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AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO ORDER UNITS
AND MEMBERS IN THE READY RESERVE TO
ACTIVE DUTY FOR NOT MORE THAN 12 MONTHS

GOVERNMENT
Storage

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S.J. Res. 224

AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO ORDER UNITS AND MEM-
BERS IN THE READY RESERVE TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR NOT
MORE THAN 12 MONTHS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

SEPTEMBER 10, 1962

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AND MEMBERS IN THE READY RESERVE TO
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO ORDER UNITS

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

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II

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AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO ORDER UNITS AND MEMBERS IN THE READY RESERVE TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR NOT MORE THAN 12 MONTHS

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building.

Present: Senators Russell (presiding), Stennis, Jackson, Ervin, Thurmond, Engle, Byrd of West Virginia, Saltonstall, Smith of Maine, Bush, Beall, Goldwater and Case of New Jersey.

Also present: William H. Darden, T. Edward Braswell, Gordon A. Nease, professional staff members, and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sure all of you know we are here this morning to consider Senate Joint Resolution 224, a copy of which is before each member.

(The resolution referred to follows:)

[S.J. Res. 224, 87th Cong., 2d sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION To authorize the President to order units and members in the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than twelve months, and for other purposes

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, until January 31, 1963, the President may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months. However, not more than one hundred and fifty thousand members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for training), without their consent, under this section at any one time.

SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until January 31, 1963, the President may authorize the Secretary of Defense to extend enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of active duty for training, periods of obligated service or other military status, in any component of an armed force or in the National Guard that expire before February 28, 1963, for not more than twelve months. However, if the enlistment of a member of the Ready Reserve who is ordered to active duty under the first section of this Act would expire after February 28, 1963, but before he has served the entire period for which he was so ordered to active duty, his enlistment may be extended until the last day of that period.

SEC. 3. No member of the Ready Reserve who was involuntarily ordered to active duty under the Act of August 1, 1961, Public Law 87-117 (75 Stat. 242), may be involuntarily ordered to active duty under this Act.

SEC. 4. This Act becomes effective on the day after the Eighty-seventh Congress adjourns sine die.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senate Joint Resolution 224 was introduced in the form that this legislative proposal was received from the White

House. Since the resolution was introduced the Chair understands the date of January 31, 1963, should be changed to February 28, 1963, that is on line 4 of page 1, and on line 4 of page 2.

Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Mr. Paul, are here this morning to give us the views of the executive branch of the Government on the necessities and reasons for requesting this legislation of the Congress.

Mr. Secretary, we are pleased to have you here and those accompanying you, and you may proceed if you have a statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Secretary McNAMARA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am very grateful to you and the members of your committee for affording me so prompt an opportunity to testify on this proposal which the President considers to be of very great importance.

Senate Joint Resolution 224 is on its face an interim measure, designed to provide the President with authority, while the Congress is out of session, to order a limited number of members of our Ready Reserves to active duty for a maximum period of 12 months if in the President's judgment the security requirements of our country so dictate.

The resolution specifically limits the number of reservists which may be called to not more than 150,000, and provides further that no member of the Ready Reserve involuntarily ordered to active duty under Public Law 87-117, the law passed last year and expired on July 1 of this year may be involuntarily ordered to active duty under this act.

It is our sincere hope, Mr. Chairman, that it will not become necessary to invoke the authority contained in this proposed resolution. One hundred forty-eight thousand of our citizen soldiers, sailors, and airmen responded to a call last year, which was dictated by a current and immediate crisis.

Almost without exception, they served with distinction, and with remarkably little complaint, and their response to the call provided tangible evidence, in the clearest possible manner, of the ability and determination of this country to respond, at whatever sacrifice, when our vital security interests are involved.

I am sure that there is no need for me to elaborate to this well-informed committee on the situation which confronts us today. Secretary Rusk, General Carter, and I appeared before you and the Foreign Relations Committee less than a week ago for a special briefing on the subject.

President Kennedy has made crystal clear his recognition of the threats with which we are faced, and the policy of this Government not to allow the export of Communist aggressive purposes by force, in this hemisphere or in other areas of the world.

It is obvious to all Americans that we are in a period of very acute international crisis and international tension. It is also obvious that the forces opposed to us have the capability to precipitate crises, at the moment of their choosing, in many parts of the world—and that we must be able to respond promptly and decisively.

The authority requested in Senate Joint Resolution 224 would permit such a prompt response, short of measures which would require the declaration of a national emergency.

The potential need for a callup of Reserve Forces to meet the military requirements similar to those imposed upon us a year ago has been considerably reduced.

Our conventional capability has been greatly enhanced during that period by the addition of 5 Army combat ready divisions, bringing our total to 16.

The Marine Corps has increased its active strength to the 190,000 authorized by the Congress.

The Navy and Air Force have made commensurate improvements in operational capability through realignment of units and modernization of surface and air equipment. Strike Command is now organized and has undergone tests and field exercises.

Our regular military forces are strong today, and their strength continues to improve. The authority for a limited callup of Reserves, however, would provide us with a flexibility of response which could be crucial if the international situation deteriorates suddenly and specific crises occur.

Inasmuch as the nature and seriousness of such crises are unpredictable, I cannot state at this time a firm anticipated requirement for the call of numbers and types of units. Alternative plans have been developed, however, which can be refined and implemented promptly when and if a requirement is established.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to reemphasize that the President and the Defense Establishment are acutely aware of, and grateful for the sacrifice and devotion to duty recently demonstrated by our Reserve Forces.

Those who have responded to that call will not be reordered to active duty under the authority now requested. As a matter of fact, we hope that this authority will not have to be invoked at all. But we are faced with a period of a few months, with the Congress out of session, at any time during which we may face a challenge requiring an immediate and effective response.

The enactment of Senate Joint Resolution 224 will constitute an endorsement by the American people of our determination to make that response, and provide us with the means to do so.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my very brief statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. From your statement, Mr. Secretary, I gather you have not yet determined that it will be necessary to call up any considerable number of men at all.

Secretary McNAMARA. We have not. And in that respect, Mr. Chairman, the situation differs quite measurably from last July or a year ago when we met with this committee on this subject.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is in the nature of a shotgun behind the door which you can reach back to get it if the circumstances require?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, it appears to be a prudent precautionary measure.

Chairman RUSSELL. The situation would have to be even worse than it was, last year, I assume, before it would be necessary to invoke this, because our conventional forces that were the principal ones that were called up are so much stronger today than they were at that time?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, not only our conventional forces but our nuclear forces are also stronger. As this committee recognizes we added \$6 billion to fiscal 1962 and \$8 billion to fiscal 1963, and \$1½ billion for strategic nuclear forces, and they, too, are stronger forces, and, as you pointed out, the conventional forces are considerably stronger.

The Army combat ready divisions have been increased by about 40 percent, the number of air squadrons being increased very substantially, the number of ships on active duty has also been increased so the military forces are today much stronger than they were 12 or 14 months ago when we appeared supporting a similar resolution.

But, nonetheless, the period that we face ahead is a period of such great uncertainty and such potential crisis that we believe this is a prudent measure to take at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, you will recall when you were before us last year that I expressed very great concern that the Department of Defense would exercise the very greatest care and utmost vigilance to see that those who had done the shortest period of active duty and who were on a pay status should be called before those who had done a long term of active duty and those who were not receiving any pay were called up. We had a few little slipups in that but by and large I think the Department did a pretty good job.

What are your plans with respect to this callup in event you call them up?

Secretary McNAMARA. Our plans would be exactly the same, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps, I could report to you very briefly the standard we stated we would apply during the last callup, the manner in which we applied them and finally the standard which we would apply in this case.

I stated to this committee over a year ago, that in the event it was necessary to exercise the authority we were then requesting, we would first plan to fill our needs by encouraging reenlistments, secondly, we would plan to increase the voluntary recruitment.

Thirdly, we would plan to increase the draft, and fourthly, to the extent that the first three needs or first three actions did not meet our needs, we would exercise the authority granted us by the joint House-Senate resolution to call up Reserves involuntarily.

Applying that authority, we would apply it first to those reservists in pay drill status, and to the extent that they were not members of units we would apply it first to the men with the shortest period of active service, specifically those with only 6 months' active service.

We did follow those priorities. There were about 300,000 men added to the Active Force which, as you recall, we started with a strength of about 2½ million men and built to a strength of about 2,800,000 for a net increase of approximately 300,000, and I can give you the breakdown of the sources of that increase of 300,000.

The increased reenlistments and the increased voluntary recruitment provided 70,000 of the 328,000 increase. The increased draft calls provided 47,000 of the increase, the increase from involuntary extension of service of those on active duty, action that was permitted by the resolution added 63,000 of the total, and we called 148,000 from the Reserves of the 328,000 net increase.

Of the 148,000 we called from the Reserves, 66,000 were men with only 6 months' active service; 54,000 were men with more than 6 months' active service, but men who were on paid drill status, and only 28,000 out of 328,000 were men from the Reserves called back involuntarily who had more than 6 months' active service and who were not on paid drill status.

Now, it was that 28,000, small though it be, perhaps 9 percent of the total net increase, that caused most of our trouble. We did make some errors and I think those errors were applied particularly to that group. Some of those men were poorly selected, and I think we could avoid that situation to a considerable degree in the future.

In any event I would propose to the committee that we apply the same standard of priority in the event it becomes necessary to exercise the authority under this resolution that we applied under the last resolution.

Chairman RUSSELL. In the last resolution, Mr. Secretary, the President was authorized to recall involuntarily, and I quote—

Any unit and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit.

The resolution before us this morning contains the identical language. It was argued later that that language prohibited the Department from calling up 6-months' trainees and drill pay reservists from organized units and using those persons as fillers in units that were ordered to duty.

So you had to call 28,000 who were not on pay status while passing up several hundred thousand that were being paid directly.

I am aware of all the arguments about the necessity of maintaining unit integrity, but I am very strongly convinced that we must have the most fair and equitable sharing of responsibility of military service possible to attain.

Would there be any objection to amending the language that appears on line 5 at page 1 so as to empower the President to order any unit or any member of the Ready Reserve of any armed force to active duty?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir.

That actually increases the flexibility that we would have with which to meet a requirement for additions to the Armed Forces.

Chairman RUSSELL. There are many 6-month men who were not called up, while many others who had served more than 6 months were, because the former persons were in a unit?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct. To some degree we can avoid that situation should it be necessary to call Reserve and Guard personnel in the future, without the suggested change that you have proposed, because, as I stated to this committee in January of this year, benefiting from the problems that we faced a year ago, we have reorganized the Ready Reserve, and we have selected a pool of men, men with 6 months' service only, who do have particular occupational specialties that are likely to be required in order to fill in the vacancies in any units that are called to service.

We have about 45,000 men listed by name and by occupational specialty who have served only 6 months and who are not now assigned to units, and who do have an obligation for further service.

This is a pool that we did not have available to us 12 or 14 months ago. We could call on them rather than calling upon nonpaid personnel who have served more than 6 months, and thereby avoid some of the troubles we had with that group of 28,000 I referred to earlier.

Nonetheless, this change you suggest would be a desirable one from our point of view. We didn't request it ourselves because in the hearings before the Senate and the House a year ago, Members of both bodies expressed a desire that we not take action that would result in breaking up units and it was for that specific reason that we worded the provision as we have.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't want to break up units, but it seems to me that where you have a few men in a unit who have done 6 months, and you are calling up outside of units men who have done 18 months, that justice would demand that the man who had done the 6 months have an opportunity to serve a time longer.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, we have so many contradictory objectives. We would like to maintain unit integrity but, at the same time, assuring equity in calling men to service.

I suspect we can accomplish both objectives by accepting the language which you have proposed and by exercising discretion in pulling men from units.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is what I wanted to get at. Of course, we don't want to impair any unit as a unit because you never know when you will have to call them but in a number of instances men who had no occupation or MOS that was vital were in these units, were left when you were calling up men who had done much longer service. It would seem to me a little discretion ought to be used to do justice all around.

Now, Mr. Secretary, in section 3 on page 2, the resolution says:

No member of the Ready Reserve who is involuntarily ordered to active duty under the Act of August 1, 1961, may be involuntarily ordered to active duty under this Act.

Is that language wide enough to protect the 63,000 people who had their active duty extended involuntarily under the earlier resolution? We have to look after them, they had their term extended beyond the normal time and I doubt that that language would do it.

Secretary McNAMARA. Our General Counsel thought it was. If there is any doubt about it, I think we could expand upon the language to make certain that that thought is covered. We intended that it should be covered.

Chairman RUSSELL. You had a great many persons, some who had done 3 years, whose time was extended under the authority of the resolution, and certainly they ought not to be called back until some man who had done only 6 months had been called back.

Secretary McNAMARA. I agree. We had intended the words, "involuntarily ordered" would cover it on line 17.

But there may be an ambiguity there and if there is we would be happy—

Chairman RUSSELL. If a man who was kept on active duty, he was not ordered just kept on—I want to make it clear.

Secretary McNAMARA. We would be happy to adjust the language to make it clear because that was certainly our intention.

Chairman RUSSELL. Because some of those men had done even more active duty than those called up; they were reaching the end of their term. Some of them had done 24 months and some of them 3 years and some of them more.

Mr. Secretary, under statutory powers, if the President declares an emergency, he has the authority to call up to a million men for a period of up to 24 months. I am constantly asked why the Congress is called on to take this responsibility of ordering this callup, and why the President doesn't do it under his emergency powers.

I would like for you to have something in the record on that. I am not certain whether you are prepared to give a statement now.

I know about the vast powers it opens up, but I would like to have a statement in the record on it.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I believe this is a desirable resolution even though the President does have the power to declare a national emergency and under that declaration to call up to a million men, because, first, at times of crises and tension such as those we are in and face in the near future, it is essential, we believe, that the world understand the unity with which we are acting, the unity between the executive branch and the Congress and representing the unity of the American people.

This resolution supports that and demonstrates that unity.

Secondly, to apply the authority the President has to call a national emergency with all of the other powers that that gives him, and to use that declaration as a basis for calling perhaps 150,000 men or perhaps even a lesser number, may increase the tension and the crisis beyond what is necessary, and may tend to inflame the situation that we would try to meet without the aura of emergency that declaration would apply to it.

For both those reasons, therefore, we believe it wise to request the authority covered by this resolution.

Chairman RUSSELL. How many fully ready divisions does the Army have today, Mr. Secretary, compared with the situation in August of last year?

Secretary McNAMARA. There were 11—there were in the Army in August of last year, prior to the callup of the Reserve and Guard divisions, 14 divisions.

Of the 14, 11 were known as combat ready and 3 were organized as training divisions.

Today, there are in the Army 16 divisions, 16 combat ready divisions organized for combat operations.

There are support forces, combat support forces, administrative and logistical support forces available for those 16 divisions in varying degrees depending upon the character of the operations that they would face.

Under certain circumstances it might be necessary to add to those 16 combat ready divisions support forces either combat or logistical support from the Reserve and Guard.

Chairman RUSSELL. What was the number of men the Navy called up?

Secretary McNAMARA. About 8,000 men were called from the Naval Reserve to man certain of the 18 antisubmarine warfare squadrons and 40 destroyers put into active service last year.

Chairman RURRELL. Have all of those ships been returned to mothballs?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir, the 40 ships are not in mothballs. They are in semiready condition. [Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. They are not Reserves, they are members of the Navy?

Secretary McNAMARA. These are manned with Regular Navy personnel to the extent of [deleted] percent as I have outlined.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Navy seemed to get off very smoothly with its part of this mobilization because it was not as large as the others, but they got those ships to sea into actual training, is that right?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think both the Navy and the Air Force performed remarkably well in the Reserve callup last year.

The 8,000 men called by the Navy were all volunteers. They had all been specially selected and all had been trained on the type of equipment they were called upon to operate and for those various reasons, they functioned very effectively.

Similarly, the Air Force personnel called a total of about 26,000, included, if I remember correctly, only 1,600 men in the same category in which the Army called 27,000 or 28,000.

That is to say, men with more than 6 months service called involuntarily from nonpaid status.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was remarkable.

How many of the National Guard or Reserves do we have on active duty with the Air Force now, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think perhaps you are referring to the fact that the Air Force is substantially increasing the number of tactical squadrons in its Active Forces?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. In order to do that as rapidly as possible, at the time the National Guard squadrons were deactivated they recruited from the National Guard personnel certain personnel that they needed in order to active—

Chairman RUSSELL. They recruited them rather than call them to active duty?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir, they did not call them involuntarily but asked them to volunteer to transfer to the active service in the Air Force.

I can't give you the exact figures but a substantial number of pilots accepted that offer and are today on active service voluntarily with the Air Force.

It is less than a thousand, but more than 100, it is somewhere in between.

(The following information was subsequently furnished:)

Two hundred eighty-five Air National Guard officers volunteered to remain on active duty. The number of enlisted airmen volunteering to remain on active duty has not been determined at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. They all volunteered to serve?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir, for certain critical specialties in which the Air Force was short of qualified personnel.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did the Naval Air Arm, or does it have, any similar men in the present situation?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, the Naval Air Arm has not expanded to the extent that the Air Force tactical units are and, therefore, didn't face the same problem.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't like to say I told you so, Mr. Secretary, but aren't you having an increasing number of people taking pilot training in the Air Force?

Secretary McNAMARA. The Air Force has asked for an increase, Mr. Chairman, but up to the present time, we haven't found it necessary to accede to their request for the current year. We are looking ahead to the future. I can't give you the exact figures, but they are something on this order, we have been running around 1,500 pilot trainees a year. The Air Force wants to build that up very substantially. We believe that it may be necessary to increase it to something on the order of [deleted] for, a year, for I believe it is fiscal 1965, but I am not absolutely certain of this.

Chairman RUSSELL. Frankly, I think you should increase it more than that if you are going to maintain this very considerable number of planes that are on the ready alert.

Secretary McNAMARA. On air alert status.

Chairman RUSSELL. At all times. It is just not right to keep those men on 70 hours a week and do it week after week. You should have more pilots and more trained crews where they can live a more normal life.

Secretary McNAMARA. I completely agree with you. It is not right to ask the men who continue to work the hours they have in recent years.

The Air Force, at our request, is reexamining its total pilot requirements. There are two somewhat opposing actions taking place in the Air Force today: One is the very substantial buildup in tactical squadrons. As I mentioned earlier, this is occurring and has been provided for in the fiscal year 1963 budget of the Defense Department.

I believe that I am correct in saying there were about 55 tactical fighter squadrons in the Air Force on July 1 a year ago. Our plan is to build that 55 to a total of about 73 by the end of fiscal year 1963.

At the same time that very rapid buildup is occurring in the tactical units, there is, of course, the planned reduction in the strategic bombing forces, as the B-47's phase out, and it is the combination of those two actions that must be taken into account in planning the pilot training rates for the future.

The Air Force is reexamining their total pilot training program in the light of both of those events.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I don't know that you can answer this question, but we will be asking it a number of times.

Is there any one location or situation or condition in the world at any one site that prompts this or is it requested in view of the overall world situation to give you power that you think you need while the Congress is out of session?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, it is requested because of the total world situation, the world confrontation of the Soviet threat.

We are in a period of crisis and tension, it appears to be increasing and it is to be able to move quickly in relation to that during a period while Congress is out of session that we particularly ask for this authority.

But there are many places in the world in which the Communist drive for domination is apparent. Southeast Asia is one of those. There are others as well.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't know whether any of my colleagues have had the same experience, but my people are more concerned about Cuba than they are about all of those put together. My people have been insistent we should do something about Cuba, particularly since this last massive Russian shipment.

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't believe Cuba can be isolated from the rest of the world, particularly, I don't believe that the Soviet Union's actions in relation to Cuba can be isolated from the Soviet Union's actions from the rest of the world and this is what in my mind makes the recent moves of the Soviet Union in Cuba assume very great importance indeed, because they know we are in a period of crisis in Berlin, they know we are conducting substantial military assistance operations to blunt their drive in southeast Asia and despite the tension that exists in both of those situations they have seen fit to add these very substantial quantities of arms to Cuba.

I think that their action there must be read against the background of their action in Berlin and elsewhere in the world.

Chairman RUSSELL. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a very few questions, Mr. Secretary.

First, I would say, following up what the chairman has just said, I think it is very difficult for a man like myself, or men like ourselves, to answer questions as to the difference between what is an aggressive weapon and a defensive weapon in Cuba.

I think the feeling among the average citizens is that, if they are sending weapons over there, they don't care whether they are defensive or aggressive. That we should do something about it.

Now, as the chairman has said what to do about it—the chairman has added the feeling that it may spread all over South and Central America. I make that as an observation; I don't think you can make any particular comment on it. But I think that is a very difficult question to answer factually.

Have you anything to add to that statement?

Secretary McNAMARA. I agree it is a difficult question to answer, Senator Saltonstall.

The information we have available to us does indicate that the weapons that have been sent to Cuba by the Soviets are the type of weapons which have a primary application to defense.

That certainly is true of the surface-to-air missiles, and associated radars and other apparatus which we have seen in increasing quantities in recent weeks.

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask just two or three technical questions.

If you have not already said it to the chairman, I didn't quite get that you had in detail, what is the size of our Ready Reserves today.

Secretary McNAMARA. This varies very substantially by service. I can give it to you for each of the separate services.

The total for all services and for all types of reserve forces, Reserve, actual Reserve Forces, guard forces, Guard, Retired and Standby Reserves, amount to 3,100,000, and that breaks down as follows:

In the National Guard there are a total of about 400,000-plus. When I say 400,000-plus, it is because the exact number is being determined as the forces are being deactivated, some of the men have completed their Guard service and will immediately drop out, some of them will remain in the Guard on standby service and we don't have the exact figures, but the number is slightly in excess of 400,000.

In the Army Reserve, the number exceeds a million and a half. That includes forces in the units on paid drill status and it includes forces with an obligation for service in the Standby Reserve, and it includes approximately one hundred and seven or one hundred and eight thousand in the Retired Reserve.

In the Naval Reserves there are a total of 539,000, 540,000. There the Ready Reserve of the 540,000 approximates 380,000.

In the Marine Corps the total Reserve Forces are about 178,000, the Ready Reserve component of 178,000 approximates 160,000.

In the Air Force there are two components, the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve. The Air National Guard includes about 72,000, 73,000, and the Air Force Reserve includes a total of about 415,000 of various categories.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that when we call up 150,000, we are calling up apparently a small percentage of the whole?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator THURMOND. What was the last figure, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McNAMARA. 415,000.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In the first section the President is limited to calling them up for not more than a consecutive 12 months.

That is a flat provision and no discretion in it. Wouldn't it be well to give the President a little more discretion than that so if a unit was going to have to serve, we will say 13 or 14 months, you wouldn't have to come back to Congress for it or you presumably intend to come back to Congress, we will say, after January 1 when Congress is again in session, if you feel it is necessary?

Secretary McNAMARA. We would prefer to see it left as it was proposed, to leave no doubt in the minds of the public it was our intention to limit the call to a period of 12 months or less, unless we would come back to Congress. We don't believe—


Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, that is psychological, you might say?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir, from the point of view of reservists concerned, it is.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In the third section of the bill, on page 2, starting on line 16, you use the words:

No member of the Ready Reserve who was involuntarily ordered to active duty under the Act of August 1, 1961, may be involuntarily ordered to active duty under this Act.

Wouldn't it be well to add something about a unit that was ordered to active duty because this might give you permission to order a unit back but leave out of that unit any members who had served before?



Wouldn't it be better to put in the words, "No member of the Ready Reserve or unit which was ordered involuntarily to active duty"; wouldn't that help you?

Secretary McNAMARA. We would have no objection to adding the word "unit" but I don't think it is necessary to meet our purpose which is, of course, to avoid calling up individuals who were called involuntarily under the last authority.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I agree with you that it would make it even clearer if the word "unit" were added; would it not?

Secretary McNAMARA. We would have no objection to that.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You have answered this question put to you by the chairman, and I would simply make sure that it is answered fully because I have been asked it a number of times. If the President has the power to call up to 1 million men, why is it necessary to get a joint resolution of Congress? I think the answer to that is that it would involve a lot of other subjects except that of simply to call up men; am I not right on that?

Secretary McNAMARA. It provides him with a substantial authority beyond the authority to call up men, and it may lend an air of undue emergency and crisis to an action that we would hope could be carried out and avoiding that air of emergency and potential military conflicts.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In short, it is better to have Congress do it at the recommendation of the President rather than to have him do it alone?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. I strongly believe that for both reasons that I outlined and, at least, as important as the one I last gave as my first reason, that I believe the action by the Congress indicates a unity within the Government and a unity within our Nation, and it is the unity of expression that I think is extremely important to declare before the world today.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I agree with you.

Just one final question: On page 2, line 10, or from lines 10 through 15, those are words or that is a sentence that was not in your act of August 1, 1961, and I wondered if that was put in to make it clear to a member of the Ready Reserve, because it would seem to me that it was covered by the first sentence, the first part of section 2, which was in the act before.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. This is put in simply to insure that each individual understands that when he is called up he can be retained on active duty for 12 months, even though his period of enlistment and his obligation would terminate prior to that 12-month period.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It is for clarification, then?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, your questions have covered this matter, I think, about these lines here. But I want to be sure I understand. You are agreeing to change lines 5 and 6 of the first page, Mr. Secretary, to cover the situation where you can draw individuals who may be in a unit you are not calling, draw them out because of their scarcity of service heretofore?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, that is quite agreeable to me. It increases the flexibility with which we would approach the call.

Senator STENNIS. Then over on page 2, lines 16 and 17, the clarification there, those who had had extended service, your wording says, "involuntarily ordered to active duty," and you agreed to let that apply to those who had extended service?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. If there is ambiguity—

Senator STENNIS. I was just going to mark this as I go along.

I want to ask you this: So far as the Cuban situation is concerned, you do not need any additional manpower or any Reserves to take care of any situation that could be anticipated with reference to the Cuban situation, do you?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would like to, if I may, Mr. Chairman, have this answer left off the record.

Senator STENNIS. If you would rather not go into this phase of it—

Secretary McNAMARA. I would like to answer it, sir, and keep it off the record, if I may.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well, we will keep it off the record. I do not see why, though, if we are not prepared to deal with Cuba militarily by itself, then we are in pretty bad shape.

Senator STENNIS. I thought you might have some highly secret matter and, Mr. Chairman, we will take that up later, but I think this is the very heart of what we are discussing here.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator STENNIS. This brings up this question, and I know it would not be a final answer, but as of now, in the picture as you see it, what units would you most probably need? [Deleted.]

Senator STENNIS. Well, anyway, the Congress would be out of session—you are through, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. Only about 90 days, but you do have units that you can call that would be virtually ready to go in anticipating this spread of possible activity and emergency; that is the real basis of this call, is that right?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator STENNIS. General Clay testified before the preparedness subcommittee this spring. He was in Berlin a year ago, as everyone remembers, and he said the psychological advantage of a callup over there was tremendous, not only to the West Berliners but to our adversaries. He thought it was very fine.

Do you have hopes there would be some value on this same resolution; I mean, some value that would come from this resolution to the extent of and on the same scale?

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

Senator STENNIS. That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, in your opinion does the situation in Cuba constitute a threat in any manner to the United States?

Secretary McNAMARA. Senator Smith, I believe that the existence of a Communist-oriented government in the Western Hemisphere, with the possibility that that government will wish to export its political philosophy to other nations in the hemisphere is, if not a threat, at least an undesirable condition.

I do not believe that this has developed suddenly. I do not believe that the addition of the arms that the President has reported to have entered Cuba, within the past several weeks, is in itself a threat to this country.

I believe it is the existence of the Communist-oriented state in the hemisphere, with what that implies for subversion and covert aggression, that is the undesirable condition.

Senator SMITH. How does the Soviet threat through Cuba compare today with what it was a year, a year and a half ago?

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is what I wanted for you to say.

At what point do you feel we must take over; do you feel we have to wait until Castro fires a missile against us?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think the President expressed the views of the administration very clearly in his statement of a week ago when he pointed out that there is no evidence of an organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country today, there is no evidence that Cuba is providing military bases to the Soviet Union.

There is no evidence that Cuba itself is violating the treaty between Cuba and the United States with respect to our base in Cuba, and there is no evidence of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles or of other significant offensive capability there on the island either in Cuban hands or in the hands of foreign nationals.

He went on to say, as I remember, that would it be otherwise the greatest issues would arise.

I think that probably I should not comment further on that score. This is a very sensitive point, as I know all of you are aware, perhaps better than I.

Senator SMITH. Is there any danger that Castro will move against our naval base at Guantanamo?

Secretary McNAMARA. Could we go off the record again, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes. I suppose it would be all right.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Would you give the committee for the record the number of Cubans employed at the base?

General LEMNITZER. Yes; we can.

Secretary McNAMARA. I will give you a rough figure now and correct it for the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think the last statement General Lemnitzer made—

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I think the last statement General Lemnitzer made about people working on the base should be on the record.

Secretary McNAMARA. There are about 3,100 Cuban employees at Guantanamo and about 800 living on the base.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, if I may ask the Secretary, the old concept of the use of the Reserves was limited to a callup at time of national emergency and in event of war, usually war.

That concept now has been changed, and a declared national emergency is no longer required for a callup.

Do you think that the reservists now have been effectively indoctrinated to the fact that they may expect to be called up at any time for any reason, and especially for the purpose of the President waging psychological warfare against Khrushchev?

Secretary McNAMARA. No; because I do not believe that is our plan.

We do not propose to call them up for the purpose of waging psychological war against Khrushchev.

I think that it was clear that many of the reservists who were called a year ago did not have a proper understanding of their obligation under the laws of this country.

I think we failed in this respect. We had not properly expressed that obligation to them, at least to the point where they fully understood it, and the Army was instructed, and has since developed plans, and is now carrying out those plans, to fully and completely explain to each of the members of the National Guard and each of the members of the Reserve who are in those units on an involuntary basis the full extent of their obligations to serve in the event they are requested to do so on active duty.

But as to our plans for utilizing the Reserve Forces earlier this year in an appearance or appearances before this committee and the comparable House committees, I said that I believe that the Reserve Forces in the Army should serve two purposes:

The first was an ability to meet on short notice the requirements to augment significantly the Active Forces during periods of grave international tension and imminent military conflict.

The second was an ability to provide a base for a large-scale mobilization.

Now, the first purpose might be served by a callup of relatively limited numbers of men, such as the numbers we are requesting authority for today, 150,000.

The second purpose would, of course, require the callup of substantial numbers of men, that is to say, numbers required to serve as a base for large-scale mobilization, but we do not anticipate calling the Reserves as psychological moves in relation to the actions of Khrushchev.

Senator SMITH. Although you, I thought, did say it did have its psychological effect.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. It has its psychological effect, but that is not by any means the primary purpose.

Senator SMITH. In view of the fact that they can be called up any time now and without requiring a declaration of a national emergency or war, are you giving them enough training and enough modern equipment for their training to make them fully ready for a callup, to make the word "Ready" in the Ready Reserve have a true meaning?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is to better meet those objectives that we are building to reorganize the National Guard and the Reserve of the Army.

I think it is quite clear that in the past the Reserve and the Guard Forces of the Army have not been provided sufficient equipment with which to train to insure a high readiness status.

The readiness objectives of the Reserve Forces reflected that deficiency in equipment, and the readiness objectives were far too long to meet the requirements that we see in the future, therefore, those

readiness objectives have been shortened, and in order to insure that the Reserve and Guard Forces of the Army can meet the new readiness objectives, the percentage of equipment that they were authorized, that they will be provided, has been increased very substantially.

That equipment is presently on order. Most of them have not received the increased equipment.

Furthermore, the percentage of manning for the high priority units, the units with the new readiness objectives, has been increased substantially.

The combination of the increased men, the increased equipment, and in addition an increase in the number of full-time employees, specifically those known as technicians, who are for training supervision and logistical support, has also been increased.

The combination of those three actions with the other actions we propose to take in eliminating from the Reserve and Guard the units no longer necessary and adding to the Reserve and Guard the units required by the new technologies and new tactics will, we believe, substantially increase the readiness of the Reserve and Guard Forces.

Senator SMITH. When you place them in such a callup position, is it either fair or realistic to cut their funds for training pay and to require them to perform some training without pay? I have in mind the action of the Air Force in eliminating pay status for those reservists assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces.

Secretary McNAMARA. I am not familiar with the particular incident you mentioned, but I do know in times in the past some reservists have been asked to train without pay contrary, I think, to the intent of either the Defense Department or the Congress, and we have taken action to stop that.

I would be quite happy to look into the particular situation referred to.

Senator SMITH. I wish you would, because with these callups it does not seem quite fair or realistic.

Secretary McNAMARA. I will be very happy to.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, just 5 years ago in this committee I raised questions about the Air Force permitting a 42-year-old major general to resign from his 8th Air Force Command and from the regular Air Force in order to take a high-paying civilian job, but to be immediately commissioned in the Air Force Reserve.

Is it realistic or fair to reservists generally to approve such a pattern when there is no intention of ever calling that former regular major general back to active duty short of war? In other words, is it fair to let a man retire at the early age of 42 after all of the money and training has been given him, and let him go into the Reserve immediately with a pretty good understanding that he never will be called except in actual war?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think that it depends somewhat on the situation.

If a man had served 20 years in the active services, he certainly has a right to retire. I think that action would be independent of whether he should or should not have been appointed to the Reserve.

As to his appointment in the Reserve, I do not believe any man should be appointed to the Reserve who is unwilling to or is not qualified to serve, nor do I think there should be restrictions on the right of the Department to call a man in the Reserve to service.

If this particular individual met no one of those or failed to meet all three of those criteria, then I believe we acted improperly.

I would be happy again to look into the particular case, Senator Smith. I am not certain I am familiar with it.

Senator SMITH. I am trying to point out that a major general is not very apt to be called except in case of war, and going into the Reserve gives him considerable pay above the fellows who stay in.

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, I do not believe we should pay men who are either not qualified or unwilling or who, for some other reason, are not likely to be called to meet the obligations of their service.

I would point out that there was called to my personal knowledge a general officer from the Massachusetts area in the Air Force during the last callup. He took a fighter wing to Europe and did a magnificent job, as a matter of fact.

Senator SMITH. Was he the one who had to serve as a colonel even though he was a general?

Secretary McNAMARA. No. He was wearing stars when I saw him.

Senator SMITH. When action for callup of the Reserves is requested twice within a year, is it in the best interests of our national security to permit regular generals to retire, to take high-paying civilian jobs when they are in their forties and early fifties, the very peak years of their value to the service?

This has been a question the committee has discussed, and I think you have talked about it, and it troubles me anyway, that we should spend the time and money in training these people and, at the time when they are needed the most and can give the most, they are permitted to retire.

Secretary McNAMARA. This a difficult question to answer.

I think, in the first place, the generals that I have known who have retired—I think of Ed Rawlings, for example, president of General Mills Corp. who is a four-star general and who retired, whatever it was, 2, 3, 4 years ago, have all been quite willing to come back on active duty.


As a matter of fact, it was interesting to me last year, after the callup, to receive a large number of letters from retired officers, generals and others, asking to be considered for positions stating they felt they were qualified and were quite willing to come back to serve.

Secondly, I think the opportunity to retire is a built-in right of our present military compensation service plan, and it is a right that I believe ought to be retained.

I think it is quite clear that most military officers serve during the greatest percentage of their active service at compensation substantially less than they could receive from other occupations in our society. Therefore, it seems to me they have a perfect right to exercise their rights to retire. Sometimes it fits in with their personal plans and personal requirements.

As I suggest, it has been my experience that those I have come in contact with are quite willing and anxious to return to active service when the Nation requires their service.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, my last question, I think has been answered in one of your questions, but I will ask it with the thought that the Secretary may want to make a more complete statement.



What safeguards are you taking to prevent the mistakes of the call-up last year in the nonutilization or misutilization of reservists, particularly Army reservists? I think you have answered that, but if you have any further comments I would appreciate them.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would be very happy to expand upon it briefly now and, further, for the record.

One of the most serious problems we faced in the last callup was caused by the fact that the priority units called up for service had not been manned while on inactive service at a high rate of authorized strength and, therefore, they came into active service without all of the personnel they required, went on active duty.

It was to fill those deficiencies that we called men, so-called fillers, from the Reserve pool, many of whom had already served 2 years or more in the Active Forces.

A whole series of problems arose as a result of that condition. We have, I think, minimized those problems for the future by taking two actions:

One, by raising the percentage of personnel strength of the units in the priority categories while they are on active duty, thus minimizing the number of men that must be added to them when called to active service; and, two, by providing the pool I mentioned earlier of specially selected men, selected with particular military occupational specialty requirements in mind, and with particular regard to their prior service, selecting men with only 6 months' prior service, military service, therefore, with particular military specialties in mind, keeping them on file by name and keeping the file up to date by dropping men as their period of Reserve service expires, and by adding other men with equal occupational specialties with similar low periods of active service.

I think it was that set of conditions which, I believe, we have met, that caused the greatest percentage of the problems.

There were many others that I can respond to for the record, but those were the primary problems.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make the following observations. I think there needs to be a recognition that we are in a cold war and that we have to use our military power wisely to achieve specific diplomatic objectives. Last year we actually called the forces to active duty by a direct act of Congress which, I think, had an enormous diplomatic impact. I do not think there can be any denial of it.

In connection with this request, with this power from the Congress, you can make Mr. Khrushchev understand a little more clearly that we mean business.

I think we are in a period now where we need to reevaluate this whole concept of calling up Reserves, and the use of Reserves to achieve specific diplomatic objectives.

I do not know the answer to it. I think this decision is a wise one for the reason I indicated. But it does seem to me that this is one of the real problems in trying to handle these forces.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bush.

Senator BUSH. Mr. Secretary, I attended the meeting the other day when you appeared with the Secretary of State and General Carter, and I don't think I have felt so uncomfortable and so uneasy about our situation, certainly at no time in the last 10 years, since I have been in the Senate, as I do right now.

Despite the fact, which you made so eminently clear yourself, that we do have an excess of power over the Soviets, and thank God we do have it, and I believe that your assessment of it was valid and accurate and very comforting, too, nevertheless, we are in a very serious situation and I agree with the sentiments expressed by the chairman earlier, that this Cuban situation is very, very disturbing to our people, that is to me personally, and I think I get more mail about that than anything else, and I have been back home over the week-end and everybody asks me about the Cuban situation.

I know that it is a matter of deep concern to you, despite what you have said here today.

Now, you have asked us to pass a resolution here authorizing the President to do something which he already has the authority to do. There are some good reasons why he would like to have that resolution passed, and they have been made clear here today.

Mainly the purpose of the resolution is to fortify the President in taking that action if he thinks it is necessary to do so. In other words, the Congress is asked to share that responsibility, to prepare the way for him to take that responsibility, and I am prepared to go ahead and support that resolution because I think it is fair that he should have this.

But I don't think that this resolution is particularly helpful in connection with the Cuban situation, and I want to call your attention to and ask you to look into the resolution which I proposed in January of 1960 and again in January of 1961, which does come to grips, I think, with the Cuban situation, and which would do a great deal to fortify the President in connection with that situation.

I want to make a very brief analysis of this resolution and what it would do, what it is proposed to do.

It goes on to say in the "whereas" clauses, after it describes the situation of the Communist infiltration of Latin America, and so forth, and then I will only read the last three "whereas" clauses because they have a particular bearing on the resolving clause and what it says is this:

Whereas the American Republics have condemned emphatically intervention or the threat of intervention even when conditional from an extracontinental power in the affairs of the American Republics; and

Whereas the intervention of the Sino-Soviet powers in the American Republic of Cuba is threatening hemispheric unity and jeopardizing the peace and security of this hemisphere; and

Whereas in the rapidly evolving atomic age the threat presented by any such intervention might develop with such rapidity that there would not be time to assemble a meeting of the Inter-American Organ of Consultation to provide for joint action to repel the danger: Therefore be it

Resolved—

and this is a joint resolution, concurrent resolution of the two Houses—

Resolved, That (a) if one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance should be threatened in any manner

with domination, control, or colonization through the intervention of the world Communist movement, any other such party would be justified, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, in taking appropriate steps to forestall such intervention and any domination, control, or colonization of any nation of the Western Hemisphere by the world Communist movement.

(b) If any such defensive measures are taken by any defending nation of the Western Hemisphere, such nation should report promptly the action so taken to the Inter-American Organ of Consultation, to the end that an emergency committee, established in the manner provided by the Convention of Havana of 1940, may be organized to provide for the provisional administration of the nation so defended, pending its restoration to a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

What this, in effect, is saying, this is in effect reactivating the Monroe Doctrine in modern terms, to recognize the existence of the United Nations and our commitment to it, to recognize the Organization of American States, and our commitments to it, and in my judgment a resolution of this kind would justify unilateral action by the President if he decides that it is necessary.

In other words, we are giving him a much broader fortification especially in connection with the Western Hemisphere and with the Cuban situation than we are in connection with the callup Reserves which he already has the authority to do.

Now, this resolution has been referred to the Foreign Relations Committee. It is there. The State Department has opposed having hearings on it, both in 1960 and in 1961.

I don't want to ask you to comment off the cuff on as important a matter as this, but I am going to give you a copy of this resolution and I urge you in the interests of our total problems to study this and see if this kind of a resolution wouldn't be a very excellent fortification for the President in the responsibilities that we are giving him in respect to the callup matter.

In other words, we are stating the policy that we are prepared, if necessary, to take unilateral action in connection with the Cuban situation, and we are saying why.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought we would let you finish your statement, Senator, and you won't be interrupted then.

When you conclude your statement then I thought we would recess until about 1:30.

Senator BUSH. I will continue then for just one moment. [Deleted.] I submit that this broader resolution which signifies our intention—signifies our ability, our authority under existing agreements, to take unilateral action, and a resolution that we are ready to do it if we have to, would be far more significant, it seems to me, than fortifying the President in a resolution calling up Reserves with authority which he has already exercised once more than a year ago, and which he may exercise even today if he doesn't have the authority of Congress.

So I am going to ask you, Mr. Secretary, to study this thing, just in the interest of our total security position hoping that you might think it significant enough to discuss it with the Department of State and perhaps give it your blessing so we can get some action on it, at least get some hearings on it in the Foreign Relations Committee where it now rests in limbo.

Secretary McNAMARA. Senator Bush, I will be very happy to look at it. I take it that you think of it as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, the kind of resolution we are discussing now?

Senator BUSH. Yes, I am not offering it as a substitute for the call-up resolution; I think, as I said at the outset, that I shall certainly support that.

But, I think the situation in Cuba as the Secretary described it, the Secretary of State described it, to us and as you heard him, and you commented later, not on the direct point there on Cuba but as to our total position, it seems to me that the situation as he describes it, we ought to say something and the countries of Latin America, I think would be glad to hear us under a resolution of this kind, as the Congress of the United States, and I believe that psychologically it would greatly fortify the President and also have a much broader psychological effect, because it shows that we have got the right to do this under the United Nations Charter, we have the right under the Organization of American States and we know we have got it and we are worried about the Cuban situation and we are prepared to use that authority at such time as the President thinks may be necessary.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to put this resolution into the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. The resolution will appear in toto in the record.

(The resolution S. Con. Res. 5 referred to follows:)

[S. Con. Res. 5, 87th Cong., 1st sess.]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas intervention by the world Communist movement directly or indirectly in the affairs of any of the independent nations of the Western Hemisphere would threaten the sovereignty and political independence of that nation and other such nations; and

Whereas the free and independent nations of the Western Hemisphere have long since ceased to be objects for domination, control or colonization by other powers; and

Whereas the direct or indirect intervention by the world Communist movement, by whatever means such intervention might be disguised, in any American nation, would constitute in effect such domination, control or colonization by a non-American power, and would violate the sovereignty and political independence of an American nation; and

Whereas any such intervention by the world Communist movement in the affairs of any nation situated in the Western Hemisphere would constitute a threat to the peace and safety of the United States and the other nations of that hemisphere;

Whereas the American Republics have condemned emphatically intervention or the threat of intervention even when conditional from an extra-continental power in the affairs of the American Republics, and

Whereas the intervention of the Sino-Soviet powers in the American Republic of Cuba is threatening hemispheric unity and jeopardizing the peace and security of this hemisphere, and

Whereas in the rapidly evolving atomic age the threat presented by any such intervention might develop with such rapidity that there would not be time to assemble a meeting of the Inter-American Organ of Consultation to provide for joint action to repel the danger: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring). That (a) if one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance should be threatened in any manner with domination, control, or colonization through the intervention of the world Communist movement, any other such party would be justified, in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, in

taking appropriate steps to forestall such intervention and any domination, control, or colonization of any nation of the Western Hemisphere by the world Communist movement.

(b) If any such defensive measures are taken by any defending nation of the Western Hemisphere, such nation should report promptly the action so taken to the Inter-American Organ of Consultation, to the end that an emergency committee, established in the manner provided by the Convention of Havana of 1940, may be organized to provide for the provisional administration of the nation so defended, pending its restoration to a government of the people by the people, and for the people.

Mr. Secretary, I hope that you have whoever is going to sanitize this record get on it right away because I hope to have this record printed and get this bill up in the very near future.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; we will act very promptly.

Chairman RUSSELL. You can be back here at 1:30?

Secretary McNAMARA. I can, Mr. Chairman. Would it be at all possible to extend that to perhaps 2 or 2:15? I say this only because I was to join President Eisenhower and President Kennedy at 1 o'clock; I can cancel that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think 2 o'clock will be all right?

Secretary McNAMARA. Two o'clock, yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Two o'clock.

Notify the offices of all Senators because I said 1:30, so we will recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Stennis, Ervin, Byrd of West Virginia, Saltonstall, Smith of Maine, Bush, Beall, Goldwater, and Case of New Jersey.

Also present: Senator Cooper.

William H. Darden, T. Edward Braswell, Gordon A. Nease, professional staff members, and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Goldwater.

Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman, before I get any questions in, I would like to ask the Secretary to carefully review his agreement with Senator Saltonstall this morning about including units. I say that for this reason: I will use, as an example, our own National Air Guard outfit, the 197th fighter-bomber group.

Now, they are going over to transports. I don't know what the designation will be, but that could be the 360th transport group; that group might not have served in this last callup.

The 197th has. The 197th will go to some newly activated tactical outfit. Therefore, that group, under its designation and the wording

you agreed with Senator Saltonstall, would not be called up even though they hadn't actually been called up before.

In my own opinion, the language you have in here is adequate.

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe it is as well.

I don't believe, however, that insurmountable problems would arise by adding the word "unit," but we will look at that carefully.

Senator GOLDWATER. Fifteen tactical units in the Guard are going over to transport. There is just that chance that might happen but I think the words that you have are clear enough.

Now, you want to keep from calling up any member of the Ready Reserve who has been involuntarily ordered to active duty under the act of August 1, 1961.

Suppose there are no adequate units or personnel, except in those personnel or units you find that had already been called up, would you have the power to call them up in view of this language?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, we would not.

Senator GOLDWATER. Would it be desirable?

Secretary McNAMARA. No. I think it is important that those who were called involuntarily under the terms of Public Law 87-117 understand clearly, and without question, that they will not be called involuntarily under the terms of this legislation.

It is almost inconceivable to me that within the 2,800,000 members of the active force, plus the close to 3 million reservists, we can't find men with the skills we require other than those 148,000 who were called involuntarily under the terms of Public Law 87-117. Since I think it is so very unlikely that such would be the case, I would dislike seeing section 3 qualified in any way that would raise questions in the minds of the 148,000 men who were called previously as to whether they could be called again.

Senator GOLDWATER. I appreciate that, I agree with you, but I am wondering if this might not be restrictive to you in some areas that you might have to move in?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, I think there may be 1 or 2 or 10 or maybe 50 cases of that kind, but I doubt that there would be any substantial number.

I feel that way particularly because, as you know, this joint resolution would give us the authority to extend the service of personnel presently on active duty, who would be completing their service within the periods covered by this resolution, and that is a most important authority because there will be literally thousands of specialists moving out of the several services during this period whom we could draw upon in the event of need.

Senator GOLDWATER. They could volunteer.

Secretary McNAMARA. Pardon me?

Senator GOLDWATER. They could volunteer.

Secretary McNAMARA. The man called last time could volunteer?

Senator GOLDWATER. Yes.

Secretary McNAMARA. Oh, yes, indeed, and we could accept them as volunteers; all this does is prohibit us from calling them involuntarily.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will the Senator yield to Senator Saltonstall?

Senator GOLDWATER. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to emphasize, as the Senator from Arizona talked about section 3, that the suggestion I made about units instead of members I don't think is a particularly good one, and I shall not follow up on it even though you said you were willing to take it.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it is desirable not to include it, but, if the committee wished to do so, we could.

Senator SALTONSTALL. After talking with the chairman and the clerk, I decided to drop it.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Goldwater.

Senator GOLDWATER. This has nothing to do with the callup, but it has to do with training of the Air Guard; have you made any changes in your plans for inventory for these tactical groups, fighter and bomber groups?

We have nothing coming off the line now, and the 100's, and a handful of 104's are all that are left.

What are your long-range plans, if you care to divulge them, on inventory for the supporting groups?

Secretary McNAMARA. We have nothing coming off the line directly for the National Guard, but we do have substantial numbers of new fighter aircraft on procurement, of 104's and of F-4H's, to move into the active squadrons, which, in turn, in part, will replace aircraft now on active duty to move into the Guard units.

I will be very happy to send you a complete replacement schedule.

Senator GOLDWATER. I have seen that schedule, but I am not quite convinced that it is going to get the job done, frankly. For your F-104's, as I understand it, your inventory will not be complete until 1967?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator GOLDWATER. That is a 5-year gap. The 104's are now grounded again, the 100's are running into more and more difficulty, and I can't imagine them lasting as long as you think they will.

I had heard rumors that you were considering some purchases of 104's for the Guard. Is there anything to that?

Secretary McNAMARA. No.

Senator GOLDWATER. Was that discussed at all with you?

Secretary McNAMARA. Not to my knowledge; at least not to my recollection.

Senator GOLDWATER. This is rather recently?

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't recall that. We are presently working on a long series of actions relating to fiscal 1964 budget which is very much in the state of discussion, and this may be one of the matters the Air Force would wish to raise, but I haven't heard them suggest it.

We added, as a matter of fact, to the original proposal of the Air Force for fiscal 1962 very substantial numbers of F-105's and of F-4H's.

Senator GOLDWATER. For the Guard?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, for procurement of the Active Forces. I am just suggesting we raised substantially the number of aircraft to be procured and the number of total fighter units to be deployed.

Senator GOLDWATER. But your inventory of the 104's isn't very large? If I am not mistaken you are through making them, aren't you?

Secretary McNAMARA. Oh, no, the 105's—

Senator GOLDWATER. Wasn't the line closed down?

Secretary McNAMARA. Oh, no; the 104's. If I can have a moment here, I can tell you the procurement schedule of the 105's. It extends substantially into the future. I believe we continue to receive those up through fiscal 1964; I am not absolutely certain of the month.

I would be happy to give you the details.

Senator GOLDWATER. The total inventory isn't going to be much even there?

Secretary McNAMARA. Oh, yes; the total inventory of 104's when it reaches the maximum would be [deleted] aircraft and another [deleted] we have today, I would guess around [deleted] maybe, so we have [deleted] plus to come.

Senator GOLDWATER. And you are planning to put those into the Guard?

Secretary McNAMARA. No; into the Active Forces, but they, in turn, will replace 100's and some remaining 84-F's in the Active Forces.

To the best of my knowledge we have had no plans for procuring new aircraft for the Guard nor do I recall any plans even as having been discussed with me with the Air Force.

Senator GOLDWATER. I had heard there was a review of the 104 with a possible purchase in mind in quantity to get them down in price, for the Guard units.

Secretary McNAMARA. No, I know nothing about it.

Senator GOLDWATER. This has been a concern that the Air Guard, which is a highly trained and very useful organization, running out of fighter planes and they are going to wind up in transport.

Secretary McNAMARA. We plan to have an actual increase in the number of fighter aircraft in the Guard, after it rotates over to a total of about [deleted] by fiscal 1966.

Senator GOLDWATER. I think most of those are 100's.

Secretary McNAMARA. I was going to say, these are planes moving out of the active inventory into the Guard. [Deleted.]

Senator GOLDWATER. I hope the attrition rate doesn't get any higher.

What I was worried about is not the accidents, but the problems of maintenance we have had with them so far, especially the 105's.

Secretary McNAMARA. That [deleted].

Senator GOLDWATER. Now, Secretary McNamara, how long have we had information coming to us about Soviet and Soviet bloc equipment going into Cuba?

Secretary McNAMARA. I can't speak with authority beyond the past 18 months, but I believe I am correct in saying that we have known that Soviet military technicians and associated equipment have been moving into Cuba since July of 1960. [Deleted.]

Senator GOLDWATER. That is in accordance with my knowledge.

It is not new. I wanted to make that clear, that this moving of equipment into Cuba is not something that started last week or the

week before. It has been going on, I imagine, since before you even took office.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I understand July of 1960 was one of the early points in the period of movement. The events of the past several weeks have been associated with increasing rates of movement and shifts in the type of equipment, specifically the addition of surface-to-air defense equipment.

Senator GOLDWATER. [Deleted.]

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted.]

Moreover, I would like particularly to emphasize the importance of this action as it relates to certain specialized deficiencies in our present military force.

As I mentioned this morning, we are increasing the number of tactical air units very substantially, roughly 45 percent, from about 55 fighter squadrons to a total of around 73 at the end of fiscal 1963. [Deleted.]

The addition of the combat-ready guard squadrons would, therefore, be an important addition to our forces.

Similarly I mentioned this morning the 40 destroyers most of which were taken out of mothballs last year and all of which are presently in an active-duty condition [deleted]. These deficiencies in manning are deficiencies that could be corrected by calling up Reserves, and the addition of the 40 destroyers to our antisubmarine capabilities and to our naval blockade capabilities could be very substantial and very important under certain conditions.

So this resolution fulfills two purposes: (1) This provides us with authority to call up highly specialized forces than can add importantly to our combat capabilities in the event of increased international tensions; and (2) as many of you have suggested and I fully agree, it provides another way of saying to the Soviets we are firm, we are determined to protect our interests [deleted].

Senator GOLDWATER. One more question.

When General Lemnitzer moves to NATO, will he have the power to make decisions on the use of nuclear tactical weapons in the event of any Russian strikes?

Secretary McNAMARA. Within the limits of the authority granted to him by the President. The President has full authority to delegate the command decision to utilize nuclear weapons but only he has the authority presently to authorize and order the use of such weapons.

Senator GOLDWATER. I am not talking about large warheads, but talking about conventional weapons, fighter carried.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; I know. I am speaking of all nuclear weapons. Only the President has the authority to order the use of those weapons.

Senator GOLDWATER. Are you satisfied that the decision could be made fast enough to be effective?

Secretary McNAMARA. I am; yes. [Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Ervin?

Senator ERVIN. I have observations rather than questions, Mr. Secretary, don't you think the crisis would be just about as bad when Congress reconvenes as it is now?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it may be. It is difficult to look ahead with any feeling of certainty, but I don't believe that that

would make unnecessary the resolution we are requesting to grant authority to apply during the period Congress is out of session.

If Congress was in session we could assume it could act very promptly if it believed it necessary and desirable to do so.

Senator ERVIN. Of course, I expect to support the resolution, but I would be far happier if the request was for authorization to increase the strength of the armed services permanently by 150,000 men.

In the first place, I believe they would be better trained and better equipped and better prepared.

In the second place, I have had a lot of misgivings about the way our Reserves have been treated. I know a lot of them came out of the Second World War and, they were requested to stay in the Reserves and were assured they would not be called back into active service except in the event of war or all-out mobilization.

The Government breached faith with them, I think, in the Korean conflict. We called back thousands of them to the service after the Second World War while at the same time we allowed millions to escape serving their country a single day. Then we called them up again last year while millions were still escaping serving their country a single day. I think if we pass this resolution, which we will do, without difficulty, we are going to have hundreds of thousands of men, most of whom have served before in some capacity, put under something in the nature of a sword of Damocles.

If this resolution is not implemented up to the extent of 150,000, everybody in the Ready Reserve is going to figure he may be called any day, and his employers will be under the apprehension he is going to be called any day and it seems to me they will be paying a fearful penalty which could be avoided if we just increased the Armed Forces by 150,000.

Those are observations and if you have any comments I would be glad to hear them because those things give me very real concern.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would be happy to comment on it.

I don't believe there is any action we could take today that would make unnecessary the request for authority to call certain specialized types of personnel in the event the international situation requires use of those personnel during the period Congress is out of session.

I use the air squadrons as a perfect illustration of that point. It isn't the lack of authorization for men in our Active Forces that makes necessary the call for possible men in our air squadrons, but rather that the men in the Active Forces are being trained on new equipment and are not qualified to be deployed in combat at the present time whereas certain air squadrons in the Air National Guard are better qualified than the men being trained for the additions to the Active Air Force.

We recognize the importance of building the Active Forces to the point where it won't be necessary to have frequent callups of the Reserves because of lack of Active Force strength, and it was for that reason that the five additional combat ready Army divisions were brought into being, and it is for that reason that there is very substantial increase in tactical airpower underway at the present time.

It is for that reason that many additional ships have been added to the Active Navy. For example, we increased the amphibious lift for the Marine Corps by a third. We increased the number of logistical

support ships on active duty by about 15. There have been other increases in the Active Navy as well, so that all three services have had very substantial increments in their Active Forces.

But despite that, today we can see the need for possibly calling specialized units from the Reserve to complement those units.

Secondly, while I strongly support your feeling that to the maximum extent possible we must distribute the burden equitably among the members of this country, among the citizens of this country, nonetheless, the great bulk of the men who would be covered by this are men who would only serve 6 months in the Armed Forces and who, when they choose that form of service, accept automatically the possibility of being called. As a matter of fact, the obligation of serving additional years in the Reserve is a total of 6 years of service, Active and Reserve.

This is one of the obligations that each of us has as a citizen.

Many of them will never fulfill that beyond having served 6 months in the Active Forces. So from the point of view of equity, this resolution seems reasonable.

There are inequities, I am sure in the sharing of the burden of military service. We are doing everything we can to reduce those to a minimum.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, you referred to the F-84's. There are two or three different types of that F-84, are there not?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; there are a number of different types.

Chairman RUSSELL. The people get the idea that the F-84 you are talking about is some ancient plane, but some of them are better than the F-86.

Secretary McNAMARA. The F-84F is still a very usable airplane.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, we are talking about tactical air, and I am in favor of increasing it. But are you satisfied we have exhausted the possibilities of coordinating the efforts of the naval air with the tactical air? The Navy has a great deal of tactical air. Maybe General Lemnitzer should answer that question.

We have these big carriers carrying 100, 150 of them, around, and they could be landed on airfields and used, thrown right in with the Air Force tactical air.

Have all those planes been coordinated in the plan, General Lemnitzer?

General LEMNITZER. During the Korean war there was very close coordination between the tactical air support provided by the Air Force and that provided by Task Force 77, which operated from carriers off the coast of Korea. My own division, the 7th Infantry Division, in the high mountains of Korea, received the major part of our close support from carrier-type planes, both Marines and Navy.

Chairman RUSSELL. They do not have to land on the deck of a carrier. Can't they land on a field, too?

General LEMNITZER. Yes, they can; indeed they can [deleted].

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Erwin referred to the increase of the Regular Forces. You are not at all sure that you are going to need 150,000 men, are you, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think the probabilities are we will not have to call them during this period, but there is a sufficient possibility that they would be required to warrant the proposal before you at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want to share all the sentiments expressed about one man fighting two wars when there are millions who had not fought any, and if I thought that this could result in any repetition of Korea, I would not support this resolution.

That was one of the worst hardships I have ever witnessed. A man who had just gotten out of World War II and trying to establish himself in business, buying a home and having been married, and maybe having a baby or two, being called up to fight. But that should not happen under the situation we have today and, frankly, I have very little sympathy with the 6 months' serviceman who complains too bitterly about being called up 12 months more for service. His counterpart served 24 months and perhaps had his time extended, and if a person has only served 6 months, he should not object too strongly.

Senator ERWIN. I share that sentiment, Mr. Chairman, as far as the 6 months' men are concerned.

Chairman RUSSELL. This reminds me of the old saying that he is taking the king's shilling, he has had a break. He chose 6 months and gambled on that being all the active military service he would ever have to do. If he does have to come back he suffers no more in having to serve 2 years than anybody else.

I think that the griping on the part of these men who have been called up has been greatly exaggerated. I think two or three gripers writing letters to the papers attracts more attention than 2,000 men going ahead and performing their services and confining their gripes to their tents.

Griping has been one prerogative that soldiers have had since the beginning of time. Sometimes the hardest griper makes the best soldier.

But under our present Reserve setup with these thousands of men who have served 6 months particularly those who are receiving pay, I do not see what grounds they have to say, "I didn't think I would ever have to serve," because they have not made a disproportionate contribution to the national defense.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, are you through, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, since we have become a little generalized in our discussion here, would it be in place to ask you how the reorganization that you were discussing earlier with the Appropriations Committee and with the Armed Services Committee is proceeding?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; I would be happy to tell you.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And in relation to the National Guard.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I would be happy to discuss it with the committee, Senator Saltonstall.

I appeared before the Governors' conference in Hershey, Pa., earlier this year, perhaps in June or July, and discussed with the Governors the broad outline of the plan which we are proposing, the major elements of which you are familiar with.

We have about 8,800 units in the Reserve and Guard units today. Of the 8,800 units, about 1,700 are obsolete in terms of weapons tech-

nology or current tactics, or are surplus to our requirements in relation to a translation of our contingency war plans into Army units.

The surplus units, in part, reflect the very substantial increases in our active force which have taken place during the past year.

Further, of the 8,800 units, after deducting the 1,700, we are deficient about 1,000 units, these units being associated with changes in technology, changes in weapons, and changes in tactics and requirements.

Therefore, the major portion of our Reserve and Guard modernization plans was directed toward eliminating the obsolete and surplus units and replacing them with units which we require.

To the extent possible we would actually reorganize about 1,000 of the 1,700 units to be eliminated, and through that reorganization shift them over to the new weapons and new technology in the thousand units.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You do that without getting them geographically out of their area?

Secretary McNAMARA. To the extent possible.

Senator SALTONSTALL. This is one of the problems that you posed to the Governors?

Secretary McNAMARA. This was one of the problems that we posed to the Governors.

We had made a tentative analysis of all the Reserve and Guard units, selected certain units which we considered representative units of the type that were obsolete or surplus, indicated which of those would be eliminated entirely and which would be reorganized, if possible, to serve as units of the type that we are short today.

We had shown this by State and by geographic area within the State, and we asked the Governors for their comments.

They gave some of them to us at that time. They promised to examine the problem and to respond with additional comments later. We are receiving those comments now.

A short time ago, perhaps 2 weeks ago, I received a lengthy letter from Governor Vandiver of Georgia, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Reserve and Guard Affairs, expressing disagreement with certain of our proposals and accepting others.

We find in certain cases that the Governors believed we are asking too much of their States, and in other cases too little. We are endeavoring to modify our plan in response to their suggestions.

We will not find it possible to accept all of the suggestions, but many of them we can.

A second portion of our reorganization plan was associated with increasing the manning levels in certain of the priority units. [Deleted.]

We propose to identify six of the Reserve or Guard Divisions as high priority divisions, and for those we propose to increase the manning levels to approximately 80 percent of their authorized strength.

Furthermore, we propose for those divisions, to procure and, as a matter of fact, have obtained funds from the Congress to start the procurement of equipment to allow them to train with much higher levels of equipment than they have had in the past.

Beyond that we propose to increase the employment of what are known as technicians, full-time employees, for certain of the Reserve or Guard units to serve as trainer supervisors, logistical support supervisors, and otherwise fill a full-time role with the Reserve and Guard units.

Through these three measures we hope to substantially increase the combat readiness of the units in the Reserve and Guard identified as priority units.

This portion of the plan, I think, will work out very satisfactorily.

Again the Governors have certain suggestions, because in distributing these priority units and these manning levels among the States, in certain cases they said that we were overburdening the State, and again in other cases they felt we were cutting the State too much.

In one of the North Central States, for example, the Governor said he could not possibly meet the personnel requirements being placed upon his State. They were very small in terms of numbers of people, but they were very large in terms of a percentage increase over his present levels, about a 20- or 25-percent increase, as I recall, even though the total numbers involved were only 2,500 for the State.

We are taking account of the comments of that kind, modifying our plan to conform to the suggestion from the Governors as much as we can.

The Congress passed legislation authorizing the strength of 700,000 for the Army Reserve and Guard; 400,000 for the Army National Guard, as I recall; and 300,000 for the Army Reserve Forces.

We have stated to the Congress that we would program to that strength with certain very important qualifications, and they are:

First, we will not tolerate a lower level of mental or physical qualification for the Army Reserve and Army National Guard units than we accept for the Active Army Forces.

In the past, in order to meet strength goals imposed either by the Department or by Congress, physical and/or mental standards have been lowered. We propose to raise those standards to the same levels as are applied in the Active Army Forces.

Secondly, in the past, in order to meet prescribed strength levels, men have been accepted outside of the required military occupation specialties. This is one of the problems we faced in the last callup.

We called up Reserve and Guard units, assuming that the number of men assigned to them were properly qualified, only to find out that in order to meet prescribed strength levels, strength objectives, they had accepted men through recruitment who were not qualified for the occupational specialties required for that particular type of unit.

We propose to insist that 90 percent of the men recruited for a particular unit and assigned to that unit be qualified within the occupational specialties authorized for that unit by the tables of organization.

Thirdly, we propose that units be limited as to the number of men that they can recruit and retain on assignment. Again in the past, in order to meet prescribed personnel strength levels, certain units fell far behind those goals, and to offset that other units were allowed to rise far above the prescribed goals, and this simply created a distortion and imbalance within the Army Reserve and Army National Guard organization. We propose to eliminate that.

Finally, there is a fourth qualification—I do not believe I mentioned this in my letter to the committees of the Congress when I discussed the subject and stated how we propose to apply the strength authorization—but I think it is a qualification that the Congress would wish us to apply, and that is that men who fail to fulfill their obligations to the Reserve or Guard, that is to say, particularly men who fail to attend meetings or fail to perform effectively and properly at the meetings, will be eliminated and will be thrown back into the draft pool for potential service as draftees.

Now, applying these three or four qualifications to the program strength as I stated to Congress previously, may well result in a strength below the authorized levels. How much below I cannot say, but I think the reduction below the authorized levels would be a small price to pay for the very, very great improvement that will accrue in the combat readiness and efficiency of the Reserve and Guard units when we apply these standards.

That, in substance, is where we stand today, Senator Saltonstall. We are trying to as quickly as we can obtain all of the suggestions from the Governors.

There are certain problems we have not resolved with them. We propose to do so as promptly as possible within the next 4 to 8 weeks, and within that period we will be ready to put that plan into effect.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It is proceeding amicably and proceeding helpfully from the military point of view?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; I feel so. I do not wish to say there are not controversies and differences of opinion remaining, and I am sure that they will continue to remain. But, on the whole, I believe it is proceeding very satisfactorily.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you very much.

Senator GOLDWATER. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I am through.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed to ask your question, Senator.

Senator GOLDWATER. Have you in your studies ever given thought to a combining of the Guard and the Reserve, both ground and air, into one Reserve unit, whether it be called Reserve or Guard?

Secretary McNAMARA. No; I have not. We have had so much difficulty in putting through the rather minor changes that we discussed this year that to approach the much more major change of the kind you are suggesting has been beyond any plan we had in mind.

The Guard, of course, particularly the Army Guard, plays a very important role in the State, and is quite different from the Reserve in that respect, and we have not felt it either desirable or necessary to suggest a modification in that role.

Senator GOLDWATER. In the Air—I recognize the use of the ground Guard by the Governors. But it seemed to me there might be merit in the consideration of the combination of the Air Guard and the Air Reserve.

I say that for a valid reason. I have served in both, and there is no comparison between the training in the Guard and the Reserve. Even the best of the Reserves would not measure up to the training possibilities of the Guard.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think that is true in the Air, and I do not know quite why nor do I know for sure why the two should be continued separately.

First, let me say that the Air Guard has performed so satisfactorily that we have not spent nearly the amount of time on it that we have spent on the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. I cannot answer your question other than to say that there has not been the requirement for action as I have found necessary in the Army.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator yield for just a very mild comment?

Senator GOLDWATER. I am through.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would say this, Mr. Secretary, if you had been a Governor of a State you would see how difficult it was, and what you would run into if you tried to combine the Reserve and the National Guard.

Senator GOLDWATER. I am talking about the Air.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I was not thinking of the air, but I was thinking of on the ground.

Senator GOLDWATER. Right after the war when we reformed the Air Guard, there were many Governors who did not want it because they did not know what to do with it, and still do not. But I think politically it might present some kind of a problem today.

I have always felt that we do waste money in this one area of having Reserve Air and Guard Air. I remember in my State we had a lettuce strike, and we used the L-1 to patrol the roads, and that is the only time we ever used the Air Guard in an emergency. It is just a thought that you might toss around.

Secretary McNAMARA. We would be happy to do so, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, has the Department of Defense any definite plan with respect to the callup of any specific unit or of any particular group of MOS at this time?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir; we do not have any such plan. We have contingency plans, alternate contingency plans, for the callup of particular specialties or particular units, but we have no definite plan for the callup at this time of any individual or individual specialties or individual units.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are there any further questions?

Senator STENNIS. I have a question.

Mr. Chairman, I want to make one point. I do not know how far the members of the committee have gone in coming in contact with or appraising the effectiveness of the Reserve and the Guard during this last year's experience.

The Senator from North Carolina remarked that he would feel better if this were enlarging the Regular Forces rather than these Reserves. I just feel the opposite, with great deference to him.

Based on actual contact with them, I think it is an amazing record that was made by some of these units during the last 12 months. For instance, the Air Guard that the Senator from Arizona mentioned put on a marvelous response here to that callup.

I think in 33 days they had several hundred of these cargo planes all ready and on station in Europe, and without the slightest semblance of an accident or a scratched wing.

The Tactical Air was found to be splendid.

I was down at Dobbins Air Force Base the other day for an hour or two, and I was amazed and highly pleased. It is a center for training of reservists.

They had Naval Air and Air Force Air units there, and it seemed to be splendidly operated.

Those men were coming from all over that area for the weekend training. They were training 3,500 men there. As far as the cost is concerned, the only way I see for us to save any money in this gigantic military program or to meet the increased costs of these weapons and the ground units is to improve the Reserve.

I asked a person the other day how much it would cost to put in two new divisions in military construction, just two new divisions. He estimated \$250 million, if you have to have a new start from the ground up.

It costs \$30 million just to build barracks to the standards we now build for 15,000 new men.

I just use that as an illustration of how you get into the enormous costs involved in these added Regular divisions.

So I think we are very fortunate to have these Reserves that we could call on, and to find them in the state of readiness that I have just briefly touched on.

I do not think you are going to have any Reserve units that are worth a continental unless you call up the men who went on and joined a unit, too, knowing what the possibilities were. I do not know much about military organization.

Senator GOLDWATER. Will the Senator yield?

Senator STENNIS. Yes, I will yield.

Senator GOLDWATER. The Senator hit on one of the major reasons why I think this 6-month training idea is a bad one. You can hardly teach a man right face and left face in 6 months, and then he is a drag on his Reserve or Guard outfit when you try to train him.

The great advantage of these Reserve and Guard outfits is the fact that they are made up of veterans, most of them.

Most of these Air Guard squadrons have many pilots who flew in World War II and are still active, you will find, for instance, on checking the total hours or the total experience of pilots in the Guard and in the Reserve outfits, they are double and triple the experience level of the Regulars, and they compare more favorably with Regular outfits because of this experience.

I think you are probably going to have a hard time if you have to call up men, in picking out people who are going to be valuable to you, who have not served before.

I have always felt we made a mistake in going into the 6-month offer to the boy, as he can take it and say, "Well, this is my obligation," and he takes the chance.

Sure, he can be put back into the draft, but we are not calling any draftees to speak of today.

I would much rather have seen us maintain a 3-year period so that the product would have been good. Not that they are all lost, but those who will turn out good will turn out good anyway. I do not think that 6 months are enough.

Senator STENNIS. There is one other illustration I wanted to make, showing the strength of some of these Reserve and National Guard units. I went down to Fort Polk, where they had about 1,800 Mississippians on duty down there during this last callup. One battalion

particularly was from an area where I used to be judge, and I asked for the privilege of just meeting with any of the officers who wanted to come, and then a separate group with the noncommissioned officers, they came out there and we talked.

I knew some of them when they were boys, and I found in that non-commissioned group former presidents of the Kiwanis Club, members of the high school faculty at West Point, Miss., and a group of unusual leaders with talent and variety of experience.

They belong to those local units, and some of them did not want to assume the responsibility of a commissioned officer because it required more time, but there was an amazing amount of talent.

Since then I have made inquiries, and they tell me uniformly that many of these Reserve units have more talent and experience than do some of the Regulars. I think they are making a great record.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think they have, and I wish you would have put in that plug for Dobbins Air Force Base before the Air Force moved their headquarters to Tinker Air Force Base. [Laughter].

Senator ERVIN. I agree with everything the Senator from Mississippi says, except his thought that his arguments sustain his position rather than mine, because after they got that year's training in, under my preference they would still be there in the service.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there anything further? If not, we thank you gentlemen very much for your appearance here. We will excuse you now.

(Whereupon the committee proceeded to mark up the bill, and subsequently unanimously voted to report S.J. Res. 224, with amendments as covered by S. Rept. 2023.)

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particularly was from an area where I used to be judge, and I asked for the privilege of just meeting with any of the officers who wanted to come, and then a separate group with the noncommissioned officers they came out there and worked.

I knew some of them when they were boys and I found in that non-commissioned group former presidents of the Kiwanis Club, members of the high school faculty at West Point, Miss., and a group of military leaders with a lot and variety of experience.

They belong to those local units, and some of them did not want to assume the responsibility of a command position, because it is a pretty more time, but there was an amazing amount of talent.

Since then I have made inquiries and they tell me that many of these officers have more talent and experience than do some of the lieutenants. I think that is making a great record.

Chairman Russell, I think that you and I wish you would have put in that plug for Dobbin Air Force Base before the Air Force moved their headquarters to Wickenburg Air Force Base. [Laughter.]

Senator Bunker, I agree with everything the Senator from Missouri says, except his thought that his arguments sustain his position rather than mine, because after they get that year's training in, under my preference they would still be there in the service.

Chairman Russell, is there anything further? If not, we thank you gentlemen for your appearance here. We will excuse you now.

proceeded to mark up the bill, and subsequently to report S.J. Res. 221, with amendments.

