GOV
Y4
.P31
P31/PT. 6

GOVERNMENT
Storage

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO

KSU LIBRARIES
A11400 821441

PART 6

JANUARY 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, AND 21, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO

PART 6

JANUARY 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, AND 21, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

79716

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina
JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1– 399	1– 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401– 982	1059– 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983–1583	2587– 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585–2063	4195– 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065–2492	5461– 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493–2920	6647– 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921–3378	7889– 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8	3379–3927	9108–10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929–4599	10518–12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601–5151	12278–13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153–5560	13709–14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements.

Names of Witnesses in All Proceedings Regarding the Pearl Harbor Attack

Keyed to Pages of the Original Transcripts, Represented in These Volumes by Numerals in Italics Enclosed in Brackets, Except Witnesses Before Joint Committee

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Allen, Brooke E., Maj	203–209							
Allen, Riley H			3105–3120					
Anderson, Edward B., Maj						64		
Anderson, Ray			2479–2491					
Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm		391–398						
Anstey, Alice			4022–4027					
Arnold, H. H., Gen			148–186					
Asher, N. F., Ens	1127–1138							
Ball, N. F., Ens	1033–1038							
Ballard, Emma Jane			2567–2580					
Barber, Bruce G			3972–3988					
Bartlett, George Francis			2492–2515					
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr	1719–1721							
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm								5269–5291
Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens	1219–1224							
Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm								3814–3826
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm	886–951	115–134	1575–1643	660–688			471–510	3450–3519
Benny, Chris J	1382–1399							
Benson, Henry P			3720–3749					
Berquist, Kenneth P., Col	377–389		1186–1220					
Berry, Frank M., S 1/c	1224–1229							
Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen						194		
Bicknell, George W., Col	314–320		1413–1442			59–63		5089–5122
Bissell, John T., Col					1, 2			

Bloch, Claude C., Adm	733–812	2–29, 86–96	1469–1537	385A–417				
Boone, Gilbert E., Lt. Comdr							554–557, 607–608	
Bothne, A. M., Btswn	1181–1185							
Bragdon, John S., Brig. Gen			2894–2922, 3831–3884					
Brainard, Roland M., Vice Adm		399–403						
Bratton, Rufus, Col			T.S. 54–96, 227–244, 278–308		1	206–208		4508–4628
Brenchman, Albert L	520–527							
Briant, Granville C., Comdr		229–233						
Brooks, H. E., Lt. Col			974–994					
Brotherhood, F. M., Lt. Comdr				919A–930			143–147	
Brown, Wilson, Rear Adm	1241–1259	135–146						
Brunner, Gertrude C			2216–2221					
Bryden, William, Maj. Gen			898–909					
Bunkley, Joel W., Rear Adm		413–415						
Burgin, Henry T., Maj. Gen	268–283		2598–2664					
Burr, Harold S., Comdr			3067–3073				376–386	
Burton, H. Ralph			848–896					
Butler, Bernard	1753–1765							
Butterfield, James W			4103–4121					
Calhoun, W. L., Vice Adm	951–960	225–228		931–946				
Capron, W. A., Col			2015–2030					
Carmichael, W. A., Lt. Col			4015–4021					
Caulfield, Frances M			143–144					
Chun, Philip Chew			3258–3265					
Clarke, Chester R			3623–3636					
Claterbos, Louis J., Col			4095–4103					
Clausen, Henry C., Lt. Col								4300–4508
Coll, Raymond S			3166–3184					
Colton, Roger B., Maj. Gen			670–696					
Combs, R. E			2427–2455					
Conant, Joseph M., Lt. (jg)							158–162	
Connolly, Thomas E			2158–2198					
Cooper, Howard F., Maj	473–478		2130–2133					

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col	478–483, 301–310							
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)								5080–5089
Crosley, Paul C., Comdr		179–184						
Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)	1171–1178							
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN		105–114						
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN	1178–1180							
Davidson, Howard C., Maj. Gen	1659–1663, 170–198		4125–4151					
Davis, Arthur C., Rear Adm		96–105						
Dawson, Harry L						87–B		
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen						205		
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm	812–843, 1538–1571	74–85	1695–1732	495–510			163–181	
Dickens, June D., Sgt	504–509		2745–2785					
Dillingham, Walter F			4186–4196					
Dillon, James P								3826–3838
Dillon, John H., Maj			3190–3201					
Dingeman, Ray E., Col			1928–1965					
Donegan, William Col	2–32					B223–224		
Doud, Harold, Col						B65–66		
Dunlop, Robert H., Col	365–368					B229–231		
Dunning, Mary J						49–51		
Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, Col							418–423	
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN			3642–3643					
Earle, Frederick M., W/O								
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN	1747–1753	368–378					451–464	

Ebey, Frank W., Capt., USA	437–442							
Edgers, Dorothy							511–514	
Eichelberger, Leslie E	1286–1295							
Elliott, George E., Sgt			994–1014	644–659				5027–5075
Emanuel, Theodore, Ch/S. C						183–184		
Evans, Joseph K., Col						83		
Fabian, Rudolph J., Comdr							68–79	
Farthing, W. E., Brig. Gen			832–848					
Ferguson, Homer, Hon			4385–4408					
Fielder, Kendall J., Col	287–301, 311–313, 1670–1682		2943–3010			B41–42, 190–193		
Finnegan, Joseph, Capt., USN							424–427	
Fitch, Aubrey W., Vice Adm		288–290						
Flannery, Harry W			2516–2522					
Fleming, Robert J., Jr., Col			1254–1343					
Flood, William F., Brig. Gen			2848–2865					
Freeman, Frederick L., Lt., USN							149–150	
French, Edward F., Col	1842–1847		186–206		1	B81–82		
Friedman, William F					1, 2		515–528	
Fuqua, Samuel G., Lt. Comdr	1025–1033							
Furbush, Edward A			4338–4345					
Furlong, William R., Rear Adm	960–975							
Gabrielson, William A	1296–1310							
Gailey, Charles K., Jr., Gen			145–147			B80		
Gerow, Leonard T., Maj. Gen	1848–1860		4224–4338		1	B198–200		983–1048, 1592–1673
Gesler, Earl E., Col			932–964					
Gibson, Ernest W., Lt. Col			T. S. 271–277		1			
Glover, Robert O., Capt., USN		170–178						
Grafe, Paul			2288–2320					
Graves, Sidney C			4346–4355					
Grew, Joseph C			4197–4223	1062–1069				560–603, 615–773
Griffith, Edwin St. J	517–520							
Hain, Robert W., Lt. Col			3304–3355, 3650–3661					
Hall, Mobley, Sgt	428–437							
Halsey, William F., Vice Adm	978–1025	293–307						

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept				1070–1076				
Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen			2030–2090					
Harrington, Cyril J			3957–3971					
Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator								4797–4828
Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen			241–274					
Heard, William A., Capt., USN				461–469				
Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA	1571–1574							
Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen			207–240			212–213		
Hill, William H., Senator			2934–2942					
Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN						100–101		
Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr						182		
Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col	1664–1670							
Hornbeck, Stanley K				763–772				
Horne, Walter Wilton			2200–2214					
Howard, Jack W., Col	469–473		1914–1917					
Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr							428–432	
Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN						100–101		
Hull, Cordell								403–457, 551–560, 605–615, 5367–5415 [1]
Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c							414–417	
Hunt, John A., Col			745–778					
Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm		417–430		816–851				4221–4300
Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm								26–34, 36–38, 40–49, 55–73, 75–79, 82–92,

								99–106, 113–118, 122–125, 130–138, 143–144, 146–148, 151–152, 154–155, 157–165, 172–196, 198–231
Jensen, Clarence G., Col						54–55		
Judd, H. P	1329–1333							
Kaminsky, Harold, Lt. Comdr	1722–1738							
Karig, Walter, Comdr							80–86	
Katz, Benjamin, Comdr		29–31, 54–55						
Kay, Harold T			3931–3951					
Kelley, Welbourn, Lt., USNR							80–86	
Kestly, J. J., Lt. Col			3666–3677					
Kimball, George P., Lt (jg), USNR	1507–1524							
Kimball, Richard K	1494–1506							
Kimmel, Husband E., Rear Adm	529–640, 660–733, 1469–1488, 1538–1571, 1744–1747, S1–S226		1734–1814	273–385, 1121–1135				2497–2663, 2701–2915
King, Edgar, Brig. Gen			2696–2707					
King, H. J			2524–2566					
King, William, Capt., USA			4453–4485					
Kingman, Howard F., Rear Adm		335–337						
Kingman, John J., Brig. Gen			543–568					
Kitts, Williard A., III, Rear Adm		185–194		511–527				
Klatt, Lowell V., Sgt	463–469		1454–1467					
Kogan, Mary B			1673–1677					
Kramer, A. D., Comdr				950–987			128–139, 576–596	3893–4221

[1]Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN								5555–5560
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen					1			
Landreth, J. L., Ens	1146–1156							
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/O						103		
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col	1156–1171							
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC							541–553	
Lawton, William S., Col	4–32		2665–2695					
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN	1068–1095	214–225	3028–3067	904–918		107–112	182–292	4829–4909
Leahy, William D., Adm								341–368
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm		363–367						
Lewis, Fulton, Jr			1161–1185					
Litell, S. H	1272–1285							
Locey, Frank H			2787–2802					
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA			1014–1034	628–643				
Lorence, Walter E., Col			1678–1694					
Lumsden, George, Maj			3226–3250					
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN	500–504							
Lynch, Paul J			2362–2374					
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr				734–740			140–142	
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen						186		
Marshall, George C., Gen	1793–1805		2–54	852–885		219–222		1049–1439,
			T. S. 2–52, 192–226					1499–1541, 5175–5200
Marston, Morrill W., Col			3126–3152			102		
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen	320–352, 1648–1659		1816–1913					

Martin, H. M., Comdr	1206–1212							
Martin, Howard W., Capt., USA						227–228		
Martin, John M			2321–2353					
Mason, Redfield, Capt., USN							68–79	
Mayfield, Irving H., Capt., USN	1039–1068	308–313					558–575	
McBriarty, Raymond F., Pvt	490–495							
McCarthy, William J., Col	442–452		1918–1928					
McCollum, Arthur N., Capt., USN							10–42	3381–3448
McCormick, L. D., Rear Adm		66–73						
McCrea, John, Capt., USN		273–278						
McDonald, Joseph P., T/4			4152–4163					
McKee, John L., Brig. Gen			56–90					
McKee, Robert Eugene			2398–2425					
McKenney, Margaret						57–58		
McMorris, C. H., Rear Adm	843–854	233–249	2866–2893	886–902			293–334	
Meurlott, Byron M., Maj	1574–1578		3918–3925			98		
Midkiff, Frank E			2803–2832					
Midkiff, John H			2833–2846					
Miles, Sherman, Maj. Gen			91–132F		1	214–216		776–982, 1360–1375, 1541–1583
Minkler, Rex W., Col						217–218		
Mollison, James A., Brig. Gen			790–832					
Moody, George H			3184–3189					
Murphy, Vincent R., Capt., USN		195–204						
Murray, Allan A., Lt. Comdr							433–441	
Murray, Maxwell, Maj. Gen	259–268		3075–3104					
Newton, J. H., Vice Adm		314–323						
Nimitz, C. W., Adm				947–948				
Noyes, Leigh, Rear Adm				1026–1051			153–157	4710–4792
Nurse, Howard B., Lt. Col			3996–4012					
O'Dell, Robert H., Lt., USA			4504–4514		1			
Osmun, Russell A., Brig. Gen			133–142					
Outerbridge, William W., Capt., USN							87–96	
Parker, Maurice G			3775–3795					
Pefley, Alfred R., Maj	1587–1594							
Pering, Alfred V., Lt. Comdr				812–815			148	
Perliter, Simon			3695–3719					
Petrie, Lester	1357–1367		2708–2721					

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col						45–46		
Phelan, John, Ens								5210
Phillips, Walter C., Col	212–247, 284–287		1107–1160, 1240–1252	477–495				4933–5009
Pickett, Harry K., Col	1584–1594							
Pierson, Millard, Col			3636–3640					
Pine, Willard B			2375–2398, 3990–3996					
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov	1340–1356		3153–3165					
Powell, Bolling R., Jr., Maj			2923–2933					
Powell, C. A., Col	352–365, 395–415, 428		3885–3915			179–181	387–388	
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr				9–11, 271–272, 572–573, 1081–1082, 1136–1137, 1151–1152				
Prather, Louise						232		
Pratt, John S., Col			1968–1988					
Pye, William S., Vice Adm	1766–1783, 855–884	147–169	1035–1070	417–446				
Rafter, Case B			778–789					
Raley, Edward W., Col						76–77		
Ramsey, Logan C., Capt., USN				578–608				
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm				1091–1108				

Reierstad, Leo, Lt. Comdr							158–162	
Renchard, George W						202		
Reybold, Eugene, Maj. Gen			568–634					
Richards, Robert B., Col			730–745					
Richardson, J. O., Adm				1052–1061				253–340
Roberts, Owen J., Mr. Justice								3259–3303
Robins, Thomas K., Maj. Gen			697–728					
Robinson, Bernard L., Col			3588–3623, 3803–3827					
Rochefort, Joseph John, Capt., USN	1096–1123	207–213	1644–1672	470–476		43–44, 52–53	43–67, 541–553	4672–4710
Rohl, Hans William			2222–2287					
Ross, Mary L						70–71		
Row, Lathe B., Col			2092–2129					
Rowlett, Frank B., Lt. Col						67, 225–226		
Rudolph, Jacob H., Brig. Gen	198–202		1221–1240					
Russell, Henry D., Maj. Gen			4362–4366					
Russell, John E						85–86, 87–B		
Sadtler, Otis K., Col			T. S. 246–259		1, 2	209–211		4628–4659
Safford, L. F., Capt., USN		355–362	T. S. 109–191	744–761			97–127, 529–540, 609–612	3555–3813, 3842–3893
Saltzman, Stephen G., Lt., USA	455–463							
Scanlon, Martin F., Brig. Gen			4164–4186					
Schlesinger, Helen			3287–3304					
Schley, Julian L., Maj. Gen			635–669					
Schuirmann, R. E., Rear Adm		404–412		194–218, 311–318, 692–732				
Schukraft, Robert E., Col						201		4910–4933
Schulz, Lester Robert, Comdr								4659–4672
Settle, F. A	1579–1583							
Shaw, C. H., CH/T	1138–1146							
Shirley, J. P			2354–2360					
Shivers, Robert L	1401–1447		3201–3225			88–96		
Shoemaker, James M. Capt., USN	1191–1205							
Shoemaker, Thomas B			4366–4383					

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Short, Arthur T			3644–3650					
Short, Walter C., Maj. Gen	37–169, 1617–1647		276–541, 4411–4445	220–270				2921–3231
Shortt, Creed, Pvt	452–455							
Sisson, George A			3265–3286					
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN							4–9	
Smith, Ralph C., Maj. Gen					2	69		
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen						195–197		
Smith, William W., Rear Adm		32–65		528–572			335–375	3354–3378, 3521–3555
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN				1077–1081				
Smoot, Perry M., Col	1738–1742							
Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr								5009–5027
Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen					2			
Staff, W. F, CH/CM	1186–1190							
Stark, Harold R., Adm	1805–1808			2–194, 320–324, 774–810				2096–2223, 2244–2477, 5153–5175, 5202–5269, 5543–5555
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR		323–334						
Stilphen, Benjamin L			1539–1575					
Stimson, Henry L			4037–4094 C					5416–5440 [2] 5441–5463 [1]
Stone, John F						203–204		
Street, George							411–413	
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen						185		

Sweeney, J. J., Rev	1368–1372							
Taylor, Angus M., Jr., Capt., USA	1447–1469		3250–3257					
Taylor, Kenneth, Lt., USA	415–422							
Taylor, William E. G., Comdr	1229–1240	338–354	1071–1094	609–627				
Thielen, Bernard, Col								26–27, 34–36, 38–41, 49–55, 57–61, 64–65, 70–75, 79–80, 92–101, 103–111, 130, 138, 139–154, 165–172, 188
Thomas, James K., Lt., USA	484–486							
Thompson, O. N., Col						99		
Throckmorton, Russell C., Col			1387–1412					
Tillman, Thomas E			2134–2157					
Tindal, Lorry N., Col	390–393		4487–4500					
Tinker, Clarence, Brig. Gen	1706–1718							
Truman, Louis W., Col			1444–1453					
Turner, Richmond K., Rear Adm	1809–1829, 1861–1862	250–272		988–1024				1911–2063
Tyler, Kermit A., Lt. Col	368–376		1095–1105	446–460				
Ullrich, Ralph T., Sgt	486–489							
Underkofler, Oliver H., Lt., USNR							465–470	
Utterback, Charles J	509–517							
Van Deurs, George, Capt., USN		290–292						
Walker, Eugene B., Col			965–972					
Walsh, Roland, Brig. Gen			1381–1387					
Waterhouse, George S	1262–1272							
Waterhouse, Paul B	1373–1381							
Weddington, Leonard D., Col	1213–1219		3012–3027					
Welch, George S., Maj	422–428		2008–2014					
Wellborn, Charles, Jr., Capt., USN		383–390						
Welles, Sumner								458–473, 477–549

[1] Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
[2] Sworn statement presented to committee.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen	1311–1329		2722–2744					
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col	496–499		3120–3124					
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col	1830–1842							
White, William R., Brig. Gen			1989–2007					
Wichiser, Rea B			2456–2478					
Wilke, Weslie T	1334–1340							
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm		279–288					389–410	1723–1911
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen						187–189		
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen	247–259		1345–1381					
Wilson, Erle M., Col			910–931					
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col			3663–3665					
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm				1083–1090				
Wong, Ahoon H			3677–3683					
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR						105–106	376–386	
Woodward, Farnsley C., Lt. (jg), USN							541–553 597–602	
Woolley, Ralph E			3750–3773					
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr		379–382					442–450	
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col			3357–3586					
York, Yee Kam	1525–1538							
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN	1683–1705							3233–3259, 3303–3354
Zucca, Emil Lawrence			2580a–2596					

[6647] [1]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m. in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson and Brewster, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[6648] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Counsel, I believe, desire to have some documents put into the record before we begin the testimony.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I am requested by counsel for General Short to have the name of Lt. Col. Randolph Karr added to the list of his counsel, as shown by the record, volume 1, page 11.[2]

His address is 2601 Munitions Buildings, and his telephone is REpublic 6700, extension 78109.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to read into the record some correspondence between Miss Tully and Mr. Mitchell, and some correspondence between Justice Roberts and Mr. Mitchell with reference to the whereabouts of the original Roberts report, which was requested by Senator Ferguson at page 3180 of the transcript, and was again referred to by Mr. Mitchell at page 6148 of the transcript.

By reading it into the record, it will avoid making an exhibit of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead, Mr. Masten.

Mr. MASTEN. The first is a letter dated December 21, 1945, addressed to Miss Tully from Mr. Mitchell.

DEAR MISS TULLY:

[6649] The Committee has requested, and I therefore wish you would obtain for us, a photostatic copy of the original signed report of the Roberts Commission as filed with President Roosevelt, together with any drafts of the report which may be available in the files of President Roosevelt.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

[1] Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

[2] Hearings, Part 1, p. 4.

Miss Tully's answer, dated December 27, 1945, is as follows:

DEAR MR. MITCHELL:
I have your note of December 21st, requesting a copy or draft of the report of the Roberts Commission. I am sorry, indeed, that I cannot find this report, or any reference to it, in the files of the late President Roosevelt.

Very sincerly yours,

(Signed) GRACE G. TULLY.

Under date of January 2, 1946, Mr. Mitchell wrote the following letter to Justice Owen J. Roberts:

DEAR JUSTICE ROBERTS:
The Committee is attempting to locate the original report submitted by the Commission, of which you were Chairman, which investigated the Pearl Harbor matter. We have been advised that the report is not in the files [*6649*–A] of the White House or the files of the late President Roosevelt.

I would appreciate a note from you, at your convenience, advising just what procedure was followed in submitting the report and to whom it was submitted.

The Committee is particularly anxious, apparently, to determine whether any portions of the report were stricken or amended following your submission of the report, presumably to the President.

I am sorry to bother you again.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

Justice Roberts' reply, under date of January 4, 1946, is as follows:

[*6650*] Hon. WILLIAM D. MITCHELL,
Counsel, Joint Committee on Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I have your letter of January 2. I am glad of the opportunity to answer it. The report of the Commission of which I was Chairman was signed by the Commission in duplicate originals. When it was ready for presentation to the President on the afternoon of Friday, January 23, 1942, I telephoned the White House and inquired whether the President desired the report transmitted to him by messenger, delivered to him by the Commission in a body, or delivered to him by me as its Chairman. The President's secretary later telephoned that the President desired I should present the report as Chairman of the Commission to him in person, and would see me for that purpose at eleven o'clock on Saturday [*6651*] morning, January 24, 1942.

At the time named I called at the White House and handed the President, at his desk in his study on the second floor, the two duplicate original copies of the report. He read the entire report in my presence, asking questions and making comments concerning the facts disclosed. The interview lasted over two hours.

At the conclusion of his perusal, the President inquired whether any of the facts stated in the report, if given publicity, might embarrass our military or naval operations or give the enemy information which ought not to be disclosed. I replied that the Commission had submitted the fact findings (but not the report) to the Secretaries of War and Navy and had been advised by each of them that there could be no objection to the publication of the facts as the Commission had stated them in its report.

The President then said he saw no reason why the report should not be given to the press in full. I replied that it would be a satisfaction to the Commission if this were done. He thereupon rang for his secretary, Mr. McIntyre, and when the latter arrived said to him that the report should be released to the press in its entirely, for publication on the following day, Sunday, January 25, 1942. Mr. McIntyre said he would have mimeographed copies for the press prepared at once. I am not certain whether he handed [*6652*] both duplicate originals to Mr. McIntyre, but I believe that he did. I have never since seen the originals. I subsequently read the report in mimeograph, as given out by the White House. The mimeographed sheets looked as if a number of stenographers had worked simultaneously on different portions of the report. I also read the report as printed in the New York Times, and as printed as a public document pursuant to Congressional direction. I can assure you the report thus published was full and complete, as submitted by the Commission, without deletion or alteration.

One copy of the report was retained by each member of the Commission. I have my copy, which I believe to be a carbon copy of the original handed to the President.

Yours sincerely,

(S) OWEN J. ROBERTS.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection with that, is it clear as to whether there were any changes at the time the original statement was submitted to the Army and Navy concerning the facts, as to whether there were eliminations [*6653*] at that time incident to the war situation then?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, we have no information with reference to this report, except as contained in this letter. We have endeavored to find the original report, but we cannot. It would be possible, I think, to ascertain very likely from Mr. Justice Roberts whether there was any change in the findings after they were presented to the military authorities.

Senator BREWSTER. That was the point. I was not clear from the letter whether that would be clarified or not. I think whatever is the most practical and convenient should be done.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We will endeavor to get some information on that, because this letter does not cover that.[1]

Senator BREWSTER. It might well have been proper to eliminate certain findings of fact at that time, due to the war situation, but that would not be material now, I presume. Whether that is the case, I do not know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, there has come to our attention some correspondence relating to the idea that Mr. Wendell Willkie would take a trip to Australia and other points in the Southwest Pacific. We have gathered together letters from the Under Secretary of State, a memorandum for the President in connection therewith, and a letter issued by the President to Mr. Willkie, and some postscripts thereto.

[*6653-A*] This correspondence is, I think, complete so far as our files are concerned, with reference to the Willkie correspondence, and I would like permission to offer it in evidence as Exhibit 111.

Copies have already been distributed to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The correspondence referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 111.")

[*6654*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Mr. Chairman, in connection with the examination of Admiral Kimmel, his statement, which has been circulated and which he proposes to read here today, makes reference to a large number of documents and other evidence, much of which has already been offered in evidence as exhibits in this proceeding, but there are a large number of those documents referred to by Admiral Kimmell in his statement which are not in evidence yet as exhibits, and Admiral Kimmel and his counsel have prepared a compilation reciting in detail the dispatches and other material which are referred to in the footnotes to the statement which he proposes to read.

With possibly a very few exceptions, these documents that are set forth in this compilation are not yet in evidence, but there may be in a very few instances a duplication of exhibits that are already in evidence.

Inasmuch as this compilation would be of very great convenience to the committee in the examination of Admiral Kimmel's statement, we

[1] See Justice Roberts' testimony in Hearings, Part 7, pp. 3261–3303.

would like to present it and have it marked as an exhibit in order that the source authority which is contained in that compilation may be exhibitively before the committee for examination, subject, of course, to the understanding that if it should be hereafter found that there were any typographical or other reportorial errors in the compilation they can be corrected, as, of course, we [6655] have not had time to go over this entire compilation and compare word for word the copies here with the original.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the same document which has been distributed to the members of the committee?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right; it has been distributed to all members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be filed as Exhibit 112.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 112.")

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to the committee Admiral Kimmel, who has a statement that he desires to present to the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire what are the facts regarding the release of the previous confidential testimony of Admiral Kimmel. As I have had various inquiries with regard to that I want to know what the committee's records are in the matter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have this to say in answer to the inquiry that when the prior testimony of Admiral Kimmel was collated we had it mimeographed. After consultation with my staff, I directed that it be given to the members of the committee, with a notation that we did not propose to release it until after Admiral Kimmel had made his statement on the stand.

The next I heard of it were the press notices, that indicated [6656] that the press had had access to one of those copies. Since none were issued by our office, it must have been that one of the copies that went to the members of the committee went to the press, concerning which the committee is as familiar as I am.

That is all the information I have.

Senator BREWSTER. Then there was exactly the treatment accorded the previous confidential testimony of Admiral Kimmel so far as the committee officially was concerned as was accorded to Admiral Stark and General Marshall, so far as your knowledge goes?

Mr. RICHARDSON. My associate advises me, as I understood the fact to be, that, we at no time, had a compilation of Admiral Stark's prior testimony. With reference to General Short, there was a compilation of his prior testimony and that, as I understood it, was released by the committee to the press direct, and it was because of that release that I thought it well not to release the Kimmel testimony until after Admiral Kimmel testified.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recalls that when General Short's prior testimony was distributed among the members of the committee, and also I think copies given to the press, it was stated here in the committee that so far as previous records were concerned, as I recall it, it might be released. That was not done, so far as I recall, in regard to Admiral [6657] Kimmel. The fact that it was done illustrates what probably was an error and an unfairness on the part of the committee in releasing General Short's testimony because it discounted in advance what he would say to this committee.

It seems to me that regardless of what happened in these prior instances, that prior testimony of witnesses ought not to be made available for publication until the witness goes on the stand.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be the rule hereafter so far as the Chair can control it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not quite clear. It looks to me as if there might be some confusion. I was wondering whether Senator Brewster was referring to the copies of the statement that Admiral Kimmel expects to make here today.

Senator BREWSTER. No; not at all. It was his prior evidence.

I am very glad to hear the statement of the Chairman in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Frankly, I was away last week and I haven't seen the newspaper reports about this prior testimony nor the editorials, which I understand were somewhat critical of the committee on account of it, but the committee is out to observe the rule that until a witness goes on the stand neither [*6658*] his statement to the committee now or previous testimony should be released for publication, because it inevitably discounts the testimony in advance. It is unfair to the committee and to the witness, too.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might make one further suggestion. If it should be determined by the committee, or a member of the committee, that such testimony should be released, and the committee should determine that it is to be released, if the committee's decision could be routed through me, I can then furnish to the members of the press copies of that testimony.

Now, our difficulty, one of them, has been to have quite a group of newspapermen descend on us and ask for copies of Kimmel's testimony because someone got a copy of his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. That illustrates the difficulty.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you be sworn.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED)[1]

The CHAIRMAN. You may be seated.

The Chair understands that you have a written statement which you desire to read to the committee.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, sir.

[*6659*] Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to announce before Admiral Kimmel begins his testimony that new counsel succeeding Mr. Mitchell and his assistant, Mr. Gesell, are here. Mr. Seth W. Richardson and associate counsel, Mr. Samuel H. Kaufman, of New York.

Now, you may proceed, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you.

This is the first opportunity I have had to speak to the representatives of the American people. I propose to give an account of my stewardship as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. My statement has four main parts.

[1] Footnotes and subtitles throughout Admiral Kimmel's statement are his own.

In part I, I shall describe the Pacific Fleet in 1941, its base at Pearl Harbor, its assigned tasks under the war plans, its program of preparation for war, and the measures I took to provide for its readiness at sea and its security in port.

In part II, I shall set forth the information I had prior to the attack and my conclusions and actions based upon it.

In part III, I shall describe how the Pacific Fleet was deprived of a fighting chance to avert the disaster of December 7, 1941, because the Navy Department withheld information which indicated the probability of an attack at Pearl Harbor at the time it came.

[*6660*] In part IV, I shall outline previous investigations into the Pearl Harbor catastrophe.

Part I. The condition and activities of the Pacific Fleet in the year 1941.

I took command of the Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941. I had served for more than 40 years in the Navy. I entered the Naval Academy in 1900 and graduated in the class of 1904. I went around the world with the fleet in 1908 as a junior officer. During World War I I served on Admiral Rodman's staff. He was in command of the United States battleships operating with the British Grand Fleet. I commanded a destroyer division in the Asiatic Fleet, and did additional duty in the Philippines and China from 1923 to 1925.

After a tour of duty at the Naval War College and in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, I commanded a destroyer squadron in the Battle Fleet from 1928 to 1930.

I was Director of Ship Movements in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations from 1930 to 1933.

I commanded the battleship *New York* in 1933 and 1934, and during the next year served as chief of staff to Admiral Craven, commander, battleships of the fleet.

I was budget officer of the Navy Department from 1935 to 1938. As a rear admiral, I commanded a heavy cruiser division of the Scouting Force of the fleet in 1938.

[*6661*] I was type commander of the cruisers in the Battle Force in 1939. I held this position until I was appointed Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The facts as to my acquaintance with President Roosevelt are briefly stated. Six months after my appointment as Commander in Chief, and in June of 1941, I came to Washington on official business and called on the President. This was the first time that I had had any conversation or communication with him since 1918.

My appointment as Commander in Chief came as a complete surprise to me. My reactions at the time are stated in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated January 12, 1941:

> When I got the news of my prospective assignment, I was perfectly stunned. I hadn't had any intimation that Richardson's relief was even being considered; and even had I known that his relief was being considered, I did not in my wildest dreams really think that I would get the job. Nevertheless, I am prepared to do everything I can when I take over on about the first of February.

When I assumed command, the decision to base the fleet in the Hawaiian area was an historical fact. The target and base facilities required to train the fleet for war were in the process of being moved from the west coast to Hawaii. The fleet had been practically

without gunnery practice for nearly a year due to the previous uncertainty as to the location of its base. Any further uncertainty would have delayed the availability of the mobile facilities to maintain, repair, and train the fleet. The resulting loss of time in starting intensive training would have been disastrous.

This was my view when I took command. My appointment was in no wise contingent upon any acquiescence on my part in a decision already made months before to keep the fleet in Hawaiian waters.

The fleet was not ready for war in 1940.[1] I set out to make it ready. This required an intensive training program. In carrying out this program, we were handicapped by the detachment, from time to time, of officers and men in large numbers to meet the demands of the expanding procurement and training agencies on shore, and the supply of trained personnel to man new ships.

My concern about this is reflected in my correspondence in 1941. On February 7, in an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, I stated:[2]

[*6663*] We are forced to operate our ships as they are and the number of men required to man them has been determined by the considered judgment of the best officers we have available. In view of the large numbers of men required for newly commissioned ships, both now and in the future, and in view of the fact that only at sea can men-of-warsmen be adequately trained, every seagoing ship should be filled to capacity now. In this connection it cannot be too strongly emphasized that stabilization of personnel, both officers and enlisted, will contribute more to the efficiency of the Fleet than any other single factor.

On February 16, 1941, I wrote to Admiral Nimitz, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, now the Bureau of Personnel, that[3]—

I realize in some degree the necessity for the services of competent personnel under the Bureau of Ordnance. I am, however, faced with a very real situation here in the Fleet. During the past year the detachment of so many competent officers has reduced the number of experienced officers remaining in ships of the Fleet to such a point that I consider it dangerous to make further considerable reductions in our best officer personnel at this time. The Fleet is [*6664*] just now recovering from the heavy officer personnel shake-up which it has experienced.

* * * * * * *

While I appreciate to some extent the deficiencies of the Bureau of Ordnance and the urgent necessity to remedy them, I must sound a note of warning that we cannot spare any considerable number of qualified officers from the Fleet without assuming an enormous risk. The condition of the Fleet now and in the near future may well be of much greater importance to the nation than the production of a two-ocean Navy by 1946.

* * * * * * *

While on this subject of personnel, I would like to add that the continued detachment of qualified officers and enlisted men renders it next to impossible for the ships to reach the high state of efficiency demanded by a campaign. This Fleet must be kept ready to fight, and that is impossible unless we stabilize the personnel to a much greater degree than has been done in the past. * * *

On March 3, 1941, Admiral Nimitz, in reply to my letter wrote:[4]

* * * Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance [*6665*] problems through the administration of the Lend-Lease bill is the task of procurement, inspection and delivery of enormous—almost astronomical—quantities of ordnance supplies for the British Navy and any Allies which may survive to fight

(See footnote 1, p. 2497, supra.)
[1] Record, testimony Admiral Richardson, p. 777.
[2] CinC file, P16-3/(0217).
[3] Personal letter to Admiral Nimitz, Feb. 16, 1941.
[4] See file letters Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel.

the dictators. I do not know if you have been informed of all the new ordnance plants that are being erected in various parts of the country to start from scratch the manufacture of various items of ordnance * * *

Admiral Nimitz pointed out that these conditions made it necessary to detach trained officer personnel from the fleet.

In addition, the aviation expansion program required that trained aviation personnel from the fleet be sent to the mainland to train others. For example, we were required to send from the fleet to the mainland 12 trained patrol plane crews each month. In the same letter Admiral Nimitz stated:

The situation regarding aviators is not unlike that of Ordnance P. G.'s. In order to build up our aviation we must of necessity have the services of qualified aviators to get all our air training stations going. We know the new aviation officers lack a great deal in being ready to serve the Fleet when they first report, and we also know you will do your best to provide the additional training and [6666] experience needed.

The naval expansion program required the fleet to supply large numbers of trained officer and enlisted personnel to man the new ships. The building and procurement program for all classes of naval vessels and material also required naval personnel from the fleet for inspection and supervisory duties.

[6667] The detachment of trained officer and enlisted personnel continued until December 7, 1941. The corresponding need for training new personnel continued. Because of this situation, the manpower needs of the fleet were never satisfied. In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 15, 1941 I wrote:

This Fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize an additional 10,000.

More than 50 percent of the officers of the fleet were newly commissioned reserve officers. With constantly changing personnel, both officers and enlisted men, and the induction of new personnel, there were times when 70 percent of the men on board individual ships had never heard a gun fired. Training and target practice were imperatively needed for every ship's crew and every plane's crew. The men and officers who were detailed to the engine room, to the guns, to the radio, to the ship control, to the lookouts, to the electrical installations, to the fire control for the guns, to the signals, to the commissary, and numerous other billets, had to be trained before they were competent. Unless they were trained, the most modern equipment was useless. Break-down or insufficiency in any category might well be very costly in time of war.

There were other factors that made the training activi- [6668] ties of vital importance. In addition to individual ship training I had to provide for coordinated training of ships, divisions, and squadrons as part of the fleet as a whole. New weapons and new techniques were an every-day product of the war in Europe. New methods had to be devised, tested, and perfected to meet new threats. For instance, the antiaircraft defense of large formations had to be improved to meet possible Japanese air tactics in the event of war. Our previous training, chiefly dictated by safety considerations, had been largely confined to individual ship practices in defense against individual attacks. It was now necessary to develop means and methods of countering mass attacks by coordinated fire, in maximum volume,

from as many ships as could bring their guns to bear with reasonable prospect of hitting the target and allowing for acceptable hazards to other ships.

Again, the advent of radar with all of its implications, particularly the necessity for wide extension of existing communication channels required to take full advantage of its latent possibilities, posed an entirely new problem for which no solution was to be found in past experience. We had to visualize and set up new situations in order even to indicate a solution. It was only through wide experience, covering a period of months and crowding in as much work as possible, that the new apparatus could be utilized to its fullest poten- [6669] tial. We were handicapped by the few ships equipped with this device, making it all the more important that advantage be taken of every opportunity that could be stolen from the few days or weeks that might remain to us prior to actual hostilities.

Radar, also, gave promise of completely revolutionizing the art of night warfare. This possibility was especially important as it was known that the Japanese attached great importance to night action. Measures, such as steaming and maneuvering in complete darkness in large and complex formations, with abridged accent on safety, had to be perfected. Most of this program was, for us, experimental, because large-scale and complicated maneuvering at night was new to our Navy.

In addition to all this, we needed all the time we could get to try out and perfect the operations we had set up for the opening phases of the war, if it came, against Japan. These operations, too, were largely new and untried, and handicapped by lack of facilities and personnel, particularly in the case of amphibious landings. These exercises gave birth to the Fast Carrier Task Force, later found so effective in the prosecution of the war.

Our training activities were not just routine training or peace- time training. They were intensified training ac- [6670] tivities indispensable to the creation of fighting efficiency in the fleet.

At the same time the ships needed substantial repair and maintenance work. We had before us, and I believe I accomplished, the task of preparing practically every ship to a high degree of material readiness. The engines and motive equipment were overhauled and retuned. The ship's crew engaged in many tasks of installation, repair, and alteration to the limit of their ability while in port. This included the installation of splinter protection, degaussing, the installation of listening gear, and in general, the application to the fleet so far as the supplies were available, of the lessons of war in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. On April 4, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations advised me by dispatch "to strip ship in accordance with orders." [5] This operation alone consumed considerable time for every ship in port.

On May 26, 1941, the Navy Department promulgated its Basic War Plan. This plan set forth the Navy's tasks under the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan which had been drawn up after staff conversations with the British in February and March of 1941.

In February and March of 1941 Great Britain and the United States had staff conversations. The report of these conversations un-

[5] Dispatch, Op.Nav to CinCPac, April 4, 1941, 041700.

der date of March 27, 1941, bore the short title [*6671*] "ABC–1."[6] On the basis of these, the Army and Navy prepared the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan. This joint plan was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the Secretary of War on June 2, 1941. It bore the short title "Rainbow No. 5."[7] On the basis of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan the Navy Department promulgated the Navy Basic War Plan on May 26, 1941. This plan bore the short title "W PL–46."[8] The Pacific Fleet was directed to prepare its own war plan supporting the Basic Navy War Plan. This was done. The War Plan of the Pacific Fleet was distributed on July 25, 1941[9] and thereafter, on September 9, 1941, approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.[10] This plan bore the short title, "WPPac–46."

The Joint Army-Navy War Plan primarily emphasized the defeat of Germany. Admiral R. K. Turner, war plans officer for the Chief of Naval Operations in 1941, in his testimony before Admiral Hart described these objectives of the War Plan in these words:[11]

> The plan contemplated a major effort on the part of both the principal Associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period this matter was discussed and it was [*6672*] determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe. We felt that it was encumbent on our side to defeat Germany, to launch our principal efforts against Germany first, and to conduct a limited offensive in the Central Pacific, and a strictly defensive effort in the Asiatic.

In accordance with this statement of principles, the Basic War Plan of the Army and Navy, Rainbow No. 5, provided in section 4, paragraph 13 (a):

> Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

Again, section 4, paragraph 13 (d) of the plan provided:

> Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not [*6673*] intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malasia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

The following tasks were assigned the United States Pacific Fleet in section one, paragraph 3212 of the Navy Basic War Plan, W. P. L. 46:

> a. TASK
> Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of

[6] Exhibit 49.
[7] Official letter CNO to CinCPac, April 3, 1941, serial 038612.
[8] Official letter CND, May 26, 1941, Serial 060512.
[9] Official letter CinCPac, July 25, 1941, Serial 063W.
[10] Official letter CNO to CinCPac, September 9, 1941, Serial 098912.
[11] Hart testimony, Admiral R. K. Turner, pp. 251, 252, question 10.

positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

b. TASK

Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced Fleet Base in Truk;

c. TASK

Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or [6674] destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

d. TASK

Support British Naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155° east;

e. TASK

Defend Samoa in Category "D";

f. TASK

Defend Guam in Category "F";

g. TASK

Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);

h. TASK

Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;

i. TASK

Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces;

[6675] j. TASK

Establish Fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require;

k. TASK

Route shipping of Associated Powers within the Fleet control zones.

These tasks were to be carried out in "the Pacific area." The Pacific area included the ocean areas from the coast of North America and north of the Equator to a line extending to the westward of the Marianas up to latitude 30 north, where the area was extended to include the reaches of the ocean all the way to the Asiatic Continent and from about 700 miles off the coast of South America south of the Equartor, to a short distance from the Australian coast.

I changed the wording to make it a little more accurate, that is all.

It was this vast expanse which I had to consider the prospective theater of operations for my forces. It was in this area that the Pacific Fleet was to divert enemy strength by the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, destroy Axis sea communications, and protect the territory of the associated powers. To build the fleet into a fighting machine capable of meeting these assigned tasks, and to solve the manifold problems of supply and logistics required con-
[6676] siderable planning.

It became apparent soon after I took command that the existing organization of the United States Fleet was not a proper one to meet the tasks which would be required in a Pacific war. Early in 1941, therefore, the vessels of the Pacific Fleet were reorganized into three task forces, including one fast carrier task force, one amphibious task force and one battleship task force. In their operations at sea, these task forces were operated under wartime conditions. Fueling at sea, a requirement for long-range operations, was stressed.

The operating schedule was so arranged that there was always at least one of these task forces, and usually two, at sea. Frequently during fleet maneuvers the entire fleet was at sea. Periods in port were of course necessary for all ships. At no time during 1941 were all of the ships of the fleet in Pearl Harbor.

It was recognized that the Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet in every category of fighting ship.[12] No one in authority expected that the Pacific Fleet could meet the Japanese head on.

Admiral King's official report, Our Navy at War, transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy on March 27, 1944, completely dispelled previous public misconceptions about the strength of the Pacific Fleet prior to Pearl Harbor. Admiral [6677] King stated:

> Had we not suffered these losses (at Pearl Harbor), however, our fleet could not have proceeded to Manila as many people supposed and there relieved our hard pressed forces. Such an undertaking at that time, with the means at hand to carry it out and support it, would have been disastrous.

Japan, at the outbreak of hostilities, had nine aircraft carriers in commission and operating. We had three carriers in the Pacific and those did not have their full quota of planes.[13] Although the battleships of the fleet were all approximately the same age as the heavy ships of the Japanese Navy, our ships were particularly deficient in short-range antiaircraft weapons.

The fuel problem affected every decision. At this time both the reserve stocks in the Hawaiian area and the facilities for getting fuel from storage tanks into combatant ships were not adequate. The Pacific Fleet had only 11 tankers. Of these, only four had the speed and mixed-cargo characteristics suitable for fueling other ships at sea. It required from 24 to 36 hours to refuel a task force in Pearl Harbor. Shortly after I organized the fleet in three major task forces, I attempted to keep two of the three forces at sea and only one in Pearl Harbor. I quickly found that fuel deliveries were [6678] falling behind consumption. The reserves were being depleted at a time when it was imperative to increase them. It was this fact, and this alone, which made it necessary to have two task forces simultaneously in Pearl Harbor at certain periods. It was not advisable, unless an attack on Pearl Harbor was known to be imminent, to keep the fleet at sea and fuel it by sending detachments into Pearl Harbor at night even if there had been adequate fuel reserves in port. Operations at sea would have been then restricted to a small area. The increase in submarine risk would have been unjustified.

A destroyer at full power exhausts its fuel in 30 to 40 hours, at medium speed in 4 to 6 days. War experience has proven the necessity of fueling destroyers every third day, and heavy ships about every fifth day to keep a fighting reserve on board. To have kept the entire fleet at sea for long periods would have required not 11 tankers but approximately 75, with at least one-third of them equipped for underway delivery. I did not have adequate reserves. There were no facilities for delivering stored reserves to the ships at a rate which would permit fueling more than about one-fourth of the fleet in any one 24-hour day or one-eighth of it in any one period of darkness. To keep the fleet at sea and exhaust our resources, only to find that such expenditures were unnecessary, or, still worse, to have the entire fleet short of fuel [6679] when action was joined, were contingencies too grave to be accepted on indefinite information or conjecture.

---

[12] See Joint Memorandum, Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, November 5, 1941, exhibit 16.

[13] See exhibit 86, also Record, p. 4840, also personal letter Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, August 22, 1941.

We had one newly commissioned Navy troop transport in the Pacific and a handful of partially trained marines at San Diego. These, with the marines stationed at Pearl Harbor and the outlying islands, constituted our landing force.

On May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote me that he had "an over-all limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores." In connection with this proposed expedition in May and June of 1941, practically all the trained and equipped marines on the west coast, several small transports, and some other small craft were transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic.[14] They were never returned.

In April and May of 1941, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 battleships, 4 cruisers, and 18 destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic.[15] In a letter to me on April 19, 1941, Admiral Stark advised me of this proposed transfer. He described the fleet units to be detached as "the first echelon of the Battle of the Atlantic." He added: "I am telling you; not arguing with you." This transfer took away approximately one-fourth of the fighting ships of the Pacific Fleet and resulted in a striking reduction in its power. The details of the transfer must have [*6680*] been quickly known in Japan.

When I was in Washington in June 1941, it was seriously proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional detachment to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers, and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer was not made.

The tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet under the War Plans indicate that it was not based in the Hawaiian area for the sole purpose of defending Pearl Harbor. The War Plans required fleet action far from the Hawaiian Islands. They did not contemplate that the resources of the fleet were to be devoted exclusively or even primarily for the defense of Hawaii.

A naval base exists primarily for the support of the fleet. The Naval Court of Inquiry, in paragraph VIII of its findings, states:

> A naval base exists solely for the support of the Fleet. The fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the Base, or for that of the vessels within its limits * * *. To superimpose upon these essentials the further requirement that the seagoing personnel shall have the additional respon- [*6681*] sibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent Naval Base, is to challenge a fundamental concept of naval warfare.

This principle has long been recognized by both the Army and the Navy. In the "Joint Action Army and Navy, 1935" the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was vested in the Army. That specifically provided:

> Strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. The Fleet must have no anxiety in regard to the security of its base.

When I took command of the fleet, the exchange of letters between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy[16] indicated that

---

[14] Dispatch, OPNAV to CinCPac, May 24, 1941, 242130.

[15] See dispatch, OPNAV to CinCPAC, May 13, 1941, 132019; CinCPac to OPNAV, May 15, 1941, 150625.

[16] Exhibit 10.

the provisions of the agreement would be carried out and that existing deficiencies in the defense of Pearl Harbor would be corrected. However, it was never my disposition to assume that high echelon agreements or correspondence were panaceas. At all times in 1941 I was concerned with the security of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor. I did everything within my power to strengthen and improve the base defense.

Pearl Harbor was the only refueling, replacement, and repair point for ships operating in the Hawaiian area. Lahaina Roads off the Hawaiian Island of Maui could not be used as an operating base. About a month before I took command, Admiral Richardson issued orders that no ship was to be anchored [*6682*] at Lahaina because it was not safe against submarine attack. I agreed with and continued those orders in effect.

Pearl Harbor had but one entrance. Because of the topography of the island and the narrowness of the channel, the capital ships were obliged to move in and out in single file. We had frequent training in this maneuver even at night under war conditions without lights. To complete a sortie of the fleet required at least 3 hours. The danger that the channel would be blocked was always present.

The defense of such a base before the outbreak of hostilities is quite different from its defense in war.

During hostilities, when the fleet is not required to wait until the potential enemy commits the first overt act, our own offensive operations protect the base.

Pearl Harbor was included within an area defined as the Hawaiian coastal frontier in annex 1, page 9, Joint Army and Navy War Plan, Rainbow 5.[17] The defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, which included Oahu and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu, was entrusted by this plan to the commanders of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, who were designated as follows:[18]

> Army—The Commanding General Hawaiin Department
> Navy—The Commandant, 14th Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Fron- [*6683*] tier. This officer also commands the assigned Naval local defense force and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

The local naval-base defense forces under the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District were negligible. On October 17, 1941, the commandant wrote requesting the Navy Department to send a number of small fast craft, equipped with listening gear and depth charges, and two squadrons of patrol planes. He said:[19]

> The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, is the USS *Sacramento* which has no batteries, to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run.

I forwarded the commandant's letter with the following endorsement:[20]

> There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the United

[17] Exhibit 44, item 3, p. 3.
[18] Exhibit 44, item 3, p. 3.
[19] Official letter Com 14 to CNO, October 17, 1941, ND 14 (01084). See exhibit 46, Naval Court of Inquiry.
[20] COMinCH 1st endorsement to Com 14 letter A16–1/ND 14. See exhibit 46, Naval Court of Inquiry.

States Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its base by diversions to other purposes of light forces necessary for its [6664] security at sea is, in a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as can possibly be made available. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs.

The commanders of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, General Short, and Admiral Bloch, had no means to conduct distant air reconnaissance from the island of Oahu. The War Department had allocated on paper 180 flying fortresses to the Hawaiian Department. General Short had only 12 of these planes in Hawaii prior to the attack of which but 6 were in flying condition.

The Navy Department had allocated on paper one-hundred-odd patrol planes to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. He never received a single patrol plane.

As a consequence, the base defense against air attack was predicated on borrowing Fleet patrol planes for distant searches. Under the war plans these fleet patrol planes were ear-marked for operations with the fleet thousands of miles from Hawaii when war broke out. Their primary mission was always connected with fleet operations. They were frequently based on the outlying islands—Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. [6685] They had to train with the fleet and search areas in which the fleet operated. Under these circumstances, they were available for distant search from Oahu, only when and if the fleet did not need them for its own operations, actual or impending. They were not at any time sufficient in number to conduct distant searches from Pearl Harbor as a regular routine.

The local defense plan against air attack, submitted to the War and Navy Departments, clearly provided that effective distant air reconnaissance from Oahu could not be made as a routine matter. It was only to be instituted when there was information from other sources that a carrier strike against the islands was probable within narrow time limits.[21] This was a makeshift plan, but none better was possible with the means at hand.

The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District wrote letters to the Chief of Naval Operations on December 30, 1940,[22] May 7, 1941,[23] and October 17, 1941* pointing out that the had no planes and that he needed planes. Each of his letters was strongly and favorably endorsed by the Commander in Chief of the Fleet. On November 25, 1941, 2 weeks before the attack, the Chief of Naval Operations informed the Commandant:[24]

The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become available [6686] in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the strategic situation as it develops.

Under my standing orders I placed the guns of the fleet at the disposal of the local antiaircraft defense. My Security Order 2 CL 41[25]

[21] Exhibit 44, item 8, p. 4.
[22] Letter from Com 14 to CNO, December 30, 1940, ND 14 (629), exhibit 28, Naval Court of Inquiry.
[23] Letter from Com. 14 to CNO, May 7, 1941, exhibit 41, Naval Court of Inquiry (ND 14).
*See footnote 20.
[24] CNO to CinCPAC and Com 14, November 25, 1941, serial 0135412.
[25] Exhibit 44, item 12.

prescribed a plan for berthing ships in sectors to develop in each sector the maximum antiaircraft fire. I designated the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District Naval Base Defense Officer because he was permanently stationed in Pearl Harbor and would always be familiar with local conditions. I delegated to him the duty of advising the Senior Officer Present Afloat (exclusive of the Commander in Chief), what condition of readiness to maintain in the ships in port. This was a flexible system designed to use the fleet's resources in port in the base defense.

In addition, I issued standing orders for all ships that ammunition for all antiaircraft guns, 5″, 3″, 1.1 and 50 caliber, be kept available in the ready ammunition boxes at the guns at all times, day and night. These orders also required that there be on board at all times a sufficient number of trained personnel to man completely all the guns of the antiaircraft battery. All double bottom and lower deck compartments of the ships in harbor were to be kept closed except when work required they be temporarily opened. No higher state of material readiness could long be continued without serious [*6687*] reduction in the morale and physical condition of men and the accomplishment of necessary work on the ships.

At the time of the attack, the orders in effect required that one-fourth to one-half of the antiaircraft guns, depending upon the type of ships, be manned at all times in port. At the time of the attack the guns were so manned. Admiral Inglis has testified that on the morning of the attack all the antiaircraft batteries on all the ships were manned and firing within 4 to 7 minutes.[26] The men of the fleet on December 7, 1941, made the transition from peace to war with speed and courage.

[*6638*] I might add that immediately after that attack I was informed that in the first flight of torpedo planes, the ships shot down three out of the first flight, and I have never seen that contradicted.

In his letter to the Secretary of War on January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy listed an air torpedo plane attack as one of the possible forms of hostile action against Pearl Harbor. Subsequently, the Chief of Naval Operations forwarded to the Fleet and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, detailed technical advice which practically eliminated from consideration an air torpedo plane attack as a serious danger to ships moored in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor.

The depth of water in Pearl Harbor is 30 feet or less, except in the channels where it was generally 40 feet. The Chief of Naval Operations on February 15, 1941, wrote to me on the subject of antitorpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks on Pearl Harbor stating:[27]

> Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T (antitorpedo) baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attack. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for antitorpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles * * *
>
> [*6689*] * * * A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is

[26] Record, p. 124.
[27] Official letter, CNO to CinCPac, February 15, 1941, Serial 09330, exhibit 49, Naval Court of Inquiry.

250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. The desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed but this may be altered.

In the same letter he underlined the fact that the depths of water in which torpedoes were launched in the successful attacks at Taranto were between 14 and 15 fathoms; that is, 84 to 90 feet of water. A letter of similar tenor was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandants of various naval districts, including the 14th Naval District.[28]

On June 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter on the same subject to the commandants of the various naval districts, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District a copy of which was sent to me.[29] After reading this letter, my staff and I, as well as the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, believed that the danger of a successful airplane torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor was negligible.

[*6690*] The Naval Court of Inquiry concluded that the torpedoes launched by the Japanese in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor constituted, in effect, a secret weapon in the category of the robot bomb, which was unknown to the best professional opinion in Great Britain and the United States at the time.[30] The Secretary, in his endorsement to that report, stated that the Navy Department had information from British sources that aircraft torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water in the year 1940. Such information was never supplied to me.

In any event, the Navy Department apparently decided that torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor were not required and exhibited no concern at their absence.

In his letter to me of February 15, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations stated, in effect, that existing torpedo nets were so cumbersome that their installation in Pearl Harbor would interfere with the movement of ships and the ability of the Fleet to get away on short notice. He stated:

There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protective harbors and which can be readily removed.

[*6691*] The fleet did not have facilities in Hawaii to manufacture anti-torpedo nets or baffles. If the light efficient net described by the Chief of Naval Operations was ever developed by the Navy Department in 1941, we never heard of it or received it. Admiral King, in his endorsement to the record of the Naval Court tersely stated:

The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department.

My relations with General Short, which were once the subject of considerable confusion in the public mind, have now been clarified by exhaustive investigations. The committee has all the evidence on this subject. I need not labor it. It has been established that our official and social relations were friendly, that we frequently conferred on official matters of common interest and invariably did so when either

[28] CNO to several commandants, February 17, 1941, Serial 010230, exhibit 54, Naval Court of Inquiry.
[29] CNO to several commandants, June 13, 1941, Serial 055730, exhibit 55, Naval Court of Inquiry.
[30] Naval Court of Inquiry, finding XV.

of us received messages which had any bearing on the development of the United States–Japanese situation, or on our several plans in preparing for war. As the Naval Court of Inquiry summarized the matter:[31]

> Each was mindful of his own responsibility and of the responsibilities vested in the other. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes.

[*6692*] General Short and I were not "opposite numbers" in the sense that our total concerns and duties were coextensive. The responsibilities of the fleet under war plans were far flung and offensive. Those of the Hawaiian Department were local and defensive. Because I was interested in the security of the fleet and the Hawaiian Islands I gave General Short all the assistance I could, even in connection with local defensive measures which were exclusively under the Army's control. The Aircraft Warning Service is a case in point. I took Army personnel to sea with the fleet so that they could be trained as radar operators. I assigned to the Army a naval officer who had experience in Britain with radar to give any advice and assistance he could in connection with the aircraft warning net in Hawaii. General Short informed me his radar was operating and could give a 100-mile coverage. In joint Army-Navy drills it did perform satisfactorily. In the period before December 7 I was informed that the Army's radar was manned. It was so manned. It was only the day before the attack that some subordinate Army officer gave the permission to shut down at 7 a. m. on Sunday. Even despite this, one of the stations was operating after 7 a. m. on the morning of December 7, and obtained information both about the incoming and outgoing planes. This information was not passed on to the Navy.

[*6693*] My relations with my staff, Task Force Commanders and senior flag officers were excellent. This is another subject dealt with exhaustively in the testimony of previous investigations now before the committee. My staff was composed of superior officers whose records in the war have demonstrated their abilities. I was accessible to them. We had full and frank discussions about the various decisions which it was my responsibility to make. The so-called "war warning" dispatch I also discussed with the senior task force commanders, Admiral Pye, commander of Task Force 1; Admiral Halsey, commander of Task Force 2; Admiral Brown, commander of Task Force 3; Admiral Calhoun, commander, base force; and Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

I did not personally show that dispatch to or discuss it with Admiral Newton or Admiral Bellinger. The orders sending Admiral Newton to Midway were issued by me to Admiral Brown, who was in command of Task Force 3,[32] and under whom Admiral Newton served. Admirals Newton and Brown conferred before the former set out to Midway.[33] Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions. As for Admiral Bellinger, he served directly under Admirals Bloch and [*6694*] Brown, who were familiar with all important developments. I was fully aware of the conditions in Admiral

---

[31] Naval Court of Inquiry, finding IV.
[32] Secret dispatch, CinCPac to COMTASKFOR 3, COM 14, December 4, 1941, 040237.
[33] Hart investigation, testimony Admiral Newton, p. 320, question 45.

Bellinger's patrol plane force, knew and had approved his schedule of operations. Had I seen any need for him to change his course of action, I would have issued orders to him to that effect directly.

A description of the measures I took for the security of fleet units at sea remains to be given. The Naval Court of Inquiry has described them as follows: [34]

> The task forces operating at sea were screened defensively by aircraft and destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day and night, ammunition was at hand, and depth charges were ready for use. Watertight integrity was maintained, horizon and surface battle lookouts were kept posted, the ships steamed darkened at night, and the use of the radio was restricted to a minimum.

The court concluded:

> It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the security of his fleet while at sea were adequate and effective.

In summary, the Pacific Fleet in 1941 established and maintained the highest degree of security measures at sea and in port consistent with our assigned mission of intensive [*6695*] preparation for war. We had our difficulties with shifting personnel and an exposed and inadequately defended base. We had much to do in preparing a fleet then unready for war. We were proud of having a hard job to do. Admiral Hewitt, in his report to the Secretary, made this finding which has never been made public.[35]

> Throughout his encumbency as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for War * * *.

We maintained as a regular procedure a high state of daily alertness which, with a very short time, could be intensified to deal with a particular hazard when and if it developed. We needed one thing which our own resources could not make available to us. That vital need was the information available in Washington from the intercepted dispatches which told when and where Japan would probably strike. I did not get this information.

PART II—INFORMATION RECEIVED AND ACTION TAKEN

In this part of my statement, I shall describe the information available to me prior to the attack and the actions which I took upon the basis of that information. [*6696*] I shall deal with the following topics:

First, the information furnished to me by the Navy Department, prior to October 16, 1941;

Second, the dispatches sent to me by the Navy Department from October 16, 1941, to and including November 27, 1941;

Third, the meaning of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, and related information;

Fourth, my decisions and actions from November 27 to the time of the attack.

1. *Information and dispatches, January–October 1941.*—In February 1941, when I became commander in chief, I was somewhat familiar with the tense situation in the Pacific. During the year 1941 I received dispatches and letters from the Chief of Naval Operations

[34] Naval Court of Inquiry, finding X.
[35] Hewitt report, conclusion 25, p. 779.

which might be broadly described as "war warnings." On January 21, 1941, he sent a dispatch to the commander in chief [1] which stated:

The international situation continues to deteriorate. It now appears to me that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan DOG my memorandum to the Secretary. If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to plan RAINBOW THREE with following modifications Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execute all tasks except affirm [*6697*] expect early reenforcement from Pacific and much stronger British Isles detachment. Pacific Fleet waiting attitude or execute assigned tasks in Area eastward of 160 degrees east depending on action by Japan. Asiatic Fleet cannot expect early reenforcement alert status or carry out tasks according to circumstances.

On February 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch from the United States naval attaché in London which stated: [2]

I have been officially informed that Japanese are apparently planning an offensive on a large scale presumed against Indo-China Malay Peninsula or the Dutch East Indies no doubt to be coordinated with attack on Great Britain approximately February 10. It is definite that the Jap and German relations are becoming more intimate and that the Japs are conducting a hatred campaign against the British even in ordinarily pro-English press also two large Japanese merchant vessels sailings have been cancelled. Reports believed reliable state that all Jap shipping being called home to be taken over by the government. Request your knowledge of this. The Japanese mediating Thai Indo China scene meeting abroad Jap cruiser. Price of umpire's services unreliably reported to be bases on the west coast of Siam [*6698*] that are usable by light craft for cutting Singapore communications via the Malacca Straits.

On July 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch which stated: [3]

The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy probably involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. However, CNO holds the opinion that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of Naval, Army and Air bases in Indo-China * * *.

The dispatch predicted that Japan's major military effort would be against Russian maritime provinces. It also stated that all Japanese vessels in United States Atlantic ports had been ordered to be west of the Panama Canal by the 1st of August.

On July 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me another dispatch.[4] This reported that the Japanese Government had issued orders that certain Japanese vessels in the North Atlantic and Caribbean areas pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific. Under these orders all Nipponese [*6699*] merchant vessels would be clear of the Caribbean and North Atlantic areas by July 22. It related information from unusually reliable Chinese sources that within two weeks Japan would abrogate the neutrality treaty with Russia and attack. The dispatch concluded as follows:

That present strength and deployment of Nip Army in Manchuria is defensive and the present distribution of the Japanese Fleet appears normal, and *that is capable of movement either north or south.* That a definite move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 20-August 1 is indicated by the foregoing. [Italics supplied.]

---

[1] Dispatch CNO to CinCUS, January 21, 1941, 212155.
[2] Dispatch ALUSNA, London to Opnav, February 3, 1941, 031400, passed to CinCUS as OPNAV 032300.
[3] Exhibit 37, p. 4.
[4] Exhibit 37, p. 5.

On July 25, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch in which the Chief of Staff joined.[5] This advised that on July 25 the United States would employ economic sanctions against Japan. It stated in part:

* * * The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff do not anticipate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date. This dispatch is [*6700*] to be kept secret except from immediate Army and Navy subordinates. * * *

In addition to these dispatches the Chief of Naval Operations' letters to me show recurrent tension in the international situation during 1941. His letters use such expressions as:

What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess. (Memorandum of May 14, 1941.)

An open rupture was described as a possibility on July 24, 1941, "Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual." (July 31, 1941.)

* * * Also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate. (August 21, 1941.)

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender. (August 28, 1941.)

P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying *that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse.* (September 23, 1941.)

None of these letters or dispatches warned of an attack in the Hawaiian area, or indicated that an attack there was imminent or probable. None of these letters or dispatches [*6701*] directed an alert in the Hawaiian area against an overseas attack.

On the contrary, on February 1, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me on the subject of "Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor."[6]

He stated that Mr. Grew had telegraphed the State Department on January 27, 1941:

The Peruvian minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless, he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff.

The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations added:

The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, *no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.* [Italic supplied.]

[*6702*] This estimate as to the improbability of a move against Pearl Harbor was never withdrawn.

Consider my situation as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet at the time I received, by letter and dispatch, these ominous predictions of Japanese aggression in the Far East.

[5] Exhibit 37, p. 14.
[6] Exhibit 15.

I was carrying out an intensive training program to prepare the fleet for war. I was under specific injunction to continue that program. In an official letter to me on April 31, 1941 (Serial 038612), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote:

> In the meantime I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into war.

[*6703*] On November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch stating that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that, in his opinion, an aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam was a possibility.[7] Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he did not intend that the Pacific Fleet should discontinue its training program upon receipt of this dispatch, 2 weeks before the attack.[8]

I was not expected to discontinue training for all-out security measures, concentrated on the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, every time an alarming dispatch was received from Washington predicting Japanese aggression in the Far East. Indeed, had I done so, the training program would have been curtailed so drastically that the fleet could not have been prepared for war.

During the time these dispatches were sent, the Navy Department knew just what my program in Hawaii was. My fleet-operating schedules were filed with the Navy Department,[9] [*6704*] where the location and movement of substantially every ship in the fleet was known at all times. No dispatch or letter contained any order or suggestion for departure from my operating schedules. On May 24, 1941, the Navy Department sent me the following dispatch.[10]

> The Department in the interest of morale will consider visits of small detachments or individual ships to the Pacific Coast. *It is not desired that detachments of such size make these visits as to indicate the breaking up or reducing the Hawaiian concentration.* Your recommendations are requested. [Italics supplied.]

When the War and Navy Departments wishes to put the forces in Hawaii on alert against attack, they could and did use appropriate language to that end. The dispatch of June 17, 1940, from the War Department to the Hawaiian garrison demonstrated this. That dispatch stated:[11]

> Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff [*6705*] be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

In reply to Admiral Richardson's dispatch reporting the actions taken by the fleet forces to cooperate with the Army in maintaining the "alert", the Navy Department directed him to continue such cooperation.[12]

---

[7] Exhibit 37, p. 32.
[8] Naval Court of Inquiry. Testimony of Admiral Stark, questions Nos. 142, 404, and 405.
[9] CinCPac file No. A4-3/FF12/(13), Serial 01254, August 13, 1941, received OpNav September 3, 1941.
[10] Dispatch OpNav to CinCPac, 24 May 1941, 242150.
[11] Exhibit 52, p. 1.
[12] Record, vol. 17, pp. 2779–2781.

It is one thing to warn commanders at a particular base of the probable outbreak of war in theaters thousands of miles away, knowing and expecting that they will continue their assigned tasks and missions after the receipt of such warning, and that the very nature of the warning emphasizes to them the necessity for continuing such tasks and missions.

It is quite another thing to warn commanders at a particular base of an attack to be expected in their own locality.

In 1941, we of the Pacific Fleet had a plethora of premonitions, of generalized warnings and forebodings that Japan might embark on aggressive action in the Far East at any one of the variously predicted dates. After receipt of such warnings, we were expected to continue with renewed intensity and zeal our own training program and preparations for war rather than to go on an all-out local alert against attack.

[*6706*] In the year 1941, the international situation was grave and, at times, tense. However, preparing the fleet for war through an intensive training program had to go on. There was a vital element of timing involved in determining when the fleet should curtail training for all-out war measures. Maximum security measures, consistent with the maintenance of the training program, were already in effect in the fleet. When would Japanese-American relations reach the point that all training should cease and all-out war dispositions should be made? This was what we needed to know in the Pacific in the year 1941.

Throughout 1941, the Navy Department had several courses open. It could furnish me directly with the best evidence of Japanese intentions and plans—the intercepted Japanese military and diplomatic messages. This would have given me an opportunity to judge for myself the gravity and intensity of the crisis as December 7, 1941, approached, and the probability of a Japanese attack on Hawaii. The Navy Department failed to do this. The Navy Department did not permit me to evaluate for myself the intercepted Japanese military and diplomatic messages.

Another course of action then remained. That was to issue an order which would have directed dispositions of the fleet to guard against an attack in Hawaii. The message [*6707*] of June 17, 1940, "be on the alert against hostile overseas raid," was such an order. It would have had the same effect in December of 1941 as it had in June of 1940. Such an order was not given.

Further, the War and Navy Departments could have ordered the local commanders of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Admiral Bloch and General Short, to execute the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. This was not done.

The Navy Department could have given the order to mobilize under the War Plan. This order would have had a definite meaning. It would have placed the fleet on an all-out war basis. The order to mobilize did not authorize acts of war.[13] The dispatch of January 21, 1941, indicated that mobilization would be ordered when war was imminent.[14] The order to mobilize was not given.

---

[13] Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, ch. II, sec. 2, sections 0221, 0222, 0223.

[14] Dispatch CNO to CinCUS, January 21, 1941, 212155, "If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to Rainbow Three with following modifications. * * *"

In the dispatches I received on and after October 16, 1941, I was not given available information as to the actual status of Japanese-American negotiations and as to Japanese military plans; nor was I given orders for alert against an attack on Hawaii. These dispatches had the same tenor as the warnings which had previously been sent in February, June, and July 1941 predicting probable Japanese action [*6708*] thousands of miles from the Hawaiian area.

2. *Dispatches from October 16, 1941, to and including November 27, 1941*—On October 16, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the commanders in chief, Atlantic, Asiatic, and Pacific Fleets, the following dispatch:[15]

> The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include reapprochement with the U. S.
>
> In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

The term "preparatory deployments" used in this dispatch is non-technical. It has no especial significance other than [*6709*] its natural meaning. After receiving this dispatch, I made certain preparatory deployments. I ordered submarines to assume a war patrol off both Wake and Midway.[16] I reinforced Johnston and Wake, with additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional marines to Palmyra Island. I ordered the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands. He did so and reported his action to me.[17]

I placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in west coast ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, delayed the sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a west coast navy yard. I dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway with orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island,[18] and placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating areas.

On October 22, I reported by letter all these dispositions to the Chief of Naval Operations.

[*6710*] I might say I summarized all these movements in a letter and the reports had previously been made in movement reports.

By letter dated November 7, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations specifically approved these dispositions. He wrote:

> OK on the dispositions which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet.

The naval court of inquiry found:

> He (Admiral Kimmel) did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or warranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his Staff, all experienced officers of long service and sought by every means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The consensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by the information at hand.

---

[15] Exhibit 37, p. 18.
[16] Dispatch, CinCPac to ComSubScoFor 170354 and 170426, October 17, 1941.
[17] Dispatch, CinCPac to Com14, 170319, October 17, 1941, and dispatch Com14 to CinCPac 170356.
[18] Dispatch, CinCPac to Compatwing 2, 170429, October 17, 1941.

In the dispatch of October 16, 1941, I was advised that there was a possibility Japan would attack the United States and Great Britain. But this advice was given a definite meaning by the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to me on October 17, in which he said:

> Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you *merely stated the* [6711] *"possibility"; in fact* I tempered the message handed to me considerably. (Italic supplied.)

This letter made it clear to me that when Admiral Stark stated certain Japanese action to be "possible," he meant that it was not probable.

In his letter of October 17, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations enclosed a "Memorandum for the CNO" from Captain R. E. Schuirmann, who was in charge of the Navy's liaison with the State Department. Admiral Stark stated in his letter that this memorandum by Captain Schuirmann "sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down."

The dispatch of October 16 and the Schuirmann memorandum were not consistent. The dispatch of October 16 began: "The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave crisis." The memorandum began: "I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese policy of thought or action."

The memorandum stated:

> Present reports are that the new Cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen.

The memorandum was to the effect that the Japanese military would determine Japan's policy regardless of the [6712] Cabinet in power.

On November 24, I received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which was addressed to me, the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and the commandants of the Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts. This dispatch read as follows:[19]

> Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their Naval and Military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform Senior Army Officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

Under date of November 25, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me a letter which reached me on December 3. This letter contained a postscript added after a "meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today." The dates of the conference and the postscript are not known to me. In the postscript he wrote:

> [6713] * * * *From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indochina, Burma Road area as the most likely.*

[19] Exhibit 37, p. 32.

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it more likely to be "anything". (Italic supplied.)

On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me and to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, the following dispatch: [20]

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. [*6714*] Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

On the same day I received two other dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations, which affected my current estimate of the situation, as well as my subsequent dispositions.

The first of these dispatches was as follows: [21]

Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament.

The second of these dispatches was as follows: [22]

In order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use OpNav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway [*1615*] *and a similar number at Wake provide you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier.* Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations. Confer with Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable. (Italics supplied.)

3. *Analysis of the so-called "war warning" dispatch of November 27, 1941, and related information.*—The so-called "war warning" dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. It did not repeal or modify the advice previously given me by [*6716*] the Navy Department that no move against Pearl Harbor was imminent or planned by Japan. The phrase "war warning" cannot be made a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a characterization of the specific information which the dispatch contained.

---

[20] Exhibit 37, p. 36.
[21] Dispatch CNO to CinCPac, November 26, 1941, 270040.
[22] Dispatch CNO to CinCPac, November 26, 1941, 270038.

The dispatch warned of war—where?

In the Far East. The dispatch stated:

> The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Thus the Philippines, Thai, and the Kra Peninsula were stated to be expected objectives of Japan. When it came to "possible" objectives, Borneo was the only one specified. Hawaii was not mentioned. As the Naval Court of Inquiry points out, "No reference was made to the possibility of an aggressive movement in any direction as had been done in the dispatch of 24 November." This indicated to us in the fleet that since the earlier dispatch, the Navy Department had obtained later information, on the basis of which it could specify both probable and possible Japanese objectives.

Moreover, the two other dispatches which I received on November 27, in addition to the so-called "war warning" [*6717*] dispatch were affirmative evidence that the War and Navy Departments did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable.

One of these dispatches proposed [22a] that I send 25 Army pursuit planes by aircraft carrier to each of the islands of Wake and Midway. The other dispatch [22b] proposed the reenforcement of Marine defense battalions on Midway and Wake with Army troops.

About the same time General Short received a dispatch [23] from the War Department which stated that the Army proposed to take over the defense of these islands from the marines.

Thus, the dispatches sent from the War and Navy Departments were in disagreement on the very fundamentals of the project.

The proposed exchange of Army troops for marines on the outlying island bases was not feasible. General Short and I had extensive conferences on the subject. I learned that the Army had no guns, either surface or antiaircraft to equip any troops which might relieve or reenforce the marines. Thus, if the marines were withdrawn, their equipment and arms would have to be left for the Army. I did not have sufficient [*6718*] additional supplies to reequip and rearm the marines removed. The marines stationed on the island were trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards which could be immediately obtained by Army troops relieving them. The Army had nothing in its organization comparable to a Marine defense battalion, so that the Army garrison would have required a new table of organization. The proposed relief of the marine garrisons by Army troops would necessarily disrupt the defense of the islands during the period that one garrison was preparing to depart and the other was being installed.

Furthermore, at Wake, the more westerly of the two islands, there were no harbor facilities or anchorage. Material and personnel had to be landed from ships under way in an open seaway. Ships had been delayed in unloading at Wake for as long as 28 days due to bad weather. It was not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 days. Extensive unloading of men and material from ships at Wake, in the face of any enemy operation, would be impossible.

[22a] See footnote 22.
[22b] See footnote 21.
[23] Message No. 489, November 29, 1941, War Department to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

I believe that responsible authorities in Washington would not plan or propose a project for shifting garrisons under such circumstances, if they considered that enemy action against these outlying bases was imminent.

I promptly recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that the marines should not be withdrawn from the outlying [*6719*] islands until the Army had received arms and equipment for its defense battalions and had adequately trained them.[24]

The replacement of Marine planes on the islands of Wake and Midway with Army pursuit planes, as proposed by Washington, was also impracticable. At conferences with the Army on this matter, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment stated that the Army pursuit planes could not operate more than fifteen miles from land, nor could they land on a carrier. Consequently, once they were landed on one of the outlying islands they would be frozen there. Their fifteen-mile limit of operation radically restricted their usefulness in the island's defense. I so advised the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch and letter.[24] [25]

[*6720*] The Army pursuit planes which it was proposed to send to outlying islands from Oahu on November 27 constituted approximately 50 percent of the Army's pursuit strength on Oahu. The very fact that the War and Navy Departments proposed their transfer from Hawaii indicated to me that responsible authorities in Washington did not consider an air raid on Pearl Harbor either imminent or probable.

In brief, on November 27, the Navy Department suggested that I send from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor the carriers of the fleet which constituted the fleet's main striking defense against an air attack.

On November 27, the War and Navy Departments suggested that we send from the island of Oahu, 50 percent of the Army's resources in pursuit planes.

[*6721*] These proposals came to us on the very same day of the so-called "war warning."

In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would consider that the "war warning" was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.

From November 27 to the time of the attack, all the information which I had from the Navy Department or from any other source, confirmed, and was consistent, with the Japanese movement in southeast Asia described in the dispatch of November 27.

On November 30, the Navy Department sent me for information a dispatch addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.[26]

---

[24] Dispatch CinCPac to OpNav, November 28, 1941, 280627; Official letter CinCPac to CNO, December 2, 1941, Serial 0114W; personal letter to Admiral Stark, December 2, 1941.

[25] In the "Narrative Statement of Evidence (sic) at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations" prepared by the Navy Department for the Senate Naval Affairs Committe and distributed to this committee, the following statement is made (pp. 326 and 327): "It appears from the evidence that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had a conference about the subject of the dispatches concerning the Army's willingness to garrison Midway and Wake Islands, and that the project fell through because these two area Commanders could not agree as to whom should command the Army troops. Each insisted he should be supreme." This statement is not accurate. The decisions not to send the Army pursuit planes and not to relieve the marines with Army troops were made for the reasons I have outlined and which are stated in my dispatch, and official and personal letters.

[26] Exhibit 78, p. 2.

This stated there were indications that Japan was about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition. The Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was directed to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.

On December 1, the Navy Department sent me for information another dispatch which it addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet,[27] describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya. Japan planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malaya in order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malay into Thailand. Thailand would then call Britain an aggressor, and call upon Japan for aid. This would facilitate the Japanese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally, and give Japan [*6722*] air bases in the Kra Peninsula, and a position to carry out any further operations along Malaya.

From the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, from the China coast, and other sources, we had reports of the development of a Japanese amphibious expedition headed south. Movements of troops, tanks, amphibian boats, landing craft, transports, and naval vessels had been sighted moving to the Kra Peninsula.[28]

On December 6, 1941, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet reported various large Japanese forces apparently making for Kohtron,[29] These consisted of one 25-ship convoy with an escort of 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers, and another 10-ship convoy with 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers. The scouting force of the Asiatic Fleet had sighted 30 ships and one large cruiser anchored in Camranh Bay in Indochina. Incidentally, Kohtron is in Indochina.

In short, all indications of the movements of Japanese military and naval forces which came to my attention confirmed the information in the dispatch of 27 November—that the Japanese were on the move against Thailand or the Kra Peninsula in southeast Asia.

The fortnightly "Summary of Current National Situations" issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations under date of December 1, 1941, stated on page 1 "Strong indications [*6723*] point to any early Japanese advance against Thailand." [30]

The same publication, on page 9, under the heading "The Japanese Naval Situation," stated definitely "Major capital ship strength remains in home waters as well as the greatest portion of the carriers."

On December 3, 1941, I received intelligence that Japanese consular and diplomatic posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London had been ordered to destroy most of their codes.[31] This dispatch stated "most of their codes and ciphers"—not all—a point which was noted by me and my staff at the time. This information appeared to fit in with the information we had received about a Japanese movement in southeast Asia. Japan would naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her communication system in the event that her action in southeast Asia caused Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over her diplomatic residences.

---

[27] Dispatch OPNAV to CinCAF, info CinCPac, 1 Dec., 011400. See also Hewitt testimony, Captain Layton, pp. 216, 217.
[28] Dispatch OpNav to CinCAF, info CinCPac, November 28, 1941, 281633. See also Hewitt testimony, Captain Layton, p. 201.
[29] Dispatch CinCAF to OpNav, info CinCPac, December 6, 1941, 061255.
[30] Exhibit 80.
[31] Exhibit 37, p. 40.

[*6724*] In addition to actual observation, there was another way of obtaining some indications of Japanese Fleet movements. This was the system of so-called traffic analysis. It rested on an attempted identification of call signs of various enemy ships and of subdivision commanders in the enemy fleet. The call sign is a group of letters and numbers used by a ship to identify itself much as a radio station announces itself as "Station WABC." The location of the ships from whence the call signs emanate is made by direction finders. In 1941 we had direction finders at Manila, Guam, and Pearl Harbor. We made a daily traffic analysis. I went over the material with care.

Under the best of circumstances the accuracy of estimates of enemy fleet movements based upon traffic analysis is open to serious doubts. To illustrate: On December 8, 1941, the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to me for information. This dispatch was based upon traffic analysis made by the Communication Intelligence Unit in Manila. It stated: [32]

> The following Japanese distributions are based upon radio call recoveries since December first and are conservative:
> * * * Radio bearings indicate that Akagi is moving south from Empire and is now in Nansei Islands area.

This dispatch therefore placed the Japanese carrier *Akagi*
[*6725*] early on December 8 in Empire waters proceeding south from Japan. As a matter of fact, we now know—and you have the evidence before you (record, p. 450)—that the carrier *Akagi* was in the striking force that attacked Pearl Harbor and could not possibly be moving south from Japan on December 8.

I was familiar with the vagaries of traffic analysis, which this dispatch illustrates. May I point out how these mistaken estimates arise?

Let us assume a radio call sign "KAGA" is heard, and that direction finders locate in the China Sea the ship from which this call sign issues. The crucial question still remains: What ship is using the call sign "KAGA"? Is it a battleship, a cruiser, a destroyer, a carrier, or some auxiliary? The actual intelligence transmitted by the ship having the call sign "KAGA" affords the best clue to her identity. The analyst, however, does not have that intelligence unless he knows the text of the message which the ship is sending. Until then his estimate of the identity of the ship from her call sign alone rests on assumptions which are open to question, and may be in error.

When the call signs of the flagship and individual ships in a fleet are changed, there is a considerable period during which the location of these fleet units, through traffic analysis, is practically impossible.

[*6726*] The Japanese Navy changed its call signs on May 1, 1941. It took about a month thereafter before sufficient signs had been identified to make the location and identification of ships and subdivisions of the fleet sufficiently accurate to merit any real consideration.

Again on November 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanese Navy were changed. About the end of November we had reached a point where the number of identified calls made the data as reliable as such data can be. Then on December 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanese Navy were again changed. This second change within 1 month was entirely consistent with preparation for the anticipated movement to southeast Asia by Japan.

---

[32] Dispatch Com16 to OpNav, info CinCPac, December 8, 1941, 080333.

From December 1 to December 7, 1941, as a consequence of the change in call signs, the data which we obtained from traffic analysis was fragmentary. Out of 20,000 calls involved in the change, only 200 service calls had been partially identified.[33] After December 1, practically all Japanese navel traffic was in a code which we were unable to read.

During the days from December 1 to December 7, 1941, there was a heavy volume of unidentified radio traffic of the Japanese Fleet. The Japanese carrier calls were not identified, nor were the calls of the major part of the Japanese Fleet. [*6727*] The failure to identify carrier traffic did not indicate that the carriers were en route to Pearl Harbor. There was a similar failure to identify the calls on other major units of the Japanese Fleet, which did not come to Pearl Harbor. The failure to identify the carrier calls did not indicate that the carriers were not a part of the fleets which were known to be moving to southeast Asia.

Nor did the failure to identify carrier calls mean that the carriers were preserving radio silence. It was entirely possible that the carriers were originating traffic and that their traffic was included within the great volume of unidentified traffic. Even on the assumption that the Japanese carriers were not originating radio traffic, it would not follow that the carriers were engaged on a secret mission. When ships are within the immediate location of shore stations, they do not ordinarily transmit over long distances, because their traffic is handled through shore stations. Consequently, even radio silence may merely mean that the ships are at anchor in some port in home waters.

The failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic, on and after December 1st when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. During the 6 months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods of 8 to 14 days each, in which there was a similar uncertainty about the location of [*6728*] the Japanese battleships. During the 6 months preceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of positive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the Japanese First Fleet, and eight periods of 10 to 20 days each, in which the location of the greater numbers of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet was uncertain.

[*6729*] As to the Japanese carriers, during the 6 months preceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of 134 days—in 12 separate periods—each ranging from 9 to 22 days, when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio traffic analysis was uncertain.[34]

In brief, in the week immediately prior to Pearl Harbor, I had no evidence that the Japanese carriers were en route to Oahu. Radio traffic analysis did not locate their positions. But this was not a new or unusual condition. It was inherent in the changes of call signs. It had existed on 12 other occasions over a 6-months' period.

The dispatch of November 27 stated that Japanese-American negotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific had ceased. The Navy Department did not let this statement stand without modification. On November 29, 2 days later, the Navy De-

[33] Hewitt testimony, Captain Layton, p. 224.
[34] See memorandum for the Roberts Commission from Lt. Comdr. E. T. Layton, Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, dated January 5, 1942.

partment sent me a dispatch,[35] which quoted the War Department's message to General Short of November 27. It stated:

> Negotiations with Japan *appear* to be terminated with only the barest possibility of resumption. [Italic supplied.]

[*6730*] This dispatch came to me near the end of "the next few days" set forth in the dispatch of November 27 as the period within which the Japanese action would come. Further, there was a public resumption of Japanese-American negotiations after November 27. The public press and radio news broadcasts contained accounts that negotiations were continuing after November 27 and after November 29. In the absence of more authoritative information, I took account of this public information as to diplomatic developments. This suggested a lessening of the emergency which prompted the so-called "war warning" dispatch.

The Navy Department did not inform me of the contents of the American note to Japan on November 26, or that the prevalent opinion in the Navy Department was that the proposals contained in that note were so drastic as to make Japanese acceptance of them impossible.[36] In a letter of November 14, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a copy of a memorandum for the President signed by himself and General Marshall. This memorandum advised against direct United States intervention in China and recommended specifically that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

I was not informed that the Japanese were continuing the [*6731*] negotiations after November 26 only as a device to cover up their plans. The Navy Department knew this to be the fact.[37] I was not informed that, upon receipt of the American note of November 26th, the Japanese considered that negotiations had not merely ceased but that relations with this country were ruptured. The Navy Department knew this to be the fact.[38]

The statement in the Navy Department's dispatch to me to the effect that negotiations had ceased on November 27 was a pale reflection of actual events; so partial a statement as to be misleading. The parties had not merely stopped talking. They were at swords' points. So far as Japan was concerned, the talking which went on after November 26 was play-acting. It was a Japanese stratagem to conceal a blow which Japan was preparing to deliver. That stratagem did not fool the Navy Department. The Navy Department knew the scheme. The Pacific Fleet was exposed to this Japanese stratagem because the Navy Department did not pass on its knowledge of the Japanese trick.

In the November 29 dispatch after quoting the Army message, the Chief of Naval Operations added the following direction:

> WPL–52 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will [*6732*] not be placed in effect in that area except as now in foce in South East Pacific Sub Area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL–46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

WPL–52 was the Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5. Under this plan the Atlantic Fleet had shooting orders. It was

---

[35] Exhibit 37, p. 38.
[36] See Finding XVI, Naval Court of Inquiry.
[37] See exhibit 1, pp. 191, 195, 199.
[38] See exhibit 1, pp. 204, 180.

charged with the task of destroying German and Italian naval, land, and air forces encountered in the area of the western Atlantic. The southeast Pacific sub area covered the area from the coast of South America to a distance of 700 miles westward. Here the southeast Pacific naval force had similar shooting orders and a similar task. In the dispatch of November 29, the Chief of Naval Operations informed me that WPL–52 was not applicable to the Pacific. This was to impress upon me the fact that I did not have shooting orders and that I was not to shoot until Japan had committed an overt act. Although this dispatch was sent me for information I was as much bound by these orders as though I had been an action addressee.

Incidentally, when I received that dispatch, I considered that a modification of the orders I have received in the war-warning dispatch, and that I was to be governed by the [*6733*] provisions of this dispatch. I can see no other interpretation, and I thought that the Navy Department had been brought into accord with the orders that had been issued by the War Department, and I thought that was what they were doing when they sent that dispatch.

This same note of caution is in the dispatch of October 16, 1941:

> You will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan.

Again in the War Department dispatch, quoted to me by the Chief of Naval Operations in his message of November 29:

> The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. * * * Measures should be carried out so as not repeat not alarm civil population or disclose intent.

The Pacific Fleet was based in an area containing over 130,000 Japanese, any one of whom could watch its movements. You can appreciate the psychological handicaps orders of this kind placed upon us. In effect, I was told:

> Do take precautions.
> Do not alarm civilians.
> Do take a preparatory deployment.
> Do not disclose intent.
> Do take a defensive deployment.
> [*6734*] Do not commit the first overt act.

One last feature of the so-called "war-warning" dispatch remains to be noted. This is the directive with which it closed:

> Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL–46.

Under WPL–46 the first task of the Pacific Fleet was to support the forces of the Associated Powers (Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States) in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay barrier.

The Navy Department emphasized this instruction by repeating it on November 29. The dispatch of that date directed:

> Be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL–46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

Thus in two separate dispatches I was ordered by the Navy Department to have the Pacific Fleet ready to move against the Marshalls upon the expected outbreak of war in the Far East.

This was a determinative factor in the most difficult and vital decisions I had to make thereafter. There was not a hint in these two dispatches of any danger in the Hawaiian area.

The CHAIRMAN. The recess having arrived, the committee [*6735*] will stand in recess until 2 p. m.

(Whereupon, at 12: 30 p. m., the committee recessed to 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[*6736*] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

(The hearing was resumed at 2 p. m.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Admiral.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL (Resumed)

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed, I have a request that I would like to submit to the committee and counsel.

We have been provided with the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and General Short given at previous hearings before the Army Board and the Navy Board.

Admiral Stark has testified as a witness before this committee. I have not yet had an opportunity to examine the testimony given by Admiral Stark before the other examining bodies, and I believe that, in the interests of a proper determination as to the weight to be given to certain testimony by Admiral Stark before this committee, the committee should have the benefit of the same prior analysis of testimony that has been furnished in the case of Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

I wonder if that testimony is available?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will ask counsel to answer that question. I think none of the members of the committee [*6737*] have been as yet furnished with the previous testimony of Admiral Stark.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We have one copy of that testimony, but it has never been duplicated as yet, in the same way that we have duplicated the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. It can be duplicated and furnished to the committee if the committee so desires.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, as one member of the committee I do desire it, and I think it is quite advisable that we have that testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection the committee will ask counsel to provide that duplicate.

Mr. KEEFE. May I also suggest at this time, in view of the fact that I understand Admiral Bloch will also be a witness before this committee, that we also have the benefit of the prior testimony given by Admiral Bloch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The some thing that is true of Admiral Stark is also true of Admiral Bloch. That can be furnished to the committee if the committee desires it.

Mr. KEEFE. I think the committee ought to have it prior to the time that Admiral Bloch takes the stand as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the desire of the committee on that?

[6738] Senator BREWSTER. I would think it would certainly be appropriate and would probably expedite the consideration if that can be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection counsel will furnish the committee with the previous testimony of Admiral Bloch.

Senator BREWSTER. I think the same consideration, as far as I know, applies to the previous testimony of General Marshall.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Beg pardon?

Senator BREWSTER. The previous testimony of General Marshall is in the same status.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to make the same motion in regard to that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, just where does the committee want to fix or draw the line on that? Is there to be a manifold duplication of the testimony of all of the earlier hearings? You suggested General Marshall, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Stark. Are there any others?

If we could have the committee's ideas as to just what they wanted, then we could do this job only once.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I anticipate there are some other witnesses coming on, such as Safford, Cramer, Bratton, and various other witnesses, and it certainly would [6739] be very beneficial for the committee members to have that testimony of these important witnesses before they take the stand.

I anticipate the committee should, at the end at least, put into the record the previous testimony of all of the witnesses before all the boards.

The CHAIRMAN. That involves quite an order. If you mean by putting in the testimony having it printed as part of these hearings, or making it in the form of exhibits available to the committee——

Senator FERGUSON. I had in mind an exhibit, so it can be released to the public, showing what the previous reports were based upon. That would include the Roberts report. That is so the public may know what the reports are.

The CHAIRMAN. The immediate matter is the duplication of Admiral Bloch's, Admiral Stark's, and General Marshall's testimony, and without objection, the counsel will be asked to do that.

As these other witnesses come along we can probably discuss that later. Personally, I have no objection to any of it being made available. It would involve quite a lot of printing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It will take weeks to get all of that record duplicated, if it is to be duplicated.

[6740] Mr. KEEFE. May I ask counsel as to whether or not he has received from the State Department the Hornbeck statement which I requested?

The CHAIRMAN. I might say, Congressman, that Secretary Acheson called me yesterday and said he would like to bring that statement over and let you go over it and see exactly what it is, and then we can determine whether his estimate of its pertinency or our own would govern. He said he would be glad to do that.

It has not been received yet officially, but he wanted to show it to you. so you could see it yourself.

Mr. KEEFE. That is perfectly all right. Of course, all I wanted to do was to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no purpose to withhold it. It seems that this statement, from what I gather, only made an indirect reference to Dr. Hornbeck. You can determine for yourself when you see it.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; we will proceed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, just one word. We have, of course, copies of the testimony previously given by Safford and Kramer, and all of the witnesses just discussed, and that testimony is available to any member of the committee who wants to examine it.

[6741] It might be worthy of consideration to see whether the examination of that testimony could be so spelled between the members of the committee that it would not be necessary to go to the trouble of having mimeographs made of all of that testimony, because we are already rushing the mimeograph facilities almost to the limit.

That constitutes a pretty big order.

Mr. KEEFE. May I say, Mr. Chairman, I have specifically limited my request, because I have had the opportunity to read carefully the testimony of General Marshall, Captain Kramer and Captain Safford, and also Colonel Bratton. I have read that testimony and the memorandum received, and as far as I am concerned personally I do not need the copies, but I have not been able to see the testimony of Admiral Stark.

The CHAIRMAN. It is entirely possible that all the members of the committee would want to take the time to read in detail all of the testimony of these former witnesses, and if it could be arranged that those who are interested in reading it in order to make a comparison, wish to do so, and it can be made available to them, it would save a considerable item of printing, and the work of the mimeographing machines if that is done.

Senator FERGUSON. I was not inquiring for my own use.

[6742] The CHAIRMAN. No doubt some of the members of the committee will not have the time to read all of the previous testimony in order to make a comparison with this testimony.

Those who are interested in it, I am sure it can be made available to them.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that is an excellent idea. You will recall that some rather, it seemed to me, unkind comments came from our former counsel occasionally of how this procedure was interrupted by members of the committee getting single documents. I gather that this counsel will not be troubled with that. It is also true if any member of the committee wants to read this information it is much easier to have 10 copies than 1.

That is what happened with Admiral Kimmel's evidence in this previous case. I do not suggest that as the reason why it should be duplicated at all.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there will be no difficulty in making a satisfactory arrangement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, as I understand it, we are to furnish you with the former testimony of General Marshall, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Stark?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.[1]

[1] The complete records of all prior investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack have been admitted to this committee's official record as Exhibits Nos. 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, and 149. (See Index of Exhibits; see also Index of Witnesses.)

All right, Admiral, you may proceed.

[*6743*] You were at the top of page 58, I believe.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

4. *Action taken and decisions made after November 27, 1941.*— The War Plan of the Pacific Fleet (W. P. Pac–46) prescribed a definite plan of operations to enable the fleet to carry out its basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from the Malay barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls.

The CHAIRMAN. "The Marshalls" refers to the islands and not to the general?

Admiral KIMMEL. How is that?

The CHAIRMAN. The word "Marshall" there refers to the islands and not to the general?

Admiral KIMMEL. This refers to the Marshall Islands to the east of the Carolina Islands in the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Admiral KIMMEL. This plan was called the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan.[39] Under the plan, Task Force 2, under the command of Admiral Halsey, was to depart from Pearl Harbor one one J-day; i. e., one day after hostilities with Japan began. This task force, consisting of the carrier *Enterprise* with battleships and destroyers, was to proceed toward Taongi Atoll in the northern Marshalls. [*6744*] Task Force 1 under the command of Admiral W. S. Pye, was to depart Pearl Harbor above five J-day, so as to rendezvous with Admiral Halsey's task force at a designated point on eleven J-day. From six J-day to nine J-day, Admiral Halsey's task force was to reconnoiter by air the atolls of the Marshall Islands for the purpose of determining the best objectives for a raid. About 10 J-day, Task Force 3, under the command of Admiral Wilson Brown, was to join Task Force 2 under Admiral Halsey, and thereafter operate as a part of that force. After the rendezvous of the task force on 11 J-day, the commander in chief of the fleet would direct Admiral Halsey to commence the attacks one the selected islands of the Marshalls group. Admiral Halsey's battleships would then be transferred to Task Force 1, which would operate as a covering force for Halsey's raiding force. On about 13 J-day, Task Force 2 would attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces.

Thus our plans called for a strike at the Marshalls very shortly after J-day—when hostilities commenced. We were conscious of the great value of speed in setting this expedition in motion. Its prime purpose was to divert Japanese strength from the Malay Barrier. If it were delayed, its entire purpose and value would be frustrated.

Under this plan of operations, the patrol planes of [*6745*] the Pacific Fleet had an essential role. The plan provides:[40]

(d) *Task Force Nine* (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes with those of other forces as follows:

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating squadrons at OAHU.

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.

[39] W. P. Pac–46, annex II.
[40] W. P. Pac–46, annex II, p. 7, subpar. (d) (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and acquaint *Commander Task Force Two* with the results. Thereafter, conduct search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating toward the MARSHALLS.

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of *Task Force Two* resume normal operations as required by paragraph 3242 b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.

[*6746*] The mere recitation of these tasks demonstrates the vital air reconnaissance required of the patrol plane force. Without it, the task forces might be exposed to surprise attack if they entered the dangerous Marshall area. It was an indispensable feature of the entire operation.

Beginning November 30, 1941, I made a daily memorandum entitled "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 24 hours." The last form of this memorandum I reviewed and approved on the morning of December 6, 1941. In it I attempted to keep the basic plan of the raid on the Marshall Islands up to date and in conformity with the existing dispositions of fleet units. The last issue of this memorandum, dated December 6, 1941, is as follows:

1. Send dispatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

2. Send dispatch to task force commanders:

(a) WPL 46 effective (Execute O–1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below). (The submarine and patrol plane plans will become effective without special reference to them.)

(b) Commence sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Napo Shoto, cancelled.

(c) Raiding and reconnaissance plan effective, [*6747*] modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost dispatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

(d) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Taskfor 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

(e) Lexington land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in Company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to join Lexington group. Return DMS to Pearl.

3. (a) Do not modify the movements of Regulus at Midway (departing 9th), nor ships bound to Christmas and Canton.

(b) Direct that William Ward Burrows continue to Wake but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that *Lexington* group send two destroyers to join Burrows prior to her arrival at Wake.

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

[*6748*] (d) Provide two destroyers to escort *Saratoga* from longitude 150° west to Pearl Harbor.

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from Manila, nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward California or Samoa until further developments occur.

The provisions of the memorandum were coordinated with the basic plan for the Marshall raid. The "VP plans" which were to "become effective without special reference" were the plans for the operation of the patrol-plane force. Paragraphs 2 (c), (d), and (e) had reference to the existing disposition of fleet units on December 5 and 6. Admiral Halsey at that time was returning from an expedition to Wake Island with a task force specially constituted for that purpose

and called Task Force 8. I planned to have him return to Pearl Harbor to refuel before joining Task Force 3 on the expedition to the Marshalls. The carrier *Lexington* on December 6 was en route to Midway. She was in a task force specially constituted for that purpose and called Task Force 12. In the event of hostilities I planned to have the *Lexington* carry out the Midway expedition and proceed to Wake, there to be joined by the commander of Task Force 3 of which the *Lexington* was a regular component. Admiral Wilson Brown, the commander of Task Force 3, on December 5 was engaged in operations in [*6749*] the vicinity of Johnston Island. I planned to have him leave that area and join the *Lexington* group, thereby bringing together all elements of Task Force 3. Task Force 3 would then be joined by Admiral Halsey's Task Force 2. When these task forces joined, they would proceed with the reconnaissance features of the raiding plan as a preliminary to the actual raids on the Marshall Islands.

This initial expedition was to continue operating as long as we could supply it with fuel. We estimated that it would require continuous operation of maximum patrol plane strength from 4 to 6 weeks. Additional expeditions were to be undertaken as rapidly as events and forces permitted.

I shall now describe the nature and extent of distant reconnaissance from the Hawaiian area on and after November 27, 1941.

By dispatch on November 27, the Navy Department had urged me to send Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake by aircraft carrier. I replied by dispatch that on November 28 I was sending a carrier to Wake with Marine fighter planes, and that I expected thereafter to send other Marine planes to Midway.

I considered the Navy Department's suggestion that planes be sent to Wake and Midway to be sound. It was [*6750*] desirable that the defenses of these outlying islands should be as strong as possible. The planes which went to Wake were, of course, not enough to save that island. Together with its other defenses, they could make the capture of that island sufficiently costly to justify sending them there. The actual results in the defense of Wake after December 7 demonstrated that fact.

The sending of the carrier task forces to Wake and Midway did more than reinforce the air defenses of the islands. It permitted a broad area to be scouted for signs of enemy movement along the path of the advance of these task forces to the islands and their return to Oahu. In addition, they were in an excellent position to intercept any enemy force which might be on the move.

On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier *Enterprise*, 3 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles with his planes for any sign of hostile shipping.[41]

On December 5, 1941, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in command of Task Force 12, consisting of the carrier *Lexington*, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Newton, like Halsey, conducted scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance.[42]

---

[41] Hart testimony—Admiral Halsey, p. 299, q. 44.
[42] Hart testimony—Admiral Newton, p. 318, q. 30.

On December 5, Admiral Wilson Brown left Pearl Harbor en route to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises.

Thus by December 5 there were at sea three task forces of the fleet, each deployed in a different area. The *Lexington* and the *Enterprise* were each conducting air searches. It was a more intensive search in the areas covered than could have been made by patrol planes based on Oahu. Further, as they approached the outlying islands, these searches were conducted at a much greater distance from Oahu than any patrol plane based on Oahu could travel.

In addition to the operations of these task forces, other distant reconnaissance was conducted by the fleet after November 27.

Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, I ordered a squadron of patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas en route. While at Wake on December 2 and 3, they searched to a distance of 525 miles. These orders were executed.[43]

[*6752*] I also ordered another squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor to replace the squadron which went from Midway to Wake.[43] This squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded to Johnston Island. On the way to Johnston, it searched the ocean areas. It then proceeded from Johnston to Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon reaching Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3, 4, 5, and 6.[44] On December 7, five of these Midway-based patrol planes were searching the sector 120° to 170° from Midway, to a distance of 450 miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at the same time to rendezvous with the *Lexington* at a point 400 miles from Midway. Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with bombs, were on 10-minute notice as a ready striking force.[45]

When the *Enterprise* completed its delivery of planes to Wake, I withdrew a squadron of patrol planes from Wake. This squadron then proceeded to Midway, searching the ocean areas en route. It then moved from Midway to Pearl Harbor, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en route.

In the week before December 7, these reconnaissance sweeps of the patrol plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to Pearl Harbor, covered a total distance of nearly 5,000 miles. As they proceeded, each squadron would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path. They brought under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of ocean area.

In addition to these reconnaissance sweeps, submarines of the fleet on and after November 27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously.

At Oahu before the attack, there were 49 patrol planes which were in flying condition. Eight other planes were out of commission and undergoing repair. In addition, on December 5, a squadron of patrol

---

[43] Dispatch CinCPac to COMPATWING 2, 28 November 1941, 280450.
[44] Mailgram COMTASKFOR 9 to COMPATRONS 21 and 22, November 20, 1941, 292103.
[45] Naval Court of Inquiry testimony, Admiral Bellinger, p. 684, questions 106, 107.

planes returned to Pearl Harbor after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake. This squadron consisted of obsolete PBY–3 planes, approaching 18 months' service and overdue for overhaul. It was not available for distant searches.

The 49 flyable patrol planes on Oahu were part of the planes which had arrived during the preceding 4 weeks—18 on October 28, 24 on November 23, and 12 on November 28. These planes were of the PBY–5 [*6754*] type. They were experiencing the shake-down difficulties of new planes. There was considerable difficulty due to the cracking of new engine sections, which required replacement. A program for the installation of leakproof tanks and armor on these planes was underway.[46] The leakproof tanks and armor were necessary to make these planes ready for war. That work had to be carried out in Hawaii. Under war plans the planes were to operate from advance bases, Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra Islands. There, they would operate from aircraft tenders. There were no facilities at those advanced bases to complete important material installations. The planes had to be in the highest condition of fighting efficiency before they left Oahu.

There was a total absence of spare parts for these planes.

There were no spare crews.

To insure an island base against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes, it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360° arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours. Of course, the same planes and the same crews cannot make that 16-hour flight every day. For searches of this character [*6755*] over a protracted period, a pool of 250 planes would be required. These are fundamental principles. You will find them in the testimony of expert aviation officers before the naval court; and in the very comprehensive letter Fleet Admiral Nimitz wrote to the commander in chief, United States Fleet, on January 7, 1942, on the subject Airplane Situation in Hawaiian Area.

It is clear that I did not have a sufficient number of planes to conduct each day a 360° distant search from the island of Oahu. That fact is beyond controversy.

A search of all sectors of approach to an island base is the only type of search that deserves the name. The selection of one sector around an island for concentration of distant search affords no real protection. After a while it may furnish some insurance that the enemy, having knowledge of the search plan, will choose some other sector within which to make his approach. The search concentrated on the so-called "dangerous sector" then ceases to offer much prospect of detecting the enemy. Admiral Nimitz put the matter clearly in his official letter on the subject. He said:[47]

> It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded. The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.

Tactical discussions now of what was the most dangerous sector around Oahu before December 7 do not reach the heart of the problem which I faced.

---

[46] Hewitt testimony, Admiral Bellinger, pp. 485, 497. Naval Court of Inquiry testimony, Captain Ramsey, p. 590, q. 72.

[47] Letter CinCPac to CinCUS, January 7, 1942, serial 059.

The Secretary of the Navy in his endorsement to the record of the Naval Court of Inquiry has stated:

> There were sufficient fleet patrol planes and crews, in fact, available in Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128° to a distance of about 700 miles.

This statement assumes a 25-mile visibility for each patrol plane engaged in the search. It further assumes that I could have used all the patrol plane force for this type of search alone without keeping any planes in reserve for emergency searches or to cover movements of ships in and out of the harbor and in the operating area.

If I instituted a distant search of any 128° sector around Oahu on and after November 27, within the foreseeable future, I would have deprived the Pacific Fleet [*6757*] of any efficient patrol plane force for its prescribed war missions.

In the secret investigation before Admiral Hewitt, from which I was excluded, Vice Admiral Bellinger, who commanded my patrol plane force, testified:[48]

> Q. Assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct the fullest possible partial reconnaissance over an indefinite period of time, could you have covered 128 degrees approximately on a daily basis and for how long?
>
> A. It could have been done until the failure of planes and lack of spare parts reduced the planes to an extent that it would have made it impossible. *Perhaps it could have been carried on for two weeks*, perhaps, but this estimate is, of course, very vague and it is all based on maintaining planes in readiness for flight. (Italic supplied.)

This testimony reflected the conditions in the patrol plane squadrons as I knew them on November 27 and thereafter.

Captain Ramsey, the executive officer of the patrol wing, testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry as follows:[49]

> [*6758*] * * * As nearly as I could estimate the situation and in view of our almost total lack of spare parts for the PBY–5 planes, I believe that three weeks of intensive daily searches would have been approximately a 75 percent reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have been placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other planes going. The pilots, I believe, could have kept going approximately a six-weeks period, but at the end of that time they would have all required a protracted rest period.

[*6759*] The patrol planes in Oahu were not uselessly employed prior to the attack. They were not standing idle. There was a definite program for their operation which was consistent with creating and preserving their material readiness for war. In the week preceding the attack, there was a daily scout by patrol planes on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, of a sector to the north and northwest of Oahu to a distance of 400 miles, after which the planes required maintenance and upkeep.[50] This was not distant reconnaissance, as such, although the distance covered was greater than that searched at the time of the 1940 alert. In addition, there was the daily dawn patrol out 300 miles to cover the areas where the fleet operated.

I had been ordered, not once but twice, to be prepared to carry out the raids on the Marshalls under WPL–46, which meant the extended use of the fleet patrol planes from advanced bases in war operations.

---

[48] Hewitt testimony—Admiral Bellinger, p. 505.
[49] Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony Captain Ramsey, p. 583, q. 44.
[50] Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony Captain Ramsey, p. 595, question 101.

I had to decide what was the best use of the patrol planes as a matter of policy for the foreseeable future, and with their war task in front of me.

Had I directed their use for intensive distance searches from Oahu, I faced the peril of having these planes grounded when the fleet needed them and when the war plan was executed.

[*6760*] I had no way of knowing that the war was to start on the 7th of December. I could not decide the matter on the basis of 5 days or 10 days of distant searches.

I did not have the intercepted Japanese dispatches pointing to Pearl Harbor as a probable point of attack.

I knew that any search I could make, straining the planes to the breaking point, was in its nature partial and ineffective.

I took account of my resources. They were slender.

I took account of my probable future needs and of my orders from the Navy Department.

I decided that I could not risk having no patrol plane force worthy of the name for the fleet's expected movement into the Marshalls.

I considered the nature and extent of the distant reconnaissance I was effectuating with my task forces at sea and the patrol plane sweeps to and from the outlying islands.

I considered the necessity of permitting the essential replacement and material upkeep program for the new patrol planes in Oahu to be continued to get them into war condition.

I considered the need for patrols of the fleet operating areas against the submarine menace and these I carried out.

I considered the need for some reserve of patrol planes for emergency distant searches.

[*6761*] I considered the need for patrol planes in covering fleet movements in and out of the harbor—which might have to be quickly and unexpectedly executed.

I considered the endurance of my patrol-plane manpower—and the absence of any spare crews.

I decided that I could not fritter away my patrol-plane resources by pushing them to the limit in daily distant searches of one sector around Oahu—which within the predictable future would have to be discontinued when the patrol planes and crews gave out.

The three admirals who composed the Naval Court of Inquiry scrutinized my decision after extensive testimony. Each of the admirals could view the matter from the point of view of the commander in the field. They summarized the problem:

> The task assigned the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent—how imminent he did not know. The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of available information.
>
> If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet [*6762*] for war would be reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet operations.
>
> The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be reduced seriously after a few days because of the inability of planes and crews to stand up under the demands of daily long-range reconnaissance.

The court concluded (finding XIII):

> The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and con-

sultation with experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved.

I shall now discuss the dispositions of the capital ships of the Pacific Fleet on and after November 27. On November 28 Admiral Halsey left for Wake with a carrier task force and on December 5 Admiral Newton left for Midway with another carrier task force. These missions were in pursuance of an explicit suggestion from the Navy Department. When Admiral Halsey left for Wake on November 28 the three battleships of his task force accompanied him out of Pearl Harbor so as to avoid creating the impression that there was anything unusual about the movement of his task force. However, immediately on clearing the channel Admiral Halsey diverted his battleships and instructed them to carry out exercises in the Hawaiian area. He then [*6763*] headed west with the remainder of his task force.

It would have been unwise for Admiral Halsey to have taken along the battleships. The maximum speed of the battleships was 17 knots. The fleet units which he took to Wake could make 30 knots. To take his battleships with him would have meant the loss of 13 knots of potential speed. He was bound for dangerous waters where curtailed speed might spell disaster. He needed all the mobility his force could attain. Three battleships did not furnish sufficient supporting strength to warrant the risks of reduction in speed and mobility which their presence in the expedition to Wake would entail. Moreover, it was necessary to complete the Wake operation as quickly as possible so that the ships engaged might be ready for further eventualities.

Almost every disposition which I made in the Pacific with the forces available to me had its cost. In sending the two carriers to Wake and Midway, I took from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor, for the time being, the fleet's air strength. We had no carrier left in the Hawaiian area. The *Saratoga*, the third carrier of the Pacific Fleet, had been undergoing repair and overhaul on the west coast. The advisability of using her to transfer a squadron of Marine fighter planes from San Diego to Hawaii was suggested by the Chief of Naval Operations on November 28.[51]

[*6764*] The absence of the carriers from the Hawaiian area temporarily limited the mobility of the battleships which were left behind.

While the carriers were absent on the assigned missions to Midway and Wake, the battleships force was kept in Pearl Harbor. To send them to sea without air cover for any prolonged period would have been a dangerous course. The only effective defense at sea from air attack, whether it be a bombing attack or a torpedo-plane attack, is an effective air cover. Surface ships, such as destroyers and cruisers, are much less effective against an air attack. That is so today. It was the more so prior to 7 December because of the existing inadequacies of antiaircraft guns.

The carriers furnished air coverage for the battleships at sea. The few planes that battleships and cruisers carry for use by catapult are not fighters. Their function is only scouting and reconnaissance. They are ineffective as a defense against enemy air attack. The battleships at sea without carriers had no protection from air bombing attack. In Pearl Harbor they had the protection of such antiaircraft

[51] Dispatch CNO to CinCPac, November 28, 1941, 282054.

defenses as the Army had. At sea, in deep waters, there were no physical barriers to the effectiveness of torpedo-plane attack. In Pearl Harbor, where the depth of water was less than 40 feet, a torpedo-plane attack was considered a negligible danger. The [*6765*] battleships of the fleet at sea, without carriers, sighted by a force of such character as to have a chance of a successful air attack on the Hawaiian Islands appeared to be more subject to damage than in port.

Vice Admiral Pye, commander of the Battle Force, and I discussed these considerations in a conference after the receipt of the so-called war-warning dispatch.

At the time of our discussion—at that time and later—we did not have before us the intercepted Japanese messages indicating that the ships in port in Pearl Harbor were marked for attack. We had no information that an air attack upon Pearl Harbor was imminent or probable. The fact that the Navy Department proposed at this time that our carriers be sent to the outlying islands indicated to us that the Navy Department felt that no attack on Pearl Harbor could be expected in the immediate future.

All the dispositions of my task forces at sea, as well as the presence of the battleships in port, were known to the Navy Department. Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the Roberts Commission as follows:[52]

> What we expected him (Admiral Kimmel) to do was to get more planes and personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task forces—some [*6766*] task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, which he did. He did that. *We knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea. He informed us that one was returning from having put the people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had been sent to Midway, and were expected to go on the fifth or sixth day down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in port, and at that particular time out of the three task forces, there were two scheduled to be in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port. He kept the others at sea. He had taken those measures which looked absolutely sound. It was a safe assumption that other measures had been taken of a similar nature.* (Italics supplied.)

Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, 1941, I issued orders to the fleet to exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas and to depth bomb all contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas.[53] My dispatch of November 28 to the fleet containing this order was forwarded to the Navy Department on that day. On December 2, I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations directing his personal attention to this order. The Navy Department, in the 10 days prior to the attack, did not approve or disapprove my action.

For some time there had been reports of submarines in the [*6767*] operating areas around Hawaii. During the first week of February 1941, a submerged submarine contact was reported about 8 miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. A division of destroyers trailed this contact for approximately 48 hours, after which the contact was lost. The destroyers were confident it was a Japanese submarine. I was not fully convinced, but made a complete report to Naval Operations, stating the action taken and adding that I would be delighted to bomb every suspected submarine contact

---

[52] Roberts Commission testimony, pp. 1813 and 1819.
[53] Dispatch CinCPac to Pacific Fleet, info OpNav, November 28, 1941, 280355.

in the operating area around Hawaii.[54] I was directed by dispatch not to depth bomb submarine contacts except within the 3-mile limit.

A similar contact at approximately the same position was made about the middle of March. Again the destroyers were confident that they had trailed a Japanese submarine. Again the evidence was not conclusive because the submarine had not actually been sighted.

On September 12, 1941, I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations and asked him "What to do about the submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity." I stated, "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts but not to bomb [*6768*] unless they are in the defensive areas. Should we now bomb contacts without waiting to be attacked?"

On September 23 the Chief of Naval Operations replied to my question in a personal letter. He stated:

> The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step.

No conclusive evidence was obtained until December 7, 1941.

The files of the Comander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, contain records of at least three suspicious contacts during the 5 weeks preceding Pearl Harbor.

On November 3, 1941, a patrol plane observed an oil slick area in latitude 20–10, longitude 157–41. The patrol plane searched a 15-mile area. A sound search was made by the U. S. S. *Borden*, and an investigation was made by the U. S. S. *Dale*, all of them producing negative results.[55] On November 28, 1941 the U. S. S. *Helena* reported that a radar operator without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against submarines was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area.[56] [*6769*] A search by a task group with three destroyers of the suspected area produced no contacts. During the night of December 2, 1941, the U. S. S. *Gamble* reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20–30, longitude 158–23. An investigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced no conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine.[57] On the morning of the attack, the U. S. S. *Ward* reported to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District that it had attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon a submarine operating in the defensive sea area. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District directed a verification of this report with a view to determining whether the contact with the submarine was a sound contact or whether the submarine had actually been seen by the *Ward*. He also directed that the ready-duty destroyer assist the *Ward* in the defensive sea area. Apparently, some short time after reporting the submarine contact, the *Ward* also reported that it had intercepted a sampan which it was escorting into Honolulu. This message appeared to increase the necessity for a verification of the earlier report of the submarine contact.

Between 7:30 and 7:40 I received information from the Staff Duty Officer of the *Ward's* report, the dispatch of the ready-duty

---

[54] Official letter CinCPac to CNO, February 11, 1941, serial 0243.
[55] Hewitt report, pp. 148–149.
[56] Dispatch U. S. S. *Helena* to GR 1.5—info CinCPac, November 28, 1941, 280835.
[57] Hewitt report, p. 149.

destroyer to assist the *Ward*, and the efforts then under way to obtain a verification of the *Ward's report.* [*6770*] I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action in view of the number of such contacts which had not been verified in the past.

PART III.—INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM THE FLEET AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

When I took command of the Pacific Fleet I realized that information about our relations with Japan and the plans of that government was of supreme importance to me. I knew in general, from my experience in the Navy, of the sources from which the Navy Department might derive such intelligence, including the so-called "magic" source. The Pacific Fleet was dependent upon the Navy Department in Washington for information derived from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages.

Shortly after I took command, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, upon his arrival in Hawaii from Washington, informed me of some confusion in the Navy Department as to whether the responsibility of furnishing the Commander in Chief, Pacific, with secret information rested with Naval Operations or Naval Intelligence. I immediately added a postscript to a letter which I was writing to the Chief of Naval Operations, bringing this situation to his attention. I wrote Admiral Stark on [*6771*] February 18, 1941:

> I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI—that is Naval Intelligence—considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander in Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding.

He replied in a letter of March 22:

> With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and the responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CinCUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibilities in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States.

On May 26, 1941 I wrote an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject of "Survey of Conditions in the Pacific Fleet." In a separate paragraph entitled [*6772*] "Information", again I described my need for information of all important developments affecting our foreign relations.

> The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tend sto create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify. [*6673*] adapt, or even reorient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by stategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

I brought this official letter to Washington with me in June of 1941, handed it to the Chief of Naval Operations personally, discussed it with him, and received his assurance that I would be informed of all important developments as they occurred and by the quickest secure means available.

In the month of July 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations [*6774*] sent me at least seven dispatches which quoted intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Washington, Tokyo to Berlin, Berlin to Tokyo, Tokyo to Vichy, Canton to Tokyo. These dispatches identified by number the Japanese messages they quoted and gave their verbatim text.[1]

I was never informed of any decision to the effect that intelligence from intercepted Japanese messages was not to be sent to me. In fact, dispatches sent to me by the Navy Department in the week before the attack contained intelligence from intercepted messages. On December 1, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations,[2] sent to me for information, quoted a report of November 29 from the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok to Tokyo which described a Japanese plan to entice the British to invade Thai, thereby permitting Japan to enter that country in the role of its defender. On December 3, a dispatch to me from the Chief of Naval Operations set forth an order from Japan to diplomatic agents and expressly referred to this order as "Circular 2444 from Tokyo."[3] Another dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations on December 3 referred to certain "categoric and urgent instructions which were sent [*6775*] yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts."[4]

The Navy Department thus engaged in a course of conduct calculated to give me the impression that intelligence from important intercepted Japanese messages was being furnished to me. Under these circumstances a failure to send me important information of this character was not merely a withholding of intelligence. It partook of the nature of an affirmative misrepresentation. I had asked for all vital information. I had been assured that I would have it. I appeared to be receiving it. My current estimate of the situation was formed

[1] Exhibit 37, pp. 6 to 12.
[2] Dispatch OpNav to CinCAF info CinCPac, 1 December 1941, 011400.
[3] Exhibit 37, p. 41.
[4] Exhibit 37, p. 40.

on this basis. Yet, in fact, the most vital information from the intercepted Japanese messages was not sent to me. This failure not only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me.

I was not supplied with any information of the intercepted messages showing that the Japanese Government had divided Pearl Harbor into five subareas and was seeking minute information as to the berthing of ships of the fleet in those areas.

On September 24, 1941, the Japanese Government instructed its consul general in Honolulu as to the type of report it desired from him concerning vessels in Pearl Harbor. These instructions divided Pearl Harbor into five subareas. Each area was given an alphabetical symbol. Area A was the term prescribed to describe the waters between Ford Island and the ar [*6776*] senal. Area B was the term prescribed to describe the waters south and west of Ford Island. Area C was the term prescribed to describe East Loch; area D, Middle Loch; Area E, West Loch and communicating water routes. The dispatch stated: [5]

> With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)

This dispatch was decoded and translated on October 9, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

On September 29, 1941, Kita, the Japanese consul general in Honolulu, replied to his government's dispatch of September 24. He described an elaborate and detailed system of symbols to be used thereafter in designating the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor. The letters "KS" would describe the repair dock in the navy yard. The letters "KT" would describe the navydock in the navy yard. The letters "FV" would describe the moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island. The letters "FG" would describe vessels alongside Ford Island, the east and west sides to be designated by A and B, respectively. This dispatch of the consul general was decoded and translated on October 10, 1941.[6] This information was never supplied to me.

[*6777*] In the critical period before the attack, the Japanese Government sent further significant instructions to Honolulu. On November 15, Togo sent the following dispatch: [7]

> As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular but at the rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy in Washington on December 3, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

On November 18, 1941, Togo sent the following dispatch to Honolulu: [8]

> Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein; area N, Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay (Honolulu), and the Areas Adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

---

[5] Exhibit 2, p. 12.
[6] Exhibit 2, p. 13.
[7] Exhibit 2, p. 13.
[8] Exhibit 2, p. 15.

This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 5, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

On November 18, 1941 the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu reported to Tokyo in accordance with the system prescribed in the dispatch from Tokyo on September 24. He reported that in Area A there was a battleship of the *Oklahoma* [*6778*] class; that in Area C there were three heavy cruisers at anchor, as well as the carrier *Enterprise* or some other vessel; that two heavy cruisers of the *Chicago* class were tied up at docks "KS." The symbol "KS" it will be recalled was established by the Consul General in his September dispatch to Tokyo to designate the repair dock in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. The Consul General described in great detail the course taken by destroyers entering the harbor, their speed and their distances apart. He reported that they changed course five times, each time roughly 30°, from the entrance of the harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C at which they were moored. This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on December 6, 1941.[9] This information was never supplied to me.

On November 20, Togo in Tokyo dispatched instructions to Honolulu to investigate comprehensively Fleet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Military Reservation. This dispatch was decoded and translated on 4th of December.[10] This information was never supplied to me.

Again on November 29, Tokyo sent the following dispatch to Honolulu:

[*6779*] We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 5, 1941.[11] This information was never supplied to me.

In the volume of intercepted Japanese dispatches eliciting and securing information about American military installations and naval movements, the dispatches concerning Pearl Harbor, on and after September 24, 1941, stand out, apart from the others (exhibit 2). No other harbor or base in American territory, or possessions was divided into subareas by Japan. In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl Harbor, followed the general pattern of their interest in American Fleet movements in other localities. One might suspect this type of conventional espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those which followed, there was a significant and ominous change in the character of the information which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of an unusual character and outside the realm of reasonable suspicion. It was no longer merely directed to [*6780*] ascertaining the general whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf. In the period immediately

[9] Exhibit 2, p. 14.
[10] Exhibit 2, p. 15.
[11] Exhibit 2, p. 15.

preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawaii was directed by Tokyo to report even when there were no movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor. The information sought and obtained, with such painstaking detail, had no other conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. Its effective value was lost completely when the ships left their reported berthings in Pearl Harbor.

No one had a more direct and immediate interest in the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor than its commander in chief. No one had a greater right than I to know that Japan had carved up Pearl Harbor into subareas and was seeking and receiving reports as to the precise berthings in that harbor of the ships of the fleet. I had been sent Mr. Grew's report earlier in the year with positive advice from the Navy Department that no credence was to be placed in the rumored Japanese plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor. I was told then, that no Japanese move against Pearl Harbor appeared "imminent [*6781*] or planned for in the foreseeable future." Certainly I was entitled to know when information in the Navy Department completely altered the information and advice previously given to me. Surely, I was entitled to know of the intercepted dispatches between Tokyo and Honolulu on and after September 24, 1941, which indicated that a Japanese move against Pearl Harbor was planned in Tokyo.

Knowledge of these intercepted Japanese dispatches would have radically changed the estimate of the situation made by me and my staff. It would have suggested a reorientation of our planned operations at the outset of hostilities. The war plans of the Navy Department, and of the Pacific Fleet, as well as our directives and information from Washington prior to the attack indicated that the Pacific Fleet could be most effectively employed against Japan through diversionary raids on the Marshalls, when the Japanese struck at the Malay Barrier. Knowledge of a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor afforded an opportunity to ambush the Japanese striking force as it ventured to Hawaii. It would have suggested the wisdom of concentrating our resources to that end, rather than conserving them for the Marshall expedition.

The intercepted dispatches about the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor also clarified the significance of other intercepted Japanese dispatches, decoded and translated by the Navy [*6782*] Department prior to the attack. I refer particularly to the intercepted dispatches which established a deadline date for agreement between Japan and the United States. When this date passed without agreement, these dispatches revealed that a Japanese plan automatically took effect.

The deadline date was first established in a dispatch No. 736 from Tokyo to Washington on November 5, 1941. In this dispatch the Japanese Government instructed its Ambassador in Washington as follows:[12]

[*6783*] Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement, be completed by the 25th of

[12] Exhibit 1, p. 100.

this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself alone.

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy on the date of its origin, November 5, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deadline was reiterated in a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 11, 1941. This dispatch stated:[13]

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message No. 736 is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite deadline and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day?)) according to the schedule. The government [*6784*] must have a clear picture of things to come in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short * * *"

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy Department on November 12, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deadline was again emphasized in a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 15, 1941. This dispatch stated:[14]

Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy Department on the date of its origin, November 15, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deadline was again reiterated on November 16 with great emphasis upon its importance. A dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of that date was as follows:[15]

For your Honor's own information:

[*6785*] 1. I have read your #1090 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. * * * In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline from the solution of these negotiations in my #736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

This dispatch was decoded and translated on November 17, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

The deal line was finally extended on November 22 for a period of 4 days. On that date a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington instructed Nomura and Kurusu:[16]

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our

[13] Exhibit 1, p. 116.
[14] Exhibit 1, p. 130.
[15] Exhibit 1, p. 138.
[16] Exhibit 1, p. 165.

fixed policy and do [6786] your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short, if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

This dispatch was decoded and translated on the date of its origin, November 22, 1941. This information was never supplied to me.

Again on November 24, 1941, Tokyo specifically instructed its Ambassadors in Washington that the November 29 deal line was set in Tokyo time.[17] This dispatch was decoded and translated [6787] on November 24, the date of its origin. This information was never supplied to me.

In at least six separate dispatches, on November 5, 11, 15, 16, 22, and 24, Japan specifically established and extended the dead line of November 25, later advanced to November 29. The dispatches made it plain that after the dead line date of Japanese plan was automatically going into operation. The plan was of such importance that as the dead line approached, the Government of Japan declared: "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days."[18]

When the dead line date of November 29 was reached with no agreement between the United States and Japan, there was no further extension. The intercepted dispatches indicated that the crisis deepened in its intensity after that day passed. On the 1st of December, Tokyo advised its ambassadors in Washington:[19]

The date set in my messages #812 has come and gone and the situation continues to be increasingly critical.

This message was translated by the Navy on the 1st of December. This information was never supplied to me.

An intercepted Japanese dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of November 28, 1941, made it clear that the American proposal [6788] of November 26 was completely unsatisfactory to Japan and that an actual rupture of negotiations would occur upon the receipt of the Japanese reply. A dispatch on November 28, decoded and translated on the same day, stated:[20]

Well, you two ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the view of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. * * *"

After receipt by Tokyo of the American note of November 26, the intercepted Japanese dispatches show that Japan attached great importance to the continuance of negotiations to conceal from the United States whatever plan automatically took effect on November 29. Thus,

[17] Exhibit 1, p. 173.
[18] Exhibit 1, p. 137.
[19] Exhibit 1, p. 208.
[20] Exhibit 1, p. 195.

the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 28, cautions the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington:[21]

* * * I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that [*6789*] you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific * * *

This information was never supplied to me.

Again the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of December 1, 1941, advising the Japanese Ambassador that the dead line date had come and gone and the situation continues to be critical, contains this further information:[22]

* * * to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)

This information was never supplied to me.

Again in the trans-Pacific telephone conversation intercepted on November 27, and translated by the Navy Department on November 28, Yamamoto in Tokyo explicitily instructed Kurusu: "Regarding negotiations, don't break them off."[23]

In another trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, intercepted and translated by the Navy [*6790*] on November 30, Kurusu noted the change in the Japanese attitude with respect to the duration of the American-Japanese negotiations. Before the deadline date Kurusu and Nomura had been urged by Tokyo to press for a conclusion of negotiations. Now they were instructed to stretch them out. Kurusu asked, "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?" Yamamoto replied, "Yes." Kurusu then stated: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."[24]

The information from these telephone conversations was never supplied to me.

Again on November 29, an intercepted Japanese dispatch from Tokyo contains cautious representations to be addressed to the United States. The following instructions accompanied them:[25]

* * * In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations. * * *

This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy on November 30, and never sent to me.

[*6791*] The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show that on and after November 29, a Japanese plan of action automatically went into effect; that the plan was of such importance that it involved the fate of the empire; and that Japan urgently wanted the United States to believe that negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan.

---

[21] Exhibit 1, p. 195.
[22] Exhibit 1, p. 208.
[23] Exhibit 1, p. 190.
[24] Exhibit 1, p. 207.
[25] Exhibit 1, p. 199.

What was this plan? Why such elaborate instructions to stretch out negotiations as a pretext to hide the operation of this plan? Anyone reading the Japanese intercepted messages would face this question.

Certainly the concealed Japanese plans which automatically went into effect on November 29 would hardly be the Japanese movement in Indo-China. "* * * No effort was made to mask the movements or presence of the naval forces moving southward, because physical observations of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy." [26] The troop movements to southern Indo-China were the subject of formal diplomatic exchanges between the two governments of Japan and the United States.

On December 2, 1941, Mr. Welles handed to Mr. Nomura and [*6792*] Mr. Kurusu a communication which the President of the United States wished to make to them. This communication was as follows: [27]

> I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indo-China. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indo-China. . . The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indo-China would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. . . . Please be good enough to request the Japanese ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indo-China. . .

[*6793*] Thus, it was apparent to the Japanese Government from this formal representation of the United States that our Government was aware of the movement in Indochina. The United States expressed its concern about potential Japanese action against the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand. There was, therefore, very little reason for Japan to keep up a pretext of negotiations for the purpose of disguising these objectives.

Consequently, as time went on after November 29, and as Japan insisted to her envoys upon the continuance of negotiations as a pretext to divert the suspicion of the United States, it must have been apparent to a careful student of the intercepted dispatches that Japan on a dead-line date of November 29 had put into effect an operation, which was to consume a substantial time interval before its results were apparent to this Government, and which appeared susceptible of effective concealment in its initial phases.

The messages as to the berthings of ships in Pearl Harbor would then have given the reader of these intercepted dispatches an insight as to one of the probable directions of the plan which went into effect automatically on November 29, and which Japan was so anxious to conceal. All these dispatches taken together would have pointed to Pearl Harbor as a probable objective of this plan. Yet, because [*6794*] I was not furnished with these intercepted dispatches, nor

---

[26] Record, testimony Admiral Inglis, p. 453.
[27] Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931–41, vol. 2, p. 779.

given in summary form any indication of the dead-line date, the automatic execution of a plan by Japan on that date, and the continuance of negotiations thereafter as a pretext to hide that plan, I was deprived of the opportunity to make this deduction, which the dispatches as a whole would warrant, if not compel.

After November 27, there was a rising intensity in the crisis in Japanese-United States relations apparent in the intercepted dispatches. I was told on November 27 that negotiations had ceased and 2 days later that they appeared to be terminated with the barest possibilities of their resumption. Then I was left to read public accounts of further conversations between the State Department and the Japanese emissaries in Washington which indicated that negotiations had been resumed.

[*6795*] The Navy Department knew immediately of the reactions of Nomura and Kurusu to the American note of November 26—"Our failure and humiliation are complete." [28]

The Navy Department knew immediately of the reactions of the Japanese Government to the American note of November 26. Japan termed it— [29]

a humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.

The Navy Department knew that Nomura and Kurusu suggested to Japan on November 26 one way of saving the situation—a wire by the President to the Emperor.[30]

The Navy Department knew that the Japanese Government advised Nomura and Kurusu on November 28 that the suggested wire from the President to the Emperor offered no hope: "What you suggest is entirely unsuitable." [31]

[*6796*] The Navy Department knew that on November 30, Japan gave Germany a detailed version of the negotiations with the United States. Japan stated that "a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause," and characterized certain features of the American proposal of November 26 as "insulting"—"clearly a trick." Japan concluded that the United States had decided to regard her as an enemy.[32]

The Navy Department knew that Japan had instructed her ambassadors in Berlin on November 30 to inform Hitler: [33]

The conversation begun between Tokyo and Washington last April * * * now stand ruptured—broken. Say very secretly to them (Hitler and Ribbentrop) that there is extreme danger that way may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

All this vital information came from intercepted dispatches, decoded and translated in Washington, either on the day they were sent or a day or two later. None of this information was supplied to me.

---

[28] Exhibit 1, p. 180.
[29] Exhibit 1, p. 195.
[30] Exhibit 1, p. 180.
[31] Exhibit 1, p. 195.
[32] Exhibit 1, p. 205, 206.
[33] Exhibit 1, p. 204.

[*6797*] On November 19, 1941, the Japanese Government set up a system for informing its representatives throughout the world of the time when Japan was to sever diplomatic relations [34] or go to war [35] with the United States, Great Britain, or Russia. This decision was to be made known through a false weather broadcast from Japan. The words "east wind rain" in the broadcast meant that Japan had decided to sever relations or go to war with the United States. The words "west wind clear" would denote such action against England. The words "north wind cloudy" would denote such action against Russia.

The interception of the false weather broadcast was considered by the Navy Department to be of supreme importance. Every facility of the Navy was invoked to learn as speedily as possible when the false weather broadcast from Japan was heard and which of the significant code words were used. Extraordinary measures were established in the Navy Department to transmit the words used in this broadcast to key officers in Washington as soon as they were known.[36]

[*6798*] The Naval Court of Inquiry heard substantial evidence from various witnesses on the question of whether or not Japan gave the signal prescribed by the winds code. The Naval Court of Inquiry found the facts on this matter to be as follows: [37]

On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

It was known in the Navy Department that the Commenders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.

Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, [*6799*] although Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department.

[*6800*] From various intercepted Japanese messages it was apparent that the high point in the crisis in Japanese-American affairs would be reached when the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 was received. As the Naval Court of Inquiry put it: [38]

The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of the War and Navy Departments because of the feeling that Japan would not accept the conditions presented, and that diplomatic relations would be severed or that war would be declared.

On the afternoon of December 6, 1941, there was intercepted, decoded, and translated in the Navy Department, a dispatch from Japan to her Ambassadors in Washington, known as the "pilot message." This stated: [39]

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

---

[34] Exhibit 1, pp. 154, 155.
[35] Dispatch Alusna Batavia to OpNav, December 5, 1941, 031030; Naval Court of Inquiry, exhibit 64, item 3; record, testimony General Miles, p. 4100.
[36] Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony Commander Kramer, p. 956, question 32.
[37] Addendum to Naval Court of Inquiry Finding of Fact, p. 4 (not published).
[38] Naval Court of Inquiry, finding XVI.
[39] Exhibit 1, p. 238.

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

[*6801*] 3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

The first 13 parts of the Japanese reply were intercepted and received by the Navy Department at about 3 p. m., December 6, 1941, and were translated and made ready for distribution by 9 p. m., Washington time, on that date. These 13 parts contained strong language. The following expressions are fairly typical of the tenor of those 13 parts:[40]

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war (Part 9) . . . it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure (Part 9) . . . It is a fact of history that the countries (of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have) been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice [*6802*] (themselves) to the prosperity of the two nations. (Part 10).

Mr. Hull described the whole document on December 7:[41]

In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government of this planet was capable of uttering them.

The 13 parts and the pilot message instructing the Japanese envoys that a specific hour was later to be fixed for its delivery could mean only one thing; that war with the United States was imminent. An hour had been fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimate and for the probable outbreak of hostilities. The hour fixed would be communicated to the Japanese emissaries in Washington in a separate message to be expected shortly. Not a word of these supremely critical developments of Saturday, December 6, was sent to me. This vital information which was available at 9 p. m., Washington time, was distributed to the most important officers of the Government in Washington by midnight, Washington time. The President of the United States had it. The Secretary of the Navy had it. The Chief of Military Intelligence had it. The Director of [*6803*] Naval Intelligence had it. Apparently, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State were apprised of these momentous events on that same evening. Nine p. m. in Washington was 3:30 in the afternoon in Hawaii. At midnight in Washington it was early evening, 6:30 p. m., in Hawaii.

The dispatch fixing the hour for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to the United States as 1 p. m., Washington time,[42] was intercepted and decoded by the Navy Department by 7 on the morning of December 7—7 a. m., Washington time, 1:30 a. m., Hawaiian time—nearly six and a half hours before the attack.[43] The translation of this short message from the Japanese was a 2-minute job.[44] Not

[40] Exhibit 1, pp. 239–244.
[41] Foreign Relations of United States, Japan: 1931–41, vol. 2, p. 787.
[42] Exhibit 1, p. 248.
[43] Hewitt report, p. 86.
[44] Hewitt testimony, Captain Kramer, p. 595.

later than 10:30 a. m. the Chief of Naval Operations was informed of it. This information was not supplied to me prior to the attack.

I cannot tell what the evidence at this investigation will ultimately show as to the precise hours on the morning of December 7, when various responsible officers of the Navy Department knew that 1 p. m., Washington time, was the hour fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to this Government. This much I know. There was ample time, at least an interval of approximately 2½ hours, [*6804*] in which a message could have been dispatched to me.

Regardless of what arguments there may be as to the evaluation of the dispatches that had been sent to me, I surely was entitled to know of the hour fixed by Japan for the probable outbreak of war against the United States. I cannot understand now—I have never understood—I may never understand—why I was deprived of the information available in the Navy Department in Washington on Saturday night and Sunday morning.

On November 28, 1941, the Navy Department could have informed me of the following vital facts:

(1) Japan had set November 29 as an immovable dead-line date for agreement with the United States.

(2) The United States gave to Japan certain proposals for a solution of Japanese-American relations on November 26. I might remark parenthetically that an authoritative statement from my Government as to the general nature of these proposals would have been most enlightening.

(3) Japan considered the United States proposals of November 26 as unacceptable and planned to rupture negotiations with the United States when he reply to them was delivered to this Government.

(4) Japan was keeping up a pretext of negotiations after November 26 to conceal a definite plan which went into effect on November 29.

[*6805*] This was the type of information which I had stated in May I needed so urgently in making the difficult decisions with which I was confronted.

The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine: Would the receipt of this information have made a difference in the events of December 7? No man can now state as a fact that he would have taken a certain course of action 4 years ago had he known facts which were then unknown to him. All he can give is his present conviction on the subject, divorcing himself from hindsight as far as humanly possible, and re-creating the atmosphere of the past and the factors which then influenced him. I give you my views, formed in this manner.

Had I learned these vital facts and the "ships in harbor" messages on November 28, it is my present conviction that I would have rejected the Navy Department's suggestion to send carriers to Wake and Midway. I would have ordered the third carrier, the Saratoga, back from the west coast. I would have gone to sea with the fleet and endeavored to keep it in an intercepting position at sea. This would have permitted the disposal of the striking power of the fleet to meet an attack in the Hawaiian area. The requirement of keeping the fleet fueled, however, would have made necessary the presence in Pearl Harbor from time to [*6806*] time of detachments of various units of the main body of the fleet.

On December 4, ample time remained for the Navy Department to forward to me the information which I have outlined, and in addition

the following significant facts, which the Navy Department learned between November 27 and that date:

(1) Japan had informed Hitler that war with the Anglo-Saxon powers would break out sooner than anyone dreams;

(2) Japan had broadcast her winds code signal using the words "east wind rain", meaning war or a rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States.

Assuming that for the first time on December 5 I had all the important information then available in the Navy Department, it is my present conviction that I would have gone to sea with the fleet, including the carrier Lexington and arranged a rendezvous at sea with Halsey's carrier force, and been in a good position to intercept the Japanese attack.

On December 6, 15 hours before the attack, ample time still remained for the Navy Department to give me all the significant facts which I have outlined and which were not available to me in Hawaii. In addition, the Navy Department could then have advised me that 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the American proposals had been received, that the tone and temper of this message indicated [*6807*] a break in diplomatic relations or war with the United States, and that the Japanese reply was to be formally presented to this Government at a special hour soon to be fixed. Had I received this information on the afternoon of December 6 it is my present conviction that I would have ordered all fleet units in Pearl Harbor to sea, arranged a rendezvous with Halsey's task force returning from Wake, and been ready to intercept the Japanese force by the time fixed for the outbreak of war.

Even on the morning of December 7, 4 or 5 hours before the attack, had the Navy Department for the first time seen fit to send me all this significant information, and the additional fact that 1 p. m., Washington time, had been fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to the United States, my light forces could have moved out of Pearl Harbor, all ships in the harbor would have been at general quarters, and all resources of the fleet in instant readiness to repel an attack.

It is my conviction that action by the Navy Department at any one of these significant dates in furnishing me the information from the intercepted messages would have altered the events of December 7, 1941.

The Pacific Fleet deserved a fighting chance. It was entitled to receive from the Navy Department the best [*6808*] information available. Such information had been urgently requested. I had been assured that it would be furnished me. We faced our problems in the Pacific confident that such assurance would be faithfully carried out.

[*6809*] PART IV—PREVIOUS PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS

Voluminous data and documents have accumulated during the course of previous Pearl Harbor investigations. The procedure adopted at certain of these investigations must be considered in placing a value on the results and conclusions which were reached.

At the proceedings of the Roberts Commission, I was told that I was not on trial.[1] I was not permitted to be present at the testimony

[1] Roberts Commission testimony, p. 581

of other witnesses or to examine or cross-examine them. I was not permitted to know what evidence had been presented.

The Roberts Commission held sessions in Washington prior to going to Hawaii. At these sessions the highest-ranking officers of the War and Navy Departments were heard. Their testimony was not recorded. A precis was made of testimony given by responsible officers of the Navy Department.[2] There is also a memorandum prepared by Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, dated December 19, 1941, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, which gives a contemporaneous account of Admiral Wilkinson's testimony.[3] These documents contain statements that prior to the attack I was [*6810*] given all the information available to the Navy Department.[4] It appears that the so-called magic or intercepted messages were freely discussed before the Commission. Consequently, it is likely that the Commission received the impression that the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were either forwarded to me by Washington or available to me in Pearl Harbor. The Director of War Plans, Admiral Turner, testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry to the effect that he may have given the Roberts Commission the impression that I was familiar with these intercepted dispatches because that was his information at the time.[5]

I do not intend to suggest that any of these responsible officers deliberately misled the Roberts Commission as to my receipt of the "magic messages." It was tragic, however, that the Commission did not ask me about this matter. No question was addressed to me on the subject of my knowledge of the intercepted Japanese dispatches. I had no opportunity to correct any misinformation which the Roberts Commission may have received as to my receipt of this information. I had no way of knowing what evidence had been given the Commission other than my own testimony. It was more than 2 years after the Commission concluded its proceedings before I [*6811*] was permitted to know what evidence had been presented to the Commission.

In June of 1944, the Congress, by statute, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to make investigations. The Naval Court of Inquiry was appointed for this purpose. The three admirals who sat on the court were selected by the Secretary of the Navy. The court proceedings lasted several months. I was present at all hearings, was represented by counsel, introduced evidence, examined, and cross-examined witnesses. This proceeding was the only one of the secret investigations of Pearl Harbor in which these basic American rights were accorded to me.

The Naval Court of Inquiry found unanimously that there was no ground for criticism of my decisions or actions. The findings of the naval court were not made public, however, until August 28, 1945. When they appeared in the press, I learned for the first time that the Naval Court of Inquiry had found that I was not guilty of any dereliction of duty or errors of judgment.

On February 6, 1945, I wrote to the Secretary of the Navy requesting permission to read the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations

[2] Record, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, p. 5021.
[3] Record, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, pp. 4891–4900.
[4] Record, testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, pp. 4893–4895, 5022.
[5] Naval Court of Inquiry, testimony of Admiral Turner, vol. 4, p. 1018, question 158.

of the Naval Court. On February 13, 1945, the Secretary of the Navy denied my request.

In May of 1945, long after the Naval Court of Inquiry [*6812*] had filed its report, the Secretary of the Navy detailed Admiral Hewitt to conduct a further secret investigation into Pearl Harbor. I learned from the public press that this investigation had begun. On May 8, 1945, I wrote to the Secretary requesting permission to be present at the hearings before Admiral Hewitt, to introduce evidence, to confront and cross-examine witneses. The Secretary of the Navy denied my request in a letter of May 14, 1945.

On May 24, 1945, I wrote again to the Secretary requesting that he reconsider his decision to exclude me from the Hewitt investigation. The Secretary of the Navy never replied. The Hewitt investigation went ahead in secret.

On the basis of this secret investigation, the Secretary, in effect set aside the verdict of the Naval Court of Inquiry.

With these facts the American people will know how to evaluate the various investigations into Pearl Harbor. If this investigation succeeds in preserving for the future the pertinent facts about Pearl Harbor, I shall be content. History, with the perspective of the long tomorrow, will enter the final directive in my case. I am confident of that verdict.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 4 o'clock, and the Chair was advised in advance that if Admiral Kimmel did not finish [*6813*] reading his statement until 4, he would rather not proceed now to examine.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the hearing was recessed until tomorrow morning, Wednesday, January 16, 1945, at 10 a. m.)

[6814]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson and Brewster and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[6815] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chairman is detained a few moments and we will go ahead. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, in relation to the letter written by Mr. Justice Roberts read yesterday, I would like to call attention for the record to the minutes of the meeting of the Roberts Committee on January 21, 1942. It is just one page and if I might put it into the record I would like to do so.

January 21, 1942.

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m. at room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were in attendance.

The Commission went into an Executive Session which continued until 1:10 o'clock p. m., when the Commission took a recess until 2:45 p. m.

At that time the Commission reconvened and resumed the Executive Session until 6:30 o'clock p. m., when there was an adjournment until Thursday, January 22, 1942, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.

[6816] At 3:00 o'clock p. m., the Secretary of the Navy, having been——

This is the part I had in mind calling to the attention of the committee and for the record:

At 3:00 o'clock p. m. the Secretary of the Navy, having been shown certain proposed findings of fact, stated that he suggested no changes for safeguarding the national interest, in any of the statements, except one in Finding No. 20. This was then differently phrased.

At 4:30 o'clock p. m. Brigadier General Gerow, designated by the Chief of Staff, after examining the same findings for the same purpose, stated to the Recorder that he found no changes to suggest, and the Recorder so informed the Commission.

Signed Owen J. Roberts, Chairman.

Signed Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder.
Signed Albert J. Schneider, Clerk.

Now, if we examine the Roberts report, that was printed as Document No. 159 of the Seventy-seventh Congress, second session, I find only 19 paragraphs. The nineteenth finding is on page 16 and carries over on page 17. There is no No. 20 finding. Whereas in the minutes of the Commission it says "except one in finding No. 20. This was then differently phrased."

I think we should have that as part of the record, indi- [*6817*] cating that the finding No. 20 does now not appear in the record, as indicated by document No. 159 of the Seventy-seventh Congress, second session.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is all. It is to clear up that matter of yesterday.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, might I, in that connection, ask whether it is contemplated that that will be taken up further with Justice Roberts to find out what the report was on that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was a suggesion yesterday, Mr. Chairman, that it was possible that the reading of the Roberts' letter might dispense with the necessity of calling Justice Roberts as a witness.

My attention was called later to the idea that he might still be asked to appear as a witness. I would like to inquire now whether any member of the committee would like to have me arrange to have Mr. Justice Roberts present himself for examination in connection with the point brought up by Senator Ferguson, or any other point in connection with the report in which the committee is interested.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have Justice Roberts called as a witness, particularly with regard to the minutes that I read this morning indicating that there [*6818*] were 20 findings and there are only 19 appearing in the official document. Also if he had a conversation, which is indicated in the letter, for several hours with the President on this particular case and on his findings, and so forth, we may obtain information there that would help to explain some of the things now before the committee.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson has submitted his request. Are there any other requests?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say on the record that I cannot see why we should call Justice Roberts, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, when we are not calling any members of the Army Board, we are not calling any members of the Navy Board.

Of course, it may be that the gentleman wants to talk to him because he talked to President Roosevelt.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask Senator Ferguson this question: I haven't examined the report to which the Senator refers. Do I understand that each one of those paragraphs presents a separate finding within itself?

Senator FERGUSON. That is true. They relate to each other but they are the findings.

[*6819*] Senator LUCAS. I was wondering whether the report might not include the entire findings even though there are only 19 paragraphs in it.

Senator FERGUSON. But I can't tell that from the report itself and from the minutes. That is the reason I think it is material that we find out. Particularly is this true because we haven't been able up to now to locate the original of a report from a commission named by the President.

Senator LUCAS. The only point I was attempting to make was whether or not the report itself sets out definitely one finding after another.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. There are a number of findings in there?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that it is altogether desirable that Justice Roberts should appear, as I think there is something that would be not clear to any further student of this situation in the letter of Justice Roberts that we had read yesterday. He said:

> I replied that the Commission had submitted the fact findings (but not the report) to the Secretaries of War and Navy and had been advised by each of them that there could [*6820*] be no objection to the publication of the facts as the Commission had stated them in its report.

I assume the Justice there referred to the final draft after the changes had been made, but that was, of course, the object of the committee in its original inquiry, as to whether there were changes made subsequent to the first determinations of the Commission, and I am sure Justice Roberts would be helpful in clarifying that situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, so that the record will be complete, I would like to say that in the testimony of the Roberts Commission itself there was a statement made that all of the testimony would be submitted to both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy in order to have them pass on it, to see whether or not there was anything there that would affect national security, that would affect national interest, or would affect national defense, and as to whether or not that in being made public would affect them.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that was proper. The clear implication of the Roberts letter is that no changes were made as a result of that inquiry and it would appear from the record Senator Ferguson has read clearly there were certain changes which may well have been in the public interest at that time but might affect the record as far as subsequent developments were concerned.

[*6821*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request that former Associate Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court be requested to appear as a witness in this hearing.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection but I prophesy now that he won't add anything to this Pearl Harbor inquiry outside of taking a little more time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

(No response.)

The Chair hears none and the counsel will please arrange for the appearance of Justice Roberts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I should like to offer at this time a number of exhibits for the record that came to my attention in connection wth an examination of the record and of Admiral Kimmel's statement in his prior testimony. I do not regard them as particularly important and they are not new but in order that the historical documents in the case may be complete and since some questions may be asked concerning some of these exhibits, I have had copies prepared and laid before the members of the committee and I should like permission now to have the various documents marked as exhibits and offered in evidence at this time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You will please proceed and call the attention of the committee to the documents and give the number of the exhibit. They will be admitted as exhibits for the record.

[*6822*] Mr. MASTEN. As the next exhibit, which I believe is 113, we would like to offer the document entitled "Pacific Fleet Employment Schedules, Fall and Winter, 1941." This includes a letter dated August 13, 1941, signed by Admiral Kimmel, the employment schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.

In addition, we are having duplicated the employment schedule for Task Force 9, which will be offered as soon as it has been duplicated.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This will be received as Exhibit 113.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 114, we would like to offer photostatic copy of WPAC–46, which is Admiral Kimmel's implementation of Rainbow 5.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that before members of the committee?

Mr. MASTEN. We did not have the 10 copies necessary for each member of the committee, but we have distributed as many as we had, and we will obtain the other copies, but did not get them this morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That will be accepted as Exhibit 114.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 114.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 115, we would like to offer a collection of three documents. The first is entitled "Communi- [*6823*] cation Intelligence Summaries Concerning Location of Japanese Fleet Units, 1 November 1941 to 6 December 1941."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is 115?

Mr. MASTEN. One hundred and fifteen; yes. The second part of Exhibit 115 is entitled "Intelligence Reports by Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, 27 October 1941 to 2 December 1941."

The third part of Exhibit 115 is entitled, "Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum of 1 December 1941—Location of Japanese Fleet Units."

We would like to offer all of those as Exhibit 115.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be so received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 115.")

Mr. MASTEN. As exhibit 116 we would like to offer a compilation of all of the correspondence which we have found dealing with the subject of antitorpedo nets. Certain of this correspondence has already been offered as part of the record included in the present exhibit, but this brings together in one compilation all of the correspondence in that connection. We offer that as Exhibit 116.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let us see a little more clearly just what that is. Hold up the document.

Mr. MASTEN. This is a compilation of letters the first of which is dated February 11, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

[*6824*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is 116?

Mr. MASTEN. 116.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 116.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 117, we would like to offer a collection of correspondence, the first of which is a letter dated 16 January 1941, from the Commander Patrol Wing 2 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This correspondence is offered to complete the record on the subject of the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. There are a number of other documents in this connection that are already in exhibits, but they do not include the correspondence which we now offer as Exhibit 117.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 117.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 117.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 118, we would like to offer the daily memoranda dated 30 November 1941 and December 5, 1941, prepared by Admiral Kimmel and entitled "Steps To Be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War Within the Next 24 Hours." It is our understanding that no memoranda were prepared on the days of December 1, 2, 3, and 4, that these two are the only ones that exist. We offer them as Exhibit 118.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 118.

[*6825*] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 118.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 119, we offer the document entitled, "Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station 7 December 1941." This includes the communications between the Destroyer *Ward* and the radio station in connection with the dropping of depth charges on the submarine on the morning of 7 December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 119.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 119.")

Mr. MASTEN. As the last exhibit this morning, which will be No. 120, we offer two reports, the first of which is a memorandum for Admiral Kimmel signed by Admiral Bellinger and dated December 19, 1941, and the second of which is a memorandum dated 2 January 1942, also signed by Admiral Bellinger, to which is attached a report of the Army-Navy Board dated 31 October 1941, referred to in the memorandum of 1 January.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 120.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 120.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete the exhibits?

Mr. MASTEN. That completes all of those that are ready this morning. There will be a few others.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to inquire as to this document that appears to be before all members.

[*6826*] Mr. MASTEN. That is the Pacific War Plan 46 which was offered as Exhibit 114.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what you referred to as the photostat?

Mr. MASTEN. That is right. That is all we have this morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further at this time before the examination of the witness begins?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything further you desire to present to the committee before the examination of counsel begins?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I have nothing further.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed with the examination of the witness.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral Kimmel, you have spent 40 years in the Navy, according to your testimony yesterday?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How much time and what have been your assignments in the Pacific area during those 40 years, generally?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will have to think a minute. I was in the Pacific area first in 1908 on a cruise around the world, when we went around South America up the west coast to Hawaii, Australia, Manila, Japan, China, and the rest of the way around the world.

In 1913 I was in the Pacific. I served on the staff of Admiral Thomas B. Howard and later Cameron Winslow, who were successively commanders in chief of the Pacific Fleet. I was a fleet gunnery officer at that time.

In 1923 to 1925 I was in the Asiatic Fleet.

In 1921 I was in the Pacific Fleet. Oh, I suppose all the time I was in command of a battleship or command of a squadron of destroyers I was in the Pacific except for brief visits to the Atlantic. As a matter of fact, the last duty I did in the Atlantic was about 1911, except for a period during the first war, First World War, when I was with Admiral Rodman in the American detachment of battleships with the British Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you join the Pacific Fleet prior to your appointment as commander in chief of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I joined the Pacific Fleet in the summer of 1938. I took command of the Seventh Heavy Cruiser Division with the *San Francisco* as flagship. I cruised in the Pacific and when we came to the Atlantic for the war game I made a trip around South America with three cruisers on a good will tour and I visited all the principal ports of South [*6828*] America. After that I shifted my flag to the *Honolulu*, which was the flagship of the cruisers for the Battle Force, that is, the light cruisers, and from that time until I became commander in chief—this was in 1939—I was in command of the cruisers of the Battle Force and I cruised with the fleet. When the fleet went to Hawaii in 1940 I went out there with the fleet and except for about 2 weeks when I came back to the coast I stayed out there until I was relieved as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your specific command at the time you were promoted was what?

Admiral KIMMEL. My specific command at the time I was promoted was three divisions of light cruisers. They included two divi-

sions of the *Boise* class, which were probably some of the most effective units we had in the fleet. I trained them and I think I contributed somewhat to their efficiency.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you retire from the Navy, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I retired from the Navy on the 1st of March, 1942.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you relate the circumstances leading up to and in connection with your retirement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have some documents here which I have [*6829*] prepared on that subject, which gives a factual account. I will review it briefly rather than read it. If I make any mistakes you can readily correct it from this record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it might be well, in view of the nature of the testimony, if this compilation might be offered as an exhibit since copies are now being distributed to members of the committee. I have not seen this compilation myself up to now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the number of the exhibit?

Mr. RICHARDSON. 121.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 121.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Admiral.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 121.")

Admiral KIMMEL. After I was relieved I was ordered back to the west coast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And when were you relieved?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was relieved on the 17th day of December 1941. I stayed in Hawaii for several weeks and after I had completed my testimony before the Roberts Commission I was ordered to the west coast and I went to San Francisco.

I waited in San Francisco for whatever disposition they wished to make. The Roberts Commission report was published and about 2 or 3 days—a few days after the Roberts [*6830*] Commission report was published Admiral Greenslade, Rear Admiral Greenslade then Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District, got in touch with me, told me he had an official communication from the Navy Department for me. He informed me that Admiral Randall Jacobs, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, had telephoned him an official message to be delivered to me that the Acting Secretary of the Navy had informed him that General Short had submitted a request for retirement. That was the message.

Up to that time I had not considered submitting any request for retirement; it never entered my head. I thought the matter over and decided if that was the way the Navy Deparment wanted to arrange this affair that I would not stand in their way. I wrote a request for retirement and I submitted it.

A few days later Admiral Greenslade told me that he had a telephone message from Admiral Stark in which Stark assured him that this information which had been supplied to me was not intended to influence me in submitting a request for retirement, that I was free to do as I thought best. Of course I was free to do as I thought best.

In reply to that I submitted a letter to the Navy Department under date of January 28, 1942, in which I stated:

Reference (A) was submitted after I had been officially informed by the Navy Department that General Short [*6831*] had requested retirement.

I was officially informed today by the Navy Department that my notification of General Short's request was not intended to influence my decision to submit a similar request.

I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service.

That went along. I had various communications from Admiral Stark in the meanwhile which are included here. The the storm of criticism arose because I was running out on them and on February 22 I wrote this letter to Admiral Stark.

[*6832*] DEAR BETTY: I started writing this letter a few minutes after Pye gave me your letter of 21 February. I thank you for the letter and for the information contained therein. I also thank you for your other letters which I have not answered.

I understand from your letter that I will not be retired for the present, that I will be in a leave status until some further action is taken.

I submitted my request for retirement because I was notified that Short had done so and took that notification as a suggestion for me to do likewise. I submitted this request solely to permit the department to take whatever action they deemed best for the interests of the country. I did not submit it in order to escape censure or punishment.

When I was notified that the notification in regard to Short was not meant to put pressure on me, I submitted my second letter on the subject.

When the fact that Short and I had submitted requests for retirement was published to the country, I was astounded that the department would put Short and me in such light before the public.

On February 19, I received notification by the [*6833*] Secretary that I would be placed on the retired list on March 1, 1942. Paragraph 2 of this letter states, "This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action."

I do not understand this paragraph unless it is to be published to the country as a promise that I will be disciplined at some future time.

I stand ready at any time to accept the consequences of my acts. I do not wish to embarrass the government in the conduct of the war. I do feel, however, that my crucifixion before the public has about reached the limit. I am in daily receipt of letters from irresponsible people over the country taking me to task and even threatening to kill me. I am not particularly concerned except as it shows the effect on the public of articles published about me.

I feel that the publication of paragraph two of the Secretary's letter of February 16 will further inflame the public and do me a great injustice.

I have kept my mouth shut and propose to continue to do so as long as it is humanly possible.

I regret the losses at Pearl Harbor just as keenly, or perhaps more keenly than any other American citizen. [*6834*] I wish that I had been smarter than I was and able to foresee what happened on December 7. I devoted all my energies to the job and made the dispositions which appeared to me to be called for. I cannot now reproach myself for any lack of effort.

I will not comment on the Report of the Commission, but you probably know what I think of it. I will say in passing that I was not made an interested party or a defendant.

All this I have been willing to accept for the good of the country out of my loyalty to the Nation, and to await the judgment of history when all the factors can be published.

But I do think that in all justice the department should do nothing further to inflame the public against me. I am entitled to some consideration even though you may consider I erred grievously.

You must appreciate that the beating I have taken leaves very little that can be added to my burden.

I appreciate your efforts on my behalf and will always value your friendship, which is a precious thing to me.

My kindest regards always.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

To: Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.
(Written in San Francisco, California.)

[*6835*] That letter went forward on the 22d of February.

Admiral Stark apparently did not even know that the papers retiring me had left the Navy Department. In any event, I was retired and the Secretary promised the public to give me a general court martial.

I subsequently learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Acting Secretary of the Navy who had directed him to inform me of General Short's retirement was Mr. Knox.

In my request for retirement, the original request, I stated that I stood ready to perform any duty that the Navy Department would assign to me. In order to keep the record straight, on 21 April 1942 I submitted an official letter to the Bureau of Navigation in which I stated:

Supplementing the statement in my request for retirement dated 26 January 1942, I wish to again state that I stand ready to perform any duty to which the Navy Department may assign me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You received no assignment?

Admiral KIMMEL. I received no assignment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When Admiral Stark testified, Admiral Kimmel, he stated that there never at any time was anything between you and him except the closest personal friendship. Do you agree with that statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I agree in that statement. I [*6836*] had known Admiral Stark since Naval Academy days. I had served with him on several occasions; I had the highest regard for him; I trusted him, and I felt he was one of my best friends. I had that feeling, but I cannot forget the fact that—well, events that have occurred since then.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you say that your relations during your term of duty at Hawaii were friendly and cooperative with the various naval officers connected with Admiral Stark in the Office of Naval Operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are not conscious at this time that that office, or anyone in it, had any personal dislike or hostility to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had not that idea at any time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And is that also true with respect to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I felt the Secretary of the Navy was a very loyal friend of mine, Mr. Knox. I had known the Secretary only slightly. I met him when he came to Hawaii in September, I think it was, of 1940. He was sent by Admiral Richardson—I will put it this way: Admiral Richardson arranged for a schedule for him to visit various types of ships with various flag officers, and Secretary Knox spent about 3 days with me in my flag [*6837*] ship while we were at sea, and that was when I came to know him, and about the only time I knew him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You know of no reason, admiral, why there should have been the slightest difficulty in a complete liaison between the Office of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy in Washington, and your command in Hawaiii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had not any question in my mind. None.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, admiral, it would be fair to say, would it not, that your experience in the Pacific had given you a very intensified superior knowledge of naval conditions in the Pacific area?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I had served there a good while.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Subject to your ability to understand those conditions, you have had plenty of opportunity to find out what that work was?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had plenty of opportunity; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And those contacts of yours in the Pacific gave you an extensive and detailed contact with Japan, and its representatives?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I did not have detailed contact with the representatives of Japan. I had some contacts with them. I had never lived in Japan. I visited in Japan [*6838*] on occasions, two or three times, but I had no opportunity to obtain any profound knowledge of the Japanese people by contacts with them.

The knowledge I had came principally from reading, and I did that extensively.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The only important power in the Pacific of direct interest to the United States was Japan, was it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in all of your war plans from the time you first went to the Pacific and up to the 7th of December, Orange in those plans meant Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And all of those plans were directed at the exigency of possible war with Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in connection with those plans there was constantly in the minds of you and the other officers in charge of our Navy in the Pacific what would be done or could be done, and how it should be done in the event hostilities with Japan should ever eventuate?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will put it this way:

The only war plan that was called for in the Pacific, and the only one of which I had any knowledge, was the [*6839*] Orange war plan, and all of our thoughts, so far as the Pacific war was concerned, were directed against Japan, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it had come to be a fixed feeling among the naval officers familiar with Pacific missions that sooner or later it was extremely likely there would be a war with Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think that is a fair statement that a good body of opinion in the Navy felt that a war with Japan was coming sooner or later. There was, however, a considerable number of officers in the Navy who felt that Japan and the United States would have no real reason to fight, and principally because if Japan did ever start anything, they would be wiped off the map.

Mr. RICHARDSON. As a matter of fact, Admiral, there was quite a divergence of opinion in the Navy as to how long it would take to accomplish that result, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. In a body of that kind there is always a considerable number of different opinions, but in my thoughts about Japan, and my studies at the War College, and other places, everything I knew and read about, confirmed what President Theodore

Roosevelt is purported to have said back in about 1905 or 1906, and
[*6840*] that was that forces necessary to lick Japan in the Pacific would take a fleet equal to the then British Fleet, plus an army equal to the then German Army, and that anybody who embarked on a Pacific war with any other idea was in for a great awakening.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In 1941, all of this situation with respect to the probability of war with Japan immensely increased, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And may it be fairly said that it was the opinion of the high naval command in the Pacific that the peaceful situation between Japan and the United States was constantly deteriorating day by day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that it seemed quite probable, from a military standpoint, that war would result?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[*6841*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in 1941 there was a shooting war in the Atlantic?

Admiral KIMMEL. Beginning in the summer, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was known to the high command in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was the subject of certain conversations and correspondence between you and the Office of Naval Operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You understood that it was the settled military policy that the war in the Atlantic was to have precedence over the situation in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is one way of putting it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And there was during 1941 a transfer to operations in the Atlantic, and operations relating to the Atlantic, of the overwhelming majority of all of our munitions of war and ships and other equipment in aid of the Atlantic situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and that was something I tried to put a few brakes on, and I felt that a strong Pacific Fleet was a real deterrent to Japan and, as I think you will find in my correspondence—this is no afterthought—I stated then that a weaker one might be an invitation.

[*6842*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, at its top strength the Pacific Fleet during 1940 and 1941 was never strong enough to meet in battle the main Japanese Fleet, was it, on equal terms?

Admiral KIMMEL. If you could have gotten the two fleets out and lined them up and eliminated all questions of logistics and just gotten them into battle with the fleet prior to the time they made the transfer to the Atlantic—well, it would have been a nice mix-up, and it would not have been all one-sided by any means.

But when you speak of a fleet in the Pacific sufficient to defeat Japan, we are speaking of something entirely different from what you have spoken of. We are speaking of a fleet which can go to Japanese waters and force them out and defeat them in their own home waters, and none of our plans ever stopped short of that, and we never at any time until this war started had the Navy to implement that plan.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And until we had this policy of ours in the Atlantic you never contemplated that the war against Japan in the Pacific would be given secondary consideration?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. By the Government?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. We were forced into that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now early in 1941 this fleet in the Pacific was materially weakened by the withdrawal of a [*6843*] battleship and several cruisers, several destroyers, and other naval vessels?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, not the withdrawal of "a" battleship, but it was a withdrawal of a division of three battleships which, incidentally, were probably the strongest ships we had in the fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were removed from the Pacific area to the Atlantic area?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were removed, 3 battleships, 1 carrier, 18 destroyers, and 4 of the most modern and most effective light cruisers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who recommended that withdrawal?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know. I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any discussion that you knew of pro and con on whether that withdrawal should be made at the time it was made?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not with me. I think you will recall I had a letter setting forth this plan in which Admiral Stark says, "I am telling you, not arguing with you."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, following that, Admiral, there was another proposed attempt to further weaken the Pacific Fleet by an additional assignment of additional fighting ships to the Atlantic area, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[*6844*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Just what part did you plan in connection with that event?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was in the Navy Department, having come here for an official conference, in June of 1941, and Mr. Knox, I think, came back from a cabinet meeting and stated that they had decided to transfer another division of battleships, another carrier, four cruisers, and a number of destroyers to the Atlantic from the Pacific. I heard that, and I was very much concerned.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Admiral KIMMEL. Because I felt that we should make every effort to keep Japan out of the war. I felt that the way to keep Japan out of the war was to have a fleet out there which would deter them from doing anything. I felt in case we did get into a war with Japan and if we had been further reduced by another increment equal to the first, leaving us one-half as strong as we had been in 1940, that we would be in a bad way.

Subsequently, when I had an interview with Mr. Roosevelt, I told him just that. As I recall his conversation, he said, "Well they told me from the Navy Department that that would be all right." "Well," I said, "whoever told you was crazy. It just is ridiculous," and eventually that transfer was not made.

[*6845*] Mr. RICHARDSON. As an experienced naval officer, Admiral, what is and what was during 1941 the importance of the Pacific Fleet in the Pacific to the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the importance of the Pacific Fleet was to keep Japan out of the war, and failing that, to be in a position to stop their advance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any other defense of importance in the entire Pacific Ocean to our western coast than this Pacific Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. May I have that question again?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you read it, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there were many important elements out there: The bases on the Pacific coast, the productive capacity of the Pacific coast, the bases at Hawaii. The fleet was a very important part, and perhaps the most important part, of the defense of the coast at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It was the only major naval power we had in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. It was all the naval power we had in the Pacific except the detachment in the Asiatic known as the Asiatic Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And how extensive a detachment was that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they had a squadron of destroyers, [*6846*] a number of submarines, about two light cruisers, and we had—the Navy Department had, I mean, deliberately kept that fleet down there for two reasons. One was that unless they could put a sufficient fleet in the Asiatic to meet the Japanese Fleet it was not good policy to sacrifice ships out there, and the other was we had no means of maintaining a fleet in the Asiatic.

In the weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of war we transferred most of our submarines from the Pacific to the Asiatic.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the base of the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. What was the basis of it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The base. What was its base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Manila, I should say. They had other bases out there, but Manila was the principal one.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With the exception of the Manila base the only major base we had in the Pacific was at Pearl Harbor, was it not, away from the mainland?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I would say Pearl Harbor was the only base we had in the Pacific. Manila was by no means a major base at that time. All it afforded was ample anchorage space.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The main base was Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[*6847*] Mr. RICHARDSON. And had been such for years, had it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Pearl Harbor is located on the island of Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the island of Oahu is a small island?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the base is very largely surrounded by mountains?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The base itself is a shallow harbor, is it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Difficult of entrance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is not a difficult navigational problem, but there is only one entrance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is narrow, long, and somewhat winding?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is fairly straight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There is no place in the base where major ships can be hidden or camouflaged?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the base is of such a nature and location that anyone with a pair of spy glasses who wants to climb any one of 100 mountains can see the entire base and [*6848*] everything in it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And there is no possible way of avoiding it except by keeping human beings away from the mountains with spy glasses?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I might add, with cameras also.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How close is it possible for the casual observer to get to the Pearl Harbor base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, it is my recollection maybe 100 yards, 200 yards, something of that kind.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now our two main military establishments in Hawaii are Hickam Field and Shafter, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Hickam Field and what other?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Shafter. Isn't it Shafter where the general of the Army has his headquarters?

Admiral KIMMEL. Shafter?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They are the two military establishments on Oahu, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Schofield Barracks.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Schofield, I mean; not Shafter.

Admiral KIMMEL. Shafter is another. Then they have a [*6849*] number of small forts scattered around.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What are two or three of the largest?

Admiral KIMMEL. Schofield Barracks is the largest. Shafter is the next. I suggest you get the details from General Short. I may be a little mixed up in names.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, in location, Admiral, they are all fairly close to Pearl Harbor, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I do not remember the exact dimensions of Oahu, but I think it is something like 40 by 25 miles, something like that. Isn't that about right?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, they are close enough, are they not, Admiral, so that it is perfectly practicable for one air attack to attack all of those establishments at Pearl Harbor on the same operation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Provided you have enough planes, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, if we are to have any defense in the Pacific worthy of the name the thing of the most supreme importance in the Pacific is the Pacific Fleet, is it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Do you mean now?

Mr. RICHARDSON. At any time in the last half-dozen years.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in order to have a Pacific Fleet functioning there must be a base for that fleet?

[*6850*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but the experiences of this war have pretty well demonstrated that the fleet can take its own base

with them, and that is something that our Navy had been working on for many years, and I think it is in pretty good shape at the present time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But that was not the situation in the summer of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And with conditions as they were in the summer of 1941 would you not agree with me that the protection of the Pacific Fleet was of the highest importance to the interest of the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now what is the significance, Admiral——

Admiral KIMMEL. I just want to interject one little thought. You cannot spend all your time protecting yourself. If you do you do not get anywhere.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I was just going to come to that. What is the significance of a base for a fleet such as you had in Hawaii in 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I cannot give any better definition than I have already given. It is in the statement taken from the joint action of the Army and Navy in a plan known long before it was enunciated, and the basic point of that is that [*6851*] a permanent naval base must have within itself the means for its own defense and for the defense of all the naval units which are based thereon, and that the fleet must have no anxiety as to the security of its base. That was laid down many, many years before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now it is essential, is it not, Admiral, in the operation of such a fleet as you had there in the summer of 1941, that that fleet make use of the Pearl Harbor base at regular intervals?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was no alternative.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What use would the fleet be absolutely required to make of the base?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the first place, the thing that tied the fleet to the base more than any other one factor was the question of fuel. We had the fuel at Pearl Harbor. During the time I was there, as I stated in this statement, I tried to operate more ships at sea and found I could not do it because I was depleting the fuel supply at a time when it was imperative that we bring this fuel supply up. Every move I made I had to get back to that base to get some fuel.

The facilities for fueling in Pearl Harbor were such that you could not fuel more than about one-eighth of the [*6852*] fleet in any 12-hour period. And the tankers we had were entirely inadequate to support that whole fleet at sea for indefinite periods.

I had gone to great lengths in order to get the tankers equipped for fueling ships at sea, and we were running our tankers betwixt the mainland and Hawaii and having them away long enough to have these exercises at sea in fueling and to keep up the fuel supply there. It was a nice balance that we had to maintain.

The policy that I did follow out there—and it was forced on me more than anything else—and when the time came we did have the place full of fuel, and I have been informed that, I think in the first 6 months after the war started, they used up more than half of that

stored fuel before they could get their supply coming out to keep it replenished and to keep the fleet replenished.

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, Admiral, the fuel supply in Pearl Harbor is kept in a lot of metal tanks?

Admiral KIMMEL. Was kept in metal tanks.

Mr. RICHARDSON. On the edge of the base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Perfectly visible?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Perfectly subject to air attack?

[*6853*] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But fortunately not touched by the attack of December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If that supply of fuel in the Pearl Harbor base had been destroyed by that attack, could you have continued to maintain your Fleet at the Pearl Harbor base in the future?

Admiral KIMMEL. With the facilities I had at that time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What would you have had to have done?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have had to withdraw to the Coast where I could get fuel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were familiar, were you not, Admiral, with the dispute between Washington and Admiral Richardson with respect to where the Fleet should be stationed?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In that controversy did the question of the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor ever become the subject of discussion?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never took part in any of those discussions. I think you better get that answer from Admiral Richardson. However, I think from all my knowledge of it that [*6854*] his prime idea was to put the Fleet in a place where it could train more expeditiously. All of this that you speak of was well-known to Admiral Richardson, the Navy Department, and everybody concerned.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, on the question of fuel alone, there always hung over the safety of the Pearl Harbor base the protection of that fuel supply?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now from the very start of your connection with the Pacific Fleet as its commander in chief, you knew, did you not, Admiral, what that base in Hawaii and what your fleet should have in connection with the base by way of equipment in order to properly defend the base and defend the Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think if you will read my letters written during that period you can arrive at that conclusion.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that constantly from the time you took charge of that fleet you bombarded Washington for more planes, more antiaircraft guns, more ammunition and more men?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you think that those additional items were necessary in order to properly protect the fleet and defend the base?

[*6855*] Admiral KIMMEL. I adopted the scheme of providing as far as I could for all eventualities. I wanted Hawaii to be secure not only for the protection of the fleet while it was in there, but for the protection of the base, for the facilities, the fuel supply at all times, and I wanted the fleet free to move and accomplish something.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What would you have had to have had that you did not have to accomplish those results? Let me put it affirmatively.

You needed more patrol planes, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a combination——

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not saying, Admiral, what you had or the devices that you used to make what you had go as far as possible, I am simply stating now, as a naval expert, when you took charge of the Pacific Fleet what did you need to be sent to you as commander in chief of the fleet in order to protect the fleet and protect the base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I should say the protection of the base was an Army responsibility.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I understand that.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was not what I needed. I did not command the Army in Hawaii, I had no command over them whatsoever. It was what the Army needed for the defense of Hawaii.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In order to make my question clear, I [*6856*] am entirely familiar, Admiral, with your suggestion that it is a military axiom that the fleet is not supposed to protect its own base.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the duty of the Army. But there never was a time at Hawaii, was there, Admiral, when the protection of the base was not part of the duty of the fleet, under your cooperative arrangement that you made with the Army in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, if you are talking about what steps I took after I came there in command, we had a condition to face and not any theory.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the condition?

Admiral KIMMEL. The condition was that the Army had a handful of planes, the Army was short of a great many things. Subsequent to the effort that we made in the early days of my command out there they got a few planes. They got some fighters, they got some B–17 bombers. At one time the Army was built up to 27 B–17's—I think that figure is correct—and we had promises of more. Then the War Department ordered the bombers transferred to the Philippines and all of those B–17's disappeared to the westward, along with some others, except 12, and in the process of outfitting them at Hickam Field they stripped 6 of those 12 planes to such an extent [*6857*] that they were not in commission.

That was the way we found ourselves on December 7th.

Now the Army had allocated—and I speak from memory—about 180 B–17's. The Navy had allocated 160 patrol planes to Oahu, and with that 160 patrol planes plus the 180 bombers—and we had hopes always, you see—this condition would have been quite different.

The allocations were all right, but what we had was all wrong.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In order to properly defend the base and the fleet in connection with the base, it was necessary, was it not, to have Navy patrol planes to carry on that type of reconnaissance which would disclose an approaching enemy force in the ocean?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. And furthermore, to have available a striking force of bombers and torpedoes, and what not, who would go out and destroy the approaching force. It does not profit you much to discover the enemy if you cannot hit him with anything.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you had neither the planes with which to discover nor the planes with which to hit him after you discovered him?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you so advised Washington?

[*6858*] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the fact is, Admiral, is it not, that as a matter of naval policy you were directed to carry on and maintain a defensive position in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the only departure that was contemplated in WPL–46 was a raiding move toward the mandated islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. The most important part of any defensive attitude is the offensive action you take to carry it out. We speak of defensive in the sense of strategic defensive, not a tactical defensive.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, with the size of fleet that you had in Hawaii during the summer of 1941 you were not in a position to inaugurate a grand offensive?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Against the Japanese Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. A main offensive involved going into the Japanese waters. What we had there would permit us to make raids on the Marshalls. This was a Navy Department plan, and I was carrying out the plan. We hoped to divert the strength of the Japanese away from the Malay Barrier, to ease the pressure on the British and Dutch, and to do as much damage as we could to the enemy.

[*6859–6959*] Incidentally, we had Wake Island and we planned, in the days before Pearl Harbor, that we could use Wake Island as more or less of a bait to catch detachments of the Japanese Fleet down there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, if you had any naval disaster in the Hawaiian area, was there any place you could look for immediate aid?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we could look for immediate aid by planes from the coast, that they would send out.

Incidentally, I have been informed, although not in detail, that in the days immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor a great many planes of good type did appear there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the only relief they could give to you would come from the mainland?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And from the mainland bases?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that, as a matter of fact, Admiral, it can be fairly stated, can it not, that your main defense for yourself in the Pacific lay in your own hands and that of the Army at Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; we were out there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now you not only found when you went there, Admiral, a shortage of planes which could make [*6960*] recon-

naissance and planes which could attack upon a reconnaissance, but you also found the base deficient in antiaircraft defenses, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. And in fighter planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Leaving the fighter planes, there was also a shortage of antiaircraft guns, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And part of your requests to Washington asked for an assignment of more of those guns?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[*6961*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Were they an essential part of the defense of the base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I think so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Those guns would be ordinarily under the control of the Army, would they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but we wanted additional antiaircraft guns for our outlying island bases. We requested that on many occasions.

Incidentally, on the 29th of November of 1941, I received a dispatch from the Navy Department in which the—well, here is the dispatch:

Arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be best that can be done under the circumstances, but suggest advisability of transferring very many of 221.

That is a Marine fighting squadron.

—from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga. War Department will instruct Commanding General, Hawaiian Department to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of marines. War Department will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses, but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon.

Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37-millimeter AA guns and receive ammunition in February. You desire these guns for Midway and Wake. Request Airmail report on present defenses of all outlying bases and these increases planned in immediate future.

When I got that dispatch, I sent another dispatch—I don't see it here—to the Navy Department, in which I urged that inasmuch as they were going to supply us with sixteen 37-mm. AA guns for the marines in December, that they give us at least 3,000 rounds of ammunition to teach the people at least how to use them when they got the ammunition in February.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, was this condition that I have been talking about with respect to the need of planes and antiaircraft guns and the other equipment which you felt was essential to the protection of the base—the fleet's interest in the base—ever furnished you in sufficient quantities to meet the need?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not completely, no. And when you say "furnished me," you mean furnished the Army in Hawaii?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes. Admiral, I plead guilty to the fact of not being able all the while to separate in my mind the Army and the Navy in Hawaii, but that is due to the fact, and I am going to ask you, whether you didn't enter into a cooperative defense arrangement in late 1941 in which you were both for one and one for both?

[*6963*] Admiral KIMMEL. I entered into that early in February of 1941. I issued a letter which is entitled "2 CL–41." The date of the first letter was early in February, and about 2 or 3 weeks later we replied to that. I wanted to get something out right away and that is the reason we hurried with the first one.

Two or three weeks later we revised it, and issued another one in the latter part of February, and by that time we felt that we had covered the point with the equipment and the forces we had in pretty good shape.

That letter stood until the 14th of October of 1941, when we issued another letter.

Incidentally, I might tell you a little bit about my activities in regard to getting an agreement betwixt the air forces out there. Immediately I got this responsibility, or knew I was going to have it, I started to work on the Army, and when General Short arrived I went out to call on General Short before he had taken over his command. I went out in civilian clothes. I realized the importance of cooperation betwixt the services.

I found General Short a very likable gentleman, and subsequently a very able Army officer. I broached the subject of some kind of an agreement whereby the efforts of the Army air and the Navy air could be coordinated on [*6964*] the island of Oahu and in the Hawaiian area.

I found General Short very much of the same mind, and we set in motion the studies which eventually resulted in the agreement to use what we had jointly.

That agreement was sent on to Washington. Eventually, we got out the estimate of the situation, which Admiral Bellinger and General Martin had a great deal to do with drawing up, and the coordination betwixt the two services was of a higher degree there than any other area that I had ever known prior to that time.

I issued an order that every Navy squadron of planes on wheels was to land on each of the Army fields, and to be serviced there and to get ammunition and bombs so they would know how to do it, and General Short did the same thing for the Army.

Now, those were the steps that we took in trying to utilize to the best advantage the facilities and the forces that we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Those steps were made necessary, Admiral, by your shortage in equipment?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, in any event it would have been very desirable, especially as regard air. I am talking now of the air of the Army and the air of the Navy, which was temporarily based on shore at any one time.

[*6965*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, as a matter of fact, Admiral, for the Navy you did assume a protection to the base which, under better conditions you wouldn't have had to assume?

Admiral KIMMEL. I tried to insure that we would have all of our forces actively take part in the defense of the Islands.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had become quite familiar with Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know what you mean.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew that 40 percent of the people in Hawaii were of Japanese ancestry?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I knew that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew that there was in Hawaii a very numerous and highly developed Japanese espionage system?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I had an idea that that might be so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The conditions were ideal for the building of such a system, were they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, and in the summer of 1941 there was numerous consular agents there. The commandant of the district, who handled all of those matters for the fleet and for the Navy——

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was Admiral Bloch?

[*6966*] Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Bloch. Recommended they put them all in the jug. That is in effect what he recommended. The Army thought that wasn't a good idea, and they recommended against it.

This bounced back and forward and I believe that—I have since found out, or since been informed that the Secretary of War was the man who finally decided that no action should be taken against these people.[1] What his reasons were, I don't know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in dealing with such a group, did you find any difficulties in your way by reason of the law in connection with wire tapping, or the tapping of cables and other means by which message could be transmitted from Hawaii to Tokyo?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I did find some difficulties; yes. I, of course, took an interest in all of these matters. I was more concerned with the information they obtained than the means they took to obtain it. And, as I have said, that phase of the Pacific Fleet's operations, whatever responsibility the Navy had in Hawaii, was directly under Admiral Bloch.

I have every reason to believe that Admiral Bloch did everything within his power.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, with that large group of Japanese [*6967*] agents free in Hawaii, you knew, did you not, Admiral, that they knew everything with respect to the disposition of the base, its defense, and the movement of ships in and out of the base; that you knew?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I wouldn't go so far as that. I would say that they could know the movements of the ships in and out of the base, but I hoped then that we were able to keep a good many things from them. When all of the disclosures were made about what they knew at Pearl Harbor, I found we hadn't been quite so successful as we thought we had been,

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was no reason, was there, why an intelligent group of spies, such as these, couldn't keep an active watch on what was happening on every airfield in Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I imagine they did pretty well, because they could go up in the hills and look down.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if the planes on the various air fields were bunched together, it would be very easy for them to find it out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I don't know about that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All they would have to do is use their eyes; wouldn't that be so?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say so.

[*6968*] Mr. RICHARDSON. You had always discovered in your talks and conferences concerning the Japanese that they were an ardent, competent, intelligent people in connection with such a subject as espionage?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And they were not afraid?

[1] See Exhibit No. 128, introduced on p. 2768, infra.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were most industrious.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They never were afraid?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were industrious. I don't go with all the rest of that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They never were afraid of hard work?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, would you be surprised now to find that the Japanese spies were unable to find out the number of available planes that the Army and the Navy had in Hawaii during 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think they knew that; they must have known it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew, of course, that whatever they knew, they were free to send to Tokyo?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they were much freer than I knew they were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Every method of transmission between Hawaii and Tokyo was open to them, was it not?

[*6969*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; but you must remember that I had something else to do besides running around finding out what the Japanese knew. I had competent officers there to do everything within their power. I believe they did do everything within their power.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I understand that. When I say "you" Admiral, it is a rather editorial "you."

Admiral KIMMEL. All right, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I mean that you knew, as the commanding officer, the extent and possibility of Japanese espionage in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it was your duty as a commanding officer, to fear the worst with respect to the amount of things they could find out?

Admiral KIMMEL. We feared the worst, all right. We feared it all the time.

In connection with this, you mentioned something about the bunching of planes. This is something about which my part has never been presented to anybody so far as I know.

I ran across this letter, which I knew I had issued on September 23, 1941, and this is a letter which deals with the security of aircraft in the Hawaiian area from [*6970*] air attack at fields or stations. I don't know whether it is necessary to read the whole letter, but in it I direct the commandant of the district to take steps to insure at all times the maximum dispersion of aircraft at the various fields, and naval stations there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Admiral KIMMEL. Because it was the sensible thing to do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I ask again why was it sensible? What were you trying to effectuate by objecting to the bunching of planes on airfields?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was reading at all times, the results of the war in Europe. We were trying to put into effect in Hawaii every single thing that would help us in the defense of Hawaii in the event of an air attack or in the event of any other kind of an attack.

I tried to overlook nothing, and this was just one of the steps.

Now, this was a thing that could be done and should be done and I presumed was done to the limit of the facilities that we had there at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if the planes were all bunched up close, wing tip to wing tip, it would take a considerable amount of time to get them in a position where they [6971] could take off and go into the air?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; I don't think it would take much more time. They could be bunched wing tip to wing tip and you could run one out at a time and get them out quickly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you think, was the primary danger by way of attack to the Pearl Harbor base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Pearl Harbor base, the principal danger from attack to the Pearl Harbor base was from the air, of course.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You pointed that out, did you not, over again in your correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; but there is another form of attack in the Hawaiian area, and that was a submarine attack on the base as divorced from the whole area. The primary form of attack was probably by air, if any attack came.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, in view of the Admiral's suggestion as to this letter, since we have been furnished with copies, it might be well to have it made an exhibit, and circulated with the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why not just read it into the record?

[6972] Mr. MURPHY. It would be better to spread it in the record so it will be tied up with the testimony at this point.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no objection.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed to read it, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP

CinCPAC File No. A16-3/AD/(95) Serial 01504

Confidential PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *September 23, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject: Security of Aircraft, Hawaiian Area, from Air Attacks at Fields or Stations.

1. The Commander-in-Chief desires that provision be made for maximum security of fleet aircraft in the Hawaiian area from air attack while on the ground or water.

2. As amply demonstrated by current war experience, both dispersal and protection where dispersed are fundamental requirements. Movement of aircraft units to various available fields or locations and individual dispersal at these locations are primarily operational responsi- [6973] bilities. Provisions for this individual dispersal and for passive protection, however, are under the cognizance of the District.

3. Because of the large size of patrol planes and the need for solid surfaces for these planes when on shore, less can be done for their individual dispersal and protection than for landplanes. It must be handled primarily by maximum intervals between planes on parking platforms and maximum provision of well separated moorings of all patrol plane operating points.

4. Much can and must be done, however, for individual landplane dispersal and protection. Ideally, there should be separate "stalls" at each landplane field

or runway where, during emergency conditions, all planes that may need to operate from a given field can be placed while on the ground. It should be possible to taxi planes readily to and from these points without undue delay in operating speed. These points should, further, be arranged in other than straight lines so as not to provide consecutive targets for attacking planes. Revetments for averting and localizing damage should be provided around each stall.

. For both patrol planes (when on shore) and landplanes, suitable concealment camouflage should be developed and provided. The net type is suggested.

[*6974*] 6. The Commander-in-Chief understands that action along the above lines is already being taken by the Army in this area. He also understands that studies are in progress for dispersal construction at Ewa Field. (That is a marine field.) He considers that dispersal construction should be undertaken at all fields under naval control in the Hawaiian Area and on the outlying islands. These on the Island of Oahu are of primary importance and should have first priority. It is recognized that what can be accomplished on Ford Island will, because of space restrictions, be far from ideal, but the best possible solution should be sought.

7. Because of the close relationship of dispersal construction requirements with active operations, it is important that all phases of dispersal be simultaneously considered and coordinated. Accordingly, Commander Aircraft Battle Force and Commander Patrol Wing Two are directed to consult with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District as to plans and requirements. The objective is the earliest possible provision of both the necessary construction and suitable operating doctrine.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:
Combatfor
Comscofor
[*6975*] Comairbatfor
Comairscofor
Compatwing TWO.

Senator LUCAS. May I inquire, Mr. Counsel, what is the date of that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Senator LUCAS. What is the date of that again, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. September 23, 1941.

And I might add that the Navy at Kanoehe Bay had dispersed their patrol planes to the maximum extent possible. Over there they had anchored out quite a number of patrol planes. They had done the same thing at other naval fields out there.

On the day of the attack every single one of the patrol planes that was anchored out was destroyed because they were sunk at the moorings, and the ones that were more or less bunched on the ramps, most of them were saved because they could get to them and put out the fires.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, the United States lost about 3,000 men in that attack, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Something on that order.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you tell me where the great bulk of losses came? Was it on board ship, or was it in connec- [*6976*] tion with trying to get the planes off?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the major part of the losses were on shipboard. That is something you can verify very readily.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, throughout 1941 and up to the early fall, pretty near every communication you had with the Chief of Naval Operations referred to the possibility of air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

No; that isn't right. It didn't refer to the possibility of air attack. Nearly every communication I had from the Navy Department did not refer to the possibility of air attack. It referred in greater or

less degree to the supply of material which we thought we needed out there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, in every one of your letters where the subject of an attack on Hawaii was discussed, the possibility of an air attack was presented by you as one of the hazards of the base?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was always that possibility. I wanted that base to be secure over an indefinite period and to meet any eventuality that war might bring forward.

I wanted it to be able to defend itself even though the Pacific Fleet were wiped out.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And so far as ships in Pearl Harbor [*6977*] were concerned, the danger that they would suffer from a submarine attack would be less than they might suffer from an air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. We thought that the danger from submarine attack in Pearl Harbor was nil—nothing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. We had at the entrance of the Harbor an antitorpedo net. We didn't have an antisubmarine net. We knew of no submarines which could enter the harbor entirely submerged and this two-man submarine that did enter the harbor submerged was an entirely new type and something of which we had no knowledge.

Incidentally, I think the two-man submarine never paid for itself. The only one that ever got in to that harbor they sank very promptly, and its two torpedoes were discharged harmlessly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then your discussion of a submarine attack had reference to damages to the fleet in the open sea?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, in the operating areas around—in the sea around Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With reference to the hazard to the base that lay in a possible air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. That appeared to be the only means [*6978*] that they could take to get in to do any damage to the fleet at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, with respect to an air attack, you had to have a suitable fleet of reconnaissance planes that could carry on a distant reconnaissance in an attempt to locate an attacking enemy force before their planes could leave their carriers for attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. And to have a striking force to go out and sink the carriers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The second thing that you had to have, passing from the question of patrol planes for distant reconnaissance, was a suitable fleet of fighters that could do some fighting after you found the enemy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, the fighters—the pursuit planes, which we call them in the Navy—fighters are defensive. They are to knock down the planes after the attack is launched. And the only real defense against an airplane attack from carriers, is to discover the carriers and to sink the carriers before they can launch the planes. And those are bombing planes, long-range bombing planes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that once the planes leave a carrier in quantity for an attack it is a very difficult matter to prevent some of those planes from reaching their objective?

[*6979*] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And however good your defense may have been against the attack on December 7, you, as a Naval man, would be surprised if some of the attacking planes had not come through and reached their targets?

Admiral KIMMEL. Those were the lessons that we had learned from the war in Europe at that time. We had learned those lessons from our own maneuvers.

We had staged many attacks on Pearl Harbor ourselves as a matter of training, and those same principles and facts have been demonstrated many, many times during the 4 years that have elapsed since that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in addition to the subject of planes, patrol and fighters, it was essential to a proper defense of an attack on the base that you have, that there be available a proper number of antiaircraft guns?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, as an immediate defense.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have such in Hawaii at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. We didn't have such on our ships. The antiaircraft batteries of all our ships, and particularly the battleships, were woefully inadequate. It was something that a great many of us had known for many years, and that somehow or other we hadn't been able to remedy. [*6980*] And the thing we were particularly deficient in was the short-range antiaircraft guns. That deficiency we were in the process of remedying at the time the attack came on Pearl Harbor.

Today battleships, I don't know the number, but they have hundreds of antiaircraft guns. On the battleships that we had out there we had 12 or 15, maybe 20 altogether of all types. Fifty calibers. And no real short-range antiaircraft guns.

I mean, so few as to be almost negligible.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The land-based antiaircraft guns were under the control of the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever make an inspection of the antiaircraft batteries of the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know how many they had?

Admiral KIMMEL. In general, it has been reported to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Had you made the subject of their guns or their number a matter for definite examination by members of your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; the number of antiaircraft guns had been reported. I don't know what you mean by definite [*6981*] examination by members of my staff.

You mean to go out and look at them?

[*6982*] Mr. RICHARDSON. That is what I meant.

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, no.

Now, this question of numbers of guns was treated in correspondence and you will recall that that subject was taken up by Admiral Bloch, and in December of 1940 he prepared a letter. Richardson had had a conference with the commanding general, General Herron, out there, and this letter was prepared by Bloch and forwarded by Richardson, and apparently that started the correspondence betwixt the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, and when I saw that correspond-

ence I had high hopes that we were going to get what everybody seemed to admit was required in Hawaii.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you knew you had not gotten them?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I knew we had not gotten them and in the quantities—they got some but they had not gotten them in the quantities that they thought were necessary.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have any knowledge, or did you direct any member of your staff to get specific knowledge as to the status of readiness of the Army's antiaircraft batteries immediately prior to the attack on December 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a matter which was covered in my fleet security order, and all of that work was delegated to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who was the naval base defense officer; he was also the commander of the [*6983*] Hawaiian coastal frontier, and, as I indicated yesterday, with General Short was charged with the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier by the Navy Department and as a naval base defense officer to coordinate whatever fleet effort could be available with that of the Army, and I read from specification "G" of 2 CL–41, dated October the 14th, 1941:

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer. As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

[*6984*] (4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed."

Admiral Bloch, I might say, was the commander in chief of the United States Fleet just prior to Admiral Richardson. Admiral Richardson relieved him as commander in chief of the United States Fleet. I relieved Richardson, as you recall.

Admiral Bloch was an accomplished officer, an officer in whom I had the highest confidence and still have and I had turned over this matter to him, not to a member of my immediate staff, and he did, I believe, a great many things. You will get him here, you will have him testify.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, did you understand, Admiral, that it was Bloch's duty under your direction to see to it that the Army antiaircraft batteries were in a state of readiness to defend that base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, insofar as the Navy had any responsibility for it, yes, but now I think maybe it would be well for me to go into that a little bit in regard to General Short's alert.

In the late afternoon of November 27, 1941, Captain Earle, Admiral Bloch's Chief of Staff, brought to me a copy [*6985*] of the message which General Marshall had sent to General Short. General Short had sent a copy to the Naval Base Defense Officer, Admiral

Bloch. I read General Marshall's message. I noted the language that Short's measures were not to alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. I also noted the order directing General Short to report the measures taken by him to General Marshall. The officer who brought me the message informed me, "The Army has gone on an alert." The next morning my Chief of Staff confirmed this report with information about Army troop movements.

I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages each of us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We considered, as we did frequently before and did later, the probabilities and possibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was discussion of the effect of the suggestion from Washington that 50 Army pursuit planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the Army was on an alert and that the alert was against sabotage among other things, although I do not now recall General Short specifically mentioning the details of his alert.

During 1941 I went to sea with the fleet on maneuvers whenever that was possible. I also expected that if war came and the fleet left Pearl Harbor on an operation, I would be [*6986*] far from Pearl Harbor. Consequently, I knew there was need to have a naval officer permanently based in Pearl Harbor to coordinate the use of the naval units which might be in Pearl Harbor at that time in the base defense. If you refer to my Fleet Security Order, 2CL–41, Exhibit 44, item 12, you will find the following provisions:

(G) (6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer. As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what conditions of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

[*6987*] (4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, was the naval base defense officer. He was invariably in attendance at my conferences with General Short. He has testified at some length before the Naval Court as to his activities prior to the attack in carrying out the duties assigned to him under the provisions of my orders which I have just read. He will be a witness here. I do not wish to anticipate his testimony. However, I will give you certain highlights of his activities, as testified to before the Naval Court of Inquiry, because I was generally familiar with them prior to the attack.

In February 1941 he had urged upon General Short the necessity of emplacing his mobile antiaircraft guns in the field. He personally examined the plans for location of all Army antiaircraft weapons that were to be emplaced. His subordinates were in constant touch with Army representatives.

In October or November 1941 General Short had explained to him the difficulties General Short had emplacing certain of the Army's mobile antiaircraft guns. Sites were not on [*6988*] Government land. Fire-control communications were out in weather and subject to deterioration. It was difficult for personnel comprising the gun crews to be quartered and subsisted.

To help obviate this last problem for the Army, the Navy was actually making arrangements on December 7 to mess and quarter Army gun crews on Navy reservations.

I considered I had done everything I could prior to the attack to strengthen the Army antiaircraft defense of Pearl Harbor. As late as December 2, in an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, I pointed out that "the Army is not only lacking antiaircraft guns for outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu." I had appointed a responsible naval officer to exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and to arrange with the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced. From everything I knew, he had been active and diligent in following the matter up. Of course, the Army had its difficulties, some of which I have mentioned. Neither I nor Admiral Bloch could solve them. Moreover, if I had constantly intruded into the day-to-day coordination of Admiral Bloch and General Short on this matter I might very well have undone all my security order, 2 CL–41, was designed to accomplish, the working out of a permanent Army-Navy local defense coordin- [*6989*] ation which would have to continue in my absence and that of the fleet.

I knew that General Short had been ordered to report the measures he took in response to his message of November 27 from General Marshall. This meant the joint participation of General Marshall and General Short in the character of the alert assumed in Hawaii. I thought that General Marshall and General Short knew better than I what specific Army measures should be adopted to perform adequately the Army mission of defending the naval base at Pearl Harbor and at the same time of complying with the restrictions involved of not alarming the civilian population nor disclosing intent.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire from what the witness is reading? Is it from a previous record or what?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy has inquired, Admiral, as to what it is you have been reading from?

Admiral KIMMEL. A memorandum which I prepared.

Mr. MURPHY. Your own memorandum?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know, Admiral, what General Short's first alert was?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean No. 1 alert, as you call it?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is it.

[*6990*] Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know he had but one kind of an alert.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What kind of alert did you think he had?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought he had an alert where he put his people on the alert.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know at the time you talked with General Short that his No. 1 alert was simply against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know he had a No. 1 alert. I think I have found out since, however, that this No. 1, 2, and 3 alert business was put into effect on the 5th of November of 1941. Prior to that they had an alert and a nonalert status.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know from any conversation you had with General Short or any reported to you by your staff that Short had responded to the dispatch from Marshall with a notice on his part to Marshall that he had put in this first alert against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never saw Short's reply and was never informed of it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You never knew anything about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In your opinion, under the circumstances that there faced you would an alert against sabotage have been in accordance with what you were contemplating under the order that you have just referred to concerning a defense [*6991*] of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had taken the steps to put the ships of the fleet on an alert some time before—I mean to put them in shape where they could go on an alert very quickly a long time before. I had provided—I mean I had made sure that the ammunition for the guns was available, that the crews were on board and that a certain proportion of them would be manning the guns. At sea we had full security measures in effect and in port we had the security measures in effect which we felt that the situation demanded at the time and there was very little more that we could have done in port than what we did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, did you contemplate, Admiral, in connection with your assignment of duties to Admiral Bloch, that he should inform himself of the question of the readiness of the antiaircraft batteries of the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the Army's responsibility and there were two separate commands in Hawaii. There was the Army command and there was the Navy command and when the Army said they were on an alert I thought they knew their business and I had every reason to think so because General Short is a very capable officer.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if it should be found to be the fact that only one battery of antiaircraft guns were in readi- [*6992*] ness, that none of the other guns had ammunition, some not nearer than 75 yards and some not nearer than 500 yards from the gun placements, would, in your opinion, that have been a form of alert against an attack on the base that you thought the Army had in effect at the time of your discussion with General Short or at the time of any directions you may have given to Admiral Bloch?

Admiral KIMMEL. My best answer to that is to call your attention to the steps that I took.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, one more subject I want to bring up at this point.

In addition to the question of the use of planes to defend against an air attack and in addition to the use of antiaircraft guns to defend against an air attack there is one more method, is there not, by which you can help and get ready to defend yourself and that is radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, as I understood your statement, you suggested that there had been supplied at long last to the fleet various radar equipment?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that in connection with the use of that equipment and as an aid to the Army you took with you a number of men designated by the Army on your ships in order to [6993] familiarize them with radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it is a fact, is it not, that there was to be supplied to the Army in Hawaii a number of so-called mobile radar sets and a number of radar sets that were to have fixed land locations?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is true.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you knew prior to December 7 by a report from General Short or under his authority that the mobile radar sets were operating and were in shape to operate?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will put it this way: I could not concern myself with whether the Army had mobile radar sets or fixed radar sets. I knew they had radar which could give a coverage, I had been so informed by General Short, and whether they were mobile or fixed I do not recall whether I knew that or not. I knew something of the plans but just which ones they had in operation, my knowledge of that prior to the attack, which ones they had in operation, was sketchy. I knew they had sets in operation, that they could give us coverage and I was so informed.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, there was no way within the instrument itself at that time by which you could tell through radar whether approaching planes were enemy planes or friendly planes?

[6994] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, and that was something that we had urgently requested because we realized from the time that radar first came out there that that was going to be one of the great difficulties.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in order to make a practical use——

Admiral KIMMEL. Such a device was in existence, you know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you did not have it?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did not have it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So the only way you could allow for that would be to try and orient planes that would be discovered on radar with your own information as to where your own planes might be?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that if a radar set operating on Hawaii should find on the chart approaching planes, the only way of telling whether those planes were friendly planes or enemy planes would be to have available the information where the friendly planes that you knew of were?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, in order to do that you would have to have, would you not, established what is known as an information center and to that information center would come the reports from the various radar sections of what they discovered and then there would be at the radar center appro- [6995] priately assigned men who from their knowledge of where our planes were could make a deduction as to whether the planes shown were or were not friendly planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they had to have that knowledge and the only way they could get that knowledge and keep up to date was to be in communication with the operating agencies. All they had to do was to get in communication and even then it would be a very difficult thing to do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, I presume so, because you never could be exactly sure where your own planes were?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, you could never be exactly sure where your own planes were and with some of the—well, I will say half-trained pilots we had out there at that time, they were fine boys and no fault of theirs, but they did not always go and do exactly what they were told to do.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, if on the morning of December 7 a radar station had located an approaching group of planes, the next step would have been to have communicated that information instantly to an information center?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then at the information center there should be representatives familiar with the supposed whereabouts of any friendly planes, either Navy or Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[*6996*] Mr. RICHARDSON. So that would require at the information center Army representatives to do that job and Navy representatives to do that job and Navy representatives to do that job?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why not?

Admiral KIMMEL. A Navy man has no God-given faculty for telling where Navy planes are. He has to work with the naval operators to get it. An Army man properly trained could do it just about as well as a Navy man. Any individual put in there and trained and told where to get his information could have done it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it would be the duty of the representative, let us say, of the Navy at the information center to communicate where he had been educated to communicate to find out whether there were Navy planes in the sector from which these approaching planes had been seen?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I never operated an information center, I have never had anything to do with an information center such as this. That was purely and entirely an Army function. I presumed that the steps necessary to make the information center or the radar information, you might say, effective had been taken. I did not go to the information center.

Now, one other thing: There would be in a case like Hawaii [*6997*] not one Navy representative as you call him, one man to look out for Navy affairs, but one man perhaps to look out for the patrol planes, another man to look out for the planes at Wheeler Field, another to look out for the battleship planes, to look out for what not. Now, how many men would be required is a question of experience and whether that man who sits there and is responsible for a segment or detachment of planes is an Army man or a Navy man is immaterial so long as he gets the information and knows where to get it.

Now, suppose—I will anticipate a question a little bit. I had a letter from General Short. He asked me on 5 August 1941 in a letter to

detail an officer from my headquarters to serve as liaison officer betwixt my headquarters and his.

Senator LUCAS. Is that an exhibit, Mr. Counsel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Senator LUCAS. Is that in an exhibit?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think not. I have it here, you can have it. It has been passed to the committee, I am informed.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Admiral KIMMEL. On August 16 I replied to that letter and assigned my fleet communications officer, Commander Maurice L. E. Curts, to act as a liaison officer.

Now, Commander Curts was to assist him. My understanding [*6998*] and my intention at the time was that Commander Curts was to assist him in any way he could in technical matters. I never had any request from General Short at any time to detail any watch standards in the communications center, the information center, and I would not have expected him to request me as commander in chief to detail these officers. I would not have expected him to ask Admiral Bloch to detail the officers and I think you will get from Admiral Bloch whatever steps that were taken there.

Now, I did detail an additional officer to General Short at the request of the Army, I think it was General Short's request, a Lieutenant Taylor. Lieutenant Taylor had been in Britain and he had some knowledge of the operational difficulties of an information center and I turned Lieutenant Taylor over to the Army completely for the time being, to give them whatever assistance he could in advising them as to the operation of an information center.

Now, you must realize that we had had many drills in Hawaii, during which time this information center, to the best of my knowledge and belief, was operating and in shape. The commandant of the district reported to me that successful drills were conducted. He had the men who conducted drills insofar as the Navy was concerned. I never inspected the information center and I never went into the organization of [*6999*] the information center and I was under the conviction, you might say, from the conversations that I had had with General Short and also with General Davidson, who was in command of the fighter group and the information center, General Davidson had told me of some of the results that they had obtained and they appeared to be quite satisfactory to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your answer, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all I want to say.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[*7000*] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything further before resuming the examination?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. There are two more compilation of the records which have been referred to by Admiral Kimmel which we would like to offer in evidence at this time as exhibits.

Mr. MASTEN. The first is a compilation of letters, of eight letters, the first of which is dated August 16, 1941, on the top of the compilation, all having to do with aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department. We believe these should be offered as exhibit 122.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Mr. MASTEN. They were distributed to the committee near the close of the morning hearing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Give us the date and description again, please.

Mr. MASTEN. The top letter is one dated August 16, 1941, from commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, regarding aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is exhibit what?

Mr. MASTEN. 122.

[*7001*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 122.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 122.")

Mr. MASTEN. The second is a group of communications, copies of which were distributed to the committee a few minutes ago, having to do with the question of the construction of a combined operating center in Hawaii. The top communication is a message from Opnav to commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, dated October 15, 1941.

We offer those as exhibit 123.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 123.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 123."

Mr. MASTEN. That is all we have, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further at this point before resuming the examination?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything at this point before the examination is resumed?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I don't.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, are we to understand from your [*7002*] testimony that there was an information center in operation in connection with the Army radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. You would understand from my testimony that the radar had been operated; that orders had been given to planes in drills. I did not know the condition of the operating center, information center, and I did not inquire as to the specific condition in which it was at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do I understand that it is your recollection that you assigned anyone from the Navy to function at that information center?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was never requested to detail anybody to function at that information center. I considered it an Army responsibility. I stood ready to help them in any way I could. I did help them. The organization and the whole information center was purely an Army function.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I want to call your attention to your testimony before the Roberts Commission to see whether it, in your opinion, is a fair statement of what it had reference to. I read from page 663 of the record. This is your language:

My recollection is, and I give you this for what it is worth—I have not talked to anybody about this since the action—but my impression was that they had, I think, three permanent stations, and I think some seven or eight portable stations around the island, and their big ones were the ones, [7003] according to which I thought that we could have some dependence on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, while I think your information is incorrect as to that, the fact is that in the week of December 7 and the days prior to that, and on the morning of December 7, you were quite confident that you would get a definite warning of distant planes; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought we would get some warning of distant planes.

General MCNARNEY. And as a responsible officer you did not assure yourself of that fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, except indirectly, but when we had two separate commanders and when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them.

General MCNARNEY. Let us examine into that. Under the situation you had the system of mutual cooperation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General MCNARNEY. And in the method of mutual cooperation, it is necessary for one commander to know what the other commander is doing or what his plans are?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

That fairly represents what you desire to express with [7004] reference to your attitude toward this radar information center?

Admiral KIMMEL. The "no" business at the end there?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. Let me see that.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that, 667?

Mr. RICHARDSON. 663.

Admiral KIMMEL. You will have to turn over—in the first place, I put in a correction; I find here now, on page 631–A, wherein the answer to the last question was changed from "no" to "yes." As a matter of fact, I have no recollection of every having said "no," but I corrected it.

[7005] Then on page 672 of the record——

Mr. RICHARDSON. What page is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. 675. [Reading:]

After the conclusion of the session on Saturday, I thought that a portion of my testimony was not clear and also that there might be some misapprehension as to my underlying attitude. I think I stated in the discussion which took place at the last session that I was convinced that there were at least three fixed stations, and by that I mean three stations with communications to the central plotting room, and to the central place by wire, and reasonably secure, and I thought there were more.

I find that there were six, and I underestimated.

Now, I have been informed that each one of these radar stations that was manned was the search type and that they are—what do you call them, two seventy, wasn't it? Leave that out.

I don't know what that means now, that last thing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is that all you want to read?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all I see right here now. I think that is all for the present.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Admiral, in order to sort of crystallize this, I want to go over those operations which, in your opinion were

essential to the defense of [*7006*] Hawaii, so that none may be omitted, and the first I desire to suggest would be the availability of a suitable number of patrol planes for distant reconnaissance.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Second, there should be enough of those patrol planes to conduct a proper patrol over a 360-degree protected area around Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There should be available the best radar facilities.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Land defenses of all character should be mobilized in radio?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The fleet should be alerted?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, it is true, is it not, Admiral, that the extent——

Admiral KIMMEL. Just one moment. You left out, I think, an essential point of this defense of Oahu, and that is the presence of sufficient long-range bombers to destroy the enemy carriers after they are discovered.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Correct. I accept your suggestion. I missed it in my notes.

[*7007*] Now, Admiral, the extent and detail to which these operations are to be carried is dependent upon judgment as to the extremeness of the danger?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[*7008*] Mr. RICHARDSON. You thought on December 7 that the danger of air attack on Hawaii was very slight?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In fact, Admiral, the danger was exceedingly great as the event proved to be?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I think that is fair.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the disaster at Hawaii was the result of an error of judgment?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, not entirely. It was not entirely the result of an error of judgment. If we had had available in Oahu at this time all of the facilities which you have outlined and we had been able to take the precautions which you have outlined, that would have been one thing.

We had to make a choice. We felt that we had to make a choice. We had to provide for what we knew was coming in all probability against what we conceived at that time to be a very small chance of an attack on Oahu.

Now, you can never be absolutely secure, there is no such thing as absolute security and with a fleet that is particularly true and this estimate that we made—that I made—was made after mature consideration of balancing probabilities and when you balance probabilities you must take into account the means which you have to meet these various possibilities.

[*7009*] Mr. RICHARDSON. In reaching such a judgment, Admiral, do you have to consider the possible result of a mistake?

Admiral KIMMEL. You should; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if the mistake on the one hand might result in the destruction of the fleet as against a delay in training what have you to say to that?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was not a delay in training that was involved in this. The primary thing that we had in mind all the time was to be ready for offensive action.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, let me restate my question. In reaching a judgment as to what you were to do, what weight would you give the fact that a mistake with respect to a possible air attack on Hawaii which might result in the destruction of your fleet as compared with the preparation of your fleet for future offensive action outside of Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the first place, I never believed that an air attack on Hawaii, on Pearl Harbor would result in the destruction of the fleet. I was firmly convinced at the time that torpedoes would not run in the waters of Pearl Harbor and if it had not been for the destruction accomplished by the torpedoes at that time the damage would have been comparatively negligible.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Weren't you told, Admiral, in the letter of June 13, which was the second letter in the series with [*7010*] respect to torpedoes launched from planes, that it cannot be determined that any preexisting depth of water is too shallow to dispose of the possibility of torpedo attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. You have not stated that exactly correctly. What it did state——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would you mind reading it?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to inquire. That is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to you as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet? Is that correct, Mr. Counsel?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; that is not a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to me as commander in chief. It is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandants of the various naval districts, with a copy sent to me for information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You received it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I received it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now read it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might state, since you brought that question up——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to identify what you are fixing to read, that is what I had in mind.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; but you have reminded me of something.

[*7011*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a letter that was addressed to me as commander in chief on February 13, if I remember the date correctly, and in it the Chief of Naval Operations told me as commander in chief that the minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed and that 150 feet is what they would most likely need; that is the essence of it. At the same time the Chief of Naval Operations wrote a letter to the commandants of the districts, in which he included approximately the same information.

Now, when the change came in this letter of June 13 he did not write anything to me. He wrote a letter to the commandants of the districts

and sent me a copy of the letter. I got the letter, there is no question about that. I just want to show you the difference.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Read it, please, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Paragraph 2 of this letter of June 13, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandants of the various naval districts states:

> Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much at 300 feet, and in some cases may initiate dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it [*7012*] cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

Paragraph 3:

> While no minimum depth of water in which Naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attack force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.
>
> As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto, were, in general, at thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched at eleven or twelve fathoms.

Now, there is no information, definite information in there anywhere that you can launch a torpedo at less than ten fathoms.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you concluded——

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, I would like to add to that just a little bit.

[*7013*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was not the only man who read this letter. I had a very competent staff. Their accomplishments during this war have proved that beyond doubt. Admiral Bloch, who was more directly concerned with this, any protection that should have been afforded in the harbor because he would have been the one to install it, all of my staff, Admiral Bloch and I considered the torpedo danger negligible after receiving this letter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, in connection with the subject of information and referring to information from external sources and what I may call information from internal sources, is it correct to say that the external sources would be, first, intelligence reports to you, both local and from other sources; second, information you might get from spies or espionage of your own if you had any such; third, a formal declaration of war.

Now, what other sources of information would there be from the exterior to the commander of a fleet as to a possible coming attack than may fall within those three categories?

Admiral KIMMEL. The commander in chief and the commandant of the naval district had in Hawaii an intelligence unit and this intelligence unit was primarily concerned with information which they could obtain in the Hawaiian Islands. The [*7014*] only exceptions to that were what is known as the traffic analysis method of locating ships. That was a radio-direction finder hook-up which permitted them to make certain traffic analyses.

Mr. RICHARDSON. These were Hawaii originated activities?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; they were not Hawaii originated activities. They were part—Hawaii was part of a net—I am talking now about traffic analysis—which included Guam and Manila.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Oh, I see.

Admiral KIMMEL. But I think what you are driving at and what I hope to answer is that practically all information that we could hope for from spies abroad, from intercepts, from diplomatic exchanges, from naval attachés' reports and from the multitudinous means that Washington had of obtaining information had to be supplied to me by Washington. I had no way to get it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If there had been a formal declaration of war and you had been advised of that, would that have been information which would have changed your Hawaiian dispositions?

Admiral KIMMEL. If we had had a formal declaration of war my troubles would have been practically ended.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, so far as internal sources of in- [*7015*]
formation against an attack you would have radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You would have your distance patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And then you would have the military deductions that you as the chief might eventually make on the information you had?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, let me run over with you the knowledge that you had in Hawaii on December 6th. You knew at that time of the fundamental importance of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; I had known that for a long time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you knew at that time of the vulnerability of the Pearl Harbor base?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know that the Pearl Harbor base was nearly as vulnerable as it proved to be, as I have just tried to explain in regard to this torpedo business.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Except for the liability of torpedo attack was there any other vulnerability of the base that you did not appreciate?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, not that I can recall at the present moment.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, you knew at that time that [*7016*]
your armament, whether considered as patrol planes or fighter planes or bombers or antiaircraft guns was insufficient to permit you to make a full, satisfactory defense of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will answer that this way: A full satisfactory defense of an island base can never be assured no matter what you have there. The element of surprise, the element of a fast moving, superior air force coming down on you—and although we would have been in much better case had we had the additional forces which you have outlined here previously, we could not have had absolute security there. And we were not entirely helpless out there. I do not want anybody to get the idea that I thought we were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, insofar as your armament availability was lessened your ability to defend also lessened, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; of course.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you had at the time a fleet sufficiently inferior in size so that it had to remain generally in a defensive position?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew that war was imminent?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew that the relations were badly strained. I knew that war had been predicted time and again [*7017*] during the past year. Just how imminent was just what I did not know and I did not know that a deadline date had been set, I did not know that after a certain date things were going to happen automatically; I did not know but that the situation had eased somewhat in the 10 days since I had received the warning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew of the Japanese reputation for surprise attacks?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew how closely they corresponded to a declaration of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, yes; I had known that they had corresponded closely to a declaration of war.

I think there has been a little misconception about the Japanese attack on Port Arthur. My recollection of that Japanese attack is they had broken off diplomatic relations some 2 or 3 days, I think it was 4 days, before they made the attack on Port Arthur.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, was not one of the things, Admiral, constantly discussed by you and your staff that Japan was just the kind of a nation that might attack without warning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you knew at that time of the ap- [*7018*] propriateness from a military standpoint of an air attack on Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I cannot say that I fully appreciated the appropriateness of an air attack on Oahu at that time. In the first place, there were very many difficulties that the Japanese had to overcome in order to be able to make that attack. I had been warned of a surprise attack. I had been told where that surprise attack was coming, at least by implication; that it was to be against Thai, the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Philippines.

[*7019*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, did you understand, Admiral, that the attack on Thai or Borneo or the Philippines, or down to the China Sea was a surprise attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why yes. Why not? We did not know which place they were going. They could have attacked many places. They could have made a surprise attack in many places.

As a matter of fact, one of the most productive places for them to make a surprise attack was in the Philippines. That, I think, was mentioned by the Chief of Naval Operations to me as one of the most embarrassing things that could happen to us.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He said it would be embarrassing, but did he say it would be a surprise?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the surprise could very easily be gotten from the tenor of all of the dispatches, yes; a surprise attack in the Philippines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In view of the fact that pretty near all of the dispatches that you had from Washington, and in view of your suggestion that those dispatches misled you, because they constantly talked of the Philippines, Thai Peninsula, Indochina, Malasia, you still think that those attacks would be a surprise attack similar to

what a surprise [*7020*] attack would be on Oahu that had never been mentioned?

Admiral KIMMEL. They could very easily have made a surprise attack on any one of the places I mentioned. They could have made a surprise attack on the ships of the Asiatic Fleet, as far as that goes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, in your correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, including your conversation with President Roosevelt on your visit to Washington, one form of attack on Hawaii that was constantly mentioned was an air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, and there was just one reason that was constantly mentioned, and that reason was because we wanted to be sure they could not make a successful air attack, and we felt reasonably certain that any other form of attack would not have been successful because we had the means to combat it, and we were emphasizing our deficiencies.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Admiral, it would seem from an examination of the dispatches that after about October, say the first of October, there seems to have been no more mention of air attack in the correspondence and the dispatches that passed between you and Washington.

Have you any explanation of why, for a period of 6 months or more, there should be such constant reference to [*7021*] air attack and then a sudden cessation of reference to it in the trend of dispatches after about the first of October?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I presume that you have been over the correspondence, and that what you say is indicated. However, I think I read a dispatch here this morning of November 29, and in that we were talking about antiaircraft guns, 37-millimeter guns.

In my correspondence with the Navy Department, and particularly with the Chief of Naval Operations, I asked for many things. I pointed out many deficiencies.

The one that you have emphasized the most—and as a matter of fact it has been emphasized the most since Pearl Harbor—was that it had to do with antiaircraft and an air attack.

I was equally concerned about the lack of bombs in Pearl Harbor. We had no bombs. There were not any out there when I took over—a handful, perhaps. We had no replacement ammunition for the ships. We had no transportation to get that ammunition, and those bombs out there and I remember in the early months of my time there I issued orders that every ship that came out there was to bring bombs and ammunition.

Of course, that is explosive, and I had to take that [*7022*] responsibility.

There were numerous other things I asked for besides antiaircraft stuff. I was trying to and did emphasize a great many other things besides antiaircraft. I tried to emphasize everything that we were lacking in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I simply wanted to ascertain whether the fact that an air attack seems to have not been the subject of comment after about the first of October, was due to any change in your belief that an air attack, which had been feared for 6 months during 1941, was no longer to be feared after October?

Admiral KIMMELL. You have said I feared an air attack. I felt always that an air attack was a possibility. I felt that I would have been remiss if I had not called the attention of the Navy Department and the War Department, with all of the force at my command, to the necessity of providing against every contingency in Hawaii.

At no time did I consider that an air attack was any more than a possibility under the conditions that we had out there. What the events of a war might bring forth was quite a different thing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We might just as well explain it now. Why do you suggest that you did not think an air attack was more than a possibility? What were the reasons why it not [*7023*] only could not have been limited to a possibility, but that it was not a probability?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I knew the difficulties of an overseas expedition such as that. I knew the short range, the steaming range of the Japanese aircraft carriers. I very much doubted their ability to plan and execute an attack such as they made. We had had various reports on the Japanese Air Force, and I think not only I, but all the Navy Department were very much surprised at the efficiency of their air force and the manner in which they conducted that attack.

Now, the hazard that they undertook when the came there was something that I thought they would never take a chance on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You also knew by December 7——

Admiral KIMMEL. And I might add that I gathered this opinion after a great deal of thought and a great deal of consultation with the best naval minds we had, and I think those naval minds were right in Hawaii at the time I was there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew, Admiral, of the burning of the Japanese codes by December 7, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean the message of December 3?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is one of them. There was more [*1024*] than one with reference to the burning of codes, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was only one that I recall at the moment. There was a message of December 3 which said the Japs were burning most of their codes and ciphers in London, Hongkong, Batavia, Washington, and so forth.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What would that indicate to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. At that time it indicated to me, in conjunction with the other messages I had that Japan was taking precautionary measures preparatory to going into Thai, and because they thought that the British or the Americans, or both of them, might jump on them and seize their codes and ciphers after they went into Thailand.

Now, that was the interpretation we gave on it at that time.

[*7025*] Now incidentally, I would like to add another thing to that. That message came to me. It had nothing in it directing me to pass this on to General Short. That was a procedure that the Navy Department always used when they had an important message that they wanted me to give to General Short. I tried to give everything that I thought would be of interest to General Short to him anyhow.

But when the Navy Department sent me an important message which they thought should be conveyed to General Short they put that

in the message. They did not put it in this message, and that in itself ient some weight to my construction of it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you advise General Short about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not personally, no, but you will hear from him about whether he heard about it or not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you instruct any of your staff to advise General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not. I did not advise my staff to instruct General Short to do a great many things, but they did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They did what?

Admiral KIMMEL. I say I did not instruct my staff to instruct General Short to do a great many things that they did automatically. Most of his information he got from the commandant of the district.

[*7026*] As I have tried to tell you, this liaison with the district on matters of that kind was more direct than it was with my fleet staff. Now the district got everything that I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I was just going to ask you, do you know that Admiral Bloch got this information with reference to the burning of codes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then from your plan of operation that you had there you would expect that information to go from Bloch to Short or his staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. To exchange the information, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now you knew also on December 6 about the status which we spoke about this morning of the Jap espionage in Hawaii. You had all the knowledge you ever had up to December 7 about the presence in Hawaii of a flock of Japanese spies that were transmitting information into Tokyo as to the situation in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. We knew about that, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You knew also on December 6 about these reports which had frequently come to you of military movement by Japan on the Asiatic Coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh yes, yes. That was following the pattern that was laid down in the messages of the 24th and [*7027*] 27th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, it is also a fact, isn't it, that on December 6 it was reported to you by one of your staff, under circumstances showing his nervous interest in the fact, that for 6 days the Japanese carriers had been lost?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought I covered that pretty completely.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You did. Let me finish.

And in response to his anxiety about it you made the remark, "Do you expect me to believe that the carriers are coming around Diamond Head?"

Now do you recall the incident and will you give us your version of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. You are talking about the twinkle in my eye, I suppose.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, that is part of it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall the exact words that I used to Captain Layton, but I was very much interested in the location of all Japanese ships, not only the carriers but the other types. I felt if I could locate the carriers I would be able to determine pretty closely

where the main Japanese effort was going to be. I went over these traffic analyses reports with Captain Layton every morning. Captain [7028] Layton was a very excellent officer. He was very intense, and I have no doubt that I made such remark as that to him, not in any way to decry his efforts, or to treat the matter lightly, I did not treat the matter lightly, and he would be the last one to ever say that I treated the matter lightly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you had a very different reaction to the suspected fact than he did?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I had no different reaction from what he had. If you have gotten that impression I think it is entirely erroneous.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he come to you with a twinkle in his eye when he told you that he had not heard anything of the carriers for 6 days?

Admiral KIMMEL. He came to me because I told him to come.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, that is all right.

Admiral KIMMEL. He came to me every morning. The first thing I did when I reached the office in the morning was to go over everything that had come in during the night.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you get any idea from him when he came that he was not serious in this report about the loss of the 6 carriers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Serious?

[7029] Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course he was serious. There was never any question of being serious. Not about the loss of the carriers. As far as we were concerned the carriers were never lost, and when people say the carriers were lost they might as well say the whole Japanese fleet was lost.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, Admiral——

Admiral KIMMEL. Just one second, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. We had during this period a wealth of traffic. There was a great deal of traffic. The only trouble was we were unable to identify it, and we were not only unable to identify the Japanese carriers, we were unable to identify pretty nearly all the Japanese fleet. It was not that we had lost six carriers, that was not the thing. We did not even know we had lost them. We could not identify them.

[7030] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did not Layton use the word "lost" in reporting to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. As far as I remember, no. All he said he was unable to identify them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, you also had on December 6, and the morning of December 7, various information with respect to real, or fancied submarine activities at the Hawaiian base?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in that connection, without referring to those submarines which had been reported at an earlier date and referring to what we may call the Ward submarine——

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many submarines were there discovered in the immediate Hawaiian-Pearl Harbor area on the morning of December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, on the morning of December 7, there must have been a half-dozen altogether. There was one which came into the harbor and which was promptly sunk by one of the airplane tenders, and destroyer—well, somebody else got into it, I forget now, but they hit him all about the same time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How far did that one get in?

Admiral KIMMEL. He got all the way in to Ford Island. [*7031*] He apparently did no damage at all. They got him right away.

I have never investigated this myself, because I left out there too soon to go into things like that, but my recollection is that he was supposed to have followed the *Altair* into the harbor, not the *Altair*—one of the tugs into the harbor earlier in the morning when she came in through the gate, through the antitorpedo net.

Now, mind you, this was a submarine of a type that we did not know existed, and we did not believe any submarine could get into the harbor without showing its periscope as it came in. That was the reason they got in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When was it sunk?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was sunk inside.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I know, but when? Do you know the precise time? Could you tell me?

Admiral KIMMEL. Just about the time the attack started or within 5 minutes of it, when I think it was sunk.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, go ahead.

Admiral KIMMEL. Then, there was another submarine which ran aground up in Bellows Field, the north side of Oahu, and they got the skipper out of it. He was the one that the FBI finally decided had been around Pearl Harbor and had reported the location of the ships in there.

[*7032*] Mr. RICHARDSON. What time did he go ashore, about as compared with the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not remember.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it before the attack or during the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it was after the attack.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Army found him over there and we sent over there and got him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Describe those submarines that you refer to that were of a new type.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know too much about them because I had a great many things to do out there at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were they both these midget submarines?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were they both these midget submarines?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they were the midget submarines, the two-man submarines. The submarine is about 10 or 12 feet in diameter and about 60 or 70 feet long. It is so small that a white man could not get into it. They had to cut the thing apart in order to get a white man in [*7033*] to the seat where they drove it.

I think it was air-driven and it was capable of about 20 knots under water, which was something far in excess of any submarine we knew anything about. It was a ship very much like a torpedo and could have, I think, about a 100-mile cruising radius, or something of that kind.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, there were two, Admiral——

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, Draemel went out——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who is he?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is Rear Admiral Draemel. He was in command of the destroyers, of the Battle Force at the time. I forget the details, but anyhow, he got a distress call in one of the bays over there. He started in and two submarines fired at him torpedoes. They were trying to get him in there to shoot at him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When was that with respect to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. When was that with respect to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, maybe a couple of hours afterward. I cannot recall all these things off the bat, but I should say there were conservatively a dozen or more submarines in the Hawaiian area at the time the attack took [*7034*] place that we discovered, and maybe more than that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When did the *Ward* episode happen with respect to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. The *Ward* episode I have since learned—I think she fired depth charges at this submarine around about 6:30 or a quarter to 7, and she made some kind of a report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Whom did they report to?

Admiral KIMMEL. The report went to Admiral Bloch. The report was, "Have attacked a submarine." It was not as clearly stated at that time as it was in a subsequent message about a half-hour or three-quarters of an hour later.

When Admiral Bloch received it, he was waiting for verification, because we had had various attacks, or incidents where our people had dropped depth charges on suspected submarines, after I had issued the order there on the 27th of November.

I thought his action was quite all right. He did seek verification before he did anything else.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I call the committee's attention to the fact that there is a log which is in the record as exhibit 119, giving the radio log with respect to some of this submarine activity.

[*7035*] Admiral KIMMEL. You must realize, in reading this log—I have never read it in detail, but I have been told approximately what is in it—that we were constantly receiving reports of suspicious objects to be investigated, of possible submarines, and this kind of thing was going on several times a week.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, should that report that came in on this so-called *Ward* submarine to Admiral Bloch have been immediately relayed to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was relayed to me. I do not know how immediately, because I got it around 7:30, between 7:30 and 7:40, something of that kind, or 7:20 to 7:30, something of that kind.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, you had also on December 6–7, information with reference to the change in the call letters of the Japanese Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, yes. On December 1 that change was made.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, the previous change had been made on November 1.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And before that, those call letters had been changed about every 6 months, were they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. At irregular intervals, as I recall it. The first one in 1941 was made in May 1941. The second one in November 1941, and the third in December, December 1, 1941.

[*7036*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Would the fact that there had been such a short period from the change on November 1 arouse any apprehension in your mind that it had any particular significance?

Admiral KIMMEL. We thought that was a prelude to their moving down the China coast.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then you did think that the change in call letters had some call reference to future military operations with Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in that way; yes. It was entirely consistent with the advice we had received from the Navy Department.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now you also knew on the morning of December 7 that you were not conducting any distant patrols other than those which attended the operations of your task forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. On that particular morning; yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that has been very thoroughly covered in the previous testimony that I have given.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, there is another thing I wanted to talk to you about. It was quite generally understood, was it not, during 1941, in discussing the question of air attack upon Hawaii, that the dangerous sector, the origin of those attacks was the northern sector?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I think that that is a misconception, and it is a natural misconception which seems to be inevitable after a fact. I know that my predecessor did not consider the northern sector the most dangerous, if you take the sector that he covered during his patrol, which was to the westward, northwestward, and around to the southwestward. I know that Admiral Halsey's idea even on the day of the attack was that they would probably come from the Marshalls.

I testified before the Roberts Commission as to the north being a dangerous sector, and I gave the reasons which appealed to me at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. If I can help counsel, pages 605 and 606.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. Pages 605 and 606.

Mr. MATSON. Is that the typed number?

Mr. MURPHY. That is the little typed number, on the bottom of page 605 and the top of page 606.

Admiral KIMMEL. Are you ready for me to go ahead?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just let me clarify your recollection, Admiral Kimmel, with this testimony. I am reading from typewritten page 605 and pencil page 622. This is the Kimmel previous testimony before the Roberts Commission.

Senator BREWSTER. Could we have what Admiral Kimmel
[*7038*] was saying at the time he was interrupted?

Admiral KIMMEL. Beg pardon, sir?

Senator BREWSTER. You made a statement as to having predicted an attack in the north and having given reasons for it. I think you were in the process of stating the reasons when you were interrupted by the gentleman on the other side.

Admiral KIMMELL. Yes; I started to give an answer but I was diverted.

Senator BREWSTER. Will the reporter read the statement to see how far you got?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Then I started out to say I did not wish to make an alibi after the fact, and maybe I leaned over a little too far the other way.

In any event, I gave the reasons why an attack from the northward might be successful. I did not give it in any detail at all, in fact I scarcely touched upon the disadvantages of the northern route, and those disadvantages were well known to me at the time.

The principal disadvantage of the northern route is that it is a 3,500-mile pull from the homeland; it is through rough seas at that time of the year; the 3,500-mile pull would require refueling, and an expedition of that kind had no better than a 50–50 chance of getting through, due to weather alone.

[*7039*] You have heard testimony here to the effect that this task force was very lucky in being able to get through, I mean in being able to refuel and come down there, because they struck some smooth weather, which was very unusual at that time of the year.

In view of all the circumstances before and since I feel, and I felt then, that no arc, no sector could be ruled out as a possible way for them to come in. I quoted Admiral Nimitz on that, who relieved me, and he agreed in toto with the conception that I had of that. They could come in from the east without too much trouble; they could come from the Marshalls, and come in from the southeast. There was no sector that they could not come in from.

If they could come in after a 3,500-mile trip through the northern seas, the rough seas up there, there was certainly no deterrent to their coming in from any direction. We know that now better than we did before Pearl Harbor, as a matter of fact.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, Admiral, just to keep the record straight, do you think that this answer should be qualified:

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you were expecting a raiding force to come from the southward, what would you do?

Admiral KIMMEL. The air raid force on this place would [*7040*] have a better chance, a much better chance to get in from the northward than they did from the southward, but no part should be disregarded.

Admiral KIMMEL. One reason I made that statement—and these were not considered statements anyhow, I was called before this commission and questioned at length, I had no time to prepare myself, I had been without sleep for some time, I was, to a considerable extent, strained, and all that must be taken into consideration here—but what I probably had in mind at the time about coming in from the southward was that we had been operating from the southward.

Admiral Brown was down at Johnston Island, which is to the southward, he had been operating out of there, and I had had some patrol planes operating out of there, I had had some patrol planes sweeping betwixt Johnston Island and Midway, and I had patrol planes sweeping betwixt Oahu and Midway.

I thought their chances at that particular time for being able to get in were better than from the northward, and that probably influenced me considerably in what I had to say at that time.

Now I have attempted to reconstruct in my own mind a little about where the Japanese say they went. I am not sure that one of our sweeps missed them by so very much out [7041] there. I have not plotted it on the chart.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, let me call your attention also for clarification to the further testimony of yourself on typewritten page 1547, in which the chairman says this:

> Now I think that General McNarney wants a question in order to avoid reading all that the order relates and having you repeat it, and his question is to the effect: Why, Admiral, did you suggest there was a probability or possibility of a carrier to the northward?
>
> Admiral KIMMEL. Because I thought that was the most probable direction of an attack coming against this place.

Admiral KIMMEL. Just what I have stated, sir, because we had covered a good many areas to the southward recently. And there was another thing. I had on that morning what might be termed a hunch and I did not know why, but I felt the carriers were to the northward, and I put that in a dispatch to Halsey. I did not want to make it much more than a hunch.

Subsequently we got information which seemed to indicate the carriers were to the southward, and I had nothing more than this feeling, you might say.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall the subject of the northern sector being the most likely sector in which an air attack would approach in any dispatches or correspondence between [7042] you and Stark's office?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I recall nothing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you remember any suggestion coming out of the Office of Naval Operations affirmatively stating that the northern area was the dangerous area?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I remember no such communication at any time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, I want to ask you another question. Do you know a man named Captain Zacharias?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I know him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There has been a suggestion made that he had conversations with you prior to the attack on December 7 with respect to the probability of air attack on the Pearl Harbor base.

I would like to have you give us, if there were any such conversations, what they were, how they occurred, the circumstances, and generally tell the committee about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will do so. Captain Zacharias is a Japanese language student. He is a very excellent Japanese language student. I will give you a little background.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is what I want.

Admiral KIMMEL. He was an intelligence officer down in the San Diego district in October of 1940 when Admiral Richardson had a detachment of the fleet consisting of two or three [7043] battleships and some smaller craft at anchor at Long Beach, and Captain Zacharias sent a message to Admiral Richardson that there was going to be an attack by Japanese planes on the fleet in Long Beach that night, that the Japs had an airfield down in Mexico, and that they were going to get the planes over here some way or another—I believe by carrier—and they were coming up there.

Richardson had this information. He did not believe it, but he had no choice but to get his detachment under way and get out, and subsequent investigation proved there was not anything down there and there were not any Japanese planes anywhere near the coast.

Captain Zacharias had an interview with Mr. Nomura, Admiral Nomura, when he came over here, and he gave me a valuable résumé of his conversation with Admiral Nomura by letter. Eventually he, in command of a cruiser, the *Salt Lake City*, I think, came out and joined the fleet, and along in March of 1941 I was back in the War Plans Section of my headquarters when Admiral W. W. Smith, my chief of staff, brought Captain Zacharias back there to talk to me.

I had a conversation with Captain Zacharias. Most of it was taken up with my asking him questions about the Japanese Navy. I have no recollection of Captain Zacharias having said anything about an attack on Pearl Harbor, and [*7044*] least of all do I recollect anything about his having said that the attack was going to come at any particular time.

I might add if he had told me in March that the attack was coming on December 7, I would not have been greatly impressed. In any event, about 2 weeks prior to Captain Zacharias' conversation with me I had received from the Chief of Naval Operations a letter, which has been quoted here before this committee, to the effect that no Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was planned for or projected in the foreseeable future. I think you will recall that letter.

I would have been very much inclined to take the estimate of the Chief of Naval Operations forwarding the views of the Chief of Naval Intelligence over those of Captain Zacharias.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, don't you think, Admiral, that if he had specifically advised you of the probability of an immediate attack on Pearl Harbor that you would now recollect that conservation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should think so, sir, but I do not recollect it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now let me move on, Admiral, to ask you some questions as to the precise condition in Hawaii at the time of the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might add you will have Captain Smith before you and you can get his version of the same [*7045*] conversation, because he was prompt throughout the conversation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now at the time of this attack on December 7 you had three task forces out: One to Johnston, one to Wake, and one to Midway; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And they were out upon missions, they were not connected with fear of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, yes; that is true; not fear of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now let me call your attention, Admiral, to this map. I place the pointer on Oahu. Now I place the pointer on Midway. One of these task forces was proceeding from Oahu to Midway [indicating].

Admiral KIMMEL. It was down about 400 miles, a little bit further down from where you are indicating. It is to the southward and eastward, along in there [indicating], about 400 to 500 miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is this [indicating]?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Newton task force, the *Lexington*.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am not referring to any particular name, but there was a task force that went to Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did not go to Midway, it was only going about 400 miles from Midway, or put it about 700 miles from Oahu.

[*7046*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, that task——

Admiral KIMMEL. That put it about 700 miles from Oahu.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To the west?

Admiral KIMMEL. To the west of Oahu about 700 miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But the course of that task force was to the west?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; a little north of west.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many degrees north of west?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, looking at it, I would say 20, maybe.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The other task force was going to Johnston Island?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. That is, Brown's task force.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then did you have a task force going to Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that would also be in a weswardly direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was on its return at that time. That was about some 300 miles west of Pearl Harbor at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But that task force at no time would go appreciably north of a west line from Oahu, would it?

[*7047*] Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Calling your attention to these red lines on this map as very inferentially illustrating the course of the Jap fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor——

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You had no task force or other patrol that was operating in the area covered by those red lines?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So that on the morning of December 7, your three task forces and the supporting planes which were making reconnaissance with those task forces was very largely confined to a sector which might be called the southwest sector from Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it was the westerly sector, I should say, would be more appropriate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you also on that morning had a plane patrol between 4 and 7 a. m., that was covering only local areas for training purposes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. Covering the operation areas to search out the submarines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you had on that morning also a radar operation schedule between 4 and 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Army had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right. And, so far as you [*7048*] know, and so far as the Navy is concerned, no method of getting a radar report to the Navy from that operation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why wasn't there anybody to get a radar report from them to the Navy?

Mr. RICHARDSON. You didn't have a Navy man assigned?

Admiral KIMMEL. That makes no difference, sir, that I can see. Anybody that could talk English could tell me where the planes were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There was no Navy man assigned to the Information Center on Sunday morning, was there?

Admiral KIMMEL. The only Navy man that I had assigned to the Army at that particular time was Lieutenant Taylor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He was a technician?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; he was an operating man. He was not a technician.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You didn't think, did you, that he was to make reports?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought he was to be used by the Army in any way they saw fit. I turned him over to them completely, and they could give him any order they pleased.

Now, if they had the information, if the information was in fact available, anybody could have telephoned it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But nobody did?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, they didn't. I [*7049*] never received it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, on that Sunday morning of the attack, you had your ships so arranged in the harbor as to facilitate the use of your antiaircraft batteries on the ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a fact.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was a matter of definite policy which you had worked out to guide your ships when in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. So in event of an air attack they could concentrate their fire in the most scientific way?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; instantly.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you testified that your information is that your fleet guns, aircraft, antiaircraft guns were firing on this attack within 4 to 7 minutes after the attack started?

Admiral KIMMEL. My understanding and my belief is that in from 4 to 7 minutes, variously estimated, all the guns of the fleet were firing, all the antiaircraft guns of the fleet, but that those that were manned before the attack opened fire at once.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is that in your opinion as great a state of readiness as could have been provided for for those [*7050*] ships under those circumstances that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it was a very reasonable condition to maintain. When any gun, or group of guns, one-quarter to one-half of them, opened fire at once, and began to shoot at the first planes coming in, and when the rest of them chime in to the extent of the whole outfit within 4 to 7 minutes, I don't believe you will beat that much anywhere.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Also, it is a fact, is it not that on this Sunday morning, under the Short direction, the Army was in its first alert against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have heard that stated. I don't know it as a fact.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you have also heard it stated, have you not, Admiral, that upon the Army air fields, the planes of the Army were bunched together in order to facilitate guarding themselves against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. I read that in some reports, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, passing from the exact condition in Hawaii on this morning to find out what was not available then, I bring up

again the fact that there was on that morning no distant patrol reconnaissance out of Oahu.

Admiral KIMMEL. That has been pretty well established.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And there was no continuous radar [*7051*] beyond this operation we referred to between 4 and 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. You have the testimony on that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And there was no alerting of the antiaircraft guns of the Army on that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. I learned the details when I read the report of the Army Board.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And those details that you learned indicated that they were not alerted?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think those details, as published, speak for themselves.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the only comment you care to make?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no—I don't think any comment is called for by me. I don't know whether the assertions made in the report of the Army board are correct or not. I think you should get this from General Short.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, you don't know, and your Navy contingent had no knowledge, with respect to whether those guns were or were not alerted?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know now from my own knowledge what condition the Army guns were actually in on that morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was any report made to you by members of your staff with reference to that fact?

[*7052*] Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall any at the present time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now——

Admiral KIMMEL. But the members of my staff were not charged with that duty.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was because it was the duty of the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; that was because it was a duty that was, insofar as the Navy had anything to do with it, it was a duty of the commandant of the district to look out for that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He was under you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but he is not on my staff. Maybe I spoke in a restrictive sense of "staff."

Mr. RICHARDSON. It was of exceedingly great importance to you that those antiaircraft guns of the Army were in a condition of readiness?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had confidence in General Short. I may say I had confidence in General Marshall. I read the report—not the report—the dispatch which came to General Short, in which he was told to report to General Marshall just exactly what he had done, and I had, I remember, this dispatch, you see. I had every reason to believe that that business had been looked out for. It [*7052 A*] was doubly sure that if it were reviewed by the Chief of Staff, that they would get this condition of alert that he with his additional information in Washington knew or believed was required there at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, at best, that would be an assumption on your part, wouldn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh——

Mr. RICHARDSON. There certainly was no verification of it by you?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I made no assumptions, I would have spent all my time running around checking up on every detail.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was the condition of readiness of your antiaircraft guns defending Pearl Harbor, simply a matter of detail?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was in the dispatch which came to General Short an admonition not to alarm the civil population, and I presumed that he would work that out to the satisfaction of the defense of Pearl Harbor and the Chief of Staff, so it wouldn't alarm the civil population, and that they would get a reasonable set-up for it.

[*7053*] Mr. RICHARDSON. In other words, neither you nor any member of your staff made any attempt to verify or find out what the condition of alertness was with respect to the antiaircraft guns operated by the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. And neither did General Short make any attempt to find out the details of an alert that the Fleet had in effect at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That, I might suggest, Admiral, is one of the troubles in this proceeding.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there is such a thing as having confidence, and if you don't have confidence in the people you work with you don't get much result.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me interject this at this point, Admiral: Do you think the condition of affairs that existed in Oahu, which culminated in the attack on this Sunday morning, has any relevance to the question of a single authority directing military operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say no, and the reason I make that statement is that we had two chances to receive the vital information which was withheld from us. One chance was from the Chief of Staff of the Army supplying it to General Short. The other chance was from the Chief of Naval Operations supplying it to me. And if either one of us had had the vital information, which I have set forth, I believe, at great [*7054*] lengths, I think that the conditions that obtained in Hawaii on that morning would not have obtained.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The fact is, is it not, Admiral, that as you approached December 7 you very definitely gave the Navy program for action in event of the declaration of war precedence over the establishment of the defense of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I had believed in those days preceding Pearl Harbor that there was a 50–50 chance or anything approaching that of an attack on Pearl Harbor, it would have changed my viewpoint entirely. I didn't believe it. And in that I was of the same opinion as that of the members of my staff, my advisers, my senior advisers.

In this connection it might be appropriate to say this. I had conversations with Admiral Pye several times during the week ending on November 7. On November 6 we spent most of the forenoon together going over the situation.

Senator LUCAS. Do you mean December 6 or November 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. December 6, the day before the attack.

And in the afternoon I spent practically all afternoon, and spoiled a couple of golf games, by keeping my operations officers, my war plans officer and my Chief of Staff to discuss the situation. I had

conversations with Admiral Wilson Brown, who was in command of the Scouting Force of the Fleet, and [7055] under whose command Admiral Bellinger operated as part of the Fleet. I had several conversations with him. He went to sea on the 5th of December and was down at Johnston Island. I had on my staff Captain Smith, W. W. Smith, commonly known as "Poko," who has since become a vice admiral. And Captain McMorris, who was my war plans officer. Captain McMorris stayed there with Admiral Nimitz as war plans officer for several months, when he went to sea, and was in action up in the Aleutians, successful action, too. And then Admiral Nimitz took him back as his Chief of Staff, where he remained as Chief of Staff until the end of the war.

Admiral Delaney, he is a vice admiral now, he was a captain, he was my operations officer, and he was one of the three that was with me most of Saturday afternoon.

There is Admiral Murphy, Rear Admiral Murphy, then the commander, who was one of the assistant war plans officers. He has been a very successful commander in this war.

There was Kitts, my gunnery officer, the man who, incidentally, advised me about the torpedoes. He is now Assistant Chief of Bureau of Ordnance here in the Navy Department and a very able one.

Those were the type of men I had advising me. Admiral Calhoun, vice admiral now, was the commander of the base force. He was there. Not to mention Admiral Bloch, whom I [7056] have talked about before.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You agreed, did you not, Admiral, that if there was real danger of an air attack on Hawaii the training program shouldn't have stood in the way for a moment?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't let the training program stand in the way of the alert that I considered necessary at that time. The fleet was on the alert. It was on the alert and any man who says the fleet wasn't on the alert, when the whole outfit were firing in the times that have been testified to here, well, I don't know what he means by alert. I took certain courses of action. I took them after mature consideration. I did the best I could. And with the same information again I am not sure but what I would do the same thing.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if you had been sufficiently wise to have sensed the probability of an air attack, would you have withdrawn all of your distant reconnaissance patrols?

Admiral KIMMEL. Would I have done what?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Withdrawn all of your distant reconnaissance patrols, as you did do?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I have tried to indicate in my statement what I believe, now believe, I would have done had I considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable.

[7057] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, let's consider for just a minute the propositions suggested as to mistakes originating in Washington.

You, as I understand it here, assert that the messages that you received from the Chief of Naval Operations properly bear the interpretation that you put on them?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your point, as I understand it, is that if those dispatches were intended to alert you against an attack at Pearl Harbor

they should have said something about Pearl Harbor as well as talking about Borneo and the Malay States and Thai and the China Sea and other places on the Asiatic coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. If they had convinced me in the dispatches which they sent to me of what they now say they meant by those dispatches there would never have been any Pearl Harbor such as it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And your contention with reference to what I call the harbor plotting message, your contention with reference to them, is that had that information come to you it would have definitely pointed to Hawaii as a possible point of attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't gather any other conclusion from those messages, and I have taken this matter up with [*7058*] members of my staff, former staff, with Admiral Pye, and they wouldn't believe, when I first told them about it, that those messages were in existence. They wouldn't believe it. I couldn't believe it myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, the evidence that has been given here indicates that those intercepts with reference to those harbor plotting messages reached all of the high command here in Washington who customarily received such intercepts.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that they passed over the desks of all of those members of the High Command.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you any explanation, as an Admiral in the Navy for 40 years, of how a series of messages like those could have passed through all those hands without any significance being attached to them?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have tried to get an answer to that and I have none. I do feel this, that had they given me those dispatches, my primary concern out there being the fleet, these people in Washington, it is true, had other things to do, but if they had given them to me I can say, without any reservation whatsoever, that it would have changed my ideas completely and every one of my staff that I have talked to, [*7059*] and I have talked to Smith, Murphy, Kitts, and Pye, all of them feel exactly the same way I do. We were there. We were on the ground.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, the thing that bothers me is just that, you were on the ground.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were in the midst of the greatest hotbed of Japanese espionage there was in the United States. Shouldn't you have had reason to suspect that such an important bit of information as the plotting of the only fleet we had in the Pacific, in Pearl Harbor, was being transmitted to Tokyo by that Intelligence without receiving information on it from Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. The significance isn't so much that they were transmitting this information to Tokyo. The significance is the demand of Tokyo to get this information to Tokyo, Tokyo's anxiety to have it, Tokyo's reiteration of what they wanted, and of making the reports twice a week, making them even when there was no movement. Tokyo's demand was, to me, the significant thing. It wasn't so much that the Consul there was transmitting information. But there is no reason why they would have wanted that information unless they were going to use it on the ships while they were in the harbor. You

must remember that this [*7060*] information was good only for a matter of days at best because the ships got out. They had to find out over again where they were. This question of getting the ships out of Pearl Harbor, of putting them in a position where they could get out and head out, and that kind of stuff, we had worked that out months before, and when a ship came in she was berthed headed out, so that all she had to do was cast off her lines and breast herself out a little bit and out she steamed.

More time was consumed in berthing the ships for that reason.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, let me direct your attention to these dispatches with reference to the so-called cut-off dates of November 25 and November 29. Those were the dates mentioned in the letters.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, there would be nothing in those letters, would there, that would indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All you would get from those letters would be some appreciation of one of the two elements of doubt, to-wit, when war would be declared?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; yes; and what we would have gotten [*7061*] from those messages is this, that a definite date after which things were automatically going to happen had come and passed, the automatic operation that was planned was not taking place. It took some time to get it into operation and every day it was delayed after the 29th made an attack far distant from Japan much more likely than it had been before.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me see if I follow you. Your contention is that since the 29th passed——

Admiral KIMMEL. The 25th first.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The 25th first, then the 29th passed, and no action; in view of the language of those dispatches, that they indicated a movement from Japan to some distant point that would require that expenditure of time to get there?

Admiral KIMMEL. That seems reasonable.

[*7062*] Mr. RICHARDSON. For that reason those cut-off dates didn't have reference to a war on the Asiatic coast. Thai, Indo-China, Malasia, or the Philippines?

Admiral KIMMEL. After the elapse of a certain time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. One thing further: You stated in your testimony with reference to the flight of B–17's that came in from San Francisco on the morning of the attack, you suggested that the fact that those planes had been sent in unarmed, not ready for fighting, indicated that the high command on the mainland couldn't have contemplated an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't remember my testimony on that line, but it is quite probable that is what I thought, whether I testified to it or not, that nobody would send unarmed planes to Hawaii if they expected an attack on Hawaii any time in the immediate future.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I only brought it up to suggest to you whether it wasn't known that the reason that the planes were not sent armed was because of the necessity of increasing their possible gasoline load so they could make the trip to Hawaii.

Admiral KIMMEL. The planes, I have been informed—I haven't seen the planes—had the guns on board. I am, in talking of arming

planes, I am talking of self-defense [*7063*] now, not offensive measures. They had guns on board and they were what was called "kalsomined," put up in heavy grease, and they couldn't operate.

Now, the only additional thing that would have been required would have been the ammunition necessary to serve those guns.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, these task operations to Wake and Midway were under your control, were they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you had disapproved them, you wouldn't have had to send those task forces out, would you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you concluded, as you stated in your statement that the idea of the high command in directing those task forces to move to Wake and Midway was sound?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I thought so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Had you made that——

Admiral KIMMEL. Under my conception at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you made that decision knowing that you could have held them back if you wanted to?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I could have held them back; I could have reported to the Navy Department that I was going to do so, and then they had the power and the auth- [*7064*] ority to order me to do it, anyhow.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, if they had not gone out, isn't it reasonable to expect that the number of ships in Pearl Harbor at the time of this attack would have been multiplied?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't think so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You don't think you would have increased your ships in Pearl Harbor out of these task forces if they had not been on missions, but had been in Hawaiian waters?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is something that is in the realm of speculation at the present time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the point that I was driving at was whether or not the situation wouldn't have been worse in point of danger to the fleet if the task forces hadn't been sent than it was in sending them, even though you weakened the defense at Hawaii in sending them?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I hadn't sent these task forces to Wake and Midway, it would have been because I wanted to get the fleet out and to have air cover there for them.

They wouldn't have been in.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you had sent your battleships to sea on the morning of the 7th, if you had had sufficient information so that it would have been possible to maneuver [*7065*] them and make a sortie with your battleships, wouldn't those battleships have been in greater danger from air attack in the open sea without any planes of yours that could protect them than they were in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the morning of December 7, it was a little late to send the battleships to sea, but on the night of December 6 I could have arranged a rendezvous with Halsey and gotten out pretty much in the same vicinity with him. I could have had the patrol planes out, and such planes as we had in the fleet at that time. I could have called back Newton with the *Lexington*, and he would have been in supporting distance of the fleet by daylight the next morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long would it take to sortie the battleships out of the harbor into the open sea?

Admiral KIMMEL. Three hours, perhaps.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you had had every possible warning of the 1 o'clock message which was so delayed on Sunday, the most you could have done with your battleships in that time would have been to sortie them, wouldn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but I think now, and again this is hindsight, I can't help but believe I wouldn't have sent the battleships to sea.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is just the point I was making.

[*7066*] Admiral KIMMEL. I would have sent all the light forces to sea. I would have gotten the destroyers and cruisers out. As a matter of fact, one of my problems all the time there, against a fast raiding force, if any should come, was the fact that my battleships would have been of very little use to me.

They couldn't go fast enough, and the only ones that were of use were the ones that could get out and do something to the enemy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the point that was running in my mind was that so far as your battleships were concerned, the 2-hour warning that you might have had on the 1 o'clock message wouldn't have assisted in your defense?

[*7067*] Admiral KIMMEL. It would have assisted to this extent. I would have had every gun on deck manned. We would have had not condition X-ray, as we called it, but condition ZED in the ships, which would have made it a little bit more difficult to sink them and this 2-hour warning would certainly have served to warn the Army.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 4 o'clock and we will recess until 10 o'clock in the morning. That will give you a chance to review your notes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have just a few minutes left.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., January 16, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 17, 1946.

[7068]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, JANUARY 17, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[7069] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this time for the record before resuming the examination?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, we have for introduction into the record a large number of documents which we think essential in order to completely cover the field, which have been prepared; copies have been, I think, distributed or are available for distribution by Mr. Hannaford, of my staff, and as he will be leaving Washington on Saturday, I would like to have about an hour of the committee's time, either today or tomorrow, to enable him to offer those documents in evidence; and if the chairman will give the matter attention and let me know sometime during the day when that may be done, he is prepared to go ahead with it at that time. It is a matter that does not have to be decided now, but sometime during the day. Most of these exhibits, if not all of them, are answers to requests that have been made by different members of the committee of us.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, do the members of the committee have any views on this point? If we will have to take an hour to do this, it seems to me we might just as well decide now when to take it.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that this is to be done in open hearing and that he will offer them while we are here [7070] in session.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I noticed the other day that a group of exhibits were offered and extended on the record by the reporter without the committee being in actual personal session. I do not know whether that would be permissible practice with these. It is purely a formal introduction into the record of these exhibits.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, that occurred late one afternoon.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We had run over the usual meeting time already and then it developed that certain exhibits were ready to be presented to the committee and the committee, as I recall, by unanimous consent agreed that counsel might submit those for the record, but personally I would think it would be better if these could be presented when the committee is in session so that we may have a description of them and know what they are.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, if, for instance, just by way of suggestion, the committee could conclude to pause, for instance, at 3:30 this afternoon, Mr. Hannaford would be ready to complete the presentation of those exhibits at the close of this afternoon's hearing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to that suggestion on the part of counsel?

[7071] (No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair hears none. It will be so ordered.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further before resuming the examination?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Nothing, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you having anything you want to present before counsel resumes his examination?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will now proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, referring to your compilation on retirement matters, which is noted in the record as exhibit 121, I note in the first paragraph the statement that a message came to you that, "Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the Acting Secretary of the Navy to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement."

I note then in the fourth paragraph of the letter:

> Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official directing him to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement was not the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox.

[7072] What do you desire the record to show as to the significance of the reference to the Acting Secretary and the reference to the Secretary?

Admiral KIMMEL. Technically the term "Acting Secretary" as referring to Mr. Knox was perhaps correct. I was curious to know the individual who had ordered Admiral Jacobs to send this message to Admiral Greenslade for me and I inquired of him who it was and he told me Mr. Knox. I wanted to know who the individual was.

[7073] Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there not a common understanding dealing with departments of the nature of the Navy Department, that the Acting Secretary, so-called, is not usually the Secretary himself?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was the reason for your further inquiry?

Admiral KIMMEL. When I made the inquiry, I did not know who had given the order. I wanted to know. I found that Mr. Knox had given it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, referring to your statement which you read the other day, and referring to page 35, I want to ask you a question or two.

I asked you yesterday whether you had not concluded, as the commander of the Pacific Fleet, to subordinate the question of Hawaiian defense to the proposition of training.

I find in your statement this paragraph:

> I was not expected to discontinue training for all-out security measures, concentrated on the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, every time an alarming dispatch was received from Washington predicting Japanese aggression in Far East. Indeed, had I done so, the training program would have been curtailed so drastically that the Fleet could not have been prepared for war.

[*7074*] Now turning to page 36, I find this paragraph:

> In 1941 we of the Pacific Fleet had a plethora of premonitions, of generalized warnings and forebodings that Japan might embark on aggressive action in the Far East at any one of the variously predicted dates. After receipt of such warnings, we were expected to continue with renewed intensity and zeal our own training program and preparations for war, rather than to go on an all-out local alert against attack.

Now, Admiral, you are not complaining, are you, because you received from Washington, what you call a "plethora of premonitions, generalized warnings and forebodings"?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was merely stating facts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the transmission to you as commander of the fleet of just such premonitions, warnings, and forebodings as were sent you were precisely what should have been sent you from Washington for your information?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was glad to have all of these warnings and forebodings, but the continued submission of these did not mean to me at any time that I was to go out on all-out security measures and abandon the training program.

What I was trying to emphasize was that in my correspondence with the Navy Department, and in particular in my letter of May 26, I set forth my principal problem, and [*7075*] my principal problem was to determine when to stop the training program and to go to all-out security measures, and that was what I wanted more than anything else, and in a very definite form.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And with the information that you had at your disposal in Hawaii, preceding the attack and the inferences which you drew from it, there came your decision to proceed with the training program rather than with an all-out alert for defense?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; not entirely. I took the steps which I have outlined in great detail, which I thought it was possible and advisable to take, which I thought the situation demanded.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Precisely; but the steps which you did take, and which you thought the situation demanded put you on a training basis, rather than on an all-out alert defense basis, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. The steps that I took were all that I considered the situation justified at the time, and the fleet was on the alert at that time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, a word, Admiral, with reference to the use of torpedoes, aerial torpedoes, by the Japanese in the attack.

You have referred to the letters of February and June [*7076*] as informative to you as to the probability of such an attack on your ships in Pearl Harbor with the depth of water there present.

Now, all the Japanese did to have the aerial torpedo to make the attack was to take some old Whitehead torpedoes built back in 1931, and put some fins on them, so located on the torpedo that when it struck the water the fins would bring it up to the surface and avoid the question of shallow water, wouldn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a device which the Japanese used. It was a device which all the brains of our own Navy Department, who had been seeking such a solution, had been unable to arrive at. Any solution of any problem appears simple when you get the answer, and the simpler the better it is.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The fins were made of wood, weren't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know. I think so. I never saw one of them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you feel that the use of wood fins on a torpedo in the water, with those fins so slanted as to bring the torpedo up to the surface as soon as possible was a new development in the art of warfare comparable to the use of radar?

[*7077*] Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; I do not go that far, but this was a device which the Japanese discovered, and which our own people had been unable to discover. I think it cannot be compared in importance with the discovery of radar.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, on October 14, 1941, you issued to your fleet what is known and referred to as Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL–41, Revised?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did. That was not the first time that was issued. I think that has been stressed here before.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I understand that, but there was one issued on October 14?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that is included in the compilation known as Exhibit 44?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume so. I do not know what is in Exhibit 44.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me read you the second paragraph of that letter.

> The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian area is predicated at present on two assumptions:
>
> (a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under present existing conditions, by attack on [*7078*] Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:
>
> (1) Sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft;
>
> (2) To block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel;
>
> (3) To lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.
>
> [*7079*] Now:
>
> (b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:
>
> (1) A separate attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
>
> (2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
>
> (3) A combination of these two.

Now in sending that letter to your fleet on October 14, you sent that to them as indicating to them what your understanding was as to the basis for the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and Hawaiian waters at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you will find substantially the same wording in every issue of this 2CL–41, the security order.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that continued appearance of that information in all of those confidential letters either before or after the one of October 14 was because there was present in your mind at that time that the matters mentioned in that paragraph threatened the security of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. We were covering, as I have stated several times, all the possibilities that we could foresee, and we were laying down a procedure, insofar as we could see, to meet each one of these conditions that arose. When you make plans you make plans to foresee everything possible, not only the probable things.

[7080] Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, would a copy of these confidential fleet letters to which we have been referring come to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations in due course?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; he is furnished with copies of all these letters. You will note at the end of the letter the distribution is 5CM–41, and a great many letters and indications there, and if necessary, you can find from the then existing mailing list whether this was received in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I can tell you now that there is not the silghtest doubt but that he did receive it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were also transmitting these confidential fleet letters to the Army in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am quite sure they were furnished copies of this. I cannot swear to that now, but I am as certain as I can be of anything without investigating it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, calling your attention to your testimony in the Roberts hearings, on page 366, I want to read to you a short excerpt from that. Commencing with question 376.

Mr. MASTEN. That is the Navy court.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me correct that. The record that I am reading from is Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the naval court, commencing with question 376:

QUESTION. Did you at any time as Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, question the advisability of maintaining the Pacific Fleet [7081] in Pearl Harbor?

ANSWER. When I took command of the Fleet I knew of the disagreement between Admiral Richardson, my predecessor, and the authorities in Washington on the advisibility of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He told me himself. I agreed with Admiral Richardson in general, but when I took command of the Fleet we had been for sometime without much gunnery, due to the fact that no adequate training target facilities were present in the Hawaiian area, and when I took command we had just about succeeded in completing the transfer of the material from the Coast. I did not make any protest, any formal protest against maintaining the Fleet at Pearl Harbor at any time. I did, in conversation with the Chief of Naval Operations in June of 1941, point out to him the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor as a Fleet base. The various elements that entered into it are well-known. I repeated substantially the same thing to the President when I had an interview with him, and the substantial point of the conversation was that so far as an air attack on Pearl Harbor was concerned, the only real answer to an air attack was not to have the Fleet in port if and when the air attack came, that it took from two to four hours to sortie, and once an air attack started the attack would be completed before we could change in any degree the disposition of the [7082] Fleet. I pointed out the chances of blocking the entrance, the single entrance that we had, and the danger from the oil storage as it was at that time, and I do not recall anything other than that at the present time, although there probably was. These were factors which were well-known to the President and Chief of Naval Operations prior to any statement by me.

I accepted the conditions at Pearl Harbor. That was one of the reasons why repeatedly in correspondence I requested to be kept informed of developments.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON (reading):

Question. In other words, does the Court understand that you concurred with your predecessor in that the Fleet should not be kept at Pearl Harbor?

Answer. In general, yes.

Question. And you so expressed your opinion in conversations with the President and Chief of Naval Operations?

Answer. I did not definitely recommend that the Fleet be withdrawn at the time of my conversation, because I wanted to get some training in. I accepted the situation but pointed out the dangers that existed so long as the Fleet was in Pearl Harbor.

Question. Did you at any time make any recommendations as to the withdrawal of the battleships and carriers or battleships alone from Pearl Harbor?

[*7083*] Answer. Not that I recall.

I just wanted to ask you, Admiral, whether today you regard that as an accurate statement of the situation as thus discussed and reported?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, I want to call your attention to exhibit 37, page 1, a dispatch from OPN to "All naval districts." You are familiar with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me read it:

Personnel of your naval intelligence service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

Do you agree with the statement thus made, that Saturdays and Sundays and holidays were days of more probable attack than other days of the week by Axis Powers?

Admiral KIMMEL. I want to say first that I never saw this dispatch until after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In fact, I never saw it until I came to Washington. The dispatch is addressed to the commandant of the naval districts. It was never sent to me. I have no recollection of ever having [*7084*] been warned by any agency that Saturdays and Sundays were a time of particular danger for a surprise attack.

However, I was familiar with, in general, with the activities of the Axis Powers; but I didn't then consider that Saturday and Sunday were particularly a time when the Axis would choose for such a surprise attack, and I am not convinced even today that such a time was any more than a coincidence.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it discussed at any time between you and the members of your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not to my recollection. I have no recollection of ever having discussed that with members of my staff, or anybody else.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me call your attention to exhibit 16, which purports to be a memorandum for the President, dated November 5, 1941, from Stark and Marshall, which memorandum came to you by letter on November 14, 1941, as shown in the record as exhibit 106. You are generally familiar with what I am talking about?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me read an excerpt from page 2:

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. [7085] In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing all naval vessels. * * *

There is a notation at the bottom of the page that there was inserted after the word "all" the word "practically," so that it should read:

* * * practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the battle of the Atlantic in the near future.
The only existing plans. * * *

Here there is a notation at the foot of the page "two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word 'current' substituted," so that it would read:

The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies.

You received that communication?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You agree with the statement of fact [7086] therein contained?

Admiral KIMMEL. With the statement of fact? I don't understand you, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will put it differently. Have you any comment to make upon that language as to whether you agree with it or not? Let me carry it through——

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't quite understand the question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The statement is made that the U. S. Fleet is inferior to the Japanese Fleet. Do you agree with that?

Admiral KIMMELL. That was correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The statement is made that to enable you to do so you would have to withdraw strength from the Atlantic.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That such an offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage. Do you agree with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That the result of such withdrawal might [7087] well cause the United Kingdom to meet with disaster. Do you agree with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a matter of opinion. I think it was perhaps accurate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that the current plans for war against Japan were to conduct a defensive war in cooperation with the British and Dutch for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was correct insofar as I knew it, so far as any facts were available to me.

[7088] Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, we discussed very briefly, yesterday, Admiral, the question of the report to you by Captain Layton

of your staff, with respect to the change in Japanese call signs on November 1.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall Captain Layton stating to you in connection with the communication intelligence summary of December 1, 1941, that the change in the Japanese call signs "indicated a progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale"?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall the exact language, but I have no doubt that language was used in the summary which was submitted to me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And do you recall that at the time he submitted it to you with his communication intelligence summary that you underlined the sentence I have quoted in red pencil?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't recall whether I underlined that myself, or whether Captain Layton underlined it. It was a phrase that would and should have been called to my attention, and I have no doubt it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And it was a practice when particular words were called to your attention for you to underline them?

[*7089*] Admiral KIMMEL. A practice for me to underline them?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. If something struck my mind as being of particular importance, I might underline it. I think it is equally possible that Captain Layton himself underlined it. I don't quite get the significance or importance of whether I underlined it or whether Captain Layton underlined it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, there wouldn't be, Admiral, any particular distinction if the underlining was done when you two were conferring about it. What I am more interested in is what the significance was of underlining it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I would say that the significance of underlining it was that that was probably the most important part of that particular communication, and either I underlined it to get the significance when I was rereading it, or Captain Layton underlined it before he brought it to me, or he may have underlined it after I had completed my conversation. That I can't say now to save my life.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, we discussed yesterday also briefly what I clumsily referred to as the lost carrier fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. One of your staff was Vice Admiral [*7090*] McMorris?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He was a captain then?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was a captain in charge of the war plans section of my staff. He had several very able officers assisting him in that section.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Have you read his testimony in the Hewitt investigation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't now recall whether I have read his testimony in the Hewitt investigation or not. I have read a great deal of his testimony.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, I want to call your attention to this language:

Taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand, we were extremely disturbed.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You would agree with that conclusion on his part?

Admiral KIMMEL. We were disturbed; certainly we were disturbed, not only on November 27 and succeeding days, but disturbed—I was disturbed all the time I was in command of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, but, Admiral, this discussion of Admiral McMorris had reference to the particular report to [*7091*] you by Layton with respect to the lost fleet around the 1st of December, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to state that unless I read his testimony. If you say he was referring to that, I presume he was.

Senator LUCAS. Will counsel tell me what he is reading from?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have tried to the best of my ability to set forth just what I knew, and just what significance I attached to these traffic analysis reports.

I have tried to indicate that so far as I was concerned there was no lost fleet. There were ships and types of ships which we were unable to identify, and we had no reason to suspect that there was a lost fleet containing the six carriers any more than we had reason to say there was a lost fleet containing, we will say, 75 percent, or 80 percent of Japanese naval forces.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If the fleet that we speak of as a lost fleet was still in home waters in Japan, or in the China Sea, it would not be as important to you as though that fleet was in the neighborhood of Hawaii, would it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I read now from page 321 of the Hewitt report, statement by Vice Admiral McMorris:

[*7092*] Mr. SONNETT. Well, I take it, Admiral you recall no specific discussion of the lack of information concerning carrier divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese fleet on or about December 1, 1941, and prior to the attack?

Vice Admiral MCMORRIS. I do not so recall, but I do recall that during this general period the information as to the locations of Japanese fleet units was far from as specific as desired. But I do not recall that lack of information. Taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand, we were extremely disturbed.

Admiral KIMMEL. Extremely disturbed?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you extremely disturbed at that time about the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I wanted to know where the Japanese carriers were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you extremely disturbed about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I won't say I was extremely disturbed. Had I been extremely disturbed in it, I would have—might have deduced that they were headed by Hawaii. Is that what you are trying to drive at? I was not disturbed to that extent, and neither was Captain McMorris, as shown by his testimony before numerous other boards.

I am unable to interpret Captain McMorris' testimony [*7093*] as to exactly what he meant. I am quite sure that Captain McMorris will be able to speak for himself, and I understand he is on the list of witnesses to be called here.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral, let me read you further from page 363.

Admiral KIMMEL. Does that answer your question?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think so. Let me read this to you further from page 363 of the Hewitt report, answers given by Vice Admiral Smith, who was also on your staff.

Admiral HEWITT. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Referring now to the whereabouts of the lost carrier fleet, as I put it:

Mr. SONNETT. Does——

I guess I will read the preceding question.

Senator BREWSTER. Give the page each time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I did. 363.

Vice Admiral SMITH. Now, I see nothing very alarming in those dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy, right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the second fleet, he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercises maintain radio silence. We had a very large force, almost [*7094*] half of the Pacific Fleet in May 1941 proceeded to the Atlantic, and no traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks, so the absence of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.

Mr. SONNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?

Vice Admiral SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea.

Do you agree with that conclusion?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not entirely. They may have been at sea. They may have been in port. The only thing we knew was that we were receiving a great deal of traffic. We knew a great deal of traffic was being exchanged, and we were unable to identify it.

Now, Admiral Smith's testimony and Admiral McMorris' testimony was given without benefit of recent examination of the daily summaries which were submitted to me, and which they themselves saw at the time, and the best answer to their impressions and their testimony here is that during all of this period prior to December 7, never once did any of them suggest to me that the carriers might be on the way to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you know, Admiral, anything about at the time, a conference of destroyer commanders conducted [*7095*] by Admiral Bloch following the receipt of the warning message of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall whether I knew of any such conference prior to December 7. It would have been a natural thing for him to do, and when he spoke of his destroyer commanders, he spoke of those destroyers which were assigned to him for use in the defensive sea area.

It would have been a perfectly proper thing for him to do, particularly in view of my order to exercise extreme diligence in the operating areas against submarines and to bomb all suspjected submarines contacted.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If he, in his conference, warned his destroyer commanders following the warning message of November 27 that something might happen and they should be on the alert that in your opinion was precisely what he should have done?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, yes. I tried to warn them myself, and I tried to warn them in positive language.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you recall, Admiral, that he reported to you what he had told his destroyer commanders?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall that he told me anything about it. There was no reason why he should. I [*7096*] would assume that he had done some such thing. I had a right to assume so.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever, following the receipt of the warning message of November 27, ever advise the Chief of Naval Operations that you had decided not to operate any long-distance reconnaissance, but intended to concentrate on your training program?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Chief of Naval Operations was informed in correspondence the means available for long-distance air reconnaissance in Pearl Harbor, that we were unable to maintain a reconnaissance for more than a short time, that in order to have a reconnaissance, we had to know within narrow time limits, the time of attack, and we had no means in Hawaii to make that reconnaissance over indefinite periods.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you were in effect, through the disposition of your task forces, maintaining in effect, such a reconnaissance in the west and southwest sectors of Oahu; were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, we were; and we did that incidental—not incidental, it was a factor which was considered in this situation, and we took advantage of everything we could to make a reconnaissance.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But you did not detail a single patrol [*7097*] plane to make any kind of reconnaissance in the entire north and northwest sector from Oahu either on December 6 or December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Admiral, would it have been practicable for you to have detailed either destroyers or submarines for the purpose of maintaining a distant patrol in any of those sectors?

Admiral KIMMEL. The naval court of inquiry went into that question very throroughly. To maintain an effective reconnaissance by surface vessels or by submarines—the use of surface vessels for such a purpose was, to my mind, highly inadvisable. We had no unimportant units out there which we could afford to sacrifice for that purpose. You will find in the record that we tried to get a bunch of vessels which might have been useful for such things. We were never able to get them.

The only thing we had were surface vessels which, in my mind, were far too valuable to put out on a wide arc and had they been put out there, they would have been destroyed in detail by the attacking force with never a chance. The submarines might have been used if I had had submarines available to do it with.

At the time of Pearl Harbor and immediately preceding [*7098*] it, I had a patrol of submarines off Wake and Midway. We had not a sufficient number of submarines to maintain more than patrol. I mean a sufficient number available for operation at that time.

In about the early days of November, or it may have been the latter part of October, it was decided, with my approval and the approval

of the Navy Department, to send a large number of submarines to the west coast ports in order to have installed a distilling apparatus. We found that the time the submarine could stay at sea was dependent upon the amount of fresh water they had available, and by putting in an improved distilling plant, they were able to increase the time by something like 50 to 75 percent.

And they were balancing then the supply of water against the supply of fuel oil and other things which enabled them to remain at sea.

For that reason a large part of the submarines which were attached to the Pacific Fleet proper were in the west coast ports at that time, and I recall specifically that Admiral Withers, who was examined before the naval court, had told me he was having great difficulty in maintaining the patrol of these four submarines off Midway and Wake and the reliefs for them.

You will also be interested to know that in the, oh, [*7099*] within 2 or 3 months preceding Pearl Harbor, we had sent successive detachments of submarines to the Asiatic Fleet, where we believed they could be of more use because they were closer to the Japanese homeland. Therefore we had very few submarines available at this time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many did you have?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection of the figures is that there were four, on patrol off Midway and we had either four or five in Pearl Harbor being held there, who had recently returned from Midway, and were having a rest and recreation period and getting ready to go out and relieve these fellows at Midway.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The patrol of submarines at Midway and the outlying islands was at your order?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You removed them from the Hawaiian area and sent them on to the Midway area?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You could have brought them home any time you wanted to?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; any time I considered it desirable to do so, but I did not consider it desirable to do so, and I think they were performing very useful service off Midway and Wake.

[*7100*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Is it your position, Admiral, here, that you were instructed by the Navy Department to continue your training programs?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made no such statement. I made the statement that the Navy Department knew throughout the year that I was continuing the training program and that when in their opinion, with all of the information they had here—I thought the least they could do was to give me a definite time, either by supplying me with all of the information, or by giving me orders.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well——

Admiral KIMMEL. I repeated and I repeat again, that what we needed was information or orders, and what I wanted to determine above everything else was when to stop the training program, and when to go on all-out security measures.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And did you ever send a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations asking that question?

Admiral KIMMEL. I gave it in language which I am unable to improve upon to this day in my letter of May 26 and I believe in terms which cannot be misunderstood by any human being.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, let's change our question.

Did you ever ask Naval Operations in Washington after November 1, 1941, whether you should continue your training [*7101*] program, or whether you should go on an all-out defense of Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I didn't ask them that question; but I would like to invite your attention to a statement I made at page 35 of the paper which I read before the committee the other day.

Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he did not intend that the Pacific Fleet should discontinue its training program upon receipt of this dispatch, two weeks before the attack.

That is on November 24—was the dispatch referred to.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But, Admiral, you didn't know that before the attack, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Didn't know that Admiral Stark felt that way?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew it in every way that I could deduce it from the dispatches that I had received.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it a serious question that you had to consider and decide, whether you would continue the training program or concentrate on Hawaiian defense?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a serious decision to make to stop all training and to go to all-out security measures. I never conceded that the Pacific Fleet was placed in [*7102*] Hawaii to defend the base at Hawaii. I thought the Pacific Fleet was there, I still think the Pacific Fleet was there to conduct offensive operations, and by offensive operations to afford a measure of security for the fleet—for the base, I mean.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Don't you think it is unusual, Admiral, if you had such a serious decision to make in November 1941, that you didn't ask the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, in an appropriate way, for his up-to-date conclusions on this very important question?

Admiral KIMMEL. From his dispatches and from his letters to me I felt I would get nothing more than he had already given me, and in his letter of November 25, which came to me on December 3, you will see the language which was quoted there.

[*7103*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well now, Admiral, referring again to the so-called war warning message of November 27, what did you do with respect to the defense of Pearl Harbor and Hawaii after November 27, in response to that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I have set that forth in the statement there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In other words, the statement you have made in your statement is your answer to that question?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You refer at one place in your statement to your desire to see the actual decoded messages which were being received in Washington.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you take the position here that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to send to commanders in the field

the precise documents by way of information that came in to the office at Washington or their compiled judgment of what those dispatches mean?

Admiral KIMMEL. I felt that the commander in chief of the United States Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, which positions I occupied at the time, were entitled to every scrap of information they had in Washington, and how or in what form that information was supplied to me, or supplied to the commander in chief, I think is unimportant, [7104] it is whether or not the information was supplied.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you think, Admiral, that there should have been sent to you the specific dispatches themselves?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't care whether they were sent by dispatches, by letter, by courier, or by any other means that they wanted to send them. I felt that in order to get—I will say this today that I feel that in order to get the meaning out of dispatches, referring particularly to Pearl Harbor and to the Pacific situation, it would have been very much better to give me the text of the dispatch. That I didn't at any time in this statement intend to insist upon. What I did intend to insist upon was that I was entitled to all the information, whether in summarized form, all the essential information which had to do with the Pacific situation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you understand, Admiral——

Admiral KIMMEL. And I thought I was getting all that information.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you understand, Admiral, as to the scope of the interception of messages that was being conducted by the Intelligence stationed at Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew that the Intelligence stationed at Hawaii was detailed primarily and almost exclusively on what we have termed traffic analysis, that all of their [7105] resources were devoted to that end. When they got a message, such as this light message, as I think it has been referred to, where they talked about burning the flares, and lights in the windows, and things of that kind, they undertook to decode that more as a matter of interest and exercise, with entirely inadequate facilities for decoding it. They had no facilities for decoding it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it was your understanding that at no time were they in position to intercept and decode these messages that were referred to here as magic?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Incidentally, I think, in regard to this light message, I think you will find some testimony before the Hewitt Board, Hewitt Board of Investigation, that that light message was in fact decoded and translated in an understandable form by 1 o'clock on December 6, 1941, and that that was here in the Navy Department at that time. That type message that these young fellows out in Howaii were doing their best to break and which they were unable to break until, I understand, they got some tips from the Japanese Consulate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you consider, Admiral, to have been the significance of the so-called Mori message?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know. I never heard a thing about that. Never knew any such message existed until after [7106] the

attack was over. I recently saw in the newspapers, if you want me to tell you what I saw in the newspapers ——

Mr. RICHARDSON. No; if you didn't see it before the attack I am not interested in it.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, on page 67 of your statement you advanced the idea that if you were conducting a partial patrol confined to a single sector, that would immediately become known to Japan and completely neutralize the advantage of such patrol in that sector.

Now, if I correctly interpret your position in that regard, then it would necessarily follow, would it not, Admiral, that this reconnaissance that was being conducted in the west and southwest sector would make it pretty certain that no Japanese attack would come from that sector under that reconnaissance, wouldn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that the form of reconnaissance that we conducted in the west and southwest sector from the airplane carriers and from planes operating from Midway and Johnston and from Wake, was much less liable to be known in Japan than any search conducted by planes based on Oahu.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, there would be no possible way, would there, except through Japanese espionage in Hawaii, of Japan knowing about a patrol in the north section?

[*7107*] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Japanese espionage in Hawaii would have been able to determine about the north sector. What I am talking about is that planes taking off from carriers at sea and planes taking off from Midway and Wake and Johnston, the knowledge of that would have been much less liable to get into Japanese hands than anything which originated on Oahu and, according to the northern sector, it would have to come from Oahu.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, I have just a question or two, Admiral.

Admiral, isn't it fair to state that the information contained in the war warning message of November 27 was a fair compilation of the general, specific information which had been given to you in the two or three preceding messages in late October and November? Isn't it in effect a summarized compilation of the information you had in the messages which immediately preceded it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a summarized compilation, but it was more definite and more restrictive than the previous messages were.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now ——

Admiral KIMMEL. It indicated not an attack in any direction but an attack in one of, I think it was, four specified directions.

[*7108*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you ever in all of your experience as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet ever see another dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which was designated a war warning in words?

Admiral KIMMEL. My answer to that—I have prepared a little memorandum here because I thought something like this might come up.

On July 3, 1941, I received the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations in which it was stated that the Japanese Fleet was so deployed that it was capable of movement either north or south, that a definitive move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 20–August 1.

On July 25 I received another dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations in which the Chief of Staff joined. This told me of the economic sanctions that the United States was about to impose and continue. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff "do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities."

In the letters of the Chief of Naval Operations to me there appear the following which I detailed on page 33 of my statement and which I repeat:

What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess.

[*7109*] (Memorandum of May 14, 1941.)

An open rupture was described as a possibility on July 24, 1941.

Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual.

(July 31, 1941.)

Also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate.

(August 21, 1941.)

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.

(August 28, 1941.)

I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse.

(September 23, 1941.)

My reaction, and the reaction of all of the people, insofar as they communicated their feelings to me, was that this term "this is a war warning" added little, if anything, to the message of November 27. "This is a war warning," merely, "This is to be considered a war warning" merely characterized the information which it contained and the information which [*7110*] it contained was the thing that we considered most. I had never heard the term used in naval parlance before "This is to be considered a war warning." I considered all the messages—not all—but a great many of the messages that I received during the years as war warnings, and the addition of these five letters which are now pointed to as a cure-all for every deficiency that might have accrued to Washington in this matter, did not have any such effect on me, nor did it have any such effect on any of my associates in Pearl Harbor.

[*7111*] Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, your answer to my question as to whether you ever saw another message from the Chief of Naval Operations stating that the message was a war warning in those words, your answer would be "No"?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. I not only never saw that before in any corespondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, I never saw it in all my naval experience.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And did it occur to you, since it was such an extraordinary term, that you might inquire from the Chief of Naval Operations what he meant by using it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is just the trouble. I did not consider it an extraordinary term.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, one further question, Admiral. In your statement in a number of cases you refer to information from Washington.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you detail just what you meant by "Washington" for us? Did you mean the Chief of Naval Operations or the Secretary of the Navy or State or War or the President or who?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I was concerned in my official capacity I referred to the Navy Department. I used the term "Washington" to include by implication, if you will, the fact that the War Department, in my humble opinion, had just [*7112*] as much responsibility for notifying General Short of activities that might affect Hawaii in any degree as the Navy Department had in notifying me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, then, in fact your reference to Washington meant any of the high command at Washington who were in a position to give you information either through your Navy Department or through the War Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. I looked to the Navy Department for my information. I took all the information I could get either from the Navy Department or from the War Department and I considered every bit of this information, and in that connection I considered the information in General Short's messages from General Marshall and I noted on the 29th that the orders that were given to General Short by General Marshall in Hawaii were also given in almost exactly the same terms to the western defense command, which indicated that General Marshall must have considered the western defense command in as much danger of attack as he considered Hawaii.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, right along that line, Admiral, a question occurs to me that I have overlooked. If the message of November 27 or its equivalent went to all of our naval commands on our west coast—Puget Sound, San Pedro, and whatever others there are there, should there have been, in your opinion, any different interpretation placed upon that [*7113*] dispatch by those posts than you were entitled to place on it in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection of that, the addressees for that message——

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am referring to the message of the 27th. Who would that message go to, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. This message went from the Chief of Naval Operations to action of commander in chief, Asiatic, and commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. It went for information to the commander in chief, Atlantic, and to special naval observers. That did not go to all the other naval commands. Those were the ones that that message of November 27 was confined to, and Admiral Hart in the Asiatic was faced with a considerably different situation from the one I had in Hawaii and that was meant to cover both.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If counsel will permit, I think it is shown that the parallel War Department message went to these commanders to whom you have referred.

Mr. Richardson. That will be brought out.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir. That is what I was referring to a moment ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, one final question, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. The message to which I referred a few minutes ago was from the Chief of Naval Operations to com- [*7114*] mander, Pacific Northern and Pacific—to the two commandants on the west coast as I understand it here.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would include Panama?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. Pacific northern coastal frontier and Pacific southern coastal frontier, naval coastal frontier. That is where this message went to and it was for information of CinCPac and Commander Pacific naval coastal frontier.

Now, in the text of the message it says, "Army has sent following to Commander, Western Defense Command," and this was the message which was sent to me for information.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any indication that the message went to Panama?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; information Pacific naval coastal frontier—Panama naval coastal frontier, I guess that is what that is. They have got these abbreviations which I am a little bit rusty on right now.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, a final question, Admiral. You will agree, will you not, with reference to this Pearl Harbor attack question that we have been discussing, that if the information which you had and those deductions which you as a skilled naval commander should have made warned you of the immediate danger of an attack at Pearl Harbor, that no amount of negligence at Washington should have prevented you from offering all the defense you could?

[*7115*] Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly, if I had had anything which indicated to me the probability of an attack on Hawaii then there would not have been any trouble about what I did out there in Hawaii. The messages which came to me, and particularly this message of November 27, were carefully gone over, not only by me but by a great many intelligent people and they got the same meaning out of it that I did. Now, when a number of people of the intelligence of members of my staff and my principal task force commanders who saw these messages and this particular message, too, and had seen everything else that I had gotten, including my correspondence with Admiral Stark, when they did not get the meaning out of it then there must have been something the matter with the message and the people who originated the message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, over and above those messages and the meaning of those messages it is your contention, is it not, Admiral, that you did not have enough information available to you to warrant you in doing otherwise than you did?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the hearing began the committee adopted the procedure by which questions from the committee would alternate from the center toward each end. If it is [*7116*] agreeable to the committee, the Chair would like to reverse that procedure during the remainder of the examination of Admiral Kimmel and give the end man of this group a break by beginning at the end and going toward the center. Is there any objection to that?

Mr. MURPHY. I object to that, Mr. Chairman. I do not think that there should be any variance on any particular witness. Having adopted a procedure, I do not think there should be any change as to one of the most important witnesses that is before us.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, if there is objection, the Chair will not do it.

The Chair wishes to say that on account of his necessary absence yesterday and his inability to hear the testimony given by Admiral Kimmel on the examination by counsel, he asks that he may be passed until he can look over the testimony so that he will not in his questioning duplicate what has already been brought out. Therefore Congressman Cooper, of Tennessee, will be recognized.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is the plan to continue to 12:30, is it?

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter for the committee. We decided while the two Houses were not in session that we would go to 12:30. There will be no legislation today, I suppose, [7117] in the Senate. I don't know about the House. There may be some bills introduced and speeches, but it will probably be a relief to the committee to be in session while they are made.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, as the chairman is the only gentleman who has had the privilege of making a speech in the Senate since we have reconvened, I appreciate his modesty, but I think——

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator calls what I said the other day a speech, I would like to have a description of one of them that I really do make.

Senator BREWSTER. From certain questions which were raised on the Chairman's side of the Senate the other day about very important matters that one of the Senators who is usually regular wished to bring up, I would be glad if I could be present there to see just what he has in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. The only question brought up the other day was whether bills and resolutions should be introduced prior to the President's message, and I rather indicated that, if the President's message was not ready by today, that we would take the halter off and let Senators introduce bills and resolutions, but so far as I know, there is no legislative business.

Senator BREWSTER. I refer more specifically to Senator [7118] Green of Rhode Island, who indicated that he had a matter of great importance to bring up. I would like to know what it is.

The CHAIRMAN. The matter of great importance was a resolution which he proposes to introduce along with Senator Smith, of New Jersey, authorizing the appointment of a committee to look into the question of a Presidential successor. There will be no action taken on it. He just wanted to introduce it.

Senator LUCAS. I think the Senator from Maine is about ready to make a speech on the floor of the Senate. I think the chairman ought to withdraw the remark.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, whatever the committee wants to do about going on after 12 is all right.

Senator BREWSTER. Without indicating any agreement with the Senator from Illinois, because I do not think I have made many speeches and I haven't any in mind today, but I do think that we could make an exception on this particular day in view of the discussion, and I would appreciate it if you would. I felt from what the chairman said the other day on the floor about going forward today if the Presidential message was not received. I appreciate the supe-

rior knowledge in possession of the chairman as majority leader to determine it, but I would personally be glad to have the opportunity of going on the floor at 12 o'clock today to see what goes on.

[*7119*] The CHAIRMAN. We might as well then, under the circumstances, agree to adjourn today at 12. That is not a precedent that we will set, however.

Senator BREWSTER. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I desire to inquire briefly. Admiral Kimmel, you served in the Navy more than 40 years?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor you were one of the senior officers of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Very few were senior to you in length of service in the Navy at that time, were there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, yes; I think that is a fair statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And on December 7, 1941, you held one of the most important commands in the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You received considerable communications from the Navy Department during the period of time that you were in command of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did.

[*7120*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. There has been presented to the committee a compilation including letters of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel to and from each other. The pages of this compilation are not numbered but according to my count there are 241 pages in this exhibit No. 106.

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume that may be correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Which is copies of communications from Admiral Stark to you and from you to Admiral Stark.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That would certainly show that there was a considerable volume of correspondence between you two gentlemen?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There has also been presented as exhibit 37 in this hearing a document showing basic exhibits of dispatches of the Navy Department. Those pages are numbered and show that some 46 pages are included here. An examination of that document also shows that many of those dispatches went to you as commander of the Pacific Fleet. That would also indicate, wouldn't it, that the correspondence and dispatches from the Navy Department to you and from you back to the Navy Department was quite voluminous during the period of time that you were in command of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I might add that that is only a part of [*7121*] the correspondence, of the total correspondence. It includes substantially all the so-called personal correspondence, which was really official, but in addition to that there was a great deal of official correspondence which has not been presented to the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that, then, it is true that there was a great volume of correspondence and dispatches passing between the Navy Department and you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Undoubtedly. Yes, sir; that is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You also kept informed from all sources available to you as to the situation existing between this country and Japan, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did, indeed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you consider war with Japan as inevitable?

Admiral KIMMEL. Beginning when?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At any time in your life have you considered war with Japan inevitable?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the few months before Pearl Harbor I thought was with Japan was highly probable. At no time did I reach the final conclusion that war was inevitable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then your answer is that you never did at any time consider war between the United States and Japan as inevitable?

[*7122*] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I thought it highly probable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, when did you reach the conclusion that it was highly probable?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I should say by the time I became commander in chief.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was in February of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From that time on you considered that war between the United States and Japan was probable?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Or did you say highly probable, which?

Admiral KIMMEL. Maybe I said highly probable, yes; highly probable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you ever consider that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made estimates of the situation from time to time. Had I considered that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent at any time my course of action would have been considerably different from what it was. I set out from the time I became commander in chief to do everything within my power to make Pearl Harbor secure against a Japanese attack. I felt it was the part of prudence, it was our most important base in the Pacific outside the continental United States, but [*7123*] I have testified here, I put into my statement that I did not consider an attack on Hawaii any more than a remote possibility at the time that it came and that I had to make a choice of how I was going to employ my forces.

Does that answer your question, sir?

[*7124*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I would like you to be a little more specific as to whether you at any time considered or were definite in your own mind that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought it was a possibility. I at no time considered that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent, if that is what you mean.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You never did at any time consider that an attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor was imminent?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You considered that an attack on Pearl Harbor might be possible, but you did not at any time think it was probable?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. In a campaign, and the ups and downs of a campaign my opinion on the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor might very well have changed considerably. I was looking forward in all of my efforts to any and all eventualities and under all of these eventualities to be able to hold Pearl Harbor, to hold the Hawaiian Islands.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But, if I understand you correctly—and I want to try to understand you——

Admiral KIMMEL. I want you to understand me, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is my whole purpose in asking you these questions. My only purpose in serving on this committee is to try to find the truth about Pearl Harbor.

[*7125*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and I hope you get it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were one of the head men there.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and I will give you everything I know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think you ought to be in a position to tell us considerable about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then I would like to know, if it is appropriate, as to whether you at any time thought Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Prior to December 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Then of course the attack that did come on December 7 came as a great surprise to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I was surprised when it came. I did not think it was coming.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then having reached the conclusion that the war was highly probable between the United States and Japan, where did you think the first attack would probably come?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I have stated that in my statement. I expected the attack, any attack that eventuated after [*7126*] November 27, to be confined to the Far East.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. For the purpose of assisting, I would like to have the reporter mark the passage where Admiral Kimmel spoke about taking every possible step for the security of Pearl Harbor as either the present examiner or others I am sure will want to refer to that. Perhaps the reporter can already locate it now, the statement he made a few questions back about taking every possible step for the security of Pearl Harbor.

Do you recall the answer?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I recall the answer.

Senator BREWSTER. I would just like to have it marked, that is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I hope the reporter will please note that. I did not consider it exactly responsive to the question I was then asking and that is the reason I did not pursue it further. I might ask some other questions about it.

Senator BREWSTER. It varies, as I understood it, with what previously has been said with respect to the respective responsibilities. That is why I thought it was significant and it ought, at any rate, to be noted in the record, and I shall want to ask about it. I will ask the reporter to note [*7127*] that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Along the line of the question I asked before the Senator from Maine intervened, I understood you to say, Admiral, that you considered that if war did come between the United States and Japan, that Japan would probably first attack in the Far East. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. As nearly as I can recollect my feelings at that time, I was not at all sure that Japan was going to attack the United States when it did. The information that I had indicated to me, and to my associates, that the war would probably—that Japan's next move would be to go into Thailand, and that it was by no means certain that they were going to attack the United States. I do not mind saying that one of the reasons why I felt Japan was not going to attack the United States was because it was national suicide for them to do so. I never at any time wavered in my belief as to that, not even immediately after Pearl Harbor; I had no doubts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "immediately after Pearl Harbor you had no doubts?" As to what?

Admiral KIMMEL. That Japan was going to be wiped off the map before the end of the thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now I did not know of the Japanese [*7128*] "mad dog" attitude, as I have heard some people express it, that they were of a state of mind where they were going to strike out regardless of how much they got hurt, or how much they hurt anybody else.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In other words, you thought they would have too much common sense to attack the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, at least in that respect I think you and Admiral Stark are in agreement.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe it was Admiral Stark who expressed in somewhat those words that he gave them credit for having too much common sense.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To jump on the United States.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your view of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never disassociated myself from that view, and I could not conceive—well, I never have understood why they were so lacking in—well, common sense; yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But having reached the conclusion in your mind that war with Japan was highly probable, if that did occur, why—it had to start somewhere—didn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, it had become highly [*7129*] probable, I mean that I had reached that conclusion due to the information which I had received as to their actions. But even "highly

probable" does not mean inevitable, and I thought there would be and there should be forces in Japan which would be able to see this thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, had not there been more or less a general feeling, admiral, in the Navy for many years that it was probable there would sometime be war between Japan and the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, yes; there had been a good many people in the service who felt that war with Japan and the United States would come. It started back in my earliest recollection of this when Mr. Hobson back in about 1904 indicated that, and various writings in all the years since then indicated it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you one of those in the Navy that entertained the view that war between Japan and the United States was sometime probable?

Admiral KIMMEL. Was sometime probable, you say?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Probable, yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never reached the stage where I thought war with Japan was inevitable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, did you think war was going to occur between Japan and the United States?

[*7130*] Admiral KIMMEL. I thought there was a very good chance of it, as I told you before here.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. Eventually. What I wanted to know above everything else was when it was going to start.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am satisfied many people would have liked to have known that. They did not send out any message as to when it was going to start, did they?

Admiral KIMMEL. Pretty nearly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And based on that, why, the Navy Department issued you an order, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Based on that information which you say was pretty nearly a notice, the Navy Department issued you an order?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they issued me certain information and certain advice.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did not they issue you a direct order, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. The only direct order in the message which I received was this "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL–46," and I carried out that order to the best of my ability.

[*7131*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have issued and received many orders during your service in the Navy, haven't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you regard the dispatch you received on November 27, 1941, as an order from the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. The part "execute an appropriate defensive deployment," certainly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I executed it in a way that I thought would best meet the situation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I had one more question I wanted to ask back along the line of inquiry I was making before going to that message that we have just referred to.

You stated here yesterday that you considered that the best minds of the Navy were at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I consider there were no better minds in our Navy, or any other navy, than at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did any of those best minds expect an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, they did not—not at the time it came.

[*7132*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, did they expect an attack on Pearl Harbor at any time, as far as you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not like to speak for a body of men like that, but insofar as they expressed their views to me, I think they shared my views fairly completely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were in command of all of them?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And none of them ever expressed any view to you that indicated they expected an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now you were asked some questions about——

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). At the time it came, I am talking about.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did anybody expect an attack on Pearl Harbor at any time, as far as you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not at any definite time; no. They shared with me the idea we should be prepared for eventualities out there, and the situation might change and it might develop into a time when we could expect an attack on Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But up until December 7, 1941, you and none of the other so-called best minds stationed at Pearl Harbor expected an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now you were asked some questions about conversation between you and Captain Zacharias.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was an officer under your command at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you stated that you did have a conversation with him in March of 1941, and you did not recall that he said anything to you about expecting an air attack on Pearl Harbor, is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I made such a statement as that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you have any conversation with him at any other time other than March 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not that I now recall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You had no other conversation with him at all, that you remember?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I cannot recall every conversation I had with every other officer in Pearl Harbor, but so far as I know, Captain Zacharias never expressed any idea that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent at any time to me. He may have expressed such sentiments, I do not know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, Admiral, you say that when [7134] you received the message of November 24, 1941, from the chief of naval operations you considered that with the senior officers of your command.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that all of them concurred with you in the view that there was not anything in that message to cause you to anticipate any trouble at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. To anticipate an attack on Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. An air attack on Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, any other kind of attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. You are talking about the message of November 24 and not the message of November 27 now? You said the 24th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I said I expect to ask you a few questions about both, but I now have before me the message of November 24, and to refresh the memory of both of us I will just read it.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, are you going to go on? We are a little past our hour now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon. We will suspend at this point to 2 o'clock, Admiral. Thank you for calling my attention to that.

(Whereupon, at 12:03 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[7135] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Nothing, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything you want to present before the examination is resumed?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I may have left the wrong impression in regard to these torpedoes by leaving the statements about these long vanes and large rudders, that putting these long vanes and large rudders was the only thing necessary to make these torpedoes run in shallow waters.

As I told you, I had never seen the torpedoes but during the noon recess Admiral Smith informs me that he did examine the torpedoes and, incidentally, Admiral Smith is an officer who has had a great deal of experience with torpedoes and understands them very well.

He said in addition to putting long and staunch vanes on and rudders on these torpedoes it was necessary to greatly strengthen the after bodies. That in our experiments in dropping torpedoes the trouble was that the shock of impact would [7136] break the torpedoes in two and, therefore, before these old torpedoes were suitable for dropping from an airplane they had to have their after bodies very greatly strengthened, practically rebuilt.

Also, the other factor in connection with it and probably the most difficult was to get a gyro. The gyro, as you know, was the agency by which the torpedo was kept on a straight course and this gyro had to be completely rebuilt and strengthened so that when a torpedo struck the water the gyro neither upset nor carried away completely, in either event making the torpedo entirely inoperative, and in justice to our own Navy Bureau of Ordnance I think that I should make that statement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, admiral, in commenting on it what difference would the depth of water have to do with the effect on the torpedo of dropping it to which you have referred? If it broke in two it would break by reason of striking on the surface of the water, wouldn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, would it make any difference whether the water was 40 feet or 80 feet deep?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there is something in that, but to make these torpedoes effective to drop them from airplanes all these things had to be done and these old torpedoes, modernizing them to make them suitable for dropping from airplanes, was [7137] not merely a question of putting more vanes on them. That is the point that I was trying to make.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement on that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all I have, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, this morning I asked you a few questions about your conversation with Captain Zacharias. At that time I did not have before me the photostatic copies of certain documents that have been presented here to the committee with respect to Captain Zacharias, and at the conclusion of the morning session counsel handed me this copy which is the only one before the committee. It is headed, "Notes, correspondence and reports relating to Pearl Harbor and events leading up to it," and quite a number of items are listed on the front page, but I will pass on down to an item appearing about the middle of this page, which I will read to you:

March 1941: Conversation with Admiral Kimmel, CinCPac—

that was you—

and his Chief of Staff, Captain W. W. Smith, U. S. N.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Regarding Nomura, notifying of surprise attack on our fleet by Japanese in case hostilities eventuate. De- [7138] tails of this conversation are covered in a personal and confidential memo to Chief of Staff, to CinCPac, Rear Admiral Milo Draemel, U. S. N., for presentation to CinCPac (Admiral Nimitz) and dated March 17, 1942, copy attached.

Then I turn over to this copy to which he refers in that note. I will not take time to read all of it but in the fourth paragraph of this headed, "Personal and confidential memorandum for Admiral Draemel, March 17, 1942," I read you as follows:

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them of the exact events to take place on 7 December not only as to what would happen but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battleships and they got five.

Do you recall any such statement as that, or any information of that nature given you by Captain Zacharias?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there is very little I can add to my previous testimony on that subject. In the past few days I heard of this memorandum and I had read that memorandum before I testified before this committee and if you want me to clarify any of my previous statements I will be pleased to do so, but I am willing to let it stand as it is.

[*7139*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, in questions asked you by counsel and those which I asked you you stated that you did not remember——

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (continuing). Any conversation with Captain Zacharias along this line.

Admiral KIMMEL. I remembered a conversation with Captain Zacharias.

[*7140*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. But I have now tried to refresh your memory.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If it is worth anything in that respect.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. By reading you what appears in this memorandum prepared by him, which has been presented to this committee for whatever it may be worth.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I am now asking you whether he said to you what he states there, or anything like that.

Admiral KIMMEL. He did not. And furthermore, I would have paid very little attention to any man who told me in March of 1941 that an attack was going to occur on the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I might say, Admiral, that certain members of the committee requested that Captain Zacharias' name be added to the list of witnesses to appear here.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would be very glad to have you hear him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I was not one of those that made the request, but the request was made.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

[*7141*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. However, that was a long time before this thing even came to our attention.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to invite attention to one thing. The date of his memorandum was nearly a year after his purported conversation with me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think that is correct. I think his memorandum is dated March 17, 1942. But my purpose in asking you and inviting your attention to it was I wanted you, if you felt prepared to do so, to give a direct answer as to whether that was said to you or not.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thank you very much, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, Admiral, just before the noon recess I was in the act of asking you some questions about the message of November 24, 1941, that was addressed to you along with several other responsible naval officials.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you received the message?
Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I received the message.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. This message states:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

That is a definite statement, isn't it?
Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. You had no doubt that that was the fact?
[7142] Admiral KIMMEL. Very doubtful.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. I say, you have no doubt that I stated the fact?
Admiral KIMMEL. I believed it, if that is what you mean.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. You believed that anyhow before you received this, did you not?
Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I should say that is true.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. And at least that stated a clear statement of fact of the Navy Department to you?
Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.
The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movement their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction—

now that states a definite fact?
Admiral KIMMEL. "In any direction," yes, that is what it says.
The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

A surprise aggressive movement in any direction.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a very definite statement of fact?
Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then following that:

Including [7143] attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform Senior Army Officers their areas.

That was a definite statement and request?
Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to invite your attention to the fact that the "surprise aggressive movement in any direction" is somewhat qualified by the statement "including an attack on Philippines or Guam."
[7144] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, Admiral, after all that is a question of construction.
Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is a question of your construction; it is a question of the construction of the Navy Department?
Admiral KIMMEL. But nevertheless, it is there.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it is a question of construction that I or anybody else might give to it?
Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. But the words are there?
Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. The words are there.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right——
Admiral KIMMEL. "Including an attack on Philippines or Guam" is also there.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. If I say I am going to take a trip to my home, including a visit to one or two other points, the fact that

I include a reference to one or two other points does not change the fact that I said I am going home, does it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I suppose not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. But in this case, "surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philip- [*7145*] pines or Guam," you are entitled to your own opinion, sir, and I do not want to change that, but when you say "including the Philippines or Guam," it seems to limit the ideas of the man who is sending it to the vicinity of the Far East somewhere.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, anyhow it states "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction"?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It says that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then following that, "including attack on Philippines or Guam."

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, it is your interpretation, and you gave the construction at the time you received it that those last quoted words, "including attack on Philippines or Guam," qualify or limit the previous statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. To a degree; yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I might say to you that I questioned Admiral Stark about that.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I recall I questioned Admiral Turner, who is the man who wrote the message——

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[*7146*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And their construction is entirely different from yours.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no doubt of that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So after all, it is a difference of opinion on that point?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They stated, as I recall, that that meant just what these words said to them.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, too.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. "A surprise aggressive movement in any di-dection." Now it is your view that the following words qualify or limit them?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, but I would like to call your attention again to the fact that this message of November 24 was followed 3 days later by the message of November 27.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes. If you will indulge me a moment I am hoping to get to that. I am just trying to take the cold words that appear on the printed page of this message and discuss them with you. That is my only purpose of inquiring about this dispatch here.

Admiral KIMMEL. I should be pleased to do just what you want, sir, but this message stood undiluted for only 3 days. At the end of 3 days I had another message.

[*7147*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. It also states:

Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The words "tense situation" are there, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. The "tense situation" I cannot say was anything new.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The situation had been tense for some time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And according to the words of this message it was still tense?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Guam will be informed separately.

That concludes the message.

Well, now, what did that message mean to you, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. That message meant to me to do whatever I could to be prepared for anything that might make——

The VICE CHAIRMAN (interposing). If you will pardon me at that point, I do not know whether you have quite finished your statement or not, but this message does not tell you to do anything except notify the Army, doesn't it?

[*7148*] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was not directed to you on any point except to notify the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Purely an information message?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it referred to aggressive movement in any direction, and "tense situation" and so on?

Admiral KIMMEL. There is one thing that might be considered a directive in there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the "utmost secrecy necessary."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It might be. Yes, that is true. It might be.

So, as I understood you to state in response to the previous question I asked you, that message meant to you that you were supposed to do whatever you thought was necessary to take care of the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you accepted it as a warning to that extent, that you understood you were supposed to do whatever was necessary to take care of the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, I invite your attention to [*7149*] the message of November 27, 1941, which was addressed to you, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, and sent to two other officers for information?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was sent directly to you and Admiral Hart?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And of course you received it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Now, in connection with this message of the 24th, in a letter to me sent by Admiral Stark on November 25, 1941, he said, in a postscript:

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long talk with

him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation.

That I take to mean the message of the 24th, which you have just been talking about.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the date of the letter that you are referring to now?

Admiral KIMMEL. November 25.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

Will confirm it all in today's meeting, [7150] as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be "anything."

Certainly, when I received that it qualified to a considerable extent the dispatch which I had received before on the 24th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you receive that?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the 3d of December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The 3d of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Still even what Admiral Stark stated there indicated that the situation was still quite tense and serious, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It did not detract any from that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; that is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. But it was concerned much more with what we should do than what Japan was expected to do to us.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But it still emphasized that the situation was tense and serious?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it did not retract anything that had been said to you in the message of the 24th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, he states:

I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know that I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, they did all of them, except attack Russia, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Eventually, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They did everything he mentioned there except what he says about Russia?

[7152] Admiral KIMMEL. But that limits the perspective, after all, considerably.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There isn't anything in there that said that they were not going to do anything that he indicated in the message of November 24?

Admiral KIMMEL. But I think any reasonable man would take that as a qualification.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, some men did not. You say you did.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the point I am getting at.

Then inviting your attention to the message of November 27, to the words "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning," you say you never knew of that language being used in any other message in your 40 years' experience in the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why do you think responsible officials of the Navy Department sent that message to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean now, or when I received it?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At the time you received it. Why did you think the Chief of Naval Operations, the head of the United States Navy, and responsible officials working with him said those words to you?

[*7153*] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think I have covered that very thoroughly in the statement I made. I do not know how I can add to that any, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I have no doubt, Admiral, you have done that to your complete satisfaction, but unfortunately I am sorry it is not completely satisfactory to me, and I am hoping that I might be able to get some further information from you on it.

I would still like to know why you thought the head of the United States Navy would say those words to you if they did not mean anything.

Admiral KIMMEL. They did mean something.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. What did they mean?

Admiral KIMMEL. They meant that they were a characterization of the rest of the message which came to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you accept it as such?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you still state, as I understood it, in effect, that the inclusion of the words "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning," did not mean anything, did not carry much weight with you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it added very little to the message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It added very little to the message?

[*7154*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you do not know this, I suppose, and that is why the head of the United States Navy would put those words into such a message? You do not think that they would amount to anything?

Admiral KIMMELL. I will put it this way: It did not mean to me, nor to my associates, what Admiral Turner and Admiral Stark they were intended to mean. I have told in great detail, I think, what those messages meant to me.

Incidentally, sir, before I brought this statement of mine down here, I asked various members of my former staff, who happen to be here

in Washington, Admiral Smith, Admiral Delaney, Admiral Murphy, Admiral Kitts, Admiral Pye, who was one of my task force commanders—those were all that happened to be available in this area—to read this statement, and to indicate to me any place that I had made an error, an overstatement or an understatement, and they agree that factually the statement of what occurred, what we thought and what we did at the time is a correct statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Does the gentleman yield for just one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Do I understand that all of these admirals [*7155*] have gone over the statements you have given to the committee and agreed with it before you submitted it to the committee?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. I asked them to check it. If there was anything wrong I wanted to know about it.

[*7156*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. In that connection, was that statement written by you?

Admiral KIMMEL. This statement is, to my mind, the same story that I attempted to tell to the Roberts Commission.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. With all deference to you, Admiral, I asked: Did you write this statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will answer your question, sir, if you will give me an opportunity. I will try to, at least.

Senator BREWSTER. I think he is entitled to that courtesy, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I presented the same thing, if not in the same words, to the Naval Court of Inquiry. This statement was prepared under my direct supervision. I had the assistance of counsel and I had the assistance and criticism of various other people in getting it up. This is my statement. I had a great deal of assistance in preparing it. I am not a literary genius and I couldn't have submitted it in the words that it is here.

But the ideas, the facts and everything that is in it are mine.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you did not write the statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I wrote various parts of it. I will say that the words, I was assisted there. The ideas are mine.

[*7157*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you did not write or dictate the statement yourself?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not all of it, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, has that question been asked of other witnesses who appeared here?

The CHAIRMAN. The record will show whether it has or not.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it is regrettable, and I hesitate to comment, but I think that as to all the people who have appeared here we have recognized that the statements were composite products, and I never before heard that criticism.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The only reason I thought of asking the question was because the admiral himself stated that he conferred with all of these other officers that he named in the preparation of this statement. I think it is a perfectly logical and reasonable question for me to ask—how much of this statement then is Admiral Kimmel's statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Every bit of it is mine.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And how much of it was prepared, suggested or dictated by someone else. He said it was a composite thought and idea of all these officers he conferred with, so I am just trying to find the fact.

[*7158*] Admiral KIMMEL. I tried to give you the fact.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. I thank you.

Senator BREWSTER. I didn't understand his statement to be as you stated it. I don't want that implication to appear. He stated that he submitted this to a variety of officers on the staff and they indicated their concurrence. That was his statement. About his counsel, and others, that was assistance.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I hadn't thought anything about it until the gentleman from Pennsylvania asked him the question as to whether this was the result of conferences with all these other officers named by him, and he said "Yes."

Now, Admiral, getting back to the message of November 27, that I was seeking to secure some information about, I would like to ask you, with your permission, once more what you think the words "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning"—what those words mean?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the time I received it, and in conjunction with the rest of the dispatch, the part of that dispatch which appealed to me, "and an aggressive move by Japan is expected"——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, I dislike to interrupt, but I am asking this simple question—what these words I quoted, "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning," [*7159*] what they meant to you, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. It meant—I am trying to tell you, sir. I am trying to tell you what this dispatch meant to me. It meant to me that war was going to eventuate in the Far East.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all it meant to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I got out of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. [Reading:]

Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was a clear statement of fact, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You knew that from what it says here?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what it says.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a clear statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you accepted that for what it says?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

* * * The number and equipment of [*7160*] Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was a clear statement as to what the indications appeared to be?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

That is a clear order to you, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you do that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Completely?

Admiral KIMMELL. I did. You must read the rest of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

Preparatory to——

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

Carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes. That is the end of the sentence.

Admiral KIMMEL. I executed an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to executing the tasks assigned in [*7161*] WPL–46.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you complied with that order?

Admiral KIMMEL. I complied with that order and I took every precaution in the Hawaiian area that I thought the situation justified and the probabilities demanded. The fleet was on the alert. The use of the patrol planes I have given in great detail here, my reasons for taking the steps I took, and I have also given in great detail my reasons for the disposition of the fleet at the time, in the days before and at the time of the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then it states:

Inform District and Army authorities.

You did that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Now, I understood you to state, Admiral, that even if you had understood that Japan was going to attack that you would not have moved your battleships out of the harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Will you please show me that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I got the impression from what you stated in response to a question asked here.

[*7162*] Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall making such a statement as that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. I think I can find my note here.

I will ask you this question: Did you state you would not have taken the battleships out of the harbor even if you had expected the attack was coming?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I had expected the attack was coming—and when did I find out that the attack was going to come?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I just want to ask you this question: Did you state you would not have taken the battleships out of the harbor if you had expected the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I may have made a statement that if I had received this information on the morning of December 7, when I wouldn't have had time to get them out, that I would not have taken them out. Other than that I have no recollection of making such a statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say you would have sent smaller craft out but would have kept battleships in the harbor probably for use of their antiaircraft guns. Did you say anything like that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I made that statement, and I made that statement because—I predicated that on receiving the knowledge of an attack too late to do anything else, and I [*7163*] predicated it on the chances of getting the battleships caught in the channel on the way out and blocking the whole channel, and the various other considerations.

That was on the basis of receiving the information so late that, by 1 o'clock, I couldn't have completed a deployment.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But if you had——

Admiral KIMMEL. I stated in other places that if I had received the information a day or two days before then I certainly would have taken the ships to sea.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. I believe you stated that you did not consider it the duty of the fleet to defend Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, wasn't it your duty to defend yourself so far as you could?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; and it was my duty to do everything I could to destroy any enemy forces. But that is quite a different thing from being tied down to have to remain in one vicinity for the defense of that particular locality.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you stated on page 27 of your statement to this committee, the statement that you have here, "The so-called war-warning dispatch," toward the [*7164*] bottom of the page, the next to the last sentence on page 27—do you find it there, "The so-called war-warning dispatch"?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Six lines from the bottom.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (reading):

> The so-called "war warning" dispatch I also discussed with the Senior Task Force Commanders, Admiral Pye (Commander of Task Force 1), Admiral Halsey (Commander of Task Force 2), Admiral Brown (Commander of Task Force 3), Admiral Calhoun (Commander, Base Force), and Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I did not personally show that dispatch or discuss it with Admiral Newton or Admiral Bellinger.

That is correct, then, is it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is a correct statement.

[*7165*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Newton was a commander of one of the task forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Bellinger was the air officer of your command, was he?

Admiral KIMMEL. With headquarters at Ford Island, across the bay from where I was, and in constant telephone communication with me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was your Air Corps officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was. He was the commander of patrol planes. Patrol Wing 2.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He is the same officer who had prepared the so-called Bellinger report?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Which was an air defense of Hawaii, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; but you must remember—I would like to just correct what may be a misapprehension. Admiral Halsey, then Vice Admiral Halsey, was the senior Naval Air Force commander in the Hawaiian area, and as such the rest of them looked to him more or less for guidance and assistance. He had command of the carriers, the airplanes afloat.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, wasn't it about the day you [*7166*] received the war-warning message, or the following day, that you sent Halsey off to Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; and in the afternoon Halsey came over, he spent the day with me before he went to Wake and his recollection and mine, I have talked to him about this, is that he saw the war warning before he sailed, and we discussed it briefly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What I am getting at is, Admiral, why didn't you show the war-warning message or even discuss it with your air officer Bellinger, who had prepared the air defense for Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Bellinger was a subordinate of Admiral Wilson Brown in the organization and also a subordinate of Admiral Bloch. I knew what Admiral Bellinger was doing. I didn't consider it necessary and I didn't consider it necesary to discuss it with a great many other admirals that I had in Pearl Harbor with me. The ones that I discussed it with were by no means all the admirals that we had out there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Bellinger was the man who had prepared the plan for the air defense of Hawaii, wasn't he? The Bellinger report shows that.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, Admiral Bellinger did the work under the direction of Admiral Bloch. Admiral Bloch was the [*7167*] man who was responsible for that report.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All I know, Admiral, is what I have heard here.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, Admiral——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I know it has been referred here throughout the hearings as the Bellinger report for the air defense of Hawaii.

Admiral KIMMEL. That report was prepared by Admiral Bellinger, and General Martin, and they submitted it, whether it was revised or not, I don't know, but it had to be approved by the Commandant of the District, Admiral Bloch, and by the Commanding General in Hawaii before it could have gotten past them, and they were, therefore, resposible for that publication.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But Admiral Bellinger is the man who prepared the report?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume he is. He signed it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He prepared the plan for the air defense of Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, he prepared it for Admiral Bloch's approval.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And he was your air officer there at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[*7168*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't show him——

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't tell him because I didn't consider it necessary.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't tell him about the war-warning message or didn't show it to him?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You didn't consult with him about it at all?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The VICE CHARMAN. All right.

In that connection, Admiral, I might ask you, did you show the war-warning message or discuss it with Admiral Newton?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not show it to Admiral Newton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was one of your task force commanders?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, he was not a regular task force commander. His task force was organized by Admiral Brown at my direction, and Admiral Brown issued Admiral Newton's orders.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral, whether you issued the orders, or some man you told to issue the orders, did so, Admiral Newton was the commander of one of those task [*7169*] forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, and before he went to sea with his task force, according to his testimony, he had an interview with Admiral Brown, and I have no doubt that Admiral Brown told him everything he needed to know. I don't know whether he told him about the war-warning message or not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't have his testimony before me, but I have a recollection that he says he wasn't told.

Admiral KIMMEL. He said he was never told about a war-warning message. He also says he was in conference with Admiral Brown, who had seen it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

You never did tell him about it, never did show it to him?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not, and I did not tell a great many other admirals out there, and I didn't show it to them, this war warning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. I certainly understand you, but he was one of your task-force commanders; he was in command of one of your task forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. Excuse me, sir. All I am trying to do is to give you the facts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all I am trying to get.

[*7170*] Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, I will yield.

Senator LUCAS. Just for a question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I think it is important right here to ascertain whether or not Admiral Newton had the same orders that Admiral Halsey had in his task force.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you answer that question for the Senator's benefit, please, sir, and I will be interested in it too.

Senator FERGUSON. May I also, in the same question, put this, whether or not it was in writing, whether the orders were in writing.

Admiral KIMMELL. I told Admiral Brown, and the dispatch is in the file, showing exactly what I said to Admiral Brown, to send Newton with a certain detachment up to Midway to land these planes, and Brown issued his orders. Just what they were, I don't know. I haven't seen them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were there any written orders about it?

Admiral KIMMELL. My orders to Brown I have here, but I have never seen the orders Brown gave to Newton. I suppose he gave him adequate orders.

As far as Halsey is concerned, I gave him written [*7171*] orders, and he was in my office, as I told you, for pretty much all day of the 27th, and in the course of the conversation, and having seen these warnings he turned to me and he said, "How far do you want me to go in this business?" "Well," I said, "all I can tell you is to use your common sense."

Those were the orders that he sailed with, according to conversations I have had with him since. I had forgotten some of the details myself. And the next I knew about his orders was after he returned to Pearl Harbor subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor. And then Halsey told me he had sailed under war orders, as I testified before, I think, one of the other—the Roberts Commission, perhaps—that he had sailed under war orders.

He had armed all of his planes, and he had given orders to sink every Japanese ship he came in contact with. Those were the verbal orders, as I recall his conversation with me, and that is all I know about it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, getting back—do you want some time to look at something there?

Admiral KIMMELL. They just called my attention to something. I have here, if the committee wishes to look at it, the orders issued to Admiral Brown, directing him to send Newton to Midway, if you would like me to read them.

[*7172*] I have no desire to put them in.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You might just read it for us.

Admiral KIMMELL. On 4 December, 1941——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You issued it, you probably know more about it than anybody else; so you go ahead and read it.

Admiral KIMMELL. These are already included in an exhibit on page 41.

[*7173*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand, but you wanted specific attention called to this, and I think you might go ahead and read it.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I didn't.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In response to the question, Admiral, by the Senator, maybe it would be well to read it.

Admiral KIMMEL.

From: CINCPAC
Action: COMTASKFOR 3, COMFOURTEEN, COMPATWING 2 } MAILGRAM
Info: COMBATFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMAIRBATFOR, LEXINGTON } MAILGRAM

Ø4Ø237

Myser Ø1825 of 1Ø Nov Marine Scoron Two Three One will base eighteen planes Midway X Lexington provide transportation X On 5 Dec after sortie Pearl form Task Force Twelve under Comcruscofor consisting of Lexington Chicago Astoria Portland Desron Five less Desdiv Ten X Task Force Twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 13Ø degrees from Midway at 223Ø GCT on 7 Dec X From that vicinity fly off marine planes to Midway X Return operating area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway X Comtaskfor Nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying [7174] off position provide security while that area and guard marine plane flight X Communications radio condition 19.

Et cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there an English translation of that available?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just trying to be funny. Is there any English translation of all that available?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I don't blame you, sir.

That means we sent the *Lexington*, three heavy cruisers, five destroyers from Honolulu to 400 miles from Midway, where he was going to fly off 18 marine planes to form part of the garrison of Midway.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What it finally means is that you ordered an admiral to take his force to within 400 miles of Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I wanted the admiral to form a task force from his forces to go to a point 400 miles from Midway.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had to use all those technical and all those other words and signs and ciphers to tell him that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then there is some question raised [7175] about whether people understand naval orders or not.

Admiral KIMMEL. You must understand that that order went not only to the people who were in that particular task force but they were to go to Admiral Bellinger's outfit who were to cover his advance up there and to cover him while he was on the way up there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, to get back to the point I was seeking some information on, admiral, Admiral Newton left with his task force without ever seeing the war warning message or having it discussed with him?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know he did. That is what he said.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what he said.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no reason to doubt it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You said in your prepared statement you didn't show it to him or discuss it with him.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. You know, in this business about Newton going up there, he only got about 700 miles from Pearl Harbor, I don't know whether you realize that or not. Midway is only 1,100 miles from Pearl Harbor and he was going about 400 miles from Pearl Harbor. That wasn't so far away to run off.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand that. The fact is——

Admiral KIMMEL. And Halsey's condition was considerably [7176] different.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was going to Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. 2,000 miles away.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Which was much further.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But as events finally transpired Newton was much closer to the line of approach of the Japanese attacking forces than Halsey was.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct; yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In fact Newton's task force was the one closest to the line of approach of the Japanese attack force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, yes. I wish he had been closer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sure we all do.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; I yield.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman permit me to read something ito the record right on this point?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I am reading from Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations, page 87:

It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation——

[7177] Admiral KIMMEL. May I inquire what you are reading from, sir?

Senator LUCAS. I am reading from Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations.

Admiral KIMMEL. That has never been submitted in evidence and it has never been reviewed by anybody in authority.

Mr. MURPHY. It was admitted in evidence last week.

Senator LUCAS. It is exhibit 107.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is in evidence in this hearing, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon.

Senator LUCAS. If these facts are not correct, Admiral, why you can so state, but I am reading this statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you, sir. I didn't understand.

Senator LUCAS. It was prepared by the Navy and I thought it was information upon this point that might well be developed here.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a powerful force consisting of the *Lexington*, *Chicago*, *Portland*, and five destroyers, to deliver a squadron of planes to Midway.

[7178] He testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war, other than the ordinary routine. He said that he never saw, nor was he ever informed of the contents of the October 16 dispatch concerning the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch advising of the possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, or the November 27th war warning. He said that except for what he read in the newspapers, he did not learn anything during the period November 26 to December 5th which indicated the increased danger of hostilities with Japan.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think, if you want to get—this is a version, this version was prepared in the Navy Department. The testimony

in regard to this, I am sure is available to the committee, and I think it would be well to examine that and not to—I have endeavored, in the testimony I have given, to tell you what I know about.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, is this information here that the Senator from Illinois just read, is it in conformity with your knowledge of the facts?

Admiral KIMMEL. In this account, I think they should have added that the testimony before Admiral Hart showed [*7179*] that Admiral Bellinger had a conference with Admiral Brown—with Admiral Newton—wait a minute.

That Admiral Brown had a conference with Admiral Newton before he sailed on this expedition to Midway and I did not attempt to inform all of the admirals in the fleet of this. I informed the senior task force commanders. And I was enjoined to preserve secrecy and not to alarm the people and I restricted the information to the officers that I have indicated.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But that didn't mean you couldn't tell an admiral in the United States Navy about it, did it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Neither did it mean that I was obligated to tell every admiral out there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But here was an admiral going off on a mission under your orders, in command of a task force, with some of the most valuable vessels of the United States Navy in that force, and you didn't tell him, or you don't know that anybody else ever told him?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have every reason to believe, and I believe, that Admiral Brown gave him the information which he needed to put him in proper shape.

Now, it says in here that he proceeded in the routine way. Well, the routine way, as a matter of fact was to take all precautions at sea. He also testified that he [*7180*] zigzagged on the way up there. He testified that he put up an airplane patrol, and that he maintained an airplane patrol constantly. I don't know myself how many more things he could have done. He also had my order, which was issued to all the fleet, in regard to exercising extreme vigilance in regard to submarines and to depth charge everyone that came in the operating area.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether Admiral Brown will be a witness? If he isn't listed, I think he should be.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel may answer that, whether Admiral Brown will be a witness.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We expect to call everyone of these members of Admiral Kimmel's staff, both those in charge and those that were subordinates.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, Admiral, what day was it that Admiral Newton left with his task force for Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. December 5.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. December 5. What day was it that Admiral Halsey left with his task force for Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. November 28.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor under your orders on November 28 with his task force to [*7181*] go to Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And——

Admiral KIMMEL. He was going into an area where a contact with the Japanese was much more probable than in this 700-mile jaunt of Newton's.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But Admiral Halsey left with his task force on November 28 under your orders, with full orders and instructions to sink every Japanese ship in sight?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have just given you the facts in the case, and they are not as you have stated it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How was it you stated it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I stated that Admiral Halsey, after seeing these warnings, turned to me and asked how far he should go, and I said, "Use your common sense," and he left with those orders.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all he had from you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all he had from me, was to use his common sense. He interpreted that as I have told you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He interpreted that as full battle orders, didn't he, and so issued it to his command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is what he did.

[*7182*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And based on the war warning message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. And Admiral Newton, who left on December 5, which was some 7 or 8 days later, left without any knowledge of the war warning message, without any information about it, or without any war orders; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't think that is right, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. You will have to ask Admiral Brown, because he gave Admiral Newton his orders.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you don't know?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. I have told you that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was under your command, and you don't know what orders he went under or what his instructions were?

Admiral KIMMEL. The details, no; I trusted Admiral Brown and I have no reason to regret that trust.

The CHAIRMAN. And you don't know whether Admiral Newton had war orders when he left Pearl Harbor or not?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I don't; not personally.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, I would like to invite your attention, Admiral, to page 47 of your statement presented [*7183*] here to the committee, the second short paragraph there, just three lines, or two and a half.

Perhaps I can read it to you quicker than you can find it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Page 47?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[*7184*] The VICE CHAIRMAN (Reading):

> In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would consider that the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.

That is the way you felt about it at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cited the circumstances in the preceding pages, if I remember correctly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think that is true; that is your conclusion there.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was my conclusion.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Then why didn't you so advise the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. It never occurred to me to notify the Navy Department of every conclusion that I reached.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, they had sent you a message they called a war warning message and made reference to a tense, critical situation, and so forth. You did not consider it such?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did not construe what as such?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As a war warning message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, if anybody will define for me what a war warning message is I would be better able to tell you whether I construed it as such.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I have certainly understood [*7185*] from you—and if I am mistaken I want you to correct me—that you did not consider it as a message indicating that war was imminent or that there would be any probability of any attack on your command.

Admiral KIMMEL. The two are considerably different.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, war was getting closer, we could see that, there was no question about that, I have never tried to get away from that at any time and I took all steps in Pearl Harbor which I considered the probabilities justified and what my forces permitted.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then just to get back to the words of your own statement here:

> In these circumstances no reasonable man in my position would consider that the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you said it did not occur to you to ask the Navy Department about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, I believe you state that you did not know about General Short's reply to General Marshall's message.

[*7186*] Admiral KIMMEL. I knew that he would make a reply because he was ordered to.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. You did not make any reply to the message you received?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not because none was required.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was not customary in the Navy, was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It has been done.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, was it customary in the Navy to reply to messages of that type?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not unless a reply was asked for.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. I think that is what Admiral Stark testified here, that it was not the custom in the Navy, as it was in the Army, to ask for acknowledgment or——

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I wouldn't say that. When you speak of customary, whenever the situation demanded a reply. I have seen such messages where a subordinate was given instructions or informa-

tion and directed to report the measures taken, but it was not done in this case. If he had wanted a reply he would have asked for one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it never did occur to you to ask for any further information or anything further after you received that message of the 27th?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought I understood the situation.

[*7187*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. If I had not I would have asked for further information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, testimony has been given the committee here, admiral, by the first witnesses who appeared at this hearing, Admiral Inglis for the Navy Department and Colonel Thielen, I believe his name was, for the War Department, that no searches were made by airplanes on December 6, 1941. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have covered that exhaustively in my statement, the searches that were made prior to December 7, and on December 7, and on December 7 Halsey's force did make a search in the early morning and were in process of making that search when the attack took place.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand that is the 7th, admiral. I am asking you if there were any searches made by aircraft from Pearl Harbor——

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, from Pearl Harbor?

The VICE CHAIRMAN (continuing). On December 6, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; there were searches made of the operating area.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On December 6, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What searches were made?

[*7188*] Admiral KIMMEL. Of the operating area.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, just what was that?

Admiral KIMMEL. A distance of about 300 miles out and an area to the southward.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. On December 6 and December 7 too.

The VICE ADMIRAL. Well, there were not any searches made beyond the 300 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Navy had the responsibility for long-range reconnaissance, didn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; they did under the agreement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And none were made on the 6th beyond the 300 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. With the important qualification that it had been stated and had been given to the Navy Department, and which the Army and all interested parties understood, that you could not maintain a search except when we knew that an attack was expected within narrow limits, narrow time limits.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not make any searches or reconnaissance unless you expected an attack within a limited time?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what we said. That is all we could do. We told them that months before and the situation [*7189*] had not changed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So there were never made at any time then?

Admiral KIMMEL. On occasions we made some searches, yes. On one occasion Admiral Bloch came to me and suggested we scout down to the southward.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was probably in September. I do not recall exactly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. About how long a range search did you make?

Admiral KIMMEL. We sent them about three or four hundred miles and we took as a median line a line betwixt Oahu and Jaluit and our object was to try to catch on the surface some of these submarines that we suspected as operating in the area.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, these flights that you refered to, Admiral, on December 6 within a distance of 300 miles, that was part of the training program, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was not?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. That was——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was not connected with training?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was an established patrol of the [*7190*] operating area to discover any submarines that might be there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were looking for submarines?

Admiral KIMMEL. Primarily.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But there were not any searches made looking for any surface vessels?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had forces operating around Hawaii both to the northward and to the southward at all times and they made searches with their observation planes from the battleships and by the planes from the carriers almost constantly.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There wasn't any made to the north?

Admiral KIMMEL. Some were made to the northward, yes. In the case of people who went up there we had planes operating to the northward and they reported everything they saw, not as a regular patrol you understand, but it served the same purpose.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, wasn't there something connected with the Martin-Bellinger report and the Bloch report and those related to the possibility of an air attack——

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN (continuing). ——on Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes—that rather emphasized the northern direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, it never emphasized the northern direc- [*7191*] tion. It emphasized an attack on Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Didn't it call attention to any extent to any particular direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not to my best recollection at the present time, because I think they felt that it was dangerous to predict which sector the attack was coming in from.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I am sorry to have detained you as long as I have, admiral. I would like to ask you this, though: I understood you to state this morning that you issued notices on November 27 to sink all submarines that were sighted.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I issued no such order as that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I issued an order to depth bomb every submerged contact in the operating area. If a Japanese submarine had appeared on the surface, that would have been another story.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you issued that order on November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought it was the 28th. It may have been the 27th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was the 28th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You issued the order on the 28th?

[*7192*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To sink Japanese craft of any kind that was encountered, was that it, or found?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. I had better read it to you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is CinCPac to Pacific Fleet. This is to everybody; and, incidentally, I thought it was a pretty good alert in itself [reading]:

> Exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas vicinity Oahu especially during sortie and entrance X Our submarines will conduct submerged operations in areas cast 5 and cast 7 only proceeding elsewhere on surface X Depth bomb all submarine contacts suspected to be hostile in Oahu operating areas except areas cast 5 and cast 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you. Describe what you mean by "operating areas". Is that the three hundred mile limit?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, what do you mean by the operating limit there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Have you got that chart you had this morning?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you can tell me, can't you, what

[*7193*] it is?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think if you have that in front of you you can see it. Just put it right in front of him.

We carved up the ocean area in all directions from Pearl Harbor, north, south, east, and west, into rectangles or squares in order to be able to designate these particular areas and those we had—you see there "Cast 5 and Cast 7"—that is C–5 and C–7. "Cast" is a naval term.

When I issued this order that said depth bomb them everywhere except in those areas which were very definitely laid down on that chart and such a chart was in the possession of each ship in the fleet, they knew exactly what I meant, the areas in which they were not to depth bomb submarines and they were to depth bomb them in all the rest of the areas in which they were discovered.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They were to depth bomb submarines in all of the areas except those that were excluded?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And we used that in order to assign a detachment of the Fleet to some particular locality to carry out certain exercises and during that time they had that area clear and we put others in other areas where they would not interfere with each other.

[*7194*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you issued those orders for that on November 28?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And Admiral Halsey issued orders to shoot every Japanese vessel in sight?

Admiral KIMMEL. So he told me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. And you issued orders to get into action on 24 hours' notice, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that? I don't know what you mean now about 24 hours.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You referred to something. I think it is on page 60.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, you mean my plans of exactly what orders we expected to issue, or at least what things we expected to cover in case we had war with Japan in 24 hours? Yes, I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You issued those, prepared those plans?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had those plans. I had that drawn up as a memorandum and kept it in my headquarters for quick reference in case anything should happen.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I believe you stated, didn't you, that Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions?

Admiral KIMMEL. As nearly as I could make out from his description in his testimony.

[*7195*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you say on page 28, line 5:

Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions.

Admiral KIMMEL. The information I have of that is Admiral Newton's testimony before Admiral Hart.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All those things happened after you received the war warning message of the 27th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. What you have referred to here, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. These specific things that I have referred to all happened under your orders and instructions after you received the war warning message on November 27?

Admiral KAMMEL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you at any time after November 27 order long-range airplane reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I covered that completely and the answer is "no."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will the gentleman yield for just one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, under the order of the committee 3:30 having arrived the hearing will be suspended in order that the counsel may file some documents here that they said will take about an hour. Admiral, if you have got another word here put it in.

[*7196*] Admiral KIMMEL. I just wanted to add, the answer is "No" with the qualifiaction that I have set forth completely in my statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At this point, Admiral, I think you may be excused until 10 o'clock in the morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is not suspended. It is simply diverted here for the next hour or so in order that certain official documents may be filed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, you may proceed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, in the statement filed by General Short he refers to an exhibit which consists of a statement made by him and filed with the Roberts Commission and which exhibit also has been filed with the Army board as an exhibit. The document is very, very long. There are six copies of this document, one in the possession of General Short, three in the files of the War Department, and two in our files and we were wondering whether this exhibit may be used without having duplicated the necessary copies for all of the members of the committee. We have five that can be made available to the committee and many of the documents referred to in this exhibit are already in evidence here and have been copied and copies are in the possession of all of the members of the committee.

[*7197*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, Mr. Kaufman. Due to the confusion I did not catch just what the description of this is.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General Short in the statement that he has filed, which he will read when he takes the stand next week, refers to an exhibit,[1] which exhibit he tendered to the Roberts Commission in December of 1941. That exhibit was also referred to in the hearings before the Army board.

Many of the documents making up this exhibit are already in evidence and copies of them have been supplied to members of the committee. Other parts of it have not been marked in evidence.

There are in existence six copies of this exhibit, one in the possession of General Short, two in the possession of counsel, and three in the War Department, and we were wondering whether we could avoid the duplicating of this entire exhibit, most of which is already in the record in various parts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And there are five copies available for members of the committee?

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to not having this duplicated?

(No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair hears none. It is so ordered. Proceed with the next item.

[*7198*] Mr. HANNAFORD. Mr. Chairman, I have here a number of matters which I would like to insert in the record. They are for the most part in response to inquiries made by various members of the committee.

The first matter is in response to an inquiry of Congressman Murphy at page 1952 of the record where he asked for information regarding the establishment of Pearl Harbor as a Navy base.

The Navy has submitted a two-page memorandum here which I would suggest be made a part of the record or I can read it if the committee cares to have me read it. It goes back to 1899 and brings the history of Pearl Harbor up to date.

Do you wish to have it spread on the record, or do you wish to have it read, Mr. Chairman?

[1] Subsequently introduced as Exhibit No. 133.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is something that Mr. Murphy called for, isn't it, or inquired about?

Mr. HANNAFORD. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have some preference about this?

Mr. MURPHY. I did not hear what was said.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that when they are marked as exhibits that we will get copies of them, each member will get a copy? If it goes into the transcript, naturally, we get the copies and are able to read them.

Mr. HANNAFORD. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But if they are just put in as exhibits, [*7199*] then we must go to the office of counsel in order that we may read them or get them from him to read, that is the distinction.

Mr. HANNAFORD. I would suggest that this be made part of the transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not very long, is it?

Mr. HANNAFORD. It is a two-page exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you suggest that it be spread on the transcript?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I suggest that it be spread on the transcript.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be spread on the transcript at this point.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, it might be better to put it in tomorrow because I am going to go into it, but it can be spread now in order to get it in for reference.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 14 January 1946.

1083A
R#-5
Memorandum
To: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

[*7200*] 1. In response to the request of Congressman Murphy, noted at page 1952 of the "Report of Proceedings of the Joint Committee's Investigation," for information regarding establishment of the port and base at Pearl Harbor, the following information is submitted:

The Naval Station Hawaii was established in 1899 and in 1902, the Navy Yard Halawa was established in Pearl Harbor. The name was changed to Navy Yard Pearl Harbor about 1912. In 1909 construction of a dry dock and improvement of the channel was begun. To improve security Pearl Harbor was declared a "closed port" in 1912 and a defensive sea area was established in 1939. A submarine base was established in 1919 and the Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, in 1920.

Following World War I, reestimates of Naval Base requirements were made by Navy and Army-Navy planning agencies culminating in the report of the Rodman Board. The Secretary of the Navy approved this report and forwarded it to the Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives, with copies to other appropriate committee and subcommittee chairmen of the Senate and House. This report recommended "An advanced base to be developed on Oahu capable of serving the entire fleet to the maximum subject only to the natural limitations imposed by the size and character of this island. * * * This advanced base should have priority of development over the fleet bases named in paragraph 19 (San Francisco, Puget [*7201*] Sound, New York-Narragansett Bay region, Chesapeake Bay, and Canal Zone)." This recommendation gave the Hawaiian base first priority.

Development of the base facilities was slow until the mid-twenties when the surface fuel storage was begun, additional dry docks were constructed, industrial facilities were expanded, and the channel was improved. During the thirties, further dredging and industrial expansion occurred, the radio station and ammunition depot were moved out of the Navy Yard, and moorings were constructed in Pearl Harbor. The Aiea Hospital was built and the underground fuel storage was begun. Incident to the latter, an independent water supply system for the Navy Yard and the adjacent activities was installed. Supply Depot facilities were also progressively developed. Several air fields were built on Oahu and one on Mauri. Aviation repair capacity primarily on Ford Island was also increased. This base development proceeded in the forties at an ever-increasing tempo before and during hostilities until it became apparent that the war was nearly over.

The Naval Base facilities on Oahu and other Hawaiian Islands were before the war, and continued to be, the most important in the Pacific. Fleet concentrations for combined training occurred in the Hawaiian area in 1925, 1928, 1932, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1938, and 1940. In 1939, a large number of ships called [*7202*] the Hawaiian Detachment, were sent to Hawaii and remained until joined by the remainder of the fleet in 1940. These fleet visits tested the capacity of the base and indicated necessary improvements. Prior to the war, repair and supply facilities were especially deficient to maintain the fleet. During the war it was necessary to limit repairs to emergency work, largely battle damage, and to return ships to West Coast ports whenever time and the ship's condition permitted. Pearl Harbor was the port of departure and return for practically all Central Pacific and the early South Pacific Task Force Operations prior to our capture of the Marshalls. Subsequently, individual ships returned there for permanent or temporary repairs and replenishment. The supplies stored there both in the Naval Supply Depot and the Aviation Supply Depot were invaluable to support the routine and emergency requirements of our forces in more forward areas. All Central Pacific Submarine Patrols originated at Pearl Harbor until the secondary base at Midway was ready for service in late 1942, after which major overhauls continued to be accomplished at Pearl Harbor until the end of the war, minor refits being conducted in forward bases. A large part of the Gilberts, the Marshalls, the Marianas, the Iwo Jima, and the Okinawa operations were mounted in Pearl Harbor.

In addition to serving the material requirements of the [*7203*] fleet during the war, Pearl Harbor, with its extensive communications facilities, was the Pacific Fleet operational command center from December 1941, until early 1945, when CinCPac moved to Guam. Many of the CinCPac staff functions continued to be performed in Pearl Harbor as well as those of the various type commanders. CinCPac's operational staff has now returned to Pearl Harbor.

JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lieut. Comdr., USNR.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item I have is a letter from Admiral Stark in response to a question submitted to him by Representative Gearhart, at page 6121 of the transcript. I might read the letter. [Reading:]

In my testimony during the afternoon session of 3 January 1946, at page 6121 of the transcript, Representative Gearhart asked whether there were any so-called "shooting orders" applicable to the Pacific. I stated that there was such an order applicable to the Southeast Pacific, and Mr. Gearhart asked that I produce it for the record.

Accordingly, I am enclosing a photostat copy of CNO's secret despatch 282121 of 28 August 1941, which was sent to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and other [*7204*] addressees.

I would suggest that this letter and the attachment also be spread upon the record at this point, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The attachment referred to follows:)

NAVAL MESSAGE—NAVY DEPARTMENT

Phone extension number	Addresses	Message Precedence
From: CNO	Cincpac	Priority PPPPPPPP Routine
Released by: Adm. Stark	Commander Panama Naval Coastal	Deferred
Date: 28 August 1941	Frontier	
Tor: Coderoom	Cinclant; Spenavo, Lon: Commander Pacific Southern Coastal Frontier;	
Encoded by Obannon-Purdy	Commander Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier; Com 11	

Paraphrased by Allensworth

Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory

NOTE: This despatch sent to SPENAVO London as OPNAV 282128 282121 CR ØØ84Ø

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

[7205] Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery

Date Time GCT

Text

Certain operations prescribed for the Atlantic by WPL 51 are hereby extended to areas of the Pacific Ocean as described herein In view of the destruction by raiders of merchant vessels in the Pacific Ocean within the Western Hemisphere neutrality zone as defined in the declaration of Panama of Oct. 3, 1939. Formal changes in WPL 51 will be issued but meanwhile action addresses will execute immediately the following instructions. Cincpac constitute the southeast Pacific force consisting of two 75ØØ ton light cruisers and dispatch it to Balboa. For task purposes this force will operate directly under CNO after entering the southeast Pacific sub area as defined in WPL 46, PARA 3222 except western limit is longitude 1ØØ degrees west, within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier and within the southeast Pacific sub area the commander Panama naval coastal frontier and commander southeast Pacific force will in cooperation and acting under the strategic direction of the chief of naval operations execute the following task colon destroy surface raiders which attack or threaten United States flag shipping. Interpret an approach of surface raiders [7206] within the Pacific sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier or the Pacific southeast sub area as a threat to United States flag shipping.XX For the present the forces concerned will base Balboa but CNO will endeavor to make arrangements for basing on South American ports as may be required XX Action Adees and commander Southeast Pacific Force inform CNO when these instructions have been placed in effect.XX

Distribution

12 . . . Originator CNO File. Show File . . File . . .

Copies to 16. 2¢. 3¢. . 38. . 38W. . WPD, US Army. . Brit. Nav. Staff in Washington

SECRET

See Art 76 (4)
Nav Regs

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person
Return to F-105.

Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item that I have is also a letter from Admiral Stark in response to a question propounded by Senator Ferguson with respect to whether or not the shooting orders issued in the Atlantic had been also sent to the Pacific. Admiral Stark has submitted a letter here and has attached to it the dispatch which advised the Pacific Fleet commander of the issuance of these orders to the Atlantic.

[7207] Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of notifying the Pacific?

Mr. HANNAFORD. The dispatch is dated October 9, 1941.

I would suggest that this letter and the dispatch also be spread upon the daily transcript.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[7208]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington 25, D. C., 14 January 1946.

The Honorable ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: In my testimony during the afternoon session of 5 January 1946, at page 6488 of the transcript, there appears the following colloquy with Senator Ferguson:

"Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall whether or not you ever notified CINCPAC and CINCAF of the orders to the Atlantic Fleet to start shooting German subs?

"Admiral STARK. I think I covered that in my statement, about telling them about the order.

"Senator FERGUSON. There was no official order?

"Admiral STARK. No, sir.

"Senator FERGUSON. It would be in that letter that I read to you this morning, or that you read to me?

"Admiral STARK. I do not recall having informed them officially. I believe I sent them copies of the order and told them in a personal letter."

[7209] I have checked up on this matter and I find that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was a holder of Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5 (WPL–52), which contained the so-called shooting orders with respect to the Atlantic. A photostat of the distribution list of Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5 is enclosed.

When WPL–52 was placed in effect, a despatch was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to "ALL US HOLDERS OF WPL FIFTY TWO OUTSIDE OF NAVY DEPARTMENT". Therefore, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet *was* informed officially of these so-called "shooting orders" in the Atlantic. A copy of CNO's secret despatch 082335 of 9 October 1941 is enclosed.

Respectfully,

(S) H. R. STARK,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

cc: The Hon. HOMER FERGUSON,
Rear Admiral O. S. Colclough, USN.

(without enclosures)

[7210] U. S. NAVY WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PLAN NO. 5—SECRET

Distribution List

Official to whom issued	*Registered Nos.*
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	1
Commander, Battle Force	2
Commander, Battleships, Battle Force	3
Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force	4
Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force	5
Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force	6
Commander, Scouting Force	7
Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force	8
Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force	9
Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force	10
Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	11
Commander, Southeast Pacific Force	12
Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet	13
Commander, Battleship Division Three, Atlantic Fleet	14
Commander, Battleship Division Five, Atlantic Fleet	15

Distribution List—Continued

Official to whom issued	*Registered Nos.*
Commander, Cruiser Division Eight, Atlantic Fleet	16
Commander, Cruiser Division Seven, Atlantic Fleet	17
Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet	18
Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet	19
Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet	20
Commander, Patrol Wings, Atlantic Fleet	21
Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet	22
[7211] Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet	23
Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet	24
Commander, Train Squadron Three, Atlantic Fleet	25
Commander, South Greenland Patrol	26
Officer in Charge of U. S. Naval Shore Activities in Iceland	27
Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet	28
Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force	29
Commanding General, First Marine Division	30
Commanding General, First Marine Brigade (Provisional)	31
Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in Iceland	32
Operations—Director, War Plans Division	33
—Director, Naval Intelligence Division	34
—Director, Naval Communications Division	35
—Director, Fleet Maintenance Division	36
—Director, Ship Movements Division	37, 38
—Director, Naval Districts Division	39
—Director, Naval Transportation Service (Issued to Director, Ship Movements Division)	40
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation	41
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance	42
Chief of the Bureau of Ships	43
Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks	44
[7212] Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics	45
Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts	46
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	47
Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy	48
Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps	49
Director, Shore Establishments Division (Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy)	50
President, Naval War College	51
Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard	52
War Plans Division, General Staff, War Department	53
Commandant, First Naval District	54
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland	55
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I	56
Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier	57, 58
Commandant, Third Naval District	59
Commandant, Fourth Naval District	60
Commandant, Fifth Naval District	61
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda	62
Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier	63
Commandant, Sixth Naval District	64
Commandant, Seventh Naval District	65
Commandant, Eighth Naval District	66
Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier	67
Commandant, Tenth Naval District	68
[7213] Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba	69
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad	70
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District	71
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District	72
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District	73
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District	74
Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier	75, 76
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District	77
Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District	78
United States Military Mission in London	79, 80
United States Naval Attaché, Ottawa, Canada	81

Distribution List—Continued

Official to whom issued	*Registered Nos.*
Registered Publications Section—Working Copy	82
Registered Publications Section—Library Copy	83
Registered Publications Section—Reserve Copies	84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96

Official to whom issued but not to be accounted for to RPS

British Joint Staff Mission in Washington	97, 98
The British Admiralty (To be issued through the U. S. Military Mission in London)	99
The Canadian Chief of Naval Staff (To be issued through the U. S. Naval Attaché, Ottawa, Canada)	100
The Canadian Chief of Air Staff (To be issued through the U. S. Naval Attaché, Ottawa, Canada) [7214]	101
The Naval Attaché to the Canadian Legation, Washington, D. C. (To be issued through the Office of Naval Intelligence)	102

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM *CNO*

RELEASED BY
Adm. H. R. Stark
DATE *9 OCT. 1941*

EM

DECODED BY
IVANYSHYN

PARAPHRASED BY
ALLENSWORTH

FOR ACTION

ADDRESSEES

ALL U. S. HOLDERS OF WPL FIFTY TWO OUTSIDE OF NAVY DEPARTMENT

NAVY DEPARTMENT

MESSAGE PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

082335 CR 0786

TEXT
ON OCTOBER 11TH AT 0200 GCT CANCEL WPL 51 AND PLACE WPL 52 IN EFFECT

DISTRIBUTION:
12 A ORIG

13 A 16 A 38 A 20P A RECORD COPIES
GENERAL FILE

CNO FILE G
20 OP FILE G

[*7215*] Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item that I have is at page 6438 and 6442 of the transcript, various portions of two dispatches produced by Admiral Stark which related to the dispatch of December 2 on page 39 of Exhibit 37, the so-called order of the President to establish a patrol in the Western Pacific, various portions of these dispatches were read on those pages that I have just cited and I think in the interest of clarity for the transcript we might have the two dispatches spread upon the record in full at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The dispatches referred to follow:)

[*7216*] 2 December 1941
From: CINCAF
Action: OPNAV
Info:
Ø21332

URDIS Ø 12356: My views are as follows: The Jap movement down the Indo-Chinese coast is already defined but it remains to be seen whether aimed against the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, or both. That the British can meet their commitment to guard as far as Cape Padaran and we should use what have left after guarding against descent on Luzon in watching for one on Borneo. Am recalling Isabel from current mission and sending toward Padaran. She is too short radius to accomplish much and since we have few fast ships her loss would be serious. Therefore have to recommend against carrying out Isabel's movement though it is improbable that can start any chartered craft within

two days. Am searching for vessels for charter that are suitable but cannot yet estimate time required to obtain and equip with radio. Army planes are reconnoitering sector northerly from Luzon and eastward from Sanbernardino. Navy planes northwesterly from Luzon, also covering Balabac Strait and joining up with Dutch to cover Mindanao-Halmahera line, effectiveness is problematical but as great effort as available forces can sustain continuously. Two cruisers, two desdivs are deployed well south, remainder surface forces on local [7217] or repairing.

Have five submarines out now, remainder either placed in readiness for defensive missions or held here prepared for offensive tasks. When it is considered called for will increase air patrols and send out more subs.

Naval message message precedence: priority
3 December 1941
From: OPNAV
To: CINCAF
Secret
031540

Isabel may be replaced by chartered vessel at your discretion as per my 012356. Ref your 021332.
Redistribution:
38 . . . Orig
Record copy . . . 12 . . . Gen file CNO file 20 OP file

[7218] Mr. HANNAFORD. The next, Mr. Chairman, is another letter from Admiral Stark in which he asked that certain corrections be made in his testimony. I would request that the letter and the corrections be spread upon the record at this point as we have done in the past.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[7219]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ROOM 3028.
Washington 25, D. C., 11 January 1946.

The Honorable ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the
Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: I am enclosing a list of corrections to my testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

I understand the record is to be printed, and I trust these changes will be approved and made in the transcript before printing.

There is also enclosed an errata sheet issued by Ward & Paul, correcting the time of the attack, which was erroneously stated by me in a colloquy with Representative Murphy. I assume this change will be included in any made in the transcript before printing.

Respectfully.

(S) H. R. Stark,
H. R. STARK,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

[7220] *Corrections in testimony of Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N.*[1]

VOLUME 31

Page	Line	Correction
5687	4	Insert a period after "time". Begin new sentence with "I".
5695	22	Change "to use his eyes" to "for use as eyes". Change "For example" to "However".
5696	3	Change "extent" to "intent".
5696	8	Add "reconnaissance" after "distance".

[1] See Index of Witnesses for testimony of Admiral Stark.

Corrections in testimony of Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N.—Continued

VOLUME 32

Page	Line	Correction
5722	14	After "recollection" add "that it was".
5723	22	Change "Mr. Stark" to "Mr. Mitchell".
5728	19	Change "what" to "which".
5731	12	Change "UPNAV" to "OPNAV".
5734	13	Delete "Yes".
5745	12	After "is" insert "a letter".
5745	14	After "Two" add "dated 10 November 1941".
5750	25	Change "6 o'clock" to "1 o'clock".
5790	14	Change "sak" to "say".
5790	18	Change "apetite" to "appetite".
5814	25	Change first "He" to "General Marshall".
5815	16	Insert period after "it".
5815	18	Insert period after "phone".
5833	22	Change "Admiral Keefe" to "Admiral Stark".
5839	17	Delete the period.
[7221] 5839	18	Change "With" to "with". Insert period after "population" and begin new sentence.
5845	15	Place period after "were tense".
5845	16	Before "might also" insert "To have brought it back".
5845	20	Change "reaction" to "recreation".
5855	22	Change "change" to "chance".
5856	19	Insert "in connection" before "with".
5868	17	Change "term" to "time".
5869	22	Change "jointed" to "joined".
5870	18	Change "by" to "we weren't".
5870	19	Change comma to period after "more" and begin new sentence.
5870	20	Change to read, "we were playing for time. In the fall of 1941, it".
5886	24	Insert "10:40" after "somewhere around".
5889	5	Change "craft" to "aircraft".
5894	7	Insert "and" after "Admiral Hart".
5896	10	Change "blowed" to "flowed".
5899	11	Change "absent" to "absence".
5907	20	Change "to include" to "I included".
5911	21	Insert "Not" before "separating".
5913	15	Insert "now" after "I have seen it".

[7222]

VOLUME 33

5989	23	Correct spelling of "accompanying".
5990	2	Change "158" to "58".
6008	8	Change "Commander-in-Chief" to "Commandant".
6009	25	Change "2613" to "261331".
6016	11	Delete "proper".
6016	13	Insert period after "WPL–46". Change "in foreign" to "Inform".
6022	12	Insert "if" before "I". Insert "had" after "I". Change period at end of of line to a dash.
6035	22	Delete "from this type of attack".
6036	4	Change "Commander" to "Commanders" and delete "in Chief".
6044	10	Correct spelling of "Congress".
6047	3	Delete "in which".
6051	19	Insert "But" before "Once".
6052	11	Change "board" to "Board" and "he" to "we".
6052	12	Insert "overcrowding" after "to".
6052	14	Change "He had that report" to "The President had that report."
6052	15	Insert "for" before "every".
6054	17	Change "and" to "because"; insert "that the" after "found" and delete "a"
6054	18	Insert "into commission" after "coming" and delete "in that they".
6057	25	Delete "with".
6067	11, 12	Change "2:30" to read "1:25".
	13, 14	Change "1:57" to read "1:25".
	15	Change "Shortly before 2:00" to "1:25".
	17	Change "1:57 to 2:00" to "1:25".
	21	Insert a dash after "Communications".
6084	9	Change "18" to "A/T".
6088	15	Delete "it to"; change "that" to "to which", and delete "not".
6098	15	Insert "definite on that" after "anything".
6117	25	Change "Grear" to "Greer".
6118	23	Change "Grear" to "Greer".
6119	5	Change "Caesar" to "Sessa".
6121	19	Insert "steps" after "similar".
6129	4	Insert "I wrote" before "that".
6129	5	Insert period after "anywhere" and begin new sentence with "In my opinion".
6131	13	Change "southern" to "southward".
6141	14	Change "he" to "Secretary Stimson".

Corrections in testimony of Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N.—Continued

[7224] VOLUME 34

Page	Line	Correction
6151	11	Change "right or" to "rights of".
6152	20	Change "men-o-war" to "men of war".
6154	20	Change "hunt" to "hung".
6160	14	Change "as" to "at least".
6169	16	Change "inferring" to "endeavoring."
6180	7	Change "did not" to "indicates I tried to".
6182	12	Change "ascertain" to "ascertained".
6183	5	Change "Maxwell, Hamilton and Ballenger" to "Maxwell Hamilton and Ballentine".
6185	6	Change "on" to "in".
6186	13	Insert "officer" after "executive" and before the comma.
6201	10	Change "ready" to "read".
6201	17	Change "about it" to "right".
6203	6	Delete "and"; insert comma before "that".
6204	3	Insert "it" after "governments".
6207	17	Insert quotation marks before "is there etc".
6207	19	Insert quotation marks after "out?".
6207	24	Delete "answered the question and", and insert before "The answer" the word "Assuming".
6207	25	Delete quotation marks after "affirmative". Insert a comma after "affirmative", and delete "in answering you, but".
[7225]		
6208	5	Add quotation marks after "our effort".
6209	4	Delete "not" and the second "for".
6214	22	Insert "a" before "guess".
6279	20	Change "July" to "January".
6281	8	Change "short" to "shore".
6287	17	Change "attack" to "attached".
6290	3	Change "Jerry" to "Dudley".
6293	8	Change "briefly" to "sharply".
6322	12	Change "made" to "implemented".
6331	22	Delete comma and insert dash at end of line.
6331	23	Change "understand" to "understanding".
6333	20	Insert "if it is" after "defend".
6338	14	Change "The use" to "They use".

[7226] VOLUME 35

6370	17	Change "Mr." to "Pa".
6376	6	Change "that" to "them".
6377	15	Change "outlay" to "outline".
6377	20	Insert "up" before "to the".
6379	7	Change "in" to "into".
6379	9	Change "tought" to "tough".
6379	18	Change "tried" to "had".
6379	19	Change "to, on" to "to go on".
6380	10	Change "That" to "The".
6382	15	Change "McCollough" to "McCollum" and "Cramer" to "Kramer".
6384	4	Change "but" to "that".
6389	4	Change "bearing" to "bear".
6389	5	Delete ", and" and insert dash after "27th".
6393	17	Insert "it" after "that" and "and" after "properly".
6393	18	Change "they" to "by".
6394-A	5	Change "me. Not" to "me—not" and change period at end of line to dash.
6394-A	6	Change "As" to "as", change "Wellborne" to "Wellborn" and "is" to "was".
6395	6	Change "couldn't get" to "came".
6395	25	Change "busy, we" to "busy. We".
[7227] 6397	13	Insert "the" before "King".
6421	23	Correct spelling of "seriousness".
6424	7	Delete "that".
6446	3	Change "He" to "We".
6448	24	Change "if available" to "is available".
6449	9-10	Change "depending on the scale" to "defending ourselves".
6463	6	Delete "about 200,".
6471	19	Insert "it" after "put".
6474	21	Insert "recently" after "not".
6477	11-12	Change "as sizing up under all" to "after sizing up all".
6477	14	Correct spelling of "heart".
6483	21	Change "I" to "he".
6502	12	Capitalize "Allied Naval Commander in Chief."
6502	20	Change "Transport" to "Task Force".
6521	7	Change "of this" to "indicated an".
6525	9	Change "were they" to "where they".
6527	5	Change "assume" to "assumed".
6546	4	Change last word of line to "as".
6547	18	Delete "Admiral Keefe".
6567	15	Change "conditional" to "additional".
6587	19	Change "premises" to "premise".
6592	8	Change "say" to "saw".

[7228] Mr. HANNAFORD. At page 4346 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson requested all Japanese intercepts in addition to those set forth in Exhibit 1, which were transmitted between August 16 and August 29, 1941, and which pertained to Japanese-American negotiations.

I would just like to note at this point that these dispatches have been sent to Senator Ferguson and they are so bulky that I do not think it is worth while making them part of the transcript, but I just want the record to show that they have been sent to him and we have another copy available for any member of the committee that wishes to see them.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to see them.

Senator FERGUSON. They are going to be made an exhibit now?

Mr. HANNAFORD. They are not an exhibit as yet, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I would certainly like to have them an exhibit.

Mr. HANNAFORD. We can make them an exhibit at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Senator requests that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I request that. It is very material to the issue.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered. What will be the number?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I request then that this document be marked
[7229] "Exhibit 124," Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be so numbered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 124.")

Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item, Mr. Chairman, is an answer to Mr. Murphy's request at page 160 of the transcript in which he asked for a comparison of the actual damage to the battleships at Pearl Harbor as compared with the statement issued by Secretary Knox on December 15.[1]

A photostatic copy of this comparison has been placed before each member of the committee and I would suggest that the actual document be made part of the transcript at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

Comparison of actual damage suffered by the fleet at Pearl Harbor and that stated in the report that was released by Secretary Knox on 15 December 1941

	Name	Actual damage	Reported by Knox
	Arizona	Sunk	Destroyed.
	California	do	Not mentioned by name.
	West Virginia	do	Do.
[7230]	Oklahoma	Capsized	Capsized but can be righted and repaired.
	Nevada	Heavily damaged	Not mentioned by name.
	Maryland	Damaged	Do.
	Pennsylvania	do	Do.
	Tennessee	do	Do.
	Helena	Heavily damaged	Do.
	Honolulu	Damaged	Do.
	Raleigh	Heavily damaged	Do.
	Shaw	do	Do.
	Cassin	Heavily damaged, burned	Lost.
	Downes	do	Do.
	Vestal	Badly damaged	Do.
	Oglala	Sunk	Do.
	Curtiss	Damaged	Not mentioned by name.
	Utah	Capsized	Lost.

[1] See Hearings, Part 1, p. 70.

In addition, Secretary Knox made a general statement of damage as follows:

Navy sustained damage to other vessels. This damage varies from ships which have already been repaired, and are ready for sea, or which have gone to sea, to a few ships which will take from a week to several months to repair. In the last category is the older BB *Oklahoma* which has capsized but can be righted and repaired.

[*7231*] Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item that I have is a response from the Navy Department in answer to a question of Senator Ferguson at page 177 of the transcript, in which he asked for a table showing the times at which various points in the Pacific were attacked.[1]

The Navy Department has submitted a chart showing the times in local time, Greenwich time and Washington time and a photostatic copy of this chart has been placed before each member of the committee and I would suggest that it be made part of the transcript at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The chart referred to follows:)

[*7232*] *Time of Jap attacks in the Pacific 7 and 8 December 1941*

Place	Local time	Greenwich time	Washington time
Pearl Harbor	7:55 a. m.—7th	6:25 p. m.—7th	1:25 p. m.—7th.
Singapore	3:00 a. m.—8th	8:00 p. m.—7th	3:00 p. m.—7th.
Khota Baru	3:40 p. m.—8th	8:40 p. m.—7th	3:40 p. m.—7th.
Davao Gulf, P. I.	7:10 a. m.—8th	11:10 p. m.—7th	6:10 p. m.—7th.
Guam	9:10 a. m.—8th	11:10 p. m.—7th	6:10 p. m.—7th.
Hong Kong	8:00 a. m.—8th	Midnight—7-8th	7:00 p. m.—7th.
Wake	12:00 noon—8th	1:00 a. m.—8th	8:00 p. m.—7th.
Clark Field, P. I.	9:27 a. m.—8th	1:27 a. m.—8th	8:27 p. m.—7th.
Midway	9:30 p. m.—7th	9:30 a. m.—8th	4:30 a. m.—8th.
Nichols Field (Manila)	3:00 a. m.—9th	7:00 p. m.—8th	2:00 p. m.—8th.

NOTES

(1) The above times are compiled from existing records. Minor inaccuracies are possible.

(2) There were other attacks on Army and foreign installations of which the Navy has no records.

Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item that I have relates to the question of watertight integrity of ships at Pearl Harbor and inspections of the ships, which have been raised by several members of the committee at pages 160, 242, and 2821 of the transcript.

At page 4437 of the transcript we inserted a partial answer to this inquiry, which was supplied to us by the Navy [*7233*] Department and which show the schedules of inspections of the various vessels at Pearl Harbor.[2]

We have also received one additional memorandum from the Navy Department, to which we wrote a subsequent memorandum asking for additional information. I would request that these two memoranda be spread on the record at this point so that each committee member may have it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

[1] Hearings, Part 1, p. 77.

[2] See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347 et seq., for correspondence on this subject.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
Washington, 11 December 1945

R-#16
Memorandum
To: William D. Mitchell.
Subject: Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels.

1. Pursuant to your request concerning the above matter, the following information has been obtained and is submitted:

(a) An examination of the logs and records of the major vessels at Pearl Harbor indicates that only one vessel did not have an equivalent of the condition "all water-tight openings below the third deck closed" at the time of the attack. That vessel, the USS California, had ten inner and [*7234*] outboard voids open for maintenance work. Its remaining water-tight openings below the third deck were closed.

(b) The logs of the USS Oklahoma and USS Arizona were destroyed. However information has been obtained through Commander Fuqua, the Damage Control Officer of the Arizona, that on his ship all water-tight doors below the third deck were closed. This was also the condition that prevailed in the USS Oklahoma, according to information stated by the Commanding Officer of that ship.

(c) Material conditions of readiness referred to as conditions "Baker" or "X-Ray" or "Yoke" are higher than the minimum. The minimum requirements are considered to be those prescribed by Navy Regulations, that is, that all water-tight openings below the third deck be closed from 1600 to 0800.

(d) According to the best available analysis in the Navy Department, the USS California is the only ship that might have been saved from sinking by the closing of manhole covers that had been left open for maintenance.

(e) The USS Pennsylvania was in dry dock and is not included within the above general statements concerning the conditions of water-tight integrity that prevailed at that time.

2. If more specific and detailed information on these matters is desired, an attempt will be made to locate and [*7235*] have present necessary witnesses.

JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

DECEMBER 11, 1945.

Memorandum for Admiral Colcough.

I have just received from Lt. Commander Baecher a memorandum dated December 11, 1945, entitled "Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels."

The inquiry from members of the Committee was broader than this. They have inquired about the charge that some or more of the ships in Pearl Harbor were undergoing a Sunday "inspection", that some had ammunition on shore, for that purpose. The report of December 11th seems too meager on this.

Water-tight doors are only one feature. An ordered "inspection" might indicate a general state of mental unalertness to a possible attack.

Can you not at least answer specifically the "inspection" charge, and name witnesses from the ships who could testify about each vessel.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

[*7236*] Mr. HANNAFORD. I would like to comment on the final answer in response to our final request, which we have received from the Navy Department.

They have compiled a statement of 20 December 1945 from the logs of various ships, that show that inspections occurred on December 5th and 6th, 1941. I would request that this chart showing the various inspections that were held on the battleships to the extent that logs are available be spread upon the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

Mr. HANNAFORD. I would like to make this additional statement, that the extracts show that on December 5th or 6th each battleship

whose log is available held some type of inspection ranging from a daily inspection, which I take it is a minor type of inspection, to a monthly inspection, which I assume is a more important one.

We have been advised by the Navy Department that the logs for December 7, 1941, which are not extracted in this document which will be made a part of the record, were not included in the extract because the attack occurred earlier than inspections would normally have been held if they were to be held on December 7. The Navy is checking further to find what the actual logs on December 7 show and additional information will be forthcoming.

Senator LUCAS. What do the inspections show with respect to water-tight integrity? [7237]

Mr. HANNAFORD. The water-tight integrity aspects are covered in this memorandum which I have asked to be spread upon the record rather than reading it, Senator. I can read it if you wish me to.

Senator LUCAS. No; I will read it.

(The document referred to follows:)

20 DECEMBER 1945.

Inspections made on U. S. Battleships which were at Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec 1941. These inspections occurred on 5 or 6 Dec 1941 as designated.

U. S. S. *Arizona*

No log received for Dec 1941.

U. S. S. *California*

5 Dec 1941

1149 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

6 Dec 1941

1020 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

Made monthly inspection of all indices of smokeless powder on board; conditions normal.

U. S. S. *Maryland*

5 Dec 1941

[7238] 070 Food inspection.

6 Dec 1941

0800 Made daily visual examination of all smokeless powder samples, violet paper, and test for local heating of magazines on board ship; conditions normal.

1330 By order of the Commanding Officer, Lt (jg) Nelson H. Randall, C–V (S) USNR, was suspended from duty for a period of 5 days from and including this date for improper performance of duty as Communication Watch Officer failing to deliver a dispatch to the Commander Battleships Battle Force. The Commanding Officer further ordered that, due to the exigencies of the service Lt (jg) Randall is restored to duty for the duration of the Annual Military Inspection and Damage Control Practice of this vessel on December 8, 1941 and December 9, 1941.

U. S. S. *Nevada*

5 Dec 1941

No inspections.

6 Dec. 1941

0705 Food inspection.

0900 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

U. S. S. *Oklahoma*

No log received for Dec 1941.

[7239] U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*

5 Dec 1941
0800 Food inspection.
1150 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.
6 Dec 1941
0833 Landing force left the ship to be inspected by Commander Battleship Division TWO. 1045 Landing force returned.

U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*

6 Dec 1941
1155 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

U. S. S. *Tennessee*

5 Dec 1941
1010 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.
1445 Secured boiler number 8 after having conducted tests on safety valves.
6 Dec 1941
0745 Commenced embarking Landing Force for Annual Military Inspection.
1130 Landing Force returned aboard. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.

U. S. S. *West Virginia*

No log received for Dec 1941.

[7240] Mr. HANNAFORD. The next item that I have relates to an inquiry by Representative Gearhart, at page 879 of the transcript, in which he asked for the log of the U. S. S. *Wright* from November 27 to December 7, 1941.[1]

The Navy has furnished us with two copies of this log, which I think should be marked as an exhibit at this time, Exhibit 125 it would be.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be received as Exhibit 125.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 125.")

Mr. HANNAFORD. And without objection I would like to read two extracts from this log and also a memorandum from the Navy Department with relation to them.

On November 27, 1941, the entry at 2024 o'clock reads as follows:

Steaming as before. 2100 sighted unidentified ship bearing 205 true, distance approximately 10 miles on opposite parallel course; average steam 200 pounds; average RPM 87.

The second entry is one that appears at 1216 o'clock on December 7, 1941, and reads as follows:

Steaming as before. 1200 C–C 2, 109 degrees true and gyro; 098 degrees PCC and 098 degrees PSTGC. 1305 secured No. 1 boiler. 1711 sighted plane, bearing 170 de- [7241] gres true on opposite parallel course, distance 8 miles. Plane passed abeam to starboard. 1405 plane sighted off starboard beam on parallel course, distance 8 miles; average steaming 200 pounds, average RPM 84.

Now, the Navy has submitted us a memorandum attached to which is a chart, a map, at which the location of the *Wright* at those two points has been charted.

[1] Hearings, Part 1, p. 339.

With reference to the entry on November 27 where they sighted a ship, the Navy's memorandum says:

As shown by the enclosed chart, the U. S. S. *Wright* was approximately 1600 nautical miles distant from the assumed position of the Japanese striking force on 27 November 1941.

With respect to the entry on December 7, where the *Wright* sighed some planes, the Navy's memorandum says as follows:

As shown by the chart, the U. S. S. *Wright* was approximately 390 nautical miles from the assumed position of the Japanese striking force on 7 December 1941.

I might add that the entry on December 7 does not show whether the planes that they sighted was friend or foe.

Mr. GEARHART. Where was the *Wright* when it was 300 miles from the assumed position of the enemy?

Mr. HANNAFORD. From the chart it appears as though it is pretty nearly due west of the Hawaiian Islands.

[*7242*] Mr. GEARHART. How many miles?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I cannot read this chart. I would request that the chart be made part of the exhibit as well.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.

Mr. HANNAFORD. The last item I have is at page 6363 of the transcript, where Senator Ferguson asked for the reports of Mr. Curtis Munson. I would just like to note that we have handed those to Senator Ferguson yesterday.

Mr. GEARHART. Before we get away from that, will you tell me what detachment the *Wright* belonged to?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I am sorry, Congressman, I cannot. It perhaps is shown by the exhibit itself, Exhibit 6. Have we got a copy of Exhibit 6?

Senator LUCAS. The Navy men can tell you that.

Mr. MURPHY. The *Wright* was 22 north, 163 west C. V. as seaplane tender 300 miles west of Oahu. That is on the morning of December 7 at 8 o'clock.

Mr. HANNAFORD. I am not sure what it was doing, Congressman. The Navy advises me that they believe the *Wright* was on detached duty at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. It was a seaplane tender.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you explain that?

Mr. MURPHY. May I inquire about this Munson business? Is that very lengthy?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I actually have not seen it.

[*7243*] Mr. MURPHY. Is it very lengthy, the Munson report? You said you had it yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. 20 or 25 pages. I will have it here in the morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further from counsel?

Mr. HANNAFORD. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Senator George has just asked what the Munson report is. It is a report that, as I understand it, the State Department—or as an agent of the President they had a special intelligence system and Mr. Munson was one of the intelligence agents to go out and get information for the State Department and for the President on the Japanese question.

Mr. MURPHY. Who has got an extra copy?

Mr. HANNAFORD. That concludes all that I have.

Mr. MURPHY. Who has got an extra copy?

Mr. HANNAFORD. We have only one copy of it, Congressman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. May I inquire? The copy furnished Senator Ferguson is the only copy we have?

Mr. HANNAFORD. Yes, the copy furnished Senator Ferguson is the only copy we have. We can have it spread on the transcript.

Mr. MURPHY. It may not be material.

[7244] Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I think it is material.

Mr. HANNAFORD. I haven't read it; I do not know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, we can decide that later.

Senator FERGUSON. It shows this, that at least the State Department and the President were not satisfied with intelligence of the Army and the Navy and the FBI and they sent out their own intelligence agents to get certain information in relation to the Japanese both in Hawaii and the Japanese on the west coast.

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't it particularly as to the danger of uprisings among the Japanese element?

Senator FERGUSON. It covered that. It covered the whole question of espionage and counterespionage.

Senator LUCAS. I suggest that it be spread on the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, do you request that it be spread on the record?

Senator LUCAS. It is only 25 pages.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It that your request, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

[7245]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 11 January 1946.

Memorandum:
To: Mr. Seth Richardson.

1. In compliance with a request from your office, there is enclosed a photostatic copy of a "Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States" by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

/S/ John Ford Baecher
JOHN FORD BAECHER
Lt. Comdr., USNR.

(Pencil notation:) Received 1/15/46 JMH

Confidential Confidential

Subject: Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

Confidential Confidential

[7246] Secret
Confidential Confidential

Subject: Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

Secret Secret
Confidential Confidential

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
OP–16–B–7 *November 27, 1941.*

Memorandum for the Director

Subject: A Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

A résumé of this report by John Franklin Carter (Jay Franklin) is prefixed to Mr. Munson's report.

It is interesting to note that Mr. Munson stated that he spent about a week in the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval Districts with the full cooperation of Naval Intelligence Representatives. Mr. Munson stated, "Our Navy has done by far the most work on this problem, having given it intense consideration for the past ten or fifteen years."

Although Mr. Munson's report is a little lengthy, I think it is worth reading.

A copy of this report has been routed to Op–16–F, [7247] Op–11, Op–12, and Op–30. Copies will be sent to ComEleven, ComTwelve, and ComThirteen.

HARTWELL C. DAVIS.

Dictated November 27, 1941
Dictated by Commander Davis
Typed by R. Blalock

1st Endorsement

Op–13/PS NOVEMBER 25, 1941.
Serial No. 041813
(SC)A8–2/EF37
From: Director Central Division.
To: Director Naval Intelligence Division.
Subject: Confidential report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States.

1. Forwarded for information and file.

R. E. SCHUIRMANN.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
In reply refer to *Washington, November 24, 1941.*
U–L
Strictly Confidential

MEMORANDUM

To: Director, Central Division, Navy Department.
From: Liaison Officer.
Subject: Confidential report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States.

[7248] At the direction of the Under Secretary, I enclose for the confidential information of the Chief of Naval Operations a copy of C. B. Munson's report entitled "Japanese on the West Coast", together with a covering memorandum summarizing the report. The report, a secret one, was given the Under Secretary personally.

ORME WILSON, *Liaison Officer.*

Enclosure:
Copy of C. B. Munson's report.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 National Press Building

Confidential WASHINGTON, D. C., *November 7, 1941.*

MEMORANDUM ON C. B. MUNSON'S REPORT "JAPANESE ON THE WEST COAST"

Attached herewith is the report, with supplementary reports on Lower California and British Columbia. The report, though lengthy, is worth reading in its entirety. Salient passages are:

1) "There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite around their waists and make a human bomb out of themselves . . . but today they are few."

2) "There is no Japanese 'problem' on the coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will be [7249] undoubtedly some sabotage financed by Japan and executed largely by imported agents. There will be the odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese 'crackpot'."

3) "The dangerous part of their espionage is that they would be very effective as far as movement of supplies, movement of troops and movement of ships * * * is concerned."

4) "For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at worst, hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible mobs."

5) "Your reporter * * * is horrified to note that dams, bridges, harbors, power stations, etc. are wholly unguarded everywhere. The harbor of San Pedro could be razed by fire completely by four men with hand grenades and a little study in one night. Dams could be blown and half of lower California might actually die of thirst. * * * One railway bridge at the exits from the mountains in some cases could tie up three or four main railroads."

J. F. C.

[7250] JAPANESE ON THE WEST COAST

(C. B. Munson)

GROUND COVERED

In reporting on the Japanese "problem" on the West Coast the facts are, on the whole, fairly clear and opinion toward the problem exceedingly uniform. In reporting, the main difficulty is to know where to leave off and what to leave out. One could gather data for fifteen years with fifteen men and still be in the position of the Walrus and the Carpenter:

If seven maids with seven mops
Swept it for half a year—
Do you suppose, the Walrus said,
That they could get it clear?

Whisking up the grains of sand is the wrong approach, yet when your reporter declares there is a sea and a shore and some sand, and that he has sampled the general quality of sand in many varying beaches, do not be too hard in your judgment for him if he has stopped far short of sorting out each layer or tint or even each beach. You have to feel this problem—not figure it out with your pencil. We only cite the sand that our reader may never forget the complexities of even a shovel full of sand.

Your reporter spent about a week each in the 11th, 12th, and 13th Naval Districts with the full cooperation of the [7251] Naval and Army Intelligence and the FBI. Some mention should also be made of the assistance rendered from time to time by the British Intelligence. Our Navy has done by far the most work on this problem, having given it intense consideration for the last ten or fifteen years. Your reporter commenced in the 12th Naval District, which covers Northern California, from thence to the 13th, covering Washington and Oregon, winding up his observations in the 11th Naval District, covering Southern California, where to his mind the whole "problem" finally focuses. Your reporter also turned the corner into British Columbia through a member of the R. C. M. P. and the corner into Mexico through a conference with our Consul at Tijuana.

Opinions of the various services were obtained, also of business, employees, universities, fellow white workers, students, fish packers, lettuce packers, farmers, religious groups, etc. etc. The opinion expressed with minor differences was uniform. Select Japanese in all groups were sampled. To mix indiscriminately with the Japanese was not considered advisable chiefly because the opinions of many local white Americans who had made this their life work for the last fifteen years were available and it was foolish to suppose your reporter could add to the sum of knowledge in three weeks by running through the topmost twigs of a forest.

[7252] BACKGROUND

Unless familiar with the religious and family background of the Japanese, this rough background summary should be skimmed over as it has a bearing on the question. If the reader is familiar with the Japanese background, it may be omitted.

An American wit once said, "You cannot tell the truth about Japan without lying." The same witticism might be made with reference to the Japanese people, but, like all generalizations, it needs a corrective explanation. A study of Japan is a study in the category of social fully as much as of political science. The study of the Japanese people is one of absorbing interest.

Who are the Japanese people? From when did they come and what emotional concepts did they bring with them? While there might not be unanimity of opinion as to the various strains that go to make up the Japanese of today, one leading anthropologist, Dr. Frederick Star of the University of Chicago, a number of years ago said to the writer, "the Japanese are the most mixed race of people that I have ever studied." The Malay strain is pronounced in the Japanese, especially in the Province of Kumamoto. The Mongol is very pronounced in the upper middle as well as in the so-called higher brackets of society. Then there is the Aryan strain still to be seen in its unmixed form in the 17,000 and more Ainu who inhabit portions of Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands. [7253] These latter are related to the Aryan group in physiognomy and in language. These three strains have produced the Japanese of today.

The Ainu, insofar as we know, was the aboriginal. His social status was changed from time to time as conquering groups drove him farther and farther to the north. These conquering groups came from China via Korea. Japanese history begins with the conqueror Jimnu Tenno, who arrived on a "Floating Bridge of Heaven"—a poetical expression for his coming to Japan by boat. He found a tribal people with a primitive animistic faith of nature worship. He had a superior religion and he was shrewd. He told the conquered people that their reverence for the tribal chief was a true reverence and that he also revered the head of his clan which was the Sun Goddess, whose beneficient rule was seen in her health-giving rays. Thus began what is known as "Shinto" ("The Way of the Gods"), as we know it today. From the days of Jimnu (the first Japanese Emperor) to the present, all Japanese have revered the Emperor as a descendant of the Sun Goddess, whose appearance in Japanese mythology is too complicated to be discussed here.

Another cultural element in Japanese life stems from the introduction of Buddhism in Japan in the sixth and seventh centuries. Buddhism is a foreign religion and made little progress in Japan, even though it was fostered by [7254] the Emperor Prince Shotoku. Buddhism had a very difficult time until some wise propagandist hit upon the idea of incorporating the Shinto Gods into the Buddhist Pantheon. All the Shinto deities were recognized as avatars of Buddha and we have continuing in Japan until the days of the Restoration what is known as twofold Buddhism—a union of Shinto and Buddhism—a union so intricate that Buddhist God shelves in the home have unmistakable Shinto deities and Shinto God shelves have unmistakable Buddhist deities. Japan can never repay Buddhism for its contribution to the cultural life of the people. Its temples were schools wherein those who wished might be taught. It developed the arts and crafts, and was the developer and preserver of much that is beautiful in the cultural life of the Nation today.

While the Shinto and the Buddhist influence, separate and co-mingled, were moving forward, there developed in Japan a feudal type of society. This society was organized under the rule of a tribal person known as "The Great Name" (a land baron). He had warriers or knights known as Samurai. They, the Samurai, preserved order and fought battles to maintain the existance of the clan. Besides the Samurai there was the farmer who raised the food, the artisan who fashioned and fabricated the tools, not only of the farmer but also of the warrior, and there was the merchant; below them there was the eta, and lower still the hinin—whose who [7255] for misconduct or through capture had been reduced in status until they were not considered men, as the term "hinin" implies.

For nearly 1,000 years, this state of society existed with internecine wars of all too frequent and carnal occurrence until early in the seventeenth century when a great man, Ieyasu, appeared and became the founder of what is known as the Tokugawa family. The story of this period is interesting, but time and space do not permit the telling of it here, other than to say it was a period of about 250 years of great peace.

During the Tokugawa period, Confucianism had great vogue. The Samurai children were privileged to attend the few schools which were maintained and where the principles of Confucian ethics were taught, but with one great characteristic change—the Japanese substituted for the chief virtue, loyalty, for filial piety.

Chugi (loyalty) is loyalty, not to an idea nor an ideal, but to a person. In this feudal society personal relationships were supreme, and loyalty was the cardinal virtue.

In the feudal state, as well as throughout all Japanese history, the individual as an individual did not exist. He existed as a member of the clan. The family could dispose of individuals at will, should occasion merit such action. Even life itself could be taken, after the case had been [7256] submitted to the family council. In this connection, one should not overlook the tremendous influence of the dead. The living succeed or fail, are happy or sad, through the influence of the dead who live in the tombs of the village or hover over their familiar haunts. It is well to keep this in mind when estimating Japanese activity. The Japanese believe that the dead remain in the World and that all dead become Gods with supernatural powers, and that happiness of the dead depends upon respectful services that are rendered them by the living.

In a feudal society, the merchant cuts a very poor figure. He was looked down upon by the Samurai and he was inferior to the farmer and the artisan. It is significant that but a very few families of merchants have maintained a good social position. Of these there are the Mitsui, the Iwasaki (this latter being represented by what we know as the Mitsubishi), and also the Sumitomo family.

With the coming of Commodore Perry in 1853 and 1854, the feudalism began to pass away and within 20 years was abolished by Government edict. Although the feudal social system was legally abolished, its influence continues even today.

With the Restoration there appeared a new influence in Japanese life and that was the coming of the Christian missionary with his doctrine of individual responsibility to deity. This was something new to the Japanese system of [7257] society. Heretofore religion centered in the family, and family culture and family faith were a collective thing and not individual. The success of the missionary movement in Japan is remarkable because it brings this new element into the social picture. Wherever Christianity succeeds, it also succeeds in breaking the old family ties and hang-overs of a feudal order. Japan's advance in Government, its development educationally and the vast improvements that we see in society today have been furthered by the application of Western methods of teaching, of Government, etc. But, the Christian influence must not be underestimated nor should one go too far in overstressing its great importance. Christianity is individualistic, and that is one reason why the "powers that be" in Japan today are endeavoring to regulate its activities, if not to change some of its tenets. The Christian Japanese understand America better than any other group because they have been more and more weaned away from the influence of feudalism.

The Japanese are a perplexing people and their study is a very interesting and very enlightening one. They follow the leader—they have done this throughout all the years of their history. Even today, personal ties are stronger than legal ones.

No estimate of the elements characteristic of the Japanese is complete without a word about "giri". There is [7258] no accurate English word for "giri". The nearest approach to an understanding of the term is our word "obligation", which is very inadequate and altogether too weak. Favors or kindnesses done to a Japanese are never forgotten but are stored up in memory and in due time an adequate quid pro quo must be rendered in return. The clever and none-too scrupulous individual often hangs "giri" upon the unsuspecting, to their hurt and harm. "Giri" is the great political tool. To understand "giri" is to understand the Japanese.

ASSOCIATIONS

The Japanese is the grestest joiner in the world. To take care of this passion he has furnished himself with ample associations to join. There are around 1563 of these in the United States. Your reporter has before him a Japanese publication entitled "The Japanese-American Directory of 1941" at least two inches thick listing the Japanese associations in fine print. Your reporter also has before him lists furnished him in the various Naval Districts of some of the leading associations considered the most important, with full descriptions of their activities as far as known. It is endless to clutter up this report with them.

FAMILY SET-UP IN UNITED STATES

In the United States there are four divisions of Japanese to be considered:

1. The *ISSEI*—First generation Japanese. Entire [7259] cultural background Japanese. Probably loyal romantically to Japan. They must be con-

sidered, however, as other races. They have made this their home. They have brought up children here, their wealth accumulated by hard labor is here, and many would have become American citizens had they been allowed to do so. They are for the most part simple people. Their age group is largely 55 to 65, fairly old for a hard-working Japanese.

2. The *NISEI*—Second generation who have received their whole education in the United States and usually, in spite of discrimination against them and a certain amount of insults accumulated through the years from irresponsible elements, show a pathetic eagerness to be Americans. They are in constant conflict with the orthodox, well disciplined family life of their elders. Age group—1 to 30 years.

3. The *KIBEI*—This is an important division of the NISEI. This is the term used by the Japanese to signify those American born Japanese who received part or all of their education in Japan. In any consideration of the *KIBEI* they should be again divided into two classes, i. e. those who received their education in Japan from childhood to about 17 years of age and those who received their early formative education in the United States and returned to Japan for four or five years Japanese education. The Kibei are considered the most dangerous element and closer to the [*7260*] Issei with especial reference to those who received their early education in Japan. It must be noted, however, that many of those who visited Japan subsequent to their early American education come back with added loyalty to the United States. In fact it is a saying that all a Nisei needs is a trip to Japan to make a loyal American out of him. The American educated Japanese is a boor in Japan and treated as a foreigner and with a certain amount of contempt there. His trip is usually a painful experience.

4. The *SANSEI*—The Third generation Japanese is a baby and may be disregarded for the purpose of our survey.

We must now think back to the paragraph entitled BACKGROUND. This is tied into the family of which the Issei is the head with more authority and hold over his family than an old New England Bible-thundering pioneer. Their family life is disciplined and honorable. The children are obedient and the girls virtuous. We must think also of the Associations, some sinister, some emanating from Imperial Japan, some with Japanese Consular contacts. It all weaves up into a sinister pattern on paper. This pattern has been set up in a secret document entitled "Japanese Organizations and Activities in the 11th Naval District", and may be scrutinized with proper authorization in the Navy Department in Washington. We only suggest this to our reader in case our words have not built up the proper Hallowe'en atmosphere. It is like [*7261*] looking at the "punkin" itself. There is real fire in it, yet in many ways it is hollow and dusty. However, your reporter desires to have you know that all this exists before he goes on to the main body of his report on how the Japanese in the United States are liable to react in case of war with Japan.

The Tokio-Sun God-Religious-Family-Association plus oriental mind set-up shows signs of the honorable passage of time.

There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves. We grant this, but today they are few. Many things indicate that very many joints in the Japanese set-up show age, and many elements are not what they used to be. The weakest from a Japanese standpoint are the Nisei. They are universally estimated from 90 to 98 percent loyal to the United States if the Japanese educated element of the Kibei is excluded. The Nisei are pathetically eager to show this loyalty. They are not Japanese in culture. They are foreigners to Japan. Though American citizens they are not accepted by Americans, largely because they look differently and can be easily recognized. The Japanese American citizens League should be encouraged, the while an eye is kept open, to see that Tokio does not get its finger in this pie—which it has in a few cases attempted to do. The loyal Nisei [*7262*] hardly knows where to turn. Some gesture of protection or wholehearted acceptance of this group would go a long way to swinging them away from any last romantic hankering after old Japan. They are not oriental or mysterious, they are very American and are of a proud, self-respecting race suffering from a little inferiority complex and a lack of contact with the white boys they went to school with. They are eager for this contact and to work alongside them.

The Issei or first generation is considerably weakened in their loyalty to Japan by the fact that they have chosen to make this their home and have brought up their children here. They expect to die here. They are quite fearful of being put in a concentration camp. Many would take out American citizenship if

allowed to do so. The haste of this report does not allow us to go into this more fully. The Issei have to break with their religion, their god and Emperor, their family, their ancestors and their after-life in order to be loyal to the United States. They are also still legally Japanese. Yet they do break, and send their boys off to the Army with pride and tears. They are good neighbors. They are old men fifty-five to sixty-five, for the most part simple and dignified. Roughly they were Japanese lower middle class about analogous to the pilgrim fathers. They were largely farmers and fishermen. Today the Japanese is farmer, fisherman and businessman. They get [7263] very attached to the land they work or own (through the second generation). They like their own business, they do not work at industrial jobs nor for others except as a stepping stone to becoming independent.

The Kibei, educated from childhood to seventeen, are still the element most to be watched.

WHAT WILL THE JAPANESE DO

Sabotage

Now that we have roughly given a background and a description of the Japanese elements in the United States the question naturally arises—what will these people do in case of a war between the United States and Japan? As interview after interview piled up, those bringing in results began to call it the same old tune. Such it was with only minor differences. These contacts ranged all the way from two-day sessions with Intelligence Services, through businessmen, to Roman Catholic priests who were frankly not interested in the United States and were only interested in making as many Catholics as possible. The story was all the same. There is no Japanese "problem" on the Coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will undoubtedly be some sabotage financed by Japan and executed largely by imported agents or agents already imported. There will be the odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese "crackpot". In each Naval District there are about 250 to 300 suspects [7264] under surveillance. It is easy to get on the suspect list, merely a speech in favor of Japan at some banquet, being sufficient to land one there. The Intelligence Services are generous with the title of suspect and are taking no chances. Privately, they believe that only 50 or 60 in each district can be classed as really dangerous. The Japanese are hampered as saboteurs because of their easily recognized physical appearance. It will be hard for them to get near anything to blow up *if it is guarded.* There is far more danger from Communists and people of the Bridges type on the Coast than there is from Japanese. The Japanese here is almost exclusively a farmer, a fisherman or a small businessman. He has no entree to plants or intricate machinery.

Espionage

The Japanese, if undisturbed and disloyal, should be well equipped for obvious physical espionage. A great part of this work was probably completed and forwarded to Tokio years ago, such as soundings and photography of every inch of the Coast. They are probably familiar with the location of every building and garage including Mike O'Flarety's out-house in the Siskiyous with all trails leading thereto. An experienced Captain in Navy Intelligence, who has from time to time and over a period of years intercepted information Tokio bound, said he would certainly hate to be a Japanese coordinator of information in Tokio. He stated that the mass of useless [7265] information was unbelievable. This would be fine for a fifth column in Belgium or Holland with the German army ready to march in over the border, but though the local Japanese could spare a man who intimately knew the country for each Japanese invasion squad, there would at least have to be a terrific American Naval disaster before his brown brothers would need his services. The dangerous part of their espionage is that they would be very effective as far as movement of supplies, movement of troops and movement of ships out of harbor mouths and over railroads is concerned. They occupy only rarely positions where they can get to confidential papers or in plants. They are usually, when rarely so placed, a subject of perpetual watch and suspicion by their fellow workers. They would have to buy most of this type of information from white people.

Propaganda

Their direct propaganda is poor and rather ineffective on the whole. Their indirect is more successful. By indirect we mean propaganda preaching the

beauties of Japan and the sweet innocence of the Japanese race to susceptible Americans.

Summary

Japan will commit some sabotage largely depending on imported Japanese as they are afraid of and do not trust the Nisei. There will be no wholehearted response from [7266] Japanese in the United States. They may get some helpers from certain Kibei. They will be in a position to pick up information on troop, supply and ship movements from local Japanese.

For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at worst, hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible mobs. We do not believe that they would be at the least any more disloyal than any other racial group in the United States with whom we went to war. Those being here are on a spot and they *know it*. This is a hurried, preliminary report as our boat sails soon for Honolulu. We have not had a moment even to sort out our voluminous material since we came west. Your reporter is very satisfied he has told you what to expect from the local Japanese, but is horrified to note that dams, bridges, harbors, power stations, etc., are wholly unguarded everywhere. The harbor of San Pedro could be razed by fire completely by four men with hand grenades and a little study in one night. Dams could be blown and half of lower California might actually die of thirst, not to mention the damage to the food supply. One railway bridge at the exit from the mountains in some cases could tie up three or four main railroads. The Navy has to crawl around San Pedro on its marrow bones from oil company to oil company, from lumber yard to harbor board, to city fathers, to politicians in lieu [7267] of a centralzed authority, in order to strive albeit only partially to protect the conglomeration of oil tanks, lumber, gas tanks and heaven knows what else. And this is the second greatest port in the United States! This is the home base of at least the South Pacific Fleet! This is the greatest collection of inflammable material we have ever seen in our lifetime concentrated in a small vulnerable area! We do not suspect the local Japanese above anyone else or as much as the Communists or the Nazis, but before or on the outbreak of war in the South Pacific someone will set fire to this. If they do not they are fools. The Navy or some unified authority should have complete control of the harbor of Los Angeles, known as San Pedro and Long Beach, from the water's edge in a twenty-five mile radius inland, before the outbreak of war with Japan. That time is now.

We will re-work this report for final submittal later. We have missed a great deal through haste. We believe we have given the high points to the best of our ability. The Japanese are loyal on the whole, but we are wide open to sabotage on this Coast and as far inland as the mountains, and while this one fact goes unrectified I cannot unqualifiedly state that there is no danger from the Japanese living in the United States which otherwise I would be willing to state.

[7268] SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON LOWER CALIFORNIA AND NORTHWESTERN MEXICO

In a conference with the U. S. Consul from Tijuana, he stated that there was no Japanese problem in his district as there were very few Japanese left there. One Rodriguez, former Governor for many years of Lower California, and very partial to the United States, abetted by the American Navy, has set up a shrimp fishing monopoly in the Gulf of California thereby eliminating Japanese fishing (Japan-controlled) in this area. The Consul states that he has sent full reports to the State Department covering the situation there. There is evidently nothing in the Japanese problem across the border about which to be exercised.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON BRITISH COLUMBIA

The following information was furnished by a reliable source but it has not been verified and cannot be vouched for.

The total population of Japanese in Canada is estimated as between 25,000 and 30,000 of whom 23,000 reside in British Columbia. A few of these Japanese are naturalized but the great majority are either native born Canadians or immigrants.

The Japanese population is suspected of having a predilection for Japan although the exact feelings of most of them is unknown. They are not believed to

be a serious threat from a standpoint of armed uprisings in the event of war although there are probably a number of individuals in [7269] the group who would engage in subversive activity.

From a strategic point of view these Japanese are dangerously located in event of war between Canada and Japan. They are situated at the mouths of important rivers and around the entrances of harbors. There are many of them located in the vicinities of important air bases in British Columbia. Japanese communities exist at most of the strategic points throughout the province. They own a total of 2,144 vessels in Provincial waters, 211 of these vessels being over ten tons. As a race they generally look to the Japanese Consul for their guidance in matters pertaining to their welfare and political position in the community.

REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS REGARDING HANDLING JAPANESE QUESTION ON THE COAST

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.,
December 20, 1941.

(C. B. Munson)

This report should be read in conjunction with your observer's pre-war report on the "Japanese on the West Coast," and his report entitled "Report on Hawaiian Islands." Our report on "Hawaiian Islands" should be attached to and become part of our report on "Japanese on the West Coast." We did not repeat many basic statements originally embodied in the first report ("Japanese on the West Coast") in the later [7270] report ("Report on the Hawaiian Islands") as these statements had already been made and held good in both cases.

We desire respectfully to call attention to a statement of the Secretary of the Navy evidently made to some reporter on his return to Washington after the Pearl Harbor attack as printed in the Los Angeles Times of December 18 and the Los Angeles Herald and Express of December 16 (marked in red, clipping enclosed). This release was a UP and AP release.

We quote, "I think the most effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii with the possible exception of Norway," Secretary of the Navy Knox said. We suggest that this paragraph creates the wrong impression in that it uses the term "Fifth Column." This term is loose and has been widely abused. Should not the term "complete physical espionage" have been used instead? "Physical espionage" is supplied unwittingly by the gabble of Navy wives, by the gabble of loyal second generation Japanese, by the gabble of the postman and the milkman and classified by definite agents of a foreign government. To this may be added years of photographing, sounding and "look seeing" by disloyal and paid American people for the last twenty years. Fifth Column activities, such as in Norway, impugns the loyalty of a certain large proportion of a population Your observer still doubts that this was the case in Honolulu. [7271] He doubts, for instance, that outside of sabotage, organized and paid for by the Imperial Japanese Government beforehand (i. e. professional work), that there was any large disloyal element of the Japanese population which went into action as a Fifth Column, running around and intentionally disrupting things on their own hook. We draw attention to the remark in the Secretary's report that people of Japanese ancestry employed at Pearl Harbor burnt their hands on machine gun barrels firing at Japanese planes.

What makes this physical espionage so effective and dangerous on the West Coast and in Honolulu, as we printed in our first report, is simply that there are a lot of Japanese in these districts and have been for years. For instance, we are given to understand that the best maps on the Aleutian Islands were and still are Japanese.

Some reaction of an undesirable nature is already apparent on the West Coast due to this statement of the Secretary's. In Honolulu your observer noted that the seagoing Navy was inclined to consider everybody with slant eyes bad. This thought stems from two sources; self-interest, largely in the economic field, and in the Navy usually from pure lack of knowledge and the good old "eat 'em up alive" school. It is not the measured judgment of 98% of the intelligence services or the knowing citizenry either on the mainland or in Honolulu. An observer can only report [7272] what he observes. Your observer must note without fear or favor that 99% of the most intelligent views on the Japanese, by military, official and civil contacts in Honolulu and the mainland, was best crystalized by two Intelligence men before the outbreak of the war. These two

men are Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle of the 11th Naval District in Los Angeles and Mr. Shivers in Honolulu of the F. B. I. Mr. Shivers in Honolulu, since the attack on Pearl Harbor, should know whether he was right or wrong, and we believe he is big and loyal enough to be only interested in finding out in what regards he was wrong and immediately notifying his superiors. In our first report we quoted Alice in Wonderland,

"If seven maids with seven mops
Swept it for half a year,
Do you suppose, the Walrus said,
That they could get it clear?"

The best measured judgment on the local Japanese may be wrong. Mr. Shivers in Honolulu holds the key. An attack is the proof of the pudding. His hindsight should be of inestimable value in shaping policy toward these people on the mainland where an attack has not yet occurred. Your observer guesses by mental telepathy that Mr. Shivers has not changed his point of view. Your observer suspects that Secretary Knox's comparison to the Fifth Column in Norways [7273] stems from either of two things: First, a very busy man being caught by the coattails by a reporter; and second, from the *unknowing* "eat 'em up alive" element amongst whom of necessity he was largely exposed in his hurried visit to determine responsibility.

Your reporter, fully believing that his original reports are still good after the *attack*, makes the following observations about handling the Japanese "problem" on the West Coast.

If Shivers says he was wrong, your observer is wrong too, and this report should be thrown in the ashcan and something much tougher substituted.

[7274] SUGGESTIONS

A. The loyal Japanese citizens should be encouraged by a statement from *high* government authority and public attitude toward them outlined.

B. Their offers of assistance should be accepted through such agencies as:

1. Civilian Defense
2. Red Cross
3. U. S. O., etc., etc.

This assistance should not be merely monetary, nor should it even be limited to physical voluntary work in segregated Nisei units. The Nisei should work with and among white persons, and (b) made to feel he is welcome on a basis of equality.

C. An alien property custodian should be appointed to supervise Issei (first generation-alien) businesses, *but* encouraging Nisei (second generation-American citizen) to take over.

D. Accept investigated Nisei as workers in defense industries such as ship-building plants, aircraft plants, etc.

E. Put *responsibility* for behavior of Issei and Nisei on the leaders of Nisei groups such as the Japanese American Citizens League.

F. Put the *responsibility* for production of food (vegetables, fish, etc.) on Nisei leaders.

Enlargement of Foregoing Suggestions

A. "High Government Authority," i. e. President or Vice [7275] President, or at least almost as high.

C. *Memorandum Concerning Farm Food Production and Distribution Situation in the Los Angeles Area following December 7, 1941.*—The immediate results at the revocation of all licenses authorising Japanese Nationals to engage in business was a sharp curtailment of the movement of vegetable produce into the Los Angeles market. This was due to the closing of a number of houses in the local produce market owned or controlled by Japanese Nationals and to a fear on the part of the Japanese Nationals on the farms that their produce would not be received or handled if they brought it in; also due to the immediate blocking of all bank accounts of Japanese Nationals.

It was at once obvious that some provisions must quickly be made to relieve the stoppage of food production and distribution. Under the assumption that they would be asked for advice for a plan of reopening the several closed Issei produce houses under Federal control, a plan was discussed and tentatively drawn up by a group of local produce dealers.

In anticipation of a lessening of these restrictions a press release was issued on December 11th calling upon Japanese farmers to bring their products to market as evidence of their loyalty to the United States and assuring [7276] them that these products would be received by American firms for marketing. Issuance of the General License No. 77 under Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940 as amended and Regulations issued pursuant thereto relating to transactions in foreign exchange, etc., issued by the Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of December 11, 1941, granted a general license under strict banking control for certain Japanese Nationals to engage in the production, marketing and distribution of food products in Continental United States.

As a result of the press release and the issuance of General License above referred to, the local produce market which on December 11th had a total volume of only 30 percent of normal, received 75 percent of normal on December 12th and was virtually normal on December 13th. In spite of the apparent severity of the banking controls set up by this General License, it was generally accepted by all concerned as a necessary thing and discussions were immediately undertaken as to the most effective means of operating under its terms without severe dislocation of the food production program.

Since the new license No. 77 immediately allowed the Issei produce houses to open under their former management in a manner more lenient than had been expected, it was still believed that these houses would be promptly taken [7277] over directly or indirectly by the Federal Government so as to transfer their operations to the control of American citizens. This was particularly expected because of the belief that operation of these houses had been strongly influenced and directed previously by the Japanese Government.

"As discussions were proceeding looking to the setting up of a successful program for gradually taking over these essential businesses by American citizens and as clarification of a few points in the General License above mentioned were being requested, these discussions running over into Monday, December 15th, we were suddenly surprised to receive copies of General License No. 68a under Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940, as amended and regulations issued pursuant thereto, relating to transactions in foreign exchange, etc., issued by the Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of December 15, 1941. We assume that this order may have been issued as a result of the wave of query and protest that may have arisen immediately following the realization of the total freezing situation which occurred immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. At any rate, the effect of General License No. 68a which appears to open wide the doors so far as Continental transactions are concerned, and puts a great number of Japanese nationals back in control, rather than the loyal American citizens of Japanese parentage, many of whom we had expected would be [7278] put in control of these essential businesses.

"It has been and is our belief that the objectionable features of the old control system have operated by virtue of control over consignments of merchandise and credits exercised by the Issei produce houses against the Japanese on the farms. Of prime necessity then is the complete elimination of Japanese national control of the produce houses. How far into the farms the elimination of Japanese National control should extend depends upon the individual circumstances. In some cases on the farm, control has already passed—in some cases perhaps several years back—into the hands of the American citizen children of Japanese parents. It is believed that in many other cases there are on the farms Nisei children capable of assuming complete control and who would have assumed that control very promptly if it had not been for the issuance of License No. 68a previously referred to.

"There are unquestionably a number of Japanese National farmers eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. Some of these have minor children who are not yet capable of taking over the control of the farm. There are also unquestionably instances of Japanese Aliens on farms whose capable sons of American birth are in the United States Army and hence not available for control or operation of the farm. These are some of the reasons why the matter must be approached from the point of view of con- [7279] sideration of the individual cases.

"The statement is made by authoritative sources that Japanese National firms have in the past appropriated for their own use funds that were due Japanese National farmers in one locality in order to extend credit to Japanese National farmers in other localities so that American citizen farmers competing with them could be driven out of business and in turn this second group having been established would be used as a source of funds to repeat the operation in another locality.

"Although there are California statutes providing ample redress for any farmer who believes he has not received proper returns from the commission house, it is reported that Japanese National farmers never make a complaint nor will they allow their names to be used to enable the California officials to properly enforce these statutes. It is extremely doubtful if this condition would exist in relations between Japanese American citizens if they are found ready to avail themselves of the protection and the machinery set up by American laws for preventing such abuses in business transactions.

"The fact that some of the Japanese Aliens are operating as commission merchants without proper license and bond in violation of these California statutes are some of the reasons for placing emphasis on the necessity for proceeding as [7280] promptly as possible toward elimination of the alien controlled distributor houses and in this field there are a great number of loyal American citizens of Japanese parentage capable of taking over with or without immediate control and governmental direction of the operation of these houses."

D. *Fishing Industry.*—Fishing and produce are the two major industries of the Japanese. Shopkeeping comes third, but is much smaller than the other two. There are many little industries such as sign painting. It is our belief, however, that if the two major industries are reorganized to function properly in safe hands that the other minor industries will either be satisfactorily adjusted to the change along the same line or can be taken up later.

There are distinct differences between produce and fishing. Fishing provides an opportunity for direct contact with the enemy and transmission of information, probably to submarines, although transmission of information to surface vessels is not an improbability. The general practice is that the Nisei do not own or captain fish boats. Japanese and those of Japanese descent own the nets and tools for fishing and organize into gangs while the fish boat operators hire the gangs with their nets. We consider it very dangerous to send all Japanese or all [7281] Nisei crews to sea. The real danger in this lies in the fact that all Japanese crews in the intense competition of following the fish might get into battles with Scandanavian, Czechoslovakian and Italian crews. The fishing people would like to use part Nisei crews—i. e., mixed crews. For this purpose a clearing house of loyal Nisei should be established (Japanese American Citizens League) to guarantee and give clearance to those who fish. Incidentally, the fuel might be limited to the amount necessary for the trip. Of course this is equally true of all Italians and other nationalities who are fishing. Unlike the produce industry less than 25 percent of the fishing is in Japanese hands. There has been issued from Washington an order which keeps all Japanese, including American citizens of Japanese ancestry from fishing. This is palpably hysteria as they are not any much more of a danger than the Italians who are still quite freely fishing.

E. & F. In case we have not made it apparent, the aim of this report is that all Japanese Nationals in the continental United States and property owned and operated by them within this country be immediately placed under absolute Federal control.

The aim of this will be to squeeze control from the hands of the Japanese Nationals into the hands of the loyal Nisei who are American citizens. As there may be a small [7282] percentage of these Nisei who are not loyal, it is also the intention that those Nisei who are put in positions of trust will be passed upon by the unquestionably loyal Nisei who focus in some organization such as the Japanese American Citizens League. It is the aim that the Nisei should police themselves, and as a result police their parents. Whatever organization (Japanese American Citizens League?) wields this influence, it in turn must be rigidly approved by and under the thumb of our government or some group which fully understands the Japanese on the Coast and is appointed by our government. This body should be on the Pacific coast, fully conversant and in touch with local problems and preferably of a military or naval intelligence texture.

Likewise there are many technical aliens (legally Japanese citizens who are loyal to U. S. but prevented by our laws from becoming naturalized). The control should be sufficiently flexible to encourage these on the basis of performance in each individual case.

To illustrate such a case there are two Japanese ministers in the city of Bakersfield, California; one Christian, one Buddhist. The Christian minister is an alien. He came to the United States in infancy, grew up here, and is thoroughly loyal to the United States. The Buddhist minister is legally a U. S. citizen. He

went to Japan in infancy, grew to manhood there, and returned to the United [7283] States within the last two years. He cannot speak good English. Which is really the American?

REPORT ON HAWAIIAN ISLANDS BY CURTIS B. MUNSON

Your reporter, after a four weeks' survey of the Japanese problem on the Pacific Coast, sailed for Honolulu, where he spent nine days. There he received the full cooperation of Army and Navy Intelligence Services and the F. B. I. He also contacted British Intelligence based on Singapore. In the civilian field he had many personal interviews with first and second generation Japanese, police chiefs, school teachers, businessmen, contractors, rural officials, etc. The F. B. I. seem to hold the leading place in Honolulu, due to the fact that they have been set up longer on the Japanese question and also due to the personality of Mr. Shivers, their Agents in Charge. He has gone far to develop the confidence of the Japanese and others in himself and his organization there. The Army got going next, and as they have to live with the Japanese on land while the Navy sails the seas, they have earnestly thrown themselves into the task under an able Reserve officer who brings experience in intelligence service in the last war and decided business acument to bear upon his assignment. The Naval Intelligence, though a late starter, is silently and ably developing an organization whose real power will not reach its peak for [7284] four or five months yet. There is the same cooperation between the Services that is evidence on the mainland.

The consensus of opinion is that there will be no racial uprising of the Japanese in Honolulu. The first generation, as on the Coast, are ideologically and culturally closest to Japan. Though many of them speak no English, or at best only pigeon-English, it is considered that the big bulk of them will be loyal. This is especially so, for in Hawaii the first generation is largely on the land and devoted to it. It may be well to state here in a general way that everyone in Hawaii, especially in the dark-skinned laboring classes, places loyalty to Hawaii first, and the United States second. This is not meant to impugn their loyalty—but they love the Islands. The second generation is estimated as approximately ninety-eight percent loyal. However, with the large Japanese population in the Hawaiian Islands, giving this the best interpretation possible, it would mean that fifteen hundred were disloyal. However, the F. B. I. state that there are about four hundred suspects, and the F. B. I's private estimate is that only fifty or sixty of these are sinister. (In all figures given on suspects only aliens are considered. Should it be possible to pick up citizens, this figure would have to be materially increased.) There are also a few Germans and Italians in the Islands who should be picked up. We [7285] do not at the moment remember the exact number, whether it was seven or seventeen. The Army Intelligence showed this reporter a secret map with pins of different colors to denote first generation, second generation, and other nationalities who are suspect, and their distribution in the Islands. Each one of these men's address is known and they showed me that it would be a comparatively easy job to pick them up almost in a few hours, should the necessity arise. There is not the same danger as in Continental United States that if they escaped the first grab that they will completely escape, as of course they have nowhere to go but the Pacific Ocean. There will be, undoubtedly, planted Japanese and agents who are there for the purpose of sabotage. Though sabotage may be expected, it is a self-evident fact that the main things to sabotage in he Islands are the Army and Navy installations, and these are under the protection and complete control of the two services. However, materials are sometimes lacking to build, say protecting guard fences. Outside of the services' installations there are only two things open to sabotage; the commercial waterfront (this does not include Pearl Harbor), and the power stations and power lines. However, these power lines are especially important, for if one transformer is damaged in the Islands there are no replacements, and it would be a considerable time before a replacement could be secured [7286] from the mainland. Hawaii is particularly fortunate as regards water supply, possessing a large artesian flow along with numerous reservoirs. Fortunately, in the Islands there would be no "White" sabotage which could be purchased by the Japanese, as there is on the Coast, outside of the imported white defense workers. There are very few whites who would be anything except loyal.

The danger of espionage is considerable. This is especially the case as many Navy wives are over-garrulous with regard to their husbands' departures and

where they are going. We believe that the Naval Intelligence Service is looking to put a curb on this, and we are sure they can be trusted to police their own family. However, facts can be easily compiled from mail piling up, milk and grocery orders cancelled, along with knowledge of what officer is on what ship and other private information, which might indicate the length of the ship's visit and where headed. This is almost unavoidable in such a compact and small community, though the services bear this in mind. The bottleneck in the Japanese espionage would not be in the gathering of data but how to transmit it to Japan. This was easy when Japanese vessels were touching at the Hawaiian Islands. Now it is very far from easy. It has been suggested that fishing boats might drop oilskin packages at sea to be picked up by Japanese Naval vessels. This has [7287] more the elements of rumor, especially as no such parcels have ever been picked up at sea by the numerous American vessels. It is suggested that the transmittal may be going East instead of West, probably to Mexico or some such likely point. From there it would be an easier task to forward it to Japan. In this connection there is also some suggestion that rumors with sufficient basis in fact to cause the Naval Intelligence to look into it, emanate from Mexico City to the Islands. A sample of this was the story pointing to Mexico City as a source that the Japanese were running submarines off the shore of a certain Island, the crew submerging them and going ashore. With them they brought an end of an electric wire on shore. On M day they would press a button which would set the submarine mechanism to work so it would again come to the surface. The grain of truth which made the rumor interesting was the fact that the shores of the Hawaiian Islands are notoriously deep, rocky, and unsuited for this purpose. The one spot in all the Islands which the chart showed was suitable was the small spot indicated by the rumor. Investigation by the Navy proved there were no submarines sunk on this one sandy-bottom shoal. However, it wasted a good deal of their time, as did some other rumors of this nature. All these rumors had one basic local fact which was true and all seemed to start from Mexico City.

[7288] One important difference between the situation in Hawaii and the mainland is that if all the Japanese on the mainland were actively disloyal they could be corraled or destroyed within a very short time. In the Hawaiian Islands, though there are sufficient American troops and Navy present to overwhelm the Japanese population, it would simply mean that the Islands would lose their vital labor supply by so doing, and in addition to that we would have to feed them, as well as import many thousands of laborers to take their place. Since a large party of the vital and essential work of the Islands is ably carried on by the Japanese population, it is essential that they should be kept loyal—at least to the extent of staying at their tasks. If Imperial Japan were wise, she would devote all her energies in the Hawaiian Islands to trying to induce a spirit of mind which would cause a universal Japanese sit-down strike. She evidently has not thought of this as there is no sign of this type of propaganda. Propaganda, by Japan, is practically non-existent on the Islands.

No report on Honolulu should start anywhere but with the "Big Five." The "Houies" or white people at the head of Island affairs centralize in the Big Five. The native whites who own the Islands are in a general way descendants of white missionaries and traders. Due to these two facts, they had an interest in their labor—Japanese, Philippine, [7289] Hawaiian and Portuguese—and treated them well. Though they paid low wages and made money out of the Islands, there was hardly ever any absentee management. They sent their sons to Yale, Harvard and Princeton, and these sons returned to carry on the work of the Islands. There was never the abuse of labor in the Islands by rich, low white trash which made Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, or the bull pens of Idaho famous and contributed so to the rise of the "isms." You never see today a pair of patched pants in any of the Islands, and a short stroll through the streets of Honolulu—if one eliminates the defense workers imported from the mainland—convinces one that the faces are the fairly contented faces of people who have been, on the whole, not badly treated.

The Islands are really a huge monopoly, centralized under the ownership of five families and an independent or two. These five families are called the "Big Five." The "Howies" include the sons, the management and less fortunate whites of long residence—in a word, all those who go to make up the directing business force of the Islands. These whites, especially the "Big Five," are intelligent and see the handwriting on the wall. They know that this last oasis of paternalistic capitalism is doomed. Naturally they are determined to hold onto it 'til the

last ditch. Due to the fact that the Japanese have always voted either as [7290] Democrats or Republicans, the whites control the Islands politically. If the Japanese ever voted on racial lines, it is they who would control politically. However, it must be said to their credit and the credit of the white owner class that they have never done this. The politics are really controlled in a last analysis by the "Big Five". The people of these Islands have become accustomed to being controlled thus, and as a result it must not be overlooked as a factor of safety in the control of the Japanese "Problem" in the Islands. The "Big Five" see in the ascending power of the Army and the Navy, due to war, a factor which is sure to hasten the end of this "last oasis of paternalistic capitalism" previously referred to. Thus we have in the Islands the development of three lines of thought. One is exemplified in the sea-going branch of the Navy. This leans to a slight lack of regard for the civilian life on the Islands, or possibly is the best expressed by saying that it regards the Islands as a Naval Base and wants them to be a darn good base, regardless. Of course, this point of view is wholly unofficial, but it exists in unthinking elements of the Navy. The second thought exemplified is the thought of the extreme element of paternalistic capitalism which desires to keep control in their own hands to the "nth" hour as far as safety of the Navy or the Army forces is concerned. The heads of the F. B. I. and, [7291] we believe, the Intelligence Services generally, as well as most responsible service people, take the well-balanced middle view. This view is the one which we desire to make apparent in our report. The well established and really kindly paternalism of the Islands has a definite contribution to make and deserves credit as a considerable factor in the safety of the Islands.

The general background and characteristics of the Japanese are the same in the Islands as they are on the mainland. However, certain differences in the situation have tended to ameliorate these in some particulars. We believe that the best over-all method of expressing this is by the following observation: This reporter believes there is this fundamental difference between the Japanese "Problem" on the Coast and the Japanese "Problem" in the Hawaiian Islands. On the Coast, the Japanese are discriminated against on a racial basis. In Hawaii it is really only on a social and economic basis. This is peculiarly American. In our materialistic civilization one fits in socially largely on an income basis, provided he is willing to wash his neck and give up eating with his knife. In Hawaii, the Japanese fit in thus among the bulk of the inhabitants because the bulk are dark-skinned of one kind or another. The whites generally are on a higher economic plane than they are on the mainland. The few Japanese who [7292] reach a position economically where they can mix with the whites are not numerous enough to make much impression even if they do resent not being asked to tea. The bulk of the whites in Hawaii would not mix socially anyway with stevedores or dock laborers, black or white. On the mainland there are plenty of "Okies" to call the Japanese a "Yellow-belly," when economically and by education the Japanese may not only be their equal but their superior.

The result of this is that the Hawaiian Japanese does not suffer from the same inferiority complex or feel the same mistrust of the whites that he does on the mainland. While it is seldom on the mainland that you find even a college-educated Japanese-American citizen who talks to you wholly openly until you have gained his confidence, this is far from the case in Hawaii. Many young Japanese there are fully as open and frank and at ease with a white as white boys are. In a word, Hawaii is more of a melting pot because there are more brown skins to melt—Japanese, Hawaiian, Chinese and Filipino. It is interesting to note that there has been absolutely no bad feeling between the Japanese and the Chinese in the islands due to the Japanese-Chinese war. Why should they be any worse toward us?

The extreme Japanese "lover" in Hawaii is probably motivated frequently by self-interest. This is because he knows that the economic status quo is built largely on the [7293] fine industry of the Japanese labor, and he wishes to keep control of this as long as possible and is very loath to suggest to the Army or Navy that there is any danger from the Japanese. Any extreme anti-Japanese thought in Hawaii is probably due either to an unthinking element of the Navy which wants its base to be secure and of good service regardless of other consequences, or it is extremely anti-"Big Five" thought.

Imperial Japan has attempted to do the same things in Hawaii that she has attempted to do on the mainland. Anyone interested in the Imperial Japanese picture visualized on paper should refer to secret documents in the office of the F. B. I. in Washington entitled "Japanese Charts of Hawaiian Office." This

will show the same network of Reserve officers, Shinto and Buddhist priests, language schools, prefectural clubs and associations, etc., as will be found in the Navy Department in Washington in secret charts entitled "Japanese Organizations and Activities in the Eleventh Naval District." This reporter did not visit any other Island than that of Oahu, in which is found the city of Honolulu. The Service theory is that this is the only really good harbor and so all the defenses have been concentrated on this Island. In order to attack this Island Japan would first have to seize one of the other Islands and then be strong enough to seize, from there, Oahu. If she were strong enough to do [7294] this she would be strong enough to seize one of the other Islands first anyhow. Therefore there has been no spreading of defenses thin over the whole group. There is only one other harbor at Hilo, on the Island of Hawaii, and this is a poor one. Of course, surveillance and small garrisons are maintained on the other Islands of this group. This reporter was advised that he would be more or less wasting time to visit these other islands. There is possibly only one that he was negligent in not visiting, though advised that it was unnecessary. That was the Island of Kausi. The Japanese Communists are more strongly organized on this Island than on any of the others. We believe Japanese Communism is purely economic and on this Island it is not considered a really serious factor. However, this is the Island that Japan would be most likely to seize in the case she felt herself strong enough to have a base for an assault on Oahu.

The best consensus of opinion seemed to agree that martial law should be proclaimed now in Hawaii. We believe that under appointment from the President, the Governor of Hawaii is empowered to declare martial law when he feels the need. Many people in Hawaii felt that the Governor was fairly spineless and would not do anything soon enough. However, the Army Intelligence Head told your reporter confidentially that the Governor would be pretty well guided [7295] by what General Short (Commanding General, Army Forces, Hawaii) told him to do. In other words, he said the Governor was under General Short's thumb. If this is the case, your reporter sees no need to worry on this score, and in line with this, read in the newspapers since leaving Hawaii that the Governor had made some official move which envisaged the posting of guards at all vulnerable points. Your reporter is not in a position to say definitely one way or the other whether the Governor is spineless, whether he is a man of determination or whether (which would be ideal) he is under the thumb of General Short.

There is some danger in Hawaii of race riots. This is largely due to four elements. The Filipinos are intensely anti-Japanese and if they were attacked on the Philippine Islands they have threatened they would kill every Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands. The Intelligence Services, however, have made particular note of this and in conjunction with the sugar plantations, by whom most of the Filipinos are employed and controlled, have lectured the Filipinos kindly but firmly on this point. They have pointed out that if there is to be interference with any of the inhabitants of the Islands it must be by the properly authorized officials of the American Government. The Filipinos seem to have appreciated this and considerably toned down their patriotism. There is a type of Japanese who may be termed the "bright [7296] young thing," a bit loud, and liable to be openly resentful of insult. He is the prototype of his brother on the mainland. He has broken away from the fine character and parental control of his Japanese background while becoming too Americanized without fully comprehending what Americanization means. Fortunately, he represents a small group in the second-generation Japanese and contributes most of the juvenile delinquency which is found in this race. He gets drunk and frequents pool halls. There is danger that drunk sailors may push him off the street and call him a "Yellow-belly," especially if they have just returned from some Naval battle with the Japanese. Where other Japanese would take this in silent anger, this bright young thing might hit back and start some racial trouble. However, it must be said that the Army and Navy have this fully in mind and are very efficiently policing their own families. The sailors are extremely well behaved and it is a matter of common comment and approval. The real danger of racial trouble comes from the defense workers who have been imported from the mainland. Most of these come from the Pacific Coast and contain the dregs of the waterfront element. If they had been able to secure a job on the mainland, they would not have gone to Hawaii. They include many of the "Okie" class and to them any brown-skin is "Nigger." They

do not like the Islands and are only there because they could not get a job [7297] on the mainland. They already have insulted many Kanakas by calling them "Negroes" and treating them as such. To them every Japanese is a "Yellow Peril" and to be treated accordingly. There is fear in the native white element in the Islands that these people will create a problem after the emergency or war is over. The controlling plantation and business class would prefer to bring in Filipino labor to take care of the shortage of labor on the plantations caused by the former plantation workers going into defense work. In fact, they feel that all labor for the Islands should be imported from the Philippines. Of course, the reasons are pretty selfish as the Filipinos are more docile, and easily handled and create no problem for the future. Besides, the construction labor recruited from the Coast is additional handwriting on the wall pointing to the final destruction of paternalistic capitalism. Your reporter is not in a position to state, nor is he able to make up his own mind, as to what is the best course to pursue. Those who desire Filipino labor will say there is absolutely no danger from the Japanese, and, in the next breath, argue that the importation of Filipino labor would offset the Japanese danger, as the Filipinos are so anti-Japanese. In our mind this is not an argument, however, as soldiers stationed in the Island of Oahu are more than sufficient to take care of the Japanese population if it all were [7298] disloyal, without the aid of any Filipinos. Still, we must confess we see the danger of the imported coastal riff-raff and do not find ourselves any too partial toward them. Besides, a Social Security number entitles a man to work while he may change his name twenty times and no information may be secured from Social Security. Many men with very bad records are hiding under this. The Intelligence have uncovered many men with very bad records among these workers. On second thought your reporter casts his vote for the Filipinos.

Due to the preponderance of Japanese in the population of the Islands, a much greater proportion of Japanese have been called to the draft than on the mainland. As on the mainland they are inclined to enlist before being drafted. The Army is extremely high in its praise of them as recruits. The Japanese seems to be chiefly afraid that their boys will not be given the same chance at promotion as the whites. Frankly, at first this discrimination existed. A Japanese still had to be better than a white to gain promotion. The Army is gradually eliminating even this discrimination. They have been giving them a chance at becoming officers. Recently they picked out a few of the very best of these and put them in charge of white troops. The Army officers confessed that they held their breath. Much to their surprise and relief there was absolutely no reaction from the white [7299] troops and they liked these officers very well. Of course, these were especially good officers, but the Army is going to try more. This has been a great thing in strenghtening the loyalty of the Japanese in the Islands. They are beginning to feel that they are going to get a square deal and some of them are really almost pathetically exuberant.

In summarizing, we cannot say how loyal the Japanese in the Hawaiian group would be if there were an American Naval disaster and the Japanese fleet appeared off the Hawaiian Islands. Doubtless great numbers of them would then forget their American loyalties and shout "Banzai" from the shore. Under those circumstances if this reporter were there he is not sure that he might not do it also to save his own skin, if not his face. Due to the fact that there are more than enough soldiers in the Islands to take care of any Japanese, even if not so inclined, the Japanese will doubtless remain quietly at their tasks. However, in fairness to them it is only right to say that we believe the big majority anyhow would be neutral or even actively loyal.

[7300] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have one suggestion. We have had some difficulty in getting certain memorandums in relation to the Atlantic Conference and the Far East. I want to suggest to the committee that there is one man who now knows most about that subject, Mr. Churchill, and he is in the country and I suggest that he be requested to appear. He has appeared on several occasions before Congress and given his views and I am sure that he would be glad to answer questions in relation to those conferences as it relates to the Far East.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Churchill has been a great figure in this world over a great many

years and that he has come to this country as a place of rest, he so stated in the papers when he arrived in the country, and I think it ill behooves this committee when a great citizen of the world comes to this country for rest that we cannot let him have the rest and instead of that we are going to ask him about the Atlantic Conference when we have an abundance of material on the subject now, with all American officials present.

I don't think it is showing much courtesy to a great citizen of the world.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the other day when I read into the record the statement of Mr. Hornbeck in relation to [*7301*] the parallel action, it was suggested even by the chairman of this committee that we should get the records from Britain on what that parallel action was and we haven't learned yet from our State Department whether or not any parallel action was taken. In a democracy such as we have here it is up to the people to have all of the facts.

[*7302*] Senator LUCAS. Does the Senator think it is fair to suggest that Churchill be subpenaed here, a citizen of another country who happens to be here?

Mr. MURPHY. It makes good headlines.

Senator FERGUSON. I certainly do or I would not suggest it to the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to be more concerned with what happened at Pearl Harbor instead of just putting out headlines. I think this Churchill business is not fair to a great citizen of this world.

Senator FERGUSON. No one is above coming in and telling the facts on as great a catastrophe as we have had at Pearl Harbor. This committee is laboring to get the facts, and when I say "laboring" I mean just that, and if we can get the facts it is up to the committee to get all of the facts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. With two members of the committee having temporarily retired, would it be agreeable, Senator, to carry this question to the full committee?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not care to press it at this moment.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It would be agreeable then to carry it over until the other members are present?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Just another "fishing expedition," that [*7303*] is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to say a word on this "fishing expedition." I know I have endeavored to obtain some records on occasions and it has been a month or 6 weeks from the time certain records were requested until they were obtained.

Now if that is a "fishing expedition," then, of course, that is what it is.

Senator LUCAS. I am talking about the Churchill request, that it is employed for the benefit of the press and is a "fishing expedition," and I repeat it.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I as one member of this committee, regret the entirely unparliamentary comment of the Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. I don't care what you think.

Senator BREWSTER. I think if we were proceeding under any sort of parliamentary rules he, of course, would be immediately subject to being silenced. Now, the request of the Senator from Michigan is entitled to receive the consideration of this committee without reflection upon his motives or his purposes, which, in the first place, have been demonstrated by a long record of public service and, in the second place, have been demonstrated, I think, in this committee by citations of evidence produced which even [*7304*] the Senator from Illinois has been pleased to cite with approval after they have been produced over very serious objection.

So, with that in mind, I have a request that I hope will not be subject to a similar charge, which I have had pending for 2 months and I have not so far had a reply.

I filed a written request with this committee early in November asking the State Department for the records in the Kent case, and I have not had a word on it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will not the gentleman admit that a member of this committee says the Tyler Kent testimony has absolutely nothing to do with this inquiry after talking with Tyler Kent for 2 hours?

Senator BREWSTER. I shall be very happy to say also that the matters with which I am concerned have nothing to do, as far as I understand, with what the gentleman discussed. I have never had the privilege myself to discuss it with Mr. Kent, and I do not know that I care for it. I think that members of this committee, or Members of the Senate, are entitled to a reply to a respectful request through the proper channels of this committee as to whether or why these records can or cannot be produced. The records can then speak for themselves.

I do not care to take the opinion of anybody else regarding [*7305*] that. I would like to have the opportunity to look at them for myself.

I think even the gentleman on my left has exhibited great diligence and might very likely like to look at the records himself.

Mr. MURPHY. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that counsel for this committee, the eminent counsel who has retired, said there were 1,500 stolen documents by Tyler Kent and, in his judgment and the judgment of the State Department, they have absolutely nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. With over a million and a half words in the record already, as well as thousands upon thousands of other pages, I see no reason why we should go into that matter, which is not pertinent, and in view particularly also of a public declaration by Tyler Kent that he knows absolutely nothing about Pearl Harbor and can contribute nothing.

[*7306*] Senator BREWSTER. I appreciate what the gentleman contributes. I have not even had the privilege to be told as much as apparently the gentleman has. But, unfortunately, neither the State Department, the eminent counsel who has retired, nor Tyler Kent are under the mandate of the Congress of the United States, under which we are operating, to form our own independent judgment as to whether or not matters of this kind are or are not relevant.

I have not indicated at any time a desire to introduce them into the record. I have simply asked for permission to examine these records in order that I might carry out my legislative mandate to determine for myself whether they have any relevance, and the more persistently the gentleman opposes that examination, the more one suspects that perhaps that these may be matters of concern.

Mr. MURPHY. I will say the gentleman is back in the committee and we are having trouble all over again.

Senator BREWSTER. I would like an answer. I would like someone to tell me what the answer is.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Obviously several of these matters mentioned will have to be considered in executive session.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I do not intend to inject myself into the [7307] discussion that has been had, but in view of the fact that counsel has offered a number of exhibits that have heretofore been asked for, I would like to inquire whether or not the written request which I made, which was approved by the committee as a fair request, and approved by the counsel of the committee, which purported to request correspondence between the late President and Mr. Churchill, between certain specific dates, whether or not, after the lapse now of a couple of months, that material has been made available, and is there any answer that can be given to the request which I made?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair inquire, does that relate to the letter received from Mr. Acheson, of the State Department?

Mr. KEEFE. No; it is a different matter. The Senator from Illinois will recall the request which I made, and the chairman was kind enough to state it was a fair request at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is counsel prepared to give any reply now to Mr. Keefe's question?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have received a letter from the War Department which you have asked for. The Navy advised me this noon they will have a similar letter over here tomorrow morning. I was on the telephone with the State Department asking them to expedite their delivery of [7308] the information that was requested; to have it here tomorrow or the next day. We have been following that up practically every other day.[1]

Mr. KEEFE. I realize counsel has been diligent in the matter, and I have endeavored not to inject myself into it too frequently, but time marches on. It is like a lot of other things we have requested here. We just simply do not get them.

I was going to say, Mr. Chairman, I am going to be insistent on having a statement from Mr. Acheson, or whoever is responsible, sometime pretty soon to my request for the Salisbury report, so we may determine that issue. We have witnesses coming on, and I do not have the report, and I cannot decently and intelligently ask questions in the absence of having the evidence before us.

When can we have an executive meeting when Mr. Acheson can come down and present this Salisbury report so we may determine whether it has anything in it that is relevant and that the committee ought to have?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sure the gentleman remembers the report made to him in committee meeting hereby the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. At some future time, or at some time agreeable to the committee, Mr. Acheson himself can come [7309] down and bring those reports and allow us to look at them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is apparent that the committee will have to have an executive session sometime very soon. We can convey

[1] See Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3839–3842.

these matters that have been brought up here to the chairman of the committee and request an executive session.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one request of the counsel which I think is probably material to a proper finding of the comittee in the final analysis.

There has been much information coming from witnesses with respect to the amount of traffic that was received by the Intelligence Department in Hawaii, as well as the Intelligence Department here in the Army and Navy.

I believe if we could have just the number of communications of all types and kinds, including Magic, diplomatic exchanges, messages from the attaches, in various parts of the world that came into the Naval Intelligence Department from, say, November 1 to December 7, as well as the messages in the Military Intelligence Department, and then have the same thing with respect to the Navy and Army Intelligence Departments in Hawaii, it would expedite matters.

In other words, we heard witnesses say, and we know [*7310*] the same immense responsibility that devolved upon men here in Washington.

It struck me it might be of some value just to know how many messages from November 1 up to the 7th of December they received here in Washington, and how many in Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:13 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, January 18, 1946.

[7311]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[7312] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

When the hearing was suspended yesterday, Congressman Cooper was examining Admiral Kimmel.

Do you have further questions, Congressman?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to state to Admiral Kimmel, if you got the impression that I was questioning you rather closely about these matters yesterday, I just want to say I also questioned Admiral Stark and especially Admiral Turner very closely about these things, trying to get all the information I could about this matter.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED)—Resumed

Admiral KIMMEL. I welcome the examination.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thank you for the information you gave in response to my questions.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have one thing I would like to present to the committee this morning, if this is the time to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, proceed.

Admiral KIMMEL. In connection with the orders for Admiral Halsey, that were issued to him in November of 1941, I would like to read the order which I gave him. I think it should be in here to complete the record.

I have no comments to make on it except just to read [7313] the order.

SECRET

28Ø447 Nov. 41
CINCPAC TO: COMTASKFOR 2
COM 14
INFO TO: COMPATWING 2
COMBATFOR
COMBASEFOR

Twelve planes Marine Fightron Two Eleven are to base Wake accordance Myser 1Ø1825 of 1Ø November X Enterprise provide transportation X After departure Pearl on 28 Nov from Task Force Eight consisting of Enterprise Chester Northampton Salt Lake City and Desron Six and Pass Command Task Force Two to Rear Admiral Draemel with orders Task Force Two carry out normal operations in Hawaiian area X Proceed to arrive 2ØØ miles Ø7Ø degrees from Wake at Ø7ØØ on 3 Dec X Fly off Marine planes that vicinity and upon receiving info that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl X Enroute to and from Wake pass through Point Afirm four hundred miles south of Midway X Patrol planes from Midway and Wake will cover your route and provide security while at Wake X Communications radio condition nineteen guard NPM Primary Fox continuously X Comfourteen inform Wake that planes expected arrive there Ø83Ø on 3 Dec and direct Wake report Comfourteen by coded dispatch when planes arrive there X Comfourteen furnish this final arrival information to Comtaskfor Eight X Wake submarine patrol Tambor Triton will be advised X Narwhal and Dolphin [*7314*] are enroute Pearl at 12ØØ GCT on 27 Nov they were about 3ØØ miles east of Wake.

That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel want to ask any further questions?

Mr. RICHARDSON. If you would pause before further examination to permit us to put into the record at this time a couple of small exhibits?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. We would like to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we have three short dispatches which we would like to read into the record in connection with the last paragraph on page 96 of Admiral Kimmel's statement, which is the first paragraph on page 6797 of our transcript.

The dispatches are as follows:

TOP SECRET

28 NOVEMBER 1941

From: CINCAF
Action: OPNAV
Info: COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN
281430

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X If diplomatic relations are on verge [*7315*] of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and N-e-i XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi No Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi No Kaze Hare X Unquote X British and Comsixteen monitoring above broadcasts.

TOP SECRET

1 DECEMBER 1941

From: COMSIXTEEN
Action: CINCAF
Info: CINCPAC, OPNAV, COMFOURTEEN
Ø11422

J-V-J press tonight in closing seventeen hundred schedule stated quote "All listeners be sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero seven thirty

tomorrow morning, since there may be important news" unquote XX suggest frequencies seven three two seven X nine four three zero X and one two two seven five X times Tokyo LCT.

[*7316*] The third dispatch is from OPNAV for action of the Commandant of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, and for the information of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

It reads as follows:

New Tokyo broadcast schedules as follows X J-V-J one two two seven five kc six pm and seven pm to Pacific coast six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X J-H-L five one six zero kc eight pm nine pm and ten pm to China coast X J unit option nine four three zero kc six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X J-H-P one one nine eight zero kc ten thirty pm to Europe X probably Tokyo time.

That is all we have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, these copies furnished us, I only see the first one here.

Mr. MASTEN. The first two have been furnished you this morning. We haven't had time to have the third duplicated.

Senator LUCAS. Can counsel tell us the significance of that last message?

Mr. MASTEN. As I understand it, these are instructions to the monitoring stations, the last message.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel, as to the second message, that of December 1, do [*7317*] we have a memorandum of what was broadcast on the 7th?

Mr. MASTEN. We do not; not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you tried to find out?

Mr. MASTEN. These only came to my attention last night.

Senator FERGUSON. You just received them last night?

Mr. MASTEN. They came to my attention last night.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why they didn't come to your attention before? They seem to be in relation to the winds message.

Mr. MASTEN. I think they have been down in the office in connection with getting together the documentary papers on the winds exhibit that Mr. Mitchell spoke of some time ago. In view of the statements made in Admiral Kimmel's statement in this connection, it was thought desirable to have them before the committee this morning.

Senator BREWSTER. Is this the so-called winds message or is it another one?

Mr. MASTEN. I understand this is the same as the intercept that appears on page 154 of exhibit 1.

Senator BREWSTER. That was the initial winds message.

Mr. MASTEN. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say for the record that this second page about which question has been asked is in the naval narrative. My recollection is that [*7318*] there was never anything happened on the morning of December 1 when there was supposed to be a special broadcast. At least we never got word of any.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper, are you through?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George would be next, but he is temporarily absent.

The Chair recognizes Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I desire to ask only one or two questions to clarify some matters in my own mind.

In legal or legislative procedure——

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't hear you.

Mr. CLARK. I am sorry.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am deaf.

Mr. CLARK. I say, in legal or legislative procedure I would probably understand what would be meant by "surprise attack." I am not so sure that I do understand its full significance in military parlance. Would you help me out a little on that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I know of no particular significance in military parlance that isn't contained in the words themselves. It is a surprise attack. They tried to get in to a point of attack without being discovered, to, if possible, catch people off balance. A surprise attack is just—I [*7319*] take it the words express what it is. I know of no other meaning.

Mr. CLARK. Does it involve almost necessarily the element of the unexpected?

Admiral KIMMEL. Insofar as they are able to make it, yes; yes, I would say so.

Mr. CLARK. Now, a surprise attack had long been listed as the chief danger to the base at Pearl Harbor, had it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't hear you, sir. I am sorry.

Mr. CLARK. That is all right. I say a surprise attack had long been listed or estimated to be the chief danger to the military establishment at the Hawaiian Islands, had it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not only to the Hawaiian Islands but any place in regard to the Japanese. The Japanese were known to make surprise attacks whenever they could. The only difference betwixt the Japanese and any other nation in that respect was that they were liable to do it without a declaration of war.

Mr. CLARK. Well, could the establishment at Pearl Harbor or the Hawaiian Islands have been attacked successfully in your opinion otherwise than by a surprise attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course, a surprise attack always gives the attacking force a great advantage. We have seen [*7320*] that dozens of times.

Mr. CLARK. Well, what I have in mind, sir, is to compare the likely success of a surprise attack by air with any other kind of attack that was possible at the Hawaiian Islands.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think that other kinds of attack would have been possible in the Hawaiian Islands. It depends entirely on the forces they have available, and had these carriers been discovered by patrol planes, had we found them, it is highly probable—well, I won't say highly probable, but it is quite possible that they could have launched their planes and started the attack before we could have done anything about it.

Even if it hadn't been a complete surprise the attack could have been launched.

Mr. CLARK. Well, as between a surprise attack by air and a landing attack, what would you say as to the likelihood?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, well, I would say that a surprise attack by land was much less possible than a surprise attack by air. The very nature of air makes for the ease of a surprise attack, the rapidity with which it can be delivered. There is no question about that, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I understand that in former times war games were conducted there with a surprise attack by air featured in the war games. Are you familiar with that?

[*7321*] Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; we had many exercises in which we sent planes in to attack the installations on Oahu.

Mr. CLARK. What time were those planes sent in usually, what time of day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, at various times, but the early morning, the forenoon sometime, was probably the best time, primarily because that gave the carriers a chance to recover their planes during daylight and to have the following night to get away from the range of the land based aircraft and from any attacking forces, and have the night to dodge and get out.

[*7322*] Mr. CLARK. I was just a little interested, Admiral, in the background upon which a surprise attack by air had been fixed as the No. 1 danger to our set-up at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. A surprise attack by air was one of the forms of attack that could have been made, that is all. We felt, I think, that the Japanese didn't have the forces or the logistic support to send a very great number of troops and train, and all that kind of thing across the ocean at that particular time, and do other things that they would have to do, and the air attack was one of the things that they could do.

It was within the realm of possibility, that is what I mean.

Mr. CLARK. In your judgment, is that why a surprise attack by air was fixed as the No. 1 danger?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no, not in order of probability. I thought that what they were going to do in case of war in the Pacific at all, were against the United States, was to have a mass submarine attack in the operating areas around Pearl Harbor.

Mr. CLARK. Why, in your judgment, did the military authorities fix a surprise attack by air as the No. 1 danger to Pearl Harbor?

[*7323*] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I couldn't give you exactly why they fixed that as the No. 1 danger. As a matter of fact, I never considered it the No. 1 danger in the order of probability by any means, and I feel that the other people scarcely felt that either.

They felt that they should be in the best case to defend against air attack because a hit-and-run attack was always within the realm of possibility.

Mr. CLARK. I think in the course of your testimony you may have said that an attack on the Philippines, or Thai, or Kra Peninsula might be in the nature of a surprise attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; I think so. It could be.

Mr. CLARK. You wouldn't say that after the message of November 27 had designated those points as likely points of attack, would you?

Admiral KIMMEL. There were many points in Thai, in the Philippines, and the Kra Peninsula that they could have hit, any one of which might have been a local surprise.

Mr. CLARK. Yes, a local surprise——

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all that a surprise attack can be, is a local surprise.

Mr. CLARK. But you wouldn't say that after an attack in those directions had been forecast in this message that [*7324*] then an attack in those directions would be a surprise, would you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they would endeavor to make it a surprise attack; yes, sir. The fact that we had forecast it—well, put it this way: If we had been convinced in Pearl Harbor of the probability of an air attack in Pearl Harbor it would have still been a surprise attack, so far as the Japanese, their best efforts could make it. They didn't know what we thought nearly as well as we knew what they thought, or at least was known in Washington.

Mr. CLARK. You mean the Japs would have been surprised to know that you were prepared for it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; but they would have endeavored to make it a surprise attack, no matter how much we were expecting it, and when you are expecting an attack over months and months and weeks and weeks, no matter how alert you are, it is possible for the enemy to make a surprise attack, and we have seen that time without number in this war, where they did make surprise attacks, after war had been declared and on places where they could have expected an attack. They were nevertheless surprises in the sense they hadn't done all the things they could have done if they had known the attack was coming at a particular time.

I think that Halsey's attack on the installations in [*7325*] Manila and the ships, the vast number of ships that he sank out there, was in the nature of a surprise attack. That was after war had been going on for a couple of years.

Mr. CLARK. I think you have stated in your testimony that the attack at Pearl Harbor on the 7th, was a surprise to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I thought they weren't coming at that time.

Mr. CLARK. Now, will you please state just what disposition you would have made of your forces, including your ships and planes and the use of radar, if at any time between the 27th of November, and the 6th of December you had been convinced that there was going to be an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I have set that forth in considerable detail in the statement which I have submitted.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I listened rather carefully and it didn't seem to me that it was entirely covered. That is why I ask you the question now.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well——

Mr. CLARK. May I interrupt you just a moment?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. A high naval officer has testified before [*7326*] this committee as to what dispositions he would have made had he been in command at Pearl Harbor as you were, and had received the message of November 27.

Admiral KIMMEL. Plus the information he had.

Mr. CLARK. No, no, the question was submitted to him as to what action he would have taken if he had been in command under conditions then existing and had received the message of November 27. He has stated what dispositions he would have made.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. By way of comparison, I would like to have you state just what dispositions you would have made of everything at your command if you had been reasonably sure at any time between the 27th of November and the 7th of December, that a surprise air attack was going to be made there.

Admiral KIMMEL. In that event, I would have considered that my mission was considerably changed. I would have thought that the most important thing that I could do under those circumstances was to intercept and destroy this Japanese detachment that was expected to come to Hawaii. I would have put to sea with the fleet and I would have maintained them in a position where they could be in the best intercepting position. I would have used all of the [*7327*] facilities of the patrol planes, by planes afloat. I would have kept my carriers in the Hawaiian area. I would have abandoned the overhaul of the *Saratoga*, which was in the nature of—she was not entirely out of commission. She was able to get about all right.

I would have had her brought back to the area and joined up. And I would have had the three carriers, the patrol planes covering the approaches to the fleet and the approaches to Hawaii, and I would have gone ahead and exhausted the patrol planes and thereby curtailed my chance to carry out the raid on the Marshalls, because I would have considered the attack force as a primary objective at that time.

[*7328*] Mr. CLARK. What use, if any, would you have made of your radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. The radar on the ships at sea would have been in constant use. I have no doubt that the Army would have—if they had felt the same way that I did at the time, and they probably would if I felt that way, they would have used their radar to the limits of its capacity.

Mr. CLARK. Well, as commander in chief of the fleet you would have insisted on that, would you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have advised them. I had no power to insist beyond the matter of advice.

Mr. CLARK. Did you consider the situation as between the United States and Japan any more serious and any more likely to break from and after the 27th of November than it had been prior to that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think I did. The situation was becoming increasingly serious. I was not convinced from the information I had that Japan was going to attack the United States at that time. There was that possibility and we guarded against it, to what I considered the best way with the information I had and my conviction at the time.

Mr. CLARK. You tell the committee now that as this situation became more tense and serious you now have the feeling that you did everything that you reasonably could have [*7329*] done to have anticipated and at least minimized the effect of this attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I had known the attack was coming, if I had been convinced——

Mr. CLARK. Admiral, I beg your pardon, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not understand, sir. I want to answer you.

Mr. CLARK. I want to ask you this: You have said that you considered the situation to be becoming more tense from and after the 27th of November.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now I am asking you whether you are now telling the committee that under those conditions——

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, wait a minute. I had better qualify what I said slightly.

Mr. CLARK. All right, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. The message of November 27—after I received that I considered all the previous messages and that the situation in the Pacific was becoming more tense. As the days passed after November 27 and nothing happened within the next few days I was not so certain that something was going to happen. I was watching every single thing I could to get any indications, and the indications then followed out the line in the message which had come from the Navy Depart- [*7330*] ment that they were probably going down into Thailand to make another advance down there and see what could be done, but I was not convinced—as the days passed I was even less convinced—that they were going to attack the United States.

Mr. CLARK. Well, then, their going into Thailand had been prophesied or communicated—the likelihood of that had been communicated to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Mr. CLARK. I say, the likelihood of their going into Thailand had been communicated to you by the Chief of Staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. There was nothing in the nature of a surprise about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I thought it could be a surprise even if they went there, and then there were several other places that were mentioned, any one of which could have been a surprise attack by the Japanese.

Mr. CLARK. Well, we have been over that somewhat, so I will get back to the other proposition.

Admiral KIMMEL. Put it this way, sir: If they had known that an attack definitely was going to come against the Philippines at a certain time, the defending forces would have had a great advantage, because they would have known it at that particular time, and they could have gone out on an all-out [*7331*] alert to culminate at a particular instant, you might say, and so it could be at any other place.

Mr. CLARK. I understand that. I appreciate that fully, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. But you had the record before you that the armed services had classified a surprise attack as a number one thing. Now, what I want to ask you is, getting back to my question, in the light of all the circumstances before you from the 27th on you now tell this committee that you think of nothing else that you could or should have done as commander of the Pacific Fleet that would have either averted or minimized this attack on Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I think that is true. I feel that way; yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Isn't the essence of this whole controversy that everybody from the higher officials here in Washington on down through the lieutenant who disregarded the radar message, just muffed the situation, let the Japs outsmart them?

Admiral Kimmel. I think you should draw those conclusions, sir, rather than me.

Mr. CLARK. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the further examination of Admiral Kimmel the Chair wishes to make a statement.

[*7332*] Late yesterday afternoon, in the absence of the chairman, who had to leave before the hearing was concluded, the suggestion was made that Mr. Winston Churchill, former Prime Minister of Great Britain, be asked to appear here as a witness. The Chair does not wish at this moment to discuss the propriety of that suggestion, but wishes to state that as chairman of this committee he will neither issue a subpena for Mr. Churchill nor send him an invitation to appear here as a witness unless ordered to do so by the committee.

Inasmuch as the matter was brought up in a public session, the Chair thinks it ought to be settled in a public session; and if any member of the committee desires now to make a motion instructing the Chair either to subpena Mr. Churchill or to invite him, the Chair will entertain that motion at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I now move that the chairman of the committee, in behalf of the committee, invite Mr. Winston Churchill to appear before this committee at a time that is agreeable to him and also to the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Maine.

Senator BREWSTER. I am not prepared to pass upon this [*7333*] myself in quite as expeditious a fashion without consideration and discussion. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the reasons, if I may make this observation, why the Chair brought this matter up at this time is in view of the fact that he thinks that the question of whether Mr. Churchill is to be either subpenaed or invited here ought not to be bandied around and held in suspense. He thinks it ought to be settled by the committee, and it ought to be settled promptly, and that is why the Chair brought it up.

The Senator has moved to lay that motion on the table. As many as favor that motion say "Aye." (Chorus of ayes.)

Those opposed, "No." (Chorus of noes.)

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to have a roll on that.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have a roll call on that. The Chair will call the roll.

Senator BREWSTER. Particularly in view of the fact that one of the highly reliable papers in this country misquoted me this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not interested in that. That happens to me every day.

Senator BREWSTER. That is why I wanted it on record.

[*7334*] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will call the roll on the motion to lay the Senator's motion on the table. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Aye.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The motion is defeated.

The Chair will now call the roll on the motion of the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Ferguson, to instruct the Chair to invite Mr. Churchill to appear as a witness. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. No.

[*7335*] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to vote "No" on that previous motion. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Present.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Aye.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Aye.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair votes "No". The motion is lost and that settles that. Proceed with the examination. Senator George is recognized. The committee will be in order. Senator George.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make this [*7336*] statement in view of the fact that I voted "Present" on this resolution, that the people of the country have had an opportunity to see an expeditious handling and disposition of public business and I hope that perhaps we have that reflected on the floor of the Senate as well as before this committee in the handling of public business also.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair appreciates that observation and always appreciates the observations of the able member from Wisconsin.

Senator LUCAS. That might apply to the House, too.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might suggest in view of that that the Congressman from Wisconsin is no doubt interested in the expedition of business before both Houses of Congress and he might exercise his influence on the Committee on Rules, a body of which he is a member, to expedite business in that body.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not a member of the Committee on Rules.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Exercise your great influence.

Mr. KEEFE. I have tried to exercise my influence on that great committee. I see the member of the Rules Committee on our side is here and he has taken a back seat in this discussion here. I have no influence on the Committee on Rules.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George is recognized.

[*7337*] Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, since I was not here at the opening this morning I desire to ask Admiral only a very few questions.

Admiral Kimmel, referring to the message of November 27, to the part of it that gave direction in the language beginning "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment," may I ask you if "deployment" or "defensive deployment" are technical terms within the knowledge of naval officers?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Do they have any special significance?

Admiral KIMMEL. None that I know of.

Senator GEORGE. What, Admiral, did you understand by "defensive deployment," forgetting for the time being the words that follow it, which I wish to question you about, because the word "preparatory" to doing something else is used there, but what did you understand by "defensive deployment"?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never read the "defensive deployment" except in connection with the remainder of the sentence, the defensive deployment in order to accomplish something and that something was the attack on the Marshalls.

Senator GEORGE. Now, may I ask—the language is "to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to something else."

[*7338*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is exactly what I did to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Senator GEORGE. And you understand that "appropriate" meant something that in your judgment you thought would best accomplish the order given you in this directive here?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did, indeed. The "appropriate" was left entirely to my discretion.

Seinator GEORGE. Well, now, let me ask you with reference to WPL–46.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Where was that prepared, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. WPL–46 was prepared in the Navy Department. It was a basic war plan, Navy basic war plan.

Senator GEORGE. Here in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Here in Washington and based upon that I had prepared, as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, what we termed "WPAC–46." WPAC–46 was the implementation of the war plan prepared in the Navy Department and that WPAC–46, prepared by my staff and approved by me, had been submitted to the Navy Department and had been approved by them.

Senator GEORGE. So that the requirements of your implementing plan were known here in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Known to the Navy Department?

[*7339*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Will you say—I believe it is in the record in the form of an exhibit but I am not sure—what the main requirements of WPL–46 were? I am not asking for detail. I am asking for information.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you will find that set forth beginning on page 11 of my statement. That is a copy of the basic war plan in WPL–46.

Senator GEORGE. The statement that you made in the beginning of your testimony?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. WPL–46. Would you mind saying now what your implementing order or plans in the main required?

Admiral KIMMEL. My implementing plans in the main required the fleet to depart immediately after hostilities commenced to conduct reconnaissance and air raids on the Marshalls. They had other supporting things to do, but that was the primary mission that we had in the Pacific Fleet at that particular time.

Senator GEORGE. You say after hostilities commenced?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Well, now, this directive was, "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46."

[*7340*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right. That is what I did.

Senator GEORGE. And that has been detailed in your statement before the committee?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, in great detail, what I did and why I did it.

Senator GEORGE. And that was your interpretation of your own order supplementing or implementing WPL–46 which had been approved here in the Naval Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And was understood here by Admiral Stark when he formulated or sent to you this message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I say "Admiral Stark." Whoever sent the message to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, in the message of November 24 there was no specific direction to take any particular action, was there, addressed to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there was one there. There was one direction:

Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.

That, I think, could be termed a "directive."

[7341] Senator GEORGE. Had that appeared in any previous message received by you from the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean the injunction as to secrecy?

Senator GEORGE. The injunction as to secrecy.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I think so.

Senator GEORGE. You think there had been previous messages?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That carried the same injunction?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the one on October 16 this sentence occurs:

In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployment as will not disclose strategic intention, nor constitute provocative action against Japan.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, you probably covered it in your general statement but you are more familiar with that statement than any member of the committee would be from having heard it or having read it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have any knowledge prior to December 7 of the answer made by the State Department on November 26?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. The only information I had on [7342] that subject I got from the newspapers.

Senator GEORGE. You had nothing by way of letter or dispatch?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not a word.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have any information concerning the message from Tokyo to the Japanese to which the November 26 State Department document was a reply?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know it existed. I did not know until I read the testimony of Mr. Hull before this committee that Mr. Hull considered that a Japanese ultimatum. I had no knowledge whatsoever of that message, of that note.

Senator GEORGE. And you had never seen any text of that message or of our State Department reply of November 26——

Admiral KIMMEL. I had seen neither one, sir.

Senator GEORGE (continuing). Prior to December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Prior to December 7.

Senator GEORGE. Nor no summary of the contents?

Admiral KIMMEL. No summary whatsoever.

Senator GEORGE. Did you have any letter from Admiral Stark that gave you the contents of the November 26 reply of our State Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator GEORGE. How long, Admiral, had your implementing plan, that is, carrying out WPL–46, how long had it been in the [7343] Navy Department and when was it approved?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was approved on September—I will get the exact date. My plan WPAC–46 was approved by the Navy Department on September 9, 1941.

Senator GEORGE. I believe I have no other questions, Admiral.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, Admiral.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel, you have told the committee that your appointment as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in January 1941 came as a complete surprise to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, and it did.

Senator LUCAS. You so expressed yourself very forcibly along that line in a letter to Admiral Stark?

Admiral KIMMEL. Immediately after I learned of my prospective appointment.

Senator LUCAS. You have told the committee in your statement that you first met the President of the United States in 1918.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. If I told you any such thing as that it was in error. I did not intend to tell you any such thing as that. Would you like me to tell you when I first met him?

[*7344*] Senator LUCAS. Yes, indeed, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. In 1915 I was serving as fleet gunnery officer in the Pacific Fleet on the staff of Admiral Thomas B. Howard, who was then commander in chief. Mr. Marshall, who at that time was Vice President, and Mr. Roosevelt, who was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, came to San Francisco to open the San Francisco and San Diego expositions which were in celebration of the opening of the Panama Canal.

Wallace Beathoff, a lieutenant from Admiral Howard's staff, was detailed as an aide for Mr. Marshall. I was detailed as an aide for Mr. Roosevelt.

Senator LUCAS. What was your rank at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was a lieutenant at that time.

I traveled with Mr. Roosevelt to the San Francisco Exposition and from there I went with him to San Diego. I had a very pleasant time.

Senator LUCAS. How long were you with Mr. Roosevelt?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was with him about 10 days. At the end of that time I went back to my duty as fleet gunnery officer of the Pacific Fleet.

Subsequently, in 1916 I came to Washington on duty in the gunnery office of the Navy Department, what is now the Office of Fleet Training. I saw Mr. Roosevelt, oh, three or four times during the time I was here, and in 1917 I went [*7345*] over to the British Grand Fleet to take some gear that we had developed and subsequently I went on Admiral Rodman's staff as his gunnery officer in what became known as the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet.

In September, I think it was, of 1918 Mr. Roosevelt came over to visit this detachment and he was entertained at luncheon by Admiral Rodman, and I was present. I saw him then and I had no further conversations with him until June of 1941, 6 months after I had been appointed commander in chief.

To make the record complete, I did pass Mr. Roosevelt at the White House in a receiving line once or twice, but that is all.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the last time you saw him before you saw him in June 1941——

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not understand you, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The last time you saw Mr. Roosevelt before you saw him in June 1941 was in 1918 in England?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the harbor of Rosyth, which is near Edinburgh in Scotland.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever see him after that meeting in 1918 until you saw him again in 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Except when I saw him at a White House reception; no.

Senator LUCAS. You had no conversations with him during [7346] all of those years or any communication, as I understand it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. What State are you from, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Kentucky.

Senator LUCAS. And when were you appointed to West Point?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was appointed to the Naval Academy in 1900.

Senator LUCAS. The reason I made that mistake, I read somewhere that you originally wanted to go to West Point.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. And finally landed in the Navy.

Admiral KIMMEL. My father was a West Pointer. He wanted me to go there.

Senator LUCAS. As a matter of curiosity, by whom were you appointed?

Admiral KIMMEL. By Henry D. Allen.

Senator LUCAS. And was he a Congressman?

Admiral KIMMEL. Congressman from the Second District of Kentucky.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know whether he was acquainted with the President or not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I could not answer that question; I do not know.

[7347] Senator LUCAS. Well, do you recall, Admiral Kimmel——

Admiral KIMMEL. At that time I was not.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall, Admiral Kimmel, reading in the press or hearing it rumored about that you were such a close and intimate friend of the President that he jumped over 46 admirals who had more seniority and grade in order to give you this job?

Admiral KIMMEL. I read that many times. I thought if it was to be answered it should be answered by somebody else besides me.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it was rumored around here at that time, and rumors and gossip are pretty free around Washington and other places, that your appointment was purely a political one and only because you were a Democrat and because you were the President's aide at one time.

Admiral KIMMEL. I know those rumors; I mean I heard those rumors. I heard—well, I will pass it.

Senator LUCAS. Go ahead.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will say it; yes. I heard that the reason I was appointed commander in chief was because my wife was a niece of Senator Barkley, and my wife had never seen Senator Barkley.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you know of the testimony before the committee here by Admiral Stark and Admiral Richardson [7348] who recommended you as one of the men to take charge of the Pacific

Fleet in the event anything happened to Admiral Richardson; you know of that testimony?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have heard something of that kind; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it is obvious from the testimony of yourself and others that these statements and these rumors and this gossip that went around immediately following the disaster to Pearl Harbor were false and without any foundation in either fact or truth?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were misrepresentations and lies.

Senator LUCAS. Well, of course, I am talking about the general proposition that you were appointed solely for political reasons and because you were a Kentucky Democrat.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. You are entirely correct.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that lays another one of these false cannards on the shelf.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I am glad to have it laid.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, on page, I believe it is 2 or 3, page 3 probably, of your statement you stated:

> When I assumed command the decision to base the Fleet in the Hawaiian area was an historical fact.

I presume you want the committee to understand by that statement that you were in no way responsible for having the [*7349*] fleet in Pearl Harbor when you took command?

Admiral KIMMEL. I hadn't that particular thing in mind but it is a fact. I was not responsible. I had nothing to do with basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. Before I leave the President, I would like to go back and ask you one more question with respect to the conversation that you had with him in June 1941 when you returned from Hawaii to Washington to discuss the Pacific situation. As I recall, you had quite a lengthy conversation with the President.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did, yes, sir; not very lengthy but, oh, maybe an hour.

Senator LUCAS. And one of the chief things that you discussed at that time with President Roosevelt was the decision that the Navy Department made to take from your fleet a division of battleships and cruisers and destroyers?

Admiral KIMMEL. I expressed myself as forcibly as I knew how on that subject.

Senator LUCAS. Will you elaborate for the committee a little more as to what the President said in connection with that decision that was made by the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. My best recollection is that I brought up the subject of the transfer of this detachment from the Pacific to the Atlantic and protested against it and the [*7350*] President said:

> Well, they told me that that could be done all right and you could defend the Pacific with this reduced Fleet.

As nearly as I can recollect my reply I said, "That is ridiculous and nobody in his right mind could ever make such a statement as that." "Well," he said, "that is what I thought, too," and that ended it. He was convinced. I did not press it any further.

Senator LUCAS. Well, after that conversation there was no further discussion or any attempt to move this division of battleships and cruisers and destroyers?

Admiral KIMMEL. It remained in the Pacific.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir. Who do you mean by "they"?

Admiral KIMMEL. "It," I said.

Senator LUCAS. Oh, yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. The division of battleships remained in the Pacific and the rest of the ships they had contemplated taking. My recollection is that at that time they contemplated taking three battleships, an aircraft carrier, another detachment of cruisers and a couple squadrons of destroyers. The proposal never became absolutely concrete but that is as nearly as I can recollect what the proposal was.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, Admiral, I want to talk with you about another statement that you made in your——

[7351] Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield right at that point?

Senator LUCAS. Yes; I will yield, Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. You asked what the admiral meant when he used the word "they." Now, in his subsequent answer he has used it several times, "they wanted to divert certain parts of the Pacific Fleet."

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Who do you mean by "they" when you are speaking "they wanted to divert"? Are you talking about——

Admiral KIMMEL. He did not say they wanted to divert. I said he said they had told him.

Senator LUCAS. Who are "they"?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I presume he must have meant some officials of the Navy Department or perhaps some of his Cabinet. He did not elaborate.

Senator LUCAS. I see. Now, returning to your statement that you made before the committee you said:

> My appointment was in no wise contingent upon any acquiescence upon my part in the decision already made many months before to keep the Fleet in the Hawaiian waters.

Will you elaborate just a little on that for me?

Admiral KIMMEL. I meant that nobody said to me that, "I will appoint you if you keep the fleet in the Hawaiian waters," [7352] or any such thing; nothing of any description. There were no conditions attached to my appointment as command in chief.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, in your testimony before the Roberts Commission the question was asked there as to why the fleet was—or rather the discussion was had before that committee about the fleet being in the Hawaiian waters. There had been some discussion of that between Admiral Richardson and the President previous to the time that he was relieved of his command.

Now, on page 565 of the Roberts' testimony, which is in that bound volume there—what is the number of that exhibit?

Mr. MASTEN. That is not an exhibit, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In that bound book, on page 565, you made this statement after discussions off the record:

> Admiral KIMMEL. Why the Fleet is in Hawaiian waters? All the senior officers of the Navy have recognized the increased possibility of a surprise attack against the Fleet when the Fleet is operating and based in the Hawaiian waters. These facts were forcibly brought to the attention of the authorities in

Washington by my predecessor, Admiral Richardson, in answer to a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations under date of May 27th reading as follows——

[7353] and then you proceeded to give the committee what you believed to be the essence of that letter.

Have you ever had an opportunity to examine Richardson's letter since that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think I have; yes.

Senator LUCAS. It is not quite in accord with the statement you made there, is it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true, it is not.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, Admiral Richardson at that time wanted to move the fleet back to the Pacific coast for a number of reasons?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true; you are quite right.

Senator LUCAS. But the security of the fleet was not involved in any of those reasons?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was not in his written letter.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I am talking about.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, he talked about——

Admiral KIMMEL. That is my recollection at least.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that is correct and I wanted to call your attention to that statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Because you were apparently in error there in assuming what you did before the committee and I take it [7354] because of your lack of the actual knowledge as to what was in that letter.

Admiral KIMMEL. At the time I was speaking from memory.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir. Now, on the next page of that same document, admiral, you state:

> Now, those same conditions obtained up to the time of the attack here on the 7th. I knew that the Navy Department and the administration in Washington insisted on keeping the Fleet out there. I knew the vulnerability of the Fleet here. I thought that was appreciated by the Navy Department as well as by me but it was one of the things that I felt it was beyond my power to change.

You recall, of course, making that statement, I presume, before the Roberts Commission?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Do you care to make any further explanation of that statement at this time, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. In all of my time as commander in chief this particular thing was before me and I did all in my power to remedy it and the thing that would have helped me most and the thing which I time and again tried to impress on the Navy Department was that what I needed out there was information; I needed the information upon which to base my actions and if I had had the information which was—I recognized the vulner- [7355] ability of the fleet largely due to the fact that we had only one base and to the limitations of fuel and other things, which I have gone into here and what I hoped and believed that the information would come to us in time to at least alleviate the situation.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I presume you did not discuss the question of the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl Harbor when you came back here in June 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I discussed that.

Senator LUCAS. With whom did you discuss that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I discussed it with the Chief of Naval Operations, with the Secretary, and I had some conversation with the President about it. I just pointed out the situation which he was fully cognizant of before I told him about it, and I accepted the risks. You cannot be safe; but I did not anticipate what happened by any means.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at least you stated before the Roberts Commission and you so state now that you knew of the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl Harbor as a result of what was transpiring between the United States and Japan at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew of the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl Harbor as to the physical location of the fleet, the physical environment, and I did everything I could to remedy [7356] that situation.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, you have spent considerable time in explaining to the committee that the fleet was handicapped through lack of trained men. You said you could not spare qualified officers without assuming an enormous risk.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I take it you were making that statement based upon the fact that if the fleet remained intact you wanted qualified trained men to fight either a defensive or an offensive war.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I wanted a trained fleet ready to fight.

Senator LUCAS. And you wanted the complements completed on every ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Now, in this situation I pointed out, I thought, as clearly and as forcefully as I knew how, certainly as clearly and as forcefully as I knew how and I think plainly, what the situation was in the fleet and when the decisions were made here I accepted them and went ahead to do the best I could do, but it was my duty to point these things out. That I did. There was one phase that I was particularly insistent on and that was that—and I never could quite understand why we were unable to—why they were unable to keep the numbers in the fleet up, not the trained [7357] men, you see, but the numbers and we never had the complements that we considered necessary. Now, that is not a question of trained men. That is a question of numbers of green, of good material, you see.

Senator LUCAS. You stated that you had a number of men on those ships who had never fired a shot in their life; is that right?

Admiral KIMMELL. From time to time, yes; and that was the compelling reason why I had to maintain this training program.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you, Admiral, how many men did you have on the battleships that were struck at Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th of December, roughly, if you cannot give the exact figures?

Admiral KIMMEL. The numbers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Anything I can give you would be a——

Senator LUCAS. I think it is probably in the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you can find that. I would prefer not to because I might be wide of the mark.

Sentor LUCAS. Well, how near were the battleships and other ships that were struck in Pearl Harbor on December the 7th up to the complement that you desired; what percentage?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, unless I knew the numbers and the complement I could not very well tell you that, but if what you [*7358*] are driving at is that we had sufficient men to man the ships under the conditions of repelling an attack at anchor in Pearl Harbor, we did have a sufficient number. We had a sufficient number to man the guns there at that time, but that was not the object of my setting this lack of men forth.

Senator LUCAS. I understand.

Admiral KIMMEL. If we had had trained crews, the cost of going from a training status to an all-out security status would have been much less. Now, once you get a trained fleet you do not have much to do to keep them polished up. Do you understand, sir?

[*7359*] Senator LUCAS. I understand.

You had a sufficient number of men on these battleships and other ships that were in the harbor to take care of them and repel the attack that was made. What you did not have was a sufficient number of men for an all-out, over-all training which would have been necessary in the event you had to go on the offensive at sea.

Adimiral KIMMEL. That is right. In that connection I would like to point out we did not have spare patrol plane crews out there, and we had been using our utmost endeavors to get spare patrol plane crews.

At the time, as I pointed out, we were required to supply the mainland, for distribution to other places, 12 patrol plane crews per month. So we were never able to catch up, to get the screws for the navel patrol planes.

The same thing obtained in the case of submarines. What we endeavored to do was to get the spare crews for submarines, and those were the two services that were arduous, and the submarine was a very arduous service.

Senator LUCAS. As I recall, you made a request from the Chief of Naval Operations for an additional 9,000 or 10,000 men.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not make the request. I informed him that the fleet was 9,000 men short of comple [*7360*] ment, and we could use an additional 10,000.

When I used the term "10,000," I had in mind filling up all of the training activities on shore, on the island of Oahu, and these patrol plane crews, the submarine crews, and what not.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this: If those men had been furnished to you, is it a reasonable assumption that more men would have been lost at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not think so.

Senator LUCAS. Your battleships would have been filled, would they not, with a complete complement on the morning of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they might have had a few more men there. I do not see how you can arrive at the conclusion that more men would have been lost.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the more men you had on these battleships and other ships that went down, the more men you would probably have lost. That is the point I am assuming. It may be an unwarranted assumption.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is a reasonable assumption if you lose a certain percentage of your men, and you increase the number of men and still lose the same percentage, why, you would lose more men.

Senator LUCAS. The point I am making is, if you had [*7361*] had the 9,000 or 10,000 men that you thought were necessary, it would have been no aid to the defense of the harbor on that particular morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Under those particular circumstances, I told you, sir, that they had ample men to man the guns and to use all the offensive power they could inside of Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. And any additional men would not have affected the case one way or the other?

Admiral KIMMEL. On that particular morning. It might have affected many other things.

Senator LUCAS. That is the reason we are here, because of that particular morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. How is that?

Senator LUCAS. That is the reason we are here, because of that particular morning on December 7. That is what we are talking about.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel, Senator Barkley is not quite clear, and perhaps I did not make it clear myself, with respect to the number of men that you requested, or that you said you could use. Was it 10,000 in addition to the 9,000, or was it the total of 10,000?.

Admiral KIMMEL. The total of 19,000.

[*7362*] Senator LUCAS. Total of 19,000?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I was not clear on that myself. Thank you, Senator Barkley.

Now, Admiral, in this statement that you made before the committee, which is a very powerful statement, you told the committee you recognized the Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet in every category of fighting ships.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is an accurate statement.

Senator LUCAS. That would be true if you wanted to consider it ship by ship and tonnage by tonnage?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. We demonstrated, after the war started, that we were inferior many times in tonnage to the Japanese Fleet, but we went on and were successful, and victorious over them.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. So it is not always a question of tonnage versus tonnage.

Admiral KIMMEL. By no means. You are quite right.

Senator LUCAS. Now, you also stated that the ships that you had were deficient in antiaircraft weapons.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[*7363*] Senator LUCAS. And you have also told us that in April 1941, when the 3 battleships and 1 aircraft carrier and 4 cruisers and 18 destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and sent to the Atlantic.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Now, let me ask you this question.

You appreciated the vulnerability of the fleet in Pearl Harbor. You have told us these three things, and many others.

Did these facts showing the inadequacy of manpower, the inadequacy of ships, planes, shortage in antiaircraft guns, all of these things cause you to use more diligence in providing measures for the fleet's protection from submarine or air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I did everything I could to bring the fleet up to fighting efficiency.

Senator LUCAS. You were conscious, of course, of these things, as you expressed, from time to time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, of course I was.

Senator LUCAS. And it seemed to me that as a result of your knowledge of the situation, and your letters to and from the Chief of Naval Operations, that it demanded more diligence and more vigilence on your part, and I presume you did do that very thing.

[*7364*] Admiral KIMMEL. I did.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this question. You have detailed to great extent in your statement before the committee these different shortages. Do you use the inferiority of the fleet, the shortage in planes, ships, tankers and other equipment as a part of your defense for what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and particularly the mobility of the fleet.

Senator LUCAS. It seems to me that these factors of weakness standing alone should have made you and your command more sensitive, and more wide awake to any kind of attack, including a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did everything that I felt I could possibly do. You noted the shortages in the fleet. The most critical shortage was in planes, long-range reconnaissance planes, and long-range attack planes. That was the thing that I had stressed over and over again.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall now how many long-range reconnaissance planes on the morning of December 7 that were ready to make the search?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think we could have mustered, according to Admiral Bellinger—I think his figures were 49. They might have been supplemented by 6 B–17 Army bombers, and that was all.

[*7365*] Senator LUCAS. Do you recall now when the last time was that you used any of these planes for search, reconnaissance work on any wide-scale basis?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I used them for search in reconnaissance work in the week immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, covering the advance of the ships which were going to Wake and Midway. There were reconnaissances made as part of the training on several days of the week of December 6. That is in the statement, I think. They were in the north and northwest sector, or in the northwest sector.

Senator LUCAS. But you had no regular schedule of reconnaissance going out from the Island of Oahu from November 27 to December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I did not.

Senator LUCAS. Or December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. I could not maintain that reconnaissance, except for a very short time, and I think that is very well set forth

in the statement and in the testimony of the people who knew the condition of the planes at the time, and I knew the condition of the planes at the time myself.

Senator LUCAS. Under the joint plans that you had agreed to with General Short it was your duty to maintain an air patrol against enemy forces in the approaches of Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. And in that same [*7366*] estimate you will find a statement that with the forces available we could do that only when an attack was known, within narrow limits, known to be probable within narrow limits.

Senator LUCAS. Well, do you recall, Admiral, when you were there in 1940, when Admiral Richardson was in command, that he had such research planes going under an alert order that was issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. He never had any search under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, except the search which he conducted in response to the alert sent out by General Marshall in June of 1940. He had, for training purposes, a search made up to a distance of 180 miles, in a sketchy kind of search, and that was to carry out the maneuver basis under which we were operating at that time.

He has so testified.

Senator LUCAS. I see.

Admiral KIMMEL. When the alert, the order from General Marshall came out to General Herron, they increased that reconnaissance to 300 miles. At no time did they have, in my opinion, any real reconnaissance flying from Pearl Harbor that would have been successful, except by chance, in discovering an attack in time to be of any real use.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at least they carried out the [*7637*] order and made the attempt to do reconnaissance work in 1940, did they not? Whether it amounted to anything or not, they did attempt that reconnaissance work?

Admiral KIMMEL. They attempted that reconnaissance work because they were told to be alerted, or take an alert against an overseas raid, and they continued as long as that order was in effect, and to them that meant that an attack was imminent, an overseas raid on Hawaii was imminent, and had I received such an order later I would have used every means at my command to cover whatever I could cover.

Even at this time they had a reconnaissance out to a distance of 300 miles in only a partial sector.

Senator LUCAS. You do not believe that the war warning message sent to you on November 27, in which there was the request that you use the appropriate necessary defensive deployment, directed you to do any reconnaissance work?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not specifically; no. They told me to take an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46, and that I did.

Now the Navy Department should have known, and did know beyond doubt, that I had no means to conduct a search over a considerable period.

Senator LUCAS. I agree with you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now I might have made a token search [*7368*] and I might have been able to come here and say I made a token search. it was not worth anything but I made it, and therefore I am all right.

I did not do that. I have never done that kind of thing, and I will not do it.

Senator LUCAS. Not even though you were commanded to do it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will not do anything that I consider futile and expending effort unnecessarily.

Senator LUCAS. Did you consider it futile and expending effort unnecessarily in the summer of 1940 when they did carry on that reconnaissance work?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think it was ineffective. They had an order to do it and they did the best they could. That was a direct order.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, I understand. Did you consider the command that was given to General Short by General Marshall, in which he definitely requested reconnaissance, a part of your command?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection—I have not seen that dispatch for some time—is that was to make such reconnaissance as may be practicable. I think that was the term that was used.

Senator LUCAS. I have forgotten the exact wording of it, sir.

Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense [*7369*] Command quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

You saw this message, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; I saw that message.

Senator LUCAS. You discussed it with General Short at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. How's that?

Senator LUCAS. Did you discuss it with General Short at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population,

and so forth.

Now you do not consider that message which came from Marshall, which talked about reconnaissance and which under [*7370*] the joint agreement was your duty, you did not consider it was your duty to start a lengthy search at sea for any hostile enemy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not. I would like to call your attention at this time to the fact that on the 29th I received this same dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, which he sent for action to the commander of the Pacific northern naval coastal frontier and Pacific southern naval coastal frontier, and in it it says, "Army has sent following to commander, western defense command." Now that meant to me that the Puget Sound area and the San Francisco area were placed in the same category by General Marshall as the Hawaiian area.

Senator LUCAS. I made a slight mistake in reading to you, Admiral, the message that went from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders on the western coast. I would like to have the record

corrected so it shows it was the message of the 27th from General Marshall to the commanding general, Hawaiian department. The language is practically the same, so I will not go over it again.

Senator BREWSTER. Does the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Should it not appear in the record at this time that on the following day, November 28, Admiral [*7371*] Kimmel received a copy of this Army wire containing additional instructions regarding his activities? I assume that wire or the radio of November 28 is in the record, but that does contain the complete Army order.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. Then it contains additional instructions apparently for the information of Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is right. I think that was the 29th, not the 28th.

Senator BREWSTER. The one we have says November 28.

Senator FERGUSON. I think he received it the 29th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator BREWSTER. The last part, after the "XX."

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. It apparently contains additional instructions for your command.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right.

Senator LUCAS. Well, developing the point that has been made here by the Senator from Maine, do you recall those additional instructions that you received and whether or not they changed in any way the instructions you received on November 27 and November 28?

Admiral KIMMEL. The additional instructions which I received from the Chief of Naval Operations in this message [*7372*] were WPL–52, the end of the quote, you see, just before this, and then the Chief of Naval Operations went on on his own:

> WPL–52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub-area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.

Now that applied to the shooting orders which were in effect in the Atlantic and in the Southeast Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier.

Now in addition it says:

> Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL–46 as far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

Now in the first place, they told me that no shooting orders were to be issued in the Pacific, and to undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I was going to say. In other words, in the message of General Marshall to General Short which you discussed with General Short, it definitely said that Japan had to commit the first overt act before you could start in shooting.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[*7373*] Senator LUCAS. This does not change that phase of it very much, does it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It does not change that phase of it very much, but those orders were first issued to General Short and I would have thought they applied to me without this message.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. But with this message, any doubt I may have had was dispelled because the Chief of Naval Operations said, for my information,

> Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act—

and again repeated—

> be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL–46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

Senator LUCAS. Incidentally, those additional messages kept talking about the serious danger with Japan, and when they told you not to commit the first overt act, it was a pretty fair indication that war was pretty close at hand, was it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not entirely, because I interpreted their admonition not to make an overt act as still a desire on the part of my Government to avoid hostilities with Japan.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you construe that message to be, notwithstanding all of these messages that you [*7374*] received in the past, that not to commit an overt act meant that we were still trying to retain peace with Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not to upset the applecart.

Senator LUCAS. They upset it for us.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; very definitely. I think they were finally upset, though.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; they were, Admiral. We all agree on that.

I want, Mr. Chairman, to read into the record just briefly at this point a memorandum or two dealing with reconnaissance that was used in 1940 when Admiral Richardson and General Herron were in command out there.

Let me ask you this, Admiral: Do you recall how many planes were being used for reconnaissance by the Army in Hawaii in 1940?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no figures on that.

Senator LUCAS. Now, on July 1, Mr. Chairman, General Herron sent to the Chief of Staff in Washington this message:

> Alert on two weeks today. All quiet locally, no ill effect on command except cumulative hours on plane engines and impaired overhaul facilities due to move from Ford Island.

On July 8, another message from General Herron:

> [*7375*] Three weeks of alert completed today with no unfavorable reaction on personnel but a good deal of wear on motor transportation. No developments in local situation.

On July 10, General Strong sent this to General Marshall—or General Strong, on the advice of General Marshall, sent this to Herron:

> The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogram in the Chief of Staff's secret code be dispatched to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department:
>
> "Your five July 8. Can you not avoid undue wear on motor transportation by putting present alert stations on a permanent basis without unfavorable reaction on convenience or morale of personnel? If this meets your approval, submit an estimate for the necessary construction of temporary type—"

And so forth.

On July 15, 1940, another message from General Herron to the Chief of Staff:

Alert entering fifth week. As now conducted, it is without undue strain on personnel or materiel including motors. New construction unnecessary. Navy continues cooperation by outer aerial patrol.

Finally, Marshall advises Herron on July 16:

You are authorized, at your discretion, to relax [7376] alert provisions except that first, precautions against sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readiness, and second aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished on an alert basis on short notice.

Now, General Herron wrote a letter on August 21, 1940, to General Marshall, in which he said, on the question of alert, the following:

The alert has now been on two months. The only present measurable loss is in the weathering of the hundreds of miles of field wire in place, largely for anti-aircraft purposes, but that is probably worthwhile.

This is all in Exhibit 52, from which I am reading.

On September 6, General Herron wrote to General Marshall the following:

DEAR GEORGE: Your note of August 28th has just reached me here, where I have come to collect my wits and obtain a little perspective. Wish you could do the same!

My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that "the alert" as now carried on here, does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real power accumulates and that the season of individual target practice and instructions is about [7377] over, the maneuvers of numerous small units camped along the beaches will build up naturally and easily the effectiveness of the alert.

I would like also, Mr. Chairman, at this point to call attention to page 4462 of the record, in which the Navy Department——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The record in this hearing?

Senator LUCAS. The record in this hearing, in which the Navy Department furnished the Senator from Illinois the number of planes that were attached to the Pacific Fleet in 1940 and 1941, that were capable of running a long-distance reconnaissance.

In that tabulation without going into the number of planes that they had, I direct the committee's attention to this one fact: In addition to whatever Army planes were doing search work at that time, and apparently they were, under the letter that I have read into the record here sent by General Herron to General Marshall, Admiral Richardson also had out security patrol from Barber's Point as of June 30, 1940, in a 300-mile circle, 180° running north and south in a circle that went to the northwest and south from that point.

Now, it is true that he only had six patrol planes that were in operation, and each plane each day covered a total [7378] distance of 922 miles, and one as far north from Barber's Point as 226 miles, and that far west. I merely bring that to the attention of the committee because I believe it is pertinent to this inquiry.

Now, Admiral, I do not suppose you care to make any comment on what I have read into the record?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume what you read is perfectly accurate.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you whether or not you knew on December 5 and 6——

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). There is one thing I might say. I do not know whether it is of any importance, but Admiral Richardson, prior to the time I took command, discontinued any patrols he had

out except the patrol over the operating area, and that I continued in effect.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. I understand that. The order of alert had practically ceased.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. The long-distance search was discontinued after the alert was more or less called off?

Admiral KIMMEL. The 300-mile search was discontinued.

Senator LUCAS. They did carry on that search for a number of weeks?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[7379] Senator LUCAS. For whatever good it was?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, you can always carry on a search as long as you have one plane.

[7380] Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this question: What is a dawn patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we started these searches of the operating areas near dawn and that was the dawn patrol. It went out a distance, oh, I think, about 300 miles.

Senator LUCAS. What time would they leave in the morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Just about dawn; depending upon the season of the year.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have such a dawn patrol in operation at any time during the first week in December there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator LUCAS. Was it operating on the 6th and on the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. In what direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. The southern although over the operating areas which we considered it necessary to search.

Senator LUCAS. But there were no long distance reconnaissance planes, such as have been testified to here two or three times, either on the 6th or the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. They went out the 300 miles, and you have frequently referred to this patrol that Admiral Richardson and General Herron established, as a long-distance patrol, and that was to 300 miles

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you, how many reconnaissance [7381] planes were operating on the search on the morning of the 6th and the morning of the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. I haven't those exact figures, but I think about five or six, and in addition on the morning of the 7th I recall there were several patrol planes out operating with the submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair announces that the hour of 12 has arrived. In view of pending matters in the Senate some members of the committee from the Senate have indicated that they would like to be on the floor from 12 on.

In view of that the committee will recess here until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:03 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[7382] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Lucas, will you proceed with the examination of the Admiral.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (Retired)—Resumed

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel, before the recess for lunch we were discussing the question of reconnaissance by Army and Navy planes in and about Pearl Harbor the week preceding the attack.

I should like to ask you whether or not you had any conversations with General Short following the receipt of the war warning message on November 27 with respect to long-range reconnaissance to be carried on by the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume I discussed that with General Short. If you ask me specifically what I said to him and what he said to me, I could not answer you.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. You must understand, sir, that we had had an agreement over a considerable period of time and that agreement, and the limitations of the agreement, were perfectly well-known to General Short and to me, and the point in that was that we were not going to institute a long-range reconnaissance until such time as we knew, within narrow time [*7383*] limits, the time that the attack was to be expected.

Senator LUCAS. Was that contained in the agreement, with respect to the narrow limit of the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that was stated in the estimate of the situation, which might be termed a part of the agreement; yes. It was a question of forces that we had available, and until the number of planes was, we will say, multiplied by about 4, we would be unable to conduct any long-range reconnaissance over a long period of time.

In connection with all this patrol affair I would like to invite your attention to the fact that on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday of the week preceding the attack we did, in fact, send out patrol planes in the northwestern sector to a distance of about 400 miles. After that time these patrol planes required overhaul and upkeep, and they were taken in for that purpose.

I stated in my statement that these were new planes, 54, as I recall the number, and all of them had been supplied to us within the month preceding the attack.

These new planes were experiencing shake-down difficulties. They had no spare parts. They had some trouble with broken engine sections, and there were certain alterations required in the planes before they were fully ready for war service.

Those alterations had not been completed by December 7. [*7384*] When we got these new planes we sent back the planes which we had out there, and these planes relieved them.

Now reverting again to Richardson's patrol, which we touched on here this morning. In 1940, June of 1940, General Herron received this order from the Chief of Staff to alert his command against an overseas raid, or words to that effect. Of course that was a specific order and Richardson was asked to cooperate in this. Richardson had no other orders except to cooperate against an overseas raid.

Naturally he used every facility he had to do the best he could with it. My orders were very different. My orders were to take a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the raids in the Marshalls.

Richardson's orders at that time, or General Herron's orders, had no implications and nothing in his orders beyond conducting a reconnaissance.

I just wanted to point that out, and I think that makes considerable difference.

[*7385*] Senator LUCAS. That may be true, Admiral. As I understood you to say this morning, on the question of an appropriate defensive deployment, it did not necessarily mean, in your opinion at that time, that you should use these planes for reconnaissance and search?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I might say that the "appropriate defensive deployment," and "defensive deployment" used in that letter, I mean that dispatch, was a strategic matter, not a tactical matter. It was a strategic defensive deployment—I mean our understanding was—and that was primarily to make sure that when we deployed the fleet, or put them in any position that they would not take on an offensive character or anything that the Japanese could consider as offensive.

That, coupled, with the other admonitions that I had about doing nothing, to commit no overt act or anything that could be construed as such, meant, in other words, that I was not to go down to the Marshalls and sit right on them right away.

Senator LUCAS. Now, when this war-warning message came on November 27, did you discuss the question of long-range reconnaissance with the key officers of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I am quite sure I did. We discussed that so many times, and our policies were so well [*7386*] known, that very little discussion was required. We had gone up and down this scale dozens of times. We knew what we could do.

Senator LUCAS. Did you discuss that with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. I could not say I did, specifically; no.

Senator LUCAS. In the hearings before the Roberts Commission, the chairman of that commission asked General Short this question:

> When you had your discussion, sir, from November 27 to December 7, with the Navy commanders, were you informed of what scouting forces they had out?
>
> General SHORT. No, sir. I usually knew they had task forces out. They usually talked about it.
>
> The CHAIRMAN. There was no discussion about increasing the patrol?
>
> General SHORT. No, sir.
>
> The CHAIRMAN. Was there any call upon you for additional planes?
>
> General SHORT. No. There was no time when we refused planes to them. They understood perfectly well they would be made available if necessary, if we had them.

Now, at any time, did you call on General Short for planes to carry on any long-range reconnaissance?

[*7387*] Admiral KIMMEL. Not during that period. Furthermore, I reported to the Chief of Naval Operations, in a dispatch of the 28th of November, I think it was that there were just six Army B–17 bombers that were in operating condition on the island of Oahu at the time, and those were the only planes that General Short had which were suitable for long-range reconnaissance, and I knew it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Admiral KIMMEL (continuing). And, furthermore, I might add at this time that Admiral Bellinger received a daily report on the avail-

ability of planes from General Martin, and General Martin received a daily report of availability of planes from Admiral Bellinger, and I was kept reasonably well informed of the status of the planes.

I do not mean in detail, but in general.

[*7388*] Senator LUCAS. Did the Congressman want to say something?

Mr. MURPHY. My impression was that you were going to send them away from Oahu entirely.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't there a communication that you were going to send the 12 B–17's away from Oahu, but only 6 were in condition to run?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, it came up, to be sure, in connection with our plans to use the B–17 bombers if and when they became available on the island of Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake; and we had hoped to get those B–17's out there to augment our forces, particularly we were hoping to be able to get some B–17's to operate from Wake to make the reconnaissance of the Marshall Islands.

The B–17's were very much faster, had a higher ceiling, and were in every way more suitable for reconnaissance than were the patrol planes.

It is quite true that this report was made in connection with that. Nevertheless, what I was trying to point out was my knowledge of the B–17's at the time and the fact that the Navy Department had that same knowledge available.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel, leaving the recon- [*7389*] naissance for a moment, I take it it goes without saying that you knew that Pearl Harbor was our most important outpost in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You also knew that Pearl Harbor and the fleet was the hub of our Pacific strategy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you knew that the fleet was the most important cog in our defensive and offensive war machine in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I think that is true.

Senator LUCAS. And you also knew that it was the greatest single factor in the protection of our possessions as well as the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and I was planning to so use them as rapidly as I could.

Senator LUCAS. Now, you went into command of the Pacific Fleet in February 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. February 1, 1941.

Senator LUCAS. February 1, 1941, with that thorough knowledge and understanding?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I had had that full knowledge and understanding for a long time before I became commander in chief.

[*7390*] Senator LUCAS. As commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, it was your sole responsibility to take every precautionary measure under all circumstances to properly protect that fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That I did.

Senator LUCAS. You were commander of the fleet long enough to know and properly evaluate the fleet's strength and its possibilities both on the offensive and defensive?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and I found that strength leaving much to be desired.

Senator LUCAS. With all of these facts, Admiral, admitted, do you want the committee to understand that every consideration was given the fleet, that the fleet had received every consideration at your hands when naval strategy was being discussed, from November 27 to December 7, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Not only from November 27 to December 7, but from the time I became commander in chief and long before that.

Senator LUCAS. You want that to include from the time you became commander in chief?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. When you became commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, there was an operating schedule of ships [*7391*] that had been ordered by Admiral Richardson, whereby one half of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor and one half of the fleet would be at sea?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. When you took over and became commander of the fleet you changed that operation schedule?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I didn't. I changed that operating schedule after I found that even operating one half the fleet out and one half in, that I was depleting the oil reserves at Pearl Harbor. I couldn't keep up the oil reserves with the means I had to transport oil from the coast, and do the various other things we had to do with the tankers.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand now that you want the committee to know that the reason for the changing of the schedule was due to the reserve supply of oil on the island of Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was one of the principal factors in the decision.

Senator LUCAS. What were the other factors, if I may inquire?

Admiral KIMMEL. The other factors were the necessity for having the fleet in port a little more to make these alterations which were rapidly coming on from our war experience.

[*7392*] Senator LUCAS. In other words, due to the stress of the deteriorating conditions between Japan and this country, there was a continuous change in connection with attempting to get the fleet more ready for war, and that caused the ships to be in port more than otherwise; am I correct in my understanding?

Admiral KIMMEL. I tried to balance everything. I tried to get the most out of the time that we had. And the fuel situation alone would have demanded that I do what I did. The other factors were to be considered, and we took full advantage of the fact that the fuel situation demanded we keep them in port.

Senator LUCAS. It so happens that on the morning of December 7, two-thirds of the fleet were in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am not sure as to the numbers that were in Pearl Harbor. I think that is a little high. I think a little over half.

Senator LUCAS. Well, all I have is the records that I have examined, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Perhaps you are correct.

Senator LUCAS. I may be in error about that. If I am you can correct it upon further investigation. But it is my understanding from reading the record that two-thirds of the fleet that was based at Pearl Harbor was in the [*7393*] harbor on the morning of December 7, when the attack came.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I haven't those figures in front of me, but I think that is not entirely accurate.

Senator LUCAS. It may not be, sir, and if so, you may correct it. I should be glad to have it that way.

Now, after you received the war warning on November 27, did it occur to you to change the operation schedule in any way whereby fewer ships might be in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did change the operating schedule to the extent of carrying out those tasks which we thought were demanded at that time.

Senator LUCAS. With respect to the carrying out of those tasks which you say were demanded at that time, as I recall those messages that came from the Chief of Naval Operations, they placed the direct responsibility upon you to say whether or not those movements were feasible and practicable, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. And with the information I had, I thought they were. Otherwise, I would not have done it.

Senator LUCAS. But I rather reached the conclusion from your statement that you read to the committee, Admiral, that you assumed that that was a direct command from the [*7394*] Chief of Naval Operations here in Washington.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in naval circles, and I think military circles, a suggestion from a senior is little short of a command. I realized that I had discretion in the matter. I thought his suggestion was good, and therefore I carried it out. And I wouldn't have hesitated to differ with him had I seen any good reason for doing so.

Senator LUCAS. Those two messages that came directing you to take the task forces to Wake and Midway in the event you believed it impracticable and not feasible, came after the war message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Came, I think, on the same day.

Senator LUCAS. I understood you to say in your direct statement those two messages were taken into consideration by you, and rather qualified the war warning message.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. My recollection is that those messages, one of them came in before the war warning, 23 hours, I think I figured up, and the other one was the day after the war warning, in connection with the transfer of planes.

However, that is easy enough to check on. It was almost simultaneously.

Senator LUCAS. I was under the impression both came after the war warning message. I may be in error, and you [*7395*] may be right. I am not sure.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have got time groups on each one of these.

Senator LUCAS. It may not be so important, although I thought it was.

Admiral KIMMEL. The only thing I have here is the time of origin. I haven't the time I received it, but it would be only a matter of hours at the most.

Just one moment, sir.

The two of them, the time of origin of the two messages in regard to sending these reinforcements to the islands were just about 23 hours before the war warning message.

Senator LUCAS. That is the date of them?

Admiral KIMMEL. All of them are on the 27th. The time group on the first of the island messages was 0040 and the time group on the second one of the island messages was 0038, and the time group on the war warning message is 2337.

Senator LUCAS. Would it have made any difference in your plans out there for defense or offense if those messages came before the war warning, or after?

Admiral KIMMEL. They came so close together—no, it wouldn't have made any difference. The three messages stood. They all originated on the same day as it happened. [*7396*] Whether one came in just ahead or just afterward, I think would have made no difference.

Senator LUCAS. When you sent the task forces out on these two missions, before you sent them, you had given consideration to the war warning message of the 27th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; yes. And I reported to the Chief of Naval Operations on the 28th, after he knew I had received the war warning in regard to sending the planes to Wake and also told him that I was going to send them later to Midway.

[*7397*] Senator LUCAS. My thought was that the reason perhaps that they used the words "practicable" and "feasible" was due to the fact that he had already sent you the war warning message and because the war warning message was there it was up to you to determine whether or not you thought under those circumstances those task forces should go out.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, he must have known that I couldn't very well get these movements underway before I would have the war warning message anyhow.

Senator LUCAS. Now, Admiral Kimmel, after you received the war warning message of November 27, was there any change at all in the movement or the operation of these ships in and out of Pearl Harbor, outside of the two task forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean any change from the ones we had scheduled for?

Senator LUCAS. Yes. You had a regular schedule, as I understand it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Was that routine of ships entering and leaving Pearl Harbor changed any in any way after you received the war warning message, other than the two task forces we have been talking about?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I couldn't answer that but there was no major change.

[*7398*] Senator LUCAS. In other words, the war warning message that you received did not cause you to change in any way the movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Except for these task forces.

Senator LUCAS. Except for the task forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Will you tell the committee where Halsey's task force was when Pearl Harbor was struck?

Admiral KIMMEL. To my recollection he was about 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. He was on his way home?

Admiral KIMMEL. On his way to Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. On his way to Pearl Harbor after having carried out the assignment that had been given to him by you on the 28th—was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. There is a rumor, one of those rumors that you hear all the time, there is a rumor that Halsey's task force was delayed in coming back because of some engine trouble, or some other trouble, out at sea. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Never heard of it.

Senator LUCAS. Nothing to it. You would have heard of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I would.

[*7399*] Senator LUCAS. Assuming Halsey's task force had arrived in Pearl Harbor on the night of the 6th, would they have been anchored in there too?

Admiral KIMMEL. Halsey's task force needed fuel. I would have brought him in for fuel if they arrived because they needed fuel. And, as a matter of fact, I kept Halsey out and he had to send his destroyers in for fuel and I had to send out other destroyers to him to take the places of the ones he had, and after about, oh, not more than 2 or 3 days of operation, I had to bring Halsey in to fuel his carrier.

Senator LUCAS. Where would Newton's task force have been if you had not given him the order to go to Midway on the morning of the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well——

Senator LUCAS. They left on December 6, they left Pearl Harbor on December 6.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know what the operational schedule of those particular ships was in the regular routine on the afternoon of December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't recall that at the present time, sir.

Senator LUCAS. But it is a near assumption that they [*7400*] might have been in Pearl Harbor on the night of December 6 had they not carried this mission out to Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; they would have been at sea.

Senator LUCAS. They would have been at sea?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Why do you say that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Because that is my recollection.

Senator LUCAS. I see. There is another question that I want to, ask you about the task forces as a result of the colloquy which took place on yesterday.

Halsey's task force, as I understand it, went out fully armed and prepared to shoot and sink anything they saw?

Admiral KIMMEL. He so informed me after he returned.

Senator LUCAS. Did he have the power or authority to do that under the order that you gave him and which you read into the record this morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. You better ask Admiral Halsey when he comes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I will ask Admiral Halsey when he comes, but you were the commander in chief of this fleet, in a pretty serious time.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. This——

[*7401*] Admiral KIMMEL. And I didn't want Halsey to get caught, and I hoped he wouldn't, and I knew Halsey.

Senator LUCAS. You didn't have to give the admiral any orders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, he knew the situation thoroughly.

Senator LUCAS. I know that, but I am just now talking about your responsibility out there as commander of the fleet in giving orders to men on task forces of this kind.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[*7402*] Senator LUCAS. Now, I was wondering whether or not under the order that you read in the record this morning and the order that you read yesterday to Admiral Brown—whether or not under those orders these men would have the right and the authority to arm themselves to the teeth for the purpose of sinking or shooting down anything that they might run across that they thought was an enemy?

Admiral KIMMEL. When you send a man on an expedition of any kind and particularly an admiral, you have got to trust him to do the things which the situation demands. I had no authority to give him any shooting orders and I had been enjoined not to put shooting orders into effect in the Pacific but I did not want them to get caught, either one of them.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I can appreciate what you were up against at that particular time, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The only thought that I had in mind in asking you these questions was to discover, if I could, the reason why Admiral Halsey sailed under one set of orders and Admiral Newton sailed apparently under another set of orders.

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Halsey made his own interpretation of my suggestion that he use his common sense when he asked me how far to go and in view of everything I think he made a pretty good selection.

[*7403*] Senator LUCAS. Under any circumstances——

Admiral KIMMEL. Excuse me. Another point, though, that I have tried to indicate was that Halsey was going about 2,000 miles out.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, I know it.

Admiral KIMMEL. That Newton was going only 700 miles and the chances of trouble that Halsey might get into were very much greater than anything that Newton had.

Senator LUCAS. Well, under any circumstances and irregardless of how they interpreted those orders, Admiral Kimmel was the man who had to be held responsible in the final analysis for whatever they did.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I have been held responsible.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in your statement to the committee on page 63 you said the following:

> The sending of the carrier task forces to Wake and Midway did more than reinforce the air defenses of the islands. It permitted a broad area to be scouted for signs of enemy movement along the path of the advance of these task forces to the islands and their return to Oahu. In addition, they were in an excellent position to intercept any enemy force which might be on the move.

Now, do you believe that Newton's task force was in a position, assuming his testimony is correct, was in a position [*7404*] to intercept any enemy force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, regardless of his testimony the location in which he was and the track that his course followed put him in a position where he was to the westward, a little bit north of west of Oahu and any force coming to Oahu or on its way there, having once been discovered, Newton could have been directed to take an intercepting course and that is what we endeavored to do with him on the morning of December 7. The only trouble was that we made a mistake due to the information we received and thought the Japanese attack force was down to the southward instead of the northward.

Senator LUCAS. But the point I am making——

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, I will yield, Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. Just for clarification. In one of your questions referring to the Newton task force I understood you to say that that sailed on the 6th of December. My understanding has been up to this time that it sailed on the 5th of December.

Admiral KIMMEL. They did sail on the 5th.

Mr. KEEFE. So that the record may be clear on this point in connection with this cross-examination——

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not notice that.

[*7405*] Mr. KEEFE (continuing). The testimony is that it sailed on the 5th. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir. I had not noticed that.

Senator LUCAS. I thank you, Congressman. That is correct.

The point that I was attempting to make, though, Admiral, and only using your statement to the committee to do so, was whether or not Newton, assuming his testimony was correct, if he was just coasting along on routine duty, as to whether or not he was in a position to intercept anybody in the event he had met a hostile enemy?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was fully fueled, he was fully armed, he was zig-zagging against submarines, he had up an air patrol and I presume that he could have gone into action in a matter of, oh, a couple of minutes at most.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if this statement is correct, and I read it into the record yesterday, on that mission he was given no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war other than the ordinary routine and the only point I am trying to make is whether or not, if that is correct, whether or not his force would not have been destroyed before he could have gotten into action?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had had orders in effect for a long [*7406*] time about the arming of planes and I presumed Admiral Newton was carrying those orders out.

Senator LUCAS. Well, if Newton's testimony is correct the task force undoubtedly——

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon, sir. May I make an observation?

Senator LUCAS. Certainly.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you are not quoting from Newton's testimony. You are quoting from a——

Senator LUCAS. I am quoting from the appendix to the narrative statement of evidence at the Navy Pearl Harbor Investigation.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I think you would get a more accurate presentation if you wanted to get Newton's original testimony.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that may be true, but is there any doubt in your mind now from Newton's testimony that I take it you have read, that he testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding the preparation for war other than ordinary routine? Is there any question about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, my contention is that the ordinary routine should have been sufficient under the orders under which he was operating.

[*7407*] Senator LUCAS. You think he should have been prepared then in every way?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Then if there is any question of failing to perform the duty under the order that you gave him, then it is on Admiral Newton?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say so.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Senator LUCAS. I will yield for a question.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if the responsibility would lie on Admiral Newton under those circumstances, if it was Colonel Bundy's duty and General Gerow's duty to check the Short reply, why the gentleman feels that the responsibility lies on General Marshall?

Senator LUCAS. On General Marshall? Well, I don't want to get into that argument right now.

Now, one other question, Admiral, or two. You spent considerable time explaining to the committee how you made a daily memorandum from November 30 on as to what should be done within the next 24 hours.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. And you were really on a 24-hour war alert after November the 27th, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not quite understand what you mean [*7408*] by that.

Senator LUCAS. Well, something in that war message on November the 27th caused you from that time on to issue a daily 24-hour memorandum of some kind.

Admiral KIMMEL. I prepared—I had prepared a memorandum on the steps which we would take immediately that hostilities commenced. I did that as a precautionary measure and I think it was a wise thing.

Senator LUCAS. I agree with you, Admiral, and the only point that I am making is that you went on that 24-hour basis immediately following the war-warning message that you received on November the 27th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, yes.

Senator LUCAS. And that was the first time that you had gone on a 24-hour warning basis of this kind or——

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. We had done it but not quite as systematically as I insisted on doing it at that time. We always had a summary of what we were going to do but I reduced it to—well, to a little better system, that is all.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you had not been writing out a message or a memorandum up to that time, had you?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I had not been writing out a memorandum, but they had been keeping it in the war plans. About the only difference here was to be sure that the staff duty [*7409*] officer at all times had that in his hands.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, in that memorandum that you prepared on the morning of December the 6th there were seven specific items referring to the movement of air force in and about Hawaii.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I presume the seven is correct, but there were several.

Senator LUCAS. I am now turning again to your testimony before the Roberts Commission on page 146 of that rather voluminous document that is before the committee. This question was asked:

Admiral REEVES. As I have checked it, there are seven specific items referring to the movement of air force in this memorandum.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was to be put into effect in the case of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was the action you took on what date?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was approved by me on the morning of 6 December.

Admiral REEVES. That was the direct result of the warning of November 27?

[*7410*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. You took these war preparation measures on that morning as a result of that warning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; as the result of that warning and the general situation I wanted to know—I was keeping a running record of what——

Admiral REEVES. Well, would you say that these measures that you have taken are anti-sabotage protection? Did you have anti-sabotage in your mind when you took these measures to despatch forces all along?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Then, you took the warning of November 27 to mean more than protect yourself against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCOY. Did you discuss that with the Army commander?

Admiral KIMMEL. What I was going to do here? I think I didn't show him this. I discussed a great many things with the Army commander.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not hear that, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

General McCOY. Did you discuss that with the Army commander?

[*7411*] Admiral KIMMEL. What I was going to do here? I think I didn't show him this. I discussed a great many things with the Army commander.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. And that is correct. You did not, as I understand it, discuss any of these daily messages or memoranda that you prepared with General Short.

Admiral KIMMEL. What I meant was that he and the others had not seen this memoradum which I had prepared. Some of the things would have been of interest to him and all of those I think I did discuss with him at various times, but so far as showing him what we had drawn up there, it was a crystallization of our ideas, that is all.

Senator LUCAS. And you conveyed the crystallization of those ideas on to General Short, I take it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say so, the things that he was interested in.

Senator LUCAS. Did you see General Short every day and discuss with him the military and naval situation around the island of Oahu from the time you received the war-warning message up to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not see him every day, but to the best of my recollection betwixt November 27 and December 7 I had conferences with him on four or five different occasions.

[*7412*] Senator LUCAS (reading):

General MCCOY. Do you remember on what dates immediately prior to the attack you had conferences with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would be difficult for me to say that, sir, but I think I can look at some of these dispatches and approximate the——

General MCCOY. Now may I help you? General Short made a statement to us that he had conferences with you on certain days. Could you have that looked up, the dates? Would that be here or at the hotel?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is probably at the hotel, General.

Who was Mr. Schneider? Was he one of your men?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know who Mr. Schneider was.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

Admiral KIMMEL. We had several conferences.

General MCCOY. My remembrance is that he spoke of a prior conference with you.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. What kind of conference, sir?

Senator LUCAS. Prior conference.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

[*7413*] Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

General MCCOY. Immediately prior to the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct.

General MCCOY. And we asked him to give us some idea of what you talked about,——

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. —to see what effect these dispatches had on the two of you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Talking it over together.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. And the dispatch that we had particularly in mind, I think, at the time, was this one that was the war warning on the 27th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Apparently General Short didn't remember that at all. He had received no copy of it. That is, he had the record looked up. He didn't remember it at all, but he said he felt that you must have mentioned it to him, although he couldn't remember it, and his records and his file over there do not show that it was ever furnished him.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, General, I not only sent that war warning to General Short, to the best of my know- [*7414*] ledge and belief, but——

General MCCOY. I understand from your records that you had sent him a paraphrase.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Would that paraphrase use the term "war warning," do you think?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, sir; we had a paraphrase, or he read it, because they were not the same in literal wording, but "war warning" was in both dispatches, the paraphrase and the original.

General McCoy. It made no impression, as I remember, on General Short, however.

Admiral Kimmel. No, I don't think it did.

General McCoy. He said, however, that he felt you had shown everything you had received.

Admiral Kimmel. I was going to add, General, that I believe that in my own office I showed him these dispatches and discussed them with him.

Is that still your best memory on that question, Admiral?

Admiral Kimmel. I think you can search your record a little further——

Senator Lucas. I am going to.

Admiral Kimmel. (continuing). And find that I subse- [7415] quently testified that on the afternoon of November 27, when I received this war warning, I immediately sent for—well, my Intelligence officer brought it in. I told him to prepare a paraphrase of it and give it to General Short. That he did and the message was delivered to General Short's headquarters, there is no question about that, on this afternoon or evening of November 27.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Admiral Kimmel. And General Short subsequently, I think, arrived at the same conclusion.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Lucas. He may have arrived at the same conclusion thereafter but at this particular time he apparently was not certain as to whether or not the message was ever delivered and you were.

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; I was certain. I was certain then and the only trouble was that at that particular instant I wanted it checked to make sure that my subordinate had carried out the orders I gave him. I subsequently found out he had.

Mr. Murphy. I believe the record will show that the gentleman, the admiral, referred to Layton as being an idiot because he did not carry out the order which he was given, I believe. He was given it and told to deliver it personally [7416] but did not deliver it personally. He gave it to a subordinate and the subordinate did not deliver it personally. He gave it to some other subordinate of the Army, according to the testimony.

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. And the record will show the admiral calling Layton an idiot before the Board because he did not do what he was told.

Senator Lucas. Well, is there any question about whether or not Short did finally get the message?

Admiral Kimmel. I think there is no question but what he received it.

Senator Lucas. I now turn briefly to the radar question which has been discussed quite a little.

Admiral Kimmel. What is that, sir?

Senator Lucas. I am going to talk to you now about radar for just a few moments. After November the 27th, Admiral, when you went on a 24-hour alert, I call it that, maybe that is not quite correct, did you have any conversation with General Short about the condition of the Army warning service at that time?

Admiral Kimmel. My best recollection is that I was informed by General Short at about this time that he could give us a coverage of 150 to 200 miles. Subsequently General Short [7417] corrected

me to say that he had told me a hundred miles. At any rate, I was informed that the Army radar was manned and that, as far as I was concerned, suited me.

Subsequently I found that the Army radar had been manned daily from 4 o'clock in the morning until 6 p. m. and eventually changed to 4 in the morning until 4 p. m. This is all second-hand. I did not go to the place to see it. That eventually, the day before the attack, one of General Short's subordinates told them they need not man it after 7 o'clock and up to and including Saturday preceding the attack they had been manning it from 4 o'clock in the morning until 4 in the afternoon.

I did not inquire of General Short the hours that he was keeping in manning his radar, nor did I inquire of him the status of his information center. That was an Army responsibility. I had been informed that the radar was in operation and I presumed that General Short—and I always thought he was perfectly competent to set the hours for manning his radar.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, in view of the deficiencies and the inadequacies and the vulnerability of the fleet that we have testified to here and all agreed on wasn't it almost your duty to find out definitely whether or not the radar was working in line with the warning that was given in that war message?

[*7418*] Admiral KIMMEL. I thought I knew. You must trust somebody. I couldn't do everything.

Senator LUCAS. I appreciate that you must trust someone, but under the orders that you were operating on at that time and the agreement that you entered into for the coastal defense of the island it was the duty, as I understand it—if I am wrong you will correct me—for the Navy to have a liaison man between the Army and the Navy so that they could properly obtain just what those who were experimenting or operating radar were doing. Am I correct about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. The responsibility for the information center and the Army radar was entirely an Army function. I received a letter from General Short, as I testified to already before this committee, on August 5 requesting that I detail a liaison officer to work with his forces in the development of radar. I did so detail an officer, Commander Curts, who was my fleet communication officer at that time, and this liaison officer, my understanding of it at the time, which was never changed, was that he was to furnish them with technical advice and information. He was in nowise to be a watch stander in the information center.

Senator LUCAS. Who was to be a watch stander?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a function of the Army; and the Army commander, if he wanted a naval officer in there, he could [*7419*] have requested a naval officer, and one naval officer would not have been sufficient. He would have required several.

And, furthermore, had he requested these several watch standers to stand watch in the information center he would undoubtedly have submitted that request to Admiral Bloch, who was the commandant of the district and the man who was working with him in connection with all those affairs.

I believe that Admiral Bloch has stated he never received a request.

Now, I would like to make clear that the man sitting in the operations center and the people to whom the Army refers as liaison officers were in effect officers detailed to stand watch in the information center. An Army officer who had the information in regard to the Navy planes could have done that job, in my opinion, quite as well as a naval officer could have done it and, likewise, an Army officer detailed—I mean a naval officer detailed to follow Army planes. The only advantage in having a naval officer to look out for naval planes or an Army officer to look out for Army planes was that they probably knew the means of getting information. They could not sit in the information center and tell which planes were operating. They had to get that information from the people who were ordering the operations and directing the operations.

[*7420*] Now again I would like to add there was one other thing that I did. A few weeks, I forget the exact date, before the attack a member of my staff came to me and said the Army had requested the services of Lieutenant Taylor. Lieutenant Taylor was a young naval officer who had been operating with the British and who had some knowledge of the operation of an information center, and I sent Lieutenant Taylor to report to the Army and they had complete control over his movements from that time until December 7 and how much longer I have forgotten. At any rate, Lieutenant Taylor did everything that he could to assist the Army in getting organized and improve their center. I felt that having done those things I had done all that I could to assist the Army in getting their radar business in operation.

Senator LUCAS. My inquiries have been directed to radar primarily for this reason: Everyone knew about the vulnerability of the fleet out there.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Everybody knew that there was no long-range reconnaissance going on.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Everybody knew that there were no surface ships that were patrolling wide areas because it was not feasible to do that.

[*7421*] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. There were no submarines at that particular time.

Admiral KIMMEL. Because we did not have any.

Senator LUCAS. You did not have any.

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Senator LUCAS. So the only one thing that you really had on the 6th and the 7th that would have given you any information at all about the approaching planes and a surprise attack was the radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, and, as a matter of fact, we found out—I found out on the Tuesday following the attack that they had picked up these planes.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Well, now, you found that out after the attack had taken place and that brings me right back to the question that seems to me important—it may not seem to you with all the responsibilities you had—as to why it was when you knew at that particular time that radar was the only weapon that you could depend upon to discover approaching enemy planes, that you and General Short did not have a little better understanding with respect to the transfer of

these messages when they came in on radar? You have gone over that and you answered it rather fully.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have answered it and I might answer that [7422] when you know something when you don't really know it, you are in a pretty bad way, and I thought I knew.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. You thought you knew and you were depending upon someone to give you that information in the event that it came in.

Admiral KIMMEL. And you have always got to depend on someone if you are going to get anywhere. You cannot do everything.

Senator LUCAS. Now, you stated, I think, on yesterday that you did not talk to General Short about a matter of this kind because that was an Army matter and——

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, not only because it was an Army matter but because I had confidence in General Short.

Senator LUCAS. You did not hesitate, Admiral, to talk to General Short when the Army proposed the exchange of Army troops for marines on the outlying bases?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I did not hesitate to talk to General Short at any time on any subject that I considered necessary to talk to him.

Senator LUCAS. Isn't it a fact, now, that on the morning of the 7th and on the day of the 6th that information on that radar was more important to the protection of the fleet than any outlying bases outside of Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. Again I come back to the fact that I [7423] thought the radar was manned, that is all I can answer to that and when you—I don't know what other answer to make.

Senator LUCAS. All right, Admiral. I want to read this bit of testimony before the Roberts Commission upon this point. Page 630. [Reading:]

The CHAIRMAN. And you probably knew or should have known that the Army warning service was not in shape to give you a warning, or to give them a warning, of distant airplanes, so there just was not any machinery for warning here; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought that the operations of the radar, Army radar, which was reported to me in the maneuvers that we had, that they had been able to pick up planes taking off from Maui and picking them up this side from Hawaii and following them all the way in, in these exercises that we had. They told me that they picked up planes from our ships coming in, and we had several attacks on Pearl Harbor where we had them carry out and had the carrier run in and make the attack and the carrier run the planes in.

I had been informed that they had picked them up and that they had followed them in, and I thought the radar warning was in very good shape.

I knew that some of the radar warning net was not [7424] what they wanted it to be, and we were pushing in every way we could to get that radar warning net perfected, and within a week before this attack took place I knew that my staff had taken a very effective part in urging the District and the Army to do certain things in connection with it, and particularly the District, and young Taylor, I gave, as I told you about today.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And he had come down and told us also and some other people from the District and from the Army, and we were working on the perfection of the warning net, and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, while I think your information is incorrect as to that, the fact is that in the week of December 7th and the days prior to that, and on the morning of December 7th, you were quite confident that you would get a definite warning of distant planes; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought we would get some warning of distant planes.

General McNARNEY. And as a responsible officer you did not assure yourself of that fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, except indirectly, but when we had two separate commanders and when you have a respon- [7425] sible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them.

General McNARNEY. Let us examine into that. Under the situation you had the system of mutual cooperation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And in the method of mutual cooperation, is it necessary for one commander to know what the other commander is doing or what his plans are?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCOY. Was there an officer on your staff detailed to the radar warning service room to keep you informed?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCOY. How did you expect to be informed?

Admiral KIMMEL. The radar warning service was the function of the Army and the Naval Base Defense Officer. I had a staff who were active and trying to do the best. It is a physical impossibility for them to do everything, and I thought that they had developed it and handled it.

If I had it to do again, of course, I would check it a good deal more than I did.

Does that statement still stand?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I had it to do again under the condi- [7426] tions that I then knew I would have done differently, yes, certainly, because that is a perfectly natural thing.

Senator LUCAS. That was hindsight?

Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly.

Senator LUCAS. Now with respect to this liaison man I want to call your attention to section 7 of the joint coastal frontier defense plan and this is under the "war and defense plans." [Reading:]

U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five:

On July 26, 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations. The plan provided in part.

And section 7 of that plan is as follows, a part of it:

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army air- [7427] craft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations.

It seems to me that is rather plain as to what should be done with radar on behalf of both the Army and the Navy.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, this question of Navy liaison officers, the number that they required in the information center was a thing for the Army to determine and for them to request a detail of liaison officers when they wanted them. I thought they had what they needed and in all of the drills that we had had before, and we had had many, the results as reported to me showed that the information center was working. It was far from perfect, but it was working and they had put the information out. I did not inquire into those

details and the responsibility for getting information to and from the information center was certainly in the hands of the Army because it was their function to do so.

Senator LUCAS. Well, let me ask you this, Admiral: Is this the kind of an agreement that looks good on paper and is fine in theory but in practice it just does not work out?

[7428] Admiral KIMMEL. No, I would say that the agreement was based on getting all the things that we knew we required to put everything in bang-up shape and they were in process of getting in that condition as rapidly as they knew how.

Senator LUCAS. Well, of course, there is always some difficulty, is there not, where you have a joint command of this kind in carrying out details, where the Army and the Navy are definitely scheduled to do certain things?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, there is always difficulty in carrying out any operations where a number of people are involved and we had made an agreement and everybody that I know of in Oahu at the time was doing their best to effectuate those agreements.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the radar went into operation immediately after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. It was in operation before the attack.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, it was in there, but the chairman asked this question:

> He knew what the conditions were, is that right?
> Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think he probably did.
> The CHAIRMAN. And as the radar system is now running there is a Naval officer sitting there at the board to inform you of anything that goes on there?
> [7229] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I said this because I presumed that was correct, and the naval officer would have been there, I presume and, as a matter of fact, I did not know but what he was there already.

I think it might be well to say at this point once more that the information center and the radar had operated in drills and in exercises and I thought it was on a reasonably efficient basis and all the reports I had received led me to believe that.

Senator LUCAS. You did have these air drill exercises?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; we had the air drill exercises.

Senator LUCAS. Where radar was involved?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. These air drill exercises were based upon the possibility of an air raid on the island?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. We had the drills and at the drills the information center—to the best of my knowledge and belief, the information center had been manned on all the drills and they had gotten very satisfactory results.

Senator LUCAS. For instance, in a statement that was made before the Roberts committee——

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Senator LUCAS. In a statement that was made again before [7430] the Roberts committee, on page 602 Justice Roberts said:

> But you did not discuss the possible air attack with him?
> Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think, sir, we discussed a possible air attack on many occasions. We held these drills. For a long time we held them weekly, and then there was some difficulty about getting all elements to take part in the air-

raid drills, so we adopted the scheme of setting a date considerably ahead of time, so all of us, particularly the Army aircraft, could take part to the fullest extent, and that had been in effect for—the air-raid drills started, oh, I should say in March at the latest.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. Now, how long did those air-raid drills continue?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean the duration of each drill?

Senator LUCAS. No. Take the date of December 6: When was the last air raid drill that you had previous to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I should say within a couple of weeks of the attack.

Senator LUCAS. A couple of weeks of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; we had them weekly for some time [7431] and then due to difficulties in getting all elements to take part we finally decided that once every 2 weeks would give better results.

Senator LUCAS. According to a memorandum that was just handed to me by counsel it shows that the last air drill you had was on November the 12th, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. That would be about right, I imagine.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is part of exhibit 120.

Senator LUCAS. That is part of exhibit 120.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Before that you had a drill on October 27.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Before that October the 13th. Can you tell the committee why the air drills ceased after November the 12th?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot. I did not know they had ceased.

Senator LUCAS. Well, this is a report from P. N. L. Bellinger, January the 1st, 1942 [reading]:

From: The Commander Patrol Wing TWO
To: Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of December 7, 1941.
Subject: Data Requested by Board.

1. In accordance with your request I am sending [7432] herewith six copies of Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941.
2. The dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid Drills were held are as follows:

The first one beginning on April 24, 1941, and running through November 12, 1941. There were some dozen or 15 drills in there.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I did not follow up the schedule of air-raid drills exactly when they were conducted, and they were not suspended to the best of my knowledge and belief. They may have been deferred somewhat for some reason beyond my knowledge at the present time.

Senator LUCAS. Well, was that one of your responsibilities, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I was responsible for everything out there.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I say that with the utmost kindness, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg pardon?

Senator LUCAS. I say that in the utmost kindness. I was trying to find out whether or not that was one of your responsibilities.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not consider that the holding of air-raid drills was one of my responsibilities and that I had indi- [7433] cated my approval and desire that the air-raid drills continue. I left

it to General Short and Admiral Bloch as to when they would schedule the air-raid drills and I paid very little attention to carrying out the schedule, but I did pay considerable attention to the results which they obtained from them.

Senator LUCAS. You further stated:

> They were held as often as practicable thereafter, and we held these dress rehearsals, you might call them, along about once a week and then once every two weeks because we wanted to get the two elements into it without conflicting with the training and the various operations.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. They came to me—Admiral Bloch, I think it was—came to me and said he would like to change the weekly drills to biweekly drills and he gave his reasons for it, which appealed to me and I thought it was a good idea that one drill every 2 weeks thoroughly carried out was much more valuable than a drill conducted once a week with only a few elements that could take part.

Incidentally, I might invite your attention to my order of 2CL–41 and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was charged, among other things, with the coordinating of anti-aircraft fire, with the base defense by (1) holding necessary drills. Do you remember that?

Senator LUCAS. I do, sir. I would like to have you an- [*7434*] swer this question: As I have followed the testimony and followed these hearings I have gained a very distinct impression that it was your purpose and your definite purpose to have this fleet trained down to the last minute, so to speak, in the event that war came between this country and Japan.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. We put on extra steam. Every command I ever had while I was in the Navy I endeavored to get it ready to fight and when the situation became more and more critical we redoubled our efforts.

Senator LUCAS. I am just wondering whether or not your determination and your overzealousness to have this fleet trained to the moment, which was certainly commendable, that you probably did not lose sight of the vulnerability of the fleet, because of the lack of airplane protection, and because of the lack of radar and these things that we did not have, apparently.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, you can arrive at your own conclusion. That is your right.

Senator LUCAS. I do not say that that is my conclusion, but I was just thinking along that line because I have followed you very closely, Admiral, and I know how intense you have been in this hearing and I know how intense you were all through your naval career, and you had a fine one, there is no doubt about that, and I was just thinking about putting [*7435*] myself in your shoes at that particular time and knowing that war was imminent, whether or not the training of the fleet there did not overshadow everything else?

Admiral KIMMEL. What, sir?

Senator LUCAS. The training of the fleet did not overshadow everything else.

[*7436*] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I do not think so. I think that the steps I took at this time, and the reasons which I have given to the committee—well, they can speak for themselves. I cannot add anything to them.

Senator LUCAS. In this same statement, you said, about the possibilities of an air raid:

I confess, and so stated, I considered an air raid on this place as a possibility, but by no means a probability.

Now, it seems that everybody was talking about air raids, you drilled for air raids, you drew up in your joint coastal frontier defense plans certain surveys indicating exactly what was going to happen. Isn't that true?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, we did. One of our objects in that was not only to explore the matter thoroughly but to bring it so forcibly to the people in Washington and everywhere that action would be taken to make that base perfectly secure under all contingencies.

Now, then, if I had not done that, I would have been properly subject to considerable censure.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. The point is every week and every day I had to balance one thing against another. I could not do everything, and everything I did cost me something. I did not have an unlimited number of dollars to buy the [7437] things I wanted, if I may illustrate it that way.

I had to buy the things I could with what I had.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, regardless of what you had under the circumstances, with the information you had available at that time, you would have still been taken by surprise?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not understand that question.

Senator LUCAS. I say regardless of any deficiencies or inadequacies, you might have had in ships and planes and what not, you would have still been taken by surprise with the information available that you claim you had at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. No, sir. I think that is wrong. If I had had an adequate patrol, an adequate supply of patrol planes, if I had had an adequate supply of Army B–17 bombers, then the necessity for doing what I did would not have existed. It would have been an entirely different proposition.

I had to conserve my meager forces for what I thought was the most useful purpose I could put them to.

Senator LUCAS. That is correct, and that was in the training of the fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Senator LUCAS. That was in the training of the fleet [7438] for action?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no; I think you are mistaken.

Senator LUCAS. That is what you really did. I mean you were really training that fleet, eliminating long-range reconnaissance, and concentrating primarily upon getting the fleet ready?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, no. In what I have set forth, I have completely failed in giving my views if that is all you have gotten out of it. I was conserving these patrol planes for uses which I had for offensive operations, and had I had available, we will say, 200 patrol planes and 120 B–17 bombers, the situation would have been entirely different. I could have used the patrol planes then, and still had a sufficient number left to conduct the offensive operations.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I want to read into the record at this point, just one part of this Martin-Bellinger report. It is found on page 35 of the appendix to the narrative statement. It is as follows—and these were the estimates, the evaluations that they were making with respect to the air raid, and this was approved by you in September 1941, as I remember.

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces probably [7439] composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier, and that, in a dawn air attack, there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.

[7440] In other words, that was an exact prediction by these two men as to what happened; isn't that true?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is always possible, as I have tried to point out in my testimony here, that no matter what you do the enemy may effect a tactical surprise.

I might invite attention in that connection to the fact that when General MacArthur landed on Leyte that was a tactical surprise, and when General MacArthur went to Lingayen Gulf that was a tactical surprise. The Japs thought they were going to land to the southward. All through the war we had many instances of tactical surprises.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I think that the statement you made yesterday, that you did not think there was going to be a surprise attack, that with the hazards that the Japs would have to meet they would never go through with it, and you were surprised, everybody in Hawaii was surprised, and probably everybody in America was surprised when they finally hit us at Pearl Harbor on December 7; isn't that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is a fair statement.

Senator LUCAS. I want to read just for the record an editorial in the Chicago Tribune.

Did you read any papers out there in Hawaii, Admiral, when you were commander of the fleet?

[7441] Admiral KIMMEL. Did I read the papers there?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never saw the Chicago Tribune. I wish I had.

Senator LUCAS. I did not ask you about that. I just asked you if you read any newspapers from time to time out there.

Admiral KIMMEL. I read the local papers, that is all, and some magazines.

Senator LUCAS. I want to show you how one section of the country were thinking about Hawaii at this particular time. That coincides with all of the evidence that I have heard here practically with respect to this surprise attack.

Everybody out there talked about this surprise attack, everybody had air drills for it, they tried to determine when and where it was going to happen, and yet when it happened everybody was surprised.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the Senator from Illinois will say this represents the thinking of this section of the country, the Chicago Tribune editorial?

Senator LUCAS. Well, the Senator from Maine can put his own interpretation upon this editorial after I read it into the record. It is rather interesting, and it is along the lines that we have been talking

about here, and shows how [7442] some people were thinking and how a great newspaper was thinking at this particular time, and I think it is pertinent to this inquiry to read it into the record.

It is a part of a long editorial on Monday, October 27, 1941. The editorial is entitled, "Mr. Knox Spies a War."

The editorial proceeds:

And so now Mr. Knox wants the country to believe that we may be at war with Japan at any moment.

Remember that is October 27, 1941, about the time you had your last air drill out there.

War for what?

Nations, unless they are governed by fools, do not go to war, and particularly modern war, except for interests so vital that the life of the nation is threatened by their loss. They fight to defend those interests or to take them from their opponent. The objective must be worth the treasure and blood expended before the dreadful risk is considered. What vital interests of the United States can Japan threaten?

She cannot attack us. That is a military impossibility. Even our base at Hawaii is beyond the effective striking power of her Fleet. She may threaten the Philippines but the Philippines are of so little vital interest to this country that we have already arranged to give them their independence [7443] within five years.

And what has Japan that we want? Nothing.

I read that into the record just merely to show what a great newspaper was telling the people at that particular time with respect to Hawaii, that it could not be attacked. Apparently that is what everybody thought, that it could not be attacked at that particular time. It surprised everybody.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have got one or two more questions that I want to ask the admiral and then I am through. I regret that I have taken so long.

These are just some conclusions, Admiral. Is it a fact that all of these deficiencies and inadequacies that you have explained at great length placed upon you the highest degree of diligence in the protection of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, yes.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe under all the circumstances that between November 24–27 and December 7 you exercised that high degree of care and caution that was automatically imposed upon you when you took over this fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I did.

Senator LUCAS. From November 24 until the hour of the attack did you exercise that superior judgment necessary for one of your rank and position when you knew the war was practically imminent?

[7444] Admiral KIMMEL. I did.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe that on the day of the attack you were guilty of any neglect of duty?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, Admiral, you are now telling the committee under solemn oath that you did not commit any mistakes or commit any errors of judgment from November 24 to December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say that is a reasonable conclusion, and it is a conclusion that the Naval Court of Inquiry, composed of three

Admirals, selected by the Secretary of the Navy, came to when they submitted their report to the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. Do you assume any responsibility whatever in the loss of ships, property, and lives of our men on that tragic day?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was commander in chief of the fleet. I cannot escape the responsibility which goes with that position, but I have no responsibility due to any dereliction on my part.

Senator LUCAS. I presume you will agree with me that Pearl Harbor was the worst naval defeat in all the history of the American Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say maybe that is correct.

[*7445*] Senator LUCAS. Notwithstanding that humiliating and far-reaching sea disaster, you now contend that with the information you had available to you you did all that any prudent commander could do to prevent or to minimize the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is a fair statement.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

The Chair wishes to say that the counsel have asked that the committee hold a brief executive session to consider the matter which they wish to bring to its attention immediately after we adjourn this afternoon.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel, a few moments ago you said that a suggestion from a senior in the Navy is a little short of a command. I was wondering if you regarded a suggestion from the Secretary of the Navy, the constitutional officer in charge of the Navy, as being a command?

Admiral KIMMEL. A suggestion from the Scretary of the Navy to whom?

Mr. MURPHY. To the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, if you consider that a command.

Admiral KIMMEL. That would depend somewhat on the circumstances under which it was made. If I received a suggestion from the Secretary of the Navy I would do my best [*7446*] to carry it out.

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring particularly to the letter of the Secretary of the Navy, which had the approval of the Secretary of War, which stated that there was a probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, in fact that an air attack was the most probable kind of attack. Was that a command to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I gave great weight to what the Secretary had to say in his letter, and I was very much encouraged when I received that letter, because I hoped and believed at that time that the deficiencies which the Secretary himself had pointed out would be remedied as rapidly as our resources in this country would permit them to be remedied.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did not consider what he said was true, did you, in December of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Secretary's letter suggested the probability of an air attack, and shortly thereafter I received the information from the Chief of Naval Operations which told me, in effect, that no air attack on Pearl Harbor would be made by the Japanese in

the foreseeable future. That came, as I recall, shortly after this letter from the Secretary, and I took the letter from the Secretary in the way that it was meant. I believe it was meant to put ourselves [7447] in a proper condition in Hawaii to repel any and all attacks that might be made on it.

I have here the exact text of the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations. He quotes Mr. Grew's warning, and says——

Mr. MURPHY. That letter, Admiral, I am already familiar with, and it is already in the record on several occasions, but I will be glad to have you read it again.

Admiral Kimmel. I just want to make my position clear, that is all.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it is most appropriate that that should be done. The Congressman is pursuing this line of inquiry and I think the record should be complete. I think he should read that.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. I am glad to have him read it.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

> The office of Naval Intelligence places no credence on these rumors. Furthermore, it has no data regarding the present disposition and deployment of Japanese Army and Navy forces. No more against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, I refer you to another letter, the letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, was the same Secretary of the Navy, was he not, in command [7448] of the United States Navy, as a member of the Cabinet, on December 7, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Mr. Knox; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the Secretary of the Navy said to the Secretary of War:

> The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be
> (1) air bombing attack.
> (2) air torpedo plane attack.

Now when did you decide that the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War were incorrect in their estimate of the situation at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have given my views on that at great length.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have you state them right now, if you will, for the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg pardon;

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have you state your views on that matter right now on the record, at this point, please.

Admiral KIMMEL. When I received the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have just quoted I was very much influenced by it. When I received, further, the letter of February 15, I think, in which he told me unqualifiedly that torpedoes could not run in the waters of Pearl Harbor, that eliminated the air torpedo attack from my consideration.

[7449] In the months that followed I had to reestimate the situation, and due to my knowledge of the difficulties of overseas raids from Japan and the means they had to accomplish it, I arrived at the conclusion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was not probable. That was very shortly after I received the Secretary's letter.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you had by February decided that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, in their judg-

ment as to what the dangers were at Pearl Harbor, were in error; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was always the possibility of such an attack. I agreed in toto with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that we should so arrange our defenses at Pearl Harbor, and should have supplied to us the means for this defense so that the air attack would be practically impossible.

Now, in connection with Mr. Knox's opinions, Mr. Knox told me when he came to Pearl Harbor that he was surprised, very much surprised when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and he repeated, I think, in public on several occasions that he was surprised.

Mr. MURPHY. I agree, Admiral, that Mr. Knox said that, and a great many other people said that. I am now asking, however, when you ceased to believe that the Secretary of War [*7450*] and Secretary of the Navy were in error? I take your answer to be that you changed your opinion when you got the letter in February about the possibility of an attack by a torpedo plane, as well as when you got the letter from Admiral Stark about the unlikeliness of an attack subsequent to the so-called Peruvian message. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. After that, did not you have an admiral of your fleet, and one of the officer airmen in the Navy, the No. 2 man in the Navy, under your command, make a survey as to the unlikeliness of an attack at Pearl Harbor, and did not he say that an air attack was the most probable, subsequent to these two items that you have already given?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; he did.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you disagree with your air expert?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not disagree with the estimate, because I believe in making an estimate of the worst thing that can happen and provide against it to the best of your ability.

Now, then, when it comes to the time to take action you must balance probabilities against possibilities.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a fact, Admiral, is it not, that the No. 2 airman in the United States Navy says that the most likely attack at Pearl Harbor was to be an air attack? [*7451*] Isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was his opinion.

Mr. MURPHY. And he was in your fleet, wasn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. And that was his particular——

Mr. MURPHY. Domain?

Admiral KIMMEL. Domain.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And he was quite right in making such an estimate.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. And then on December 17, 1941, you asked his opinion on the availability and possibility of using planes as of and prior to December 7, did you not?

Mr. KEEFE. December 17?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; on December 17 you asked him to prepare and had him prepare an estimate of the situation as it was prior to December 7? I mean exactly that.

Admiral KIMMEL. I wanted a record of his views at that particular time, and I asked him to set them forth. I knew all of the essential features of that myself before December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, however, Admiral, that you did have an estimate made, did you not, on December 17?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I had a letter submitted by him on December 17, because I wanted it made a matter of record.

Mr. MURPHY. I beg your pardon; it was December 19, and [7452] I stand corrected.

Admiral KIMMEL. It may have been the 19th, but it was about that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. Now, then, in that particular letter which Admiral Bellinger gave to you, on page 2, paragraph 4, or note 4, I find the following—first, the first paragraph, paragraph 1, "Availability and disposition of patrol planes on morning of 7 December 1941", and then in paragraph 4——

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MURPHY. Excuse me.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask if we have copies of these letters?

Mr. MURPHY. I got mine as a member of this committee at this table. I assume you have got what I have got.

Senator BREWSTER. Was that furnished to the other members?

Mr. MURPHY. I got it sitting in my chair at the table.

Mr. MASTEN. What is the date of it?

Mr. MURPHY. December 19.

Mr. MASTEN. That is Exhibit 120.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I have already read, Admiral, paragraph 1, and I now read paragraph 4:

All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a full allowance of machine-gun ammunition.

[7453] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I now go to paragraph (e), on page 4:

Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive expansion training operations and improvement of the material military effectiveness, at the same time preserving the maximum practicable availability of aircraft for an emergency. Under the existing material and spart parts situation, continuous and extensive patrol plane operations by the PBY–5's was certain to result in rapid automatic attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes immediately available by the exhaustion of small but vital spare parts for which there were no replacement.

Then again I read paragraph (f):

In this connection it should be noted that there were insufficient patrol planes in the Hawaiian area effectively to do the job required. For the Commander of a search group to be able to state with some assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection, would require an effective daily search through 360 degrees to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 15-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16-hour flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 200 patrol planes, adequate spare parts, and ample well-trained personnel would be required for such [7454] operations.

Now the fact is, Admiral, that on December 19 you did get the estimate of Admiral Bellinger as to the appropriateness of having reconnaissance subsequent to November 27, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not understand that question.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read it, Mr. Reporter?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I got it. I asked for it. I wanted it made a matter of record. He was the man who knew most about this. I had been informed of this condition, I knew of the condition prior to December 7, and I wanted it made a matter of record for use on just such occasions as this.

Mr. MURPHY. He was the air expert at Pearl Harbor, wasn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was not the only air expert at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Halsey had been at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Was not he the one in charge of the Air Force at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. In charge of what?

Mr. MURPHY. The Air Force, the air defense force at Pearl Harbor. Was not that his assignment?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, he was in charge of the Patrol Wing 2, which was the patrol wing of the fleet.

[*7455*] Mr. MURPHY. Was not he the air base defense officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh yes, yes, he was the air base defense officer, that is right, yes, and as such he was charged with the operation of these patrol planes, and such Army patrol planes as were supplied to him for the purpose of conducting long-range reconnaissance and bombing operations.

Mr. MURPHY. He was the very officer of the Navy who was to make any reconnaissance that should be made, and who was to contact the Army, to get the Army's planes, to use them in the event a reconnaissance was made, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Notwithstanding that fact, and notwithstanding the fact that you discussed the war warning message with ever so many of your men, you never consulted your air man, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was not the only air man we had there. He was rear admiral in charge of this patrol wing. If you mean that I did not tell him about the war warning, that is correct. I did not tell a great many other admirals about the war warning. I did not tell a great many other people in Hawaii about the war warning. But Admiral Bellinger was there directly under my orders, and I felt capable of giving him any orders that he required.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I am not inquiring about orders [*7456*] now, I am inquiring about a staff consultation, in view of a war warning coming from Washington, to discuss with your airman the necessity for taking any measures appropriate to the occasion in view of the war warning having arrived.

Admiral KIMMEL. He took the measures that I considered necessary.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, he took what orders you gave him, but there was no consultation with your air defense officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that there was a plan under way, was there not, before December 7, to have a separate air department in the Navy and you opposed it, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. A separate air department in the Navy?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. We have some correspondence here to that effect.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know of any movement in the Navy, any serious movement to have a separate air department in the Navy.

Mr. MURPHY. Will counsel tell me the number of the exhibit that is the correspondence about a separate air force, and the letters from Admiral Kimmel? Do you have that?

Mr. MASTEN. I haven't that here, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I think there is such a letter. I will [7457] produce it in the morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am perfectly willing to give my views, if that is what you are driving at.

Mr. MURPHY. I am only interested, Admiral——

First of all let me say this: I think it is highly regrettable that circumstances are such that a man who rendered honorable service for 40 years in the United States Navy should have to be answering my questions, and I am only asking them because of the occasion of my being here, and because of what happened on December 7. I am only interested in what your views were, what your views as commander in chief were up to and including December 7, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was endeavoring to give you those as honestly as I can.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, Admiral. Now, then, did you write a letter in which you opposed a separate air force in the Navy prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did I oppose it?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Most emphatically, yes. I still oppose it.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. If there had been a separate air arm in the Navy on December 7, Admiral Bellinger would have been in the consultation in order to determine the appropriate- [7458] ness of the reconnaissance, would he not?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I think the man I would have consulted would have been the senior airman in the fleet, and that was Admiral Halsey, and I did so consult him.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, even if you had a separate air force you would not have a consultation, I take it, with the man responsible for the air base defense and the man responsible for having a reconnaissance started, and the man responsible for calling on the Army for reconnaissance planes? Even under those circumstances he would not be consulted; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you are laboring somewhat under a misapprehension.

Mr. MURPHY. It may be. I am only a layman and you are an admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. As a matter of fact, so far as this activity is concerned, Admiral Bellinger was the air base defense officer and Admiral Bloch was the naval base defense officer, and Admiral Bellinger, for ordinary purposes, was directly under the command of Admiral Bloch. I just want to get the organization straight in your mind. The man who was responsible, insofar as the Navy was responsible for the defense of the base, was Admiral Bloch.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will check the record with you a [7459] little on that, Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Mr. MURPHY. I say, let me check the record a little bit on that. There seems to be a little confusion on that. It may be in the record.

[*7460*] Admiral KIMMEL. I gave orders at times directly to Admiral Bellinger, that is perfectly true, and I did to a great many subordinates, but that doesn't alter the organizational set-up.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that as soon as the air raid occurred at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Bellinger immediately assigned two men to the interceptor command, didn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume he did. I don't remember.

Mr. MURPHY. There were no men there before from the Navy, were there, before the raid, but two immediately afterward?

Admiral KIMMEL. There were men there. I told you about one of them, at least, that I sent over to help. And that assignment of these men to the Air Interceptor Command was the duty of Admiral Bloch and Admiral Bellinger, to furnish and supply the Army with whoever they could to help them in the Air Interceptor Command.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand, you assigned a man to headquarters as a liaison between the Navy and the Army. Taylor was assigned?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no.

Mr. MURPHY. And Kurts?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. Taylor was not a liaison.

Mr. MURPHY. Taylor was assigned as a technical man. [*7461*] I am sorry.

Admiral KIMMEL. He was assigned as a technical man. Kurts was also a technical man. Kurts was a technical man insofar as matériel was concerned. Taylor was a technical man insofar as operations were concerned.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that Admiral Bellinger, who did not know about the war warning up to December 7, immediately assigned two men to the interceptor command right after the air raid, didn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume he did if you say so.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I am quoting from the record, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you also said a few minutes ago that when you sent a man on a mission you trusted him to do what the situation demanded?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't you expect that the Chief of Naval Operations would expect the same of you as commander in chief of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think he did.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there seems to be quite some confusion in the record as to the amount of discussion that occurred between you and General Short from the time of the receipt of the war warning message down to and including December 7.

[*7462*] Is it your impression that you discussed those warnings with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is most certainly my impression that I discussed the warnings with General Short, and in the discussions which had to do with the island bases, the transfer of personnel, and matériel out there, the activities of General Short at Canton, and Christmas Islands, it was inevitable that we would discuss all phases of the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, on November 27 in the morning you and General Short were together for 3 hours. Do you recall that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall exactly the time, but we were there for some time. Where did you get the record?

Mr. MURPHY. I will read it to you, Admiral. I will give you the day and date and the page.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is approximately correct, anyhow.

Mr. MURPHY. It is my understanding that you met for 3 hours on November 27, and that the meeting was before the receipt of the war warning message.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the morning of November 27 was before the receipt of the war warning message; that is right.

Mr. MURPHY. And the purpose of your meeting then was [*7463*] to discuss the outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPKY. That was the time, before you received the war warning message, that you asked McMorris what the possibilities of an air raid on Oahu were?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have testified before, and I will testify again, that I don't recall that. It may very well have occurred.

Mr. MURPHY. I will quote the record for you on that. You met again on December 1, and again on December 2, and I believe on December 3, and at those meetings your discussions were of the outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. And other matters.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, a great deal of your time was taken up with a discussion on the outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, on December 3 you came in to General Short with an eight-page letter; you remember that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't remember the date. I did go over there one evening.

Mr. MURPHY. That was also with regard to the outlying islands, and the possibility of whether the Marines or Army would take over?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[*7464*] Mr. MURPHY. Now, there has been testimony in the record, true or not I don't know, to the effect that one of the men present at the meeting testified, and I don't say it is true, but it is in the record, to the effect that when it came to who would take over command, that you said the Army would "take over your dead body."

Admiral KIMMEL. I made some such statement as that, as a matter of emphasis.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, there was still a difference on December 3, between you and General Short as to who would be in command if the Army went in there?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt that because there was some Navy question, that they were islands, you should be in command, and General Short felt that if the Army went in the Navy wouldn't command it. He was going to?

Admiral KIMMEL. As I remember, General Short stated about that time that he didn't want to send his people out there——

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. If they did, he felt he should command it.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And in my letters and dispatches to [7465] the Navy Department subsequently, I suggested to them that the question of command should be settled in Washington.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you also suggested, didn't you, that it be put over for a while, that if there was going to be a settlement, there ought to be an express direction from Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. I suggested that it be put over for a while, not on account of the command.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. We could have ironed that out, but for other technical reasons which I set forth in the letter.

Mr. MURPHY. Construction of air fields?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Supply difficulties?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. It is all in the letters. I wrote two letters on December 2, one a personal letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, one an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I would like to direct to one part of your statement in which you say you did not expect an attack on Hawaii? Do you recall that? I believe it is on page 37. You were asked about it by Mr. Cooper yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. While the gentleman is looking that record up, the Chair will announce that in view of an [7466] important engagement of one of the members of the committee, the executive session referred to will not be held this afternoon.

Mr. MURPHY. You said at page 37, Admiral:

> In these circumstances, no reasonable man in my position would consider that the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area.

Isn't it a fact that you have already testified in a previous hearing that you expected a mass submarine attack on Pearl Harbor, subsequent to November 27, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I testified that I thought a mass submarine attack was a thing to be guarded against, it was a thing that could have been carried out simultaneously with the other operations that I believed that Japan might undertake, and, furthermore, it was something well within the capacity of the Japanese submarines.

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't that because of the November 27 message?

Admiral KIMMEL. What was that?

Mr. MURPHY. Was that because of the war warning, that you felt that way?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was not only because of the war warning, it was because I felt that any time we got into war with Japan that there would be many submarines in the [7467] operating area.

Mr. MURPHY. Because of your statement, Admiral, I am having difficulty. It is my understanding that the war warning was a war warning, and it is my understanding that you took very definite and positive measures as a result of it.

But as I remember your statement, you don't now feel that the war warning was a war warning.

Now, did you or did you not think it was a war warning? I mean the message of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. You ask me did I or did I not believe it was a war warning. I never said I didn't believe it was a war warning. I said the words "This is to be considered a war warning," did not add anything to the message. It merely characterized the information which that message contained.

Mr. MURPHY. Did it make you believe, if it was a war warning, that war was imminent?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did it what?

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read the question?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I didn't think that war was imminent. I thought it was more probable than it had been before.

[*7468*] Mr. MURPHY. But you said a bit ago that it was a war warning, and if it was a war warning, when you get a warning that war is coming, it ordinarily would occur imminently?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; because I had messages throughout the year which I considered war warnings.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me direct your attention, Admiral, to page 645 of your testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Lieutenant, you will find it as page 645 in ink, and 301 typed.

I am now directing your attention, Admiral Kimmel, to question 91 on page 301. Do you have it before you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I have it before me.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Question. Did the receipt of Exhibit 17, which is the dispatch of November 27, 1941, in any way change your estimation of the situation in regard to Japanese intentions?

Answer. My estimate of Japanese intentions after the receipt of this dispatch of November 27, was as stated in the dispatch that a move would take place within the next few days in the form of an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. I estimated from this and all other information available [*7469*] to me that if an aggressive move eventuated against a United States possession, it would be made against the Philippines, and if it were made against the Philippines I felt there was a very good chance that a mass submarine attack would occur in the Hawaiian area.

I thought an air attack was still a remote possibility and I did not expect an air attack to be made on Pearl Harbor at this time, due to the tenor of the dispatches and other information available to me, the difficulties of making such an attack. And the latest information I had from the Navy Department and other sources was that the greater portion of the carrier forces were located in home waters.

I considered, of course, that one of the primary causes for the dispatch was as stated, that negotiations had ceased. Consequently, when the press indicated further conversations were continuing between the Japanese ambassadors and the State Department, the warning lost much of its force. I further assumed that no ultimatum had been given by the United States Government to Japan, because I had been informed that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations had submitted a recommendation to the President that no such ultimatum be delivered.

I had no knowledge of the contents and tenor of the [*7470*] note handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese ambassadors on November 26th until long after I returned to the United States.

Now then, Admiral, I come back to your quote on page 47. [Reading:]

In these circumstances, no reasonable man in my position would consider that the war warning was intended to suggest the likelihood of an attack on the Hawaiian area.

Is that consistent with what you say here:

I felt there was a very good chance that a mass submarine attack would occur in the Hawaiian area.

Admiral KIMMEL. Perhaps I should have said an air attack. I was talking in this statement about the type of attack that did occur.

Mr. MURPHY. In that connection, let me come back to your air expert. Didn't your air expert say that even the presence of one submarine would very likely indicate the presence of airplanes and certainly the presence of an attack from more than one submarine would more likely indicate the presence of an air attack. Isn't that what your air expert told you in the Martin-Bellinger report?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not only did the air experts make such a statement as that, but you find in 2CL–41 some such statement as that

[7471] Mr. MURPHY. Then you disregarded the Bellinger idea and 2CL–41 that if you had one you wouldn't have the other in view of this consideration; isn't that so?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I didn't.

Mr. MURPHY. Both of those say if you have submarines you will have air. Here you say you are going to have a mass submarine attack, but no air.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to point out to you now that there wasn't any submarine attack prior to the airplane attack on Pearl Harbor. There was not. A submarine was discovered, and our people attacked the submarine. The submarine didn't attack any ships outside.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, that is not the question. I am going to come to that submarine and go into it.

Admiral KIMMEL. But that is the question.

Mr. MURPHY. No. My question is this: There is nothing in the Martin-Bellinger report, and there is nothing in 2CL–41 which says that in order to have an air attack you must have submarines, but that if the Japs are going to have submarines and make an attack, then they would like have an air attack.

Now, then, if you expected a mass submarine attack, why couldn't you also expect airplanes?

Admiral KIMMEL. I tried to explain that at great [7472] length. The mass submarine attack was well within the capacity of the Japanese.

I thought they would probably have it, and at no time did I consider that a mass submarine attack had to be accompanied by an air attack. We were only taking possibilities and you could have one without the other. You could have an air attack without a submarine attack.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, all I am saying is this, isn't it so that in 2CL–41 and in the Martin-Bellinger report it is said that the presence of one submarine or more submarines by way of an attacking force, one or more, that the likelihood is that there will be also an air attack; isn't that in both?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. It said an air attack may be accompanied by—where is it?

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read what it says, Admiral, please?

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

A single submarine attack may indicate the presence of considerable surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by carriers.

That is in my own order.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right, and it was subsequent to your estimate of the situation in the Martin-Bellinger report from your air expert in which they pointed that out?

[7473] Admiral KIMMEL. I had much advice besides his. I considered his along with the other I had.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I direct your attention, Admiral, to the Martin-Bellinger report, Exhibit 44, subsection 8, on page 3, paragraph B.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It does say there, does it not, it appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that appears there.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Admiral, I would like to go with you, if I may, to the testimony of General Short before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

By the way, before I go into that, did you ever hear of any difficulty which existed between General Herron and Admiral Richardson by way of General Herron never being able to ascertain whether or not Admiral Richardson was having reconnaissance, and if he was having it, where it was?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never heard anything about it.

Mr. MURPHY. I just asked you the question. I don't know. I have never seen anything on it except a question asked of General Short in this record by one of the Board, and I will come to that specifically. You don't recall [7474] any such difficulty, do you?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, why didn't you tell General Short about the message you got that the code machines were being destroyed?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have explained that. That was consistent with what I believed would accompany an expedition down the Asiatic coast.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know that General Short said this, at page 1620 of the record of the Roberts Board:

The thing that would have affected me more—

speaking about the message from Marshall—

The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter——

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute, please.

[7475] Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Page 1620.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to direct your attention to page 1620, Admiral, at which Justice Roberts, as chairman, said to General Short, referring to the Marshall message on December 7:

Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would have stirred you up, General Short?

The only thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing, that they are going into an entirely new phase and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say, of three or four days. That would have been extremely significant to me, the code machines, much more significant than just the ultimatum.

Then he goes on to talk about another matter which I will go into later.

General Short considered that a highly important matter, the fact that the Chief of Naval Operations had seen fit to send you subsequent to the war warning a message that code machines were being destroyed. You had that information. You said you didn't give it to General Short and you didn't tell anybody else to give it to him. Who could have given [7476] it to him if you didn't order it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I might say that if the Navy Department had considered this message of such prime importance they might at least have told me to deliver it to General Short.

Mr. MURPHY. But, Admiral——

Admiral KIMMEL. May I complete?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Pardon me.

Admiral KIMMEL. The message which I got on December 3 I think was the one he was talking about.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't think you understood, Admiral. I am talking about the reaction to the message of December 7 at which time Short said if he had had prior dispatch about the codes being burned and the machines being destroyed that it would have been of great significance to him.

Admiral KIMMEL. You haven't read any such testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't understand me, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

> The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And that was in the message which General Short received after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. But the fact is, Admiral, that you knew [7477] they were destroying the codes and you had heard it from two or three different sources before December 7.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. No, no.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me refer you, Admiral——

Admiral KIMMEL. What they said in the previous message to me, which came on December 3, was they had been ordered to destroy most of their codes and ciphers, not all.

Mr. MURPHY. Why didn't you tell General Short that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why didn't I?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't consider that of any vital importance when I received it and furthermore, if the War Department, or the Navy Department, had considered it of such vital importance as they now say they do, they should at least have taken the precaution to tell me to give this message to General Short. I tried my best to keep General Short informed of all matters but in a matter of this kind I used my own judgment about it. I had no objection to his knowing. I presumed he had gotten it. I didn't order it given to him because it didn't strike me as being highly significant at the time I received it.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you were supposed to play golf with him on Sunday morning, weren't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[7478] Mr. MURPHY. You were friendly with him. Why wouldn't you tell him?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am talking about this message where "most" were destroyed.

Do we have that message of the 7th?

There is a difference there.

Mr. MURPHY. While your assistant is looking, you didn't think the message of Marshall on the 7th was very clear either, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Was very clear?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought it could have been a better message, yes, when I saw it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, while they are looking——

Admiral KIMMEL. May I get this first?

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, here is a message of General Marshall. This is General Marshall's message:

> Japanese are presenting at one p. m. eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what significance the hour may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly.

And in this you will notice that he gives a flat statement, [7479] not that they destroyed most of their codes and ciphers, but they are to destroy their code machines immediately.

That is quite a different message from the one I received on December 7 and I believe—on December 3, I mean—and I believe that is the message to which General Short is referring in his testimony on page 1620.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you had word to the effect that you could authorize the outlying islands to destroy their secret papers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't that indicate the coming of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily. One of the reasons that they authorized that was because they found my communications set-up had given them some very secret codes and they wanted them destroyed right away because they never should have had them.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 4:30. The Chair supposes that the member can't finish?

Mr. MURPHY. No. It will be quite lengthy.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m. the committee recessed until 10 a. m. Saturday, January 19, 1946.)

[7480]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, JANUARY 19, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson, and Brewster, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[7481] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Murphy was in the process of examining Admiral Kimmel. Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (Retired)—Resumed

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. I think before you begin counsel have two or three documents they want to make a part of the record.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, I find in checking the transcript on the three dispatches that were read into the record yesterday, the third of which appears on page 7316, that I neglected to state the date of the dispatch. In order that it may be clear on the record I would like to state that that dispatch, No. 282301, is dated November 28, 1941.

As Exhibit 126, we would like to offer three documents which have been distributed to the committee this morning, the first of which is dated February 3, 1941, and is entitled "General Order No. 143, Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States," signed by Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy; the second is a single page containing excerpts from Navy regulations; the third is a document entitled "Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions, 1941."

All of these have to do with the general duties and responsibilities of the commander in chief of the Pacific [7482] Fleet and his staff. We would like to offer those as Exhibit 126.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't see any paper here that contains only one sheet.

Mr. MASTEN. It is the third page of the collection of documents the first of which is entitled, up in the upper left-hand corner, "General Order No. 143."

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about those others.

Mr. MASTEN. It is the third page of that collection, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see.

Exhibit 126 will be filed.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 126.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 127, we would like to offer a collection of several letters and memorandums having to do with the air situation in Hawaii after December 7, 1941. At page 77 of Exhibit 113 there is a letter dated January 7, 1942, from the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to the commander in chief of the United States Fleet regarding the aircraft situation in Hawaii. We would like to offer these as additional information regarding the situation after December 7, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection they will be filed as [*7483*] Exhibit 127.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 127.")

Mr. MASTEN. As Exhibit 128, we would like to offer a collection of letters and memoranda, six in all, having to do with the prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii. This matter came up at page 6966 of the transcript, and these letters or memoranda are the only documents that we have thus far discovered in this general connection. The first is a letter dated June 4, 1941, addressed to the Attorney General and signed by the United States attorney for the District of Hawaii. We would like to offer these as Exhibit 128.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so filed.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 128.")

Mr. MASTEN. And finally, at the request of Senator Ferguson, we would like to offer as Exhibit 74–A a memorandum dated December 4, 1941, to the Secretary of State signed by Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, regarding a conversation between the first secretary of the British Embassy and an officer of the Far Eastern Division on December 4, 1941. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 74–A. Exhibit 74 has to do with warnings to nationals.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so filed.

[*7484*] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 74–A.")

Mr. MASTEN. That is all we have.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, there has been quite a deal said in the record about establishing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, and as to whether it should have been or should not have been. I think it is pertinent to read into the record at this time a report of the United States Congress on why Pearl Harbor was established.

Now, reading from "U. S. Congress, House Committee on Naval Affairs, Establishment of a Naval Base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands," dated 1908:

> The Committee on Naval Affairs, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 18120) to establish a naval station at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, report the same with the recommendation that it do pass without amendment.
>
> The Hawaiian Islands afford the only possible location for a strong naval base in the central Pacific Ocean for a distance of over 4,000 miles from our western coast.

Pearl Harbor is beyond question one of the best, if not the best, natural harbor in the world. It has a depth of water of over 60 feet and an area of nearly 10 square miles, and capable of floating the combined navies of the world. It [7485] is not only landlocked, but, by reason of the topography of the surrounding ground, ships lying in this harbor are out of view from the open sea. It is the only practicable site for a naval base in the Pacific Ocean, and is the recognized key to naval supremacy in those waters. Its equipment as an operating base is a prerequisite to the most successful operation of our fleets whether offensive or defensive.

For over sixty-five years the United States Government has officially recognized the strategetic importance of the Hawaiian Islands and the necessity of preventing their occupation by any other nation.

Beginning in 1842 President Tyler gave notice to all European nations that the United States would never consent to their occupying Hawaii or establishing any naval base there.

This "Monroe Doctrine of the Pacific" was reiterated by Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State, in 1851, and by William L. Marcy, the great Democratic Secretary of State, by James G. Blaine, and by William McKinley.

Captain (now Admiral) A. T. Mahan, writing in 1893, came to the conclusions:

"To anyone viewing a map that shows the full extent of the Pacific, * * * two circumstances will be strikingly and immediately apparent. He will see at a glance that [7486] the Sandwich Islands stand by themselves in a state of comparative isolation, amid a vast expanse of sea; and again, that they form the center of a large circle whose radius is approximately the distance from Honolulu to San Francisco. * * *

"This is substantially the same distance as from Honolulu to the Gilbert, Marshall, Samoan, and Society Islands, all under European control except Samoa, in which we have a part influence. * * *

"To have a central position such as this, and to be alone, having no rival and admitting no rival, * * * are conditions that at once fix the attention of the strategist. * * * But to this striking combination is to be added the remarkable relations borne * * * to the great commercial routes traversing this vast expanse.

"Too much stress cannot be laid upon the immense disadvantage to us of any maritime enemy having a coaling station well within 2,500 miles, as this is, of every point of our coast line from Puget Sound to Mexico. Were there many others available we might find it difficult to exclude from all. There is, however, but the one. Shut out from the Sandwich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown back for supplies of fuel to distances of 3,500 or 4,000 miles—or between 7,000 and 8,000 going and coming—an impediment [7487] to sustained maritime operations well nigh prohibitive. * * * It is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defense of a coast line—of a sea frontier—is concentrated in a single position, and the circumstance renders doubly imperative upon us to secure it if we righteously can."

Twenty-two years ago, by the reciprocity treaty with King Kalakaua, the United States acquired the right to establish a naval base on Pearl Harbor.

Ten years ago this nation, foreseeing the likelihood that they might fall into the hands of an Oriental nation, annexed the Hawaiian Islands. This momentous action was taken primarily because of the strategic value of the Hawaiian Islands and for the purpose of establishing a strong naval base on Pearl Harbor.

Since that time a magnificent site for a naval station, consisting of over 600 acres of land, has been purchased by the Federal Government, and a 30-foot channel has been dredged through the channel bar.

The War Department has also acquired ample sites for fortifications at the channel entrance, and the first battery is now under construction.

Up to the present time no beginning has been made toward the actual construction of a naval base on Pearl Harbor. Year after year the needs of the Naval Establishment in other [7488] directions have been permitted to crowd it out of the naval bills.

In the judgment of your committee the new developments on the Pacific and among the nations that border its shores make it imperative that a strong operating base be established for our Navy at Pearl Harbor without further delay.

A naval base at Pearl Harbor is not designed primarily for the protection of Hawaii. Its main purpose is to form a buffer of defense for our entire Pacific coast and to make possible our naval supremacy upon the Pacific.

An enemy in possession of Hawaii could harass and threaten our entire western coast. On the other hand, with our own fleet operating from a well-equipped base at Pearl Harbor, no fleet from the Orient would find it practicable to threaten our coast, because of the stronghold left in their rear and of the prohibitive distance from their coaling base.

The equipment of Pearl Harbor is therefore a matter of national prudence and not of extravagance. It affords the nation's least expensive way of defending our Pacific coast. It will constitute one of the strongest factors in the prevention of war with any power in the Far East.

Your committee has received memorials from all of the strongest commercial organizations on the entire Pacific [7489] coast, urging that the development of Pearl Harbor be provided for at this session of Congress.

The national importance of this measure is emphasized by the fact that commercial bodies from the Central West and from New York City have also memorialized Congress on this subject during this present session.

The question of a naval base in Hawaii is not comparable with the same problem in the Philippines. Hawaii is both a permanent organic part of our nation, and is also a source of revenue; during the past eight years Hawaii has paid more than $9,000,000 into the Federal Treasury.

Every consideration, whether of national honor or policy, demands that Pearl Harbor be made impregnable and equipped as a naval base immediately.

With a naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii would be our great defensive outpost; in the hands of an enemy it would double the nation's cost for naval defense.

Mr. MURPHY. I will be glad to yield.

Mr. KEEFE. As I understand the procedure, Admiral Kimmel was under cross-examination. I am wondering whether the counsel is now presenting testimony or whether we are going on with the examination of Admiral Kimmel. If he is making out a case for himself of some kind here we ought to know about it and all of us can spend the rest of the next week introducing excerpts from opinions of this person and that person and the other person. I did not think there was any dispute about the facts that have been set forth here in that naval report of 1908 as to Pearl Harbor. I just wonder how far counsel is going to go in reading all this material into the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair cannot answer that question. It occurred to the Chair that instead of reading the document it might be printed as a part of the transcript at this point so that it will be in the record. It is not my understanding that there is any controversy over the fact that Congress established Pearl Harbor as a naval base.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you through, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that my reason for putting this in is not to destroy my voice nor to take the time of the committee. If I did not think it was [7491] pertinent I would not have put it in, and the fact is that there has been a great deal in this record, as well as throughout the country, about some unusual situation that the President of the United States had ordered the fleet to Pearl Harbor, and there has been testimony of Admiral Richardson as well as Admiral Kimmel as to why the fleet should be at Pearl Harbor, and this is the basic document as to why the United States Congress established the base at Pearl Harbor, and if it is not interesting to the gentleman from Wisconsin it may be to the American people. It is to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the only point is whether a document that is admitted as an official record of Congress should be read rather than printed as a part of the transcript.

Mr. MURPHY. My only reason, Mr. Chairman, in reading it is so that the other members of the committee will know what I am putting in the record—of course, they can read it later—and so that Admiral Kimmel will know what I read, and I expect to ask some pertinent questions about the matter that I read.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I am inclined to agree, I would like to say, with the gentleman in the importance of this thing and we have, I think—and I would like to say this as a member of the minority—that we have shown considerable latitude to members of the majority in introducing [*7492*] what they deem proper and pertinent and I should be reluctant to see any restrictions imposed upon any individual member as to what they deem to be pertinent.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been no restriction imposed upon any member whether he is a member of the majority or minority. The only point is whether these official documents should be read or put in the record for the sake of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, if the Congressman wants to ask questions on this I think he should read it into the record so that the witness will be familiar with the text of it and then he will be in a position to answer questions. I assume that counsel is going to ask some questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it has been read and therefore it is all done and he can proceed to ask questions about it if there are any, and I presume there are.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Mr. Chairman, I would like to direct the committee's attention to a report on the inspection of the naval shore establishment in 1929 and 1930 by Ernest Lee Jahncke, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. I am not going to read the report but there were recommendations at that time back in 1930 that the Nation was slow in getting Pearl Harbor in the condition it should be in which to meet the enemy. I won't read that. Anyone who wants to read it can read it.

[*7493*] Now, then, Admiral, I direct your attention to an exhibit which was placed in the record this morning referring to the aircraft scouting force and dated December the 8th, 1941. Will you kindly look at that?

Mr. MASTEN. It is Exhibit 127, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Exhibit No. 127. I direct your attention, Admiral, to page 2, on the second page of the exhibit.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I have an opportunity to read this a moment, please, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, surely. I am referring particularly, Admiral, to the letter of the 22d, on the second page of the exhibit, dated December 22, 1941, and signed "C. L. Tinker."

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. I say I am referring particularly to the letter of the 22d, on the second page of the exhibit, dated December 22, 1941, and signed C. L. Tinker, T-i-n-k-e-r, brigadier general.

Admiral KIMMEL. I see it.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to go over with you the items in that letter and go down first to paragraph 1, section f. On December 22, 1941, the order directed that all planes be camouflaged. Were the planes camouflaged before December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you had better ask General Short about that.

[7494] Mr. MURPHY. I am asking about Navy planes. Were the Navy planes camouflaged?

Admiral KIMMEL. I read a letter into the record the other day dated in September in which I directed the dispersal of all Navy planes in Oahu and to proceed with the camouflage measures. I am not familiar with the steps that were taken. I presume they were camouflaged; I do not know.

Mr. MURPHY. You do not know yourself whether or not the Navy planes were camouflaged——

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not.

Mr. MURPHY (continuing). Prior to the morning of December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, paragraph 1, specification a:

Ordered immediate wider dispersal of airplanes, supplies and personnel.

And that is exactly what you had done with the Navy planes, isn't that so? I say that is exactly what you had ordered for the Navy planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph b:

Directed surveys to be made of additional fields for operation of aircraft on the Island of Oahu.

c. Required the movement of pursuit into Hickam [7495] Field area for more positive protection in the event of adverse weather at the former base at Wheeler Field.

d. Moved——

Admiral KIMMEL. Are you asking me about paragraph b?

Mr. MURPHY. No, no, I am reading it into the record, Admiral, because it pertains to the Army.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I see.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph d:

Moved obsolescent B–18 and A–20s to Bellows Field to eliminate the airplane congestion at Hickam Field. A–20s were later moved to Wheeler Field.

e. Moved one squadron B–17s to Wheeler Field to further relieve congestion at Hickam Field.

Paragraph f is about the camouflaging of the planes already referred to.

g. Directed plans be completed for air transport of aircraft ammunition to Maui and Molokai, capable of dispatch on two hours notice.

h. Have issued orders on alerts as follows:

1. 30 before sunrise to 0800, and one (1) hour before sunset to 30 after sunset ⅓ Army Pursuit and Navy fighters in air.

That was not done prior to the 7th? I say that plan was not in effect prior to December 7?

[7496] Admiral KIMMEL. No; that plan was not in effect prior to December 7, and my information is that they tried this for a few days and were forced to abandon it because the planes and crews could not stand up.

Mr. MURPHY. We will go into that. I am glad to have your information.

Admiral KIMMEL. Isn't that correct, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know. I never saw this before. You say that this plan of the 22d was put into effect and abandoned?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am talking about this particular section which you have just read.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. In regard to having the planes in the air and warmed up and ready. My recollection is that in a report submitted by the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, he reported that they had tried that and that they had to abandon it after a short time on account of wear and tear on both crews and planes.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask for a copy of that report. We certainly ought to have it. It is pertinent.[1]

Admiral KIMMEL. I have seen it somewhere. I cannot put my fingers on it at the moment.

Mr. MURPHY. I am going to request the Navy liaison officer to [7497] produce that report so that it can be made an exhibit, and until such time, I will proceed reading, Admiral:

All other Army and Navy planes including pursuit excepting searching planes warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

That was not done prior to December 7, was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot speak for the Army planes.

Mr. MURPHY. The Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph 2:

Between 0800 and one (L) hour before sunset:

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit in air.

1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit warmed up, manned and ready to take off.

All other Army and Navy planes including fighters excepting searching planes on one hours notice.

3. One (1) hour after sunset, 30 minutes before sunrise ¼ planes on one (1) hours notice, ¾ on four (4) hours notice.

e. I have visited all operating airdromes, made ground reconnaissance of areas where additional airdromes are to be located, have discussed tactical operations, administrative problems, morale and rewards with all major commanders.

[7498] j. I have conferred with Com. Pat. Wing Two and expect to submit to the Department Commander within twenty-four hours revised plans for the employment of the Air Force in the Hawaiian area.

k. I have directed that plans be made and they are well under way for the use of certain elements of the Air Force in offensive operations.

1. Commanding General, 18th Bombardment Wing, directed to have striking force of minimum of 18 B–17's available at all times.

In connection with that, Admiral, it would be difficult to have 18 prior to December 7 when they only had 6 in commission, isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not follow you.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read it, please?

(Question read.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a fact they only had six in commission on the 7th, is that right, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was my understanding and my belief at the time; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph m:

Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be arranged.

[7499] Admiral KIMMEL. I think this will be all right, sir.

[1] See letter from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5484.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, Admiral. Now then I read paragraph m:

Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be arranged.

It is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that you had asked for that equipment before December 7, but were unable to obtain it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have lost you, sir. I do not know where you are right now. I am trying to keep up.

Mr. MURPHY. I am now referring to paragraph m of the same thing I was reading, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. "m"?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I see.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship identification be arranged.

The fact is that you did not have the equipment at Pearl Harbor but had requested it before December 7, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask to have spread on the record at this point, Mr. Chairman, from Exhibit 112, a letter dated January 7, 1942, and I refer particularly to page 4 thereof, [*7500*] paragraph 7.

Admiral KIMMEL. Let us catch up, please, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Page 4, paragraph 7, Admiral, which is page 80 in the exhibit.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it now.

Mr. MURPHY. A letter from the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to the commander in chief, United States Fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. And I would like to read, Admiral, in connection with what you said that there was a change in the plans that were recommended, in Exhibit 127 the following, paragraph 6 on page 3:

With these it is not possible simultaneously and effectively to maintain necessary long-range search operations, to keep available a useful air striking force, and to meet constant requirements for special missions, such as covering submarine contacts and guarding convoy approach and departure, without having on hand for search alone at least three times the number of planes that are needed for search on any given day. There is no way of getting around this if material and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the other can do more.

Then paragraph 7, which describes the search actually [*7501*] being made and that it had to be reduced to the following basis, which is therein outlined. That would be in accordance with what you said before, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Probably this is what I was talking about.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, I am referring to volume 35 of the testimony in this case and particulary to page 6489. The reason why I am referring to this is at page 6489, which was while Admiral Stark was on the stand and during the course of the morning hour, the distinguished Senator from Michigan had read into the record several messages about the bomb plot and about the reports, regularly and irregularly, at Pearl Harbor to which you have referred.

Incidentally, I think you should have gotten that information, but in order to show what was before the people at Washington, at page

6489 and at 6490 I refer to the general situation, referring to Puget Sound, to San Diego, to the Panama Canal and to Alaska and the Philippines.

Did you know, Admiral, or do you know now that there were messages about those particular areas that were not ship location messages?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have heard—I have not seen the messages, all the messages, but I have been informed, and I believe that in one of those localities were there [*7502*] messages of the same character and content as those that were requested by the high officials of the Government of Japan, nor did the high officials of the Government of Japan show any such anxiety as to the location of ships in other localities.

Mr. MURPHY. I would agree with you, Admiral, that there was no other message which talked about the plans as to berthing ships, but I ask you to refer to Exhibit 2, at page 34, if you will.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. That is a message from Buenos Aires to Tokyo—or to Panama, rather——

Mr. KEEFE. From Tokyo to Panama?

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman on the left has made a statement before I started a question and he was going to try to cut me off. We are all men. Now let us not have this needling going on. I want to conduct a fair examination and I do not propose to be cut off.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman did not hear the remark.

Mr. MURPHY. I did.

Mr. KEEFE. I did not hear any such remark as that at all, and if he did, he does not hear well. That is all I have got to say about it.

The gentleman has asked a question which I did not [*7503*] understand, and I wanted to understand it. I ask the reporter to read the question so that the members may know what the question is.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the reporter will read the question.

Mr. KEEFE. Let us see what it is.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask to have it stricken.

Mr. KEEFE. I should like to have it settled, Mr. Chairman, because the gentleman has caustically referred to my interruption and I think the interruption was thoroughly justified.

If the gentleman wants to throw the question out and start over again, I have no objection to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us proceed, gentlemen.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, I am referring to exhibit 2, page 34, and to the message which is on that page. It is from Buenos Aires to Toyko, and dated the 23d of September 1941. It is Circular No. 146. Then it says:

Buenos Aires to Tokyo #416.

Strictly secret; C. O. R.

When Minister Yamagata was in Panama he was asked by the Italian Minister there to deliver some maps and charts of the Panama Canal Zone for him, which he did. Since then, we had Usui go to Chile to take charge of those maps and upon their arrival here they were delivered to the Italian Ambassador. At the same time, we requested that we be given [*7504*] copies of them.

Recently, these copies were delivered to us. (At the time of this delivery, Assistant Attache Kameda and Usui were present to ascertain that they were exact copies of the originals). And we entrusted them to our Navy's courier Tatuma who is returning home on the Buenos Aires Maru.

The Italian Ambassador here requests that upon the arrival of these papers in Tokyo, we notify the Italian Government to that effect through (our Embassy in Rome?)

Minister Yamagata has already advised Chief of Bureau Terasaki regarding this matter. The Navy has also sent a report.

That would be an inquiry which would be rather pertinent—whether they wanted maps of the Panama Canal—wouldn't it, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I see nothing which indicates that the Government of Japan wanted maps of the Panama Canal. That follows the pattern of Japanese espionage over many years.

[*7505*] Mr. MURPHY. You say if you saw the one about Pearl Harbor, in the month of September and translated on October 10, about the bomb plot, that would have changed your whole plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. This is one in September also, looking for maps of the Panama Canal, maps and charts.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Would that indicate a special interest in the Panama Canal?

Admiral KIMMEL. The difference, I think, is that in the one case this was information which had been gathered by the local espionage units in the ordinary course of their duties, and was being sent to Tokyo. I can see nothing in this message, and any other messages that I have had access to, where the Government in Tokyo was seeking and demanding this information at that particular time.

Now, incidentally, I think this message might well have been supplied to me as well as the others. I did not mention it at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, Admiral, as I understand you, the distinction you make is: It is significant if Tokyo asked for it, but not significant if it is supplied to [*7506*] Tokyo?

Admiral KIMMEL. Significant that Tokyo asked for it and related information on several occasions.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me come again to the Panama Canal.

At page 36, from Panama to Tokyo. This is a message dated October 2, 1941 [reading]:

Since the recent shift in military aviation efforts to the Pacific Area the "Panama Air Depot" located at France Field was transferred to Curundu Heights (immediately adjacent to Albrook Field).

Rear Admiral Sandler, Commander of the 15th Naval District, since the extensive activities on the Pacific end of the Canal, made public on the 1st a statement to the effect that because of the increase of naval supplies a four-story warehouse built on pier 18 (it will be completed the middle of November), the ammunition unloading pier (west of pier 18) consisting of 32 buildings and the existing buildings in the neighborhood of the Balboa drydock would all be taken over as warehouses. Furthermore, the petroleum supply tank at Boca on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope (the railroad junction from which the line branches to Colon and Ft. Randolph) on the Atlantic side (recently it is believed that these tanks have been camouflaged) have been taken over.

[*7507*] There are intelligences at hand concerning the construction of a food storage depot at Corozal which would contain sufficient foodstuffs to supply the Canal Zone for a six-month period, even though shipping routes between this point and the United States are severed.

Would that mean anything to you if you were at Washington and you had these series of messages about that particular area?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think this is in the same category as the previous message.

Mr. MURPHY. They are talking about camouflaging oil tanks and the like, and giving certain vital military information to Tokyo there, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. They are giving military information to Tokyo.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Do you think that you should have had that message also?

Admiral KIMMEL. I see no reason why it should not have been supplied to me.

Mr. MURPHY. You were awfully busy as it was without reading hundreds of additional messages, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had a sizable staff out there.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

[*7508*] Now, I refer you, Admiral, to page 122 of the same exhibit 2, this being a message from Tokyo to Mexico, from the Tokyo Jap Foreign Minister to Mexico, Koshi, dated June 23, 1941. No. 106 [reading]:

Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and vicinity, please have career attache Kihara make an official trip to Panama. (It might be well to have secretary Yoshimizu accompany him).

Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the Naval Attache, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns.

Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their #62 from Panama to me, mentioned the question of a trip get in touch with them regarding date and time of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also any telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.)

Would not that show an unusual interest on the part of Tokyo in the Panama Canal?

Admiral KIMMEL. That shows an interest; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And would not that have been before the authorities in Washington when they were wondering where [*7509*] the Japanese were going to strike, if they were going to strike?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume it was before them.

Mr. MURPHY. Don't you think that adds a chapter, at least, to your impression about the bomb-plot message, that that directed that the attack was going to happen at Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I see nothing here requesting specific information of ships in the harbor, or their location in the harbor, and that type of information is good just so long as the ships remain where they are. This information is information of more or less permanent installations which will be good for a long time.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, Admiral, however, that the authorities in Washington, on deciding where the Japs were going to strike, did have this before them, as well as the bomb-plot message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I presume they did.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to now refer you, Admiral, to page 125 of the same exhibit. This is a message from Vladivostok to Tokyo, dated July 3, 1941 [reading]:

Report on recent naval activities in this area.

Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have tightened up on watch and [*7510*] are engaged in naval preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality. However, naval exercises are limited to only one section of the force for there are many ships which are undergoing repairs. Evidently the preparations are intended for defense against Japan.

I am wondering, Admiral, if that kind of a message had been sent by Japanese espionage from Hawaii to Tokyo, if there would have been an attack on Hawaii. They say there the Russians are prepared to meet any eventuality. They could not have said that about Hawaii, could they? You were not prepared to meet any eventuality on Hawaii, were you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you are a better judge of that, or the committee is a better judge of that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you had nothing at all to take care of an oncoming air raid by way of reconnaissance, did you, or any radar working at the time, or any watchers on the hills, at the observation posts, or any pursuit planes in the air, or any ships out scouting to the north from which they came, you did not have that, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. The evidence answers all of those questions very conclusively.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, there was a message from [*7511*] Hawaii to Tokyo saying that there was still a good chance as I recall it, that there was no reconnaissance being made and still a good chance for a raid on Hawaii. That was a message sent to Tokyo, wasn't it, before the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Which was translated after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. It was, at any rate, sent to them?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think some such message was sent.

Mr. MURPHY. So that as to Hawaii, they had a message that there was still a good chance for an attack, but as to Vladivostok they had a message that the Russians were prepared to meet any eventuality, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not read that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it says—let me read it to you——

Admiral KIMMEL. "By enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality."

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; "by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality."

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot read there anything except exercises.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, we may differ on that, but at any rate it says there, "to meet any eventuality."

[*7512*] Admiral KIMMEL. I only speak of the language here; that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. It says—

in naval preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality.

Of course, that may not mean what I think it does, but it is English, and we can both interpret it.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to the fact——

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). Certainly in the Hawaiian area we had had exercises designed to meet any eventuality.

Mr. MURPHY. You had exercises right along up to November 20, and after November 20 you had no more exercises, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. With the Army. You did not have any exercises after November 20, did you, with the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall those details, but we had exercises designed to meet any eventuality, up to and including December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is that you had no exercises with the Army after November 20, did you, of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know. You have some records on that which I presume are correct.

[*7513*] Mr. MURPHY. All I know is what was put in the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. You are talking now about an air-raid drill. That is by no means the only exercise to meet eventualities.

Mr. MURPHY. It was a very important one, wasn't it, Admiral, reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; it was important, and we held the drills regularly and as completely as possible.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Admiral, I direct your attention to page 6491 of the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. Page what?

[*7514*] Mr. MURPHY. I am just putting this in the record. I am referring to page 6491 of the printed record at which reference is made to page 38 of Exhibit 2.

Admiral KIMMEL. Page 38?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. That is another message from Panama to Tokyo, dated October 6, 1941:

The result of my investigations, as I reported in my secret letter No. 142, are as follows:

1. The airplane bases which the United States is constructing are located at La Chorrera in Panama province, (please refer to part 4 of my #149) Chitre in Herrera province, Monsabo in Los Santos province and at Remidios and Las Ra-Hasu in Chiriqui province.

2. The Panamanian airports already constructed which will be converted into military establishments are the ones at David in Chiriqui province and Paidonya outside the limits of Panama City.

3. Airports which have been surveyed but because of the poor condition of the terrain have not been constructed, are the airports at Guarare in Los Santos province and at eight other projected points.

Does that also show an additional interest on the part of Tokyo in the defenses of Panama?

Admiral KIMMEL. They are always interested in the [*7515*] defenses of Panama.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like also to refer to page 39 of the same exhibit, from Panama to Tokyo, dated October 18, 1941, where the statement is made:

In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th.

And again:

I found that construction is going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have lost you, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I will read the whole thing. I have been reading only the high lights.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. I will read the whole thing:

Ship movements from the 14th to the 18th:

Moving toward the Pacific: 4 American, 1 British freighters; 2 American tankers.

Moving toward the Atlantic: 4 American, 2 British, 1 Dutch freighters; 1 American tanker, 1 American passenger steamer. Recently ships have been going through the canal at night.

In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end [7516] on the 10th. (Naturally they do not allow us to inspect the forts.) I found that construction is going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications. Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large hangars, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks, and 8 barracks to accommodate 200 men each.

At Corozal, 4 two-hundred-men barracks, 55 two-family officer's quarters and a 500-patient hospital are nearing completion.

That again would show an active interest of Tokyo in the Panama Canal area, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. It shows an interest, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I direct your attention to an entry on page 40, from the Panama Canal, or from Panama to Tokyo, dated October 18, 1941, and you will find in that particular message, Admiral, without my reading it, a reference to gun emplacements at Panama.

Admiral KIMMEL. A reference to what kind of place?

Mr. MURPHY. Gun emplacements.

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume so. I haven't read it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to page 51. That particular message, while it is dated November 22, 1941, it is translated December 5, 1941. Of course that was before the Japs but not before Washington, but I think [7517] it shows the course of conduct of the Japanese.

You will find the following:

The United States Government is going on the assumption that the attack on the Canal will be made from both air and sea.

Do you see that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I see it.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to direct your attention to page 52, a message from Panama to Tokyo, dated November 22, 1941:

The anti-air defenses (?) on lock #1, which is now being used, are being improved. (Of course, there are anti-air defenses (?) at lock #3.) The naval defense area patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene (on ?) the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands.

That would seem to divide up Panama a bit, wouldn't it, as to air defenses, and as to what they have in each section?

Admiral KIMMEL. The message speaks for itself there.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, Admiral, they talk about anti-aircraft defenses on lock 1, and again on lock 3, and then talk about the naval defense area, don't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[7518] Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, on page 6493 of the record, in order that the committee, or whoever desires to read in the record the messages which are along the lines to which I have referred at the Panama Canal, covering Alaska, covering the Philippines and the other areas, are referred to by me by page numbers.

The stenographer has copied into the record all of the entries referred to by the distinguished Senator from Michigan, but he has not copied into the record the references which I have given, but only shows the page numbers.

I ask at this point the entries on the pages referred to on page 6493 be spread in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.
(The messages referred to are as follows:)

[7519] From: Manila
To: Tokyo
August 20, 1941
#532

Re your Circular #1793.[a]

I am reporting to you below information which I have been able to get, though it may be somewhat incoherent.

1. There are many tall buildings in the city, to the upper stories of which admittance is forbidden. It is thought, therefore, that anti-aircraft guns have been placed in them. It is fairly certain that guns have been placed on the Great Eastern Hotel (some have actually seen ten disguised machine guns on the top of it), the (hitchcock?) Avenue Hotel (this is the former Marco Polo Hotel), and on the Insular Life and the Trading Commerce. Besides these, I presume guns have been placed on top of the Capitol, the Municipal Building, the post office, etc. (I believe that the army and navy both have in their possession a map giving the locations of the tall buildings in the city).

2. A person has seen during the evenings in the latter part of July, 36 anti-aircraft guns being transported to Camp Murphy.

ARMY 21461 Trans. 8/26/41 (6)

[a] Not available.

[7520] From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
September 22, 1941
#623

Re my message #618.[a]

The *Phoenix* left port the morning of the 22nd.

ARMY 22771 Trans. 9/27/41 (6)

[a] See SIS #22772.

From: Davao (Kihara)
To: Tokyo
September 26, 1941
#135

Upon my arrival to take up my post here, I heard the following report concerning Zamboanga [a]:

Since last August American destroyer tenders, destroyers and submarines enter that port from the South Seas every Saturday. After they have lain at anchor for one or two days they leave again for the South. In summing up the statements of members of the crews of these boats, it appears that these warships ply the waters from Jolo [b] to Tawao [c] and Tarakan [d] on the island of Borneo.

ARMY 24468 Trans. 11/7/41 (6)

[a] A city on the island of Mindanao.
[b] Name of the island connecting the main Philippine group [7521] to Borneo
[c] Town in British North Borneo.
[d] In Netherlands Borneo.

From: Tokyo
To: Davao
October 2, 1941
#62

Re your #105[a].

Please wire me the location and movements of fishermen and ____ since your last report.

ARMY 2597 Trans. 12-4-41 (6)

[a] Not available.

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Manila
October 4, 1941
#318

I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.
ARMY 23207 Trans. 10/8/41 (6)

[7522] From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo
1 November 1941
(RE your #318)

Strict guard is being maintained hence the gathering of information is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the concentration of military strength.

Localities are as follows:

Kabanatuan, San Marcelino ---- (several groups missing).

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary measure.

[7523] 2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more than 3,000 workmen are being used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000 infantry troops left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above place. It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are being built there and the docks are being enlarged.

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is said that even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited.

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAARU (Laur?) and by the middle of October there were less than two kilometers that had not been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day and night and the progress is amazing.

4. In Iba there are 30 or 40 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several score of altitude planes (?) it is said.

Details by Mail.

[7524] *JD-1: 5681. "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest."
(SIS #23207)
JD-1 (H) Navy Trans. 11-4-41 (S-TT)
24382

From: Manila (Nihro)
to: Tokyo
November 4, 1941
#727

Intelligence.

1. Since about a month ago little by little brown [7525] soldiers have been arriving at the Stotsenburg Barracks. The number at present is about two or three thousand. In view of the fact that these soldiers speak Spanish, they may be "Iko's." I understand that they are not very friendly with American soldiers. We are now secretly investigating where they have come from.

2. Taraiao.[a] Recently the Miguel Air Field has been extended to form a rectangle about 1,000 meters long.

[a] Tarallo, Camarines Province.

3. All the wooden bridges on the national highway between Taraiao and Lingayen[b] have been replaced with concrete bridges.

4. At the foot of a hill situated to the north of Teraiao (the hill overlooks the Lingayen Gulf) about 200 barracks have been constructed. I understand that new barracks are being built at Ste Ignatia.

5. From what I hear the American soldiers stationed at Stotsenburg maintained an arrogant attitude toward the Filipinos and, since there have been two or three cases of assault on Filipinos, the Filipinos are furious.

ARMY 24626 Trans. 11/12/41 (6)

[b] Pangasinan Province, Luzon, Philippine Islands on Lingayen Gulf.

[7526] From: Tokyo
To: Manila
5 November 1941
#355

For Secretary Yuki

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same:

These items in regard to each port of call:

(1) Conditions at air ports on land.
(2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
(3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.
(4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

JD-1: 6424 (F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (6-AR)
24696

From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
November 12, 1941
#754

According to a report handed on to me by a Japanese [7527] who has lived in the Province of Ilocos Norte for some fourteen or fifteen years, the following has been ascertained.

1. At the present time there are approximately 400 Philippine soldiers and seven or eight officers stationed in Laoag[a]. It is being rumored, however, that the Philippine troops will be increased to approximately 1,700. At the present time they are constructing additional barracks.

2. There seems to be no indication that they plan the expansion of the present civil airport in Laoag (length 1,200 metres; width, 850 metres) nor are they stationing any military planes at that field. Aside from a reconnaissance flight nightly (one plane) over the coastal area in the vicinity of the city, no extensive activity is in progress.

3. Though it is said that Claveria[b] and Burgos[b] are being equipped with ---- ----, the details are unknown. (I am continuing my private investigations in this connection.)

ARMY 25064 Trans. 11/21/41 (6)

[a] Seaport in the Province of Ilocos Norte on the Island of Luzon, P. I.
[b] Towns on the northern shore of the Island of Luzon, P. I.

[7528] From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
November 12, 1941
#755

A report given me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines Norte[a] is as follows:

1. In that area at the present time there does not seem to be many troops stationed. Only about 60 members of the Philippine Patrol organization, with headquarters in Daet[b], are located in that area. Every day five or six of these patrolmen are dispatched as a relief unit to Paracale[c] and Jose Panganiban[d].

[a] Province near southeastern extremity of Luzon.
[b] City on southeastern extremity of the Island of Luzon.
[c] Seaport in the province of Camarines Norte.
[d] English spelling. Cannot identify.

2. The Civil Airport at Paracale is not being used at the present time. Insofar as the military air field at Daet is concerned, though one or two military planes landed there during February of this year, from that time to this there has not been a single military plane alight on this field. As this field is located right on the beach, should it be necessary it is said that naval planes could land in the shipping lane just off the beach as well.

3. On the point of land, San Muricio [e], north of Jose Panganiban it is rumored that they are equipping ---- with ----, but this has not been verified. (I am continuing my secret investigations.)

[*7529*] 4. Twelve or thirteen coastal reconnaissance planes were seen to have flown over the area within a period of three days. Toward the latter part of last year 13 American freighters are said to have entered the port of Panganiban. Since then, almost on the average of once a week, American freighters sail from Batganas [f] to Hondagua [g].

ARMY 25162

[e] English spelling. Point of land cannot be identified.
[f] Seaport in southwestern Luzon.
[g] Seaport on Lopez Bay off Lamon Bay.

From: Toyko
To: Manila
15 November 1941

#368
Strictly confidential.

Re your #746*

Please ascertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philippines, and also please make investigations again as to their number.

(SIS #24850)

JD-1: 6753 25236 (H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (AR)

*JD-1: 6545. Reports 32 B-19 bombers in the Philippines.

[*7530*] From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
#767

1. It has been ascertained that the ship of my #757*, paragraph 2, was a British transport, the AWATEA which entered port at the same time under convoy, (12000 or 13000 tons, 700 or 800 soldiers on board). Both ships sailed again on the evening of the 14th, destination unknown.

2. On the afternoon of the 14th, 4 destroyers, 11 submarines, 1 minelayer, entered port.

3. Ships in port on the 15th:

A Manila:

MADDO	BERU**	20 submarines
Portland	HON	1 minelayer
BUKKU	WOHOTOSU	
BERU	8 destroyers	

[*7531*] B. Cavite:
TON
PASU

SIS #24780
JD-1: 6754 25237 (H) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (AR)

*JD-1: 6503. Re movements of U. S. Naval and British Naval craft in Manila area.
**BERU repeated.

From: Manila
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
#767

We are retransmitting our machine telegram of the 14th with indicator 97720 because of a mistake on the plug board, as follows:

The following is from a report of a Japanese resident of Cebu.

1. At present there are about 300 American and 2500 Filipino soldiers stationed there. (There are four barracks each with a capacity of about 500 or 600 soldiers.

2. The airport has an area of about 196 acres but is being enlarged (by use of convict labor). [7532] About 12 planes (of medium size) used by the Philippine Army, have been transported to Java by air, and 12 or 13 American Army planes (monoplanes—whether they were scout planes or pursuit planes was not clear), are now stationed there. In addition to these there is one large bomber in the hangar (double type, capacity 40 planes.)

3. The headquarters of the former patrol force are being used as the commisariat storehouse and all sorts of provisions are being stored there.

4. On the 22nd of September, about 20 American warships anchored on the northwest coast of the Sulu Archipelago. Around the middle of October two destroyers and one cruiser entered Cebu harbor and early this month, one oil supply ship of the 20,000 ton class, and a camouflaged cruiser of the 10,000 ton class, entered port and anchored for two or three days. It has been recognized that occasionally two or three American ships anchor around the south of Mactan, Bacol, and Panglao.

5. There is an open drydock at MAKUGAA (operated by Chinese) capable of handling ships up to 10,000 tons.

JD–1 6587 24933 (H) Navy Trans. 11–18–41 (S–TT)

[7533] From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941
#785

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the *President Harrison*) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and material.

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

Manila—Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isabel; Heron; Wohotosu[a]; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.

Cavite—Houston (?); Canopus.

ARMY 25471 Trans. 11/29/41 (6)

[a] Kana spelling.

From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
November 24, 1941
#789

1. Putting together various reports, it appears that a large amount of military stores was removed from the "port [7534] area" during the "black-out" of the night of the 21st. Forty or fifty civilian buses (carrying the "mark" of the Manila Electric Company) were seen in the Rizal Province district. Investigations are being made to find out if these were loaded with troops.

2. At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 22nd, 60 light tanks (carrying one gun two——) and 20 ammunition trucks were seen leaving (Quezon Bridge?). These light tanks and ammunition trucks were seen on the 21st grouped near the headquarters of the "port area" military police. It is conjectured that (troops?) arrived on military boats recently entering the harbor. An English language "bulletin" of the 24th stated that a large number of light tanks and ammunition trucks had left at 4 and 6 o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd in transit for Meycuayan in Bulacan Province and San Fernando in Pampanga Province. I believe that these had been landed sometime around the 21st. The final destination of these tanks and trucks is now being investigated.

3. At present it is seen that there are two or three hundred American army trucks near the "port area" which have been imported at short intervals, creating a hurried atmosphere. Also, troops have newly arrived at (certain places in ?) the hills within the city. They are evidently American reinforcements. Feeling among the people in general has become tense.

ARMY 25530 Trans. 12/1/41 (6)

[7535] From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo
26 November 1941
#790

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland * (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.
2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.
3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown.

JD-1: 7035 25708 (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR)

*Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND of 8000 tons.

From: Manila (Nihro).
To: Tokyo
27 November 1941
#797

The Portland, BUKKU *, 2 destroyers, 10 submarines, left port on the *26th* (?). Destination unknown.

JD-1: 7082 25782 (H) Navy. Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)

*Probably Black Hawk.

[7536] From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941
#799

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day.

ARMY 25764 Trans. 12/5/41 (6)

[7537] Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, was it not your feeling while you were commander in chief of the fleet, that you had an attack force mission to perform and that you should not be obliged to participate in the defense of the Hawaiian Islands as such; I mean the base itself?

Admiral KIMMELL. I felt, and I believe all the Navy felt, that the real mission of the Pacific Fleet was offensive, and I think that nothing has ever occurred to change that conviction in the minds of any responsible naval officers.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, I would like to refer your attention to a letter which you wrote, and in which you objected to having the combined houses for the Army and Navy.

By the way, there was a proposition, was there not, that the Army and Navy commanders, the commanding general and commander in chief of the fleet at Hawaii be housed together in the same building? That was made prior to December 7, was it not?

Admiral KIMMELL. My recollection of that is that that referred to an information center.

Mr. MURPHY. No, I think you will find it is beyond that.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Murphy, that is Exhibit 123.

[7538] Mr. MURPHY. Will you get that exhibit for the admiral, please?

(The document was handed to Admiral Kimmel.)

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have Exhibit 123 before you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I have Exhibit 123.

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to the second page of that exhibit, being a letter from the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, for the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute. Will you say that again?

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to the second page of the exhibit, a letter dated November 3, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[*7539*] Mr. MURPHY. From the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to the Chief of Naval Operations, by way of the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph 1 says:

It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present time to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building as proposed in reference (a).

That was a plan to combine how much of the Army and Navy, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection of all this is that that was a common information center. Under date of the 15th of October 1941, you will see a dispatch. He says:

Your dispatch 140400 to BUDOCKSX request consideration be given to construction of combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii such as CINPAC COMFOURTEEN COMTRAIN COMSUBFOR COMPATWING and parallel activities of Army. CNO considers contemplation of Army and Navy activities in one building of proper construction constitutes great advantage for emergency operations. Comment with recommendations including location and estimate of cost requested.

Mr. MURPHY. Was not that to combine all of you in one [*7540*] building?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a combined operating center.

Mr. MURPHY. It says, "operating activities * * * of CINPAC COMFOURTEEN." Would not that put you and Admiral Bloch together in the same building?

Admiral KIMMEL. If that had been carried out, yes. That is what it says.

Mr. MURPHY. I say that is the recommendation, is it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would not necessarily put me and Admiral Bloch in the same building. It would put the operating staffs necessary for the Army and Navy together in one building.

Mr. MURPHY. In the November 3 letter Admiral Bloch says:

I do not believe that the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet operations would be benefitted by being in a common office building with the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

That was his version of it there, wasn't it, at the bottom of the page, in paragraph 5, about the fifth line up from the bottom?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. Referring to the letter of November 3, 1941, paragraph 5, the fifth from the last line.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. What about it?

[*7541*] Mr. MURPHY. It says there:

I do not believe that the Commander in Chief or the Fleet operations would be benefitted by being in a common office building with the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

So that his impression apparently was that they were discussing putting all three of you in the same building, isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they were discussing that.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMELL. The operating agencies.

I might shorten up your work here if you want to, however.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. You mean by saying it was adopted after December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was adopted?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, wasn't it, after December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not in that form, no. I do not know what was done after December 7 definitely, because I have not been out there since, and I haven't talked it over with people, but my general feeling at the time, and as I have expressed it in here, I think I have expressed it in some of these letters—I have not had a chance to read them recently—but the fleet commander should not be concerned with the immediate operation of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. You had a naval admiral and an Army general, and fleet [7542] commander in my opinion should have been free to do other things besides concerning himself with the details of the defense of Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. That is exactly what I am coming to. In other words, that was your feeling on December 7, and prior thereto, and in your letter of November 3, the first endorsement dated November 3 on page 2 in that exhibit, under paragraph (f), I mean paragraph 3, subparagraph (f).

In objecting to a combined operating center for the Army and Navy—

you say——

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute.

Mr. MURPHY. Excuse me. That is paragraph 3 (f).

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You say there, "in objecting," and so forth, paragraph 3. Then you say:

On the other hand, there are manifest disadvantages among which are the building—

and then I go down to (f)—

It would have at least a psychological tendency to divert Fleet units to defensive tasks.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you did not feel that the planes of the fleet should be used for the purpose of defending that base, did you? You felt that Admiral Bloch should have his own planes and the Army should have their planes, that absolutely and primarily it was an Army obligation and [7543] that you should be left to go on with your preparation to fight, because that is what you thought you were out there for, isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but I made plans to utilize every facility, every naval facility that happened to be in Pearl Harbor in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I think that the plans that I made show that most conclusively.

Mr. MURPHY. You did object to Washington to the fact that you had to do that, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly I objected, and I objected because I wanted to have those planes free for other things, and I knew that even with all the planes and everything we had that we were forced to make a choice as to what we could and should do.

Mr. MURPHY. You complained to Admiral Stark; and Admiral Stark, in effect, kind of agreed with you but said, "There is no choice. We have to do it," did he not?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. That was an old problem, because it existed back in 1940 with Admiral Richardson, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; it existed always.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to read into the record from a letter dated November 28, 1940, a letter to Admiral Stark from Admiral Richardson. I would like to refer to the second [7544] paragraph, Admiral, which reads as follows:

> With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This fight on the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and I think it can easily be provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships at present are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

In that connection I would like to direct your attention, Admiral, to the discussion of the torpedo nets at Hawaii.

Mr. MASTEN. That is Exhibit 116, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Exhibit No. 116. Do you have your copy of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, there was a letter in February that gave you the impression that there was no danger of a torpedo attack at Pearl Harbor. Do you recall that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Gave me definite data, which was conclusive, that there was no danger of torpedo attack in Hawaii or in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. By the way, there was reference made, when counsel was questioning you, to Whitehead torpedoes that were purchased by the Japs. Is it not a fact that the Japanese had perfected those torpedoes in 1931 for the [7545] specific purpose of being used in an attack on Pearl Harbor? Of course, we did not know about that.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course, I did not know about that, but if that be true, this is the first time I ever heard it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it is my impression, and only an impression, that in the record a statement is made that the Japanese perfected this torpedo for use against Pearl Harbor in 1931. Of course, the Navy did not know about it, and I am not criticizing the Navy.

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. MURPHY. But I am putting it in the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you are a little bit in error.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. My understanding, although I do not know, is that they took some Whitehead torpedoes that were manufactured in 1931 and shortly before Pearl Harbor they succeeded in so altering them as to make them suitable for use in the waters of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. It may be so.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is the correct statement.

Mr. MURPHY. I am glad to have you say that. My only reason for going into it, Admiral, was, I was wondering if the Japs were plotting an attack on Pearl Harbor in 1931. Some people in this country would have us believe that they started [7546] to prepare on November 26, 1941.

I am referring, Admiral, to this group of letters in Exhibit 116, and you have already covered the letter written in February that led you to believe that there was absolutely no danger from torpedoes.

This reference has been made to the letter in June. Do you remember that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. The letter of June 13.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Where they discussed Taranto. Now, both the opinion of Admiral King and a great many opinions are to the effect that the idea was then abandoned.

I now direct your attention to the letter of September 16, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute. It appears I haven't got that letter.

Mr. MURPHY. You say you do not have the letter?

Mr. MASTEN. Is it in the same exhibit?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. What is the date of it?

Mr. MURPHY. September 16, 1941, a letter from Admiral Ingersoll.

Mr. MASTEN. I think you will have to read from the copy [7547] you have, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Under date of September 16, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. A letter was written from Admiral Ingersoll, Acting Chief of Naval Operations, to the Bureau of Ordnance, and in paragraph 1 the following may be found:

> It is suggested that in order that progress may be made in solving some of the problems which confront us, that a small group of officers, engineers and draftsmen be assigned exclusively to planning improvements in net and boom designs and to development and experimental work.

Then again in paragraph 2:

> In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations indicated the desirability of undertaking some research and development work. Among other suggestions, the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be laid and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes.

At any rate, that indicates that the Chief of Naval Operations in September 1941 was trying to get a net that could be used, isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Which could be what?

Mr. MURPHY. Which could be used if they had perfected [7548] one?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I knew nothing of this letter. I never saw it until recently.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you also find, Admiral, a letter in October following this?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume so.

Mr. MURPHY. I wonder if you would be kind enough to read the October letter? It is lost in my exhibit. It is a short letter.

(The document was handed to Mr. Murphy.)

Mf. MURPHY. I find a letter dated October 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, and paragraph 2 reads as follows:

Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. The Chief of Naval Operations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net which can be made up, towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pontoons, as suggested, does not appear to solve this question; a reduction in the number of moorings, at present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required.

You did not know about that letter either, Admiral, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I did not know about it.

[*7549*] Mr. MURPHY. My reason for putting it in the record is to show that the Navy had a very active interest in perfecting a net and that the Navy should not be subjected to the criticism which they have received from some quarters that they were derelict in not trying to get a net for Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were obtaining nets to be used in all harbors, I presume. Their efforts were not confined to Pearl Harbor by any means.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And the fact that that letter is in existence shows that they were working for a net. It doesn't show where they were going to put the net. I presume they would have sent some to Pearl Harbor. I don't know.

Mr. MURPHY. It showed they had an active interest in the development of a good torpedo net; isn't that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like now to refer to a letter dated December 30, 1940, from Admiral Bloch to the Chief of Naval Operations, in which he says in paragraph 1:

In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with [*7550*] the equipment and forces at hand.

Then I desire to read only a part of paragraph 2, in which it states:

The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers, and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers.

Again at the end of the paragraph:

For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

I would like also to read from a letter dated January 4, 1941, from Admiral Richardson as commander in chief of the United States Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations, paragraph 2:

As neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of an attack by hostile aircraft.

Now, Admiral, I direct your attention to the basic exhibit of Navy dispatches. That would be exhibit No. 37. [*7551*] I direct

your attention, Admiral, if you will, to a dispatch in that exhibit where you were notified that the Japanese were going to proceed to attack sometime prior to November.

Yesterday we were discussing the significance which you attached to the messages about the destruction of the codes and you said at that time that the reason why you didn't pay particular attention to the first message about the codes was that it said that only some, not all, but most of the codes were being destroyed; do you recall that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I do.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you did have a subsequent message, however, which did say that the machines were being destroyed, didn't you?

The first dispatch of December 3 said that they were told to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. There was also a dispatch on the 3d which said that they were to destroy the machine.

Admiral KIMMEL. There was a qualifying word in there and it referred to a particular machine.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will read it exactly.

Circular 2444 from Tokyo 1 December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December Second Washington also directed destroy X All but one copy of other systems X And all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied.

Wouldn't that be a highly important and significant message in view of the developments at that time, to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. You will note on your copy that the word "purple" was inserted by Mr. Gesell on December 17, 1945, and "there no longer being any necessity for maintaining it a secret." Gesell's amendment is found in volume 26, page 4559.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking what was before Admiral Kimmel before December 7.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I am trying to show exactly what was before Admiral Kimmel and what was before Admiral Kimmel was that the Japs had ordered the destruction of one particular machine which was by no means all they had.

Mr. MURPHY. I take it then that when you heard about the purple code, which was their most precious one, their ultra code, you didn't know what "purple" meant, was that it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I didn't know what purple meant.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ask Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. I asked my intelligence officer.

Mr. MURPHY. Did he know?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, he didn't know.

[*7553*] Mr. MURPHY. Did you ask Washington then?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I didn't. My intelligence officer finally found one officer on the Island of Oahu who told us it was one of the Japanese very secret machines, which one I did not know at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, wouldn't that, in view of the war warning, indicate to you that trouble was afoot and that war was coming?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a step but it was by no means a conclusive step.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you had other messages too about the destruction of codes, didn't you, from your own intelligence officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the afternoon of December 6 my intelligence officer came to me and told me that they were burning papers outside of the Japanese consulate. Such reports had been made to me three or four times in the course of the year. The first time I received such a report I was considerably concerned and attempted to find out all I could about it and on succeeding reports of that nature I also attempted to find out about it.

When this report was made to me I knew nothing about any information that the FBI may have obtained and I did not see the dispatch that was sent by the commandant of the district [*7554*] until after the attack.

Now, whether or not they were destroying codes, I do not know. There was nothing definite that came to me that they were destroying codes. The report that came to me was that they were burning papers once more.

Mr. MURPHY. Did the FBI man talk to you before you went to the hotel that night, the night of the 6th? There was an FBI man who I understand talked to General Short before he went into Schofield Barracks. I was wondering if that same FBI man talked to you before you went to the hotel?

Admiral KIMMEL. He did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you did have reports besides the one of the 6th about the destruction of codes, from your own intelligence officer, didn't you, Admiral? Didn't you have messages showing you that they were being destroyed at other posts in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I had some, and I had a message authorizing me to destroy codes on the outlying islands.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you know, Admiral, that the Navy code was much more difficult to break than the Army code?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean our own Navy code?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, your own Navy code, was a much better code and harder to break than the Army code?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I didn't know it at the time. I [*7555*] had an idea that the Navy code might be better. I thought we had a better communications system than the Army had.

Mr. MURPHY. The Army says so.

At any rate, you did have a message from Batavia about them destroying codes and machines there?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the message I just read, I think.

Mr. MURPHY. No, the one of the 6th was the one from Honolulu. I am now talking about one of a couple of days before December 1. You had a message from Batavia about them destroying codes, in your intelligence report?

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that?

Mr. MURPHY. I will get it for you. It is in the fleet intelligence report. The one that goes up to December 2, as I recall it.

Lieutenant HANIFY. I have that exhibit, sir. It is Exhibit 115.

Mr. MURPHY. From October 27 to December 2, 1941.

Lieutenant HANIFY. I haven't found the reference yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. In this message that we have just been discussing, the one of December 3, 1941, it talks about the destruction of the purple machine. "Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo." Is that what you are referring to?

Mr. MURPHY. No. There is a separate message in your intelligence report.

[7556] Lieutenant HANIFY. The last item in that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. On December 2——

Lieutenant HANIFY. United States Ambassador at Bangkok?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. On December 2, 1941, the intelligence report that was placed you show the United States Ambassador at Bangkok on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of codes. That showed that our Ambassador there was quite concerned about war coming, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Bangkok is in Thailand. He was concerned that they might get his code down there when they attacked Thailand. I might say that was the least significant of all of them.

Mr. MURPHY. Didn't it indicate to you that he felt down there that war was coming on December 2? You said yesterday that when nothing happened in several days the importance of these things started to become minimized in your mind.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a precaution that he might well have taken.

Mr. MURPHY. You don't see any particular significance to that?

Admiral KIMMEL. You will recall the information I had about the conspiracy of the Japs to induce the British to come into Thailand and attack them. That was all part of that picture.

[7557] Mr. MURPHY. Yes; that was also in that same group of messages, wasn't it? That was placed before you within 2 or 3 days of this other one. Admiral, do you have the intrigue message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I have it here.

Mr. MURPHY. That was just a few days before, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. The day before.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you speak in your statement about the winds code and the winds code execute. You knew the details of the winds code, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew the winds code had been set up.

Mr. MURPHY. You knew that we were looking for it and trying to find out if there was an execute message?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. You had a dispatch on the 28th of November giving you that in detail, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Telling you exactly what it would mean and showing, if there had been an execute, it would mean that there was a rupture in diplomatic relations; Isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. At least that, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, it is your opinion, is it not, that there was an execute message? You say so in your statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. My opinion, yes. I took my opinion [7558] from the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry. I quoted them on it. I don't recall that I gave any opinion.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the assertions in your statement which led you to believe that you had been misled were based in part upon the belief by you now and at the time you made your statement that there had been a winds code execute; isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I based that on the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry who heard all the evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, if there had not been an execute message it would considerably alter your statement to that effect?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would not alter my statement that the Naval Court of Inquiry found as a fact that the winds message execute had been received.

Mr. MURPHY. If it is a fact, Admiral, that there was no execute message, would it alter your statement that you have made to this committee that you were misled to that extent?

Admiral KIMMEL. If I became convinced that the Naval Court of Inquiry was in error and they had conclusive evidence that it never had been received it would alter my statement to that extent.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, speaking about the Naval Court of Inquiry, [7559] were you given a fair trial there?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was, indeed.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you given a fair hearing before the Roberts Commission?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was permitted to testify before the Roberts Commission. I didn't have any counsel.

Mr. MURPHY. You had somebody beside you, didn't you? Didn't you have Admiral Theobald with you?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was assisting me with the papers. He was not counsel. And he said he was not counsel.

Mr. MURPHY. He said he wasn't counsel, but he did volunteer quite a little information?

Admiral KIMMEL. And Mr. Roberts said he wasn't counsel.

Mr. MURPHY. But he was at your side, getting papers and making statements occasionally to clarify the picture, wasn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, for which he was—all right.

Mr. MURPHY. They asked him to be sworn?

Admiral KIMMEL. They asked him to be sworn so that he would be a witness.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; as long as he was giving information.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There were some distinguished admirals on that Board, on the Roberts Board, were there not?

[7560] Admiral KIMMEL. There were two admirals on the Board; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you have any reason, Admiral, to feel that they weren't able admirals?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MURPHY. Up to the time that you saw their report did you have any grievance against them or any criticism to make of their capacity to sit? Up to the time you saw their report and differed with it, had you any particular criticism of the ability of those two gentlemen?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were able officers.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, were they competent to sit on this board?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were.

Mr. MURPHY. Now the Army Board, you appeared before that, didn't you? The Army Pearl Harbor Board, you testified before them, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you treated all right there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I was not permitted to hear the testimony of other witnesses before the Army Board nor to introduce evidence. I merely testified before the Army Board.

Mr. MURPHY. The Navy Board; how were you treated there?

[*7561*] Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy Court of Inquiry?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was permitted to have counsel, I was permitted to introduce evidence, I was permitted to cross-examine witnesses, I was permitted to confront witnesses.

Mr. MURPHY. That was ordered by the Secretary of the Navy and you were given every right that you wanted to demand, that you required, or that you requested, except that it was not made public?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was given full facilities to present my case to the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Mr. MURPHY. Now do you know of any reason why Admiral King and Secretary Forrestal would differ as they did, and The Adjutant General of the Navy differ as he did, with the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I would like to go with you, if I may, to the testimony of General Short before the Roberts Commission. I direct your attention—do you have it?

Lieutenant HANIFY. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Can you make that available, Counsel?

In the meantime I will read—would you prefer to have a copy before you? I am going to ask you some questions. I think in fairness to you you ought to have a copy before you.

[*7562*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think I ought to have a copy. I would like to see what it is you are reading from.

Mr. MURPHY. While they are going downstairs to get a copy I will go into some other things, Admiral.

Admiral, in your statement you complain, apparently, about the tenor of the messages that were sent to you from Washington; first, the messages about the economic sanctions in July, and then the messages in October about the change of Cabinet, and then the other messages in November, and you say that each of them were in effect a war warning.

Wouldn't you think the responsibility was more on the Japanese than it was on the officials at Washington for that series of messages? Wasn't it the conduct of the Japanese that prompted those different messages which appeared to be war warnings?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to say.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a fact that you did expect to be told about the change in Cabinet and what might happen in October, October 16?

Admiral KIMMEL. I expected full information, yes. I was glad of any information I could get.

Mr. MURPHY. You certainly expected to be told about the economic sanctions in July, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Certainly.

[*7563*] Mr. MURPHY. And on each of those occasions they would have to have a message of pretty serious import to describe that occasion to you, wouldn't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Would Washington be to blame for the series of messages or the Japanese?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't blame anybody for the series of messages. I set forth what I had.

Mr. MURPHY. Except that you see to complain about having had some messages prior to the war-warning message.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well——

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if it wasn't the Japanese that caused that instead of somebody in Washington.

You did have a message from the Chief of Naval Operations about code machines or codes being destroyed, before, Admiral, didn't you?

I refer to a message in July 17, 1941, reading as follows——

Lieutenant HANIFY. Which exhibit, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. 37, page 9:

17 July 1941.
From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF
Info: CINCPAC

[*7564*] The time has come blank Tokyo to Vichy twelve July two seven four and two seven five list six terms of ultimatum to be answered by twenty July X Japan will send necessary Army Navy air forces to southern French Indo China X French turnover naval and air bases listed in Jonab or seven July X Expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move about freely X French withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible clashes X Vichy authorize French Indo China military to arrange details with Japanese either before or after landing X Colony to pay Japan twenty-three million piastres annually to meet cost of occupation XX Tokyo to Vichy fourteen July two eight one Army now planning advance on or about twenty July XX Tokyo to Saigon and Hanoi sixteen July circular one five one eight formal demands presented to Vichy on fourteen X Reply asked by twentieth X Japan intends carry out plans by force if opposed or if British or United States interferes X Kanju Maru being held at Saigon to evacuate all Japanese there sailing early dawn twenty-four July X Burn codes X Japanese in northern area evacuate or move into Hanoi end of this.

[*7565*] Would that indicate that since war was coming in that direction that the Japanese were ordering the codes be destroyed and wouldn't that indicate——

Admiral KIMMEL. Let me say, I haven't seen this message for a long time.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the only part I am interested in is the fact that they seem to be going to advance.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am trying to find out what he is talking about.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it is a Navy message.

Admiral KIMMEL. Who is to burn codes, and how? Can you make out?

Mr. MURPHY. My assumption is that OPNAV is telling what has happened between Tokyo and Vichy. They are talking about what they are going to do. They are going to make an advance, and before they make their advance——

Admiral KIMMEL. There must be something missing, because I can't see that it makes any sense, so far as the burning codes business is concerned. I don't know what that is.

Mr. MURPHY. My only purpose is to ask you, as between an ordinary layman and an expert, if it wasn't a fact that the advance at that time meant war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Your command of language is better [7566] than mine, I think.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. You should be able to understand what the message means. It is plain English. It says "burn codes." I can't make out what kind of codes he is talking about. There must be something missing. I can't see that it makes sense.

Mr. MURPHY. My trouble is that when I read the one in December about burning codes, from everything I have read, I thought that meant war, but apparently it didn't mean war at Hawaii, because burning codes you said didn't have much significance to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, this "burn codes" here in July didn't bring on war, at least. I don't know what it meant. There is something about burning codes.

Mr. MURPHY. You say it didn't bring on war. They did go into Indochina. They took over there, didn't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, as far as I am concerned, I don't understand what they are talking about.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a fact that after this message, shortly thereafter, they did go into Indochina and take over?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but who burned the codes?

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, I am only dealing with [7567] what messages are before us, and my only reason in talking about burning codes, if you didn't understand it, did you ask Washington then, in July, to explain it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought I understood it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will counsel check that and get us the original?[1]

Mr. MASTEN. That is the one on page 9?

Senator LUCAS. You are going to find out who burned the codes?

Mr. MURPHY. I am interested in whether or not we are getting accurate information. It is hard enough to keep up with accurate information.

Admiral KIMMEL. From memory, I don't remember the message. I probably saw it; if it was addressed to me I certainly saw it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, do we have the copy of the Short testimony?

Before the Roberts Commission, Admiral, General Short was being questioned about what he would have done if he had had all of the material which was asked for. He was also asked what the Navy would have done if the Navy had all the material they had asked for. The general was reluctant to answer the question, but he did say to the Roberts Board that even if the Navy had had all that it [7568] wanted and had asked for in his opinion there still would have been no reconnaissance on that morning. Would you agree with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I take the statement that you have made, and I presume it is correct, I haven't read it, but I do not agree with his conclusion as you have stated it.

[7569] Mr. MURPHY. I refer to page 1637.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. Where is it?

Mr. MURPHY. Excuse me just one minute. I beg your pardon; page 1641, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. 1641?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; 1641, at the bottom of the page.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[1] The document was supplied to Representative Murphy. See p. 5134.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General McCOY. If you had been furnished with all of the things that you felt necessary, would that have made any difference in this particular action?

General SHORT. I do not believe it would.

Admiral STANDLEY. Right there: In case the patrol planes that were necessary to make the effective off-shore patrol were here in sufficient numbers, do you still think that no change would have been made in the plans?

General SHORT. None whatever, because you couldn't tell when some of them might have been ordered away. If they had been left they just simply would not have called upon us. As a matter of fact, as I said, in most of our exercises the assumption was that they had enough to make the patrol, so they made the patrols and called up on us to execute the bombing mission, because [7570] they considered that our B–17s were more effective as bombers than their own planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but in this estimate they stated definitely that there were not sufficient forces to make a continuous air patrol as required in war.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Well, there wouldn't be——

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, if you had had that force here do you think under the circumstances you would have been making that patrol every morning? Not you, I mean, but the Navy.

General SHORT. But the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. The combined effort, yes.

General SHORT. Well, I think that would be a fair question to ask the Navy. I don't hardly think under the conditions that they would; I think that they would have been doing it as an exercise now and then in connection with us. I do not believe that they would have been doing it habitually if they had had them, but I don't know. It would be a fair question to ask them.

And then down below:

Admiral REEVES. Before you go to that, General, let me ask General Short this: On the other hand, if you had had material and [7571] fully equipped radar stations, would you have been operating them throughout the day or would you have operated them as you did on the morning of the 7th?

General SHORT. I probably would have operated them just as I did.

Now, do you agree, first, with General Short that if you had had the planes that you wanted that you would have continued the same schedule of operations on the morning of the 7th as you did?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not agree with any of his conclusions here about that. I most certainly do not.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, Admiral, that General Short testified before the Roberts Board that he implicitly believed that you were having reconnaissance on that morning, although he did not know the details of it and, as I understand it, you testified that you implicitly believed that you were getting radar protection for 200 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, if there had been a conference between you and General Short on what to do and into detail after November the 27th, would you have been led to believe that you were getting a 200-mile coverage at all times on radar and would he have been led to believe implicitly that there was a reconnaissance?

[7572] Admiral KIMMEL. Let us get the beginning of that. That is a little bit too long for me.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a long question.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; a little too much there.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Read the question, please.

(Question read.)

Admiral KIMMEL. There was a conference, not only one but several of them, at which we discussed all phases of the Pacific campaign and the defenses of Hawaii and I have covered that very thoroughly in

previous testimony and in the statement which I submitted to the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. You have read, have you, General Short's testimony before the Roberts Board?

Admiral KIMMEL. Have I what?

Mr. MURPHY. Have you read General Short's testimony before the Roberts Board?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have read some of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, didn't he tell them that you did not discuss details, that you spent your time on discussing the outlying islands; that he had never seen the war warning message of the 27th and that he thought there was reconnaissance, but he did not know the details?

Admiral KIMMEL. He changed that testimony considerably later, as you will recall.

[7573] Mr. MURPHY. Before the Board?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

Mr. MURPHY. He changed it in subsequent hearings, but I was wondering if he testified to it before the Board. He did say that it was his recollection that he had seen the message, but he did not know whether he had or not, as I remember it.

Let me go into it exactly; I think it is important. I direct your attention to page 38 of the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What record?

Mr. MURPHY. Of the Roberts hearing, General Short's testimony. General Short there said that since the beginning of the emergency there was only one alert and that was at the time of the freezing of assets in July. At that time General Short placed the Army on an alert against——

Admiral KIMMEL. Where are you reading from?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not reading yet. I am giving this as preliminary to try to save time.

In July, after the message about the freezing of the assets, General Short immediately put out his sabotage alert. As I understand it, at that time the Navy did nothing special; is that right? You took no special precautions?

Admiral KIMMEL. What date was that, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. In July, after the message about freezing [7574] the assets.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall now just what action we took at that time, if any.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, as I understand it, you were on a sabotage alert for many years; the fleet had done everything they could to stop sabotage, and there was no need of getting into any additional precautions about it; isn't that so?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true; that part of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Whereas the Army did go into a sabotage alert, and they put men out to protect the utilities, and as I understand it, they never stopped protecting them right down to November 27, whereas you did not have any special precautions at that time.

Admiral KIMMEL. I had many precautions, but our problem in regard to sabotage in the Navy and the Army's problem were entirely separate and distinct; very different.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, in October, when you got the message, you did go in and take special precautions and make special assignments, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. As I recall, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. The Army, so far as you know, did not take any steps at that time, did they?

[7575] Admiral KIMMEL. I do not now recall.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to page 46. At the bottom of the page, about 10 lines from the bottom of the page, General Short says:

The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never known by me.

Do you see that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I saw that.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

If they called on us for a squadron of planes they would assign it to a certain sector, say maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out 600 miles, or whatever it was. I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all the other critical areas, and they probably were. I say, that was a matter that was not under my control.

General Short did so testify, didn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, it is so recorded here.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. I now direct your attention to page 47, about one-third of the way down:

General SHORT. From March 21——

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

From March 21 on we had repeatedly carried out exercises along that line. We had a minimum of one exer- [7576] cise a week, and sometimes exercises more frequently than that, but we were working constantly to perfect that coordination. This has no direct bearing, but to show what we were trying to do, that same agreement provided that when we were using fighters over the Island of Oahu then they turned their fighters over to my command. We were trying to get a coordinated whole in that.

Now, I am reading, Admiral, but I do hope that the counsel will check on the date of November the 20th as being the last exercise.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The 12th.

Mr. MURPHY. November the 12th?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. As the last exercise, and I am wondering why if you and General Short had plans to have an exercise every week and sometimes oftener than that throughout the year, there was not at least an exercise held to get ready after the war warning of the 27th.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to answer that. I told you that that was a matter handled by the commandant of the district and the commanding general.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention, Admiral, to page 54 at the bottom of the page, the last paragraph:

So, while I do not remember exactly asking a speci- [7577] fic question as to the location of the Japanese carriers, I had a very decided impression that at that time there was nothing in the situation that the location of the

Japanese carriers was worrying us at that time. In fact, the question came up very definitely by a question of Admiral Kimmel's. During his conference on the 27th with General Martin, his chief of staff, Colonel Mollison, the question was asked, and I would like to read it since his statement is more definite than my recollection:

"I certify that on November 27, 941 I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defense of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

"Admiral KIMMEL. 'McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu?'

"Captain MCMORRIS. 'I should say none, Admiral.'"

At that time there was no exception taken to that statement by either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch, and apparently the Navy felt that they had definite information of the location of carriers and major ships of the Japanese and that there was no question in their minds of the [7578] possibility or probability of a surprise attack up Oahu.

Now, the fact is, Admiral, that at least one person there in the affidavit says that the purpose of that meeting on that morning was about Wake and Midway; isn't that so?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct and that was before the receipt of the war warning dispatches you will recall.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. But we did discuss—in the discussion about the sending of planes to Midway and Wake it was inevitable that we should discuss the Pacific situation and we did discuss it and this one little passage here is an indication of the fact that we did so discuss it.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever discuss the question of a raid with McMorris in the light of the war warning to see if that would change his judgment? He said there was no danger of a raid before he knew about the war warning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. But then came a war warning. Did you ask McMorris for his judgment in view of the fact that war is coming?

Admiral KIMMEL. I discussed all phases of the situation with McMorris almost daily; not almost daily but daily, and we went over the whole situation and at no time did McMorris [7579] recommend to me that we put out these planes for reconnaissance purposes, and he would have done so had he considered it necessary. He is a very able, outspoken officer and a man in whom I had the highest confidence.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you discuss that subject with General Short and was McMorris asked as to whether or not his view would be qualified in view of the war warning, before General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did I discuss it before General Short?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot now recall.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot recall any specific discussion, but I am sure it took place.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention to the same page:

General SHORT. At that time there was no exception taken to that statement by either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch, and apparently the Navy felt that they had definite information of the location of carriers and major ships of the Japanese and that there was no question in their minds of the possibility or probability of a surprise attack upon Oahu.

In other words, you were not even discussing Oahu at that [*7580*] time, were you, I mean as such? Your problem—well, I think General Short is wrong myself on that one, because one contradicts the other.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, of course it does.

Mr. MURPHY. I am not going to question you on that.

Now, I direct your attention to page 58. You gave some testimony relative to the flight of the B——

Admiral KIMMEL. One moment.

Mr. MURPHY. I am not referring to any particular part yet, Admiral. This is preliminary.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right; go ahead. What is this?

Mr. MURPHY. You gave some testimony relative to the fact that the Army had sent B–17's from the west coast to Hawaii and you said that they did not even have guns ready to shoot and you apparently criticized that, or at least said that that would mean that they were not worrying about attack. There was a question of ammunition and there was also a question of a crew.

Now, on this page I would like to refer to the testimony of General Short relative to where he says the crews would not be enough to man the guns——

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is this?

Mr. MURPHY. I will get it for you. At the bottom of the page, in the last paragraph, about 10 lines up:

[*7581*] The crews—

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait. I think I had better clear up something right now.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never saw these B–17's that came to Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know of my own knowledge anything about the condition of their guns.

Mr. MURPHY. I am not going to ask you that question. You have already testified that they were cosmolined.

Admiral KIMMEL. I testified that that was reported to me.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And no statements were made and, so far as I know, they have never been contradicted.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right, I am not challenging that. My question here is that General Short says that the crews would not be enough to man the guns even if the guns had been in shape to fire and even if they had ammunition and I want to ask you that for this reason: There is much ado made in this record, as I recollect, by yourself and by others about the fact that the B–17's had come from the coast to Hawaii without being able to protect themselves.

General Marshall said that the reason why that occurred [*7582*] was that there was a question of the amount of gasoline, we did not have planes as good then as now, and that there was a question of how much gasoline they could possibly carry and they wanted to have as much as possible because they thought they could not cover that distance; they were having winds at the time and the distance basis.

Now, as I understand it you testified that that would lead to the inference that they did not fear an attack and you said that they had the guns themselves there on the ships but they were cosmolined and could not fire.

Now my question is to you as an expert. General Short said they did not have enough crew to fire the guns and they did not have enough ammunition—did not have any ammunition. What would the relative weight be of a sufficient number of men to fire the guns, a complete crew and ammunition and would that interfere substantially with the amount of gas they could carry? Now, do you understand my question?

Admiral KIMMEL. I understand your question, and I do not know enough to answer it. I think you can get complete and full answers from people who knew the characteristics of the B–17's at that time. However, I certainly was under the impression and the belief that they could have taken on a full crew and ammunition and still have had ample gasoline to make the trip from San Francisco to Hawaii. Now, I am not familiar [*7583*] with the details, but from all the evidence which was presented to me and from all that I believed before Pearl Harbor and afterwards, that is what I thought. I do not know whether that is true or not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, my only reason in asking you the question, Admiral, was that you had discussed the cosmoline question and the fact that they were not able to fire and I agree with you that——

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I did not discuss cosmolined guns because I believed then and I still believe, although I cannot prove it and I am not qualified as an expert, but I believed that the B–17's could have made the trip with guns and ammunition and a crew.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir; I will.

Senator BREWSTER. I presume that is a thing about which there need not be any question or controversy. There must be some competent authority to determine it and I am wondering, Does the gentleman contemplate having counsel prepare a statement?

Mr. MURPHY. I presume General Arnold can answer it. I think General Short will be able to answer it. We are having an airman here, General Arnold, but there is a conflict in the record now, I think, between the Admiral and General Marshall.

[*7584*] Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MURPHY. I think the record and the testimony conflict, because General Marshall said the reason they did not do these other things was because of the difficulty with gas and there you think they could have had the full crew and the ammunition and the gas at that time.[1]

Admiral KIMMEL. I want you to understand that I am not able to testify accurately on it. I am merely testifying as to my understanding from conversations I have had.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to page 69 in which General Short says——

Admiral KIMMEL. It might be interesting to find out what condition the B–17's that came out subsequent to December 7, what condition they were in when they came out.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the last ones we have were those that came that morning and they were in the same condition.

[1] See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5134 et seq.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, you will recall, of course, that they quickly reinforced places out there with a number of B–17's and B–25's, and so forth.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I would be surprised, although I know nothing about it, I would be surprised if they went out there unarmed.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, will counsel check that, the condition [*7585*] of the B–17's that went out to Hawaii immediately after the attack, as to whether they had a full crew and ammunition and guns not cosmolined but ready to fire and a proper bore sight?

Now, I direct your attention to page 69, Admiral, a question to General Short, speaking about the air warning center:

General McCOY. Could you state whether there was a naval officer there that morning?

General SHORT. There was not, for some reason, a naval officer there during the period four to seven. There had been on previous days, and as a matter of fact the Navy had felt that it would be a good idea to have a little more of that, and they had arranged—the interceptor command and the Navy and the whole group had worked out, on just a volunteer basis, of continuing that training every day until four o'clock in the afternoon, but decided that on Sunday they would only work until seven, but the Navy had been instrumental in even extending that period, and it had been agreed that they would work right through until four o'clock. I had not ordered that, but that was just something they were doing on their own.

Now, you have previously testified, as I understand it, that you do not know whether there was a Navy man there on that morning.

[*7586*] Admiral KIMMEL. Not of my own knowledge, no.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, then we will go into that with another witness, but at any rate General Short said that you had a Navy man there, as I read his testimony, on other days but not on the morning in question.

Now, immediately after the attack the interceptor command station did work 24 hours a day, didn't it, with Navy men present, or would you know that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume they did, if it is in your reports.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 73:

General McCOY. Yes. Is it in actual operation today?

General SHORT. Oh, yes, 24 hours of the day.

Now, there is one statement on that page that may be a typographical error, but it is an important one if it is. I direct your attention to page 78 in which General Short is testifying and about the middle of the second paragraph he says:

Admiral Halsey had an airplane carrier up to the north.

This is before December 7. Do you see that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I see it.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there any reason why General Short would think that an airplane carrier was up in the north waters?

[*7587*] Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to state. He had access to all the information on the movements of our own ships that we had ourselves.

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to page 109, on which General Short says in the middle of the first paragraph:

Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly ever step out of his house without hearing planes.

Do you see that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there anything in any of these messages about publicity that in any way influenced your judgment as to what the Navy should have done after November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had to take that into consideration in what I did.

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to November 30, in which the Honolulu Advertiser in a big headline across the top of the page says,

"THE JAPANESE MAY STRIKE OVER THE WEEK END."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Would there be much concern about publicity after that headline in the papers in Honolulu?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Honolulu Advertiser carried a good many headlines like that.

[*7588*] Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate on the 30th of November you said that after November 27 you got your information from the papers and that they, in effect, made you think that there was less danger of an attack, and I am wondering about this particular one, "The Japanese may strike over the week end; Kurusu bluntly warned the Nation is ready for battle," if that would make you think less of the likelihood of war or more?

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course, the Honolulu Advertiser said they might strike over the week end. The week end came and passed, and they did not strike, and you will read—my recollection of those headlines in the Honolulu papers is that that eased off considerably after that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you said yesterday you did not know about Mr. Hull's attitude and this testimony of the foreign expert about Tokyo's mad dog madness.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. You said yesterday you did not know about the Hull attitude to the effect that they were mad dogs, about the madness of the war lords in Tokyo. Wouldn't that be along the same line?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not in the same language, and this was a newspaper article.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. By the way, would you give [*7589*] a newspaper article more importance or greater weight than you would to a command of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; of course not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did let newspaper articles influence your judgment, didn't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Everything that I saw and heard influenced my judgment to some degree, and I tried to differentiate betwixt the source and the reliability of everything I heard. In the newspapers in Honolulu and on the radio I heard that Mr. Hull was talking to, I forget exactly, but that he was having conversations still with the Japanese Ambassador, he called him down to talk to him, Mr. Welles talked to him, all in that week, and I think that is contained in the—that was in the papers, and it is also contained in the volume called Peace and War, I believe it is.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your answer on that question, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[*7590*] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Does counsel have something at this point?

Mr. MASTEN. We have two letters that we would like to add to Exhibit 113, which we distributed to the committee.

The first is dated February 21, 1941, from the commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet to various commanders of the fleet.

We would like to offer that as Exhibit 113–A.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 113–A?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be received as Exhibit 113–A.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113–A.")

Mr. MASTEN. The second letter is one dated October 31, 1941, headed "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL–41," having to do with the organization and missions of the several task forces. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 113–B.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113–B.")

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED) (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything, Admiral, before examination is resumed?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have nothing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania is recognized to continue his inquiry.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel, after receipt of the war warning message to the Army, which was not so worded, however, but the message of the 27th of November, General Short made a reply to Washington, and, as I recall it, you referred to that reply in your statement to the committee. Are you familiar with the wording of that reply?

Admiral KIMMEL. Generally, yes; I would like to refresh my memory on it, if I may.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you refer to exhibit 32, page 16. I beg your pardon, page 12; do you have that, admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I have it now.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, after General Short received the message of November 27, he sent a message to Washington reading as follows:

> Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.

Now, did you see that dispatch, that you can recollect, [*7592*] subsequent to November 27, the answer of General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never saw that dispatch until after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to page 380 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings.

Will you get that for the Admiral, please?

In my opinion, it is one of the most important entries in any of these volumes.

General Grunert to General Short:

In your message of November 27——

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that?

Mr. MURPHY. The middle of the page, question 134. Do you have that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. General Grunert to General Short:

In your message of November 27, you say, "liaison with the Navy." Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?

General SHORT. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had, and what they were doing.

General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long distance reconnaissance?

[7593] General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff.

Did you know then that General Short had notified Washington and meant to infer by that telegram that he expected you were conducting the proper reconnaissance after November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. General Short knew that I was going to conduct a reconnaissance and that I had the means to conduct a reconnaissance only for a very short period, and when an attack on Hawaii was known to be probable within narrow limits—and I never knew at any time that an attack on Hawaii was probable within narrow limits—that was also a part of the estimate of the situation and was well known to everybody that had anything to do with it.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think if you and General Short had held the proper kind of conference——

Admiral KIMMEL. We did.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me finish. Do you think he could have made a statement such as he makes at page 359?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't explain why General Short made his statement.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention to page 1633 [7594] of General Short's testimony.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I have it.

That would be in the photostatic section.

Mr. MURPHY. Doesn't General Short say—do you have your copy, counsel?

Mr. MASTEN. Admiral Kimmel is using our copy.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand that at page 1633, General Short makes the statement that he did not know what the Navy was doing.

Admiral KIMMEL. General Short?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you had better put in what he said.

Mr. MURPHY. I will get exactly what he said.

I have myself confused the papers. I thought I wouldn't have to refer to that again, Admiral.

Well, I can't find it. I will pass on that one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Perhaps you could use counsel's copy.

Mr. MASTEN. Do you want to see this copy?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; I would like to see page 1633, if I may.

Mr. MASTEN. Very well.

Admiral STANLEY. Well, as a matter of fact, this [7595] shows that your search was not being made, and these orders indicate that they were not to be made in peacetime, and they were only to be made in case of initiation of a hostile attack.

General SHORT. Frankly, I do not know how much search the Navy made, as the whole business of search was tied in between the ships and the planes, and it was their responsibility, and I do not know when their task forces—as I say, they have two task forces out at the time. I don't know what instructions their task forces had as to search. I assumed that when their task force went out, if it located Japanese ships, it would report to them.

Admiral STANDLEY. But his search from Oahu itself, which in wartime was to be an all around search, did you know that that was not being carried out?

General SHORT. I didn't know just what the Navy was doing, frankly. I knew they had task forces out and I assumed any searching they did was tied in with the task forces.

Would that indicate to you that General Short knew whether you were conducting reconnaissance or not?

[7596] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that indicates to me the testimony that General Short made at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to page 1638, General Short again testifying:

General McCOY—

At the bottom of the page.

Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General McCOY. I would like to ask a few questions: In view of what happened and looking back on it are you satisfied with the adequateness of the system in operation?

General SHORT. I think the system is all right. I think we made a very serious mistake when we did not go on an alert against an all-out attack. I think our system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of the situation was not.

Do you think you made a mistake in not going on an all-out alert?

Admiral KIMMEL. In view of what happened, yes; of course.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention to page 108, General Short's testimony before the Roberts Board.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is the number?

Mr. MURPHY. 108, Admiral. I am sorry to take you [7597] around the lot but this is a big proposition and it is a big record, Admiral. This is at the top of the page, the first question:

General McNARNEY. As I remember, you stated in your statement that you assumed that the Navy was sending out the proper reconnaissance covering the proper areas. Did you know that they were?

General SHORT. I knew it was their full responsibility, that if they could not do it they would call on me for bombers to assist them. That was in the definite agreement. I didn't think that I had a right to call on them for a daily report of what they were doing. They had task forces out all the time. I don't know just where they went, and I don't know just what they did when they went out. That was a naval problem.

General McNARNEY. Didn't you feel it was part of your responsibility for the security of your command that you should have that information available?

General SHORT. I didn't feel that they had certain information in regards to the location of Japanese boats. I felt sure that if they had anything to indicate any Japanese carriers or anything within a thousand miles or probably closer than the Mandate Islands, which are 2100 miles, they would have told me, and I did not feel [7598] that it was my business to try to tell Admiral Kimmel

how he would conduct his reconnaissance. I think he would have resented it very much.

Would you have resented it if General Short asked what reconnaissance was being conducted in view of the war warning of the 27th of November?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have supplied General Short with all the information I had and all the information of all I was doing very cheerfully and I must point out again that if I had had any information on the location of a Japanese ship within a thousand miles of Pearl Harbor I certainly would have passed that information on to General Short.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to page 114 of the same record, at the top of the page, in the third line.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, there General Short said:

I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian [7599] waters and informing me of the fact.

That, incidentally, is one of General Short's statements by way of summary. Do you think he is justified in making that statement about the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I think he is scarcely justified because he knew that we did not have the means to conduct a reconnaissance over long periods of time and that we had to know within narrow limits when an attack was going to be made in order to have any search that was worthy of the name.

Mr. MURPHY. I now direct your attention to page 130.

Admiral KIMMEL. As far as the task forces that were out, we did conduct reconnaissance in connection with those task forces and we did everything within our power to discover any Japanese ships that might have been within the area. We did not have the means to conduct a reconnaissance which would have been effective and I did not want and I thought it wise not to expend the facilities I had in a partial and an ineffective search.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 130, Admiral, General Short says in the last two lines of the last paragraph:

We figured—

Do you have that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. (reading):

General SHORT. Not if it stopped at 500 miles, no. [7600] Our plan and the plans we had sent in to the War Department called for reconnaissance out to a thousand and fifty miles.

Now, you sent a letter to Admiral Stark, as I remember, in which you stated that you were having regular tests with the Army and that you were having liaison with them. Do you remember that? Let me get it exactly.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know which one you refer to, but I sent many letters to Admiral Stark.

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring now to the one of June 4, 1941, as follows:

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held.

The second page of that group shows under date of June 13:

Memorandum for General Marshall:
Enclosed is the arrangement of Kimmel and General Short with regard to joint air operations. You will recall our talking about it and it looks to me extremely good.

My question is, in view of that letter of yours to Admiral Stark and that being sent to General Marshall and in [*7601*] view of what General Short said about what he meant by liaison with the Navy, don't you think Washington would be justified in thinking liaison with the Navy meant that reconnaissance was being had?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I do not. That liaison with the Navy statement is a very indefinite statement and the message from General Marshall to General Short said, "Report action taken" and if he wanted to know what action was taken I would consider that an entirely inadequate report. Unless General Marshall, when he received that message, thought that the alerting against sabotage was all that was required at that time I would say that then that was an inadequate report.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did hear me read what General Short intended to convey by it, didn't you, a little while ago?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is it?

Mr. MURPHY. You heard my question before? You heard me read what General Short meant to convey by the words "liaison with the Navy"?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, if you will, please, to page 143 of the same record.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. In the middle of the page, Admiral Standley to General Short:

[*7602*] You don't remember having seen or heard of a message that started out, "This is a war warning"?
General SHORT. No, sir, I didn't see it.
Admiral STANDLEY. That message never got to you?
General SHORT. No.
General MCCOY. Didn't it instruct the admiral to inform him?
General SHORT. May I ask the date of that message?
The CHAIRMAN. November 27.
General SHORT. It may have been the same. It may have been the same as my message of the 27th.
The CHAIRMAN. No. It started out, "This is a war warning."
General SHORT. I don't remember seeing it. I think I would remember seeing that.
The CHAIRMAN. I think I asked you whether you thought you had been apprised of that message but you said you did not recall, that you had been in conference with the Navy officers and supposed you had seen it.
General SHORT. Oh, I was in conference for two or three hours. If they got that later in the day——
The CHAIRMAN. You were in conference with them again later than this?
General SHORT. Yes.
[*7603*] The CHAIRMAN. They may or may not have shown it to you, but that is the best you can say on that?
General SHORT. I do not know whether I saw it or not. I am not sure.

Admiral KIMMEL. As a matter of fact, that message, or a very accurate paraphrase of it, was delivered to General Short's headquarters on the evening of November 27, 1941, there is no question of that. I think General Short covered that very completely in his subsequent testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the same board?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I do not know about the same board.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I direct your attention to page 355 and 366 of the Army board in the same volume but over in the next section, 355 and 366.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. At the bottom of the page:

General SHORT. Because of the information I had from the Navy and the Navy strength that was there, I was not exercised at any one time as to the possibility of an immediate attack. I realized that there was a possibility of a considerable part of that navy being moved out at some time and that the danger would become very acute. With that in mind, I made a special effort to bring the antiair equipment up to date and to get enough [*7604*] coast artillery personnel that we would not have to have dual assignments, and to get the aircraft warning service functioning.

Now, my question is, isn't it more likely that there would have been an air attack with the fleet in the harbor than with the fleet out of the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is very difficult to say but I would like to observe at this time that had the attack been made on Hawaii, and if there had not been a ship in the port, they could have done serious damage, and if they had destroyed the oil which was all above ground at that time and which could have been destroyed, it would have forced the withdrawal of the fleet to the coast because there wasn't any oil anywhere else out there to keep the fleet operating.

Mr. MURPHY. There were 4,000,000 gallons, weren't there, not bombproof?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. There were 4,000,000 gallons not bombproof or protected by bombproof covers?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was nothing there that was protected by bombproof covers at this time.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, if they were going to come all the way from Japan, they could, of course, destroy the base, which would have prevented you from operating, or they could [*7605*] have come with the fleet in the base and destroyed the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It is hard to say which they might have done or whether they would have come if the fleet was out.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am saying that if they had destroyed the base and the facilities in the base and destroyed the oil there it might well have been even worse than it was.

Mr. MURPHY. Incidentally, there is a letter from a very distinguished admiral in the Washington Post today on that question. I am just calling that to the attention of the committee. A very distinguished Senator had something to say about it; Admiral Hart talks about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not say that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I saw that, but I am not going into it. If somebody else wants to they can.

At page 361, Admiral, of the Army Board—I might say I am almost through—page 361.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. At the bottom of the page. General Frank to General Short.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

General FRANK. Were you advised that there was a Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between the 25th, [7606] and 30th of November?

General SHORT. No, sir. In fact, as I remember the thing, I was led to believe that there was a task force of Japanese out somewhere to the south of Japan, but not in those Islands. My feeling was that it was more directed toward the Philippines.

General FRANK. You had no knowledge?

General SHORT. At least, I don't remember that I had any. That is my recollection, that my information was that the Japanese ships were either in their home ports or had been sent to the south.

General FRANK. Would you not have been concerned if you had gotten the information that there was a Japanese force——

General SHORT. In the mandated islands? Yes, yes.

General FRANK. There was a piece of information that Navy had that they did not give you?

General SHORT. Yes, that may have happened. Did they have definite information to that effect, or was it rumor?

General FRANK. It was information that is reported in the Roberts report, of which they were sufficiently confident to notify the Navy Department in Washington.

General SHORT. In a report from Kimmel, you mean, [7607] or from the Asiatic Fleet?

General FRANK. From Kimmel to Washington.

General SHORT. To Washington? Well, I don't remember it, if he gave it, and I think I would have remembered it, because I do remember that we talked about the location of the fleet during that period, and as I remember it, it was rumored that the Japanese ships were partly in their home ports, and that what were not there they thought were proceeding to the south.

General FRANK. The basis of your feeling of security then was the belief that the Navy was effectively at its job?

General SHORT. I would rather say, a confidence, than a belief—a confidence that they were working at their job and doing it effectively.

Now, do you remember telling General Short about this expedition and the possibilities of aircraft carriers in the Marshalls?

Admiral KIMMEL. The facts of the matter in regard to that are that the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District on November 26 made a report to OPNAV:

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise AIRRON Twenty Four at least one carrier division unit [7608] plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet

and that went from the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to OPNAV and I had a copy of it.

At the same time the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District in Manila reported on November 26, 1941:

Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in Mandates. Our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area.

Now, in that connection, the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District was in a more advantageous position to intercept Japanese

communications than were the people in Honolulu, and not only the Chief of Naval Operations but I, myself, gave more weight to the opinions given by commandant, Sixteenth, on matters of that kind, and for the reasons I have tried to state here than I gave to that of the commandant, Fourteenth. They made their estimates independently, but the commandant, Sixteenth, had more accurate and more detailed information than was ever available to the commandant, Fourteenth.

[*7609*] On November 24 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, and "information" various other people:

Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addressees is often conflicting because of necessary fragmentary nature. Since COMSIXTEEN intercepts are considered most reliable I suggest other reports carefully evaluated be sent to COMSIXTEEN for action, OPNAV for information. After combining all incoming reports COMSIXTEEN direct dispatches to OPNAV info CINCPAC, based on all information received indicating own evaluation and providing best possible continuity. Request CINCAF issue directive necessary to fulfill general directive.

Now after I had received those two dispatches I thought it was highly improbable that there were any carriers at all in the mandates, and I now believe, after all the returns are in, that there were no carriers in the mandates.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, is it fair to say that at that time there was some dispute between the Intelligence forces at Manila and Intelligence forces at Hawaii as to whether or not there were carriers in the Marshalls and that you did not inform General Short about that situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have informed General Short if I had believed there were any carriers in the Marshalls. [*7610*] I did not believe it, and I did not inform him.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, in order that the record on the first telegram the admiral referred to may be complete, would it not be well to have the reporter spread it on the record in full at this point?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I read only a part. It is a long message, but I have read all the parts that I believe to be pertinent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The reporter will spread the whole message on the record at this point.

(The first two messages referred to are as follows:)

From: Com 14
Date: 26 November 1941
Decoded by A. V. Pering

For Action: OPNAV
Information: CINCPAC
CINCAF
COM 16

26Ø11Ø
COPEK

For past month Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a task force which comprises following units: Second Fleet, Third Fleet including First and Second Base Forces and First Defense Division, Combined Air Force, Desron Three, Airron Seven, Subron Five, and possibly units of Batdiv Three from First Fleet.

In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and [*7611*] French Indochina Force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama, Bako, and Takao.

Third Base Force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive communications wth Second Fleet Commander.

Combined Air Force has assembled in Takao with indications that some components have moved on to Hainan.

Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako.

Second Base Force appears transporting equipment of Air Forces to Taiwan.
Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentied Second Fleet unit and submarine division or squadron.
Crudiv Seven and Desron Three appear as an advance unit and may be enroute South China.
There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airron Twenty-four at least one carrier division unit plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet.
Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

TOP SECRET

November 26, 1941
From: Comsixteen
To: CinCPac, Opnav, Comfourteen, Cincaf

[*7611–A*] Morning comment comfourteen two one ten of twentysixth X Traffic analysis past few days indicate Cinc Second directing units of First Second Third Fleets and subforce in a loose knit task force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections X For purposes of clarify units expected to operate in South China area will be referred to as First Section and units expected to operate in Mandates will be referred to as Second Section X Estimated units in First Section and Crudiv Seven X Airron Six Defense Division One X Desron Three and Subron Six XX Second Section Crudiv Five X Cardiv Three Ryujo and One Maru X Desrons Two and Four X Subron Five X Desdiv Twentythree X First Base Force of Third Fleet Third Base Force at Palao X Fifth Base Force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX Crudix Six and Batdiv Three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX Balance Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including Desron Five will take station in Formosa Straits or further south X There are slight indications today that Desron Three Crudiv Seven and Subron Six are in Takao area X Combined airfroce units from empire are at Pakhoi Hoihow Saigon Takao and other bases on Taiwan and China coast X Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in Mandates X Our best indications [*7611–B*] are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kura area X Our lists indicate Cinc combined in Nagato X Cinc First in Hyuga and Cinc Second in Atago in Kure area X Cinc Third in Ashigara in Sasebo area X Cinc Fifth in Chichijima area X Comdr Subforce in Kashima in Yokosuka area but this considered unreliable XX South China Fleet appears to have been strengthened by units from Central or North China probably torpedo boats XX [*7612*] Southern Expeditionary Fleet apparently being reinforced by one base force unit XX Directives to the above task forces if such are directed to individual units and not to complete groups X Special calls usually precede formation of task force used in area operations X Cinc Second X Third and Cinc Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles X Traffic from Navminister and CNGS to Cincs of fleet appear normal X Evaluation is considered reliable.

Mr. MURPHY. Just a few words about your previous testimony. I direct your attention to page 630, that is the typewritten 630, of the Roberts Board. As I understand it, the Chairman asked you this question:

In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the Army knew that it was not going to get any warning from your distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I lost you again.
Mr. MURPHY. At the top of the page, the first question.
Admiral KIMMEL. "The Chairman", you mean?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the Army knew that it

was not going to get [7613] any warning from your distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

You meant by "no, sir" that they should have known they were not going to get any warning, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, as I now reconstruct that testimony——

Mr. MURPHY. After 4 years or 5 years——

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute.

[7614] Mr. MURPHY. I might, to clarify your thinking, Admiral, say the way this has been set up, they have one sheet, then they have a correction sheet, and then after showing all of this for 200 pages, they have another statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to say something in connection with this at the present time, and it may serve to clarify the situation a little bit. After I had given my testimony before the Roberts Commission, I waited for an opportunity to revise and correct my testimony, and after 3 or 4 days, I asked that I be given an opportunity to correct my testimony.

I was finally given permission to come to the Royal Hawaiian Hotel alone, to correct my testimony. When I got there, and the testimony was submitted to me, I found it inaccurate in many respects. The recording of it, I mean. I spent all that afternoon and the next day I came back, and I brought a yeoman with me, and Admiral Thiebold, and we worked for some time attempting to reconstruct this testimony.

It was very badly recorded, and I do not know whether this testimony is the result of some of the poor recording or whether it is after I had attempted to correct it and bring it into some kind of order.

[7615] Mr. MURPHY. I might say for the benefit of the committee that both statements are in this exhibit here, your corrected statement and the other statement. Just how much they differ, I am not going to take the time to check, several hundred pages.

Admiral KIMMEL. They did differ to a considerable degree. I had submitted, amongst other things, a 16-page statement which I read, and when my testimony was first submitted to me, that had been entirely omitted from what purported to be my recorded testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. What I meant by what I said, Admiral, is I do not think I should be expected to go through that. I assume that there are a number of corrections, because you said so, and I certainly take your word on the matter.

The record shows that you did submit this several hundred pages after the hearing was concluded, and requested that it be submitted, but that the Board took both instead of taking what you claimed was the correct one.

Admiral KIMMEL. They refused to change the testimony as recorded, although I knew and told them it was in error, and they attached my statement to their report. At least I was so informed.

Mr. MURPHY. They took the position, did they not, that they should have it both ways, the way it was reported [7616] by the recorder, and the way you claimed it should be?

Admiral KIMMEL. Although they knew full well as recorded by the recorder, it was inaccurate and incomplete.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to page 636. That is the typewritten page.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I have 636. Is this corrected or uncorrected?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure whether this has been corrected or not, but let me ask you this [reading]:

The CHAIRMAN. If you had known that no radar was working on December 5, 6, or 7——

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait a minute. Let me find where it is.

Mr. MURPHY. The third or fourth question down.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

The CHAIRMAN. If you had known that no radar was working on December 5, 6, or 7, would you have altered your distant patrols in any way?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I doubt it.

Would that be a correct answer to that kind of question?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the way I would answer that question now is that I was doing all I could with the patrols at that time, in the light of the information I [*7617*] had. The reason I probably said "I doubt it," was because I could not.

Mr. MURPHY. The next question is:

The CHAIRMAN. Then if no radar was working on that morning, there was no method of warning of a raid on these islands; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct. If I had known that no radar was working, it would have been a factor to consider, but what I would have done under those conditions, I do not like to state.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought it was working?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the short of it. I thought it was in working condition.

Now, Admiral, I direct your attention to your letter of December 12, 1941. Do you have that before you, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In your letter you say in the first paragraph:

Briefly, we had considered an air raid on Hawaii as a very remote possibility——

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that please?

Mr. MURPHY. In the first paragraph.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it now.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

Briefly we had considered an air raid on [*7618*] Hawaii as a very remote possibility, particularly at the time that it occurred. There were ten BP in the air that morning. They, of course, could not adequately cover 360 degrees of arc, and their primary effort was directed against the submarine menace that everyone fully recognized.

In our endeavor to avoid wearing out both personnel and planes, we had made periodic sweeps to the northward and westward, but none were made on the morning in question.

That was exactly the position you had on December 12, 5 days after Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not understand.

Mr. MURPHY. I say that is exactly the same position you had on the 12th of December, 1941, and the same position you take before this committee?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, in the next paragraph you say:

Full precautions were taken by all ships at sea.

Did you mean to include there the ships in the harbor? I do not believe you did, but did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the words "full precautions were taken by all ships at sea," explain themselves, and I am happy to state no casualties were incurred by any of [7619] them.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is all ships in the harbor were on alert 3, which did not provide for the antiaircraft guns being fully manned; isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That has been exhaustively gone into here, and I would like to repeat once more that from one-quarter to one-half of the guns opened fire immediately, and the remainder of the guns were firing on all ships depending upon the different ships. Some of them got all guns in action in 4 minutes, and others took as much as 7 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY. But you did say, Admiral, did you not, in the second to the last paragraph, at the bottom of the page, "The ships in the harbor opened fire very promptly, but the first attack wave was practically unopposed"?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did state that. I was in error. That was a very few days after the attack, and I had gotten very few reports by that time.

Even if I did not indicate it, anybody would know that in such a short time as that, I was unable to get all the facts straight.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it not a fact, Admiral, that if the men were at the antiaircraft guns before the wave of planes came over, if they were alerted, that the damage [7620] would have been less by the damage that these additional guns could have done in about 3 or 4 minutes?

You state also in the paragraph before that,

> The Army antiaircraft guns were not manned.

Was that a correct statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had found that out by that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, I ask that this——

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). Where is that?

Mr. MURPHY. That is the third to the last paragraph, Admiral, on the bottom of the first page.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of the first page?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. You said, "The Army antiaircraft guns were not manned."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that was the information that I had at the time. You must realize my information on all this situation, when I wrote this letter, was very sketchy.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find, Admiral, that General Short agreed with you, that there were skeleton crews there for sabotage purposes, but not to man the guns strictly as such.

Admiral KIMMEL. This, you must understand, excluded all of the information I had gained after the time I wrote the letter.

Mr. MURPHY. I am agreeing with you, Admiral.

[7621] Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, there is a paper that has been presented to the committee which shows the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor; Singapore; Khota Baru; Davao Gulf, Philippine Islands; Guam; Hongkong; Wake; Clark Field, Philippine Islands; Midway,

and Nichols Field, Manila, all occurring between the time of the attack on Hawaii, and the 8th of December, Washington time.

I think that should be spread on the record, and I ask that it be done at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be done, without objection.

(The table referred to is as follows:)

[7622] *Time of Jap attacks in the Pacific 7 and 8 December 1941*

Place	Local Time	Greenwich Time	Washington Time
Pearl Harbor	7:55 am—7th	6:25 pm—7th	1:25 pm—7th.
Singapore	3:00 am—8th	8:00 pm—7th	3:00 pm—7th.
Khota Baru	3:40 pm—8th	8:40 pm—7th	3:40 pm—7th.
Davao Gulf, P. I.	7:10 am—8th	11:10 pm—7th	6:10 pm—7th.
Guam	9:10 am—8th	11:10 pm—7th	6:10 pm—7th.
Hong Kong	8:00 am—8th	Midnight—7-8th	7:00 pm—7th.
Wake	12:00 noon—8th	1:00 am—8th	8:00 pm—7th.
Clark Field, P. I.	9:27 am—8th	1:27 am—8th	8:27 pm—7th.
Midway	9:30 pm—7th	9:30 am—8th	4:30 am—8th.
Nichols Field (Manila)	3:00 am—9th	7:00 pm—8th	2:00 pm—8th.

Notes: (1) The above times are compiled from existing records. Minor inaccuracies are possible. (2) There were other attacks on Army and foreign installations of which the Navy has no records.

[7623] Mr. KEEFE. As I recall this exhibit, it lists a statement from the Navy in an attempt to fix in columns the various times when these attacks took place Washington time and Greenwich time, and it lists the attack on Pearl Harbor as taking place 7:55 a. m. Am I correct in that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is Hawaiian time, not Greenwich time.

Mr. KEEFE. That is Hawaiian time. Now I want to call attention to the fact that in the official Navy report published sometime after Pearl Harbor, about a year or so, they fix the time at 7:55, but further state that an attack had taken place at Kaneohe some minutes prior to 7:55.

I want to call attention to it now because there is a dispute in this record as to the exact time when the first flight of planes attacked, and you will find it in the official Navy report.

So that this record will not be considered to be entirely conclusive upon that subject, and I, as one member of the committee, cannot accept it as conclusive, as to showing the exact time, because of the fact that the official naval report contains the language which I have indicated.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Keefe, so the record will be clear, what is the date of the report that you are speaking of?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I have it in my file. I cannot give [7624] the exact date, but I will bring it in here next week.

Mr. MURPHY. I really think we ought to have that, in order to make it clear.

Mr. KEEFE. It was published in full in the New York Times, and that is what I have a copy of, the New York Times.

Mr. MURPHY. May I inquire which is the official Navy report?

Mr. KEEFE. This is a report that was published by the Navy about a year, I would say, after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. I think we ought to get a copy of that, if that is the official one. I have been looking for it for some time. I would like to see it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I ask Congressman Keefe to hand us his copy and then we will contact the Navy and get the official copies for distribution.

Mr. KEEFE. I will bring that here Monday, Mr. Counsel. I have it. I had it here before and I raised questions about it at the time when the Navy man was on the stand, Admiral Inglis.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If Mr. Murphy will allow the Chair to inquire as to the document which has been spread upon the record that was furnished by the counsel, that is a document [*7625*] from the Navy Department, is that correct?

Mr. MASTEN. I understand, Mr. Cooper, that that was furnished us by Commander Baecher from the Navy. I, myself, had not seen it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was distributed to the members of the committee here. I recall seeing it, and I have a copy of it.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt at this point——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, I will be glad to.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection with this matter of time, I think it may be a matter of considerable importance and significance as to the timing of the attack on the Philippines. There have been suggestions from highly responsible sources that the times here given may be somewhat inaccurate. So I would appreciate having whatever official report they are based on made available in this examination.

Possibly it may be desirable subsequently to have testimony of some of those who were participants in the situation at the Philippines.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, we will report later on the more accurate information as to those times.[1]

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Counsel has heard the observations [*7626*] made by the various members of the committee, and I am sure he will do all he can to meet those suggestions.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not have available a copy of the original Honolulu Advertiser of Sunday, November 30, 1941. I do have what appears to be a correct duplicate of it from the Christian Science Monitor of Thursday, September 28, 1944, and I ask that this photostat appear in the record, to show what was before the people of Honolulu and I assume before the commanding general of the Army and commander in chief of the fleet on that morning 1 week before Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received in the record.

(The illustration referred to faces this page.)

[*7628*] Mr. MURPHY. I would like to read into the record from a letter of December 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark the following:

I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive.

[1] See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5314–5315.

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend!

The Honolulu Sunday Advertiser
Hawaii's Leading Newspaper
FINAL EDITION
66TH YEAR. NO. 19,759 — 62 PAGES — HONOLULU, HAWAII, U. S. A., SUNDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 30, 1941. PRICE, TEN CENTS

KURUSU BLUNTLY WARNED NATION READY FOR BATTLE

Mexican Top Office

Honolulu Paper Was Alert Early

Headlines in the Honolulu Sunday Advertiser of Nov. 30, 1941, published a week before the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor, show anticipation of surprise action by the Japanese. The two-column story leading the front page at the right told of President Roosevelt conferring by telephone with his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, on the situation, with the announcement that the President might cut shorter his Warm Springs, Ga., visit to return to Washington.

Another top story, at left, recorded a widely held belief that the Japanese might attack at any moment, as conditions daily worsened in the Far East.

Leaders Call Troops Back In Singapore

Hope Wanes As Nations Fail at Parleys; Nightly Blackouts Held in Pl; Hawaii Troops 'Alerted'

Will Santa Fit The Plane?



TAKES MEASUREMENTS—Lt. E. L. Allen, of the 50th Observation Squadron, Hawaiian Air Force, has a tape measure handy as Santa Claus (small fry into observer's seat of his O-47 observation plane which he will fly over the city this morning, landing on the polo field at Kapiolani park at 11. When he was told that Santa could come down the chimneys of his fireplaces in The Advertiser lobby he doubted the dimensions and said a small 30-5 fight squadron had be could make it. (Advertiser photo).

Hey Kids, Santa Claus Will Land Here Today!

Genial St. Nicholas To Arrive by Airplane

Nazis Clamp Curfew Over Montmarte

Terroristic Bombings Bring Rigid Shutdown On Once Gay District Of Parisian Cabarets

Foreign Affairs Expert Attacks Tokio Madness

WARM SPRINGS, Ga., Nov. 29. (UP)—President Roosevelt talked to Secretary of State Cordell Hull by telephone tonight, Secretary Stephen Early said, and added that the President may cut short his visit here and leave for Washington Sunday.

It was understood that the President has received several reports on the Pacific situation since his departure from Washington yesterday.

NEW YORK, Nov. 29. (UP)—Tyler Dennett, former adviser to the state department, said tonight that the United States and Japan always have been and always will be natural allies, but Japan's "political madness" now has reached a point "where we are ready to meet the Japanese challenge to fight it out."

In a speech before the foreign policy association, Dennett called the United States policy of withdrawing from the Far East precluding granting of Philippine independence.

"Under the most improvident of Japan would accomplish by force what would almost certainly come to pass by the operating of economic forces," he said.

British Reveal Naval Help To Reds In Arctic

Sinking of Eight Nazi Ships by Pair of Subs First Action Reported

Humuula Taken Over By Army

I also wish to read from page 7 of the letter of December 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark.

Mr. MASTEN. Is that part of Exhibit 106?

Mr. MURPHY. Part of the general group of letters contained in that exhibit.

Now I would like to refer to a part of your statement, Admiral, in which you refer to a letter to Admiral Stark asking for more detailed information as to the international situation. Did not you say in your letter that you did not expect any categorical instructions from Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made certain observations along that line. I think the best thing to do is to read it.

Mr. MURPHY. It is in your statement at page 79.

Admiral KIMMEL. This letter was, incidentally, on the 26th of May 1941.

The commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of [*7629*] Government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained fleet must be carefully balanced against [*7630*] the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it may be a cardinal principle that the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

Mr. MURPHY. You did say you did not want any categorical instructions? You did say that, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not say I did not want any categorical instructions. I gave the reasons why I thought that problems could best be solved by giving me the information rather than giving me categorical instructions. One or the other was certainly necessary.

Now in that connection, I was at times given categorical instructions, and you will find one, for instance, in the dispatch of November 26, 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. What was that, Admiral?

[*7631*] Admiral KIMMEL. It is dated 270038.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read the categorical instruction?

Admiral KIMMEL. Page 55 of exhibit 112, and in that dispatch, suggesting that we send reinforcement to the islands, this passage occurs—I will read the whole thing.

In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats. Essential spare parts, tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, had you not already said that to the Chief of Naval Operations—that because of the difficulties there, you could not possibly get up in there? Did you not say that in your correspondence—that it would be difficult to get boats up in there, that there was danger of submarines, and difficulty in getting close enough to do [7632] anything but they would have to fly out to the ship. Had you not told Admiral Stark that previously? Is not that repeating what you had told him?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall whether I specifically told Admiral Stark, but it was certainly information which he could have had and which I probably did give him. But then these are categorical instructions about things that certainly could have been worked out in Honolulu and Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you did not think that was a wise procedure, did you? Why did not they let you work that out?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had no objection to it. I had no criticism of it. I do not mean to make a criticism of it, I merely am trying to show you that I did receive categorical instructions.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I refer to your letter of September 12, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. I find in your second paragraph, Admiral, about the middle of it——

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is this?

Mr. MURPHY. In your second paragraph on page 1, about the middle of it.

the question arises as to just how much we can [7633] discount the threat of Japanese action.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will have to find it. I have lost you.

Mr. MURPHY. About the eighth line down the second paragraph.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right in the middle of a sentence.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action.

Now at the end of paragraph (a), the last sentence——

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait just a moment, please.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you want me to read the whole letter?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think in order to make sense you had better.

Mr. MURPHY. I tried to tie it up with what you have down below. I will read the whole letter.

Dear Betty—

Admiral KIMMEL. I mean at least start reading with the beginning of the paragraph.

Mr. MURPHY. I will read the whole letter, Admiral, and then there will not be any question about it.

DEAR "BETTY",

We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?

I noted that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for surface raiders east of 100 degrees west, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are concerned but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course, I know that the possibility of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of United States-Japanese rapprochement and the absence of and specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions that arise are:

(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against German and Italian raiders?

Now it is this next sentence that I want to ask you about.

[*7635*] Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. It is this next sentence that I want to stress:

In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I feel that you are the only one who can answer this question.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now my question is: If you felt he was the only one who could answer the question, why did you not feel that way when he said "This is a war warning"?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have told you several times that I thought I knew what the war warning meant. I would not have hesitated to ask for clarification if there had been any doubt in my mind at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. You also say, Admiral, on page 2, in the third sentence:

I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet.

Did you thereby mean to say that the fleet, where it was, was a deterrent to Japanese action?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you ought to read this whole letter. You cannot take out one little passage from a letter and ask questions on it; it has got to be taken as a whole [*7636*] and not separated from its context.

Mr. MURPHY. Apart from the letter, Admiral, did you think the presence of the fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent to Japanese action?

Admiral KIMMEL. I felt that the strength of the fleet in the Pacific was what primarily affected the Japanese. Its location in Hawaii, in the opinion of the best minds in Washington, was that the fleet at

Hawaii was a deterrent to Japanese actions. I felt that they were perhaps better able to judge that than I was.

Mr. MURPHY. I am directing that inquiry to you, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you feel that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent to Japanese action?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I will put it this way: The strength of the fleet in the Pacific was what governed Japan. After the fleet had been in Hawaii for over a year it might well have been interpreted as a sign of weakness if they had brought it back to the coast. That, however, I very much doubt.

Mr. MURPHY. You did say, Admiral, on the third page of that letter, did you not, at the end of the paragraph:

> Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific?

[*7637*] Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that?

Mr. MURPHY. The last sentence in the first paragraph on the third page:

> Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific—and the Pacific is still very much a part of the world situation.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it is difficult for me at this time to interpret every word I wrote more than 4 years ago, but I will give you my interpretation now for what it is worth, and my interpretation is that when I said "here" I meant the Pacific.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me ask you this question, Admiral: In view of the success of the strategy that was adopted by those in Washington and those in command of our Army and Navy by sending ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and using them as we did use them, in view of the success we had, do you think now that it was a wise policy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I feel that after December 7 a very considerable number of ships suitable for the early stages of the Pacific campaign, which were carriers, fast cruisers, destroyers, and fast battleships, were sent to the Pacific, and that added to the forces that they had out there—I haven't the figures, but I am quite certain that a considerable number was sent from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

[*7638*] Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the strategy that was used by those in command did result in victory, did it not, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; there is no question about that.

Mr. MURPHY. In that connection, and as my parting final question, I would like to refer to your letter of January 28, 1942.

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). The disposition of ships prior to December 7, particularly those in the Pacific, was changed considerably after December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to refer now, Admiral, to the last paragraph of your letter of January 28, 1942.

Admiral KIMMEL. January 28, 1942?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, Admiral, the third paragraph. I think if I read it to you it will be all right, Admiral. In that paragraph you say this:

> I desire my request for retirement to stand subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service.

So that after forty years and eight months of honorable service you held yourself out during the war to contribute to the war effort in any way you possibly could, isn't that right? You proffered your services to those in authority?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the letter speaks for itself. [*7639*] I do not want to comment on that.

Mr. MURPHY. You do not want to go further on that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have nothing to add on to that except what is already in the record.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, I have no further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster, of Maine, will inquire, Admiral.

Senator BREWSTER. I want to comment first that the exacting character of your examination——

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot hear you, sir. I am sorry.

Senator BREWSTER. I will get a little closer to this thing. I do not know that I can get accustomed to it.

I appreciate, as you do, that perhaps necessarily over the past few days, this entire week now, there has been much that is repetitious in the very extended examination. I do not want to single out any of my colleagues by undue mention, but I do want to say Mr. Cooper, who is perhaps of the most belligerent variety, has questioned you in his customary style. But you do not want to interpret it as personal to you, as he went after other witnesses in the same way.

When I went before him as a witness one time in the House, he offered to throw me out of the room. I say that so you will understand in questioning we are seeking the truth.

[*7640*] Admiral KIMMEL. I can appreciate the belligerency. I may have indulged in that sometimes myself. I do not object to it.

Senator BREWSTER. Now if I repeat some of the questions that have been gone over before, or that may seem to have been covered, I apologize. I will try to be as brief as I can.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to give you as full information as possible.

Senator BREWSTER. Have you testified so far, Admiral, as to your whereabouts on Saturday evening, December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. As to where I was when?

Senator BREWSTER. On Saturday evening, December 6. That is the question we asked of Admiral Stark and General Marshall, and they have been able to tell us, so I want to ask you.

Senator FERGUSON. What year?

Senator BREWSTER. That is in 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will tell you. In the forenoon of December 6 I was in my office and I discussed the situation during most of the forenoon with Admiral Pye and, as I recall it, I had my Fleet Intelligence officer come in and give us a survey.

In the afternoon I spent most of the afternoon talking to Captain Morris, Captain Delaney, and Captain Smith, all in my staff, and then I went home to my quarters.

[*7641*] I went to a dinner at the Halekulani Hotel in Honolulu. I was the guest of Admiral and Mrs. Leary. There was a party of about a dozen people there.

I left about 9:30 and went to my quarters. The Halekulani Hotel is about 20 to 25 minutes by motor from my headquarters. I spent

the rest of the night in my bunk, until I was called in the morning to get this report about the submarine, and then the airplane attack a few minutes later.

Senator BREWSTER. And you were accessible all that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; my staff knew where I was. My staff duty officer knew where I was and, so far as I know, I missed nothing that came in.

Senator BREWSTER. The Halekulani Hotel is immediately adjacent to the coast defense batteries, isn't it, in that vicinity?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I believe there is an Army coast-defense battery there; yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Now we will go a little into the matter of the submarines that appeared off Pearl Harbor, and also to those that entered the harbor, the one that entered the harbor and was sunk.

There has been previous testimony about a map recovered from the submarine sunk at Bellows Point.

[*7642*] Admiral KIMMEL. Adjacent to Bellows Field.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; Bellows Field. It purported to show the route of a Japanese submarine around Pearl Harbor during the early morning hours, between 4 and half-past 5 in the morning. Has that come to your attention at any time?

[*7643*] Admiral KIMMEL. I remember something about it. I don't know whether I ever saw the papers on it or not. But the best opinion that I have been able to get on the subject is that this Jap commander had laid down his courses and speeds and times he expected to pass various places in the harbor, and that he had this list of ships and where they were berthed all plotted in there when he went down to go into the harbor; that he made a miscue somewhere and instead of getting into the harbor he ran aground on the north coast. That is what I believed then; that is what I still believe.

I do not believe that any Japanese submarine would have entered Pearl Harbor except to shoot.

There was no reason. It didn't make sense. They could see from the hills, so why risk a submarine going in there.

And besides, if a submarine had stuck up a periscope in Pearl Harbor, in the narrow waters there, where boats were running constantly, where the look-outs were scanning every inch of the place, that submarine would have been discovered at once, just as the one was that did enter, and the minute its stuck up a periscope, the people began to shoot at it.

It doesn't make sense to me that they would go in and [*7644*] without examining any evidence, I would strongly discount anything except the most positive evidence that the Japanese were stupid enough to send a submarine in there merely for purposes of observing.

Senator BREWSTER. One of the entries alleged to be on this map, the original of which I understand we will have available, was interpreted as saying in Japanese, "I saw it with my own eyes."

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Senator BREWSTER. "I saw it with my own eyes." That was one of the entries on the map. As though the officer had apparently made it in the enthusiasm of his success.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I have talked to some of these Japanese scholars, and I think there is considerable difference of opinion as to

the exact translation of those Japanese notations. I don't know whether he entered or not, but it doesn't make sense to me. I don't believe he did.

Senator BREWSTER. What about the condition of light at 10 minutes of 5 in the morning? What was the time of dawn then?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I have forgotten just exactly what time dawn was. Sunrise was at 6:27, and dawn must have been, oh, a half an hour before that, maybe.

[*7645*] Senator BREWSTER. Would a submarine periscope before 5 o'clock in the morning have been readily visible?

Admiral KIMMEL. I doubt it very much; I doubt it.

Senator BREWSTER. That might lend some credence to the possibility that he might have been in there and not have been discovered.

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't think he could have seen much himself.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I take it a battleship against the skyline would be somewhat more visible than a periscope.

Admiral KIMMEL. You are quite right about that. My conclusion is based on the fact that he would gain nothing by it.

You must remember that these Japs could go up in the hills and look down in the daytime and see everything.

Senator BREWSTER. In what was termed an official account of the incident prior to Pearl Harbor, compiled under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the book which I have here, it was intimated that one of the grounds for saying there might have been a report by this submarine commander was that, as I recall, a ship, which he identified mistakenly as a carrier, and which was, I believe, the Utah, received a great deal of attention from [*7646*] the Japanese. These two naval officers who wrote this book indicated that that might indicate that the Japanese thought they were attacking a carrier. Did that theory ever come to your attention?

Admiral KIMMEL. I heard something of that kind.

Senator BREWSTER. Are you familiar with this [indicating] book?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am not familiar with it. I have read it hastily, and the comments I have heard do not give it a very high mark for accuracy.

Senator BREWSTER. What was the situation as to the submarine net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the first place there was no submarine net in the entrance to Pearl Harbor. There was a torpedo net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. That is different. And the torpedo was to prevent any submarines or other craft from coming up off the entrance and flying a torpedo which would have run up into the area where the ships were berthed. The net was being operated, and the orders for the net were issued, and under the control of the commandant of the district.

My understanding was it was being operated.

Now the details of what happened there on that morning are not known to me personally, and I never investigated [*7647*] it thoroughly, because I never had time.

Senator BREWSTER. It is my understanding that the evidence shows that the net was open from approximately 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock that morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I believe that is true, but I am talking about what I know now.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. From my own investigations.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I hesitate to give evidence based on something I read, and that is somebody else's evidence.

Senator BREWSTER. If that were correct, would that be, so far as you know, unusual?

Admiral KIMMEL. I wouldn't know why it had been kept open for that length of time, and in view of my order to exercise vigilance against submarines which I issued on the 28th, I think it was—I was surprised when I saw that testimony.

Senator BREWSTER. Were the torpedo nets such as would have detected the entrance of a submarine of the character the Japanese used, the one that entered the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

Senator BREWSTER. It wouldn't have been able to go [*7648*] under the net?

Admiral KIMMEL. That I am not positive of. I would judge it probably couldn't. At one time somebody had reported to me that it was deep enough in one spot for the submarine to have gotten under the net. On further investigation I think that is very doubtful.

Senator BREWSTER. Was it unusual that you did not have a submarine net there?

Admiral KIMMEL. We didn't have a submarine net, because all the submarines of which we knew were so large that if they entered that channel, the periscope would show; they couldn't go down far enough without having their periscope showing. And these were a surprise type, and I described them in very sketchy terms here the other day. They were very small and were able to submerge in the channel, and in the waters of Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you permit an interruption?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that what has been described to this hearing as the midget submarine?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, the midget submarine.

Senator BREWSTER. That was a new development in naval warfare?

[*7649*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and a very ineffective one, in my opinion.

Senator BREWSTER. Had other countries been using it prior to that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know of any in recent years. I believe way back before the Civil War they had a one-man or a two-man submarine, something of that kind, but it was a thing that we did not expect, and as far as I was concerned, and I believe that is true of everybody else, we didn't know that any such thing as that existed.

Senator BREWSTER. There was the message of December 6, 1941, authorizing the destruction of confidential papers.

Have you testified as to when that was received? Regarding the outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will look at it. I couldn't tell you when that was received, but to the best of my recollection I never saw it until

after the attack. It is an even bet as to whether I saw it before or after the attack.

I think I didn't get it until after the attack.

Senator BREWSTER. That was my understanding, but I thought it should appear in the record as to whether it was delivered in Hawaii before December 7.

Do you know what the record shows on that?

[*7650*] Admiral KIMMEL. I have no record upon which I can definitely state that. I can only state my recollection.

Senator BREWSTER. I inquire on that because the Roberts report, on page 8 of the Senate document, that is referred to as one of the items that might be considered in creating concern in your mind; I thought it ought to be established definitely as to whether it was a matter that had come to your attention prior to that time.

Admiral KIMMEL. Incidentally, I might point out, in the Roberts report, they added, you notice, the wording here, it says "In view of the international situation."

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Roberts report reads, "In view of the tense situation."

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. There is a little added impetus given in the Roberts report over what the dispatch itself shows.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. At any rate, if I did receive this before the attack, it was no more than I would have expected under the circumstances.

You may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of emergency.

And that was not particularly alarming.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know whether or not that message was sent deferred so that it didn't have priority?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that it was.

Senator BREWSTER. That is my understanding.

Admiral KIMMEL. Those things are eliminated from here, and you should have it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that message was sent deferred. You are right. I had forgotten that.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Now, what is the significance of a message being sent deferred, both as to its expedition, and as to its significance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, a deferred message comes after they have cleaned up all the messages of priority. It is routine. My understanding of "deferred" is that it goes out after every other message has been cleared.

Senator BREWSTER. Would that have any significance as to its importance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

Senator BREWSTER. That it was of lesser importance?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was of lesser importance, the [*7652*] deferred message.

Senator BREWSTER. In your letter of October 14, 1941, concerning the Pacific Fleet confidential letter, on page 4, you stated:

> The battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singlely insofar as avaliable berths permit.

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that now? What page, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Page 4 of your letter.

Lieutenant HANIFY. Which paragraph?

Senator BREWSTER. I haven't that before me. It is referring to the mooring of the battleships singly.

The testimony before the Robert committee; have you that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, sir; I have it now.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, do I understand that it was not possible to have them moored singly at this time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I presume that is correct. Otherwise, they would have carried out this order. I can't tell you now what the considerations were, but I presume it was because available berths did not permit the single berthing, they had to double them up.

Senator BREWSTER. There had been no alteration in your orders, so far as that was concerned?

[*7653*] Admiral KIMMEL. This order was in effect on the day of the attack.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, in the Hewitt narrative, you are quoted as stating that you told Admiral Stark and the President of the dangers to the fleet blocking the harbor and so forth.

You are quoted on page 367 of the Navy testimony to the following effect:

> The only real answer to an air attack was not to have the fleet in port when an attack came, that it took two to four hours to sortie, and once an attack was started, it would be completed before they could change the disposition of the fleet. In general he said he felt that the fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor, but he made no protest and made no recommendations for withdrawal for any of the battleships or carriers.

Is that a fair summary, in the Hewitt report of your statement to the President?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did make that statement to the President, that the only real answer to an air attack, so far as the fleet was concerned, was not to be in Pearl Harbor when the air attack came, but there were other considerations, and I still think that the best answer is not to have the fleet in Pearl Harbor when an air attack comes there.

[*7654*] Senator BREWSTER. Now, the further statement:

> In general, he said he felt the fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor—

I take it that would, apparently, apply as a general policy.

> the fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor, but made no protest and made no recommendations for withdrawal of any of the battleships or cruisers.

Did you go that far with the President?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am just trying to think. Where does this come from?

Senator BREWSTER. Take your time.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to know where it comes from.

Senator BREWSTER. That is the Hewitt narrative and it is on page 367 of what is called the Navy testimony. It is cited here in this compilation. Apparently, this is the Hewitt summary of what you were supposed to have said.

Did you testify before the Hewitt and Hart inquiries?

Admiral KIMMEL. I testified before the Hewitt inquiry? I testified neither before the Hewitt nor the Hart inquiry. When the Hewitt inquiry was started, as I have said before, I tried to be made an interested party, and have the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Now, he didn't get that from anything before the Hewitt [7655] inquiry. He must have taken that—that is his conclusion from other testimony that I gave, and it must have been either before the Roberts Commission, or the Navy Court of Inquiry.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, he apparently attributes it to page 367 of the Navy testimony.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is where it is then, I presume. If you want to find out what I said, I think it is much better to go to page 367 of the Navy testimony than to take conclusions that Admiral Hewitt drew.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, the point which I am making is that the Admiral Hewitt report is one of the factors in these proceedings, and whether or not it is a fair presentation of your viewpoint or your testimony, I thought might be a matter that would invite your comment.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I am glad to comment.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Admiral KIMMEL. In general, my recollection is that I told the President that the only answer to an attack on the fleet in Pearl Harbor was not to have the fleet in there. I was pointing out to him the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor as a base, not only in regard to the fleet but with regard to the whole situation out there. I went into it fairly thoroughly. I did not recommend that he [7656] withdraw any ships from Pearl Harbor, and I accepted the hazard and I tried at that time, when I accepted that hazard, to impress upon everybody the extreme necessity under those conditions to keep me fully and completely informed.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to keep the record straight. There is no 367 in the Hewitt narrative given to us.

Senator FERGUSON. It is page 367 of Admiral Kimmel's previous testimony. It is this testimony that has been handed to us.

Mr. MURPHY. I just wanted to show that.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a boiled-down version of what he said.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate it is not at page 367 of the Navy narrative.

Senator FERGUSON. That is true. It was given in the Navy testimony.

Senator BREWSTER. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for the correction. We certainly want to keep the record as straight as we can.

Admiral KIMMEL. Did I answer your question?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, except this: What comment did [7657] the President make on it at the time of your presentation? I don't think you have testified about that.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think he generally agreed with me about it. I had no disagreement on that subject.

Senator BREWSTER. Did he give you the reasons why he felt it nevertheless should stay there, in spite of a certain lack of security?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't ask him his reasons, and he volunteered none.

Senator BREWSTER. You have stated that keeping the fleet in Pearl Harbor was in no way a condition of your taking command?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true. I never had any conditions imposed upon me before I took command, and the only conditions I had afterward were the orders I received, all of which have been placed in evidence here. Most of which, I should say.

Senator BREWSTER. What did you understand as to why Admiral Richardson was relieved of his command?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never knew and Admiral Richardson——

Senator BREWSTER. I didn't ask you that. I asked you what you understood?

Admiral KIMMEL. I know. I wanted to preface my remarks with that.

[*7658*] Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never knew, but I did know that Admiral Richardson had come to Washington, and he had had an interview with the President and that he had disagreed with the President, and he came back to Pearl Harbor.

I believed at the time that, or just before I received my notification that I was to be made commander in chief, that Admiral Richardson was going to stay there. I hadn't any idea he was going to be relieved. I have known Richardson very well for many, many years. He is a man I have always admired very much.

I knew his views about taking the fleet to the coast rather than Pearl Harbor; I knew that his primary reason for wanting the fleet to go to the coast was that he thought it could be more expeditiously and quickly prepared for war there than it could at Pearl Harbor. That was his prime objective.

I knew also that he knew the conditions that obtained at Pearl Harbor as did every other experienced naval officer who ever went out there, and it was something that was not new. It had been there for many, many years, and had been the subject of conversation in the Navy and in naval circles for a long time.

Senator BREWSTER. Were you a subordinate of Admiral [*7659*] Richardson at that time? Had you been serving under him?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I was a subordinate of Admiral Richardson. I had command of the cruisers of the battle force.

Senator BREWSTER. You were in that way familiar with his views on the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. That wouldn't necessarily make me familiar with his views, but Admiral Richardson told me various things because he wanted to.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you have any substantial disagreement with him on his views in that situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I didn't. I felt, as I said in my statement, that after the fleet had been out there for so long, I was particularly concerned about getting the fleet so that it could get ready to fight, no matter where it was gotten ready, and I didn't want any further delay in getting busy on it.

Senator BREWSTER. That is, you were confronted with a condition and not a theory?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir; very much so.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, what about the significance of the change in routing of the merchant shipping around November 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had been routing merchant ships, [*7660*] escorting them for some time. I forget the exact date, but it was over a period of months.

Senator BREWSTER. Was that escort initiated by you or from Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. From Washington.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And about November 25, we got orders to route the shipping down through Torres Strait as a matter of precaution, and to take them further from the Japanese homeland, and that was continued up to well long after December 7.

Senator BREWSTER. That did involve several thousand miles further travel by the merchant shipping, did it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a step that wouldn't have been taken, except from necessity, because it added, yes, several thousand miles, to the trip.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Now, further quoting the Hewitt narrative, as it is called, quoting from Hart's testimony, it states:

> Kimmel's orders to Halsey when he left for Wake, and asked how far he wanted him to go, was "use your common sense." Admiral Smith stated that before Halsey left he asked Kimmel what he should do in case he met Jap forces. [*7661*] Admiral Kimmel said in that case he was to use his own discretion. Admiral Halsey replied that those were the best orders he had received, to keep his movements secret, and if he found even the Japanese sandman he would sink it.

That was within the discretion of Admiral Halsey under the order which you had given to him, was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I had given Admiral Halsey, as I testified here the other day——

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. In his conversation with me after he came back from Wake, he said that when he asked me how far he could go, I said "You will have to use your common sense." By that I meant whatever situation arose he would have to take care of.

[*7662*] Senator BREWSTER. That left him with a very large discretion?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, Admiral Smith before the Hart committee said he thought there had been too much "crying wolf," that such warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson.

Does that express to some extent your feeling as to the situation as far as apprising you of danger was concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. To some extent, yes; because I think you will find Admiral King made a statement that was a sameness to the warnings that went, a sameness——

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I noted that sameness.

Senator BREWSTER. When did you learn that Admiral Hart was in receipt of the intercepts and of the ability to decode them?

Admiral KIMMEL. I learned of that after, sometime after the naval court of inquiry had completed its proceedings. I don't know the exact date.

Senator BREWSTER. Was there ever any discussion with you or by you about securing decrypting facilities for Pearl Harbor covering the purple or any other code?

[*7663*] Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't know the purple code by that name. I knew in general of the set-up. I knew what we were capable of doing in Washington and I knew that the primary decrypting and decoding was done in Washington by a much larger force than we had at Honolulu and supplying us with the necessary code machines, or what not, whatever might have been necessary, was only a part of the problem. The remainder of it was to supply us with trained and efficient personnel in such numbers as to handle all this. And it appeared to me then that if all this was being done in Washington and they were supplying me with information, that that was a solution to the problem.

Senator BREWSTER. But you did not know that Admiral Hart had these facilities for decrypting and analyzing the code?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I didn't know it at the time.

Senator BREWSTER. In your judgment would it have been feasible for those messages to have been sent to you by courier with practically complete security?

Admiral KIMMEL. I could see no reason why there shouldn't have been complete security if they were sent by courier. That is always a thing that you have to balance everywhere, the security as against getting the information where it will do the most good, and I have always been [*7664*] one of the school who feels that the information should be used, taking all the precautions.

We had a naval code which was pretty secure. I don't know whether the Japs ever broke any of them or not. Or anybody else. But certainly sending it by naval courier would have been a very secure method, I should say.

Senator BREWSTER. And the planes were flying back and forth from the Pacific coast to Hawaii at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Quite regularly.

Senator BREWSTER. So that it would have been a matter of 1 or 2 days to get material through under normal conditions?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, even in bad weather they could have done it in 4 or 5 days.

Senator BREWSTER. And had there ever been any difficulty as far as your office was concerned in the leakage of information that was supplied you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't understand.

Senator BREWSTER. Had there ever been any difficulty as far as you or your office were concerned in the leaking of information which had been supplied, so that they would have any occasion for concern?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know there were no leaks.

That is something that no man can answer categorically, [*7665*] that there were never any leaks.

Senator BREWSTER. No. Whether there had ever been any complaint.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, there was never any complaint that came to my attention.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There is some testimony about your hearing a Navy wife reporting something about your operating procedures. My impression is that in the record there is something about you putting some kind of a regulation into effect and then shortly afterward, in a public place in Honolulu, you heard some Navy officer's wife repeat it.

I don't want to misspeak, that is an important statement, but I think I can get you that in the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is an entirely different type of information from that which we are talking about here. One of our greatest difficulties out there was the Navy personnel and the Army personnel talking. And I think that is a common trouble that we have everywhere.

As I recall it, I issued some kind of an order cautioning all of them not to talk, to keep their mouths shut, and not to know so much. And I even went to the extent of doing this, we had a Navy directory they used to get out out there, [*7666*] and I restricted the distribution of this directory so as it couldn't get into the hands of unauthorized people.

[*7667*] Senator BREWSTER. If the so-called magic messages were being sent to the British Admiralty by Washington would that affect your opinion as to whether or not they might safely have been entrusted to the commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I know of no reason why they should not have been supplied to the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, and I think he was quite as much entitled to them as the British Admiralty was.

Senator BREWSTER. On page 538 of the Roberts Commission as corrected you were reported as testifying:

> The Secretary of Navy has stated that a special warning was sent by the Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet on the day preceding the surprise attack. The fact that such warning was not delivered to me indicated that the Administration did not expect an air attack on Oahu.

Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is correct, and I would like to add a little. When Mr. Knox came to Honolulu after the attack one of the first things he asked me was, "Did you get the dispatch that the Navy Department sent out on Saturday night?"

Senator BREWSTER. December 6 that was.

Admiral KIMMEL. December 6th. "Did you get Saturday [*7668*] night the dispatch the Navy Department sent out?" I said, "No, I received no such dispatch.' "Well," he said, "we sent you one." "Well," I said, "I am quite certain I did not receive it. However, there is aways a possibiity that my communication outfit might slip up and I will check." "Well," he said, "I am sure we sent one to the commander in chief of the Asiatic station, and we either sent it directly to you or for your information," and then he asked me if I decoded all dispatches going to the Asiatic station.

I told him no, that that was something we did not do normally and that it would be highly improbable that we would try to decode a

dispatch addressed only to the commander in chief of the Asiatic station, but that I would check up.

I did check up, and I found that no such dispatch had ever been sent to me and had never been received in my communication organization, and I subsequently found that no such dispatch had ever been sent to the commander in chief of the Asiatic station.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you ever take the matter up further with Secretary Knox to find out what was the explanation of that apparent misunderstanding?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never did. I had not received the dispatch and at the time I did know it was something that was water over the dam as far as I was concerned. I did not make [7669] any attempt to find out anything more about it at that time. I assured myself that we had never received it and subsequently I found that it had never been received in the Asiatic either, so the only conclusion that I could draw was that the dispatch, if it had ever originated, had gotten bogged down somewhere in the Navy Department.

Senator BREWSTER. But that matter has never been sufficiently explored to find out the basis for the misunderstanding, as far as you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. As far as I know it has never been. I know no more about it than I have told you right now.

Senator BREWSTER. Secretary Knox' visit was within a very few days after the event, was it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot hear you, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Secretary Knox' visit was within a very few days after December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Secretary Knox, I think he arrived out there on the 12th; it was about the 12th. I believe the 12th was the day.

Senator BREWSTER. And he seemed at that time to have a very clear recollection that he understood a message had been sent?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, he was quite positive at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, on page 568 of the Roberts testi- [7670] mony you are quoted as saying that the Army radar network had picked up many unknown planes at or about six A. M.

Was that, do you know, a discrepancy, or what is the explanation of that as distinct from the 7 o'clock report?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall now, sir. It is quite possible that I had been misinformed as to the time, and I think that the testimony which has been subsequently developed is probably better than my testimony. I was merely giving my opinion as far as time goes. I had only been informed about this.

Senator BREWSTER. When Secretary Knox talked with you at that time regarding the Saturday night message was General Short present so far as you recall?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am not sure but I believe he was. Captain Smith was present.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Admiral KIMMEL. And I believe Admiral Bloch was present at the same time and Admiral Pye. I am quite sure Captain Smith was there.

Mr. MURPHY. The record shows that General Short and Admiral Kimmel were together talking to the Secretary during the conversation and that then the Secretary later talked to General Short separately and went over the line of each officer, but they did talk at length together for some time.

[7671] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is quite true. General Short and the Secretary, Admiral Bloch, Captain Smith, and maybe two or three other people were present during at least one interview we had.

Senator BREWSTER. I have a message here labeled "Message No. 042000, December 4th," I take it. I will show it to you and ask you whether you can interpret it. It does not mean very much to me [handing document to witness].

Admiral KIMMEL. I am afraid you will have to get somebody that knows more about this thing than I do to make sense out of that.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I will ask somebody to look it up over the week end and perhaps we can get it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will look it up and try to find out, if I can, something about it.

Senator BREWSTER. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall that message at all.

Senator BREWSTER. You can take the number of it there.

Admiral KIMMEL. See if we can find that, what that is.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, as I gather from your testimony, Admiral Kimmel, you feel that the people in Washington had far less reason to be surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 than you did?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that it a perfectly reasonable [7672] conclusion with the information which they had and which I did not have.

Senator BREWSTER. I think the testimony of most of them who have spoken regarding this has indicated that they certainly were as much surprised as you, if not more so. The attitude of mind of official Washington and in the White House, one excerpt we have bearing directly on it is the New York Times of October 8, 1944, purporting to quote Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt when she stated as follows in what is marked as a direct quotation:

> December 7th was just like any of the later D-Days to us. We clustered at the radio and waited for more details but it was far from the shock it proved to the country in general. We had expected something of the sort for a long time.

That impression had been conveyed to you from neither official or unofficial sources, I gather.

Admiral KIMMEL. That thought you mean?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, that you were expecting something of this sort for a long time.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, and I might add a little here. Another thing that Secretary Knox said to me in the presence of these officers was that they were all surprised in Washington, that nobody in their estimates of what would happen in the Pacific [7673] had ever mentioned an attack on Pearl Harbor, not even Kelly Turner. Those were his words.

Senator BREWSTER. Does that refer to Admiral Turner?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. The dispositions of the ships and the alerting effect on December 7 were your best judgment as to the action consistent with your various responsibilities on the basis of information then available to you after careful consultation with your highly competent staff and consideration of all factors; is that statement true?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is absolutely true. I had discussed this thing daily with my staff, not only after November 27 but practically all the time I was out there.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, this was a continuing decision throughout the preceding 11 months?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. In the light of the diplomatic and military situation and the continuing responsibilities to make the fleet ready for war; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. It was something that we had to reappraise almost daily.

Senator BREWSTER. Whether or not the offensive function of the fleet in the event of war was the reason for its existence?

[*7674*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; a fleet that was not trained would have been useless.

Senator BREWSTER. That would be recognized by all competent naval authorities as to the functions of a fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

Senator BREWSTER. Would it be possible for anyone to appraise the wisdom of your decisions and the disposition of the fleet without knowledge of all the offensive functions of the fleet under the war plan then governing the program of the United States in the event of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I considered my primary responsibilities out there offensive action which we expected and hoped to undertake and no man can get a proper view of my responsibilities and the problems which faced me without having the complete text of the WPL–46 and my operating plan, WPAC–46, which contains not only defensive measures but primarily offensive measures.

Senator BREWSTER. I call your attention to Exhibit 44, "Copies of Defense Plans," which were submitted to our body, extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 (WPL–46) and in section 7 of that, "Tasks, The Pacific Area, Army Tasks." Then we come to subsection 35, "Navy Tasks," in which we find A. B, C, D, and E missing. They go on with the outlining of F, G, and H, with apparently some other initial- [*7675*] ing subsequently thereto.

Now, that invited my attention at the time and I asked counsel regarding it as it impressed me that if you were under a responsibility for carrying out offensive action with that fleet you must at least take that into account. I take it that was the purpose of your orders, to be prepared to carry out what your plan specifically called for and subsequently when we secured A, B, C, D, and E we found some very considerable responsibilities resting on you which I will read:

a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying [7676] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

Now, those are rather large orders, are they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and in that connection I might say that prior to the commencement of these hearings we found out what they were submitting to counsel and my counsel went to Mr. Mitchell and pointed out to him that these defensive measures divorced from the others did not give a true picture of my responsibilities, of the problems that faced me; that it was necessary to have these additional things brought to the attention of the committee. After that and when it was distributed to the committee my counsel again went to Mr. Gesell and informed him that we felt this was not a full presentation of the picture which was necessary to be drawn if they were to find out what my responsibilities were in the premises, and beyond that we went no further.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know what reply Mr. Gesell made to your counsel as reported to you regarding that matter?

Admiral KIMMEL. What, sir?

Senator BREWSTER. What reply Mr. Gesell made to your counsel as reported to you, regarding that request?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know as he made any reply, but he did not do anything about it.

[7677] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I am quite interested because I raised this very question early in the hearing as it impressed me that we would be utterly unable to form a balanced judgment on whether or not you had made a wise decision unless we knew what your responsibilities were and if your primary responsibilities were to carry out aggressive warfare all over the Pacific Ocean, out as far as the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines, and all that, I assume that must be taken into account. I was unable to secure recognition of that by the counsel at the time and I am very much interested to know that you apparently had presented a similar and what seems to me a well-warranted request and I think that it will be in order to find out, if possible, why it was that this information was not made available to us initially by whoever was responsible.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I don't know anything about it.

Senator BREWSTER. No; I know you do not.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Mitchell made a statement to the committee that the reason it was not was he thought the committee was primarily concerned with defense obligations made as to Pearl Harbor. Then he was pressed by the committee and he and Mr. Gesell then made available to the committee the complete war [7678] plans of the Pacific and the complete plans covering the entire situation and we have that.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you through?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand counsel had this entire matter before them and only furnished us this deleted version, or did they have to go back to the Navy and get the entire matter? And I would like to know whether they requested the entire record at first.

Mr. MURPHY. I am sure I cannot answer that. I can only say that Mr. Mitchell said at first all they wanted to present was the defense of Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel find that out?

Mr. MURPHY. And then they gave us the whole plan and we have it and have had it for some time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Hannaford can answer the question specifically.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; we will hear from Mr. Hannaford.

Mr. HANNAFORD. Mr. Chairman, WPL–46 was received as an exhibit in the Naval Court of Inquiry and all of those exhibits have been available to counsel from the very beginning. We asked the Army and Navy to make extracts from it and reproduce them rather than reproduce the entire document, because [*7679*] it is very voluminous, and that is the document which is now in evidence as exhibit 44 and it was received and distributed to the committee. Thereafter, at the request of the committee we had the entire document duplicated and that was also distributed to the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. When was the latter distribution made?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I cannot tell you that, Senator. I can check that from the record. I think it was distributed about the time Admiral Turner came on the stand.

Mr. MURPHY. Several weeks ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Can I inquire from counsel as to whether or not it was counsel's request to leave out certain things, the socalled deployment under WPL–46?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I cannot tell you that, Senator, because I do not believe I discussed the details of drawing that document up.

Sentor FERGUSON. Could we have that topic requested?

Mr. HANNAFORD. Well, there is nothing in writing that I know of, Senator, requesting how exhibit 44 should be made up.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how would the Navy know how to make it up if it was not in writing?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I assume that it was as a result of an oral conversation, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. Were you present at this conversation [*7680*] with Mr. Gesell and Mr. Mitchell regarding the reproduction of the war plans?

Mr. HANNAFORD. I was not, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, may I have counsel's attention? The fact is, it is already before the committee now.

Mr. HANNAFORD. It certainly is.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And has been for several weeks.

Mr. HANNAFORD. It certainly has.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I would like to have you locate the date when that subsequent one was made available and I will appreciate a statement from Mr. Gesell regarding the conversation when this was

requested because when I initially requested this report I was met with a rather firm response. It was intimated that that was not at all essential. I haven't located the point in the evidence where that was done but I hope to.

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find we have had it about a month.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, the first copy I received was on November 17. That was something over 3 months ago.

Mr. MURPHY. That was 4 days after we were in the hearing, November 17.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire as to [*7681*] whether or not the entire plan, WPL–46, has been marked an exhibit? Is it Exhibit 114, or was it withdrawn?

Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit 114 is WPAC–46, the Pacific implementation of Rainbow 5.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this in evidence?

Mr. MASTEN. WPL–46? No, not entirely.

Senator BREWSTER. What is this? This one has the "114" scratched out.

Mr. MURPHY. We have the complete Pacific war plan. I think we have every page and every word of every plan for the Pacific and have had for about a month.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel whether or not this complete instrument is now an exhibit in the case, the one that Senator Brewster read from, WPL–46? He read paragraph 35 as I recall it.

Mr. MASTEN. It is not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I move that it become an exhibit, with an exhibit number identifying what Senator Brewster read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let us have counsel identify what it is.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, if the counsel can describe it to their own satisfaction. It is quite a document.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where did it come from?

Senator BREWSTER. It was given to us by counsel.

[*7682*] Mr. MURPHY. I think the record should also show that each member of the committee has been furnished a list of the exhibits before them and we have had the list covering all of the exhibits for quite some weeks.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is not an exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I would like to have made an exhibit.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is no reason in the world why this should not be made an exhibit if the committee wants to have it made an exhibit. This is WPL—46. It is not expurgated or changed or modified, it is all here and if this instrument is to be made an exhibit, why, we will send it down and have it duplicated and distribute it to the members of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that it has already been distributed. Every member of the committee has a copy of it.

Mr. MURPHY. I think the record will show that it was submitted to the members of the committee with a statement by Mr. Gesell that it was not being made an exhibit; that it was rather bulky to duplicate. Each member of the committee got a copy. I think you will find that in the record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then there is no reason, Mr. Chairman, why this cannot be made an exhibit and given a number.

[7683] Senator FERGUSON. I so move.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered, but with every member of the committee having a copy of it is there any reason for having it copied again?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. The exhibit number would be 129.

Mr. MURPHY. The exhibit was distributed the day that Mr. Keefe cross-examined Admiral Stark, and he referred to it in his questioning when he spoke of the fortification of Guam.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 129.")

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral Kimmel, you were under some necessity of conserving, so far as possible, your resources on account of the emphasis on the war in the Atlantic, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not understand quite, sir. I am sorry.

Senator BREWSTER. You were under the necessity of conserving your resources on account of the emphasis on the war in the Atlantic. You had been told at various times that the war in Europe was the primary emphasis under any war plans that we might carry out, is that not true?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is a fair statement, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. In your statement of the case on page 10 you included this statement which I would like to read for [7684] purposes of reemphasis and to invite your further comment, as it seems to me to have a considerable significance in connection with the decisions you were obliged to make. [Reading:]

> The Joint Army-Navy War Plan primarily emphasized the defeat of Germany. Admiral R. K. Turner, War Plans Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations in 1941, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, described the objectives of the War Plan in these words:
>
> "The plan contemplated a major effort on the part of both the principal Associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period this matter was discussed and it was determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe."

Was that what you understood to be the policy of the United States during the year preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not have that available to me in Pearl Harbor prior to the attack. What I did have available to me was the statement of principles in the basic war plan of the Army and Navy, rainbow No. 5, which is quoted on the fol- [7685] lowing page.

Senator BREWSTER. On page 11.

Admiral KIMMEL. And that is not very much different. This is a little franker but not very much different from the statement of principles laid down in the basic war plan.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, how would you interpret the significance of that statement by Admiral Turner that we were going to initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us? How would we go about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I wouldn't know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to state at this time that I believe today will be the last day that Mr. Hannaford will be with us as a member of our legal staff. Is that correct, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I feel sure I voice the sentiment of all members of the committee when I express deep regret that we are to lose his valuable services as a member of our legal staff. We appreciate the splendid efforts that he has exerted. He has served with great ability and credit and distinction throughout the period that we have been working on this matter, and we regret exceedingly that he has to leave us and we want him to know that he leaves with our deepest appreciation for all that he has done and the valuable services [*7686*] that he has rendered the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I get the date of this Admiral Turner's memorandum that is quoted on page 10 of Admiral Kimmel's original statement?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you prepared to give the Senator that information, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot give you the date immediately, but it is in the Hart testimony. You will note the notation at the bottom of the page.

Senator BREWSTER. Page 251.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

Hart testimony, Admiral R. K. Turner, page 251, 252, question 10.

Senator FERGUSON. But I wanted the record, if possible, to show at this point the date that that statement was made; not made as a witness, but actually made by Turner.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was made as a witness by Admiral Turner.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not the date I want. I want the date that he made it originally, the idea when it was to take place.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I could not give you that. I do [*7687*] not know.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I want to make one request of counsel, that they ask the Navy to supply us with a comparative statement of the number of ships in Pearl Harbor during January 1941 compared with December 7, 1941, as to whether or not it is not a fact that there were more ships in the harbor in January of 1941 at one time than there were on December 7, 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will please take note of that request.

Senator BREWSTER. It may appear now that the complete copy of WPL–46 was made available to the committee on December 20, 1945, after the original limited copy had been made available to us on November 17, and had been the subject of some discussion, according to the record which the counsel has just furnished me.

May I ask the Chairman about the printing of the record, as to what progress is being made? That is quite a job and it would seem essential.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a matter that Senator Barkley has been looking after personally, and I regret I am not prepared to give that information, but I am sure he can.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

[*7688*] Mr. KEEFE. It has been suggested that it might be a good policy to continue these hearings into the night so as to complete Admiral Kimmel. I wonder if the Chair entertains such views?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair had not. We have run now till past 4:30, so the committee will now stand in recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn can I make one request?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Before the recess I asked for photostatic copies of the intercepted messages bearing date of December 6, regardless of their time of translation. That was over a month ago.

Just before the recess I was called on by Attorney Masten of our counsel and the Army liaison officer. They explained to me what the problem would be in developing the picture that I had asked for, and for the accommodation and for the purpose of lightening the work I modified my request considerably. As a result of that interview I was promised those photostatic copies the next day. Three or four weeks have gone by and I haven't received them. I was wondering if somebody has them—if there is somebody on our counsel's staff that can supply me with them.

[*7689*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is counsel prepared to give the gentleman the information he is requesting?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Gearhart, it was my understanding that the only thing you wanted, which you had a chance to look at, was the document which was introduced subsequently, I have forgotten the exact page number, which covers certain of the intercepts in Exhibit 2 relating to Hawaii. If there is anything else you want, I am sure we will be glad to get it.

Mr. GEARHART. Do I understand that the intercepts that I have asked for have been photostated, each one of the papers relating to the particular intercepts that I have requested, and that they have been introduced in evidence in this case?

Mr. MASTEN. No; there have been no photostats that——

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I know the intercepts that have been presented to this committee. That is where I got the information that caused me to make the request. What I want is the photostats of all of those messages which were dated December 6 regardless of their date of translation. I want to see each paper relating to those, each individual intercept, so that I can make a study of them.

Mr. MASTEN. As I said, my understanding was that you had abandoned that request and you no longer wanted those photostats; that the data which was subsequently introduced before the committee was all that you wanted. [*7690*] If you want to change that, we will be glad to cooperate.

Mr. GEARHART. No; I don't want to be understood as changing anything. I am limiting my request to include certain definite messages appearing upon certain pages in the exhibit and you told me and the Army officer assured me that they would be in my hands the next day. A month has gone by and I haven't seen them.

Mr. MASTEN. Well, we will endeavor to get them for you Monday.

Mr. GEARHART. With that assurance I subside.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock Monday.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p. m., Saturday, January 19, 1946 an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Monday, January 21, 1946.)

[7691]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee, met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[7692] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

I have been advised by telephone that the chairman, Senator Barkley, is unavoidably detained and unable to be here this morning. He had to be out of town over the week end and on account of weather conditions was unable to get back this morning as he had expected and expects to get in during the day.

I also understand from Senator Ferguson that Senator Brewster had to be out of town over the week end and on account of weather conditions he was unable to get back this morning as he had expected and will not be able to resume his inquiry at this time. So, with that explanation, the Chair will recognize Mr. Gearhart of California.

Before that, however, does counsel have anything at this time to present to the committee?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything you want to present before the examination is resumed?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I have not.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart of California will not inquire.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Murphy has something to present at this time.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a re- [7693] quest.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to request counsel to produce for this inquiry any word in any testimony by any witness in this proceeding from the date of December 7, 1941, to the present time about a so-called lost message to Hawaii alleged to have been sent, apparently, on the night of December 6, and my reason for bringing that up is the papers

of the country have had headlines about a lost message and the quotation by a member whom I do not want to quote until he is present, the distinguished Senator from Maine, and I would like to know what the facts are if counsel can ascertain anything. I haven't, in reading all the records.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All the information we have is what the Congressman heard with reference to the conversation Admiral Kimmel had with Secretary Knox on his arrival at Honolulu, plus the fact that two people associated with Secretary Knox, Rear Admiral Beatty, and, I think, Captain Dillon—I am informed—say that Knox talked to them about having written such a message.

My people are endeavoring to get a conference between Dillon and Beatty and me for the purpose of ascertaining whether they know any more than that. Further than that, it [*7694*] will be absolutely impossible for counsel to search this record from the beginning to find any piece of testimony at this time. It is all we can do to keep a foot and a half ahead of the examination of the committee on current witnesses, but I think that when I talk with Beatty and Dillon I will have gathered together all the proof that we have with reference to the message that Secretary Knox is supposed to have sent to Kimmel.

I have instructed my people to go into the Secretary of the Navy's office and ascertain, if they can, any stenographer or person in the executive staff there that could have written any such message, and we are going to do all we can to find it, and when I do get some information I will let Congressman Murphy know immediately.

Mr. MURPHY. I may say that, if it will help counsel, I have gone over the record pretty carefully, and the only reference I see by the witness on the stand to any message of the 6th is a statement that there was a message sent to Admiral Hart, but I see not a word of testimony in any previous hearing by the witness referring to any alleged lost message to him.[1]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart will proceed with his examination.

[*7695*] **TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (Retired)—Resumed**

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the thoroughgoing examination of yourself and your comprehensive answers to questions of the distinguished counsel, Mr. Richardson, and the other members of the committee who have preceded me, there are just a few topics that I want to ask you a few questions about by way of emphasis more than as an endeavor to bring out new facts.

There has been a very studied effort, it would seem to me, on the part of some members of this committee, almost a frantic effort, to develop the idea that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii was, in some way or another, a deterrent to the Japanese.

I would like to explore that idea a little. My first question is, Do you think the presence of the fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was a deterrent to the Japanese?

[1] See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5146, for a memorandum from the Navy Department.

Admiral KIMMEL. They made an attack, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you consider that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent to the Japanese on November 27 and November 28, 1941, when the Japanese Fleet left the Kuriles on the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to state how much of a deterrent it was. I think the facts speak for themselves.

[*7696*] Mr. GEARHART. I will ask you if you think that the presence of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian waters was a deterrent to the Japanese on November 5 and November 7 of 1941 when the Japanese Government issued its operational order No. 1 and operational order No. 2 for the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the facts speak very well.

Mr. GEARHART. I will ask you whether or not the presence of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian waters during the spring and early summer of 1940 was more or less of a deterrent to the Japanese when, by order of the Chief of Naval Operations, your three best battleships, one carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers were detached from your fleet and transferred to the Atlantic?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it would have been much more of a deterrent had they retained those ships in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. If it had any influence upon the Japanese as a deterrent it would have become more so if they had added to your fleet rather than subtracted from it as our relationships with that country were fastly deteriorating, is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When the order came for the detachment of those ships you were foreclosed by the Chief of Naval [*7697*] Opertions from discussing the subject with him by his telling you abruptly that he was not starting an argument, he was telling you what to do?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now what was the purpose of the Japanese Fleet in making the attack in the Hawaiian area? I ask you to answer that question in the light of hindsight and in the light of all that occurred, and in the light of what they did following the attack.

What would you say was their purpose in making the attack in that area?

Admiral KIMMEL. Their purpose was to do as much damage as they could to the fleet.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Their purpose was to immobilize the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. And in that one objective they were successful, they immobilized our fleet for practically 1 year, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I do not think they were entirely successful in immobilizing the fleet, because the ships that were most useful in the early stages of the compaign—and I speak of the carriers, the cruisers, and destroyers—suffered very little damage.

[*7698*] Mr. GEARHART. What you mean by that, Admiral, is that we still, after the attack, had a very powerful fleet left?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I mean, too, that the battleships in the early stages of the campaign in the Pacific were not particularly useful.

It was only during the latter stages of the campaign that they became useful.

Now if we had had some battleships in the Pacific with sufficient speed to accompany a fast carrier task force, they would have been useful in the early stages, and they were useful when they finally got ships of that character out there. But the primary ships in the early stages of the campaign, and the ones that did the damage and the ones we thought would be useful—and I think I pointed that out in my correspondence—were the fast, light forces, and the carriers and the submarines, of course.

[*7699*] Mr. GEARHART. Yes; and even though conceding that our fleet perhaps was not in condition to go to the relief of the Philippines, even if we had not suffered these losses, after we suffered the losses, the opportunity of performing such a mission was eliminated until the ships could be repaired. Is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in my opinion, if there had been no damage whatsoever to the fleet at Pearl Harbor, it would have been disastrous to send the forces that we had in the Pacific to the relief of the Philippines, and I have some distinguished company in that opinion.

Mr. GEARHART. I know you have, and that is for the reason that our air defense in the Pacific was not developed so we could risk going through the Japanese mandated islands, on many of which we knew they had established powerful bases?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true as to air defense. But the fleet supply train, the oilers, the supplies of all descriptions that are required by a big fleet, we had no means of transporting them over long distances in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. But the purpose and the objective of the Japanese was to make certain that our fleet was immobilized to the extent that it could not go to the aid [*7700*] of the Philippines, or become and remain a menace on their flank while they were doing other things?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, yes; in general that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. And the reason they wanted to immobilize the American Fleet for a definite period—or it may be for an extended period of time, if not definite—was to give them time to conquer the Philippines and Hongkong, and other bases to the south of the Philippines?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I think so.

Mr. GEARHART. And as it turned out, the Japanese were able to complete those conquests in the southwestern Pacific before the American Fleet and the American Army—American forces of all kinds and types—were ready to go to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is right.

Mr. GEARHART. Then instead of the American Fleet being a deterrent to the Japanese in Hawaiian waters, it was, in effect, a direct invitation to the Japanese Government to come there and put our fleet out of commission for a certain length of time, if not permanently, is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am afraid you are indulging in a little hindsight now, sir. What you say was borne out by [*7701*] events, I admit that.

Mr. GEARHART. I think so, and of course, we have got to make allowances for hindsight. I am indulging in it myself, Admiral, as well as asking you to do so at times.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we all do it. We cannot help it.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, consider for the moment, the transfer of the fleet to our west coast. Let us assume that it was transferred to the west coast at the time that Admiral Richardson asked that that be done; that would not have lessened the problem one whit, insofar as the Japanese were concerned, of demobilizing our fleet while they were making their conquest in the southwestern Pacific, the problem, of course, would still have been theirs?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; the problem would still have been theirs.

Mr. GEARHART. And the problem of the Japanese would have been a very much more difficult one than the one they confronted at Hawaii, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say so, insofar as immobilizing the fleet on the west coast is concerned, but as I pointed out here the other day, I think even with the fleet in Hawaii, they might have done more damage to us had they destroyed the base at Pearl Harbor. You cannot get some- [*7702*] thing for nothing, anyway.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, there would be no objective for the Japanese to come to destroy the base at Pearl Harbor because that would not relieve them of any of the burdens that they had in the attack to the southwest, would it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; that is right.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, if the fleet was not there, the Japs would not have come, in all probability; is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a possibility.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And if the were still intent upon immobilizing the fleet, and the fleet was on the west coast, say at Long Beach, their fleet would have had to travel 2,000 miles more to the attack, and in traveling 2,000 miles more, the chances of detection of their mission would have been greatly increased, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and if it had been on the coast, the necessity for air patrols, the area to be patrolled would have been halved.

Mr. GEARHART. I did not hear the last part of your answer.

Admiral KIMMEL. I say it would have been halved.

Mr. GEARHART. Halved?

Admiral KIMMEL. Would have been just about half as [*7703*] much, because you had a land mass on one side, and all you had to do was to patrol the sea, whereas in Hawaii, you had 360° to patrol.

Mr. GEARHART. You had a circle to patrol in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. While we had 180° to patrol on the west coast.

Mr. GEARHART. And furthermore, you had more room to deploy your ships if you were stationed, say, at Long Beach, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not believe I got the question.

Mr. GEARHART. You would have had a greater ocean space in which to deploy your ships while in port, would you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there were more entrances at Long Beach. They could have gotten out more rapidly.

One of the advantages of having them stationed on the coast was that we had several ports in which detachments of the fleet could go from

time to time. There would have been several ports; San Francisco, Long Beach, San Diego—three ports at least in the southern part—and also the ports in Puget Sound, and there would have been a much better chance, I think, to keep the Japs guessing a little bit, about where they were at all times, because one of the factors—and there was nothing you could do about it— [7704] was we had only that one port in Pearl Harbor where all the ships had to return to sooner or later.

Mr. GEARHART. And on the Pacific coast you had many ports where the fleet could have been scattered under such conditions that you could have them reassemble at a designated rendezvous, if necessary?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Of course it is hard to say what the Japs would have done if the fleet had been on the west coast as recommended by Admiral Richardson, and as I think you said you would have liked to have had it, although you knew that had been decided for you in Washington at the time you took command, it is hard to say what the Japs would have done?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a speculation, sir.

[7705] Mr. GEARHART. Because they have done a lot of foolish things during this war, did they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; they did a great many foolish things.

Mr. GEARHART. Nothing quite so foolish as their attack on Hawaii, in its consequences?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that was the greatest mistake they made.

Mr. GEARHART. But it is your opinion, as it is mine, that had they attempted to immobilize the fleet by coming to the west coast to attack it, their chances of success would have been reduced almost to the point where even an ensign of the Japanese Navy would probably have considered it too great a chance to have undertaken; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Their difficulties would have been very much increased; very much increased.

Mr. GEARHART. So far as the physical evidence is concerned—the physical evidence at Pearl Harbor and on Oahu—the Japanese had only one target and that was the American Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is evident from the attack itself.

Mr. GEARHART. There is no evidence that they were on a mission to destroy any of the permanent installations on the islands?

[7706] Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that the damage to permanent installations was negligible.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And much of that might be due to poor marksmanship and excitement, don't you think?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there was much of it.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, so much for this theory that the presence of the fleet at Hawaii was a deterrent.

Now, Admiral, you have from time to time during the course of your testimony adverted to several Japanese intercepts which the Washington people had in their possession and within their knowledge, which were not passed on to you as information. Neither was the substance of those intercepts conveyed to you in the way of directives. I will ask you this question: Following that up a little further, when you received a copy for information of the shooting orders which had been issued by Admiral Stark to the commanders of the Atlantic Fleet,

when you received a copy of them, did they call your attention to or send you a copy of a Japanese, Italian, and German agreement of November 28, 1940, or treaty of alliance, the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact?

[7707] Admiral KIMMEL. Of what date was that again, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. I think November 28, 1940.

Admiral KIMMEL. Wasn't that September of 1940?

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was not the Comintern Pact, that was the Three-Power Pact.

Mr. GEARHART. I will have to make that correction. The tripartite agreement of 27th of September 1940.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. They called your attention to it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, that took place before I became commander in chief. I do not know whether they called that to the attention of the then commander in chief. However, I knew about it. I knew the essential features of it as applied to our business. I don't know where I got the information.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the fact that it has never to this date been printed in the English language, so far as I know or infer from the letter from the State Department that I received just a few days ago, whatever you knew about that agreement was hearsay, was it not?

In other words, did you ever have the text of it before you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have never seen anything about it [7708] that I can now recall, about the Three-Power Pact, in a communication from the Navy Department, if that is what you mean.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. But I did know the provisions of the pact. I am unable to state now when I—I say I knew the provisions—I knew that Germany, Italy, and Japan had agreed to declare war on any nation which attacked any one of the three during the European war, and I think Japan had an exception that she was not going to attack Russia in case she came in. But the pact was clearly aimed at the United States. I knew that much, and that is about all I did know.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, that is the substance of it, but you never had the words, the letter of the treaty, before you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no recollection of it. Whether one was sent to the commander in chief or not in September 1940 I don't know; or subsequent thereto.

Mr. GEARHART. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I want to read into the evidence this tripartite agreement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The gentleman may proceed.

Mr. GEARHART. (reading):

THREE-POWER PACT BETWEEN GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN

The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan consider it as a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each [7709] nation of the world be given its own proper place. They have therefore decided to stand together and to cooperate with one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend this cooperation to such nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to

give to their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows.

ABTICLE 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

ARTICLE 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

ARTICLE 3

Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their [7710] efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

ARTICLE 4

For the purpose of implementing the present pacts, joint technical commissions, the members of which are to be appointed by the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, will meet without delay.

ARTICLE 5

Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

ARTICLE 6

The present Pact shall come into force immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At the proper time before expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, if one of them so requests, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Pact and have [7711] hereunto apposed their seals.

This is interesting.

Done in 3 original copies at Berlin, on the 27th day of September, 1940, in the XVIIIth year of the Fascist Era, corresponding to the 27th day of the 9th month of the 15th year of the Showa era.

JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
CIANO
(Signature of the Japanese Representative)

[7712] Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, might I interrupt for just a moment?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I call attention to the fact that on page 165 of Foreign Relations of the United States which is a book already in evidence, the text of this Three-Power Pact which the Congressman has just read, appears as set forth.

Mr. GEARHART. The text or the substance?

Mr. RICHARDSON. The text.

Mr. GEARHART. The text does?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. I was advised by a letter, which is attached to the text I read, that printed copies were not available in the State Department, and so I assumed it had not been printed, although in another part of that document you have just referred to appears a discussion

of this instrument, with the assertion that section 3 was plainly directed against the United States.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will say, Mr. Chairman, to the Congressman, that glancing at this copy here, it does not contain, in fact, that it was the particular year of the Fascist rule to which you referred. It stops entirely with article 6.

[7713] Mr. GEARHART. I will ask, Mr. Chairman, that the letters which are attached to this document, which I will hand to the reporter, letter from the State Department dated January 18, 1946, and a further statement in reference to it from the State Department be included in the record with the text of the instrument itself.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The letters referred to follow:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., January 18, 1946.

In reply to refer to
RP 026 American White.
Book/1-946.

MY DEAR MR. GEARHART: Reference is made to your letter of January 9, 1946, requesting a copy of a Treaty of Alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan.

There is enclosed a copy of a translation prepared in the Department of State of an announcement as published in the "Reichsgesetzblatt" of November 28, 1940, containing the text of the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940. Printed copies [7714] of the text of the Pact are not available in the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ DEAN ACHESON,
Acting Secretary.

Enclosure: Three-Power Pact—Department of State translation.

The Honorable BERTRAND W. GEARHART,
House of Representatives.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D. C.

CENTRAL TRANSLATING DIVISION

(Translation)

TC No. 15150

Source: "Reichsgesetzblatt", Part II, Berlin, November 28, 1940, No. 41, P. 279

ANNOUNCEMENT

Concerning the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan on November 25, 1940

On September 27, 1940, at Berlin, the Three-Power Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan was signed by Representatives with full powers of the German, Italian and Japanese Governments. The Pact came into force upon signature. It [7715] is published below.

Berlin, November 25, 1940.

THE REICH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
VON RIBBENTROP

Mr. GEARHART. Again directing your attention to article 3, to the words:

They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means, if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Within the category and the definition set forth in these words, the United States is plainly included, is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you considered that as an element in all of the evidence, the force and effect of which was that the relationships with Japan were fastly deteriorating?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was an element, but, again, I felt that Japan would be governed in her action by her own best interests, and she would hesitate to violate that pact if she thought it was to her advantage to do so.

Mr. GEARHART. I think you are entirely correct. The [7716] Japanese would have double-crossed their Axis partners, if they thought they could advance their own interests in the Pacific by so doing.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And if they could have obtained an agreement from the United States to disregard the John Hay open-door policy in China, if they had been able to induce the United States to, by agreement, tear up the Nine-Power Pact, which required all the nations that signed it, 27 in number, to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China, and if they could have gotten the United States to tear up the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact which outlawed war as an instrument of international policy, had gotten us to promise in an agreement with them to lay off while they were conquering the Pacific Southwest, they would have double-crossed Germany in your estimation, in the light of hindsight?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they would have double-crossed Germany any time it was to their advantage to do so.

Mr. GEARHART. What would have been your opinion if you had been supplied a copy of the intercept, which was not sent to you, the intercept which appears on page 205 of exhibit 1, in this proceeding, the intercept which contains paragraph No. 3, appearing on the top of page [7717] 206, if they had immediately supplied you a copy of that intercept, which was received by our Washington authorities on the 30th day of November 1941, and translated on the 1st day of December 1941, would it not have brought back the tripartite agreement to importance, in your considerations, and I read it:

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever.

Referring to the United States.

In it, there is one insulting clause which says no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power, it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time, the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China— they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and [7718] has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

Now, if you had had that information conveyed to you on December 1, 1941, that would have been an important item of evidence, added to the other intercepted messages which were denied you, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That clearly conveyed the information to the United States, or those who received it in the United States, not you, that Japan was standing up to its obligation under the anticomintern tripartite treaty, and that she regarded the United States as an enemy, and that she regarded our proposals to her as an insult?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you analyzed the so-called Hull message to the Japanese of November 26, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Have I analyzed it?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. In other words, have you read all the words, the verbiage, and reached a conclusion as to what it means in substance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I have gotten a fairly good idea of it since I have read it; yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Wasn't it just the opposite in effect [*7719*] to the Japanese-tendered agreement of November 20, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it was; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You will agree that the Japanese agreement would have required the United States to have abandoned the time-honored principle of the John Hay open-door policy; it would have required the United States to have torn up the Nine-Power Treaty to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China, and it would have required the United States to have consented to Japan using war as a means of international policy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[*7720*] Mr. GEARHART. Thank God we didn't do that, and we didn't, did we?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. GEARHART. By rejecting that we stood up for the highest and noblest of America's traditional principles, did we not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I never criticized what they did.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Hull called that an ultimatum. Now, to turn to his reply to that ultimatum and analyze it. That would have done just the opposite of what the Japs wanted. That would have required the Japanese to have respected the John Hay open-door policy in China and would have opened its ports to the ships of other nations. It would have required Japan to respect the political independence and sovereignty of China. It would have compelled the Japanese to withdraw their armies and abandon the use of force as a means of international policy. Would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The answer is, of course, apparent: Why is the Hull message, therefore, any less of an ultimatum than the Japanese message, which meant the same thing.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the important part is that the Japanese so regarded it.

[*7721*] Mr. GEARHART. That is true. That appears all through the Japanese writings and intercepts. And I am proud of the fact that they did, because America was standing up to its time-honored principles. I agree to "millions for defense but not a cent for tribute." I agree with "freedom of the seas" and for every noble aspiration that this country has ever announced to the world. It is a pity that Mr. Hull insists upon saying that it is not an ultimatum.

It means, when you say it is not an ultimatum, that we are willing to treat, to compromise, and deal, on those great propositions, and I, as one American, I am not ready to give anything, not one whit on any of the those principles.

I am not passing upon the question of whether or not the timing of the delivery of that message was right in view of the fact that our military and naval authorities were begging for time. That is an entirely different question.

Now, I am going to conclude my examination by reverting to an old subject with you. Just like as to the point of the deterring effect of the presence of the fleet at Hawaii, certain members of the committee have frantically endeavored to overstress and give meaning that nobody at the time had accepted, to the so-called war warning message.

Now, I am going to ask you to go along with me and let's analyze this.

[*7722*] Senator LUCAS. I wonder who is testifying here this morning, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GEARHART. Whenever you heard the wheel squeak it needs a little grease and I am giving it to you right now.

Well, I don't have the mysterious document, it seems to have gotten out from under my eye at the moment.

Mr. MURPHY. You may use mine.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, here it is.

Now, to get the full meaning of a document it is necessary to read it through, is that not correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't hear that.

Mr. GEARHART. I say, to get the full meaning of any document you have to read it through?

Admiral KIMMEL. You have to read all the document; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Supposing you got just one line in the message that reached you upon November 27, 1941:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

Would that have told you with whom we were going to have war?

I am asking you to confine yourself to the words alone. We are going to take this apart right now.

You got a message and it said "This is a war warning." You know, as a reasonable individual of considerable educational [*7723*] attainments, that there are around 52 or 54 nations in the world, don't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I never thought of it that way.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, that line doesn't tell you what country in the world is going to start a war, does it? Let's stick to the letter of the word and go no further and draw nothing on your imagination, but applying the reasoning of a reasonable man. With just those words before him, it wouldn't tell you who you were going to war with, how many nations would participate in that war, it doesn't tell you where the war was going to occur, whether it was going to break out simultaneously everywhere, or whether in certain parts of the world, or whether in a single part of the world.

Admiral KIMMEL. Such a message as that would have been quite indefinite.

Mr. GEARHART. So because it doesn't tell us when, where, or who with a war was going to occur, you have to read on to the next sentence, don't you, to get that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You have a very general statement before you, with just the phrase "this is a war warning."

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

[*7724*] Mr. GEARHART. It is so general, it wouldn't help you at all?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not very much.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then, to find out who it is with, we get the next sentence:

Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

That puts a lot of nations out of the consideration, and centers your thoughts upon Japan and Japan alone, doesn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So this general message has been narrowed down to a very specific message referring to Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. But it doesn't tell you where the war is going to break out, up to now. It doesn't tell you with whom Japan is going to be associated, if with anybody, but it does narrow it down to Japan. So, you have to find out where the war is going to be by reading another line, and you have a right to read it all, and it is your duty to read it all, is it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; it must be read all together.

[*7725*] Mr. GEARHART. There is more.

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

Now, the war's scope has been restricted from all other nations of the world, down to one nation, and to one place on the face of the earth, hasn't it, and that is the southwest Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is what it appears to say.

Mr. GEARHART. And that is the interpretation which a reasonable man, acting in the light of experience would give to a document such as that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, of course, in designating the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, that does not exclude Hong Kong; it does not exclude the Burma Road; it does not exclude Java, or possibly Singapore, because they are all in the same area of the territory which is defined by the places that are mentioned. Isn't that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it would be interesting for you [*7726*] to know that your interpretation of that document as limiting the place of the attack to the southwestern Pacific, is precisely the same interpretation which the courts would have given that document if it

had been submitted to them in a judicial dispute. The rule of interpretation which you applied to that is exactly the same interpretation which over a thousand years of jurisprudence the courts have given to documents of that kind.

A general statement followed by a specific limitation, always limits the interpretation in the courts to the things of the same character of the specific things mentioned.

I am not going to spend much time on a lot of intricate legal questions, but this is one of the best settled in all of the lines of decisions of our courts. The rule of interpretation is known as the ejusdem generis rule.

Let me quote from one of the standard lawbooks, Black's Law Dictionary, for its interpretation of ejusdem generis, for the benefit of anybody who may read the record:

In the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, the "ejusdem generis rule" is that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to [7727] be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

And to show how far the courts go in applying that sort of interpretation, I read the second line after a great many cases are cited in this particular legal work:

The rule, however, does not necessarily require that the general provision be limited in its scope to the identical things specifically named.

That is why your war message would be enlarged to include the Burma Road, Java, Singapore, and all of those other areas.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. No. The gentleman is not going to start a legal argument. If you want to make a legal speech, you can do it later.

Mr. MURPHY. You are making a speech about the law, and I would like to correct it.

Mr. GEARHART. You would be a great help to the Supreme Court.

I turn to volume 14, of Permanent Edition of Words and Phrases, page 135, under the heading of Ejusdem Generis:

Principle of 'ejusdem generis" is that general words following enumeration of particular things are applicable only to things of same general nature.

[*7728*] That is a case from Oregon.

From a case in Texas, we find.

Under "ejusdem generis rule" general words following particular words will not include things of a superior class.

Now, one from California:

The rule of "ejusdem generis" requires that words of general description following words of particular description be interpreted as applying to things of similar character.

And:

Under the rule of "ejusdem generis" the general words applied to persons or things contained within the general genus of the particular person or things, enumerated, and are not limited to any particular one.

That is from a North Dakota case.

Then one from Illinois:

The rule of "ejusdem generis" is that general words following an enumeration of particular cases apply only to cases of the same kind as expressly mentioned.

Now, what counsel (Mr. Murphy) was jumping around for, itching to interpose, was to point out to you that it is clearly without the sense of the text, of course, it will not be limited to the precise words. But that brings us to this question of surprise.

[*7729*] Even though there is an abundance of evidence for the first several years after this tragic event that nobody was surprised in Washington, the President told about the impending attack, as you remember, was reported in the Stimson Diary, just 2 or 3 days before it happened, that we were going to be attacked by Japan.

He told Mr. Willkie that we were going to be attacked in 2 or 3 days in the famous letter that was received here in evidence.

"You better make plans in the light of the pending attack," that was sure to come. Also, in view of the fact that Mrs. Roosevelt said that they were not a bit surprised in and around the White House, that they sat by the radio listening to the radio. And, I don't know whether it is hind-thought or not, but now, in the course of this hearing, Admiral Stark says he was surprised. He was the commander in chief, and he was the man who wrote that message to you.

Now, if he intended to include Hawaii in that warning to you, would he have been surprised when the attack came?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to answer that. I think the evidence presented answers that very well.

Mr. GEARHART. General Marshall, so he said, was very much surprised when the attack came.

Admiral KIMMEL. So I understand.

[*7730*] Mr. GEARHART. And we have been informed by certain witnesses that the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, was very surprised when the attack came in Hawaii.

The point I am making, and I don't know whether you like it or not, but I want to make it—I think the American people should know—how can they condemn the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for being taken by surprise when everybody above him, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, all insisted that they were surprised.

I guess you don't want to comment on that.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think what you say is quite pertinent, and I think what you say is accurate.

Mr. GEARHART. I think that is all. Thank you very much. I see the Senator from Michigan is here, and he will inquire.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Kimmel, you have in your possession certain war plans; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Those plans were known as Rainbow 5,

[*7731*] and they related to the Orange power, which was Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, Rainbow 5 included more than that, but it included Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. What other powers did it include? Being a war plan, it anticipated that certain things would be done if we had a war with what powers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, as I recall, it was Germany, Italy, and Japan. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And as far as it possibly could be done, you had to carry it out if we got into war, you had to carry out that plan; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get orders to mobilize your fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I never did.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you have mobilized your fleet without carrying out that war plan or any part of that war plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. If we had received an order to mobilize that would automatically put into effect the provisions of the war plans short of hostile action.

[*7732*] Senator FERGUSON. Now, did that war plan provide what steps you were to take in case of hostilities with the orange power, or Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. The war plan did provide that; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, provided there was a war between America and Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there a method of putting that plan into effect after a declaration of war, was there some provision in the plan that after a declaration of war you were to take certain steps?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as far as the United States was concerned, the only way the United States could declare war was by an act of Congress; isn't that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that as far as we were concerned that war plan would take effect after we had declared war on Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, yes, sir, but——

Senator FERGUSON. But it also provided, did it not, that if Japan declared war on us the war plan would come into [*7733*] effect?

Admiral KIMMEL. I must say right here that after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor I issued an order to all ships and stations to execute the WPL–46 against Japan. I may have anticipated the Congress but I thought it was necessary to warn everybody in unmistakable language, and I did so.

Senator FERGUSON. Japan could declare war in two ways upon us, one by her legislative act or body and the executive branch or by an attack ?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I considered that when they attacked Pearl Harbor they declared war on us and took every choice away from us.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the plan was in operation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In that kind of case you didn't have to wait for any formal notice from the Secretary of the Navy or from Admiral Stark?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know whether I had any legal obligation to wait, but I didn't wait.

Senator FERGUSON. But prior to that time you had certain duties as a peacetime commander in chief, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. What was that?

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that time, prior to the [7734] attack, you had certain duties to perform, as commander in chief of our fleet, in peacetime?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when they gave you a war warning, did they put into effect this plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I was expressly enjoined to make a preparatory deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46.

Senator FERGUSON. So that instead of putting into effect this war plan it went further and warned you only to prepare for putting it into effect?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is what words say.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did that war plan provide what you were to do in case England or the British possessions were attacked?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever try to find out what you were to do in that case?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you want to know that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Because I wanted to know what our action would be following war betwixt Great Britain and Japan, [7735] and because I knew of the conversations which we had had, and I wanted to definitely know what we would do in case of such a war.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew that in the Atlantic we had what was known as a shooting war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I knew that.

Senator FERGUSON. And shooting orders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was in effect in certain parts of the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. The southeast Pacific, a restricted area, about 700 miles off the coast of South America.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that apply to the Japanese as well as the German and Italian Governments?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did not apply to Japan; no.

Senator FERGUSON. So there was no shooting war in effect so far as Japan was concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Anywhere?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did want to know then what our attitude would be in case of a war between Britain and Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Also I wanted to know what [7736] our attitude would be in case of war betwixt Russia and Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. And also between the Netherlands and Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not definitely; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say "not definitely," did you ever find out to any extent?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the letter which I received from the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 25 that question was still undecided in his mind. I have read that message before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you got an order about escorting some ships, did you not, so far as the United States was concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. On the bottom of page 28 one of the tasks assigned—and that is the exhibit put in Saturday; what is that number?

Mr. MASTEN. 129.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got it before you? Page 28.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Route shipping of Associated Powers within the Fleet [7737] control zone.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain that to me. That was one of the tasks.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the fleet-control zones were to be established after the outbreak of war, and we were to tell them where to go, when to arrive, when to depart, the route they were to take through those zones, so we would know at all times where our own shipping was, and that would be the associated powers.

Senator FERGUSON. When you included "our own" you meant also the associated powers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We were escorting British and Dutch ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the Pacific?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. We escorted a Dutch ship; at least one.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a message somewhere, and I haven't it at my fingertips now, of what we would have done in case there was an attack on a Dutch ship. Do you recall that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I remember something about that.

Senator FERGUSON. We were escorting a Dutch ship at that [7738] time?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did escort a Dutch ship, as I recall, from Pearl Harbor down to Moresby in New Guinea.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know about what time we escorted that Dutch ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, it was sometime in the summer, I think. I forget the date. That can be determined very readily.

Senator FERGUSON. I will try and find that message, Admiral.

Had you any message or information about the United States sending some Army troops to New Guinea on the Dutch possessions?

If I can take a moment I will try and find that.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. On the 26th of November did you know that in announcing that the United States would cooperate with the Netherlands in protecting bauxite mines in Dutch Guiana and by sending a contingent of the United States Army there, the White House explained that this action was taken—

because disturbed conditions in the Pacific made it inadvisable for the Netherlands to strengthen the Dutch Guiana defense by drawing upon the defense forces now stationed in the Netherlands East Indies.

Senator LUCAS. May I inquire what you are reading from?

Senator FERGUSON. I am reading from "The Situation in [7739] the Far East, a general summary on November 26, 1941, to the Secretary of State."

Senator LUCAS. Is that an exhibit in the hearing?

Senator FERGUSON. No; it is not.

Senator LUCAS. Whose summary is it?

Senator FERGUSON. It isn't signed. It has got the initials "G. A." Who would that be?

Mr. MASTEN. George Atcheson, it might be. I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to see it, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. No; I don't care to see it. I just wanted to identify the document.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just asking him about it. I don't care to put the instrument in.

I am asking if you ever heard of that, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. I may have heard of it. I don't recall it now. I have no recollection of it at the present time.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard of the plan proposed to buy New Guinea and give it to the Japs?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I never heard it, and I didn't know anything about—I don't know anything about it even now.

Senator FERGUSON. You had never heard of it until I asked the question?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

[7740] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if Dutch Guiana is in the Pacific. It is in the Caribbean.

Senator FERGUSON. It is in the Pacific. Did I say Dutch Guiana? It is New Guinea.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought you said New Guinea. That is what I took you to mean.

Senator FERGUSON. You had never heard of any such plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I have no knowledge of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, as to the document I read here, Dutch Guiana is in the Caribbean, the bauxite mines. You understood that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I was thinking of the Pacific all the time.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to change that. It reads:

> In announcing that the United States would cooperate with the Netherlands in the protection of the bauxite mines in Dutch Guiana—

that is in South America?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

> by sending a contingent of the United States Army there, the White House explained that this action was taken [7741] because disturbed conditions in the Pacific made it inadvisable for the Netherlands to strengthen the Dutch Guiana defenses by drawing upon the defense forces now stationed in the Netherlands East Indies.

Admiral KIMMEL. I misunderstood. I had in mind New Guinea. I think I did hear something about that, but whether I read it in the newspaper or where I got the information I don't know. But I did

know something about that. I did hear something about it, but that was outside of my province and I didn't consider it of any great moment to me.

[7742] Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know prior to the 7th of December—and the testimony is of General Marshall here—that we were putting certain air bases in the Pacific in the British possessions and the Dutch possessions, and we were sending bombs there and oil and gas?

Admiral KIMMEL. Do you speak of Christmas and Canton?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew that we were undertaking some work out there, and I knew that General Short was directed to do certain things, and we assisted him in that, particularly in supplying him with fuel, the ships; he brought a ship out there, and we had to supply it with fuel—or chartered a ship, I should say.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would it be correct to say that your first and your chief objective in the event of an American-Japanese war was an attack upon the Marshall Islands to divert the Japanese from the Malayan barrier which comprised vital possessions of the Dutch and the British, who would be our allies?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Mr. Churchill had on——

Admiral KIMMEL. That was if and when we got into the war.

[7743] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Mr. Churchill had on the 25th of August 1941 said: "It is certain that this has got to stop." I had better get the exact quote from the newspapers. I will read from the New York Times as of Monday, August 25.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of what year, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Monday, August 25, 1941. This was a broadcast:

> It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed, but this I must say, that if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourself unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.

Were you familiar with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Whether I saw that or not, I saw some statements made by Mr. Churchill along that very same line.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, what was the Malay barrier as far as you understood it? What did it consist of?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, as I understood the Malay barrier it was a general term to include the Malay States, [7744] Sumatra, Java, Borneo, New Guinea, and the adjacent islands.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it include the Kra Peninsula, the Kra Isthmus?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is a Malay State; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And it included Singapore, did it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it include the Dutch East Indies?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, would the attack on the Marshalls accomplish the chief purpose of the American war plan that you then

had, if that attack occurred after Singapore had fallen to the Japanese?

Admiral KIMMEL. That would have been a little late.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would it have been a little more than a little late?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it would have been, in my judgment, if I had waited too long.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. Well, now, was that one of the reasons why you were trying to find out in advance what you were to do in case they attacked the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would have also been late after the Japanese had gone into Borneo and Java, would it not?

[*7745*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, was the Marshall operation and its value contingent upon it being undertaken before the Japanese had breached the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, certainly before they had had a chance to take those land areas which comprise the Malay Barrier. It had to draw the forces away in time, before they had conquered that country and before they had gone down there really.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, is that why you were interested in the movement and why the United States was interested in the movement south?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was very much interested, yes. I wanted to know what they were doing and where they were headed for.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you also want to know what you were to do in case you were sure that they were going south?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you ever find that out prior to the attack on the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. What I was to do?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; not definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now you come back to those words

[*7746*] "Not definitely." Did you ever find any information on it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not except what has been presented right here, and the war plans and other places. I wanted to know what we were to do. I did not find out.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, in the war plans that Senator Brewster questioned you about, page 35, or section 35, here was one of the Navy's tasks. It is on page 23 of the appendix.

Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I find it first, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you have it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is page 23 of the appendix. It is appendix I. It is the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, section 8, "Tasks continued" under 35, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I have it now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you were to—

Support the task forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of

positions in the Marshalls and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

[7747] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did that task depend upon your first knowing that America was in the war by virtue of an attack or declaration of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did. I had no authority to act until I received definite word from my Government. I had no authority to act at all and if the—I will put it this way: Had the Japanese made an attack on the Kra Peninsula, had they made an attack on Java, I would have been unable to do anything until I got orders to move.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Admiral Hart on the 6th—that is on a Saturday—had inquired about what we were to do in relation to three or four incidents in case of an attack on other than our territory?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that he reported to the Navy Department that he had learned from Admiral Phillips of certain commitments made by our Government of which he had never been informed and asked for further information.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, that very thing you had been inquiring about before, had you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had not found it out?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had not found it out.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know about that inquiry?

[7748]It is in exhibit 40 now before us. Did you know about that inquiry of Admiral Hart prior to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that came to me after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. After the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. It reads in this way:

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the message introduced as exhibit 40.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not get that until after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That came to me after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were you here when I asked Admiral Turner some questions? Were you here when he was examined?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I was not present.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you aware that Admiral Turner had informed the Japanese Ambassador in August—or, no, in July, and I think the exact date was July 23 or 24,— [7749] that the United States would not tolerate, in view of its policy of aiding Britain and its interpretation of self-defense, a Japanese threat to the Malay Barrier?

Admiral FERGUSON. I did not know that he had made any such statements.

Senator FERGUSON. You never had any such information?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you ever told that Admiral Stark was called to the White House by the President on July 24 and that then he heard a statement by the President to Japan to the effect—which statement was that if Japan attempted to get Dutch oil by force, the British and Dutch would fight and there would then result a most serious situation between the United States and Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't remember ever having been informed of that conversation.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Is that Stark's testimony?

Senator FERGUSON. It is in volume 2 of "Foreign Relations".

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever had that information?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

[*7750*] Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you would have had that information in relation to Admiral Turner's conversation—and, by the way, a copy of that was sent to the President, was sent to the Secretary of State and was never disputed as far as Turner was concerned and he was never called on the carpet, or it was never taken up with him that he was wrong in that—and this other conversation that Stark heard from the President to the Japanese—if you had known of that would you then have known the policy of America in case of an attack upon the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have been most helpful to me and if I had known all the circumstances and the fact that that was the policy of the Government; yes, it would have helped immensely.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you as a peacetime commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet trying to carry out the policy of America?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And your endeavor was at all times to learn, if you could, what our policy was?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you also had to know at the same time if you wanted to be an efficient officer what the policy of any proposed enemy or contemplated enemy, let me put it [*7751*] that way, would be?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we wanted to know everything we could about the enemy, everything that was available.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, were you advised that on August 17, when the President returned from the Atlantic conference, that the President called the Japanese Ambassador to the White House and told him in diplomatic language, and it was rather blunt and in writing, that a Japanese threat or show of force against the Malay Barrier or any movement in the Pacific would compel the United States immediately to take any and all steps necessary to protect our rights?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not know about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that such a message was delivered after the return of the President?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Any message?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; not to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you advised that responsible leadership was intercepting secret Japanese messages wherein the Japanese Ambassador was advising his Government that it must expect armed opposition from Great Britain and the United States should Japan move against the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was never informed of that.

[7752] Senator FERGUSON. You never had any information on that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you aware from your own judgment, like Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner have stated here, that Anglo-Dutch-American embargoes on Japan oil supplies, regardless of their justification for such embargoes, constituted an actual and a logical cause of war with Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I thought that the embargoes would irritate Japan considerably and I knew about the embargoes.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you think it would irritate them enough, as has been stated by Admiral Stark, that we should have anticipated war over that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily; no.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not go that far?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In the previous hearing the witness said that he thought it was another step on the road to war.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way you want to put it, just another step?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think there is very little difference betwixt that and what I have just said.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, another step would not be [7753] definite unless we knew how many steps we were away from war.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at that time about how many steps were we away from war, if we can clear that up?

Admiral KIMMEL. That depended upon the attitude of our Government and the attitude of the Japanese Government and had I known what was known in Washington I could have estimated much more accurately how many steps we were away from war.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you fully aware on November the 27th that the Japanese had concentrated for an attack upon the Malay barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was so informed.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in the so-called war warning message they told me that they were and in the—well, we had various reports of the Japanese fleet moving. We had the war warning message, we had the ONI bulletin of December 1 and various other information which showed that they were, the fleet was on the move.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you aware that such an attack, even the obvious preparation for it, was a direct defiance of the formal and explicit warning against such movement given by the United States?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know of the formal and explicit [7754] warning given by the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. So, therefore, you could not evaluate this movement, is that what you are telling us?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I could not properly evaluate it.

Senator FERGUSON. You could not properly evaluate this movement?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were advised on November 24 to expect an immediate Japanese attack upon the Malay barrier and any other place in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. On November 4?

Senator FERGUSON. Twenty-fourth.

Admiral KIMMEL. Twenty-fourth?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the first message.

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't think that said Malay barrier. It said an attack in any direction, or something of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. You had better look at it. It is exhibit 37.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

A surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

That is what the message of the 24th says.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

Indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines [7755] or Guam is a possibility.

That was what it said.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the way the message read?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, then, under date of November the 25th Admiral Stark wrote you a letter, did he not, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you got that letter on the 3rd?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were advised by Admiral Stark after he had a conference at the White House that he was damned if he knew what the United States was going to do should Japan attack the Malay Barrier without at the same time attacking possessions of the United States.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the essence of his—

Senator FERGUSON. That is the essence of what he said?

Admiral KIMMEL. Of his statement; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, with that kind of language to you——

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't know what we were going to do.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). And your knowledge that they were going to the Malay Barrier, at least concentrating to do that, you did not know what steps you could or should take under War Plan No. 5 or 46, as the case may be, [7756] is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, between the date of that letter and its receipt you had been instructed, had you not, to prepare to attack the Marshalls after Japan had committed an overt act against the United States because you got it on the 27th? You got a message on the 27th, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So between the 25th and the 3d you had this message, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the manner of ordinary naval strategy, would the Japanese expect an attack by the Pacific Fleet on the Marshalls in the event the United States should implement its direct and specific warning to oppose a Japanese movement against the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think they probably would expect attacks on the Marshalls. That is reasonable, yes. They, of course, I hoped did not know what we were going to do.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You always have to anticipate, do you not, that Japan knew what our war plan in the Pacific was?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean the statements that had been made to them?

[*7757*] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, in broad outline; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. We knew that they had spies, did we not, not only in America, but in Hawaii and on the west coast in America and for that matter here in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Or should have anticipated that they had.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, even now I doubt if they had access to our war plans.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know or did you anticipate that they could be intercepting our messages?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is always a possibility.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, for instance, from Tokyo to Berlin on November the 30th we knew here that Japan said this in that message:

> What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan they conferred with England, Australia, and Netherlands and China. They did it repeatedly. Therefore it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan along with Germany and Italy as an enemy.

That is on page 206, Exhibit 1.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I don't know what they referred to [*7758*] there. I never thought that, as I read that that——

Senator FERGUSON. But you never had that message before the attack, did you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; I never had the message. I mean now, after I know about these things, that it never occurred to me that that referred to our war plan, particularly as to details of the war plan. What I took it to mean was the broad plan that we—put it this way: That message, in my opinion, referred to the collaboration and the fact that we were allying ourselves with Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, and so forth. That was what I understood that plan to mean. I had known of that before the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, we had talked here about the so-called missing fleet, and I think you said that was a misnomer, but it was the ships that at least we did not know about, the carriers, their location. Was your anxiety about the location of these certain missing Japanese units predicated in any way on the expectancy of meeting up with such a unit in that projected attack on the Marshalls? You had a war plan, did you not, what you were to do?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. When we started off—our expeditions to the Marshalls were largely to get the units of the Japanese fleets to come over there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any idea as to how im- [7759] portant or how vital Singapore was to the Malay Barrier?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. I thought it was a very important post out there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether our leadership in Washington—did anyone here in Washington advise you on December the 6th that a Japanese invasion fleet of sixty-some vessels had been sighted and was within a day or 14 hours—I think the message read "fourteen hours"—of striking distance of the approaches to Singapore? It is the so-called Winant message.

Admiral KIMMEL. What message was that?

Senator FERGUSON. Winant. At 10:40 the State Department received it here in Washington.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I never got that message, but I got information along that same line.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you show him the message? It is the Winant message that came into the State Department on the 6th of December. It reads this way:

British Admiralty reports at 3 A. M. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers; Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.

(Signed) WINANT.

[7760] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there was a message from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to OPNAV on December 6 which said:

Report by CINC China "25 ship convoy with escort of 6 cruisers and 10 DD's Lat 08-00 N, 106-00 East at 0316 GMT Today. Convoy of 10 ships with two cruisers and 10 destroyers 07-40 North, 106-20 East two hours later. All on course west. Three additional ships 07-51 North 105 East at 0442, Course 310. This indicates all forces will make for Kohtron." Sighted by my scouting force anchored Camranh Bay—30 ships and one large cruiser.

Now, I had that, and Kohtron, where he sighted these ships, was located—where he said these ships were headed is in Indochina—not so very far from the Thai border.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Admiral, now what could that mean to you with the knowledge that you had when you tried to find out what we were going to do if they attacked the British possessions, what could that message, with the other information, mean to an admiral commander in chief?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, what it meant to me when I saw this thing, "Forces moving for Kohtron," that was the estimate there, we followed out what the Navy Department had told me that the most probable places they would go into was into [7761] Thai and they were concentrating their forces over there to go into Thai.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you did not know, Admiral, what the United States was going to do in case they attacked there, why in the world would they send you that message? That was another power. We were a separate and distinct nation. Why would that message be sent to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, this message was sent to OPNAV because OPNAV had directed the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to get this information and the commander in chief Asiatic Fleet had carried out his orders to get the information.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Admiral, why would they be sending it to Washington? America is an independent and sovereign power. Why were we concerned if we did not have a war plan in relation to that attack? Why would it be sent here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, those were some of the problems there that I had.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize they were your problems and you were trying to find out what we were going to do.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I was.

Senator FERGUSON. And you told us now that you never did find out.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

[*7762*] Senator FERGUSON. You were positive about that, that you never got an answer as to what we were to do.

Admiral KIMMEL. The last answer I had on that subject before the attack was what you have just read here a few minutes ago in Admiral Stark's letter of November 25, which I received on December 3.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. He also had a memorandum which had been given to the President which says that the only plan we had was to conduct a defensive war in connection with the British and the Dutch for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes; I had that.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the memorandum of November 5.

Admiral KIMMEL. I see.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that give you information as to what you were to do?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did not; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or what America was to do in case of an attack only on some other power?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; it did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the President by [*7763*] direct order had ordered three ships to go into the Gulf of Siam or off the Coast of China to watch for this movement into the Kra Peninsula?

Adimral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had known that would that have indicated you did have something to do in case of that kind of an attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew that the commander in chief of the Asiatic had been ordered to send some planes over to scout, but I did not know that the——

Senator FERGUSON. Three men-of-war?

Admiral KIMMEL (continuing). Ships had been sent over.

Senator FERGUSON. Three men-of-war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, you can call them men-of-war, yes. They had the character of men-of-war, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. They were ships with sailors and guns?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was a perfectly natural thing for us to do on the basis that we wanted to know what the Japanese were doing;

we wanted to know whether they would come to the Philippines or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how would it tell you whether they were coming to the Philippines, and I would like to have you look at the message on page 49 of Exhibit 37:

[7764] Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. Men-of-War are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice.

The President is even telling them how to make men-of-war.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not see that message.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I knew nothing about that. All I knew about was the airplane scouting out of there of the patrol planes, which was at the time, I considered, a very good move to find out what they were doing out there and whether they were coming to the Philippines or not.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, if you had known of this message of the President, from OPNAV to CINCAF, information no one mentioned, would that have indicated to you an answer to that question as to what we were going to do in case of an attack upon the Malay Peninsula?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have been useful information. It would have still been short of any authoritative statement of what our intentions were.

[7765] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for a moment there, just for information?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Doesn't our record show that these three ships were never sent?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, but the fact of going to send them, ordering them to be sent by the President himself, would that have been significant to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That would have been useful information; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know that the presence of the Japanese force before the approaches of Singapore required the responsible leadership in Washington to act immediately or to back down from the former position it had taken with Japan as of Sunday, August the 17th, 1941? I will repeat that question. I will repeat it, Admiral.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me just a moment, Senator, before you go into that. I just call attention to the fact that the President's message, I understand, is to be read in the two Houses about 12 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to recess now?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And Senator George has suggested that we would all like to hear it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I would.

[7766] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I assumed Senator Ferguson would, too.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not through, but we will come back later.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand that it will probably be agreeable for us to recess at this point until 2 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. It is perfectly agreeable and I will try and repeat that question to you this afternoon.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is news to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will recess at this time until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[*7767*] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY (Retired)—Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Kimmel, my last question was, Did you know then that the presence of this Japanese force before the approaches to Singapore required the responsible leadership in Washington to act immediately or to back down from the former position it had taken with Japan as of Sunday, August the 17th, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you had known that, would this fact that they were moving toward the Kra Peninsula made a difference with your action?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is a difficult question to answer because there were so many things that I did not know, but I am quite sure that such a knowledge would have affected my action to some extent.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you had never before you—you had nothing before you, had you, that the United States Government intended to back down from any stand or any policy that it had?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, if the policy was such [*7768*] that we should have anticipated that if they attacked the Kra Peninsula it would mean war with America, should we not have then at the same time anticipated a co-attack on America?

Admiral KIMMEL. That would appear to be reasonable; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know why no one seems to have anticipated that if they attacked the Kra Peninsula they would not also attack America at the same time?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at any time after November the 25th, 1941, did the chief of naval operations, that is Admiral Stark, advise you that instead of being damned if he knew what the United States was going to do in the event that Japan attacked the Malay barrier after bypassing American positions, he did know what the United States was going to do? You see, he wrote you that letter on the 25th.

Admiral KIMMEL. If he had informed me that he knew what the United States was going to do and what they were going to do, it would have been of great assistance to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we had an instrument go in here in evidence last Friday or Saturday. Would you let me have the instrument that went in?

Mr. MASTEN. Which is it?

Senator FERGUSON. The one with regard to the disposi- [7769] tion in relaxation to exchange of nationals.

Mr. MASTEN. Here it is. Exhibit 74–A.

Senator FERGUSON. 74–A. It is the 4th of December 1941 and it is Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Just one sentence from it in relation to an agreement with Japan while we are not at war, to get our nationals out in case we are going to war.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I find that on my copy, please, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It is on page 2. The words, "Such attempt." Britain is trying to get us to take parallel action with them or joint action as our desires may be.

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean beginning with "Although it is possible"?

Senator FERGUSON. No. "Such an attempt might." Do you find it? Are those pages the same? They may not be the same.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I see it. I have it now.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Such attempt might, at this time, be advisable also in that it would be definite indication to the Japanese Government of the firmness of the American position in the present crisis and would be one means of impressing upon the Japanese Government the seriousness with [7770] which we view the present situation.

Now, that being true, that coaction there would indicate to the Japanese Government that we were acting with Britain and considering this as one, shouldn't we have anticipated that if they attacked one they would attack both?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is reasonable; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now we go to the end of it and this is on the end and it is signed by "M. M. H." who, I understand, is Maxwell M. Hamilton:

As the making of such an approach—

and they are speaking now about getting nationals out of Japanese territory in China before the declaration of war, before the shooting starts, and I will read:

As the making of such an approach would be interpreted by the American public as a definite indication—

then this is inserted in—

that this Government—

meaning America—

expects war between Japan and the United States, the Secretary may wish to speak to the President in regard to the advisability of this Government's making such an approach at this time.

Now, that is dated on December the 4th, 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, from all that you have learned wherein the messages were intercepted and was known in Wash- [7771] ington, have you any doubt that war was imminent and that we knew we were going to war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no doubt, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, did you get this message so that it would indicate that we did not want the American public to know that we were going to war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I received no such message; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You received no such message?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, can you account for the fact that you did not get any of this other information that it was along the same line, that they did not want the American public to know that we were going into war? Would that answer some of these questions?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know why I did not get the information, sir. I have never been able to figure it out.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were told this, were you not, that you were to do nothing that would arouse the population of Hawaii to indicate that we were going to war?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was contained in messages which came to me; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, as an admiral in the Navy, how could the fact that General Marshall or Admiral Stark would have alerted you on Sunday morning, say between 7 and 9, [7772] that that message was received, how could the intercepting of that message by the Japs have changed the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to state. I cannot see how it would have changed the situation in the slightest, except that it would have helped us considerably.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But suppose the Japanese fleet had learned at 7 o'clock in the morning, that is 7 our time, on Sunday, which was 5½, is it, 5½ hours before?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Which is 5½ hours before their ships came in, their airplanes came into Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose that they had flashed to that fleet the fact that the Hawaiian Islands were fully alerted and knew that there was something going to happen and our ships would have gone out, how would that have interfered with the Japs other than probably to have stopped them coming in?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't understand how it would have interfered in the slightest degree.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, as an admiral, then, as an expert, you cannot tell us why that would have interfered with our defense?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I indicated that very clearly in [7773] my statement, sir. I cannot understand why I did not get those messages—that information, I mean.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, did you know that on Saturday night about 9 o'clock the President sent a message to the Emperor? Did you get that on the radio?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not know that until after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did give us the answer that you knew of several other things that were being negotiated back and forth during the period between the 27th and the 7th, that there were negotiations on?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I knew from the public press.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all I got.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Well, now, at any time in the year 1941 and from any authoritative source had you been advised that the task of the Pacific Fleet should be in the event of an outbreak of war in the Pacific which did not involve a Japanese attack directly on American possessions—did you know what your task would be in that case, from any source?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any instructions in the event of such a contingency?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

[7774] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any instructions or plans for the Asiatic Fleet in such a contingency?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not get that last.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any instructions to Hart's fleet, the Asiatic Fleet, in such a contingency?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, or did you not know, that the Atlantic Fleet and the South Pacific Fleet were engaged in what the English language has always defined as a war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I knew the shooting orders which had been issued to the Atlantic Fleet and to the Southeast Pacific detachment.

Senator FERGUSON. Southeast Pacific, yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any shooting in the Pacific outside of those two areas, that Southeast Pacific? Did you know of any shooting prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Only the orders I issued myself about depth bombing submarines.

Senator FERGUSON. Did yiu know of any other actual shooting?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't been able during the noon [7775] hour to find that message in relation to the Netherlands ship, someone indicating that a definite ship or some Netherlands ship—that we would go between them in case there was any shooting.

Admiral KIMMEL. I recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, what kind of an order do you interpret that to be?

Admiral KIMMEL. The way I interpret that order is that you would go in betwixt an attacking force and a Netherlands ship and if they shot at you——

Senator FERGUSON. You would shoot back?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why, I would probably shoot back.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, that would create at least an incident, would it not, an international incident?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, it probably would.

Senator FERGUSON. And there would be little use then of talking about the first overt act, wouldn't there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Japs would have shot first.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. Even though you would have run between the mark that he was shooting at and that wasn't our mark.

that did not belong to this country, you would consider under those circumstances that the Jap shot first?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have to know all the circumstances first.

[7776] Senator FERGUSON. On the 18th of November 1941, there is this message, in exhibit 37——

Admiral KIMMEL. What is the date, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. The 18th of November 1941.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It reads:

In convoy with American Flag vessels, placing of *Bloemfontein* is authorized Until international conditions on and subsequent to 25 November become defined, and clarified, however, any further direct or Great Circle routing between Hawaii and the Philippines should not be used. Until further advised by department routes south of Mandates should be prescribed.

Do you know why they used the date there "subsequent to November 25"?

Adimarl KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that we had a message that we intercepted from the Japs showing that the dead line date was the 25th of November?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I never had anything like that.

Senator FERGUSON. So then if you received this message what would that November 25 mean? It was for your action—CINCPAC.

[7777] Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know what November 25 meant, but I was concerned, when I received this, with the orders I received to put the *Bloemfontein* in the convoy with American-flag vessels.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a Dutch ship, was it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That was a Dutch ship.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the fact that we put that ship into our convoy would indicate that we were taking parallel action? Did you take it as such?

Admiral KIMMEL. My memory is not entirely clear, but I think we had some matériel, or personnel, or something on this ship that we wanted to get through, on the *Bloemfontein.*

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think we had some soldiers on that ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall that, as to just what it was. On one of these Dutch ships that we used, we had some fliers that were going out to China.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not get that word.

Admiral KIMMEL. Aviators.

Senator FERGUSON. Fliers. I did not get the word at first.

Admiral KIMMEL. I forget which one it was.

[7778] Senator FERGUSON. Who would know what was on that ship that we were using our convoys to take out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the only place you could find that now would be in the Navy Department. I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Masten, would you let me have that Formosa information on the fleet?

Mr. MASTEN. That has not been offered yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you offer it in evidence as Exhibit 130?

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we would like to offer at this time, as Exhibit 130, a collection of memoranda and communications obtained from the files of the State Department regarding reconnaissance by Japanese aircraft over American possessions in the Pacific, together with a dispatch dated November 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to the Secretary of State forwarding a note from the Japanese foreign office protesting the flight of an American airplane over Taiwan on November 20, 1941, and the reply of the State Department to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo to that message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received as Exhibit 130.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 130.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that the same document that was distributed to the committee Saturday?

Mr. MASTEN. It is.

[*7779*] Senator FERGUSON. Would you get a copy of it, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have it.

Senator FERGUSON. The first item on that is dated October 27, 1941 and reads:

British sources report 2 Japanese aircraft carriers, one of which is the Kaga, operating in mandated islands. Following planes reported there:

Now we did not have possession of the mandated islands, did we?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did not have possessions in the mandated islands?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. None, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why this kind of report was sent to our Navy Department then?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I believe they were exchanging information about this time.

Senator FERGUSON. The next one is dated November 21, 1941:

Source New Zealand Naval Intelligence: On November 16 and 17 planes, apparently Japanese, were sighted over Gilberts.

Were the Gilberts under our control?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were British possessions, the [*7780*] Gilberts.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this information sent to you prior to the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am just trying to read it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; if you will read it all.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the next one is November 24, 1941:

Dependable reports here of reconnaissance flights over Gilbert Islands on November 15 by monoplane with tapered wings, single tailfin, twin engines. Next day repeated by monoplane flying boat silver color number of engines unobserved.

That was not over our territory, was it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the Gilberts again, the British possessions.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now the next one is a complaint over our planes, where Japan made a complaint. It is dated November 29, 1941.

I have the honor to state that according to a report from the Japanese Naval authorities, an American airplane flew over Garanbi on the southernmost tip of Taiwan Island at 12:30 p. m. November 20, 1941, and after circling at an altitude of 2,000 meters flew away southward at 12:45 p. m. the [7781] same day.

It is believed that the Japanese Government cannot overlook such a violation of Japanese territory by an airplane and it is therefore requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the United States authorities concerned.

Also I particularly bespeak Your Excellency's solicitude particularly the recurrence of such incidents at this time when the international situation is tense and the untoward events to which they might give rise are unpredictable.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Signed by Togo, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is sent to the Department of State only and signed by Grew.

Had you known of that wire?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or that event?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you know of our reply where we made a complaint on December 6, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Where is that, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the last page. It reads:

Your 1868, November 29, 6 p. m.

The Foreign Office note has been brought to the attention [7782] of the appropriate authorities of this Government.

In connection with this question, you may be interested to know that the Navy Department has been informed by the Governor of Guam that about noon on November 24 an unidentified two-motored airplane circled the southern extremity of Guam for about ten minutes flying at an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet.

In other words, instead of our replying to the complaint that they made we said, in effect, "One of your planes flew over our territory." That is what it amounts to, doesn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is what it appears to amount to.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was any scouting over Guam or Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. Guam or Midway, did you say?

Senator FERGUSON. Guam or Midway. This shows that apparently there was some scouting over Guam.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no recollection of any report having been received to that effect. It is possible I did get it, but I am quite sure I never got anything about Midway.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know if there was any scouting over the Philippines?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Over our territory?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

[7783] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask the Senator to ask counsel if they haven't evidence that the Admiral did have knowledge of this business in the South Pacific, and also Guam?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am not positive about Guam.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel also to look up any record from the Navy or Army showing any scouting planes or observation

planes of the Japs over the Philippines prior to the time of the attack on the Philippines.[1]

Mr. MURPHY. I think you will find there is definite information about them being over Guam, and there is definite information about them being over the southern route, and that was under discussion, as to whether they should protect the shipping there.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you are correct about planes on the southern route. I do not recall exactly, but I have no recollection of this particular message.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not know about this message.

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. I did not know about this message either, Admiral, but I remember something about Guam. I will get it.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, did you know that the Japanese Ambassadors here to America, the Japanese Foreign Minister [7784] and Japanese press indicated that they expected the United State to proceed in the Pacific as it had in the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific in the event of an Anglo-Japanese war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Will you repeat that, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you know that the Japanese Ambassador here to America, or Japanese Foreign Minister and the Japanese press, had expressed themselves to the effect that they expected the United States to proceed in the Pacific as it was proceeding in the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific in the event of an Anglo-Japanese war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew what we were doing in the Atlantic on that shooting order?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I knew what we were doing in the Atlantic, and whether I read anything like that in the newspaper I am unable to say at the present time.

However, I do not think I got it either way.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it occur to you at that time, having this example of the Atlantic, that the Japanese naturally and logically would expect the same formula in the Pacific? In other words, did not we have a policy that they should [7785] have anticipated and expected we would carry the same thing out in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, no; I did not not think that they would, because I had been led to believe we were keeping out of war in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. What brought you to that conclusion?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, all the correspondence I had that we did not want to tackle two wars at once. We wanted to confine it to the Atlantic, we did not want to go into the Pacific. That was my impression prior to December 7, that I am talking about now.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you really did not come to the conclusion at any time prior to the attack that we were going to have war in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not come to the conclusion that war was imminent. I did not come to the conclusion that we were forcing the war, or that we were in any way forcing the war. In answer to your question, therefore, I did not consider that the Japanese would

[1] The information was furnished Senator Ferguson. See pp. 5359 to 5361.

expect us to take any such action in the Pacific as had been taken in the Atlantic.

Senator FERGUSON. Now after reading these, intercepts, Exhibit 1—do you know what I mean? That is the printed copy.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. The intercepts I did not get.

[7786] Santor FERGUSON. The intercepts you did not get?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that Japan would anticipate that we were going to carry out the same thing in case they got into a war with England?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that would have been a reasonable conclusion on their part, or something along that line.

Senator FERGUSON. As of December 6, and as a result of the information and instructions sent to you from Washington, and particularly the Stark letter you got on December 3, which was mailed the 25th, did you visualize naval action in the Pacific by the United States following the pattern of the naval action in the Atlantic?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I did not, not following the pattern of the naval action in the Atlantic.

Senator FERGUSON. Now Japan had a fighting Navy in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this factor the vital one in the difference between the conditions in the Atlantic and those in the Pacific: Germany did not have a fighting Navy in the Atlantic, except submarines, did they?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; they did not. They had certain ships that could have done great damage to our convoys in the [7787] Atlantic, and the Italians were putting up considerable trouble in the Mediterranean at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Because they had a fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; they had a fleet there. Also, in all justice, it must be said there was a question as to what Vichy was going to do, and they had quite a fleet, and that was a factor in the Atlantic.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you aware, Admiral Kimmel, that on December 6 information from Singapore to the Asiatic Fleet was to assist the British then in Singapore, and that Admiral Hart was making arrangements to such effect at the time an attack against Singapore was at hand?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe there is any evidence to that effect. I may be wrong about it. I do not believe there is any evidence before this committee that Admiral Hart was getting ready to assist the British in event of an attack against Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. I call to the attention of the Senator that he wired about the talk he had with Admiral Phillips.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there was an Admiralty message that came from the British Isles to us, and then there was a reply dictated, to be sent—according to the memorandum—after the actual attack.

[7788] Senator LUCAS. That is true.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, for the explanation of both Senators, there was an Admiralty dispatch sent to Admiral Kimmel on November 1 about what the British were going to do but not about what we were going to do.

Senator LUCAS. The only thing I am making any complaint about at all—it may not be serious—is the erroneous assumption that Admiral Hurt was to attack. Admiral Hart can testify about that himself.

Senator FERGUSON. I am speaking now about the arrangement that he was making. He had sent out these flying missions to get the information, and he asked for the information. The information was made up here before the attack came. So someone knew here in Washington before the attack came what was to be sent to Admiral Hart in reply to his inquiry, whereas you had made a similar inquiry and, as I understand it, you had no information sent to you, that you received, or sent to you that you did not receive, prior to the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I had no information, and I am not familiar with any details of what Admiral Hart did down there, nor what reply he received.

[*7789*] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. To try to get the record straight, it is my impression that that which you read this morning, "I don't know what we will do, but in my judgment we will do anything," it is my impression that you stated this morning and you seem to state now that that referred to what we were going to do if there was an attack on the Malay Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The question to Admiral Stark was what would happen if we went to war with Russia, and that was the answer he was giving.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 5130 of the record, Mr. Mitchell quotes the reply of Admiral Hart as follows:

> The five parts of your dispatch beginning with 070327 approved with comment as follows:
> X Part one approved X Part two approved but CNO invites attention to possibility that the major Japanese attack against Philippines may come from the eastward and that a Japanese concentration may be established Halmahera or Mindinao approximately in accord with ideas expressed in WPL–44 X.

What was WPL–44? Is that a misprint in here?

[*7790*] Admiral KIMMEL. I think it must be a misprint.

Senator FERGUSON. It must be WPL–46.

Admiral KIMMEL. The only one I know about is WPL–46.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think it is most pertinent in connection with what you are now asking that you refer to page 354 of volume 2 of the Navy Narrative in which there is a discussion of this very question, the Admiralty dispatch, and what we would do, sent to Admiral Kimmel. I don't know whether you have that in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't at the moment.

At least, Admiral, you didn't know of this reply to Admiral Hart?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that I didn't know anything about that until after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the attack on the approaches to Singapore—that is, Malay—was about 9 o'clock Hawaiian time, which was several hours after the attack on Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I knew that at the time; yes, sir. I knew it was after the attack on Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. That was almost a simultaneous attack?

[7791] Admiral KIMMEL. Close to it; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You would consider it as such, within a couple of hours?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it appears that there was a simultaneous attack on Britain and America?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall just what time the Philippines were attacked?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had no knowledge of that through official channels. It has all been published. My information is not authoritative, but my recollection is about 9 o'clock in the morning out there Philippine time, which was about, oh, 5 or 6 hours after the attack at Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, how do you account for the fact, with the years of experience that you had, and the knowledge you had on the 7th, and the knowledge that ships were moving on Malay, that you didn't anticipate an attack simultaneous, or within a few hours or minutes by the Japs on both the British and the Americans? It is indicated on the 6th that within 14 hours there was going to be a movement on Malay, which came to sometime Sunday morning.

As an admiral, with your experience, and the knowledge [7792] you had, how do you account for the fact that you didn't anticipate a concurrent attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. You mean with the information which was actually available to me?

Senator FERGUSON. With the knowledge you had; yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I covered that as thoroughly as I knew how in all my testimony here, and I don't know how to answer it any more clearly than I have. I had forces in the Pacific which I employed to meet what I considered the probable dangers, and to accomplish the most I could in hurting the enemy in case we got into war.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this knowledge you had show the parallel action that now is disclosed in the instruments that were known here in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't know that the parallel action had—if you call it that——

Senator FERGUSON. Whatever you call it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Had gone to any such extent as I now know. I knew that we were having staff conversations. We had had staff conversations. Now, what I wanted to know was what we were actually going to do in certain contingencies. I didn't find that out.

Senator FERGUSON. From your viewpoint, as an admiral, knowing what you knew Washington knew about this parallel [7793] action or joint action, would you have anticipated a concurrent or simultaneous attack if they were going to attack Britain?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Michigan constantly refers to Washington knowing about taking parallel action with Britain. I submit that there isn't any evidence in this record up to this time that shows that the official Government of the United States, and

the official Government of England ever agreed upon any parallel action to be taken by way of a warning against Japan.

Notwithstanding that, the Senator from Michigan, with every witness that he has examined, assumes always that such parallel action was taken. I do not believe it is quite in keeping with what is fair to put that sort of a question to a witness who was not totally familiar with what was going on in Washington. To assume with this witness that parallel action was taken, and to let him answer on that assumption, is not in keeping with what seems to be fair.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course it is unusual to have one member of the committee object to the questions of another member of the committee, but I want to say this, that I am just endeavoring to find out what action was taken.

Now, I endeavored to get whom I consider the only [*7794*] living witness to what took place originally at the Atlantic conference. I am not going to discuss that question. He is not going to be called because the majority of the committee has declined to call him, Mr. Churchill, who is the only man I know of in this country who can tell us what action the British took, or what action was agreed on to be taken.

Now, I will ask this question, forgetting about the word "parallel action": Knowing what you do now, about these messages in this country at the time; knowing now that the Foreign Relations book and the other information shows what took place on the 17th of August—what took place all along the line, not what you knew at the time of the 7th, but what you now know was in Washington in the possession of those in authority—would you have anticipated a simultaneous attack on both and, therefore, if we knew in Washington that there was going to be an attack on the Malay Peninsula that we should have anticipated an attack on all our possessions in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, if I had known all that was known in Washington, I think I would have anticipated such an attack.

Senator FERGUSON. There is one question which I would like to have answered to my satisfaction, and to the [*7795*] satisfaction of every member of this committee.

It is: How could this attack take place as it did, and not be anticipated by those who were in charge of defending the life and the possessions of America?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am unable to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you answer it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when Secretary Knox met you in Hawaii, you said he said something to you about "did you get the message that was sent on the 6th to you?"

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. About the attack. He was referring to the attack? Or what was he referring to? How did it come about? Tell us about it so that we can get some idea?

Admiral KIMMEL. I took it that he was referring to a warning which had been sent out on the 6th. That was my understanding of what he was talking about at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, can you recall who was with you when Secretary Knox made that statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think Captain Smith was there, now Vice Admiral Smith. My recollection is Admiral Bloch was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Was General Short there?

[7796] Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Beatty—Captain Beatty.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where Captain Beatty is now? Is he up in Maine at the Portsmouth Navy Yard?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so. Not at Portsmouth Navy Yard. He has gone to sea now, I believe.

Well, I had better say that I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, owing to that remark, I would like to have Admiral Beatty as a witness in this case, and I think that ought to be made known before he goes to sea.[1]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will take notice of the request of the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would also in that connection, have Admiral Hart as a witness.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Hart?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. We have been talking about him quite a bit, and I think he should be called as a witness.[2]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will take notice of that request by Congressman Murphy.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have just been informed that Admiral Beatty has headquarters at Portland, Maine, and that he is in command of the destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet. I give you that information for what it is worth.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Admiral Beatty one of your [7797] officers?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. He was aide to Secretary Knox.

Senator FERGUSON. So he came to Hawaii from Washington with Secretary Knox as his aide?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you talked to Admiral Beatty since the time you saw him in Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; I talked to him in New York some months ago.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you have a conversation with him at that time about this so-called warning that was sent on the 6th? Did he mention that he knew anything about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; he mentioned something about it at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say, if you recall, or the substance of what he said?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, he was vague about what the warning was. He never saw it, and he didn't know, as I recall, exactly where Mr. Knox got his ideas about it. But he recalled that Mr. Knox had made the statement, and that Mr. Knox, I think, believed always that some such message was at some time either prepared or started from the the Navy Department.

[7798] Senator FERGUSON. And Admiral Beatty indicated that his conversations with Mr. Knox were such that he came to the same conclusion?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; he came to the same conclusion.

---

[1] Adm. Beatty's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3814–3826.

[2] The testimony of Senator Hart, formerly Admiral, commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, appears in Hearings, Part 10, pp. 4794–4828.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the substance of what he said?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you throw any other light at all on that purported warning message of the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot. I know nothing about it. The conversations with Mr. Knox at the time were not important to me. He made the statement. I never thought anything more about it for a long time.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, we can all recognize surprise in a man, although at times it is pretty hard to describe, but when you said you hadn't received it, did you see any surprise as far as Mr. Knox was concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, at first he insisted that he had sent it and that I must have received it, and I was a little concerned over my communications system, that it might have been at fault, and when he spoke at the first, I didn't know whether my people were at fault, or what, and I proceeded to investigate.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

[*7799*] Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Do you have the Roberts' report here, counsel?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield? I would like to clear a matter up.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I am wondering why, if this Knox incident occurred, there wasn't some reference to it by the admiral before the Roberts Board, because before the Roberts Board he spoke about a message on the night of December 6 having been sent to CINCAF; but nothing at all about any discussion of messages ever going to Hawaii.

Admiral KIMMEL. Because, by that time I had convinced myself that I had never received the message, and that message about which I spoke as having been sent to CINCAF—I still thought when I went before the Roberts Commission that such a message had been sent to CINCAF, and that because Secretary Knox told me so. That was all the evidence I had. I think I so stated.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Kimmel, you couldn't be mistaken could you, that Secretary Knox was talking about a message sent to Admiral Hart?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I had better tell the story again——

Mr. MURPHY. May I add this—Senator, will you yield?

[*7800*] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There is, I think, one other pertinent observation, and that is that there is testimony that when Philips, who was the Chief of Staff of General Short first talked to General Marshall on the phone, he is quoted in the record as saying, "Did you get the message we sent last night."

I don't know whether you know about that or not, but that is in the record, where Philips spoke about a message "last night," and it is my understanding that Marshall at that time was referring to his own message on the 7th rather than the night of the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, before the Roberts committee—beginning with the sentence before:

Expedition is approaching Thailand for MacArthur. The Secretary of the Navy has stated that a special warning was sent by the Department to CINCAF on the day preceding the surprise attack. The fact that such a warning was

not delivered to me indicates that the Administration did not expect an air attack on Oahu.

I am reading from page 27 of Admiral Kimmel's previous testimony. It is page 538 at the top.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel's testimony where, Senator?

[*7801*] Senator FERGUSON. The large volume presented to us. Before the Roberts Commission.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Admiral has testified more than once. I wanted him, Admiral, to direct your attention to which testimony he was referring to.

Admiral KIMMEL. I understood what he was reading.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, where did you get the idea that a message was sent to Admiral Hart? That is CINCAF?

Admiral KIMMEL. When I told Mr. Knox, after I had investigated, that no such message had ever been sent to me, then he said, "I am sure it was sent to CINCAF."

Senator FERGUSON. But at first he insisted it was sent to you also?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; he did. And then he asked whether I would decode all the messages that went through to CINCAF. I told him not unless we were, not unless they were addressed to me, or to me for information, at least, that there was a large volume of messages and a great many of them didn't concern us.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you only decoded those that were either action for you, or information for you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Generally speaking; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

[*7802*] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think I have the answer.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

[*7803*] Mr. MURPHY. In the Knox report you will find, in column 1—I am reading from the New York Times, Saturday, January 5, 1946. Under the heading "Defense plans were prepared," it says:

General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight—

That is, General Short.

General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight before the attack failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been made.

Now, then, later on——

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment, that I may clear the record.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is on page 6223 of our transcript. I have it before me.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. I want to come to the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Under the fourth column, in the New York Times, under the heading paragraph 2:

The Army and Navy Commands had received a general war warning on November 27 but a special war warning sent out by the War Department at midnight December 7 to the Army [*7804*] was not received until some hours after the attack on that day.

So he is apparently referring to one of the messages, and not to a "lost" message, as the papers of the country carried it over the week end.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 6223 of the record (reading):

General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him unfour or five hours after the attack had been made.

Was Secretary Knox talking to you about a War Department message or a Navy Department message?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was talking to me about a message which he thought originally was addressed to both the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and that was my understanding of what he said.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was a Navy Department message then?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume so.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, he didn't——

Admiral KIMMEL. I didn't inquire any further into it than what I have said.

Senator FERGUSON. He didn't indicate that he was talking [*7805*] about a War Department message to General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He talked about it being sent to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. And to the commander in chief of the Asiatic.

Senator FERGUSON. And the commander of the Asiatic?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you talked to Admiral Beatty—what is his first name?

Admiral KIMMEL. Frank; Frank Beatty.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. Rear admiral.

Senator FERGUSON. When you talked to him did you get any light on whether or not he thought that it was a Navy Department message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the last time I talked to him he appeared to be confused about it; I mean about what actually happened, but there is no question in my mind, at least, about what Mr. Knox said to me. I have tried to give you that exactly. I am unable to interpret it any further than I have already done.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all we want.

Now, here is one that went out late Saturday evening. That is, on the 6th, 12:43 at noon on the 6th.

[*7806*] In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands, you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should, of course, be maintained until the last moment.

Was Hawaii one of the outlying islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Was Hawaii one of our outlying Pacific islands referred to in that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. What we would term the outlying islands were Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake. This was a message which you called my attention to yesterday, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Which we spoke of. And that message you also reminded me had been sent in a deferred status.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand; that is correct.

Admiral KIMMEL. They certainly wouldn't send a message that they considered highly important in a deferred status.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that was actually received? Was it Monday?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I would say that that was received—I think I didn't see that until after the attack.

[*7807*] Senator FERGUSON. After the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I told you yesterday. I can't swear to that, but it is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Can counsel get us just when that was received in Hawaii? I want to know when it was actually received and translated there as a deferred message. There is something in the record that it was received as late as Monday. I haven't that before me now. They are going to get when it was received, Admiral.[1]

Your knowledge is that you never saw that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is my belief at the present time. As I say, I can't swear to it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It is my understanding that Admiral Ingersoll sent that, and here in the Navy Narrative it says it was sent priority, so I think there is a dispute on it. I will get the page.

Senator LUCAS. Will you get the photostat?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator give me the date of the message?

Senator FERGUSON. December 6.

Senator GEORGE. December 6, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. December 6, 1941.

[*7808*] Now, Admiral, in conclusion I want to ask you if there is anything that you want to put on this record now, either new or in correction of anything that is on it, so far as you are concerned, so that you will now feel that you have had a full hearing before this committee.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have nothing further to say.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your answer?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have nothing further to say.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel then that you have had a full hearing before this committee?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. I wouldn't want any man to feel that he didn't have such a hearing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Full enough to satisfy you, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and more so.

Senator FERGUSON. On this message of the 6th that I read to you, exhibit 37, page 45, who would naturally or ordinarily receive that in Hawaii? It was for action CINCPAC, that is you, and it was for information CINCAF, that is Admiral Hart, and it was from OPNAV, which was Admiral Stark.

Admiral KIMMEL. That would come to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, tell us the machinery out there, what happened to it when it came over the radio.

[1] See memorandum from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 9, p. 4288.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, when it came over the radio it [7809] went to communication officer. They had it decoded. And it was presented to me and to the members of my staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was your radio, that is, your Navy radio, in operation 24 hours a day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that if this was sent at noon, or any hour of the day, it should go out on your radio and be picked up by your radioman, and if it was deferred you say then it would be among the last or the last to be decoded and given to you? What did you call those not deferred—priority?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that there were four classes of messages in effect at that time. There was the ultra priority, there was a priority message, there was a routine message, and then the deferred message, in that order.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to read from page 613 of the Navy Narrative, volume 2, referring to this message:

> Admiral Noyes testified that the above dispatch to Admiral Kimmel was treated as a priority dispatch.

That will be found in the naval court of inquiry record at page 1040 and 1042.

> Admiral Kimmel testified that he presumed he had received [7810] the above dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations prior to the attack.

That is at page 327.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well——

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have an answer to that?

Admiral KIMMEL. The only thing is that the photostatic copy of the message which was supplied to us during the naval court of inquiry indicated that it was in a deferred status, and that is where I got my idea it was deferred, and where you probably got your idea. I certainly am unable to state now from my memory whether it was a deferred or priority dispatch. I also said that I had testified here that I do not recollect whether it was received before or after the attack, I thought afterwards, and I judged that from the time of its origin, that it probably came in at night, and if it did and was deferred it certainly wouldn't be such as they would wake me up for it.

Mr. MURPHY. The exhibit is 22 among the naval court of inquiry exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. I agree with the Congressman and the Senator from Illinois that this is——

Admiral KIMMEL. I want it understood with regard to this dispatch I haven't looked at the papers recently and I am testifying from memory.

[7811] Senator FERGUSON. I think it is important and I think the other members think it is important that we know exactly when this message was received and whether or not you received it. One of the disappointing things, I think, in this hearing is that we don't find time stamps as to the sender and the receipt of messages. That is one thing that is important when we are dealing with hours as we are here on the 6th and 7th. It is disappointing to find that your messages are not time stamped.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[7812] Senator FERGUSON. And therefore you can't place responsibility.

Admiral KIMMEL. The time of origin here is not necessarily the time it was sent, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel let me see the original message?

The liaison officer of the Navy—I have just talked to him—would like to make another search as to how the original message is classed. That is, the one that is delivered to the transmitter. The one that is delivered to the sender of the coded message. So that we will know definitely whether it was a priority, first class, or a deferred message.

And then I would like to have counsel also get a search at Hawaii as to whether or not it was delivered to Admiral Kimmel, and when it was translated.

This is not clear.

Admiral KIMMEL. This was a message that I had when I testified before the naval court of inquiry. I mean, that transcript of it, that photostat.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That indicates it was sent deferred. I took that as being correct.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, if it isn't marked Priority 1, 2, or 3, whatever it is, then it goes deferred?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is it.

Senator FERGUSON. So this, not being marked, this photostatic copy, it indicates to you, as it indicates to me, that it went deferred?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But I want another search made to see whether or not there is any other message showing that when it got to the place, it was to be sent to, whether it went actually under priority. I think that is material.

That is all I have.

Mr. MURPHY. May I make the request that the testimony of Admiral Kimmel as contained in this volume [indicating] be marked an exhibit and be incorporated by reference in the record?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that may be done.

Mr. MASTEN. It will be Exhibit 131.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 131.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will now inquire, Admiral.

[7814] Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, before asking any questions of Admiral Kimmel, I want the record to show that in connection with the offer of an exhibit which purported to show the times of the attack on various localities which was offered yesterday or the day before, ostensibly from naval information, that I stated at that time that the Navy had issued an official statement about a year after Pearl Harbor, and that I had read it in the New York Times, but could not at that time fix the date.

I now have that paper from my files, dated Sunday, December 6, 1942. It states:

The Navy Department today issued the following statement on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, last.

And in this statement appears this language:

At 7:55 a. m., on December 7, 1941, Japanese dive bombers swarmed over the Army Air Base, Hickam Field and the Naval Air Station on Ford Island. A few minutes earlier the Japanese had struck the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe Bay.

Now, I have had information from several books that have been written on the subject which indicated that the first attack took place on the naval air station at Kaneohe Bay, and fixed the time considerably earlier than [*7815*] 7:55, and I bring this information to the committee merely to indicate that in the official Navy release issued 1 year after Pearl Harbor, they indicate that the first attack did take place on Kaneohe Naval Air Station some minutes prior to the attack on Hickam and Ford Island, and so on.

The question still arises as to the exact time that the attack took place on Kaneohe Naval Air Station, and on that, before the hearing is concluded, I hope to be able to submit some very definite proof as to the exact time.

Now, Admiral, I think you have had a hearing that has been full to overflowing, you have been doing a lot of talking and I have been trying to keep step, but as the last member of the committee, I always just catch the drippings, after the bird has been plucked right down to the bone.

So at least we have come to what is the beginning of the end of the ordeal to which you have been subjected.

So far as I am concerned, you have acquitted yourself magnificently.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you.

Mr. KEEFE. What I shall ask you is merely to try to clarify one or two things that have bothered me to some extent in connection with this long cross-examination.

I would like to have you state specifically and [*7816*] clearly for the purposes of the record, the exact functions of the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, which at the time of Pearl Harbor was Admiral Bloch.

Now, so that you may know, and I don't want to have any confusion on the subject when we get through, I am somewhat confused in my own mind, because it appears that your testimony heretofore has indicated that you gave certain orders, and that certain orders went to Admiral Bloch who was commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and that he in turn had certain relations with the general in command, General Short, and that orders might go direct from Washington to Admiral Bloch and hence to General Short, and he might report directly to Washington, rather than you.

I am confused as to this relationship, and I would like to have you straighten it out for purposes of this record.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I will endeavor to do so, sir, but the organization is not easy to understand, I must admit.

The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had duties which fall into two broad categories:

First. Those which have their origin directly in Navy regulations, or joint Army-Navy war plans.

Second. Those which have their origin directly in [*7817*] specific orders issued by me as commander in chief of the fleet.

In the first category are the following duties:

Under Navy regulations, the commandant is a direct representative of the Navy Department in all matters affecting district activity. In short, he is in charge of the naval shore establishments and naval local defense forces. Under war plans, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, were commanders of the Hawaiian coastal frontier which included Oahu and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu.

In this connection, Admiral Bloch and General Short prepared a joint coastal frontier defense plan for the Hawaiian coastal frontier.

That set forth various Army and Navy missions in some detail.

This Hawaiian Coastal Frontier included all of the Hawaiian Islands. The duties which I assigned specifically to the commandant were correlated with his general status under war plans and naval regulations.

I placed him in command of Task Force 4 of the fleet. Its mission was to organize, train, and develop the island bases, Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra, in order to [*7818*] insure their own defense and provide efficient service to the fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

I designated him naval base defense officer. His duties were set forth in my order 2CL–41:

The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consisted of several 3-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of 5,000 yards with center in the middle Ford Island.

The Army, assisted by certain units of the Marine Defense Battalions, as may be available will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of 3-inch gun positions.

In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all fleet aviation shore based on Oahu will augment the local air defense.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, without going into all of the technicalities of these——

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I was trying to——that is all in this order, which you can read, and I will skip that part of it there, and say:

The commandant of the 14th Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer. As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over Naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) assisting the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) holding necessary drills.

(3) giving all arms for:

attack, blackout signal, all-clear signal.

(4) informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) arranging communication plan.

(6) notifying all Naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

On page 2, under "Sortie and Entry," under subsection 2:

The Commandant 14th Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the entrance channel and the swept channel.

[*7820*] The commandant controlled the movements of all ships within Pearl Harbor and was charged with maintaining the patrols which were required within the harbor. He operated the torpedo defense net, and he had control of the destroyer patrol which we maintained at all times of the entrance to the harbor.

[*7821*] Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, with that rather meticulous description of his rather broad responsibilities may I ask you whether what you have now read into the record or stated to be his duties results from your order, or is that the result of an order from the command in Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it was both.

Mr. KEEFE. Then he acted in a sort of dual capacity, did he not?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was under my orders, he was subject to my orders, and he was one of the officers of the fleet and responsible to me for all of his duties in connection with fleet activities. In the administration of the navy yard, the shore developments there, he was responsible directly to the Navy Department. That is generally the broad division.

Mr. KEEFE. But he had a dual capacity. With respect to certain of his activities he had a direct responsibility to Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As to certain other responsibilities he was under your command, directly under your command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. To perform the functions and duties which you have outlined; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. He also administered the harbor control [*7822–7823*] post, which was one of the other things I did not mention.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, then, there was an agreement between the Navy and the Army for joint defense of Pearl Harbor, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not get that question, sir. I am sorry.

Mr. KEEFE. There was an agreement between the Army and the Navy, an agreement for the joint defense of Pearl Harbor, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, under that defense plan the Army was represented by General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And Admiral Bloch represented the Navy as commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is correct; is it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, you had a staff out at Pearl Harbor, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was Admiral Bloch a member of your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was one of the task force commanders, not a member of my staff proper.

[*7824*] Mr. KEEFE. How many men constituted your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the time of Pearl Harbor I had approximately 50 commissioned officers and maybe 175 enlisted men.

Mr. KEEFE. That was all staff personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in the higher echelons of your staff can you give me the names and the rank of the men that served on your staff prior to December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Capt. W. W. Smith was my chief of staff. He served on my staff. He was afterward commander of the cruisers of Task Forces 8, 11, and 17 and for his services there he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

Mr. KEEFE. That is subsequent to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Do you want that data?

Mr. KEEFE. I want it, yes. What is his rank today?

Admiral KIMMEL. He is a vice admiral today.

Mr. KEEFE. So that as captain and chief of staff—he was a captain when he was chief of staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And he subsequent to that went into active duty in charge of certain cruiser detachments?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[*7825*] Mr. KEEFE. And for his services was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and promoted to vice admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, he after that came to the Navy Department as Director of the Naval Transportation Service and from that job he went to the command of the surface force of the Pacific, which is a very big job.

Mr. KEEFE. And he now holds the rank of what you say?

Admiral KIMMEL. He now holds the rank of vice admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, who is the next man on your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was Capt. C. H. McMorris and Captain McMorris was my war plans officer and for his services on the staff of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet from February 1941 to April 1942 he was awarded the Legion of Merit. He was commanding officer on the *San Francisco* from May 1942 to October 1942 and for his exploits there in the Aleutians in the fight he had up there he was awarded the Navy Cross. From December 1942 to June 1943 he was commander of the cruisers of Task Force 8 and 16 and for the services there he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. He then went in June of 1943 to be chief of staff for Admiral Nimitz, where he remained until the end of the war.

Mr. KEEFE. What is his present rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. His present rank is vice admiral.

[*7826*] Mr. KEEFE. So he went through the war after Pearl Harbor from a captaincy to vice admiral and with the distinguished services that you recorded?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

My operations officer was Capt. Walter DeLany and he was awarded the Legion of Merit for duty on the staff of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet; from February 1941 to June 1944 he commanded the U. S. S. *New Orleans* and then in November of 1942 he came to Washington as Assistant Chief of Staff to the commander in chief of the United State Fleet here in Washington and he is now a vice admiral.

Capt. Willard A. Kitts, Jr., was the gunnery officer on my staff. He is now a rear admiral and Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

He was awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a second Legion of Merit for services on the staff of the commander in chief Pacific Fleet from February 1941 to September 1942. He was awarded the Navy Cross for services as commanding officer of the *Northampton* and he was awarded the Legion of Merit for services as commanding officer of the *Nevada.*

Capt. Lyon McCormick——

Mr. KEEFE. What is his present rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. Kitts' present rank?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

[*7827*] Admiral KIMMEL. Rear admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Admiral KIMMEL. Capt. Lyon McCormick was the assistant war plans officer on the staff, and he was awarded the Legion of Merit for his services on the staff of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, from April 1941 to January 1943 and then from January to August 1943 he commanded the *South Dakota*, and then from October 1943 to March 1945 he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for logistic plans here in Washington. He now commands Battleship Division 3.

Mr. KEEFE. What is his present rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. His present rank is rear admiral.

Capt. A. C. Davis, U. S. N., was my aviation officer and he was awarded the Legion of Merit for duty as fleet aviation officer on the staff of commander in chief, Pacific, for duties from April 1941 to June 1942. He was awarded the Navy Cross for services as commanding officer of the *Enterprise.* He commanded the fleet air base at Quonset Point and in February 1943 extending to August 1944 he was assistant chief of staff here for operations, of the commander in chief, United States Fleet, here in Washington.

From August 1944 to July 1945 he was chief of staff and aide to commander, Fifth Fleet, and in July 1945 he was ordered to the command of Carrier Division 5. He is now a rear admiral.

[*7828*] Do you want any more?

Mr. KEEFE. Those are the topmen on your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. Those are the principal men; yes, sir. There are others.

Mr. KEEFE. And all of the men on your staff that you have listed have evidently rendered conspicuous and distinguished services in the prosecution of the war and have been awarded various medals of distinction and have received promotion?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, and if you would like to have it I can give you my principal task-force commanders at this time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I would like to have that, too. I would like to have now, Admiral, so that I can understand you, I would like to have those men who served on your staff and who were called into consultation on the problems that confronted you as commander in chief of the fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Those are the ones I am giving you now, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield just for a correction?

Admiral KIMMEL. There is Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr. It is hardly necessary to recite his exploits.

[7829] Mr. KEEFE. Who, sir?

Admiral KIMMEL. Halsey.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, Halsey; sure.

Admiral KIMMEL. As commander, aircraft battle force, from June 1940 to March 1942 he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. As commander of South Pacific air and South Pacific force from March 1942 to June 1944 he was awarded a gold star in lieu of a second Distinguished Service Medal and the Army Distinguished Service Medal.

From June 1944 to a short while ago he was commander of the Third Fleet and for that service he was awarded a gold star in lieu of a third Distinguished Service Medal and a gold star in lieu of a fourth Distinguished Service Medal.

Mr. KEEFE. Was he on your staff, too?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was a commander of aircraft of the battle force at that time and also in command of Task Force 2, one of the three principal task forces I had out there. He was not on my staff but he was a man I consulted with frequently.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the point I want to get at. Did you consult with Admiral Halsey with respect to the problems that faced you as commander in chief?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did indeed, at length.

Mr. KEEFE. Frequently?

[7830] Admiral KIMMEL. At length and frequently.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, now, give us some of the other men.

Admiral KIMMEL. There was Admiral Claude C. Bloch, United States Navy, retired now. He was a rear admiral at the time, and from April 1940 to March 1942 he was commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Since that time up to the time of his retirement a very short time ago he was a member of the Joint Board of the Navy Department.

There was Vice Adm. Wilson Brown, United States Navy, who commanded Task Force 3. From February 1941 to April 1942 he was commander of the scouting force of the Pacific Fleet and commander of Task Force 3 while I was there, and for the services he was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal.

Mr. KEEFE. What is his present rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. His present rank is vice admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. What is the present rank of Admiral Halsey?

Admiral KIMMEL. The present rank of Admiral Halsey is a fleet admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. Fleet admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And what was the rank of Bloch at the time he retired?

Admiral KIMMEL. He retired as an admiral.

[7831] Mr. KEEFE. A full admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. A full admiral.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Vice Adm. William S. Pye from June 1940 to September 1942 was in command of the battle force of the Pacific Fleet and commander of Task Force 1 under me.

From November 1942 to the present time he has been president of the Naval War College at Newport.

Rear Adm. William L. Calhoun was in command of the base force when I was in command of the fleet and he was in command of the base force from December 1939 to February 1942 and for his services there was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal. From February 1942 to March 1945 he was commanding the surface forces of the Pacific and for that he was given the Legion of Merit.

Mr. KEEFE. What is his present rank?

Admiral KIMMEL. He is now a vice admiral. That appears to be all of the principal ones.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't think you covered Admiral Newton.

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you cover Admiral Newton?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Newton was in command of a division and I restricted my consultations on all these matters to [7832] the people that I have named here to a very large extent, not that I wanted to keep anything from Admiral Newton or anybody else out there, but physically you just can't get more people than that in.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, who selected these men for the positions which you have indicated while they were under your command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, as far as task force commanders, they were selected by the Navy Department, but my staff I selected.

Mr. KEEFE. It has been remarked to me that prehaps this list of distinguished naval men is the most distinguished list of advisers that have been assembled at one time under any man's command. Do you agree with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I know of none that are better. There may have been others just as good.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in carrying out your command there as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet the purpose of having these staff officers was for your aid, assistance, and advice?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And in addition to that you had these task force commanders designated by Washington, including such men as Admiral Halsey and the others to whom you have re- [7833] ferred, who were available to you for constant consultation and advice?

Admiral KIMMEL. And whom I consulted frequently and showed them the secret dispatches I received and my correspondence with Admiral Stark.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in arriving at determinations as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, those decisions, I assume, were arrived at as the result of extended consultations with your staff and with the various task force commanders whom you have named?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is true, sir. I asked the advice of my staff and of my principal task force commanders. However, I want it clearly understood the decisions were mine, that was my responsibility.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand that exactly and I think that should be quite clear, that any person who is invested with responsibility may seek advice from any sources that are available but the final decision rests with the person upon whom the responsibility is placed and that was you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I did not want to appear to be shoving off any responsibility for decisions upon anybody else.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield for a correction?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, I will be happy to.

[7834] Mr. MURPHY. The record as it now stands would make it appear, as I have listened to it, that the Admiral consulted with all of the men named and who have subsequently had distinguished records. The fact is that the Admiral did not consult with Kitts, who was in charge of the guns; at least the record so states.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you so state. What do you state, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, when I said I consulted with these men, I consulted with these officers in their proper sphere. It does not mean that I consulted about every phase of the thing with everybody there, with everybody that was there.

Kitts was a gunnery officer and I consulted with him on all gunnery matters. If he means that I consulted with him as to what I did betwixt November 27 and December 7, I did not. I did not say so.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you consulted with those who were specialists in the fleet involving the subject matter under consideration?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that a fair statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has made a big point out of the fact that you did not consult with your air [7835] arm out there, the head of your air arm, I recall in his cross-examination. You had a staff adviser for air, did you not, on your staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You have named him this afternoon?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Mr. KEEFE. What was his name?

Admiral KIMMEL. Davis was his name, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. The point that I am trying to understand is this: while you refer to your decisions and your orders and your interpretations, the final decision that you came to, while it was your order and your responsibility, was arrived at as the result of consultations with this distinguished staff that you have referred to?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All of whom participated to a greater or lesser extent in the decisions which were reached with reference to the particular fields in which they were specialists, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And all of those men who served on your staff at Pearl Harbor have gone on since that time to render greater [7836] and more distinguished service and all of them have been promoted in the service of the United States, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I want to get one other thing clear. Reference has frequently been made to the fact that you subordinated the defense of Pearl Harbor to the war training program, at least that is the interpretation that I am to place, and I do place, upon many questions that were asked you.

Is it or is it not a fact that the Pacific Fleet was constantly being drained and deprived of its trained personnel in 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is a fact.

Mr. KEEFE. And you complained about that fact, did you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; extensively.

Mr. KEEFE. That the Pacific Fleet was being used as a training base to train personnel and officers for the Atlantic Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made some such statement as that in a letter of November 15 that I wrote to Admiral Stark, as I remember.

Mr. KEEFE. In your opinion and in the opinion of your staff officers was it necessary to continue the training program to the greatest possible accelerated pace there in 1941?

[*7837*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, reference has been made to the message of November 24 received by you in which it says, without reading it—it has been read many times—"Indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction," and then follow the words "including an attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, the message of November 24, am I correct in assuming, was intended to apprise you that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction might be expected by the Japanese with the possibility that they might even hit the Philippines or Guam?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And at no time in any of these messages, including this and the messages of the 27th, was the Hawaiian area ever mentioned?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Nor any other of our outlying possessions, including Panama and the Aleutians?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The only reference to a possible attack on American possessions is the reference to the possibility of the Japanese extending their attack to the Philippines or Guam?

[*7838*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is right.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the information you got from Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I had, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when these messages came in, Admiral, just so a layman and a man not too well versed in military tactics may understand it, was it customary for you to call your staff together and discuss the meaning of these messages?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. These messages were routed to selected members of my staff. They did not go to all members of the staff because they were very secret. It went to the War Plans, the Operations, and, of course, Intelligence and the Chief of Staff.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, now, then would you get together and discuss it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And was that the common practice?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that while the decision as to the interpretation to be placed upon the message fundamentally was yours, that final interpretation resulted from the joint opinion of the members of your staff with whom you constantly consulted?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; that is the way a staff operates.

[*7839*] Mr. KEEFE. It is a board of directors meeting, then, similar to that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I have been advised, Admiral—I do not know whether you recall it or not—that out there in Hawaii on this Saturday afternoon there was a big football game. Do you remember it?

Admiral KIMMEL. When was that, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. On the 6th of December. The Shriners' annual charity football game between a mainland team and the University of Hawaii was played. Do you recall that?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I do not recall it. I did not got to it. On December 6?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, I did not go to it. I did not know about it, or if I did, I had forgotten it.

Mr. KEEFE. You testified what you did and where where you were on December 6?

Admiral KIMMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Afternoon and evening?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You remember that, do you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What did you do? You were at your [*7840*] quarters when you received word of this attack, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I was in my quarters when I received word of the attack and I bounced out of the door and saw the planes coming in and by the time—I watched there for maybe 4 or 5 minutes and then I got into the car and went immediately to my quarters, which was about, oh, four or five hundred yards away.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you give any orders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I issued some.

Mr. KEEFE. The fleet went into immediate action?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. It went into action without any orders from me. They required no orders to get into action.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I think the evidence is that within 3 minutes in some cases their guns were firing.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were in action by the time I got out on the outside of my quarters.

Mr. KEEFE. I think that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, there has been some testimony about the joint coastal frontier defense set-up, and I am wondering if we have here in the room, general order No. 143.

[*7841*] Mr. Masten: That was introduced. That is in evidence, Mr. Murphy, in one of the recent exhibits.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you read that?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is it?

Mr. MURPHY. The effect of general order No. 143, although you had set up a coastal frontier, was to prevent the establishment of a coastal frontier force, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. There were very few coastal frontier forces that I remember.

Mr. MURPHY. No. Isn't it a fact that by an order you stopped the establishment of coastal frontier forces, general order No. 143?

Mr. MASTEN. That is Exhibit No. 126.

Mr. MURPHY. May we have it, please? That order reads, as I understand it:

For the present, naval coastal frontier forces as prescribed in General order No. 143 will not be formed.

In other words, you had a coastal frontier set-up but the forces were never formed. I would like to know whether or not that is a fact. I am referring particularly to 358.

Admiral KIMMEL. You are talking about General Order No. 143?

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring particularly, Admiral, to [*7842*] the testimony before the naval court of inquiry at page 358, question number 324. As I understand it, at that time you were being questioned by counsel for Admiral Bloch.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And there had been considerable testimony, as there has been here, about the establishment of joint coastal frontiers. I take it from question 324 which reads as follows:

Please read the first sentence of paragraph 4.
Answer by Admiral KIMMEL (reading): "For the present naval coastal frontier forces as prescribed in General Order No. 143 will not be formed."

And I was wondering if the effect of that order of yours was not in the end that you had frontiers but you had no forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had nothing to do with that order. That was General Order No. 143 issued by the Navy Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Do we have that 143 here? May I see it?

Mr. MASTEN. It is Exhibit 126, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Admiral, what order was it that prevented the establishment of naval coastal frontier forces?

[*7843*] Apparently order 143 would have set them up, but some order came out that they were not to be formed, and I would like to know what order it was and who signed it.

Do you know, Admiral, what order it was that prevented the establishment of naval coastal frontier forces, who it was that stopped them at Pearl Harbor? Do you have here a copy of the directive of July 1, 1941?

Mr. KEEFE. Let him answer one question at a time.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is question 323.

Mr. MURPHY. I will read it, Admiral:

Question. I refer you to Exhibit 4, the directive of July 1, 1941. Just read the first sentence of paragraph 4. It may refresh your recollection.
Answer. (Reading:) "The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312 of WPL–46 are hereby established."

Question 324:

Question. Please read the first sentence of paragraph 4.
Answer. (Reading:) "For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier forces, as prescribed in General Order No. 143, will not be formed."

Now we have a great deal——

Admiral KIMMEL. Wait just 1 minute.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

[*7844*] Admiral KIMMEL. I think the naval coastal frontiers "were prescribed and are hereby established," it says.

Mr. MURPHY. That is it. We have had a great deal of testimony here, and I have been reading a great deal about the naval coastal

frontier, but I am wondering what significance it all has if there never were any forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they were established. It says so here. We did not furnish them forces.

Mr. MURPHY. There were no forces to carry it out. It was merely a piece of paper, isn't that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, but the plans and responsibilities of the coastal frontier commanders were prescribed.

Mr. MURPHY. But no forces to carry them out?

Admiral KIMMEL. But the forces were very meager, and I think we have testified to that, but the coastal frontier forces were prescribed and were established.

Mr. MURPHY. It says here they were not formed. I would like to know who issued the order and what order stopped them from being formed.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a Navy Department order.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have the naval liaison officer produce here the order which stopped the formation of the naval coastal frontier forces after they set up a command.[1]

Admiral KIMMEL. As I recall it, they did not establish [*7845*] the naval coastal frontier forces because they did not have them.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to know who stopped them and why.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois may inquire.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Kimmel, the Congressman from California indulged in a number of hypothetical questions with respect to the fleet being based in Pearl Harbor when you took command. I should like to ask you also a hypothetical question along that line.

Assuming on December 7, 1941, the fleet had been withdrawn to the Pacific coast; and, further, assuming that the Army in Hawaii had been alert to sabotage; and further assuming that the defenses of the island were in the same condition as found on that day; would you say that under those hypothetical conditions the Japs could not only have surprised the island with an air attack but, had they wanted to take a chance, they could have also approached the island with a landing force?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not believe that they would have been successful with any landing there.

Senator LUCAS. The question is, could they have taken that chance and would their opportunities have been better, had they wanted to do so, if the fleet in its entirety had [*7846*] been based on the west coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say they would never have attempted to occupy the island of Oahu so long as the fleet was in being.

Senator LUCAS. So long as what?

Admiral KIMMEL. So long as the fleet was in being either on the Atlantic coast or anywhere else.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You mean on the Pacific coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the Pacific coast, yes; that is right.

Senator LUCAS. Well, assuming for the sake of this question that they had attempted a landing under those conditions and they had been successful, then our position in the Pacific would have become extremely vulnerable, would it not? I am just assuming now that

[1] See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5295.

they could make a landing and were successful in it. In that case our position would have been extremely vulnerable, would it not?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have been necessary for us to retake the islands, and I believe, with my knowledge of the forces they had available and their capabilities, that it would have been such a hazardous undertaking that they never would have tried it. If they had taken it, if they had been successful, then it would have presented a very serious problem for us.

Senator LUCAS. That is the question that I address myself [*7847*] to.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I think you can find some naval expert who would testify that it was a possibility, under the hypothetical question that I have given to you here.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but a "possibility" covers a lot.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. It covers the surprise attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. That was only a possibility.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. But it happened.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In the event they had made a successful landing in Hawaii it would have meant that we would have lost, of course, all of the outlying islands and probably the Japs would have had little or no trouble in taking Australia, New Zealand, and all the other islands in the Pacific?

Admiral KIMMEL. If they had occupied the islands, yes. I do not believe they could have done it.

Senator LUCAS. That is my assumption, that they could.

Now another question. At about the time the surprise attack occurred, is it not a fact that there was a serious controversy existing not only in the Congress but with the [*7848*] naval men as well, with respect to the relative strength of battleships and air power?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the time of the attack?

Senator LUCAS. At the time of the attack, yes. Was not there a controversy existing at that time as to whether or not a battleship could be destroyed by air power, if it were at sea?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, no; I do not believe so. I think they felt that the battleships could be destroyed by air power. Certainly after the experience in the Atlantic with the *Bismarck*, if I remember, where she was stopped by airplanes and placed immobile in the water and was unable to get away. To be sure she was polished off by some battleships.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. But the air power is what stopped her there, if I remember correctly.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I base that statement upon what occurred before the Naval Affairs Committee immediately following the beginning of the war, and on the testimony of a high naval officer at that time who gave to the committee this information. You will recall that the *Prince of Wales* went down and was not escorted by air power. I am correct in that, am I not?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

[*7849*] Senator LUCAS. And the admiral told us that Admiral Phillips, as I remember, who was I think the captain of that ship, has always contended that he feared no air power whatsoever if he could have his battleship at sea where he could maneuver and use the offense that he had in the way of antiaircraft batteries.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think that our Navy knew much more about air power, and the possibilities of air power, than did the British service.

Senator LUCAS. That relative strength between battleship and air power was not then, I take it, in the minds of the naval officers in Hawaii at that time? You knew the strength of air power, as far as your ships were concerned?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we did not know it then as definitely and as well as we did later, of course, but we gave air power a big weight.

Senator LUCAS. One further question and then I am through, Admiral. Admiral Kimmel, do you bear any ill will against the late President Roosevelt because of your retirement from the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask two questions, Mr. Chairman.

[*7850*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I just want to spike what I think is another rumor. It is a false one. Was there anyone in Washington in any authority whatsoever who issued any order to you which obliged you to have the fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Now on page 1133 of the naval court of inquiry you were asked the question as follows:

> Had you known of a probable break within 10 days or two weeks after the note of 26 November was delivered, would you have recommended this operation for these two ships?

Referring to the *Lexington* and *Enterprise*. Your answer was:

> I think maybe the break alone, I might have considered it worth while to take a chance and let them go, because they were a fast force and could get away, and had within themselves, each one of them, considerable fighting power; but had I thought that there was a very good chance of an air attack on Oahu at the time, I might have had a different idea about it.

That is a correct statement, isn't it, of your attitude?

Admiral KIMMEL. I feel I would not have a different idea.

Mr. MURPHY. Just one last question, Admiral Kimmel.

With the tense situation, such as it was from November 27 [*7851*] on, would you have been content to have the fleet remain, two-thirds of it, in the port at San Diego, considering the fact that your first move was to the Marshalls under the war plans. Considering the fact that you had already been stripped for action about 8 months before, with the war warning and tense situation, would you have been content to have two-thirds of the fleet remain at San Diego?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is a difficult question to answer. I think it would have been much more difficult to attack it on the west coast than it would be on Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. My understanding of Admiral Richardson's testimony was that his problem was he wanted to get the ships stripped for action, and he wanted to get certain equipment. It is my understand-

ing that the ships were stripped for action in about April, so that would satisfy Admiral Richardson's first requirement. I do not understand his testimony that he would still keep the fleet at San Diego with the crisis coming in international relations, four or five thousand miles or thereabouts from the Marshalls where you were supposed to go to work.

Admiral KIMMEL. It had that advantage by keeping it at Pearl Harbor, there is no doubt about that.

Mr. MURPHY. If you were going to go to the Marshalls how many more miles would you have to cover to go from San Diego [*7852*] to the Marshalls than you would from Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say on a direct route, and just guessing at it, maybe 1,500 miles more.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you think you would be just as well off at San Diego as you were at Pearl Harbor to carry out the mission to the Marshalls? That was your first place to go, wasn't it, under the war plans?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; we could get there faster from Pearl Harbor than we could from San Diego; that is right.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions by members of the committee?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to inquire from Admiral Kimmel whether or not the war warning message of the 27th, as part of the padding—do you know what I mean by the padding to a message?—I find on the original here two words. The first word is "Hell's" and the last word is "loose."

Admiral KIMMEL. Those words don't mean anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the message that you actually received at Pearl Harbor, the war warning message of the 27th, had those two words on it, the first word "Hell's" and the last word "loose"? Do you remember [*7853*] that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I never heard of that before. I never saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. Look on the original message, at those two words. The first word is "Hell's" and the last word "loose." They go well together.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is the first time I ever saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they ever on your message?

Admiral KIMMEL. "Hell's—loose"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never saw that until this minute. I never saw it, at least. I wish I had.

Senator FERGUSON. It would mean something if it had been on your message, as coming to you, but it is merely the padding part of it going to the sender.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I never saw that before.

[*7854*] Senator FERGUSON. You never saw it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not mean I never saw these messages, but I never read that part of it.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you would say on your original message as delivered to you, the words "Hell's loose" were not on it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I would like to ask you whether or not from the 1st of November, any Japanese nationals were removed from Hawaii, to your knowledge?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not to my knowledge, no.

Senator FERGUSON. I note that there was some 1,400 of the Japanese nationals taken from the Philippines, from the 1st of November.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am not positive about that, but I do not recollect it.

Senator FERGUSON. And that there were reports that all remaining Japanese nationals, except those belonging to the official establishments, had been removed by the Japanese Government, had to leave the Netherlands East Indies, and some 1,100 British nationals were reported by the press to be planning to leave Shanghai on November 28 for Australia.

Did you have those facts before you?

[*7855*] Admiral KIMMEL. I do not now recall, sir. I knew they were evacuating nationals from the mainland, and I knew this *Tatu Maru* was bringing back some American nationals from Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to those so-called padding words, is this a fair explanation, that the man who decodes leaves off these so-called padding words?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, he does.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would account for the fact that you never got the message reading "Hell's loose"?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is one other thing that I wanted to go into. I wanted to know whether or not you knew about when it was that they alerted Singapore?

Admiral KIMMEL. When did they alert Singapore?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Was that called to your attention?

Admiral KIMMEL. I recall something in the newspaper about it within the week preceding December 7. What it was now, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that mean anything to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, it meant that they were preparing for eventualities down there.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew what those eventualities [*7856*] were because you knew the vessels were going there?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had never had an answer to the inquiry you made as to what that meant to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Netherlands Government, on December 1, notified our Government that the Netherlands East Indies had ordered a comprehensive mobilization of its armed forces? Was that ever called to your attention?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that on December 2 our State Department knew of press reports in Japan that the Japanese Government had decided to continue the Washington conversations?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I saw something like that in the Honolulu papers.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know that at the same time——

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the only information I had, however.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). At the same time that that was appearing in the press, that this message was intercepted by us here, the message from Tokyo to [*7857*] Washington the 1st of December:

Re my 857 the date set in my message 812 has come and gone—

That is the 29th date—

and the situation continues to be increasingly critical.

This is on page 208 of Exhibit 1.

Admiral KIMMEL. I remember that.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have advised the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. The above is for only your information. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the United States Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124.

There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the Capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far East situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never received that message with the information it contains at all.

Senator FERGUSON. So that while we have in a report [*7858*] of December 4 that on December 2, according to press reports, the Japanese Cabinet decided to continue the Washington conversation, we intercepted a message that showed that that is a fraud, in fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And that that did not mean any such thing as that, and that the date of the 29th is mentioned "has come and gone, and the things are growing more critical."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that kind of message as intercepted here and shown on page 208, from Tokyo to Washington, is that a significant message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. That they did mean business?

Admiral KIMMEL. A very significant message. I mentioned that in my statement, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the date when the *Prince of Wales* was sunk?

Admiral KIMMEL. I believe it was December 8.

Senator LUCAS. It was later than that.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that we received information that the *Prince of Wales* was going down there, and it was indicated that she was the ship that could catch [*7859*] anything and kill anything, that the British believed that, and so notified us?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I knew that the *Prince of Wales* was on the way down there. I do not know about this other thing you mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know that the British were of the opinion, that Mr. Churchill was of the opinion, that she was the ship that could catch anything and kill anything?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is what he said publicly.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what he said publicly, I believe. I heard that since.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add three things, in view of the question of the Senator from Michigan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I would like to call your attention to page 354 of the Navy narative, referring to a message of November 1, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral KIMMEL. I am lost. I cannot keep up. I will try to.

Mr. MURPHY. I will be brief.

[*7864*] Admiral KIMMEL. I have page 354 now, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to refer, first, to the message of November 1, 1941.

The Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, and that message, as I understand it, told you about the British sending a new commander in chief over into the eastern fleet. Is that right? Do you remember receiving that message? It is dispatch 311955, in which the Admiralty dispatch was quoted.

Admiral KIMMEL. Have you got that dispatch?

Mr. MURPHY. I do not have it right here.

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot identify it unless I see the dispatch.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask that dispatch 311955 be spread at this point in the record.

(Dispatch No. 311955 follows:)

[*7860A*] From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 16
Date: 1 November 1941

This is admiralty dispatch one seven one nine afirm slant two eight action to cincs nore Portsmouth Plymouth William afirm Rosyth China *easy* inter sail afirm afirm and William inter Mediterranean Baker five hypo fox easy option cast queen sail negat option inter slant cast Dover afirm cast negat Baker negat zed negat roget *cast* negat sail Canada fox option cast negat afirm sail option *force twelve five* info negat option inter slant cast Simonstown and Washington spenavo x paren *afirm* paren it has been decided to replace the appointment of cinc China by a new appointment styled cinc eastern fleet x paren *Baker* paren while Japan remains neutral the duties of cinc eastern fleet will be colon dash paren inter paren sea command and administration of eastern fleet see para paren fox paren below and of naval forces and establishment on China station at present carried out by cinc China paren inter paren the preparation of plans and war orders for whole eastern theatre in collaboration with cinc far east cinc easy inter afirm cast negat Baket negat zed negat Baker and US and Dutch authorities x the eastern theatre is defined in para paren hypo paren below paren *cast* paren on outbreak of war with Japan or when directed by admiralty cinc eastern fleet will in addition to above duties assume strategic control of all British and Dutch naval forces with exception of local defense allied commanders in eastern theatre subject to following colon dash paren inter paren while distribution and general plan of employment of naval forces throughout the eastern theater is responsibility of cinc eastern fleet cinc of each station will retain operational control of naval forces other than eastern fleet operating on other stations paren inter paren dominion and associated powers have right to withdraw or withhold forces from strategic control of cinc eastern theatre provided prior information is given latter x [*7860B*] *paren dog paren* the degree of strategic control exercised by cinc eastern fleet over naval forces of USA should latter be a belligerent will be governed by such agreement as may be in force at the time between US and Great Britain paren *easy* paren in order that cinc eastern fleet may fly his flag afloat he will be provided with a chief of staff

and a chief of staff officers x the former will deputize for cinc eastern fleet at Singapore in his absence semicolon the latter will remain afloat paren *fox* paren it is possible that a part of the eastern fleet may be assembled in eastern theatre before outbreak of war with Japan x the disposition of any such units within eastern theatre will be the responsibility of cinc eastern theatre who will delegate operational control of them while employed on stations other than China station as he considers necessary x units which are to be considered forming eastern fleet will be promulgated by admiralty in due course paren *George* paren the above arrangements will come into force when ordered by admiralty paren *hypo* paren the eastern theatre comprises colon dash paren one paren while US are non belligerent the existing East Indies China Australia and New Zealand naval stations paren two paren if US are belligerent the existing East Indies China Australian New Zealand naval stations bounded north and south by the following lines colon dash the parallel zero three zero degrees north from the coast of China to meridian of one four zero degrees east down latter to equator along equator to one eight zero meridian and down latter x the Pacific ocean to east of this line will be an area of US strategic responsibility paren *jig* paren my zero zero five zero slant one one may my two zero two four one three may my zero five three three one nine may to all addressees are cancelled paren King paren cinc sail afirm pass to senior officer force George on arrival.

[*7861*] Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, the purport of that message was to tell you what the British were going to do about their defense in the Pacific, the far Pacific. You have no recollection of the message yourself?

Admiral KIMMEL. I cannot identify it from this.

Mr. MURPHY. I will also ask you whether or not you recall receiving the letter from Admiral Stark on the 7th of November in which Admiral Stark said:

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific.

Admiral KIMMEL. I received that. I think it is in there.

Mr. MURPHY. I will ask you if you also received a letter from Admiral Stark of November 14 in which Admiral Stark said:

Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen?

Do you recall receiving that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think I recall that.

Mr. MURPHY. You also received the estimate, did you [*7862*] not of the 5th of November 1941, which was the estimate submitted to the President?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to page 358 of the same volume. On November 18, Admiral Stark sent a dispatch to you—and I am only asking this in connection with the November 25 deadline. You did get a message, did you not, on the 18th of November, saying:

Until international conditions on and subsequent to 25 November become defined and clarified any further direct or Great Circle routing between Hawaii and the Philippines, should not repeat not be used. Routes south of Mandates should be prescribed until further advice by Department.

Admiral KIMMEL. I received that dispatch.

Mr. MURPHY. After you received that, Admiral, did you not get in touch with Washington and suggest that, in your opinion, it would be all right to send ships by Guam, and did not Washington answer you and say "no" that the situation in the Pacific was too dangerous, or tense to go by way of Guam, and you should continue the southern route?

Admiral KIMMEL. I presume that is correct. I do not remember all of the details of it now.

[*7863*] Mr. MURPHY. I refer to the dispatch reading as follows:

Your dispatch 220417. Pacific situation unchanged comply my 181705. Guam cargo should be sent to Manila then trans-shiped for Guam. Make other arrangements personnel in Chaumont for Midway and Wake. Bloemfontein and Holbrook obtain water enroute at Tutuila Suva, or other port as expedient.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you thought things were in such shape that they could be sent direct to Guam, and Washington said no, and told you to send them on another route, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. You have jogged my memory a bit. My recollection now is that I felt it was necessary to get to Guam, to sail 1,500 miles from Manila in an area which is considerably closer to Japan than was the route from Oahu to Guam direct, and I saw very little additional hazard in shipments going to Guam, going from Oahu direct rather than all the way around through Torres Strait up to Manila, and across this 1,500 miles.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, Washington said the situation was tense and you should not go the way you suggested but to go the southern route?

[*7864*] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and I carried out the orders.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence, because I asked some questions on it, the matter of the purchase of New Guinea as a means of settling our difficulties with Japan. I will read it. It is not long.

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask now, before the Senator reads it——

Senator FERGUSON. I just offer it to make it clear.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask one question.

As I understand it, this is E. Stanley Jones offering to pay $200,000 to buy peace?

Senator FERGUSON. This has got nothing about that Stanley Jones.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

[*7865*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. It is dated November 18, 1941. The letterhead is Department of State, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. SECRETARY.—

it is marked "strictly confidential."

Mr. SECRETARY. Herewith another idea which might possibly be of constructive value in your discussions with the Japanese Ambassador. The proposal might cause Japan to feel that she was being given sufficient "face" to enable her to agree in good faith to remove all her troops from China.

At first blush the proposal may appear to represent "appeasement". However, Japan would under the proposal sell to the United States, ships which we very much need. Also, the sale by Japan of such ships to us at this time would mean a very practical step by Japan away from her Axis alliance with Germany.

The Australians and the Dutch would be perturbed by such a proposal, especially at first glance. However, it is also to their interest that additional shipping be made available to us and that Japan's offensive striking power be lessened.

We would of course have to discuss this with the Australians and the British (and the Dutch if their territory [*7866*] should be involved) *before* making any mention of the proposal to the Japanese.

I send this forward in the light of your request that we explore all possibilities.

M. M. H.

That is Maxwell M. Hamilton.
This is the proposal:

November 17, 1941.

It is on the same stationery.

PROPOSAL FOR THE EXCHANGE OF CERTAIN TERRITORIES IN THE PACIFIC FOR JAPANESE SHIPS

Agreement might be reached between the United States and Japan (with the assent of the other countries concerned) along the following lines:

I. Japan to purchase New Guinea.

1. The western part (belonging to the Netherlands)

or

2. The southeastern part (Papua) (under the Government of Australia)

or

3. The northeastern part (now administered by Australia under a mandate from the League of Nations). (The mandate for this territory might be transferred to Japan, Australia being compensated for a relinquishment of its rights by Japan.)

or

All three.

II. The United States to furnish funds to Japan for the purchase of these territories.

III. Japan to reimburse the United States through the transfer to this Government of merchant ships or possibly certain categories of naval vessels.

Such an arrangement would of course be reached only in conjunction with an agreement on the part of Japan to withdraw its forces from China and to follow general courses of peace.

Note in regard to the mandated territory of New Guinea: Neither the Covenant of the League of Nations nor the text of the Mandate for New Guinea contains any provision with regard to the manner of revocation of a Mandate or the transfer of a Mandate from one mandatory to another. The Mandate for New Guinea provides, however, that the Mandate may be modified with the consent of the Council so it would seem that the Mandate might be transferred in like manner by the Council with the consent of the mandatory. The Council is now in suspension, but if desired a special session could probably be convened. Alternatively, it would seem that the mandate might be transferred—or sovereignty over theterritories might actually be vested in Japan—by the Principal Allied [7868] and Associated Powers—that is, the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan—these powers having conferred the Mandate for New Guinea upon Australia.

Mr. MURPHY. Whose idea was that, Senator? Was that E. Stanley Jones' idea?

Senator FERGUSON. Not that I ever heard of.

Mr. MURPHY. Was it the official policy of the Government to try to buy New Guinea?

Senator FERGUSON. It is suggested by Hamilton as one way to settle things.

Mr. MURPHY. Nobody took it seriously, did they?

Senator FERGUSON. My next question was going to be to counsel, as to whether we have any follow-up on this to show what was done with this instrument? [1]

Mr. MASTEN. I have never seen any, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you try to find out what was done with it?

Mr. MASTEN. I think your request covered it. As I remember it, your request was that everything sent to the Secretary from the Far Eastern Division during the period November 1 to December 7, 1941, be furnished. Was not that document included among those that came in in answer to your request?

Senator FERGUSON. This is November 18.

[1] See footnote 1 on the following page.

Mr. MASTEN. The request was from November 1 to December 7, 1941.

[*7869*] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. I think the documents the State Department sent you covered all they could find, so presumably that was right in those documents. That is all I know about it.

Senator FERGUSON. I just offered this so the record will be clear on it.

I want to ask counsel another question. Can we find out now whether or not that had ever reached the President?

Mr. MASTEN. The proposal you have just read?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. We will try to do so.[1]

Mr. MURPHY. I found out from inquiry there were lectures around the country at 25 cents a seat, I think, on that subject.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral, when the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, extended the Atlantic shooting orders to the Pacific off the west coast of South America, you were required by the order that was furnished to you to supply some naval contingents for that purpose, were you not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Some what?

Mr. GEARHART. Supply some naval ships for that purpose.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[*7870*] Mr. GEARHART. About what time of the year did this occur?

Admiral KIMMEL. When did that occur?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; late summer?

Admiral KIMMEL. That can readily be established, but my recollection is it was in September or October.

Mr. GEARHART. The late summer or early fall?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Of 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes; that is all contained in the dispatches which fixed it definitely.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; and then aside from having already detached the three best battleships that you had, three cruisers, nine destroyers, and one carrier, you were required by this order to make a further numerical reduction of the fighting strength of your fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you remember at this time just what you had assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations for this raider service off the west coast of South America?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did I do what, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Do you recall at this time the number of ships you were required to detach for that purpose?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was three ships, three of the old [*7871*] light cruisers. That is my best recollection now.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, as I remember that order, it directed those ships to enter an antiraider campaign off the west coast of South

[1] In Hearings, Part 10, p. 5147, Mr. Masten states that the State Department advised the committee that no action was taken on the memorandum and it did not reach the President.

America, but, as I remember it, the order does not say anything about the nationality of those ships that were to be the subject of an attack. Was there any order, other than the copy that was introduced in evidence, which would indicate the nationality of the raiders that were to be attacked and shot at by the American contingents that you were detaching for that purpose?

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is the German and Italian.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

[7872] Mr. MURPHY. Why not the Japanese?

Mr. GEARHART. It was limited to the Germans and Italians?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any further questions by members of the committee?

(No response.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I believe you will agree there is some indication here that the committee is trying to dig up everything it can about this question that is now presented to us.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have observed a tendency in that direction.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel for the committee have any questions to ask of Admiral Kimmel?

Mr. KAUFMAN. No questions of Admiral Kimmel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel for Admiral Kimmel have any questions that he desires to ask?

Mr. RUGG. We have none, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, do you have anything further that you desire to present to the committee, or any further information that you desire to give us?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I have nothing further.

[7873] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you most sincerely for your appearance and the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to present to the committee your side of the question, and the information you have prepared to submit to the committee for consideration.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that full, ample, and complete opportunity has been presented to you here to present your side of the matter?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your appearance. You may be excused.

The committee has not yet adjourned, however. You will wait just a second.

I want to ask counsel, is General Short prepared to appear as the first witness tomorrow?

Mr. KAUFMAN. I understand that he is, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that true?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. Yes, sir. General Short will be here in the morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This is Colonel Karr speaking?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Short will be here as a [7874] witness in the morning?

Lieutenant Colonel KARR. Yes, sir; as far as we know.

Mr. KAUFMAN. May we, Mr. Chairman, have Mr. Masten put some documents in the record?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; certainly.

Admiral, you may be excused, if you desire.

We appreciate your patience, and your assistance to us.

(The witness was excused.)

Counsel may proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Chairman, we received the following memorandum from the War Department, and to it are attached certain documents which have been distributed to the committee. I would like permission to read into the record the memorandum, of which we have only one copy, and to offer the attached documents as an exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may so proceed.

Mr. MASTEN. The memorandum reads as follows:

1. On 23 December 1945, the War Department received from General MacArthur's headquarters twelve reels of microfilms containing a Japanese file relating to the negotiations between the United States and Japan prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. This file was found in the possession of Mr. Isono, Director of the Archives of the Japanese Foreign [7875] Office; it was stated to have been prepared by Mr. Osono, at the direction of the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, immediately after the declaration of war. The file appears to cover the negotiations during the period March 1941 through 8 December 1941. Nearly all the documents which it contains are in Japanese, although there are some statements, memoranda, etc., in English text.

2. Since the films arrived in Washington, four of the twelve reels have been enlarged and photostated by the War Department. Those four reels contain 872 separate frames (each frame constituting a photograph of a single page), which make up a total of 255 separate items in the file. The file is not arranged in exact chronological order, and the 255 items bear dates ranging from June through December.

3. Examination, by qualified Japanese linguists, of the photostats made from the four reels discloses that they contain the following:

a. The Japanese text of 227 diplomatic messages. Practically all these messages were sent either from Washington to Tokyo or from Tokyo to Washington, although there are a few between Tokyo and other points. All but four of the 227 messages were intercepted by the U. S. Army or Navy at the time of transmission in 1941. The four [7876] messages which were not intercepted have been translated by the War Department during the past few days; none of them appears to be useful to the Committee, but the War Department will, of course, make them available to the committee if that is desired.

b. A small number of statements, or drafts of statements, in English text, which have already appeared either in "Peace and War" or in the second volume of "Foreign Relations of the United States."

c. A few miscellaneous items, including the following which may possibly be of some interest to the Committee:

May I say these are the documents that have just been distributed:

(1) A memorandum entitled "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 A. M., December 8, 1941."

(2) A memorandum entitled "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 A. M., December 8, 1941."

(3) A memorandum written by Mr. Matsumoto, Head of the Treaty Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entitled "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council [7877] December 8, 1941."

Translations of the above items have been made by the War Department during the past few days, and are attached as Inclosures 1, 2, and 3.

4. The War Department is continuing the processing of the remaining eight reels of the microfilms and will inform the Committee as promptly as possible of their contents.

(S) HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

Colonel Duncombe is the Army liaison officer.

I will not read, unless you wish me to, the six pages of documents enclosed.

[*7878*] The VICE CHIIRMAN. It is not necessary to read them, but I want to ask, do you want them spread on the record at this point or filed as an exhibit?

Mr. MASTEN. In view of the possibility that some of these other reels may contain information which we might wish to make an exhibit, I suggest that these be given an exhibit number, and, if any other pertinent material appears, we can then add it to the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. I move that be done. If at that time it becomes vital to the hearing to have that other material, why, then we can insert it at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done.

Mr. MASTEN. We will offer these, then, as Exhibit No. 132.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be received as Exhibit No. 132.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 132.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. MASTEN. I have two other short items here that I can dispose of now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. MASTEN. At page 5604 of the transcript there was a reference in Admiral Stark's statement to a telegram dated [*7879*] February 7, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to the State Department, and a request was made at page 6434 of the transcript for that telegram. Copies have been distributed to the committee this afternoon, and I suggest that it be spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MMM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Tokyo
Dated February 7, 1941
Rec'd 12:55 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

180, February 7, 11 p. m.

Following the Embassy's telegram No. 827, September 12, 1940, I respectfully submit the considerations set forth below, by way of once again taking stock of the political and military situation in the Far East as viewed from the angle of this Embassy.

One. As concrete manifestations of the rapid progress of Japan's policy of southward advance we are confronted with the following recent developments, factuually reported:

[*7880*] (a) The presence of Japanese naval vessels in Camranh Bay and of one or more Japanese cruisers, a seaplane tender and destroyers in the Gulf of Thailand, as well as rumors of a Japanese landing force at Songhkla, a Thai base not far from the northern frontier of the Malay States.

(b) Progressive military encroachment by the Japanese in Indochina, including control of the air ports, mediation in the dispute with Thailand, and reports that Japan expects to be paid for her mediatory services through the granting of special facilities in the use of naval bases.

Two. These developments represent the logical extension of the steps already taken during the past two years involving Japanese seizure of Waichow, Hainan, the Spratley Islands and Northern Indochina. They represent the Japanese technique of

GREW

[7881]

MMM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Tokyo
Dated February 7, 1941
Rec'd 12: 40 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

181, February 7, midnight.

tentative sallies and thrusts in the desired direction, followed by pauses to feel out the effects and results of the accomplished steps. Differentiating in effect the nibbling policy foreshadowed in the Embassy's telegram under reference, a policy which is now obviously achieving progressively increased momentum under Nazi stimulation.

Three. By following this policy Japan has edged her way cautiously to a position from which with some added preparation could invest Singapore, establish a bypass for supplying axis ships in the Indian Ocean and eventually launch an attack on Singapore. Such an assault may well be planned to synchronize with the expected German all out offensive against the British Isles. While conservative strategy would appear to counsel delaying such a single handed Japanese assault on Singapore pending the outcome of developments in [7882] Europe, nevertheless we must reckon with the present headstrong do or die spirit of the Japanese military leaders and their categories to achieve their objectives before either the United States or Great Britain could or would intervene.

Four. The importance of Singapore to the immediate defense of British Isles has been effectively set forth in the Department's unofficial memorandum dated December 4, 1940.

GREW.

MMM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Tokyo
Dated February 8, 1941
Rec'd 2: 02 p. m. 7th

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

182, February 8, 1 a. m. (continuing our 181)

and without further argument may be accepted as fundamental. In view of the fact that Great Britain cannot today or presumably in the near future spare further important naval vessels for the defense of Singapore, it would seem to follow logically that our expressed policy of supporting the British Empire dictates measures on our part to prevent the control of that strategically essential base from passing into hostile [7883] hands.

Five. In this connection it is believed that the whole structure of the morale of the British in the Far East, the Netherlands East Indies and the Chinese Nationalist Government depends in large measure upon hopes of eventual American assistance. The Dutch are under great pressure in Batavia and the British in the Far East may be confronted with acute pressure, even suddenly, in the near future. It is axiomatic that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Should [7884] the Dutch morale suffer a sudden collapse, the task of rehabilitating this morale would be difficult if not impossible. Without effective Dutch determination, the defenses of the East Indies and Singapore would become problematical. Chinese morale has held up astonishingly well during the past 3½ years, but the effect of the fall of Singapore would have to be regarded as virtually a death blow to the Chinese Government. The effect of such a blow upon the British position in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Near East would be incalculably dangerous.

GREW.

WWC

[7885] TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MMM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

From: Tokyo
Dated February 8, 1941
Rec'd 2:03 p. m., 7th

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.
183, February 8, 2 a. m.

Continuing our 182.

No. 6 The nature of the measures to be taken by the United States and the moment for their inception are matters of high strategic policy not within the competence of this Embassy to determine. We believe, however, that the point to be discussed is the taking of half measures of a character which would evoke all the possible undesirable results without proving effective. I have expressed the opinion that the principal question before us is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese southward advance, but when. Increased American naval concentration in the Far East would entail inevitable risks of war. Those risks constitute an imponderable factor which cannot be appraised with assurance, and they should not be undertaken unless the United States is prepared to face war. On the other hand we believe that those risks are less in degree than the future dangers which would inevitably confront us if we were to allow the Japanese advance to proceed indefinitely [7886] unchecked. We also believe that the Japanese are counting upon the quiescence of the United States. The moment decisive action should be taken, if it is ever to be taken, appears to us to be approaching.

(End of message.)

GREW.

NPL

[7887] Mr. MASTEN. We have received a memorandum from Commander Baecher, the Navy liaison officer, responding to a request by Senator Ferguson for the names of the officers in charge of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations on the night of December 6–7, 1941, and their hours of duty. This memorandum states that the names and hours of duty of those officers are as follows:

Commander (now Captain) A. Hobbs, U. S. Navy; hours of duty, 1145–1900.

Commander (now Rear Admiral) C. D. Glover, U. S. Navy, hours of duty, 1900–0200.

Commander (now Captain) J. L. Wyatt, U. S. Navy, hours of duty, 0200–0800.

Commander (now Captain) M. J. Gillan, Jr., U. S. Navy, hours of duty, 0800–1400.

Senator FERGUSON. Are these on the 6th?

Mr. MASTEN. That covers the 6th and 7th. For example, Commander Glover's period was 1900–0200. That is 1900 on the 6th to 0200 on the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MASTEN. The memorandum also states that a search of available records does not reveal that there was any duty officer on the night of December 6–7, 1941, in Admiral Turner's office, the War Plans Division.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were these men that you read first?

[7888] Mr. MASTEN. The persons whose names I read first were in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. That is in Admiral Stark's office?

Mr. MASTEN. Presumably Admiral Stark's office, although the memorandum does not so state.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it say where they were?

Mr. MASTEN. I am advised that the officers whose names were first read were on duty in Admiral Stark's office.

To go on, there was no watch maintained in Admiral Turner's office after working hours at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you find out for us what were the working hours in Admiral Turner's office?

Mr. MASTEN. We will ask the Navy what the expression "working hours" on that day means.[1]

That is all we have.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not give us the Navy Intelligence. I will now make the request that you get the same kind of information on Navy Intelligence.

Mr. MASTEN. We will ask the Navy what that is.[1]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:45 p. m., January 21, 1946, the committee recessed to 10 a. m., of the following day, Tuesday, January 22, 1946.)

[1] See memorandum in Hearings, Part 9, p. 4010.

Part 7—January 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946—follows.

×