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NOMINATIONS OF GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR AND
GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER

GOVERNMENT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS


SECOND SESSION
ON
GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, U.S. ARMY, FOR APPOINTMENT
AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, U.S. ARMY, FOR APPOINTMENT
AS CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

AUGUST 9, 1962

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NOVEMBER 1962

NOMINATIONS OF GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room 212, Senate Office Building.

Present: Senators Russell (presiding), Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Thurmond, Engle, Bartlett, Saltonstall, Smith of Maine, Bush, Beall, and Case of New Jersey.

Also present: William H. Darden, T. Edward Braswell, and Gordon A. Nease, professional staff members; Harry L. Wingate, chief clerk; and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

The first part of today's meeting is scheduled on the nomination of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor for appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a term of 2 years, and Earle G. Wheeler for Chief of Staff of the Army for a term of 2 years. Both of these distinguished officers are present.

General Taylor, of course, has been before the committee several times during his earlier service as Chief of Staff of the Army. The Chair and I am sure many other members of the committee developed a very high regard for General Taylor's ability.

General Taylor, we welcome you before the committee again. And we extend congratulations to you and to the country on your nomination.

The Chair has no questions in his own behalf, but other members of the committee have asked the chairman to propound questions for them, and the Chair will propound those questions at the appropriate place.

(The nomination reference and résumé of service career of General Taylor follow:)

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
July 25, 1962.

Ordered, That the following nominations be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

General Maxwell D. Taylor, United States Army, for appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a term of two years.

RÉSUMÉ OF SERVICE CAREER OF MAXWELL DAVENPORT TAYLOR,
GENERAL [REDACTED]

Date and place of birth

August 26, 1901, at Keytesville, Mo.

Years of active service

Over 38.

Present assignment

Military Representative of the President, U.S. Army Element, Office, Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., since July 1961.

Military schools attended

U.S. Military Academy.
The Engineer School, basic course.
The Field Artillery School, battery officers' course.
Command and General Staff School.
Army War College.
Educational equivalent to National War College.

Major permanent duty assignments (last 10 years)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, Office, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., from July 1952 to February 1953.
Commanding General, 8th Army in Korea, Army Forces, Far East, from February 1953 to November 1954.
Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Far East and 8th U.S. Army, Far East Command, from November 1954 to March 1955.
Commander in Chief, Far East Command, from April 1955 to June 1955.
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., from June 1955 to June 1959.
Retired from active service, June 30, 1959.
Recalled to active duty, July 1, 1961.

Promotions

	Temporary	Permanent
Second lieutenant.....		June 13, 1922
First lieutenant.....		Mar. 9, 1927
Captain.....		Aug. 21, 1935
Major.....		July 9, 1940
Lieutenant colonel.....	Jan. 1, 1942	June 13, 1945
Colonel.....	June 24, 1942	
Brigadier general.....	Dec. 11, 1942	Jan. 24, 1948
Major general.....	June 21, 1944	Mar. 8, 1952
Lieutenant general.....	Aug. 1, 1951	
General.....	June 23, 1953	

Medals and awards

Distinguished Service Cross.
Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters).
Silver Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster).
Legion of Merit.
Bronze Star Medal.
Purple Heart.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall, any questions?

Senator SALTONSTALL. General Taylor, you and I have, I hope, a warm friendship, and I have a high regard for you. I think it would be very helpful if you would clarify for the committee your views about which there has been a difference of opinion on several points—on two points that I have in mind.

One point is, what is your attitude of mind on the present Joint Chiefs of Staff setup, and whether that should be changed?

And the other point is your feeling as to the relative merits, if you will, of the best security of our country as to nuclear deterrent as opposed to a buildup of what we call a conventional army.

I would like to ask those two questions. I have prefaced them by saying that I have a very high regard for your views, and I have a high regard for your integrity and for your educational and intellectual abilities.

But I think for the benefit of us all, and particularly when we bring this nomination on the floor of the Senate, it would be helpful if we had those questions answered.

STATEMENT OF GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, NOMINEE FOR APPOINTMENT AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General TAYLOR. Thank you very much for your kind words, Senator Saltonstall. As you gentlemen know, I retired from the Army in 1959 and did so expecting to leave the military service for keeps. I tried to be a good civilian for 2 years, but it didn't turn out that way. In 1959 upon retiring, I wrote a book which is an action often alleged to be a mistake on the part of people in public life.

However, I thought that this was really my valedictory comment upon the experience to which I had been exposed. And my words were serious, I meant exactly what I said. Since that time I have been away from the Pentagon and the Department of Defense for 3 years, and I am not returning, if you gentlemen confirm me, as a crusader for change, but rather to make the present system as effective as possible.

There is a new team, a new atmosphere in the Pentagon, and I would expect to profit by these changes.

Three years ago I felt that the best solution for the Joint Chiefs of Staff problem was to replace the present Joint Chiefs by a single Chief of Staff, and by another military committee similar to the Joint Chiefs for advisory and policy matters.

In other words, we must recognize that the Joint Chiefs really do two things. They are a military staff in the line of command between the Secretary of Defense and the unified commanders. As such they perform tasks like any other military staff and need the normal kind of administration by a Chief of Staff.

On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are also the primary advisers on military matters to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and to the National Security Council. This is an entirely different role. Here the committee process seems to be entirely appropriate, and the need would exist for the combined experience of the members of a Joint Chiefs of Staff arrangement.

Basically my suggestion was responsive to this division of tasks. That was 3 years ago. I can assure you, I am not going back as a crusader for change at this time. I want to see how the present system is working with a new team in a new atmosphere.

Does that cover the first point, Senator?

Senator SALTONSTALL. That covers the first point, I think, General. In other words, you are going into the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the feeling that the present system is working, if you can improve it you will improve it, but you certainly aren't going to make any radical change in it or going with the feeling that you have got to make a radical change.

General TAYLOR. Certainly not without the accumulation of a great deal more experience.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And certainly if you do make that change it will require legislation?

General TAYLOR. Very much so, sir. No single individual in uniform or out can make changes of the nature we have been discussing. It would require first the concurrence of my civilian superiors and then action by the Congress.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But you are not going in with a prejudiced mind?

General TAYLOR. I hope not.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The other point that I didn't think that you answered yet is as to your feelings about the buildup of the conventional forces as far as you can say in an open hearing as opposed to a nuclear deterrent.

General TAYLOR. What I have always supported, Senator, has been described as a flexible response, namely, making possible as many military alternatives as feasible to those civilian leaders who have to make these very difficult and very critical decisions in regard to peace and war.

I felt for a long time that we were overemphasizing the development of nuclear forces, particularly of the strategic nuclear forces, and at the same time neglecting conventional forces, and incidentally, the small atomic weapons which can be of tremendous aid to ground forces. As a result, an imbalance had been created in our strategic position.

I am happy to say that that trend seems to be reversed. I am very much encouraged by the present appreciation of the need to correct the imbalance and develop conventional forces.

I would like to say, however, that I have been somewhat surprised and disturbed by foreign press comments to the effect that my appointment somehow suggests a change in the U.S. attitude toward the defense of Europe, particularly with regard to the use of nuclear weapons in that defense.

In his last press conference, President Kennedy called these reports of a change of U.S. policy "wholly unfounded and wholly untrue." Personally, I am at a loss to understand how any views of mine could support such rumors. I am known to be an advocate of a powerful nuclear strategic force and of tactical atomic weapons to support ground operations. To provide flexibility of choice when the time of decision comes, the defense of Western Europe requires a plentiful supply of nuclear weapons of many types, along with strong, modernized, conventional forces.

In my judgment, if an attack on Western Europe comes, we must use whatever weapons and forces are necessary to defeat it. To meet a massive attack today, because of the lack of adequate conventional forces in the West, it would be necessary to resort to atomic weapons early in the conflict.

Senator SALTONSTALL. General Taylor, am I correct in my understanding that of course any change in nuclear policy certainly giving nuclear weapons to other nations again would require an act of Congress, am I not right?

General TAYLOR. Yes, it is impossible to transfer atomic weapons to foreign powers under the present law.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. General Taylor, the immediate and overall question here is whether or not this committee will recommend favorable action on your nomination. And I can sum that up pretty

quickly without being personal to you. If the President had asked me—which he did not do—whom I would select for this position, I certainly would have recommended this strongly, and that is not based upon personal associations or personal friendships, but what I have learned about you from sitting around this table and other contact with you in your duties.

And I think we are very fortunate to have the benefit of your services in this position.

I don't think that this is the particular time to try to cross-examine you. Your views on the conventional forces are well known. I was one of those that you convinced on this several years ago, and there were very fine statements about it right here at this table. And I think we have come a long ways in the last few years with reference to building up these forces.

General TAYLOR. We are certainly improving, Senator.

Senator STENNIS. And I have been impressed myself with the Berlin callup, the effect it had, as I understand it, on the situation in Europe, and also what it demonstrated, undoubtedly demonstrated, as to the potential we have there, the reserve forces or the National Guard. I know that there is a lot of thought that the National Guard is a political organization in the States, and perhaps in the old days it was, and it may linger in a few States now. But as I see it, that is not the situation generally.

Do you recognize the Reserve Forces including the National Guard as a very strong source of our strength, near-ready strength?

General TAYLOR. Yes. We have made a great deal of progress in this field in recent years. The readiness of the National Guard and the Reserve has been far greater than at any time in the past. I think the record has been very good if you look at the work accomplished and the level of readiness reached.

Senator STENNIS. The level of capacity and the level of training that these units showed after a few weeks or months on duty, is that what you referred to?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I did not personally have an opportunity to visit them, but all the reports I have seen were encouraging.

Senator STENNIS. That is your idea about it?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. Well, we had quite an argument in the Appropriations Committee, not an argument, but a discussion, and we finally balanced it off there this year, that by keeping these forces or units that are not obsolete at least, we could realize more the potential and the near readiness. And from what you said I judge that that would be your policy in the future in your position, is that correct?

General TAYLOR. That is right, Senator. We certainly need some of these units at as high a priority of readiness that we can obtain from citizen soldiers.

Senator STENNIS. I went down to Fort Polk where they had about 21,000 men, all of them Reserves and National Guard, from PFC's to the general, and they had just been scored by Regular Army officers, and they scored very high.

And I found an unusual quality of leadership there too in the enlisted men—men who were president of the Kiwanis Club back in school, and principals of schools—

General TAYLOR. This reflects the good basic training that they are now getting thanks to the law Congress passed some years ago.

Senator STENNIS. So your position would be to continue to press for a certain program, and of course require high standards in carrying it out?

General TAYLOR. Very much so.

Senator STENNIS. I think Senator Saltonstall's questions have covered what you are going to be faced with here with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And now your immediate problem is to make this a going concern. And that would be your purpose, is that right?

General TAYLOR. That is right.

Senator STENNIS. That is all I have at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator SMITH.

Senator SMITH. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

General TAYLOR, a recent UPI story titled "General Taylor's Ideas Modified Since His Book Came Out" contains some statements on which I would like your comment as to their accuracy. I wonder because of a recent experience I had with a UPI story that erroneously indicated that I was paid by the USIA to make Voice of America broadcasts.

The story states that you are "no longer sure that the United States should have a single, supreme Chief of Staff to replace the present command system"—is that true, and if so, why and in what manner have you changed your views as expressed in your book?

General TAYLOR. I think I partially answered that, Senator Smith, in response to Senator Saltonstall. I am not prepared to withdraw any of my statements in the book, other than some which were based on intelligence which didn't quite pan out.

On the other hand, I am quite prepared to say that my views may not be entirely valid now in the new climate in the Pentagon. So I am returning to take a new look at the situation, and will act on that basis.

Senator SMITH. Second, the story further states:

Nor these sources say, is he likely to still want to upend and rebuild the land, sea, and air forces in an extreme new mold or to cut back the size of the strategic nuclear forces—

Is that true, and if so, why, and in what manner have you changed your views?

General TAYLOR. I am afraid my answers would be the same. When I get over there I will try to develop new views on new subjects. I am not deluded to the extent of believing that time has stood still for 3 years. Things have changed, and I have been at a distance, too much of a bystander to see how the system has been working.

Senator SMITH. Third, the story further states:

The fact is, UPI was told, the four-star Army paratrooper and Presidential adviser whimsically wishes he could rewrite the testy, if militarily solid, book he penned after retiring as Army Chief of Staff in 1959.

Is that true, sir?

General TAYLOR. I would be very happy to deny that.

Senator SMITH. I didn't get your answer.

General TAYLOR. I am very glad to deny that.

Senator SMITH. In your book, you wrote, with respect to decision-making:

Until a Secretary of Defense requires the Chiefs to identify these basic divergencies and to present them to him for decision, it will never be possible to avoid splits or to rise above piecemeal action in putting the Defense house in order.

Do you expect President Kennedy to call upon Secretary McNamara to make decisions of this order? And do you think he should?

General TAYLOR. My impression is it won't be necessary to ask Secretary McNamara to make these decisions; he will make them.

Senator SMITH. Do you think he should?

General TAYLOR. Yes, indeed.

Senator SMITH. In that connection, you did observe that—

the President held aloof from the internal issues of the Chiefs, depending on the Secretary of Defense to adjust the differences.

Do you believe that President Kennedy should be aloof and leave this entirely to Secretary McNamara?

General TAYLOR. No, of course not, because he is the Commander in Chief, and bears that heavy responsibility. It is always a question of judgment, however, to what extent matters should be brought to the President.

With an effective Secretary of Defense, a decisive Secretary of Defense, many things will, I think, quite properly be adjudicated at the level of the Pentagon. Nevertheless, broad questions of strategy must be brought to the President and he must make a personal decision on these matters.

Senator SMITH. In this connection, do you feel he should be aloof to the reported differences between you and Secretary McNamara on the size of the Army and on the need of the Nike-Zeus antimissile missile—differences reported in the UPI story?

General TAYLOR. No; I think the issues you mentioned are so important that they should be aired before the President.

Senator SMITH. As I recall, in your book you advocated a reorganization of the Armed Forces according to the mission rather than according to the medium of locomotion—and in doing so, you contended that such change would have the advantage, budgetwise, of letting us know where our money was going, in contrast to military budgeting, which simply allots so many billions to the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, with all their overlapping missions and duplicated hardware.

Do you still feel this way or have you changed or modified your view?

General TAYLOR. No; I think that would still be my view. And furthermore, as I understand the budget system in the Pentagon is very close to that now; in other words, the division of the budget by function gives a very clear picture of how the money is being spent.

Senator SMITH. My next question is a long one, General Taylor, and I am going to ask you to follow it very closely. In the New York Times issue of July 2, 1961, Military Analyst Hanson W. Baldwin wrote, in connection with your appointment as military representative of President Kennedy:

Another problem in the appointment is the belief by many in and out of the Pentagon that it represents a step toward the downgrading of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body, and the possible ultimate emergence of a single powerful Chief of Staff.

With your becoming the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is this not the second and perhaps next-to-last step of your own ultimate emergence as a single powerful Chief of Staff through personal dominance, backed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General TAYLOR. No, I can't see that that follows, Senator Smith. I am simply going to take over the same position General Lemnitzer held and his predecessors as well and I expect to discharge the functions in the same manner that they discharged them.

Senator SMITH. Has anyone been selected to take the place of military representative of President Kennedy made vacant by your appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General TAYLOR. I don't think so.

Senator SMITH. Have you discussed that with the President?

General TAYLOR. No. (In subsequent elaboration after the committee hearings General Taylor requested that the phrase "not finally" be added in amplification to the statement of record.)

Senator SMITH. In the absence of any indication that the vacancy will be filled, is it not reasonable to conclude that you will remain in reality the military representative of President Kennedy while serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—particularly in view of the fact that while General Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Kennedy concluded that it was necessary to have his personal military representative even though there was a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the person of General Lemnitzer?

General TAYLOR. No, I don't see that my position as Chairman will be any different from that of General Lemnitzer. I never asked the question, but I would not know whether the President with the experience he has now acquired in office would want a separate military adviser.

The conditions a year and a half ago were quite different than what they are now. I would simply repeat that my position as Chairman will be exactly the same as General Lemnitzer's.

Senator SMITH. In view of all of these aspects, is it so unreasonable for some people to strongly suspect, in line with the observation reported by Hanson Baldwin last year, that the actual results of this appointment process in 1961 and 1962 in your case—in first placing you as military representative over the Chairman of the organization that you recommended in 1959 be abolished—and now making you Chairman of the organization you proposed be abolished and replaced with a single Chief of Staff—that the actual results in practice, as distinguished from theory, are to make you the real single Chief of Staff—the position you recommended be created—but under the guise and title of Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General TAYLOR. I am afraid I can't follow that, Senator. I would make one correction as to the statement that I was placed over the Chairman.

I am definitely not over the Chairman, I am not over any of the Chiefs. I am an individual adviser to the President outside of the

channel of command, and so far as I know, the only person I can issue orders to is the aide who sits outside of my office.

Senator SMITH. Have you any intention to transform the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reality to that of—in practice—a single Chief of Staff?

General TAYLOR. I not only do not intend to try, I couldn't succeed if I tried.

Senator SMITH. In what ways do you propose to handle the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff differently than your predecessors have administered that office and position?

General TAYLOR. I am really not aware of any specific changes that I have in mind. I will do my best to make the system function as it is. I don't doubt that my personal methods will be somewhat different from my predecessors', because personalities vary. But insofar as the legal position is concerned, I can see no change in the future over what that position has been in the past.

Senator SMITH. Is it your intention to press for special emphasis on (a) flexible response?

General TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Is it your intention to press for special emphasis on (b) reorganizing the Armed Forces into functional forces?

General TAYLOR. Not at the present time.

Senator SMITH. Is it your intention to press, percentagewise, for a downgrading of our nuclear capability—both strategic and tactical—and the upgrading of conventional forces?

General TAYLOR. I don't like "downgrade" and "upgrade". We need all three of these components. I am going to press for progress on all fronts.

Senator SMITH. Do you intend to press for special and foremost emphasis on the Nike-Zeus in the same manner as the Air Force has pressed first for the B-70 and then for the RS-70?

General TAYLOR. I will press for any weapons that are needed for national defense.

Senator SMITH. Do you intend to press for taking more and more tactical airpower away from the Air Force and giving it to the Army?

General TAYLOR. I have no plans to try to revise the roles of the services at this time.

Senator SMITH. I have one more question, General.

If you should ultimately find yourself in basic disagreement with the President on military policy and believe that his military policy was not best for the security of our country, would you resign or retire in protest and take your case to the American public with a new book or through other means—or would you accept the role of obedience to your civilian Commander in Chief and remain in the position, trying to carry out his policy and wishes as long as he wished for you to do so?

General TAYLOR. That is very hard to answer merely "Yes" or "No," as you can appreciate. I would only say that I believe the line of conduct which led me to retire in 1959 would be the same in the case you mentioned.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. I have no questions. I just want to observe that in General Taylor we have a military man who really understands all the elements that go into national security. I think being Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requires that a man have more than just a military understanding of our problems. Our security certainly depends on more than just the element of military consideration.

And I personally feel that we are very fortunate in having in the person of General Taylor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a man who understands particularly the relationship between military power and foreign policy objectives. I want to congratulate him.

General TAYLOR. I appreciate your kind words.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bush.

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I have confidence in General Taylor. He is one of the outstanding military men. I think his selection is first class.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I think in general I am familiar with General Taylor's views. I think he is one of the ablest military men we have in uniform, and I want to congratulate him and the President upon his appointment.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Beall.

Senator BEALL. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I do want to say, though, that I have been a strong admirer of General Taylor's, and it is nice to see him have this position.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bartlett.

Senator BARTLETT. Just one question.

Does it give you a feeling of well-being, General, that the wheel has now turned so that the situation is that you can once more appear before congressional committees?

General TAYLOR. Well, I have some good friends here, Senator, whom I am happy to see, whether I am to testify or not.

Senator BARTLETT. Nothing further.

Chairman RUSSELL. We have now reached the place where Senator Goldwater would have the opportunity to ask questions. Senator Goldwater is out of town today. He addressed a letter to me, and I guess it is quite all right to read the letter, and I shall, prior to asking some questions that he asked be propounded. [Reads:]

First, please excuse the unseemly length of this letter, but I believe the interrogation that will take place before your committee on Thursday to be of such importance that none of us can forgo any question that might be on our mind.

First of all, I will not vote against the appointment of General Taylor to be Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs, but there are questions that I should like to have raised for purposes of the record. I preface these remarks by saying that these questions are raised by former statements of General Taylor, most of which are contained in his book written at the time of his retirement.

To set the questioning in its proper perspective, allow me to go to a statement contained in the general's book, "The Uncertain Trumpet," and I quote, "It is a reminder of what happens when military plans and actions are controlled by other than military factors." The question I ask at this point is: Does General Taylor still consider this statement to be sound—in other words, would he rather place more reliance on military judgment than upon civilian judgment in the fields of the military? Regardless of how he answers this, the next question should be based on the following quote from the Army magazine of March 1962: "Those who considered the New Look, an unsound approach found themselves in a minority, but, as the decade of the fifties progressed, the small band of opponents of the New Look began to acquire support from outside the Government, especially among serious students of defense policy on university faculties and among thoughtful publicists."

In view of this quoted statement from his article appearing in the Army magazine of March 1962, entitled "Our Changing Military Policy," does General Taylor believe that individuals such as Alain C. Enthoven, Harold Brown, Henry Rowen, Merton Joseph Peck, and Adam Yarmolinsky are better equipped to write strategic papers for the military than the military themselves? This is a question that you, Senator Russell, can develop on your own as I think it has been rather conclusively shown before our committee and subcommittees that strategic decisions and papers are being written by nonmilitary people, and I disagree that their lack of experience is made up by their years of study. At this point, I would appreciate your reading the questions that I have prepared which are indexed under tabulation beginning with "Massive Retaliation" and ending with "Roles and Missions".

The first question, General Taylor, seems to be:

You have denounced repeatedly the policy of massive retaliation. I would like to read to you the official definition of massive retaliation:

"The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. Now the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our Military Establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices. That permits of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means.

"We have developed, with our allies, a collective system of great power which can be flexibly used on whatever scale may be requisite to make aggression costly.

"Our capacity to retaliate must be, and is, massive in order to deter all forms of aggression. But if we have to use that capacity, such use would be selective and adapted to the occasion" (Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State).

Here, sir, is the question:

In your book you talk of "responding anywhere, any time, with weapons and forces appropriate to the situation." The same words, basically, as the definition of massive retaliation. Haven't you interpreted massive retaliation exclusively in terms of "all or nothing" alternatives, rather than in the terms of flexibility expressed by Mr. Dulles? Haven't you considered only the extremes of the massive retaliation policy?

Is that question too long? If it is, I will pass this question down to you.

General TAYLOR. I think I can answer that quickly. It is quite true that one can give some flexibility to massive retaliation in varying ways. But in the climate in which I operated for 4 years, massive retaliation was pretty much unqualified, so that it was my opinion that by placing the center of gravity of our efforts on developing heavy strategic weapons, and by neglecting other kinds of weapons, we were pretty much musclebound in this one capability.

So that massive retaliation meant, in the language of the Pentagon, in my time, the unlimited use of our atomic resources against the homeland of the opposing country.

Chairman RUSSELL. In other words, there is more than one definition of massive retaliation?

General TAYLOR. There are variants. The statement Mr. Dulles makes I cannot take issue with as such. On the other hand, I would also say, the way I have referred to massive retaliation in my book was consistent with the doctrine which was in vogue at the time.

Chairman RUSSELL. The next question is:

Do you recommend a military force structure which would allow the Communists to be able to apply a massive retaliation policy to our actions, i.e., have a superior capability to fight particularly at the higher intensities of war?

General TAYLOR. Obviously not. I don't know what the reference is.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is supported by a statement on page 146, "The Uncertain Trumpet."

General TAYLOR. It doesn't bring to my mind anything that I would endorse.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will read this so you will understand clearly what Senator Goldwater had in mind:

The national military program of flexible response should contain at the outset an unqualified renunciation of reliance on the strategy of massive retaliation. It should be made clear that the United States will prepare itself to respond anywhere, any time, with weapons and forces appropriate to the situation. Thus, we would restore to warfare its historic justification as a means to create a better world upon the successful conclusion of hostilities.

You stated that you do not think—

General TAYLOR. No, sir. The so-called flexible response strategy certainly includes massive retaliation as one form of possible retaliation.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

Question: Throughout your book, "The Uncertain Trumpet," you subscribed to the theory of mutual deterrence, that is, that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are each deterred from total war by the other's nuclear capability. Do you still hold that view?

General TAYLOR. Yes, I think that the likelihood of a deliberate resort to total war is even less than when I wrote the book.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

Do you still believe, as you indicated in your national military program, that the maintenance of forces to deter general war is our highest national defense priority?

General TAYLOR. I do.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

To maintain a state of mutual deterrence, do we need to maintain our current margin of strategic superiority, or do you recommend that we reduce our strategic forces to a position of parity or near parity with the U.S.S.R. and use the funds saved for conventional forces?

General TAYLOR. There should always be a very liberal margin for superiority in our strength. The trouble in my day was that there was no one to decide how much; there were no yardsticks to determine what was a reasonable level not only for our strategic forces, but for conventional forces and all other categories of military forces.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

If we assume a state of mutual deterrence, but deterrence fails (i.e., an all-out Soviet assault against NATO Europe), what course of military action is open to us that will not result in the destruction of the U.S. as well as the loss of Europe?

If you think any of these questions are classified, General, we will carry that over.

General TAYLOR. Would you mind reading that again? I missed it.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

If we assume a state of mutual deterrence, but deterrence fails (i.e., an all-out Soviet assault against NATO Europe), what course of military action is open to us that will not result in the destruction of the U.S. as well as the loss of Europe?

General TAYLOR. We will certainly have to respond at once with all weapons in order to punish the aggressor, and it will be at a great price to us also. That is one of the unhappy facts of general atomic war.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

It seems to me—

it seems to Senator Goldwater—

that mutual deterrence concept depends on our defense not failing, for if it fails we will not possess forces adequate to do more than gain revenge. Is this not a "no-win" strategy for all the small scare wars?

General TAYLOR. No, but unfortunately there is hardly a win strategy in a general nuclear war. Both sides are going to suffer heavily. In that sense I think Senator Goldwater is correct. I have never heard anyone say how to get around this dilemma as long as we and our opponents have nuclear weapons.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is my own question. To clear up any possible inference, would you not advocate the massive extent of that tragedy as any reason for surrendering anything?

General TAYLOR. No, I think it is a strong argument to have other alternatives, not to be faced with that dilemma.

Chairman RUSSELL. The next question (reading):

Acceptance of a mutual deterrent strategy does not provide sufficient forces to allow the U.S. to pursue the counter military strategy as enunciated by Mr. McNamara. Do you agree with Mr. McNamara in this case?

General TAYLOR. I don't get the reference, Senator.

May I look at that?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

General TAYLOR. This is the previous question.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Repeat the question, please.

Chairman RUSSELL. It really was answered by your last answer.

General TAYLOR (reading):

Acceptance of a mutual deterrent strategy does not provide sufficient forces to allow the U.S. to pursue a counter military strategy.

I don't understand the term, it doesn't mean anything to me.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

As enunciated by Mr. McNamara.

Do you agree with Mr. McNamara in this case?

General TAYLOR. I am sorry, gentlemen, I don't know what the question means.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will ask that the quotation from "The Uncertain Trumpet" appear in this place.

(The quotation referred to follows:)

From "The Uncertain Trumpet," p. 61]

* * * In such a situation of nuclear parity, where both sides had the capability of destroying one another, there was no place for a policy of massive nuclear retaliation except as a deterrent to total nuclear war or as a reprisal if one began. This fact had become so apparent that it was doubtful whether either the Soviets or our allies believed that we would use our retaliatory power for anything other than to preserve our own existence * * *

Chairman RUSSELL. Now this series of questions seems to deal with countermilitary strategy (reading):

Mr. McNamara has enunciated a countermilitary strategy—a strategy for the destruction of as much of the enemy military threat as possible—in contrast to a so-called "city-busting" strategy. Do you agree with Mr. McNamara that a countermilitary strategy is the best strategy?

General TAYLOR. I am afraid if we are going to talk about targeting, we will have to go into executive session.

Chairman RUSSELL. The next question (reading):

Mr. McNamara's controlled nuclear response is apparently designed to offer the Russian a better alternative than suicide, while at the same time limiting damage to the United States. Isn't this a better outcome than the mutual suicide you predict if deterrence fails?

Do you wish to answer that question?

General TAYLOR. I don't think I can contribute much to that in open session, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

If, as you recommended once, the deterrent force consisted of only a few hundred missiles and a decreasing bomber force, how could it be targeted except against cities?

General TAYLOR. Those figures were valid 3 years ago. I would have to revise any such statement now.

Chairman RUSSELL. The next question is——

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the Senator yield for a question in context?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I assume Senator Goldwater would.

Senator SYMINGTON. I appreciate it.

General Taylor, when you wrote your book, conditions were of a particular character and type in the world, and therefore, as I understand it, what you said in your testimony prior to these questions of Senator Goldwater you would want to review on the basis of conditions as you found them when you go to your new position; and based on that, you have an open mind as to whether conditions still apply as against when you wrote convictions in your book, is that correct?

General TAYLOR. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

If the fear of losing one's cities is a credible deterrent to us but not to the Russians, wouldn't we be playing into their hands?

General TAYLOR. I have never seen that angle of the argument, because when we talk about mutual deterrence, it presupposes not just a facade of strength, but the real strength, and the adequate ability to destroy the enemy completely, and he must know it and will know it.

And if he makes a mistake it is just too bad for him.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

If the Russians are inferior now, shouldn't we expect them to champion a stalemate?

General TAYLOR. I am not sure what is meant by "stalemate." If that means a reluctance to resort to general atomic war, of course that is the mutual deterrence we are talking about, that we are seeking now. We are in a stalemate in that sense.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

If you do, is this compatible with the theory of mutual deterrence? Could we execute a countermilitary strategy from a force posture design for mutual deterrence?

General TAYLOR. I am afraid I am lost, Senator. I am not sure what the point is.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are not completely sure as to what this counter-military strategy is?

General TAYLOR. No.

Chairman RUSSELL. I would like to have inserted in the record at this juncture a quotation from "The Uncertain Trumpet," pages 61 and 62.

(The quotation is as follows:)

* * * I urged that we be ever mindful of the attitude of our allies toward massive retaliation. Both in NATO and in the smaller nations, there was a growing feeling, I thought, that U.S. military power was becoming increasingly inflexible. By our ever-growing dependence on nuclear weapons and nuclear retaliation as the backbone of our military strength, we appeared to these allies to be reaching the position where we could react to Communist power politics in only two alternative ways—apply all-out nuclear power or back away from the challenge. In the era of mutual deterrence to nuclear war, this inflexible condition of our military strength provided scant support to our political strategy. Our allies doubted, understandably, that we would risk the suicidal possibilities of unrestrained nuclear reaction in order to meet limited military threats * * *.

Senator JACKSON. This is sort of a book review.

General TAYLOR. In preparation for this, Senator, I tried to re-read "The Uncertain Trumpet," but it was pretty dull going.

Senator JACKSON. The book sales will go up.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

Do you believe that in a limited war situation the introduction by the United States of a few tactical nuclear weapons against purely military targets would automatically escalate a conflict to a global nuclear war?

General TAYLOR. Not necessarily. It would create new tensions, but I am not one who believes that there is anything automatic in this escalation from a tactical nuclear war to a general one.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

You do, then, believe that there is flexibility in nuclear operations?

General TAYLOR. I certainly believe in having flexibility to be able to do a number of things, starting with the use of very small nuclear weapons, which, by their restrained effect, are hardly compatible with the normal concept of nuclear weapons.

Chairman RUSSELL. The next question is:

Then conventional forces are not the only flexible forces? How great a conventional capacity do you recommend? Are we to fight Russia and Communist China all out conventionally?

General TAYLOR. Definitely not. The exact size which I will recommend now—I would have to review. Three years ago I was talking in terms of a million-man army. I am not sure that that would be the figure today. I would like to review the requirements in the course of the next budget, and at that time I will take a new position.

Chairman RUSSELL. What is the approximate size of the Army at the present time, then?

General TAYLOR. About 960,000.

Chairman RUSSELL. The next question is (reading):

Don't we have ample conventional forces to handle any nation's conventional forces other than the U.S.S.R. and Communist China?

General TAYLOR. I beg your pardon?
Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

Don't we have ample conventional forces to handle any nation's conventional forces other than the U.S.S.R. and Communist China?

General TAYLOR. We do potentially if we consider the Reserve forces that Senator Stennis referred to. But there is also the question, Are you going to have more than one limited war at a time? All these factors have to be taken into account. It is never clear that we would have only one limited war at a given moment.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator yield, in the words of Senator Goldwater?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. General Taylor, do you believe that the conventional forces of the United States at the present time are equal to any emergency that we may have to have for our national security, whatever might arise? I don't want to qualify it "except for Russia" or "China" or anything else. Do you believe that our conventional forces today are adequate, or if they are not adequate, do you see the way to making them adequate?

General TAYLOR. I would have to qualify it again. It is not an easy question to answer, because it requires a consideration of the possible requirements for military force in several areas. Until I have a chance to restudy this in a professional way, which I have not had, all I can say for the moment is that we are improving our posture. It is better this year than last year, but we still have a considerable distance to go.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I asked that question because I thought your answer might be misinterpreted.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you read this question?

General TAYLOR (reading):

In your book you advocated the flexible response as the antithesis of massive retaliation. I have several quotations from Mr. Dulles on the subject: "The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. Now the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices. That permits of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means.

"We have developed, with our allies, a collective system of great power which can be flexibly used on whatever scale may be requisite to make aggression costly.

"Our capacity to retaliate must be, and is, massive in order to deter all forms of aggression. But if we have to use that capacity, such use would be selected and adapted to the occasion."

In what respects do you believe massive retaliation as expressed by Mr. Dulles fails to meet your flexibility criteria?

I have a feeling that I answered almost the same question. I would say first that the implication in the Dulles quotation is that massive retaliation can deter any kind of threat. Obviously, it cannot and it has not.

Furthermore, I would say that Secretary Dulles didn't believe this at the end. He came to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on two occasions in about 1958 and said that he now perceived the deficiencies in mas-

sive retaliation. Hence, I would say that this was not his final view.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

In view of your stress on flexibility, do you think that phasing out our manned bombers and interceptors in favor of missile would provide us with the necessary flexibility in force employment?

General TAYLOR. It depends on how it is done, Senator. It is a very delicate and difficult question on how to phase in a new weapons system and phase out the old. At the present time we still need some of the bombers. This changeover is under constant study by the Joint Chiefs, and is a matter that has to be examined very carefully.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am advised by the staff, General, that these references to countermilitary measures and Mr. McNamara's countermilitary philosophy derive from a speech that Secretary McNamara made at the University of Michigan, in which he stated that our initial response would be to strike military targets.

General TAYLOR. I think counter force strategy is what Senator Goldwater meant.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is what the Senator has in mind in referring to the countermilitary philosophy of Secretary McNamara:

Do you believe missiles have equal flexibility of operations to manned aircraft?

General TAYLOR. Not in certain respects, in the sense that the missile cannot be recalled.

Chairman RUSSELL. The next question is (reading):

How can a purely missile force be used in a countermilitary role? For the present and foreseeable future are missiles not limited to fixed type targets?

General TAYLOR. That is correct, they are limited to fixed targets, and have a limitation hence to the general strategic role. At the present time, as you know, we do not expect to depend exclusively on missiles, we do have a combination of missiles and bombers.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

Is it not necessary, therefore, for the United States to develop and maintain a mixed strategic weapon force consisting of missiles and modern manned aircraft?

General TAYLOR. We are doing that at the present time.

Chairman RUSSELL. And you advocate that?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir, at the present time.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General, and there may be some repetition here. If there is, you can just refer to your previous answer (reading):

Despite dramatic changes in the organization of the Defense Department, there have been no recent discussions of reorganizing the Joint Chiefs. Do you still favor dissolving the Joint Chiefs and replacing them with a single Chief of Staff?

General TAYLOR. I think I have answered that, Senator. I never proposed that. I proposed a single Chief of Staff and a military committee. I would like to make that distinction very clear; the functions of the present Chiefs would not devolve upon a single individual, but would be split between the military committee and the single military officer.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe you answered this next question: (reading)

Would this alleviate the requirement for a Military Assistant in the White House?

General TAYLOR. I beg your pardon?

Chairman RUSSELL. I understood Senator Smith to ask this question, not in identical words, but in substance (reading):

Would this alleviate the requirement—

No, that is just in case you were to answer yes, and you didn't answer yes—

If you do not favor a change at this time, is it because you believe that the JCS is still a useful system?

General TAYLOR. It is very definitely a useful system.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

Do you see any needed improvements in the Unified and Specified Command structure?

General TAYLOR. I have nothing particularly in mind at the present time. On these professional matters I would like to reserve judgment.

Chairman RUSSELL. A quotation from "The Uncertain Trumpet," page 176, will be put in the record.

I would dissolve the JCS as it now exists and replace it by a single Defense Chief of Staff for the one-man functions and by a new advisory body called provisionally the Supreme Military Council. The service Chiefs of Staff would lose their Joint Chief hats and would return to their respective Department Secretaries. The new Defense Chief of Staff would preside over the present Joint Staff (I say the Joint Staff, not the Joint Chiefs), assisted by two deputy chiefs of staff on the military services other than his own. He would wear four or five stars and be the senior military officer of the United States Government reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. He would be legally and overtly a single Chief of Staff, with public responsibility corresponding to his great authority * * *

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

You were once critical of the ambiguous position of the Joint Chiefs with respect to the formulation of our military strategy. How did your position as Military Assistant to the President lessen this ambiguity?

General TAYLOR. I would not feel that my position in the White House has had any effect on this particular area, bearing in mind again that I was never in the channel of authority, nor in any deciding capacity whatsoever, but simply one of the staff assistants to the President.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

Would you recommend the position be abolished now? And if so, why?

General TAYLOR. I would say it depends entirely upon the President; it is a personal matter, and only he can decide that.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will have this quotation from "The Uncertain Trumpet", page 20, placed in the record:

Heretofore the Joint Chiefs had been regarded as a nonpolitical body charged with giving professional advice to the Secretary of Defense, to the National Security Council, and to the President. It had been thought that they should give their advice with limited, if any, attention to political or economic factors, since these components of the national strategy had qualified spokesman elsewhere in the governmental structure. A new ambiguity was given to the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which has existed to the present time and continues to plague the formulation of our military strategy * * *

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

Would you favor Marine and naval units be placed in the STRICOM organization to increase STRICOM effectiveness?"

General TAYLOR. I have not had a chance to study that organization, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

Considering the unparalleled experience and capabilities of the Air Force in tactical air operations and theater airlift roles, do you see any justification for expanding Army aviation to duplicate these existing capabilities?

General TAYLOR. Well, again, I would rather not get into that now.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will insert in the record the quotation from "The Uncertain Trumpet," pages 170-171:

I would make mobility and the ability to live and operate with the Army in the field and distinguishing characteristic of all Army equipment, to include combat aircraft and missiles. The Air Force would have the forces and equipment characterized by the need for permanent bases and fixed installations. The Army would be adapted primarily to life and operations on an oversea land mass; the Air Force to life at home and operations conducted intermittently against long-range strategic targets. Specifically, the Army would have mobile, surface-to-surface missiles of all necessary ranges (short of the intercontinental ballistic missiles) and all air-defense missiles needed for the defense of its forces in the field and the land area in which they operate. The Air Force would have the ICBM's and the fixed air-defense missiles for the defense of its own installations and bases. This delineation amounts to giving the Air Force essentially the entire mission of continental air defense * * *

Senator Goldwater left here an article that appears in the Time Magazine of August 3, entitled "The Pentagon's Whiz Kids." It deals with this question from the Goldwater letter:

Does General Taylor believe that individuals such as Alain C. Enthoven, Harold Brown, Henry Rowen, Merton Joseph Peck, and Adam Yarmolinsky are better equipped to write strategic papers for the military than the military themselves?

General TAYLOR. I am afraid that is a beating-your-wife kind of question, Senator. I don't know that they do this kind of writing.

Chairman RUSSELL (reading):

I have absolutely no question about General Maxwell Taylor's ability, his utter loyalty, and his proven outstanding ability as a military leader, but I would be deceitful to my conscience if I did not raise these questions in light of the general's expressions in his book and his known positions coupled with the influence that he will be subjected to under the administration's policy of continued deference to Soviet demands.

Dick, I can't emphasize too much the importance of getting these questions on record plus the questions that will naturally come to your mind and the minds of others on the committee. Again, I reiterate, I have nothing but the utmost confidence in the loyalty and patriotism and professional ability of General Taylor, but I do have deep concern about the aims and desires and the philosophy of those civilians assigned to the Pentagon who are seemingly dictating our military posture in the world. I think it is most important to develop, and you should consult with Senator John Stennis on this—the testimony of General Power, commander of SAC, in which he had to admit that by 1970 if we follow our present commitments, we will in effect have no strategic strike force composed of manned aircraft.

I want to emphasize, and I wish you would make this plain to the general—in fact, you can read him my entire letter if you care to—that I am completely in accord with his feelings as to conventional weapons if he refers to them as an additive, but I am completely opposed to the concept that conventional weapons replace our strategic air strike capabilities and nuclear weapons. If we for one moment think that our enemy is going back to fighting wars as we fought them in 1917 and 1918, then we have already lost the next contest that we engage in on the fields of battle, no matter how much all of us hope and pray this will never come about.

In conclusion, I thank you for handling these questions for me and apologize if they seem to be of exceeding length, but the defense of our country to me can know no bounds. I apologize for not being with you, but circumstances over which I have no control, nor if I had would I want to alter, prevent that possibility.

Senator CASE?

Senator CASE of New Jersey. I have just one question. You say you have been a bystander for the past few years, and perhaps an observer. As a result of that experience do you have any change in our military posture at present that you would like to give a higher priority to?

General TAYLOR. No, I really do not. I will return and go over these problems which I knew well 3 years ago to find out what has taken place, but I am not arriving with any blueprint in my pocket.

Senator CASE of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Engle has just come in.

Do you have any questions, Senator Engle?

Senator ENGLE. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say that I enthusiastically support this nomination. I have great admiration for General Taylor. And I think this is one of the finest nominations that has ever come before the Congress. We have had some comments here from a well-known Reserve officer in the Air Force. I would like to say that as a Reserve officer in the Air Force I enthusiastically support the nomination of General Maxwell Taylor of the Army to be Chief of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington indicates he has another question.

Senator Symington. First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate General Taylor for coming back in the service. And I congratulate the President for getting him back. He comes from my State, and is a worthy successor, in my opinion, to such other Missouri Chiefs of Staff, as General Pershing and General Bradley. I think perhaps most of all it is important we have as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff one who recognises the importance of change and progress.

The Secretary of Defense is trying to utilize his authority in order to reduce cost in the Pentagon. Many of those who bellyache upon the cost of government are the ones who resist any change in the organization over there. I note that Secretary McNamara said recently that \$3 billion could be saved in logistics, and of course that is prior to any saving that could be made by an analysis of weapons systems, which in effect would mean we would not have two or three ways of doing the same job.

General, I would ask this question. Do you plan to institute an analysis of weapons systems evaluation when you go into this work?

General TAYLOR. I think you will find one very much in progress, Senator. I have been talking to my friends over there, and find a great deal of new effort is going to this question of evaluating weapons systems. I think the budget system we have mentioned before tends

to focus attention upon how money is being used in terms of functional results. And that in turn calls for a harder look at the weapon systems.

Senator SYMINGTON. And that not only would save a great deal of money if there were some of these weapons systems you could cut out, but it would streamline your ability to retaliate, would it not?

General TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was hoping you would say that, because a 10 percent cut in the military budget from the standpoint of the taxpayer would be worth more than a 50 percent cut in any other branch of the Government. When you left the Army, the truth is that the strength of the Army had been under steady reduction over a period of years, had it not?

General TAYLOR. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. And therefore, in effect when you left, comparable to when General Ridgway and General Gavin left, you felt the Army was being cut too far, did you not?

General TAYLOR. That was my feeling, yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And at the time you wrote your book you felt that although the other services were just as important, the capacity to wage conventional war had been deemphasized to a point you thought was against the best interest of our security, is that correct?

General TAYLOR. Yes. And I would make the point you refer to, Senator, that this was not purely an Army affair. The lack of balance in our strategic capability, affects all services.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think that is a very good point. As I understand it, this morning you say you are going to take a new look in your new position, but at the same time you do not take back any reorganizational thoughts or philosophies you expressed in your book, is that correct?

General TAYLOR. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Senator STENNIS. May I just add a word, Mr. Chairman?

I don't think you should go into it here in detail. But what Senator Symington said about the weapons evaluation leaves me to say this, that along with those of us who have to pass on these figures year after year, I wouldn't attempt to get into weapon evaluation myself, but it seems like you just add on new ones and add on new ones and at some point we are going to have to stop. And I think it is already overdue by far.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think in this age of revolutionary weaponry it ought to be a continuing process from day to day, and never stop.

Would you be kind enough to exchange seats with General Wheeler here? We will let you remain for a few minutes, and then we will go into executive session.

(Subsequently, in executive session, the nomination of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, for appointment as Chairman, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was approved by the committee. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate the same day, August 9, 1962.)

NOMINATION OF GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

Chairman RUSSELL. General Wheeler, I believe it is your first appearance before this committee. I am sure I speak for all members of the committee when I congratulate you on your appointment, and extend to you a welcome on your first visit.

If you will summarize your biography for us, the members of the committee may then have some questions.

(The nomination reference and biography of General Wheeler follow:)

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
July 25, 1962.

Ordered, That the following nominations be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

General Earle G. Wheeler, United States Army, for appointment as Chief of Staff, United States Army, for a term of two years.

BIOGRAPHY OF GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER

Earle Gilmore Wheeler was born January 13, 1908, in Washington, D.C., and graduated from high school there. He was an enlisted man in the District of Columbia National Guard from August 1924 to July 1928. He then entered the U.S. Military Academy, graduating in June 1932, and was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry. His first duty station was with the 29th Infantry at Fort Benning, Ga. He completed the Infantry School Course in 1937 and joined the 15th Infantry in Tientsin, China.

In 1940, he became a mathematics instructor at West Point and from 1941 to 1942 served as aide-de-camp to the commanding general of the 36th Infantry Division at Fort Sam Houston and Camp Bowie, Tex. Following his graduation from the Command and General Staff College in February 1942, he commanded the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry, until September 1942. He then became Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3) of the 99th Infantry Division at Camp Van Dorn, Miss., and in 1943 was named Chief of Staff of the 63d Infantry Division there.

Early in 1945, he went overseas to the European theater of operations with the 63d Infantry Division, serving as Chief of Staff until September. Returning to the United States, he joined the faculty of the Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla., in December 1945, as an instructor in combined arms.

In 1946, General Wheeler was sent to Paris, France, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply (G-4) of Western Base Section, serving subsequently as Acting Chief of Staff and then Deputy Chief of Staff there. Early in 1947, he became Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3) of the U.S. Constabulary at Stuttgart, Germany.

Entering the National War College in July 1949, he graduated a year later and was assigned to the Joint Intelligence Group in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Wheeler was named commander of the 351st Infantry in Trieste in 1951, and a year later as brigadier general, became Inspector of Training for Allied Forces, Southern Europe, at Naples.

In 1954, he was named Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

He returned to the United States the following year to become Director of Plans in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations in the Pentagon, and was promoted to major general in December 1955. He became Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations in July 1957.

General Wheeler arrived at Fort Hood, Tex., October 30, 1958, to become commander of the 2d Armored (Hell on Wheels) Division. Then in March 1959, he became commanding general, III Corps, Fort Hood and 2d Armored Division, III Corps, was inactivated May 1959.

Among his military decorations are the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, and the Army Commendation Ribbon with Oak Leaf Cluster.

General Wheeler and his wife, Frances Howell Wheeler, have one son, Gilmore Stone Wheeler.

General Wheeler was Director, Joint Staff, from April 1960 to February 1962.

General Wheeler was named Deputy Commanding General, U.S. European Command, Paris, France, and was promoted to general March 1, 1962.

Personal data

Born: January 13, 1908, Washington, D.C.

Father: Clifton F. Wheeler (deceased).

Mother: Ida Gilmore.

Married Frances Howell, June 10, 1932 at Old Greenwich, Conn.

Children: Gilmore S. (attending George Washington University, Washington, D.C.).

Official address: Care of The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C.

Education

U.S. Military Academy, 1932 (B.S.).

The Infantry School (regular course), 1937.

Command and General Staff College, 1942.

National War College, 1950.

Chronological list of promotions

Rank	Temporary (AUS)	Permanent (RA)
2d Lieutenant.....		June 10, 1932
1st Lieutenant.....		Aug. 1, 1935
Captain.....	Sept. 9, 1940	June 10, 1942
Major.....	Feb. 1, 1942	
Lieutenant Colonel.....	Nov. 11, 1942	
Do.....	July 11, 1947	July 1, 1948
Colonel.....	June 26, 1943	Sept. 7, 1950
Brigadier General.....	Nov. 8, 1952	May 13, 1960
Major General.....	Dec. 21, 1955	June 30, 1961
Lieutenant General.....	Apr. 21, 1960	
General.....	Mar. 1, 1962	

Chronological list of assignments

29th Infantry, Fort Benning, Ga., from August 1932 to August 1936.

The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., from September 1936 to May 1937.

15th Infantry, Tientsin, China, and Fort Lewis, Wash., from June 1937, to July 1940.

Mathematics instructor, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., from August 1940 to June 1941.

Aide-de-camp to commanding general, 36th Infantry Division, Fort Sam Houston and Camp Bowie, Tex., from June 1941 to December 1941.

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., from December 1941 to February 1942.

Battalion commander, 141st Infantry, Camp Blanding, Fla., from April 1942 to September 1942.

G-3, 99th Infantry Division, Camp Van Dorn, Miss., from October 1942 to April 1943.

Chief of staff, 63d Infantry Division, Camp Van Dorn, Miss. and Europe, from May 1943 to November 1945.

Instructor, the Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla., from December 1945 to April 1946.

Deputy chief of staff, Headquarters, Western Base Section, France, from May 1946 to December 1946.

G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary, Heidelberg, Germany, from January 1947 to June 1949.

Student, National War College, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., from August 1949 to June 1950.

Member, Joint Intelligence Group, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., from July 1950 to October 1951.

Commander officer, 351st Infantry, Trieste, from November 1951 to October 1952.

Deputy commanding general, TRUST, Trieste, from November 1952 to November 1952.

Assistant chief of staff for plans and operations, Allied Forces, southern Europe, Naples, Italy, from December 1952 to September 1955.

Director of plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Washington, D.C. from October 1955 to June 1957.

Assistant deputy chief of staff for military operations, Washington, D.C., from July 1957 to September 1958.

Commanding general, 2d Armored Division, and Fort Hood, Tex., from October 1958 to March 1960.

Director, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., from April 1960 to February 1962.

Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, Camp des Loges, France, from March 1962 to date.

List of citations and decorations

Legion of Merit

Bronze Star Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster)

Army Commendation Ribbon (Oak Leaf Cluster)

Legion of Honor (Chevalier) (French)

Service medals

American Defense Service Medal

American Campaign Medal

Europe Middle East Campaign Medal

World War II Victory Medal

Army Occupation Medal (Germany)

National Defense Service Medal

Badges

General Staff Identification Badge

Department of Defense Identification Badge

Personal background material

Interests and hobbies: Fishing; walking; and reading.

Civic activities: Boy Scouts and USO.

Religion: Protestant.

STATEMENT OF GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, NOMINEE FOR APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

General WHEELER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee in connection with my appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army.

I was born here in Washington, D.C., in 1908, and graduated from high school here. My military service began with 4 years as an enlisted man in the District of Columbia National Guard prior to entering the U.S. Military Academy in 1928.

Upon graduation from the Military Academy in 1932, I was commissioned in the infantry and served most of the next 8 years in regimental assignments at Fort Benning, Ga., in Tientsin, China, and in Fort Lewis, Wash.

In 1940, I became an instructor in mathematics at West Point. In 1942, I completed the course at the Command and General Staff College and was assigned to the command of a battalion of the 141st Regiment of the 36th Infantry Division of the Federalized Texas National Guard. In succession, I was then operations officer of the 99th Infantry Division, and Chief of Staff of the 63d Infantry Division, remaining in this assignment until the end of the war. The 63d took part in the campaigns of the Rhineland and central Europe.

Following a tour as an instructor in combined arms at the artillery school, I returned to Europe as assistant chief of staff for supply of the then Western Base Section. Early in 1947, I was assigned as operations officer of the U.S. constabulary in Germany, remaining in that post until entering the National War College in 1949.

Upon completion of the War College I was assigned to the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In 1951, I was assigned to command the 351st Infantry Regiment in Trieste. Upon promotion to brigadier general a year later, I was successively inspector of training and then plans and operations officer of Allied Forces Southern Europe with headquarters in Naples, Italy.

In 1955, I returned to Washington to become director of plans in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, later serving as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

In 1958, I was assigned to the command of the 2d Armored Division and in 1959 commanded both the III Corps and the 2d armored Division at Fort Hood, Tex.

From April 1960 until February 1962, I was Director of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. Since last February, I have been Deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. And I am at the committee's disposal.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was this the 99th Division that was broken up so badly in the Battle of the Bulge?

General WHEELER. I wasn't with them at that time, Mr. Chairman, but they did suffer considerable damage in the early part of the battle. After that they regrouped and participated effectively in battle until the end of the war.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were not with them in the Battle of the Bulge?

General WHEELER. No, sir; at that time I was with the 63d Division in the 7th Army to the south.

Chairman RUSSELL. The 99th was badly broken up?

General WHEELER. They were in the Battle of the Bulge, yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I think I only have one question, General Wheeler. We have heard a lot in the last year or two in this committee and in the Appropriations Committee in defense of trying to build up our security forces on missions rather than separating the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and providing them each with all the funds that they believe are necessary. The Army, of course, has been the sufferer to a greater extent than the Navy and the Air Force. From your studies in the war colleges and your experiences, are you generally in favor of this progressive effort to stimulate our security by missions rather than by functions of the various services?

General WHEELER. I believe so, Senator, in this respect. Our system of unified command worldwide is to my mind a most effective means of allocating functions to our military forces. This means that these senior commanders, General Norstad, and Admiral Felt, and so on, are allocated forces of all services to carry out the mission for his particular area of responsibility. I don't believe that in the long term that the Army is going to suffer by this system.

As a matter of fact, the studies that are going on now indicate that people recognize that we have a continuing need for a strong and effective Army in the present day. This is a reversal, as I believe General Taylor brought out, of a trend that was current at the time he was Chief of Staff of the Army.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I thank you for that point of view.

No further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. General Wheeler, following up just a little further on Senator Saltonstall's reflection, you think the unified missions and the unified commands are already a reality, and you think too that they will probably be expanded?

General WHEELER. I would think that this system is going to continue to be developed, sir. Actually it came into being in sort of a rudimentary form in World War II. It has since been improved by the Reorganization Act of 1958, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff were placed directly in the line of control. I am confident from my recent experience in Europe and my experience as Director of the Joint Staff that this gives a very effective military control of our forces worldwide.

Senator STENNIS. And it is more or less a rule of necessity in operation, isn't it, the names have just changed? So your position as Chief of Staff of the Army would not put you, in your opinion, in a position to resist these unified commands or missions in any way, would it?

General WHEELER. Not at all, Senator.

Senator STENNIS. On the other hand, you have already said that you see the necessity and would want them to apply when proper, and you don't think it would be a diminution of the Army or any other service?

General WHEELER. Far from it, sir. As I look at it, in modern war we are going to have plenty for all the services to do. There can be all the heroes that we need, and certainly we are going to need Army, Navy and Air Forces in each one of our unified command areas to carry out the mission.

Senator STENNIS. I am impressed that through the training of the proper kind of men in the Reserve forces, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Guard, and utilizing the training that they already have, military training, and utilizing the talent that you find, that that is a very effective way to have a near ready, sizable force at much less cost.

You heard my question to General Taylor. Do you agree to those points?

General WHEELER. I do indeed, sir. As a matter of fact, in my present assignment I had an opportunity to observe some of the Air National Guard units in Europe, and I found that they were doing a very effective job. General Landon, who is the Commander in Chief of our Air Forces in Europe, and one of our component commanders, was very pleased with the performance.

Senator STENNIS. I just wanted to say at least that perhaps you hadn't had a chance to observe these units, but you did get a chance to observe them in Europe?

General WHEELER. That is correct.

Senator STENNIS. With your new duties if you will concern yourself now, and examine the record made by those who were in service here, I mean in the call up, as well as this entire program, do you consider the Reserve and the National Guard as a vital and essential part of the military program?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I support what is sometimes known as the one-army concept, Senator.

I think that what we must have are Reserve components which are complementary to the abilities of the Active Forces. So that we get an overall balanced military posture for the defense of the country.

Senator STENNIS. I have no grievance about it, but to illustrate one thing, it makes me think we are lacking when it comes to money. Up to the last 3 or 4 years in the military construction bill we have had actual trouble in getting just a little money, \$200,000, spent for the summer training of these Reserve units and the National Guard, and even as small an amount as \$5,000 to put up latrines and mess halls, and so forth, which is another illustration. It seems to me the Regular Army makes adequate allotments for such matters; the need for such things as training in the reserve units.

General WHEELER. Senator, you have had an experience that I haven't had. When I was Commanding General at Fort Hood, I, of course, had National Guard and Reserve units training on my reservation. Among them were the 36th Infantry Division, the 49th Armored Division, and the 45th Division, as well as smaller units.

I think we managed to take care of them quite adequately in that particular area. I can't speak of anywhere else.

Senator STENNIS. When it comes to your attitude as Chief of Staff; this will get your own attention as well as that of staff officers and will be given the necessary facilities and training too?

General WHEELER. It certainly will.

Senator STENNIS. Because of their importance in your evaluation?

General WHEELER. They will indeed, sir.

Senator STENNIS. You mentioned the 49th Division. I had the privilege of going down to Fort Polk where I saw the major units, and it was a very fine operation indeed under General West, a civilian officer.

That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. I haven't any questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. General Wheeler, you agree, do you not, that in effect, based on the past concept of the victory, nobody could really win an all-out nuclear war.

General WHEELER. Not in the old sense of the word, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Nevertheless, do you agree that we should do whatever is necessary to be at least equal to any possible enemy in the nuclear field.

General WHEELER. I do indeed, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You believe also, do you not, that we need a modern Army adequate in size and in training?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And for an army to be modern it must be modern in equipment and not only in operation, must it not?

General WHEELER. It must indeed, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. And therefore it must have adequate airlifts so it can be moved rapidly, especially when you consider what General Taylor brought up, the possibility of more than one conventional war at the same time.

General WHEELER. This is one of the prime ingredients of modern forces, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. As this committee knows, I have been working on this airlift for many years, and I am glad to see we are at last beginning to make some real progress. If you are confirmed to this position, which I am sure you will be, can you assure this committee that you will do your best to get the Army modern airlift in accordance with what you think is necessary to be mobile?

General WHEELER. I certainly will, sir. And I would like to refresh your memory, Senator Symington. In 1956 I appeared with General Gavin before your subcommittee on the subject of airlift. And I advocated essentially that policy at that time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Jackson and I both remember your appearance, and I am glad that you haven't changed your opinion.

General WHEELER. Not at all.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, we are marking up the satellite bill in Foreign Relations. I would like to place on the record my personal opinion that this is a fine appointment and in the best interests of the Services in the country, and I look forward to voting for the confirmation of General Wheeler.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to congratulate General Wheeler. From everything I know about him he is going to make a fine Chief of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bush.

Senator BUSH. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, in your position, as I understand, you of course would favor adequate ground forces?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. And when we say adequate ground forces, we would include with that adequate equipment for those forces?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. And I presume it would be your judgment that those adequate ground forces with adequate equipment would embrace battlefield atomic weapons?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir. I do indeed.

Senator THURMOND. That seems to be a question that is being knocked around, as to whether we would use atomic weapons on the battlefield. But you do feel it is important that we should be prepared to use atomic weapons on the battlefield?

General WHEELER. I do, Senator. Otherwise you are giving the enemy a possibility of inflicting damage on you with no response. We must have flexibility of response, as General Taylor outlined.

Senator THURMOND. I heartily agree with you, and I am very pleased to hear you say that in your position.

Also as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I presume you would not favor weakening in any way our nuclear deterrent.

General WHEELER. Not at all.

Senator THURMOND. Simply because you favor adequate ground forces for conventional operation doesn't mean you couldn't also favor strong nuclear deterrent?

General WHEELER. A strong nuclear deterrent is practically the first priority, sir. But I would like to see our deterrent attitude strong right across the board.

I believe the ground forces properly equipped and mobile also add to the deterrent posture of the United States.

Senator THURMOND. And when we say a strong nuclear deterrent we don't mean equal nuclear power?

General WHEELER. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. We mean a strong superiority in nuclear weapons?

General WHEELER. You have to have an additional margin above that of the enemy to be on the safe side.

Senator THURMOND. Now, I would like to ask you about how you feel toward the development of the Nike-Zeus. I am a strong believer in the Army going forward with the development of this important weapon. And I think we have lost several years by not doing so.

General WHEELER. I would like to say this, Senator. I believe that probably the most important unrealized need is an antimissile missile, because achievement by the opposition, while we have none, would give them a very important margin of superiority, and a dangerous margin.

I have been very much encouraged by what I have heard about the recent success of the Nike-Zeus that was shot in the Pacific. And it is one of the things that I want to learn more about so that we can pursue a proper program for the development of an antimissile missile as a matter of priority.

Senator THURMOND. The Nike-Zeus properly developed and available would not only act as a deterrent to war, but if war should come, it would probably save millions of lives, especially in our city, would it not?

General WHEELER. If this system does what it is supposed to do.

Senator THURMOND. And for the several million dollars that it would take to go ahead and have it ready rather than waiting and regret it later, it would be well worth the cost, would it not?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. General, there is a lot of talk these days about disarmament. I realize that this is out of your field somewhat. But as a military man, do you agree with me that the aim of the Communists is to dominate and enslave the world?

General WHEELER. That is what I understand, sir, it certainly is.

Senator THURMOND. With the concept that we are now in a total war, a military political, economic, social, and diplomatic war?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. And that this is a continuing war?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. And that when the Communists use the word "peace" they simply mean that time when there is no longer any struggle, any longer any conflict, when they control the world?

General WHEELER. They use their words to their own advantage, sir, they have special meanings, there is no question about it.

Senator THURMOND. And that the word "truth" to the Communists means anything that promotes the Communist cause, including murder, lying, stealing, or anything else?

General WHEELER. I haven't known them to bar anything yet.

Senator THURMOND. And with such a goal as that, do you feel that we can afford to consider disarming until they have abandoned their goal of world dominance, and have proven it by actions as well as words?

General WHEELER. The disarmament functions in my opinion must be accomplished by safeguards at every step to insure that the security of the United States is not jeopardized in the process.

Now, I am not aware of what has been done in this field recently. I would assume that these safeguards are being carefully preserved in any consideration of a disarmament step, I would certainly hope so.

Senator THURMOND. I don't want to try to get you out in a field in which you do not have responsibility, or propound questions out of your area of responsibility. But knowing the Communists as you do, do you feel like you can trust the Communists in any agreement that they make, unless it is to their advantage?

Haven't they broken fifty out of fifty of the major agreements that they have made, and hundreds of other agreements?

General WHEELER. I can't cite the number. Very definitely they take the course of action which seems expedient to them at the time, there is no question about it, regardless of treaty.

Senator THURMOND. General Wheeler, with further regard to the Reserve, I am vitally interested in the Reserve. Senator Stennis referred to it a few moments ago. As I understand, you do approve of this concept of one Army?

General WHEELER. I do indeed, sir.

Senator THURMOND. And one Army includes the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Reserve?

General WHEELER. That is correct, sir.

Senator THURMOND. And they all have a place in the picture?

General WHEELER. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. And it would be your intention as Chief of Staff to maintain that proper balance with no favoritism to any?

General WHEELER. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. I believe in World War II 90 percent of the Army were citizen soldiers. If we have an all-out war you need the citizen soldiers.

General WHEELER. We certainly will.

Senator THURMOND. And it is going to be too late to train those citizen soldiers after war comes, they have got to be ready. Do you believe that the Reserves and National Guard should have adequate equipment and modern equipment, just as good as the Regular Army?

General WHEELER. This must be on a matter of priority, Senator, as I look at it. We must have plans, training and equipment so that some elements are available immediately and other elements of the Reserve program come along as needed. And they certainly must have adequate equipment.

Senator THURMOND. But you certainly favor modern equipment for the Reserves and the National Guard?

General WHEELER. I do indeed.

Senator THURMOND. Without such modern equipment they are tremendously handicapped and cannot be ready?

General WHEELER. That is right.

Senator THURMOND. And unless they have this equipment with which to train and prepare themselves, they will not be familiar with the weapons and will still have to receive training in an emergency case?

General WHEELER. Always, you would have to create the equipment, Senator, if you don't have an adequate stock.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, General Wheeler has a very fine record, and I take pleasure in supporting his confirmation.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there are no further questions, thank you, General.

And the committee at this juncture will go into executive session. All other than the witnesses and members of the committee and the staff will please leave the room.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon the committee went into executive session.)

(The nomination of Gen. Earle G. Wheeler to be Chief of Staff of the Army was subsequently approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate the same day—Aug. 9, 1962.)

General Winters, I can't give the number. Very definitely they take the course of action which is expedient to them at the time. There is no question about it, regardless of that.

Senator Thurmond, General Wheeler, with further regard to the Reserve, I am vitally interested in the Reserve. Senator Stennis referred to it a few moments ago. As I understand you are anxious to get this concept of an Army.

General Winters, I do indeed sir. Senator Thurmond, and one Army includes the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Reserve.

General Winters, that is correct sir. Senator Thurmond, but they all have a place in the picture?

General Winters, that is correct. Senator Thurmond, and it would be your intention as Chief of Staff to maintain the proper balance with no inclination to any?

General Winters, that is correct. Senator Thurmond, I believe in World War II 90 percent of the Army were citizen soldiers. If we have an all-out war you need the citizen soldiers.

Senator Thurmond, we certainly will move. But it is going to be too late to train those

citizen soldiers. They were called, they have got to be ready. Do you believe that the Regular Army and National Guard should have adequate equipment? That is correct as the Regular Army?

Senator Thurmond, this is not an all-out war, Senator. We must have planes, tanks and equipment so that we have available immediately and other elements of the Army in some long war. And they certainly must have adequate equipment.

Senator Thurmond, but you certainly favor modern equipment for the Reserve and the National Guard?

General Winters, I do indeed. Senator Thurmond, without such modern equipment they are automatically handicapped and cannot be ready?

General Winters, that is right. Senator Thurmond, and unless they have this equipment with which to train and prepare themselves, they will not be familiar with the weapons and will still have to receive training in an emergency case?

General Winters, always you would have to create the equipment. Senator, if you don't have an adequate stock.

Senator Thurmond, Mr. Chairman, General Wheeler has a very fine record, and I take pleasure in supporting his confirmation. Chairman Stennis, if there are no further questions, thank you, General.

And the committee at this juncture will go into executive session. All other than the witnesses and members of the committee and the staff will please leave the room.

(Whereupon at 12 noon the committee went into executive session.) (The nomination of Gen. Earl C. Wheeler to be Chief of Staff of the Army was subsequently approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate the same day - Aug. 29, 1952.)

