


Storage

# ATTEMPTS OF PRO-CASTRO FORCES TO PERVERT THE AMERICAN PRESS

Y 4  
J 89/2  
P 92/9

8794  
J 89/2  
P 92/9



## HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

TESTIMONY OF CARLOS TODD

JULY 19, 1962

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

88947

WASHINGTON : 1963

4 Y  
2807  
9259

**COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY**

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee  
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina  
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas  
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina  
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado  
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut  
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan  
EDWARD V. LONG, Missouri

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin  
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois  
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska  
KENNETH B. KEATING, New York  
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii  
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania

**SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY  
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS**

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, *Vice Chairman*

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina  
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas  
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina

ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska  
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois  
KENNETH B. KEATING, New York  
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania

J. G. SOURWINE, *Counsel*

BENJAMIN MANDEL, *Director of Research*



## CONTENTS

---

	Page
Testimony:	
Oltmans, Willem L.....	29
Todd, Carlos.....	2

### APPENDIX

I. Historical supplement, Cuban Information Service.....	47
(a) Destruction of University of Havana.....	47
(b) The agricultural fiasco.....	60
(c) The destruction of organized labor.....	66
II. Excerpt, "The Sensual Revolution," Victor Franco.....	75
III. Article by Gordon and Hester.....	76
IV. National Broadcasting Co., letter re Hlavacek.....	81
V. Analysis of testimony re John Kuralt.....	92
VI. Six Journalists Visit Cuba.....	95
VII. Statement of Hendrik J. Berns.....	100
VIII. Clurman letter re Halper.....	111

101  
102  
103  
104  
105  
106  
107  
108  
109  
110  
111

## ATTEMPTS OF PRO-CASTRO FORCES TO PERVERT THE AMERICAN PRESS

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1962

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY  
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:55 a.m., in room 3304, New Senate Office Building, Senator Kenneth B. Keating presiding.

Present: Senators Keating and Hugh Scott.

Also present: Alan D. McArthur, associate counsel; Samuel J. Scott, assistant counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research analyst; and Frank Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator KEATING. The subcommittee will come to order.

The hearing this morning is on attempts of the pro-Castro forces to pervert the American press.

The chairman of the subcommittee is unable to be here and has asked me to open the hearings.

The witness is Mr. Carlos Todd, a Cuban citizen who is now president and editor of the Cuban Information Service in Coral Gables, Fla.

Do you have a prepared biographical sketch, Mr. Todd?

Mr. TODD. Yes, sir.

Senator KEATING. You prepared it yourself?

Mr. TODD. Yes, sir.

Senator KEATING. It will be inserted in the record.

(The statement referred to appears below:)

Carlos Todd is a Cuban citizen, born in Havana. He attended secondary school and college in the United States, and served with the Canadian Army overseas during World War II. Mr. Todd was engaged in sugar, insurance, and real estate in Havana; he became a columnist for the Times of Havana in 1956, and became the political writer of that newspaper in January 1959.

Todd was the first Cuban journalist to turn against Fidel Castro, early in 1959. In February of that year, he warned about Communist infiltration in the ranks of the 26th of July movement. He was forced to flee Cuba in October 1960, and has been the president and editor of the Cuban Information Service in Coral Gables, Fla., ever since.

Carlos Todd followed the Cuban Communist revolution from its very beginning, and is today considered an expert in that field.

Senator KEATING. Mr. Todd, there are a number of factual statements set forth in your testimony, a copy of which has been delivered to the committee. Therefore I will ask that you be sworn.

Will you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Mr. TODD. I do.

Senator KEATING. You have a prepared statement, Mr. Todd?

Mr. TODD. Yes, sir.

Senator KEATING. You may proceed in your own way.

### TESTIMONY OF CARLOS TODD

Mr. TODD. It is extremely difficult for American journalists to enter Communist Cuba today. From the American side, the traveler is required to have a passport and special permission from the State Department. In addition, he must obtain a Cuban entry visa from the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington.

These visas are not granted willy-nilly. The Czechs, following instructions from their Cuban allies, grant visas only to those U.S. newsmen who are believed to be favorable to the Cuban Communist cause, and who will present favorable reports of their visit.

Senator KEATING. Mr. Todd, I think it would be helpful if you would open your testimony by giving us a brief résumé of your own experience and background.

Mr. TODD. Yes, sir.

In Havana at the time when the Cuban revolution took over in 1959 I was a columnist for the newspaper, the Times of Havana.

On January 1 of 1959 I started writing on politics in that newspaper, as a political writer.

On the 15th of January of that year I accused Fidel Castro of censorship and intimidation of the press by his actions against the Cuban weekly then known as Zigzag.

In February of that year I denounced heavy Communist infiltration in the ranks of the 26th of July Movement, naming Blas Roca and Lazaro Peña as being the chief instigators of this infiltration.

In March of 1959 I called Fidel Castro an outright dictator. I have been writing against him ever since.

I was sued for libel by the then President of Cuba, Urrutia, and later I was threatened—

Senator KEATING. In the Cuban courts?

Mr. TODD. Yes; I was sued for libel by the President. Actually the man that presented the suit was the President's secretary, Olivares, who later went on to become the real power in the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations, and is today Cuban Ambassador in Moscow.

I was threatened repeatedly over the telephone and in the mails. I was also, on several occasions, warned of arrest. And finally, in October of 1960, my position there became untenable, because I knew that the G-2 were after me, and I had to leave the island.

Since that time I have been the editor and president of the Cuban Information Service, Inc.

Senator KEATING. What happened in the suit against you for libel?

Mr. TODD. The suit was dropped because really it was only a political maneuver to get Urrutia into a difficult spot, which later became apparent when that President was deposed. And the suit, which was about a house that he had bought, was brought up by Castro, alleging that Urrutia's salary should not have bought such a large and very

costly house, this was part of the Castro tactics in his attack against Urrutia.

Senator KEATING. You may proceed.

Mr. TODD. Here I am referring to three Americans who were permitted to enter Cuba as journalists, recently. They are retired Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Hester, of Chapel Hill, N.C., who went to Havana as special correspondent for the North American Newspaper Alliance; and Charles Kuralt, who was admitted as CBS-TV correspondent, as was John Hlavaceck, of NBC-TV.

Senator KEATING. May I ask you, are those the only newsmen in Cuba now?

Mr. TODD. These three were out, they were there recently, during the month of May.

Senator KEATING. Were they sent out by the Government?

Mr. TODD. No; they were not sent out by the Government, they entered freely and departed freely.

Senator KEATING. Have other newspapermen been granted visas to enter Cuba?

Mr. TODD. Yes. There was Carl Migdail, of U.S. News & World Report. But he went into Cuba through Mexico, he did not go through the paperwork at the Czechoslovakian Embassy here.

Senator KEATING. Are there any others that went through the paperwork of the Czechoslovakian Embassy here?

Mr. TODD. At the moment I am ignorant of any of the others who did recently. I understand at the moment Don Grant, of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, is down there.

Senator KEATING. Who?

Mr. TODD. A Mr. Grant, of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

Senator KEATING. Do you know any others?

Mr. TODD. No; I don't know of any others offhand.

Also last year in October, late October, Mr. Samuel Halper, of Time magazine, was there.

Senator KEATING. Any others within the last year?

Mr. TODD. Not that I recall.

Senator KEATING. Now, did those men also, as you say "get visas as U.S. newsmen because they were believed to be favorable to the Cuban Communist cause, and that they would present favorable reports"?

Mr. TODD. I would say that these men did come back with reports favorable to the Castro regime.

Mr. McARTHUR. Mr. Chairman, the witness referred to the news item. We have it here. And I ask that it be put into the record and be identified as an exhibit. It is the news item concerning General Hester.

Senator KEATING. He hasn't referred to anything like that yet.

Mr. McARTHUR. He mentions it in his statement. And I think we should have it in the record.

Senator KEATING. It is all right; I have no objection.

Have you seen this article in the Miami News quoting General Hester under a headline, "Cuba Not Red, Says General"?

Mr. TODD. Yes.

Senator KEATING. And the date of that is May 4, 1962.

Mr. TODD. I must make a clarification here. I say, it must be understood that, given the difficulty of getting their men into Cuba,

American press organizations will do everything in their power to obtain permission for entry; and will later proudly present the report from "Our Man in Havana," without much bothering about its contents. That would be applied mainly to television networks and not newspapers.

The writings of such men, or their appearance on television, represents a feather in the cap of large press agencies and networks. It is good copy, it is a news "beat," and it adds prestige to the organization in question. What they write or say is not scrutinized too carefully for inaccuracies or falsehoods.

Hester's press reports, which appeared very sparingly, and Kuralt's and Hlavacek's television appearances have all been favorable to the Castro Communist regime in one way or another. Hester, an inexperienced newsman, wrote more blatantly and less subtly than his fellow reporters on television.

The retired general claimed that Castro still has the support of 75 percent of the Cuban people though arriving refugees and all reports from Cuba agree that 85 to 90 percent of the population is against Castro and his Reds. Hester was quoted in the Miami News, as saying: "It is simply not true that Cuba is now a Communist satellite." He denied that hunger existed in Cuba, and claimed that he had eaten well in Cuba for 2 weeks. He even stressed the claim that Cubans living on the farms and in the country are "eating better than ever before." You have just referred to the attached Hester report, which I mentioned here.

Senator KEATING. I think this is the proper place for this report to appear. So it will appear in the record at this point.

(The Hester interview above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1

[From the Miami News, May 4, 1962]

CUBA NOT RED, SAYS GENERAL

HE CLAIMS FIDEL BOSS, PEOPLE FINE

CLEARWATER (AP).—A retired Army general turned news correspondent has returned from Cuba where he says all is not as black as reports indicate.

Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Hester, who makes his permanent home at Chapel Hill, N.C., said in an interview with the Clearwater Sun that Fidel Castro "is still unquestionably the boss" and has the support of about 75 percent of the Cuban people.

Hester, an accredited correspondent for the North American Newspaper Alliance, said "It is simply not true that Cuba is now a Communist satellite.

"When Anibal Escalante, an old-time Cuban Communist and later a member of the Cuban National Directorate, was discovered favoring his former Communist colleagues, he was fired by Castro \* \* \* and the decision stuck in Moscow as well as in Havana," he said.

Hester, formerly on the staff of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, said he saw no indications of starving Cubans and that few were hungry. He said there was no actual manpower shortage.

"More than half the land now being cultivated is still in private hands and many small enterprises are privately owned and operated," Hester said.

Hester quoted National Agrarian Reform Institute Director Rafael Rodriguez as saying the Cuban Government was prepared to pay compensations for nationalized U.S. industries in Cuba "any time the U.S. Government restores the sugar quota and buys in excess of 3 million tons annually."

Hester said he lived on food allotted under the Cuban rationing program for 2 weeks and "felt no ill effects."

He said Cubans living on the farms and in the country are "eating better than ever before.

"This year the people are healthy, happy, and busy. Engaging in sports and dancing, playing on the beaches \* \* \* often supplying labor for some of the projects where they themselves will live."

The diplomatic and trade break between Cuba and the United States, he said, has caused "some bottlenecks, but no crises." Cuba is in the midst of a complete changeover of foreign supply sources, a completely new domestic distribution system, and a huge industrialization program.

Mr. TODD. On May 25, 1962, Charles Kuralt presented his opinions and showed films of his visit to Cuba over the Columbia Broadcasting System's TV program, "Eyewitness." No doubt that the script for this program is readily available to you.

Senator KEATING. Do we have the script of that report?

Mr. McARTHUR. I don't believe the committee has that in its possession.

Senator KEATING. You may proceed.

Mr. TODD. Kuralt went out of his way to praise the Cuban agricultural program, presenting views of the "cooperative" farm in Pinar del Rio Province, specially built by the Cuban Communist Government to impress foreign visitors. It is the only one of its kind on the island; yet Mr. Kuralt gave his national audience to understand that all Cuban peasants enjoyed similar benefits under communism. "This is what they are getting," he stated, referring to the peasants, "and what they will get."

Then Kuralt entered the realm of deliberate falsehood when he told his viewers that the wages of the Cuban peasant are higher today than they were in 1958.

The affirmation is easily disproved by official Cuban Government data, which can be obtained from the Cuban economic research project or Mr. R. Miquel, at the University of Miami. It is further shown to be false by the testimony of Cuban peasants, who have fled, at considerable risk to their lives, in small boats, to Florida.

The Cuban peasant today is receiving half—in some cases less than half—of the wages he earned in 1958; he is being paid in depreciated currency; and, in the majority of cases, receives half his wages in Government scrip, redeemable only at the "People's Stores," owned by the state.

Kuralt also made allusion to the fiction that "only the rich had fled to Miami"—the affluent classes of Cuba. Cuban refugees are made up of all strata of Cuban society, from the formerly rich (whose properties have all been confiscated) to the very poor. This was apparent as early as December 1960, when the International Rescue Committee published a complete report on Cuban refugees in the United States, which I have marked there as "Exhibit No. 2."

Senator KEATING. Do we have that?

Mr. McARTHUR. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have that.

Senator KEATING. Is that a long document?

Mr. McARTHUR. Yes, it is a lengthy document.

That is exhibit No. 2, Mr. Chairman, that is an excerpt from it.

Senator KEATING. It is not very long. That will appear in the record.

(The statement above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 2" and reads as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 2

[Cuban Information Service, Jan. 7, 1961, p. 9]

A REPORT ON THE CUBAN REFUGEE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Call them refugees, expatriates, asylees, any name that might fit, and you still come up with over 1,000 Cubans who seek refuge in the United States from the Castro tyranny, week after week after week.

The Cuban Communist propaganda machine describes these people who flee from oppression, terror, and sudden death, as "Batistianos," "war criminals," "mercenaries," and "counterrevolutionaries," in the manner of the best Soviet semantics.

Recently, a spot survey was carried out by the International Rescue Committee, a nonprofit and truly international organization with offices in Germany, Belgium, Argentina, Switzerland, France, Brazil, Italy, Austria, Sweden, and the United States. The Committee's job is to care for and to find work for refugees that have been fleeing from the Iron Curtain countries and, before them, Nazi Germany.

Early in December 1960 officers of the Committee interviewed a representative number of Cuban arrivals in the United States. The investigation brought forth some surprising conclusions.

The Committee found that, contrary to the Guevara-Castro claim that the regime speaks for the "humble" people and for Cuba's youth, the majority of refugees were ordinary workers under 30 years of age.

Another Castro lie was made evident when figures proved that only 9 percent of Cuban refugees in the United States arrived in the year 1959, immediately after the fall of Batista. The remaining 91 percent have arrived in the year 1960; and of these 47 percent since July 1960.

When you consider that Castro claimed that he had stamped out all the Batista people in Cuba early in 1959; that the "war criminals" had precipitately fled the country with their ill-gotten gains in January of that year; that subsequent purges eliminated all vestiges of the Batista regime and its creatures well before April 1959; who, then, make up the 91 percent of Cuban refugees that have found asylum in the United States during 1960? The International Rescue Committee breaks the totals down as follows:

Occupation breakdown:	Percent	Age distribution of working age refugees—Continued	Percent
Workers-----	40	41 to 50-----	20
Professionals-----	23	Over 50-----	4
White collar-----	16	Total-----	100
Civil servants-----	10	Refugees by date of flight:	
Students-----	7	Since July 1960-----	47
Businessmen-----	4	First half 1960-----	44
Total-----	100	All of 1959-----	9
Age distribution of working age refugees:		Total-----	100
18 to 30-----	42		
31 to 40-----	34		

It is quite clear, isn't it, that the majority of the refugees from Cuba are young, they are workers, and they arrived in the United States during the latter half of 1960.

Where, then, is the Castro claim that only "war criminals" and Batistianos are to be found in Miami and other cities of the United States? What does he mean that this is a revolution "for the humble and the young" if it is precisely the "humble and the young" who are fleeing from Cuba in ever-increasing numbers?

Why refugees at all? Why is it that people flee by the thousands when the Communists take over a country? And why is it that these people in their majority are precisely the very same people that the Communists pretend that they are there to liberate: the young, the workers, the "humble"?

Figures of the International Rescue Committee show that arrests, threatened arrests, and police harassment account for most of the decisions to seek asylum in the United States. The younger exiles are here usually because they resisted

orders to join the factory or the youth militia. Some were blacklisted by the Communists and could not find jobs in Cuba. Government pressures, of one kind or another, are responsible for the flight of all, men, women, and little children.

Who are these people? People who find it impossible and intolerable to live under the rigid tyranny of communism; people who are stifled in an atmosphere of complete government control of thought and action; people, humble people, whose only desire was for a revolution that might bring them the joys of life and liberty, and who found the exact opposite to be true; people who will always oppose the domination of their souls; simple people whose only wish is to be free.

(Latest reports place the total Cuban refugees now in the United States at between 50,000 and 75,000.)

Mr. TODD. Kuralt praised the Cuban educational program, stating that illiteracy had been wiped out in the island. He failed to mention that the so-called alphabetization program consisted of an intense, if elementary, course in Communist indoctrination, containing vicious and malicious attacks against the United States. An enormous segment of the Cuban rural population refused pointblank to accept Communist indoctrination. Illiteracy—low (23 percent) before Castro—has not been diminished appreciably under the program.

While Kuralt endeavored to present a very rosy picture of Communist Cuba, he also stressed the contention that Castro is stronger than ever; that the people are solidly behind him; and that there is no opposition to the regime. These contentions are denied by the public utterances of Fidel Castro, "Che" Guevara, Blas Roca, and Raul Castro.

Ably refuting Kuralt's allegations, U.S. News & World Report presented a true picture of today's Communist Cuba in its June 11, 1962, issue; and ironically made use of Kuralt's own pictures to disprove the contentions of the CBS man.

Senator KEATING. May I inquire if you know how long Mr. Kuralt spent in Cuba?

Mr. TODD. I don't know how long he spent in Cuba. I believe it must have been from 3 weeks to a month.

Senator KEATING. And he is not presently there?

Mr. TODD. No; he is not presently there.

In the case of Mr. Hlavacek of NBC, on his return from Cuba he said in the Miami Herald that—

Castro, by virtue of his March 25 speech, reading Anibal Escalante out of Cuba's sole—and Communist—Party, regained a great deal of popularity.

The statement is a studied half-truth. Castro regained popularity among the young guard of the Cuban Communists, who had been subjected to pressure by the old guard, led by Blas Roca. The Escalante incident was strictly an internecine strife for power. All recent arrivals from Cuba confirm this, contrary to Hlavacek's false contention.

Senator KEATING. What position did Escalante hold in the Cuban Government?

Mr. TODD. He was primarily the theoretician of the party, and he had been placed in charge of the ORI, which might be assumed to be the Communist Party in Cuba.

Senator KEATING. In other words, a party chairman?

Mr. TODD. Well, he wasn't exactly the party chairman, he was Party Executive Secretary of the Integrated Revolutionary Organization of the Communist Party.

Appearing on NBC-TV on June 2, Hlavacek, who says he spent 5 months in Cuba—and I believe that the statement is true—could only produce film shots of a Cuban nightclub and a hotel. On the morning program "Today," he proudly showed Cuban Communist propaganda posters. The impression was that of a happy, contented Cuban people living well and gaily under communism.

Not a word from Hlavacek and Kuralt about Cuban food shortages; not a word about food queues; not a single reference to the innumerable cane burnings, which were an important factor in lowering Cuban sugar productions for the 1962 crop. There was nothing designed to be unpleasant to the Cuban Communist regime.

There was stress on Castro's invincibility, his popularity, the lack of resistance to the regime; not a word about the economic and agricultural difficulties of Cuba. Hlavacek praised the Government building program, stated that there was no housing shortage. That very same week, Fidel Castro speaking in Havana, said that the critical shortage of housing would be solved in "another 10 to 12 years," and asked the people to have patience with rationing and shortages.

The entry of these gentlemen into Cuba was not the result of individual endeavors. There are too many similarities in their reports; and a definite pattern can be discerned running throughout.

Senator KEATING. Mr. Todd, have you given a copy of your testimony of the press?

Mr. TODD. Yes, sir; I believe they have copies.

Senator KEATING. You have eliminated one paragraph in that testimony.

Mr. TODD. Yes; I eliminated the paragraph because the official in question asked me not to reveal his name.

Senator SCOTT. Why don't you read the paragraph without revealing the name?

Mr. TODD. I will be glad to do that.

Senator KEATING. In other words, you don't withdraw the statement?

Mr. TODD. No; I don't withdraw the statement.

One indication of the reasons as to why Hlavacek was granted a Cuban entry visa comes from his wife. Before the Punta del Este Conference in January 1962 she told a U.S. Government official in Miami, "Cuba is not going to Punta del Este to defend herself; but to accuse the United States, which is as should be." Such a remark is repeated; and falls on the grateful ears of the Cuban Communists infiltrated in Miami, to be reported instantly to Havana.

As I say, this remark I glossed over because I have been asked not to reveal the name of the official by the official himself.

Senator KEATING. It is not of very much value unless the official is identified.

Mr. TODD. I am sorry, I can't do that unless I have the man's permission.

Senator KEATING. I understand. I don't ask you.

Would you be willing to give the name in an executive session?

Mr. TODD. Yes.

Senator KEATING. I think perhaps that should be done.

Will you proceed?

Mr. TODD. The reports all agree that Cuba is Communist, with the exception of Hester, who claims it is not. They all claim that the majority of the people of Cuba are firmly behind Fidel Castro; the regime is successfully coping with difficulties, which have been greatly exaggerated; there are good prospects for increased production and housing; and the "revolution has gone deep"—meaning that the revolution has consolidated itself to a degree where it is useless to resist it.

The intention is to condition the people of the United States to accept the proposition that Castro and communism are in Cuba to stay; that this "historically inevitable" process should be understood by all Americans; and that, therefore, it is advisable to enter into a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the Cuban Communists.

Walter Lippmann, in a recent television appearance over CBS, agreed with Hester, Kuralt, and Hlavacek when he stated:

Castro is not very important \* \* \* it has been proved he can't hurt us (therefore leave him alone). \* \* \* We have problems in South America, but they do not come from him.

And there is an exhibit for that.

Mr. McARTHUR. The remarks of Mr. Lippmann appear in the Miami Herald of June 8, 1962. I ask that they be made a part of the record.

Senator KEATING. That may be received.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3" and is as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 3

[From the Miami Herald, June 8, 1962]

#### THROUGH THE WRONG END OF THE SCOPE: AN OPTIMISTIC LIPPMANN TAKES LOOK AT THE NEWS

(By Fran Swaebly, Herald TV writer)

Walter Lippmann, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, made his fourth television appearance in a freewheeling colloquy with David Schoenbrun on CBS Reports Thursday night on channel 4. Predictably, it was one of the most worthwhile events of the year on television.

A remarkable and fascinating man, Lippmann, now 73, has the clarity, incisiveness, and appearance of a man 20 years his junior, combined with the wisdom and insight of his actual age and experience.

Lippmann is able to view current events through the wrong end of the telescope; to put today's crises and political evolvings into long-range perspective.

The tenor of the hour was optimism—the columnist's belief that, slowly, the turning of the tide in the balance of forces between the East and the West now is swinging to the West.

He based his opinion on the conviction that Russia cannot now ever attack the West, knowing the West can strike back overwhelmingly. The proof that Russia knows this, he said, is in that they are much more prudent in dealing with us today.

Lippmann feels the major pressures on Khrushchev inside the U.S.S.R. are agricultural problems and the ideas of the younger intellectuals, who "are tired of being isolated and want a reevaluation."

Out of the growing awareness of the leaders and people of Europe and their fantastic economic growth comes the Common Market, Lippmann said, and he is certain that unless the United States takes immediate action to promote our economic growth, we will be left behind.

Logical first step to promote necessary growth: reduce direct taxes, personal and industrial, "which have gone beyond endurable limits."

Other topics on which Lippmann commented included:

Cuba: In the long-range view, "Castro is not very important \* \* \* it has been proved he can't hurt us \* \* \*. We have problems in South America, but they do not come from him."

Africa: "Through good luck and good management and with the United Nations as an instrument, Africa will not become the scene of a big United States-Russia conflict."

Laos: "A miserable affair of no use to anybody."

Vietnam: "Russia doesn't particularly want South Vietnam \* \* \* shown by fact they have protested very little our military aid."

Berlin: "The big change is that both sides recognize there is a stalemate \* \* \* the wall will someday come down."

President Kennedy: "Style has been very good, he has proved a very admirable navigator \* \* \* knows victory and atomic war are both impossible," but by avoiding political attack by trying to "prematurely balance the budget (he) is throttling our economic development."

Dean Rusk: "A really first-class negotiator with Russians."

Robert McNamara: "Greatest man in the Pentagon since it was built."

Robert Kennedy: "A very attractive human being whose greatest weakness is in taking ruthless action when he thinks he is right."

Mr. TODD. The contentions of Messrs. Hester, Kuralt, and Hlavacek are all denied by the words of Cuban Communist leaders themselves. Castro has appeared on television repeatedly, to apologize publicly for the total disintegration of agriculture, the extreme shortage of basic foods, and the precarious housing situation. Ernesto (Che) Guevara has admitted the existence of "counterrevolutionary foci in Matanzas and elsewhere." Raul Castro has condemned the activities of "counterrevolutionary worms" in sabotage and cane burnings. The reports of the three men in question have been directly contrary to these and many other public utterances of the Communists themselves.

Still, they command an audience of millions through NANA, NBC, and CBS. These audiences, ignorant of the facts about Cuba, accept the words of these men as gospel truth; and the nation is conditioned to accepting communism in this hemisphere.

Canadian and British newsmen, who enter at will, due to entry agreements between those two nations and Cuba, tell a different story.

Mr. McARTHUR. Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record an item appearing in the American View under date of June 1962.

Senator KEATING. Is that a Canadian newspaper?

Mr. TODD. The American View is a Miami newspaper.

Senator KEATING. That will be received.

(The article was marked "Exhibit No. 4" and reads as follows:)

#### EXHIBIT No. 4

[From the American View, June 1962]

#### CUBA NEAR COLLAPSE

(By Gerald Clark, Montreal Star)

If you have ever seen anyone die of cancer, you will understand what is happening to Cuba. I left there recently, dumbstruck at the shattering disintegration that has taken place since my last visit just a year ago.

In 1961 some people in Havana grumbled and cursed the steady ingrowing of communism. But at least they looked healthy and ate well.

In 1962 the grumbling has taken on ominous proportions, with women battling in marketplaces for food for their children.

All of Cuba is hungry and has just emerged from its first week of rationing with hardly a hope that there will be any improvement.

An entire nation is on the edge of starvation and complete economic collapse.

So desperately short of cash is Castro's government that it has not been able to place an order in Canada, on which it has relied for some essentials since the U.S. embargo, for 4 months.

Butter has not been seen for several weeks, and milk is reserved for children under the age of 7.

A year ago I wrote that any invasion of Cuba would be met with stiff resistance because many people were loyal to Castro; this was confirmed, disastrously for Cuban exiles, a few weeks later.

Today I would not make such a prediction because the situation has changed drastically.

Castro still has a rigid core of fanatic supporters, particularly among the teenagers who are being steadily indoctrinated. He also has an effective secret police, who even took to following me in Havana. He can boast of at least 300,000 armed militia men and women. But their loyalty is less certain; they themselves are ill fed.

The main force in Cuba, however, is the big flexible mass of people who last year wavered in their enthusiasm but did not join the vociferous group of anti-Castroites in open condemnation. So long as their stomachs were full there was relative contentment and the remarks were restrained.

But now hunger has brought on bitter and open resentful comments even by people who a few months ago classified themselves as supporters of the revolution. One man said to me: "I want some boots."

"Boots?" I said, "How many pairs—one, two?"

"No, 70,000 pairs."

"Seventy thousand pairs?" I echoed. "Don't you know you can be put in jail for black marketing?"

"No," said the man. "Bring them back filled with marines."

Members of the Eastern bloc—especially East Germans—astonished me by their frankness in saying that the Cuban revolution is a failure and should be written off.

For another thing, the Soviet Union has failed to make good its promises or, put another way, refuses to subsidize Cuba blindly. Like the East Germans, the Russians want payment beyond sugar.

When I was in Havana a year ago, Industries Minister Ernesto (Che) Guevara told me how 60 factories, provided by the Eastern bloc, were due to be completed in a matter of months.

In actuality, only three insignificant factories have been built—a Hungarian tomato cannery, an East German biscuit bakery, and Czech pencil factory. There is no sign of any others under construction.

Agriculture itself has faltered. After last year's bumper crop of nearly 6½ million tons, this year's sugar production is unlikely to exceed 4 million tons (partly the result of drought, partly the indifference of professional cane-cutters and last year's unscientific cutting by amateurs recruited in the cities).

This is the height of the harvest season, and yet city people are reduced to a diet of malanga, a kind of sweet potato that at one time only the most impoverished ate.

Allotment of butter is 2 ounces a month. Fish, though in theory doled out at the rate of a half pound fortnightly, is seldom available.

The theory now is that the Russians will let Cuban hunger pains grow more acute, and then they will send in supplies so they can earn Cuban gratitude. In other words they will not let the Cubans starve to death. But this presupposes a precise psychological moment for aid, and the lid may well blow off beforehand.

Mr. TODD. Cuban refugees tell a different story.

The Spanish section of the Miami News for May 5, 1962, accuses Hester outright of espousing the Communist cause; yet Hester is not perturbed—that is also there as an exhibit.

Senator KEATING. This is in Spanish?

Mr. TODD. Yes, sir.

Senator KEATING. And it will be translated. And without objection the translation will appear at this point in the record.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 5" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 5

[From the Miami News, May 5, 1962, p. 3A. Translated from the Spanish by the Legislative Reference Service at the Library of Congress]

A RED STAR BRIGADIER

(By Tony Solar)

It is distressing to pass judgment, without giving free rein to the necessary vocabulary, on men like Brigadier General Hugh B. Hester, who ostentatiously display the decoration for distinguished service.

Fortunately for the United States and the free world, this man is no longer in the Army. Now he is a journalist, or rather, he aspires to be one. This aspiration is unfathomable and comes too late, because it begins by serving the Communist cause with fervent devotion by means of distorting the truth.

[It is a] bad beginning for a sexagenarian. . . . a sad epilogue for a Brigadier General who perhaps had the pleasure, in his better days, to serve under arms with the same devotion to his country.

What is inconceivable in this case is that he also devotes time to conferences in the universities. His last, in Miami, was a strong condemnation of atomic tests and bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

And that gives us a picture of the frustrated Brigadier.

Now he just returned from Cuba—from that Red Cuba for which Americans can get no visas, where Western journalists are not admitted, where it is impossible to write a factual report without permission from the boss.

At times, due to lack of space—as in this case—many things are forgotten entirely. Nevertheless, it is necessary to extract some paragraphs from the Brigadier's story in order that our readers may draw their own conclusions.

"Neither does a police state exist, nor is Castro's economy on the point of falling flat on its face. Castro continues being the boss and the most popular leader in the entire Western Hemisphere with more than 75 percent of the people of Cuba supporting him," he says.

"More than half of the cultivated lands remain in possession of their owners and there is an infinite number of small businesses managed by, and in possession of, their owners. In rural areas, every 'guajiro' [term used for Cuban country peasant] has his own cows, pigs and chickens.

"The large industries are under Government control and a huge construction program is being carried on.

"Schools, dwellings, hospitals, motels, recreation and industrial centers are being constructed, and there are thousands of students being trained as agricultural and industrial technicians.

"One has to see the scope and force of the program in order to understand it," the brigadier-journalist [sic] continues.

But we have not yet arrived at the most important thing.

The Brigadier categorically denies that Cuba is a Satellite State. "The proof is that when they saw Escalante favoring the Communists, they threw him out of Havana."

He goes on to say that Raul Roa let him know that the Government of Cuba is anxious to renew normal relations with the United States and inclined to indemnify confiscated American properties, "on condition that they buy 3 million tons and restore the quota" [refers to sugar and the sugar quota here]—that quota that Guevara once said made a slave of Cuba.

These statements are not the important thing. The important thing is that this sly Communist, with all of his airs of Brigadier—which he was at one time—has an identification card as a journalist of the NANA.

NANA is the abbreviation for North American Newspaper Alliance, one of the most important agencies of the country, where the real journalists are sifted [scrutinized] before their work is published. They send a questionnaire to the journalist to fill out with pertinent information, but in the case of the Brigadier this information seems to have been disregarded.

The cable from Clearwater, Fla., is dated yesterday. It is a perverse lie about the drama of a country which is contested in a river of blood. It is a report [newspaper story] falsely spread by cable, but lacking the designation of "paid political advertisement" which makes it an infamous galley proof for journalism in all countries of the free world.

And so it [the cabled story] was taken to the director's desk together with our protest as a Cuban, a journalist, and a person who ardently pursues truth in his profession.

Mr. TODD. At this point I also would like to bring out an editorial from the Tampa Tribune regarding General Hester which gives his background.

Senator KEATING. This is from the Tampa Tribune dated June 11, 1962. It will be received at this point in the record, although first General Hester will be given an opportunity, as is the practice of this committee, to appear, himself, before the committee.

(The editorial referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 6" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 6

[From the Tampa Tribune, June 11, 1962]

HIS VISION IS NOT 20-20

On May 3 news services distributed—and the Tribune printed—a report of an interview at Clearwater with retired Army Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Hester, just back from a tour of Cuba.

In this interview he disputed reports that Cuba was in serious economic trouble, that it had been taken over by Communists, or that Fidel Castro had lost his popular following.

"Castro is still unquestionably the boss, the most popular leader in the entire Western Hemisphere, with 75 percent of his people solidly behind him," he was quoted as saying. Describing "tremendous" construction and development work underway, he said: "The dimension and dynamism of the program have to be seen to be comprehended."

This picture of conditions in Cuba was so contrary to that reported by virtually all responsible news correspondents that some Tribune readers asked us: "Who's telling the truth?"

We can offer a clue.

A summary of General Hester's statements later was distributed in a pamphlet bearing the name of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a shadowy organization which has been shown nationally to be heavily infested with Communists and Castro propagandists. This same pamphlet carried a call for the abolishment of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

The files of the Committee on Un-American Activities in Washington contain the following references to a Gen. Hugh B. Hester:

The September 1957 issue of Political Affairs, an official Communist Party monthly, carried a letter to the editor, signed Hugh B. Hester, which said in reference to a ban-the-bomb article in a previous issue: "You make a splendid case for sanity in international relations."

The November 6, 1961, issue of the National Guardian (classified by the House committee as a subversive publication) published an article by Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Hester on the Berlin issue, which stated: "Britain, France, and the United States have no moral or legal rights in West Berlin. They have only 'power' rights." The article proposed a "disarmed and neutralized" Germany and supported the Rapacki plan for "disengagement of hostile military forces" in Europe which had been advanced by the Polish Government.

The November 14, 1961, issue of the New York Times reported that Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Hester addressed a rally sponsored by the National Council for Soviet-American Friendship and that he advocated a "limited world government." The council is classified by the House committee as a subversive organization.

The November 1961 issue of the New World Review (classified by the House committee as a subversive publication) carried an article by Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Hester in which he declared that the 1948 Berlin blockade was provoked by unfair American actions and that the recent Soviet resumption of atomic bomb testing was "a predictable reaction \* \* \* to (President Kennedy's) callup of many additional thousands of draftees, National Guardsmen, and Reserves, and the increase of the U.S. military budget, already highest in the world, by many billion dollars more."

This background, we think, suggests which of the observers sees Cuba with the clearest eye. The general's vision where communism is involved is obviously something less than 20-20.

Mr. TODD. It must be kept in mind that the Cuban Government spares no trouble or expense—Sartre was paid \$25,000 for his literary services in 1960—to obtain favorable reports from visiting journalists, particularly if they happen to be Americans.

In his book, "La Revolution Sensuelle"—"The Sensual Revolution"—French Newsmen Victor Franco, tells of the attempted bribery by Robert Taber, then foreign press officer for the Cuban Government. I have the book here, and if you would like, I will translate the passages that apply to Mr. Taber.

Senator KEATING. That may be done.

Mr. TODD. On page 41 he (Victor Franco) is told—given advice—to see Robert Taber. The speaker here is somebody who works in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, who describes Robert Taber as a public relations man especially in charge of foreign journalists.

Victor Franco went to see Taber with a view to getting permission, official permission to visit one of the cooperatives. When he met Robert Taber, he says, Robert Taber gave him a breakdown of the errors and crimes committed by the United States. Then he quotes Taber as saying:

The Yankees have conducted themselves like gangsters in Chicago. It is frightful to see a great nation maul a small people about. The United States should never have stopped buying Cuban sugar. For them it represented only a minimum expense. For the island it is capital.

When Victor Franco asks him, "How is it that you, a citizen of the United States, have become a propagandist for Castro against your own country?" Taber's reply is the following:

Well, it may seem a little bit strange, but I know Fidel so well that I swore to join the revolution to see it through to its success. His cause is just. It is the cause of those men who love liberty. Where it concerns me, I consider Cuba as my true country. I have struck the United States from my life. In my place what would you have done, the same thing, no?

Later on, Taber asked Victor Franco why we had quit the Habana Libre Hotel. Franco, earlier in the book, says he had left the Habana Libre due to the fact that his rooms were being searched constantly and he was being followed every day by the G-2. When Taber asked him that, he said—he had to think quickly, or something, and merely answered that it was very expensive, \$12 a day.

And Taber said:

You don't have to worry about that, a suite will be held for you at the Habana Libre. Return there either this afternoon or tomorrow at the latest. You will not be charged a cent. The freight will be paid by the Ministry of Foreign Relations.

And then he continues:

No, don't get angry, everybody knows that a young writer has a bad time now and then. If you will permit it, I wish to help you a bit during your stay in Cuba. Here are several hundreds of pesos for your daily expenses—no, no, don't refuse, you must accept. From tomorrow on you will have a limousine and a chauffeur at your entire disposition. You will be able to visit all the cooperatives you want.

Victor Franco says that he detested this sort of proposition, and turned to leave. And Taber said to him then :

Don't get nasty, it is only that I wish to help you so that you won't have any worries.

Franco answered him :

I am not here to ask you for money, all I wanted to do was visit a cooperative. Just answer my question. Can I or can I not visit a cooperative? If not, forget about it.

And then Taber said to him :

Come now, don't get angry. In Cuba we always help honest writers, more so when they are young and meritorious. I have many pleasant things that I can do for you. I can give you an interview with Castro, and one with "Che." You can also assist an execution. Tomorrow, by the way, two people are being shot. Do you wish me to arrange that?

Senator SCOTT. That is the French "*assister*," which means "attend."

Mr. TODD (translating) :

Do you wish to assist at an execution tomorrow; do you wish to attend an execution?

Senator KEATING. That is quite different.

Mr. TODD (translating) :

Do you wish me to arrange that? You can take some photographs there which you can sell at a very high price.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Senator KEATING. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. Are you personally acquainted with Robert Taber?

Mr. TODD. No.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you know of his activities?

Mr. TODD. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. Through work with news reporting, you are familiar with his activities in Cuba?

Mr. TODD. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. On the basis of your knowledge of his activities, would you consider that he was working as an agent for the Castro government?

Mr. TODD. Yes, I would consider it so, in the sense that he was a paid employee of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations, and worked there as their press officer and public relations man. Robert Taber was also photographed—and I have the photograph in my records—wearing the uniform of a Cuban militiaman at the time of the Cuban invasion last year, with a submachinegun at the hip. Robert Taber was also heard on broadcasts beamed to the United States on shortwave attacking this country.

Mr. SCOTT. Your observation has been that his work has always been in favor of the Cuban revolution, the Castro government?

Mr. TODD. Very definitely.

Mr. SCOTT. You are aware of the fact that he has appeared before this subcommittee.

Mr. TODD. Yes, I was aware of the fact.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not he has ever registered as an agent of a foreign government?

Mr. TODD. I don't know whether he has or not.

Senator KEATING. Proceed, Mr. Todd.

Mr. TODD. There is no reason to believe that, with Taber gone, no other person has replaced him and continued his practices in the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations as public relations man for the foreign press.

The question remains: Why are Hester, Hlavacek, and Kuralt so anxious to have the American people believe that all is well in Communist Cuba? Why do these three men stress the inevitability of a Communist presence in the hemisphere; and why do they all advise "peaceful coexistence" with the Cuban Communist regime? Their answers might make an interesting hearing.

With further reference to Mr. Kuralt, I have here an article which appeared in the Cuban Communist publication *Bohemia*, in the June 8 edition of 1962. The article is shot through with many photographs of six—the title of the piece is "Six Journalists from Capitalist Countries Visit Cuba." The picture shows Mr. Kuralt most everywhere, he is shown taking pictures of supposedly ex-domestics who are studying and working in banks, and are sitting at the pool of the National Hotel. The fact that the picture is posed can easily be seen by the background with the tables stacked and the hotel cabanas closed.

There are pictures of Mr. Kuralt also in a carnival. There are pictures of him with the Cuban Rebel Youth, now known as the Young Communists of Cuba. There is a description in the article of Mr. Kuralt attending a carnival in the city of Cienfuegos. And I quote from the magazine:

When his presence was announced at the parade over the loudspeakers, an ovation came from the public.

I doubt that American newspapermen traveling in Cuba get ovations for no particular reason.

Mr. Kuralt, who claimed that the opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba was negligible, is cutting cane with so-called volunteers in the canefields, and the magazine mentioned here that he saw the cutting of burnt cane by a group. And the question is, If the cane was burned, who burned it?

Certainly not Castro's partisans.

Toward the end of the article, on its continuation on page 111, the Cuban author of the piece has Kuralt as saying that—

The Yankee diplomatic note on the agrarian reform which the general from Abilene—

And here he refers to Eisenhower—

by which the general from Abilene wished to treat Cubans as a master does a slave without respecting our independence and sovereignty has been the origin of the deterioration of the relations between Cuba and the United States.

This is Kuralt speaking.

"He wants to make us believe that Kennedy, should he have been President at the time, would have avoided such a crisis."

Then the article goes on to say:

Charles Kuralt returned to the United States.

And it asks a question of Mr. Kuralt:

Will he repeat our truth?

And I place emphasis on the "our."

Senator KEATING. What paper is that?

Mr. TODD. This is from the Cuban magazine Bohemia.

Mr. McARTHUR. We have a photostat of that article. And I ask that it be made a part of the record.

Senator KEATING. Just a minute. There is reference to other newspaper people in there whose names have not been brought out in this hearing.

Mr. TODD. I will bring out their names for you.

Senator KEATING. Do you have any reason to make charges against them?

Mr. TODD. No. The reason I mentioned Kuralt specifically is that he is played up in the whole article far more than the other newsmen are, more pictures appear of him, more news of his activities. He is given what you might call the big play in the story.

Senator KEATING. This picture has a reference to a correspondent for World Petroleum in the Saturday Evening Post.

Mr. TODD. Right, that is Miss Ruth Shelton.

Senator KEATING. I didn't ask for her name, but you have given it. Do you mean to imply that she convinced the Czech Embassy that she was going to write articles favorable to the Communists in order to get into Cuba?

Mr. TODD. I mean to imply that if she received a visa from the Czech Embassy, the Czech Embassy must have thought that she would have written something favorable to Cuba. So far I have not seen any of Miss Shelton's writing.

Senator KEATING. Is she still there?

Mr. TODD. No, she is not still there.

Senator KEATING. All right, that will be received.

(The article above referred to is printed as app. VI at p. 95.)

Senator KEATING. On page 4 at the top you refer to the infiltration of Cuban Communists in Miami. You are living in Florida, are you?

Mr. TODD. That is right.

Senator KEATING. Do you have any idea what percentage of the Cuban refugees or Cubans who have recently come from there are Communists?

Mr. TODD. I would say the percentage is very low.

Senator KEATING. What was their purpose, in your judgment, in coming to the United States?

Mr. TODD. What was their purpose in coming here? To sow disunion among the Cuban elements, mostly the political groups in Miami, also to fan discontent among the escapees here, to engage in illegitimate activities, such as bolita games, etc. Some people in Miami have been arrested for those activities. Also some are used in the drug trade, and have been bringing in narcotics into the United States, and have been apprehended at that. And I understand that they are also being used to create disturbances between Cuban and American youths in schools.

Senator KEATING. In Florida?

Mr. TODD. In Florida, and naturally to be used to garner any and all information possible that might be useful to the Cuban Communist regime.

Senator KEATING. Do you have any knowledge as to how long these three men, Hester, Hlavacek, and Kuralt, were in Cuba?

Mr. TODD. Hlavacek was there 5 months. Kuralt must have been there from 3 weeks to a month, I do not know the exact amount of his stay. And General Hester, I believe, was there for 2 weeks.

Senator KEATING. Have you called the views which you have given us this morning to the attention in any way either of the North American Newspaper Alliance or CBS?

Mr. TODD. I wrote a letter to the Columbia Broadcasting System on June 25, which has not been answered.

Senator KEATING. That was written where?

Mr. TODD. It was written by me to the Columbia Broadcasting System.

Senator KEATING. At their offices in New York?

Mr. TODD. At their offices in New York.

Senator KEATING. Was it addressed to the attention of any particular individual?

Mr. TODD. It was addressed to Mr. Richard S. Salant. I believe he is the president, at least I was given that name as the man who was president of the system.

Senator KEATING. Have you communicated with NBC in any way?

Mr. TODD. No.

Senator KEATING. Or with the North American Newspaper Alliance?

Mr. TODD. No, sir.

Senator KEATING. Senator Scott, any questions?

Senator SCOTT. Mr. Todd, the mere inclusion of the exhibit perhaps doesn't make it quite as effective as it might be unless there is reference, for example, to the contrary reports coming out from other sources. Referring to this exhibit from the article in the Montreal Star by Gerald Clark, it says:

Gerald Clark, editor of the Montreal Star wrote on his return from the Soviet Caribbean colony, "If you have ever seen anyone die of cancer, you may understand what is happening in Cuba—women fight in markets for food for their children \* \* \*. All Cuba is suffering from hunger \* \* \* an entire nation is on the verge of exhaustion and complete economic collapse \* \* \*. In 8 days I could only eat one egg \* \* \*. Touring the best restaurants I occasionally had the luck of finding a slice of boiled beef; the rest of my meals were confined to black beans and spaghetti \* \* \*. Trying to find something to eat is a constant preoccupation, even for a foreign visitor \* \* \*. Last year I wrote that any invasion of Cuba would find tenacious resistance, because many people were loyal to Castro \* \* \*. Today I would not dare to make the same prediction because the situation has changed radically."

I read that to ask you if you yourself have had conversations in any number with returning Cuban refugees, and if you have, to which point of view do their reports conform, that of the three people you have mentioned, or that of the Gerald Clark's report?

Mr. TODD. All conform with Gerald Clark's report unanimously.

I may add there that the Canadian newspapermen have no such difficulty in getting into Cuba, because of course the Cuban Government, still wishing to purchase from Canada, treats Canadian personnel with a very delicate touch.

Senator SCOTT. Mr. Kuralt, as I understand it, is CBS South American correspondent and is based in South America and living there, as I understand. Would it be certain, then that he received his visa in Washington from the Czech Embassy, or could he have gotten it somewhere else?

Mr. TODD. I understand he left from this country.

Senator SCOTT. But you don't know for certain?

Mr. TODD. I don't know for certain. To the best of my knowledge, he left from the United States.

Senator SCOTT. I take it, Mr. Chairman, that these gentlemen whose names have been mentioned will be given an opportunity to appear and testify if they so wish.

Senator KEATING. By all means. These charges that have been presented by Mr. Todd are of an extremely serious nature, at least they have serious implications. And I think it is very important that we not draw any conclusions from this testimony until the members of the subcommittee have had an opportunity to examine the transcripts of the television programs in question, and the news stories written by General Hester.

And in the interest of fairplay, I believe a copy of this hearing record should be sent to CBS, to NBC, and to the North American Newspaper Alliance for any comment they might wish to make. And in addition, I think the record should be kept open so that Messrs. Hester, Hlavacek, and Kuralt may have an opportunity to appear before the committee if they so desire, and an opportunity should be extended to them and an invitation to appear before the committee.

Senator SCOTT. One of the exhibits refers to the files of the House Committee on Unamerican Activities with relation to General Hester, and quotes him as having spoken in a Communist publication and at a rally sponsored by the National Council for Soviet American Friendship, and in a publication classified by the House committee as a subversive publication. So I think it desirable that the committee do invite General Hester.

If General Hester holds the views attributed to him, we are observing a retired general whose views are as far leftist as some of our retired generals have expressed views to the far right. If that is the case, I would like the press to know that maybe there are some retired far leftist generals as well as far rightist, though I have very little sympathy with either one.

Have you been in touch with former officials and leaders of various Cuban governments prior to the Castro regime?

Mr. TODD. Prior to the Castro regime?

Senator SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. TODD. No, sir.

Senator SCOTT. You have not yourself discussed any of these matters with such people as the head of the committee in exile—

Mr. TODD. Are you talking about the president of the Cuban Revolutionary Council?

Senator SCOTT. Enrique Menocal.

Mr. TODD. I know Enrique Menocal. I haven't spoken to him.

Senator SCOTT. I think if these views vary decidedly from the views of the Cuban revolution, I would like to have Enrique Menocal testify as a roommate of the Fidel Castro who joined the revolution

within 24 hours, became a refugee, and has told me many instances which run quite contrary to the statements allegedly made by these three people. So I simply make note here that I may ask Enrique Menocal to testify.

Mr. TODD. I would like to say, Senator, this is the headline from the Miami Spanish daily *Diaric Las Americas*, of July 18, just yesterday. And the headline reads, "Fidel Castro threatens death to those who protest in the streets due to hunger. Abundance is still far away, said the Comunist leader. The Cuban Prime Minister threatened the death penalty to those who demonstrate in the street as a protest against hunger, as has happened in numerous cities in Cuba, because"—and I quote Castro—"they will be treated as those who sow terror in a city in siege, and we are under siege by imperialism."

Any purpose in reading this headline is also to show that the words of Castro himself deny the contentions of these three gentlemen. There is unrest, there is opposition, and there is hunger.

Senator SCOTT. I may add that I have seen with my own eyes at Key West, escaping peasants and fishermen, and they did not look like the upper classes.

That is all.

Senator KEATING. For the sake of the record, the State Department advises that between January 1961 and July 15, 1962, there have been 1,250 passports issued for travel in Cuba. But an American can only be issued a passport if he falls in one of three classes: (1) A newsman; (2) a businessman; and (3) a relative of Cubans who have serious illness. Mr. Scott?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, we have some additional information and material which we would like to get in the record at this point, particularly on the Cuban Information Service. We have three articles here written by Mr. Todd which are rather voluminous but which could be placed in the appendix. We would like to have that done.

But first I would like to lay a foundation for it.

Mr. Todd, you are the publisher of the Cuban Information Service?

Mr. TODD. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. What is your business address?

Mr. TODD. 5807 Ponce de Leon, Coral Gables, Fla.

Mr. SCOTT. This is a weekly publication?

Mr. TODD. It is a weekly bulletin newsletter.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have here three articles written by Mr. Todd. I will identify them by title and ask that they be placed in the appendix.

No. 1, "The Destruction of Organized Labor in Cuba."

No. 2, "The Agricultural Fiasco."

No. 3, "The Destruction of the University of Havana."

These were published by the Cuban Information Service, is that correct, Mr. Todd?

Mr. TODD. That is correct.

Senator KEATING. How is the Cuban Information Service financed?

Mr. TODD. Through donations, sir, subscribers send in money, and it is used to send the material to our mailing list.

Senator KEATING. And it is distributed in general to whom?

Mr. TODD. It is distributed to all newspapers, all the main newspapers, I should say, in Canada and the United States in English, to some newspapers in Great Britain, and it goes to all of the newspapers in Latin America, all the television and radio stations in Latin America. It also goes to business elements that had business before in Cuba, to banks, sugar trade people; it goes to labor organizations in Latin America; it goes to some departments of political science in universities here and in Latin America; and to individual subscribers.

Senator KEATING. The three publications referred to may be printed in the appendix to this record.

(The material was marked "Appendix I" and is printed at pp. 47 to 74.)

Mr. SCOTT. The circulation in Latin America—the newspaper is in Spanish?

Mr. TODD. In Spanish, that is right.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the total circulation?

Mr. TODD. Roughly three thousand.

Mr. SCOTT. Could you give an approximate breakdown as to the English and the Spanish?

Mr. TODD. The Spanish edition is much bigger—about three times the English.

Senator SCOTT. May I ask your judgment as to how the newspaper *El Diario* in New York is regarded by Cuban refugees as to accuracy in reports?

Mr. TODD. I couldn't answer that question, because I am not familiar enough with that newspaper.

Senator SCOTT. When those who were injured and prisoners of the Castro regime, some of them, a representative group of them were freed and put on parole and sent to this country, and Castro demanded large sums of money for their release, and there was a campaign on to raise the money. What is the status of these wounded prisoners now? Is that fund raising still proceeding, are they still in this country or not?

Mr. TODD. I understand the fund raising is still proceeding at a very slow pace. I also understand that the ransom for the 60 wounded or sick men who returned amounts to something like \$2½ million, which has not as yet been collected. And I can also say that the great majority of the Cuban refugees in this country are completely opposed to any money deal with Castro over the prisoners.

Senator SCOTT. That is all.

Mr. SCOTT. Before we forget it, Mr. Todd, you read the excerpt from the book by Victor Franco, "La Revolution Sensuelle," I think it was pages 40 to 45. Could you provide the committee with a verbatim translation of the material concerning Robert Taber?

Mr. TODD. I would be very happy to.

Senator KEATING. When received, the material may be printed as an appendix.

(The translation above referred to is printed as app. II at p. 75.)

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Todd, we have from time to time had several names come up, and we have had information on those individuals. I have a list here I would like to go over with you as to whether or not you are acquainted with them, the extent of your acquaintance, and any information concerning their activities that you may provide the committee.

Mr. Herbert L. Matthews.

Mr. TODD. Mr. Herbert L. Matthews of the New York Times. I met Mr. Matthews in Havana in the summer of 1959, it was either in June or July, at a reception offered by the American press attaché, Mr. Paul Bethel. On that occasion I was introduced to Mr. Matthews, and I spoke with him, and asked him what was his opinion on the increasing virulence of the campaign against the United States that was being carried out by the Cuban Government.

He replied that he had had no indication whatsoever that any such campaign was going on, that he had had lunch with Armando—and by saying Armando, he referred to the Minister of Education, Armando Hart.

Then I asked Mr. Matthews what he thought of the steady campaign of class hatreds and racial hatreds that was being carried out systematically by the Government. And Mr. Matthews denied that anything such as this was taking place in Cuba. I refuted the statement. And of course I was joined in that refutation by Mr. Goar Mestre, and his brother, Abel Mestre, who were Cuban television and radio executives, and who both agreed with me completely on the matter.

We talked for a while, but Mr. Matthews could not be convinced that this was taking place in Cuba, although an editorial which had appeared in the newspaper *Revolucion*, which was the Government-controlled paper at that time, had published a scathing attack on the United States, the Yankee imperialists, as they call them.

And that is about the extent of the conversation that I had with the gentleman.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Lyle Stuart.

Mr. TODD. Mr. Lyle Stuart showed up at the offices of the Times of Havana one day and asked me out for lunch. This was again in 1959, I think it was in July or August, I can't recall the exact month. And we had lunch together. And he tried to convince me that my ideas on the Cuban revolution were all wrong, and that there were no Communist influences there whatsoever, that Fidel Castro was a true patriot. To which of course I had to answer that I was a Cuban, I was living in the country, and I was seeing what was happening. But Mr. Stuart was unconvinced and later went to New York to write an article very favorable to the Castro regime in Cuba, hailing it as the people's revolution, or some such thing.

Senator KEATING. That was in 1959?

Mr. TODD. Yes.

Senator KEATING. And Castro came to power January 1, 1959?

Mr. TODD. Yes, sir.

Senator KEATING. Of course, it must be said that there were many well-intentioned people who welcomed the Castro revolution at first, and who did not recognize the Communist influence.

Mr. TODD. There were quite a few people then, Mr. Chairman, that were completely deceived as to the intention of this man and his people.

Senator KEATING. Did you have any conversations with newspapermen in 1960 or 1961, or this year? When did you leave Cuba?

Mr. TODD. I left Cuba in October of 1960.

Senator KEATING. Did you have any conversations in 1960 with newspapermen in Cuba?

Mr. TODD. Yes.

Senator KEATING. I think we should limit our inquiries, if Senator Scott agrees, to roughly a period after, a year after Castro came to power, otherwise I think implications might be drawn which would be unfair.

Senator SCOTT. I think the year would give an adequate opportunity for any myopia or astigmatism to clear up.

Mr. SCOTT. In keeping with this suggestion I will ask what information you have of the activities within the last year or so, or 1 year after the revolution, of Carlton Beals.

Mr. TODD. Carlton Beals, as late as last year, I understand, early last year, was writing for the Castro Communist press agency, which was described as a Communist press agency by the Inter-American Press Association: *Prensa Latina*. And he had also written articles for Cuban Communist newspapers. He was in Havana at the time of the rupture in American relations. And at that time he was writing for these Cuban press agencies and publications.

Mr. SCOTT. Waldo Frank.

Mr. TODD. Waldo Frank was down in Cuba in 1960, and he appeared on television praising the regime to the skies. And he later wrote articles in the Cuban press.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the latest date as to which you have information on his activities or writing?

Mr. TODD. About early 1961.

Mr. SCOTT. Barbara Collins.

Mr. TODD. Barbara Collins, I understand, is in Cuba today. She is a member of the Communist Party, and has been broadcasting over a powerful Cuban shortwave radio station in English against this country.

Senator KEATING. Is she an American citizen?

Mr. TODD. She is an American citizen.

Mr. SCOTT. Blas Roca.

Mr. TODD. Blas Roca is the titular head of the Communist Party, the secretary general of the Communist Party, and for a while he came out as the top dog, until the young Communists and the Communist Old Guard in their struggle came to a compromise when Escalante was ousted by the party and chosen as the scapegoat for the complete disruption of Cuban production, industrial and agricultural. Blas Roca arrived in Mexico immediately before the visit of Mr. Kennedy just now. And I understand that he talked with the Mexican Government there, he was summoned by the Mexican Government, and asked that all Communist demonstrations be completely canceled during the stay of Mr. Kennedy in Mexico, because the Mexicans alleged that they were leaning over backward to help the Cuban Government, and in return they should be shown this courtesy on the part of the Cuban Communists.

So Blas Roca canceled all plans—and there were many plans—for Communist demonstrations in Mexico City.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have here an excerpt from Time magazine in November of 1961 with a picture of Blas Roca, with comments about it, concerning the requirements that any American newspaperman, if he travels, must travel with a guide in Cuba. I ask that this be placed in the record in the appendix.

Senator KEATING. What is the purpose of this? Is it in order to prove the facts contained in it?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir; as corroborative evidence.

Senator KEATING. I don't think a newspaper article is very good evidence—a magazine article—I don't mean any implications as to a particular magazine, but I don't think it is very satisfactory to prove the facts.

Mr. SCOTT. I was pointing out that only those reporters who were acceptable were permitted to travel in Cuba.

Senator KEATING. I would rule—subject to Senator Scott's approval—that the evidence of the fact will have to be established in some way other than from the magazine article.

Mr. TODD. Victor Franco, in this book, also mentions the fact that the moment that the Cuban Government found out that he was not associated with French Communists or pro-Communist publications, they completely withdrew all help, they withdrew all cooperation, and he had to do everything on his own.

Mr. SCOTT. Were you acquainted with or did you have any information concerning the activities of Sam Halper?

Mr. TODD. Sam Halper was down in Cuba in October of 1961, I believe. And I understand that Mr. Halper was ably assisted during his visit by Robert Taber.

Mr. SCOTT. Robert Williams?

Mr. TODD. Robert Williams. I know that Robert Williams fled to Cuba, he was under accusation here of kidnapping. He has been glorified in Havana. And recently, I understand, they had a poster with Abraham Lincoln on one side and Robert Williams on the other. He has also been broadcasting in English against the United States of America. And he is engaged in a campaign in Cuba in which he is trying to prove that the Negroes here have absolutely no rights, and that the roads in the South are completely lined with the cadavers of Negroes who have been lynched by the population, etc. He has been spreading a vast network of lies about the alleged persecution of the Negro in this country.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Todd, you are acquainted with Hendrik J. Berns, and you have two items there on Radio Miami, WGBS, June 26 and June 27, 1962.

Mr. TODD. Yes. I might clarify that these appeared on June 26 and June 27. Mr. Berns broadcasts daily over WGBS in Miami and WHS in New York for a 5-minute program in the morning, and the same talk is repeated in the evening. On Sunday, June 24, Mr. Jay Mallin of Time magazine and myself went on the air on WGBS in a program called "Perspective" in which more or less the talk was the same as I have said here about Hlavacek, Kuralt, and Hester. Mr. Berns tried to refute our contentions, I don't believe with much success, but when he had the microphone all to himself on these 2 days he came out with a slashing attack on us, which of course is his perfect right.

But he tried to imply here that nothing that was said by Cubans here could possibly be relied on. He says at one point here:

We have come to the point where the exiles demand to know why we doubt the word about conditions in Cuba which they try to convey to us on the basis of what they call underground information.

He was merely trying to say that whatever information any Cuban has on Cuba is to be regarded as so much twaddle.

And he also stated something which again is a half-truth:

We have come to the point where they feel that every American returning from Cuba reflects, in whatever he reports on his return, that he has been taken in.

Nobody told Mr. Berns that we felt that these people were taken in. Again Mr. Berns goes on to say:

Because he does not return with stories of rising disgust, mass sabotage, storms that, at any moment, might topple the regime, and death by starvation on the streets in Havana.

Nobody has ever claimed that people are dropping of starvation in Havana, we have only said that people are hungry down there.

Again he casts doubt upon any information which might be given about Cuba when he says that:

Exiles in our midst, lack of realism, and lack of reason and lack of open-mindedness has pervaded this discussion of late.

Here he was directly referring to our program of the 24th of June.

Then again Mr. Berns implies that conditions in Cuba are miserable because of the American embargo, and that the United States is to blame for this miserable condition. He says the production of sugar, food, and other goods has dropped off sharply, apparently due to this embargo. Nevertheless, Cuba, embargo or no embargo, before Castro, grew bumper sugar crops, and grew a great deal of her own food.

He states here as a fact: Fact No. 3 is:

That much of what the exiles pass along as factual information is instead wishful thinking—

when the truth is that 2 days before, when we dealt with factual information, and certainly not with wishful thinking, we were dealing with accurate, authenticated reports from Cuba.

On the 27th of June, again he stresses the fact that:

The ideas and criticism advanced by Cuban exiles are more emotional than factual.

Again there is the insistence that anything said by any Cuban is not to be trusted, because it is emotional and not factual.

In the very next paragraph he still insists that:

To live in exile \* \* \* does not always permit them—  
meaning the exiles—

to be coldly realistic and boldly sensible.

In the next paragraph he says that Cubans are—  
blurring the picture and thus the facts, as well as the truth.

This is the constant hammering away at the credibility of any information about Cuba coming from Cubans—

based more on and motivated more by emotionalism than rationalism and triggered more by fiction than fact.

Again he is insisting on the theme that we don't know what we are talking about.

Then he tries to say that Americans who have been imprisoned in Cuba are there because of criminal and not political offenses. This is

entirely untrue. The Americans that are held in Cuba today are held there because of political offenses and not criminal.

And then he says, again placing the onus of relationship with Cuba on the United States:

We broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. It was our diplomats who left voluntarily.

He does not say here that the reason for the interruption of relations was the impossible conditions imposed by the Cuban Government on the American Embassy, insisting that they reduce their personnel to 11, whereas it normally employed 400 people.

Senator SCOTT. He denied that there is any dissatisfaction in Cuba. On June 26 he says:

If the mass of the Cuban people do not want him—  
Castro—

or communism to be there tomorrow, neither he or communism would be there tomorrow.

Mr. TODD. That is like saying that if the mass of Frenchmen did not want the Germans in France during the war, the Germans would have been promptly thrown out. The parallel is the same, because the Communists in Cuba are backed up by a tremendous armed force, the second largest in the hemisphere.

Then Mr. Berns goes on to say—and this is again implying that there should be a status quo as to Cuba—the truth of the matter is that we can do very little today about confiscations that occurred, or were permitted to occur 2 and 3 years ago, therefore forget about the subject—the last remarks are mine, of course.

And here he says:

There is not a single American in a Cuban prison except those convicted of criminal, not political charges.

All Americans in prison in Cuba today have been convicted of political, not criminal charges.

Senator KEATING. Of course, in order to give a balanced record, I think part of this statement must be read, after talking about the mistake of seeking to go to war in Cuba, he says:

If we should ever venture forth to liquidate communism militarily, we should be rather foolish to start off with Cuba. You don't eradicate tumors by cutting off the periphery. You do it by cutting off the tumor. And the tumor is in Moscow.

Are there further questions?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, we have a few.

Are you acquainted with Mr. Oltmans?

Mr. TODD. No; I am not acquainted with Mr. Oltmans.

Mr. SCOTT. Are you familiar with his activities?

Mr. TODD. Yes. He was broadcasting over this same WGBS in December of 1961. And there were many complaints as to Mr. Oltmans' presentation of the news, his slant favorable to Castro. I have a letter here written by station manager Robert Martin to a listener, one of the many who complained, Mary Louise Wilkinson, of 11-800 Southwest 83d Court in Miami, in which he says:

DEAR MARY LOUISE: Your letter of yesterday concerning the commentary of Bill Oltmans heard on Saturday has come to my attention. Please let me assure you of my intention to answer all mail regardless of its nature. We never file a

piece of communication that is answerable. Your reference to Mr. Oltmans is entirely true, and in the vigilance that we try to retain there are flaws directly attributable to human frailty. I have become extremely concerned of late about the attitudes and comments of some of the news personalities on WGBS. You have heard Mr. Oltmans on WGBS for the last time. The decision was made yesterday after a lengthy discussion of our news members. We have tightened our security over content of broadcasts because we feel in these critical times we must exercise the extreme care of repealing any attempt no matter how slight to undermine the confidence in the American way of life.

I sincerely appreciate your concern, and the time you took to express your consternation. Please be assured that we are constantly aware of the slightest infiltration in our media.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Todd, do you have any information concerning the existence and location of missile bases in Cuba?

Mr. TODD. By missile bases I understand that you refer not to these huge ICBM's or intermediate—

Mr. SCOTT. Small operational bases.

Mr. TODD. Small operational bases. I have received a report from Cuba, not once, but repeated reports that there are small missile bases located in the Province of Pinar del Rio, and there is another one located in Soroa, which is about 15 or 20 miles from Havana, and I understand that another base has been erected in the hills surrounding the city of Holguin in the Province of Oriente. The latter city of Holguin is quite close; it is about a hundred miles away from the Guantanamo Naval Base.

Mr. SCOTT. Were you a Batista man, Mr. Todd?

Mr. TODD. Never; I was not a Batista man.

Mr. SCOTT. Were you in sympathy with the July 26 movement?

Mr. TODD. No, not before Castro—I was, you might say, carried away with enthusiasm 1 or 2 weeks, that is how long my enthusiasm lasted, and then, after taking a much colder look at this proposition, I began to see things there that weren't quite according to Hoyle. But as far as Batista and Castro were concerned, prior to the 1st of January 1959, my feeling was, "A plague on both your houses."

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Senator KEATING. Do you have any questions?

Mr. McARTHUR. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KEATING. Do you have any further questions?

Senator SCOTT. One philosophic comment. There is a great body of Americans—I have sometimes been among them—who erroneously draw the conclusion that a strong man is also succeeded by a good man, and then comes the disillusion.

I have no further questions.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question.

Mr. Todd, do you have any information concerning any recent kidnappings?

Mr. TODD. I understand that five Russian technicians were kidnaped by Cuban guerrillas something like 2 or 3 weeks ago, and that they were being held in exchange for five important guerrilla leaders that the government has in its own possession.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you have any information concerning the alleged forgery of any diplomatic documents?

Mr. TODD. That came up at the time when secret correspondence was taken from the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires last year by the defecting Cuban Consul Vitalio de la Terre, and the papers were

brought up here for authentication. They were duly authenticated up here, and then the Frondisi government, at the time, was very anxious to get its hands on those papers.

The Cuban revolutionary consul did not release the entirety of the papers into the possession of the Argentine Government, as far as I understand. Then the Argentine Government claimed that these were forgeries, because the signature of Carlos Olivares, who was then Acting Minister of Foreign Relations for Cuba—it was signed "Carlos Olivares," and the signature changed with different documents.

Of course, it was later learned that this had become a practice by the Minister of Foreign Relations in Cuba to prevent the authentication of anything that went out of there. It was discovered that safe-conduct papers had been issued to people who had taken asylum, which safe-conduct papers were all signed by Olivares, and the signatures differed although signed by Carlos Olivares, the conclusion being that the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations was using different people to sign different documents with the same name and so it could always be alleged that they were forgeries, because the signature was not the legitimate Olivares signature.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Senator KEATING. The staff will advise those whose names have been brought out in the hearing that they will be given every opportunity to appear and testify before the committee. And the subcommittee hearing will be held open for that purpose.

(Responses to the above invitation may be found in the appendix.)

Senator KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Todd. And the hearing is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

## ATTEMPTS TO PERVERT AMERICAN PRESS

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1962

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER  
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:45 p.m., in room 2228, New Senate Office Building, Senator Kenneth B. Keating presiding.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Alan D. McArthur, associate counsel; Samuel J. Scott, assistant counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator KEATING. The subcommittee will come to order.

Some time ago this subcommittee had some hearings at which Mr. Carlos Todd, the head of the Cuban Information Service in Coral Gables, Fla., testified before the committee and referred to certain news correspondents and positions which they had taken in news dispatches.

At that time I directed that the staff advise these correspondents that the subcommittee would be willing to hear them in either executive or open session, as they preferred, to answer some of the statements made by Mr. Todd.

Pursuant to that, Mr. Willem L. Oltmans expressed a desire to testify, and was heard in executive session, and thereafter requested that he be heard in open session, since Mr. Todd had testified in open session. Mr. Oltmans therefore is appearing here at his own request, and we will now hear him. Mr. Willem Oltmans.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, while Mr. Oltmans is coming forward, might I say for the record that the date of the prior testimony from Mr. Todd was July 9, 1962. As the chairman said, it was a public session.

The Chair might want to place into the record at this point the text of the notification which, at Senator Keating's direction, went to all of those whose names came into that hearing. This happens to be the carbon copy of the letter which went to Mr. Oltmans.

Senator KEATING. Very well. That will be made a part of the record.

(The letter above referred to reads as follows:)

JULY 24, 1962.

MR. WILLEM L. OLTMANS,  
Care of WGBS,  
Miami, Fla.

DEAR SIR: On July 19, 1962, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. Carlos Todd, editor of the Cuban Information Service,

88947-63-3

of Coral Gables, Fla., regarding alleged attempts to influence the American press in behalf of the Castro government of Cuba.

In view of the fact that your name was mentioned in this testimony, we wish to offer you the opportunity to read the testimony and present your viewpoint at a subsequent hearing.

Arrangements for reading the testimony can be made through Mr. J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel, or Alan D. McArthur, associate counsel, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, room 3224, New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., telephone CApitol 4-3121, extension 6241.

Very truly yours,

ALAN D. MCARTHUR, *Associate Counsel.*

Senator KEATING. There were, in addition, statements sent to the acting chairman by several of the other individuals mentioned, which will be made a part of the record and, in due course, be released, I assume.

Mr. Oltmans is the only one, I believe, who has requested the opportunity to appear in open session.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is correct, sir.

Senator KEATING. Therefore, we will be very glad to hear you, Mr. Oltmans.

Mr. OLTMANS. Mr. Senator, do you want me—I have 30 copies of the statement, do you want me just to give it to you and skip the reading?

Senator KEATING. Whatever is your desire.

Mr. OLTMANS. To use as little of your time as possible. Maybe if we just passed these out then it will stand as being read.

Senator KEATING. Do you have a number of copies?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir; I have 30 of them.

Senator KEATING. Will you give them copies, please.

If it is satisfactory to you—

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Senator KEATING (continuing). We will be glad to receive your statement as if read, and it will be made in full a part of the record.

Mr. OLTMANS. Thank you, sir.

Senator KEATING. Counsel, do you have any questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a few, Mr. Chairman, with the Chair's permission. The mention of Mr. Oltmans during Mr. Todd's testimony was quite brief, and before this witness is sworn I would like to ask permission of the Chair to offer for the record just the excerpt which led into and had to do with Mr. Oltmans. As the Chair sees, it was simply one paragraph. If the Chair wishes it read I will be glad to read it.

Senator KEATING. That will be made a part of the record.

(The excerpt referred to reads as follows:)

Mr. SCOTT. \* \* \*

Are you acquainted with Mr. Oltmans.

Mr. TODD. No; I am not acquainted with Mr. Oltmans.

Mr. SCOTT. Are you familiar with his activities?

Mr. TODD. Yes. He was broadcasting over this same WGBS in December of 1961. And there were many complaints as to Mr. Oltmans' presentation of the news, his slant favorable to Castro. I have a letter here written by Station Manager Robert Martin to a listener, one of the many who complained, Mary Louise Wilkinson, of 11-800 Southwest 83d Court in Miami, in which he says:

"DEAR MARY LOUISE: Your letter of yesterday concerning the commentary of Bill Oltmans heard on Saturday has come to my attention. Please let me assure you of my intention to answer all mail regardless of its nature. We never file a piece of communication that is answerable. Your reference to Mr. Oltmans is entirely true, and in the vigilance that we try to retain there are flaws directly

attributable to human frailty. I have become extremely concerned of late about the attitudes and comments of some of the news personalities on WGBS. You have heard Mr. Oltmans on WGBS for the last time. The decision was made yesterday after a lengthy discussion of our news members. We have tightened our security over content of broadcasts because we feel in these critical times we must exercise the extreme care of repealing any attempt no matter how slight to undermine the confidence in the American way of life.

"I sincerely appreciate your concern, and the time you took to express your consternation. Please be assured that we are constantly aware of the slightest infiltration in our media."

Senator KEATING. I will ask you to rise and be sworn, Mr. Oltmans.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony and evidence you give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. OLTMANS. I do.

Senator KEATING. The statement which you are filing as your statement and which will be made a part of the testimony as if it had been given in full is given to us under your oath that has just been administered to you; am I correct?

#### TESTIMONY OF WILLEM L. OLTMANS

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Oltmans follows:)

Mr. OLTMANS. Senator Keating, gentlemen, Mr. Carlos Todd, the head of the Cuban Information Service in Coral Gables, Fla., has accused before this honorable committee, as reported by the Washington Star of July 20, Walter Lippmann, various other journalists, and myself of slanting our radio broadcasts or news analysis with pro-Castro views. During a closed hearing on August 16, I came here to take issue with Mr. Todd's allegations and supplied the committee during my testimony with numerous quotations from statements and articles by me on the emergence of the People's Republic of Cuba. I asked Senator Keating to reschedule a hearing for the reason that Mr. Todd voiced his criticism in public, and it seemed only fair to defend oneself also in public.

I categorically deny Mr. Todd's serious allegations that I, as a Dutch journalist at any time would have acted as an apologist for international communism. Arrested to be liquidated by the German S.S. at the age of 19 I think I am capable of competing with Mr. Todd in evaluating the true face of totalitarianism. I came to understand the meaning of freedom and democracy the hard way during a 5-year Nazi occupation. The virus of international communism is now spreading through this hemisphere. I do not believe that untimely emotionalism, inaccurate reporting, or underestimating the strength of an enemy on the basis of wishful thinking necessarily serves the imperative interests of the free world. Since Mr. Todd did not further specify nor give any proof in his testimony of my supposedly pro-Castro reporting, I am prepared to let the matter rest, also to take no more of the valuable time of the distinguished members of this committee.

However, in all due respect, I would venture to obtain the following information from the committee. August 9, a week prior to my first appearance here, a report was published in a leading Dutch newspaper that the Government of the United States was about to evict me from the country on the basis of "un-American" activities committed

by me as a foreigner within the boundaries of the United States. The article implied that I had been called to Washington as a first step of being thrown out of the country. As a permanent member of the International Federation of Journalists, as a member of the Netherlands Federation of Journalists, as an accredited correspondent for eight Dutch daily newspapers and a leading Asian magazine to this country, I kindly urge the committee to please inform me whether it is correct to state that I came of my own free will to testify here, at my own initiative, and that at no time the committee considered such grave demarches against me as to order me out of the country for having committed "un-American" activities. In view of the serious professional consequences this above-mentioned report might have for the uninterrupted continuation of my journalistic work, I would be deeply gratified to the committee if it would refute the above-mentioned report. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Oltmans, I see at the beginning of your statement you have brought the name of Mr. Walter Lippmann into it. Would you tell us why you do that? Do you think Mr. Lippmann needs any defense from you?

Mr. OLTMANS. To tell you the truth, I don't think neither Mr. Lippmann nor I need a defense for being Communist apologists. I only mention him to make it very brief. I intended to mention several others, but on my second reading I cut it out in order to make the statement as brief as possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think you and Mr. Lippmann are two of a kind, in other words?

Mr. OLTMANS. That I leave to you sir, to conclude.

Senator KEATING. Let us get this record straight here. Did Mr. Todd refer to Mr. Lippmann in his testimony? I ask counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon. I was not present at that hearing, sir. I am unable to say that he did.

Mr. McARTHUR. To the best of my recollection he did not.<sup>1</sup>

Senator KEATING. I am advised that he did not. Let us not extend this hearing indefinitely here. There is no implication in counsel's questions or in your statement, is there, Mr. Oltmans, that Mr. Lippmann has given any slanted broadcasts or news analyses of any kind at any time?

Mr. OLTMANS. He was mentioned in the same articles which referred to me in an Associated Press cable published in the Washington Star of July 20 last. Both Mr. Lippmann and I were discussed in connection with Mr. Carlos Todd's hearing.

Senator KEATING. Then I have been misinformed. Did I understand counsel to say that Mr. Lippmann's name was not brought into the earlier hearing?

Mr. McARTHUR. To my recollection, Carlos Todd did not mention Mr. Lippmann during the course of the hearing. What the press may have quoted I don't know.

Mr. OLTMANS. Mr. Lippmann was brought into this article quoted, in between quotes.

Senator KEATING. All right.

<sup>1</sup>In the course of Mr. Todd's testimony he did mention Mr. Lippmann as follows: "Castro is not very important \* \* \* it has been proved he can't hurt us [therefore leave him alone]. \* \* \* We have problems in South America, but they do not come from him."

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Oltmans, you mentioned in your statement and you have just used again here the phrase "acted as an apologist." Where did you get that from? That wasn't part of anything Mr. Todd said.

Mr. OLTMANS. Sir, Mr. Todd said very little about me, as a matter of fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. OLTMANS. He never proved that I had said anything to defend Mr. Castro.

Mr. SOURWINE. All Mr. Todd said, isn't it true, was that he did not personally know you and he read into the record a letter from the program manager of a Miami radio station to the effect that there had been complaint as to your presentation of news, your slant favorable to Castro, and you were being taken off the air.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir. But I was surprised to find that nobody asked Mr. Carlos Todd at that time to substantiate his accusations, and by reading a letter that Miss Mary Louise Wilkinson, of Miami Beach, doesn't like my radio broadcasts, doesn't prove that I am trying to defend totalitarianism or Marxist-Leninism or anything of that kind.

Mr. Scott asked whether Mr. Carlos Todd was familiar with my activities, according to the testimony, and he said "Yes," and then he came up with this letter of a distinguished lady from Miami Beach.

Now, I thought that I should come here—and I regret to take your time—that it sounded to me as not sufficient proof that a station in Miami Beach did not continue my broadcasts.

The same station informed my editor, Dick Applegate, former head of UPI in Tokyo, and who was in Communist China in prison for some period of time, that, during the period I did these broadcasts, that Miami considered me the most popular man on radio.

I was informed by writing and by cable because of my programs from the wall in Berlin. So I was very much surprised to later be informed through the press that I was accused, by a paid agent for Cuban refugees, of trying to defend Mr. Castro.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Oltmans, it is possible that you are exaggerating in your own mind what Mr. Todd said, but the record will speak on that.

I would like to know, do you know whether you did make radio programs which were broadcast over Miami station WGBS?

Mr. OLTMANS. I was aware that my syndicate in Chicago distributed the programs, and while I didn't know the station I knew it was in Miami Beach.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether those programs were discontinued by WGBS?

Mr. OLTMANS. No. I heard that after the story which turned up in the Washington Star of July 20 after Mr. Todd's testimony.

I looked into the matter and I was then informed the true reason for why I was discontinued the first days of January—the reason which was given to me by my editor in Chicago—was that the company went broke and out of business.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether there were any complaints to the station that you were slanting your news broadcasts in favor of Castro?

Mr. OLTMANS. No, sir; not until I read Mr. Carlos Todd's testimony in the newspapers in Washington, D.C.

Mr. SOURWINE. The letter which Mr. Todd read purported to have been written by Robert Martin, station manager of WGBS. Do you have any reason to think this letter was a fake or that Mr. Martin did not write it?

Mr. OLTMANS. Oh, sir, I am not implying anything of the kind. I am only saying that this letter, the station manager must have written to my editor in Chicago, and I was not aware of it. The only reason which Chicago gave me for the discontinuation of my programs was that they had financial difficulties and Radio Broadcast Syndicated, Inc., if that title is correct, I hope, went out of business for financial reasons, and nobody ever indicated to me that that was one of the reasons, and that is why I felt like defending myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Oltmans, your statement speaks of quotations from statements and articles by you on the emergence of the People's Republic of Cuba which, you say in the statement, you furnished the committee in connection with your appearance in executive session. Do you wish to have those quotations made a part of this public record?

Mr. OLTMANS. If you could take those quotations out of the hearing with Mr. McArthur, I would very much like you to do that, if you think that is in the interests—

Mr. SOURWINE. Can that be done, Mr. Chairman? The witness furnished us at the executive session with certain quotations from his own prior statements and articles. He says now he would like to have those statements taken out—

Mr. OLTMANS. Quotations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Out of the executive record and made a part of this record. I see no objection.

Mr. OLTMANS. If you think that is important, I would gladly do so.

Senator KEATING. That will be done.

(The excerpts referred to read as follows:)

"My (first) visit (during the early weeks<sup>1</sup> of 1960) was a brief one and I did not write about it. I made a statement to *Revolucion* and *El Mundo*, two Havana newspapers, in which I said that it seemed to me of primary importance that relations between Washington and Havana remained fluent and that the U.S. Government should work together with Castro. I likened Fidel Castro to President Sukarno of Indonesia. I drew a parallel and called both leaders the fathers of their countries. I do know Sukarno rather intimately well and I saw clear similarities, at that time, in their political philosophies. I maintained that I believed Cuba should associate with the Afro-Asian bloc, as foreign Minister Raul Roa's visits to Cairo and Belgrade at the time seemed to suggest. That same year President Sukarno went on a state visit to Havana."

\* \* \* \* \*

"On December 18, 1960, I wrote in the *Providence Journal*, 'Kids on the street wave Communist Chinese flags and wear hammer-and-sickle insignias \* \* \* teenage boys stroll around carrying revolvers and Czech-made weapons \* \* \* Castro has ordered the loyal Fidelistas to report defeatists to the police \* \* \* what a difference the Cuba today of what I saw a year ago \* \* \* today people live in fear they thought had gone forever with the ouster of the dictator Batista \* \* \*'

"On January 1, 1961, I reported in the same paper, 'These cooperatives are only a hairbreadth from the Chinese commune system. And the hairbreadth

<sup>1</sup> After having been supplied by mail with the above excerpt from his executive testimony, Mr. Oltmans wrote the subcommittee that this visit was in January 1960, at which time the United States was represented by an Ambassador.

may well disappear when Castro begins to feel the pinch of the U.S. embargo on his sugar crop \* \* \* Castro has made no bones about the fact that he means to foment revolt throughout Latin America \* \* \*.”

\* \* \* \* \*  
 “Following my second journey to Cuba, as reported in the Republican of Pottsville, Pa., I have said, ‘It takes me a long time before I call anyone a Communist, for we too often call foreign leaders Communists, but, under Fidel Castro, Cuba is going communistic.’”<sup>2</sup>

Mr. SOURWINE. You say in your statement, sir, that you want it clear that you came here of your own free will. The chairman has, of course, already stated that. But the record should be abundantly clear. You did ask for an opportunity to testify. You were not subpoenaed. The committee had sent you one of a number of identical letters, which, at the instruction of Senator Keating, had gone out to all those whose names had come into the Todd testimony, and the text of that letter is now a part of our record.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So I think the record is quite clear on that point.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir; except, if you excuse me, I particularly take offense against the phrase “un-American activities.” I will not at any time let myself be accused of un-American activities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who has accused you of that? Certainly not this committee.

Mr. OLTMANS. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor has Mr. Todd, so far as his appearance here is concerned.

Mr. OLTMANS. Oh, no, no. But I have been accused in one of our leading newspapers in my country. This was an unfounded front page story on the 9th of August before I ever came—

Mr. SOURWINE. This must be the portion of your statement you referred to when you said that there were reports that this committee had considered taking some action against you or somehow involving your immigration status.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It should be stated clearly for the record, as I am sure you know, that this subcommittee would have no jurisdiction in any event to take any action with respect to the immigration status of you or any other alien.

Mr. OLTMANS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are not in the executive branch and we do not have administration over the immigration status of any person in the United States.

Mr. OLTMANS. Sir, I am very grateful to you.

Mr. SOURWINE. The committee has taken no such action, has not recommended any such action, and has no jurisdiction to do so.

Mr. OLTMANS. I am particularly grateful to you.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did appear in executive session on Thursday, August 16, 1962, and at that time it was at your request?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time you were permitted to present a written statement which you prepared in advance of the hearing?

<sup>2</sup> After having been supplied by mail with the above excerpt from his executive testimony, Mr. Oltmans wrote the subcommittee that the article published in Pottsville was written late in 1960 or early 1961, and at a time when the United States had not yet broken diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want that statement as well as the statement you have offered today made a part of the record of this hearing?

Mr. OLTMANS. No, sir. I have come the first time to your committee quite unaware of what I was getting into. I realize that a layman should not go before this distinguished committee. Senator Keating had advised me to bring counsel. I inquired what the costs would be. It would be \$150 to have me accompanied by counsel, sir; I felt not quite prepared to go through that expense. I only have thought very carefully about this short, brief statement, and in order to take no more time of anybody and everybody I would like to leave it at that, sir, if that is agreed, if you can agree on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will not then offer that prior statement, but there are one or two questions I want to ask you—

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing). Involving those matters.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you came before the committee in this executive session last August, did you agree to furnish the committee with certain copies of broadcasts on Cuba made by you in December 1961 and in 1962?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir. But I must—

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you furnished the committee with the copies of these broadcasts?

Mr. OLTMANS. The problem is that I can furnish the committee with substantial copies of everything I have written because I have carefully collected anything I have written in any country, at any time, about Cuba.

But my radio broadcasts were a matter of going before the United Nations radio station and have a tape there, and I would make sketchy notes during sessions of the Security Council, and would, on the spot, sort of, create my analyses of 3 minutes, and I have looked very carefully, and I found I have kept notes that I kept, but I didn't think this was an appropriate reflection of what I actually said because it was read from notes, so I suggested to Mr. McArthur that I was aware of the fact that my company had master copies of every single broadcast I had made, and if the committee would insist on having those that I am sure that Radio Broadcasts Syndicated, Inc., from Chicago, could still furnish them.

I think I wrote Mr. McArthur immediately after your request, or at least 1 or 2 weeks afterward, and I informed him I didn't have it. I couldn't get it because I only had sketchy notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, I am only trying to make the record show the fact. The prior record said you had them, could furnish them, and agreed to do so, and I just wanted the record to show, here, what the facts were as to whether you can or will furnish it.

Mr. OLTMANS. Did you say I didn't write that letter?

Mr. McARTHUR. Yes; you told us that.

Mr. OLTMANS. I thought you disagreed.

Mr. McARTHUR. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. No argument about the letter.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am just trying to make the record speak, and, if the Chair is agreeable, we won't press any further about the notes or the broadcasts because I don't think it is needed.

Senator KEATING. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the statement which you placed in the record at the executive session—

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing). Did you say that following your third visit to Cuba, which took place during April and May of 1962, and I am now attempting to quote from the statement :

I had written an article and sent it to Look magazine, but it was turned down. I filed six articles with World Wide Press, as I had done after my second voyage, but Editor Arthur Fletcher found them unacceptable, and commented he considered them too much an apology for the Castro regime.

Mr. OLTMANS. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those were your words?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your own prepared statement?

Mr. OLTMANS. Definitely so; and I was advised not to put it in the statement; but I do because I believe in the honesty of this testimony. I have tried very hard, upon coming back from Cuba in May of this year, to place some of my interviews I had in Cuba, especially with background information furnished to me by the Netherlands Embassy, its second official. He sat down with me for over 6 hours to brief me on the situation in Cuba, and he is now the Foreign Minister in the Hague, and I felt very much that it would be in the interests of the American public and everybody concerned who is concerned with Western hemispheric situation to have a report which would also highlight some of the other things.

I stand for and I fight for the integrity of the newsman to be able to report, maybe, also details about Cuba that are not pleasant to read. I don't believe that you will fight an enemy by underestimating his strength.

I believe we fooled, to a great extent, the American public with completely biased and incorrect reports written from Miami Beach, instead of letting cooler heads prevail. I think if we would let our own, maybe American, reporters go in there, or we should try not to fool ourselves as to the strength of the Castro revolution because if we hadn't done that we wouldn't have gone into the Bay of Pigs and lose so many gallant lives, and swim back, and make Mr. Castro more strong than he is already.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have always reported, fearlessly, the facts as you found them?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir, and they refused to print them.

Mr. SOURWINE. As you saw them?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, and that alarms me because I have had the same situation in my own country, sir, as far back as 1956. I warned that the Dutch policy in the Netherlands New Guinea was self-defeating and would amount to another defeat for the West in southeast Asia, and, as a matter of fact, as President Sukarno sent in his paratroopers, the Dutch had to withdraw this summer under the most deplorable circumstances, 5 years later, and I stood alone then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Oltmans—

Mr. OLTMANS. I would like to finish this phase, sir. I stood alone then with my own people; it was the same thing. They didn't want to read or have objective reports on Indonesia or the question of Netherlands New Guinea reported in most of the Dutch press, and the result has been a further strengthening, a further slanting to the left, of Indonesia, the arming of Indonesian forces with Soviet bombers and Soviet arms.

We have further dug our grave in the Far East instead of standing up for the interests of our country.

I stood then alone and maybe I stand now alone, but I think nothing is more important these days than to try to be honest and objective when you report.

I have gone to Senator Wayne Morse immediately after my second trip to Cuba; on my first trip, I didn't think I gathered enough information. After my second trip to Cuba, I started writing on Cuba for the first time, and I warned Senator Wayne Morse, in person, as to the strength of the Castro revolution, the fanaticism of the Cuban people that are whipped up to this new idea, and that was a few months only prior to the invasion in the Bay of Pigs, and now we are faced with a worse situation there.

It is true neither Look magazine nor World Wide Press wanted to print either the photographs I took or the views. I did print them in other countries. For instance, in India, in United Asia, I wrote an 8-page article on the Cuban affair—

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon me, Mr. Oltmans, we can't cover all of what you have written about all of the subjects.

Mr. OLTMANS. OK, I apologize.

Mr. SOURWINE. But on this question of objectivity, and the statement which you placed in our record in our executive session, you said:

I believe, as a reporter, that one's conclusions, the analysis of a reportage, should be coated in a language acceptable to both sides in a dispute.

What did you mean by that?

Mr. OLTMANS. Sir, if I will stand ready—you asked me a few minutes ago whether certain quotations from articles I had written in that statement should be placed in the record. Now, these are not quotations—

Mr. SOURWINE. I am quoting directly from your written statement which you offered to the committee.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir. But I understood only the quotations would go into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying that you won't answer the question?

Mr. OLTMANS. Oh, yes. I will never have—

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you objecting to being asked what you told us in your prepared written statement which you offered the committee in August?

Mr. OLTMANS. No, sir. I understood that you only would place the quotations in the record, and I didn't think we were going to discuss once more this first statement. But if you want to I am quite prepared. If you think it is important I will answer any question, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you answer the one that is pending now?

Mr. OLTMANS. Excuse me, sir. Would you repeat it, be kind enough to repeat it?

Mr. SOURWINE. You said in your written statement :

I believe as a reporter that one's conclusions, the analysis of a reportage, should be coated in a language acceptable to both sides in a dispute.

The question is what did you mean by that ?

Mr. OLTMANS. What I mean by it is this, sir: that when I testified before this committee or when I wrote an article as a professional journalist I am not trying to favor one side or the other, if possible. I am not sure that I will always succeed in doing that but I am not going to Cuba to come back and write sensational articles about how hungry the people of Cuba are going these days.

They do, incidentally, they have more troubles than they had before. But I wouldn't highlight necessarily for the sake of selling copy or making sensational headlines all the black sides of this Cuban revolution.

I feel that with the strongly biased views we get now—we have to digest now—it might be some use to write an article in which some of the positive sides of the Cuban revolution are covered, because that is what we are up against, because it is the positive side which makes Mr. Castro go on for so long, and I think by studying them and by trying to understand what makes these people tick and what the youths in Cuba think—and I go to great lengths to talk to them—and then you don't want to print it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am very glad you explained that because I am afraid the average person reading those words without your explanation might feel that you were saying that a newspaperman should write his story so as to please both sides on every question.

Mr. OLTMANS. Thank you, sir. I am not trying to exactly please people when I write.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Oltmans, in the statement which you placed in the record in the executive session you characterized the National Insider as a "mass circulation item on U.S. newsstands."

What do you know about the National Insider, and do you think that this publication is in any way representative of the American press ?

Mr. OLTMANS. Sir, no country in the world produces a newspaper of the standing of the New York Times. It is regrettable that only 800,000 people in a country of 180 million read this great newspaper.

Sir, when I travel on my lecture tours by Greyhound bus, and I stop off at stations and I see over and over again at the newsstands this junk which they print like—

Mr. SOURWINE. Which who prints ?

Mr. OLTMANS. For instance, this paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not the New York Times ?

Mr. OLTMANS. No, sir. For instance, this paper which, unfortunately, probably has larger circulation than the New York Times.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are talking about the National Insider ?

Mr. OLTMANS. I am not aware of the circulation of the National Insider, sir. But you would agree with me that a headline of the entire front page—

Mr. SOURWINE. I never saw the paper, I never heard of it until you gave us this mention of it in a statement.

Mr. OLTMANS. Well, sir, I am a newspaper man. Maybe that is why I know about the newspapers that are printed in this country. You definitely have this paper on every single newsstand.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is it printed?

Mr. OLTMANS. 5 cents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is it printed?

Mr. OLTMANS. I don't know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know?

Mr. OLTMANS. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it a daily or a weekly?

Mr. OLTMANS. No, I think it comes out once a month.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a monthly newspaper?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say it is on newsstands everywhere?

Mr. OLTMANS. It is on every newsstand I have been on for such a long time that I finally decided to take that specific issue to show why I don't want to write about Cuba. I wouldn't repeat here what was on the front page because it is unacceptable language probably here. It dealt with the story of the entire front page of how an American woman was raped 18 times by Castro's men, including Mr. Castro himself, if I remember correctly.

I just don't think I—I would certainly have been able to sell a story like that, but I felt in this late hour in the Cuban crisis that information passed on to me by the chargé d'affaires of the Netherlands Embassy in Havana has background information, which I could certainly use, and which I did use in this article for Look, that that would be responsible journalism to try to spread those thoughts and ideas. I have a copy of that article for Look magazine, and I would gladly still send it to you so you can see what I actually wrote for Look magazine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Counsel would not recommend inclusion in this record of any issue of the National Insider on the basis of the description we have had so far.

Senator KEATING. He is now offering a copy of his own article which he sent to Look magazine and which was declined.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I misunderstood. I have no thoughts on whether it should or should not.

Senator KEATING. I think there is no point in including it unless you wish to do so.

Mr. OLTMANS. No, sir. I don't wish to take any more of your time, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your statement filed with the committee at the executive session did you attack the program of U.S. aid to Latin America?

Mr. OLTMANS. In what statement, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. The statement, the written statement, that you filed with the committee when you came here in August.

Mr. OLTMANS. What I said, sir, was not that necessarily. If I recollect, you see—

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me refresh your recollection.

Mr. OLTMANS. What did I say?

<sup>1</sup> The subcommittee staff contacted a number of newsdealers in Washington, D.C., in an effort to secure a copy of the National Insider, but without success.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you said was:

If there is anything the Socialist bloc of nations wants us to do it is to go broke. The present dumping of billions of dollars in Latin America to turn the tide of Castroism and communism, in my view, is furthering that specific end with terrific speed.

You continued:

Our ideal is that of a free democratic hemisphere. Latin America is totally unprepared for orderly democratic government. Is our ideal fit for the hemisphere?

Perhaps I should rephrase my question. Did you intend this as an attack on the U.S. aid program in Latin America, *Alianza para Progreso*?

Mr. OLTMANS. Sir, what I tried to say is that dumping of dollars does not necessarily stop communism; but I was afraid that the enormous amount of effort and money now put into Latin America is not enough to face squarehead on the problems which we are involved in with Latin America today.

Sir, from going to Cuba as late as May of this year, I have taken one recollection most vividly and most precisely, that these revolutionaries are guided by such drive and such determination and they are planning to spread this determination to other countries, and I simply cannot see how a decent development program based on dollars, which I think is too much accent still on our money, will do the job that we would like to do.

I am a great defender of the Peace Corps. In every single article and lecture I do believe in that. But I don't necessarily believe that you will achieve in Latin America or anywhere else with dollars what we tried to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Oltmans, did you in your signed statement presented to the committee last August, say:

I am unable to refute Mr. Todd's allegations in connection with my radio broadcasts for Syndicated Broadcast Features, Inc. of Chicago. I have made some 100 programs for them and only a few dealt with Cuba and Castro. Whatever I must have said and which shocked Miss Wilkinson in Miami, and many others in that area, a hotbed of anti-Castro fugitives, must have sounded to them as pro-Castro, as my remarks undoubtedly did not fit the usual anti-Castro propaganda we are being fed usually.

Mr. OLTMANS. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want to add anything to that now?

Mr. OLTMANS. No, sir. I think it is a very correct statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. With the Chair's permission, because I want to take about 10 minutes more, the witness during the executive session told us that he had known intimately one person of international importance, and that he had met certain others in Cuba. I think we might have information of value to the committee, and I would like to ask about them.

Senator KEATING. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told us, Mr. Oltmans, that you knew Sukarno intimately.

Mr. OLTMANS. Very well, and I am very proud of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you told us that you saw similarities in the political philosophies of Sukarno and Fidel Castro. Would you tell us just briefly how it happens that you know Sukarno intimately, and then tell us what the similarities are in the political philosophies of Sukarno and Fidel Castro?

Mr. OLTMANS. Sir, as a descendant of a family of four generations being born in Indonesia, I have always been fed in Holland anti-Indonesia and anti-Sukarno propaganda. I couldn't call it anything else, until, by incident, I ran into Sukarno in Rome in 1956, and I informed my editor that I was going to interview him, and my editor, the editor of the *De Telegraaf*, the leading Dutch newspaper, forbade me to interview President Sukarno.

He sent me a cable to that effect that I was not allowed to interview President Sukarno for his paper. A copy of this cable is in my possession.

I saw that the same way then I reason now in the case of Cuba.

I said, "Now, Mr. Sukarno, whether you like him or not, is the President of Indonesia, and although many people in Holland hope he drops dead, I think he is news, and if Mr. Khrushchev comes to Rome, I would go to see him."

I went to see Mr. Sukarno, and he turned out—

Mr. SOURWINE. You say when Mr. Khrushchev comes—you didn't go to see Sukarno with Khrushchev?

Mr. OLTMANS. Sir, I will not comment on that. To continue with what I was saying—

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go to see Sukarno with Khrushchev?

Mr. OLTMANS. Sir, what are you trying to imply?

Mr. SOURWINE. Not anything. I thought it was perfectly clear that you didn't, and I was trying to make the record show that you didn't, and then you declined to be responsive.

Mr. OLTMANS. Do I have to answer this?

Senator KEATING. You did mention Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. OLTMANS. What I said was if Mr. Khrushchev would have come to Rome I would have tried also to interview him. So it doesn't make any difference whether it was Mr. Khrushchev or Mr. Castro or Mr. Sukarno. At that time I was opposed to him in every way, as I am still in some ways, but I didn't know anything about him actually, so I went to see him.

I interviewed him and I reported in the Dutch papers, the report of the conversation. This started my fight in Holland to the effect that even today on the express instruction of the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr. Joseph Luns, I am not to be given any facilities as a Dutch newspaperman because of my views expressed, starting from 1956 on the question of Netherlands New Guinea.

When I met Sukarno in Rome I decided the man is on his diplomatic toes. He is going to be very nice to me because he tries to do something in the Dutch press through me, and in order to verify my impressions I went to Indonesia for the first time in my life for the *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, that is the "Times" of the Netherlands, and I stayed there until 1956 and 1957, and I made many trips throughout the country, and I got to know President Sukarno intimately, and I am now writing a book on him, the first book ever written on Sukarno.

This same situation I saw arise as to the question of Cuba. We may hope that Mr. Castro will drop dead tomorrow. We have waited for Mao Tse-tung to drop dead for 12 years, but the question is how are we going to deal with the situations, and I felt in 1959 and 1960 already this is going to be serious.

I said that I am going to go down to find out more because I learned from my experience in Indonesia and Sukarno that we are not told, given, sufficient information to have an opinion on the situation, and I see in Castro the same kind of folk war leader to paraphrase John Forth Amory's book, "Around the Edge of War."

Castro is the same kind of folk war hero who very much might appeal to a much wider group of Latin Americans than we would like to see, like Sukarno and Nkrumah, like the Belgrade-Bandung axis is doing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us from your intimate knowledge of Mr. Sukarno what his position is and has been with respect to communism?

Mr. OLTMANS. Sir, you would have to take into consideration, first, one thing: that Belgrade and Bandung don't think in terms of east-west. Sukarno does not think—they think truly in the sense of non-alignment, try to be no part of either side and concentrate on getting rice in their bellies.

Now, I can vouch, and I would vouch with two hands in fire, for President Sukarno has in no way—I won't say this is a man who will never be a Communist as in many respects Mr. Castro personally—I have the feeling that Mr. Khrushchev doesn't take Mr. Castro too seriously, because if Mr. Khrushchev would be stuck with more Communists like Mr. Castro, he would get into a lot of trouble because he isn't a Communist by training and organization and anything else.

Mr. Sukarno is no Communist whatsoever, and he never will be. But he believes, as he explained to me, since we are living in this world with close to a billion Chinese in the near future, and so many Russians, "we are not going to get anywhere by promoting further cleavages, and we will have to live with them," and he said, "I have in my own country 8 million Communists—the last election in Indonesia turned out about that number of Communists, which is 30 percent of the population," and he doesn't feel that it is right to outlaw them or to not take into consideration their wishes.

I am always very weary when I see in the U.S. press, which is so effective with this term of leftist and rightist, you are a rightist Laos premier, and a leftist Laos premier; a leftist Nkrumah, and a leftist Sukarno, and I don't think we do much service to our own purpose in classifying these, because we found out Mr. Sekou Toure of Guinea, who also, sir, used to be called in our press leftist leader of Africa, and now we suddenly find that after he threw out the Russian Ambassador now we tell the people in our reports that he changed, he is repenting, Mr. Sekou Toure.

If you talk to the Guinea Ambassador about it he laughs because he says that is what the press says now, but that they are crazy, because it has nothing to do with—

Mr. SOURWINE. You will excuse me, we are getting a little afield. We asked about Sukarno, and we were interested—

Mr. OLTMANS. And I ended up with Toure. I apologize.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Bisbé, the late Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him intimately also?

Mr. OLTMANS. No, not that intimately. But we knew him when we had diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Mr. SOURWINE. You went to Cuba in the latter part of 1960 as his guest?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir, at his initiative. But let me say this, all I got from Ambassador Bisbé in November of 1960 were correspondent facilities, but I should add that I came back from that trip and reported that my impression was that Cuba was going Marxist-Leninist or Communist, and I warned very strongly in all articles I wrote for World Wide Press in very strong terms I have warned them, that I felt Cuba was going to take a Communist turn, so I hope that, by accepting the invitation of the Cuban Government to go to Cuba, my integrity as to reporting what I saw in Cuba was not necessarily affected by accepting the invitation.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wasn't getting into that at all.

Mr. OLTMANS. I just want to make this very clear. I wanted to play safe.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was simply laying the foundation of asking you whether you ever had any discussions with Mr. Bisbé; did you ever have a chance to talk with him?

Mr. OLTMANS. Only in the U.N. delegates' lounge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever talk with him about his part in the transmission of funds from the Castro Government for the use of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the United States?

Mr. OLTMANS. Not a word ever, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in Cuba in 1960 as a guest of Ambassador Bisbé, did you meet any anti-Communist Cuban leaders?

Mr. OLTMANS. Not leaders, sir. Yes, I don't know whether he was a leader, but I have met numerous Cubans at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told us about a number whom you did meet, but I am asking now if you met any Cuban anti-Communist leaders; Cuban anti-Communists?

Mr. OLTMANS. Anti-Communists? Sir, I have not met one Cuban refugee in the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about when you were in Cuba as a guest of Ambassador Bisbé at the end of 1960.

Mr. OLTMANS. At the end of 1960, sir, Castro hadn't come out as a Marxist-Leninist, and it was my private opinion they were becoming Communists or turning toward communism, but I don't necessarily look at that time, I didn't think of communism at that time that much in my approach to the reportage, because Cuba at that time was trying to get together with Bandung powers. My conclusion and the warnings from my embassy were that Castro was turning toward communism but I didn't approach Cubans at that time in the sense of whether they were pro or contra communism. I didn't approach that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told us that while you were there in 1960 as a guest of Mr. Bisbé you met Fidel Castro?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You met his brother, Raul, and the Foreign Minister Raul Roa?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You met Raphael Rodriguez?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You identified him in your statement as the leader of the PSP.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the PSP?

Mr. OLTMANS. The Communist Party of Cuba.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew then that Rodriguez was a Communist?

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, I knew he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Raul Roa was a Communist?

Mr. OLTMANS. That I wouldn't say. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Raul Castro was a Communist?

Mr. OLTMANS. No. At that time I did not know. I knew Raphael Rodriguez was very much a Communist because I wrote about him in World Wide Press articles, and I quoted him and I said among others that I asked Mr. Raphael Rodriguez whether it was true that, in his view, the Communists had taken over Mr. Castro, and his answer was, as I reported in World Wide Press, "Mr. Castro has us in his pocket because we have decided to go along with Castro. We agree with most of his views and we are going to cooperate with him."

Here, sir, I saw another parallel to Indonesia because the Communist Party of Indonesia is equally nationalized by President Sukarno in his unity idea, and the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Indonesia is playing politics together with President Sukarno in the overall frame of no alining policy. This is the first step in which they work, they first go along with national folk war leaders like Sukarno and Castro.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told us of one other prominent person whom you met in Cuba in late 1960. You called him Premier Ben Khedda of Algeria.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't believe he was Premier at that time, was he?

Mr. OLTMANS. No, no, he was at that time the head of the Algerian delegation who was touring Latin America for the purpose of increasing understanding for the Algerian revolution. At that time I wrote the statement he was Prime Minister.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was Minister of Social Affairs from 1958 to about August of 1961, I think—

Mr. OLTMANS. Well, at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing). Of the provisional Government in Tunis.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes.



Mr. SOURWINE. And he became Premier of the provisional Government in August of 1961, went out in July of 1962.

Mr. OLTMANS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you met Ben Khedda, did you have an opportunity for any discussions with him?

Mr. OLTMANS. I spoke with him, sir. I went to the television studio where he had a program and I wanted to see what he had to say over the television. I have seen him an entire evening. We haven't necessarily discussed communism at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KEATING. That is all, thank you.

Mr. OLTMANS. May I make one remark?

Senator Keating, may I thank you for your very fair ruling in giving me a chance to stand up against what I thought was sort of an insinuation that I would defend Marxism.

Senator KEATING. Thank you very much. I was simply carrying out the rules of this committee which provide that.

Mr. OLTMANS. Thank you, Senator.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

# APPENDIXES

---

## APPENDIX I

### CUBAN INFORMATION SERVICE—HISTORICAL SUPPLEMENT

#### THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA— PART I—AUGUST 5, 1961

This supplement is dedicated particularly to faculty members of the universities and colleges of all countries which receive the Cuban Information Service. The so-called radical, liberal, liberal-progressive, and other similarly inclined professors of nonpolitical subjects, who view the advance of communism in this hemisphere with tolerance and benignity, and who unwittingly sign pro-Communist petitions, placed before them by clever subversionists, may be interested in the fate of their fellows at the hands of the Communists in Cuba.

From the very moment that Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, and his lackey, Fidel Castro, obtained control of the reins of power in Cuba, the attack to destroy the autonomy of the University of Havana, to nullify its student body as an active political and democratic force, and to throttle the spirit and the authority of the faculty began with the intelligent and diligent use of every trick in the Communist book.

In January 1959, the situation at the University of Havana was the following: Batista had closed that center of learning in 1957, when it became a beehive of concentrated opposition against his regime. Classes had been suspended for many months; and some students engaged in terrorist activities against the dictator.

It must never be imagined that this nucleus of opposition represented the majority of the students. Like other Latin American universities, Havana University contained its fair share of professional students, whose sole interest in an academic career was the furtherance of their political ambitions. The mass of the student body never engaged in clandestine activities against Batista; for the majority of the students of any university in the world are there to pursue the study of their chosen professions, and not to agitate politically.

The proof of this contention is found in the very small amount of students who actually did join Castro in the Sierra Maestra, or Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo in the II Escambray Front. There were so few that the Castro propaganda machine was forced to deify chosen students José Puente Blanco, Omar Fernández, Angel Quevedo, Juan Nuiry, and Rolando Cubela as heroes of the revolution.

Of these, Puente Blanco was abroad during most of the struggle against Batista; Angel Quevedo did not grow his beard until after January 1, 1959; Omar Fernández was unknown; Juan Nuiry claimed a ghostly association with some undetermined fighting body; and Rolando Cubela joined up during the last few days of spotty guerrilla warfare. All were to become useful for the purposes of the Communists.

It was José Puente Blanco who emerged as leader of the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria, the Students' Federation, known as the FEU. A word here about the FEU to describe that political organization. Ostensibly working as a sort of student council, the FEU has always been the center of violent political activity at the university. In former, and happier times, the FEU produced politicians belonging to all parties and ranks, from president of the republic on down to mere aldermen. If a student had political ambitions, if he were to succeed in obtaining elective office in the future, the FEU was the training ground for his chosen field of endeavor.

The FEU has always been directed by a small clique, which in the times of Presidents Grau San Martín and Carlos Prío, became known as "el bonche," or the bunch. It was inevitable that Fidel Castro should become one of "the bunch," which in plain language, was little more than an extremely dangerous, armed group of juvenile political delinquents.

When Castro was a member of the FEU, he was constantly at odds with another student leader, Manolo Castro (no relation), who proved to be more popular and able than Fidel. He paid for his ability and his popularity with his life; and the murder of Manolo Castro is directly traceable to today's bearded prime minister.

It was the small clique of the FEU, now purged of the gangster elements of Grau and Prío times, which came to the fore when Batista began to have trouble early in 1957. Under the leadership of José Antonio Echeverría, the president of the FEU, the small clique of terrorists began to plant bombs in Havana and plot the assassination of Batista. On March 13, 1958, when the presidential palace was unsuccessfully attacked, Echeverría was killed by police for his radio appeal to the population.

Echeverría, considered by most to be a decent fellow, is said to have been betrayed to Batista forces by the Castro people. Havana University students in Miami today can tell you that the FEU leader had broken with Castro and come out firmly against communism. There is a letter in existence, written by Echeverría, in which he speaks of his irreconcilable differences with Castro, who immediately signed the former's death warrant by betrayal.

The death of Echeverría gave the Communists a very valuable propaganda weapon. Guevara and Castro instantly canonized the slain FEU leader, and claimed him for their own. Echeverría, in fact, had never belonged to the 26th of July movement, but had been a member of the student directorate fighting against Castro. It was José Puente Blanco, who, as a member of that directorate, emerged as president of the FEU in January 1959. He was chosen for the job by the faculty university council, which still had some authority in those early days of the revolution.

Nevertheless, the Castro people managed to get their minions positions of power in the FEU. Raúl Castro saw to it that his man, Rolando Cubela, was among those present. Other Castro appointees: Omar Fernández, suddenly proclaimed captain in the rebel army; Maj. Angel Quevedo, who had not had time to grow a proper beard; Capt. Juan Nuiry, a useful member of "the bunch." Time would take care of Puente Blanco, the innocent lamb among the Communist wolves. The rest are still in power.

---

#### PART II—AUGUST 12, 1961

The FEU takes over.

Faculty reaction.

Prime Minister Miró Cardona speaks.

The Government assault against the university and its faculty began early in January 1959. The FEU took over the university lock, stock, and barrel. The faculty, which did not understand what was taking place, were cleverly deceived as to the real purpose of the FEU's subtle moves.

It must be remembered, in all justice, that Cuba was, at the moment, bubbling over with revolutionary fervor. The FEU clique was presented as composed of revolutionary heroes; and they were accepted as such by the entire population and the faculty.

To a very few, the implications were all too clear and alarming; for the FEU decided that it would become the judge of who was and who was not acceptable in the faculty. It would pass judgment not only on the political acceptance of faculty members, but it would also determine which professors possessed the necessary learning and abilities to hold their positions.

While the first proposition was acceptable to a hysterical country, the second was patently absurd. It was the students, then, who would determine who knew and who did not know their subjects in the faculty; when these students knew nothing at all about the subjects themselves.

The pseudolegal basis for the FEU action was to be found in the provisions of laws 19 and 20 of the Educational Code of the Republic, promulgated in 1937.

The FEU claimed that, under those laws, the faculty had to prove their capabilities as instructors by taking tests on their subjects every 5 years. By law,

the faculty university council was responsible for duly qualifying instructors by means of these tests.

The reasoning went thus: Since the council had not carried out the requisites of the Educational Code, it followed, according to the FEU, that it was not worthy of controlling the destinies of the university. Ergo, to fill this "gap in authority," the students could think of only one organism that could successfully fill the vacuum: the FEU.

The "bunch" of the Students' Federation failed to explain how it could be possible for professors to take the prescribed examinations when the university had been closed down since 1957 by Fulgencio Batista.

Ignored, buried deep in the pile of university rubble, lay article 4 of the Educational Code of 1937, which stated, "The University of Havana will be governed by its professors, under their responsibility, and by means of faculty authorities and organisms as determined in the statutes. *In no case may the professors delegate those faculties*"—which is exactly what the poor, misguided professors did when they acquiesced to the demands of the FEU for a *political* and educational "purge" among faculty members.

The faculty was not guiltless in the beginnings of this process that would lead to the complete deterioration of their authority. Some professors accused, not the FEU, but their own colleagues, who had joined the FEU in its drastic assumption of power in the university.

Prof. Rafael Sentmanat, of the faculty of medicine, said on the first week of February 1959, "The students are in their proper role; but not Prof. Ruiz Leiro (later to regret his actions), who encouraged students to act irresponsibly both in the legal and revolutionary sense. University reform must be carried out by the faculty, at the request of the students."

Ruiz Leiro had joined the FEU in its demands for the very simple reason that the small clique had "elected" him dean of the school of medicine, contrary to all university laws and statutes. He simply wanted to be dean.

On the other hand, Sentmanat reflected the ambiguity of thought among some of the faculty members when he agreed that the students had acted with "good intentions," when they insisted in the "purification" of the "undesirable elements" among the faculty. At the same time, he condemned those "good intentions" as illegal; and he further castigated faculty members who had adhered to FEU resolutions.

Another professor, Dr. Angel Vieta, was more positive in his stand. He accused the students of not only taking over the university, but also of invading Calixto Garcia Hospital, a free national institution, staffed by excellent doctors, and training medical school interns.

Willy-nilly, the FEU ousted doctors, nurses, even common employees, placing their political stooges in their places. Dr. Vieta stated flatly that the hospital was now "in inexpert and irresponsible hands, and without any juridical personality whatsoever."

FEU puppet, Dr. Ruiz Leiro, now installed as dean of the medical school by "the bunch," came out with Orwellian double speak. Said he, "Pleased with the realities that are taking place in university reforms, I consider that the important factors are: the tonic that has been provided by the FEU in their decision to 'purify' the university, which some people would call pettifogging; but which has permitted that this reform may conjugate in unison moral, legal, and revolutionary reasons." That language went over big in those days.

The Government was concerned very little about the situation at the university. José Miró Cardona, then Prime Minister, said on television, "The university is autonomous; and the Government is zealously respectful of that autonomy. Things will work themselves out." Miró added that the students were right in their attitude, but that he deplored the methods used. With this soft pat on the wrist of the FEU, the Government, proclaiming the "sacred autonomy" of the university, washed its hand of the problem, or so it seemed at the time.

Actually, it is possible that the implications of the FEU takeover escaped Miró, as it did so many other faculty members, who refused to recognize that their authority had been infringed, and that a small clique of handpicked Communist trainees had been chosen by Ernesto Guevara to undermine the structure of faculty authority. It must also be realized that the only person in Cuba, in 1959, who could decide what should be done in any field of human activity, was Fidel Castro Ruz, who encouraged the FEU behind the scenes.

The "purge" of the faculty went on, with the ambitions of certain members overriding their self-respect or their stupidity. Most of the faculty members

who were not purged, believed innocently that they could still regain control of the students and the FEU. They did not realize that powers once surrendered are gone forever; and the process of the distintegration of authority continued unchecked.

Some very sincere and honest professors believed implicitly that the FEU-inspired "purge" served to rid the university of many incompetent professors; and there were some who could be classed as hopeless misfits. They did not, however, realize that it was not they, but the FEU, which had demonstrated the power to dismiss the incompetents. It also escaped them that professors of known anti-Communist sentiments had been quietly "purged," with no one the wiser among the faculty.

---

PART III—AUGUST 19, 1961

Operation Abolition.

The FEU elections of September 1959.

Raúl Castro elects FEU president.

The second week in February 1959, one of the members of the faculty of the School of Medicine of the University of Havana told us that he was convinced that certain incompetent professors of his faculty had to be "purged."

Dr. X (he is still in Havana and militantly anti-Castro) described his school as discredited all over the world. Inordinately and justly proud of the excellent reputation the world over of Cuban doctors of his generation, Dr. X ascribed the situation to the presence of doctors in that faculty who had not practiced their profession in years; or else had not kept abreast of medical advances within the past 10 years, thus prejudicing the future of young Cuban doctors.

Nevertheless, he agreed that the methods employed by the FEU (Students' Federation) and those faculty members who had adhered to the student leaders, were deplorable.

Dr. X did not realize then—although he was to realize it only too well in the months following—that all authority in the university would not devolve upon the faculty once it had been breached. The FEU was in no mood to return to the professors the power that it had seized illegally.

This, then was the situation which confronted the mass of the student body (15,000 to 20,000), which was powerless to make itself heard over the shouts of the FEU "bunch", and the professors, who did not understand that their loss of authority was permanent.

The methods of Communist infiltration and the gradual tightening of control over the students and the faculty was typical. Under the guise of "university reforms," which were supposedly instituted to "purge" the faculty of incompetent professors, a very different process took place.

The operation was perfectly planned. No one could possibly object to a cleansing process designed to rid the university of professorial trash. In the initial enthusiasm, little notice was taken of the marked political aspects that the "purge" immediately acquired once it had begun.

Those members of the faculty who were keen enough to see through the strata-gem protested. Some resigned then and there, and others were marked for future elimination. In cases where a convenient excuse could be found, faculty members of known competence were purged for their opposition to the "purification" scheme.

The attack had begun very subtly; and, for the moment, the Communists deemed it wise to ease pressure and await future developments. The first objective had been accomplished: control of the faculty university council and had been placed in the hands of the FEU leaders.

The next step was to ratify the positions of power of the Communist "bunch" by holding elections of officers of the FEU, with the participation of all the student body. The attention of the students, the faculty, and the public was diverted from the "purge" to the scandalous elections that were to be held in September 1959.

The elections were called to choose officers of the Federation of University Students (FEU), and officers of the student councils (subservient to the FEU) in each school of the university.

The ranks formed quickly with one faction led by Pedro Luis Boitel, engineering student, and the other by medical student, Rolando Cubela, incidentally under secretary of the interior of the "provisional" revolutionary government.

"Both Boitel (who represented Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement's anti-Communist elements) and Major Cubela were summoned by Raul Castro on sev-

eral occasions in July and August of 1959. The younger Castro set down the law in no uncertain terms, and demanded that a single slate run for the presidency of the FEU, with his pet boy, Cubela, as the only candidate for that post.

Boitel and his followers refused to accept Raúl's dictum; and went to the student body for backing. They found it; and immediately the Government, on Raúl Castro's orders, began a studied campaign of personal, moral, and economic intimidation and coercion, against student leaders and their families. The intimidation was designed to force Boitel's group to retire from the electoral arena. Pressure was also brought to bear on the faculty university council to suspend elections until the end of October, by which time Cubela and his gangsters would have physical control of all electoral activity.

Police Chief Efigenio Ameijeiras zoomed into the university in a police car, with the siren blowing full blast, urging all students to vote for Cubela. This was armed invasion of the autonomous precincts of the university by the police.

Special emphasis must be placed on the fact that Boitel and his group supposedly represented the 26th of July Movement. In reality he was being undermined by the Communists in power in the Government, who presented themselves as the heroes of that movement.

On the eve of elections, Fidel Castro summoned Boitel and his partisans to the offices of the newspaper, *Revolución*, for a conference which lasted some 3 hours, and demanded their resignation. Boitel bowed before the inevitable; and a special edition of *Revolución* was sent to all students in the university asking them to vote for a single slate: Major Cubela and his Communist cohorts.

That same election day, at 2 o'clock in the morning, all radio stations began an intense campaign announcing the resignation of Boitel, but at a huge student meeting held later that morning, his resignation was not accepted by the majority of the student body, which decided to vote for him.

The elections were a complete farce. The polls were open from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m., an impossible 3 hours for the 15,000 to 20,000 students to vote. Cubela arrived at the university to the crash of drums and cymbals escorted personally by Raúl Castro. Raúl Castro and his guns elected Cubela.

Once the polls were closed, an official announcement stated that the results would be made known within 2 days; yet early that very same evening, the triumph of Cubela was officially announced. The Communists were now in absolute control of the FEU Council—and the FEU "bunch" controlled the faculty.

Immediately after the election of Cubela, the University of Havana was flooded with pro-Communist and Communist propaganda, including official publications of the Cuban Communist Party (*Partido Socialista Popular—PSP*). The brainwashing had begun; but it would never subvert the majority of the student body or the faculty.

---

#### PART IV

The opposition speaks out.  
The Mikoyan incident.  
The Conte-Agüero incident.

The triumph of Rolando Cubelas and his fellow Communists was immediately felt within the precincts of the University of Havana. The broadside of Communist propaganda, which flooded the university with books, pamphlets, the CP newspaper, *Hoy*, and similar literature, was stubbornly opposed by the overwhelming majority of the students.

The names of Alberto Müller, Manuel Salvat, Ernesto Fernández Travieso, anti-Communist student leaders, began to appear on the mastheads of student publications, *Trinchera* (the Trench) and *Aldabonazos* (literally, the Rap on the Door). An all-out attack on the Communists was launched by these weeklies; and heated discussions took place in the main university plaza, with the Communists always in the minority.

When FEU "bunch," following instructions from Ernesto Guevara and Raúl Castro, announced its intention to join the International Union of Students (UIE), open violence broke out between the "bunch" and the anti-Communist students.

So serious were these disturbances, that Fidel Castro appeared at the university to lecture the students, condemning their "ideological discussions" and terming the arguments of the opposition leaders as "Byzantine."

It must not be supposed that the entire student body participated in these clashes. After 2½ years without classes, the young men and women were eager

to commence their careers, and their sole interest lay in the quick resumption of courses.

Some schools began classes in the fall of 1959, but others were still in the midst of purges and discussions, which delayed the reopening of classes again and again. Nevertheless, the majority of the student body was firmly against communism, in all its phases.

The first serious rupture came in February 1960, when Soviet Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan was received in Havana as an honored guest of the "provisional" revolutionary government.

On February 5, 1960, Mikoyan, together with Government leaders, dutifully deposited a wreath of flowers in the shape of the hammer and sickle, before the statue of Cuba's national hero, José Martí, in Havana's Central Park, smack in the middle of the city.

Immediately after Mikoyan left the park to attend a Russian trade exposition a few blocks away, a large group of students, carrying banners which proclaimed their support for the Castro revolution, but condemned communism, appeared at Central Park. They too carried a wreath, in the shape and colors of a Cuban flag, which they planned to deposit before Martí's statue, as apology for the Communist insult to that great democrat.

The wreath was never deposited. Armed Communist goon squads, who were keeping watch over the Mikoyan floral offering, overpowered the students and destroyed the flag of flowers. Immediately, an intense shooting spree took place. Eyewitnesses can tell you that Mikoyan, who heard the shooting a few blocks away, paled visibly. The police joined the shooting spree, and proceeded to arrest the majority of the students which had formed the small demonstration against communism.

Naturally, Salvat and Müller, the two main anti-Communist leaders at the university, were taken to the offices of the DIER (Army Investigations Department, who worked with the dreaded G-2), where they were charged with "counterrevolutionary activities."

The arrest of Müller and Salvat conclusively demonstrated to the mass of the student body that the crime here was not being against the revolutionary government—placards had proclaimed the contrary—but consisted of open opposition to communism.

The "bunch" of the FEU acted quickly. They convoked an assembly of students asking for the ouster of all those who were present at the demonstration against Mikoyan. On the 8th February, the general assembly of the students was held, and Major Cubelas, president of the FEU, was the only speaker. Müller and Salvat, now released by the DIER, were not permitted to speak.

Cubelas used the old argument of "unity" within the university ranks, and soundly condemned the demonstrators for "insulting an honored guest of the revolutionary government." He was careful, however, to excuse the actions of the protestants, alleging that they had been "deceived by counterrevolutionary elements." The temper of the crowd would not permit any other solution; and Cubelas was forced to declare that the FEU was not with communism or with capitalism; but simply backed the current official government doctrine of "humanism."

The meeting did not serve to bring cordiality between the Communist and the anti-Communist factions. If anything, the breach increased.

At this precise moment, an imponderable stepped into the tight situation. Luis Conte Agüero, longtime Castro friend and admirer going back to 1946, acquired fame and fortune on television and radio as a commentator in favor of the revolution and all its works. He had a vast audience in both mediums; and his name had become well known in every corner of Cuba.

All the while mouthing platitudes about the Castro government, Conte Agüero came out firmly against communism, and attacked that deadly plague daily in his two programs on the air. It must be well understood that Conte did not attack the "provisional" revolutionary government. Conte Agüero spoke over CMQ-TV and radio for 14 months. Nobody objected. Conte Agüero came out against communism. Objections flew thick and fast.

For 3 straight weeks, Conte pounded the Communists unmercifully. His listener response and encouragement was so great that he considered himself with sufficient popular backing to increase the tempo and force of his attacks on communism.

He was vociferously supported by the students who obtained a large number of signatures from their fellows, who also backed the commentator. It could not last, of course. Conte Agüero had to be silenced and silenced quickly.

On Friday, March 25, 1960, after Conte read a lengthy letter on radio Progreso at noontime, in which he counseled his friend, Fidel Castro, against the Communists, a well-organized armed goon squad, brought specially in trucks, was waiting for him in front of CMQ-TV station, near the university. Officers of the secret political police (G-2) led the mob, which prevented the entry of Conte into the TV studios. Police officers were plainly in evidence, but they did not lift a finger to halt the aggression against Conte.

University students siding with Conte joined the fray; and promptly had their heads opened by brickbats or were carted away to jail. People who telephoned police stations received no answer to their calls. Radio cars were notable by their absence. Conte was fortunate enough to escape and sought asylum at a foreign embassy.

In the university, Cubelas quickly summoned his armed goons and announced that the university would soon be rid of "counterrevolutionary elements." It is worthy of note that Cubelas addressed a group of Communists, who were not students of the university, and which had formed part of the armed mob that attacked Conte Agüero.

Some form of legal rigmarole had to be invented to rid the university of the anti-Communist group of Müller, Salvat, and Travieso. The FEU hit upon the happy solution of forming "disciplinary tribunals" to judge the conduct of the "counterrevolutionaries" who were against communism.

The Conte Agüero incident is of supreme importance in the history of the Cuban revolution. Up to that time, the majority of the people were convinced that the government of Fidel Castro was not Communist. The day of the Conte Agüero incident, people began to doubt. But when Fidel Castro appeared before the TV cameras on the following Monday, March 28, and denounced his old friend as a "counterrevolutionary" and a "reactionary," even the man in the street stood up and took notice; for Conte's only crime was his attack on communism. The day after Castro destroyed Conte, Joe Public said silently, "Fidel must be for the Communists." And Joe Public was definitely not pleased.

Neither did Cubelas and his cohorts like the increasing agitation against communism within the university. The student body made it clear, in numerous meetings and by means of signed petitions, that they were roundly against the Communists.

When his "disciplinary tribunals" were not approved as legal instruments, Cubelas and his FEU bunch decided that force was the order of the day. First Müller and then Salvat, and finally Fernández Travieso were physically ousted from the university by armed gangs of "students"—in reality imported Communist thugs who had nothing to do with the university—which soon became the scourge of anyone who opposed communism.

The faculty sat mute and helpless whilst the precincts of the university were overrun by these armed bully boys. All authority now completely out of their hands, the good professors had to bow to the whims and fancies of the FEU "bunch" and their imported goons.

Conte Agüero was in asylum, soon to leave the country. The leaders of the anti-Communist faction had been scattered by violence and they could enter the university only at the risk of their lives. In the background, Ernesto (Ché) Guevara watched placidly and prepared to address the students.

---

#### PART V—SEPTEMBER 2, 1961

Ernesto (Ché) Guevara speaks.

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez joins the faculty.

The attack on Aureliano Sánchez Arango.

Through March and April of 1960, the physical violence, coercion, and intimidation of anti-Communist students in the university continued apace; although that resistance was far from being permanently broken.

However, the tense situation at the university might give other people ideas; and this the Communist government of Cuba could not tolerate. The bone that was sticking in the government's threat was the question of the autonomy of Havana University.

Technically, the faculty university council and the students' federation (FEU) were subject only to university discipline and statutes. Again, technically, the faculty council held the power to administer that discipline and those statutes; and students were free to discuss any subject under the sun.

The real power in Cuba, the Argentine hard-core, disciplined, Communist Party member, Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, who as president of the National Bank of Cuba had nothing to do with these matters, decided that the time had come to show rebellious students who was the boss.

In a speech at the university early in May 1960, he made it quite clear that all-out 100-percent "collaboration" with the government was expected from the students. His warning could not have been plainer. Students were expected to desist from engaging in "controversial" subjects. The university schools would be reorganized, Guevara informed his student audience, with special attention being given to "technical" studies.

Guevara is a quiet speaker. He does not rant and rave like Castro; so that his words were not well understood or appreciated by the majority of the student body. Only the leaders of the anti-Communist groups knew that he meant exactly what he said.

These young men were not complete fools. They knew that their sacred autonomy was being threatened; and with that gone, the university would be completely in the hands of the Communists. Against the threat of action by armed goon squads, they issued proclamations defending their political affiliations, mainly the Triple A Party of Dr. Aureliano Sánchez Arango and the Auténtico Party; although both parties had been rendered powerless as of January 1, 1959.

Fat was added to the fire that same month of May, when Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, editor of the Communist Party newspaper *Hoy*, and one of the top brass of the Cuban Communist Party, was assigned (after due pressure) to substitute for a teacher of economic science who was on leave of absence.

This was a direct slap at the majority of the students, who were strongly anti-Communist. Reaction came immediately, with economic science students refusing to attend classes held by Rodríguez. When they tried to proclaim their protest peacefully, the Communists imported armed thugs into the university and proceeded to beat up the protestants. Students were severely mauled and kicked for selling the anti-Communist weekly *Aldabonazos*, which decried the presence of Rodríguez in the university. Girl students were not immune, and were reviled and insulted by the bully boys imported by FEU President Rolando Cubelas and his "bunch."

The FEU did not lift a finger to halt the disorders; but then, nobody expected that it would. On the contrary, alleging that Carlos Rafael Rodríguez was in personal danger from the anti-Communist students, the FEU threw an armed guard around the party member every time that he entered the university.

That first week of May 1960 another serious incident took place which showed the impatience of the Communists with opposition in the university. Dr. Aureliano Sánchez Arango, head of the Triple A Party, who had opposed Batista at every turn for 7 solid years, returned from the II Congress pro Democracy and Freedom held in Caracas, Venezuela.

Sánchez Arango, a professor of law in the university, had a large following among the students. He was also a known anti-Communist; and his presence at the Caracas conference had caused considerable annoyance to Guevara and the Castro brothers.

The FEU "bunch" was ordered to give Sánchez Arango a suitable welcome at Havana's Ranco Boyeros Airport on his arrival from Caracas. He and his supporters were viciously attacked by organized, armed Communist gangsters. Again it was demonstrated that where the Communists could not obtain their ends by means of subversion and infiltration, they always resorted to violence.

When Sánchez Arango protested against this incredible aggression, he was immediately vilified in the most despicable terms on radio, in the press, and on television. Strange to relate, radio stations were describing the disorders at the airport before the plane had come to a stop on the landing strip.

With a straight face, the FEU, which had instigated the attack on Sánchez Arango, accused his partisans of attacking "innocent students" at the airport. The contention was against all logic and reason. Innocent students at the airport went to acclaim, not to attack, Sánchez Arango.

The purpose of the whole incident was to force Sánchez Arango to leave the faculty. The Association of Law Students (controlled by the FEU "bunch") asked for his substitution by another professor, contending that Sánchez Arango used the classroom as a forum for political discussions. The Association of Law Students did not consult its members; and the decision was taken by FEU puppets who were fervent admirers of Communist Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.

Again, following Communist custom of accusing your opponent of the crime you yourself are committing, the charge of "indoctrination" was placed against Sánchez Arango, when it was Carlos Rafael Rodríguez who was using his classroom as a school for Communist teachings.

The FEU "bunch" now attended the university full armed, with its president, Maj. Rolando Cubelas, surrounded by his gun-toting bullies. Some 150 armed thugs were imposing their will on some 20,000 students. An aggressive, determined Communist minority, with full governmental backing, was running the show.

Sánchez Arrango, however, precariously remained on the faculty momentarily; and to make matters crystal clear, Cubelas, speaking on the government's TV channel 12, said that "if university autonomy stands in the way of the revolution, autonomy will have to go."

The very thing that students in the university had fought for, for generations, was being sold down the river by a man who, with supreme cheek, said that he represented those students. Not a single line of Cubelas' statement appeared in the Cuban press on the day after his television appearance. The subject had become very touchy.

Communist patience was at an end; that was obvious. Further violence was vetoed, for the moment, by Guevara, who finally found the solution to the whole problem. The attack was shifted from the students to the faculty. The university faculty council must be destroyed, if total control of the University of Havana were to be obtained. The figurehead must go to bring the whole apparatus crashing down.

---

#### PART VI—SEPTEMBER 9, 1961

Trouble at the School of Engineering.

The opening Communist gambit.

Full attack against the Faculty University Council.

At 8:30 on the morning of June 13, 1960, students of the School of Engineering of Havana University were due for an examination in hydromechanics. They naturally went to the classroom of that subject for their examination. At that moment, student Luis Blanco told Profs. Manuel de Vera and Luis Núñez that they wished to take their exams in the mechanical drawing classroom.

Professors Vera and Núñez refused to agree, stating that the suggested classroom offered no guarantees for supervised examinations. Student Blanco then and there decided to suspend the exam, claiming that the students had been grossly "insulted" by the professors' implication that class integrity and honesty were to be questioned.

Blanco promptly incited a small group of students to form a young riot in the hydromechanics classroom. They insolently booted out Professor Núñez, Vera's colleague; they sealed the door of the classroom without the presence of any university authority; they agreed to expel Professors Núñez and Vera; in the presence of these two faculty members they threatened fellow students who did not join their arbitrary stand; and they published an announcement in the press stating that the two engineering faculty positions "were vacant", and candidates for them could present themselves for "approval."

Professors Núñez and Vera accused Blanco's student group of "serious faults against academic discipline, and of taking over the key to a room which contains valuable university property \* \* \*."

The evening press on June 16 carried an announcement by the university faculty council which stated that the press declarations of the students, and their contention that the two posts of the faculty were "vacant," were invalid, "since the only ones legally authorized to make such a convocation (for faculty candidates) are the deans of the faculty."

Student Blanco and student José Rebellón, both of the engineering school's FEU (students' federation) "bunch," ignored the faculty announcement completely, and set up a "tribunal" to preside over the "tests to be given to faculty candidates for the two "vacant" posts. In short, they had taken over the faculty's authority to hire and fire professors.

Blanco and Rebellón were not through. In a public announcement, they declared that while "*we lack the legal authority to do so* (i.e., expel two professors and advertise for new faculty members), we have the necessary moral authority to carry out the reform in the school of engineering for the good of the revolution."

The chickens that were hatched early in 1959 were coming home to roost. The faculty, which did nothing to protect its authority a year and a half before, now found that that authority had vanished \* \* \* even though the engineering "bunch" said "we lack the legal authority to do so. \* \* \*"

The small arms fired in this initial skirmish soon gave way to the heavy artillery that was emplaced against the bastions of the university council. That ruling faculty body made its first mistake when it gave Dr. Aureliano Sánchez Arango (newly returned from Caracas and attacked at the airport by Communists; see pt. V), a full year's leave of absence without pay. The FEU "bunch" maintained that the law professor should have been expelled for "counterrevolutionary activities." Their demand was hurled at the council like a guided missile.

In turn, the council maintained that such a request must be presented (a) following the rules of the university, (b) in writing, and (c) containing all the allegations of the FEU written by its secretary, Maj. Angel Quevedo, ardent Communist.

When the FEU "bunch" refused to allow professors Núñez and Vera of engineering to enter university grounds, the council suspended all classes in the school of engineering for 72 hours. They were never to reopen under the council.

This move was countered by the FEU retirement of student representatives in the university faculty council, and from the councils of each of the schools of the university, with the FEU giving as reason the failure of the council to expel Sánchez Arango. Things were moving faster, much faster.

Dean Roberto Chomat of the school of architecture resigned his post in disgust, rejecting all FEU declarations and allegations, which stated that a faculty plot existed to create conflict in the university; which is exactly what the FEU "bunch" was itself doing.

On June 28, 1960, the FEU held a meeting at which they declared that the government of the university (by both students and faculty) had not brought a single advantage to that center of learning. The "bunch" also stated that everywhere they had clashed "with the retrograde mentality of the professors, who cannot conceive a revolutionary university as demanded by the present moments." Guevara's instructions were being followed to the letter.

The hand of the Gray Eminence of Cuba was also visible in a statement of the FEU "bunch" which said, "The more we have gotten to know the functioning of Government organs, the more we have become convinced of the enormous obstacles that we must face to bring about the realization of reformist principles."

Not satisfied with all that, the FEU accused the university council of "despising basic rights and not listening to the *revolutionary arguments* of the students' representatives." The Government-controlled press had a field day with these preposterous lies.

José Rebellón, who with Blanco began the trouble at the school of engineering, imperiously declared that same June 28 that a superior council of reform must be set up with faculties over and above all university authority. He demanded *the immediate elimination of the university council*. The cat was out of the bag, and the real reason for the initial fuss at the school of engineering was boldly stated by Communist Rebellón.

The little gangster also demanded that professors, up till then employed by a system of tests on their subjects, be hired under a new system of "contracts," which would be renewed periodically.

Rebellón's plan, handed to him by the higher-ups in the Government, would mean the end of all semblance of faculty authority. Anyone with the right "attitudes" could be considered good faculty material by the all-powerful Superior Council of Reform, which would become a club in the hands of the FEU "bunch," who considered that a good professor must be a man who had no opinions, except those laid down by what would become a monstrous organ of repression.

By the end of June 1960 even the professors of the faculty of the University of Havana had come to realize that this was a fight to the death for the total, absolute control of faculty and students by the Communists in the Government—Ché Guevara, Fidel, and Raúl Castro, and their minions—and that the lines had been irrevocably drawn.

For many in that faculty, it was a rude awakening to reality. Many of these theoreticians, dreamers, and innocents believed until then that the revolution was working for the good of the Cuban university student.

Now they faced the stark fact that they must bow their heads submissively before the armed gangsters of Cubelas and his FEU "bunch," and the juggernaut of Government press propaganda that was being hurled against them with ever-increasing intensity.

Some of these men, who had lived the secluded and well-cushioned life of the professor, went completely to pieces. Their hopes, their ideals and their firm belief in a better Cuba were shattered into a million shards before their incredulous eyes. Others, made of sterner stuff, girded their loins for the battle for survival that lay ahead.

## PART VII

### The CENA declarations.

### The FEU accuses the university council.

### The council strikes back.

The last, dying gasp of student opposition to the Communist destruction of the University of Havana came from an organization called the CENA (Comisión Estudiantil Nacional Auténtica), representing students with political affiliations that tended to agree with the basic principles of the Auténtico Party, as had been set down several months before by the leaders of that party.

The CENA gave the clearest and most succinct definition of the FEU "bunch" when it stated that it was "firmly opposed to any attempt at intervention in the university on the part of outside persons or institutions \* \* \*"—meaning the hoodlums imported by the FEU and the Government.

The CENA minced no words, that last week of June 1960, when it denounced before public opinion that a group of "opportunists, invoking the name of the revolution, are provoking a crisis between faculty and students to satisfy outrageous ambitions." It called on the FEU to "deprive of authority the discordant, demagogic, and opportunistic work of some of its members (the "bunch") which are seeking to commit an act of piracy to take over the Government of the FEU (which they had already done) at the cost of university autonomy."

True to style, on July 2, 1960, the group of "discordant, demagogic, opportunists" published in the Government-controlled press a document which—if we were to believe in its basic statements—made everyone wonder how the University of Havana could possibly have graduates practicing their professions without killing a great number of people.

According to the FEU declaration, the faculty and the method of teaching subjects at the university were hopelessly outdated, so lacking in knowledge and its application, so reactionary and inefficient, so devoid of purpose and meaning, that graduates would have been tragically ignorant of the basic principles of their chosen careers.

If FEU allegations were to be taken seriously, Cuban doctors would have murdered their patients outright, victims of ignorance and incompetence. Buildings erected by the graduates of the schools of engineering and architecture would long ago have crashed to the ground; and lawyers would have snarled the legal tangle worse than the Cuban revolution had succeeded in doing.

All throughout the long document the word "incompetence" was repeated over and over to describe the faculty of the University of Havana. The FEU "bunch" criticized the system of lectures, the textbooks, everything, saying that students could not learn their subjects well. This is perfectly true of the "bunch," if you consider that the FEU people did not attend lectures and did not bother to read books.

Another FEU charge stated that people from the "humble classes" never had access to the university, and that only the "privileged few" were permitted to enter the institution. Presumably, then, the FEU consisted of members of the group of those "privileged few."

The FEU also opposed the system of tests, describing it as "archaic"; they accused the faculty of "chauvinism"; and called them "mental midgets," opposed to the inclusion of foreign (i.e., Communist bloc) professors in the university. The FEU failed to mention that professors from the United States and Latin America had taught at the University of Havana on and off for many years.

The "bunch" also insisted that the merit system used in hiring professors was totally wrong. A new system of "contracts" must be installed, a system that could not possibly reveal the academic abilities of future candidates to the faculty except for their political sympathies.

Accusation after accusation of "incompetence" was leveled at the faculty. Demands and more demands were hurled like bolts of Thor by the omniscient hoodlums.

The key to all these accusations and demands was crystal clear. No. 7 in the document asked that "*incompetent, counterrevolutionary, and immoral*" members of the faculty be booted out instantly. Who would judge the "incompetence, counterrevolutionary attitudes and immorality" of the faculty? The FEU "bunch."

The real target of the FEU declarations and accusations was the rights to the freedom of opinion and freedom of speech of both students and faculty.

The university council answered these charges in unequivocal terms. Every demand and every accusation was rejected. When the FEU "bunch" charged that only the "privileged" were permitted to attend the university, the council pointed out that according to the educational law and the Constitution of Cuba, the Government was obliged to dedicate  $2\frac{1}{4}$  percent of its budget to the university. *Nothing like this was being done.* Havana University, with some 20,000 students, received something over 2 million pesos a year for tuition purposes; and 40 percent of the student body did not have to pay a penny's worth of tuition.

But the die was cast, and the game was over. That became clear when the controlled press studiously ignored the university council's defense, dedicating its pages exclusively to elaborating on and exaggerating the FEU document, which was an insolent example of the big lie.

Dr. Luis Baralt, of the faculty of philosophy and letters, was a crushed man. He simply could not believe that his revolutionary heroes, his idealists, his honorable barbudos could have been accessory before the fact to the total destruction of his beloved university.

Other liberal and progressive professors, who did not or could not understand the basic truths behind the Communist process, were shocked as severely. The innocent beliefs of a lifetime came crashing about their shoulders. Their naive and mistaken notions of "Communist ideals" were exploded before their very eyes. Force, naked force had arrived; and they were not equipped to handle the realities of the situation.

The spineless, grasping at saving straws, bowed to that force and intimidation, demonstrating once more that moral courage is not the outstanding quality of the opportunist and the coward.

The coup de grace was to be administered mercilessly on July 15, 1960. On that day, the long and honorable history of the University of Havana came to an end.

---

#### PART VIII—SEPTEMBER 23, 1961

The final curtain finally came down on the tragedy of the University of Havana in July 1960. A small group of political hoods succeeded, by methods of coercion, vilification, baseless charges and base insults, in ousting the legally constituted body which ruled the destinies of the university, the council.

When the going got rough, the little people among the faculty, those who had joined the vicious little "bunch" of the FEU, flocked to ally themselves to the banner of force and repression. Those who did not, those professors who fought a valiant struggle for their rights under university law, those men who believed in order and discipline among themselves and the student body, those gentlemen of integrity and courage, easily separated the men from the boys.

In the whole history of Latin American universities, it becomes difficult to achieve the utter disregard for authority, for law, for statutes and regulations as was demonstrated on July 15, 1960, by the little knot of political puppets which called themselves the University Students' Federation (FEU).

When the FEU finally came to the conclusion that the university council had no intentions of bowing down to their outrageous demands, and their insolent, malevolent charges—indeed the council had answered these charges with paralyzing clarity—they stopped trying to obtain their ends by accepted legal measures. The FEU came to the conclusion that the council could not be intimidated by threats and insults; so quietly they began to undermine the tottering authority of the faculty by direct approach to individual professors of the different schools of the university.

It is only natural that they should begin their labor of hate among the weakest elements in the faculty, aided by those professors—and there are some everywhere—who backed the "reform" of the university by the self-appointed dieties of the FEU.

Little by little, cracks and fissures began to appear on the faculty front. The Veterinary School was among the first to resign en masse and join the FEU "bunch". The faculty of philosophy and letters joined the exodus to the ranks of force and repression. Others followed.

The School of Medicine, to its eternal credit, stood fast and refused to deal with the armed upstarts who demanded submission to their imperial will. The council stood fast, although one or two members took a quick look and panicked to the other side.

The impasse came when the council refused to resign, refused to accept the conditions imposed by the FEU, and totally rejected the unfounded, hysterical charges made against it by the puppet politicians.

On the night of July 14, when the FEU considered that it had enough cravens to start a show of its own, it declared that henceforth the university would be ruled by a body that was baptized with the name of Superior Government Council (JSG). The FEU "bunch" stated that it considered that the university council was dissolved "since the majority of its members had resigned and it did not have a quorum at the meeting convened yesterday at 6 p.m." The majority of the council had not resigned.

Dr. Clement Inclán, the octogenarian rector of the university, and a tired old man, received an insolent visit from the "bunch," who advised him that his post no longer existed. With insulting condescension, they invited him to join the new Supreme Government Council. The old man turned down the invitation, which he was later to accept.

And the superior government council? These things are always easily organized by the Communists. An assembly was held on July 15, attended, so they said, by "more than 100 Professors" of the university schools. Considering that the University of Havana had over 20,000 students, 100 professors, was a very small minority of the total faculty members.

At this assembly, the hand-picked professorial puppets were magnanimously informed by Maj. Angel Quevedo, secretary of the FEU, that they were free to choose a delegate from the faculty of each school so that they, in accord with the "students," could choose the members of the superior government council (JSG).

These delegates in turn, twiddled by strings from above, were told who would have the honor of forming part of the JSG, to be composed of four faculty members and four FEU people. The FEU's Quevedo practically told them who was to be selected for the JSG, stating that he needed a faculty lawyer and a professor of medicine, while the other two faculty members would come from the FEU faculty marionettes in the Veterinary School and the School of Science.

It didn't take much perception to know who the four FEU members of the JSG would be: Maj. Rolando Cubelas, president of the FEU; Maj. Angel Quevedo, secretary; Ricardo Alarcón, vice president, and José Venegas, vice secretary. Every single atom of power in the university was now concentrated in the hands of these four hoodlums; and they, in turn, were dancing on the strings of Guevara and the Castro brothers.

It is revealing that at the meeting of the JSG held on July 16 at the university it was agreed to modify article 4 of the educational law immediately, *in order to legalize the intervention of the FEU in the government of the university*. Their action was against the law on the books. *It was not legal.*

Following the common Communist practice of saying exactly the opposite of what one is doing, Rolando Cubelas, FEU boss, said at this meeting, "The only force which we should employ is that of reason \* \* \* we do not want anarchists \* \* \*." This was naked, vicious cynicism in the face of events.

From then on, the faculty of the university of Havana could move only at the command of the four FEU members of the JSG. All authority was stripped from them; the faculty was defeated and in rout. The Communists had won. Havana University was destroyed and will not rise again until the Red tyranny has been flushed from Cuba.

At that time, Carlos Todd, writing in the Times of Havana on July 18, 1960, had this to say, "If some of the faculty acted like white creatures to be found under stones, much more blame for the anarchic situation at the University of Havana must be laid squarely on the enormous majority of the student body. As students, they lost all chance of making their numerous voices heard long ago. Those who did were bundled out of the university and prevented from entering its precincts by armed force. Those who remain will, to their dying day, contemplate the degrading spectacle of their youth spent on hands and knees, while older, wiser men fought their battle for them \* \* \* those members of the faculty who died with their boots on."

## CUBAN COMMUNIST TACTICS: THE AGRICULTURAL FIASCO

## PART I—JANUARY 27, 1962

One of the greatest frauds perpetrated by the Communists in Cuba—not only on the Cuban people, but on the rest of the world as well—was condemning the island to the status of an “underdeveloped” country. Early in 1959, the steamroller propaganda machine with the Castro front began hammering that expression into the heads of Cubans; and, on their side of the water, Soviet Russian ballyhoo was dinning the word into the soft minds of the world.

It did not matter that many countries in this world are totally unsuited to becoming large industrial powers; that spots on the map do not possess the wherewithal of establishing and maintaining heavy industry; that the natural resources of those lands—some eminently suited to agriculture—are not present in sufficient quantities to industrialize the nation; and their import would be prohibitive. The Communists, whose big selling point is “industrialization,” by making it synonymous with “power,” conveniently ignore the geography, resources and the standard of living of any country; and promptly dub it “underdeveloped” to suit their purposes of propaganda.

People who were, and are, called “underdeveloped” by the Soviets, in many cases never stop to think that their standards of living are considerably higher than those of the average Russian; and that their ways of life are considerably more advanced economically and socially than those of the serfs of the Soviet Union. For the Russian offensive with “underdevelopment” as the banner that hides terror, hunger, fear, and murder, is almost always directed against the people of countries that could not be truly described as “underdeveloped.” Indeed, the Cuban Communists called for a conference of these “underdeveloped” countries—thus placing Cuba in that category—to be held in Havana, in the summer of 1960. Although the “conference” never took place, it is commemorated in Cuban stamps today; and many living in Cuba with extremely short memories are convinced in this manner that such a “conference” did indeed convene and discuss.

Certainly Cuba could not be placed in the “underdeveloped” bracket by any stretch of the imagination. And certainly Cuba, like every other country in the world—including the United States and Soviet Russia—required a process of acceleration in its development to provide for the necessities of an ever-increasing population. And undeniably, the Cuban standard of living, among the highest in Latin America, and the entire world, held room for some improvement. Any country must perforce follow the same process if it is to forge ahead and be recognized as a prosperous and wealthy nation, something that Cuba was in 1958. If the Cuban political scene needed revamping, it is equally true that her economy was not retreating, but advancing.

The argument that the economic development of Cuba was based on too much sugar and too little of anything else is also sound, if the bases of the economy were to enjoy greater stability and less dependency on the oscillations of the market price of one commodity.

Before the Batista regime, and throughout the 7 years of his tenure of power, Cuban industrialists, professionals, workers and all concerned with the welfare of the country were very much aware of the need for diversification; and it is to the eternal credit of the Cuban people that very appreciable gains were made in this field during the 15 years preceding the Communist conquest of the island.

In 1957, the gross national income rose to the respectable figure of \$2,391 million a very large amount for a nation of 6½ million people. The per capita income placed Cuba among the first 3 countries in the entire region of Latin America, which contains some 200 million people. By that time, sugar and products derived therefrom amounted to *only 24.75 percent* of the gross national income; a figure which clearly demonstrates the trend away from sugar to other agricultural and industrial endeavors.

Certainly Cuba's system had its defects and deficiencies. All systems in every country in the world are afflicted by the same ailments. Things were far from perfect; yet in 1958 the little island stood at the head of production in cattle and agriculture, in proportion to other Latin American countries.

During that year, tractors, for example, totaled 25,000 in operation; irrigation and fertilization of the land had become common; and the use of insecticides and fungicides was general. The most modern methods of agriculture were employed in the cultivation of sugar cane, tobacco, potatoes, fruits, and vegetables.

On the debit side of the ledger, and in spite of the undeniable progress made

in agriculture, there was room for a good deal of improvement in the rural areas of the country. The basic problems were illiteracy, the lack of proper housing, the scarcity of trained technicians, and deficiencies in the credit and marketing systems. The question of better distribution of goods was also of importance; as well as the more efficient use of land and other natural resources.

Illiteracy in Cuba, in 1958, was estimated at 23 percent, mostly concentrated in the rural areas; and representing, without doubt, a stumbling block to the obtaining of a better standard of living for the peasant. It must be also realized that the Cuban peasant lived better than his counterpart in almost all the other countries of Latin America. On the other hand, the application of modern agricultural techniques required increasing numbers of technicians to direct the diversification of agriculture and the techniques of production in general.

If you analyze the statements of the Communists when they first made their appearance on the Cuban scene in 1959, you will find that they harped on these very points with diabolical insistence—diabolical, because these needs were well recognized by the very people who placed them in power, i.e., the industrialists, the professionals, the middle class—in short, the large educated sections of the population.

This explains, to a great measure, the initial success and overwhelming support that Fidel Castro and his outlaws received when they arrived at the seats of power. People knew that these things were needed, if the country were to continue its prosperous development; and they believed that Castro was telling the truth when he called for the eradication of illiteracy, the diversification of agriculture, the increase of technicians, and, finally, when he shouted the Communist open-sesame of agrarian "reform." When the land was deliberately thrown into chaos and confusion by the Communist, the illiterate, the amateur, the incompetent, and the frustrated, those same people found to their dismay that Fidel Castro had no intentions of fulfilling the golden promises of his advent.

---

#### PART II—FEBRUARY 3, 1962

The very first speeches of Fidel Castro in 1959 contained a word that was specifically designed to mystify and confuse the people of Cuba. Over and over, the bearded butcher repeated the word "Latifundio"; and described those connected with what became a despicable expletive as "latifundistas."

As always, the Communists never bother with dictionary definitions of words, instilling their own psychological meaning into their language. "Latifundium," as it is known in English, is defined as vast tracts of land that are not cultivated or poorly cultivated. The "latifundistas" were the owners of those lands; except that Castro applied the term to any person who owned land, in large or small tracts. This was later made evident by the fact that the agrarian reform limited ownership of agricultural lands by one individual to a maximum of 990 acres. This was a technicality; for all land eventually became State property. These "latifundistas" were presented as fearful ogres, who enslaved the peasants working their land; ruled like tyrants over those unfortunate enough to live within its limits; and precluded the social and economic development of the country. Naturally, most of these ogres were American, with a few Cuban robber barons thrown in for good measure.

The Communist half lie did its deadly work among the population of Cuba, and the hue and cry began against the "latifundistas" and their associates. The country was being prepared for the greatest land rustling in hemisphere history; and it would be converted into one huge latifundium of the Cuban Communist state.

Now for the facts: In 1937, a sugar coordination law was passed by the Cuban Congress, which established the "right of permanency" on lands to the benefit of sugar growers, large and small. These growers were entitled to make use of the land, *with the right to remain on that land*, as long as they covered sugarcane quotas assigned to them under controls that were instituted in Cuba in 1926, under agreements with other sugar-producing nations, regulations made imperative by conditions in sugar world markets.

This right of permanence gave effective control of lands they occupied to tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and squatters who grew sugarcane. In other words, these tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and even the squatters, *could not be evicted from the land they occupied by any process of law*. The right of

permanence—the right to remain on the land and work it as titular owners—was inheritable, and could be sold to other persons.

Granting that these lands were the property of foreign and Cuban sugar interests, for more than 20 years neither could dispose of any acreage occupied by these small sugar planters. To all effects, the planters owned that land, they lived in it, they worked on it, they could bestow it to their children, and they could sell their right of permanence to another person if they so wished to.

It is important to note that, after 1937, the right of permanence was extended to include farmers dedicated to crops *other than sugar*; and, due to that fact, *not a single Cuban peasant* had been evicted from the land he worked for the 15 years prior to 1959. Eighty percent of the Cuban sugar crop was grown by these small “colonos” (the name given to sugar planters), who numbered well over 65,000 and represented the most powerful and best organized agricultural nucleus in America.

The Association of Sugar Planters (Asociación de Colonos) which was organized in 1934, was finally dissolved by Fidel Castro in 1961, in complete negation of his promises to the Cuban farmer.

In the cattle industry, small cattlemen totaled 60,000; and equally large figures were present in the cultivation of tobacco, coffee, fruits and vegetables, rice and other grains, the Cuban agricultural classes in general.

It is because these people occupied their land, and because they had free use of it to pass it on to their children or to sell it, that a country with 6½ million people was able to export more than \$700 million worth of agricultural products each year. The incentive, the free enterprise, and the profits were there.

The Cuban agricultural class had prospered under the system; but they wished to have legal ownership of the land, as well as titular ownership. Under no circumstances did they ever believe that the road that led to their goal could be the abolition of private enterprise or of the agricultural associations; and the installation of a Communist collectivization of the land.

That master of deceit, Fidel Castro, duped the Cuban farmer and peasant, using, for the gigantic swindle, a system of “cooperatives,” reduced the Cuban agricultural class to simple, salaried peons, modern serfs, in the largest latifundium ever to smother Cuba: the Communist state. The right of permanence enjoyed by the man of the soil disappeared; and, with it, his right to own and work land.

---

### PART III—FEBRUARY 10, 1962

To understand the atrocity of the Cuban Communist “agrarian reform” program, one must realize that never, at any time, did the outlaw government pretend to abide by the provisions of their own law.

The agrarian reform law, which became effective on May 17, 1959, was, in itself an arbitrary document. It had been prepared, without consultation of any sort, by persons eminently disqualified to tamper with the problems of the Cuban agricultural and cattle industry. No groups or agricultural organizations of any kind were allowed to have the slightest say in the matter; and, indeed, they did not learn of the enormity committed against them and the country until the law was published in the Official Gazette of the Government.

Even if the original provisions of the law had been strictly adhered to, the result would still have been the total dislocation and ruin of the cattle, sugar, tobacco, and coffee industries of the island. People who showed well-founded concern then, would later find out that the law would be completely ignored by the very men who wrote it and the system which imposed it.

Fidel Castro, a campus radical, a pseudolawyer who has never tried a case in his life, tried to make it appear that he was one of the main architects of the law. In those days, in Cuba, Castro had to appear as the ultimate in every field of human knowledge. The law was actually conceived and prepared by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Communist intellectual leader of the party; Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, of the Argentine and international communism, who as a bad doctor was a worse economist, had been in Cuba for exactly 2 years and 4 months, and knew little about the country and its problems; and Segundo Ceballos, again of the Communist intelligentsia.

That they took immense pains and consulted other prominent Communist leaders to add, delete, and change provisions, demonstrated their utter cynicism and contempt for the Cuban people. Remember that *not one* of these men seriously considered applying the articles of the law, unless it was necessary to complement their plans for the communization of the country. The fraud was immense;

and the Cuban people, delighted with the prospect of getting something for nothing, greedily ate the Communist candy, only to find out too late they had been fed poison.

From the very beginning, the gangsters that rule Cuba ignored the law and its articles. Article 5, which called for the expropriation and distribution of land, stated specifically that the first to be distributed would be lands belonging to the state. This would be followed by the expropriation and distribution of lands that were not being cultivated or were poorly cultivated; and then the rest of Cuban land would be expropriated and distributed.

It simply never happened that way. The state did not yield a single inch of land; uncultivated or poorly cultivated land was ignored; but the richest, best cultivated land in Cuba was promptly seized by the Government.

Although land was the thing in question, the law did not call for the confiscation of private homes, personal clothing and effects, furniture, television and radio sets, automobiles and farm machines, in short, anything that the hoodlums in uniform could get their hands on, *at the point of a gun*.

In the case of small landowners, not even a receipt was tendered. They were physically routed out of their homes and their ranches. Many in exile and in Cuba today do not have a single document to show that they once owned land, or that it has been expropriated by the Government. The Communist propaganda trumpets blared forth and a few thousand acres of land were given to peasants, who received meaningless, importantly sealed and beribboned documents which gave them title to the land. These poor dupes soon found out that they could not dispose of the land in any way; and that the Government ordered what crops should be grown and what profits they might obtain therefrom. Eventually, they were forced to join the Cuban Communist kolkhoz system (idyllically called cooperatives) and became simple slaves of the all-powerful State.

The Government also announced that, since it lacked the cash to pay for confiscated land, it would issue agrarian reform long-term, low-interest bonds to compensate for the seizures. That it never had the slightest intention of paying for the theft of an entire country, is evidenced by the fact that those bonds have still to be printed.

The system of cooperatives (communes) was soon reorganized and named "Granjas del Pueblo" (people's farms), controlled by the Communists with an iron hand. The small peasant farmer was forced to join these farms, buy exclusively at the people's stores, work longer hours for less pay, and eventually submit to the payment of part or all of his salary in scrip, redeemable only at the people's stores.

The attack on private enterprise was two-pronged. With the people's farms enjoying preferential treatment in government-seized markets, and selling their products at prices dictated by the government, the independent farmers soon found out they were being undersold and discriminated against in markets that were no longer open to normal price variations caused by supply and demand. The government was squeezing the small, independent peasant farmer, who could not stand the ever-growing pressure. Sooner or later, if he wished to survive—survive physically—he would be forced to join the people's farms.

The small grocer and tradesman was also being pushed to the wall, as his former clients were now forced to buy at the government's people's stores. A vise had been clamped on private enterprise in the rural regions of Cuba that would lead to the systematic destruction of Cuban agricultural production and the death of its once thriving cattle industry.

To give you a better idea of the gravity of the agrarian problem that confronts Cuba today, next week, we shall give you a summary of the conditions which reigned in this field before Red puppet Castro and his Communist masters brought desolation, hunger, misery and terror to the once prosperous and happy people of Cuba, and the situation as it stands today.

---

#### PART IV—FEBRUARY 17, 1962

To the foreigner, the name Cuba has always been synonymous with "sugar, rum, and tobacco." Cuba produced enormous quantities of sugar, rum is made from sugarcane; and Cuban cigars are known the world over.

Nevertheless, the island enjoyed the benefits of a very considerable cattle industry which, utilizing the latest methods of breeding and increasing pasture lands, had brought beef within the budget of rich and poor. The Cuban had become a great meat eater. Rice, a staple in the Cuban diet, was being grown

in several parts of the island, with production increasing yearly, and experimentation carried out for the cultivation of brands peculiarly suited to climatic conditions.

The Cuban vegetable and fruit industries had progressed to the extent where Florida markets were absorbing both products from Cuba; so much, so, that Florida growers were becoming concerned with the inroads made by lower priced Cuban fruits and vegetables.

The dislocation and destruction of these once-thriving industries began immediately after Fidel Castro and his outlaws gained power on January 1, 1959. Wanton destruction, incompetence, ignorance, bad management, and supreme contempt for the application of modern methods of production were responsible for the immediately noticeable effects in these industries, particularly the cattle industry, which even in 1959 had been turned back 25 years.

Sugar: The first sugar crop under the Communist regime of Cuba was exclusively the product of private enterprise. Spring plantings in 1957 and 1958, plus perennially producing lands provided the sugarcane for the crop of 1959. Fields had been fertilized and planted for the 1960 crop by the people who were soon to be despoiled of their rightful property.

These sugarcane fields included not only the lands belonging to the sugar mills, but also those cultivated by the small sugar planters (colonos), who numbered upwards of 65,000.

After Fidel Castro settled the labor disputes, taming the power of the sugar workers' union, cane was cut and ground to produce a total of 5,788,000 Spanish long tons for 1959. This was a restricted crop, produced under the quota system assigned by the Government, in accordance with international sugar agreements.

When the Communists sprang their so-called agrarian reform on the unsuspecting sugar people in May 1959, the crop had already been gathered. This meant that, by 1960, all Cuban sugar mills would be grinding their last sugarcane before they became the property of the state, which inherited a total of some 108,000 cabs (approximately 3,564,000 acres) of lands which had been held in reserve for the 1960, plus the usual enormous acreage of other cane lands.

The 1960 crop, again produced under the international system of restricted planting, totaled 5,689,000 Spanish long tons, with Cuban sugars still finding entry into the United States under that country's quota system until July of 1960.

The crop, harvested during the first 4 months of 1960, was milled normally, still under private enterprise, although many controls had been clamped on by the Government for its eventual takeover of the entire industry.

There was a slight tendency of the salaries of sugar workers to go down, but not appreciably, for the industry still enjoyed the benefits of a higher price in the American market.

The picture changed completely in 1961. On October 14, 1960, the Communist government of Cuba seized those sugar mills which still remained in private hands (many had been confiscated during 1959 and 1960 for various vague reasons); and it also seized the vast sugar lands that belonged to the mills and the large sugar planters.

The provisions of the agrarian reform law, and the contemptuous manner by which they had been ignored by the Government, gave the sugar people a warning of things to come. The industry did not bother with new plantings or with expensive fertilizers. What for? The land would pass out of its hands within the next few months. Let the Government take care of its own.

The reserves which had been carefully tended would last through the 1961 crop, but no further. And it was that 1961 crop that was crucial to the Government. All-out, unrestricted sugar production was ordered; reserves were eaten up, and an enormous production of 6,576,386 Spanish long tons was harvested and ground last year.

The Government encouraged the production of this huge amount of sugar for two reasons: (1) it had to accumulate great stocks of raw sugar to pay for armaments and oil shipments from the Communist bloc, extremely important items for the consolidation of the regime, and for the total subjection of the people; (2) the Communists had to prove to the people of the island that under their system more sugar could be produced than under private enterprise in 1959 or 1960.

The effort had to be shored by the use of inexperienced men and women, who were forced to cut cane in the sugar fields on Sundays, and were given the name of "volunteers" by the Government propaganda mills. Reserves were eaten

up by this mammoth drive for more sugar; and the inexperienced cutters ruined field after field of sugarcane for future growth by their ignorance of proper cutting procedures.

The results of such irresponsible overproduction are being felt this year. Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, the Communist minister of production, admitted recently on television that Cuba could expect a considerable decrease in sugar production for 1962. Ruined fields and exhausted reserves have left their mark for this year and for the future. That, and lack of proper care for sugarcane fields by people who are totally ignorant of technical agricultural methods. Fertilizers from behind the Iron Curtain have proved to be inadequate for the needs of the Cuban soil. The 1961 crop has not been entirely sold, with warehouses still bulging with well over 1½ million tons of last year's sugars.

Irresponsible, uncontrolled production in 1961 has sent prices lower on the world market; and sugar workers refuse to work long hours for starvation wages, paid in government scrip. Total production for 1962 is estimated at 4,500,000 Spanish long tons, a deficit of nearly 2 million tons from last year's crop, although some believe that the deficit may be slightly less.

Bad management, ignorance, incompetence, the ruthless Soviet plunder of the land and its people, Communist use of the Cuban crop to manipulate sugar politically on the world markets, and the stubborn refusal of the Cuban planter and peasant to become the slave of the vicious system have all contributed to the tremendous drop in production. The year 1962 will be bad enough. The year 1963 may well turn out to be near fatal to an industry created by private enterprise and destroyed by communism.

---

#### PART V—FEBRUARY 24, 1962

The Communists wasted no time in wrecking the prosperous cattle industry of Cuba. By mid-1959, one cattleman estimated that the advances made by private enterprise in cattle breeding had been turned back 25 years by the incompetence, ignorance, and stupidity of the Communists in the Government.

At the end of the 1958, the Cuban cattle industry had more than 6 million heads of bovine cattle. Its superb quality permitted its entry into many international expositions. Venezuelan cattlemen went to Cuba to buy cattle, to improve their herds. Infinite patience, long-range planning, careful breeding, adequate pasture, and effective control of cattle diseases had built up something the island could be proud of.

The Cuban people could afford to eat meat regularly. The industry was protected by a Government law which forbade the sale of veal; and permitted only lamb and pork (no beef) to be served in public restaurants on Fridays. Annual per capita consumption of beef stood at 72 pounds, one of the highest dietary ratios in the Americas.

Then came Castro and chaos. Herds were indiscriminately decimated. Prize breeding bulls were chopped up for steaks. Cattle ranches were broken up by the "agrarian reform"; and the hard work of 25 years was destroyed within a few months. By the end of 1959, the cattle industry was in a bad way; and by December of 1960, people were finding it extremely difficult to find meat for their tables. Today meat is strictly rationed in Cuba; and annual per capita consumption fell from 72 pounds in 1958 to 12 pounds in 1961.

Meat rationing does not necessarily mean that it is available. Cubans recently arrived in Miami reported that they had not tasted beef for weeks. Pork and chicken, once plentiful, are also very difficult to obtain. Eggs are precious trophies; and milk is available in limited quantities for children only—if and when available.

When the first production meeting was held in Havana by the Communist government in August 1961, the speeches of the delegates of confiscated industries revealed the magnitude of the resounding failure of Communist methods in agriculture and cattle. Delegates all claimed that production had not decreased. Increased consumption, due to the higher purchasing power of the people, was the cause of the shortages in beef, pork, chicken, eggs, dairy products, vegetables, and fruits. That was the official explanation.

The broken record of this outright lie is disproved by the fact that the wages of sugarworkers, which constitute a substantial part of the income of the Cuban working classes, went down considerably early in 1961. The statement can be confirmed by data found in Circulars Nos. 3 and 79 of the General Management of Sugar Mills of the Agrarian Reform Institute (Administración General de Ingenios del INRA). Further, a great number of industries and businesses

stopped paying their personnel when lack of raw materials forced them to halt operations; and the Cuban forced exchange of currency within the country last year retired enormous sums of the devaluated currency in circulation.

The rice industry went the way of the sugar, cattle, pork, dairy, and poultry industries. In 1958, Cuba produced roughly 50 percent of her annual consumption of 400,000 tons of the grain. Rice farms were confiscated in the summer of 1959; and, immediately, the crass blunders of incompetence and ignorance resulted in lower production.

On a personal whim, Fidel Castro decided that the Zapata Swamps were ideal places for growing rice. The project ended in total disaster, after millions had been pumped into the fiasco to humor the fantastic notion of the maximum leader. Rice, as an important staple in the Cuban diet, has faded from the national picture; and the Government has been forced to import limited quantities of inferior rice from Communist China.

And what happened to the enormous truck garden industry of Cuba? A land that once gave forth all manner of vegetables and tubers has felt the blight of the Red hand of Communist failure. In 1959, Castro jokingly proposed that, if everything else failed, the Cuban would always have "malanga" to eat—a popular tuber which grew so profusely that it was used for feeding hogs. Today there are no vegetables and no tubers—not even the common "malanga." The INRA Chief of Production was forced to admit that this most humble of tubers was missing from the Cuban diet (reported in *Revolución*, August 28, 1961, issue).

Even coffee, that incomparable Cuban coffee, is scarce on the island. Production of the 1959-60 crop totaled 1,200,000 bags of 100 pounds. The Communist plague sent production skidding to 60 percent of that figure in 2 short years.

The people of Cuba are suffering today the identical fate that is reserved for those who live under communism: an ever-present shortage of basic foods, coupled with a constant daily struggle to obtain what little there is available.

Mismanagement, incompetence, and stupidity have their place in this dismal picture. But the Communists are also aware of the fact that a population kept at a bare subsistence level lacks the necessary stamina, the drive and energy that are imperative to give it the will to rebel against the evil that rules it. Hunger is a major political weapon of the Communists; and it is being diabolically employed to subjugate the Cuban people.

The peoples of Latin America would do well to look at the Cuban picture of scarcity and hunger. It never existed under private enterprise. It always exists under communism.

(NOTE.—Data and statistics obtained from the Cuban National Association of Agricultural and Sugar Engineers in exile (Colegio Nacional de Ingenieros Agrónomos y Azucareros).)

---

#### CUBAN COMMUNIST TACTICS: THE DESTRUCTION OF ORGANIZED LABOR

PART I—DECEMBER 23, 1961

The smothering blanket of Cuban Communist propaganda, which was thrown over the entire island and the whole world in January of 1959, was designed to convince people in and out of Cuba that the workingman had been the victim of all manner of abuses during the Batista regime, and even prior to that.

It was the intention of the Cuban Communists to give the impression that at no time in Cuban history had labor enjoyed any protection from social legislation. Not only did the Batista regime, but the 1940 Constitution of Cuba come under direct assault. Denounce and discredit, the usual Communist attack practices, became the order of the day.

A short summary of Cuban labor rights under the Cuban Constitution of 1940 dispels all ideas about "repression" of the workingman. It must be remembered, that although Batista suspended certain civil guarantees offered to citizens under the Constitution, *never, at any time*, did he tamper with the protection afforded to labor under its articles. Labor laws were strictly enforced by the Cuban courts, as can be testified by the many labor organizations today in exile.

The constitution of 1940 said unequivocally that work is an inalienable right of the individual; and that the state will employ its resources to provide occupation to all who lack it, and will assure to all manual or intellectual workers the economic conditions necessary for a dignified living wage.

All workers were guaranteed a minimum salary or wage, which was determined according to the conditions prevailing in each region, and the normal

necessities of the worker in the material, moral, and cultural order, considering him as the head of a family.

Minimum wages in Cuba were strictly enforced. Sugarworkers were further protected by a rise in salaries and wages proportional to the rise in the average export price of sugar during the crop. They were further guaranteed a bonus at the end of each sugar crop, which was paid religiously, and strictly enforced by law. The Constitution further created commissions with equal representation from management and labor to regulate salaries periodically.

Those working at the same job, under identical conditions, were guaranteed equal salaries; and all discounts from salaries not authorized by law were strictly forbidden. No wages or salaries could be paid in scrip or similar substitute money—something which has been conveniently forgotten by the Communist Cuban dictatorship.

Working hours were also regulated by the Constitution, with the maximum decreed at 8 hours daily and 44 hours weekly. Cuban workers and employees all enjoyed a *full month's vacation a year, with pay.*

In the union field, the Constitution established the right to form free unions, the right to strike, the validity of collective bargaining; and, most important, and management's bone of contention: no worker or employee could be dismissed without legitimate reason. Management was obliged to go to the courts of the land, with a complete legal brief of the case, before it could dismiss an employee. Further, if the courts did not find sufficient reason for dismissal, the employee was reinstated and paid his full salary during the time that the case was being decided.

The Constitution also foresaw the moving of factories and shops to other locations, and ordered that working conditions under the new circumstances be maintained at the same high levels.

All conflicts and problems arising from relations between management and labor had to be submitted to a conciliatory commission, made up of an equal number of representatives from both factions. Social security was paid by employer and employee, with each union keeping strict control of retirement funds, under Government inspection and supervision.

This impressive list of labor rights under the Constitution protected the Cuban workingman for 18 years, with the enactment of laws which were strictly enforced. They provided Cuban labor with an enviable status in the hemisphere, not only in the field of wages (which were incredibly high in comparison with other Latin American countries), but also by affording a very high standard of living, which enabled the workingman to buy foods and creature comforts totally out of reach to his neighbors to the South.

The powerful Cuban Confederation of Labor (CTC) watched zealously over the rights of its members, provided eminent legal talent to protect them in the courts and demanded the enforcement of the laws which gave Cubans the soundest, most advanced social legislation of all the Americas. Individual or collective conflicts were decided ultimately by the court of constitutional guarantees, which usually leaned over backwards to favor labor.

This, then, was the protection which the Cuban Constitution of 1940, Cuban laws and Cuban courts afforded to labor and its rights. The deference shown to labor at times brought protests from management, which complained that certain laws were interpreted solely in favor of that faction.

The rise of a strong middle class in Cuba, and the continued prosperity of the country before Fidel Castro were partly made possible by the salary raises, the tight legislation controlling any managerial abuses, and the general satisfaction of worker and employee with their conditions of work.

Unions grew so rich that the Hotel Workers' Union was able to build and own the huge Hilton Hotel. Other unions enjoyed the benefits of bulging, retirement funds. What deprivations there were, came from a few, unscrupulous union leaders, not from management.

This equitable system of protection for labor was the very first thing that the Communists began to destroy. In order to do that, it was necessary to make labor believe that its rights did not exist or were being denied; it was necessary to blame management for these imaginary wrongs; and it was necessary to obtain iron control over the labor unions.

The program began immediately, in January of 1959. Not a moment was to be lost. The Cuban worker and the Cuban employee must be deceived, trapped, and enslaved before they had an opportunity to realize what was happening. In this, the Communists succeeded beyond their wildest dreams.

## PART II—DECEMBER 30, 1961

The student of the Cuban Communist revolution must always keep one thing in mind: Cuban labor had little or nothing to do with the rise of Fidel Castro and his Communist masters to power.

Indeed, when a general strike was ordered on April 9, 1958, there was only a mild flutter of excitement in Havana, a gas main exploded in the Prado, and a hardware store which sold arms was raided. Nothing else. Labor did not respond to the call.

In retrospect, this is not surprising. Communists have always taken power by the use of a small, determined, aggressive minority. The conflict in Cuba was considered by all to be a political struggle, with no ideological or social changes contemplated. It was simply a fight between two factions to see who would rule Cuba. That is the way that the totality of the Cuban people regarded the Batista-Castro struggle.

Labor was enjoying a period of unheard of prosperity; and it was merely annoyed and exasperated by a rebellion which was beginning to make inroads into Cuban production, into the tourist trade, and into the general prosperity and well-being of the island. The general sentiment favored Castro; but certainly not to the extent where a whole people were going to respond with a general strike or by taking up arms collectively.

The failure of the general strike in April 1958 demonstrated that the Communists did not have sufficient power to mobilize labor in a cause which they had already embraced as their own. Again, whatever power they did possess, they did not dare parade before they had installed men in key posts after Castro's victory.

Labor did respond to a call for a general strike, on January 2, 1961, after Batista had left the country. In a burst of new-found revolutionary fervor, the workingman stopped all activity in Cuba, when Fidel Castro personally ordered a general strike to insure that Colonel Barquin and other anti-Batista officers in Havana would not receive a smell of power; and that he could enter triumphantly in Havana on January 7.

Then labor was allowed to run riot. We recall one sign that read: "Descanso ahora, revolución después." (Rest now, revolution later.) This sign typified the new government's intention to allow labor to enter into a period of exorbitant demands; demands which the Government knew perfectly well could not be met by management.

The first assault on private enterprise came in the form of a law which forced small and big companies and individuals to rehire men who had been "dismissed" during the 7 years of the Batista regime for "political reasons." Big and little business was not only obliged to replace these men in their jobs, but also was forced to pay them *7 years' back salary*. To a small company or individual, with smaller cash reserves, it was a near mortal blow. To big enterprises, which had many employees and, therefore, with dismissals and voluntary departures proportionately larger, the blow was intolerable.

This massive penalization of private enterprise was finely calculated to convince labor that the Batista regime had ignored the laws which protected them; and that management had taken advantage of the situation to fire personnel indiscriminately. In truth, the Government winked at the "political reasons" clause of the law; and every man jack who had left a company, for any reason whatsoever, promptly showed up to collect 7 years' backpay. This included men who had left their place of employment to proceed to better jobs; men who had been dismissed for embezzlement and thievery; and men who had simply quit their jobs for personal reasons.

Suddenly, the whole country sprouted with people clamoring for 7 years' backpay. In most cases, they simply took a short vacation from their employment at the time; went to the company they had worked for to collect 7 full years of pay; and promptly went back to their present jobs.

It was a psychological and monetary club. The mood of the Cuban people brooked no arguments with new "revolutionary" legislation; and management meekly complied, their first surrender against what was to become their total defeat and extinction.

Still, the mounting demands of labor brought such anguished protests from management, particularly in the sugar industry, where, had these pretensions been granted, they would have bankrupted the entire industry. The Communists were still not strong enough to nationalize the sugar mills; and the sugarworkers had to be placated or bulldozed; for they were determined to strike to obtain their demands.

Fidel Castro did just that. The maximum leader was not amused with the turn that the situation had taken. A runaway labor movement was the last thing that the Communists wished then or at any time. Labor must be cajoled, but it must also be disciplined; and Castro still rankled at the failure of the worker to take any active part in his revolution. The situation was not without humor; and many Cubans were eager to see the manner in which Frankenstein would placate the monster he had set in motion.

Here the oratorical genius and the fine art of duplicity of Fidel Castro were employed to the full. On February 10, 1959, he cast his spell over an assembly of the CTC (Cuban Confederation of Workers). His first words were calculated to bring the audience under his control.

Castro stood up, faced a sea of silent, expectant faces, and said, "I would first ask a question of the workers; and that is whether they want me to heap praise upon them, or if they want me to tell them what really is of importance to the working class, the Cuban revolution, and country." He spoke of the agrarian reform, of the revolution, of the need for better conditions for the worker, of the sad political inheritance of the country, etc., ad infinitum. And finally he silenced the group for good saying, "Strikes are a formidable weapon; but *we must not make use of that weapon now* because we would not have any sugar crop. *Next year will be different.* I cannot speak to you more clearly. I ask the people to support three watchwords first, there will be a sugar crop. *No one will interrupt the crop.* Everyone will help the crop. Second, use national products; and third, we must have agrarian reform."

That ended his speech, and the volley of demands, protests, and accusations that preceded his words that night. He had labor in his pocket. He intended to keep it there.

He appealed to the patriotism of labor; he injected a note of nationalism into its purchasing habits; and he promised that open-sesame of the Communists: agrarian reform. But he had successfully silenced demands and all threats of strikes. Indeed, he had set the pattern that was to rule from that moment: the right to strike, whether the workers knew it or not, had gone out the window. Castro had recruited labor to work for his revolution. Forget management, he said in effect, we'll deal with them after the 1959 sugar crop—which he did indeed.

With labor demands and threats to strike permanently disposed of, the next step was to place faithful Communists in positions of power in the labor unions. This was done more easily than most people could imagine.

The infiltrators sometimes appeared in the "heroic" olive green of the 26th of July Movement. Known Communists, say in Havana, were sent to infiltrate in Santiago de Cuba, where their faces would not be familiar. Others rode into key positions in labor with the powerful support of people like Raul Castro, who did not have much trouble in imposing his creatures on the unsuspecting unions.

Like all processes of infiltration, it was a slow and cautious approach. No labor elections had been held as yet; and the Reds did not dare show their hand openly until they had gained sufficient strength in the government and in the unions.

The machinations of Castro and his people did not go totally unnoticed. On February 5, before Castro's speech to the CTC, Carlos Todd said in the Times of Havana, "Too little attention has been paid by the government to a situation that is becoming increasingly serious. Many Communists have infiltrated the 26th of July Movement, posing as true revolutionaries and patriots, while taking orders from (Juan) Marinello, Blas Roca, and that other fellow, the man who has disappeared from the public scene since he landed in Havana the first week of January (1959): Lázaro Peña." Nobody listened and nobody believed.

Peña today is head of the Communist CTC; Blas Roca runs Cuba, following instructions from Moscow, with an able assist from Juan Marinello.

---

#### PART III—JANUARY 6, 1962

In May of 1959, Fidel Castro, in one of his mile-long speeches, had some interesting words to say that indirectly dealt with the situation within the CTC (Cuban Confederation of Labor).

It was at this time that special emphasis on Communist propaganda which opposed elections was being frantically disseminated among the people; and

mobs that gathered obediently to hear the Maximum Leader in the public square were conditioned to chant "Elecciones, para qué?"—roughly translated to: "Who wants elections, anyway?" Castro conveniently convinced himself that it was not he, but the mob, who inspirationally decided to roar their approval of something that had never occurred to them before; but that they suddenly thought up in a spontaneous combustion of public thought. People suddenly had the bright idea that the right to vote should be surrendered, with a little assist and outside pressure.

The situation in the labor unions was entirely different. Here, elections were demanded by practically everybody; and the Government went ahead confidently, certain that its little boys Red would win a stunning victory.

In another burst of rhetoric, Castro made the statement that, in his opinion, there was no "ambiente" (atmosphere) at the moment for the formation of political parties. He said textually, in that May of 1959 speech, "\* \* \* it is a truth that in Cuba political parties do not exist."

Fidel Castro nicely overlooked the fact that one political party in Cuba did exist and was very much alive: the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), *the official Communist Party of Cuba*, which was the *only political party* to arise from the ashes of the downfall of Batista. All other parties were unofficially proscribed; and none dared show their faces publicly.

The labor union elections incontrovertibly proved two things: that unions were not merely unions per se, but important segments of political parties, indeed powerful branches of those political parties; and that those two political parties were the 26th of July Movement (officially not termed a party) and the PSP.

These two political elements were, for the moment, at war with each other for the control of key posts in the CTC. In truth, there were no political parties *outside of the labor unions*. Castro's horizon of the moment was bounded on the one side by the 26th of July Movement and on the other by the PSP.

Those first elections held in the CTC, to determine who would be the leaders of all the unions in Cuba, were an extremely rude shock to the Communists. Where they had expected a runaway victory and early control of Cuban labor, nothing of the sort happened. In almost every case, a 26th of July Movement candidate won an overwhelming majority over the Communist candidate. Here was proof positive that Cuban labor was not willing to go along with the Communists. The repudiation was total and instant. Here, indeed, was self-determination of the kind that was to be so assiduously ignored by the Cuban Communists and the entire hemisphere in the future.

The stunning impact of the CTC elections of 1959 left only one course of action open to the Communists: the unions must be coerced, intimidated, and forced to accept Communist leadership. This was accomplished with speed and dispatch, for there was no time to lose.

It began with small protests, which soon grew to a strident clamor from the Communist minority in the unions, which protested the procedure of elections in many labor organizations. Where it was impossible to prove that any such collusion had taken place—and this was in every single case—force, the final and inevitable resort of the Communists, was employed.

It is our intention to show exactly how a small, organized, determined and aggressive Communist minority could and did take over a union. It must be taken into consideration that, at all times, these small Red groups had at their disposal the persuasive powers of armed goon squads, ably backed, if necessary, by uniformed "heroes" of the 26th of July Movement, Communists, who operated under the guise of a revolution that had ostensibly been fought to give freedom to the Cuban people.

The combination of armed men within the union and Communists in the ranks of the 26th of July people, proved to be too much for the average worker, who was easily intimidated and bullied into accepting the mandates of his Red masters in the Government. Many unions went down fighting valiantly; but all, in the end, succumbed to the Communist assault.

## PART IV—JANUARY 13, 1962

## HOW TO OBTAIN CONTROL OF A LABOR UNION

The more curious, among people who have not lived in a Communist country, are intrigued by the actual methods by which the Reds obtain control of a union, a university, a military organization—anything.

You hear the terms "infiltration," "seizure of key posts," "intimidation," etc.; but, unless you have witnessed this terrifying process, those terms still remain meaningless phrases, inevitably followed by the incantation, "It can't happen here." It might and it can, because it can take place anywhere if people are not alerted to the typical—and so far successful—Communist pattern for conquest.

A glaring example of Communist tactics in obtaining control of a union took place in Havana in December of 1959, when it was decided that the time had come to take over the artists union (ACAT) made up of theater, movie, TV, and other types of entertainers and artists.

At Havana's Teatro Marti a tumultuous assembly of ACAT members gathered to discuss serious business at hand, at a meeting where the enormous majority of the members backed their president, Manolo Fernández.

The reason for the assembly was the series of savage attacks made in the Government-owned press (in December 1959 quite a few newspapers in Cuba had already been appropriated by the Government), and by members of the inner sanctum of the CTC (Cuban Confederation of Labor), all faithful party followers.

The intention was to discredit Fernández, who, as president of the ACAT, refused to join the Communist faction already in control of the nerve center of the CTC.

Pictures of Fernández appeared in the press, with some of Batista's very minor officials, all intended to prove that he had been a fervent "Batistiano," which was still the term of opprobrium, until "counterrevolutionary" became a la mode.

Fernández had to go, obviously, and Communist agitation finally demanded that an assembly be held to discuss his right to the presidency of the ACAT. Since he had an overwhelming majority on his side, this was instantly agreed upon, with the greater part of the members confident of a victory for their side.

At that assembly, a man by the name of Jesús Soto—who was later to supplant David Salvador as head of the CTC—a Communist, and leader of the textile workers' union (to this day no one knows how a textile leader could have a voice in an artists' assembly), excoriated Manolo Fernández from the stage of the theater where the meeting was held. Adding his voice to Soto's, Salvador threatened to expel the ACAT from the parent body if Fernández remained as president of the artists' union.

Fernández had been elected to the presidency of the ACAT early in 1959, with the beaming approval of the CTC bigwigs, and by a very large majority of ACAT members. Nothing was said at that time about his being a "Batistiano"; no accusations were hurled at the popular artist; no meddlesome textile man took the podium against him. When the attacks did come, he was defended in the newspapers that were still independent, on the radio and on TV, with the same intensity with which he was attacked.

But at the December 1959 assembly, Fernández succumbed to the oldest dodge in the world. Rather than have the union leave the parent CTC, he resigned. He resigned even though, throughout that stormy meeting, his supporters and friends, who made up the overwhelming majority of those present, backed him up. Today, some say that he resigned on purpose and under Communist orders. No one can say for certain at this moment.

The second great error came immediately after the resignation of Fernández. Nearly 300 people attended the assembly. When Fernández walked out, his supporters went with him, leaving behind a near empty hall, with a bare 40



members of the ACAT. This was compounding idiocy. The moment the president and the majority of the artists walked out, Jesús Soto, the textile union man, and his small group of Communists, won the first and vital victory that was to hand the ACAT over to the Reds. Salvador, head of the CTC, was neatly trapped, for he could not defer to the ACAT people, but must perforce have the senior councils of the CTC prevail over the "rebellious" artists' union.

Had Fernández stuck to his guns, and had his supporters, the overwhelming majority, fought for their rights, his disgraceful ouster may have been prevented, and other unions might have imitated a courageous example. Enormous pressure must have been brought to bear on Fernández to force him to turn his back on the very people that had wanted him to remain in office.

To make matters worse, Fernández irrevocably precluded any petition of recall when he took asylum in a foreign embassy, thus giving his enemies the opportunity to heap further insult and calumny on him. With the artists' union adrift, without a leader, without a purpose, the ax inevitably fell on its disorganized members.

In the first week of January 1960, Violeta Casals, a woman who made no secret of her adoration for Fidel Castro, and her Communist ties, who had opposed Fernández, and had the convenience of enjoying power and prestige in high Government circles, did what a little courage and intelligence should have done at the December assembly.

Another assembly was held now, this time on the third floor of an old house on Lagunas and Perseverancia Streets in old Havana, which housed the offices of the ACAT. Strange to relate, Violeta Casals, the Red firebrand, was elected hands down to the presidency of the union by less than 40 members who had assembled in the old house. How this number became a quorum for a union which had hundreds of members was not discussed.

The actress was elected to the presidency for a period of 90 days, during which the ACAT would be "readjusted and reorganized." Violeta Casals promptly accepted the resignation of the executive committee who had worked with Fernández, thus eliminating these potential troublemakers from any post of importance within the union.

Instantly, a new "revolutionary" executive committee was appointed, all of them men and women who were outright Communists, or who would do exactly as they were told, and never deviate from the ukases handed down by Jesús Soto and company.

The same old story was repeated again: a small, determined, aggressive minority, using defamation, coercion, and intimidation, ignoring the will of the majority, once again prevailed in the union battle.

Naturally, some reaction was to be expected from the majority of artists and entertainers for this insolent trammeling of their union rights. This possibility was also neatly taken care of by La Casals, who announced that during her tenure of office, "90 days"—she is still there—the ACAT would undertake a "revision" of the membership cards issued in the past. The "revision," said Miss Casals, "would eliminate those artists who had no right to membership in the union," alleging that they were not "true artists" (i.e., faithful sheep).

"That is why," Violeta Casals stated, "I want that, within the class, only true artists remain, and that our society also revise many of the articles in the statutes which today are practically worn out in relation with the historic moment that our republic is living." Amen.

There it is, neatly, in a nutshell. If you were a member of the ACAT, you had better behave and vote right if you expected to receive a *new* union card, something indispensable to make a living at the profession. That some of these procedures were against the statutes? Simple. The statutes were changed to conform with the procedures.

Why, you will ask, did not the majority of ACAT members rebel at this incredible imposition by a small group of 40 members? Violeta Casals had been in the Sierra Maestra with Castro during the rebellion. She had the ear of the bearded dictator and of his venomous little brother, Raúl. She had the powerful backing of Jesús Soto and his labor goon squads. She wore the uniform of the 26th of July Movement. It was a formidable combination, which no one dared to oppose.

The ACAT, early in 1960, was firmly in the hands of the Communists, as were countless other unions. The procedure never varied in this plan of conquest: Defame and discredit the legitimate union leaders, coerce and intimidate the majority of the members, install a Communist president and executive committee by trickery, by duplicity, and, if necessary, by force. Quite simple really.

## PART V—JANUARY 20, 1962

## THE FINAL BLOW

In 1959, the Cuban Confederation of Labor (CTC) resolved not to strike for a period of 6 months. In 1960, at the end of those 6 months, the stalwart labor leaders—by this time completely under the control of the Communists—again resolved not to strike, with no definite period of time being mentioned in the resolution. Thus, early in 1960, the right to strike was stricken from the list of the prerogatives of labor; and was never again to be invoked.

However, the Government wanted labor exactly where it could control it with an iron hand. It must be borne in mind that before October 14, 1960, the majority of the major industries in the island had still not felt the throttling hand of confiscation. Many were "intervened"; i.e., were operating technically as privately owned, but under the complete control of an "interventor," or Government overseer, whose very word was law.

In one of the most astute moves ever played by the Communists in this deadly game, which culminated in the total subjection of labor, a small, insignificant announcement appeared in the press in the week beginning August 22, 1960, tucked away without headline or identification, in the innermost pages of the newspapers, far from the headlines, and equally distanced from the popular sports pages. It wouldn't do to have the little item publicized.

If people had troubled to read this explosive piece of news, there would have been justifiable alarm in the ranks of Cuban labor. But the Communists rightly estimated that the average workingman didn't get beyond the headlines and the sports pages, and the trap was sprung on an unsuspecting labor force.

It was a diabolical piece of legislation, which set down the rules and regulations which would apply in the future to those who worked in enterprises that were run by the state (i.e. Government workers, and those employed in confiscated industries); those who were employed in any business that had been "intervened," or that was managed jointly by its owners and the state. This, then, did not apply to the majority of Cuban labor. Quite a few, yes; but the majority was not affected by the regulation and there was no public outcry.

Minister of Labor Augusto Martínez Sánchez (he's still in that position), by Resolution No. 16782 of his ministry, issued regulations for "the exercise of commerce, industry, and any other activity of analogous nature." You may appreciate that the preamble covered everything in the way of business and industry.

The resolution stated that "situation and characteristics of each of these industries must be considered, protecting the rights of the workers and the security of production in such a way that the plans for economic development, as planned by the revolutionary government, be carried out for the general benefit of the people." The patient was being fitted with his straitjacket.

The resolution was full of pleasant little surprises. Take the matter of salaries, for example. Workers would be paid "according to the labor contract scale of wages, or as may be decided by the management." Taking into account that the "management" referred to in the resolution was the state, the wage scale was placed entirely at governmental whim.

According to Resolution 16782 of the Ministry of Labor, the fixing of wages would be contingent on "the national and regional level of similar enterprises." In August 1960, this meant those kindred private industries which were still operating in Cuba. After October 14, 1960, it meant something entirely different; for private industry *disappeared altogether from the island.*

The question of profits came up; and the state-owned enterprises are always extremely sensitive to profits, to the extent where wages must always be subordinate to the profits of any business. The resolution next stated that salaries would be fixed "in direct relation to the stability of the enterprises." In other words, if it were found that a business was losing money for any reason, salaries, inevitably, would have to be lowered accordingly.

Naturally, the resolution offered an instant remedy for this ailment: Government subsidies. If it became necessary, due to lack of profits, to hone down the salaries "below the vital minimum," *the state would then decide* whether or not a subsidy would be granted "to the limits that make it possible to allow adequate salaries."

Who decided the question of "adequate salaries"? The workers acting through their union? Certainly not. The Ministry of Labor alone had the power to decide just how much the Cuban worker would earn in state-controlled enter-

prises. Since the managers were, or became, in time, state managers, they would be expected (as they are today) to bring in profits and not complaints. One does not need much imagination to conclude on which side the state managers would be.

The resolution continued saying, "With a view to contributing to the economic development, and to take advantage of the enthusiasm and readiness demonstrated by the workers for the building up of the (national) economy \* \* \* as long as technical conditions permit it, management (i.e., the state) will establish a minimal task or norm in each department where a common task is carried out, which task or norm must be carried out by the workers during each working day." The Stakhanovites arrived in Cuba in August 1960.

This minimal work norm would be decided by a labor contract signed between the workers and the state management; and could only be altered by mutual agreement; and, according to the change in the technical conditions of production, "a system of bonuses may be established to encourage greater and greater production" read the resolution, *all with the approval of the Minister of Labor.*

Each department of the industry or enterprise would present three delegates of the workers to form a technical advisory council composed of men who knew nothing about techniques, advice, or counsel. From these three, the state managers would choose the one *they* deemed most suited for the job. In theory, the council would be consulted by management on all phases of production, the fixing of wage scales, the work norm, and would encourage general discussions. In theory, that is.

"In all cases," Resolution No. 16782 stated, "the management *may or may not* accept the suggestions of the technical advisory council (which therefore had no power whatsoever) which, however, may appeal to higher authorities (the Minister of Labor) for further consideration of their petitions *if* the Minister considers that same are essential to the better operation of the enterprise." Not a single word about any benefits whatsoever for labor.

The last paragraph of the resolution tied all loose ends when it stated that all state-owned enterprises would present, "for consideration by the Ministry of Labor, all projected labor contracts presented by the workers, and in which (contracts) *the conditions of this resolution will be carried out.*"

This resolution became law in August 1960. It was couched in such language that the average worker could not understand the words that became the shackles around his wrists. Some, who read and understood, were still working for private industry, and were certain that the provisions of the resolution would never apply to them. The trap was sprung on October 14, 1960, when the Cuban Communist state seized all major foreign and Cuban industries and commerce.

Every single man and woman in Cuba today works under the conditions imposed by Regulation No. 16782 of the Ministry of Labor. Further, at Government whim, they can be, and are, ordered to work extra hours for no pay at all; they are compelled to work on Sundays in the sugarcane fields; they can be summoned *at any time, to any place, to do any job dictated by the State*; they can be fired at will, without explanation or reason; their salaries have been lowered below that "vital minimum."

Unions have no voice whatsoever through the so-called technical advisory councils, made up of Communists, carefully selected by the Government, to do their bidding in every occasion. Impossible work norms have been imposed; and are certainly not being met.

But this is not all. On November 26, 1960, Augusto Martínez Sánchez, Minister of Labor, had the incredible cheek, the brutal cynicism, and the cruel irony to say, "The Cuban worker was a pariah until the revolution came along; \* \* \* a pariah whose rights were ignored, and who, in many cases, was fired from his job without justification." Today he can be fired for daring to lift his face from the ground.

The crowning touch, the monstrous lie, completed the destruction of organized labor in Communist Cuba.

## APPENDIX II

Translation from the French, from "La Révolution Sensuelle" (The Sensual Revolution) by Victor Franco (Bernard Grasset Editeur, Paris, 1962)

On page 41 of the book, Robert Taber is described as a "public relations man in special charge of journalists," working for the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations.

On pages 43, 44 and 45, Franco gives the following account of a conversation with Taber:

He [Taber] reviewed the "crimes and errors" committed by the United States. "The Yankees have behaved like Chicago gangsters," he said. It's shameful that a big nation should so harry a little people. The United States should never have stopped buying Cuban sugar. For them, it only represents a minimum expense. For the island, it is capital. Here, I'll give you an example. You will understand the disproportion between the means and forces of the two countries. Each year, the amounts used by the Americans to buy beauty products surpass the totality of the Cuban budget."

He [Taber] told me that he was actively collaborating with the newspapers *El Mundo* and *Revolución*. He had just returned from a tour of the Escambray, where the anti-Castroites have guerrilla forces. He showed me a photo of himself in the uniform of a militiaman, with a submachine gun across his chest.

"I spend 2 fantastic weeks," he said. "The militiamen with whom I fought are sensational, courageous, honest, sincere, good revolutionaries. They are not like the ones they face. Those are mercenaries who have sold out to the Yankees! We gave them a good going over."

I asked him a question which came to my lips:

"How is it that you, a citizen of the United States, has become a propagandist for Castro, against your own country?"

"Well," he admitted, "it does seem a little funny [bizarre]. But I know Fidel so well, that I've vowed to give my all for the success of the revolution. His cause is just. He is one of those men devoted to liberty. Where I'm concerned, I consider Cuba my real country. I have struck the United States from my life. What would you have done in my place? The same thing, no?"

Bob Taber lowered his voice and asked, "Why did you leave the *Habana Libre* [Hotel]?"

The question, so suddenly asked, came with the effect of a blow. I invented a reason quickly, which was not the real one.

"It's too expensive," I told him. "Twelve dollars a day!"

"I thought so," Taber said. "I agreed with my friend Merino that I would take care of all your expenses. A suite has been reserved for you at the *Habana Libre*. Go back there this evening or tomorrow morning at the latest. You won't have to spend a cent. All charges will be taken care of by the Ministry of Foreign Relations."

(Taber continues) "No, no, don't get sore. Everybody knows that a young writer has trouble making ends meet. If you will permit me, I want to help you a little during your stay in Cuba. Here's a few hundred pesos for your daily expenses. Yes, yes \* \* \* don't refuse. You must accept. Starting tomorrow, a limousine and chauffeur will be at your entire disposal. You may visit all the cooperatives you wish!"

Since I detest this kind of proposition, I turned pale. I rose quickly and answered curtly.

"Don't get nasty!" he countered. "It's only a matter of helping you to work without worries."

"I didn't come here to ask for money! I merely wish to visit a cooperative! That's all. Just answer me one thing \* \* \* yes or no. Can I visit a cooperative? If not, so much the worse for you."

"Come on, now. Don't get angry. In Cuba, we always help honest writers, the more so when they are young and talented. I've thought of many interesting things for you to do. An exclusive interview with Fidel Castro and with Ché. That's good trick, no? You can attend an execution. Just tomorrow morning two characters will be shot. Do you want me to arrange that? You could take some photographs. Those would bring a good price!"

I caught my breath, hesitating between indignation, contempt, and the desire to burst out laughing. I decided on a fourth solution: "Keep your tricks for others. It's all the same to me!"

He stopped me as I was going down the stairs. "Well, forget our conversation. I have to go by the newspaper *Revolución*. If you have nothing to do I'll take you there."

#### APPENDIX III

[North American Newspaper Alliance articles bylined by Jesse Gordon and Brig. Gen. Hugh Hester (retired)]

##### 1. TELLS OF PERON-CASTRO ACCORD

###### PERON'S HEIR SAYS RUSSIA "NEVER HARMED" ARGENTINA

The authors are the first U.S. correspondents to report from Cuba in many months. As a reporting team, they have contributed to the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Progressive*, and other well-known publications. Mr. Gordon, writing in the liberal magazine, *The Nation*, on November 19, 1960, broke the story on the secret base in Guatemala where the Cuban refugee army was in training. General Hester, now retired, was food administrator in the American zone of Berlin, 1945 to 1947, and is contributing editor to the non-denominational magazine, *The Churchman*.

(By Jesse Gordon and Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Hester (retired), North American Newspaper Alliance)

HAVANA, April 9.—"The Soviet Union never harmed the Argentine nation, diplomatically or economically," Juan Peron's heir apparent told NANA in an exclusive interview here.

The No. 2 man in the Peronista movement is John William Cooke, who has been living here since April 1960.

Cooke is Peron's personal representative not only to Cuba but to all other Latin American countries. He said he is in frequent contact with the ex-dictator who is in exile in Spain.

"Peron has always been a strong supporter of Fidel Castro and supports him now as strongly as ever," Cooke said.

##### NO GRIEVANCES

"Peron is not pro-Soviet," Cooke went on, "but he is against the United States."

He said Peron told him he has no grievances against the Socialist countries and that Peron holds "a third position" in international affairs.

Cooke said Peron is "waiting for the call to return to Argentina," but that he will return only after "a popular triumph of the people."

He said he does not think the times "are favorable for Peron at present" for such a return, nor does he believe a civil war is likely "because the military is too solidly entrenched" and "the people have nothing with which to fight against the military oligarchy now ruling the country."

Cooke explained that Peron is not a Marxist-Leninist or even a Socialist, but a "Nationalist who opposes imperialism." He said the ex-dictator is in touch with Castro and his Argentine-born aid, "Che" Guevara, and is on the best of terms with them "despite ideological differences."

##### BACKED CASTRO IN 1960

Peron, he said, backed Castro in a letter sent in December 1960, to members of the Peronist Party. He said Peron condemned the decisions against Cuba taken at the Punta del Este conference, claiming that "Cuba had the right to choose her own road to liberation from imperialism."

Cooke is an Argentine by birth, despite his Anglo-Saxon name. A former professor of economics at the University of Buenos Aires, he was the leader of the Peronists in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies from 1946 to 1952.

Only 39, Cooke is the leading ideologist of the Peronista movement. "There are many differences among the leaders of the party," he said, "But I am continuing the fight within the party for the true party ideals."

In 1957, 2 years after he fled Argentina, Peron met with Cooke in Venezuela and wrote to party leaders in Argentina naming Cooke as head of the Peronista Party and, in case of Peron's death, his successor.

Previously, in 1955, Cooke had returned to Argentina and was immediately jailed. He escaped in March 1957, to Chile, where he was arrested with five other Peronist leaders. (One of the five, Patrick Kelly, was charged with killing a Communist.) Cooke, disguised as a woman, broke out of jail and made his way to Panama.

#### FRONDIZI-PERON PACT

Cooke said he and another Argentine politician, Rogelio Frigerio, in Venezuela in 1957 were witnesses to a pact between Peron and Arturo Frondizi, who was ousted a few days ago as Argentine President. Cooke said Frondizi broke the pact soon after he was elected President in February 1958.

In November 1958, Cooke returned to Argentina and was again arrested and jailed, this time on a battleship. The master escape artist was soon on a row-boat crossing the River Plate and reached freedom in Uruguay. He came here April 13, 1960, to attend a general conference of all Latin American countries.

Cooke visited the United States once, in 1941. His great grandfather was born in the United States and, according to Cooke, was a typical Yankee.

## 2. EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW

### RAUL ROA CLAIMS CUBA WILLING TO NEGOTIATE

The authors are the only U.S. correspondents currently reporting from Cuba.

(By Jesse Gordon and Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Hester (retired), North American Newspaper Alliance)

HAVANA, April 11.—"The United States is at war with Cuba and its people, but Cuba is not at war with the United States," Cuban Foreign Minister Dr. Raul Roa told NANA today (Wednesday) in an exclusive interview.

Roa also asserted that his country will not invade the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, but that Cuba would seek its return "in due time" by "legal and peaceful means."

On the other hand, the Foreign Minister said, "reliable sources confirm that the United States is training forces in Panama, Guatemala, the Vieques Islands, and on the U.S. mainland itself for a new invasion of our country."

"Cuba has no differences with the United States," Roa went on to say. "We have always said we are ready to negotiate, and we will do so at a moment's notice, on a basis of absolute equality and sovereignty of both countries, without conditions from either side.

"But the United States has always refused bilateral discussions," Roa said. "We are trying to establish a Socialist state, to which Cuba has every right.

#### BLAMES KENNEDY

"The United States is using all means to destroy this social revolution," Roa went on. "President Kennedy has admitted his part in the responsibility for last year's invasion at Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs). But the U.S. embargo against our country cannot bring Cuba to its knees. Nor will U.S. pressure on other Latin American nations to isolate Cuba accomplish its purpose.

"We are sorry the United States will not allow American citizens to travel to Cuba," Roa stated, "to see for themselves the gains we have accomplished since the revolution. Our revolution, incidentally, cannot be 'exported' or 'imported' like merchandise. "George Washington and the American Revolution were also

produced by a historical situation, because the American people felt conscious of the need to separate from England at the time. Washington simply interpreted the needs of the people of his era."

The Cuban foreign minister labeled charges that Cuba is trying to subvert other Latin American countries as "false."

"This cannot happen except by internal causes," he stated.

Dr. Roa denied reports there are missile bases in his country, based on alleged photographs taken from American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. He offered to take us to any location indicated to them by U.S. sources where such bases are alleged to exist.

#### SEEK GUANTANAMO'S RETURN

On Cuba's claim to the territory now occupied by the American Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, the Foreign Minister said:

"There are no foreign bases in this country except for Guantanamo. We consider Guantanamo Cuban territory, which—in due time—must be returned by legal and peaceful means under international law. We do not plan to invade the base. In fact, Cuba plans no invasion or attack anywhere."

Roa went on: "There are absolutely no strings attached to the economic and technological aid provided Cuba by the Socialist (Soviet Bloc) nations. Cuba cannot be destroyed by the present embargo—not even by an actual naval blockade.

"These attacks," the Foreign Minister went on, "Only fuse the people closer together under the cry 'Patria O Muerte' (fatherland or death).

"Cuba is going through the worst drought in history, but the people understand the difficulties," Roa explained. "Everybody gets the same rations here, including the Ministers."

Roa confirmed that Soviet technicians have been in his country for the last few years, but only to explore for oil, gold, and other minerals. He said he had no definite information regarding the result of their findings, but indicated that they had been successful.

#### CAN SPARE REFUGEES

Roa also said that Cuba's loss of professional men who fled his country, especially doctors, had not adversely affected his nation.

"We have enough doctors," he said, "and we are carrying on an extensive training program to have more. We also have added several thousand hospital beds to our capacity," he said.

Roa denied press reports in which his country was described as "one big prison."

"The Cuban people like this government, which expresses their desires," he said. "The people have the right to choose their own social-economic system."

On the subject of possible arbitration of Cuban-American differences, Roa said that Mexico and Brazil had offered their good services in this matter. "We accepted the offer," he went on, "but we have not been approached any further by them."

Roa stated that a charge by Senator George Smathers, implying that Cuba is jamming U.S. radio broadcasts to Cuba, is not based on fact. On the other hand, he said, Cuban broadcasts to the United States are being jammed. "I tried to tune them in when I was here last fall," he said, "but I could not hear a thing because of the jamming."

Roa, relaxed, offered the NANA reporters Cuban cigars, and accepted U.S. cigarettes in return.

### 3. EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH RODRÍGUEZ

TOP RED SAYS CUBA WOULD PAY UNITED STATES FOR PROPERTY IF WE BUY ITS SUGAR

(By Jesse Gordon and Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Hester (retired), North American Newspaper Alliance)

HAVANA, April 12.—"Cuba will arrange for indemnification of seized U.S. property if the United States starts buying our sugar again," Cuba's top Communist and economic czar told NANA in an exclusive interview today (Thursday).

"I have talked about this matter several times with both Castro and Dorticos (President Osvalde Dorticos Torrado)," the Communist leader, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, said.

"Just the other day, Castro, Dorticos, and I discussed arrangements to pay the United States for intervened properties provided we first settle political differences and provided Washington buys 3 million tons of our sugar," he said.

## HOLDS IMMENSE POWER

Rodríguez, 45, together with Blas Roca, heads the Cuban Communist Party. On February 14 he replaced Fidel Castro as president of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), which has virtually unlimited powers over the agricultural economy of Cuba.

Last year Rodríguez replaced Ernesto ("Ché") Guevara as head of the Central Planning Commission and integrated revolutionary organizations.

He answered questions in excellent English in his office, where he reputedly works 18 hours a day.

Rodríguez said a significant part of the Cuban economy is still privately owned.

"Five thousand Cubans who each own up to 160 acres of farmland are living like capitalists in the big cities," he disclosed.

"The future will decide whether we take the land away from these absentee landlords," he said. "It depends on their hostility and their reactionary activities.

"We recently took the land away from 700 owners in this class for counter-revolutionary activity," he said.

"In some cases," he went on, "we have given land back to private owners because of injustices. But the difficulty with the private owners as a class is that they are not cultivating the land properly.

"Seventy percent of the cattle-raising farms in Camaguey Province are controlled by private owners," he said.

## PAID \$2 MILLION SO FAR

"We have given compensation to the owners of small estates," Rodríguez said, "but when we intervened in the big estates the owners left the country and thus lost their right to compensation.

"We already have paid \$2 million in indemnification," he pointed out. "We make an initial downpayment and then pay the rest in 100 monthly installments.

"Agriculture is going fairly well," the powerful INRA chief said. "We lack cadres of trained personnel, but hundreds of Cubans now in training overseas will soon return," he added.

"Our coffee crop is 20,000 tons more than last year, and tobacco, tomatoes, and cotton are better, too," he said.

"But we must organize our production differently," he said, "particularly on the state farms.

"We have organized 260 state farms with the help of members of the rebel army, but many of these men are inexperienced," he said. "We need another year for the 'new look' in agriculture to develop. We are training men in standard accounting procedures for these farm operations.

"Thirty thousand private farmers in Las Villas Province are cooperating in this agricultural 'new look,'" Carlos Rafael Rodríguez said. "We are helping with tractors, fertilizers, and insecticides. Good cattle are coming from Canada.

"Fish production," he said, "was less than 50 million pounds before the revolution. Now it is 80 million pounds a year.

"The rice crop was bad this year," he said. "We need 20,000 more tons from China.

## ENDS BLACK MARKETING

"There was black marketing in meat until 20 days ago," the economic czar said, "but this has stopped since several arrests were made under a new law providing 5-year prison penalties.

"We estimate the 1962 sugar crop at 5,300,000 tons," he said.

"Private growers in Matanzas Province are not giving us the necessary cooperation, and this may be due to counterrevolutionary activity," he said.

"The opposite is true with the private sugar farmers in Las Villas, Camaguey, and Oriente Provinces," he said.

"National production figures will be ready in 20 days," Cuba's top Communist continued.

"The tobacco crop was affected this year by the U.S. embargo, but we are not reducing planting," he said. "We are selling in the international market. Uruguay has bought \$200,000 worth of our tobacco.

"Bad distribution of food has affected life in the cities," Rodriguez said, "but rationing has improved morale because it has brought us closer to equalization.

"We are beginning to put an end to irregular food distribution," he said.

"Our trouble is that there is not enough production to meet the increased consumption," he said. "The people have more money now. Soon we will be over the worst."

#### 4. SUDDEN TIDE OF RED IMPORTS SNARLS CUBA'S DISTRIBUTION

The authors are the only U.S. correspondents now reporting from Cuba.

(By Jesse Gordon and Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Hester (retired) North American Newspaper Alliance)

HAVANA, April 13.—Thirty foreign ships rode at anchor in the harbor here the other day, unable to berth for lack of dock space.

They come from all the Soviet bloc countries, bringing cargoes of food, trucks, and utility vehicles, light and heavy machinery, petroleum, hardware, and other tools.

Havana docks are piled high with these cargoes, mostly crates bearing strange names and descriptions. A majority of the crates contain machine tools, but a pile of shovels and spades 30 feet high and 100 feet long bears witness that farm implements, too, are among the imports.

#### GATHERING RUST

There is a visible shortage of warehouse space, which forces Cuban authorities to pile cargoes alongside the docks, often spilling over into adjacent fields.

Some of the goods are gathering rust from lack of protection from the elements. For instance, several thousand Russian-made 5-ton trucks, along with light and heavy tractors, are standing in an open field, unsheltered from Cuba's subtropical climate which often brings torrential rains.

Many new trucks and buses are already visible on streets and highways. They are mostly of Czechoslovakian and Chinese origin. Private autos are becoming scarce, and newly imported passenger cars are a rarity.

#### ACRES OF EQUIPMENT

There are acres of sewer pipes piled near the harbor, beside hundreds of bulldozers, steam shovels, air compressors, and diesel engines. The lettering on these machines identifies them as coming from Poland, East Germany, the U.S.S.R., and Red China.

Some small equipment and spare parts are labeled "Made in Canada."

The sudden tide of shipments has created serious problems of warehousing, cataloging, and distribution. In many recent instances, materials desperately needed elsewhere remained lying around the docks for months.

#### DISTRIBUTION CHIEF FIRED

The distribution became so snarled that Ernesto "Che" Guevara fired Maximo Berman, who was in charge of the distribution, and replaced him with a new man, Manuel Luzardo.

A visit to the storage sheds disclosed machine tools from all Iron Curtain countries, mostly Hungary, Russia, East Germany, and Red China.

Soviet engineers were uncrating and assembling a surface grinding machine with the nameplate "Moscow City Economic Council, Moscow Grinding Machine Works." Some of the machines, such as a Chinese screw manufacturing tool, were built after Swiss and other Western models.

#### MACHINERY IN USE

Much of the machinery supplied to the Castro government by the Soviet bloc is already in use. Polish-supplied boring mills are turning out gearbox parts and hydraulic cylinders for the sugarmills. Yugoslav engineers are in charge of production.

Yugoslavia also set up a fruit-canning plant in Oriente Province recently. Most of the machinery still waiting on the docks is destined for new plants and factories. However, 50 precision lathes from North Korea were being delivered to the engineering school at Havana University.

The startling growth of Iron Curtain trade with Cuba is revealed by these Government figures: In 1958, trade volume stood at \$1 million; in 1960, it went up to \$136 million; in 1961 it reached \$500 million.

## APPENDIX IV

NATIONAL BROADCASTING CO., INC.,  
New York, N.Y., July 30, 1962.

Senator KENNETH KEATING,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR KEATING: At the meeting of the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 19, 1962, you received testimony from Carlos Todd concerning John Hlavacek, who has been NBC's correspondent in Cuba. In the course of the hearing you stated that you thought it important that the subcommittee have the opportunity to examine the transcripts of the programs in question, together with any comment NBC and Mr. Hlavacek might wish to make.

This letter is in reply to your invitation. I am attaching hereto an affidavit of Mr. Hlavacek presenting the facts concerning his background and his activities in Cuba and refuting by specific references to his broadcasts the charges made against him by Mr. Todd. Attached to the affidavit as exhibits are the complete transcripts of his broadcasts on the eight NBC radio and television network programs on which he appeared in June 1962 following his return from Cuba.

We feel that the affidavit and exhibits completely dispose of Mr. Todd's accusations concerning Mr. Hlavacek. Indeed, Mr. Hlavacek's broadcasts on the Cuban situation contained appraisals that are the opposite of those attributed to him by Mr. Todd. For example, as the attached affidavit and transcripts show, his broadcast reports repeatedly commented on the severe food shortages in Cuba; he reported that Cuba is on the downgrade economically and will continue to get worse; that the Castro attempt to collectivize farming has failed; that the difficulties with Cuba's sugar crop were the result not only of drought but of cane burnings by dissatisfied farmers; that large sections of the Cuban people are disillusioned with Castro, although he has the fanatical support of the Cuban youth; that much of the new housing built under the Castro regime cannot be utilized because of shortages of water and electrical connections; and that Castro's Cuba is a far cry from the paradise he promised when he came to power. The attached material confirms other particulars in which Mr. Todd has erred in his claims and inferences about Mr. Hlavacek.

In his attached affidavit, Mr. Hlavacek refers to the fact that he has applied for a visa to return to Cuba. Since executing the affidavit, Mr. Hlavacek has been advised that the Cuban consulate in Jamaica has granted this application.

NBC News, when it first assigned Mr. Hlavacek to Cuba, had full confidence in his objectivity and impartiality as a correspondent. We believe that his record of performance in his first tour of duty there has fully justified that confidence. Consequently, NBC News has assigned Mr. Hlavacek to another tour of duty as its Cuban correspondent, and he will be returning to Cuba shortly.

We appreciate your thoughtfulness in having afforded us the opportunity to comment on Mr. Todd's testimony, and Mr. Hlavacek has asked me to convey his thanks as well.

Sincerely,

JULIAN GOODMAN.

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE  
TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND  
OTHER SECURITY LAWS

STATE OF NEW YORK,  
County of New York, ss:

John M. Hlavacek, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I am a correspondent for the News Department of National Broadcasting Company, Inc., and have served in that capacity in Cuba, among other places.

This affidavit is submitted in reply to the testimony given by one Carlos Todd on July 19, 1962, before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States

Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws.

I was born and spent my youth in Illinois. I was graduated from Carleton College, Northfield, Minn., in 1939, and held a teaching fellowship from Carleton College in Chintang, China, from July 1939 to June 1941. I then served as a truckdriver for the International Red Cross on the Burma Road until June 1942, when I became code clerk for the U.S. Military Attaché in Chungking. I remained in that post until March 1944, when I joined United Press, in China, later becoming manager of its office in New Delhi, India. In April 1957 I left United Press to accept a fellowship for an American foreign correspondent to pursue graduate studies, awarded me by the Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York City. At the conclusion of the fellowship, I moved to Jamaica, British West Indies, which I have used as a base of operations as a cameraman and correspondent in the Caribbean areas for various news organizations. I was retained by, among others, NBC News, Time, McGraw-Hill, and N.Y. Daily News.

I first covered Cuban affairs for NBC when I obtained a filmed interview with Batista in the Dominican Republic shortly after his flight there from Cuba. I visited Cuba in January and February 1959. I had specific NBC assignments there of short duration in July of 1959 and again in July of 1960.

In August of 1961 I received a call from NBC News offering me the opportunity to replace NBC's Cuban correspondent, Richard Valeriani. The Cuban government would not readmit Mr. Valeriani, but advised NBC it would accept another correspondent. I applied for a visa through the Cuban consulate in Jamaica and spent approximately three and one-half weeks in Cuba in September 1961 covering Cuban news for NBC. My reports were filed by telephone for two weeks, but the last 10 days my telephone communication with the United States was cut off by the Cuban government. I so stated in my report to NBC on landing in Miami: "Castro's government says there is no censorship. But I know there is because this is the first report I have been able to make in ten days—and I have just arrived in Miami from Havana."

NBC wanted me to return to Cuba, and I had planned to return in October. However, while I applied for a visa through the Cuban consulate in Jamaica in October, I did not obtain it until December, 1961. Consequently, I did not return to Havana until January 1962. I intended to remain as long as possible and, although my visa was good for only 30 days, I obtained several extensions which enabled me to remain until June 1962. During this five-month period I reported daily to NBC, usually by telephone, and these reports were carried on various programs of NBC radio.

Approval of the U.S. Department of State was obtained for these trips to Cuba. The Department of State has likewise granted permission to me for another visit to Cuba, and my visa application is now pending with the Cuban consulate in Jamaica.

Mr. Todd asserts that the Czech embassy personnel in Washington, "following instructions from their Cuban allies, grant visas only to those U.S. newsmen who are believed to be favorable to the Cuban Communist cause and who will present favorable reports of their visit." I do not know the policies of the Czech embassy or what instructions have been given by the Cuban government. I do not know that I am not "favorable to the Cuban Communist cause" and that my reports cannot be construed as "favorable reports" of my visits. I applied for my visas, as I have stated, to the Cuban consulate in Jamaica. I stated honestly on the Today program on June 4, 1962, in answer to John Chancellor's question how I obtained a visa: "We don't know. Lots of people put in visas to the Cuban government. There is absolutely no explanation why I got a visa and other people didn't."

Mr. Todd himself may have offered a partial explanation. He states that Canadian and British newsmen enter at will. I applied for a Cuban visa in British territory, and I may have had less difficulty for this reason.

Mr. Todd speculates that one of the reasons I was granted a visa was because of a remark my wife is alleged to have made: "Cuba is not going to Punta del Este to defend herself; but to accuse the United States, which is as it should be." I am confident that she never made such a remark. I have discussed it with her, and she has denied to me that she ever made any such statement, or any similar statement, to anyone.

Annexed hereto as Exhibits 1 through 8 are the various reports which I made on the NBC television and radio networks concerning Cuba in June 1962 following my return from Cuba. While I am content to have your committee draw its

own conclusions as to the objectivity and lack of bias in these reports, it may be helpful to point out a few specifics in which Mr. Todd's charges about me are not in accordance with the facts.

The charge: "Appearing on NBC-TV on June 2d, Hlavacek, who says he spent five months in Cuba, could only produce film shots of a Cuban night club and a hotel." The facts: As I reported on Emphasis, NBC Radio Network, June 26, 1962 (Exhibit 8) all television film is developed and screened in Cuba before it is sent abroad. The developing equipment had broken down and I was unable to bring with me the great bulk of the film which had been taken during my stay.

The charge: "On the morning program Today he proudly showed Cuban Communist propaganda posters. The impression was that of a happy, contented Cuban people living well and gaily under Communism." The facts: Since the film which I had taken in Cuba was unavailable, I felt the posters would be interesting as a demonstration of Cuban propaganda; I was, and still am, confident that the American public would not confuse such propaganda with actuality. Nevertheless, in the same program (Exhibit 5) I pointed out (1) that the educational aspect of the revolution, probably its most successful part, is desperately short of teachers because most of the middle class teachers have left for the United States, (2) that food is very, very short, although no one is starving, and the situation will probably get worse, (3) that the Cuban attempt to collectivize the farmer has failed, and (4) that much of the housing built by Castro cannot be utilized due to shortage of such things as water and electrical connections.

The charge: "Not a word about Cuban food shortages; not a word about food queues." The facts: I commented on the severe food shortage in five of the eight reports (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6).

The charge: "Not a single reference to the innumerable cane burnings." The facts: On the Weekend Report program of June 10, 1962, I stated: "Even Cuba's traditional money crop, sugar, has had a bad year. A severe drought caused some of the trouble, but the rest is the work of disgruntled farmers, who burned millions of acres of cane fields." (Exhibit 6).

The charge: "Hlavacek praised the government building program, stated that there was no housing shortage." The facts: I appraised the housing program in two programs (Exhibits 4 and 5) and in a third (Exhibit 6) pointed out that in the preceding week Castro had stated that the people must wait ten or twelve years for improvement. At no time did I state there was no housing shortage.

The charge: "Not a word about the economic and agricultural difficulties of Cuba." The facts: The subjects were dealt with in a fashion critical of Castro in six of the eight programs (Exhibits 1, 3-7). The other two programs dealt with other subjects.

The charge: "Again the stress on Castro's invincibility, his popularity, the lack of resistance to the regime." The facts: In the first program (Exhibit 1) I stated: "Large sections of the Cuban people—farmers, professional men, and the great bulk of the middle class—are disillusioned with Castro. There are also small armed resistance groups in parts of the country. But their opposition is uncoordinated and therefore ineffective." In the second program (Exhibit 2) I said: "the revolution of course has taken a very hard core minority who are fanatically behind Fidel and the opposition is leaderless—it's pretty much passive and they are just going along, waiting for something to happen." This was and is my appraisal of the situation—not the wishful thinking of what we would like it to be.

The charge: Hlavacek's statement in the Miami Herald that "Castro, by virtue of his March 25th speech, reading Anibal Escalante out of Cuba's sole (and Communist) party, regained a great deal of popularity" is a studied half truth; Castro regained popularity among the Young Guard of the Cuban Communists, who had been subjected to pressure by the Old Guard. I am not sure of Mr. Todd's point, but if it is that Castro gained popularity with the anti-Escalante faction and lost it with the pro-Escalante faction, the point is rather self-evident. It is my opinion that Castro's action resulted in a gain of popularity. Mr. Todd, of course, may reach an opposite conclusion. That does not make either his position or mine false.

I did not say—as Mr. Todd would have you believe—that the majority of the people of Cuba are—firmly or otherwise—behind Castro, that the regime is successfully coping with difficulties which have been greatly exaggerated, or that there are good prospects for increased production. I said just the opposite. I

did say that Castro has built a lot of housing, some of it not utilizable. I did not say the "revolution has gone deep." I do not know what the quotation means.

Nor do I, as Mr. Todd accuses, have any intention to condition the people of the United States to anything. My duty and my responsibility is to report on the news I am assigned to cover—objectively, dispassionately, and completely, in the best tradition of journalism.

In conformity with this concept of my duty and responsibility, I have not accepted any hospitality or favors from Cuban officials. I have not been furnished with transportation by them, I have not taken any of their conducted tours, and I have not attended government press conferences in order to avoid situations of entrapment such as other correspondents have experienced.

JOHN M. HLAVACEK.

Sworn to before me this 26th day of July 1962.

GIRARD ALLEN JACOBI,  
*Notary Public, State of New York.*

Commission expires March 30, 1964.

EXHIBIT 1. HLAVACEK BROADCAST ON "VANOCUR SATURDAY REPORT," NBC-TV, SATURDAY, JUNE 2, 1962

Fidel Castro's biggest problem is food. Last March for the first time in Cuba's history Castro was forced to begin food rationing. Cubans are complaining because they can't get the supplies of milk, meat, chicken and eggs they once did, but they still get enough to eat, and no one is starving. There is still food in restaurants and most Cubans at least in Havana still have money to eat out once in a while.

On a weekend the night clubs and bars that were once filled with American tourists are now filled with Cubans. Last Saturday, I was at the Havana Riviera Hotel nightclub. Every table was filled and people were waiting to get in. For \$4 I got a good dinner, a spectacular floor show and watched Cubans dancing till 2 in the morning. On Sundays Cubans still play baseball—in the new stadiums that the revolution has built or play in the parks that dot the city. Near the NBC office there is always a Sunday game in the shadow of the Maximo Gomez monument which stands near the entrance of Havana Harbor, across from famed Morro Castle. Other Cubans pile into buses and go to the beaches, east and west of Havana. At the National Hotel swimming pool Army officers are asked to check their guns before entering the pool area where bikini-clad señoritas lounge in the sun. Again this is only part of the Cuban picture. Large sections of the Cuban people—farmers, professional men, and the great bulk of the middleclass—are disillusioned with Castro. There are also small armed resistance groups in parts of the country. But their opposition is not coordinated and therefore ineffective.

On Castro's side is the well-trained army, a countrywide system of informers to aid his secret police, a fanatical support from Cuban youth, and backing from the Soviet Union. Economically, Cuba is on the downgrade and it will continue to get worse each year. But it will not collapse. And Fidel Castro is still the maximum leader and, short of an untimely death, he will be around for a long time.

EXHIBIT 2. MCGEE, INTERVIEW OF HLAVACEK ON "MONITOR," NBC RADIO, SUNDAY, JUNE 3, 1962

MCGEE. Thank you, Jimmy, and seated opposite my microphone now, give or take about 200 miles is John Hlavacek, NBC correspondent, who returned to our Washington studios this week after a long hard look at Cuba—late spring 1962. We'll hear from him after this:

As I was saying, John Hlavacek, NBC correspondent in Cuba. Now John is an old Cuba hand. He's been reporting from there for years, his last assignment there lasting about 5 months. He's standing by now in our Washington studios so let's pass the preliminaries and get down to cases; but first, John, are you there?

HLAVACEK. I am here, Frank.

MCGEE. It's good to hear you. John, tell us—as you move around Cuba these days do you find that your travel is restricted? How difficult is it to report from there?

HLAVACEK. No, Frank. Our travel is not restricted. We can go almost anywhere in the country and as far as I know, what the Cubans have done

for me, I've been able to do almost everything I wanted to do. Of course, we have a very small western press corps. There's a Frenchman, an Englishman, an Argentine, and myself and we are set apart from the correspondents from the so-called friendly countries—the Communist Chinese, the Soviet Union, the Czechs, and the Poles. They are given more facilities than we are. They are invited to press conferences. They are able to see some of the Cuban officials which we have not been able to do during the last 5 months.

McGEE. Well, what about cameras and photographic equipment, John? I understand the official position is distinctly negative and I don't mean a pun there—

HLAVACEK. Very much so although it has eased a little bit in the last month ever since Castro's speech on March 26, when he read Anibal Escalante out of the party for what they call sectarianism or Stalinism, we've been able to get a little more freedom on taking pictures. We still have to get permission for just about everything we want to shoot and we have to have all our film developed and screened in Cuba before it goes out, but we are able to do some work.

McGEE. Well, John, many Americans remember Cuba, Havana especially. As a matter of fact, many Americans equate the two as a gay resort place. Would you describe for us the way Havana looks nowadays.

HLAVACEK. Well, if you've never been to Havana before it's still a very, very beautiful city. The Malacanán is still there, the huge buildings. Some of the scenery is gone—the big neon signs—there are only two or three now extolling the merits of the revolution. The gambling casinos are gone but a lot of Cubans are still going to nightclubs, especially on the weekends. They still have spectacular floor shows and the Cubans have a good time dancing until all hours.

McGEE. What about tourists, John. Do you see any from this country or others?

HLAVACEK. You see no tourists from the United States. In fact, an American tourist is a rarity. Once in a while we see a few Canadian tourists that came down on a charter plane, that is foreign planes that bring in things for Cuba from Miami and of recent times there are small groups of Czechs, Russians, and Poles that come in on exchanges of tourist groups with the Communist countries. We have a lot of tourists in the way of invited guests from Latin America. Castro has an open hand for a lot of people to come up and show him what he's been doing in his revolution.

McGEE. Well, John, you are an American, of course, an American newsman, and Castro has been ranting against American citizens for a great many months now. I wonder if you could tell us if this has made any difference in the attitude of the average Cuban toward you or toward the United States in general.

HLAVACEK. Not at all, Frank. This is one of the paradoxes of Cuba. I have been treated with the utmost courtesy from the time I arrived until the time I left. I might add that I had my wife in Cuba for a week—took her around—she was treated with the utmost courtesy and we had a wonderful time. It seems to be as Fidel said, "I'm angry with the American Government but I like the American people." I've heard that many times in Cuba and the treatment that I have had seems to reflect that view.

McGEE. John, I have a little theory. Let me trot it out here and you tell me if I'm right or wrong. I believe that the Cubans can be broken into two categories really—those who are inclined to revolution and those who are not, and those who take part in it fervently. Those who do not live two lives—a public life wherein they follow the dictates of the Government and then a private life where they don't really change their previous attitudes at all but just wait for the current storm to pass.

HLAVACEK. I think you're right to a great extent, Frank. I think that in Cuba today, people are still not afraid to talk some, I mean it's closing in on them, but you still get pretty frank opinions from most people but the revolution of course has taken a very hard core minority who are fanatically behind Fidel and the opposition is leaderless—it's pretty much passive and they are just going along waiting for something to happen.

McGEE. Well, John, there has been some indication that Castro may be getting just a little disenchanted with his Communist friends. Is this true or has it been overemphasized in this country, do you think?

HLAVACEK. I think it's overemphasized, Frank. He was disenchanted in January, February when he felt that the Stalinist branch of the Communists were taking over and he's made two very significant speeches on that saying

that because of their attitude they were turning people away from the revolution. They were making enemies instead of friends and they have tried to reverse this. Castro is making more appearances now. He's inspecting, he's going about the country talking to people and he admits he's made many, many mistakes and he promises to correct them. Whether he can or not is another question.

McGEE. Well, thank you so much. We've been talking with John Hlavacek, NBC correspondent, recently returned from Cuba. Thank you, John.

---

EXHIBIT 3. SCHERER INTERVIEW OF HLAVACEK ON "THIS IS NBC NEWS," NBC-TV, SUNDAY, JUNE 3, 1962

SCHERER. NBC newsman John Hlavacek has covered many exotic datelines in his 18 years as foreign correspondent. Chungking, Singapore, New Delhi, Columbo to mention some. But, for the past 5 months he has been reporting from a perhaps not so exotic Cuba. John Hlavacek is a little bit of a fourth estate celebrity, for the past 5 months he has been the only American resident correspondent in Cuba. He came out this week. John, do the Castro people make it tough for an American to operate?

HLAVACEK. No, they don't, Ray, we are remarkably free to get around the country; in the city, we have some difficulty seeing government officials, but otherwise we have almost all the facilities we need to do a good job.

SCHERER. But my impression is that Castro's bureaucracy is almost startlingly inefficient, yet he seems to be strong with his people. How can this be?

HLAVACEK. Well, the only part of his bureaucracy that is not inefficient is his secret police and there he has got a very efficient operation.

SCHERER. What are conditions in Cuba?

HLAVACEK. Conditions in Cuba are bad and they are declining each year. Part of the problem, of course, is that Cuba always depended on the United States for everything. Now they have had to shift and get everything from Europe. Added to that is our embargo and even if they could buy things they don't have the money to buy them. So, Cuba is in an economic decline which will probably go on for years. Some of my friends who have done work in Eastern Europe said that they expect Cuba to go down to the level of probably something like Bulgaria.

SCHERER. Is Castro's anti-Americanism as virulent as ever?

HLAVACEK. Insofar as his speeches are concerned—yes. But it does not permeate to the people. The people are very friendly to Americans.

SCHERER. Do you ever see any signs that he wants to get a rapprochement with us?

HLAVACEK. There have been signs in the past few months but the Cubans are especially anxious on an economic level to have a rapprochement with the United States.

SCHERER. What are the signs?

HLAVACEK. This has come out especially in the seven American treasure hunters who were shipwrecked off Cuba. A year ago those men would have probably been captured, kept in a jail incommunicado for weeks. This time they were brought to Havana, given red carpet treatment and sent home.

SCHERER. John, how serious is the food situation—the food shortage?

HLAVACEK. The food situation is bad. He had begun rationing in March. Milk is reserved only for children 7 years and under but even then with the rationing, people are getting enough to eat and Cuba is a rich country—it grows a lot of things and I don't think the people are going to starve.

SCHERER. What about some of Castro's differences with these leading Communists that he has imported and deported?

HLAVACEK. Well, his differences came to a head in February and March. In March he read out of the party Anibal Escalante who was, according to Castro, the Stalinist of the Cuban Communist Party. Since then things have eased up quite a bit throughout the country.

SCHERER. Where would you say, by way of summing this up, that Castro stands today with the Cuban people?

HLAVACEK. Castro still has a very hard core minority that is fanatically loyal to him. He also has the youth of the country—he has 60,000 scholarship students in schools and they are for him. Another thing, Castro is a young man; he is a brave man and in Latin American politics he is an honest man.

He's not dipping his hand in the till setting up bank accounts in Switzerland or building houses in Miami Beach.

SCHERER. Thanks, John Hlavacek. You give scant comfort to Americans who believe, perhaps wistfully, that Castro will strangle of his own ineptitude.

---

EXHIBIT 4. HLAVACEK BROADCAST ON "WEEKEND REPORT," NBC RADIO, JUNE 3, 1962

When Fidel Castro marched triumphantly into Havana 3 years ago, one of the first things he did was to order an immediate 50-percent cut in rents. A few months later he set up an urban reform office which confiscated all apartment buildings in the city. From that time all rents were paid to the urban reform and not the landlords, some of whom owned as many as 20 apartment buildings. The landlords were paid only nominal sums each month, and allowed to live free in one of their apartments. Over the past 2 years the renters, many of them ardent revolutionaries, or poor people who moved into luxury from squalor, conveniently forgot to pay rent to the Government.

Many of them are months behind in their payments. The urban reform tried to straighten things out last March when Cuba was forced to introduce food rationing for the first time in its history. At that time the committees for the defense of the revolution, which had the job of taking a census of their block and issuing ration books, were advised not to issue the books unless the person could produce his rent receipt. This scare sent thousands to urban reform offices to pay their bills. But the Government couldn't make this threat stick and only a few promised to make partial payment. This week, however, Fidel Castro, in an unexpected appearance on Cuban television, warned that rents would have to be paid and the people occupying apartments illegally would be sent to prison. The Government needs the money.

The urban reform also has the job of assigning the hundreds of apartments and houses that become vacant each month as 6,000 Cubans flee to the United States.

There is a great scramble for these dwellings. Long queues form daily outside the urban reform offices and sometimes there are harsh words and threats of a march on the palace as the discontented wait in the hot sun. The urban reform, too, has the problem of finding which houses are going to be empty. It serves as a watchdog to see that any Cuban intending to leave the country does not sell off any of his material wealth. As soon as the Cuban gives an indication of leaving, such as trying to get a passport, a member of the committee of defense takes a full inventory of his house, and 48 hours before he leaves the country, he must move from his house to a hotel. The state then takes over everything—house, car, television set, furniture, and any wealth such as jewelry and stamp collection.

And the house is then sealed until it is assigned to a new family. For the Cuban leaving his homeland, it's a sad day. He can take only three changes of clothes, and this week orders went out that relatives and friends can no longer go to the airport to see him leave. Militiamen outside the airport now stop anyone without a ticket. The new rule was issued because several hundred relatives last week cheered and applauded when a group of Cubans left for the United States and then booed and whistled at Cuban Minister of Industries Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who was at the airport to greet a visiting Soviet delegation.

---

EXHIBIT 5. CHANCELLOR INTERVIEW OF HLAVACEK, "TODAY," NBC-TV, JUNE 4, 1962

(Woman sings.)

CHANCELLOR. "The poster you see is Cuban. If you hadn't guessed already, the music is Cuban and our guest now is a temporary Cuban some of these days, John Hlavacek, the NBC correspondent in Cuba. John, how are you?"

HLAVACEK. "Hello, John."

CHANCELLOR. "Back again, eh?"

HLAVACEK. "Back again."

CHANCELLOR. "Also what we used to call a breather?"

HLAVACEK. "Breather, I think; I may not go back. I'm not sure yet, though."

CHANCELLOR. "Are you the only permanent American correspondent or fully accredited American correspondent now in \* \* \*"

HLAVACEK. "Yes. I guess we call ourself semipermanent, John. We never know how long. \* \* \*"

CHANCELLOR. "Well, you're in and out."

HLAVACEK. "I'm in and out, but I'm—I'm resident there at the moment."

CHANCELLOR. "Why is that? How come you?"

HLAVACEK. "We don't know. Lots of people put in visas to the Cuban Government, and some do, and some don't. There is absolutely no explanation why I got a visa and other people didn't."

CHANCELLOR. "Cause a lot of other people have tried."

HLAVACEK. "Yes."

CHANCELLOR. "Well, we're glad you're there. Could we have some more of that music? Is that possible? There it is." (Music.)

HLAVACEK. "John, do you recognize it?"

CHANCELLOR. "Well, it has a funny familiarity to it, but I'm not sure."

HLAVACEK. "Oh, I see. This is an American tune with Spanish words, and the meaning of it—this is about a year old—it was, the words were put to it when Gagarin came to Cuba, and it's a story about all the failures of American rockets from Canaveral and culminating in the fact that Gagarin was successful and went around the world. I mean in his orbital flight. And the end of it says 'Gagarin.'

"But this is about the 'cohetes'—the rockets of America—blowing up."

CHANCELLOR. "I see. Well, that's pretty interesting. They are really. \* \* \*"

HLAVACEK. "You don't know what it is. Anybody else guess?"

CHANCELLOR. "No. Does anybody know what that is? Well, tell us." (Woman's voice off mike.)

HLAVACEK. "Ittsy-bittsy teenie weenie yellow polka-dot bikini."

CHANCELLOR. "Boy, I couldn't—much less remember the tune. I could never make the title. Listen, you brought some posters along. \* \* \*"

HLAVACEK. "Yes, John."

CHANCELLOR. "\* \* \* as well, didn't you?"

HLAVACEK. "I brought these. . ."

CHANCELLOR. "They really kind of have thrown themselves into the ideological thing with a lot of gusto, haven't they, with tunes like that and this?"

HLAVACEK. "Everything. They have very good revolutionary tunes. Actually in the cultural part of the Cuban revolution is a romantic thing, as you can see from these pictures. I think this one of Fidel is a tremendous picture, and for those of you who don't read Spanish, this says that the revolution guarantees the public six fundamental things—clothes, shoes, food, medicine, education, and recreation."

CHANCELLOR. "That's a good place to start for some of the questions I have to ask you."

HLAVACEK. "All right, fine."

CHANCELLOR. "Is the revolution fulfilling any of its promises?"

HLAVACEK. "A few, John; yes. I think that probably they're building a lot of hospitals, and they're doing an awful lot in education. I think the educational part of the revolution is probably its most successful part. They have 60,000 to 70,000 scholarship students in Havana and the rest of the country, but they are desperately short of teachers, because most of the—I'd say the middle-class teachers—have left for the United States.

"So they're doing as well as they can with what they have left plus getting educators from Russia, from Czechoslovakia, to help out."

CHANCELLOR. "Now, how about housing and food?"

HLAVACEK. "Food—let's go into that because that's what Cubans think about most—is very, very short. But, contrary to reports that you've been hearing, no one is starving in Cuba. I've traveled in five of the six provinces of Cuba in the last 5 months, and I have yet to see any child starving—in fact they're all pretty healthy."

"The food situation is probably going to get worse before it gets better, but Cuba is such a rich country that it will grow things and I don't think anybody will starve."

CHANCELLOR. "John, very briefly, is the food problem they have, does that originate in the fact that it was a one-crop economy and now they've got to diversify?"

HLAVACEK. "That's partly it, John; but partly is the fact that there's been an awful lot of inefficiency and also there's been an attempt like the Russians to collectivize the farmer, and as you know the farmer anywhere in the world is the most conservative animal there is. He doesn't want to change; he wants to be private.

"And the Cubans now have realized they have made a mistake, and just in the past 2 months they have given more freedom to the farmers; they've started

giving farms back that they have taken; and they're trying to liberalize the whole agricultural situation."

CHANCELLOR. "The classic pattern, isn't it?"

HLAVACEK. "A very classic pattern."

CHANCELLOR. "How about housing?"

HLAVACEK. "Housing—he's built an awful lot of housing. Some of it still waiting for people to move in. This is mainly due to shortages of other things. For instance, I visited a housing project just a couple of weeks ago, 503 houses waiting for people to move in.

"But they still had not connected up the water, and the electricity and everything else, and so it's going to be some time before they can make use of the houses."

CHANCELLOR. "John, if you could move back \* \* \*"

HLAVACEK. "I'm moving."

CHANCELLOR. "\* \* \* perhaps Larry Owen could just look over some of these others, because they're kind of interesting posters, while we do a little more talking."

HLAVACEK. "John if—if you can \* \* \*"

CHANCELLOR. "Yeah?"

HLAVACEK. "\* \* \* I'd like to—these posters here, I think really epitomize the sort of David and Goliath attitude of Cuba toward \* \* \*"

CHANCELLOR. "That's right. Yeah."

HLAVACEK. "... the United States. This one here is a very amusing one. This says that if the Yankees cannot live 90 miles from a Socialist country, let the Yankees move away."

CHANCELLOR. "Aha."

HLAVACEK. "And this one here was put out at the time of the Second Declaration of Havana, which to my mind was probably a Communist manifesto for Latin America."

CHANCELLOR. "Yeah—."

HLAVACEK. "And this shows Kennedy, of course, bandaged as a result of the ill-fated invasion and looking the fact that all Latin America might rise up and get him."

CHANCELLOR. "John do you get much of this personally?"

HLAVACEK. "No; not at all, John. This is one of the paradoxes of Cuba. I've been there 5 months. I've never had a word of discourtesy or an act of discourtesy on the part of anybody from extreme right to extreme left."

CHANCELLOR. "Hum. What's that one?"

HLAVACEK. "This is the 1st of May, the May Day parade in which they had a big concentration at Revolution Plaza and this shows the Cubans for the 1st of May spitting at Uncle Sam in the form of a worm. Castro's favorite expression is 'gusano,' which in Spanish means worm; it means anyone that is against the revolution."

CHANCELLOR. "John let me ask you one final very quick question. We tend to polarize our thinking about the Cuban revolution around Fidel Castro. How is he doing?"

HLAVACEK. "I think he's doing very well at the moment, frankly. He seems to be very much in control. Stories last January, February, March, that he was being replaced by old-time Communists \* \* \*"

CHANCELLOR. "No; eh?"

HLAVACEK. "\* \* \* I don't think it panned out. I think he broke the chains and he's very much in control."

CHANCELLOR. "John Hlavacek, man with an interesting job. You know I'm getting off this dodge. I may see you down there before very long."

HLAVACEK. "Take it easy, John."

CHANCELLOR. "Our man in Havana. Thank you very much. John Hlavacek. Time for a station break."

---

EXHIBIT 6. HLAVACEK BROADCAST ON "WEEKEND REPORT," NBC RADIO, SUNDAY, JUNE 10, 1962

Fidel Castro's Cuba is a far cry from the paradise he promised when he came to power in January of 1959. Then he promised free elections, free press, and a richer better life for all Cubans. It's now June 1962, and none of these promises has been kept. Castro says elections are not necessary. He controls all newspapers, the radio and television stations. There is no right to free assembly.

Cubans can be and are whisked off to police jails on the slightest suspicion. As far as the better life is concerned, Castro himself now says the people must wait 10 or 12 years for improvement. When Castro came to power, Cuba was a fabulously rich island, prospering on sugar, tobacco, and American tourists. Now, Cuba is reduced to economic depression. Severe food rationing had to be introduced in March, for the first time in its history. It's almost impossible to buy basic essentials from soap to a pair of shoes. Cubans are afraid to complain too loudly lest agents of Castro's secret police hear them. Authority for leadership is unquestioned. To the Cuban masses it is Castro. The mysterious world of the Communist Party elite and the struggle for control is beyond the knowledge or the understanding of the average Cuban.

Everywhere Castro turns, he finds himself in difficulty. In the country, the farmers are resisting Soviet-style collectivization. Food production has fallen off so alarmingly that Castro has been forced to relax controls, and return a number of farms to private ownership. In the factories, workers accustomed to American style high wages, Christmas bonuses, and paid vacations are resisting appeals for longer hours at the same pay. Cuba's once powerful and thriving middle classes are taking another way out. They are fleeing the country. The skilled professionals whom Castro needs desperately are leaving as fast as they can get passports and a seat on an airplane. Even Cuba's traditional money crop, sugar, has had a bad year. A severe drought caused some of the trouble, but the rest is the work of disgruntled farmers, who burned millions of acres of canefields.

Faced with these critical problems, how does Castro manage to stay in power? For in June 1962 he is still the maximum leader of Cuba. Castro still has a magnetic personality. His is still a father image reaching into the lives of his followers, the underprivileged and the have-nots who benefited from the revolution. Significantly, Castro draws large support from the newly-elevated Negro population. Castro draws his support from almost all of Cuba's youth. In many cases, families have been split over the youthful worship of Castro. Some teenagers have even blindly refused to follow their families into exile. The revolution has put tremendous stress on youthful opportunity, authority, leadership, and above all, education. The number of teachers has fallen sharply, but this year there are 60,000 students on government fellowships. All these young people are given intense Communist indoctrination. The army is loyal; it is no longer the rag-tag, bearded, cowboys and Indians gang that came down from the mountains. Trained and equipped by Russians and Czechs, the army today is made up of trim, crewcut, disciplined young men, who get advanced education along with their military training. The Cuban Army is patterned after the Russian, with political commissars attached to all units. The youth and the military, these are the elements keeping Fidel Castro in power. . . . John Hlavacek, NBC News.

---

EXHIBIT 7. HLAVACEK BROADCAST ON "EMPHASIS," NBC RADIO, TUESDAY,  
JUNE 12, 1962

This is John Hlavacek, "Emphasis, Latin America."

Jokes in Socialist Cuba are tinged with irony. I'll be back with this commentary on people and the times in a moment.

This is John Hlavacek, "Emphasis, Latin America."

A new brand of humor, the unfunny joke and the barbed jibe, is growing in Castro's Cuba.

Cubans who are accustomed to the good life—American automobiles, cigarettes, chewing gum, girdles, and nylons—are finding the Socialist revolution a bore.

Unable to complain openly lest neighborhood spies report them, they used darkened movie houses to spread their stories.

One of the best stories concerns a western movie starring John Wayne. Many popular westerns are not considered acceptable for revolutionary eyes, but a few are still making the rounds. Because Fidel Castro's nickname is El Caballo, the horse, the joke runs like this.

Wayne is defending his ring of covered wagons as hard-riding Indians attack. As John raises his gun to bring down an attacker, a voice from the audience yells "Don't shoot the Indian, John, shoot the horse."

Recently, in Havana, the Government propaganda machine ran old news reels to show the brutality of the Batista regime. The movie screen was showing

Batista police beating up student rioters when a voice called out, "kill them, kill them, they're Communists."

Cuba today is a land of shortages, especially of American-made products which once filled Cuban stores. And so, in Havana, the most popular telephone number is A-45-90. When a customer asks for a spare part for his automobile, or diapers for the baby, he is told to telephone A-45-90. The letter A in Spanish means "at," the 45 is the number of minutes to Miami by plane, and the 90 is the 90 miles to the United States. Hence the land of dime stores and supermarkets is A-45-90.

Probably the best current story, which also forecasts accurately the Cuba of the future, is this one.

The year is 1970. The new Cuban delegate to the United Nations arrives in New York for the summer session. He checks in at a hotel and is given a room on the 15th floor. After signing the register, he grabs his battered suitcase and heads for the stairs. A bellboy manages to take his bag. "Not that way, sir," he says, "we'll take the elevator."

At the room, the Cuban goes to the window and tries to open it. The bellboy says, "Oh, no sir, the hotel has central air conditioning and you just turn this dial." The Cuban then says, "It's been hot and I'm a little tired. Will you bring me a bowl of water to wash, and if you open my bag, you will find a towel and a small piece of soap." The bellboy, surprised, says, "But sir, here is the bathroom, with hot and cold running water and all the towels you need."

Six weeks later the Cuban returns home to be greeted by his wife who asks, "And how did you like the United States?" "Oh," comes the reply, "I had a wonderful time, but do you know something. They're very backward. Right now, they are where we were 10 years ago."

This is John Hlavacek, NBC News.

EXHIBIT 8. HLAVACEK BROADCAST ON "EMPHASIS," NBC RADIO, TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1962

This is John Hlavacek, "Emphasis, Latin America." "Freedom of the press, Cuban style."

I'll be back with this commentary on people and the times in a moment.

This is John Hlavacek, "Emphasis, Latin America."

An American reporter in Cuba is faced with a strange combination of freedom and restriction in trying to cover the news.

Within limits, the reporter has freedom of movement. He can travel, unescorted, anywhere in the country without a special pass.

Within limits, too, he can talk to anyone. Cubans are still friendly, and talkative. And despite Castro's efficient secret police, people still talk, even to an American reporter.

Talking is one thing, taking pictures is another. Anyone, anywhere, takes a risk when he takes a picture, even of the most harmless subject. Cuba today is an armed camp, with uniformed men and women on every street corner. And they all have been warned to watch for the enemy. And it's easy to spot a camera.

Cameramen working for American television companies always seek permission to film stories. Sometimes this permission is denied. Other times, even when permission is granted, cameramen can still be arrested, especially if a security man believes the pictures taken could show Cuba in a bad light. Two cameramen recently spent the night in jail because they took pictures of Chinese lanterns catching fire during a carnival parade. To Cubans this was bad publicity. Fidel Castro says there is freedom of the press. There is no official censor. Yet all telephone calls are monitored; all cables are censored; and all television film is developed and screened in Cuba before it is sent abroad.

With censorship unofficial, strange things can, and do, happen. Stories reporting Fidel Castro's speeches have been censored. And cable censors think nothing of changing a reporter's story. One reporter wrote that a crowd of 400,000 attended a big February rally for Fidel Castro. The cable censor changed the figure to read 1 million, and the story was printed around the world. When he discovered the change, the reporter sent a corrected story, this time by mail, explaining what had happened. This, too, was news around the world. And the reporter got his reward. His telephone was cut for 8 weeks.

Stories stopped by the cable censor can usually be telephoned. At least, by telephone, the reporter knows that his story has arrived the way he sent it.

Even here there is no consistency.

When a bus crashed into the garden of the Brazilian Embassy in Havana, carrying 14 people into asylum, reporters were able to file the story by telephone.

Yet a few weeks later, when 17 people climbed a ladder into the Uruguayan Embassy and asylum, the story was cut by the telephone monitor. One never knows in Cuba.

This is John Hlavacek, NBC News.

---

APPENDIX V

ANALYSIS OF TESTIMONY OF CARLOS TODD BEFORE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING—JULY 19, 1962—RE CHARLES KURALT AND THE EYEWITNESS BROADCAST, MAY 25, 1962, "AN AMERICAN IN CUBA"

Nothing in Todd's testimony impugns the loyalty of Kuralt. No facts were presented by Todd to indicate that Kuralt is a Communist or a Communist sympathizer. Rather, his testimony centers on the Eyewitness broadcast, which Todd alleges is inaccurate and unduly favorable to the Castro regime. The following is an analysis of the specific statements by Todd concerning the broadcast (page references are to our own transcription of our tapes of the Todd testimony and to the mimeographed transcription of the Eyewitness broadcast):

1. "Kuralt went out of his way to praise the Cuban agricultural program, presenting his views on the cooperative farm in Pinar del Rio province, especially built by the Cuban Communist government to impress foreign visitors" (Todd, p. 7).

In fact, Kuralt stated, "Even more conspicuous than the failure in industry is the failure in collectivized agriculture, aggravated by the worst drought of the century. \* \* \* If you visit one of the exhibition people's farms to see the best in Cuban agriculture, you can also see some of the errors. \* \* \* And the men who milk (the cows) represent a very great expense as well. All of them are former sugarcane cutters, guajiros, the very poorest element of the old Cuban society. They earned a little more than a peso a day and went unemployed 6 months of the year. The revolution promised to liberate them. Now it pays them a flat wage. It's more than tripled their pay with free housing and paid vacations. Their presence makes this people's farm a center of fanatical support for the government, but also their high pay and the farm's costly high standards make the farm a losing proposition financially. And moreover, many of these People's Farms are producing so poorly that Fidel Castro announced this month that some of them will be given back to their former owners to be operated privately again. \* \* \* The drought, the amateurs in the fields, the abandonment of sugarcane as a crop on countless cooperatives combine this year to make a small and bitter harvest of Cuba's big sweet crop" (Eyewitness, pp. 5-7).

2. "Then Kuralt entered into the realm of deliberate falsehood when he told his viewers that the wages of the Cuban peasant were higher today than they were in 1958" (Todd, p. 7).

Kuralt, as noted above, stated that those who were working on the state farm represented "the very poorest element of the old Cuban society. They earned a little more than a peso a day and went unemployed 6 months of the year. The revolution promised to liberate them. Now it pays them a flat wage. It's more than tripled their pay with free housing and paid vacations. Their presence makes this people's farm a center of fanatical support for the government, but also their high pay and the farm's costly high standards make the farm a losing proposition financially" (Eyewitness, p. 6).

Kuralt also stated that "here in the country a new class has been created. 300,000 families lifted in a matter of months from the dispossessed to the most privileged, with food for their stomachs and schools for their children" (Eyewitness, p. 7).

What Kuralt was stating was only that the most impoverished had had their material lot improved somewhat. He affirms this fact, but Kuralt notes that the increased wages are resulting in making "the farm a losing proposition financially."

3. "Kuralt also made allusion to the fiction that only the rich had fled to Miami, the affluent classes of Cuba" (Todd, p. 8).

Kuralt said that when he was in Havana in 1960, there were long lines in front of the American Embassy waiting to get U.S. visas and that these lines of "people trying to get out, rich people waiting for their U.S. visas, or shopkeepers \* \* \*" (Eyewitness, p. 2).

He also referred to the fact that a Castro policeman who acted as Kuralt's guide in 1960 was now "in prison, charged with trying to make Florida in a small boat" (Eyewitness, p. 2).

Kuralt also stated, "The rich have all gone to Miami. The middle classes have left or are leaving" (Eyewitness, p. 7).

4. "Kuralt also praised the Cuban educational program stating that illiteracy had been wiped out in the islands. This is a studied half-truth. He failed to mention that the so-called alphabetization program consisted of an intense elementary course in Communist indoctrination, containing vicious and malicious attacks against the United States" (Todd, p. 8).

Kuralt stated that what he remembered best about Cuba 1960 was "all the youngsters with the plywood rifles, trying so hard to learn to march. In Cuba 1962, they march very well, and they march everywhere \* \* \* marching to class all over Cuba. They represent the most conspicuous success of Fidel Castro's Cuba, children being educated, as most of them were not before the revolution, and being educated to love their government and to hate ours" (Eyewitness, p. 9).

Kuralt also stated that if the counter-revolution should succeed, "what would be left would be these youngsters faithful to Castro and to communism, 60,000 of them from all over the island in Havana alone, studying on scholarships and living in the luxurious buildings that once were yacht clubs and the mansions of the rich" (Eyewitness, p. 9).

He also made it clear that the "education" was purely propagandistic (Eyewitness, pp. 9-10), and was largely indoctrination (Eyewitness, pp. 9-10).

Nowhere did he state that "illiteracy had been wiped out"; and as indicated at pages 9-10, Kuralt made it explicit that the education was, to use Todd's words, "an intense elementary course in Communist indoctrination, containing vicious and malicious attacks against the United States." In other words, on this point, Kuralt did precisely what Todd accused him of failing to do.

5. "Kuralt endeavored to present a very rosy picture of Communist Cuba \* \* \*" (Todd, p. 8).

Eyewitness broadcast the following unfavorable references to Cuba:

(a) "It's easier for American reporters to get through the Iron Curtain than it is for them to penetrate the curtain that Fidel Castro has rung down between the United States and Cuba (Collingwood, p. 1).

(b) Kuralt stated that when revolution started, "Cubans were eager to play \* \* \* today it seems to me they aren't finding the game so much fun any more. The payoff is unsure and irregular" (Eyewitness, p. 1).

(c) The demonstrations now are "not so spontaneous \* \* \* the excitement was gone. All regimented columns of workers and union members." (Eyewitness, p. 2.)

(d) "The Communist exhortations make the island seem like a dream out of Orwell \* \* \*" (Eyewitness, p. 3.)

(e) "And the girls, who always seemed so pretty in their flowered dresses, have gained in what is called, 'revolutionary consciousness,' and lost their charm somehow." (Eyewitness, p. 3.)

(f) Kuralt also referred to the industrial inefficiency of the Cuban Government; he referred to the "great lines of broken-down American buses (which) sit in the vacant lots of Havana \* \* \* The aid from the Communist countries has been immense, but immensely mismanaged and wasteful \* \* \* The date for the first blast furnace somehow keeps getting postponed." (Eyewitness, pp. 4-5.)

6. "Kuralt also stressed the contention that Castro is stronger than ever, that the people are solidly behind him, and that there is no opposition to the regime." (Todd, pp. 8-9.)

Kuralt stated: "One other thing about Cuban agriculture: The counterrevolutionaries are doing their best to burn it up. On one 3-day trip into the countryside I was never out of sight of a towering column of smoke on the horizon or fields like this one, charred black \* \* \* It is becoming a major crisis, and the penalty for burning a cane field is death on the spot." (Eyewitness, p. 8.)

Collingwood also stated: "Those cane fields we saw were sabotaged by fire. How widespread is the anti-Castro opposition?"

Kuralt replied: "Well, there's a lot more grumbling, you know, than there is real outright counterrevolution, but there are counterrevolutionaries. Everybody in Cuba knows there are several bands of them in the Escambray Mountains—and I talked to some in Havana—not planning, I gather, for an invasion, another invasion, but for a Hungarian-type uprising which they're sure will come some day." (Eyewitness, p. 8.)

7. "There was no word, \* \* \* from Kuralt about the serious food shortage, \* \* \*" (Todd, p. 10).

Charles Collingwood asked Kuralt, "Has the standard of living sharply deteriorated since your last visit (in 1960)?"

Kuralt replied, "Oh, that it has, certainly has. You can only have five eggs a month now. That's the ration in all the cities, only three-quarters of a pound of meat every week, and only a small cake of soap. People are not eating very well. They're not living very well, especially in the cities." (Eyewitness, p. 4.)

8. "There was \* \* \* not a single reference to the innumerable cane burnings which were an important factor in lowering Cuban sugar production in the 1962 crop." (Todd, p. 10.)

As noted in No. 6 above, Kuralt and Collingwood both explicitly referred to the cane burnings by the counterrevolutionaries; Kuralt stated, "It is becoming a major crisis \* \* \*."

9. "There was nothing designed to be unpleasant to the Cuban Communist regime, \* \* \*" (Todd, p. 10.) See Kuralt's statement under No. 5 above.

10. "There was \* \* \* not a word about the economic and agricultural difficulties in Cuba." (Todd, p. 10.)

Kuralt explicitly stressed both the economic and agricultural difficulties. See No. 1 and 5(f) above.

In addition to Todd's characterizations of the broadcast itself, Todd sought to cast doubt on Kuralt in two other respects:

(a) Todd testified that Kuralt obtained a Cuban entry visa from the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington and that the Czechs "grant visas only to those U.S. newsmen who are believed to be favorable to the Cuban Communist cause \* \* \*" (Todd, pp. 1-2.)

The fact is that Kuralt's visa was issued not by the Czech Embassy in Washington, but by the Cuban Embassy in Brazil. As Mr. Todd noted, Canadian correspondents who have received visas from the Cuban Embassy in Canada have returned to Canada to write unfavorably about Cuba. (Todd, pp. 23-24.)

(b) Todd paraphrased at some length an article about Kuralt's visit in a Cuban Communist publication called Bohemia, which reported that Kuralt was cheered and which seems to have quoted Kuralt as saying that Eisenhower "wished to treat Cubans as a master does a slave without respecting our independence and sovereignty" and this "has been the origin of the deterioration of the relations between Cuba and the United States." (Todd, pp. 19-20.)

Mr. Kuralt hardly can control what the Communist press says. He states flatly that he did not express the sentiments attributed to him or engage in the activities described by "Bohemia." It is ironical that Mr. Todd should accept, without question, what appears in the Cuban Communist press. This is in sharp contrast to Mr. Kuralt's treatment of the Cuban Communist press. Immediately on his return in May, from Cuba, Mr. Kuralt taped a special "WCBS-TV Views the Press" broadcast on the Havana newspapers. Kuralt's opening statement was as follows:

"The press of Havana is very easy to read. You don't have to be on your guard for lapses away from objectivity or the subtle injection of propaganda into news stories, \* \* \*. You can relax, because you can read all these Havana papers, and you won't find a single objective line, and the injection of propaganda isn't subtle at all. Every word is propaganda \* \* \* every newspaper is owned by the state \* \* \* and the interest of the state trumpets at you from every page. \* \* \* For the Cuban people today, nothing happens except what the government decides can happen—and the only things the government decides can happen in the world are events which put the Communists in a good light, or on which a good light can be put. \* \* \* I suppose these papers are the ultimate example of the controlled press."

(FURTHER NOTE.—Todd testified that he wrote to Salant, president of CBS News, criticizing the Eyewitness broadcast and had not received a reply. Todd's letter was dated, June 25—exactly 1 month after the broadcast. Salant replied on July 17, 1962.<sup>1</sup>)

<sup>1</sup>In a letter to a member of the subcommittee staff, dated July 25, Mr. Todd said that on his return to Miami he found a letter from Mr. Salant, which was dated July 17, which, Mr. Todd said, was the day he left for Washington.

## APPENDIX VI

[Translation from the Spanish as printed in the Cuban magazine "Bohemia"]

## SIX JOURNALISTS FROM CAPITALISTIC COUNTRIES VISIT CUBA

(Text: Vicente Cubillas; Photographs: Marino Bueno)

"Certainly your stupid and brutal handling of Fidel Castro's Cuba—a firm policy which could hardly have been planned more carefully in order to succeed in establishing a Communistic beachhead in the Caribbean and what is more, another ideal situation to start a final world war—has us stuttering in our chorus of 'God Save America,' as I hope to explain to you tomorrow . . .

"What Mr. Diefenbaker ought to say, if he were more frank or inclined to reflect more faithfully the nature of his topics, is that we are not at all sure, in the first place, whether your embargo is for the purposes intended, that is: 'to reduce Castro's financial ability to spread his Revolution in the Western Hemisphere.'

"Finally, I suppose, it is not very friendly, but there are a few of us (particularly those of us who are designated by your newspapers, which are fond of placing us in such categories as 'pinkies') who are more inclined to think that the real purpose of the United States is simply to force Cuba to her knees so that she will be in the ideal position for the finishing touch . . . [the final destruction of Cuba].

"This cruel thought goes back to that dark day when Adlai Stevenson, a North American whom we had admired as no one else since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, appeared on our television screens with the announcement that the virtuous Government of the United States, our friends and old companions, would not even dream of an armed attack against Cuba . . .

"Apart from disappointment with Mr. Stevenson, the subsequent armed attack left us with a legacy of disillusion about North American honesty and integrity which still remains firm in us."

These things John Scott wrote in his widely read column of the Vancouver Sun, one of the daily newspapers having the greatest circulation in Canada, on Monday, February 12, 1962, in a letter to Ed Lahey, of the Chicago Daily News. Said column is reproduced in a number of Canadian newspapers and its broad coverage had turned Scott into one of the most well reputed international columnists in his country.

Jack Scott remained almost 2 weeks in Cuba, in the final lap of an itinerary which took him through various countries of South America, among them Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico.

The Canadian writer, who sincerely believes in the axiom that a good journalist has to travel in order to get a broader perspective of the world in which we live and the events of which he must relate to thousands, was able to get a glimpse of present-day Cuba by means of his zealous questioning of dozens of people active in the most divergent fields of endeavor in our country.

Food rationing, the salary scale, cultural and educational opportunities, revolutionary teachings, vacations for workers and farmers, agrarian and urban reforms—all these were topics about which the Canadian journalist persisted in his questioning.

In direct contact with students, professional people, former servants, workers, and farmers, Scott heard the truth about Cuba from their own lips.

When we found ourselves in the School for Domestic Servants, in Hotel Nacional, Jack interviewed a 16-year-old girl student in the presence of the instructress, Aracelia Sanchez, 21 years old, and herself a former domestic.

The girl explained to Scott that she worked in domestic service since she was 13 years old and that the Revolution had freed her from this servitude, giving her the opportunity to work out a better future.

"What irritates me," Scott told her "is that I have a daughter your age and she is more interested in Elvis Presley's songs and musicals in the movies than in political affairs. In Canada, my country, we begin to become concerned about politics when we are getting on toward 30 years."

Quickly, almost interrupting the journalist, Aracelia, the instructress who had been listening to the translation of Scott's words, replied peremptorily: "When he was 30, Fidel Castro was already in the Oriente mountains liberating his country. And last year at Giron Beach 14- and 15-year-olds shot down an enemy plane and fought furiously against the invaders."

Scott's face reflected the strong impression that the reply had made on him. And he continued in another direction:

"I have seen the people who go to the Ministry of Foreign Relations to get a passport, surely because they want to leave the country. What do you think about that?"

The student answered him:

"Those people do that because they are selfish and it bothers them because they no longer can enjoy special privileges and because everyone has the same opportunity in life now."

The Canadian returned to the task at hand:

"Do you think that rationing or food shortages will decrease the Revolutionary Government's popularity?"

The youngster, not losing her pleasant humor:

"Why don't you go and ask those people who are waiting for their passports? Perhaps they *do* think that there is rationing or shortages and they are worried about it. Since we always lacked everything, rationing [as such] does not exist for us. Now we are really eating and have good opportunities . . ."

That same day on El Salado, a public beach, a young doctor there on vacation gave Scott an opportunity to grasp another fact about Cuba:

"It's not that the doctors have left Cuba. What happens is that the Revolution has increased hospital services and now all classes of society, especially the poorest, really have the privilege of obtaining medical assistance and checkups on their health. Only six new hospitals are operating in Havana, aside from the Polyclinic and other services. And if we look into the interior of the country, the difference is like night and day. That's why we need more doctors." In the Rene Arcay henequen [fiber used for making rope] cooperative at Mariel, Scott visited the homes of the simple country people to see their living conditions and in order to question them.

In two of the houses there were refrigerators and he requested permission to peep inside of them. He found out that they were well stocked with food.

Arteaga, an employee of the henequen factory since 1954, informed him:

"Before we really were hungry here. A slaughtered animal hung on the hooks or in the slaughterhouse cold-storage locker for 15 days because meat was a luxury. There was no money to buy it. Now we slaughter two animals a week and they hardly last an afternoon on the hook. Here meat is not rationed and there is no ration book because we distribute food appropriately among the families of the cooperative."

There Scott saw new houses, almost finished, where the people of the cooperative will make their homes.

On the following day in Jose Marti Elementary School (for scholarship students in Santa Maria del Mar) the Vancouver journalist chatted with refugee Cuban children [sic], whose parents had to leave the United States because the FBI and CIA made their life unbearable. The son of Robert Williams, North American Negro leader exiled with his family in Cuba, stated to Scott:

"Do you think that in Monroe, N.C., I would be able to sit down at a table as I do here next to a white girl and share toys and studies with her? Do you think so? For me, Cuba is the only place in the world. And that I know very well."

During the entire time that he was in our country, Jack Scott, well known Canadian columnist, was always bumping into truths similar to those commented upon here.

"Will you put them in your column?"

2

Charles Kuralt also talked with the domestics. He filmed and recorded scenes with scholarship students at the School for Art Instructors, in Miramar. He lived in Varadero with a working-class family on vacation. He put on a "pachanga" hat [Cuban-style straw hat] and wanted to "twist" in the carnival [before Lent] festivities of Cienfuegos. He cut sugarcane in the fields around the old Soledad sugar mill. And at Giron Beach he visited spots where mercenaries sent by his Government landed to attack our country which now had ceased being "their" country.

Kuralt is a reporter-cameraman for the Columbia Broadcasting System and came to Cuba to make a half-hour documentary film for CBS-New York which will be transmitted by TV "from coast to coast."

Gerardo Lopez, lineman for the Antonio Guiteras electric company situated in Manicaragua, Las Villas, told him that he had started to work for the old company 15 years ago, earning 130 pesos.

"I have been earning 320 pesos monthly for the last 2 years," he informed Kuralt. "And this is the first time in my life that I've been able to vacation with my wife and children in Varadero, thanks to the Revolutionary Government."

In Cienfuegos one Saturday night while the men ("Pioneros") covered the Star [of the carnival] and her court with bouquets of flowers, fireworks lit up the place with luminous slashes of color, groups of players marched to the enticing music, and thousands of people from Cienfuegos indulged in explosive and contagious merriment. Charles Kuralt commented:

"They didn't tell us about this there before we came here to Cuba."

And his bright eye grew bigger as he looked at those people—threatened by Yankee imperialists on all sides—shrug off their cares and laugh with all their might.

But when the photographer, who was born in Charlotte, N.C., in one of those places where a Negro is worth less than a dog, heard the ovation from the public when they announced his name by loudspeaker, the camera almost slid from his hands and he could not refrain from making this impassioned comment:

"Who would think that this could happen to a North American newspaperman in present-day Cuba?"

The following day, Sunday, Kuralt was cutting [sugar] cane. There he saw a group of young teachers from Cienfuegos district taking away the burned sugarcane. There he conversed with two youths who teach in Manduro, in the heart of Escambray.

"Do you have a problem up there with thefts?" he wanted to know.

"From the 'lies' we hear when we come to the city, we learn that there are thefts," they replied.

And Charles picked up the "mocha" [Cuban machete, shorter and more straight than curved] and cut [the sugarcane] way down. . . .

On the way back to Giron, where his camera caught views of places tread upon by the invaders, Kuralt chatted with two protagonists of the historical episode which marks the first defeat on American soil of the imperialistic Yankee forces.

"There in that marsh," a boy told him, "we saw 20 parachutists sink. And a truck passed by us carrying the corpses of those women and children which the planes machinegunned. . . ."

Just after dinner when we were chatting at Largo Beach, Kuralt condemned Eisenhower's errors with respect to Cuba. He said that the Yankee diplomatic note on agrarian reform (in which the General from Abilene wanted to deal with the Cubans as master to slave without respecting our independence and sovereignty) had been the beginning of deterioration in Cuban-North American relations. He tried to make us believe that Kennedy, if he had been President at that time, would have avoided the crisis in a less drastic manner.

Charles Kuralt has already returned to the United States.

Will he report the truth about us?

## 3

"They" wanted to enter or satisfy their curiosity about the cottage that Jose Garcia occupied at El Salado public beach, of INIT, on the north coast between La Havana and Mariel.

"They" were Ruth Shelton, North American, editor for the technical magazine World Petroleum and The Saturday Evening Post; Willem Leonard Brugsma, Dutch, of the GPD-Press news syndicate; Gavin David Young, English, representing The Observer of London; and Rudolph Hafter, Swiss, director of the important Zurich newspaper, New Zurcker [sic].

Garcia, a simple and pleasant bus driver, invited them to enter.

"How much do you pay for this cottage?" Ruth asked him.

"Six dollars a day."

"And how many people live in it?"

"Five."

A delightful aroma was emanating from the kitchen of the cottage. Ruth, just like a woman, wanted to poke around a little more.

"What are you cooking?" she inquired from Garcia's wife.

"Turkey. I'm making it fricassee style."

"Well, it smells so good!"

In the living room of the cottage, the other three journalists chatted with the family's children.

They asked Garcia how much money he earned.

"About 8 pesos a day."

"Is it your only income?"

"No. I also get a little more driving a private bus on special trips."

"And this vacation? Or isn't this your vacation?"

"Half and half. I have a rest from the buses and I brought my family here for a week. I spend the morning with them at the beach and at noon I go to another job."

Garcia wanted to show him one of the four-peso cottages, equipped with a refrigerator and a gas kitchen. We went there.

"Somebody else in the family lives here. My cousin, with his wife and son."

More questions from the foreign journalists. It was their first direct contact in the city with the people of modest circumstances.

## 4

From the beach we went to Menelao Mora town-farm ("granja") and visited the poultry section. The four were surprised to ascertain that there were 48,000 leghorn hens in 30 structures. They checked average [production] tables and ascertained that egg production amounts to 25,000 daily.

Young wanted to know the reason for this production, and an employee explained that it was for reproductive purposes, and that the eggs were sent to incubators to a nearby town for hatching.

"And why not send all this poultry and eggs to Havana in order to remedy the shortage?" the Englishman asked ironically.

"Do you know the story of the hen and the golden eggs? Young, my friend?" was our reply.

## 5

A half hour later we inspected all sections of the Orlando Nodarse sugar mill in Mariel.

Except for Brugema, the Dutchman, none of the group had ever seen one of these industries in full production.

On the initial trip several workers accompanied us to the conductor [conveyor belt], while the cars of [sugar] cane were emptied there.

Hafter observed that there was some burnt cane and a worker explained to him that it could still be used, since only a small percentage was lost when it is burned.

"Sabotage?" asked the Swiss.

"Perhaps," replied the worker. "But they could not affect the production, since we're going to exceed the goal."

The four visitors tried the well-chilled fermented cane liquor and the still warm sugarcane from a sack before being sewn up.

"This is our sugar," he told them, using the person in charge of the department who accompanied us as an interpreter. "Our principal wealth and the reason for our present battle is the 'Peoples' Crop No. II' [refers to the sugarcane crop and production]. Write in your newspapers that you have visited a Cuban sugar mill, and that you have seen the workers cutting cane there and making sugar in order to overcome the imperialism which is attacking us, and which encourages and pays traitors who want to destroy that wealth."

## 6

Soroa, the beautiful mountain residence which the INIT converted into a wonderful recreation and vacation center, was to the liking of Ruth, Willem, Rudolph, and Gavin.

The original construction of its cottages, its fine appointments, the large pool, the orchids, the scenery, finally created a wonderful impression on the four.

The typical luncheon of the country, washed down by a drink of rum and pineapple juice, also pleased them.

For a long time after lunch we chatted about various topics: the weather; Ruth Shelton's reporting visits to petroleum-producing countries; Hafter's recent tour of several [Latin] American countries, although he didn't want to comment upon his impressions of the trip; Young's worries about being back in Havana at 7 p.m. to keep a date.

An hour later we found ourselves in the Los Pinos town farm in San Cristobal, Pinar del Rio.

The ultramodern dairy recently inaugurated there with a thousand milk cows captured the visitors' attention.

The electrically operated milking equipment, as well as the workers' facility in operating it, evoked praise from the newspapermen.

When we were leaving the milking plant we noticed that the workers had organized a flash political meeting.

In less than 5 minutes they had exchanged impressions on the nomination of the new delegate for the syndicate [a sort of a labor union] and agreed to meet the following day, Saturday, so as not to interrupt their work.

The journalists wished to chat with the worker who was addressing his companions.

Pleased, he consented.

Their questions rained upon him. Was he a Communist? And his companions [were they]? What did he understand by the term "socialism"? Did they think the day would come when everyone would earn the same salary and have the same benefits for all jobs? What is the difference between Soviet-type farms ("solvjoses") and collective farms ("kolvjoses")? Or between town farms and cooperatives? Did they feel happy to live under a socialistic régime?

Not losing his smile and with complete authority, the worker replied to all the questions. He carried on a debate with Hafter, the most insistent questioner, perhaps because he was the most bourgeois of the four. The Swiss got the impression that he was before a crystal gazer who was trying to foretell his future, because the day will come when even Switzerland will do away with the bourgeoisie.

The one questioned related how Los Pinos was in former times—a farm with hundreds of horses where only 12 men worked tending the livestock and now there were 1,300 workers in more diversified activities. He showed them the new town of 500 houses built for the workers' families by the Revolutionary Government which they will be able to live in without paying rent, light, or water bills. There was also a free school for their children and many more benefits. He spoke of the fabulous crops of different kinds of fruits which have been grown in the town farm; of breeding pigs and raising poultry and livestock, of the tomato-canning equipment. He spoke of the new system of planting tomatoes with water, the only one of its kind existing in Cuba, with the production of which has been increasing for years.

Finally, he spoke of the fact of now living in a truly free country.

"What is better than knowing that you have been really freed from wretchedness?" he finished.

Hafter could not conceal his disgust. The humble farmer who before had been a victim, had not become a party to victimizing others, and passed the interrogation with flying colors.

"This fellow must be the 'commissar.' He knows all the answers," the Swiss commented scornfully.

Speaking to us aside, Brugsma, the Dutchman, asked us to excuse his companion's rudeness.

7

Back in Havana on the main road the traffic slowed down in order to make way for artillery units which were returning to their base after maneuvers in the province. The artillerymen, the majority of them adolescents, saluted as they went by, smiling.

The journalists were impressed by the military equipment. Young and Brugsma amused themselves discussing the probable milimeters [range] of the battery of howitzers.

In a single very active day they had seen the two aspects of socialist Cuba: the country which works, builds its future, is overcoming imperialism by the battle of production, and the country which takes cannon out of the mothballs, preparing to confront the threats of military aggression, with its guard up and a steady pulse.

They saw it with their own eyes, and came into direct contact with that truth which Cuba does not hide from the eyes of the world.

---

APPENDIX VII

STATEMENT OF HENDRIK J. BERNIS

AUGUST 7, 1962.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, to say that I was dumbfounded and horrified by the statements made to you by Mr. Carlos Todd about me and my work, would be the understatement of my life. Particularly since, like Mr. Todd, I came here not only as a refugee from a totalitarian regime, but as the victim of such a regime, and I cannot possibly think of any worse accusations against my character and loyalty.

To undermine democracy, and all America stands for, would be like biting the hand that feeds you or turning into the sinister assassin of the person who saved your life.

I came here fresh from the jail cells of Mr. Hitler, and I came here because America had always been my dream.

Furthermore, I came here only through very great fortune—an American Foreign Service officer, Mr. Robert Wilson, who was then a consular official in Buenos Aires, considered me worthy of future American citizenship, and facilitated my immigration even though I had no money and no affidavit.

I am putting this ahead of my comments to Mr. Todd's accusations because it seems to me that this and the rest of my life are proof in fact that what Mr. Todd alleges to be true could not possibly be true.

To begin with, I was born in Germany, went to college and to the University of Berlin, and attempted to work my way through both by writing and working at the same time for a variety of newspapers.

When Hitler came to power in 1933 I lost my right to further education as well as my job and had to flee the country.

I lived for 2 years in France and then found it necessary, because of the severe French unemployment, to move on to Austria where, in March 1938, the Nazis caught up with me again.

They took me back to Berlin and imprisoned me because they found articles which I had written, extolling the virtues of democracy, and correspondence indicating that I had tried desperately to get out of Europe and to the United States.

I finally fled Germany in August 1938 and only by the device of a round-trip ticket to Paraguay because all other avenues to escape were closed by then.

The Government of Paraguay smuggled me to Argentina where I then met the American consular staff and where Mr. Wilson, in extraordinary kindness, was so impressed by my tale and what I represented that he enabled me to get the documentation permitting my trip to the United States.

I arrived in New York on January 17, 1939, and, with the help of a former Austrian friend, went to work as a laborer in a Maine factory. After about 2 years of the usual odd jobs of the immigrant, and the proper study of the language, I returned to newspaper work with the Gannett papers of Maine in 1941.

In 1942 I developed the idea of a radio program called "Voice of Humanity," a regular feature of station WCOU in Lewiston, Maine. I offered the idea to the State Department because it seemed to me that America represented humanity and needed a voice abroad. Out of this idea came, eventually, what is known as The Voice of America.

When the Army rejected me, for physical reasons, I made some frantic efforts to join the war in a different capacity. When the Office of War Information needed bilingual newspapermen for its overseas branch, I was only too happy to be of service.

After a brief term of service in New York and Washington, I went to London as the principal editor of the combined American-British news operation. From there I went to Luxembourg, Frankfurt, and Vienna.

Immediately after the war I became editor and publisher of the American Daily in Vienna which I developed into what is today the largest Austrian newspaper.

When I returned to civilian life in May 1946, I became managing editor of The Bangor Commercial in Bangor, Maine. I left that paper in May 1948, to become part of the Miami Herald for the next 10 years. Subsequently I joined the Miami News, where I have worked ever since.

In these years I held a variety of newspaper executive jobs that demanded not only the corresponding talent, but also the devotion to integrity and responsibility without which one can neither discharge these duties properly nor retain such long-term employment.

Also in these years, I won a number of awards, two of which I am particularly proud of:

One was the only Brotherhood Award given to a newspaperman in 1957 by the National Conference of Christians and Jews for the most outstanding contribution to the cause of brotherhood.

The second one was a \$5,000 fellowship for a study of Latin America by the New York Herald Tribune, a study which I undertook in 1958.

I might say that I was one of six newspapermen selected from 400 contestants in the United States to win such a fellowship and that I won it because of my previous trips to Latin America as a foreign correspondent for the Miami Herald. The Chicago Daily News and other syndicated papers.

Some of these articles were cited in Congress for their factuality and assessment of the situation in Latin America. Among the men who introduced them in the Congressional Record were John F. Kennedy, who was then a member of the U.S. Senate, and Senator George Smathers.

In general terms I might say that I went into journalism to contribute whatever I could to progress in this world and better human understanding and human relations and to uphold the principle and the ideas for which this country stands and in which I firmly and deeply believe.

I believe that I have been guided by this and only this ambition in my newspaper work, in my radio work and in all my public speeches. And I believe that you will find this borne out by the public record of them.

I shall now turn to my encounter with Mr. Carlos Todd:

I met Mr. Todd for the first time on Saturday, June 23, 1962, when I was invited by WGBS, which carries my commentaries, to discuss with him the Cuban situation which certainly concerns every American and particularly those of us who live with it daily in Miami.

We taped a program called "Perspective" and you will find the full transcript of that half-hour program attached herewith as exhibit A.

The program was aired at 6:30 p.m. Sunday, June 24, 1962, and I think you will find from studying the transcript that Mr. Todd and I had a basic disagreement.

Mr. Todd expressed the belief that Mr. Castro came to power by default of the United States in its relations with and backing of Mr. Batista; that Mr. Castro remains in power because the United States has failed to act properly and that, therefore, the end of Mr. Castro must be the responsibility of the United States.

I expressed the belief that Mr. Castro came to power as a consequence of Batista and because the majority of the Cuban people fell for his slogans and that the end of Mr. Castro will be brought about only by the concerted effort of the people in Cuba, the exiles and the free world.

Since I had done broadcasts on Cuba before and the problem of American guilt has been a most outstanding one in our region, I did two broadcasts on Cuba on June 26 and 27. The scripts of which are attached herewith as exhibits B and C.

In these scripts I tried to make the point that no one, particularly not I, could possibly lack compassion for the sufferings of the Cuban people under communism and the exiles who are living as refugees and homeless in our midst.

But I also said that I believe in the correctness of the administration policy which is trying to do all it can to make Mr. Castro hang himself.

Furthermore, I made the point that it is correct that we must battle communism and Castro and that we differ only about the methods and the means and that it seems to me that we would be foolish to start a war against Cuba as many exiles want us to, when the center of the enemy is the Kremlin.

At no time did I attack Mr. Todd.

At no time could I have possibly touted the Castro line, nor that of communism.

But at all times did I feel free to differ with Mr. Todd in viewpoint and opinion.

It is clear to me that anyone taking segments out of my script for purposeful interpretation can make out of these segments (as one can with any manuscript) the tool for attack which one desires.

However, I believe that anyone reading the full scripts of both programs can only come, in fairness, to the conclusion that they do not represent either an attack on the person of Mr. Todd, of whom I know nothing, nor a defense of Castroism or communism.

In conclusion, I would like to say that I am absolutely heartbroken that evidently the time has come, even in America, where the honest difference of opinion can lead to the most serious accusation of a man who has all the frailties other men have, but whose entire life and record prove only an upright and, at times, even daring and dangerous stand for the principles of democracy and freedom and against the ruthlessness of totalitarian regimes.

I say I am heartbroken because, as a matter of fact, it is a courageous expression of the honest opinion and the honest dissent which have made America great.

I hope that you will be kind enough to forgive me for the fact that I could not appear in person and permit this statement to go into the record of your hearings.

And I may add that I have never been, of course, a member of the Communist Party or a Communist organization or any subversive organization as listed by the Attorney General.

I have never even been a member of any political organization whatsoever.

Most respectfully yours,

HENDRIK J. BERNS.

EXHIBIT A

SUNDAY, JUNE 24, 1962.

PERSPECTIVE PROGRAM

Panel: Hendrik Berns, Carlos Todd, Jay Mallin, Robert Martin, Spencer Danes. BERNS. Well, I hope that Mr. Mallin and Mr. Todd can enlighten me a bit on the situation in Cuba.

TODD. The situation in Cuba today seems to be getting worse as the bubbles of revolt come up to the top of the boiling stew that Castro has created there. Although we have had reports on television lately here and the press that everything is fine in the island, this has been entirely disproved by the admittances of Fidel Castro himself, and also of his other outlaws who work with him, that there is a tremendous shortage of basic foods in the island, so much so, that this succeeded in erupting in a very large demonstration in the city of Cardenas last Saturday, so large was the demonstration, and so alarmed became the authorities that they had to send three battalions of troops down there supported by tanks, Russian Migs, rockets, and all manner of armaments. It started as a small affair; people banging pots and pans and shouting in the streets, "we are hungry" and it ended up with practically the entire town out in the streets protesting against the Government.

DANES. Was this in Matanzas, Carlos?

TODD. This is near Matanzas. It's in the Province of Matanzas \* \* \* it's the town of Cardenas \* \* \* actually is quite close to the sea \* \* \* it's a seaport town and it's right near the famous beach at Veradero.

MARTIN. Spencer, I'd like to clarify one point on Carlos Todd that not only the Cuban Information Service today because he is in exile from his homeland, but Carlos is probably the leading Latin American newspaperman prior to Castro because he has been on the scene all his life, haven't you Carlos?

TODD. I have been where?

MARTIN. Been on the scene down there?

TODD. Oh yes; I am a Cuban, I was born in Havana.

MARTIN. So that I want to make that clear that this isn't just something that's happened since the exile \* \* \* this has been your whole life \* \* \* disseminating the news.

TODD. Oh no; I mean I practically spent all of my adult life in Cuba and started writing against Castro you might say, in January 1959.

MARTIN. But I think you would have an introspective view of the question that's bothering me as to why there is such effort given to painting a good, glori-

ous picture of Cuba such as Charles Kuralt brought out and Hlavacek brought out. On the other hand the Government itself disputes all this by their utterances to their own public. How do you feel is a recompense for this? Is this two different directions they're going or is it part of the confusion they try to sow?

TODD. It's part of the confusion they try to sow and there's another thing \* \* \* that most people don't consider in Cuban communism \* \* \* there is an enormous amount of stupidity and you have this article here in Bohemia magazine, which is published in Havana, which places Mr. Kuralt in a very favorable light. In fact it's a panegyric to Mr. Kuralt. Mr. Kuralt went down there to take pictures for Columbia Broadcasting Co. \* \* \* Columbia Broadcasting System. I don't know whether he went down there to do it or have his picture taken. Because the article is full of his pictures. Then Mr. Kuralt makes the assertion when he gets back here that there was no unrest in Cuba and yet the magazine describes him as cutting cane in the field and lifting the burned cane to the carts \* \* \* to the sugar carts \* \* \* now, if there is no opposition to Castro, who burned the cane? This is ridiculous.

MARTIN. We have had for example, just this weekend, as a matter of fact, they've threatened force in Mantanzas against the Castro guerrillas who constantly are killing, burning, and sacking that which they can get their hands on. I'd like to ask Jay as a representative of Time magazine \* \* \* what is the overall philosophy of your publication in looking at the Cuban situation today. Jay do you reflect it for the magazine or when you pass the reflection on do they re-edit it to fit what they believe to be the image? How does it work?

MALLIN. No; I report things as I see them \* \* \* then if I have the same viewpoint \* \* \* if I can substantiate it with enough details and information, the magazine will usually go along with me on anything. If I want to prove that there is unrest in Cuba, if I can prove it with details, they'll go along with me on that. I can't just express an opinion and then just expect them to publish it \* \* \* they won't do that.

DANES. How long has it been, Jay, since Time has had some sort of a representation in the island itself?

MALLIN. Well, I was the last one out and I left on May 7 of last year.

DANES. Last year.

MALLIN. That's right. They've had people go in very briefly but not more than for a period of 2 weeks \* \* \* any one of them.

MARTIN. Don't you find that it's rather difficult for one person who goes in and only spends a period of 2 weeks and comes out with any kind of a clarification of the picture \* \* \* isn't it just what he is subjected to in that period of time, doesn't it take more than 2 weeks to get a true picture of what's going on in the island today because, as Carlos says, because of the confusion and stupidity?

MALLIN. Well, it does. Unfortunately the Cuban Government will not allow anyone into the island for more than a period of a week or two that isn't pro-Communist. What I mean to say is that it is \* \* \* let's say a neutral newsman or one who's completely American or, I don't mean that, but who has an anti-Communist viewpoint might get a visa for a week or two but they won't allow you in longer. But going back to your original subject I'd like to point out that the NBC correspondent got a visa for 5 months and he's the only American that did.

MARTIN. I was just about to ask you that \* \* \* Hlavacek was there much longer than 2 weeks.

MALLIN. He had been there for 5 months \* \* \* yes; and I think Kuralt was there for at least a month. I may be in error, and since we're talking about the newsmen, I'd like to refer to this article in Bohemia again, it mentions that Kuralt was applauded at a carnival in Cuba. Well, when I was a newsman in Cuba they were not applauding American newsmen \* \* \* unless you represented the Daily Worker. [Laughter.]

TODD. One thing to get down to Cuba, any correspondent must obtain his visa here from the Czechoslovak Embassy. Now the Embassy is perfectly well alerted as to the sympathies of different newsmen in the States and grants the visas accordingly. You think the case of Carl Migdale who went down for U.S. News & World Report and came back with a true picture of Cuba, much to the surprise of the people of Cuba, but Migdale I understand went into Cuba from Mexico so he obtained his Cuban visa from the Cuban Embassy in Mexico who, perhaps, was not as well alerted as the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington.

BERNS. Are the embassies representing the Western Powers in Cuba filing any confidential reports that are accessible and are compared with the reports that you have?

TODD. The Western embassies in Cuba have a very difficult position there. To begin with, they are completely shut off from all activity, all governmental receptions, all governmental meetings \* \* \* any kind of official activity is closed to them. Their citizens are hounded, literally so; I had occasion here to talk to a chap who's with a Western embassy down there. He came up for Christmas, last Christmas, in order to get some food for Christmas, as he put it \* \* \* some Cuban food because he couldn't get it down there and he told me that his life was \* \* \* well they didn't do anything to him but they made it a constant hounding the same way as they do, let's say an American diplomat in Moscow who's followed around and hounded \* \* \* and his telephone is tapped, and so forth. They do have their confidential reports but I suppose that if the Government receives those confidential reports, it's not about to make them public the way that a news agency would.

Furthermore, you have over 100,000 Cuban refugees and have more who are arriving every day who will tell you the same story. It's very strange that you have 100,000 people, all of them saying the same story, and still they're not believed.

MALLIN. You don't mean all?

TODD. They're not believed by some people \* \* \*

MALLIN. Oh, OK. \* \* \*

MARTIN. I wanted to ask Jay in light of the area in which we are going in the conflicting reports that Toronto Star gives us one story, U.S. News & World Report corroborates it \* \* \* then we have the opposite viewpoint \* \* \* what do you attribute this to \* \* \* do you attribute this to a personal reaction \* \* \* do you attribute it to political leanings in the eyes of the reporter \* \* \* or do you feel that this was a setup going in?

MALLIN. Well, I think that you know that seven or eight newsmen have gone in \* \* \* American citizens \* \* \* have gone into Cuba since the invasion of last year. And I believe with the exception of Carl Migdale, whom Carlos just mentioned, all of them have come out with stories that could not be called anti-Castro, at least not too strongly anti-Castro, which seems to establish a pattern that those were given visas usually are given visas for a reason by the Czech Embassy.

BERNS. Then you mean to say that out of seven American newsmen who went to Cuba there was not a single newspaperman with integrity enough and honesty enough to come back with the true story of Cuba?

MALLIN. Well, one did. Carl Migdale \* \* \* and the others seemed to be disputed by the facts and since the two most recent are Kuralt and Hlavacek I don't think there's much doubt that the events since then have given the lie to their reports. Most of them had reported that things were improving in Cuba and we've had riots for 2 weeks now.

BERNS. I just want to ask one more question \* \* \* have you seen the report from an Associated Press reporter out of Havana filed a week ago and published in the Miami Herald?

MALLIN. Which was that? Which story was that?

BERNS. A story to the effect that while there is no doubt about it that there's rationing in Cuba and that people are not living as well as they did before \* \* \* nobody is going hungry and that Castro still seems to be in control and that while the picture is gray and not exactly cheerful, it would be a folly to believe that there is any serious uprising in the making or that this thing is going to blow over in short order. Have you seen that piece?

MALLIN. I know that story to which you are referring and all I can do in answer to that is to say that when a town of 10,000 or 20,000 people in the city of Cardenas risk themselves to go out in the streets yelling they are hungry, I think I can believe them and not the AP story. Particularly since the demonstrations have spread to at least six other towns since last Saturday that we know of, and perhaps more that we don't know about.

TODD. Well the AP story wasn't datelined Havana, anyway. It did not originate from Havana \* \* \* it was an AP report \* \* \*

BERNS. But it was datelined Havana.

TODD. It was datelined Havana?

BERNS. Yes, sir.

MALLIN. Well then \* \* \*

BERNS. It had the byline of a new Havana correspondent on it.

MALLIN. Well, the thing is, nothing can come out of Havana that isn't censored anyway.

TODD. Aside from that there seems to be a definite pattern to the reports of all these gentlemen \* \* \* a similarity \* \* \* They all seem to agree on something.

TODD. And they all seem to agree on the same things. Contrary to the public utterances of the Communist leaders in Cuba, and the Communist leaders in Cuba get up and tell the people that they recognize that there is a very serious scarcity of food \* \* \* as a matter of fact, just this week Carlos Raphael Rodriguez, who is the head of Cuban Institute of Agrarian Reform, which is the whole productive body in Cuba, admitted that the sugar crop was a failure, admitted that something would have to be done about the serious scarcities. In Moscow Blas Roca, who's the head of the Communist Party in Cuba speaking in Russia, said that something had to be done instantly to supply the necessities of the Cuban people. To me that means that there is a very definite scarcity of food in Cuba. People that I have met just this week, who arrived from Cuba, all complained of the same thing—they're not getting enough to eat. And these people are not going to come up here and tell me that just for the foolish notion of it. Everybody from Havana says the same thing.

MALLIN. It may not be that anyone is starving down there but when you eat rice and beans two and three meals a day, it sort of wears on you after a few weeks.

BERNS. Well, I'm just trying to get at the truth of the matter and I must say in defense of the American newspapermen, whoever they may be, who have been sort of linked here with a mysterious pattern, that you can also speak of a pattern on the part of the Cuban refugees. I mean, they are also saying the same thing and still \* \* \* I mean as an American I'm sitting here and I have in front of me two sides that are as different as black and white. And among the American newspapermen there was a man on the staff of General MacArthur and I'm completely puzzled by the situation.

SEVERAL VOICES \* \* \*

MALLIN. Just a moment \* \* \* the fact that he's on the staff of General MacArthur doesn't make him an expert in Cuba and the fact that he's a general doesn't even attest his loyalty.

BERNS. I didn't say that. But all I want you to tell me is that you haven't been in Cuba since last May.

MALLIN. That's right.

BERNS. And your reports come consequently through some channels \* \* \* the credibility of which I respect but you don't seem to respect the credibility of these American newspapermen \* \* \* now what, for instance, Ian Glass, who was in Cuba during the trial of the prisoners and who wrote similar stories, I mean you know we, we—

MALLIN. Who are you going to believe—these seven American newsmen?

BERNS. I don't know.

MALLIN. Are the events that are taking place in Cuba or the speech by Dorticos—

BERNS. I don't know.

MALLIN. [Mumbling.]

TODD. Why does the Cuban President go on national television, why do they give a parade of the armed forces in Caracas—in Cardenas, rather—outrageous show of force to intimidate the population, and why do they threaten to go out and shoot people on the streets if the demonstrations continue?

BERNS. Let me ask you a question?

TODD. This came out on Cuban television.

BERNS. All right, let me ask you a question \* \* \* you say that they went to Cardenas with rockets.

TODD. Yes, rockets \* \* \*

BERNS. For what would they need rockets against \* \* \*

TODD. I don't mean ICBM's, I mean rockets that you use in the battlefields.

BERNS. Uh ha [yes].

TODD. They used to call them Cartucho during the war \* \* \*. They are mortar rockets instead of using an explosive charge as a rocket charge to get off the ground. But you brought up this general.

BERNS. Uh huuuuu.

TODD. General Hester is his name. As Jay said, the fact that he was in MacArthur's staff doesn't mean anything. As a retired brigadier—

MARTIN. Doesn't mean anything related to this subject.

TODD. This subject \* \* \* exactly.

As a retired brigadier general, it doesn't make him a good newspaperman. He, in 1957, this general, in the issue of Political Affairs, an official Communist Party monthly, carried a letter to the editor, signed by him, which said, in reference to a ban the bomb, you make a splendid case of sanity international relations. Again he appeared in November 6, 1961, in the National Guardian (classified as a subversive publication) where he said Britain, France, and the United States have no moral or legal rights in West Berlin. On November 14, 1961, General Hester wrote to the New York Times or was reported in the New York Times, as attending a rally sponsored by the National Council for Soviet American Friendship and that he advocated a limited world government. The council is classified by the Government as a subversive organization. On November 1961 the issue of the New World Review (also classified as a subversive publication) carried an article by Hester in which he declared that the 1948 Berlin blockade was provoked by unfair American actions and that the recent Soviet resumption of the atomic test was predictable reaction to President Kennedy's call up of many additional draftees. Obviously this man is a Soviet sympathizer. He is nothing else.

BERNS. You mean to say then that the North American Newspaper Alliance which sent him to Cuba on a special assignment was not aware of this man's background?

TODD. Very easily could happen \* \* \* the North American Newspaper Alliance may be a great press agency but it does not have an intelligence service.

BERNS. Well, you don't have to have an intelligence service if these facts are correct and if these facts have been published.

TODD. Somebody.

BERNS. You don't need an intelligence service.

TODD. Somebody took the trouble to dig them up \* \* \* apparently NANA didn't. That's very possible. It's also the heads of CBS and NBC did not realize that the men that they were sending down to Cuba were also sympathetic to the Castro cause.

BERNS. I don't want to monopolize this conversation but I want to ask you one more question. Isn't it correct that they have the most severe economic difficulty in the Soviet Union today?

TODD. Yes.

BERNS. All right—so the difficulty in economics doesn't prove anything, does it? The Communist empire is unfortunately still continuing to operate and nobody denies the fact that you have severe economic difficulties in Cuba mainly because of our American embargo and the action at Punte del Este. And the fact that Mr. Kennedy has been able to prevail on some other nations to refrain from buying sugar from Cuba. So the economic pincer has been effective and is becoming more effective every day.

MALLIN. I question this about blaming the embargo for Cuba's difficulties particularly since this week Carlos Rafael Rodriguez said the sugar crop was under 5 million tons, not because of embargo, because embargo doesn't affect the crop at all, but because of one the drought, and second, of all of their own errors and the incredible mistakes that they made. He cited the fact that 10,000 cabs of sugar land were plowed under. Used fruitlessly by the Government. This has nothing to do with the U.S. embargo. This is plain mismanagement by the Cuban Government.

BERNS. I understand that. I understand that.

MARTIN. I think the thing you've been searching for the last 2 or 3 weeks \* \* \* the truth out of all this \* \* \* still comes back to the main point of what can be done in the future to alleviate the problem, to roll back the curtain of communism and to, in some way, unite those who want to go back and regain the land of Cuba. I think we can discuss points of view coming out by individuals but the meat of this entire thing is: what is the meaning and what is it all leading to. This, I think, is the thing we are searching for. Is there an answer? Do you see an answer from your point of view \* \* \* do you, Jay, from your point of view see an answer to unify the effort to fight communism, to wipe it off the map of the Western Hemisphere and get Cuba back into the fold of a free world so they have a voice in how they want their country run?

MALLIN. Are you presuming that Cuba can only be freed by uniting exiles. In other words the freedom of Cuba depends on exiles alone?

MARTIN. I don't know this \* \* \*.

MALLIN. All right.

MARTIN. I don't know that by uniting \* \* \* I think uniting the exiles has to be a large contributing force to making Cuba free again.

MALLIN. The exiles are all united in their desire to overthrow the Government \* \* \*. Whether all of them are willing to do something may be another factor \* \* \* the decisions, the split is political here in Miami \* \* \* but even if they were all united what are 100,000 exiles going to do unless somebody enables them to arm and train themselves.

MARTIN. That's a reflection I want to get from you. Do you find an answer to the question you pose?

MALLIN. Yes, the answer lies in the U.S. policy. Where else; it can't lie anywhere else.

BERNS. Do you think the answer lies in the suggestion by Mr. Smathers that the U.S. Government permit establishment of an exiled government in Cuba?

MALLIN. This would be a step \* \* \* this is not the solution \* \* \*. This is one route that could be followed \* \* \* basically it amounts to one thing \* \* \* whether the United States is \* \* \* amounts to two things \* \* \* either the United States will move in militarily or else enable the Cubans to do it by training them and arming them and giving them the ships to do it with.

BERNS. How could the United States move into Cuba militarily without a violation of the principles of the Constitution of the United States and the Monroe Doctrine and a great many other principles we allegedly stand for.

MALLIN. No, the Constitution says nothing about intervention \* \* \* in any other country \* \* \* the Constitution purely is an internal document \* \* \* as for the Monroe Doctrine \* \* \* the whole idea of the Monroe Doctrine was to keep out European powers from the Western Hemisphere. Certainly it was not meant to keep the United States from moving in.

BERNS. In other words you don't think the United States of America in all its history has always stood for a policy that bars it from a war without having been attacked?

MALLIN. Well the question is \* \* \* what you mean by attacked \* \* \* in some ways we haven't been attacked. In other ways we've been threatened \* \* \* I'd like to ask you this. Under your thinking \* \* \* we probably should not have moved into Thailand either. Is that right? I mean we haven't been attacked or anything.

BERNS. We haven't gone to war in Thailand, we have gone to Thailand to protect the Thai Government against any spilling over of the war that went on in Laos. That's an entirely different situation.

MALLIN. To protect the Thai Government from falling to communism.

BERNS. That's right.

MALLIN. Well, if we're willing to go some thousand miles to fight communism \* \* \* to keep the Communists out of there, how come we allow them to stay 90 miles away?

BERNS. But we are confronted in Cuba with a fait accompli and in Thailand the Thai Government is a neighbor to a country that was in trouble and confronted with Communist aggression. In order to secure that land against the situation we sent our troops there. We had no such opportunity in Cuba.

DANES. Let me ask you this, Hendrik, should the situation in the Dominican Republic become more critical than it is today, should the uprising we've heard about in the past weeks and months there become more prevalent, would it be the same type of a situation as Thailand \* \* \* should we move in there?

BERNS. I don't think we can move into any country unless the country asks us to move in. We have no such rights.

TODD. This business about fait accompli that you mentioned interests me because under that assumption every time that the Communists conquer a country it becomes a fait accompli; therefore, you just sit back and let them conquer the world. Is that what you mean?

BERNS. Well, this is tragically the problem we have been confronted with for the past 15 years \* \* \* ever since World War II ended and communism extended its fangs across the European Continent and into Asia and by intrigue and indoctrination, partly even into Latin America. That we have been over the barrel because we cannot just go to war. We either go down with our principles or we survive with our principles.

TODD. Well, according to President Kennedy when he spoke on the 20th of April 1961 last year, he said that if the Latin American nations were not ready to meet with their commitments, or if they failed to meet with their commitments then the Government of this country would be obliged to do so in defense of its national security. When he said that he was referring to the commitments contained in two treaties \* \* \* one the Rio Treaty and the other one the Caracas Declaration.

The Caracas Declaration particularly, signed in 1954, says—I forget in which particular paragraph—that if there is any sign of Communist conquest in this hemisphere the OAS should immediately get together and take measures to oust the Communists from the hemisphere. Very well \* \* \* that was the commitments he was referring to.

BERNS. That's the Organization of American States.

TODD. Wait a minute \* \* \* I know \* \* \* but I'm still referring to his word. If those people should fail to meet their commitments— In other words, if a man comes to my house and starts peppering it with bullets, do I let him do so because my next door neighbor didn't want to do anything about it? I go out and try and get the man away, don't I?

BERNS. That is right. But since when is the Cuban house our house?

TODD. The Cuban house particularly \* \* \* it's Russia's house \* \* \* today, which is even worse.

BERNS. I mean let us—

TODD. If there was a Communist invasion of this hemisphere the attack on Cuba was not an attack on our little island \* \* \* the attack on Cuba was a direct attack on the United States of America.

BERNS. That is true \* \* \* theoretically speaking \* \* \*.

TODD. If the United States of America is not going to defend itself \* \* \* theoretically and practically, too.

BERNS. All right let me ask you another question. What is right for one is right for the other. So what would prevent the Soviet Union to say today that the United States of America, by its Alliance for Progress and by the millions of dollars we are going to spend there and the military aid we are giving and the economic aid we are giving, is having imperialistic designs on Venezuela, Brazil, and to protect these people because this is an aggression of people and an attack of their house just as much as our house they are going to go down there.

TODD. They're doing that anyway.

BERNS. So far they haven't done it.

TODD. They're doing that by subversion \* \* \* they tried to do it by an entirely different method \* \* \* they tried to do it with bullets and bombs in Venezuela in two uprisings in Carupana and Puerto Cabello.

MALLIN. In Guatemala and in Nicaragua.

TODD. Everywhere \* \* \* somebody has to put a stop to it sometime and it's not a question any more of principles, it's not a question of laws, it's not a question of agreements \* \* \* it's a question of your own national security.

BERNS. That's where we differ you see.

DANES. Realistically, gentlemen \* \* \* Carlos \* \* \* you too, Jay, from the standpoint of where the Cuban situation stands today, where it's going to go from here \* \* \* from the unrest that you talk about, do you see anything in the near future \* \* \*

TODD. Well in Cuba it's very difficult really \* \* \*. To any person who has not lived under a totalitarian regime \* \* \* actually lived there \* \* \* it's impossible to understand the terror that a thing like that can sow among the population. Furthermore 90 percent, given that 90 percent of the Cuban people are against Castro \* \* \* the other 10 percent have guns in their hands, And if you walk into a room and you have a machinegun in your hand, there are nine other fellows there without the machinegun, you win the argument with the machinegun. That's what's happening in Cuba today. Furthermore the population is being kept so busy trying to eat day after day they haven't much time to think about revolt. They may in desperation, as happened in Cardinas, go into an open revolt, but then you'd have their complete Hungary because they would bring those tanks and those planes.

MARTIN. You'd have a blood bath \* \* \* what do you see in the answer then, Carlos?

TODD. Well, the answer, there are several alternatives. Eventually, when this country realizes that it's going to lose Latin America, and lose it very quickly within the next 5 years, they will go down and invade Cuba with perfect justification to safeguard their own national security \* \* \* that is the answer.

MARTIN. The ultimate answer.

TODD. The ultimate answer, or else you have several other alternatives. The creation of a Cuban government-in-exile as suggested by Smathers \* \* \* there are some Central American nations that are just aching to get at Mr. Castro \* \* \* so there's another alternative \* \* \* if they gave them the word "go" tomorrow, they'd go tomorrow.

MARTIN. If who gave them the word "go"?

TODD. Up here.

MARTIN. United States? You think the OAS has been effective in all this?

TODD. The OAS is a very ineffective organization because it only takes two nations which have adopted this so-called neutralist policy which means friendliness, outright abject friendliness, to Soviet Russia, Mexico and Brazil, which practically run that thing to suit their own purpose.

MARTIN. Do you also feel too that the Latin American thinking is not completely understood by us here?

TODD. I don't think it's understood in the slightest. Latin America thinks this way. There is a saying in Spanish which covers it, *el que calla otorga*, and that means that he who remains silent relinquishes. So when they see the United States taking all manner of abuse, they have had their properties confiscated without compensation, you've had your diplomats arrested, your ambassadors snubbed, your President insulted, your citizens have been executed and have been arrested and maltreated down there and you've done nothing about it, your planes have been kidnaped, well then, if the little fellow can do it like that, a bigger fellow can do it. I mean the United States is not just the big boy on the block any more to Latin America. They don't know why doesn't it defend itself \* \* \* why doesn't it repel aggression no matter where it comes from.

DANES. Gentlemen, I'm sorry, I've never seen a Perspective half hour go quite as fast as this one did, and I'm sure our listeners found it extremely enjoyable. Thanks so much to Jay Mallin and Carlos Todd for sitting in with us tonight along with WGBS feature reporter, Hendrik Berns, and program manager for radio Miami, Robert Martin. This is Spencer Danes, news director for radio Miami, WGBS.

Goodnight.

EXHIBIT B—WGBS FEATURE REPORT—MIAMI, FLA., June 26, 1962.

HENDRIK J. BERNS

Abraham Lincoln once said: "To sin by silence, when they should protest, makes cowards of men."

And so I believe the time has come to take, once more, a close and frank and factual look at the issues surrounding Cuba. The issues that have to do not only with Castro and communism in Cuba. But also those that have to do with the exiles in our midst. With American foreign policy. With what they think should be American foreign policy. And with the multitude of ideas developed and advanced on the American as well as the exile side.

But above all with the lack of realism and the lack of reason and the lack of openmindedness that has pervaded this discussion of late.

We have come to the point where a large—and, by the way, intelligent—segment of the exile colony feels that America has let them down.

We have come to the point where they feel that every American returning from Cuba reflects, in whatever he reports on his return, that he has been taken in. By Castro and by communism. Because he does not return with stories of rising disgust, mass sabotage, storms that, at any moment, might topple the regime, and death by starvation on the streets in Havana.

We have come to the point where the exiles demand to know why we don't send troops to Cuba when, on the other hand, we send troops to Thailand.

We have come to the point where the exiles demand to know why we doubt the word about conditions in Cuba which they try to convey to us on the basis of what they call underground information.

We have come, above all, to the point where they are inclined—and at times make no bones about it—to believe that we are responsible for the Castro revolu-

tion, for the establishment of communism in Cuba, and for the fact that it is still there.

Yet, none of this is factual, fair, objective, realistic, or even reasonable.

The facts are that Castro followed Batista because the Batista regime was no good, because the Cubans, in Cuba, wanted a change and Castro fooled them into believing that he was the right man.

If the mass of the Cuban people had been satisfied with Batista, they would have defended him better. If the mass of the Cuban people had not wanted Castro to step in, he would not be there today.

And if the mass of the Cuban people do not want him or communism to be there tomorrow, neither he nor communism will be there tomorrow.

This is one fact—a fact born out by the Cuban history and by the crystal-clear events of our very own time. Events that no one can—and much less should—deny.

Fact No. 2 is that conditions in Cuba are miserable. The embargo leveled at Cuba has turned into the squeeze which we planned to apply. Production of sugar, food, and other goods has dropped off sharply. There is no tourism bringing in money. And people are living on tight and insufficient rations.

Yet they are still hanging on. And while some of them, in a number of villages and towns and cities, have expressed their ire against the regime by sabotage and in demonstrations, there has been no mass uprising. Certainly no uprising that might justifiably lead anyone to believe that Fidel Castro or communism are standing on their last leg.

Furthermore, the Communist empire behind the Iron Curtain is suffering from the same miseries. It has similar production problems. It has also admitted—just as Communist Cuba did—to the economic squeeze. And it has, therefore—and perhaps even for other reasons—not bailed out Castro and his Communist regime in Cuba.

Fact No. 3 is that much of what the exiles pass along as factual information is, instead, wishful thinking. It is not realism. It is emotionalism.

Yet it is, even as such, understandable. Because these people have lost their homeland. They want it back. They want to see things in certain facts that give hope. And so they see them even though nothing of what they see is visible.

This, as I said, is logical as a consequence of their fate. But it is not logical as a deduction of the facts. At least not as of now.

By the same token they would like the world around them to plunge into directions and take actions which would be equally irrational and equally disastrous.

And I shall tell you why tomorrow.

#### EXHIBIT C—WGBS FEATURE REPORT—MIAMI, FLA., *June 27, 1962*

HENDRIK J. BERNIS

It is, as I said yesterday, understandable that, many times, the ideas and the criticism advanced by Cuban exiles are more emotional than factual.

To live in exile, to live away from home yet so close to home, to have gone through what they have gone through and to know, every single day, that others are still suffering and in bondage, does not always permit to be coldly realistic and boldly sensible.

Rather, the desire to free one's homeland, to get it over with, to return home and settle once again in the familiar surroundings, to start anew, injects itself into the bloodstream of one's thinking and feeling blurring the picture and, thus, the facts as well as the truth.

Thinking back and putting together what we know today, this is what happened with the Bay of Pigs venture.

Planned under the Eisenhower administration, executed under the Kennedy administration, it was, irrespective of all the intelligence work that went into it, based more on and motivated more by emotionalism than rationalism and triggered more by fiction than by fact.

There are those who say today if the United States had supplied the armada, the bombers, and the air cover, all would have been well. Because the underground as well as the Cuban masses were ready.

The truth of the matter is that the planned contact and link with the underground failed to materialize, and that not a single window was smashed by the Cubans to signal their readiness when the landings hit the beaches and Castro's troops went to war against those who had landed to capture most of them.

It is not fair to say that the disaster was solely that of the United States. The disaster was also one of the Cuban exiles. Yet there are those, today, who insist that we try again. And not only do they say we ought to try again, they go even further. They say the Cuban people, in Cuba, cannot do anything against Castro and communism because they live under the ever-present iron rule of guns without having any guns of their own. The Cuban exiles cannot do anything because they, too, lack the weapons. The Organization of American States which turned down the idea of concerted military action against Castro and communism is no good.

The job must be done by the United States, hand-in-hand with the exiles. The United States, they say, has not only the duty to do it—it also has the right. Because the existence of communism in Cuba is an attack on the United States.

By saying that, they believe to refute the argument that the United States cannot suddenly swing around and become an aggressive, war-starting nation.

After all, they say, your property has been confiscated; your diplomats have been chased out; Americans have been imprisoned; how long will you permit the world to push you around?

But the truth of the matter is that we broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. It was our diplomats who left voluntarily. The truth of the matter is that we can do very little today about confiscations that occurred 2 and 3 years ago. And the truth of the matter is, as the Swiss Embassy in Havana, which protects our interests in Cuba, will tell you, that there is not a single American in a Cuban prison except those convicted of criminal, not political charges.

And so comes then the final argument of those who want us to go to war against Cuba: they say, you have sent troops to Vietnam and to Thailand. Why not to Cuba?

But the truth of the matter is that in Vietnam and in Thailand, the Governments of these countries invited us in. We did not go there as aggressors, we went there to help. We went there in the manner in which the fire department or the police answer emergency calls.

Yet to march into Cuba would be doing what the Russians did elsewhere.

But beyond that, there is a much stronger, much more logical, and much more rational argument against an American war on Communist Cuba. And that argument is simply this:

If we should ever venture forth to liquidate communism militarily, we would be rather foolish to start off with Cuba. You don't eradicate tumors by cutting off the periphery. You do it by cutting out the tumor.

And the tumor is in Moscow.

---

#### APPENDIX VIII

TIME, INC.,  
New York, September 11, 1962.

Mr. ALAN D. McARTHUR,  
*Associate Counsel, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. McARTHUR: I have your letter of July 20 to Mr. Sam Halper, our Caribbean bureau chief, inviting him to read the testimony before your committee of Mr. Carlos Todd. You suggested in view of the fact that Mr. Halper was mentioned in the testimony he might wish to avail himself of your invitation to present his own views before your committee at a subsequent hearing.

Since Mr. Halper has been constantly traveling he has had no opportunity to examine the testimony or to reply to your letter. Having just obtained a copy of the record myself and having read it thoroughly, I feel that perhaps in any case the reply should come from me since modesty might prevent Mr. Halper from asserting his own qualifications as strongly as I would.

I am sure that the members of your committee are well aware that Mr. Halper rightly has the reputation of being both one of the most expert and most constant critics of the Castro government. That is clear not only in the magazine we print but in every report Mr. Halper has sent us, which provide the basis for these printed stories.

You will agree, I am sure, that it would be absurd for Mr. Halper to appear before your committee merely to comment on the incidental but nonetheless slanderous fashion in which his name appears in the record and that nothing would be served by having Mr. Halper journey from his base in San Juan, Puerto Rico, to answer innuendos which were made in passing and which are

so obviously unfounded, unsubstantiated and contrary to all the published facts you and your committee members must have at your disposal. If you do think it advisable to have him as a witness we should, of course, make him available to the committee. But in view of the absurdity of the testimony to which he is so remotely linked I feel sure you would agree his appearance would be superfluous.

I appreciate your courtesy in showing us the record—as absurd as the testimony concerning Mr. Halper obviously is. And I do trust that whatever public record is made will reflect the indisputable fact that Mr. Halper belongs nowhere in any group of journalists who are remotely considered "friends of Castro."

Sincerely,

/s/ RICHARD M. CLURMAN,  
Chief of Correspondents.

# INDEX

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

	Page
<b>A</b>	
"The Agricultural Fiasco" (article).....	20
Alianza para Progreso.....	41
American View (Miami newspaper).....	10
Amory, John Forth.....	43
Applegate, Dick.....	33
"Around the Edge of War" (book).....	43
Associated Press.....	32
<b>B</b>	
Batista.....	6
Bay of Pigs.....	37
Belgrade-Bandung axis.....	43
Bisbé, Mr. (Cuban Ambassador to U.N.).....	43, 44
Bohemia (Cuban magazine).....	17, 95
Beals, Carlton.....	23
Berns, Hendrik J.....	24-26
Statement of.....	100-111
Bethel, Paul.....	22
<b>C</b>	
Castro, Fidel.....	1-4, 6-12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 34, 35, 38-45
Castro, Raul.....	7, 10, 45
Chicago.....	36, 41
Cienfuegos.....	16
Clark, Gerald.....	10, 18
Clurman, Richard M.....	112
Collins, Barbara.....	23
Columbia Broadcasting System.....	5, 9, 10, 18, 19
Communist Party of Cuba.....	7, 45
Coral Gables, Fla.....	29-31
Cuba.....	2, 7, 9, 12, 36-44
"Cuba Near Collapse" (article).....	10
"Cuba Not Red, Says General" (article).....	4, 5
Cuban Information Service, Inc.....	2, 6, 7, 20, 29, 31
Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations.....	2, 14-16
Cuban Rebel Youth.....	16
Cuban Revolutionary Council.....	19
Czechoslovakian Embassy.....	2, 3, 17, 19
<b>D</b>	
de la Terre, Vitalio.....	27
"The Destruction of Organized Labor in Cuba" (article).....	20
"The Destruction of the University of Havana" (article).....	20
De Telegraaf (Dutch newspaper).....	42
Diario Las Americas.....	20
<b>E</b>	
Eisenhower.....	16
El Diario (newspaper).....	21
El Mundo.....	34
Escalante, Anibal.....	4, 7, 12
"Eyewitness" (TV program).....	5

F	
Fair Play for Cuba Committee.....	13, 44
Fletcher, Arthur.....	37
Franco, Victor.....	14, 15, 21, 24, 75
Frank, Waldo.....	23
G	
Goodman, Julian.....	81
Gordon, Jesse.....	76-78, 80
Grant, Don.....	3
Guevara, "Che".....	7, 10, 11, 15
H	
Habana Libre Hotel.....	14
Halper, Samuel.....	3, 24, 111
Hart, Armando.....	22
Hester, Brig. Gen. Hugh B.....	3, 4, 9-13, 16, 18, 19, 24, 76-78, 80
"His Vision is Not 20-20" (article).....	13, 14
Hlavacek, John.....	3, 4, 7-10, 16, 18, 19, 24, 81-92
I	
Indonesia.....	34, 42, 43, 45
Integrated Revolutionary Organization of the Communist Party.....	7
International Federation of Journalists.....	32
International Rescue Committee.....	5, 6
K	
Keating, Senator Kenneth.....	29
Kennedy, President.....	10
Kennedy, Robert.....	10
Khedda, Premier Ben.....	45, 46
Khrushchev.....	9, 42, 43, 92-94
Kuralt, Charles.....	3-5, 7-10, 16, 18, 19, 24
L	
"La Revolution Sensuelle" (The Sensual Revolution) (book).....	14, 21
Latin America.....	41
Lippman, Walter.....	9, 10, 31, 32
Look (magazine).....	38, 40
Luns, Joseph.....	42
M	
McArthur, Alan D.....	30
McNamara, Robert.....	10
Mallin, Jay.....	24
Mao Tse-tung.....	42
Martin, Robert.....	26, 30, 34
Matthews, Herbert L.....	22
Menocal, Enrique.....	19, 20
Mestre, Abel.....	22
Mestre, Goar.....	22
Miami, Fla.....	29, 30, 41
Miami Beach.....	33, 37
Miami Herald.....	7, 9
Miami News.....	3, 4, 11, 12
Miami, University of.....	5
Migdail, Carl.....	3
Miquel, Mr. R.....	5
Montreal Star (newspaper).....	18
Morse, Senator Wayne.....	38
N	
NANA.....	10, 12
National Agrarian Reform Institute.....	4
NBC (National Broadcasting Co.).....	7, 10, 19, 81
NBC-TV.....	8
National Council for Soviet-American Friendship.....	13

National Guardian (magazine).....	13
National Hotel.....	16
National Insider.....	39, 40
Netherlands Embassy.....	37
Netherlands Federation of Journalists.....	32
Netherlands New Guinea.....	37, 38, 42
New York Times.....	13, 22, 39
New World Review (publication).....	13
Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant (Times of the Netherlands).....	42
Nkrumah.....	43
North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA).....	3, 4, 10, 12, 18, 19, 76-78, 80
O	
Olivares, Carlos.....	2, 28
Oltmans, William L.....	26, 29, 30
Testimony of.....	31-46
ORI.....	7
P	
Peace Corps.....	41
Pena, Lazaro.....	2
People's Republic of Cuba.....	31, 34
"People's Stores".....	5
"Perspective" (radio program).....	24
Pinar del Rio Province.....	5, 27
Political Affairs (magazine).....	13
Prensa Latina.....	23
Providence Journal.....	34
PSP (Communist Party of Cuba).....	45
Punta del Este Conference.....	8
R	
Radio Broadcast Syndicated, Inc.....	34, 36
"A Red Star Brigadier" (article).....	12, 13
"A Report on the Cuban Refugee Situation in the United States" (from Cuban Information Service).....	6, 7
Republican of Pottsville, Pa.....	35
Revolucion (newspaper).....	22, 34
Roa, Raul.....	12, 34, 45
Roca, Blas.....	2, 7, 23
Rodriguez, Rafael.....	4, 45
Rusk, Dean.....	10
S	
St. Louis Post-Dispatch.....	3
Salant, Richard S.....	18
Sartre.....	14
Saturday Evening Post.....	17
Schoenbrun, David.....	9
Shelton, Ruth.....	17
"Six Journalists From Capitalistic Countries Visit Cuba" (article).....	16, 95-100
Solar, Tony.....	12
State Department.....	2, 20
Stuart, Lyle.....	22
Sukarno, President.....	34, 37, 41-43, 45
Swaeby, Fran.....	9
Syndicated Broadcast Features, Inc.....	41
T	
Taber, Robert.....	14, 15, 21, 24, 75
Tampa Tribune.....	13
"Through the Wrong End of the Scope: An Optimistic Lippmann Takes Look at the News" (article).....	9, 10
Time magazine.....	3, 23, 24
Times of Havana (newspaper).....	2, 22
Todd, Carlos.....	29-35
Biographical sketch of.....	1
Testimony of.....	2-28

Toure, Mr. Sekou.....	43
26th of July movement.....	1, 2

## U

Un-American Activities Committee (House).....	13, 19
United Nations.....	36, 43
United Press International (UPI).....	33
U.S. News & World Report.....	3, 7
Urrutia.....	2

## W

Washington Star.....	31-33
WGBS.....	29, 30, 33
Wilkinson, Mary Louise.....	26, 30, 33, 41
Williams, Robert.....	24
World Petroleum.....	17
World Wide Press.....	37, 38, 44, 45

## Y

Young Communists of Cuba.....	16
-------------------------------	----

## Z

Zigzag (Cuban weekly).....	2
----------------------------	---

## O

