P. Snow, himself an eminent scientist, similarly warned against the danger of a scientific overlord—against a scientist in a position of isolated power.

What is true of the scientist is true of the military expert. It is not the unwarranted *power* of the scientist or of the military officer or of any other expert that is now cause for our concern. *Isolation* is what creates the real problem—that is, power insulated from competing skills or the claims of other groups for recognition of possible alternative courses of action. Consequently, if “knowledge is power”, as the old axiom tells us, then *insulated knowledge* fails to meet fully our needs in the making of public policy.

I believe the time has come for a new Thayer-like break-out from the relatively narrow concept of the military profession and rigid doctrines held by my generation into studies of wider scope. In particular, we must develop a faster response to the technological and scientific revolution with its resulting impact on strategy and doctrine. I am convinced that this extension of proper military concern can best be built on the firm foundation of the military sciences and of the discipline and high standards of character based on the great traditions of this magnificent military Academy and those of its sister services. For the virtues nourished here are your priceless inheritance from The Long Gray Line and must remain one of the few unchanging values in a radically changing world.

I submit, gentlemen, that only an expanding mind can deal with a world of expanding complexities; and that broadening your horizons will not diminish the value of your special military skills but will, on the contrary, enhance their validity and usefulness in those great Councils of Government where, as servants of the Republic, you will sit as keepers of the faith and guardians of the peace.

[The following text is extremely faint and illegible due to the quality of the scan. It appears to be a multi-paragraph scientific article.]

EXHIBIT II

LETTER OF SECRETARY OF THE NAVY PAUL H. NITZE TO ADMIRAL CHARLES D. GRIFFIN, PRESIDENT OF THE FY 1965 FLAG SELECTION BOARD, MAY 18, 1964

DEAR ADMIRAL GRIFFIN: In giving consideration to the responsibility I have for participating in the process of selection of officers for flag rank, I have come to the following views.

1. Far more important than anything I may write or say upon this subject is the designation of a selection board, consisting of members in which I have the utmost confidence that they will be wisely responsive to the requirements of the naval service. For this reason, I gave personal attention to this aspect of the selection process. It is my conviction that in this year's board we have members who are attuned to the changing nature of the requirements for flag officers, who will be able to determine from the performance of officers within the duty patterns of their past years, those who are best fitted to provide leadership in an appreciably different future.

2. Having said that, I should nevertheless like to record my view of how the requirements of the past may have differed from the requirements of the future and the effect this should have on your approach to the selection process.

3. I believe that it continues to be most important for the Navy to select officers of flag rank who will be superb leaders in sea-going commands. This does not mean, however, that we need to place so much emphasis upon competence in sea-going billets that we fail to give substantial emphasis to competence to provide leadership in critical positions involving technical and management responsibilities. I believe that it should be possible to identify those officers whose performance at sea has given evidence that they will be brilliant leaders of task forces and fleets, but who have demonstrated those additional characteristics of leadership that qualify them for positions of greatest responsibility ashore.

4. I shall not presume to try to describe for you, who are far more experienced in Naval operations than I, the characteristics that mark a man as a potentially great operational commander. I do believe that I have had the professional experience to provide guidance and insights in regard to those additional qualities which would be most likely to provide great benefit to the Navy in assignments other than at sea.

5. You will have been briefed by the Chief of Naval Personnel on those billets which can best be filled by officers of various sub-specializations. I have the view that these sub-specializations are most important and that this fact should be recognized by each selection board and given serious, but not overriding weight. By that I seek to emphasize that I do not consider it mandatory that any given board endeavor to provide selections from all specializations which require flag officers, but, rather, that we should expect that over a period of several years the law of averages will permit us to fill required specializations while giving major emphasis to the selection of more broadly qualified leadership.

6. After giving careful consideration to qualification for sea command and required specializations, I believe the selection board should place great stress on seeking evidence, in the past performance of prospective flag officers, of the qualities of flexibility of mind, analytical thought processes, creativity and imagination which will best qualify them to compete with the increasingly professional and intellectual civilian leadership within an increasingly integrated Defense Department. I think that the evidence of such qualifications can be found in many categories of billets. However, I can think of none where the naval officer is put to a greater test of ability to rise above his background and possible prejudices than by demonstrated outstanding performance in Joint and International Staffs and Agencies. It is here that the common dogma of any one service must give way to the give and take of analysis from differing perspectives. It is here that he must rely less on the lessons of past experience and more on his basic qualities of intellect and thoughtfulness.

7. It seems to me that still another method of getting at the qualities mentioned in paragraph 6 above is through scrutiny of the manner in which the prospective flag officer has adapted himself to changes in professional billets involving distinctly different skills. That is, an officer who has performed brilliantly in a series of positions of related skills may not be as broadly capable of the kind of performance we need in the Navy of the future as one who has demonstrated similar performance in a series of different skills.

8. As a separate matter, if the Navy is to make its proper contribution to those councils where more than one military service is represented, it is important for the program of early selection of the past several years to continue in conformity with the general guidance provided by the Chief of Naval Personnel and approved by me. At the same time, in order that motivation to continue sustained performance in the more senior years may be provided, I consider it important that there be conformity also to the general guidance for numbers to be selected in the more senior categories.

9. I hope that the results of this board will provide a balance through a range in seniority, a range in specializations, and most importantly, a strong leavening of line officers broadly qualified to provide not only brilliant operational command but also unique intellectual leadership in any new and different positions—Navy, Joint, or International—into which they may be ordered.

Sincerely,

PAUL H. NITZE,
Secretary of the Navy.

Adm. CHARLES D. GRIFFIN,
*Commander in Chief,
U.S. Naval Forces, Europe,
Fleet Post Office, New York, N.Y.*

EXHIBIT III

EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (EDUCATION) AT UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT, NEW YORK, APRIL 24, 1964

THE MILITARY MIND

A favorite subject of mine is the military mind. One of the reasons this is so is because there is so much mileage in it these days, what between "Fail Safe", "Dr. Strangelove", and "Seven Days in May."

Other less facetious reasons for my interest in the military mind are its importance to the nation and the cost of its preparation and education. All things considered, the cost is about a billion dollars. In terms of area alone, if campuses of all our military training and educational establishments were put together, they would equal in area size the size of the City of Los Angeles, added to the City of Chicago, added to Greater New York City. Nor do these campuses lack for students. We have in school at any one time up to 300,000 or between ten and fifteen percent of the total military population of the United States. All of these people aren't learning to take apart machineguns and nuclear missiles and radar sets or one thing and another. Many are studying at universities. One Service, for example, has graduate students at 88 different universities in this country and abroad. Consequently, I would imagine that today the Armed Forces are as well an educated profession in terms of the number of years they spend in school as any other. This fact is impressed upon me every morning when I come in and see the Air Force Colonel who is my Director of Education Programs because he has not only a Bachelor of Science Degree from West Point, but also a Master of Public Administration from Harvard, a Master of Business Administration from George Washington, and a Doctor of Education from the University of Denver.

But what does this erudite military mind really think about? Few people, I suppose, know or even profess to know. The military mind, of course, really isn't unlike other professional minds. It deals with intellectual problems in basically the same way that an academic mind or a medical mind or an engineering mind or a legal mind attack their respective problems. It deals with very real, intellectual problems concerning the profession of arms. Ones which I imagine most of you haven't thought about before. I'd like to illustrate one in the very simplest possible terms, the machine gun, a weapon which is in some degree familiar to all of us.

Consider for a moment the problem of being confronted for the very first time with a weapon that can shoot at so many rounds per minute, that can traverse and go up and down and shoot overhead, that takes a large amount of ammunition, that heats after a certain period of time and then freezes with heat. How would this thing be used? Do you use it on attack? Do you use it on defense? Do you mount it on something? Do you use it on the flanks? How do you supply it with ammunition? Does its firepower allow for a reduction in conventionally armed troops? It took as bright a group of intellectuals as the world has really known eight years to figure out these programs in terms so that they're willing to buy machine guns. That was the German General Staff at the turn of the century. But now, of course, military people's problems have increased a good deal more than that in intellectual terms. Have you ever thought about the history of, say, the thousand years between 847 and 1847 and then 1847-1947? That thousand to a hundred year span and then that in terms of the ten years just between 1947 and 1957. Between 847 and 1847 was the period of castles and crossbows and longbows and big Swiss pikes and gunpowder and cannons and the new engineering. Compare that to the period from 1847 to 1947 in terms of battleships, oil, gasoline, repeating weapons, tanks, planes, and the atomic bomb, and then think of it in terms of the ten years after that—automation, miniaturization, hydrogen bomb, missiles, space. You have about a thousand to a hundred to ten ratio of technological compression.

Now, what's the military problem? The military problem is to think in terms of the usage in terms of power of a technology which is changing in these kinds of terms. In other words, the military today has the problem of turning into social terms the fastest-changing technology that the world has ever seen. This is what the military mind is occupied with. It is occupied, in other words, with a world in which over a twenty-year span there has been the most enormous paradox that there ever has been in history. They are dealing with a world which technology has shrunk until it is so small that we can go around it in hours and communicate with one another through outer space. Yet, at the same time, the world over that period of time has been growing as fast as it has been shrinking in social terms. It has been getting larger in terms of numbers of countries. It has been getting larger in terms of numbers of people, and it has been getting larger in terms of the numbers of people that we care about.

So what does the military mind think about? The military mind thinks about the relationship between this technology, as I suggest, and its impact socially and psychologically and economically and politically on the world in which they live. But they have to take a step beyond this. The military today also has to be able to think in terms of training missions the world over, a more complicated problem than is faced in any other profession because he may be training at one time in South America, at another time in the Far East, and at still another in Africa or in Europe. He has got to know more than most economists know in terms of international economics—he must know village economics, and he must know how people eat, and he must know village sociology, and he must know village politics, and he must know the history of regions, and he must know the prejudices of regions, the theology of peoples, what motivates them, what they think about; he must know what they want to be so that he can help them to be the kind of people they really want to be.

This, then, is the world of the military. There is no profession which is more intellectual than this one, and that is why I suggest that the military mind really doesn't have very much time on its brain cells so to speak, to be worrying about taking over the government or starting world wars. It is really much more concerned with meeting the ever-increasing demands and responsibilities thrust upon this nation.

EXHIBIT IV

GRADUATION ADDRESS BY WILFRED J. McNEIL, FORMER COMPTROLLER OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, TO THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES, WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 9, 1964

General Schomburg, distinguished guests, faculty, gentlemen of the student body.

It was a great honor for each of you to have been selected to attend this school. It is a still greater honor to be graduating today, and I consider it a unique privilege to be able to join with you in this graduation ceremony.

You have had the opportunity of a year's study seldom available in the business world or elsewhere for that matter. To many an individual, this year would be something to cherish all one's life and many a commercial enterprise could well and profitably undertake such a program.

With a year's hard but satisfying work behind you, you may properly return to your careers with pride and a sense of accomplishment. Certainly, you go to your new duties better equipped to contribute to the solution of the problems of national security.

Postwar, James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, felt deeply that a true way to achieve a more effective military establishment was to create an environment where responsible officers of each of the military services—together with a leavening of senior people from other Government Agencies—might live and work together in an academic atmosphere of the broadest character. He collaborated with Secretary of War Stimson in broadening the field of the Industrial College, and in establishing the National War College, your sister school across the way. While the Industrial College had a long and illustrious career under Army cognizance it is gratifying to see the results of this effort to broaden its field and encouraging to find the close and cooperative relationship that exists between these two senior schools today.

It is often the habit of a graduation speaker to compare the problems that faced graduates of other years. Let us look at those that existed at the time that the College was first identified as the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. There were many grievous problems confronting the nation. Greece was fighting the Communist insurrection; Iran was being pressed by Stalin for an oil agreement; Turkey was under direct Soviet pressure; Hungary had just succumbed to the Communists and freedom in Czechoslovakia was being rapidly undermined; Britain was virtually bankrupt; Italy was near chaos, the De Gasperi government, Italy's eighth since the liberation, was under violent attack by the Communists; the Yugoslavs were threatening the free territory of Trieste; South China was hard pressed and the unification of Korea had reached a stalemate.

Many of the problems of that day were solved. Economies of many of those countries are at new high levels. In many, political stability—then only a distant goal—has been achieved. Today, the names and some of the problems are different, but they are no less in significance. Then, as now, the broad viewpoint, the mutual understanding and the trained mind offer the best chance for successful solutions.

The Department of Defense must ever be more dependent upon those who are competent in matters you have studied here. With rising costs, increasing complexity of equipment, greater problems of logistic support, those in charge must have adequate knowledge and background to ensure effectiveness.

The present tendency to increasingly greater civilian control, over both defense planning and execution, must be tempered by an increasingly skilled and competent Officer Corps. The need was never greater for fully professional men. There is a necessity for the realism of the true professional.

Civilian control is a principle, of course, that underlies our military forces. But compatible with this must be recognition of the fact that the most effective defense establishment is one where the skills and talents which can be found only among uniformed personnel, are integrated with other skills which normally are more highly developed in civilian enterprises.

The military must accept the fact that participation in more precise and objective ways of service and joint planning is now an essential element of their military profession and their duty. On the part of civilian authority, there must be an enlightened attitude toward acceptance of advice in planning and in operations, together with an understanding of what it takes beyond material resources to build and direct fighting forces. They must learn to evaluate military judgment.

Our national defense is as much a matter of strong and dynamic ideas as it is weapons systems, bases and manpower. If we lack a wealth of ideas, our wealth of the material means of defense will be meaningless.

These ideas must be cultivated at every level of our defense system. They must be encouraged and must flow with relative freedom to the very top levels of government where they can compete for acceptance.

Recently, there seems to be a dangerous tendency in our defense to try to anticipate what is wanted from the top and then supply it. In this kind of "give me what I want" atmosphere we lose many valuable ideas and the benefit of many points of view, each based on a particular perspective and framework of experience. And, perhaps, of greater importance, well trained and incisive people are discouraged from further attempts at unpatterned thinking.

Not only is it important to encourage this upward thrust of ideas in order to select and implement the best but it is also important that we use this process to develop alternate means of action. Circumstances and technology are moving too rapidly for us to rely on any single concept as the "only" or the "ultimate" means of national defense. In our arsenal of ideas there must be material that can be adapted and used to meet any threat and varied circumstances. The speed at which these technological changes and shifting circumstances occur make the need for the free development of ideas even more imperative.

The proof of these maxims is all around us. Many a business, nation, civilization lies buried because there were too many people saying "yes" when they should have been persisting vigorously alternate views and ideas.

Over the years I have been impressed by the quality of many of the reports coming from the several committees of students. They have shown original and provocative thinking. In fact, some have been so timely and dealt so competently with problems that were so troublesome that it was a great temptation not to ask that they be made available for staff use in the Government. As a matter of fact, and as an exception, one report was so outstanding that Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford made it "required" reading for senior civilian and military officials in the Pentagon. While the College is right in taking the position that such reports should not generally be circulated outside the school, I fervently hope that ideas of the kind introduced in such studies are injected into the workstream from your new duty stations.

In the high tradition of this college, you have been able to let your mind range over a wide variety of complex problems in this business of defense. Yours has been the task, as Admiral Macdonald said on opening day, of learning to appreciate the interdependence, one upon the other, of all the varied components of our overall national strength.

I am sure that many outstanding lecturers who have appeared before you have made you more aware of the political and economic factors that affect military decisions. You have had the opportunity—both factual and psychological—to examine more freely the elements that foster economic growth and stability in a free enterprise economy such as ours. You know that military policy can never be divorced from economic and fiscal policy. You are better able to realize the value of the proper management of resources and the importance of sound judgment in their allocation and use. There is no more unproductive way of spending money and wasting resources than to undertake programs which lack supervision and skill in the preparation or which are unwisely directed.

Wise old Benjamin Franklin wrote a parable on this point which is worth repeating. He describes "how to make a striking sundial by which not only a man's own family, but all his neighbors for ten miles round, may know what o'clock it is, when the sun shines, without seeing the dial.

"Choose an open place in your yard or garden, on which the sun may shine all day without any impediment from trees or buildings. On the ground, mark out your hour lines, making room enough for the guns. On the line for one o'clock, place one gun; on the two o'clock line two guns, and so of the rest. The guns must all be charged with powder, but ball is unnecessary. Your style

must have twelve burning glasses annexed to it, and be so arranged that the sun shining through the glasses, one after the other, shall cause the focus or burning spot to fall on the hour line of one for example, at one o'clock, and there kindle a train of gunpowder that shall fire one gun. At two o'clock, a focus shall fall on the hour line of two, and kindle another train that shall discharge two guns successively; and so of the rest.

"Note, there must be 78 guns in all. Thirty-two pounders will be best for this use; but 18 pounders may do, and will cost less, as well as use less powder.

"Note, also, that the chief expense will be the powder, for the cannons once bought will, with care, last 100 years.

"Note, moreover, that there will be a great saving of powder in cloudy days.

"Kind reader, me thinks I hear thee say, that is indeed a good thing to know how the time passes, but this kind of dial, notwithstanding the above mentioned savings, would be very expensive, and the cost greater than the advantage. Thou art wise, my friend, to be so considerate beforehand; some fools would not have found out so much, till they had made the dial and tried it. Let all such learn that many a private and many a public project is like this striking dial, great cost for little profit."

The points to remember are that you are the trustees of the confidence and support which the public gives you; that there is the wrong way and the right way to size up and approach a problem; that objective analysis as well as competent performance are your duty; that no degree of genius or expertise is too great to be challenged and that ideas should be filtered through the only policy computer yet devised—the minds of responsible leaders.

As General Wheeler pointed out to last year's Graduation class: "You have had the opportunity to attain a broad viewpoint and to develop a 'trained mind' which Clausewitz said is essential to survive in the element of war." May you continue to develop these attributes, for they are essential to our nation and its safety.

You take with you from this College, a knowledge of the close relationship between command and management. In fact, in many fields these terms are almost synonymous. You know of the great progress that the theory and capabilities of the management of resources has made in the military services since World War II. You are aware of the dangers of over-management and over-control. You will avoid situations where the computer becomes the master—not the servant, because you know the value of people and the application of judgment. You know that technology can fail, but leadership as characterized by the individual, must not. With this background, you have an unusual opportunity for service.

This College has given you the unequalled ability of knowing each other and those you serve. The mutual understanding and the broadened viewpoint that must be a product of your year here, will be reflected in your future service. I would hope that these qualities are never lost as you again become involved in the day-to-day problems of command and staff.

From every viewpoint, you return to other duties with greatly enhanced qualities for service to your country, and as you go, I congratulate you and your family and wish each of you good fortune and success.

CHAPTER I
THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA

THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA
BY CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS

IN 1492, CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, AN ITALIAN MARINER, WAS SENT BY SPAIN TO FIND A WESTERN ROUTE TO INDIA.

HE SUCCEEDED IN 1492, WHEN HE DISCOVERED THE ISLANDS OF THE CARIBBEAN SEA.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

HE WAS THE FIRST EUROPEAN TO REACH THE AMERICAN CONTINENT.

EXHIBIT V

LETTERS FROM SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ROBERT S. MCNAMARA ON STATUS AND EVALUATION OF THE STATE-DEFENSE
OFFICER EXCHANGE PROGRAM

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, July 27, 1964.

HON. HENRY M. JACKSON,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: In response to your letter of June 20, I am enclosing a staff report which will provide you and your colleagues with an up-to-date picture of the State-Defense Officer Exchange Program in terms of its impact on the Department of State. I would like to add some further personal comments of my own on this Program. Let me say at the outset that I am quite pleased with it and feel that it has been notably successful in accomplishing its objectives.

While the fundamental objectives of the Program fall under the heading of training, I have been impressed with the contributions that the Exchange Officers have made to the substantive performance of the two Departments. Because of their generally high quality and broad experience, these officers have usually been able to contribute in short order to the work of their new offices. There is no doubt that the Department of State's handling of politico-military problems has benefited significantly from the contributions of the Defense exchange officers. In many cases, their efforts have been quite outstanding.

With the Program now firmly and successfully established, we are not so much concerned with emphasizing its strong points as we are with detecting, and rectifying, any weaknesses we may discover. We recognize that its continuing success cannot be taken for granted. It requires close and continuing attention by those responsible in the two Departments, including senior officials. In the State Department, the Exchange Program continues to receive the personal attention of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

I would identify three key elements that have been and continue to be essential to the success of this Program: (1) the selection of high quality personnel to participate in it; (2) the assurance that positions made available for exchange personnel have an appropriate level of responsibility, challenge, and elevation in the bureaucratic hierarchy; and (3) confidence of the participants that onward assignments and general career development will bear meaningful relation to their exchange experience. I think that we have so far managed to satisfy these criteria in an impressive way, and I am confident that we can continue to do so.

Sincerely,

DEAN RUSK.

Enclosure: Staff report.

Report on the State-Defense Officer Exchange Program

The State-Defense Exchange Program went into actual operation in early January 1961 with the initial assignment of five officers by each agency. The fundamental assumption underlying the Program was that the intimate interdependence of foreign policy and military policy required that the two departments primarily responsible for them have available a growing number of officers with a solid grasp of the responsibilities, problems, procedures and operations of the other.

Serving a normal two-year working tour in the other agency was viewed as one effective way of producing this result. It was not and is not regarded as the only way to do so since a number of other personnel programs of the Departments of State and Defense contribute to it. Among them might be mentioned the assignment of Foreign Service Officers as Political Advisers to military commanders and as faculty advisers and students at the various senior military colleges; and the recently initiated program under which watch of-

ficers are exchanged between the National Military Command Center and the State Department's Operations Center.

From the point of view of those Foreign Service Officers who have participated in the Program and those State Department officers who have been supervisors and colleagues of the exchange personnel from the Department of Defense, the Program, on the basis of 3½ years of experience with it, is regarded as a substantial success. Not only is it increasing the number of Foreign Service Officers interested in and experienced in dealing with politico-military problems, but it has also contributed to the improvement of State-Defense relations and communications and to the quality of national security policy-making in both agencies.

Within the Department of State, the various aspects of the Exchange Program have been coordinated and closely monitored by the staff of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, in collaboration with the Office of Personnel. The Program has had the personal attention and interest of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to whose office the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs is attached.

As of July 15, 1964, 26 Foreign Service Officers have participated in the Program. (A complete list of these officers is attached). Eleven are on duty at present in the Department of Defense. Of the 26 officers, two later resigned from the Foreign Service and one died. Of the remaining 23, 11 have been promoted either while in the Program or since leaving it. Among the 12 officers who have moved on from the Program to other assignments, two went abroad as Deputy Chiefs of Mission (DCMs), a third received a DCM assignment after a year in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, two are serving as heads of embassy political sections in key countries in South East Asia and Africa, two are politico-military officers in key overseas missions, one is an Assistant Political Adviser to a military commander, and two are deputy office directors within the Department of State in Washington. (One of the last-named is about to go abroad as chief of the political section in a major embassy in Latin America.) As this listing suggests, onward assignments of returning Foreign Service exchange officers have been carefully scrutinized in terms of their relevance to the exchange experience.

Because of the Program's requirements for highly competent officers and positions suited to their talents, suggestions to expand its size have been very carefully reviewed. For the present the two Departments regard fifteen officers from each agency as an appropriate maximum level for the Program. It was recently agreed, for the first time, to bring overseas posts into the Program. This will begin with the assignment, in August 1964, of a civilian official from the Office of International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense to the politico-military affairs unit of the U.S. Embassy in London.

The high reputation the Program enjoys within the Department of State has generated considerable interest in participating in it. It should therefore be possible to maintain and perhaps even improve the high quality of the officers so far assigned to it. Typically, the Foreign Service Officer exchangee has been a Class 3 officer (17 out of 26). In the Foreign Service, Class 3 is usually viewed as the beginning of the senior ranks. On the basis of the experience to this point, there is some inclination to include more Class 4 officers among those assigned to the Program. Class 4 officers have usually had a minimum of 10 to 12 years in the Foreign Service and held positions of responsibility, requiring maturity and depth of policy understanding and judgment.

State-Defense exchange program

Exchangee	Dates of assignment	Assignment in DOD
1. FSO-3 William H. Dodderidge.....	May 1964 to present.....	USAF (Plans).
2. FSO-3 Robert C. Mudd.....	January 1963 to present.....	Navy (Plans).
3. FSO-4 Peter J. Peterson.....	June 1963 to present.....	Navy (Pol-Mil).
4. FSO-3 Albert A. Rabida.....	August 1963 to present.....	Army (Plans).
5. FSO-2 Edward F. Rivinus.....	July 1963 to present.....	J-5, Joint Staff.
6. FSO-3 Jordan T. Rogers.....	March 1963 to present.....	OSD (Manpower).
7. FSO-2 Harry H. Schwartz.....	October 1963 to present.....	OSD/ISA (Plans).
8. FSO-2 Edwin L. Smith.....	June 1963 to present.....	USAF (Plans).
9. FSO-3 Malcolm Thompson.....	August 1963 to present.....	Army (Plans).
10. FSO-3 Jackson W. Wilson.....	October 1962 to present.....	USAF (Plans).
11. FSO-3 Hugh W. Wolff.....	July 1964 to present.....	OSD/ISA (Foreign Military Rights).
12. FSO-4 Forest E. Abbuhl.....	October 1963 to July 1964 (Resigned from Foreign Service—will be employed by Commerce).	OSD (ARPA).
13. FSO-3 Frederic H. Behr.....	January 1961 to April 1961 (Left program due to illness).	Navy (Plans).
14. FSO-3 James J. Blake.....	June 1961 to June 1963.....	Army (Plans).
15. FSO-3 William T. Briggs.....	June 1961 to June 1963.....	OSD/ISA (W.H. Region).
16. FSO-4 Robert L. Burns.....	June 1961 to July 1963.....	OSD (ARPA).
17. FSO-3 Robert W. Dean.....	February 1961 to April 1962.....	Army (Intelligence).
18. FSO-2 William B. Dunham.....	February 1962 to March 1963 (resigned to become vice president of Carlton College).	USAF (Plans).
19. FSO-4 John N. Gatch, Jr.....	June 1963 to June 1964.....	OSD/ISA (Foreign Mil. Rights).
20. FSO-3 John Y. Millar.....	March 1961 to February 1963.....	J-5, Joint Staff.
21. FSO-3 Ellwood M. Rabenold.....	July 1961 to March 1963.....	Navy (Pol-Mil).
22. FSO-4 James R. Ruchti.....	June 1961 to February 1963.....	OSD (Manpower).
23. FSO-3 Peter Rutter.....	January 1961 to October 1962.....	OSD/ISA (Plans).
24. FSO-3 Theodore A. Tremblay.....	May 1961 to February 1963.....	Navy (Plans).
25. FSO-3 Milton C. Walstrom.....	November 1962 to June 1964.....	OSD/ISA (Plans).
26. FSO-3 Donald L. Woolf.....	January 1961 to October 1962.....	USAF (OPS).

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, July 13, 1964.

HON. HENRY M. JACKSON,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: This is in response to your June 30 request for my evaluation of the State-Defense Officer Exchange Program. I feel the program has been most worthwhile and is attaining the basic program objective of a better mutual understanding of approaches, operations and problems.

Since it was established in early 1961, a total of twenty-three Defense exchangees have participated. Our exchangees have been utilized throughout the State Department in assignments commensurate with their grades and experience. The same has been true in Defense where State exchangees have been assigned to my staff, the Joint Staff and in the service staffs. This has provided not only excellent individual training but also a desirable degree of cross-fertilization between the two Departments. While summer rotation has reduced the number to slightly below the authorized level of thirteen Defense participants, we expect to get back to full strength by September. The quality of participants on both sides has been excellent which accounts in great measure for the excellent reputation the program now enjoys in both Departments. It appears fifteen exchangees will be about the desirable number which each side can support and still maintain the prestige and careful refinement needed in the exchange process. I anticipate we will reach the fifteen level within the next year.

I doubt that there has ever been any closer coordination, cooperation and mutual understanding between the two Departments than we are now experiencing. Certainly, this is not attributable entirely to the State-Defense Officer Exchange Program, but that program has done its share in achieving this result.

Sincerely,

ROBERT S. McNAMARA.

Enclosure: List of Defense Exchangees.

State-Defense exchange program

Defense exchangee	On exchange	Assignment in State Department
Col. Donald W. Bunte, USA.....	August 1963 to present.....	OIC, Political-Military Affairs, Office of Regional Affairs, NEA.
Capt. Richard G. Colbert, USN.....	February 1963 to present.....	Policy Planning Council.
Col. Robert Ginsburgh, USAF.....	June 1964 to present.....	Policy Planning Council.
Col. Haakon Lindjord, USA.....	August 1963 to present.....	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs.
Capt. John Miller, USN.....	July 1964 to present.....	Deputy Policy Planning Advisor, EUR.
Capt. Robert Minton, USN.....	April 1964 to present.....	Special Asst. to the OIC, Office of Inter-American Regional, PM Affairs.
Lt. Col. Seymour Stearns, USAF.....	October 1963 to present.....	Office of Telecommunications.
Col. Dewitt Armstrong, USA.....	December 1962 to August 1964.	Policy Planning Council.
Col. W. B. Robinson, USAF.....	August 1961 to August 1964..	Staff Officer, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of PM Affairs, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.
Col. William Sturges, USAF.....	June 1961 to July 1964.....	Assistant Science Advisor, Office of the Science Advisor.
Col. John Splain, USAF.....	July 1963 to present.....	Office of North African Affairs.
Capt. Ross Freeman, USN.....	August 1961 to July 1964....	Disarmament Advisor, Office of U.N. Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs and later Deputy Policy Planning Advisor, EUR.
Capt. George Sharp, USN.....	August 1961 to May 1964....	Special Assistant to Officer in Charge, Office of PM Affairs, Office of Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.
Lt. Col. Marvin Kettlehut, USA.....	January 1961 to July 1963...-	Officer in Charge of PM Affairs, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
Col. Wallace Magathan, USA.....	October 1961 to July 1963....	Senior Staff Member, Combined Policy Section, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for PM Affairs, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.
Col. Leslie B. Williams, USAF.....	July 1961 to July 1963.....	Staff Member, Office of the Special Assistant (Atomic Energy and Outer Space).
Capt. Robert B. Wood, USN.....	August 1962 to July 1964....	Deputy Regional Planning, FE.
Col. Harry G. Halberstadt.....	January 1961 to July 1961...-	Office of Special Assistant (Atomic Energy and Outer Space).
Col. Cullen A. Brannon, USAF.....	January 1961 to July 1962...-	Deputy Regional Planning Advisor, Office of the Regional Planning Advisor, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
Mr. Ray Albright.....	January 1961 to April 1962...-	International Relations Officer, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.
Mr. Clarence Shaw.....	July 1961 to June 1962.....	Communications Consultant, Division of Communications Services, Office of Operations, Bureau of Administration.
Mr. Lynford Lardner.....	October 1961 to October 1963.	African Affairs.
Mr. Glenn Blitgen.....	May 1962 to June 1964.....	International Relations Officer, Special PM Affairs, Atlantic PM Affairs, EUR.