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PROPOSED NOMINATION OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON AS UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON THE
PROPOSED NOMINATION OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON AS UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

JANUARY 18, 1961

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NATIONS

HEARING

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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II



**PROPOSED NOMINATION OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON AS
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS**

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1961

United States SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (chairman), Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Church, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee is meeting this morning to hear the Honorable Adlai E. Stevenson, who has been designated by President-elect Kennedy as the nominee to serve as the United States Representative to the United Nations.

This is one of the most important positions in the world today. The United Nations can be the means either for the salvation of the free world or for its destruction.

I know that this witness needs no introduction to the members of this committee. Governor, it is very good to see you again and we are very happy to have you.

I think you have done so much during these last several years to elevate the tone and style of American politics, and I feel that all of us are indebted to you for this great service to the cause of democratic government.

Governor, do you wish to make a statement in the beginning before we address questions to you?

**STATEMENT OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON, UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS-DESIGNATE**

Mr. STEVENSON. I have a brief statement, Senator, which I should be happy to read, if that is your pleasure.

The CHAIRMAN. It is customary for the nominees to give us some idea of their qualifications.

Mr. STEVENSON. That is going to be harder.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Governor.

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

APPOINTMENT AS UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE

As you may recall, I ran twice for President. Many people showed considerable enthusiasm for this effort, but history records that still more did not. This time I have made myself available for whatever service would, in Senator Kennedy's judgment, best serve the national interest. He has asked me to represent the United States at the United Nations.

I look forward to working with such a vigorous and enlightened President, whose intelligence and rationality can help lead the world toward law and sanity and away from the risk of senseless war.

I am delighted, too, to be working with trusted friends, Dean Rusk and Chester Bowles, in Washington. I will, as Senator Kennedy has suggested, hope to contribute, where I can, across the whole range of American foreign policy.

PRIOR UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE

I am not entirely, gentlemen, a stranger to the United Nations. I participated in the San Francisco Conference in 1945, when the charter was drafted. I helped to prepare the presentation of the charter to the United States Senate that summer. I was chairman of the executive committee created in San Francisco to implement the charter; and later, chairman of the United States delegation to the Preparatory Commission in London, which created the machinery of the United Nations, which put the flesh on the bare bones of the charter. And I was a member of the United States delegations to the General Assembly in 1946 and again in 1947.

So the assignment which President-elect Kennedy has given me, with—I hope—your advice and consent, represents something of a homecoming for me.

I welcome this opportunity to serve the United States in the United Nations. I do not minimize its difficulties, but I also regard it as a great opportunity.

WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTS

The American people overwhelmingly agree that the United Nations is man's best hope for peace. But it is something more than that. It is our best hope for fashioning a peace marked with freedom and justice—a peace which accords with the aspirations of free men everywhere.

The United Nations—as an idea and as an institution—is an extension of Western ideas; of Western belief in the worth and dignity of the individual; of Western ideology. It is based on a Western parliamentary tradition. Its roots are in the Western ideal of representative government. When one stops to consider the philosophical foundation of the United Nations, it is easier to understand why Premier Khrushchev pounds the desk in frustration.

POSSIBLE REBUFFS AND DISAPPOINTMENTS IN UNITED NATIONS
ARENA

The identity of the United Nations with our deepest convictions about the nature and destiny of man is a central fact we need to keep in mind as we move through a period of relentless turmoil and travail. The membership has almost doubled since my time, and we are likely to encounter some unaccustomed rebuffs and disappointments in that political arena in the months ahead.

As something of an expert in rebuffs and disappointments, I may be permitted to emphasize that our judgments about political institutions and processes must not be based upon passing gains or setbacks, but, rather, upon the basic concepts and the long-range goals they are designed to serve.

This faith, which is at the heart of our own adherence to democratic government, may receive an early and extended test. This is because the United Nations is a sharp reflector of the turbulence which confronts us wherever we look in this world of ours.

The efforts of the Secretary General to fill the vacuum of law and order in the Congo have brought him and his office under unremitting attack from those who see opportunity in chaos.

The demands of the nations upon the United Nations for service have moved far ahead of their willingness to pay for it.

The entry of so many new nations into the United Nations has created stresses and strains.

OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE U.S. IDEAS AND INTERESTS

The members of this committee certainly do not need to be provided with a list of areas of difficulty. But there are trends that make our representation in the United Nations a sobering as well as a hopeful responsibility. You have all witnessed in the recent General Assembly the increasing difficulty of marshaling support for our positions. The fact that the membership has increased by more than one-third in the past 8 years, during this administration, from 60 to 99 members, has made the task of the United States Representative much more formidable. But it has also greatly increased the opportunity to advance the ideas and the interests of the United States.

The last session of the United Nations General Assembly was perhaps the largest gathering of Chiefs of State and of Foreign Ministers in history. To have on our shores, within the framework of free political institutions, in the atmosphere of freedom, such an aggregation of political leadership provides an unparalleled opportunity to communicate the policies, the goals, and aspirations of the American people. There is every reason to believe this opportunity will recur, and we must constantly improve our capacity to take the fullest advantage of it.

IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

And I have found in traveling around the world that many of the new and less developed countries attach even greater importance to the United Nations than we do. They see in it, first, the best hope

for the peaceful settlement of disputes; second, the best hope for the enforcement of peace; and, third, a source of help in their economic development which will not subject them to subversion, foreign control or involvement in the cold war.

Anyone who doubts the potent, if intangible, force of the United Nations should consider the eagerness even of Communist regimes to join a club which is, and will continue to be, managed predominantly by its non-Communist members.

When a new African state wants to symbolize its nationhood, its leaders come to the United Nations.

When an Eastern nation wants to complain of discrimination by its neighbors, of border raid or outright invasion, its leaders dramatize the issue before the United Nations.

When a Latin American state seeks preinvestment capital—or even when one of its leaders is suffering from self-induced invasion jitters—its leaders ask for attention from the United Nations.

When Western Europeans want to protect exposed Berlin, their leaders remind the Communist powers of their obligations in the United Nations.

When a Communist leader wants to bang his shoe on the table—and be heard—he, too, must come to the United Nations.

OPERATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

And when we want to lead in the effort to make peace operational, we, too, find in the United Nations an immensely useful instrument of American foreign policy. Yes; it is an instrument of American foreign policy—and of the foreign policy of every other people represented at the United Nations in New York.

The United Nations is like a spade; it is not self-operating. It is what we make of it, for purposes that we can find in common with our neighbors in the world. To adapt a wise remark by a wise Frenchman, the making of peace is not a matter of the nations looking at each other, but of their looking together in the same direction.

The United Nations is partly a debating society—but let us not denigrate the importance of debating, on the world's platform, about men's freedom to seek welfare, justice, a sense of achievement, and an opportunity to participate in the big decisions that affect their own destiny.

In Congress, too, there are sometimes long and tiring debates; the first principle of a free society is an untrammelled flow of words in an open forum.

But the United Nations is also an operation—a limited operation, but a crucial one. It operates, first, in those no man's lands of international security, like the Gaza strip or the Congo, where a limited amount of power and a great deal of negotiating skill can be usefully applied by international agents who are not above but are outside the clogged channels of communication between the world's great chancelleries.

It operates, second, as a facility for sorting out issues so complex that they involve many different peoples. Multilateral diplomacy is not an alternative to bilateral diplomacy; each is appropriate in differing circumstances. If the United Nations did not already exist, we would have to invent it.

The United Nations operates not only in the no man's land of international security, but also in everyman's struggle against "poverty, hunger, desperation, and chaos." (No one has yet improved on those eloquent words of General Marshall.)

ADVANCING OF UNITED NATIONS OBJECTIVES

So we must, I believe, cherish, preserve, strengthen, this great experiment in international collaboration in these days of savage attack and severe testing.

We should use it not as a device in this cold war, not just in defensive reaction to Soviet initiatives, but affirmatively to advance its great purposes—to liberate man from the scourges of war, poverty, disease, ignorance, and oppression.

In this role, as in its others, the United Nations at its best is not a formula for "stability," but a framework for change. All the world's tensions are not bad; some of the incentives of hope and the drives for self-expression and self-government are what make the free world hum. It is a mistake, in my judgment, for us to see in the United Nations merely a desperate survival operation, without also exploiting its potential as a cooperative search for better answers to the overhanging question: "After survival, what then?"

Peoples are best cemented together, after all, not by mutual fear but by mutual hope.

HARMONIZING THE ACTIONS OF NATIONS

I also see in the political field the possibility of a growing "quiet diplomacy" within the United Nations whereby we may use more of the opportunities it presents to "harmonize the actions of nations," as the charter says, away from the glare of publicity that surrounds the more familiar United Nations meetings.

And we should be ever alert to the possibility of employing its machinery not only to bring conflicts to an end, but also to seek solutions before this stage is reached. It may take great statesmanship to solve a world crisis, but it is a sign of greater, if sometimes less well-known, statesmanship to prevent the crisis from developing.

STAFFING U.S. MISSION TO U.N.

Dean Rusk said here the other day that he did not think we should regard the rapid expansion of the United Nations as a burden, but, rather, as an opportunity. I very strongly agree with that sentiment. But it is an opportunity only if we grasp it.

And, judging from my preliminary look at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York, we are by no means staffed to keep in effective touch with the thinking of the 98 nations that are our colleagues in the U.N., and to keep them effectively in touch with our thinking.

There is no doubt that we have a large and growing job of representing the United States in this, the most complex embassy in the history of our diplomacy. We will doubtless be back here later to tell you in more specific terms what we think it takes to do this unprecedented job properly.

TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY TO NEW ADMINISTRATION

In conclusion, I should report to you that in thinking about and preparing for this task I have consulted with and had the most helpful cooperation of your former colleague, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and also Ambassador James Wadsworth, Ambassador James Barco, and their associates at the U.S. mission in New York. I deeply appreciate their help, and also the help of Mr. Francis Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, who is presently leaving the Government after many years of most fruitful service. They have made possible the transfer of responsibility without interruption in the continuity of our representation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, I think that is a very fine statement.

I particularly like your thought about it being an opportunity for affirmative action, rather than merely a device for defensive maneuvers against the manipulation policies of the Communists.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST QUESTION

Governor, there are a few rather stock questions that we usually ask. I wonder if you could inform the committee if you have any interests which you believe would constitute a conflict with the interests of the Government of the United States—private investments, or things of that sort?

Mr. STEVENSON. I have resigned from my law firm, and my property in no respect, so far as I have been able to ascertain, would constitute a conflict with my responsibilities in this assignment.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, from what I read in the press, your law firm has been so decimated that there is no law firm left.

Mr. STEVENSON. I regret, Senator, that I have but one law firm to give to my country. [Laughter.]

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S LATEST OUTBURST

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, have you had an opportunity to read the report in the morning paper of the most recent outburst of Mr. Khrushchev?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, I have not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered if you had. It is an extremely interesting one, but I can understand why you did not have time to read it this morning.

Mr. STEVENSON. I have been anticipating certain other outbursts this morning.

IMPORTANCE OF AN OPEN FORUM

The CHAIRMAN. As I said, I like your statement very much. I particularly like your comment that in Congress there are sometimes long and tiring debates, and that the first principle of a free society is an untrammelled flow of words in an open forum.

I am very glad to have this statement from you, and I hope my colleagues will understand the full significance of that statement and what prompted it.

Mr. STEVENSON. Any connection with parliamentary rules changes is purely coincidental.

The CHAIRMAN. Nevertheless, it is very appropriate and significant. I will defer my questions and call upon my colleagues at the moment. The Senator from Minnesota. Do you have any questions?

Senator HUMPHREY. First, Governor Stevenson, I wish to join with the chairman in commending you on this splendid statement, and on the emphasis that you have placed upon the positive aspects of the work of the United Nations and the fact that we ought not to expect miracles, but ought to expect the chance of some opportunities.

STAFFING OF U.S. MISSION TO U.N.

I was interested in your comments on the staffing of the U.S. mission to the United Nations, Governor.

I know that you have given some serious thought to this, because of your concern with the operation of the U.S. mission.

In your consultation with Ambassadors Lodge, Wadsworth, or Barco, did you get any information, advice, or counsel that would indicate to you a need for changes in staff or changes in the required numbers, quality, or training of personnel for the U.S. mission?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, Senator.

I have reviewed the staff personnel in New York with Ambassador Wadsworth and Ambassador Lodge at some length. I think that some changes may be desirable, both in the interests of the Mission and also in the interests of certain individuals themselves.

I think that the most important concern, however, is some increase in the top representation in New York. After all, this is no common embassy to an individual country, where you maintain contact with an individual foreign office. Here we have to maintain contact with 98 delegations in New York. To do that with 1½ or 2 Ambassadors is difficult in the extreme; indeed, it is impossible.

Actually, as you know, especially the newer, more inexperienced countries want generally to see the chief U.S. representative, and they should. It is impossible for one man to do all of the top representation on the U.S. side.

I think, therefore, that the staffing at the higher level must be improved and increased. I am not prepared to specify precisely how. I have indicated in this statement, Senator Humphrey, that I may want to come back later on to make some suggestions about amendments to the Participation Act.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, may I defer to Senator Sparkman, or should I continue?

The CHAIRMAN. You go right ahead.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would rather you continue. I am reading the statement.

LATIN AMERICAN PROBLEMS

Senator HUMPHREY. Governor Stevenson, your reference to Latin America, of course, interests all of us. It is a focal point of interest today in American policy. At least, American concern is with Latin America and Africa.

Have you given thought to how our activities in the Organization of American States might better be coordinated with our activities at the United Nations?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, Senator, I have not reflected on that at any length.

I have felt during my own travels in Latin America, and in talking with the leaders of most of the countries of Latin America, that there is something wanting here. We talk at two levels with them.

We talk with them in the OAS about what we do in this hemisphere, and we talk with them in the United Nations about what we do in the world. I do not believe that these are, by any means, identical instruments. One is concerned with the hemisphere; the other is concerned with the world.

There are, however, OAS problems where I am quite sure, especially in economic matters, wherein we could profitably take some leads from the U.N. experience.

MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Senator HUMPHREY. Your reference, Governor Stevenson, to bilateral diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy was interesting to me.

There are some countries that believe wholeheartedly in the bilateral arrangements and others that have, in a sense, possibly gone overboard on the multilateral.

Just to explore your thoughts on this for a moment—and in very general terms—do you think that there is a possibility within the structure of the United Nations, or one of its agencies, or through a newly constituted instrument, of establishing a multilateral program of economic aid under United Nations auspices?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

I think not only is it possible, but that the means exist for it; that the ground has been plowed in a preliminary way; and that, as we go on, we will find that more and more of the new countries would prefer to be aided from the West through the multilateral means of the United Nations.

This makes it easier for them to reject or decline overtures from the East of economic assistance, and it also relieves them of any self-consciousness, any feeling of being the beneficiaries of charity, philanthropy, or becoming economically dependent on any single country.

I think there are many reasons to suggest that the trend is going to be more and more in the direction of multilateral economic assistance.

Senator HUMPHREY. I have been concerned about this matter. I believe that in the recent budget message there was some emphasis upon a larger U.S. effort in Africa of an economic nature. It seems to me that through the United Nations we could possibly enlist the cooperation of some of our more affluent allies in a central economic program for Africa, and for Latin America, and the entire financial burden not be placed upon this country, nor us find ourselves in economic competition with some of our friends, as well as with the Soviet bloc.

I have been concerned that a real economic rivalry could develop in the days ahead between the United States, let us say, and Great Britain, or, even more so, between the United States and Germany, in the Middle East and the Africa areas, unless we are able to multilateralize the aid programs, so to speak, in a common effort.

Mr. STEVENSON. I think there are two problems: The first is to make the most of the resources that we in the West have, the capital-rich or exporting or more favored countries.

I have been both interested and involved in the evolution of what is now called the OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

It seems to me it is imperative, first of all, that we marshal our resources in the West for this purpose; that we expand our own economies; that we improve the health and the well-being of the Atlantic community and of the other capital-exporting countries.

Then we have the second problem of determining how best to make this aid effective and useful.

I think that here is where the multilateral means become more apparent.

In other words, in saying that the emphasis on multilateral help will increase, I do not mean in any way to depreciate the importance of the OECD, or organizing multilaterally what we have to offer in the West.

COORDINATION BETWEEN STATE DEPARTMENT AND U.S. MISSION

Senator HUMPHREY. My final question is this: Do you foresee in the structural makeup of the State Department, from whatever information you might have as to structural adjustments or changes, some coordination through the office that will be occupied by Mr. George W. Ball on the policy statements on economic matters that you would present at the United Nations?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, I would assume so. I am not quite clear just how the channels of authority are going to be established in the State Department, so far as my mission is concerned.

I am clear that I am expected, and intend, to the limit of my ability, to spend more time myself on these matters in Washington than has been the practice in the past.

Senator HUMPHREY. I primarily ventured this broad general question as a step preliminary to discussing this matter in some detail with the economic officers of the State Department, because it has been my observation that there has been little, or very little, coordination between some of the pronouncements of economic policy before an international forum and the bilateral economic policies that are actually carried into practice.

It seems to me that if we are going to move on a multilateral front, it is essential that there be the intimate type of cooperation and coordination among both the bilateral and multilateral activities.

I have no more questions now. I know we do not want to discuss policies or programs here and I shall refrain from that until a later date.

FUTURE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Wisconsin?

Senator WILEY. Governor, I think you should at least be congratulated on having a very optimistic attitude. Is that description right?

Mr. STEVENSON. About the United Nations, sir?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, I have tried to be realistic about it in this statement, and indicate that I think we have some rebuffs and disappointments ahead of us, and that it is going to be more difficult.

But, likewise, I think it is a great opportunity.

EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

Senator WILEY. In your statement you spoke about strengthening this great experiment in international collaboration.

Would you amplify on that a little bit—tell us what you mean?

Mr. STEVENSON. I used the word "experiment" because I do not think that this institution which has now endured for 15 years has by any means become immortal.

We had the experience of the League of Nations, and we now witness the attack on the heart of the United Nations as an operating agency—that is, the Office of the Secretary General—by the Soviet Union, so that its future is not without danger.

I think, therefore, that we, the United States, and other countries that believe in the concept of collective security, must do all we can to preserve the institution, to make it increasingly effective, to strengthen it.

How to strengthen it step by step is a much more elaborate matter. I think that the ideas are evolving about reconstitution of certain of the organs of the United Nations, including the use of the United Nations in the manner that Senator Humphrey just discussed for multilateral aid in the economic field.

These activities, and political activities such as the Congo and the Gaza Strip, contribute, I think, to strengthening the respect for the United Nations around the world.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENTS AND ATTITUDE

Senator WILEY. You also used the expression that "it is a sign of greater, if sometimes less well-known, statesmanship to prevent the crisis from developing."

I would like to have an example as to just what you mean by that.

The chairman has called to your attention the attitude of Khrushchev as expressed in this morning's paper. And I think also that over television he did not mince any words; that, in substance, if he could not get his way, war would come.

That is the sum and substance of the statement, as it appears.

Now, how is statesmanship going to prevent that crisis?

Mr. STEVENSON. I wish I could answer that question, because it may be a question of mortal importance to all of us.

I don't know, aside from the use of reason, from the balancing of strength, from the marshalling of the sentiment of the world in the best parliament that we have, which is the United Nations.

No state is impervious, in my judgment, Senator, to world opinion, the Soviet Union included.

If, as you say, Prime Minister Khrushchev has indicated that he shall have his way by peaceful means or resort to war, I should think it was a very sad and solemn day for mankind. I do not exclude this possibility. At the same time, we have witnessed extravagant statements by him before on many occasions, to be followed by other waves of reconciliation and of reduced tension.

I think this is part of the technique, and it may involve problems that are domestic—there are extremists in the Presidium, extremists in Peiping.

These are all considerations about which I must say I cannot enlighten you, sir, for I am sure you are aware of them.

Senator WILEY. Do you agree that the big issue before the world today is war or peace?

Mr. STEVENSON. I do, sir.

Senator WILEY. And how do you analyze that mind that is known as Khrushchev? How do you estimate his attitude toward the world as it exists? Is he insistent that communism dominate?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes; I am quite sure that, as a Communist, his objective is one world, one Communist world, the extension of Communist dominion ideologically by whatever means are available.

I think, likewise, that the means that he would prefer are peaceful ones, and in this his interest is almost identical with ours. He does not want the consequences of nuclear war.

This implies, Senator, a long competition that we have all anticipated, an economic, political, and psychological competition with the Communist bloc for years to come.

Senator WILEY. Well, if Khrushchev does not change his attitude in the United Nations, what kind of position should we take?

Would you treat him as he has been treated, or will you use other methods?

Mr. STEVENSON. It is a little hard to anticipate that as a generality. I don't know that I could answer the question until I were informed as to what the facts were, the circumstances to which we would have to respond.

REFUSAL TO PAY U.N. ASSESSMENTS

Senator WILEY. You know that Khrushchev has refused to pay the assessments.

Have you any thoughts on how that matter should be handled?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think that this becomes a problem for all of the members of the United Nations, as to whether or not we are going to tolerate a refusal to comply with the resolutions about assessments.

This situation, as far as I know, has not arisen before. I think it would be a mistake for the United States, or for me here, to attempt to indicate what our position on this should be, when this matter comes up for consideration. Under the charter, I believe it is clear that a member which does not pay its assessments can be suspended and deprived of the privilege of voting.

This may be the proper solution, I don't know.

COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator WILEY. Of course, you are subordinate to the Secretary of State, but I think it is important to get your ideas as to the eastern situation.

What do you think of Communist China? Should they become a U.N. member, or how shall that situation be handled, in your judgment?

Mr. STEVENSON. I cannot possibly, Senator, anticipate what the policy of this administration will be at this stage.

I think that you would agree that it would be quite improper for me to anticipate what it is before the administration has come into office and before these matters have been considered.

I think one can mention some factors about the China situation, however, that are obvious.

On the problem of admission to which you refer, it is apparent that the support for our position has been declining in recent years.

The problem of China's relationship to the world community is extremely complex. I find it very hard to consider it, apart from China's behavior in the world community—its belligerence, its anti-Americanism, its hatred and its fierce expansionism. It may be that we are dealing with an implacable situation which we can't much improve.

I think we should always bear in mind a few things. One of them, of course, is our concern for the independence, the security, and the self-determination of Taiwan, and our treaty obligations there. Another is that no arms control system could be effective that did not include the territory of China.

I don't believe this matter is going to come up at this resumed session of the General Assembly; at least I am so informed by the staff in New York.

I think the view that China's admission to the United Nations would end its isolation and would influence the Peking Government toward a less militant and military posture, and perhaps pave the way for other settlements in Asia, is highly optimistic. On the other hand, it might become impossible to prevent it.

I think, sir, I should not go beyond that.

Senator WILEY. Is it your thought that the admission of Communist China would be constructive or create a mess in the East?

Mr. STEVENSON. I have tried to indicate I think it is highly optimistic to assume it would be constructive.

Senator WILEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Alabama?

Senator SPARKMAN. Governor Stevenson, I am sorry to have been late. I have been trying to obtain seats for the swearing-in ceremony.

Mr. STEVENSON. I will be around to see you later, sir.

INCREASING MEMBERSHIP OF UNITED NATIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. I have read your statement, and I think it is a very fine one.

I have listened to the questions and answers, and my questions shall be very brief.

You know, of course, that many of the members of this committee have served in the United Nations. I had that privilege in 1950.

At that time there were 60 nations. In fact, the 60th came in during that year, and we thought the U.N. was crowded then. It is terribly crowded now, is it not?

Mr. STEVENSON. It is, indeed.

Senator SPARKMAN. And, in fact, the world is crowded with nations now, is it not?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think I said before you came in, Senator, that since my time there the membership has doubled.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. STEVENSON. Risen from 50 to 99.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS

You feel, do you not, that it is absolutely necessary to have an international organization?

Mr. STEVENSON. I do, sir, I do, indeed.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you feel that the U.N. is the best organization, certainly the best that we have at the present time; is that correct?

Mr. STEVENSON. More than that—it is the only one.

Senator SPARKMAN. The only one.

You do feel that it does not necessarily have to be rigid, but that it can be flexible and should be, and that changes should be made as we move on?

Mr. STEVENSON. I do, sir. I think this is something we must always bear in mind: To adapt the machinery to the needs.

POSSIBLE REBUFFS TO UNITED STATES

Senator SPARKMAN. You said something in your statement, and I believe Senator Wiley referred to it, about some of the troubled times that we have ahead.

Of course, in the past years the United States has in practically every case been on the winning end of the various votes that have been taken.

Do you see the possibility of our having to take some rebuffs as we move along?

Mr. STEVENSON. I do, sir.

I think that it has been apparent this last session of the General Assembly that it is going to be progressively harder for the United States to prevail in all instances.

STAFFING OF U.S. MISSION TO U.N.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Humphrey asked you something about additional staff for your work, additional assistants to help you there.

As a matter of fact, we have not expanded our representation there in keeping with the growth of the United Nations, have we?

Mr. STEVENSON. No.

It is less today than what it was when the membership of the United Nations was much smaller than it is.

Senator SPARKMAN. Don't you feel it is inadequate to handle its tasks under the present situation?


Mr. STEVENSON. I do, sir.

I think it is imperative to strengthen the mission there, especially at the top. I think we can frequently call upon expert help from the State Department, but for the continuous problem of representation with 98 nations in New York, to take full advantage of this opportunity, to exploit it to the full in the interests of the United States, will require more senior manpower.

DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

Senator SPARKMAN. Disarmament within the United Nations would be under your jurisdiction, would it not?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.



Senator SPARKMAN. Such disarmament matters as would be handled in the United Nations.

Mr. STEVENSON. Insofar as it relates to the U.N.; yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. You do believe that we should work toward some kind of disarmament or arms control?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think this is the most important problem in the world today. I think it should be a first priority in American foreign policy.

Senator SPARKMAN. I feel the same way, and I am glad to hear you say it.

It seems to me that it is absolutely necessary for us to do something about that problem, if we are to continue to exist.

TRANSCENDENT PROBLEMS

Mr. STEVENSON. There are two transcendent problems.

One is the proliferation of the nuclear weapons in the world today and all of the implications that flow therefrom.

And the other is the disparity in living standards between the rich and the poor in the world, illustrated, I think, by the fact that the annual per capita income in the United States is in excess of \$2,000, whereas for more than a third of the world it is probably less than \$100. This is a crude way of illustrating it. But we know the consequences of any such disparity as that.

COMMENTS ON MR. STEVENSON'S APPOINTMENT AND STATEMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. Governor, I have often said that I feel that you have as fine a grasp of the international situation, the international facts of life, as anybody in the country.

I am delighted that you have taken this assignment, and I certainly wish you well in it.

Mr. STEVENSON. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Governor Stevenson, I am very much impressed by the statement which you made here.

I think it is a splendid dissertation on the philosophy of the United Nations and of our hopes for associating with it goals and objectives of peace in connection with conflicts which may arise among nations.

Mr. STEVENSON. I appreciate that, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I also feel that you have touched on a subject where great difficulties of a practical nature are involved.

RELATIONSHIP TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE

I would like to inquire for a moment or two about your situation as Ambassador to the United Nations. Let me make it clear at the outset that I do not intend to inquire into any confidential discussions which you may have had with the President on these matters. But some of the circumstances surrounding this transition, I think, are important.

On May 10, 1960, President-elect Kennedy was quoted in the press as making a statement in Oregon, and I will quote the statement from the press:

Kennedy also said that he believed any Democrat nominated for President should offer Adlai Stevenson the job of Secretary of State.

I have no means of knowing whether that is an accurate statement or not, but at least I have sufficient faith in the press to give it the benefit of the doubt at the moment, anyway.

Then later Mr. Rusk was appointed Secretary of State. Again I say I have no intention of going into intermediate details, but President-elect Kennedy is quoted on December 15, 1960, in the New York Herald Tribune, as follows:

Mr. Stevenson wanted to be clear on the working relationship that would obtain among the President, the Secretary of State, and the U.N. Ambassador.

Now, I find no quarrel with that statement necessarily. I think it would be a natural inclination and desire. But I am interested, as a matter of public policy, in what you conceive to be, or what actually are the limitations or the extent of your authority in determining foreign policy, in your new position.

Do you believe you will have an enlarged field in the determination of foreign policy over and above what other Ambassadors to the United Nations have held?

Mr. STEVENSON. I am not sufficiently informed about the conditions that have prevailed in the past to be able to answer that "Yes" or "No."

I can say that as to my own situation, my understanding is that policy matters, especially those which relate to the execution of my office in New York, will come to my attention. I will be a consultant. I will have an opportunity to express my views on policy formation in matters of concern to me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have an understanding, Governor, that on matters that may come up, let us say rather suddenly, you will have the right to exercise your independent judgment without securing the guidance and approval of the State Department or the President?

Mr. STEVENS. I would hope that I could always have the guidance of the Secretary and the President, where necessary, in matters of that kind, and that I should not be called upon to exercise independent judgment in any matter of major consequence, without suitable consultation.

If it arose, as in the case of response, immediate response to attacks on the United States, yes, I think it is clear that I would have the authority, it would be expected that I would do whatever my judgment indicated as the commander in the field.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that has been the practice in the past.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But, on substantive matters, may I put it this way: Do you anticipate that you will be given a free hand, a comparatively free hand, to determine American policy within the United Nations and, in effect, to have a veto in any way upon contrary positions that may be taken by the Secretary of State?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, I do not, sir. I would not assert any such privilege. I think it is most important—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Your expression there might be interpreted that you did have such privilege. Do you anticipate that you do have such privilege?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, I do not, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, in your position as Ambassador to the United Nations, I take it that your concept is that you will, as our system provides, be answerable primarily to the President as his representative, as Ambassador there, and that the guidance followed by you will be that as laid down by the President or through the Secretary of State as the President's agent on international matters?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct, Senator.

I think the only difference, which perhaps may not be clear in your mind, is that, to the extent that my time and circumstances permit, I would participate in the formation of policies that I would be called upon to execute.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that you will be in a consultative capacity. Is that what you mean by that?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think that is a good word for it, sir.

FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. From a practical standpoint, the United Nations has become a forum for the establishment of many basic policies, I believe.

Two years ago I had the opportunity to serve as a delegate to the General Assembly, and it seems to me that, more and more, the United Nations is becoming a policy-forming group for American foreign policy.

What is your view on the extent to which the policies developed in the United Nations should formulate American foreign policy, rather than the cumulative judgment and action of the State Department?

In other words, should the United Nations replace the State Department in any major particular as the agency for formulating United States foreign policy?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, I think clearly not. The policies should continue to be formulated in the constitutional manner by the President and the executive agency provided for that purpose, the State Department.

I think that where policy emerges as a result of United Nations activity, it is a response to what transpires there and an adaptation of policy, rather than the creation of foreign policy for the United States.

But it is inevitable that diplomatic interchange or negotiation, especially a continuous one like this, has a constant influence on the development of American policy. This is inevitable, as long as we have such an institution, I think, Senator.

ADMISSION OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO THE U.N.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, of course, one of the great areas of controversy in international matters is the question of Red China, upon which emotions may flow one way or the other.

Is it fair to say that you have taken quite a consistent position that Red China should be admitted to the United Nations?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, I do not think I have ever taken that position. I think I have taken the position from time to time that we have to face the probability that it may be and that it will be.

QUESTION OF U.N. PLEBISCITE FOR FORMOSANS AND FOR COMMUNIST CHINESE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not going exhaustively into this article, but you had a rather comprehensive article, quite a clear discussion of international matters in the January 1960 issue of Foreign Affairs.

Now, in discussing the question of negotiation and settlement of disputes, I want to quote what seems to be a rather pertinent statement by you from that article. This goes to the point of the settlement of these disputes with the Communists and the tensions which exist. In that article you said:

On the Communist side, the concessions would include the extension to China of any system of international inspection of disarmament, ending the threat of force against Formosa and subversion in Indochina, a peaceful frontier settlement with India, free elections under United Nations supervision in Korea, and acceptance of the right of the inhabitants of Formosa to determine their own destiny by plebiscite supervised by the United Nations.

On our side—

and I am continuing to quote—

concessions would presumably include an end to the American embargo on China's admission to the United Nations (not to be confused with diplomatic recognition), the evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu and the inclusion of Korea and Japan in the atom-free zone and area of controlled disarmament.

There are one or two things in this quotation that I would like to discuss with you.

In the first place, you indicate that a part of the package might include the right of the inhabitants of Formosa to determine their own destiny by plebiscite supervised by the United Nations.

Now I do not want to misquote you, and if my quotation is inaccurate in any way, I would be glad to have the record corrected, or you can correct it at the moment, if you care to. But in as much as you have apparently advocated a plebiscite on Formosa for the Formosans to determine their own system of government, why did you not include a plebiscite on the mainland of China to let the Chinese people there determine what kind and type of government that they prefer?

Mr. STEVENSON. Perhaps that would be a good idea, sir. I am not sure that we could have much influence in bringing it about.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I agree that it would be very difficult, but how much influence do you think we can have, based upon past history and actions by the Kremlin, in ending the threat of force against Formosa?

Mr. STEVENSON. I am not sure that we can have any. I said here a while ago that it might be that we were dealing with an implacable situation that we could not improve, and if you will be good enough to examine that quotation a little, Senator, you will notice that I was suggesting that we explore with Khrushchev, not with the Chinese at this point, the possibility of pacification in the area based upon a broad settlement of issues by negotiation, not force.

Then I went on to indicate the many proposals that have been made on both sides as to what might be attractive to the Russians in order to pacify the Pacific.

This was not a proposal for negotiation with the Chinese through the United Nations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand.

But the wording of my question, of course, is why a plebiscite is considered to be an important part of any potential proposal for the people of Formosa and why was a suggestion that a plebiscite would also be desirable for China not included?

The difficulties in the one case, I realize, are very great, but also undoubtedly, the difficulties on the other side are equally great.

Mr. STEVENSON. I am sure they are very great.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But I was curious about the failure to recognize the right of the Chinese people on the mainland to have a plebiscite, while suggesting that a plebiscite be confined only to Formosa.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any further comment on that?

Mr. STEVENSON. No; I have none, sir.

I was talking about the problem of Formosa, not the problem of the mainland of China.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But are they not all involved? Is it not an area situation from a political standpoint?

Mr. STEVENSON. Surely; they are all involved.

STATUS OF OFFSHORE ISLANDS, KOREA, AND JAPAN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you, as Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations, expect to advocate the evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu and the inclusion of Korea and Japan in an atom-free zone and area of controlled disarmament?

Mr. STEVENSON. Clearly, Senator, I could not advocate anything that was not the policy of the U.S. Government.

I do not know what the policy of the U.S. Government is going to be with respect to the Formosa Straits or any solution in the Pacific.

MR. STEVENSON'S FOREIGN POLICY ROLE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that that would be generally true, and yet Mr. Dean Rusk is quoted in the press, on December 15, 1960, as saying "that Adlai Stevenson would play a key role in planning U.S. foreign policy."

So if that statement of Mr. Rusk is correctly quoted, you will be occupying a key role, which I would interpret to mean something more than acting in an advisory capacity.

Mr. STEVENSON. A key advisory capacity.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Perhaps so, but I think the words "key role" certainly indicate a much more authoritative participation in the decisions which are made than merely being in what might be called an advisory capacity.

Many people are in an advisory capacity, but I submit that comparatively few people are in a key role, as we understand it in the parlance of the day; so your attitude on those matters, if you do occupy a key role in the determination of foreign policies, would be, I would think, most important.

Mr. STEVENSON. I think one of the difficulties, as best I can ascertain, is that while New York and Washington are close to one another and communication is easy, that still there is often a gulf between the mission in New York and the policies that it must advocate there and the State Department here. It is important to close this gap, if we can, so that they are fully informed here of the consequences, the embarrassments, or the advantages of a policy position in New York.

To do this, various things have been suggested. They have not been always satisfactory. The experience of all of you, I am sure, who have served on the delegation has revealed that orders are often changed, frequently at the last moment.

Sometimes policies, orders, have been inconsistent with the view of the delegation in New York.

In an effort to bring about a greater coordination of these policy positions, I have felt that the senior officer present in New York should have a more continuous relation to policymaking here in the Department, and that is what this is all about.

STATUS OF FORMOSA AND THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Back as far as 1955, especially with reference to a radio address which you made in Chicago on April 12 of that year, it seems to me that you took a very positive position that Quemoy and Matsu should be abandoned by the United States. I think you have had other things to say about that since 1955. I wonder, Governor, what your attitude toward the situation in Quemoy and Matsu is at this time?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, let me again say, sir, that I think it is quite improper for me to express policy views in my present capacity, which is not that of a private citizen, unless you withhold your advice and consent, on matters that have not been resolved by the new administration; that is, policy matters relating to China or anything else in the world.

I think that this situation that I am in must be apparent to you, sir, and, therefore, I should have to ask to be excused from commenting on what my policy would be in the future.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I respect that position certainly, and I would not expect you to outline in detail every action that you would take under any "iffy" or speculative position or situation that might occur. But I think in someways you occupy quite a unique position. You have been quite lavish in your comments on international matters and positions with regard to such areas as Quemoy and Matsu and international associations, and rightfully so. I have no

criticism of that. You have been in a most important position of leadership in your party and as a leading American citizen, and you are perfectly justified in making those statements and taking those positions. But, by the same token, I do not believe that you can today divorce yourself from the positions you have taken in the past without reasonable explanation.

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, I do not wish to—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think you are not coming to this position as an unknown or an unheralded American citizen.

You are a man of prominence and great ability and great experience and the leadership positions that you have been in have caused you, as I again say, justifiably and perfectly properly so, to take these positions. But the situation of the whole Asian Continent, at least in my view, revolves in a great degree about our firmness or our weakness in Asia. And that involves the matter of whether Quemoy and Matsu are abandoned or whether they continue to be used as an instrument in our sustaining the position of the free world and of free China in the Orient.

That is the reason I think it is very important.

Mr. STEVENSON. I think my writings speak for themselves. You will find that they are quite consistent in this field since 1955, since the first time the matter arose.

Perhaps the difference between us is one of emphasis. You will notice in 1955, and in subsequent writings on this matter, that my insistence has been on the firmness of the American position favoring the security, the independence, and the self-determination of Formosa; that this was our responsibility before even we had a security treaty.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does that policy of firmness extend to the independence and self-determination of mainland China?

Mr. STEVENSON. I do not think we have ever assumed any responsibility for mainland China; if you mean for an anti-Communist revolution. I am sure that we have never assumed any such responsibility.

We have very definitely assumed responsibility for the security of Formosa.

DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, on the question of disarmament, you have taken some strong positions, and, as I read them, quite clear positions, with regard to negotiation with Russia in this area.

Do you believe that any agreement with Russia that is not completely safeguarded by physical means, inspection or control, either multilaterally with several nations or through the United Nations, would be successful?

Mr. STEVENSON. I do not think any agreement with the Soviet Union, with or without inspection and control, is secure; unless it is to their advantage to keep the agreement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you believe that the Soviet Union will make any agreements that they do not believe will advance the cause of international communism and world control?

Mr. STEVENSON. No.

I think that every agreement that they make, they will conclude in their interest, but that might include peace.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But peace on their terms?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, disarmament, arms control, in some form or other. I am not sure just what area you are speaking about, but, generally speaking, I say that could include arms control, which could be in their interest.

COMMUNIST GOAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But do you agree that it is fundamental in the philosophy of the Kremlin and in international communism that world dominion is their ultimate and necessary goal?

Mr. STEVENSON. Oh, yes, I have said that, I guess, scores of times.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And do you see anything in the actions or the conduct of the Kremlin or its representatives that shows the slightest deviation from that purpose?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, I have not.

I think the one interesting development of recent years has been the extent to which Communist ideology, at least in Russia in contrast to China, has changed with respect to the inevitability of war, which has been a classic Marxist position, as you know.

And here there has been some modification in the 20th Party Congress in Russia, a view which apparently has not been shared in the Chinese Communist Party, so that this is one of the differences that seems to have emerged.

Just how this is being resolved, I am not yet clear. I am sure that what we have read is not an adequate and full explanation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, do you feel that the Kremlin, while perhaps deviating temporarily from the theory of the inevitability of war, has at all abandoned the instrumentality of war, if necessary, and if they think they can be successful in establishing world communism?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think they are concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the consequences of nuclear war.

As to conventional war; no. I think they have probably not changed their views at all as to the utility of conventional force.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So any possible difference—if there is a difference between the Kremlin and Peiping—and there are those who believe that there is no substantial difference, that it may be a smoke screen—

Mr. STEVENSON. I think it would be a mistake to overestimate that difference; yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that the difference would come, as you see it, on the basis that Peiping may still follow the theory of the inevitability of war, but Moscow says that conquest may be accomplished without war; but that, if necessary, war is a weapon of conquest?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes; I think that is true. I think that is substantially correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is not a very articulate, but a reasonably fair, statement of the situation.

POSSIBILITY OF REACHING ANY MAJOR AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S.S.R.

Well, then, if international communism and control in Moscow are fundamental in the Kremlin's policies, how do you envision any reliable peace or any reliable agreements with the Kremlin on the basis

of the concept of the free world; that is, any agreements of any major importance? I am not talking of little, incidental agreements here and there.

Mr. STEVENSON. I said if they thought it was to their advantage and to their interest, that then they would keep the agreement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is right.

Mr. STEVENSON. And if the agreement related to peace, and they considered peace to be more in their interest than the risk of war, that they would keep the agreement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand, and I think I agree thoroughly with you that if they consider it to be to their advantage, they will agree.

But can you conceive of the Communists agreeing to any major proposition, even though it might contribute to peace for a time? Can you envision them agreeing to any major proposition that would in any substantial way weaken the position of international communism in the world?

Mr. STEVENSON. No; not if it would weaken the position of international communism; no.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And do you think the ideals of the West and the Kremlin are compatible; that is, on the basis of the theory of individual dignity as represented in the West, and that of individual utility for the benefit of the state as involved in the Kremlin? Are those two theories in any way compatible?

Mr. STEVENSON. No; they are entirely incompatible.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then it seems that many of your hopes for agreement which will sustain or advance the cause—that is, our theory in the West, the cause of freedom in the world—may be hopeless from the standpoint of accomplishment.

Mr. STEVENSON. By agreement?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By agreement.

Mr. STEVENSON. I have said many times, sir, that I have thought we were in for a long period of conflict and competition with the Soviet Union.

But I have been hopeful that we could eliminate, to some extent at least, the hazard of war, because that was of mutual interest to them as well as to ourselves.

IMPORTANCE OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you believe that anything but superior military strength on the part of the United States and the free world would deter the Communist expansion?

In other words, is that, would you say, the important deterrent?

Mr. STEVENSON. If such a thing were possible, it would be a very effective deterrent.

I raise the question as to the possibility in a nuclear age of ever achieving what you call superiority, because the consequences—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not know that you know what I mean by "superiority" because I did not define it. I used the term loosely, perhaps.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By "superiority," I would say our ability, for instance, to inflict far greater destruction, even to the point of

total destruction, on the enemy than the enemy could inflict on us, even as grievous as their injury to us might be.

Mr. STEVENSON. I have said many times, Senator Hickenlooper, that the strength of the free world was indispensable to the peace of the world, and I have talked about it in terms of at least an equality of strength, so that any weakness of ours would not constitute an inducement or encouragement to adventure by the Communist bloc.

MR. STEVENSON'S APPOINTMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think I have taken enough time, Mr. Chairman.

In all kindness to you, I may say, in response to your remark awhile ago that you will cease to be a private citizen in a few days, that because of my political affiliation I have used whatever meager efforts I had in the past to retain you as a prominent private citizen. I say that without any rancor or gravel, but I can assure you that I have no such plans at this time.

Mr. STEVENSON. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield?

VIEWS OF EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION ON FORMOSA AND OFFSHORE ISLANDS

Senator MANSFIELD. Governor Stevenson, I recall another man who, when he was a private citizen, in a speech in Louisville, Ky., made a statement that he believed in the Bricker amendment. Later he changed his mind when he became a public official and occupied the position of Secretary of State. This same man, for whom I always had a great admiration, while a private citizen wrote a book called, I believe, "War or Peace," and he had some very interesting things to say on page 121 relative to China. So I think we can sort of pair that off against what you are alleged to have said as a private citizen some 4 or 5 years ago, and perhaps wipe the slate clean.

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, Senator, I hope that one does not have the impression that I am in any way embarrassed by anything I have said on the subject of China at any time in the past, because I am not.

Senator MANSFIELD. I am sure you are not, and certainly, as far as Senator Hickenlooper is concerned, he had every right to ask the questions which he asked.

Mr. STEVENSON. Oh, most certainly.

Senator MANSFIELD. And you have every right to give the answers that you desire.

But I just thought I would recollect, as best I could, somewhat similar instances which might well fit in the record at this time.

There has been some discussion about the offshore islands, the Quemoy and the Matsus. Again, as I recall, at the time the Formosa resolution was considered, there was no question as to our going to the defense of the Pescadores and Formosa, based on the mutual security agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. But there was some question in the committee relative to the position of the offshore islands, and, as I remember, the fear was expressed in the committee that maybe some lieutenant (junior grade) or some admiral might strike the match which could start the flame. Again, falling back on my recollection,

Secretary Dulles assured us—and I think Walter George, then chairman of this committee, stated so publicly on the floor of the Senate—that as far as the disposition of the offshores was concerned, it would be a matter for sole determination by the President of the United States. I am assuming that the position under the Eisenhower administration would, of course, be maintained by the incoming administration.

I wanted that on the record, too.

MR. STEVENSON'S APPOINTMENT

Governor, I want to say that I am very much impressed with your statement. As usual, it was cogent, to the point, and expressed your general philosophy, with which I agree.

I was also impressed with the graciousness you have shown toward Ambassadors Lodge, Wadsworth, and Barco, all of whom have performed outstanding services representing our country in the United Nations.

I think we are most fortunate that you have been selected by Mr. Kennedy for this most important job. I wish you well.

I know that you and Dean Rusk will work very closely together, and I think the country will be in good hands. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STEVENSON. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Kansas?

Senator CARLSON. Governor, you and I had the privilege of serving as Governors of two great Western States at the same time.

Therefore, we have had some very pleasant associations together in the past, serving on the Council of State Governments and many committees.

Mr. STEVENSON. I am sure they will continue to be that way, sir.

Senator CARLSON. I can assure you that they will. We served together on many Federal and State affairs committees, and I appreciate your statement this morning.

You have responded well to the questions asked. I have no questions, but I do want to make a comment on a matter that is going to be one of your problems.

AIRMEN IMPRISONED BY SOVIET UNION

We have two very fine young men of this Nation who are incarcerated in a prison in Russia and they are held in violation of international law; namely, Captain McKone, of Kansas, and Captain Olmstead, of New Jersey.

I would urge you to use all your influence in this important position to see that we secure the release of these young men, if possible.

Mr. STEVENSON. I quite agree, sir, and I assure you that I will.

Indeed, I can say to you that I already have, to the extent that I have been able to, in my position as a private citizen, and I will continue to do so as a public official.

Senator CARLSON. I thank you, sir, and that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Louisiana?

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator LONG. Governor Stevenson, I asked Secretary Herter a short time ago if he could give us some information, perhaps something that we could use as a mailing piece to those who write suggesting that the United States should quit the United Nations, something more or less indicating what the United Nations has accomplished.

I have seen some pamphlets mailed out indicating that the United Nations has accomplished nothing and that it has been a complete failure, unworthy of our support.

Would you just for the record indicate what you believe some of the accomplishments of the United Nations have been?

Mr. STEVENSON. I would be very happy to, Senator Long. I would also be very happy to give you some documentation that might be more useful for the purpose that you have in mind.

Senator LONG. I would like to have that.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator LONG. But you might also give a statement for the record.

Mr. STEVENSON. I think, like everyone, I had at the inception in 1945, 1946, and 1947, when I was active in this work after the war, hopes that the great powers would stick together, and that the division that has ensued between the Soviet Union and the West would not come to pass; that the alliance of the war would continue into the future.

Had it done so, there is no doubt but what the United Nations would have been far more effective.

As a result of this division and the ambition of the Soviet Union, the Security Council—which we looked to in those days as the hope for peace and security—has been, in large measure, frustrated by the Russian veto.

The General Assembly, on the other hand, has emerged as an opportunity to marshal the public sentiment of the world.

Public opinion, I think you will agree, sir, is the sovereign of us all and of all nations as well as peoples. In the mobilization of world opinion the United Nations has been very successful.

Its various agencies, such as the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, have performed invaluable service. The specialized agencies such as the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization have helped bring about an improvement in the conditions of life of people throughout the world.

The U.N. has performed important security services in policing the Sinai Peninsula at the time of trouble in the Middle East, and latterly in the Congo. These are enormous undertakings far beyond the anticipated competence of the Secretary General's Office. They are functions that were originally contemplated for the Military Staff Committee which has never come into being, due to Russian intransigence.

But these services to the world in both security matters and in economic and social matters in these intervening years have, I think, more than justified the Organization.

More than that, I think, is the value, philosophically, of having created a structure for collective security. If we did not have such a structure we would still be trying to erect one. It is just as indispensable to peace and security in the world as it is in domestic society.

I look forward with great hope to its expansion, to the extension of the dominion of law in the world. I suspect that it may be many years in the making, but this is the beginning.

SOVIET MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator LONG. Would it be your judgment that we would be better off with the Soviets out of the United Nations than with them in it?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think it depends on what you mean by "better off." If they are out of it, then, of course, we have a club of friendly people and can do a lot of things that we could not do otherwise.

But, unless we can maintain this contact with the Soviets, we will not be able to bring the same influence to bear on securing the peace, and on working out agreements if any are possible with them, that we would if they were in the organization.

So I do not think you can equate the two. It depends on what you are after.

Senator LONG. Yes.

On the one hand, it could be a much more effective organization for achieving action; but, on the other hand, it offers an opportunity of contact to try to work out differences, I take it?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is right.

And, also, if they are out of it, then they are isolated and we suffer the risks of separation.

U. N. ACTION IN KOREAN CRISIS

Senator LONG. What is your judgment as to the value of the United Nations in the Korean crisis? Do you believe that this Nation would have been better off if we had not been impeded by having to consult and to contend with the views of allies and members of the United Nations?

I am sure that you perhaps share the disappointment of some of us that we did not get more effective help from others. Or do you feel perhaps that the United Nations was, on the whole, a substantial asset to the situation that developed there?

Mr. STEVENSON. I thought it was an asset, because it established the principle of collective security in action for the first time. It was important to have the participation of the other nations, even on the limited basis in which they participated.

Senator LONG. In other words, the fact that we went there with the approval of the United Nations placed us in the position before the world to make the case that we were maintaining peace and security, rather than going there as an act of aggression?

Mr. STEVENSON. Or even going there in fulfillment of a bilateral obligation to the Korean Republic. As it is, we went there in fulfillment of our multilateral obligations to maintain the peace of the world.

Senator LONG. In either event, it did not keep the Communists from propagandizing all over the world to the effect that the United States started the war.

I believe they had some picture of Mr. Dulles with a helmet on, contending that he had been at the front line immediately before the war started, or something of that sort.

But I take it that you would feel that U.N. action did help to make clear what our purposes were in going there?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think so.

Senator LONG. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Oregon?

MR. STEVENSON'S APPOINTMENT AND STATEMENT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, Governor Stevenson, I have no questions.

I wish to pay my respects to you for what I consider to be probably the finest condensed statement on the symbolism and import of the United Nations that I have ever had the privilege of reading.

As an old teacher, I would suggest that for every high school and college teacher in America teaching a course that deals with foreign policy it should be required reading.

Mr. STEVENSON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MORSE. I am looking forward to our conference together in which I hope to share with you the very fascinating and illuminating experience I had as a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly this last fall. And I think you have set forth in your statement very clearly the major problems that confront our Government as far as the challenge of the United Nations is concerned, for it truly is challenging.

I happen to hold the point of view that unless we make it work, there is not going to be any Western civilization.

U.S. EXAMPLE FOR THE WORLD

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio?

Senator LAUSCHE. Governor, in response to one of the questions, you stated that one-third of the people of the world have an annual income of about \$100 a year.

The Foreign Relations Committee had a study made on the economics of the world, and it was reported in that study that the United States—and this is a fact—in 1957 had a gross national product of \$440 billion, producing in excess of \$2,000 a year for each one of our citizens on an average. Now, I understand that your objective will be, with all of your might, to seek the achievement of peace consistent with the maintenance of our honor, and contributing to the security and life of our country.

Is that a fair statement of what your objective will be?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is a very eloquent statement of it, Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. That would mean that you take the position that under our system of government, having produced a per capita income of more than \$2,000 a year, while one-third of the people of the world have a per capita income of less than \$100 a year, in a peaceful combat we will be able to demonstrate to the world that the welfare of the individual and the enjoyment of his human dignities are best assured under our system of government?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think we should leave no stone unturned to advertise the virtues of free society. I think, at the same time, we

have to also bear in mind that other societies are not as fortunate, either by natural endowment or by the skills of their peoples as a result of education, and that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for them to enjoy anything like our standard of living for a long time to come.

Senator LAUSCHE. But that does not negate the proposition that on the basis of past performance our system has provided a dignity for the human being and an economic welfare far greater than any other nation in the world has ever produced.

Mr. STEVENSON. It has no historical counterpart, so far as I know. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, the report which we received in this Foreign Relations Committee showed that under the best statistics obtainable China, with 650 million people, in 1958, had a gross national product of \$50 billion, or the equivalent of about \$77 per person.

COALITION GOVERNMENTS

Now, I want to go to another question.

There has arisen the suggestion that there be a coalition government established in Laos. What is your view on coalition governments, having in mind what followed World War II?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, I can't express an informed judgment on Laos, Senator, because I am just not informed. But I can say generally about coalition governments that they serve a useful purpose in some instances.

Where the coalition is with Communists, we have usually found that they do not work; that Communists take over. I do not think it is possible to generalize about the virtues of coalition governments.

I think they are better than Communist governments.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

But the fact is that I would say in every instance where there has been a coalition established between the Communists and what are supposed to be representatives of the free world, the Communists adopted their normal techniques and finally took over.

Mr. STEVENSON. I am sure that that could be established. I do not know that it would be true in every case, but I should think it would be true in most.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, it was true in China, I think, was it not?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think in some of the postwar governments in which Communists were included, after the war, as in Italy, for example, they did not prevail and take over.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, the most glaring example, I think, is Poland.

Mr. STEVENSON. Poland, certainly.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where the Lublin nucleus was set up in Russia and they sent him in and got Mikolajczyk to join and then finally kicked him out.

Mr. STEVENSON. Also in Czechoslovakia.

Senator LAUSCHE. And I think in Yugoslavia, where Mikhailovitch was put to the wall by the gun.

Now, then, on the matter of coalition governments, to the extent that you might be able to express yourself, would you declare that, on the basis of past experience, that subject ought to be approached with great caution before we participate in that type of government?

Mr. STEVENSON. You mean before the United States participates?
Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. That is right.

Mr. STEVENSON. Oh, yes; I would think so.

POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S.S.R.

Senator LAUSCHE. You state that past experience has demonstrated that the Red Soviet will make no agreement unless, in its opinion, the agreement will contribute to the advancement of communism.

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, I think those were Senator Hickenlooper's words. My words were: unless the agreement is in the interest of the Soviet Union, as they see it.

OBJECTIVES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Senator LAUSCHE. At the risk of having this question labeled as academic, having in mind, undoubtedly, the deep thought that you have given to this general subject, and having in mind my efforts to formulate my own definition, I wonder if you could state for this committee your definition of what our policy ought to be with regard to our relations with foreign countries?

Maybe it is quite a burden, but a general declaration. I have heard it said we have no foreign policy; that we have only a containment policy; but nowhere have I heard anyone declare on the basis of a general policy what we ought to aim to do.

What about something like this:

It is our foreign policy with respect to relations with foreign countries to be fair, to aim for the achievement of peace throughout the world, maintaining, however, our national honor, and insuring the future existence of our country. Moreover, it is our aim to give encouragement to other people of the world to adopt free systems of government, unimpeded or mandated by Communists; and to encourage independence when it is indicated that an ethnographical, homogeneous people have the ability to run their own government?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, if I understood you, sir, you said that our objectives were to treat others fairly, to promote peace with honor, to insure the security of the United States, to encourage others to adopt free institutions.

Obviously, I agree with all of those propositions.

ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW GOVERNMENTS

Senator LAUSCHE. What about the establishment of new governments where the evidences are clear that the people involved have not yet reached the stage where they can run their own governments and where it is rather reasonably certain that there will be chaos and a vacuum will develop?

Mr. STEVENSON. This is one of the problems with which we are confronted now. It presents great difficulties. I suspect for a long time we will have to anticipate that these countries can only be directed or controlled or run, after they attain their independence, by strong central governments, what we would call nondemocratic forms, until large numbers of people are sufficiently educated and advanced to exercise some judgment. I do not know any other solution for that problem.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think I agree with you.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S.S.R. AND SATELLITE COUNTRIES

Now just one further question:

We hear constantly the talk that we are imperialists; that we are seeking to exploit; and those who speak that way forget that we have spent \$75 billion to help people around the world.

What is your view of the relationship between Red Russia and the countries in middle Europe and Eastern Europe?

Are they subservient countries under the master domination of the Soviet?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, I think all of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea is under the political domination and in some cases the military control of the Soviet Union. The extent to which the people are sympathetic with communism varies, I suspect.

I have traveled in some of these countries. I would suspect that in Poland the popular support for the Communist government is very meager. It may be greater in other countries. I think it varies from country to country. I think one can say with some confidence that in no case are the Communist governments majority governments.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is your view?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is my view, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is, they are governments imposed by the power of the Soviet?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, it is not always, sir, the power of the Soviet. It is in some cases the power of the local Communist Party, which has all the instruments of power.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you see in that situation the elements of the development of a colonial power or an imperialistic power of the Soviet?

Mr. STEVENSON. Oh, yes. I think it is very clear that this is an extension of 19th century imperialism in a new form.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all.

U.S. POLICY REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW NATIONS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise one point for clarification. I am not sure that I understood all the import of one question Senator Lausche asked you, nor am I sure that the record will disclose necessarily your meaning in your answer, and I only register this observation, and ask for any comment that either you or Senator Lausche want to make, or let it stand.

Senator Lausche asked you regarding this matter of independence, about people in some areas of the world who are seeking independence from present colonial rule, and I believe the import of the question may indicate that we would seek to prevent that independence or use our influences to prevent that independence until a value judgment was reached as to whether or not they were ready to govern themselves.

I only want to say that, in my judgment, if we follow that course of action, we are headed into very real trouble, because these people are going to determine for themselves whether they are ready for independence.

If the United States seeks to brook it and continues to side with the great colonial powers that now subject them and dominate them,

and in many instances, such as South West Africa, inflict horrendous atrocities upon them, we are going to be confronted with serious bloodbaths in that part of the world against the white man.

Senator LAUSCHE. If I may?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

Senator LAUSCHE. The inference drawn by the Senator from Oregon concerning my question is incorrect.

My declaration of policy is that we will encourage the establishment of independent nations when we believe that there is a reasonable probability that those nations, those ethnographical, homogeneous peoples, will be able to maintain independent governments.

Now, then, I am not going to ask Governor Stevenson about this, but there is great room for debate on this thought advanced by the Senator from Oregon whether we can afford to follow a course that will be inimical to the interests of our historic allies, and I will not press that question. That is, I think the United Kingdom has gone to great lengths, as have other powers, in releasing countries. But you do have the question whether there are areas that are capable of maintaining stable, independent governments.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator yield?

I only want to say to the Senator from Ohio that as to his statement of our policy of encouraging independence, I completely agree.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is it.

Senator MORSE. But there is a corollary. I am afraid, if there had not been this little colloquy, the record would not have been very clear on it, and that is as to whether or not we should follow the opposite course of discouraging independence on the part of these people, if we think they are not ready for independence. And their attitude is: "Mr. Uncle Sam, it just does not happen to be any of your business." And they are going to follow that course of action.

That is why, Governor, I thought it was so unfortunate that we found ourselves in the General Assembly with a vote of 89 to 0, with 9 abstentions, one of which was the United States. We joined with eight colonial powers and refused to support the anticolonial resolution.

That was a dark day for the United States in the General Assembly.

When we got through with that vote, I want to say, as a delegate to the General Assembly, in my judgment, our influence at that point was nil.

NATURE OF UNITED STATES INFLUENCE

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Governor, I certainly have enjoyed your responses to these many and searching questions.

I think you have acquitted yourself very well. This last exchange has only brought to mind one thought I was curious about, if you wish to comment on it. You need not, if you do not care to.

Of course, we all agree with your statement—I do, at least—about our prosperity, and I know we deplore the poverty, the extreme poverty, in much of the world. I think our aversion, of course, to human suffering and degradation is aroused by this extreme poverty.

This recalls to my mind a letter I had not thought of in a long time which—I don't remember when it was, a year or two ago—John Steinbeck wrote to you, which is related to this question.

You had visited England, I believe, and had gone with him on a trip, visiting the site of, I think, King Arthur's Court.

Recalling that letter, together with certain studies that I have seen, I think since then, on the effect of prosperity upon a society, it occurs to me that this question of how to maintain our strength and our determination to fight for our system of society, our sense of values, in the face of this great prosperity, is one of the greatest problems confronting the United States.

Do you recall that letter that Steinbeck wrote to you?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It impressed me very deeply; that here we are, and we all admit this great prosperity, but is this, after all, necessarily a source of strength in the contest with these lean and hungry nations that are growing over the world?

Is not this something that we should examine very carefully, rather than to assume that this necessarily assures our triumph in the end?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think our ideals are of much greater influence in these new nations than our economic well-being.

And here I sometimes wonder, Senator, why the United States, which has developed advertising perhaps more extensively than any other society, is always at a disadvantage in furthering the public understanding of its ideals and aspirations, which are so meaningful to most of these emerging peoples that Senator Morse has been speaking about.

I think the most important export commodity we have is not wheat, is not even surplus agricultural commodities, but it is the ideals of freedom and independence, the ideals embodied in the Declaration of Independence, which have swept the world.

The CHAIRMAN. It has often occurred to me that our emphasis upon our greater material prosperity, rather than being an asset in our dealings with many of these countries is a great handicap, because we have to, in a sense, live it down by our actions. To continue to talk about it does not promote the cause which I think we all are interested in promoting.

Mr. STEVENSON. Certainly we must temper our pride and power with humility.

The CHAIRMAN. The quality of the people and the quality of the action—we will say of the performance of society—in fields other than just the production of gadgets would be much more impressive than to continue to produce the gadgets.

That is what I thought was the import of that letter, or exchange, I should say.

Mr. STEVENSON. That is quite right, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. This merely brought that to mind. I thought it was an extremely impressive short epistle that I read.

I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have spoken on this subject, and I have time and again said that our greatest strength, our economic riches, is our greatest weakness.

We are the champions, we are at the top of the ladder, and when people are living in squalor and distress, you can understand that they look with envy upon us.

It is not peculiar, because within the Halls of the Congress I hear the same psychology advanced by my colleagues. "He has too much; pull him down."

And we aggravate the situation by our perfumed couches, and by our vessels of gold and silver out of which we drink, and the dancing we do and the coats we wear, and that is especially true of those who are representing us around the world. If we have a weakness, that is where it lies.

Mr. STEVENSON. Wealth is a heavy burden, sir, I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, do you wish to add anything further? I believe the questioning is completed.

Mr. STEVENSON. I am extremely grateful to the members of the committee for their patience with me this morning and for the attentiveness and the very generous treatment that has been accorded me. I am grateful, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Governor. We look forward to seeing you in the future.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEXT COMMITTEE MEETING

May I announce to the members of the committee that tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock we will meet here to hear the Honorable Chester Bowles.

The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned to Thursday, January 19, 1961, at 10 a.m.)



