

1034 Senate - Armed services 87Y4  
Ar 5/3  
R 31/13

Y4 AUTHORITY FOR ORDERING READY RESERVES TO  
ACTIVE DUTY, EXTENSION OF ENLISTMENTS,  
AND ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR  
PROCUREMENT

GOVERNMENT  
Storage

HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

KSU LIBRARIES  
A11900 478722 ✓

FIRST SESSION  
ON

S. 2311


PROVIDING AUTHORIZATION FOR ADDITIONAL APPRO-  
PRIATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT AND NAVAL VESSELS

S.J. RES. 120

AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO ORDER ADDITIONAL  
UNITS OF READY RESERVES TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR  
TWELVE MONTHS

JULY 27, 1961

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1961

44  
A. 23  
R 31/13  
AUTHORITY FOR ORDERING READY RESERVES TO  
ACTIVE DUTY. EXTENSION OF EXISTING  
AND ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR  
PROCUREMENT

HEARING

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, *Chairman*

- |                                   |                                     |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| HARRY FLOOD BYRD, Virginia        | LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Massachusetts |
| JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi         | STYLES BRIDGES, New Hampshire       |
| STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri        | MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine         |
| HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington      | FRANCIS CASE, South Dakota          |
| SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina | PRESCOTT BUSH, Connecticut          |
| STROM THURMOND, South Carolina    | J. GLENN BEALL, Maryland            |
| CLAIR ENGLE, California           |                                     |
| E. L. BARTLETT, Alaska            |                                     |
| HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada          |                                     |
| ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia     |                                     |

HARRY L. WINGATE, Jr., *Chief Clerk*



## CONTENTS

---

Statements of—	Page
Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense-----	2-32
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff-----	43

CONTENTS

Statements of—  
Hon. Robert E. McNamara, Secretary of Defense ..... 2-33  
Gen. Lyman D. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ..... 34  
I ..... 35  
II ..... 36  
III ..... 37  
IV ..... 38  
V ..... 39  
VI ..... 40  
VII ..... 41  
VIII ..... 42  
IX ..... 43  
X ..... 44  
XI ..... 45  
XII ..... 46  
XIII ..... 47  
XIV ..... 48  
XV ..... 49  
XVI ..... 50  
XVII ..... 51  
XVIII ..... 52  
XIX ..... 53  
XX ..... 54  
XXI ..... 55  
XXII ..... 56  
XXIII ..... 57  
XXIV ..... 58  
XXV ..... 59  
XXVI ..... 60  
XXVII ..... 61  
XXVIII ..... 62  
XXIX ..... 63  
XXX ..... 64  
XXXI ..... 65  
XXXII ..... 66  
XXXIII ..... 67  
XXXIV ..... 68  
XXXV ..... 69  
XXXVI ..... 70  
XXXVII ..... 71  
XXXVIII ..... 72  
XXXIX ..... 73  
XL ..... 74  
XLI ..... 75  
XLII ..... 76  
XLIII ..... 77  
XLIV ..... 78  
XLV ..... 79  
XLVI ..... 80  
XLVII ..... 81  
XLVIII ..... 82  
XLIX ..... 83  
L ..... 84  
LI ..... 85  
LII ..... 86  
LIII ..... 87  
LIV ..... 88  
LV ..... 89  
LVI ..... 90  
LVII ..... 91  
LVIII ..... 92  
LIX ..... 93  
LX ..... 94  
LXI ..... 95  
LXII ..... 96  
LXIII ..... 97  
LXIV ..... 98  
LXV ..... 99  
LXVI ..... 100  
LXVII ..... 101  
LXVIII ..... 102  
LXIX ..... 103  
LXX ..... 104  
LXXI ..... 105  
LXXII ..... 106  
LXXIII ..... 107  
LXXIV ..... 108  
LXXV ..... 109  
LXXVI ..... 110  
LXXVII ..... 111  
LXXVIII ..... 112  
LXXIX ..... 113  
LXXX ..... 114  
LXXXI ..... 115  
LXXXII ..... 116  
LXXXIII ..... 117  
LXXXIV ..... 118  
LXXXV ..... 119  
LXXXVI ..... 120  
LXXXVII ..... 121  
LXXXVIII ..... 122  
LXXXIX ..... 123  
LXXXX ..... 124  
LXXXXI ..... 125  
LXXXXII ..... 126  
LXXXXIII ..... 127  
LXXXXIV ..... 128  
LXXXXV ..... 129  
LXXXXVI ..... 130  
LXXXXVII ..... 131  
LXXXXVIII ..... 132  
LXXXXIX ..... 133  
LXXXXX ..... 134  
LXXXXXI ..... 135  
LXXXXXII ..... 136  
LXXXXXIII ..... 137  
LXXXXXIV ..... 138  
LXXXXXV ..... 139  
LXXXXXVI ..... 140  
LXXXXXVII ..... 141  
LXXXXXVIII ..... 142  
LXXXXXIX ..... 143  
LXXXXXX ..... 144  
LXXXXXXI ..... 145  
LXXXXXXII ..... 146  
LXXXXXXIII ..... 147  
LXXXXXXIV ..... 148  
LXXXXXXV ..... 149  
LXXXXXXVI ..... 150  
LXXXXXXVII ..... 151  
LXXXXXXVIII ..... 152  
LXXXXXXIX ..... 153  
LXXXXXXX ..... 154  
LXXXXXXXI ..... 155  
LXXXXXXXII ..... 156  
LXXXXXXXIII ..... 157  
LXXXXXXXIV ..... 158  
LXXXXXXXV ..... 159  
LXXXXXXXVI ..... 160  
LXXXXXXXVII ..... 161  
LXXXXXXXVIII ..... 162  
LXXXXXXXIX ..... 163  
LXXXXXXXI ..... 164  
LXXXXXXXII ..... 165  
LXXXXXXXIII ..... 166  
LXXXXXXXIV ..... 167  
LXXXXXXXV ..... 168  
LXXXXXXXVI ..... 169  
LXXXXXXXVII ..... 170  
LXXXXXXXVIII ..... 171  
LXXXXXXXIX ..... 172  
LXXXXXXXI ..... 173  
LXXXXXXXII ..... 174  
LXXXXXXXIII ..... 175  
LXXXXXXXIV ..... 176  
LXXXXXXXV ..... 177  
LXXXXXXXVI ..... 178  
LXXXXXXXVII ..... 179  
LXXXXXXXVIII ..... 180  
LXXXXXXXIX ..... 181  
LXXXXXXXI ..... 182  
LXXXXXXXII ..... 183  
LXXXXXXXIII ..... 184  
LXXXXXXXIV ..... 185  
LXXXXXXXV ..... 186  
LXXXXXXXVI ..... 187  
LXXXXXXXVII ..... 188  
LXXXXXXXVIII ..... 189  
LXXXXXXXIX ..... 190  
LXXXXXXXI ..... 191  
LXXXXXXXII ..... 192  
LXXXXXXXIII ..... 193  
LXXXXXXXIV ..... 194  
LXXXXXXXV ..... 195  
LXXXXXXXVI ..... 196  
LXXXXXXXVII ..... 197  
LXXXXXXXVIII ..... 198  
LXXXXXXXIX ..... 199  
LXXXXXXXI ..... 200

ORDERING READY RESERVES TO ACTIVE DUTY

2

to be appointed under Public Law 87-53, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1962 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels, an authorized by law, amounts as follows:

AIRCRAFT

NAVY VESSELS

## AUTHORITY FOR ORDERING READY RESERVES TO ACTIVE DUTY, EXTENSION OF ENLISTMENTS, AND ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROCUREMENT

THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1961

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Byrd of Virginia, Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Thurmond, Engle, Bartlett, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Saltonstall, Smith, Case, Bush, and Beall.

Also present: William H. Darden, T. Edward Braswell, and Gordon A. Nease, of the committee staff; Harry L. Wingate, Jr., chief clerk; and Herbert Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.

### READY RESERVES AND PROCUREMENT

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Secretary of Defense McNamara is present this morning to testify before the committee on Senate Joint Resolution 120, and S. 2311, which are the legislative proposals to implement the President's views with respect to the Armed Forces of this country.

I think we all realize the importance of legislation bearing on our defense posture throughout the world at this time. That itself would be sufficient to cause us to move forward as expeditiously as possible with this measure, but in addition we have a situation where the Committee on Appropriations must wait on a legislative authorization before final action can be taken on the defense appropriations bill.

Mr. Secretary, on yesterday several members of the committee who are present this morning attended the hearing before the Appropriations Committee, and had an opportunity to examine you at that time. There are others present who did not have that opportunity.

We welcome you and your assistants here, and we will be glad to have you make such statement as you deem appropriate with respect to the resolution and the bill to strengthen our defense program.

(The bill and the resolution referred to follow:)

[S. 2311, 87th Cong., 1st sess.]

A BILL To authorize additional appropriations for aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in addition to the funds authorized to

be appropriated under Public Law 87-53, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1962 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels, as authorized by law, amounts as follows :

**AIRCRAFT**

For aircraft: For the Army, \$36,700,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, \$281,400,000; for the Air Force, \$294,100,000.

**MISSILES**

For missiles: For the Army, \$33,770,000; for the Navy, \$262,200,000; for the Air Force, \$8,800,000.

**NAVAL VESSELS**

For naval vessels: For the Navy, \$41,600,000.

[S.J. Res. 120, 87th Cong., 1st sess.]

**JOINT RESOLUTION** To authorize the President to order units and members in the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than twelve months, and for other purposes

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, until July 1, 1962, the President may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months. However, not more than two hundred and fifty thousand members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for training), without their consent, under this section at any one time.

Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until July 1, 1962, the President may authorize the Secretary of Defense to extend enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of active duty for training, periods of obligated service, or other military status, in any component of an armed force or in the National Guard that expire before July 1, 1962, for not more than twelve months.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

Secretary McNAMARA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Our purpose this morning is to present to you, with our recommendations for approval, the two bills requiring action by the Senate.

These will authorize certain specific actions which are a part of our broader program for strengthening the Military Establishment.

The total program contemplates the expenditure of \$3.2 billion for specific military purposes, and an additional \$200 million, approximately, for civil defense.

I have prepared a statement describing both parts of the program in considerable detail. Some of the members of the committee, as the chairman indicated, were present yesterday at the appropriations hearing, during which time I read the statement and discussed it in considerable detail.

I can do so again this morning, Mr. Chairman, or, alternatively, can extract certain portions of it and emphasize by reading only those portions that relate to the specific legislative action before this committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do we have copies of the secret presentation?  
Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of the unexpurgated edition of your statement of yesterday?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir. You have an unexpurgated edition in front of each committee member, I believe.

Chairman RUSSELL. Unless some member of the committee wishes you to read the entire statement, you may do as you suggest. Any member of the committee can ask any question he desires as to any phase not only of this program but of the operations of the Department of Defense, as well.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir. In that case, then, perhaps I could start by summarizing very briefly the total program by referring to attachment 1, which follows page 26 of this memorandum that is in front of you.

Attachment 1 lists the several actions that we are proposing to take to establish our Military Establishment.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a second, Mr. Secretary. The copy I have follows page 29.

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe that is the statement to the Appropriations Committee, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. There is a statement specifically directed to this committee that the other committee members have, which is—

Chairman RUSSELL. I was using the one I had yesterday on which I had made notations.

Secretary McNAMARA. We have a new statement that we prepared last night that is specifically directed to this committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well.

Secretary McNAMARA. On this attachment we have listed in very summary form the specific actions we are proposing, and to orient the members of this committee, I will just go through this very quickly and discuss the authorizing legislation which we seek.

First, we are proposing to strengthen our nuclear capability.

The great bulk of the expenditures, the highest percentage of the men to be added and the major emphasis, will be placed on strengthening our nonnuclear forces, but to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to our nuclear capability and our intent to use nuclear weapons under certain circumstances, we have included two specific items to strengthen that nuclear power.

The first is to increase the ready status of our B-52 and B-47 bombers by accelerating the program to place 50 percent of those bombers on a 15-minute ground alert status.

The committee will recall we presented such a program to the committee earlier this year, and provided then it would take effect in fiscal year 1962.

This action, which requires an expenditure of \$24 million, simply accelerates that program and permits us to place it into effect almost immediately.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, to state it in another way, it was indicated earlier that we were phasing out the B-47 somewhat more rapidly than had been anticipated, for several reasons. One of them was that some of the planes had shown some signs of metal fatigue or were not completely safe to operate.

Do you have a program to make these planes completely operational?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. May I comment on that next?

Item 1(b) on this attachment relates to canceling the planned deactivation of [deleted] B-47 wings, each wing of which includes about 45 B-47 bombers, and therefore, this action 1(b) relates to retaining in active service [deleted] B-47 aircraft that we had planned to deactivate and remove from the service during fiscal year 1962.

To accomplish that action will require that at the end of the year we have on active duty [deleted] men more than we had planned, and we spent during the year \$45 million more for personnel and operation and maintenance, and certain additional for procurement which I will discuss later.

The question the chairman asks is were these [deleted] aircraft that we planned to take out of service to be taken out because they were no longer serviceable or because they were no longer required in relation to our strategic plans, and the answer is they were being taken out of service because we anticipated they would no longer be required in relation to our strategic targeting objectives.

They are quite capable of remaining in service. They do not suffer metal fatigue in any way that reduces their operational capability.

The metal-fatigue problems that you may have heard of relate primarily to the B-52 aircraft and wing structure under certain operational conditions and in certain series of the aircraft.

Chairman RUSSELL. We had the same trouble with the B-47. We had to reinforce many of them to avoid the danger of metal fatigue, and it cost a substantial amount.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; and I think the rebuilding was successful, and the aircraft are entirely satisfactory for service if we choose to retain them.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. You are proposing to keep these B-47's; are you going to keep them in the air on an air alert more than you have heretofore?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir. We do not propose to increase the number of aircraft on air alert. [Deleted.]

We have authority under existing legislation, and we have requested that that authority be extended in fiscal year 1962, to increase the number of air alert to one-eighth of the total force should circumstances make that necessary.

We do not believe that circumstances at the present time make it necessary. If they develop in the future, we will, of course, place additional aircraft on alert.

Chairman RUSSELL. I concur in that view. Of course, I think the authority should be there, and it is in this year's appropriation bill as it came to us from the House.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. No B-47's have been produced for a long-time period. Is there any problem on parts?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir; there are not.

As I mentioned indirectly earlier, we are planning to increase the procurement of B-47's spare parts by \$50 million in order to pro-

vide for the necessary spares for these [deleted] aircraft while they are on extended duty.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is no problem?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And I suppose there will be unusual cost in some cases, will there not, having to tool up?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think not, Mr. Chairman, because we have, as you know, approximately [deleted] B-47's in service at the present time, and we have to buy spares for those other aircraft.

Senator BUSH. How many B-52's are in the service?

Secretary McNAMARA. About [deleted] Senator Bush.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. That, then, is the primary purpose of item 1, to strengthen our nuclear power.

We, in 1-C, propose to further increase our ability to control our interceptors by manual control in the event that the automatic control centers are attacked and disabled, and we propose there, as you see, in item 1-C an addition of about [deleted] people at a cost of \$17 million for that purpose.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just one moment while we are going over this, because this relates directly to the legislative proposal we have to pass on. You say here postponing the inactivation will mean an increase of personnel of [deleted]. How is that possible when those planes are operational today? People are there to operate them. Why does it require [deleted] more people?

Secretary McNAMARA. Because this increase in strength of [deleted] will result at the end of the fiscal year. At the present time, the [deleted] or almost all of them, are in service, but it had been our plan to deactivate those units during the year, and by the end of the year to have the [deleted] out of the service, at least out of the B-47 units.

Now, we will have to increase the Air Force's end of fiscal year 1962 authorized strength by [deleted] to permit the retention of those B-47 wings.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you mean by that that the Air Force would have been [deleted] smaller in numbers in fiscal 1962?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Unless we had had this—

Secretary McNAMARA. That is exactly what this implies, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will this, obviate the necessity, Mr. Secretary, of dismissing a number of officers who have been apprehensive about their future in the Air Force?

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, actually a large number of the officers who are assigned to the B-47 wings would have been transferred either to the missile program, which is being planned or to the B-52's, the force of which is increasing to pick up the additional B-52's that will come off of the production lines through the latter part of next year.

So these [deleted] specific individuals, in large part, would have remained in the Air Force and be transferred to other assignments.

Now, we must, by the end of fiscal year 1962, add [deleted] additional men to the Air Force, either to man the B-47's that we are re-

taining or alternatively to fill the other assignments in the missile units.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do these changes in strength, to strengthen the Air Force, do they bring about any difficulties in your training program? You have been reducing your pilot training program very rapidly year to year.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. How are you going to get people to man these aircraft?

Secretary McNAMARA. This is a problem the Air Force is working on. It sees several ways by which it can meet the problem.

For one thing, it proposes to increase the rate of voluntary reenlistments and voluntary recruitment.

There are officers who had left the service involuntarily in recent years because of the efforts to reduce the number of officers on flying status. Some of those will be willing to return to the service. Efforts are being made to sort those out and bring them back.

It is possible that it will be necessary under the terms of the resolution that we will present to you today, to extend the active duty tours of certain individuals.

Further, we would plan to retain in the service men we otherwise would have forced to retire in order to meet our goals.

From these sources I believe we should be able to obtain enough personnel to fill this gap.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are going to have a rather old Air Force in your operational units as compared to other fighting organizations if you pursue that course, will you not? I am sure these men will carry out any mission that is assigned to them. I certainly do not mean this in derogation of anyone now in the Air Force. But during World War II we ran the draft age up pretty high, and they came to us and begged us to cut it back because the older men just did not have the endurance nor the daring to carry their missions. I do not suppose that would relate to the Air Force in any way in personnel?

Secretary McNAMARA. I do not believe that it would affect the operation of these units, Mr. Chairman.

The units are in a high state of readiness at the moment. We do not plan to retain them indefinitely, but only during this immediate period of crisis, and I think, therefore, we can consider that their crews will be quite effective.

Chairman RUSSELL. I know it is going to be more difficult to get out of this than we might otherwise apprehend.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think that is probably true.

However, you will recall that we had planned to reduce the B-47 force very substantially.

There were about 20 wings on active duty at the end of the last fiscal year.

We planned to cut that to [deleted] at the end of fiscal 1962, and then beyond that to cut still further, so that we have quite a potential for further reduction here.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am well aware of that. All of the plans on the manned bombers were revised substantially this year, I believe it was.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. And the plans were such that we had planned to greatly reduce the number of operational units.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. All those reductions, all those plans, are out the window.

Secretary McNAMARA. For fiscal 1962. But I would anticipate that for fiscal 1963 and 1964, even if we remain in a situation comparable to what we face today, we would nonetheless make some reductions in B-47's as our B-52 and B-58 programs increase in strength and as our missile strength increases and our POLARIS force increases.

Senator BUSH. Item (c) of this attachment which provides personnel for manual control of interceptors at U.S. radar sites, I do not quite understand that, Mr. Secretary. What does that mean, manual control of the interceptors?

Secretary McNAMARA. The present interceptor control system is the SAGE system.

Senator BUSH. Yes.

Secretary McNAMARA. Those SAGE centers are automatically controlled. There are about 20, as I recall. They are subject to attack, and if attacked our interceptors might be without appropriate control in some instances.

There are, however, radar sites scattered around the country, over 100, as I recall, which are controlled automatically by the SAGE centers, but which, in the event some SAGE centers were eliminated, could be operated manually, and it is to accomplish that task that we are proposing [deleted] men at a cost of \$17 million in order that we may have some control over the interceptors in the event some automatic control centers are eliminated.

Senator BUSH. Thank you, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. Then, if we may proceed to item 2, which proposes the addition of approximately [deleted] men at a cost of \$226 million in fiscal 1962, in order to effect the transition of three STRAF divisions now part of the 14-division Army from a training status to a combat-ready status, this is one of the most important actions, if not the most important, that we are recommending to the Congress.

It will mean that by the end of this year we will have in this country six combat-ready divisions made up of the three presently combat-ready divisions known as STRAC divisions, plus these three STRAF divisions, to which we will add the [deleted] men, and by the first of the year place in a combat-ready status.

The six Army divisions would be in addition to the two combat-ready Marine Corps divisions, making a total of eight combat-ready divisions in the continental United States by the end of 1961.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question if it is in order at this time?

Mr. Secretary, if it is not in order, why, tell me so and we will ask it later.

On page 2 of your Senate Joint Resolution 120, you use in brackets "other than for training."

Now as you have got it written in there, doesn't that qualify the 250,000 members of the Ready Reserve? You can bring up 250,000 of

the Ready Reserve, and then you can bring an unlimited number more, as I would read that thing, for training purposes.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think that "training" as used here means short-term training of National Guard and Reserve units comparable to that which takes place each summer.

If, for example, we made no qualification of the type that has been inserted in the parentheses, it would mean that we would either substantially exceed the 250,000 or for all practical purposes not be allowed to call any for extended tours of duty, because during the summer, personnel of the National Guard and Reserves in training status have been far in excess of 250,000.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Should not that language be made a little clearer?

Secretary McNAMARA. We would be quite happy to do so. I understood "training" as used here referred to the training of the type taken during the summer. But if it is not clear we would be happy to modify it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, personally I think it would be helpful in order to avoid creating any misapprehension around the country. There are a number of people who would have to interpret this act.

Secretary McNAMARA. We will be very happy to modify it in any way that you feel shows greater clarity.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McNAMARA. Then item No. 3, Mr. Chairman, asks authority to expend up to \$150 million in the event it proves necessary to send part or all of [deleted] men to our 7th Army and other U.S. Army units in Europe.

The 7th Army is authorized about [deleted] men to cover its five divisions and their present supporting units. [Deleted.] We wish to be in a position to bring the 7th Army and other Army units in Europe to full T.O. & E. strength.

In addition, [deleted] we want, if the situation warrants it, to have additional support units behind the 7th Army to insure, for example, a proper flow of supplies and proper medical attention.

In total, it is estimated that those requirements will necessitate the addition of [deleted] men to those forces.

Item No. 4 recognizes that the additional men referred to above—

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, before he leaves item No. 3, could I ask one brief question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator BUSH. [Deleted.] I will wait until then if you would rather.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I could come to it.

Senator BUSH. I did not see it down there.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is down there.

Secretary McNAMARA. We can discuss it at that point.

Senator BUSH. Thank you, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. Item No. 4 provides for an expenditure of up to \$170 million in the addition of [deleted] men to take care of the larger input of draftees, and a larger flow of men to these combat and support units, brought about by the program we have referred to above, and by some actions we will refer to later.

This is to expand the training base of the Army in the event that additional trainees must be inducted into the Army, as we believe will be necessary.

Item No. 5 relates to the increases in sealift and airlift necessary to complement the additions to the ground forces.

We propose to reactivate [deleted] transport ships at a cost of \$15 million in order to be better prepared to move personnel to Europe; to provide a military complement for those ships, [deleted] men, at a cost of \$3 million; to increase the amphibious lift of our Navy [deleted].

At the present time, the amphibious lift of the Navy is limited to a [deleted] capacity. We have, as you know, three Marine divisions on active duty, and we are preparing a cadre for a fourth, with the personnel that we requested in the May 25 amendment.

Quite obviously, the amphibious lift is out of balance with our Marine Corps size.

We are proposing to increase it from [deleted] capability to a [deleted] capability by these two actions under 5(c), first, by retaining [deleted] attack transports that had been planned for deactivation during the fiscal year and, second, by reactivating [deleted] ships presently in mothballs.

These actions would require the addition of [deleted] people, and an expenditure of \$77 million during fiscal 1962.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are those [deleted] ships to be reactivated largely attack transports, or are they escort ships?

Secretary McNAMARA. Almost entirely attack transports.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. There are no—I believe I am correct in saying there are no escort ships among the [deleted].

Chairman RUSSELL. It is necessary then to only reactivate [deleted] more in order to get enough transportation for [deleted].

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; it is.

Further, as the Congress has pointed out on a number of occasions, in the past our airlift has been marginal, and we propose, with the addition of the troops to the ground forces, to increase the airlift by, first, under 5(d), retaining [deleted] C-118 squadrons that had been planned for deactivation, this requiring [deleted] men, and \$16 million; second, by being prepared under 5(e) to order to active duty [deleted] Air National Guard C-97 squadrons with numbers of personnel involved [deleted] at a cost of \$33 million.

Third, by being prepared to activate, to order to active duty, [deleted] Air Force Reserve C-124 squadrons, with [deleted] men at a cost of \$23 million.

These actions are actions complementing the force increases and providing additional sealift and air force for those increases.

Chairman RUSSELL. You use again those words "being prepared to order to active duty these Air Force Reserve squadrons."

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I assume that means that you have not yet definitely determined that you would order up these [deleted] squadrons?

Secretary McNAMARA. We have not, sir. We have a schedule of dates by which action must be taken if we are to meet specified combat-

readiness dates, and those dates are [deleted] in the future, and we would propose not to make a final irrevocable decision today to order up those units.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are there any specific units being alerted so that they may make the necessary housekeeping plans within the unit to get ready?

Secretary McNAMARA. Not yet.

Chairman RUSSELL. None of them have even been alerted?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir. It is possible that within the next 2 weeks we will alert a small number of units. The chairman yesterday emphasized the point with which we entirely agree, that we should not call any men from the Reserve, either as a part of a unit or as an individual, to active service unless it is absolutely essential, and we propose to follow that policy.

Chairman RUSSELL. With further reference to that discussion we had on yesterday, another thing I wanted to inquire into is that the Air Force has stated that they have, I believe it is 7,500 excess pilots, and they want legislation for us to put them on flight pay without their flying.

Why can't you use some of these pilots that you already have in excess rather than calling up Reserve pilots?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I believe we can.

Now, however, I do not want to indicate we can use all 7,500.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand that.

Secretary McNAMARA. Because there we do run into the kind of problem you mentioned earlier, on the age.

Chairman RUSSELL. Some of the 7,500 have been honorary pilots for several years, I understand, but others have flown planes within recent months and could be utilized.

Secretary McNAMARA. You are quite right, and it is in order to insure that we keep the pressure on ourselves to seek to use all of these avenues of approach other than calling up men who do not wish to serve or who would find it extremely difficult to cut their civilian commitments, that we have not yet made provision to call up any particular units.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope you will look at that very carefully because some of us have been concerned about this legislation and have not known exactly what to do about it.

I frankly have not. As an alternative to paying them for not flying, some of them should be capable of utilization in this expansion.

Secretary McNAMARA. I am sure they can be.

Chairman RUSSELL. You indicated yesterday, I understood, that you did not intend, if you could avoid it, to call up the Air National Guard units in their entirety, as such, but that you might call individuals.

Does that apply to these Navy Reserve squadrons, too?

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, if I may go back just a second to the Air National Guard. I think that we will face two possible requirements for Air Force Reserves; one is as individuals—we may need certain scarce specialists from the Reserves in order to allow us to continue to operate these [deleted] B-47 wings or fill in the B-52 units that are expanding, and the missile units that are expanding.

We will make every effort possible to fill those personnel requirements without calling individuals from the Reserves. But it may be

necessary to call a few selected specialists from the Reserves for that purpose.

If we must bring to duty the additional airlift referred to under 5 d, e, and f, it will be necessary to call the National Guard to service.

We cannot increase the airlift by the amounts involved here without calling the National Guard. We may be able to get by with a slightly lesser amount of airlift, in which case the call from the guard would be less than shown.

Chairman RUSSELL. In the Korean war when the National Guard and Reserve units were called up, very promptly they were broken up as units and scattered to kingdom come. The National Guard people did not like it at all. They wanted to stay together as a unit.

It would seem to me that if you call up all of a unit, that thought should be given to leaving them in as a unit. I don't know just where we became seized with this idea that it was not a good thing to have people from the same community fighting together.

During the Civil War, which was about as hard a war as was fought anywhere, it was fought by men who came from the same community, standing side by side all the way through.

Now we seem to think it is necessary to break up the guard and Reserve units and scatter them all through other units.

I think you will find the guard and Reserve both, if you do call them up as a unit, that they would be happy not to be dispersed and broken up—dispersed throughout the service.

Secretary McNAMARA. I am sure other circumstances being equal, it would be better to hold them together as a unit.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am glad to hear you say that.

Secretary McNAMARA. Item No. 6 refers, in part, to the question raised by Senator Bush. It provides \$107 million for the transportation of certain additional Army divisions to Europe in the event of need [deleted].

We have at the present time no specific schedule against which we would plan to ship additional divisions to Europe, but we recognize that in the event shipment becomes necessary, we must act very promptly, and we are requesting funds for that purpose.

[Deleted.] These expenditures are covered by this \$107 million.

Senator Bush. [Deleted.]

Secretary McNAMARA. If we may proceed then to item 7, it proposes actions to strengthen our antisubmarine warfare capability.

The type of military action that we may face in connection with the Berlin crisis or in connection with other Soviet actions elsewhere in the world, could lead to an extensive submarine campaign against our shipping worldwide, and to provide additional forces to defend our shipping [deleted] we are proposing [deleted] to retain in the active fleet antisubmarine warfare ships which had been scheduled to be phased out during the current fiscal year.

The operation of these ships would require a small increase in Navy personnel and an additional cost of \$17 million.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I assume from the very small amount of funds involved that those ships already have a full complement of the very latest electronic antisubmarine detection equipment?

Secretary McNAMARA. The answer to your question is they have everything that we are going to be able to provide them with in the period of the fiscal year and, therefore, equipment for those particular vessels is not proposed here.

Furthermore, these amounts in this column up to the present time are related solely to personnel operations and maintenance costs. But the answer to your specific question is the ships are adequately equipped. They have been and are now on active duty, and we propose to retain them in their present form.

Chairman RUSSELL. [Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McNAMARA. Then the next item under 7 refers to ordering to active duty of [deleted] antisubmarine air squadrons, with a total number of [deleted] men at a cost of [deleted] million.

These would be required in the event of any naval harassing actions to avoid damage, undue damage, to our supply lines.

Chairman RUSSELL. What type of air equipment do those squadrons have?

Secretary McNAMARA. A variety of types. I will be happy to insert those in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I wish you would.

(Information furnished the committee on a classified basis.)

Secretary McNAMARA. The Navy assures me that the aircraft are quite satisfactory for the purpose for which they deployed them.

Senator JACKSON. Aren't they mostly P-2-V's?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe so, Senator Jackson, but there are several others involved as well.

Item 7(e) proposes to reactivate [deleted] destroyers and destroyer escorts for antisubmarine patrol with the numbers of men in the amount of [deleted], and [deleted] million.

Now beyond the increase in our antisubmarine warfare capability we propose to increase certain other fleet capabilities, as listed under item 8.

First, by retaining one attack carrier, a carrier which we had planned to deactivate during the fiscal year.

This will require [deleted] men and [deleted] million.

Secondly, by activating, by demothballing [deleted] fleet support ships [deleted] to provide for the additional ships we previously discussed [deleted] men [deleted] million.

Thirdly, by increasing the number of naval aircraft overhauls, including the overhaul of about [deleted] aircraft in mothballs.

This committee and other committees have pointed out to us that the number of aircraft on active duty in the Navy is lower than the number authorized. This item would increase the number available for active duty by about [deleted] and would overhaul an additional [deleted] now on active duty, \$49 million.

Then by providing \$10 million of control equipment for control of Navy missiles.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, one of the firm decisions that has been made is to retain this attack carrier; that decision has been made?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; that is definitely firm.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is not one that is tentative?

Secretary McNAMARA. Exactly.

Chairman RUSSELL. And it is also true as to the [deleted] fleet support ships?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is firm.

How about these [deleted] naval aircraft overhauls, is that a firm decision?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is firm.

Chairman RUSSELL. What type aircraft are those?

Secretary McNAMARA. I cannot answer the question from memory. There are a number of different types in there, Mr. Chairman. I would like to insert that in the record, if I may.

Chairman RUSSELL. Furnish it for the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

#### AIRCRAFT REWORKS

Number: 1,190. Cost: \$49 million.

1. Of the above 1,190, 538 are reworks of aircraft in the present operating inventory which heretofore would have been deferred. The remaining 652 comprise aircraft in reserve stock which will be reworked to:

(a) Provide replacement aircraft for U.S. Naval Reserve squadrons not mobilized but whose aircraft are taken by mobilized squadrons.

(b) Provide additional aircraft to the Training Command to meet the additional requirements imposed by a heavier student load.

(c) Provide ready aircraft for U.S. Marine Corps Reserve and U.S. Naval Reserve squadrons in the event further mobilization develops.

(d) Provide a portion of the aircraft needed by the 16th Carrier Air Group to be commissioned.

Chairman RUSSELL. What is a kit for missile control?

Secretary McNAMARA. These are electronic devices—I will be happy to discuss those for the record also.

Chairman RUSSELL. I would like to have it because I did not recognize that term.

Secretary McNAMARA. They are fire control systems related particularly to the TERRIER missiles. You will see in the procurement section that we are proposing to procure additional missiles, but I would rather—

Chairman RUSSELL. This is a sighting and aiming device, electronic device, radar and timing to aim the missile, and the ground-to-air missile for the Navy?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. Vessel to air.

Secretary McNAMARA. Surface-to-air missiles, but I will be happy to explain them more fully for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is all right; I think I know, I understand that. I did not understand that term "kit."

Senator SALTONSTALL. For clarification, before we leave the Navy, I have been looking over this report of procurement and production, major end items, systems, and programs.

Now, you have got down for the *Constellation*, repair fire damage, \$41.6 million.

Now, just for clarification, is this item for the attack carrier on which there was a fire while it was under construction?

Secretary McNAMARA. This is to repair the fire damage on the carrier that was being constructed. You will recall—

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes, I remember.

Secretary McNAMARA (continuing). The accident last year, and that ship will not be on active duty until the latter part of next year, as I recall the schedule, so that the action on the attack carrier listed as 8(a) is really unrelated to the *Constellation*.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is what I wanted to bring out.

So this is an additional authority that you are asking for because you now have the knowledge of how much it is going to cost to put that *Constellation* back in service.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct; exactly.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Rather than in the original budget.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

Secretary McNAMARA. Item 9 refers to additional tactical airpower in the event the additional divisions are sent to Europe or in the event combat occurs in Europe, it is quite clear that additional fighter units are required, to insert military alternatives or military options prior to the potential use of nuclear weapons and, therefore, item 9(a) proposes that we retain on active duty [deleted] squadrons of light bomber-type aircraft.

Only a small number of additional men are required because these squadrons have been scheduled to be in the process of deactivation at the end of fiscal year 1962 and, therefore, the bulk of their strength has been provided for at that time.

We also propose to retain [deleted] fighter squadrons which had been proposed for deactivation at the end of fiscal 1962 and, therefore, require only [deleted] men to permit their retention; and we have proposed to be prepared to order to active duty [deleted] Air National Guard squadrons [deleted] with a total strength of [deleted] men, and a cost for fiscal 1962 of \$154 million.

We propose to provide for the tactical air control of these fighters [deleted] men in the event that they are called up.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, I assume (a) and (b) have both been firmly determined, and orders are underway as to those?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; they have.

Chairman RUSSELL. (c) and (d), I assume, have not?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. And these estimates you give will be reduced every month that you defer that determination; will they not?

Secretary McNAMARA. Every month following the schedule on which the figures were calculated, and if you wish we can insert that schedule in the record, I have it with me—for example, the [deleted] Air National Guard squadrons on our schedule are scheduled to start reactivation on the [deleted] and we have a time schedule of the program for calling them up, and \$154 million was based on that time schedule.

So, for example, if we deferred calling them up from [deleted] to [deleted] there would be no reduction in the \$154 million.

Chairman RUSSELL. But if you deferred it to [deleted], there would be?

Secretary McNAMARA. There would be a reduction, exactly, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. [Deleted] of it would come off.

Secretary McNAMARA. Slightly less than that because we had not planned on having them all come in on the [deleted] but only calling up a certain number in [deleted], and then the remainder in [deleted].

Senator CASE. How did you describe those [deleted] squadrons, were they tactical or strategic?

Secretary McNAMARA. Tactical fighter squadrons, Senator Case; and the [deleted] additional squadrons, making a total of [deleted] are reconnaissance squadrons.

Item 10 refers to certain items of operational and maintenance expense associated with increasing our arms logistical stocks and logistical supplies and logistical capabilities.

There are in addition to the 10 items, items (a), (b), (c), (d) under part II, at the bottom of that page which, in total, amount to approximately \$1.7 billion.

These are the procurement items, the actions chargeable to the procurement accounts.

They break into two parts: Those relating to aircraft and missiles for which we require authorization and of which I will speak in a moment.

The aircraft and missile authorizations approximate \$900 million. The other \$800 million of the \$1.7 billion is related to procurement other than aircraft and missiles, particularly to vehicles and to ammunition and specific weapons.

[Deleted.]

Now, perhaps it would be appropriate to turn to page 15, or rather 18, of the statement, at which point in the statement we discuss briefly the authorizing legislation we require to support the program I have sketched out to you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Before you do that, we discussed yesterday, and I do not want to bore those who were there, when I was expressing some doubts as to the adequacy of our armor, tank outfits, you have an item here to rebuild tanks and other equipment [deleted] million.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. [Deleted.]

To what extent does the contractor assist the Army and the Department of Defense in trying to iron out bugs in some new weapon like this M-60 tank that has caused so much trouble? Do they work at it all the time, in the plant, or do they just wait for the Army to come in and say "here, these tanks are not operating because of certain reasons?"

Secretary McNAMARA. No, no. The contractor certainly bears a heavy responsibility to identify deficiencies in the product and to correct those deficiencies.

General Lemnitzer points out that the contractors have teams at the test evaluations and normally they have teams stationed with the units operating new items of equipment during the period following introduction of that equipment into the active service.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is one other question I want to ask that has not to do with the procurement. You may order to active duty [deleted] Air National Guard squadrons, as stated in subparagraph (c) of item 9. But in No. 5 you have in (e) there ordered to active duty [deleted] Air National Guard C-97 squadrons. Is that in addition to the [deleted] or is this group of [deleted] included?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir; it is in addition to.

These units we are discussing under 5 are transport aircraft squadrons. The items we are discussing under item 9 are fighter aircraft or reconnaissance squadrons and, therefore, they are additive.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, you said [deleted] fighter squadrons?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir, [deleted] fighters under 9(c), plus [deleted] reconnaissance under 9(c), making [deleted].

Chairman RUSSELL. They are reconnaissance; there are no transports involved in that at all?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was not in addition.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Another thing, why is it necessary to build troop facilities in Europe?

Secretary McNAMARA. I hope it won't be——

Chairman RUSSELL. Are we getting ready now to embark on a large construction program on the strength of this emergency or are these people going on an all-clear basis, ready to fight?

Secretary McNAMARA. We are not planning on a large construction program. We are definitely planning to place such people as we do place in Europe on an austere basis.

Senator CASE. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

Senator CASE. What are the \$49 million that you mentioned in the appearance before the Appropriations Committee, what will that be used for?

Secretary McNAMARA. It will be used for the very austere type of accommodations that would be required in the event additional strength is required in Europe.

We actually plan on placing some of the personnel, depending on the numbers involved, in a bivouac status, meaning simply they would have tents, which is certainly austere.

Others could be housed in quonset huts, some of which are now located in Europe, and others of which would have to be supplied.

There is no plan for anything other than a very austere accommodation of such additional personnel as would be sent.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is another question I want to ask you. Don't we have several Naval Reserve transport units? I notice that none of them are involved here in your airlift and transport facilities, transport capabilities. Does not the Naval Reserve have a number of transport squadrons for cargo and personnel transport?

Secretary McNAMARA. Not a substantial number that I am aware of, Mr. Chairman. I may be wrong. I will check the answer and correct it for the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. I just noticed that none of that was mentioned here.

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir; it was not.

The Navy runs the ship transport service, as you know, and the Air Force the air transport service, and the transport squadrons are largely in the Air Force Reserve.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, but your MATS is composed of all, of both, is it not?

Secretary McNAMARA. But there are very few naval air transport squadrons available. I will supply the exact number for the record.

(Information referred to furnished the committee on a classified basis.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cannon probably can answer.

Senator CANNON. Mr. Secretary, isn't it a fact that MATS has complete jurisdiction, including assignment of aircraft for the air transportation?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Senator CANNON. And merely the naval crews are supplied for the flying of those aircraft, and where you say retaining [deleted] C-118 squadrons, some of the present naval squadrons that are being operated are C-118's, they are being operated as airplanes possessed by MATS, but flown by Navy crews.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is retaining some squadrons you have now.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. But I know there is in existence some Naval Reserve transport units, because I think there is a unit in my own State.

Secretary McNAMARA. There are, Mr. Chairman. It is a small item, and, unfortunately, I do not have the number, but I will supply it for the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have finished procurement then?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; and I was suggesting that it might be appropriate now to refer to page 18 of the statement which begins to discuss very briefly the specific authorizing legislation relating to procurement.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, there has been distributed a document called "Report of Procurement and Production, Major End Items, Systems, and Programs." That is a confidential document, but we may be required to answer when we are asked questions.

Is there any objection to putting this breakdown into this record, which is confidential?

Secretary McNAMARA. Is there any objection to placing the confidential document, is there any objection to declassifying the confidential document?

(The "Report of Procurement and Production" referred to appears on p. 45.)

Senator SALTONSTALL. No, not to declassify it unless you say it can be declassified, but to put it in our record for our information.

Secretary McNAMARA. Oh, this can be put—

Senator SALTONSTALL. For our ability to answer questions.

Secretary McNAMARA. Well that, in effect, declassifies it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. No.

Chairman RUSSELL. Isn't it classified as to the number of these types of planes that you are prepared to procure, or is that—

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, that is one of the reasons it is classified, and there are also certain types of ammunition listed that we would rather not list publicly.

Chairman RUSSELL. I know it has been the custom to publish it immediately, but some little difference exists in the degrees of the cold war. When a man could stand in a cold war with his shirt sleeves, we published everything. I thought maybe we were pulling up our overcoat collars around us and being a little more cautious.

Secretary McNAMARA. May I suggest there, Mr. Chairman, that if the committee wishes to have a declassified version of this list we can arrange to develop it for you. There are a few items on here I know we would not wish to make public.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I thought, Mr. Chairman, this record was going to be fixed up into a declassified and a classified record, anyway; am I wrong?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, we will do that. I do not know whether we will have time to get this record ready by the time this bill is considered on the floor.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The purpose, Mr. McNamara, is to help us to answer questions from other Members of the Senate.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; we can obtain for you by tomorrow morning a declassified version of this list, and if you wish, we will do so.

Chairman RUSSELL. I wish you would do it.

Senator CANNON. I would just like to make one point, if I may, and that is that the competition is not a fighter-to-fighter competition necessarily.

The competition is going to be a fighter-to-bomber competition from a defensive standpoint, and in that sense certainly the 102 with present armament and the F-89 with present armament are not obsolete against bomber-type aircraft. That is true if it is used in a defensive category.

So I think that when you say simply because these, as fighters, are not as good as a comparable fighter, we are not keeping in proper perspective the use of those aircraft.

We have many 102's and 89's that are used in the air defense picture, and used very effectively, and would be very effective against many of the bombers that the Russians could put in against us; isn't that correct?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, Senator, you are correct.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may we return to the regular order.

Chairman RUSSELL. Before we do, I want to get this record straightened out here, because I am somewhat confused. I do not want to send anybody up in an obsolete plane to fight a man in the very best plane.

But, Mr. Secretary, I am amazed that you have not given what I thought was the answer to this, and that is the close support value of these slower planes.

In the Korea war a lot of those boys on the ground were hollering for them to get rid of the jets and send them some prop planes over there.

They claimed the jets overshot the target and shot our troops, instead of the Koreans, because they moved too fast.

Now the mission of these planes, it would seem to me, would have a great deal to do with it.

If you are prepared to send those National Guard people up against the best Russian pilots, you had better leave them at home.

If you are going to use them in other applications, such as supporting ground troops, it seems to me they have a very definite value.

Secretary McNAMARA. Whether they be in support missions or air superiority missions, we would propose to place them in combat in situations where the level of their equipment would not be a penalty. I think this is the important point I would make.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, listening to the testimony, I did not understand that they were to be used for tactical purposes. I understood they were to be used in the air defense system at a layer where they could be effective with their air-to-air missiles, reasonably effective against manned bombers; isn't that the burden of your testimony?

Secretary McNAMARA. They would be used for several different purposes, conceivably support, which the chairman mentioned, air superiority in the event of fighter attack, and interdiction in the event it became necessary to close off areas and attack Soviet or other support movements of either personnel or equipment.

Senator JACKSON. Well, they are good, the slower aircraft are excellent, for close-in support.

Secretary McNAMARA. Before leaving this subject, I would like to comment upon the fighter development programs which I believe the committee is aware of.

There are two underway at the present time. One is to develop a new air superiority fighter which will be used by both the Air Force and the Navy. This project has been assigned to the Air Force.

It is tentatively known as the TFX fighter; it is a program which is now underway. It will lead to the development of a fighter aircraft having a speed in excess of mach 2, something on the order of [deleted] I believe.

The other is a project known as the VAX, which will develop a new attack fighter aircraft to be used by the Navy in support of the Marines, to be used by the Marines, and to be used by the Air Force in support of the Army. This fighter project has been assigned to the Navy for development.

Both of these new fighter projects are presently underway. Each of them will lead to the most modern fighter aircraft in the world at the time they are placed in production.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope you will expedite all that as soon as possible, but it is sometime in the future before you will have those in operation?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is. We have asked Congress for additional funds in the budget supplement of March for that purpose.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed in the regular order.

Secretary McNAMARA. On page 18 we discuss, in summary fashion, the proposed authorizing legislation. We ask for the purpose of buying additional aircraft, in part meeting the point Senator Symington has raised. The increases in the defense program—I am reading from the second paragraph—the increases in the defense program which I have discussed and, as were outlined in the attachment and reviewed a few minutes ago, require additional fund authorization for aircraft and missiles over and above that provided in Public Law 87-53, which was approved on June 21.

Attachment 2 to this statement provides a summary by category and by service of the additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization.

We have submitted to this committee a legislative proposal which would provide the fund authorizations needed. The authorizations are listed in that attachment 2.

The total amount of additional fund authorization requested is \$958.5 million. This is the \$958 of the additional procurement asked of \$1.7 billion.

Of the \$958 million, \$612 million is for aircraft of the types we were discussing a few minutes ago, in large part: \$37 million for the Army, \$281 million for the Navy and Marine Corps, and \$294 million for the Air Force.

A total of \$304 million is for missiles.

Chairman RUSSELL. Before you leave the aircraft, now, Mr. Secretary—

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL (continuing). I was looking over this list of the Army procurement, the shopping list that you have. During hearings on the earlier authorization this year, I believe we had a presentation on all of these types except the Sioux.

Secretary McNAMARA. The what, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. The helicopter, the H-13. That is a new one. I don't think you discussed that.

Secretary McNAMARA. May I enter the specifications for that in the record, Mr. Chairman? I am not prepared to discuss this in any detail at the moment.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

#### SPECIFICATION FOR H-13

##### H-13 SIOUX

Speed : 70 knots.

Ceiling : 13,400 feet.

Range : 170 nautical miles.

Capacity : Crew of one with one passenger or 220 pounds of cargo. With a fuel reduction, two litter patients can be carried externally in pods.

Contractor : Bell Helicopter.

Mission : Observation and liaison.

Chairman RUSSELL. I recall you testified about the Caribou and the Iroquois and the Mohawk and Seminole, but I do not remember anything about that Sioux. That is a new one.

Secretary McNAMARA. I will enter it in the record, if I may.

Senator CASE. A small observation type helicopter, I believe.

Chairman RUSSELL. It must be very small.

Secretary McNAMARA. It is a rather small Army helicopter, but I do not recall the specifications specifically and sufficiently to differentiate it from the others that are listed.

Chairman RUSSELL. It was indicated it was an observation helicopter, helicopter observation, page 13, Sioux.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, and it is a relatively small one.

Chairman RUSSELL. It must be very small if you are going to get [deleted] of them for \$4.5 million. It must be the very smallest one you have.

Secretary McNAMARA. I will obtain the specifications and insert them in the record, if I may.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

Just before you leave the Navy aircraft, what is this GV-1 inflight refueler? Do you know what that is or will furnish that for the record? I do not remember that one.

Secretary McNAMARA. I will have to insert that in the record also, Mr. Chairman, I cannot answer the question.

(The information referred to follows:)

The GV-1 is a high wing, medium range, land based inflight refueler/intra-theater assault transport aircraft, and is the Navy/Marine Corps version of the C-130 Hercules.

Chairman RUSSELL. I notice the last item on your Navy shopping list is production acceleration, \$15.3 million. What are you accelerating?

Secretary McNAMARA. We are accelerating the A4D's and the F4H's and the F8U production, a total there of [deleted] aircraft.

These aircraft are in production, but they had been planned lower production rates than we are presently proposing, and we need to purchase certain additional tooling items and make other preparations to allow these new schedules to be met.

Chairman RUSSELL. I see. That is to expedite your fighters, Navy fighters?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; it is.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

Now, when you get over here to the aircraft for the Air Force, I notice that you are buying both the C-130-B's and the C-130-E's. Is that because they are not able to produce the E's at the present time? The E is a much better plane, is it not?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, it is, but we can, as long as we balance our transport capacity we can, also use additional C-130-B's quite effectively.

Chairman RUSSELL. You think you have a definite use for both of them?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; we do.

Now, beyond that, as you notice there we are proposing to expend \$33 million on C-130-E long-lead components and tooling in order to, in this case to, permit the increase in production from eight per month to [deleted] per month should that appear desirable, as I believe it will.

On that same schedule we show the procurement of [deleted] F-105 tactical fighters. This is in response to the point Senator Symington made. We do need additional F-105's.

I do not think there is any question about it, and we are proposing to procure [deleted] of them here at that cost of \$82 million.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that an all-weather fighter?

Secretary McNAMARA. It is an all-weather fighter, yes. However, it is not only an all-weather fighter, but it is an all-purpose fighter, and there is a real question as to whether it is the ideal fighter for the type of close support that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, considering its cost per unit.

We, therefore, are considering the possibility, in the future, of purchasing aircraft other than the 105 for close support purposes. The A4D type of aircraft is being examined by the Air Force and the Army. It is a Navy aircraft.

It is being examined by the Air Force and the Army for close support purposes, and if we retain on active duty permanently the B-66 squadrons that we referred to a few minutes ago, and the F-100 squadrons we referred to previously, it seems very likely to us that we should equip those squadrons with newer aircraft, and we are considering the F-105 or the F-104-G for that purpose.

For close support work there is the same strong opinion that the A4D is preferred. It is not an all-weather all-purpose fighter.

It is much cheaper than the F-105, and the Army believes it will give it better support in the roles to which it will be put.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that the plane which the Marine Corps uses for its support of ground troops?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; the Marines and the Navy. Proceeding down the page, then, we are proposing a total of \$304 million for missiles—\$34 million for the Army, \$262 million for the Navy, and \$8 million for the Air Force. Actually, the figures shown for the Air Force in the three lines above, of \$294 million for the Air Force, includes certain missiles, according to the procedures the Department and Congress have followed in the past, and the terms "Air Force" includes certain missiles contrary to the usage applied to the term when applied to the Navy.

No additional fund authorization is requested for missiles for the Marine Corps.

As I mentioned earlier, \$41.6 million is requested for naval vessels, for the repair of fire damage to the aircraft carrier *Constellation*.

Since these funds are being requested for appropriation in the "Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy, account," we have included the authorization amount in the proposed bill.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Hitch furnished a list of the funds already authorized but not appropriated, and then the funds that you are requesting here in addition. Is there any objection to putting that into the record?

Secretary McNAMARA. No.

Senator SALTONSTALL. To show why you run down, so to speak, and why you need this additional authorization?

Secretary McNAMARA. We would be quite happy to have it in the record.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be helpful to have it in the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. It will be placed in the record at this point.  
(The information referred to follows:)

*Funds authorized but not appropriated, fiscal year 1962*

(Millions of dollars)

	Amounts requested for authorization and appropriation	Amounts authorized	Amounts appropriated	Amounts authorized but not appropriated
Aircraft:				
Army.....	211.0	211.0	1 206.78	2 4.22
Navy.....	1,585.6	1,585.6	1 1,553.89	2 31.71
Air Force.....	3,287.0	3,841.2	3 3,462.34	4 378.86
Missiles:				
Army.....	550.8	550.8	1 539.79	2 11.02
Navy.....	606.4	606.4	1 594.27	2 12.13
Marine Corps.....	27.0	27.0	1 26.46	2 54
Air Force.....	2,792.0	2,792.0	2 736.16	2 55.84
Naval vessels:				
Navy.....	2,915.0	2,957.0	2 897.86	2 59.14

<sup>1</sup> Based on assumption that 2-percent procurement reduction would be applied uniformly within appropriation titles.

<sup>2</sup> Difference between authorization and appropriation is attributable to the 2-percent reduction to promote improved contractual methods and practices.

<sup>3</sup> Includes \$225,000,000 reappropriated from accounts terminated for obligation.

<sup>4</sup> Difference between authorization and appropriation is attributable to: 2-percent procurement reduction (\$70,660,000); elimination of 10 T-40 A/C (\$19,100,000); reduction based on Canadian agreement (\$2,100,000); and funds authorized but not appropriated for procurement of long-range bombers (\$287,000,000).

Chairman RUSSELL. On these Army missiles here, I notice you have a very small item that deals with the NIKE and the NIKE-HERCULES.

I believe you testified that that was to use a conventional warhead where we would not be forced to resort to the use of atomic weapons.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir. It will permit us to have an optional use of either conventional or nuclear [deleted].

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there any particular use to which that could be subjected, would that be tactical on the battlefield?

Secretary McNAMARA. It would be air defense.

Chairman RUSSELL. Protect a city, air defense around our cities?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; or in the case of overseas in the case of NATO defenses.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, NATO defenses.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. It would reduce the striking power of the NIKE missile.

Secretary McNAMARA. It would reduce the effectiveness below the effectiveness with a nuclear weapon; that is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, if it came into contact with one plane it would have the same effect, but it would not have the same effect as a nuclear missile.

Secretary McNAMARA. Over a wider range it is less.

Senator JACKSON. What is the reason for the change of policy? The Army certainly places great reliance on the validity of HERCULES with the nuclear warhead.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. AJAX did not have it.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. And the whole trend was for the nuclear warhead. Now it seems like we are going back.

Secretary McNAMARA. It is only to permit us to use nonnuclear warheads in the event we do not wish to, at that particular moment of combat, run the risk of having the use of nuclear weapons serve as a foundation for escalation into nuclear war which might otherwise not be our objective.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I am glad to see it. Some of us raised the question some time ago, and there did not seem to be much acceptance of that degree of flexibility that you are now asking for, and that is why I asked the question.

Secretary McNAMARA. If we were attacked in this country in any volume at all, obviously, we should use nuclear weapons. In this Nation it is possible that we would wish to avoid the use of nuclear weapons if there were but one aircraft or something like that.

Senator JACKSON. What you are saying is in a theater where there is limited war in the sense of not using nuclear weapons of any kind, you would not want to introduce nuclear warheads for defensive purposes.

Secretary McNAMARA. We might not wish to.

Senator JACKSON. Yes. I say you would want to have that flexibility.

Secretary McNAMARA. Exactly.

Senator JACKSON. And still not rely on the AJAX type of—

Secretary McNAMARA. Exactly so.

Chairman RUSSELL. [Deleted.]

Secretary McNAMARA. There is no authorization, of course, to use nuclear weapons without the specific orders of the President.

Chairman RUSSELL. I expect before you let them fly over here that the order would be forthcoming. I would hope so.

I think we are making a mistake in not stressing more our nuclear capability.

I do not want to be the first man to use a nuclear bomb, but I also do not want to be the fellow saying that we are not going to use it. I think it is a terrible mistake.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think it is a serious error to ever make such a statement. [Deleted.]

—As you may recall Mr. Gilpatric recently in answer to a question at a news conference stated we would use nuclear force, if necessary, to repel Soviet aggression in Europe.

At various times the President and others have stated that we will use whatever weapons are required to accomplish our military objectives.

We are endeavoring to take all action possible to make clear the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. It is, in part, for that reason that we are specifically requesting now funds to accelerate the readiness status of our ground alert force and to retain on active service the B-47 wings we referred to earlier and previously.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope that you will continue to stress that because there is no time in the foreseeable future, from my standpoint, that we are going to be able to, without enormous sacrifices, defeat Russia in a war waged with conventional weapons. I think we can do it. I do not think it is beyond the reach of our potential. Many people think it would be foolish to think of ever fighting Russia on the ground.

I think we could do it if we ever had to do it. But, in my opinion, a great deal of Mr. Khrushchev's truculence and belligerency stems from the fact that we have talked so much about our humanitarian approach to war, that we are not going to use this nuclear weapon, and if he is convinced that we will fight in accordance with his own terms, he will get tougher and tougher until we do get into a conventional war.

I do not believe he wants to be destroyed any more than we do.

The Russians have made sacrifices that have scarcely ever been made in history to restore their country from devastation during World War II.

The Germans bombed them out, blew up their dams and their mines and bridges; they had large areas which were in the worst state of devastation, and they have rebuilt it, and they do not want to see it torn down again.

But if they do not believe we are going to hit them with nuclear weapons, they will soon have us picked off at a conventional war, where we will be fighting at a particular disadvantage.

Senator STENNIS. [Deleted.]

Senator CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with those remarks, too.

[Deleted.]

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, as long as we are expressing opinions, it seems to me, I hope what we are trying to do here is not to just jump because Mr. Khrushchev has again made an issue over Berlin.

It seems to me what you are trying to do is to build up to a new plateau of strength so that you can deal with not just this Berlin situation but other Berlins to follow. [Deleted.]

I would like to think of this in the long term, and I think you have to keep your head.

I do not think our planning ought to be that we are just dealing with a crisis in Berlin, and that is why I want to commend the Secretary. I think that his approach has been with his feet on the ground with respect to this whole problem.

I think the general approach here has been a sound one because you are not preparing for this, as I understand it, just this threat. You do not know what is going to happen after the first of the year.

Secretary McNAMARA. Our entire approach is, as Senator Jackson has suggested, directed toward strengthening our military power throughout the world, not solely in Europe, and strengthening it permanently rather than temporarily, because we, too, anticipate that this Berlin will be followed by other Berlins, not necessarily in Europe and not necessarily immediately after the conclusion of the present Berlin crisis, but surely we must look to the time when we will face similar situations elsewhere in the world.

Senator SALTONSTALL. [Deleted.]

Senator ERVIN. Mr. Chairman, may I make an observation?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir. I certainly would not bore everybody with mine and not listen to everybody else.

Senator ERVIN. [Deleted.]

I think the whole trouble is that the Americans are required to believe that there are easy steps which will bring us to our hopes of lasting peace.

We should be reading the poem of Rudyard Kipling that he wrote at the beginning of the First World War. The American people might as well learn that the only way they are going to survive is not only to have an adequate defense but to have the spirit which makes them prefer to die on their feet rather than live on their knees, and I think Congress gives the impression of desiring to come to that conclusion of surviving on their knees. Legislation to establish a department on disarmament, and other poppycock such as that, leaves the impression with Russia that we won't fight.

I think we had better let folks understand that we have got to keep our hearts and courage high and lift our hands in strength, and that no easy hope will bring us to our goals.

If we had not assured Khrushchev time and time again that we were not going to use nuclear weapons, but had let him understand that if he started anything we would use whatever weapon we had at hand, if necessary, to prevent his conquering the world, he would not be acting the way he is now.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to make a long observation, but I make this simple observation, that a statement to Mr. Castro the other day to release those passengers and that plane or that they be made available for release within 6 hours, would be more impressive to Mr. Khrushchev than all we are doing here.

Chairman RUSSELL. I concur in that statement, and I was disappointed that we did not make it.

I do want to express my delight that the Senator from North Carolina has expressed some concern about this disarmament agency as a permanent agency of Government.

I have heard all my life of two-headed calves but I never saw one.

If there ever was a government headed both ways at the same time, it is by proposing a disarmament agency and then breathing fire and brimstone, and asking for additional funds to defend the rights and security of our people.

I am glad that somebody else is suffering from the same infirmity as mine of being unable to comprehend how a sane person can support such conflicting objectives.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with that statement. I think the timing is very, very poor. It is pretty hard to explain to the American people, on the one hand, your setting up a disarmament agency, and then, we are coming in for \$4 billion for defense.

I think we ought to have people who know how to deal with arms control. But you can do that by Executive order, and I think if we get into a debate out here of setting up a disarmament agency right after we have appropriated over \$4 billion for additional money, they should—

Senator ERVIN. It is like the man who put vitamins in his liquor so that he could build himself up while he was tearing himself down.

Senator STENNIS. [Deleted.]

But I do not yield one iota from the proposition, of course, that this is a special program here to impress Khrushchev and others on the Berlin crisis.

Why, President Kennedy just reviewed the military budget here 90 days ago, and made some changes, but this is all a recommendation based here upon recent events, based on Berlin and, of course, it goes to the future, as Senator Jackson suggested, also to the future.

It is a buildup, not just to meet the immediate emergency; it is both.

[Deleted.]

Senator JACKSON. I certainly support the idea of building up our own conventional forces.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, do you think now that you have been able to assimilate all of these views, and that you are now able to proceed? [Laughter.]

Secretary McNAMARA. I am. I can proceed.

Senator JACKSON. You ought to be able to work out a pretty good plan from this discussion.

Chairman RUSSELL. He would have to flip a coin to decide some of them.

Senator JACKSON. He will have a lot of flexibility, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. If we may proceed, then, to the top of page 19, we have furnished to the committee a detailed list of the items requiring additional fund authorization.

Next we propose a joint resolution which, I understand, has been introduced in each House.

On Wednesday, President Kennedy requested the Congress to enact a joint resolution which would provide him with certain additional authority. First, the resolution would authorize the President, until July 1, 1962, to order to active duty, for not more than 12 consecutive months, any unit or any member of the Ready Reserve, provided that not more than 250,000 members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty without their consent at any one time.

Second, the joint resolution would permit the President, until July 1, 1962, to authorize the Secretary of Defense to extend, for not more than 12 months, the terms of service of military personnel which would otherwise expire before July 1, 1962. It would also authorize the extension of active-duty-for-training periods.

This latter authority may be used to increase the readiness of selected Reserve units and individual reservists by extending their training period to 4 weeks over and above their normal training period.

The enactment of this resolution is essential to the implementation of our plans. As I have indicated, the Navy and Air Force plan to order to active duty certain selected units and individuals from their Reserve components. The Army, too, may find it necessary to order to active duty a limited number of individuals and smaller units from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

I want to assure this committee and the Congress that we plan to use this authority sparingly. We are well aware of the disruptive

effects and the hardships that such recalls to active duty have on the individuals involved.

We also plan to use the authority to extend the terms of service of military personnel to the minimum extent necessary.

We hope to restrict its use to only those personnel whose skills and experience are essential during the buildup phase and for as short a period as possible.

We also expect to make limited use of the authority to extend the training periods of certain selected Reserve units.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask this question?

Mr. Secretary, I think there will be more questions and more suggestions put up on this than there will be on the procurement program which you have been discussing.

Now, I think I know the answer to this question, but I would like to have confirmation.

Assume a boy who is in the National Guard and had his enlistment running out on June 30, 1962, June 29, 1962. He could, without his consent, be held in for another year by the President; am I correct?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And any time up to July 1, 1962, the President can call up not to exceed 250,000 men without their consent for a 12-month period?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Does that mean that is outside of the draft? Am I correct in that?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So then if a man is drafted, the present laws concerning the draft apply.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. But this gives us some additional power in relation to men who are drafted. It gives us—

Senator CASE. Section 2 does.

Secretary McNAMARA. Pardon me, sir?

Senator CASE. Section 2 does.

Secretary McNAMARA. 2 does, exactly.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Those additional powers, then, would be to extend the enlistments, to extend the periods of active duty for training to periods of obligated service or other military status; in other words, under that language a man who had come in under the draft, we will say, for 2 years could get extended periods?

Senator McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. To make it clear, by training you mean the ordinary training periods of 2 weeks could be extended.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I should make the record perfectly clear that this 1 year's extension can apply to anyone. It can apply to an extension of time of a graduate before he could resign; it applies to all of your Holloway trainees for the Navy, everyone who is in the Active Reserve in this manner. One of the purposes of this resolution is to avoid the necessity of the President's declaring a national emergency.

Under existing law he can declare a national emergency and he then is empowered to call up not to exceed 1 million of the Ready Reserve at that time.

This, of course, would limit him to 250,000.

I had some doubts as to the wisdom of putting the numerical limitation in there, but I want to express to the Secretary again today, as I did on yesterday when we discussed it at some length, my very firm conviction that this should be used just as sparingly as possible, that we should broaden the base of those serving in the military forces of this country, and that the obligations of defense should be as widely shared as is humanly possible to do so.

It was originally contemplated, I think, to have this for 24 months. But in the discussion that was had it was decided to make it 12 months because that is a reasonable time to permit training of replacements, so it was limited to the 12-month period.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few questions on section 2.

Chairman RUSSELL. Certainly.

Senator CASE. How many men are being registered each year for selective service now?

Secretary McNAMARA. I am sorry I could not hear the question, Senator Case.

Senator CASE. How many men are being registered under the selective service law each year now?

Secretary McNAMARA. I cannot answer the specific number being registered. There are about 80,000 in the pool now. We propose to call up on the order of about between 8,000 and 13,000 in August, and approximately 20,000 to 25,000 in September and each month thereafter until we begin to meet our objectives here.

Senator CASE. Are there not more than a million men being registered anew each year?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would have to check and answer for the record, Senator Case. I do not know.

CHAIRMAN. Yes; they are registered anew.

Senator CASE. How many are there in the age of liability for draft now?

Secretary McNAMARA. I would have to check that figure also. I cannot answer it.

Senator CASE. How long is the period of liability?

Secretary McNAMARA. It varies, but it is—let me check that and answer that for the record, too.

(The information previously requested follows:)

1. Over 1.4 million men were newly registered by Selective Service in fiscal year 1961. The number of new registrants is expected to continue at approximately this level in the next 2 years.

2. The period of liability for military service under the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, as amended, is normally age 18½ through 25 years. Registrants who have been deferred on or after June 19, 1951, remain liable until their 35th birthday. Certain individuals deferred for participation in the National Guard continue liable for induction until their 28th birthday.

3. The number of selective service registrants in the ages of liability totaled 13,886,398 on June 30, 1961. This total includes registrants in all classifications.

Senator CASE. My impression is that you have got a pool of several million who are registered under the selective service law today. You are registering over a million a year. You have been drawing about 100,000 a year, 8,000 a month?

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct.

Senator CASE. The proposal that to those who are drawn, the small number who are drawn, under selective service should have a year added to them, and those who escape any liability or any actual service at all is so unfair, it seems to me, that this particular section 2 does not meet with any great enthusiasm on my part.

Those who have a Reserve liability or who are in the Reserves, I think under the Reserve liability can expect an additional call.

I can support the idea of calling for a year those who have an established Reserve status. But to add a third year to the few, the relatively few, out of all of those who are registered, before you expand the base, is hard to defend.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would answer in two parts. First, it is not more indefensible than requesting a small number to serve on a draft basis and allowing the great majority to go free.

Senator CASE. I have never been too enthusiastic about that.

Secretary McNAMARA. No. But I say—

Senator CASE. I thought the period of years of liability up to 35 should be cut down to 27. I think it is an uneconomic practice. It certainly adds insult to injury to say that the very few, the relatively few, who are drawn for 2 years should have a third year added to them, and those who are not drafted at all should go scot free, I think is utterly indefensible.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would simply like to point out that there is no other part of our lives that affects an individual more unequally and with less reason and logic, perhaps, than military service.

I think most of us, and most of you who have served, would agree with that.

Secondly, I point out, however, that it is absolutely essential that we adhere to that standard at a time when our Nation is in danger as it is today.

Senator CASE. I would support, Mr. Secretary, a proposal to increase the reenlistment allowance for those who are in for 2 years and have some skill that you want to preserve or give them some bonus or something of that sort.

But it seems to me that we ought to draft more, if necessary, or expedite the training.

Secretary McNAMARA. I would secondly point out that at a time such as the present when we face a shortage of certain scarce skills, skills that are now available in the person of men in the active service, we must have the authority to retain those men on duty until we can replace them.

We do not propose to use this authority in any instance where it is not absolutely necessary.

Senator CASE. You can call on the reservists. You have reservists with Reserve liability, and it is understood—

Secretary McNAMARA. And the men may not be properly trained or as well trained as the men we are talking about.

A good illustration is in certain of our Air Force personnel where the B-47 crews now on duty are better trained than personnel in the Reserve, for example.

Chairman RUSSELL. I just want to point out, if I may, that, Senator Case, I think you are contradicting yourself in approving section 1 and disapproving section 2.

Every man who serves his 2 years on active duty as a draftee has a Reserve obligation when released to inactive duty so he could then be ordered to duty under section 1. He is eliminated. A man can serve his 2 years under the draft law, he is released to inactive duty, and he goes into the Ready Reserve. Every single one of them under section 1 can be called up for 12 months the next day.

Section 2 is more widely spread; the purpose is to more widely spread the service than to limit it.

Senator CASE. If you have enough of a crisis to warrant his being called under his Reserve liability, that is one thing. But to extend the service for a period, it seems to me, is—

Chairman RUSSELL. I regret to do it, too. But I do not see why the draftee is any worse off than anybody else. These are the boys who have taken their Reserve training. They are in the Reserve.

It could extend them for 1 year.

Senator CASE. I am surprised, Mr. Chairman, that those present are not prepared to answer the question as to the relationship between those who are being drawn and those that are being registered, because it seems to me a consideration of this proposal would involve a consideration of the broadening of the base which you speak of.

Chairman RUSSELL. I certainly want to do that, and I have attempted as vigorously as I know how to see that it is shared. But if we are in an emergency, some of these people who have these special skills and training will just have to make a sacrifice.

Senator CASE. You must have had some appreciation of it if you expressed some doubts about the 24 months.

Chairman RUSSELL. We do not want to repeat the experience of the the Korean war, as I said yesterday, when we called up a group of people who fought World War II. They were the only trained people in the Reserve and they took them to fight another war, while millions who had not done one day's military service were available for service.

That distressed me almost worse than anything I had observed in my public career.

Senator CASE. I saw young reservists pulled out of business who had business obligations, and—

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right, and who had just started a family after having spent 4 or 5 years in World War II. It was a terrible injustice, and I hope we can avoid that in this situation.

I understood from you yesterday, Mr. Secretary, it was your purpose, so far as filling up these three divisions you intend to make ready, that you propose to use the draft as much as possible.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want you to make it clear that you are not unnecessarily going to call up people who have already performed their duty, but to fill them with draftees.

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct; to the greatest extent possible, to fill the program with draftees. It is not going to be possible to fill many positions of it with draftees. Then we will consider either extending tours of duty or calling up reservists.

In answering Senator Case's point that he considered it a deficiency that we had failed to consider the size of the pool from which the draftees might be called, we have considered the size of the pool. I

would rather submit accurate figures than figures from memory, but my recollection is that the period covered by the pool is generally 6 years.

There are exceptions to that because men drop out for various reasons, for authorized reasons; and, further, that the total number in the pool at any one time is around 7 or 8 million and, hence, the draft calls we are talking about do lead to the effect in numerical terms that he has suggested, and inequality of sacrifice, but we see no way of avoiding that, and we will do everything possible to minimize it.

Senator CASE. I heard on the radio someone quoted as saying that they regarded college training as important to national defense, so anybody who was in college would be deferred.

That immediately suggested to me in the next few weeks that any parent who has a boy who is just on the verge possibly of being eligible for the draft is going to be sure that he is enrolled into college, if that is his attitude about it.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in view of the time? Do you wish to conclude and vote on the bill, you say?

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought we would. I am not pressing any member of the committee.

Senator STENNIS. I am just asking. I can come back, if you want him to cover some other things.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement.

(The prepared statements of Secretary McNamara and General Lemnitzer, together with the report of procurement and production previously referred to, follow:)

#### STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, President Kennedy, last Tuesday, informed the Nation of the gathering crisis in our worldwide struggle against Communist aggression. He spoke of the need for still further efforts on our part, as well as on the part of our allies, to prepare our military forces to meet whatever demands may be placed upon them in the months ahead. We are here, today, to present to you the additional measures which we believe should be taken now, during the current fiscal year, and to request the additional authorization for appropriations required to accomplish them.

Together with our European allies, we have developed over the past years a solid alliance, and an effective defense of the NATO area against overt Soviet aggression. The effective functioning of this alliance and the strength of its defenses are major targets of the increased Soviet pressure on Berlin. Believing that the Western World will be very reluctant to invoke the use of nuclear weapons in response to anything short of a direct threat to its survival, the Kremlin leaders hope to create divisive influences within the alliance by carefully measured military threats in connection with the Berlin situation. In order to meet such threats with firmness and confidence and to provide us with a greater range of military alternatives, we will need more nonnuclear strength than we have today.

This is the basic short-term objective of the measures we now propose—to attain a greater range of military options together with the related deterrent and political effects which would go with them. The purpose is twofold: to deter the Soviets from pressing a Berlin crisis to the point of conflict, and to become better able to deal with any conflict which might nevertheless occur. We expect that our European allies will wish to make corresponding increases in their own strength, so that our united efforts can have full effect and so that the solidarity of the alliance can be demonstrated. We have initiated consultations to this end.

Although Berlin is now the focus of attention, these measures are also directed at the larger problem of Communist threats and pressures all around the globe. We have not lost sight of the dangerous situation which confronts

us in southeast Asia or the possibility of a sudden outbreak of trouble in other areas of the world. What we are seeking to achieve, and achieve quickly, is a peak readiness of our Military Establishment to respond promptly with appropriate forces, and in adequate strength, to any kind of armed Communist aggression anywhere in the world; and to main that posture until we can see more clearly what lies ahead. Because we cannot foresee with certainty how events may develop over the coming months, we cannot say at this time whether the strength increases we now propose will necessarily be permanent.

Our strategic forces are already in a high state of readiness and the additional measures the President proposed in March should keep them that way in the future. But there are two additional steps which we can and should take now to strengthen further our strategic capabilities.

#### STRENGTHENING OUR NUCLEAR STRIKE AND AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY

First, we must insure that our goal of maintaining 50 percent of the B-52 and B-47 bombers on a 15-minute ground alert is achieved promptly. For this purpose, an additional \$24 million of operation and maintenance funds will be required for the current fiscal year. This is the first item shown in attachment 1—the fiscal summary by program.

Second, we should retain in the force for the time being certain B-47 wings and their associated tankers, which we had planned to phase out during the current fiscal year. These actions will provide a significant increase in the number of B-47 bombers on 15-minute ground alert at the end of fiscal year 1962.

To man and operate these additional B-47 wings and associated tankers, the Air Force will require substantial additional military personnel and \$45 million in new obligational authority for fiscal year 1962. (There will also be additional costs for the procurement of aircraft spares which I will discuss later under the heading of "Procurement.")

We also deem it prudent to increase further our capacity for the manual control of interceptor aircraft at U.S. radar sites. This will provide a highly desirable backup to the SAGE system. You may recall that our March revisions also included additional funds for this purpose. We are now asking for a relatively small number of additional Air Force military personnel and \$17 million new obligational authority for fiscal year 1962 to increase further the effectiveness of the manual backup capability.

Our principal concern at this time, however, is with the tactical ground, air, and naval forces, and particularly with their conventional or nonnuclear capabilities. We feel very strongly that the U.S. Defense Establishment must have a greater degree of flexibility in responding to particular situations. We need to expand the range of military alternatives available to the President in meeting the kind of situation which may confront us in maintaining our position in Berlin.

I want to make clear, however, that this does not mean we are lessening the effectiveness of our tactical nuclear capabilities. As I pointed out to your committee earlier this year, "Even in limited war situations we should not preclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons, for no one can foresee how such situations might develop." What we are proposing now is not only to strengthen our nuclear capabilities but also to increase our nonnuclear capabilities to provide a still greater degree of versatility to our military forces.

The President, in his March and May amendments to the fiscal year 1962 budget, recommended, among other things, measures to increase these nonnuclear capabilities and to facilitate rapid deployment of our forces by modernizing and expanding our airlift. Now we must take additional measures to assure that all of the ground and tactical air forces in our central reserve in the United States are made ready for prompt deployment to whatever part of the world they may be needed.

As you know, we presently have 14 active Army divisions and 3 active Marine Corps divisions. The amendments to the defense budget proposed in May also provided for the establishment of a nucleus of a fourth Marine Corps division.

Of the 14 Army divisions, 8 are overseas, including the 1 in Hawaii. All eight of these divisions are combat ready, although some of them require additional support units. Of the six Army divisions constituting the central reserve in the United States, only the three STRAC divisions are ready for immediate deployment. The other three STRAF divisions, for the most part, are currently engaged in the training of new recruits.

## MAKE THREE ARMY STRAF DIVISIONS COMBAT READY

Clearly, in the present situation, the three STRAF divisions should also be made ready for immediate deployment. To do so would first require relieving them of the recruit training mission and increasing the divisions to full T.O. & E. strength. Selected nondivisional STRAF units should be brought to full T.O. & E. strength. Finally, the three divisions would have to be furnished additional nondivisional support elements. The preparation of the three STRAF divisions for immediate deployment could involve a relatively large number of additional military personnel at an estimated cost of \$226 million in new obligational authority for "Military personnel and operation and maintenance for fiscal 1962."

## STRENGTHEN ARMY FORCES IN EUROPE

We also believe it advisable at this time to provide for rounding out the manning and support of Army forces in Europe. First, we wish to be in a position to bring the 7th Army and other Army units in Europe to their full T.O. & E. strength. Moreover, we want to be able, if the situation warrants it, to provide certain additional support units to the 7th Army. The total augmentation of the Army forces in Europe could involve another substantial increment of men and a budget increase of approximately \$150 million for "Military personnel and operation and maintenance costs."

Of the three Marine Corps division air wings, one is deployed in the Pacific and two in the continental United States. All three division air wings will be fully combat ready. The President's earlier amendments to the fiscal year 1962 budget would provide the funds to round out the manning and support of these forces.

Thus, by the end of the current fiscal year, we hope to have in the continental United States eight combat-ready divisions—six Army and two Marine Corps.

## EXPAND THE ARMY'S TRAINING BASE CAPACITY

We plan to take steps now to begin to expand the capacity of the Army's training base and to increase base support at certain Army camps currently used for the training of Reserve units. This action could involve the addition of a relatively large number of men at a cost of \$170 million for the current fiscal year.

Together, the measures that I have outlined could require an increase of about 133,000 in the active duty strength of the Army, raising the fiscal year 1962 authorized end strength to about 1 million. The additional "Military personnel and operation and maintenance" funds required for the Army total approximately \$890 million.

The allocation of the increase in the strength of the Army which I have described represents an initial estimate of requirements in each of the major areas involved. It would strengthen both our combat and combat-support units in Europe, it would establish a higher level of readiness for deployment among the Active Army division forces currently in reserve in the United States; and it would provide for the rapid mobilization of still additional Reserves, if necessary. We intend to continue to refine these initial estimates with the objective of realizing our maximum combat potential, ready for deployment in time of crisis to Berlin or to any other threatened area of the globe.

To achieve its new strength goal, the Army will have to increase its officer procurement and draft calls to a substantially higher level—beginning with at least 20,000 in September. It may also be necessary for the Army to order to active duty from the Reserve forces certain selected individuals and smaller units and to extend the tours of personnel already on active duty.

With respect to the Marine Corps, no further strength increase is being requested at this time. You will recall that in our first two amendments to the 1962 budget, Marine Corps strength was increased by 15,000 men, from 175,000 to 190,000. This manpower increase will create an active duty nucleus for the 4th Marine Division.

## IMPROVE OUR SEALIFT AND AIRLIFT

If we are to have the capability to move these additional combat-ready forces promptly to wherever they may be needed, we must concurrently increase our sealift and airlift.

First, we propose to reactivate troop transport ships at a cost estimated at \$15 million and to provide a military complement of Navy personnel for these ships at a cost of \$3 million for the current fiscal year.

Second, we propose to increase our amphibious lift capability. This will involve the retention in the active fleet of attack transports, which had been scheduled to be phased out during the current fiscal year, and the reactivation of other amphibious ships. Together, these steps will require some additional Navy personnel and a budget increase of \$77 million.

Third, to increase airlift capacity we plan to retain in service several squadrons of C-118's which had been scheduled to be phased out during the current fiscal year. We would also be prepared to order to active duty C-97 squadrons from the Air National Guard and C-124 squadrons from the Air Force Reserve.

These augmentations would also involve an increase in the active duty strength of the Air Force and an increase of \$72 million in new obligational authority.

#### TRANSPORTATION COSTS

We also are requesting funds to cover the cost of transporting additional divisions to Europe. I want to make it perfectly clear that no decision has yet been made to deploy additional divisions. Nevertheless, we want to get ourselves in a position to implement promptly such a decision if it should be made. We are therefore requesting the necessary funds at this time.

#### STRENGTHEN OUR ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE CAPABILITY

To be properly prepared to move larger forces overseas and to meet the Soviet submarine threat under conditions of crisis we should immediately increase our antisubmarine warfare capability. We therefore propose to operate in the active fleet, for the time being, additional antisubmarine warfare ships, which had been scheduled to be phased out during the current fiscal year. The operation of these ships would require a small increase in Navy personnel and an additional cost of \$17 million.

The Navy would also be prepared to order to active duty from its selected Reserve ASW air squadrons and destroyer-type ships for antisubmarine warfare, involving a substantial number of military personnel and an additional cost to the Navy budget of \$40 million.

#### RAISE OTHER FLEET CAPABILITIES

To enable the Navy to deploy another aircraft carrier, if the need arises, we also propose to operate for the present an additional attack carrier in the active fleet. In addition, the Navy would activate fleet-support ships now laid up in the Fleet Reserve. The manning of the additional attack carrier and support ships would also require a strength increase. The "Military personnel and operation and maintenance" costs involved would total \$80 million in the current fiscal year. These particular actions will enable us to increase the readiness of the deployed fleets and to augment their strength with another attack carrier.

We are also requesting an additional \$49 million to provide for the increased number of naval aircraft overhauls required by the increase in the number of operating aircraft and the somewhat higher levels of activity. Further, we are requesting \$10 million to provide additional kits to improve the reliability of ship-based air defense missiles such as TARTAR and TERRIER. Increased quantities of these missiles would be delivered to the fleet during the current fiscal year under our procurement proposals.

The total increase proposed in the authorized strength of the Navy amounts to 29,000 and the related increases in "Military personnel and operation and maintenance" funds total some \$276 million. Some of these additional personnel will be drawn from the Naval Reserve. The remainder of the buildup will be accomplished by additional recruitment and possibly, through the extension of tours of active duty personnel.

#### INCREASE TACTICAL AIRPOWER

The planned increase in combat-ready ground forces would require a commensurate increase in supporting tactical airpower. To provide this increase, the Air Force would retain, for the present, certain light bomber and reconnaissance squadrons and tactical fighter squadrons which we had previously

planned to start phasing out of the force during the current fiscal year. The retention of these units would require a very small number of additional military personnel and a budget increase of \$14 million for fiscal year 1962.

The Air Force also will be in a position, if need be, to order to active duty Air National Guard squadrons and tactical aircraft control groups involving a relatively large number of military personnel and an increase in the Air Force budget of \$154 million.

In addition, a small increase in military personnel and \$3 million is required to maintain the tactical air control system in Europe. It had been planned to phase down this system concurrently with the replacement of older fighters in Europe. Since the older aircraft would now be retained for the time being, the tactical control system needed to make them effective would likewise have to be continued.

Thus, for the Air Force, the total strength increase requested is 63,327 personnel, which would raise the authorized fiscal year 1962 end strength to 888,227. The associated "Military personnel and operation and maintenance" funds required total \$329 million.

#### OTHER MEASURES TO IMPROVE READINESS

There are a number of other measures that we are proposing to improve the readiness of Active Forces and to prepare for the possible mobilization of Reserve forces. One involves strengthening the Army logistical base, for which \$137 million is requested, in order to complete the minimum dispersal of combat-essential stocks in Europe, to upgrade war reserve stocks in Europe and the United States to "ready to issue" condition, and to improve the maintenance of combat equipment already in the hands of troops. We are also requesting \$35 million to rebuild approximately \$245 million worth of tanks and other equipment.

Another measure is the preparation of troop facilities in Europe for which we are requesting \$49 million. This is an item associated with a possible future decision to deploy additional divisions to Europe. We are not prepared to say, at this time, to what extent or when these funds would be used, but we obviously must have additional troop facilities if additional divisions are deployed to Europe. To be in a position to act quickly if such a decision is made, we should have these funds on hand.

The measures I have outlined would entail an increase in the active duty strength of the Armed Forces of about 225,000 men. Together with the personnel increases requested in the March and May amendments to the budget, the total increase over the January budget is about 250,000 men—from 2,493,000 to about 2,743,000. Moreover, provisions have been made in these budget amendments for another substantial increase in strength if developments over the next few months should make necessary a mobilization of the Reserve components. The additional "Military personnel and operation and maintenance" funds required for the specific measures I have described total about \$1½ billion.

#### PROCUREMENT

The balance of the \$3,247 million requested for the military forces—\$1,753 million—is for the procurement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition to increase our nonnuclear capabilities. The items included in our new procurement list are chiefly those which would be most urgently needed by our forces if they were to be committed to combat soon; and which can be ordered and delivered quickly. The additional quantities to be procured are not only to equip the forces now on active duty but also those Reserve forces which might have to be ordered to active duty later, if developments over the next few months so dictate. However, all of the items requested for procurement are of a type which we would eventually have bought in any event. If they turn out not to be required immediately, we will credit them against our future needs and reduce subsequent budget requests proportionately.

Part II of attachment 1 to this statement is a summary, by service, of the amounts requested in the budget amendments for procurement. Detailed lists including items for which authorization is not required are available for the use of the committee. I shall discuss later the specific items for which additional fund authorization is being requested pursuant to section 412b. It should be noted, however, that these procurement lists are still tentative since we did not have sufficient time to check out thoroughly the status of each and every

item. If major changes are found to be necessary, the committee will be informed or its consent obtained in accordance with the agreed reprogramming procedures.

#### PROCUREMENT, ARMY

A total of \$552 million is requested for Army procurement, raising the total for the current fiscal year to \$2,543 million. This total is an increase of more than 40 percent over the amount requested for Army procurement in the January 1961 budget.

The Army list covers a wide variety of weapons, equipment and ammunition. The largest category is tactical support vehicles for which about \$175 million is requested. This includes a very large number of trucks and trailers. In fact, the revised 1962 request for this purpose is now several times the value of the 1961 program.

An amount of \$36.7 million is requested for additional Army aircraft, including IROQUOIS helicopters, SIOUX observation helicopters and SEMINOLE utility aircraft.

For tactical missiles we are asking \$19.2 million. This would enable the Army to increase greatly the number of HONEST JOHN missiles over those previously requested in the fiscal year 1962 budget. Also requested are nonnuclear warheads for the HONEST JOHN.

A total of \$14.6 million is requested for additional quantities of nonnuclear NIKE-HERCULES warheads and HAWK missiles for tactical air defense.

The sum of \$98.2 million is requested for combat vehicles, mainly for armored personnel carriers and tank recovery vehicles. For both of these vehicles, this amendment would increase significantly the number requested as compared with the 1962 budget, as revised in May.

Also, \$87.3 million is requested for ammunition, including armor piercing anti-tank rounds; \$1.3 million is requested for certain artillery and small arms items.

About \$97 million is included for communications equipment such as radios, field telephones, terminals, teletypewriters, etc.

For construction and other heavy equipment, we are asking \$23.1 million. Included in this category are quantities of various types of construction equipment, portable generators, and related logistic and combat support equipment.

#### PROCUREMENT, NAVY

An amount of \$709 million is included for additional Navy procurement, raising the total for fiscal year 1962 to nearly \$6.5 billion, or nearly 50 percent more than the January request.

The largest item in the Navy's proposed procurement list is \$281 million to provide additional aircraft, including A4D-2N attack aircraft, F8U-2N and F4H-1 fighters, patrol, search, and transport aircraft, and helicopters.

The sum of \$262 million is included for tactical and air defense missiles. Fiscal year 1962 procurement of BULLPUP air-to-surface missiles and SIDEWINDER and SPARROW air-to-air missiles would be greatly increased. The procurement of surface-to-air missiles TARTAR, TERRIER and TALOS, would also be substantially augmented by this amendment. To increase our anti-submarine warfare capability there would be a sizable increase in ASW ordnance and equipment procurement. In addition to torpedoes and other expendable ordnance, this request includes a large number of sonobuoys for detection of enemy submarines. Also included are additional funds for conventional ordnance, communications equipment, and for Marine Corps support normally financed in Navy procurement appropriations.

#### PROCUREMENT, MARINE CORPS

There is also a sizable increase in the Marine Corps procurement program. The \$67 million in the proposed amendment brings the total fiscal year 1962 request to \$266 million, nearly double the January budget.

The new procurement list contains \$15.7 million for ammunition and ordnance, including 106 millimeter recoilless rifle rounds; \$25.8 million for communications and electronics equipment; \$4.5 million for support vehicles; and \$21 million for engineer and materials handling equipment such as tractors, cranes, bulldozers, and forklifts.

## PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

A total of \$425 million is requested for additional Air Force procurement. With this addition, the total requested for Air Force procurement in 1962 amounts to \$7.6 billion—an increase of some \$620 million over the January budget (including the \$225 million reappropriation).

About \$241 million is requested for aircraft and spares, including spares for the additional aircraft on ground alert. The Air Force list includes F-105-D supersonic all-weather fighter-bombers and C-130-B and E transports. Furthermore, we plan to buy additional tooling and long leadtime components for the C-130-E so that the planned peak production rate could be raised considerably. This would enable us to get much larger quantities of this troop transport aircraft sooner under the 1963 procurement program.

An additional \$62 million is requested for missiles, including a large number of SIDEWINDER and BULLPUP missiles for tactical fighters and FALCON air-to-air missiles for the interceptor forces.

About \$111 million is included for conventional ordnance, including 20-millimeter ammunition, land mines, fragmentation bombs, etc.; \$11 million is also requested for base and organizational equipment.

## ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS

The proposed increases in the defense program which I have outlined will, of course, require additional fund authorization for aircraft and missiles, over and above that provided in Public Law 87-53, which was approved on June 21, 1961. Attachment 2 to this statement provides a summary by category and by service of the additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization.

We have submitted to this committee a legislative proposal which would provide the fund authorizations needed. These are listed in attachment 2.

The total amount of additional fund authorization requested is \$958,570,000. Of this amount, \$612,200,000 is for aircraft: \$36,700,000 for the Army, \$281,400,000 for the Navy and the Marine Corps, and \$294,100,000 for the Air Force.

A total of \$304,770,000 is for missiles: \$33,770,000 for the Army, \$262,200,000 for the Navy, and \$8,800,000 for the Air Force. No additional fund authorization is requested for missiles for the Marine Corps.

Forty-one million six hundred thousand dollars is requested for naval vessels for the repair of fire damage to the aircraft carrier *Constellation*. Since these funds are being requested for appropriation in the "Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy" appropriation in fiscal year 1962, we have included the authorization amount in the proposed bill.

Detailed lists of the items requiring additional fund authorization have been furnished to the committee. These items are included in the complete procurement lists which I mentioned earlier in my statement.

## JOINT RESOLUTION

On Wednesday, President Kennedy requested the Congress to enact a joint resolution which would provide him with certain additional authority. First, the resolution would authorize the President, until July 1, 1962, to order to active duty, for not more than 12 consecutive months, any unit or any member of the Ready Reserve, provided that not more than 250,000 members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty without their consent at any one time.

Second, the joint resolution would permit the President, until July 1, 1962, to authorize the Secretary of Defense to extend, for not more than 12 months, the terms of service of military personnel which would otherwise expire before July 1, 1962. It would also authorize the extension of active duty for training periods. This latter authority may be used to increase the readiness of selected reserve units and individual reservists by extending their training periods 2 to 4 weeks over and above their normal training.

The enactment of this resolution is essential to the implementation of our plans. As I have indicated, the Navy and Air Force plan to order to active duty certain selected units and individuals from their Reserve components. The Army, too, may find it necessary to order to active duty a limited number of individuals and smaller units from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

I want to assure this committee and the Congress that we plan to use this authority sparingly. We are well aware of the disruptive effects and the hardships that such recalls to active duty have on the individuals involved. We also plan to use the authority to extend the terms of service of military personnel to the minimum extent necessary. We hope to restrict its use to only those personnel whose skills and experience are essential during the buildup phase—and for as short a period as possible. We also expect to make limited use of the authority to extend the training periods of certain selected Reserve units.

If it should become necessary to order more than 250,000 reservists to extended active duty without their consent it would be done not under the authority of the joint resolution but rather under a declaration of a national emergency by the President, or as a result of further congressional action.

#### CIVIL DEFENSE

Let me turn now to the responsibilities in the field of civil defense newly transferred by the President to the Department of Defense.

When I assumed these responsibilities last week, I stated that we would be guided by four principles in administering the program within the Department:

“(1) The civil defense effort must remain under civilian direction and control, involving, as it does, the survival of every citizen. It requires the closest and most sympathetic cooperation between Federal civilian authorities and State and local governments.

“(2) In the age of thermonuclear war, civil defense must be integrated with all aspects of military defense against thermonuclear attack.

“(3) The civil defense functions of the Department must not be permitted to downgrade the military capabilities of our Armed Forces.

“(4) Whatever expenditures are undertaken for civil defense projects must be directed toward obtaining maximum protection for lowest possible cost.”

Defending the civilian population of the United States against the dangers of a thermonuclear attack is not in itself a new responsibility for the Department. Our primary reliance is on U.S. military forces as a deterrent against attack. But if miscalculation, irrationality, or accident produces an attack against the continental United States, our defensive forces are prepared to meet and engage the attacker.

Despite the damage that we would inflict on enemy aircraft, some of these aircraft would probably penetrate our defenses far enough to release their weapons. Nor do we yet have any effective operative defense against ballistic missiles. In a nuclear attack on the United States, several million Americans—perhaps several tens of millions—might be killed. No program of civil defense could save all of these people but a comparatively modest civil defense program can provide a great deal of protection for people who are not close to points of detonation.

As you know, thermonuclear explosions inflict damage in three ways: by blast, by heat, and by radiation. The instantaneous effects of blast and heat from a nuclear detonation can devastate an area within as much as 5 to 10 miles of ground zero. Secondary fires may spread somewhat farther. If the nuclear explosion were at or near ground level, radioactive particles would form a cloud that could drift downwind as far as 200 miles, exposing the population wherever it falls to lethal doses of radiation. The best protection against this radioactive fallout is a massive barrier of dense material. The greater the mass, the greater the protection. The damaging effects of radiation on the human system are largely cumulative, but in most areas survivors could leave a shelter after 2 weeks, and in some areas after a few days or even hours.

The augmented civil defense program proposed by the President is designed to protect the American people primarily against the dangers from fallout. Protection against fallout is much less expensive than protection against blast and can be highly effective. A megaton-yield weapon can destroy the heart of a city. But a near-miss, up-wind, could also wipe out the city's population, unless the citizens knew how to take advantage of the time following warning or the burst of a nuclear weapon to seek previously identified and prepared fallout shelter.

The President's program is designed to take advantage of available shelter, and in so doing, provide a large number of shelter spaces at the least cost per shelter space in the near future. These spaces should be sufficient to provide reasonably adequate protection for about one-quarter of the population. At the same time, the program is designed to explore the most economical ways of further increasing the number of shelter spaces by modifying the shelters now available, principally by installing forced draft ventilation operated from standby power sources, and by planning for space in new construction adaptable to shelter use.

Of the \$207.6 million that we are requesting in new funds, \$93 million covers the cost of a national program for identification and marking of available community shelter space in existing buildings. The identification and marking would be completed by December 1962, but the contracting would be completed in fiscal year 1962. It would concentrate first on the critical areas, which are also likely to have the largest number of available spaces. At the same time, we propose to initiate a \$10 million pilot program of modification of shelter spaces in existing structures, primarily to increase their capacity. We have reason to believe that forced draft ventilation can multiply the capacity of most shelter spaces several times. We propose to provide \$7.5 million to cover the additional cost of planning and constructing shelters in new Federal buildings. This last program should also serve as an incentive for State and local governments and as a model for their buildings, schools, and offices.

In order to make shelters usable, they must be equipped with the minimum essentials for survival during a 1- to 2-week period. Based upon careful studies and tests we regard the minimum essentials for survival to be: 5 days' rations—an austerity ration with a long shelf life; 2 week's water supply; first aid kits; sanitary supplies; tools to remove debris; and, perhaps most important, radiation meter kits. These items account for \$58.8 million of the President's program.

Available shelters can be more effectively used if there is an adequate, dependable warning system to tell people when to use them. Since the present siren warning system has serious drawbacks, the President's program includes \$10 million to initiate a new household warning system, which operates on an electrical impulse imposed on the regular powerlines. The complex military warning system is employed to initiate the alerting signal. This program would begin national installation of the national emergency alarm repeater (NEAR) system, if an extensive systems test in Michigan proves successful. The program also includes \$5.5 million to correct basic deficiencies in other elements of the warning and emergency operational capabilities, including communications.

Any operation depends upon intelligence; defense against fallout depends upon information on the nature of the fallout pattern and its intensity in particular locations. The President's program, therefore, contains \$9.3 million dollars for radiological detection equipment, to cover the cost of detection kits for monitoring stations, aerial monitoring equipment and individual dosimeters. This equipment would be used by workers who may have to expose themselves to fallout when they undertake decontamination operations, rescue work, and emergency distribution of food and essential supplies from outside stockpiles.

Lastly, the President's program contains \$13.5 million for research and development. The program of identification, marking, and modification of shelter space in existing structures is designed to buy all the shelter protection we can at the least cost in the immediate future. To insure that any additional units of protection purchased at a later date are also obtained at lowest cost, a vigorous program of research and development is required. Similarly, we believe that research and development can reduce the cost of warning and emergency communication systems. The experience and facilities of the Department in research and development work should be particularly helpful in pointing out paths that civil defense research and development ought to explore.

Many people, including previous Defense officials, have been apprehensive about the consequences of bringing civil defense under what has been described as "military control," as well as the dangers of degrading military capabilities. As I indicated earlier in my statement, we propose to organize the civil defense function under civilian control as a separate unit attached to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There are a number of ways, however, in which the civil defense organization can take advantage of the competence and capabilities of other units within the Department, without in any way detracting from the Armed Forces' primary military obligations. For example, the district offices of the Army Corps of Engineers and of the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks can be called upon to contract with civilian architects and engineers for the proposed shelter survey. Again, as I pointed out earlier, the civil defense warning system becomes most effective when it is considered as an extension of the North American Air Defense Command warning system.

The changes introduced in the defense program by the President have all been in the direction of increased flexibility in order to deal with a wider range of defense problems. As the size and range of strategic weapons are multiplied, civil defense becomes an essential element to round out our overall defense capabilities. The proper balance between active and passive defense is always open for discussion. By any standard, however, the present level of civil defense spending is not only inadequate but wasteful. It buys an organization but not a program.

The program proposed by the President will not satisfy everyone. It is not large enough to guarantee survival for all our citizens in a large-scale nuclear attack. No program can do that. What it does is to offer the greatest amount of protection against nuclear attack that can be made available to our civilian population in the near future, while actively exploring possibilities for practical achievement of more effective and extensive shelter facilities. In the present state of the world, I submit that this is what we must do for our people.

Mr. Chairman, with these amendments—amounting to \$3,454,600,000—the President's budget now stands at approximately \$47.5 billion for all the military functions of the Department of Defense, including civil defense. In addition, there is now pending before the Congress a budget request of \$1,885 million for military assistance, making a grand total of approximately \$49.4 billion. We believe that with the appropriation of these funds the Department of Defense will be in a position to carry out all the measures which should be taken now to prepare for the tests which lie ahead.

[Attachment 1]

*Summary by program of adjustments to the fiscal year 1962 defense budget  
proposed by the President on July 25, 1961*

## PART I—MILITARY PERSONNEL AND OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS

	Increase in personnel strength	Increase in fiscal year 1962 NOA
		<i>Millions</i>
1. Strengthen our nuclear strike and air defense capability (Insure prompt achievement of B-52 and B-47 50-percent ground alert; postpone inactivation of B-47 wings and associated tankers; and provide personnel for manual control of interceptors at U.S. radar sites.)	-----	\$86
2. Make 3 Army STRAF divisions combat ready (Add to Army training base to relieve STRAF of training function and increase training capacity; fill out STRAF units to full T.O. & E. strength; and add support units to STRAF.)	-----	226
3. Strengthen Army forces in Europe (Bring 7th Army and other Army units in Europe to full T.O. & E. strength and add support units.)	-----	150
4. Expand the Army's training base capacity	-----	170
5. Improve our sealift and airlift (Reactivate transport ships; provide military complement for transport ships; increase amphibious lift capability; retain C-118 squadrons; order to active duty Air National Guard C-97 squadrons; and order to active duty Air Force Reserve C-124 squadrons.)	-----	167
6. Transportation costs	-----	107
7. Strengthen our antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability (Retain antisubmarine warfare ships; order to active duty ASW air squadrons; and reactivate ships for ASW patrol.)	-----	57
8. Raise other fleet capabilities (Retain 1 attack carrier (CVA) and associated air group; activate fleet support ships; increase number of naval aircraft overhauls; and provide kits for missile control (Navy).)	-----	139
9. Increase tactical airpower (Retain light bomber and fighter squadrons; order to active duty Air National Guard squadrons; and provide Air Force personnel for tactical air control system.)	-----	171
10. Other measures to improve readiness (Strengthen Army logistical base; rebuild tanks and other equipment; and prepare troop facilities in Europe.)	-----	221
Total, military personnel and operation and maintenance	225,327	1,494
Army	(133,000)	(889)
Navy	(29,000)	(276)
Marine Corps	(0)	(0)
Air Force	(63,327)	(329)

## PART II—PROCUREMENT COSTS

Procurement of weapons and equipment:		
(a) Army	-----	\$552
(b) Navy	-----	709
(c) Marine Corps	-----	67
(d) Air Force	-----	425
Total procurement	-----	1,753
Total for the military forces (pts. I and II)	225,327	3,247

## PART III—CIVIL DEFENSE

1. Shelter program:		<i>Millions</i>
(a) Survey and marking	-----	\$93.0
(b) Improvements of existing shelter space	-----	10.0
(c) Shelters in new Federal construction	-----	7.5
(d) Equipment and supplies for shelters	-----	58.8
2. Warning and detection:		
(a) NEAR system	-----	10.0
(b) Warning and alert and emergency operations	-----	5.5
(c) Radiological detection	-----	9.3
3. Research and development	-----	13.5
Total, civil defense	-----	207.6
Grand total	225,327	3,454.6

[Attachment 2]

*Funding summary—Procurement and production, major end items, systems, and programs*

Category and service	Appropriation title	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligatory authority requiring authorization
Aircraft:		
Army.....	Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army.....	\$36,700,000
Navy and Marine Corps.....	Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy.....	281,400,000
Air Force.....	Aircraft procurement, Air Force.....	(211,500,000)
	Airlift modernization, Air Force.....	(82,600,000)
		294,100,000
Subtotal, aircraft.....		612,200,000
Missiles:		
Army.....	Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army.....	33,770,000
Navy.....	Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy.....	262,200,000
Marine Corps.....	Procurement, Marine Corps.....	
Air Force.....	Missile procurement, Air Force.....	8,800,000
Subtotal, missiles.....		304,770,000
Naval vessels: Navy.....	Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy.....	41,600,000
Grand total.....		958,570,000

**STATEMENT BY GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you in support of the amended programs as they have been described for you in detail by Secretary McNamara. My statement is short, but in it I have tried to relate the actions which are recommended now to the changes in the overall situation which have occurred since the Department of Defense fiscal year 1962 budget was originally presented to the Congress earlier this year.

During this session of Congress, I have expressed to several committees my belief that the decade of the sixties could be decisive in the total struggle in which we are engaged. I have expressed the view that we must in this decade meet the buildup and changes in Communist power in a clearly adequate and timely manner. It is now clear that a test of power relationships is occurring, and that prompt action must be taken to enhance our ability to face the test squarely. In the relatively short interval since the presentation of the fiscal year 1962 budget to the Congress, we have seen the Soviets adopt an increasingly belligerent attitude. A buildup of their military forces has been announced. They are threatening the allied position in Berlin. The Communists are seizing every opportunity to make trouble in the Far East and southeast Asia. In Laos, the Soviets continue openly to provide support to the Communist Pathet Lao.

Shipments of Soviet arms continue to Cuba, where the most recent development is the presence of Soviet Mig aircraft. From these examples, it seems apparent that the Soviets now believe that belligerency is the most suitable course for them to follow in moving toward their goal of world domination. They must believe that the risk of being confronted in small—that the free world is lacking in the resolve and determination to oppose with arms, if necessary, the further expansion of communism.

In this is the Soviet view—and no other would logically support the course they are now following—we must make clear to them beyond any doubt that they have miscalculated. If we are to deter the Communists, we must make them understand the firmness of our determination and the strength of our convictions. They must see our military power and respect it. It is for this basic reason that our national security interests require a prompt strengthening of our military posture.

With respect to the specific program amendments, as described for you in detail by Secretary McNamara, I would like to make a few comments.

First, it is my opinion—and the opinion of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—that the actions proposed will increase the readiness of the forces now in being. Also, they will provide added flexibility, particularly by creating a greater nonnuclear capability, which will permit varied responses to the threat. They will markedly increase the capabilities of U.S. forces to respond with greater flexibility to a Berlin crisis or to other Communist-inspired contingencies.

Second, the requirement for increasing our military posture should not be related solely to the impending crisis in Berlin—important as that is. Rather, we must keep in proper perspective the global nature of the threat, and we must be prepared to act promptly and effectively in meeting the threat wherever and whenever it may appear on the face of the globe. The forces visualized in the present program will enhance our capability to act in one area without an unacceptable weakening of our posture in other important areas.

Third, while most of the actions now proposed are intended to improve the readiness and increase the strength of our tactical ground, naval, and air forces—with emphasis on their conventional or nonnuclear capabilities—the program also contemplates actions to enhance the creditability and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent forces. The delay of the planned deactivation of B-47 wings and measures to place 50 percent of our manned bombers on ground alert should be clear evidence to the Soviets that our basic strategy continues to be founded on our very powerful nuclear retaliatory capabilities.

Fourth, the decision to make three STRAF divisions combat ready will double the number of Army divisions available in the United States for immediate deployment. This action will add significantly to the flexibility with which we can respond on a worldwide basis.

And finally, the actions proposed to provide additional sea and airlift, to bring units deployed in Europe to full strength, to enhance the Navy's anti-submarine capability, to increase the tactical airpower of the Air Force, to initiate procurement of equipment and material which will be needed by all of the services, and to take the action necessary to support further mobilization should that become necessary in the near future, are prudent steps which should, in my opinion, be taken at this time.

Mr. Chairman, the Armed Forces of the United States are the strongest we have ever maintained in a time of nominal peace. Our strategic long-range delivery forces are highly trained, strongly armed, and ready to go. Our fleets, our continental defense forces, and our deployed ground, sea, and air forces must impress those who now seek to test our resolve. In short, I am confident in my knowledge of our own strength. I make this point because it would be wrong if anyone were to regard the program amendments presented to you today as symptomatic of fundamental weakness. Instead, the amendments reflect a hard look that has been taken at possible situations with which we may be confronted, the seriousness with which those possible situations are regarded, and represent precautionary and preparatory measures developed as a result of an analysis of those possible situations. By taking these measures, we will evidence to our potential enemies—and our allies as well—that we intend calmly and confidently to be ready to meet any eventuality.

In short, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that these military preparatory actions will serve two basic and fundamental purposes. First, they will improve the credibility of our national policies—as they were described in the President's address of July 25—and the credibility of our total deterrent posture. And secondly, they will place us in a better position to implement military operations on whatever scale may be required.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to state that I fully support and endorse the program presented to you by Secretary McNamara.

REPORT OF PROCUREMENT AND PRODUCTION MAJOR END ITEMS,  
SYSTEMS, AND PROGRAMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS  
OF SECTION 412(b), PUBLIC LAW 86-149—ADDITIONAL FISCAL YEAR  
1962 NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY REQUIRING AUTHORIZATION

## FUNDING SUMMARY

*Procurement and production, major end items, systems, and programs*

Category and service	Appropriation title	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization
Aircraft:		
Army.....	Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army..	\$36,700,000
Navy and Marine Corps.....	Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy.....	281,400,000
Air Force.....	Aircraft procurement, Air Force.....	211,500,000
	Airlift modernization, Air Force.....	82,600,000
Subtotal.....		294,100,000
Total.....		612,200,000
Missiles:		
Army.....	Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army..	33,770,000
Navy.....	Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy.....	262,200,000
Marine Corps.....	Procurement, Marine Corps.....	
Air Force.....	Missile procurement, Air Force.....	8,800,000
Subtotal.....		304,770,000
Naval vessels: Navy.....	Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy.....	41,600,000
Grand total.....		958,570,000

## AIRCRAFT, ARMY

Appropriation title	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization
Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army.....	\$36,700,000

## ORDERING READY RESERVES TO ACTIVE DUTY

## PROCUREMENT AND PRODUCTION, MAJOR END ITEMS, SYSTEMS AND PROGRAMS

## Department of the Army

## PROCUREMENT BUDGET CATEGORY—AIRCRAFT

[In millions]

Item	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligatory authority requiring author- ization	
	Quantity	Amount
Helicopter, utility, tactical HU-1 (Iroquois).....	} [Deleted]	\$12.8
Airplane, transport AC-1 (Caribou).....		3.7
Airplane, combat, surveillance AO-1 (Mohawk).....		10.3
Airplane, utility, L-23 (Seminole).....		4.2
Helicopter, observation, H-13 (Sioux).....		4.5
1st destination transportation.....		.3
Reimbursement to stock fund.....		.9
Total additional aircraft program.....		36.7

## Funding summary—Aircraft, Navy and Marine Corps

Appropriation title	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligatory authority requiring authorization
Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy.....	\$281,400,000

## Department of the Navy

## PROCUREMENT BUDGET CATEGORY—AIRCRAFT

[In millions]

Item	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligatory authority requiring author- ization	
	Quantity	Amount
A4D-2N light attack.....	} [Deleted]	\$11.5
F8U-2N all-weather jet fighter.....		36.0
F4H-1 all-weather jet fighter.....		91.8
S2F-3 carrier based ASW.....		4.2
P3V long range ASW landplane.....		41.3
H5S-2 all-weather ASW helicopter.....		16.5
HUS-1 utility helicopter.....		11.6
HU2K-1 search and rescue utility helicopter.....		2.1
GV-1 in-flight refueler/transport (assault).....		21.0
Initial support.....		17.2
Replenishment spare parts.....		12.9
Production acceleration.....		15.3
Total additional aircraft program.....		281.4

*Funding summary—Aircraft, Air Force*

Appropriation title	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization
Aircraft procurement, Air Force.....	\$211,500,000
Airlift modernization, Air Force.....	82,600,000
Total aircraft.....	294,100,000

*Department of the Air Force*

PROCUREMENT BUDGET CATEGORY—AIRCRAFT

[In millions]

Item	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization	
	Quantity	Amount
F-105 tactical fighter.....	[Deleted.]	\$82.7
C-130B turboprop transport.....		28.6
C-130E turboprop strategic airlift transport.....		20.4
C-130E advance buy of long leadtime components, and tooling.....		33.6
GAR's guided air-to-air rockets.....		53.2
Replenishment spares.....		75.6
Total additional aircraft program.....		294.1

*Funding summary—Missiles, Army*

Appropriation title	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization
Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army.....	\$33,770,000

## ORDERING READY RESERVES TO ACTIVE DUTY

*Department of the Army*

## PROCUREMENT BUDGET CATEGORY—MISSILES

[In millions]

Item	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization	
	Quantity	Amount
Warhead section, GM, HE, M17 (NIKE-HERCULES).....	[Deleted.]	\$0.6
HAWK missile, with warhead.....		13.3
HONEST JOHN rocket, XM50.....		8.9
HONEST JOHN rocket M31A2.....		8.0
HONEST JOHN warhead M6.....		
HONEST JOHN warhead T2044E1.....		-----
HONEST JOHN heating and tie-down set.....		.7
HONEST JOHN handling unit, trailer mounted, M405A1 set.....		.9
First destination transportation.....		1.0
Reimbursement to stock fund.....		.4
Total additional missiles program.....	-----	33.8

*Funding summary—Missiles, Navy*

Appropriation title	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization
Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy.....	\$262,200,000

*Department of the Navy*

## PROCUREMENT BUDGET CATEGORY—MISSILES

[In millions]

Item	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization	
	Quantity	Amount
SIDEWINDER 1A.....	[Deleted.]	\$3.4
SIDEWINDER 1C.....		13.3
SPARROW III.....		74.5
BULLPUP.....		26.1
TARTAR.....		40.8
TERRIER.....		45.3
TALOS.....		48.3
Training support.....		10.5
Total additional missiles program.....	-----	226.2

*Funding summary—Missiles, Air Force*

Appropriation title	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization	
Missile procurement, Air Force-----		\$8,800,000

*Department of the Air Force*

PROCUREMENT BUDGET CATEGORY—MISSILES

[In millions]

Item	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization	
	Quantity	Amount
GAM-83 BULLPUP air-launched missile-----	[Deleted]	\$8.8

*Funding summary—Naval vessels, Navy*


Appropriation title	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization	
Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy-----		\$41,600,000

*Department of the Navy*

PROCUREMENT BUDGET CATEGORY—NAVAL VESSELS

[In millions]

Item	Additional fiscal year 1962 new obligational authority requiring authorization	
	Quantity	Amount
Constellation (repair fire damage)-----		\$41.6



Chairman RUSSELL. There was one question I wished to ask, Mr. Secretary. You do not make clear what type of missiles you are procuring for the Air Force in this breakdown. Are those SIDEWINDERS or what are they?

Secretary McNAMARA. [Deleted].

Let me refer to the page—I believe it is 16 in the statement—it is page 17 at the bottom, where an additional \$62 million is requested largely for SIDEWINDERS and BULLPUPS and for FALCON air-to-air missiles for the interceptors.

[Deleted.]

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I had one question that I wanted to ask. I understand that in talking with Senator Symington it was gone into yesterday, but that is the manned bomber, if I might, before we conclude here.

I just want to express my concern, Mr. Secretary. No one pushed the missile program harder than I did way back when there was not much interest, both the POLARIS and the whole ICBM program, but I am disturbed that during this period ahead at least the next 2 or 3 years, we are not going to have an adequate supply of reliable and survivable missile systems.

I just hope—as you know, the attitude of the Congress is that they are undoubtedly going to add funds for manned bombers, and I just hope that you and your people will review this matter very carefully, keeping in mind that we are going to have a period in here where I do not think we can place too much reliance, both from the point of view of reliability and survivability until you get the ability to fire in salvo. These are fixed targets, you cannot put your missiles on an airborne alert, even a ground alert, that is worth anything from a salvo point of view until you get the MINUTEMAN.

So I just want to express that thought, the first time I have, and I do hope that we will not take any chances during this time frame ahead.

Secretary McNAMARA. Senator Jackson, we would certainly not propose to take any chances.

It is my personal view, and I believe it is shared by the majority of the military and civilian officials of the Department, that in this time period you are discussing, say 2 to 3 years ahead, our bomber force is at least adequate for our purpose.

Senator JACKSON. Well, we are investing in HOUND DOG, and then what is the other, the SKYBOLT?

Secretary McNAMARA. SKYBOLT.

Senator JACKSON. And we had better make sure we have adequate platforms, mobile ballistic.

Secretary McNAMARA. Surely.

Senator JACKSON. What you have is a mobile ballistic missile, in effect, that we have the adequate platforms to utilize this capability.

I am beginning to have reservations about the reliability of our own ICBM's and, particularly the capability that will exist after they have hit us first.

It disturbs me, and I just hope that we do not take any chances.

Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I agree.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I mention one thing?

Senator JACKSON. I think it is a real risk.

Senator STENNIS. I won't ask you any questions, Mr. Secretary, but I just want to express concern on this point about the civil defense program.

At first I was pleased that it did not go further into construction than it does, and that is this additional duty of being put upon the Army—I mean the military.

I just believe they are called on to do too many extra military duties now, and I hope that you can carry out what you expressed to the Appropriations Committee yesterday in your statement, that you were determined to carry it out without burdening them and lessening their effectiveness as military men.

May I ask you, couldn't you file a statement that is more explicit in a bill of particulars, somewhat, on this \$49 million of foreign construction? I do not mean that you could spell it all out, but you put down huts and other things.

Secretary McNAMARA. Surely.

Senator STENNIS. I think that would be in keeping with legislative practices, and would help us out in the future, too.

Secretary McNAMARA. You are speaking particularly of item (c) which is the \$49 million for preparing troop facilities in Europe?

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary McNAMARA. We will be very happy to do so.

Senator STENNIS. Just particularize that to the extent that you can.

Secretary McNAMARA. We will be very happy to do that.

(The information referred to is of a classified nature and is therefore not included in the printed record.)

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question on civil defense?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, but just one moment. You understand, of course, Mr. Secretary, that your statement in toto has been made a part of the record and will be printed in our deleted record?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir. I understand so.

Chairman RUSSELL. I just want to make that perfectly clear.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir; I do understand that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I endorse Civil Defense going into the Department of Defense. Of the total amount of money that has been spent on Civil Defense in the past years, over \$1 billion, 60 percent, has been in salaries and 40 percent of that was for salaries of \$10,000 or over.

Now I would like to ask six questions for the record.

(The answers to the questions were subsequently furnished, and are inserted following each question.)

Do you think this is a balanced civil defense program?

Answer. Yes. I believe that we are taking the first essential steps to utilize the potential fallout shelter in existing structures. This is the core of our program. We are also planning to start pilot programs in Federal buildings to determine the feasibility of providing additional shelter by modification of existing buildings and in new construction. Further, this will permit us to develop valid cost estimates for any future programs. We plan to stock public shelter for survival as we identify it. We plan to make improvements in warning (including a start on the NEAR system), and in our control and communications structure. We are intensifying our planning and support of

training for postattack emergency operations. Lastly, we will establish a comprehensive research and development program in order to explore methods of getting increased civil defense effectiveness at reduced cost.

Should we proceed at a faster rate in providing for fallout shelter?

Answer. Not in my opinion. Our survey and marking program already has a very tight schedule. We are proceeding with all efficient speed. This takes advantage of the substantial amount of low-cost shelter already in existence. At the same time, our pilot programs for possible shelter increases must be completed and evaluated before we are in a position to make sound estimates of future program extensions.

What is the average cost per space for surveying, marking, and stocking fallout shelters under your proposed program?

Answer. We estimate that the shelter program proposed will identify 50 million shelter spaces. Of these, 30 million are planned to be stocked in fiscal year 1962 at a cost of \$58.8 million. Approximately \$40 million will be required in fiscal year 1963 to complete the stocking of all identified shelters. Thus, the total cost of this shelter program will be \$169.3 million in fiscal year 1962 and \$40 million in fiscal year 1963; a total cost of about \$210 million for an estimated 50 million spaces, or slightly over \$4 per space.

Fourth, does this program have any implied commitments to extensive future programs?

Answer. No. Our proposed shelter program consists of two major elements; first, to identify and make usable the best available shelters in our existing resources; second, to pursue pilot construction programs and extend our research efforts. The first element is completely funded in this request except for \$40 million to stock the additional shelters we expect to identify in fiscal year 1963. The second element, also completely funded, should give us a valid basis for assessing the worth of possible future programs. We are committed to none in this request.

Fifth, you have set yourself a very difficult schedule in the survey and marking program. How soon can you begin work?

Answer. I believe you gentlemen are in the best position to answer part of that question. However, we are making plans to go ahead as soon as the program is approved and funds made available. As you can imagine, there will be a large job in training survey personnel. The Army Corps of Engineers is already planning to start the first training course for engineer district supervisory personnel at Fort Belvoir on August 7. This training will be expanded progressively at the same time as architect-engineer contracts are being let. We hope to have the first shelter spaces surveyed and marked about the 1st of January in 1962.

And sixth, why do you say that civil defense is a vital defense need?

Answer. As the President stated last May, the basic security of the United States depends on an ability to retaliate swiftly and effectively after any act of aggression. To strengthen our position further, we maintain a vast network of continental defenses to guarantee the integrity of our retaliatory forces, should the enemy attempt to disarm us. Nevertheless, if war should come by an irrational act or miscalculation, provision must be made to protect our people and guarantee our survival as a free nation. This objective may be accomplished by maintaining—

- (1) Counterforce offensive systems that can destroy unlaunched enemy weapons;
- (2) Air defense systems that can destroy enemy weapons en route; and
- (3) Civil defense measures that can reduce the effect of any enemy weapons which actually arrive.

To obtain the maximum degree of protection for our people from these three elements, they must be part of a well-integrated overall program. For this reason, certain portions of our national civil defense effort have been transferred to the Department of Defense.

Secretary McNAMARA. I will be very happy to answer them.

There are two, perhaps, on there that deserve answer immediately because of their importance.

One is the cost per space to survey and mark, stock, and that is approximately \$4 per space; and the other, the question relating to the implications, Are we starting on a program which has a long tail to it with commitments in the future that are hidden? The answer is, no, this program can stand by itself.

There are no future expenditures required to complete it beyond approximately \$40 million to be expended the subsequent years for further stocking of shelter spaces beyond this particular point, and I included that in my figure of \$4 per head when I estimated the space cost.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can I ask what that \$4 is again?

Secretary McNAMARA. The \$4 includes locating, inspecting, marking shelters, and stocking those shelters with approximately 7 days' food per space, and 14 days water per space, and a minimum complement of equipment, sanitation supplies, and radiological meters.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Secretary McNAMARA. At a total cost of \$4 approximately per space.

The number of spaces will be between 45 and 50 million, and the cost being exclusive of the \$40 million, not being funded in this program, on the order of \$200 million for these particular shelters.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are not asking for any local contributions for that food and water?

Secretary McNAMARA. In this particular case, no, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Secretary, I was just discussing with Senator Stennis—yesterday I understood from a question to you, and an answer, that the military construction program was not altered in any way by this program.

Now, is your answer to that confined to the domestic military construction, and that there is some addition here in Europe for troop quarters, and so on?

Secretary McNAMARA. The money we have in Europe is \$49 million for operations and maintenance expenditures, not military construction expenditures.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

Senator STENNIS. Pardon me now, Mr. Chairman, there is an item for "Troop facilities construction in Europe," isn't there? That is what I was referring to. You said quonset huts.

Secretary McNAMARA. This is operations-and-maintenance-type expenditures rather than expenditures that are defined as construction under the terms of the military construction authorization.

Senator STENNIS. What do you include then in O. & M. for construction, quonset huts?

Secretary McNAMARA. Erection of tents, for example, and erection of quonset huts and items of that kind.

Senator STENNIS. Well then, you have no domestic military construction program made necessary by this added program?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, sir; we do not.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will this increase in personnel, Mr. Secretary, change any of the plans that were announced with respect to the closing of 73 bases or postpone the time of the closing of those bases?

Secretary McNAMARA. In the great majority of the cases there will be no change. There are certain Air Force installations relating to the B-47 wings, you will recall I mentioned there were [deleted] wings, [deleted] aircraft involved, and there are certain domestic and foreign installations, [deleted] the termination of operations of which may be deferred or postponed because of this action.

Beyond that we anticipate no effect on the plans relating to the 73 bases.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you arrived at any definite figures as to the number of men you were calling in selective service to the Armed Forces for service in the next call?

Secretary McNAMARA. We had initially scheduled a call of 8,000 for the month of August, but we had asked in an anticipation of this program, we had asked the Selective Service personnel to overfill that call to the maximum extent possible; and we believe, therefore, that we are likely to induct on the order of between 11,000 and 13,000 in the month of August and for the month of September we would anticipate the draft call would approximate 20 to 25,000 men.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, the main effect that the Selective Service has served for the last 2 years, at least, and prior to that time, has been indirectly to compel the men to select the branch of service they want to serve in and go into that. It has been more of a stimulant than anything else.

It is deceptive for you to meet the draft with about 8,000 men a month, because the fact that selective service was in operation has brought in thousands more for enlistment.

Secretary McNAMARA. Surely.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for a little additional data than that, which is to be supplied. I note that in the monthly statistical digest for March 1961, Selective Service at that time, out of those registered, 1,521,335 had not been examined.

I would like to have the current figure on the number in the pool that have not been examined.

Secretary McNAMARA. We will be happy to insert that in the record.

Senator CASE. Would you also either state now or supply for the record the draft liability that is currently in effect in England, in France, West Germany, and Canada.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I believe I have that with me, but, perhaps, it would be better to insert it in the record.

(The information previously requested follows:)

(1) The number of registrants in class 1-A, nonfathers, not examined, totaled 1,595,877 on June 30, 1961.

(2) Following is the information on current draft liability by country:

United Kingdom: The National Service Act (conscription) ended in November 1960. There are still approximately 25 percent of the 218,000 troops in the British Army who are conscripts. The last ones will leave the service by the end of 1962, after completion of 24-month tours.

France: Legal minimum age for callup is 18. Actual age is 20. Length of tour is 24 months, but may be extended to 27½ months at convenience of Government.

West Germany: Legal minimum age for callup is 18. Actual age is 20. Tour of duty is 12 months.

Canada: No conscription act in effect.

Senator CASE. Do any of these countries have a 2-year draft liability today?

Secretary McNAMARA. Which countries, Great Britain and Canada?

Senator CASE. France and West Germany.

Secretary McNAMARA. France and West Germany; West Germany's is 12 months, and there is none in England; and Canada and France, I would have to check the record on that.

Chairman RUSSELL. They have no draft.

Senator CASE. They have no draft at all.

And we are proposing to extend the 24 months to 36 by this resolution.

Secretary McNAMARA. We are asking authority to extend on active duty in cases of need, selected individuals to as long as 36 months.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you intend to apply this authority generally across the board?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe that it will only be necessary to apply it on a selective basis, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CASE. Did you give any consideration to offering a reenlistment bonus or a special pay for those who would volunteer in the skills that you desire?

Secretary McNAMARA. We did, and we considered it undesirable and probably impractical.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead. I have two or three questions on the Reserve I would like to get into the record, Mr. McNamara, and I would like to refer to the chairman's observation awhile ago and yesterday about the same people being called time and time again, and some of them who will be called this time it will mean their third term of service.

This may be inevitable to the security of the country, but I would like to ask you if it would not be both fair and realistic to offer to those who desire it, the three-time-called reservist, the opportunity to be integrated into the regular service.

Secretary McNAMARA. First, let me speak to the question of inequity. The reservists who would be called would fall into the two categories, those who were compelled to remain in the Ready Reserve because of the Reserve training associated with their draft status, they would simply be fulfilling an obligation that others have had and others will have in the future.

Second, the category of men who have volunteered to stay in the Regular Reserve and who have been paid in most cases for their participation in that Reserve.

In that particular instance, they accepted the obligation, accepted the pay, recognizing the responsibility they would have to accept a call to active service in the event of need.

Now with specific reference to your question as to whether it would be wise to offer men, perhaps, three-times-service men, a right to transfer to the active service after they were called, I should not give you an answer to that. I would like to discuss this with those who are better prepared than I to render a judgment on it, and I will be very happy to supply you an answer both individually and for the record.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, if you will do that.

(The information referred to follows:)

Our long-term needs in terms of numbers and qualifications of personnel ultimately must determine the selection of persons for career status. On an individual basis, we can expect cases in which both equity and foreseeable needs will justify tendering regular career status, and we will endeavor to do this whenever possible and practicable. Several considerations would make the establishment of a blanket entitlement undesirable. The individual's deficiencies in active duty experience and training could place him at a disadvantage in a long-term career, even though he is well fitted for current duties. In other cases, some individuals would be in such a position that they clearly would not be able to accumulate sufficient active duty to qualify for eventual retirement.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, under our system or your system of rotation, those on first call for overseas duty are those who have not had overseas duty for some time.

This would mean that practically every reservist called up in this crisis would be ticketed for overseas duty simply because they had not been on extended active duty for several years.

I ask you, is it fair to place these people on the same basis with the Regulars and the reservists who have been on extended active duty for several years on assignment for overseas duty?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think in this situation, first, as I have suggested, we do not propose to call anyone except a person we find it essential to call from the Reserve, and that would essentially be a special list, and having called on that basis, I think we must be free to put him where the need is greatest.

Senator SMITH. But would your rotation system mean that those people would be the first to go overseas rather than those who were already on extended active duty?

Secretary McNAMARA. Not necessarily.

Senator SMITH. But it would be likely so, would it not?

Secretary McNAMARA. I cannot answer the question. I am not evading it because I would say this: We wish to fill up these three STRAF divisions. I think we can do that without any substantial call on the Reserves.

There are some specialty units, however, that must be associated with those Straf divisions. We may have to call certain of those specialist units, from the Reserve, and if we do we will associate them with the Straf division, and they won't move until that division moves.

In order to avoid a complete reshuffling of the personnel within the armed structure, we would have to do that.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, when we are calling up reservists and expanding the size of our armed services, does it make sense to be retiring Regulars and Reserves in their forties and early fifties, just because Reserves have earned 20 years of service, or in the case of Regulars, to force them out under the "White Charger" provisions? Is this not a waste of trained manpower, and is it not contradictory and against our best interests?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, I would certainly think so.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any plans—

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, we have plans which provide to the maximum degree possible for obtaining voluntary reenlistments or voluntary retention of those individuals and (b) in cases where such is not possible and where the need is great, to exercise the authority we have to extend periods of service.

Senator SMITH. Did I understand that you are calling Reserve airlift units into extended active duty?

Secretary McNAMARA. We may. Those were the units I referred to under the sealift and airlift provisions which, I believe, were 5 (d), (e), and (f), and those units are part of our contingency plan.

They are scheduled—we do not need a decision to call them up until [deleted] and the exact decision to be made on the date required will be made depending on the circumstances we can foresee at that time.

Senator SMITH. Are you ordering or asking for enough of the larger transports, the C-130's, so that these people will have them to fly rather than the small ones?

Secretary McNAMARA. It will, of course, be impossible really to call these units to service and obtain enough additional production of C-130's in the interim. To actually provide C-130's to these squadrons called in (d), (e), and (f), but we are making provision, as you may have noticed, to [deleted] increase capability of C-130 production.

At the present time it is limited to eight aircraft per month. We are proposing to buy additional long-lead components and tooling to permit [deleted] per month.

We increased the C-130 procurement rather substantially, I believe, by 30 aircraft in the March supplement to the defense budget.

We are proposing additional C-130 procurement in the supplement. There are C-130's provided for as the chairman remarked, both on 130-D's and E's in the aircraft total, and we believe we are buying all the equipment we can obtain delivery for in this period of time.

Senator SMITH. When would you start getting delivery of those?

Secretary McNAMARA. The additional aircraft procured here, I think, can be available for delivery in the latter part of the fiscal year; it will be April, May, and June, I suspect, before we get any increase, because we had planned an increase and utilized the additional production capacity when we submitted the March budget supplement.

Senator SMITH. Then until then it will be necessary to use the C-119's and the C-124's, and the C-97's, which are hardly ocean—

Secretary McNAMARA. Which are far from satisfactory aircraft. They are useful, but not nearly as satisfactory as the C-130's.

Senator SMITH. They are really not adequate for transocean flying.

Secretary McNAMARA. For certain paratrooper operations they are not adequate at all. For cargo aircraft purposes they are adequate, barely adequate, I would say, but better than nothing.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, I was interested in your statement about the two new types of fighters that were ready to go.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Somewhere within the last 2 or 3 weeks it was stated that the Air Force and the Navy had not come to agreement on that matter. Are they in complete agreement now?

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, when you say complete agreement, let me say this, that some weeks ago, I have forgotten the exact date, but it was probably mid-June, I issued an instruction to the Air Force and the Navy stating that we were to proceed with the development of the TFX, which is the air superiority fighter, and we would proceed according to the major specifications, and the Air Force and the Navy and my office had agreed upon.

Further, that the TFX development project was to be assigned to the Air Force, which would develop the aircraft for the account of both the Navy and the Air Force, and that the Secretaries of the Chiefs of Staff of the two services were to come to agreement on any further specifications required for the development beyond the general specifications we had already agreed on, and that in the event of dispute they were to bring the issue immediately to the attention of either Mr. Gilpatric or myself.

To date there has been no dispute brought to my attention and, therefore, I think it is fair to assume that they are proceeding on an accelerated basis to the development of the aircraft. But to answer your specific point, there is underneath the surface some disagreement on what I would call minor specifications of the aircraft.

Senator SMITH. But that won't delay production?

Secretary McNAMARA. It will not delay the aircraft, and this approach will save between \$1 and \$1.5 billion because the alternative was for each service to develop its own unique air superiority aircraft.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I want to recur for 1 or 2 minutes to making the greatest possible efforts to equalize the service of individuals as much as we can without impairing the efficiency of the forces.

My own feeling is that for ordinary service requiring high skills or long experience, a man who has taken 6 months' training and is in the Ready Reserve should be called ahead of the man who has spent 2 years in the Army, and I also feel that those reservists on a pay status should have priority and call over those who are on a nonpay status.

They have been getting some compensation, and I would like to ask you your view of inserting some such language as this in the committee report:

To the extent practicable, priority and recall of reservists should be applied to those in a drill pay status, and to 6-month trainees rather than former enlistees and inductees.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think that is entirely satisfactory so long as "to the extent practicable" remains, and I say that not with an intent to evade, but rather to emphasize that we are being hemmed in by so many restrictions here.

For example, we have a travel restriction which almost forces us to retain people rather than to induct people.

This is one of the peculiar results of some of these restrictions, but with that exception, I am heartily endorsing the statement that you have suggested.

Chairman RUSSELL. I well realize that the main purpose of the call is to get people who have selected training and selected skills, and whose MOS is essential to fill out some particular unit or to do some job.

But when you get down to drawing the men, the average soldiers, it does seem to me that the man who has only had 6 months in the

service ought to be called ahead of the man who has done 2 or 3 or 4 years, and that the man who has been the recipient of pay, on drill pay status, ought to be called ahead of the man who has not been getting any.

Secretary McNAMARA. I fully agree with you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well, sir.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think when we start calling up units, when we do, for example, Air National Guard or something of that kind, it is going to be very difficult, if not impossible.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you call up a unit as such and intend to keep it as a unit, I do not look with any favor on breaking it up; breaking up a unit and dispersing it, as I said before.

But if you call up a unit, you cannot ask any questions, but if you have to call up a unit you have to call them up in order to use them.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one or two questions?

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, Senator.

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary, if a man is now in the service for a Regular enlistment period, do you have any incentive pay to offer him if he enlists for an additional year?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. Well, I cannot say for an additional year, but for an additional term, there are reenlistment bonuses.

Senator CASE. Would you put in the record a schedule of what those reenlistment bonuses are?

Secretary McNAMARA. Surely.

(The information referred to follows:)

*Reenlistment bonus formula*<sup>1</sup>

[Maximum cumulative amount for all enlistments, \$2,000]

Reenlistment involved <sup>2</sup>	(1) Take—	(2) Multiply by—
1st.....	Monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge. <sup>3</sup>	Number of years specified in reenlistment contract, or 6, if none specified. <sup>4</sup>
2d.....	$\frac{2}{3}$ of the monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge. <sup>5</sup>	Do. <sup>4</sup>
3d.....	$\frac{1}{2}$ of the monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge. <sup>6</sup>	Do. <sup>4</sup>
4th (and subsequent).....	$\frac{1}{6}$ of the monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge. <sup>6</sup>	Do. <sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The minimum reenlistment or extension for which this bonus is authorized is a period of 2 years.

<sup>2</sup> Any reenlistment when a bonus was not authorized is not counted.

<sup>3</sup> Two-thirds of the monthly basic pay in the case of a member in pay grade E-1 at the time of discharge.

<sup>4</sup> On the 6th anniversary of an indefinite reenlistment, and on each anniversary thereafter, the member is entitled to a bonus equal to  $\frac{1}{6}$  of the monthly basic pay to which he is entitled on that anniversary date.

<sup>5</sup> No bonus may be paid to a member in pay grade E-1 or E-2 at the time of discharge.

<sup>6</sup> No bonus may be paid to a member in pay grade E-1, E-2, or E-3 at the time of discharge.

Senator CASE. If the resolution that is introduced were to become law, would the reenlistment bonus be available to the reservists or the inductee or the enlistee whose term is extended by reason of this act?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think not.

Senator CASE. There is in the act relating to the Career Compensation Act a provision that a commissioned officer would get a higher or a special pay for various extensions or various periods of extended service.

It would seem to me that any comprehensive approach to this problem should offer the enlistee or the inductee or the reservist the opportunity to receive the same benefit of special pay for extension of service that he would get if he enlisted or voluntarily sought that extra period of service.

Secretary McNAMARA. He would, of course, have the option of accepting a voluntary reenlistment and obtaining the reenlistment pay, as opposed to accepting a forced or involuntary extension of duty for 12 months.

Senator SALTONSTALL. There is no bonus today, or reenlistment bonus for a man who reenlists for less than 3 years.

Secretary McNAMARA. There is no reenlistment bonus that I am aware of for an extension of 12 months' service.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is no reenlistment pay as such. But if a man before or on the date his enlistment expired were to reenlist under the existing law he would be entitled to any emoluments that would accompany that reenlistment without regard to this law.

Secretary McNAMARA. Exactly, Senator.

Senator CASE. You are going to put in the record a schedule of what incentive or special rates of pay may be in the law?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir. There are a large number of special bonuses inserted.

Reenlistment bonus schedule

(The bonus payable amount is in dollars, \$2,000)

Number of years specified in reenlistment contract or in time specified by law	Rate	Reenlistment period
12 months	Identify both pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge and the monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge.	12 months
18 months	Identify both pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge and the monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge.	18 months
24 months	Identify both pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge and the monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge.	24 months
30 months	Identify both pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge and the monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled at the time of discharge.	30 months

1. The minimum reenlistment extension for which this bonus is authorized is a period of 12 months.

2. Any reenlistment which extends for a longer period than that specified in the contract is authorized.

3. Two-thirds of the monthly basic pay in the case of a member reenlisting under E-1 at the time of discharge.

4. On the first anniversary of the date of discharge, and on each anniversary thereafter, the member is entitled to a bonus equal to 1/3 of the monthly basic pay to which he is entitled on that anniversary date.

5. No bonus may be held to a member in any case E-1 or E-2 at the time of discharge.

6. No bonus may be held to a member in any case E-1, E-2, or E-3 at the time of discharge.

Senator CASE. If the resolution that is introduced were to become law, would the reenlistment bonus be available to the reservists or the inductees or the enlistees whose term is extended by reason of this act?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think not.



In addition to the above crewmember incentive pays, other types of hazardous duty are compensated at flat rates of \$110 per month for officers and \$55 per month for enlisted personnel. The following types of duties are those for which these flat rates are payable.

1. Frequent and regular aerial flights not as a crewmember.
2. Parachute jumping as a part of military duty.
3. Duty involving exposure to lepers.
4. Duty involving demolition of explosives.
5. Submarine escape training tank duty.
6. Deep sea diving duty (including helium-oxygen diving).
7. Human acceleration or deceleration duty.
8. Low pressure chamber duty.
9. Thermal stress duty.

Additionally there are rates of special incentive pay for medical and dental officers. The pay is not based upon hazardous duty, but was established to attract more doctors and dentists into career military service. The monthly rates are based on cumulative years of service as follows: 0 to 2 years, \$100; 2 to 6 years, \$150; 6 to 10 years, \$200; over 10 years, \$250. These rates of special pay are in addition to basic pay and allowances. Veterinary officers are authorized \$100 a month without regard to length of service.

#### PROFICIENCY PAY

Enlisted personnel who are proficient in critical military skills or who perform their duties in an outstanding manner qualify for this special pay. The objective is twofold:

to provide a special incentive for trained enlisted personnel in occupations of critical importance to remain in the services;

to provide a stimulus for high-quality work through the award of additional pay to those who perform in an outstanding manner.

Within the legal maximum rates of \$50 for P-1, \$100 for P-2, and \$150 for P-3, the Secretary of Defense has authorized \$30 for P-1 and \$60 for P-2.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I be recorded in favor of this bill and be excused?

Chairman RUSSELL. And on the resolution?

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Senator ERVIN. I would like to ask this one short question.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Senator ERVIN. Your request in March was, I believe, for authorization to increase the Marine Corps from 175,000 to 190,000. Where is it contemplated that the additional 15,000 men would come from?

Secretary McNAMARA. Come from?

Senator ERVIN. Yes.

Secretary McNAMARA. From volunteer recruitment.

Senator ERVIN. Does it contemplate at the present time calling reservists?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, it does not.

Senator ERVIN. Thank you.

Secretary McNAMARA. You are welcome.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I would like to request that you have your staff expedite the security deletions from these hearings as much as possible after you get them so that we may have them published with the classified material out.

Secretary McNAMARA. We will do so, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there is nothing further, we thank you for your appearance here this morning.

Secretary McNAMARA. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will go into executive session. (Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee proceeded into executive session.)

(A letter dated Aug. 4, 1961, subsequently received from Senator Symington, is included in the record at this point, in accordance with Senator Symington's request:)

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
August 4, 1961.

HON. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,  
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Because of the deletions made for security reasons in my questioning of Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Lemnitzer, at a meeting of the Armed Services Committee on Thursday, July 27, and their answers, the import of many of my questions, as reflected in the deletions of both questions and answers, was not clear.

I respectfully request, therefore, that, with one exception, none of the testimony in which I participated be included in the printed record. The exception has to do with testimony on civil defense, starting on page 45 of the galley proof, as corrected, and running through to the top of page 47.

May I also request that this letter be made a part of the printed record.

Sincerely,

STUART SYMINGTON.

○



Chairman Recess. The committee will go into executive session. (Whereupon, at 1 p.m. the committee proceeded into executive session.)

(A letter dated Aug. 4, 1957, subsequently received from Senator Symington is attached in the record at this point, in accordance with Senator Symington's request.)

U.S. SENATE  
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
 August 4, 1957

Hon. William B. Harrison,  
 Chairman, Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Because of the detentions made for security reasons in the past, the Committee on Defense, Mr. McNamara and General LeMay, at the meeting of the Armed Services Committee on Thursday, July 25, and their reports, the number of my questions, as referred in the detentions of both questions and answers was not clear.

I am truly pleased therefore, that with the exception, none of the last-mentioned, which are included in the printed record. The exception has to do with testimony on July 25, 1957, starting on page 45 of the July 25, 1957, report, and continuing through to the top of page 47.

I am pleased that the last page is a part of the printed record.

Edward Symington

