NONMILITARY AND NONECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE WORLD CRISIS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

TESTIMONY OF DEAN ERNEST S. GRIFFITH, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

SEPTEMBER 25, 1962

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WITNESS

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

NONMILITARY AND NONECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE WORLD CRISIS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1962

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m. in room P–58, U.S. Capitol, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will come to order.

We are meeting this morning to receive a report from Dean Ernest S. Griffith, of the School of International Service, the American University, on a series of discussions which were sponsored by his school during the 1961–62 academic year. The discussions centered on the nonmilitary and noneconomic aspects of the world crisis.

Together with other Members of Congress, diplomats, educators, and public officials, I had the privilege of participating in those discussions. I admit that I found the experience stimulating. The issues which we discussed can be summarized in one simple question: "How do we win the nonmilitary contest with communism?"

This is a vital question for our generation and I hope that we will find an answer to it. This morning's meeting—and the hearings which I hope to hold in the future—will be devoted to the pursuit of that answer.

Dean Griffith, we are happy to welcome you this morning. I would suggest that, for the purpose of the record, you first give us the background of the discussions over which you presided, and then provide us with the list of participants as well as with a statement of conclusions reached at the end of the series. Prior to that, if you will forgive me, I would like to ask Congressman Barry if he has any comments at this time?

Mr. BARRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dean Griffith, this is a very propitious occasion that brings us together, and I hope that through these hearings we will be able to record publicly some of the information that was divulged at the meetings which we had with you, and the constructive thought that came forth from those meetings.

I would concur with the chairman that this should be only the beginning of the search for methods to find a peaceful way to combat the Communists.

Dean GRIFFITH. Mr. Congressman, you and Congressman Barry and others of this committee were among the most valued participants in this series. The background is twofold. One is the world view and the other is the immediate occasion that sparked the meetings.

For many years the free world has seemed not to speak with the authentic, united, and impelling voice necessary to win the battle for the minds of men. Opinions differ as to the reasons. The crisis of a liquidating colonialism, our consciousness of the gulf between our own ideals and their practice, divided opinion as to the best foundations for the economic order, have all played at least some part. The achievements of our Judeo-Christian tradition, the strengths of freedom and pluralism, the rise in standards of living and the enrichment of this living, seem somehow to call for an articulation and a dramatization much stronger and clearer than that which has hitherto been forthcoming.

We were fortunate, Mr. Congressman, in having attached to our university for a year and a half the man who has been called the "conscience of the free world," the Honorable Charles Malik, formerly President of the United Nations Assembly, a philosopher of stature and a world statesman.

Professor Malik had thought deeply about these things from his vantage point in the Middle East. He had been troubled that the voice of the free world had not come through in an incisive and commanding fashion. His coming here seemed to some of us to be the occasion to bring together the men in our own country, the statesmen from both branches of the Government who were also thinking about this problem.

So the School of International Service at the American University sponsored a series of dinners. They were off the record as far as the attribution of any views to any individual was concerned.

I have here the summary of the findings of those dinners, which I have the honor to present to you. Present were Assistant Secretaries of State, members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress, Assistant Secretary of Commerce in charge of International Affairs, and many other men from the Government who bear the day-to-day responsibility. These men have felt the impact of this difficulty in making our way of life come through in a fashion that will prove magnetic to the millions of new peoples who are rising to a national consciousness and who are looking for a clear voice and a creed which will correspond to their aspirations.

This is why I present this to you as participants in these discussions.

Mr. FASCELL. Dean, you have a list of all of the participants, do you not?

Dean GRIFFITH. The participant list is furnished here.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, we will submit this list for the record.

(The list of participants follows:)

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN "DISCUSSIONS OF THE NONMILITARY AND NONECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE WORLD CRISIS," SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

[The listing of a person herein carries with it no implication of his approval or disapproval of the statement of conclusions, which appears below in the record of the hearings, either in the entirety or in its individual statements. The listing is designed solely to indicate the level of the participants in the discussions which preceded and formed the basis for the document]

Adair, E. Ross	Representative.
Barry, Robert R	Do.
Broomfield, William S	Do.
Burnstan, Rowland	Formerly Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs.
Caldwell, Oliver	Assistant Commissioner, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Cleveland, Harlan	Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.
Cabot, John M	Ambassador, American Embassy in Warsaw.
Carlson, Frank	Senator.
Denney, George	Staff, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate.
Fascell, Dante B	Representative.
Fisher, Adrian	U.S. Disarmament Administration, Department of State.
Fitzgerald, D. A	Deputy Director of Operations, Agency for International Development.
Good, Robert	Research and Analysis, Department of State.
Griffith, Ernest S	Dean, School of International Service, the American University.
Griswold, Gen. Francis H	Commandant, National War College.
Henderson, Loy W	Professor, the American University; formerly Deputy Under Secretary of State.
Hoskins, Halford	Senior specialist, international relations, Library of Congress.
Hickenlooper, Bourke B	Senator.
Hall, John A	Chief, International Affairs Division, Atomic Energy Commission.
Hays, Brooks	Assistant to the President.
Hyde, Henry V	Director, Division of International Medical Education, Association of American Medical Colleges.
Judd, Walter H	Representative.
Johnson, U. Alexis	Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
Lindsay, Michael F. (Lord Lindsay of Birker).	Professor, the American University.
Lodge, George C	Formerly Assistant Secretary of Labor.
Malik, Charles H	Professor, the American University, former President of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Meyer, Armin H	Ambassador, American Embassy in Beirut.
Morgan, George A	Director, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State.
Ross, Michael	AFL–CIO.
Strom, Carl	Formerly Director, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State.
Savage, Carlton	Policy Planning Board, Department of State.
Scriven, L. E	International Business Operations, Department of Commerce.
Sparkman, John	Senator.
Tubby, Roger	Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
Valeo, Francis	Assistant to the majority leader, U.S. Senate.
Wells, Algie A	Director, Division of International Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission.
Wriggins, Howard	Policy Planning Board, Department of State.

Mr. BARRY. You previously sent this to us and I remember receiving it a little while back.

Dean GRIFFITH. Yes; there are minor changes suggested by certain of the participants which have been incorporated in the final copy.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection the analysis is admitted to the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

IMAGES AND IDEALS IN THE WORLD STRUGGLE—AN ANALYSIS

America is at her day of destiny.

The time for improvisation is running out; the time has come for which only a sustained national purpose will be adequate. We have been a people that knows what it does not want; we confront a world that knows what it does want. This is not good enough. Are we capable of a sense of mission. We believe so.

The surface aspects of the world crisis are clear. We and our closest associates of Western Europe, Japan, and elsewhere are strong and growing stronger economically; we are strong militarily, though relatively not as much so as formerly; we are sufficiently satisfied with our democratic forms of government to allow opposition its prerogative of criticism. We have liberated the diverse areas all over the world for which we have been politically responsible without over much transitional chaos and with a gratifying amount of subsequent good will.

Over against this the Soviet Union is also gaining strength; and in spite of its suppression of liberties and internal stresses and strains, it is at least for the time being proving itself a viable society. Communist China is the great enigma, clearly unstable, but with alternatives not immediately obvious. The captive countries of the Soviet bloc are biding their time, thankful for a certain measure of lessened tension, but with their internal order maintained by party oligarchy sustained in the last analysis by the power of Russia and China.

Everywhere this Communist bloc challenges the free world, courting the merging nations, subverting where it can, threatening where it cannot subvert. We on our part remain for the most part apostles of "containment," confining ourselves to defense, rarely if at all infiltrating our enemy. Yet we must not underrate the long-range effect of our higher standard of living and our freedoms as factors themselves subversive of the enemy.

It is likewise clear that in such a world the outcome of worldwide instabilities will be the critical and probably decisive factor. The core of the NATO group and Russia herself are the only exceptions to such instability. Even nations such as Italy, France, and Japan have large sectors not completely committed to their contemporary freedom and democratic institutions. This means that less than one-quarter of the world's population can claim any real stability.

Points of serious crisis vary almost from day to day. Some—such as Berlin and northern India—are along borders. Others have leaped over borders and range widely in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

We of America are fairly well educated as regards military aspects of the crisis—its balance of terror, the role of alliance, the military in the developing nations, hopefully strong enough to be stabilizing factors domestically, even at the risk of frequent military dictatorships.

We are also approaching a measure of maturity in our economic policies. Clearly, we must import, if we would export; clearly the affluent society must continue its internal dynamism; clearly, our aid to other nations must build for a longer span of time than year by year; and, clearly, such nations must generate their own leadership and act responsibly if satisfactory development is to take place. Their pattern of economic organization, however, is much less certain and therein lies a substantial sector of our uncertainty as to the future.

It is this future that raises questions, and the economic sector is but one part of the larger pattern of uncertainty. What sort of a world will the future hold politically, psychologically, socially, spiritually, as well as, or even more than, economically? Doubts seem not to trouble the Communist mind. On the other hand, we of the free world have become introspective and self-critical, where we are not complacent or defensive. The old rallying cries do not stir much beyond resentment. Such is no mood in which to win the future.

THE NATURE OF CHANGE

We must probe more deeply.

In this probe, the forces of change are the key to understanding, and the decisions made by these peoples in flux as to what they want to become will in all probability provide the decisive force. This will not necessarily be the way of life that we know. On the other hand, it certainly need not be the Communist way. The direction a people is traveling is more important than the situation at any given moment. Will we realize our potential and our obligation at this critical moment?

Perhaps one should start with the observation that few of the world's peoples have a satisfying way of life. With some this dissatisfaction is the byproduct of the introspective mood—a sense that values have somehow been lost. With others, it is the dawning appreciation that the menial and degrading status of their past and present need not be accepted. With those behind the Iron Curtain there is resentment and cynicism that the world as they find it is not the world they have been promised.

In such a confused and contradictory world a bewildering variety of channels of expression compete. A flight to security and a challenge to adventure are alternatives. So also are resentments against the powerful and aspirations to advance. Leadership can go either to those who create psychologically satisfying scapegoats at home or abroad or to those who call for clear and constructive internal effort.

Passive acceptance of the status quo is the one course which is ruled out. There is emerging a kind of revolution for selfhood among the previously disinherited. What constitutes the basic danger is this combination of aspiration and frustration in situations in which expectations for recognition and rising living standards either exceed a nation's potential or call for individual and/or collective effort not readily forthcoming.

We see the expression of these dilemmas in new-found intense nationalisms which bring in their train charismatic leaderships, be they demagogs or messiahs. We see the expression in aspirations for racial equality, in the association of colonialism only with the rule of white over color; in the sometimes pathetic search for elements in a people's history which will give them self-respect of a gigantic scale. This last is a key to much of Russian behavior today as it is to the myths of African grandeur in days past or search for "negritude" as a contribution to the civilization of the future. Internal redistribution of power, as in Cuba, is often a further expression. Foreign ownership of extractive industries is called neocolonialism. There are built-in nationalistic resistances to the imitation of institutions of other nations. Independence by itself is not enough; a viable economy, a viable society, a sense of national significance, with participation in the world of the future are collective elements which are essential to individually satisfying and rational lives. Without the latter, there is no stability; without stability, the world has not achieved its new synthesis.

While the viable alternatives presently available seem to be the Western and the Communist patterns, one must never lose sight of the possibility of further alternatives. Another way of stating this is to suggest that only certain parts of our contemporary society may be identified as having "survival value" in an evolving new order. Stress and strain will attend the transition in any event, but such identification can materially expedite it, and may even produce an inspired leadership to reduce the stress and strain and to produce acceptance of the new elements with hope and faith. Conversely, unworthy and ill-adapted elements of contemporary culture are excess cargo; they should be jettisoned.

Prior to our search for these elements let us attempt a somewhat easier task—to take note of the strengths and weaknesses of communism and of ourselves in the existing situation.

COMMUNISM'S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Communism knows, or at least seems to know, what it wants; its steady gains have yet to be arrested; it has power; it offers a specious though appealing explanation to the masses with grievances, as to the reasons for their unfair and frustrated lot. It channels their resentments against those previously in power, exposing inequities and frustration, racial and economic. Hatred is turned into political channels; street mobs and guerrillas are the instruments thereof. Exploitation of nationalism against "enemies" allied with the West is a transparent device to weaken the latter and gain friends for itself in international

circles. As for the day of "takeover," it can afford to wait. Meanwhile the intellectuals are softened by a vision of a "never-never land", of a classless society, in which they are at long last to be the deserving leaders. No inhibitions restrain the blackening distortion of the image of the West in general and the United States in particular. Finally communism offers participation in a world movement which gives a sense of significance and belonging to its devotees. Hence at one time it appeals to resentments, desire for security, and the search for recognition.

The weaknesses of communism are most apparent when practice is compared with promise. It has lost sight of its ideal goals as it furiously pursues its subversive means. Resentments in the long run are not enough to build a viable society. Periodic purges, even in the posthumous downgrading of Stalin, cannot indefinitely provide enough scapegoats for dissatisfied and frustrated lives. External enemies will serve only so far. Zones banned to thought arouse curiosity and skepticisms not only in youth. The starving Chinese millions cannot live on padded statistics. The atheism of communism outrages one of the deepest sides of human nature. The bureaucratic centralism of the Soviet Union is far from the promised utopia, even though economic progress thereunder is undeniable. Stresses and strains between its two giants can no longer be concealed.

It is surely worth noting that no people has ever chosen communism by democratic processes. In other words, its all too apparent defects; its pseudoeconomic and pseudophilosophical logic; its double moral standard, which justified the enforced captivity of Hungary and condemned the American activity in behalf of a free Cuba; its reduction of labor unions to party vassals; its forced socialized rural collectives; its misuses and distortion of the concepts of peace and democracy; above all, its violations of individual dignity and its willingness to employ any means to attain an alleged goal which turns into a mirage before attainment—these have not passed unobserved. But this is not the heart of the picture. Its strength remains that of a dedicated, organized minority that will stop at nothing to obtain and to keep power.

AMERICA'S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Because this paper is concerned primarily with the United States, it is worth probing thoughtfully and deeply into our weaknesses before turning to our strengths.

We have been not unwilling to make fairly substantial sacrifices, but the picture we have conveyed in so doing is unclear except in its anti-Communist aspects. Where a people was fortunate enough to have an enlightened group in power, we helped, but we also helped and are still helping oligarchies corrupt and otherwise. These latter situations give the Soviet Union its chance to associate itself with the exploited masses. Granted the dilemma, we must still not be surprised at the confusion. The new Alliance for Progress program in Latin America will be watched closely in this regard. Moreover, we have chosen to compete largely in military and economic terms, in both spheres of which the image of the Soviet Union is attaining some measure of equality—matching scientific achievement and rapidity of economic growth with our earlier nuclear preponderance and far higher standard of living.

Equally serious are the unlovely elements in our national life. These do not need the aid the Soviet Union lends to make themselves known. Our press and movies, oversea advertising, radio and television take care of this. So do many Americans overseas—luxury-loving, blatant, undisciplined, and morally lax. Our greatest literature today is largely critical, even to a preoccupation with the portrayal of decadence. Our pragmatism is running out and we often are just plain boring to other peoples for want of thought. Ethical relativism is rampant and breeds indecision. We are pictured as money mad, materialistic, crime ridden, and corrupt. In part, these elements are what other people want to believe about us because their own self-respect leaves them jealous of our strength and humiliated by their need for our aid. We ourselves hesitate to claim the power of the other and better side of our national life, for fear of appearing self-righteous. Hence we find ourselves far too often not merely unloved but manifesting a way of life singularly unattractive and uninspiring to the idealists and intellectuals who provide much of the leadership in the uncommitted world. To these intellectuals in particular we have had little appeal, for few of us are capable of discussing ideas as such.

A number of other weaknesses may be given at least passing mention. We have not succeeded as we should have in achieving reasonable solidarity and mutual confidence with our allies. We do not use organized labor enough in our

unofficial international contacts. We cling to outmoded international legalities, in the presence of an overriding need for identifying and associating ourselves with those whose aspirations and ideals are similar to our own. We have no worldwide organization paralleling the cells and cadres of the Communist Party. It is debatable whether we can or should meet this by similar organizations. Our idealism is too soft. Our leadership has yet to prove itself adequate. Where ideas exist, they are often chaotic. We have too much been busybodies dealing with the problems of the moment; and not enough the statesmen with long-range sustained planning and programs. We do not have enough able, dedicated people for the jobs to be done. Our treatment of the Negro leaves us vulnerable. We appear defensive, seeking only to contain communism, not to roll it back.

Finally, at least until recently, we seem to have lost our sense of mission. This is the most serious lack of all, for the world badly needs a sense of strength, adequacy, and zeal. We do not know the kind of society we want to build at home. How can we have a sense of direction abroad? It is not enough to say that we want a pluralistic society. We do, but within limits. There must be certain great, unifying, underlying values, which we care about greatly and out of which can be sustained our mission to the world. These we do not appear to have, or, at least, few of us are sufficiently conscious of them to render them articulate or to dramatize them with compelling force.

On the other hand, we possess elements of great strength, independent of any strength that is ours because of contrasts with the weaknesses of communism. Communists to the contrary, it is clear to most peoples that we threaten the freedom of no one. We are friendly people; clearly also a compassionate people. We have an open society, in which organized activity freely flourishes—cultural, religious, social, economic. Were the world not threatened by the monolithic drive of totalitarianism, this relaxed society would prove greatly attractive. We are enormously strong in our economic resources, thus constituting a reservoir out of which flows an unprecedented stream of aid to others. Government by consent of the governed, the zest for adventure and the tolerance that makes it possible, the discipline that conquers nature by obeying truth—these we have in large measure. We have kept our faith in liberty—that individuals will do cooperatively and freely what the Communists believe can only be done under the lash in a closed society. Surely our religious faith may well be our greatest strength of all, with its individualism and universalism; its dynamism and the magnetism of the life it inspires at its best. In these matters we are not alone. The free nations of Western Europe and the Commonwealth are our companions in arms, in mind, in spirit.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE

It is at this point that we ask the question, "What more must we do?" There was not complete agreement at this point among those participating. A few would say that it was presumptuous on our part to do any more than to assure other people we would continue our cooperation with them insofar as they desired independence. Beyond this, it was for them to work out their own life in their own way. Naturally we wanted a peaceful world; we wanted a prosperous world; and we would always be against change by force, though not against change as such. We are anticolonial and anti-imperialist. Officially we are striving for racial equality. These are high objectives and they have not been without their success. Mutual security is more than a phrase in these respects.

But are they enough? The majority were inclined to doubt it.

What kind of world do we really want the future to hold? Can we derive a sense of mission from the answer to this? Surely it must be a world of steadily rising standards of living, but most assuredly it must be more than this. If we could picture the elements of such a world, then the building of it—in America and everywhere—could be the mission, the sense of which we so badly need. It will be a world of the open society; it will be a world of cultural diversity—but here again it must be much more. What are the universal values around which we shall seek to have men rally? The world's ferment is far more than a protest against low economic level. It is a revolution for selfhood—for dignity without racial overtones; for education; for individual landownership and free trade unions; for room at the top for those who would serve; for free inquiry; for exalting of intellectual and spiritual leaders; for the use of science for man's freedom and not his terror; for the right to criticize and change those in power, if they betray men; for men's fulfillment of aspirations. Only on these can a satisfying society be based—and this holds true for those behind the Iron Curtain as well, when once they are free. These are ancient values, but in a new setting, phrased in new terms, and on a scale beyond all precedent. Freedom is truly a prerequisite

without which the other values have little chance. To its attainment all over the world we must dedicate our best. Its depths are inexhaustible. Yet by itself it is not enough.

Even more than the freedom of man, the fulfillment of man's personality must be at the heart of our Nation. Such fulfillment is possible only in freedom, but freedom does not guarantee it. Fulfillment comes in the realization in contemporary terms of the great ideals of the Judeo-Greek-Roman-Western culture; the unlocking of knowledge and far-reaching inquiry and experiment to fulfill man's zest for adventure, his insatiable curiosity; music and art, drama and ballet, literature—all of these for the masses as well as for the chosen few—to fulfill man's unquenchable love of beauty, his desire for creativity, his expression of laughter and tragedy, of aspiration and wonder; vigorous and healthy athletic combat and teamplay, enjoyment of the forest, desert, mountain, and sea, to fulfill man's physical destiny, as well as to give him sanity, humor, clarity of mind, a sense of inner well-being; free cooperation in constructive community and nation building, to fulfill man's incorrigible desire for participation and belonging, for responsible association and achievement; humanitarianism, sensitivity to others, each in one's own way, to fulfill man's inborn desire to serve and sympathize; finally the spirituality which fulfills life's quest for meaning and provides strength for the task—these lie at the heart of our potential world mission. These challenge us beyond all imagining. We and our associates can come to these peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and to our own people with these goals clearly in our mind and the responses in theirs. We shall aline ourselves wholeheartedly with the best aspiration of their revolutions as well as their traditions, thereby offering them, not independence alone, but a sense of fellowship and understanding between equals—as partners in a future both good and great. Together we can work out and articulate new concepts of virtue for a new age. On the homefront, idealism, humanism, the world of ideas, the realm of faith must cleanse our own national life before it is too late.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Barry, do you have any questions either on the summary or anything the Dean has said?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. I notice on page 3 of the analysis that this is a finding or a conclusion. Passive acceptance of the status quo, speaking of the free world versus communism, is the one course ruled out by everyone.

Dean GRIFFITH. That is correct. There was no one present satisfied with what we were now doing. There were a number present who were optimistic as to the course of events, but felt that more should be done.

Mr. BARRY. Would you yield?

Mr. FASCELL. Certainly.

Mr. BARRY. The thing that I gleaned from those meetings more especially than anything else was the fact that we as a nation didn't seem to have a creed or that there was no one single thing we seemed to believe in.

Mr. FASCELL. We couldn't identify our purpose?

Mr. BARRY. Yes; and more especially that we are often misunderstood in a world where another nation such as the Soviet Union has a doctrine and a creed to which they hang with tenacity and fight for with their lives.

Therefore, we are at sea, as it were, and there they are plowing a course right on through the ocean with their mast high where all can see it.

This is the picture that I got from one of the meetings that we held, and I know that we talked at some length about this and Mr. Malik was very certain that what we needed was certain beliefs about ourselves and then finally if we could come to some concrete proposal that we would present to the world that this we would stand for and

this we would fight for and this we are going to press for, for today, for tomorrow, and for the next generation. Is that correct?

Dean GRIFFITH. You have stated it completely correctly, not merely for the meetings at which you were present, but the other dinners. In part this was because we in the United States had too much taken for granted what made us what we are; we have not been able to phrase this in such a fashion that it is regarded as relevant to the world of the future. In these dinners we have done something along this line, and I think this comes through in the report. In the past, we have dramatized liberty. We have been less successful in dramatizing our thought in this country that we do not want to center authority in one place, but we want to disperse it, that our democratic way of life requires activity of many groups. It is difficult to convince nations, newer nations particularly, that that is part of a free society.

Mr. FASCELL. Dean, in this analysis on the bottom of page 3, in discussing the nature of the change, I raise a question on this sentence: "Conversely, unworthy and ill-adapted elements of contemporary culture are excess cargo. They should be jettisoned." It seemed to me a rather unusual statement. I wonder just what it means?

Dean GRIFFITH. That there are elements in our national life—and each person present might give a different list—which are very definite handicaps to us in other nations.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you mean, for example, we have too many automobiles and too many refrigerators and we live too high on the hog, as one example?

Dean GRIFFITH. That is one example. Another example would be some of the pictures of American life given in our movies. Another would be our juvenile delinquency. The blockades to more reasonable human treatment on an equal basis of minority groups would be regarded as a handicap.

Mr. FASCELL. The discussion on this statement points up one of the problems I have with this analysis even though I agree with the statement.

How do we do it? This is what worries me, not only with respect to just the issues we are talking about now, but with respect to the entire conclusion of this series of meetings.

The question I have on the whole analysis—and believe me, I think it is an excellent one, it is a fine place from which to start. What doesn't satisfy me, and gives rise to the frustration found to exist in the analysis is that we don't have an answer on what to do and how to do it.

Is this a conclusion of the analysis itself?

Dean GRIFFITH. I think not. I think the analysis would indicate that its kind of thinking, if it reaches the leadership of the country in the press, in government, in labor, in business, in the churches, would be effective; that we do have a leadership that would like to lead and that once the nature of the problem is understood and expressed by our leaders, our people will rally.

We have rallied in the past. We can rally in the present and there are many signs that we are so doing.

Mr. FASCELL. I agree with that, but now in reviewing this analysis, for example, we have a predicate, we discuss the nature of the change, we discuss communism's strengths and weaknesses. We talk about American strength and weaknesses, and we talk about the challenge

of the future, and then we stop it seems to me. I am left with the feeling that there is still more to be done. That is the reason for these hearings and why I think that this subcommittee is going to have to do a great deal more work. The frustration, as I see it, is that we need to have spelled out, if you will, if that is possible—I don't even know that it is possible—but we need to have spelled out what to do and how to do it before you can say we will rally around the leadership.

This is the way it seems to me. I think that this series of discussions and this study brings us to that point now of exploring further what needs to be done and how to do it. Is that a fair statement?

Dean GRIFFITH. Yes; the strategy and tactics of the cure were not within the sphere of——

Mr. FASCELL. That is what I wanted to make clear for the record. I thought that was the case but I wasn't sure I had it.

Dean GRIFFITH. There is in this report a great deal of meat, perhaps a deeper diagnosis according to the opinion of many people who have read this than has appeared elsewhere, and in the diagnosis itself the report does call attention to the elements of national life which are handicaps.

It calls attention to the national policies which, if pursued further or more clearly, would help us. Perhaps if there is any one conclusion, it is that we should as a people aline ourselves with the aspirations of the revolutions all over the world which coincide with the values of our own Revolution.

If there is one conclusion that is it, and this alinement will be accomplished day by day by Americans overseas and by Americans here in their national life and their national policy. However, you are quite correct, Mr. Congressman, in saying that there is no blueprint for specific action here. It was outside the sphere of the group.

Mr. FASCELL. I think the thing that was impressive is the fact that there seemed to be such unanimity with respect to this diagnosis. I think that is important.

For example, the reaching of an agreement that the status quo is just an impossible situation, I think that is important. I think it is vital to any discussion of this problem. The conclusion that adherence to the status quo constitutes a basic danger in situations in which expectations for recognition, rising living standards, and so forth prevail—I think this is important. But where do we go from there? This is the crux of the entire frustration that confronts us Americans in the free world.

Then over on page 5 in the discussion of America's strengths and weaknesses, this conclusion is arrived at, I am sure, again unanimously, "we appear defensive, seeking only to contain communism, not to roll it back." That is a tremendous conclusion in my judgment, to be arrived at by this kind of a varied group.

Dean GRIFFITH. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt just a minute?

Mr. FASCELL. Certainly.

Dean GRIFFITH. We are not justified in saying that any one sentence in the report was unanimously agreed upon. Each spokesman, each participant, understood that allowing his name to go forward did not mean that he gave his blessing to every sentence there. I think that it is important to recognize this.

Mr. FASCELL. I am glad you made that clear for the record.

Dean GRIFFITH. We do not say that portions were not unanimous, but we must safeguard the people who participated.

Mr. BARRY. The document is very much such as a rapporteur would collate after a meeting.

Dean GRIFFITH. Yes. It is not a manifesto signed by the participants; it is a report of the discussion and the ideas which on the whole met with acceptance.

Mr. FASCELL. I am glad that you corrected my inaccurate use of the word and, of course, what you stated is the case and the record should properly reflect that.

Dean GRIFFITH. It is fair to say that those points which you made met with general agreement. I am not in a position to say that they met with universal agreement because I do not know.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Barry.

Mr. BARRY. I just wanted to point out that we had these deliberations prior to the time of the Cuban crisis, at least prior to the military crisis that we now face insofar as Cuba is concerned. At the time we were trying to find a doctrine that could be easily understood and I think someone brought up the four freedoms as a basic creed that anyone in the world could understand.

I wonder in view of recent happenings in Cuba if we haven't really gone contrary to everything that we thought was the most important in these deliberations; namely, that we stick to some doctrine that is firm—that the rest of the world understands—a simple doctrine that we already have, but are not enforcing: "Anything to do with the Western Hemisphere, Europe, keep your hands off."

This has been credo for a century and a half. Are we even willing to discuss Cuba with Russia? Will we even answer Russia on a Cuban matter? If we just said we won't even discuss anything in the Western Hemisphere with Russia, we would be living up to our doctrine.

Now we say, "Oh, we are not going to be aggressive toward Cuba. We are just not going to let them be aggressive toward us. We reason with Russia and by virtue of just reasoning itself we are slipping away from a doctrine which, so far as the rest of the world, was understood: "Keep your hands off the Western Hemisphere." What do you think of that, sir?

Dean GRIFFITH. You are, of course, asking me a question rather than asking the question of the group. This was not before the group.

My own view is that we must decide Cuba in Western Hemisphere terms. We are in a certain difficulty here because necessarily we have now learned that our welfare is tied up with the whole world and not merely the Western Hemisphere, and the Soviet might if we said this say, "All right, you keep out of our part of the world."

Mr. BARRY. They say that all of the time anyway.

Mr. FASCELL. That was their whole purpose for going into Cuba. I want to say that this is an intriguing subject, of course, and absolutely vital to our existence.

I know that has concerned me as an individual Congressman and I have been here 8 years. I have tried to analyze for myself what the problem was. I early came to the conclusion that "the struggle" was the nonmilitary struggle and we better win it. I spent some considerable time in analyzing what, if anything, the U.S. Government has done about this subject.

That individual study will be expanded into the hearings of this committee. While not arriving at any formal conclusions so as not

to preempt what we are about to do here, I will say I have some fixed opinions about the strategy necessary. I am going to reserve those fixed opinions until I have had the opportunity to complete hearings on this subject.

I believe firmly in the diagnosis which is arrived at by your excellent study. It is very timely and vital. I think that the necessary followup now must take place and if it is at all possible to reach any kind of judgment with respect to what needs to be done and how it should be done, then I think we ought to do it. This is absolutely essential.

Mr. BARRY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Dean Griffith if he has had occasion since the preparation of this document to reflect individually as to the course of the Nation?

Dean GRIFFITH. I do little else but that. I do not think that personally there would be any basic modification in the analysis in the document on my part. I feel we have a military stalemate, which is what it is, a stalemate which is rapidly approaching the time in which both of the great powers have what you know is referred to as the capacity for overkill—in other words, neither can really do much more than it is doing in the way of preparation to annihilate the other and the rest of the world. We are in a situation in which I believe we are presently winning on the economic front, but the Soviet still has some cards to play there and will play them at points of difficulty for us.

The great trouble is that once the Soviet has taken captive a country, we have not found a way to reverse that. In other words, we have been content not to infiltrate, not to try to overthrow the countries within the Soviet orbit. This then leaves the nonmilitary, the noneconomic as the great battleground, and we of the free world must speak and act in terms that are understandable to the new peoples of Africa, to those of Asia who have obtained nationhood, and very much to the ones that are on the threshold of revolution of some sort in Latin America—peaceful and democratic we hope—but the experience of Cuba would indicate that that was not necessarily so.

Mr. FASCELL. I think you have put your finger on the main point. Future studies of this subcommittee will be directed toward the necessity and the strategy of winning the nonmilitary war.

Mr. BARRY. I think it could be said that there was no nation that had so much U.S. capital poured into it, that had "modernity" in every sense of the word, as Cuba, and yet here we have the reverse of everything that we have thought we were doing when we did what we did.

Dean GRIFFITH. But if the capital does not reach the masses, if the assistance from the United States is not identified in the minds of the ordinary men as having come from us, if his aspiration for an education, for a free labor union, for individual landownership, for these things which have characterized our revolution in this country, if these do not reach him, he sees our foreign aid only as aiding the oligarchy that runs his country and is exploiting him.

Mr. BARRY. Well, we are familiar with the rakeoff at the top in Cuba. We are familiar with the corruption of the Batista government. We know that.

Dean GRIFFITH. I know.

Mr. BARRY. However, notwithstanding that rakeoff at the top, Cuba had a higher standard of living than most of the islands of the Caribbean and most of the countries of South America, and in fact in some of the villages of Cuba that I have been in I thought that they lived very well.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Barry, the point is that, notwithstanding that, there is communism in Cuba.

Mr. BARRY. That is what I am saying. What I am trying to get at, in other words, is that it is not just the economic and this gets right again into——

Mr. FASCELL. I don't think that is a fair statement, is it, because you never know at what level? What level are you going to say is satisfactory?

Mr. BARRY. The point we are making in some of the meetings is that it is not the economic alone because if we concentrate solely on just lifting the standard of living, we have had good proof right down in Cuba where we didn't do it as a government, we did it through modern industry; the ideal way is to plow our private capital into a country, which we did.

Mr. FASCELL. I think the analysis makes that very clear; am I correct?

Dean GRIFFITH. Absolutely. That it is not simply the economic; it is perhaps not even primarily the economic. It is the recognition of the individual person in our tradition, as we would put it, as a child of God——

Mr. BARRY. When we walk in, we don't talk these things in these countries, and we can't.

Mr. FASCELL. Of course, that raises another area for the future studies of this subcommittee. We are going to deal with that question and that is how to properly motivate the other people to the principles in which we believe.

I think this is part of the overall problem. Whether we have done it or not; whether the institutions which we now have in the United States are doing the job; whether they were ever designed to do the job—this is all within the scope of what we hope to study.

Once again, Dean, I want to thank you for having taken the time and the initiative to start these meetings; to compile the analysis which is the predicate for a subject in which this subcommittee is very vitally interested and deals with the future of every American and the entire free world.

Dean GRIFFITH. I do appreciate, Mr. Chairman, the courtesy of this hearing, your interest and that of the other members of the committee in this, and to say that it seems to me that you could not have selected a more important field for our consideration.

Mr. FASCELL. We, of course, agree with you. I think that what we will do as a starter will be to pull out the analysis of this group with your permission and make some kind of a print of it. This then will be available to anybody upon whom we will call in the future for either the subcommittee hearings or for their own use.

This subcommittee will undertake to do that much as a starter. At this point I don't know how much we can do in the balance of this year. Looking forward to the fact that both Mr. Barry and myself will be back in the next Congress——

Mr. BARRY. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. We will start off then.

Mr. BARRY. I hope this will be the forerunner, Dean, of many such group studies over the Nation. This is not something centered in Washington. This is something that everyone in our country can be putting his time and efforts toward in neighborhood groups and college groups and certainly it isn't confined just to the United States. It should extend to the entire free world and somehow, some way perhaps we will come up with a little something that might help in the direction of a peaceful but a secure world.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.)

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